alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 21.1


                          COLUMBUS MCKINNON CORPORATION

                                  SUBSIDIARIES
                             (AS OF MARCH 31, 2004)


Audubon West, Inc. (US - MO)
Columbus McKinnon de Mexico, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)
CM Insurance Company, Inc. (US-NY)
Columbus McKinnon do Brazil Ltda. (Brazil)
Crane Equipment & Service, Inc. (US-OK)
     Larco Industrial Services, Ltd. (Canada)
Societe d'Exploitation des Raccords Gautier (France)
Univeyor A/S (Denmark)
     Ejendomsselskabet Lupinvej 11 (Denmark)
     Univeyor AB (Sweden)
     Univeyor Conveying Systems Ltd. (England)
Yale Industrial Products, Inc. (US-DE)
     Egyptian-American Crane Co. (40% Joint Venture) (Egypt)
     Spreckels Water Company, Inc. (US-DE)
         Spreckels Consolidated Industries, Inc. (US-CA)
     Audubon Europe S.a.r.l. (Luxembourg)
         Columbus McKinnon Limited (Canada)
         Yale Industrial Products Ltd. (England)
         Yale Industrial Products GmbH (Germany)
              Camlok Lifting Clamps Ltd. (England)
              Hangzhou LILA Lifting and Lashing Co. Ltd. (China)
              Yale Levage (France)
              Yale Elevacion Iberica S.L. (Spain)
              Yale Hangzhou Industrial Products Ltd. (China)
              Yale Industrial Products B.V. (The Netherlands)
              Yale Industrial Products GmbH (Austria)
              Yale Industrial Products Pty. Ltd. (South Africa)
              Yale Industrial Products Asia (Thailand) Co. Ltd. (Thailand)
              Yale Lifting & Mining Products (Pty.) Ltd. (25% Financial
                 Interest) (South Africa)
              Yale Industrial Products Kft. (Hungary)
#### In the Matter of Yvonne Johnson, Petitioner, v New York City Housing Authority, Respondent.

[698 NYS2d 474]

—Determination of respondent Housing Authority, dated January 7, 1998, which terminated petitioner’s public housing tenancy on the ground that she violated a stipulation of settlement in a prior nondesirability proceeding that conditioned her eligibility on the continued absence of an emancipated son from the subject apartment, unanimously modified, on the facts, to vacate the penalty of termination, the matter remanded to respondent for imposition of a lesser penalty, and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, New York County [Phyllis Gangel-Jacob, J.], entered on or about September 25, 1998) is otherwise disposed of by confirming the remainder of the determination, without costs.

Respondent’s finding that petitioner violated the stipulation excluding her eldest son from visiting the subject apartment is supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner acknowledged that her excluded son was in her apartment at the time of respondent’s inspection and her explanations for such presence raised issues of credibility that were decided against petitioner and are not subject to judicial review (see, *300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v State Div. of Human Rights,*45 NY2d 176, 180-182; *Matter of Serrano v Popolizio,*183 AD2d 430). However, the penalty of termination shocks our conscience, and we accordingly remand for a lesser penalty, in view of petitioner’s otherwise unblemished record in public housing, her large household of six children including an adopted son and daughter and, three foster children, her reliance on public assistance and her disabled son’s Social Security for support, and the fact that the violation arose from the isolated act of an emancipated son who does not reside with her *(cf., Matter of Williams v*
      *103
      *Franco,*262 AD2d 45, citing *Matter of Spand v Franco,*242 AD2d 210, *lv denied 92*NY2d 802). Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Nardelli, Mazzarelli, Lerner and Buckley, JJ.
[Crim. No. 549.

Department Two.

December 15, 1899.]

#### THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. WILLIAM LEWIS, Appellant.

Criminal Law—Obtaining Money under False Pretenses—Larceny— Review upon Appeal.—Where the evidence upon a charge of obtaining money under false pretenses fails of proof thereof, and it is conceded by the attorney general that the evidence indicates that the only offense committed was that of larceny, the judgment of conviction must be reversed; and as the case cannot be tried again upon the charge made, the court will not, upon the appeal, determine moot questions of law.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco and from orders denying a new trial and denying a motion in arrest of judgment. F. H. Dunne, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

P. J. Mogan, and J. J. Guilfoyle, for Appellant.

Tirey L. Ford, Attorney General, for Respondent.

THE COURT.

