alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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  EXHIBIT 10.8    
    


**—CERTAIN
INFORMATION IN THIS EXHIBIT HAS BEEN OMITTED AND FILED SEPARATELY WITH THE COMMISSION. CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT HAS BEEN REQUESTED WITH RESPECT TO THE OMITTED PORTIONS. 


 FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE AGREEMENT FOR LOGISTICS SERVICES  


        Effective as of July 1, 2009, MWI Veterinary Supply Co. ("MWI")
and Medical Management International, Inc., dba Banfield, The Pet Hospital ("Banfield") enter this First Amendment to the Agreement for Logistics
Services ("First Amendment") and agree as follows: 


        1.    BACKGROUND.    Effective as of July 1, 2006, MWI and Banfield entered that certain Agreement for
Logistics Services ("Agreement"). MWI and Banfield now desire to amend the Agreement pursuant to the terms and conditions of this First
Amendment. 


        2.    SECTION 3: PAYMENT TERMS.    The first and second sentences of Section 3—Payment Terms
of the Agreement are amended and replaced in their entirety with the following: 



"For
the Initial Term of this Agreement, MWI will extend payment terms to Banfield of /**/ days from the later of the date of shipment or date of invoice, it being understood that the date of
invoice is the date an invoice is generated in MWI's system." 




        3.    SECTION 7: SUPPLY.    The second, third, and fourth sentences, along with the corresponding
Exhibit A are deleted in their entirety, whereby Section 7—Supply shall read in its entirety as follows: 



"MWI realizes
that Banfield relies upon MWI as Banfield's sole-source distributor for most products and will therefore program its inventory system to stock the highest
service level available for all products on the Banfield formulary. Banfield branded items and other inventory items unique to Banfield will be segregated and maintained in a special Banfield "virtual
warehouse" at each of MWI's regional facilities where justified by usage and economics and be made available only to Banfield." 




        4.    SECTION 10: TERM.    The first sentence of Section 10—Term of the Agreement is amended
and replaced in its entirety with the following two sentences: 



"This
Agreement shall be effective for an initial term of July 1, 2009 through June 30, 2012 (the "Initial Term"). After the first and
second twelve month periods of the Initial Term, the parties will analyze the fiscal results of the prior twelve months and review the Logistics Fee pricing." 




        5.    INTERPRETATIONS.    All other terms and conditions of the Agreement shall remain as set forth in the Agreement. 


        6.    SIGNATURES    

 






 



							
	 MEDICAL MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL, INC.	 	 MWI VETERINARY SUPPLY CO.
	
 By	
 	
/s/ ALAN STEWART






  Print Name: Alan Stewart

Its: CFO/CAO	
 	
By	
 	
/s/ JIM CLEARY






  Jim Cleary
 President & Chief Executive Officer
	
 By	
 	
/s/ JOHN PAYNE






  Print Name: John Payne

Its: CEO	
 	
By	
 	
/s/ BRIAN TOPPER






  Brian Topper
 Banfield Executive Account Manager




 

 








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EXHIBIT 10.8
#### § 1201.3 Determination as to electric lines.

