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i 

87–621 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–89] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING 

THREATS AND CAPABILITIES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE 

AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST 

FROM THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS 

COMMAND AND THE POSTURE OF THE 

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 13, 2014 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS 

AND CAPABILITIES 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

PETER VILLANO, Professional Staff Member 

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

JULIE HERBERT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 13, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request from the U.S. Special Operations Command and the Posture of the U.S. Special Operations Forces ........................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 13, 2014 ...................................................................................... 25 

THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 2014 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FROM THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND 

THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities 1 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities ...................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Lumpkin, Hon. Michael D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Office of the Secretary of Defense ............ 2 

McRaven, ADM William H., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command ..................................................................................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Lumpkin, Hon. Michael D. .............................................................................. 29 

McRaven, ADM William H. ............................................................................. 42 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Gibson ......................................................................................................... 60 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 59 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 59 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Carson ........................................................................................................ 67 

Mr. Gibson ......................................................................................................... 68 

Mr. Thornberry ................................................................................................. 63 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING

THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 13, 2014. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:24 p.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Mac Thornberry (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. THORNBERRY. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Again, appreciate everyone’s flexibility with rooms and times. 

And we are anxious to have this open hearing, and then, as Members know, we will continue in closed session downstairs just across 

the hall from the Intelligence Committee once the closed session 

has concluded. 

I will just say welcome to our witnesses. I believe this will be the 

first time that Assistant Secretary Lumpkin has testified in front 

of our subcommittee. 

We are glad to have you. 

Admiral McRaven has been testifying a lot lately on both this 

side and the other side of the Capitol. 

We are always grateful for your openness and your willingness 

to engage with this committee on all—a whole range of issues, and 

that includes being here today. 

So, with that, I will yield to the distinguished gentleman from 

Rhode Island for any comments he would like to make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Lumpkin and Admiral McRaven, I want to thank you 

very much for being here today. And we truly appreciate your service to the Nation, and we certainly hope that you will pass on our 

gratitude to all the men and women who serve under each of you 

in your charge when you see them next. And, again, thank you 

again for the work that you are doing. 
2 

The report of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] 

makes clear that our special operations forces [SOF] will remain an 

integral part of the way the United States addresses our global and 

national security interests today and in the future. 

Even as we draw down in Afghanistan, the QDR calls for the 

growth in SOF and for them to remain decisively committed to our 

fight against Al Qaeda. It also highlights their role in dealing with 

other transnational threats, countering the spread—or use of WMD 

[weapons of mass destruction] and, of course, the critical part in 

helping to build the capacity of our partner security forces as well. 

Clearly it is a busy future for SOF, and even in our era of reduced defense resources, that is why I am pleased to see Secretary 

Lumpkin’s renewed effort at strengthening SO/LIC’s [Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict’s] oversight over SOCOM [Special Operations Command] and ensuring that Admiral McRaven’s forces 

are properly trained, manned, and equipped. 

I know that Admiral McRaven presented SOCOM’s posture statement to the full committee earlier this month, but I am glad to see 

you here today together. It is not unlike the service posture hearings we have at the full committee with the service secretaries and 

the chiefs together. 

Not to detract from the role the subcommittee plays but, rather, 

to emphasize the importance of SOCOM and the role of SO/LIC, 

perhaps this is the way the full committee should treat SOCOM’s 

posture statement in the future. 

So now, as we proceed, I will be interested to hear if your acquisition authorities remain flexible enough to provide SOF what it 

needs without duplicating other service acquisition efforts. 

Are your research and development accounts funded so that you 

can continue to set the pace to superior technology? Does your set 

of existing authorities, both statutory and command, provide you 

with the space in which to properly operate? And, finally and most 

importantly, how are your people and their families faring, and 

what can we do to help you take care of them properly? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentleman. 

Without objection, your full statements will be made a part of the 

record. 

And if you would like to summarize, Secretary Lumpkin—again, 

thanks for being here—you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW– 

INTENSITY CONFLICT, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking 

Member Langevin, distinguished members of the committee. Thank 

you for your steadfast support for our special operators and the 

U.S. Special Operations Command. 

The authorities and appropriations that Congress has provided 

the Department of Defense have allowed us to prosecute the current fight and ensure we are prepared to confront emerging threats 

and to protect the homeland. 
3 

I am pleased to testify here today with Admiral Bill McRaven, 

who has expertly led the United States Special Operations Command over the past 3 years. 

The threat we face, especially from Al Qaeda, is continuing to 

change. Although the scale of the threat to the homeland has diminished, threats to our interests overseas are actually increasing. 

With their leadership depleting, Al Qaeda still retains sanctuaries in remote areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Terrorist organizations are also expanding in Syria, North 

Africa, and the Sahel. The threat continues to evolve. We must 

maintain pressure on terrorist organizations to protect the homeland. 

We are in a time of transition. We face a yet undetermined drawdown in Afghanistan and new fiscal realities. It may become more 

difficult to maintain pressure on Al Qaeda in their traditional safe 

havens. I closely monitor how the cuts to the services impact the 

readiness of USSOCOM. 

We are assessing the impact on critical enablers. For example, 

we are ensuring that the cuts to the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance] fleet will not erode our capabilities to find, fix, 

and finish targets. As we transition in Afghanistan and redistribute SOF into other theaters, we need to ensure our operations 

and maintenance accounts are resourced to support operations. 

In accordance with the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, ASD [Assistant Secretary of Defense] SO/LIC and the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, Logistics 

are strengthening our roles in the oversight of USSOCOM to maximize efficiencies and maintain oversight responsibilities over Major 

Force Program-11 funds. These include routine interactions between my staff and USSOCOM and frequent dialogue between me 

and Admiral McRaven. 

We owe the President the best strategic options to accomplish 

our national security objectives. This includes—this is conducted in 

close coordination and honest discussion with the Congress as you 

exercise your oversight, authorization, and appropriations responsibilities. 

We are moving from a state of perpetual war to perpetual engagement, engaging with partners to build their capacity, engaging 

problems before they become too big to fix, and engaging in direct 

and indirect action to disrupt and destroy our enemies. 

As we move towards a globally networked perpetual engagement, 

our efforts are grounded in experiences that demonstrate the success of this approach. Colombia and Philippines are case studies in 

how small investment of SOF resourced for an enduring timeframe 

can have positive results. 

In the Philippines, a task force of about 500 special operators 

and supporting general purpose forces helped degrade a serious 

transnational terrorist threat from Abu Sayyaf and Jamaah 

Islamiyah. 

In Colombia, we provided counterinsurgency training and humanitarian assistance to prevent narcotics traffickers from developing sanctuaries. This effort in Colombia not only resulted in a far 

more secure and prosperous nation now, it has emerged as a great 

exporter of regional security. 
4 

We have the same opportunities in Africa and the Middle East. 

Our support to the French in the Sahel has been critical in stemming the tide of extremism in Mali. 

Modest support to AMISOM [African Union Mission to Somalia] 

in the Horn of Africa has helped reverse the trajectory of alShabaab. These discrete activities and operations constitute a global SOF network required for perpetual vigilance. 

I am proud to represent the sailors, soldiers, airmen, marines, 

and civilians of USSOCOM. Their sacrifice in this war are immense. Since October 2001, 385 special operators have been killed 

in action and another 2,160 have been wounded. 

I am committed to do everything I possibly can to ensure these 

brave warriors have the best training, equipment, and support we 

can provide. Working closely with Congress, we will surely have 

the right strategies and policies in place to employ them effectively. 

Thank you for your support, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Lumpkin can be found in 

the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM H. MCRAVEN, USN, 

COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member 

Langevin, distinguished members of the committee, thank you 

again for the opportunity to address you today. 

I would also like to recognize my friend and colleague, Assistant 

Secretary Michael Lumpkin. Mike and I have a long history together, and I greatly value ASD SO/LIC’s partnership and oversight of USSOCOM. 

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to say that, since my last hearing, 

SOCOM has made some great strides in dealing with current conflicts, preparing for the future conflicts, and, most importantly, taking care of our people. 

SOCOM continues to provide the finest warriors in the world to 

the fight in Afghanistan and, as we approach the end of 2014, your 

special operations forces will be ready to adjust to whatever decisions are made regarding our future employment in that country. 

Globally, we are developing plans to better serve the geographic 

combatant commanders [GCCs] and the chiefs of mission who, 

owing to the past 12 years of engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

have gone under-resourced with SOF forces. 