Defendant was charged with and convicted of the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses, and he appeals from the judgment, from the order denying his motion for a new trial, and from an order denying his motion in arrest of judgment. At the oral argument the attorney general stated that he was satisfied that if, under the evidence, the appellant was guilty of any crime, it was that of larceny and .not of obtaining money under false pretenses, and thereupon he confessed error. Counsel for appellant, however, contended that there were questions arising out of the evidence, and out of the admissibility of certain evidence, which should be determined here for the benefit of the lower court upon another trial; and thereupon the cause was submitted. Section 1110 of the Penal Code provides that where the false pretense is not evidenced by writing it must be proven by the testimony of two witnesses, or that of one witness and corroborating circumstances. In this case there was no written evidence and the testimony to the false pretenses was that of one witness alone; and appellant *208contends: 1. That there were no such corroborating circumstances as the law contemplates; and 2. That the court erro-, neously admitted certain evidence touching the matter of 'corroboration; and these are the questions which he asks to have determined. But upon further consideration of the case it is evident that it will not be tried again upon the present charge, and that therefore these are merely moot questions not calling for determination.

Upon the confession of error of the attorney general the judgment and orders appealed from are reversed.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.17

                       CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTED
              CONFIDENTIAL PORTION HAS BEEN FILED SEPARATELY WITH
                    THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

                                PROMISSORY NOTE

$100,000                                                   Dated:  July 24, 1998

     FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, THOMAS R. EVANS (the "Borrower"), 
hereby unconditionally promises to pay to the order of GEOCITIES (the "Lender"),
the principal amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($100,000), together with 
interest from the date hereof on the unpaid principal amount at a fixed rate 
equal to 5.56% per annum. All unpaid principal and interest shall be due and 
payable on the date that is 270 days following the earlier of (i) the closing of
the Lender's initial public offering, or (ii) the closing of a change in 
ownership or control of the Lender effected through any of the following 
transactions: (A) a merger, consolidation or reorganization approved by the 
Lender's stockholders, unless securities representing more than fifty percent 
                       ------
(50%) of the total combined voting power of the voting securities of the 
successor corporation are immediately thereafter beneficially owned, directly or
indirectly and in substantially the same proportion, by the persons who 
beneficially owned the Lender's outstanding voting securities immediately prior 
to such transaction, (B) any stockholder-approved transfer or other disposition 
of all or substantially all of the Lender's assets, or (C) the acquisition, 
directly or indirectly by any person or related group of persons (other than the
Lender or a person that directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by, or is
under common control with, the Lender), of beneficial ownership (within the 
meaning of Rule 13d-3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) of securities 
possessing more than fifty percent (50%) of the total combined voting power of 
the Lender's outstanding securities pursuant to a tender or exchange offer made 
directly to the Lender's stockholders which the Board of Directors of the Lender
recommends such stockholders accept, but in no event shall such date be later 
than May 11, 2001.

     All unpaid principal and accrued interest hereunder will be immediately 
forgiven by the Lender if its net revenues for 1998 (as set forth in its audited
Statement of Operations for such year) are greater than or equal to $ [***].

     This Promissory Note shall be binding on the Borrower and his successors 
and assigns, and shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Lender 
and its successors and assigns. The Borrower may not assign or transfer this 
Promissory Note or any of its obligations hereunder without the Lender's prior 
written consent. This Promissory Note shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with California law.


                                       /s/ Thomas R. Evans

                                       Thomas R. Evans


[***]  Confidential Treatment Requested for Redacted Portion.
```

[112th Congress Public Law 2]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

Public Law 112-2
112th Congress

                                 An Act

 
To designate the United States courthouse under construction at 98 West 
    First Street, Yuma, Arizona, as the ``John M. Roll United States 
           Courthouse''. <<NOTE: Feb. 17, 2011 -  [S. 188]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. JOHN M. ROLL UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE.

    (a) Designation.--The United States courthouse under construction, 
as of the date of enactment of this Act, at 98 West First Street, Yuma, 
Arizona, shall be known and designated as the ``John M. Roll United 
States Courthouse''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the United States 
courthouse referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a 
reference to the ``John M. Roll United States Courthouse''.

    Approved February 17, 2011.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--S. 188:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 157 (2011):
            Feb. 1, considered and passed Senate.
            Feb. 9, considered and passed House.

                                  <all>
```
#### COHEN v SPITZ CO

Ohio Supreme Court

No 21454.

