alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
ex413.htm


    EXHIBIT 4.13


    


                          


    


    


    MKM Opportunity Master Fund,
Ltd.                                                                                                           October
29, 2009

    MKM SP1,
LLC

    c/o MKM
Capital Advisors, LLC

    420
Lexington Avenue, Suite 1718

    New York,
New York 10170

    Attn:           Mr.
David Skriloff, Portfolio Manager

    


    Steven
Posner Irrevocable Trust u/t/a dated June 17, 1965

    10800
Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 350

    Miami,
Florida 33161

    


    Gentlemen:

    


    This letter shall serve to confirm an
extension of the Standstill Agreement dated June 1, 2009 (as amended) so that
the expiration date of the Standstill Period as defined in Section 1(a) of the
Standstill Agreement shall now terminate on the close of business on December 1,
2009. As consideration for the extension of the Standstill Agreement, Hague
Corp. shall issue to each of the Steven Posner Irrevocable Trust u/t/a dated
June 17, 1965 and MKM Opportunity Master Fund, Ltd., warrants to purchase
1,000,000 shares of common stock, exercisable at $.10 per share through the
close of business on October 31, 2014.

    The
warrants will contain cashless exercise provisions.

     

    If the foregoing correctly sets forth
our agreement, please acknowledge your acceptance of this agreement by signing
and returning a copy of this agreement to the undersigned.

    


    This
agreement may be executed by the parties hereto in counterpart.  This
agreement and all such counterparts so executed taken together shall be deemed
to constitute one and the same instrument.

    


    


    Very truly yours,

    


    HAGUE CORP.

    


    By: /s/ Stephen Squires

    Stephen
Squires

    Chief
Executive Officer

    


    SOLTERRA
RENEWABLE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

    


    


    By:/s/ Stephen Squires

    Stephen
Squires

    Chief
Executive Officer

    


    


    


    


    


    ACCEPTED
AND AGREED:

    


    MKM
OPPORTUNITY MASTER FUND, LTD.

    


    


    By: /s/ David Skriloff

    David Skriloff

    Portfolio Manager

    


    MKM SP1,
LLC

    


    


    By /s/
David Skriloff

    David Skriloff

    Portfolio Manager

    


    


    STEVEN
POSNER IRREVOCABLE TRUST U/T/A

    DATED
JUNE 17, 1965

    


    


    By: /s/ Steven Posner

    Steven Posner

    Trustee
§ 1620.11 Fringe benefits. ( a ) “Fringe benefits” includes, e.g., such terms as medical, hospital, accident, life insurance and retirement benefits; profit sharing and bonus plans; leave; and other such concepts.
( b ) It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate between men and women performing equal work with regard to fringe benefits. Differences in the application of fringe benefit plans which are based upon sex-based actuarial studies cannot be justified as based on “any other factor other than sex.”
( c ) Where an employer conditions benefits available to employees and their spouses and families on whether the employee is the “head of the household” or “principal wage earner” in the family unit, the overall implementation of the plan will be closely scrutinized.
( d ) It is unlawful for an employer to make available benefits for the spouses or families of employees of one gender where the same benefits are not made available for the spouses or families of opposite gender employees.
( e ) It shall not be a defense under the EPA to a charge of sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect to one sex than the other.
( f ) It is unlawful for an employer to have a pension or retirement plan which, with respect to benefits, establishes different optional or compulsory retirement ages based on sex or which otherwise differentiates in benefits on the basis of sex.
[51 FR 29816, Aug. 20, 1986; 51 FR 32636, Sept. 15, 1986]
§ 93.83 Aircraft operations. ( a ) *North-South Corridor.* Unless otherwise authorized by ATC (including the Eglin Radar Control Facility), no person may operate an aircraft in flight within the North-South Corridor designated in § 93.81(b)(1) unless— ( 1 ) Before operating within the corridor, that person obtains a clearance from the Eglin Radar Control Facility or an appropriate FAA ATC facility; and
( 2 ) That person maintains two-way radio communication with the Eglin Radar Control Facility or an appropriate FAA ATC facility while within the corridor.
( b ) *East-West Corridor.* Unless otherwise authorized by ATC (including the Eglin Radar Control Facility), no person may operate an aircraft in flight within the East-West Corridor designated in § 93.81(b)(2) unless— ( 1 ) Before operating within the corridor, that person establishes two-way radio communications with Eglin Radar Control Facility or an appropriate FAA ATC facility and receives an ATC advisory concerning operations being conducted therein; and
( 2 ) That person maintains two-way radio communications with the Eglin Radar Control Facility or an appropriate FAA ATC facility while within the corridor.
[Amdt. 93-70, 59 FR 46155, Sept. 6, 1994]
#### American Tie & Timrer Company, *a Corporation, Plaintiff in Error, v.*Sherman Washington, *Defendant in Error.*

Per Curiam.