SOCOM, as the Department of Defense’s [DOD] synchronizer for 

the war on terrorism, is also working hard to help better coordinate 

our activities locally, regionally, and globally with both the GCCs 

and the U.S. ambassadors. 

I believe the future of U.S. special operations will be in helping 

to build partner capacity with those willing nations who share our 

interest. This will mean strengthening our existing allied relationships and building new ones. No nation alone can stem the rise of 

extremism. We need our friends and allies more now than ever 

before. 
5 

Our future as a special operations force is also inextricably 

linked to the general purpose force in the interagency. The past 12 

years have shown us that a whole-of-government effort is required 

to be successful against extremism, and in SOF we have always, 

always, relied heavily on our fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 

marines for support around the globe. 

Finally, we have gone to great lengths to take care of our most 

precious resource, our people. The Preservation of the Force and 

Families initiative, or the POTFF, has already seen a marked improvement in the morale and well-being of those who serve in SOF. 

While we still suffer from the tragedy of high suicide rates, I believe we have laid the foundation for keeping our force and their 

families strong and resilient into the future. 

Once again, sir, thank you for your interest and unwavering support for the men and women in the special operations community 

and to those members of the committee, thank you. I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral McRaven can be found in 

the Appendix on page 42.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. I appreciate the testimony of you 

both. 

Admiral, I was struck when you testified in the full committee 

posture hearing, and I believe you said, essentially, the most important thing we can do to fight terrorism is working with others. 

And you just reiterated that the future of special operations is 

building partnership capacity. 

Have I got that right as far as the most important thing we can 

do, in your view, to fight terrorism? 

And then, secondly, my perception is we are very good, best in 

the world, at a variety of direct action and so forth, but we are still 

evolving our authorities, our organizations, our skills even, on 

building partnership capacity, this thing that you say is the most 

important. 

Do you agree with my perception of where we are? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I do. And to maybe not clarify my words, 

but to add some emphasis on this, I think the most important thing 

to kind of fight the extremist threat that is out there is keep the 

pressure on them. 

I think the way we do that in the special operations community 

is by building partner capacity so that the host nation where the 

extremists live, they can take care of their own security problems. 

So I do think that that is the best tool we have, recognizing, however, that we are always going to have to be in a position to conduct direct action against those irreconcilables. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Let me just ask one other question right 

quick. 

I had a Member of Congress within the past few weeks come to 

me and say, ‘‘Look at how much money Special Operations is asking for in the President’s budget. That is nearly as much money as 

the Marine Corps is asking for, and they have a lot fewer people.’’ 

What is your answer to the question of why Special Operations 

Command, with fewer people, requires the funding that it does require? 
6 

I mean, it is one of the only—one of only—really, two areas in 

the budget where funding is going up was special operations and 

cyber. 

But what is your answer to folks who say, ‘‘Why is this so expensive?’’ 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. The fact of the matter is it takes a 

lot to kind of grow a special operations operator. So when you look 

at the time from the time we bring them into the SOF community—and most of them, historically, the data will show that they 

spend about 7 to 8 years in the general purpose force. 

So you see the general purpose force already picks up a certain 

amount of the financing of the base-level training. So by the time 

they hit, you know, E–5, some of them E–6, that is when they come 

into the special operations community. 

Then to really make them world-class in—whether that is language, cultural training, direct action training, reconnaissance, it 

just takes more to train an average SOF soldier than it does a 

basic infantryman in the Marine Corps or in the Army. 

And, obviously, as we look at the technology that we are able to 

apply against a problem set, that really isn’t scalable, to some degree, across broad brigades or battalions. 

It is scalable if you want to provide everybody in your squad a 

radio. If you want to make sure that ISR is supporting a platoon 

or an ODA [official development assistance] level operation, we 

have the resources to do that because it requires special technology 

and specially trained people to do the missions that we are being 

asked to do. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you again, gentlemen. 

So, Admiral McRaven, as you—I am sure you know that this 

committee has been very interested in support of the development 

and fielding of directed-energy weapons to support military applications, and we understand that SOCOM, supported by JIEDDO 

[Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization], has been 

funding development of a manned portable high-energy laser system to address SOCOM particular needs. 

Could you talk a little bit about the status of this development 

effort as well as what actions have been taken to test and potentially field such a weapons system. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. As you point out, we have been 

working with the JIEDDO. They have provided us some funding to 

do some initial testing with the manned portable high-energy 

weapons. 

I do think that we have a future in looking at the high-energy 

weapons. The problems we have right now, of course, is we are 

going through to make sure that we are in compliance with the 

law. 

The laser safety law is something we have to make sure that 

whatever manned portable device we have is compliant with that, 

and then there are some health laws and others that we have got 

to take into consideration as we are doing the testing. 
7 

We have done some basic-level testing in the continental United 

States. The results of that I have not seen, sir; so, I am happy to 

get back to you and take that one for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 59.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral. 

And right now what is the current status of SOCOM’s Undersea 

Mobility Program? And what gaps do you foresee? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, we have two areas in our Undersea Mobility that we are looking at. We have a smaller version, a wet submersible, the SWCS [shallow water combat submersible] we refer 

to it, and then we have our dry combat submersible. 

So the dry combat submersible, we currently have a vessel that 

we are leasing, and we are doing some test and evaluation on that. 

And then we have two prototypes that are being built, one in the 

U.K. [United Kingdom] and one in Italy. 

The eventual program of record is looking at a total of three dry 

combat submersibles. This really puts us in a position to have our 

SEALs [Sea, Air and Land forces] in this case, but other operators, 

in a dry environment as they transit from point A to point B. 

The shallow water combat submersible, the SWCS, is a new variation, new technology based on our old SEAL delivery vehicle. So 

a wet submersible, a little bit more limited capability than the dry 

submersible. 

But, frankly, we need both. The wet submersible will be able to 

get into regions where the dry submersible will not, but you have 

to have both capabilities. So we are looking at a program of record 

of about 10 shallow water combat submersibles. 

The dry combat submersible, sir, is on track, and we are pleased 

with the direction we are heading. We have been working with the 

Navy on classifying this, as you know, classification, making sure 

that we are meeting industry standards for dry combat 

submersibles, and the Navy again has been working with us and 

doing this. 

This submersible, the dry combat submersible, will not be attached to a larger submarine. So that actually allows me to buy 

down some of the risk as we are building the vessel itself. 

The shallow water submersible, again, we are working with the 

Navy in developing that. And while we have had a little bit of slippage in the development because it is a new piece of equipment, 

I am confident we will be on track to produce the right number, 

sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And I know that the submersible—that we had 

problem—technical problems with those in the past. 

Have those been substantially overcome? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. In fact, sir, that is why we are actually going through an industry standard and looking at prototypes 

before we get into a final build. 

So by looking at how industry works their dry submersibles, we 

think we are going to learn a lot in terms of kind of a systemic approach to building the dry submersible that industry is very good 

at doing. 

And then we will take the lessons learned from there and incorporate them into our long-term dry combat submersible. 
8 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

So the Secretary of Defense has recently commented that SOF 

will grow to 69,700 personnel from roughly 67,000 today, and the 

fiscal year 2015 budget request includes this growth with declining 

budgets. 

How will you ensure that this force will not become hollow? How 

will you ensure you are not choosing quantity over quality? 

And this is for both witnesses. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. I think the key is, when we look at the numbers of SOF, we are not actually—even though from a programmatic view it is 72,000 going down to the 69,700, that is not 

actually a cut in the force. It is actually just stemming the growth 

of the force. 

So because it has been a metered and well thought-out process 

on how we would grow the force, I think that we are definitely in 

a position and a trajectory to make sure that the force is robust. 

What I am concerned most about is the cuts in the other services 

that provide the enablers for U.S. Special Operations Command. 

These are the things that are not organic to them, whether it is 

the ships that support them or, as I mentioned in my opening comments, the ISR that supports them. 

So that is what I am diligently working on and focusing on because that is my greatest concern on making sure SOF maintains 

its capabilities. The services have been absolutely great, but there 

are competing requirements that they are having to resource. So I 

am working diligently with them to make sure that doesn’t happen. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral, do you care to comment? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. 

The only thing I would add is our basic qualification courses that 

we do at basic SEAL training or the special forces qualification 

course we have had to ramp up over the years as the demand signal for SOF increased. 

So now we are fortunate to have the infrastructure in place to 

be able to meet the demand signal of the increasing force size. So 

I am not concerned at all, sir, that the quality of our force will 

diminish. 