Decided May 29, 1929

Syllabus by

JONES, J.

REAL ESTATE

(510 B2e) S., a broker having real property fisted with him for sale, orally promised C. that he would divide the commission with him if C. secured a purchaser for the property. C. ' did so, and as a result S. received a commission from the owner. Upon refusal of S. to pay according to his oral agreement, C. brought suit for one-half the commission. Held:

This was an action based on an oral agreement to pay a commission for the sale of an interest in real estate and, by the express terms of 8621 GC, is unenforceable.

The statute applies not only to oral agreements between owner and broker but also to those made between the broker and a third person.

Marshall, CJ, Kinkade, Robinson, Matthias, Day and Allen, JJ, concur.
[if !vml]>[endif]>

[if !vml]>[endif]>

You have reached the FederalDepository Library Program Electronic Collection (FDLP/EC) Archive. Thisarchive assures ongoing access to publications in the FDLP/EC. Access topublications in the archive is available through GPO's suite of cataloging andlocator services, including the Catalog of U.S. Government Publications(CGP).  Archived copies of publications are retrieved in the event thatpublications are no longer available from the original publishing agency site. 
**Title:Geologic map of the Granite 7.5ʹ quadrangle, Lake and Chaffee Counties,Colorado /**
 
Report | Map withHillshade | Map without Hillshade
 
SuDoc Number:I 19.91/3:3294
Item Number:0629-G-33 (online)
CGP systemNumber:000930845
 
January 16, 2018
II 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4810 

To require employee consent for any deferral of payroll taxes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 19, 2020 

Mr. VAN HOLLEN (for himself, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. WARNER, Mr. MARKEY, Ms. 

WARREN, Mr. BENNET, Ms. SINEMA, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. REED, Mr. 

KAINE, Mr. BLUMENTHAL, Mr. WHITEHOUSE, Ms. HIRONO, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. MANCHIN, Mrs. MURRAY, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, and Ms. COLLINS) 

introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 

Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To require employee consent for any deferral of payroll taxes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protecting Employees 

5 from Surprise Taxes Act of 2020’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REQUIREMENT OF EMPLOYEE CONSENT FOR ANY 

7 DEFERRAL OF PAYROLL TAXES. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—In the case of an employee of any 

9 employer, including any Federal Government employer, 

10 the withholding and payment of the tax imposed by section 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 4810 IS

1 3101(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and so 

2 much of the tax imposed by section 3201 of such Code 

3 as is attributable to the rate in effect under such section 

4 3101(a), with respect to such employee shall not be de5 ferred pursuant to section 7508A of such Code for any 

6 pay period ending after the date of the enactment of this 

7 Act, unless the employee provides written consent to such 

8 deferral to the employer. 

9 (b) LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO REMIT TAXES.—In 

10 the case of any employee who does not provide the written 

11 consent required under subsection (a), the employer of 

12 such employee shall be solely liable according to the rules 

13 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 for any failure to 

14 withhold and remit the taxes described in such subsection. 

15 (c) NOTICE.—Each employer who participates in any 

16 deferral of the withholding and payment of the taxes im17 posed by sections 3101(a) and 3201 of the Internal Rev18 enue Code of 1986 pursuant to section 7508A of such 

19 Code shall provide notice, in such manner as the Secretary 

20 of the Treasury (or the Secretary’s delegate) may pre21 scribe as soon as possible after the date of the enactment 

22 of this Act, to each employee of the employer of the em23 ployee’s right to provide or withhold written consent under 

24 this section, and of the future tax liability which would 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 4810 IS