The Interstate Commerce Commission is hereby authorized and directed upon request of the Mediation Board or upon complaint of any part interested to determine after hearing whether any line operated by electric power falls within the terms of this part.
§ 29.995 Fuel valves. In addition to meeting the requirements of § 29.1189, each fuel valve must— ( a ) [Reserved]
( b ) Be supported so that no loads resulting from their operation or from accelerated flight conditions are transmitted to the lines attached to the valve.
(Secs. 313(a), 601, and 603, 72 Stat. 759, 775, 49 U.S.C. 1354(a), 1421, and 1423; sec. 6(c), 49 U.S.C. 1655 (c))
[Doc. No. 5084, 29 FR 16150, Dec. 3, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 29-13, 42 FR 15046, Mar. 17, 1977]
§ 61.98 Flight proficiency. ( a ) *General.* A person who applies for a recreational pilot certificate must receive and log ground and flight training from an authorized instructor on the areas of operation of this section that apply to the aircraft category and class rating sought.
( b ) *Areas of operation.* ( 1 ) *For a single-engine airplane rating:* ( i ) Preflight preparation;
( ii ) Preflight procedures;
( iii ) Airport operations;
( iv ) Takeoffs, landings, and go-arounds;
( v ) Performance maneuvers;
( vi ) Ground reference maneuvers;
( vii ) Navigation;
( viii ) Slow flight and stalls;
( ix ) Emergency operations; and
( x ) Postflight procedures.
( 2 ) *For a helicopter rating:* ( i ) Preflight preparation;
( ii ) Preflight procedures;
( iii ) Airport and heliport operations;
( iv ) Hovering maneuvers;
( v ) Takeoffs, landings, and go-arounds;
( vi ) Performance maneuvers;
( vii ) Ground reference maneuvers;
( viii ) Navigation;
( ix ) Emergency operations; and
( x ) Postflight procedures.
( 3 ) *For a gyroplane rating:* ( i ) Preflight preparation;
( ii ) Preflight procedures;
( iii ) Airport operations;
( iv ) Takeoffs, landings, and go-arounds;
( v ) Performance maneuvers;
( vi ) Ground reference maneuvers;
( vii ) Navigation;
( viii ) Flight at slow airspeeds;
( ix ) Emergency operations; and
( x ) Postflight procedures.
[Doc. No. 25910, 62 FR 16298, Apr. 4, 1997; Amdt. 61-103, 62 FR 40902, July 30, 1997]
#### Israel M. Coleman, Respondent, *v.*Cating Rope Works, Inc., et al., Appellants.

Submitted November 23, 1936;

decided December 31, 1936.

*Samuel J. Worms*and *Philip Frank*for Cating Rope Works, Inc., et al., appellants.

. *David Gorfinkel*and *Ulysses S. Adler*for E. Rabinowe & Co., appellant.

*Lowen E. Ginn*and *Stephen Holden*for respondent.

Appeal dismissed, with costs, on the ground the order is not final. No opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Htjbbs, Crouch, Loughran and Finch, JJ.
§ 450.185 Ground hazard analysis. An operator must perform and document a ground hazard analysis, and continue to maintain it throughout the lifecycle of the launch or reentry system. The analysis must— ( a ) *Hazard identification.* Identify system and operation hazards posed by the vehicle and ground hardware, including site and ground support equipment. Hazards identified must include the following: ( 1 ) System hazards, including: ( i ) Vehicle over-pressurization;
( ii ) Sudden energy release, including ordnance actuation;
( iii ) Ionizing and non-ionizing radiation;
( iv ) Fire or deflagration;
( v ) Radioactive materials;
( vi ) Toxic release;
( vii ) Cryogens;
( viii ) Electrical discharge; and
( ix ) Structural failure.
( 2 ) Operation hazards, including: ( i ) Propellant handling and loading;
( ii ) Transporting of vehicle or vehicle components;
( iii ) Vehicle testing; and
( iv ) Vehicle or system activation.
( b ) *Hazard assessment.* Assess each hazard's likelihood and severity.
( c ) *Risk acceptability criteria.* Ensure that the risk associated with each hazard meets the following criteria: ( 1 ) The likelihood of any hazardous condition that may cause death or serious injury to the public must be extremely remote; and
( 2 ) The likelihood of any hazardous condition that may cause major damage to property not associated with the launch or reentry must be remote.
( d ) *Risk mitigation.* Identify and describe the risk elimination and mitigation measures required to satisfy paragraph (c) of this section.
( e ) *Validation and verification.* Document that the risk elimination and mitigation measures achieve the risk levels of paragraph (c) of this section through validation and verification. Verification includes: ( 1 ) Analysis;
( 2 ) Test;
( 3 ) Demonstration; or
( 4 ) Inspection.
( f ) *Application requirements.* An applicant must submit— ( 1 ) A description of the methodology used to perform the ground hazard analysis;
( 2 ) A list of all systems and operations that may cause a hazard involving the vehicle or any payload; and
( 3 ) The ground hazard analysis products of paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section, including data that verifies the risk elimination and mitigation measures.
#### CLARK v STUDEBAKER CORP et

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 9710.