I can tell you from my experience the quality now is better than 

it has ever been, and I am pleased to say—and that is across the 

board with our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Just to remind all Members, after this open session, we will head 

downstairs for a closed session, hopefully, all before votes resume. 

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

And I welcome the panelists as well and express my deep gratitude for your leadership and to your command for their achievements and their sacrifices and their families. 

I am going to ask a question on integration and cooperation, recognizing we are in open session here, fully understanding that, but 

also recognizing that the American people are looking for confidence in what we are doing. 
9 

So to the degree that you can bring it up to in the unclassified 

level, your response helps me communicate so we can keep that 

confidence going. 

In 2009, a radicalized youth gets on an aircraft and is en route 

to our country, lights himself on fire, and it is not our system that 

saves us. It is really a brave soul on the aircraft puts him out. 

And it turns out that weeks prior this young man’s father had 

called our country and—expressing that he didn’t recognize his son, 

that he was talking crazy talk that he could attack our country. 

And when I had a chance to come here in 2011, I chatted with 

Admiral Olson, and I asked him—I said, ‘‘Did that call ever land 

on your desk?’’ And he said, ‘‘No.’’ 

And so, you know, working with General Clapper, we worked an 

amendment in the intel authorization bill to try to, you know, take 

some of the effective action that I saw firsthand in Iraq in terms 

of flattening intelligence, linking it with operations, and trying to 

elevate that up to a national-level asset. 

And about 10 months or so later he came back and said, ‘‘You 

know, we are making progress on the cloud in terms of sharing information and, also, budgeting so that we can have better integration.’’ 

So I am interested in hearing how we have been doing in the last 

year on integration within the whole of government—I appreciate 

your opening remarks on that score—and then, also, cooperation. 

I couldn’t agree more, associate myself, with the remarks talking 

about how important it is that we work with our friends and allies. 

And I think that goes across the whole of government as well in 

terms of our diplomacy and how we work and interact with countries across the world. 

And then, of course, as—part of that is the deterrent and when 

deterrence fails and when we have irreconcilables, is taking direct 

action there. 

So I am interested in that and certainly understanding the classification, but to the extent that I could get a response that helps 

me communicate to the public the confidence that I have with you. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. The collaboration on the intelligence front 

within the interagency is phenomenal. I mean, my relationship 

with the folks at NCTC [National Counterterrorism Center], CIA 

[Central Intelligence Agency], FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], DHS [Department of Homeland Security]—I mean, and it is 

just not my relationships. It is the departments and how we dialogue and we discuss. 

So we are firing on all eight cylinders. I mean, the machine is 

working. So I feel very confident on the information and intelligence sharing that is happening. 

The other piece is the information and intelligence with our allies 

and our partners, and that becomes—because this is truly a global 

challenge that we are facing, the security of the United States, because many of the threats, of course, come from outside the country. And that is a work in progress. 

I mean, as we build our relationships and we continue to build 

the partner capacity, part of this is to make sure we can also have 

this information and intelligence sharing across the national security spectrum. 
10 

Admiral MCRAVEN. And, sir, I would echo the Secretary’s comments. 

You know, I have a personal and professional relationship with 

Tish Long at NGA [National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency]; Mike 

Flynn at DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]; John Brennan at CIA; 

Jim Clapper, DNI [Director of National Intelligence]; Matt Olson at 

NCTC. I mean, these are personal and professional friends, and 

they do not hesitate to reach out to me personally if they think 

there is intelligence that is worth knowing. 

But in the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the underwear 

bomber you were referring to, I am not sure we will ever be good 

enough to see, you know, these individuals that are radicalized out 

in the middle of Yemen, in his case, just because, no matter how 

good our intelligence gets, it is very difficult sometimes to get that 

detailed and that in-depth on a particular target. 

So this is why I think, again, we need to continue to build our 

relationships with other host nations so that they may see things 

that we don’t see. And those relationships, sir, as you indicated, 

they need to be at the intelligence community level, the law enforcement, the mil to mil, the diplomatic levels. 

And I am a very big believer in partnering, and I think this is 

where the tripwires will be crossed in our ability to find threats 

that maybe our intelligence community wasn’t looking for, but the 

law enforcement community was, or just somebody comes in from 

the tribal region and says, ‘‘Hey, something doesn’t seem right 

here.’’ 

So—but, again, I would echo the Secretary’s sentiments that our 

relationship today is as good as I have ever seen it in my 37 years 

of doing this. 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thanks, gentlemen. My time is just about expired. 

So I would ask for the record, if you have recommendations as 

we move towards the mark where we could continue this trend, 

whether it be with regard to resources or approvals, authorities, 

would welcome that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 60.] 

Mr. GIBSON. And I thank you, gentlemen. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Secretary Lumpkin and Admiral McRaven, thank you for 

being here. It is good to see you both. 

I wanted to ask you first, Secretary Lumpkin, about the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office [CTTSO]. And you mentioned that in your statement, and I certainly have been very supportive of a whole-of-government approach. 

Could you share with us, I think, why this investment is critical? 

But I also at the same time know that we have a development 

and acquisition center. It seems like there is several different entities, and I suspect they interact, but I am a little concerned. 

Is there replication and—or duplication, really? And what about 

the other services? Is there some way—as we talk about cost, is 
11 

there some way that some of that effort maybe could be more helpful to the other services or vice versa? I mean, how much of this 

is going on that we could streamline a little bit more? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you for the question. 

The Counterterrorism Technical Support Office, or CTTSO, is 

truly a unique enterprise in the fact that it partners with not only 

the State Department, but each of the services, the combatant commands, and our international allies in order to work research and 

development projects. 

So we have U.S.-U.K. projects. We are working projects in support of the U.S. Army where we can actually do cost-sharing and 

bring monies together for a common goal. 

So it truly is a place where we do exactly what you are saying, 

is that we can support people’s requirements and we can leverage 

it across the entire defense sector not only in the United States, 

but, also, with our partners. 

So we can take an idea, whether it is a new type of ammunition 

that we need to look at in our support of special operations or even 

law enforcement, and then we can work together to do the development and then share the results and maybe even find a company 

or a technology that can provide something that we truly don’t 

have today. 

So it is—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. So is that different from DARPA [Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency] or does DARPA interface with that? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. There are discussions that go on. DARPA 

and CTTSO—CTTSO is largely focused on truly the combating terrorism piece, whereas the DARPA has a much larger—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Larger frame. 

Secretary LUMPKIN [continuing]. Aperture that they are looking 

at. 

So the other piece of it is the CTTSO gives us the ability to— 

if there is a project that we want to put in the future and we see 

it coming, we can do the initial research and development in order 

to support a future project. So it is quite agile and gives us the 

flexibility to do what we need. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Admiral McRaven, did you want to comment on 

that? And can we—maybe could we save in some other areas if we 

put, you know, really the resources that you need to do this right? 

And do you have those resources today? Do you think that we do? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. I think, again, the beauty of CTTSO in itself 

is that it is not just DOD money. I mean, because we are taking 

money—I mean, leveraging money from the interagency as well as 

the international community. So we have this pooling of resources 

for a common goal, and I think that is the real beauty of it. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Is there also a way—and we know from certainly the 

San Diego community and others that there are many businesses 

that would like to be engaged in some way, and sometimes what 

they share with us is it is very difficult for them to get the attention for something. 

And I am just wondering, how do you do that in terms of the 

business piece to that so that we can bring those things online, innovate quickly, and get the job done? 
12 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Well, we have an open forum for business 

that we do once a year before—and make sure they understand 

what we anticipate the requirements are. 

In fact, I just did the opening comments for it here last month. 

So I think it is generally the first week in February we do that. 

So we open it to business. We did it at the Reagan Center this 

year, and we had over 600 businesses in attendance who came to 

see what we were looking for at the future. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Admiral McRaven, General Dunford was with us 

this morning talking about Afghanistan and where the gains—the 

good stories and some of the concerns. 

What are your concerns when it comes to their special ops forces? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Ma’am, I am very confident in their special 

ops forces. In fact, I just received a detailed brief today from our 

folks in Afghanistan. 

We are very pleased, very proud, of the great work the Afghans 

have done and that, frankly, my forces have done in training them. 

I think they have a very capable commando element, special forces 

element, and we are pleased with the development of the Afghan 

Local Police. 