— A petition for rehearing suggests that the court overlooked the assignment that the court erred in submitting the cause to the jury, the plaintiff having filed no replication to the second plea containing new matter. The point is not well taken. The record shows and the opinion states that the plaintiff joined issue on *120both, pleas. Under Section 1447 of the General Statutes cited in the opinion the “joinder of issue shall be deemed to be a denial of the substance of the plea-and an issue théreon; and in all cases where the plaintiff’s pleading is in denial of the pleading of the defendant, or some part of it, the plaintiff may add a joinder of issue for the defendant.” See Globe Theatre and Amusement Co. v. Watt, decided December 5th, 1911.

A rehearing is denied.

Whitfield, O. J., and Taylor, Shackleford, Cockrell and Hocker, J. J., concur.
**Exhibit 32.2**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection withthe Annual Report on Form 10-K of FairPoint Communications, Inc.(the “Company”) for the year ended December 31, 2006 as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, JohnP. Crowley, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that:

1.                 The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.                 Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| /s/ John P. Crowley                      |   |
|------------------------------------------|--------|
| John P. Crowley*Chief Financial Officer* |   |
| March 13,  2007                     |   |

 

A signed original of this written statement requiredby Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained bythe Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or itsstaff upon request.

 

----
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You have reached the FederalDepository Library Program Electronic Collection (FDLP/EC) Archive. Thisarchive assures ongoing access to publications in the FDLP/EC. Access topublications in the archive is available through GPO's suite of cataloging andlocator services, including the Catalog of U.S. Government Publications(CGP).  Archived copies of publications are retrieved in the event thatpublications are no longer available from the original publishing agency site. 
**Title:****Sexton Mountain quadrangle, Oregon:7.5-minute series (topographic)**
 
2012 | 2014 | 2015
 
SuDoc Number:A 13.28/6:42123-E 3/
Item Number:0080-G-04 (online)
CGP systemNumber:000932767
 
February 7, 2018
#### Payne *vs.*Smith and others.

ALBANY,

June, 1838.

Where a bill of particulars is delivered with the declaration, and the plaintiff is subsequently served with an order for a bill, he may disregard it and enter the defendant’s default for not pleading; he however cannot do so where the ordér is for further particulars.

Where a defendant is let in to defend on the merits after a default, the plaintiff is permitted to change the venue so as to enable him to obtain a speedy trial.

H. H. Martin, for the defendants, moved to set aside the default and all subsequent proceedings for *irregularity.*The action was commenced by the filing and service of a declaration and notice of rule to plead, on the 23d April. The declaration contained the common counts in assumpsit, to which was added the copy of a promissory note *made*by Smith and *endorsed*by the other defendants, with a notice signed by the plaintiff’s attorney, as follows : “Take notice that this suit is brought on a note, *of which*the above is a copy and a bill of particulars in this cause.” On the 5th May the defendant’s attorneys obtained and served an order staying the plaintiff’s proceedings until a bill of particulars *123
      *should be delivered, The plaintiff disregarded the order, and entered a default for not pleading on the 15th MayO*

*A. Taber,*for the plaintiff.

*By the*Court,

Bronson, J.

A *bill of particulars*was served with the declaration, and although it was furnished without any order for that purpose, the plaintiff was bound by it. *Williams*v. *Allen,*7 Cowen, 316. If the defendants thought it insufficient, they should have applied for a *further*bill, or a more particular account of the demand for which the action was brought. The order for a bill of particulars, when one had already been delivered, was properly treated as a nullity. The particulars delivered were sufficiently specific, and the order was probably obtained from the commissioner without disclosing to him the true state of the case, and for the purpose of throwing the plaintiff over the Seneca circuit. But there is an affidavit of merits, and on that ground the defendants will be allowed to plead on payment of costs and consenting that the venue be changed to the county of Cayuga, which will enable the plaintiff to obtain a speedy trial.

