NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

RAMIRO A.,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.W.,

Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 18-0342 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD32331

The Honorable Lisa Daniel Flores, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

David W. Bell, Attorney at Law, Higley

By David W. Bell

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson

By Michelle R. Nimmo

Counsel for Appellee DCS

FILED 3-7-2019
RAMIRO A. v. DCS, J.W.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 Ramiro A. ("Father") appeals the superior court's order 

severing his parental rights to his son, who was born in 2015.

1 Because 

sufficient evidence supports the order, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Father is a Mexican national living in Agua Prieta, Mexico, a 

town opposite Douglas on the Arizona-Mexico border. At one time, Father 

lived in Arizona, but he was deported and now cannot legally enter the 

United States.

¶3 The child was born in Tucson and is not a Mexican citizen. He

was born with a heart condition, is developmentally delayed, has a sensory 

disorder that limits his ability to travel for longer than 45 minutes at a time 

and has difficulty eating because of a congenital disorder of his esophagus. 

He sees nine medical specialists and has some 12-15 medical appointments 

a month.

¶4 The Department of Child Safety ("DCS") took custody of the 

child in March 2016 after medical personnel reported his mother had failed 

to return him for follow-up care. Once in the care of the State, the infant

was immediately hospitalized for congestion and related symptoms. DCS 

then filed a dependency petition alleging Father and the mother had 

neglected the child. The court eventually found the child was dependent 

as to his mother and set the case plan for reunification. Meanwhile, DCS 

could not locate Father and finally served him by publication in December 

2016. Father first appeared at a hearing in the dependency in April 2017. 

During that hearing, DCS stated that Sistema para el Desarrollo Integral de 

la Familia ("DIF"), a Mexican government agency equivalent to DCS, could 

provide Father some reunification services in Mexico.

 

1 The court's order also severed the rights of the child's mother, but 

her rights are not at issue in this appeal.
RAMIRO A. v. DCS, J.W.

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 In May 2017, Father began participating in services provided 

by DIF. According to documentation offered at trial, he participated in 

parenting classes that included training on "care and stimulation for 

children with developmental delays." Father also completed both a 

psychological evaluation and a home study. The psychological evaluation 

found Father competent to have custody of his child, and the home study

concluded Father's residence in Mexico was suitable for reunification. DCS, 

however, faulted both reports for not evaluating Father's understanding of 

nor his ability to care for the child's medical needs.

¶6 Meanwhile, the superior court changed the case plan to 

severance and adoption in July 2017. DCS then moved to sever Father's 

parental rights based on 15 months' out-of-home placement under Arizona 

Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 8-533(B)(8)(c) (2019).2

¶7 On July 2, 2018, DCS reported that DIF had provided a 

supplemental report that addressed DCS's concern about the previous 

reports. The new report concluded again that Father was competent to 

have custody of his son, but stated that 24-hour nursing care would be 

"necessary" for the child. The report also stated Father lives five hours from 

the nearest city with medical specialists that the child needs and that 

Father's insurance does not cover the child because the child is not a 

Mexican citizen.

¶8 The superior court held the severance hearing over three days 

in June and July 2018. Father, the child's mother, a DCS case manager, a 

doctor and an occupational therapist all testified. After hearing the 

evidence, the court severed the rights of both parents. As an initial matter, 

the court found the child has "special medical needs." The court then found 

DCS made diligent efforts to provide reunification services through DIF, 

but also concluded the services Father received were insufficient, given the 

child's medical needs. The court also found it was substantially likely

Father could not properly parent the child in the near future because Father

lives too far from the necessary specialists and his insurance does not cover 

the child.

¶9 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) 

(2019), 12-120.21(A)(1) (2019) and -2101(A)(1) (2019).

 

2 Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite the current 

version of a statute or rule.
RAMIRO A. v. DCS, J.W.

Decision of the Court

4

DISCUSSION

¶10 The right to custody of one's child is fundamental but not 

absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11-12 

(2000). When DCS seeks termination of a parent-child relationship, it must 

prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of a statutory ground 

under A.R.S. § 8-533(B), Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249, ¶ 12, and, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the best interests of 

the child, Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41 (2005). Father does 

not contest the superior court's best-interests findings.

¶11 Under § 8-533(B)(8)(c), DCS must show that (1) the child has 

been in an out-of-home placement under its supervision for at least 15 

months; (2) DCS has made "a diligent effort to provide appropriate 

reunification services"; (3) "the parent has been unable to remedy the 

circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement"; and 

(4) "there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of 

exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future."

¶12 The superior court is the trier of fact in a termination 

proceeding. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 

2009). We view the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the 

evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the court's decision. Id. 

We will not reweigh the evidence and will not reverse unless no reasonable 

evidence supports the court's factual findings. Id.

¶13 Father argues the superior court erred in finding that DCS 

made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services. To 

satisfy DCS's obligation to provide reunification services under § 8-

533(B)(8), DCS must prove it "made a reasonable effort to preserve the 

family." Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 33 

(App. 1999). This requires DCS to "undertake measures with a reasonable 

prospect of success" and "provide a parent with the time and opportunity 

to participate in programs designed to improve the parent's ability to care 

for the child." Id. at 192, ¶¶ 34, 37. DCS need not provide "every 

conceivable service." Id. at 192, ¶ 37 (quoting Maricopa County Juv. Action 

No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994)).

¶14 Father argues DCS failed to meet its obligation in three ways.

First, Father points to the superior court's finding that the services Father 

received were "unrelated to caring for a child with significant medical 

needs," and argues that finding shows DCS failed to undertake appropriate 

reunification measures. We disagree. Because Father lives in Mexico, DCS 
RAMIRO A. v. DCS, J.W.

Decision of the Court

5

could not directly provide him with services, but could only ask DIF to 

provide services to him. Through DIF, Father received a home study, a 

psychological evaluation and parenting classes. Given that DCS could not 

control the specific services provided to Father, the superior court did not 

err by finding DCS did what it could under the circumstances.

¶15 Second, Father argues that DCS should have helped him 

secure Mexican citizenship for his child so that the child could qualify 

under Father's insurance policy. But Father presumably was better situated 

than DCS to know the terms of his own insurance policy. According to the 

record, DCS became aware of the citizenship issue only after the severance 

trial began.

¶16 Third, Father argues DCS never enabled him to be present 

telephonically for his child's medical appointments so that he could learn 

about his child's conditions. But the DCS case manager testified that the 

child's medical providers had declined to allow Father to be present by 

telephone because the need for a translator would unduly lengthen the 

appointments.

¶17 Father also argues the superior court erred by finding that it 

was unlikely he would be able to provide proper parental care for the child 

in the near future. Sufficient evidence supports the court's finding. Most 

notably, Father lives a five-hour drive from the nearest medical facility that 

could provide for the child's medical needs, and, as noted, the child could 

travel by car only for 45 minutes at a time. Moreover, the court heard 

evidence that DIF recommended 24-hour nursing care for the child, and at 

the time of severance, Father's insurance would not cover his child's

medical needs.

CONCLUSION

¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court's order 

severing Father's parental rights.