So I think, as long as we can continue to be in a position to shepherd these forces as they go forward into the future—and it doesn’t 

require a lot to do that, but I do think we need to continue to be 

in a position to train, advise, and assist for a little bit longer in 

order to make sure that all the processes that General Dunford and 

General Allen before him and others before them have put in place 

and make sure those are functioning processes, pay, maintenance, 

those sorts of things. 

I think, if we can get to that point, then they will be successful 

in the future. And so we certainly look forward to having the opportunity to continue to partner with our great Afghan special 

forces. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mrs. Hartzler. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for your service. 

In your testimony, Secretary Lumpkin, you mentioned the advances that Colombia has achieved. And I just had the opportunity 

to go with Chairman McKeon on a CODEL [congressional delegation] to Colombia, Chile, Brazil, and Panama, and I was so impressed with what the Colombian people and the military has done 

and how they have really taken it to the FARC [Revolutionary 

Armed Forces of Colombia] and they have pushed them down and 

now they are in negotiations on that operation. 

But while we were there, the general in charge was very adamant, saying, ‘‘We are on the 10-yard line. We are so close, but 

please don’t leave us yet. The game is not over and, if you leave, 

it would be a game-changer for us. We need that.’’ 

So considering advances there that you mentioned in your testimony, how much longer do you anticipate that we will be engaged 

there with them? And what level of involvement do you foresee us 

pursuing still with them? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you for the question, because, you 

know, it is interesting from my days. I mean, my first time in Co-
13 

lombia was in the late 1980s when I was in uniform at the time. 

To see where it has gone from that period to now is amazing. 

And they are—the comment was absolutely correct, on the 10- 

yard line, and we need to make sure we sustain our presence and 

partnership with the Colombians in this effort. 

I think the key is that we looked at it from the outset, when the 

development of Plan Colombia came into place, was—is that it was 

going to be an enduring commitment on our part. 

And we—when we looked at it for that way, we knew that we 

weren’t looking—we weren’t playing the short game here. It was 

going to be the long game, and we focused on that. 

And the enemy gets a vote, you know, as far as how long it is 

going to go; so, I am hesitant to say that it is going to be X number 

of years or months or what have you. But I think that the fruits 

of our labor and our efforts and the resources, it is a tremendous 

return on investment long term. 

And I think it has served as a model that we could use in other 

regions and other areas and countries that—where there are challenges, because there is many countries that are challenging for us 

now that aren’t near as bad as the situation that Colombia was in 

the late 1980s. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. It did give me hope for other countries. 

And do you see it possibly being used as a model for Mexico? I 

know that NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] has added a 

Special Operations Command, North there to establish that. So 

what lessons do you think that we can translate from Colombia to, 

say, Mexico? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. I am kind of hesitant to say which country 

it would go to. But I think the key is that there has to be a comprehensive plan that is supported by the interagency that we make 

a commitment to and we know, again, it is a mindset of having the 

long game here and that there is going to be this enduring commitment to see it through to the end and having very clear metrics 

that we had with the Colombians and the Colombians clearly had 

skin in the game, which was key. 

And so it is about everybody sitting around a table, understanding, with tremendous support from the Congress, and making 

sure that this was resourced. And it wouldn’t have happened if the 

Congress had not been decisively engaged at the beginning. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. If you were to list the five things—and that is 

what I kept trying to narrow down while I was there—what were 

the keys to the success here that we could translate to other countries? 

And some of the answers that I got was, one, first of all, the people have to stand up, have to be fed up with it. The people of the 

country have to say enough is enough and be willing to get behind 

leadership. 

And the second thing they said was to have strong leadership 

within their own government, willing to take them on, who are not 

corrupt and that sort of thing, but then having our engagement, 

too. 

Now, those are three things from just visiting with a few people. 

But I would like to hear your top five things, lessons from Colom-
14 

bia, why has that worked or why is it working, that we can translate to others. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. If I could, just off the top of my head, I think 

that the top five things would be, first of all, as you mentioned, the 

people, but it is also a sense of nationalism. They saw themselves 

as a cohesive unit as a country. And I think that is actually key 

because it wasn’t fragmented. 

The other one was the interagency commitment and the support 

of the U.S. Congress on our part and that we could enter something knowing that we were looking at a long-term relationship. So 

we weren’t rushing against timelines, but, rather, had key milestones because it was milestone-based. 

I think that the other piece is it was resourced to the level that 

it needed to be resourced. And I believe that we—and my final one 

here is because there was a commitment and we had the relationship and the skin in the game of the Colombian people. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you for all you do. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral McRaven, you along with General Odierno and General 

Amos have embraced the concept of the human domain in a white 

paper entitled ‘‘Strategic Landpower’’ with great vigor. 

This concept is built upon the lessons of the decade of war from 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff along with his staff, and 

that noted—and it noted that the failure to understand the operational environment was the primary reason for the problems encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Do you agree with that assessment? And, if so, why? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, we have had a great conversation between the Commandant, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and myself 

about the human domain. 

My point has always been you have to take the population into 

consideration, I think, regardless of what you are doing, whether 

it is a major conflict or whether it is an insurgency. 

And as we look at the human domain as kind of the totality of 

the cultural, the ethnic, the social fabric that makes up the people 

that live in a particular area, you have to know that before you can 

make any decisions, whether those are, you know, large maneuver 

decisions for the Army, expeditionary decisions for the Marine 

Corps or counterinsurgency decisions for SOF. 

So the human domain, to me, really is a fundamental area where 

we in the special operations community have to focus our time and 

our attention. We have to understand everything about the culture 

before we, you know, go off and make decisions that are going to 

affect those people in a certain area. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And thank you. 

Does a program like the Human Terrain System support the 

human domain concept? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I am only vaguely familiar with the 

Human Terrain System. We have a number of programs out there 
15 

that look at the human terrain. I am not familiar with that exact 

system. 

Having said that, we have a number of systems that layer our 

knowledge of the human terrain. So if you look at a valley in 

Kunar Province, for example, the systems we have out there can 

tell you the ethnicity, they can tell you the cultural ties, they can 

tell you the tribal relationships. 

They can begin to layer this information one on top of the other. 

That gives us a much better appreciation for the dynamics in a certain region in Kunar or in Latin America or in Africa or wherever. 

So we use a number of systems to, again, layer that information 

so we have a better understanding of the problem set we are dealing with. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you think that SOCOM would be a good fit for 

the Human Terrain System? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, if I can take that for the record and get 

back to you. Again, I am not personally familiar with that specific 

system, but I will find out and get back to you, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 59.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you. 

What status of operations—excuse me. 

What special operations forces core mission areas and activities 

remain of critical importance to United States national security? In 

other words, given fiscal constraints, what should remain off of the 

chopping block to ensure that we do not hollow out the forces? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. All of the core missions that are codified in 

Title 10 remain valid and necessary; so, I don’t recommend shedding any mission sets from the U.S. Special Operations Command 

inventory. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. According to the May 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance on standards and procedures for the use of force in 

counterterrorism operations outside the United States and areas of 

active hostility, lethal action may only be taken in the case that an 

assessment has been made that capture is not feasible at the time 

of the operation. 

Which individuals or which entity is responsible for making the 

original determination that capture of any given target is not feasible? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. We have an interagency process that works 

and discusses that particular issue and makes recommendations. 

Mr. JOHNSON. What would be the titles of those interagency personnel? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. PPD–1, which is the Presidential Policy Directive Number 1, outlines the process for decisionmaking along 

this way. 

So, normally, it is a process of interagency meetings, deputies 

meetings, principals meetings, and ultimate recommendations. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So it is a collective decision? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. It is a process that works through where we 

make sure everybody’s concerns and equities are known. It makes 

recommendations. 

Mr. JOHNSON. How quickly can it be called to act? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Quite rapidly, when necessary. 
16 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank the Secretary and Admiral McRaven again 

for you being here in the last 2 weeks. 

And, Admiral, I really do appreciate your candor in regards to 

how you have discussed issues, particularly as it relates to our conventional forces. 

Obviously, I know we are here about SOCOM, but you can’t have 

one without the other, and I think sometimes people get somewhat 

confused about that. 

And just for my good friend, Mr. Johnson, I mean, if you are ever 

interested in finding out what the criteria is and how decisions are 

made, we do have that in classified setting that goes over those 

particular issues, because I had the same concerns that you had, 

Mr. Johnson. So the committee has done a good job in that. 

But, Admiral, today was the first time I heard that we were not 

going to use the dry combat submersible off of a submarine. 

Did I hear that correctly? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, we have—right now our path is to take 

a look at what we have in terms of prototypes out there. So, as I 

said, we are leasing one vessel. We have two prototypes we are 

building. 