Rule accordingly.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tower Financial Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Michael
D. Cahill, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


/s/ Michael D. Cahill
----------------------------------------
Michael D. Cahill
Chief Financial Officer and Secretary
August 13, 2004
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#### STATE ex THOMPSON v INDUST COMM

Ohio Supreme Court

No 21604.

Decided May 29, 1929

Syllabus by

JONES, J.

On October 14, 1924, Thompson, an employee in the service of an employer employing five or more workmen, but who had not complied with the workmen’s compensation law„ was injured. Upon his application for compensation the Industrial Commission found all the jurisdictional facts in applicant’s favor, including, the fact that the employee was in the service of an employer employing five or more workmen and at the same time found that Bonney was his employer; and on March 31, 1925, th'c commission made an award of compensation to Thompson. Being notified of the commission’s finding, Bonney applied to the commission for a re-hearing and contested the award upon •the ground that one Bergman, and not he. was Thompson’s employer. That issue was found by the commission against Bonney, his application for re-hearing denied and the award certified to the attorney general for collection. The attorney general instituted suit in the name of the state against Bonney for the amount of the award. Bonney contested the suit before a court and jury and secured a favorable verdict, presumably upon the issue that he was not Thompson’s employer. Held:

EMPLOYER & EMPLOYE

(250 W3) The verdict and judgment in the state’s suit was not an adjudication against Thompson, the injured employe, who was not a party thereto, had no control over it and who had no opportunity of showing that Bonney and not Bergman was, in fact, his employer.

Section 1465-74 GC, then in force, provided that “any” injured employe, whose employer had failed to comply with the workmen’s compensation law, could file his application for compensation and secure an award from the „ commission, and that the commission must award compensation “in like manner as in other cases” where the employer had complied therewith. If Thompson’s employer employed five or more persons, he was entitled to compensation under that section, whether employed by Bergman or Bonney. The duty of aeertaining who was the employer rests upon the state; if the state fails to collect premiums from or fails to fix liability upon the real employer, such failure does not deprive the injured employe from obtaining his award from the surplus fund created by 1465-54, GC.

Matthias, Day and Allen, JJ, concur.
Editorial Note on Part 21
Editorial Notes: 1. For miscellaneous amendments to cross references in this 21 see Amdt. 21-10, 31 FR 9211, July 6, 1966. 2. Nomenclature changes to part 21 appear at 74 FR 53384, Oct. 16, 2009.