Decided June 10, 1929

Arthur P. Gustafson and Louis Fern-berg, Cleveland, for Clark.

Henderson, Quail; McGrew & Morgan, Cleveland, for Studebaker Corp.

Judges WILLIAMS, RICHARDS & LLOYD, (6th Dist) sitting.

WILLIAMS, J.

The chattel mortgage provides that upon default the mortgagee may take possession of the mortgaged car and sell it at public or private sale without notice and that the mortgagee may become the purchaser at such sale. The mortgaged property could therefore be properly sold at private sale if such sale was fair and reasonable.

> *429Armstrong vs. McAlpin, 18 Ohio St., 184.

As there was evidence in the instant case tending to show that the agent of the mortgagee caused the mortgaged car to be repossessed and sold by the defendant under the circumstances narrated above and became the purchaser thereof at a price wholly inadequate and below the amount due on the outstanding notes secured by the chattel mortgage and that the car was reasonably worth in the market far more than the outstanding Indebtedness, the inference arises from such evidence that the private sale was not" made fairly and openly and in gpod faith. A prima facie case was therefore made for the plaintiff.

> 5 R. C. L., 469, 470, Sec. 103;

> Jones on Chattel Mortgages, (5th Ed.) Secs 791 792;

> Kellogg vs. Malick, 125 Wis., 239, 4 A. & E. Anno. Cases, 893, 898;

> Lee vs. Fox, 113 Ind., 98.

The court erred in sustaining the motion to direct a verdict and the judgment will therefore. be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
[Nos. 26179-1-II; 26184-7-II.

Division Two.

December 31, 2002.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Robert John Connelly, *Appellant.*The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Donald D. Dowell II, *Appellant.*

Appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court for Cowlitz County, No. 00-1-00396-7, Don L. McCulloch and James E. Warme, JJ., entered July 6, 2000. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Bridgewater, J., concurred in by Morgan and Houghton, JJ.
§ 1905.12 Limitations, variations, tolerances, or exemptions under section 16. ( a ) *Application.* Any person, or class of persons, desiring a limitation, variation, tolerance, or exemption authorized by section 16 of the Act may file an application containing the information specified in paragraph (b) of this section, with the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC 20210.
( b ) *Contents.* An application filed pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section shall include: ( 1 ) The name and address of the applicant;
( 2 ) The address of the place or places of employment involved;
( 3 ) A specification of the provision of the Act to or from which the applicant seeks a limitation, variation, tolerance, or exemption;
( 4 ) A representation showing that the limitation, variation, tolerance, or exemption sought is necessary and proper to avoid serious impairment of the national defense;
( 5 ) Any request for a hearing, as provided in this part; and
( 6 ) A description of how employees have been informed of the application and of their right to petition the Assistant Secretary for a hearing.
( c ) *Interim order* — ( 1 ) *Application.* An application may also be made for an interim order to be effective until a decision is rendered on the application for the limitation, variation, tolerance, or exemption filed previously or concurrently. An application for an interim order may include statements of fact and arguments as to why the order should be granted. The Assistant Secretary may rule ex parte upon the application.
( 2 ) *Notice of denial of application.* If an application filed pursuant to paragraph (c)(1) of this section is denied, the applicant shall be given prompt notice of the denial, which shall include, or be accompanied, by a brief statement of the grounds therefor.
( 3 ) *Notice of the grant of an interim order.* If an interim order is granted, a copy of the order shall be served upon the applicant for the order and other parties, and the terms of the order shall be published in the Federal Register. It shall be a condition of the order that the affected employer shall give notice thereof to affected employees by the same means to be used to inform them of an application for a variance.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0001062679
<NAME>                        Lexon, Inc.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. Dollars