However, the intent right now is, because we think our major 

platform, the SSGN [nuclear-powered guided missile submarine], is 

scheduled for retirement in the mid-2020s, we are preparing to be 

in a position, you know, not to build a submarine that is tied necessarily to the SSGN or to the follow-on vessel. 

Now, having said that, we are absolutely, absolutely, looking at 

alternatives that would mate to a U.S. submarine. Right now, however, these prototypes are designed to industry standards first, and 

then we will learn from the industry standards to make a decision 

on what the final product will look like. 

Mr. NUGENT. Obviously, to do that, I mean, you do have to have 

some type of a dry facility on the sub—on the deck of a sub. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. No, sir. Not necessarily. 

Mr. NUGENT. Okay. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. So there—I mean, there are alternatives out 

there that would imply that you do not necessarily have to have 

a hangar, as we think of it—— 

Mr. NUGENT. Right. 

Admiral MCRAVEN [continuing]. In order to be able to launch a 

dry submersible. 

So, again, while we are not heading down that path right now, 

we are looking at alternatives that would put us in a position, if 

necessary, to be able to have the dry combat submersible launched 

from a U.S. submarine. 

Mr. NUGENT. Having the ability to do that, launch it from a submarine, does that increase your capabilities? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, it does. Clearly, the clandestine nature 

of a large submarine puts us in a position to gain the element of 

surprise in certain areas. 
17 

However, having said that, you know, without going into too 

much detail in the open session, we have good tactics and good procedures that can get us close enough and, as we build the technology, we think we will be in a position with the dry combat submersible to meet most of our targets that we have looked at. 

Mr. NUGENT. Both of these submersibles that you are talking 

about, the dry and the wet, replace—what is the legacy model sitting out there? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, the legacy model now on the wet side is 

the SEAL Delivery Vehicle or the Swimmer Delivery Vehicle 

[SDV], Mark 8, Mod—I’m not sure where we are now—Mod 3, Mod 

4. I was raised on the Mark 8 SDV almost 30 years ago. 

We have continued to upgrade it, however, and the technology on 

the Mark 8 today is reasonably good. But, frankly, the new technology that is coming online will make the next shallow water combat submersible really a generational leap beyond what the current 

capacity is. 

We have no dry combat submersible in the inventory right now. 

Our Advanced SEAL Delivery System is no longer active. So, we 

are down to—we have no capability within the dry side. 

Mr. NUGENT. And the wet obviously limits you in regards to distance that you can travel based upon the operator’s ability to operate after being exposed to extremely cold water. 

Is there anything else that is, I guess—is big Navy on board with 

the opportunity to utilize a dry combat submersible housed somewhere on another submarine to be named? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. So we are partnered with the Navy 

in this process. One of the reasons we are going with the industry 

standard is because, if you mate a dry submersible now with a 

Navy vessel—with a Navy submarine, then you have to comply 

with Navy standards. 

And, frankly, we think the industry standards are good enough 

for our operations right now. If we had to do it in compliance with 

the Navy standards now, we think it would cost much more to 

meet those standards and may not, may not, give us a better capability. 

So that is why we are exploring a number of different options, 

to find out whether or not the industry standards will be good 

enough for our future dry combat submersibles. 

Mr. NUGENT. And I would think as we—you know, as we move 

along and budgets are tight, that is a good way to go, looking at 

industry standards, because every time we try to invent a new 

mousetrap—I hate to say it—one of my sons has one of those on 

his leg when he flies a Black Hawk—not too good. 

So I appreciate it. And, Admiral, we are certainly here to support 

you. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank the gentleman. 

All sorts of implications for the larger acquisition reform effort 

in the exchange that you all just had, it seems to me. 

Mr. Carson. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Lumpkin, looking across the globe and considering the 

threat of transnational terrorism, what are your largest concerns? 
18 

What are we assuming? Where are we assuming risk in current 

strategies? And are we postured to counter these threats? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Not only am I the Acting Assistant Secretary 

for Special Operations, but I am also performing the duties of the 

Under Secretary for Policy right now. So I have an opportunity to 

take a—I have a much broader view than I would normally have 

just looking at it from the SOF perspective. 

The world is just a much smaller place now. So when you ask 

what are the threats and—I would say the threat is it is coming 

from everywhere, I mean, in the sense that it is totally—space is 

fungible now. People can move from place to place, and the world 

is just much smaller. 

So there aren’t—while there are lines where the threat comes 

more directly, it can come from anywhere. So, for us, it is about 

having that—truly a global presence and having this networked approach that USSOCOM has built so well, as to making sure that 

each of the theater special operations commands and the SOF operators across—and there is—each geographic combatant commander 

has a TSOC, a theater special operations command—has got the 

ability to talk to each other. 

And each one of them now works in supporting the geographic 

combatant command, but for Admiral McRaven at USSOCOM, and 

he has the ability to synchronize their operations. And I think that 

is key to—that allows me to sleep at night so I am not worrying 

about this and it keeps me up. 

So I think we are postured for success, but the key is just making sure that that global SOF network remains resourced, active, 

and viable. 

So would you like to add something? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Well, I am glad you are sleeping at night. 

But I will tell you that the Secretary nailed it. When we talk 

about kind of the evolution of U.S. special operations—and I appreciate the opportunity to roll this out—you know, we have had a 

special operations enterprise for decades. We have been globally 

dispersed for the last 27 years that USSOCOM has been around. 

Now that global enterprise—because of our ability to bring them 

together with communications, now we have taken those thousand 

disparate nodes and we have connected them through communications. 

And starting last October we established a very disciplined what 

we call battle rhythm. So video teleconferences—whereas the Secretary said I have four video teleconferences a week, my staff has 

them every day with the entire network now. 

And so we talk about the global SOF network. That is just the 

name. The enterprise has been there forever. Communications has 

allowed us to connect those various nodes, and now we can better 

meet the geographic combatant commander’s requirements because 

we are much better synchronized. 

And so the Secretary exactly characterized it. But the point I 

wanted to raise is, for decades, we have had thousands of people 

out on the battlefield. Until recently we haven’t been able to connect them globally through both communications and authorities, 

and now we have that ability. 
19 

Mr. CARSON. To that point, Admiral, I have been interested in 

some time in service member mental health, particularly providing 

mental health assessments throughout deployment. 

Can you give us some assessment of SOCOM’s embedded behavioral health programs and the impact that they have had on resiliency, for that matter, in your units? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, thank you for the question. 

We have our program called the Preservation of the Force and 

Families. And my predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson, did a lengthy 

task force study before I took command, spent about 10 months 

looking at—talked to 7,000 soldiers, about a thousand spouses, 440 

different units. 

That report landed on my desk when I took command, and clearly what the report showed was that the force was frayed. And I can 

tell you in the last, you know, almost 3 years that I have been in 

command, the force has continued to fray. 

But I am confident now that, as this body has provided us the 

resources necessary, we are getting ahead of the problems. So we 

are investing in the psychological performance, we are investing in 

the physical performance capabilities, and we are investing in family resiliency. 

And we think the family resiliency piece is absolutely critical, 

and we do so with the support of the services. We leverage every 

service program out there. But we greatly appreciate what the Congress has allowed us to do in terms of the Preservation of the Force 

and Families. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being here. 

If it is all right, Admiral McRaven, I will start with you. I am 

always grateful to men like you that give your life to the cause of 

freedom. My 5-year-olds have a better chance to attain that and 

live in that freedom, and I appreciate that, along with all the folks 

there behind you that wear the uniform. 

You know, it has been the conviction of many of us that the 

threat and the challenge in terms of our national security should 

drive the budget rather than the reverse. And you know that, as 

much as we try to put that concept forward, that it usually is the 

victim of sometimes mathematics. 

But you have outlined some pretty significant challenges that 

you face, and you have mentioned that the force is frayed. 

And I just noticed that the initiative fund that you submitted in 

the fiscal year 2015 budget, the Opportunity, Growth, and Security 

Initiative, included—includes 14—I am sorry—$400 million for 

SOCOM readiness and infrastructure. 

And maybe give us just a quick idea of what those requirements 

are. And why were these not included in the fiscal year 2015 budget request? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. So the $400 million is actually broken down into two parts. One of them, 300-some-odd million, is for 

readiness. 
20 

So we are going to go back and—where we had to take cuts in 

order to meet the budget numbers were in flying hours and steaming hours and training hours. So we will be able to put, I think, $350 million or so back into 

readiness to make sure that we are able to improve the readiness 

of our folks back in the continental United States. 