§ 21.145 Privileges. ( a ) The holder of a production certificate may— ( 1 ) Obtain an aircraft airworthiness certificate without further showing, except that the FAA may inspect the aircraft for conformity with the type design; or
( 2 ) In the case of other products, obtain approval from the FAA for installation on type-certificated aircraft.
( b ) Notwithstanding the provisions of § 147.3 of this chapter, the holder of a production certificate for a primary category aircraft, or for a normal, utility, or acrobatic category aircraft of a type design that is eligible for a special airworthiness certificate in the primary category under § 21.184(c), may— ( 1 ) Conduct training for persons in the performance of a special inspection and preventive maintenance program approved as a part of the aircraft's type design under § 21.24(b), provided a person holding a mechanic certificate with appropriate airframe and powerplant ratings issued under part 65 of this chapter gives the training; and
( 2 ) Issue a certificate of competency to persons successfully completing the approved training program, provided the certificate specifies the aircraft make and model to which the certificate applies.
§ 1601.24 Conciliation: Procedure and authority. ( a ) Where the Commission determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred or is occurring, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate such practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion. In conciliating a case in which a determination of reasonable cause has been made, the Commission shall attempt to achieve a just resolution of all violations found and to obtain agreement that the respondent will eliminate the unlawful employment practice and provide appropriate affirmative relief. Where such conciliation attempts are successful, the terms of the conciliation agreement shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the Commission's designated representative and the parties. A copy of the signed agreement shall be sent to the respondent and the person claiming to be aggrieved. Where a charge has been filed on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved, the conciliation agreement may be signed by the person filing the charge or by the person on whose behalf the charge was filed.
( b ) District Directors; the Director of the Office of Field Programs or the Director of Field Management Programs; or their designees are hereby delegated authority to enter into informal conciliation efforts. District Directors or upon delegation, Field Directors, Area Directors, or Local Directors; the Director of the Office of Field Programs; or the Director of Field Management Programs are hereby delegated the authority to negotiate and sign conciliation agreements. When a suit brought by the Commission is in litigation, the General Counsel is hereby delegated the authority to negotiate and sign conciliation agreements where, pursuant to section 706(f)(1) of title VII, a court has stayed proceedings in the case pending further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance.
( c ) Proof of compliance with title VII, the ADA, GINA, or the PWFA in accordance with the terms of the agreement shall be obtained by the Commission before the case is closed. In those instances in which a person claiming to be aggrieved or a member of the class claimed to be aggrieved by the practices alleged in the charge is not a party to such an agreement, the agreement shall not extinguish or in any way prejudice the rights of such person to proceed in court under section 706(f)(1) of title VII, the ADA, GINA, or the PWFA.
[42 FR 55388, Oct. 14, 1977, as amended at 48 FR 19165, Apr. 28, 1983; 49 FR 13024, Apr. 2, 1984; 49 FR 13874, Apr. 9, 1984; 52 FR 26959, July 17, 1987; 54 FR 32061, Aug. 4, 1989; 56 FR 9624, 9625, Mar. 7, 1991; 71 FR 26828, May 9, 2006; 74 FR 63982, Dec. 7, 2009; 85 FR 65218, Oct. 15, 2020, 86 FR 2985, Jan. 14, 2021; 89 FR 11169, Feb. 14, 2024; 89 FR 12232, Feb. 16, 2024]
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, *v.*Herbert Russell, Appellant.

(Argued October 20, 1936;

decided December 1, 1936.)

*Newman Levy, James D. C. Murray, Jerome Handler*and *Theodore S. Jaffin*for appellant.

*William Copeland Dodge, District Attorney (Felix C. Benvenga*and *Erwin N. Schapira*of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment of conviction affirmed; no opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Hubbs, Crouch, Loughran and Finch, JJ. Dissenting: Lehman and O’Brien, JJ., on the ground that the judgment of conviction is against the weight of evidence.
#### LINK et v KURITSKY et

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No. 9297.

Decided October 7, 1929

H. J. McGinness, Esq., Cleveland, for Link et.

Messrs. Davis, Hartstein & Cole, Cleveland, for Kuritsky et.

*628VICKERY, PJ.

It is claimed, and the basis of this action by the plaintiff below was, that when the goods had been sold November 5th, an arrangement was entered into whereby for $235 Link would release the plaintiff from further obligations on the store and would re-pay Three Hundred Dollars - which he had been paid in advance. It is claimed, I think, and the proof shows, that the plaintiff vacated the store and Link took possession of it and gave it over to someone else, either for rent pr otherwise. Link apparently had control of it, so that it could be used foj the storing of Christmas trees. The record shows that he received something like Twenty-five Dollars for it; but that does not make much difference. He apparently assumed control of the store and the court below must have found that in order to reach its judgment.

The court- had the parties before it, heard all the evidence and found that the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant had been entered into and had been acted upon; that the store had been surrendered; that the landlord had taken possession; that the promise to repay the money was made, and so he entered up a judgment for that amount of money.

Now it is claimed that such a promise was within the statute of frauds, and, it being verbal, would be unavailing. This might be so if the defendant had retained the property and had not, as a matter of fact, surrendered possession to the plaintiff. In other, words, if the contract had been executory, it may have been within the statute of frauds and according, to the citation of the case by the plaintiff in error that would seem to be the law; but in this case the contract had been executed on both sides and the statute of frauds never applies to executed contracts. There is no reason why it should, and so the doctrine that the plaintiff- in error seeks to invoke has no application. The only questions were whether the contract was made; whether the $235 had been paid; whether the property had been vacated and whether the defendant below, the plaintiff in error here, had promised to repay the $300; and the court finding all those facts in favor of the 'plaintiff below, we cannot say that the finding is so manifestly against the weight of the evidence that we would be warranted in interfering.

There being no error in this record, the judgment of the court below will be affirmed.

Sullivan and Levine, JJ, concur.