1 be incurred as a result of providing consent to the deferral 

2 of such taxes. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
```

[114th Congress Public Law 128]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

[[Page 130 STAT. 287]]

Public Law 114-128
114th Congress

                                 An Act

 
   To revise the boundaries of certain John H. Chafee Coastal Barrier 
   Resources System units in Florida. <<NOTE: Feb. 29, 2016 -  [H.R. 
                                 890]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. <<NOTE: 16 USC 3503 note.>>  REPLACEMENT OF JOHN H. 
                              CHAFEE COASTAL BARRIER RESOURCES 
                              SYSTEM MAP.

    (a) In General.--The maps subtitled ``Cape Romano Unit P15, 
Tigertail Unit FL-63P'' and ``Keewaydin Island Unit P16'' included in 
the set of maps entitled ``Coastal Barrier Resources System'' referred 
to in section 4(a) of the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (16 U.S.C. 
3503(a)) and relating to certain John H. Chafee Coastal Barrier 
Resources System units in Florida are hereby replaced by other maps 
relating to the units subtitled ``Cape Romano Unit P15/P15P'', 
``Keewaydin Island Unit P16/P16P, Tigertail Unit FL-63P'', and 
``Keewaydin Island Unit P16/P16P'', respectively, and dated April 10, 
2015.
    (b) Availability.--The Secretary of the Interior shall keep the 
replacement maps referred to in subsection (a) on file and available for 
inspection in accordance with section 4(b) of the Coastal Barrier 
Resources Act (16 U.S.C. 3503(b)).

    Approved February 29, 2016.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.R. 890:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 114-417 (Comm. on Natural Resources).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 162 (2016):
            Feb. 9, considered and passed House.
            Feb. 22, considered and passed Senate.

                                  <all>
```
Exhibit
      32.2







**CERTIFICATION
        PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
        THE
        SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
 
 In
        connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Capital Bank Corporation
        (the “Company”) for the period ended September 30, 2007 as filed with the
        Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, A.
        Christine Baker, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
        to 18
        U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
        Act of 2002, to my knowledge that:
 
 The
        Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
        the
        Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
 
 The
        information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
        the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 /s/***A.
                  Christine Baker*
 A.
        Christine Baker
 Chief
        Financial Officer
 November
        8, 2007
 
 This
        Certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant
        to 18
        U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
        Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed “filed” by the Company for
        purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
        and
        shall not be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under
        the
        Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
        as
        amended, whether made before or after the date of this Report, irrespective
        of
        any general incorporation language contained in such filing.
 
 A
        signed
        original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
        Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the
        Company
        and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
        request.
#### KERINS v MAUMEE VALLEY MTGE CO.

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist., Lucas Co.

No. 2058.

Decided Nov. 30, 1928.

Lawton <fc Saalfield and D J O’Rouke, Toledo, for Kerins.

Fraser, Hiett & Wall, and Denman, Miller & Wall, Toledo, for Mtge Co.

HUGHES, J.

Appeal is before us on the issues between the plaintiff and the mortgage company. At the submission -of the case here, it was conceded by both parties that the sole and only issue between them is whether or not the plaintiff signed -the deed in question, that is, the deed from her to her son John dated July 30, 1925.

Mrs. Kerins the plaintiff, testified in positive terms that she did not sign this deed; ,that the signature thereon is not her genuine signature; that she never acknowledged the signature before the notary public whose name appears thereon nor before the witnesses who attested her signature. Her evidence is the only evidence in the case to support her claim that the signature on the deed is not genuine. There is no person familiar with her signature or her handwriting, who says that it is not her signature. True, one witness to the deed, A. S. Morse, testified that' what purports to be his signature on this deed as a witness, is not his signature and that he did not witness the signing of the deed by the plaintiff. The notary public, H. Henry Miller, who is also an attesting witness, testified that he witnessed the signing ¡of the deed by the plaintiff and took her acknowledgement thereof. The deed itself was introduced in evidence and is in all respects a regular warranty deed duly witnessed by two witnesses and acknowledged before a notary public.

What is above set forth, is in substance all the probative evidence in the case relevant to the issue between the parties, al*44though there is other evidence, some of which tends to impeach the witness Miller.

Were we called upon to dtermine and find that Mrs. Kerins actually executed this deed, if the burden of this issue were upon the defendant mortgage company, we would be filled with doubt as to what finding to make. However, in a case of this character, where the validity of what purports to be a valid and regularly executed deed, duly witnessed before two witnesses and acknowledged before a notary public whose seal is affixed, and then filed with (the recorder and spread upon the records as ,a muniment of title to real estate, there can be no doubt but that he who assails such a deed must support his claim by clear and convincing evidence. 45 OS page 1.. 24 C C (NS) 275, and many similar cases. If courts were to accept the lone evidence of the grantor denying the execution of what purports to be his duly executed deed of conveyance, titles !to our real estate would become quite insecure and uncertain. It must be more than this evidence, to warrant a decree to quiet one’s claimed title against such a record.

It follows that the judgment of the court must be for the defendant The Maumee Valley. Mortgage Company, and an entry may be drawn accordingly, with motion for new trial overruled and exceptions S/3/V6C1

Before Judges Crow, Hughes and Justice.