It has never affected the readiness of our forces deploying forward. We always make sure that they are absolutely ready to go 

forward wherever that might be, whether it is Afghanistan or anywhere else on the globe. 

But in the past we have taken some liberties with the readiness 

in the continental United States until they were ready to go forward. 

Having said that, there were also three programs within that $400 million that are part of our Preservation of Force and Families. There are MILCON [military construction] projects that we 

are looking at. 

And so we are grateful for this additional money coming in because we will be able to solve some of our readiness problems and, 

hopefully, some of our MILCON projects with the Preservation of 

the Force and Families. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, sir. 

You know, as much as we try, whether it is QDR or whatever 

it might be—try to ascertain what our challenges are, it seems that 

the serendipity always outpaces our predictive capability. And so 

the only real answer is to have a comprehensive force that can 

meet whatever potential threat might come. 

And it seems to me that may be one of the greatest things that 

we are overlooking here. We think that, you know, we are getting 

a leaner, meaner machine. And I appreciate that. But we need to 

have the overall capacity, ultimately, to handle what comes that we 

can’t predict. 

And so it is—with that in mind, Secretary Lumpkin, you have 

talked about a globally networked perpetual engagement for our 

special operations troops, and that is the same force that Admiral 

McRaven, in my judgment, wisely and rightly has indicated is fraying from the demand placed on them. 

And at the same time, in asking for diplomatic immunity here, 

this administration has depended on our special operators to sort 

of be the glue for our worldwide military operations during a time 

that we are withdrawing and, really, backing off of our obligations 

to friends and allies alike across the globe. And to top it off, the 

budget is being cut. 

So there is a breaking point to all of this. And I am just wondering what your own assessment of that breaking point is. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Going back to the QDR and—the QDR is a 

strategy-driven document. It happens to be budget-informed in 

order to recognize the realities of what we have as far as from a 

budget and what we have to operate with. 

That said, the global engagement piece, I mean, this is about fulfilling our obligations and our commitments to our allies and our 

friends to help them build the partnership capacity, to build the capacity to deal with these security challenges that become too big 

to fix, and to leverage their capabilities to do things on their own 
21 

so we don’t have to have this big military general purpose force to 

roll in and do that. 

But this was—when we did QDR 6 and QDR 10, this was the 

reason we built the force. And QDR 6 was to grow the special operations force in order to focus and allow us to do this building partnership capacity mission. And the QDR 10 was focused on giving 

USSOCOM those organic enablers to do those missions whenever 

possible to reduce their reliance on the other services when feasible. 

So that is—as we look at 2014 and we took in mind is—the end 

of combat operations in Iraq and we are looking at a reduction, we 

don’t know what the—whether we are going to end up with a bilateral security agreement in Afghanistan at this juncture. 

But at some point our footprint will be reduced in Afghanistan, 

and those forces—there is a demand signal by the geographic combatant commanders. They want more SOF in their theater. 

And with the post-2014 Afghanistan and, as we draw down the 

forces, it will give us the ability to meet those unmet demands 

within the GCC. So they can do that capacity building with our 

partners and our allies. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Talk about MILCON reminds me that I believe we have an outstanding request for special operations military construction that 

was requested to be submitted with the budget. I don’t think we 

have quite gotten it yet. 

So, Secretary Lumpkin, I might just put that on your radar 

screen, if you don’t mind, when you go back to the building, to 

check and see where that is. 

You were talking earlier that, in addition to being the Assistant 

Secretary for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, you are 

the Acting Under Secretary for Policy. 

You are also in charge of the task force looking for one of our 

folks who has been taken captive. Correct? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. I am the Department lead for that endeavor. 

Yes. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Looks to me like you have got a full plate. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. I keep busy. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, have they nominated somebody for Policy 

yet? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Yes, sir. Been nominated, had the hearing. 

We are waiting for the confirmation process to work its way 

through. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. When you testified in front of the Senate, I know you were asked about the Authorization for the Use of 

Military Force [AUMF]. And, frankly, I have gotten a little confused over the years what the administration policy is towards 

that. Sometimes we hear that it is don’t mess with it. Sometimes 

it is change it. 

Can you help me understand the administration’s policy? And 

from your experience, isn’t it getting harder and harder to do the 

things that we ask our special operators to do around the world, 
22 

relying back on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force that 

was passed in September 2001? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you for the question, sir. I truly do 

appreciate it. 

In May of last year, the President in his May speech at National 

Defense University mentioned about revising and eventually repealing the AUMF as a goal. 

I truly believe that the AUMF has served us well. It continues 

to serve us well. It gives us the ability to keep this Nation safe and 

do the missions that we need to do. 

That said, my comment to the Senate was that we are at an inflection point. We are at a point that is—it is always good to relook 

at authorities because they evolve. The threat evolves. 

And so I would encourage a look at the AUMF, make sure it is 

doing everything we need it to do. And if it is not, if it needs to 

be taken in or expanded or whatever, it is a chance to do that if 

we are going to take a look at it. And that is what I support. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Well, I agree, actually. 

And what I also agree with is that we should not ask our men 

and women to go and do something anywhere in the world that 

they are not fully backed up with law to do. 

And I worry about this strain as we get further and further away 

from 9/11, and the exact wording of the AUMF makes it harder 

and harder to draw those connections. 

So. Speaking of authorities, Admiral, let me just touch back. We 

talked at the beginning about working with others. One of the 

things that has been requested is an extension of the 1208 authority as well as increasing the dollar limit on that. 

In this forum, can you describe for us the role that 1208 plays, 

how important you think it is in the menu of options that special 

operators have to work with others, with 1206 and global security. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. And then I would like to defer to 

Secretary Lumpkin because he has been very supportive of increasing the amount of money for our 1208. 

Sir, I would tell you 1208 is probably the single most important 

authority we have in our fight against terrorism. It allows us to 

build forces, to train them, to equip them, and to do so with, I 

think, the right amount of oversight. And right now we are finding 

that this is a—again, about building partner capacity. This is a 

growth industry. 

So whereas a couple of years ago we had a certain level of authority, we found that our expenditure rates didn’t really match the 

authority. Now already we are closing in on the $50 million authority, and I think the demand signal—I know the demand signal out 

there is even larger than that. So Secretary Lumpkin has put forth 

a proposal to increase the authority, and I am in strong favor of 

that. 

However, one of the problems we run into is, as we look at how 

we build partner capacity, we do have to have a patchwork of various authorities. So we do use 1206 when appropriate; 1207, the 

Global Security Contingency Fund; 1208. 

And we make it work, but there is an awkwardness to it and 

sometimes limitations to it. Some of the authorities allow us to 

work with the Minister of Defense, but not the Minister of Interior 
23 

[MOI], where, in some cases, their counterterrorism forces actually 

are in the MOI, or some allows us to build minor military construction, you know, a small shoot house or a small barracks; others 

don’t. 

So what we try to do is find the right authority for the right situation, but that is not always easy. 1208 is the—gives us the greatest latitude, but it is strictly focused on counterterrorism, whereas 

1206 and 1207 give us a little bit more latitude in other areas. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. And, if I may, I absolutely agree with the admiral in the sense that 1208 is a tremendous tool for us. And we 

are rapidly approaching our maximum authorization of the $50 

million, and we are not even halfway through the year yet. 

We are tightening up our obligation, looking at what we can— 

find other mechanisms to fund so we don’t find ourselves up 

against a wall. 

But the other concern I have is that, in the event it is not renewed or we end up with a continuing resolution where it doesn’t 

allow me to continue operations, stopping that particular mission 

set has significant impact operationally. 

So I would encourage and support getting an extended authorization sooner rather than later. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I am struck by the conversation you all 

were having with Mrs. Hartzler. This is an operational authority, 

not some of the other authorities. And, yet, operationally it still 

takes a while to help develop some of these capacities. And so we 

don’t want to be shortsighted about it. 

Mr. Langevin, do you have other questions? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I probably will hold for the classified session. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Does anybody else have open session 

questions? 

Mr. HUNTER. Sure. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Really quick. 

JIEDDO. I am just wondering what do you see with JIEDDO 

going forward? You know, what do you do with JIEDDO right now? 

They have been supporting SOCOM for a long time. They are 

also supporting, you know, big Army, Marines, everybody else, too. 