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         820
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  6,532
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               7,352
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 339,478
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          831,563
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       9,203
<OTHER-SE>                                     7,490,720
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   (492,085)
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               4,611,824
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             24,380
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                4,636,204
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   4,636,204
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (0.60)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.60)




</TABLE>
### The State of New Ha mpshire 

# Department of Environmental Services Thomas S. Burack, Commissioner

Mr. Curt Spaulding Regional Administrator US EPA 5 Post Office Square , Suite 100 Boston, MA 02109 -3912 December 16, 20 13



### Re: Cancellation ofNOx RACT Order ARD-95-002 Plymouth State Un iversity 1 

### Fieldhouse Road, Holderness, New Hampshire Facility Identification #3300900033 Dear Mr. Spaulding: The New Hampshire Department ofEnvironme ntal Services, Air Resources Division ("DES"), has completed its review ofthe request to rescind NOx RACT Order ARD-95-002 , submitted on September 17, 2013 for the Plymouth State University ("PSU") faci lity located at I Fieldhouse Road, Holderne ss, NH. As part of the application , PSU submitted an app lication to amend its State Permit to Operate SP-0238 to incorpora te the modification ofthe diesel engines from prime power to emergency use o n ly. ln 2013, PSU made the dec ision to purchase all of its electricity for the campus from the grid instead of generating a portion of its own e l ectricity. Therefore, the two generators will no longer be used for generating electricity on a daily basis, but will be maintained as emergency generators. As emergency generators , they are subject to Env-A 1311, Emergency Generators, and these requirements will be specified in the facility's State Permit to Operate SP- 0238 . The requirements in the Order do not apply to emergency generators and, therefore, are no longer applicable to the two generators in question . Based on the inf o rmation pr o vided by PSU, DES has made a fmal determination of sufficiency and is rescinding the NOx RACT Order issued to PSU. Please contact Patricia North at patricia.north @ des.nh.gov or by calling (603) 271-0901 if you have any questions regarding the rescission ofthe NOx RACT Order.

CAW/prn By certified mail# 7011 1570 0003 6777 9041 cc: D. Dahl , US EPA Region I (via email) E. Shippee, Plymouth Sta te University D. Perrin, Plymouth State U niversity T. Donnelly, POWER Engineers, Inc. Town of Holderness Sincerely,

Director Air Resources Division



### www.des.nh.gov 29 Hazen Drive • PO Box 95 • Concord, NH 03302 - 0095 (603) 271-3503 • TDD Access: Relay NH 1 - 800-735 - 2964
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 98-1521MN

_____________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the District

Jose Isabel Mansanares, also known as * of Minnesota.

Jose Isabel Mansanares Maldanado, *

also known as Macrino Gutierrez * [UNPUBLISHED]

Mansanares, also known as Jose Isabel *

Mansares, *

*

Appellant. *

_____________

 Submitted: June 9, 1998

Filed: June 15, 1998

_____________

Before FAGG, BRIGHT, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

_____________

PER CURIAM.

Jose Isabel Mansanares appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of

cocaine with intent to distribute. Mansanares challenges the seizure of drug-related

evidence that was discovered when his apartment was searched under an anticipatory

warrant. Mansanares also contends the district court improperly calculated the drug

quantity attributable to Mansanares for sentencing purposes. After a careful review of

the record and the parties' briefs, we reject Mansanares's arguments and conclude that
-2-

an opinion by this court will have no precedential value. We thus affirm Mansanares's

conviction and sentence without further discussion. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Lucille Z. Alexander, Respondent, against Movietonews, Inc., et al., Appellants. State Industrial Board, Respondent.

Submitted March 8, 1937;

decided March 16, 1937.