But from your side of things, what do you want to see happening 

with them going forward? What parts of them should be kept and 

what parts of JIEDDO are just bureaucratic and won’t be needed 

anymore once we get out of Afghanistan? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. From a larger policy perspective, JIEDDO, 

as you are keenly aware, has been crucial and instrumental and 

been tremendously supportive to our operations and initiatives forward. 

So, for me, from a policy perspective, would really like to ensure 

we codify it in the Department long term and it doesn’t go by the 

wayside as we move past—beyond our current operations. 

Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask you this, though. When you codify it, 

you want to make sure it is really, really good. So you want to 

maybe cut out the parts that you don’t think are being productive 

right now or not as productive or change those parts and keep the 

parts that are really good, if you codify it. 
24 

So what parts would those be? What parts would you keep? What 

parts would you change? Or you can get back to me if you don’t 

have that on you right now. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. I will defer to see if Admiral McRaven has 

it, but I can get back to you on that. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, we have a JIEDDO rep, as you know, in 

almost every location where we have our SOF forces. And, as the 

Secretary said, JIEDDO has been absolutely fabulous over the 

years. 

For us, you know, what JIEDDO has learned to do is to understand networks. So as we look at the terrorist threat, frankly, 

where JIEDDO started out focusing on IEDs [improvised explosive 

devices]—and, of course, understanding IEDs meant you had to understand the IED network—now the folks at JIEDDO, because they 

understand the foundation of network development, you can take 

that talent and that capability and overlay it on the threat networks elsewhere. 

So I am a very big believer that what JIEDDO has learned, the 

IED fights in Iraq and Afghanistan, is fungible as we move forward 

and have to fight networks globally. 

So I wouldn’t portend to tell you where you could cut them or not 

cut them. I can tell you that they have been a tremendous resource 

to SOCOM and we greatly appreciate what they have done and, 

frankly, how they have, to some degree, reshaped themselves and 

looked at the broader network problem set. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. 

That is all I have got, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. All right. Thank you both. 

With that, the open portion of this hearing will be adjourned, 

and we will move swiftly down one floor and across the hall. 

[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to be 

reconvened in classified session.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 13, 2014 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 13, 2014 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 13, 2014 

(59) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Admiral MCRAVEN. USSOCOM is currently pursuing directed energy systems as 

a non-kinetic, stand-off anti-materiel solution. We have a requirement to surgically 

disable or disrupt a variety of fixed facility infrastructure and systems, with required capabilities ranging from breaching and access to disablement of critical 

equipment. The Man Portable High Energy Laser is one of several technologies 

under consideration for this critical mission. 

The MPHEL system was developed in close cooperation with the Joint Improvised 

Explosive Device Defeat Organization. Boeing Directed Energy Systems Albuquerque, NM has served as the lead contractor from September 2012 to present. The 

current prototype MPHEL system has an output power of 2 kilowatts and weighs 

approximately 750 pounds in a configuration the size of four large Pelican cases. 

The emphasis of further development will be on reducing the form factor, reducing 

weight, and increasing effective range. 

Initial testing of the prototype MPHEL system was conducted at Kirtland AFB, 

NM from January to February 2014, and produced positive results. The prototype 

demonstrated an ability to disable electronics devices, burn through various metals, 

and disable electrical systems. The prototype system will now be shipped to 

USSOCOM in May 2014 for user evaluation and target characterization, establishing the baseline for further development. At this time there are no plans to procure or field the MPHEL in its current form factor. 

Recognizing the importance of safety, and the unique legal implications of directed 

energy systems, USSOCOM engaged early with the US Army Institute of Public 

Health. A preliminary evaluation of the system was conducted in December 2013 

to determine potential health hazards. Initial results placed the MPHEL in a mishap risk category of medium, and identified several proposed design modifications 

for future versions. The final report is pending. [See page 7.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON 

Admiral MCRAVEN. The human domain fills a critical conceptual gap in visualizing the operating environment. None of the existing domains (air, land, maritime, 

space, and cyber) sufficiently address the centrality of people to contemporary and 

future strategy, operations and activities. The human domain complements the 

other domains and more fully describes the contemporary and future operating environments. It is not new in warfare, and a host of related terms have been developed 

to describe it. Most of these terms insufficiently define the scope and scale of the 

centrality of humans within the operating environment. 

The Human Terrain System (HTS) is a U.S. Army program implemented by the 

Army’s Training and Doctrine Command to develop, train, and integrate a social 

science based research and analysis capability that enables sociocultural understanding across the operational environment. In this regard, the HTS supports operations in the human domain by enhancing understanding of the cognitive, information, social, cultural, and physical elements that affect the domain. The HTS supports joint and coalition forces by providing social science support to military commanders in the form of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) composed of individuals with 

social science academic backgrounds. HTTs deploy with tactical units to assist in 

bringing knowledge of the local population into a coherent framework. Developing 

this sociocultural understanding provides a method for considering the effects of 

military operations among local populations. Operations in the human domain require this identification and ability to influence relevant populations in order to enhance stability, prevent conflict, and when necessary, fight and defeat adversaries. 

The HTS continues to support commanders in Afghanistan with HTTs that provide sociocultural information and reporting to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and to U.S. commanders and staffs in order to build understanding, peace and security. In August 

2013, fourteen HTTs were deployed to Afghanistan. [See page 15.] 
60 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIBSON 

Secretary LUMPKIN. I believe our military forces and Geographic Combatant Commanders have the authorities and programs necessary to mitigate current 

transnational terrorist threats. Our forces leverage, integrate, and implement a 

wide variety of security assistance and military cooperation programs. The current 

authorities available, such as Sections 1203, 1206, 1207, and 1208, provide additional and focused tools that the Department of Defense and our Geographic Combatant Commanders use to build directly or to enhance the capabilities and capacities of our partner to counter the threats of terrorism or indirectly support 

counterterrorism operations. I do not recommend any immediate changes to existing 

counterterrorism authorities or program resourcing. However, the Department of 

Defense is taking a close look at our statutory authorities for assistance to foreign 

security forces to assess the extent to which they meet evolving requirements. We 

intend to engage with Congress to discuss our findings following this internal review. [See page 10.] 

Admiral MCRAVEN. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is currently 

conducting information sharing initiatives under existing authorities. 

CDRUSSOCOM derives authority to share information and/or intelligence with foreign partners from National Disclosure Policy-1 and any applicable exceptions in accordance with CJCSI 5221.01D and DOD Directive 5230.11. USSOCOM is coordinating disclosure and/or release of information and/or with partners through the appropriate information sharing/foreign disclosure offices. [See page 10.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 13, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Do our forces and geographic combatant commanders have the 

authorities they need to mitigate current and future transnational terrorist threats? 

What changes would you recommend, including potential changes to the AUMF? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. With the strong support of Congress, the Department has 

gained several new authorities since 2001 that have been essential to conducting 

counterterrorism operations and building partner nation capabilities. Key authorities for partner capability building are found in uncodified, temporary provisions of 

law, and looking ahead we will be challenged to sustain our current capabilities 

should these authorities lapse. We would like to work with Congress to determine 

what is needed beyond the ‘‘current fight.’’ With respect to the AUMF, the President 

has said it needs to be revised and ultimately repealed. We look forward to working 

with Congress on this as well. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. A great deal has been written and said about the relationship 

between special operations forces and the CIA. What is your opinion of how the CIA 

and SOF should share responsibilities that interlock and overlap, given respective 

strengths and weaknesses? What coordination role does your office (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict) play in helping to coordinate and de-conflict CIA– 

DOD operations and activities? What are some areas of improvement? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Close coordination and deconfliction between DOD and CIA 

is essential to protecting our national security interests, as is also the case with 

other departments and agencies as part of a whole-of-government approach. In those 

areas in which special operations forces and CIA have related responsibilities, we 

coordinate our efforts through a robust exchange of liaison officers and detailees 

who collaborate on a daily basis. At the headquarters level, the National Security 

Council Staff hosts regular meetings focused on counterterrorism coordination and 

deconfliction. As the ASD SO/LIC, I represent the Department and provide advice 

to the Secretary of Defense on these matters. In this capacity, I work closely with 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the DOD General Counsel to 

ensure DOD operations are fully aligned with relevant intelligence policies and comply with all applicable laws. In the realm of DOD–CIA collaboration on 

counterterrorism operations, we are currently working on initiatives to strengthen 

and improve the flow of information, technology, and practical expertise to crosslevel capabilities between the two organizations. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. What changes can you recommend to the present set of Security 

Force Assistance authorities such as 1206 and Global Security Contingency Fund? 