Motion to amend the remittitur granted, and when returned it will be amended by adding thereto the following:

*“*A Federal question was presented and necessarily passed upon by this Court. The insurance-carrier and the employer contended that because the injuries, which resulted in the death of claimant’s intestate, occurred in Sequoia National Park, California, the Act of the Congress of June 2, 1920 (16 U. S. C. A., Sects. 66 and 67) and the Act of Congress of February 1, 1928 (ch. 15, vol. 45, Pt. 1, U. S. Statutes, p. 54) furnish the sole remedy for the recovery of damages, and that the Workmen’s Compensation Law of the State of New York has no application. The question was raised at folios 105 and 213 of the record on appeal. This Court held that the Acts of Congress aforesaid do not furnish the sole remedy in such a case, and that the award under the Workmen’s Compensation Law of the State of New York was proper.” (See 273 N. Y. 511.)
#### § 0.737-8 Hearing decision and exceptions.

The Examiner shall make a determination exclusively on matters of record in the proceeding, and shall set forth in the hearing decision all findings of fact and conclusions of law relevant to the matters at issue. The hearing decision of the Examiner shall be considered final agency administrative action unless either party files exceptions in writing to the Under Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, Washington, DC 20210 within 30 days from the date of such hearing decision.
**Exhibit 32.2**

**Certificationof the Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

I, Herbert Lindo,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report ofKenilworth Systems Corporation on Form 10-K for the year endedDecember 31, 2003 fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934and that information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K fairlypresents in all material respects the financial condition and results ofoperations of Kenilworth Systems Corporation.
| By:    | /s/ Herbert Lindo       |   |
|--------|-------------------------|--------|
| Name:  | Herbert Lindo           |   |
| Title: | Chief Financial Officer |   |
| Date:  | April 25, 2007          |   |

 

----
#### § 1602.42 Penalty for making of willfully false statements on report.

The making of willfully false statements on report EEO-5 is a violation of the United States Code, title 18, section 1001, and is punishable by fine or emprisonment as set forth therein.
#### Charles Dickerson, App’lt, *v.*Milton Gordon, an Infant, by Guardian *ad*litem, Resp’t.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department,*

*Filed May 13, 1889.)*

■Contract—Infancy—Duty of infant on rescission.

In an action against an infant on contract: *Held,*that where it does not appear that the contract was not a beneficial pne to the infant, nor that his infancy was known to the other party, nor that it was not in his power to return the consideration, upon a disaffirmance of the contract by the infant, it is *prima facie*his duty to return the consideration' he has received.

In February, 1888, the defendant sold and delivered to the plaintiff a horse, wagon and harness, at the agreed price of thirty-three dollars.

The defendant was twenty years of age.

About July 1, 1888, the defendant borrowed the horse and harness of the plaintiff, with the intention not to return them, and refused to surrender them to plaintiff on demand.

The plaintiff had paid twenty-three dollars of the pur-

*449chase money, and, at the time of his demand, offered to pay the balance of ten dollars, which defendant refused.

The plaintiff then brought this action in justice’s court to recover chattels, and was successful.

The defendant appealed to the Suffolk county court, and •obtained a reversal of the justice’s judgment, and from that judgment or reversal thé plaintiff now appeals.

*Timothy M. Grifflng,*for app’lt; *Payne & Benjamin,*for resp’t.

Pratt,

Upon disaffirmance by an infant of a contract, it is *jarima facie*his duty to return the consideration he has received. To hold otherwise would make infancy “not a shield, but a sword.”

In *Green*v. *Green*(69 N. Y., 553), it affirmatively appeared that the consideration money had been wasted, and the infant had no other property with which to repay.

Under the peculiar circumstances of that case, among which were the fact that the parties were father and son, and the infancy known to exist, it was held that the return, •of the consideration was not required to enable the infant to recover his land. But the court were careful to state that they did not intend to extend the rule beyond the facts then before the court.

We do not regard that case as sustaining the decision below. Here, it does not appear that the contract was not a beneficial one to the infant, nor that his infancy was known to the other party, nor that it was not in his power to return the consideration.

The property sold was perishable in its nature, as compared to land; and if the infant had not use for it, the sale, apparently, was for his benefit.

Upon the facts shown, we think the judgment rendered before the justice of the peace was right.

Judgment of county court reversed, with costs.

All concur,