Are these the right types of authorities to satisfy future geographic combatant commander requirements to develop partner nation capabilities? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Many of the existing Security Force Assistance (SFA) authorities, including Section 1206 and the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), are 

still relatively new. Since their creation, in Fiscal Year 2006 and Fiscal Year 2012, 

respectively, the Department of Defense has invested a significant amount of time 

and effort in developing the organizational structures and processes required for 

their effective use. We believe that Section 1206 has been a success and that the 

GSCF is now poised to succeed. 

However, the global strategic environment has evolved since the creation of these 

new authorities, and we anticipate that it will continue to evolve over the next several years. The threat of terrorism increasingly flows from Al Qaeda’s dispersed affiliates and offshoots rather than from its core, presenting a diffuse set of threats 

against which to apply these authorities. Although we are drawing down in Afghanistan and uncertain about our level of presence there beyond 2014, many of the partners we trained and equipped to assist with stability operations there are now 

poised to assist with similar operations in other regions of the world. Recent events 

in Ukraine underscore the importance of continued engagement with our Eastern 

European and Baltic partners. Given this shifting dynamic, the Department of Defense is taking a close look at our SFA authorities to assess the extent to which 

they meet these diverse and evolving requirements. We intend to engage with Congress to discuss our findings following this internal review. 
64 

Mr. THORNBERRY. A recent report on special operations forces by the Council on 

Foreign Relations suggested that, ‘‘the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Special 

Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict has difficulty fully providing civilian oversight of 

U.S. Special Operations Command’s policy and resources as directed by law.’’ Do you 

agree with this assessment? Can you outline for the committee how that office conducts oversight of policy and resources of SOCOM? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. My office provides civilian oversight of all special operations 

matters as required by 10 USC § 138. As such, I provide oversight of special operations policy and resources matters and provide advice to implement Secretary of 

Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy security priorities to meet the 

challenges posed by the global security environment. The relationship with the 

Commander, USSOCOM is collaborative and cooperative, with a common goal to develop the best possible special operations forces and to employ them effectively. Ultimately, I advise the Secretary of Defense and provide recommendations regarding 

special operations that are in the best interest of the Department. 

During each of the last three QDRs, the Department has reviewed, evaluated, and 

determined the appropriate resourcing of USSOCOM to improve the U.S. capability 

to combat terrorism on a global basis. With each of these reviews, SOLIC has also 

evolved and adapted as an organization to meet statutory and Department oversight 

requirements. SOLIC’s oversight of special operations has further developed in partnership with the other parts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff, interagency counterparts, and Congress, and through coordination with the USSOCOM 

staff. I work closely with the Under Secretaries of Defense for Intelligence; Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and Personnel and Readiness and leverage their subject matter expertise to provide oversight. I also work closely with the Director of 

CAPE, the DOD Comptroller, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative 

Affairs to develop the optimum force structure, resources, and authorities to meet 

future special operations requirements. 

I will continue work closely with all relevant officials to ensure our nation sustains a ready, capable Special Operations force, prepared to meet the fiscal, operational, and global challenges we face today and into the future. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. In addition to more than 4,000 positions authorized for SOCOM 

and its components, the service component commands of the Army, Navy, Air Force, 

and Marine Corps, taken together, have more than 2,000 authorized positions to 

support SOCOM and its operations. Have you looked for efficiencies between and 

among SOCOM and its subordinate commands? If not, why not? If so, what did you 

find? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. The numbers stated in the question are inaccurate. 

Of the 4093 billets, 2168 billets are in commands and organizations that do not 

perform Functional Combatant Command (U.S. Special Operations Command), or 

Service Component Command activities and functions. The following organizations 

do not meet the definition of a Functional Combatant Command or Service Component Command; 

• Joint Special Operations Command, a Sub-Unified Command 

• Special Operations Command-North, a Theater Special Operations Command 

• Special Operations Command-Joint Concepts, a Theater Special Operations 

Command disestablished in 2013 and manpower zeroed out in 2014 

• Special Operations Joint Task Force is an operational unit with rotational assignment to the U.S. Central Command theater of operations • Regional Special Operations Coordination Center (RSCC) is not a direct reporting unit to USSOCOM, and none had been established in FY13. The manpower 

was identified on the JTD as a precursor to possible resourcing in FY14. RSCC 

is in Proof-of-Concept development, with activities authorized by Congress on 

a limited basis 

• Special Operations Research and Development Center is a Service-like function 

that no other Combatant Command Headquarter possesses. DODD 5100.73 excludes all systems/weapons development and procurement activities that are not 

associated with HQ Management functions 

• Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) is an educational activity/entity 

that no other Combatant Command Headquarter possesses. DODD 5100.73 excludes NDU, Naval Postgraduate School, Service Academies, the Defense Industrial University, etc. JSOU falls into this category and is not a function of a 

Functional Combatant Command, or Service Component Command 

The 2110 billets identified for the Service Component Commands are correct. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Have you looked for efficiencies between and among SOCOM 

and its subordinate commands? If not, why not? If so, what did you find? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. USSOCOM constantly evaluates its manpower requirements. 

Since 2007, USSOCOM has undergone numerous reviews, studies, and evaluations 
65 

from OSD, JS, and internal reviews to find efficiencies, comply with DOD direction 

to eliminate contractors, replace military with civilians, cap the number of both civilians and military, and to streamline activities wherever possible. In addition to 

complying with all OSD and JS guidance, USSOCOM purposely evaluates our resources, both manpower and dollars to ensure we maintain a balanced, effective, efficient, and affordable portfolio of capabilities to meet the National Security and Defense Security Strategies while complying with the Laws, Regulations, Policies, and 

Procedures set forth by the President, Congress, Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Services. Total requirements for manpower always far exceed available end-strength, are dynamic, evolving, and prioritized constantly to mitigate risk across the breadth of the Special Operations enterprise. Our 

budget submissions to Congress outline the most recent and up-to-date alignment 

of forces to meet our warfighting requirements within the resources allotted by 

OSD. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. The Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative fund sub- mitted with the FY15 budget includes $400 million for SOCOM readiness and infrastructure unfunded requirements. Please outline these requirements for the committee; and discuss why and how these requirements were NOT included in the 

FY15 base budget request? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. USSOCOM’s $400 million portion of the Department’s $26 billion Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative (OGSI) is outlined in the attachment. USSOCOM’s request addresses the most pressing readiness and infrastructure requirements that could not be resourced within USSOCOM’s FY15 President’s 

Budget (PB). The FY15 PB resourced the highest priority programs required by special operations forces to conduct missions in support of Geographic Combatant Commanders’ requirements. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Can you outline some of the more difficult advanced technology 

requirements that SOF needs in order to maintain an edge on the battlefield? 

a. As we withdraw from major combat in Afghanistan, will the need for non-lethal 

weapons and directed energy weapons increase? 

b. How are you managing to stay ahead in research and development while your 

budget in this area has steadily declined over the past several fiscal years? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. a. USSOCOM expects to remain engaged in global 

counterterrorism operations for the foreseeable future. United States Special Operations Forces (USSOF) will continue to operate in close proximity to their Afghan 

partners, as aggregate US Forces retrograde from Afghanistan. Today, USSOF 

forces are gradually migrating from rural areas to fixed bases in larger population 

centers. This will reduce associated operational risk, and allow for sustained advisory and engagement support at the appropriate operational levels necessary to enable the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to unilaterally maintain operational momentum and evolve as an institution. 

Village Stability Operations will be completed December 2014 and on-going 

USSOF Security Force Assistance efforts, which have always been the focus of 

USSOF, are now reorienting away from the tactical to the operational level. This 

has led to emphasis being placed on the development of the Special Mission Wing, 

ANA Special Operations Command Headquarters and its brigades, the various Afghan Special Police headquarter elements and a variety of efforts designed to develop intelligence and their sustainment capacities. The limited tactical level advisory support continues and will predominantly occur from permanent bases, where 

the Afghan Security forces have established training centers. Given the limited nature of USSOF’s future tactical operational role in Afghanistan, we do not see demand increasing for advanced technological requirements. However, as USSOF expands globally demands for a multitude of advanced technologies will grow enabling 

USSOCOM to remain at the tip of the spear and conduct our core missions, as directed by the President and Secretary of Defense SOF needs enhanced lethal capabilities against multiple types of moving targets that will provide greater accuracy 

and desired target effects while minimizing collateral damage to near-zero probability. SOF has long-standing requirements for a variety of less-than-lethal (LTL), 

scalable effects weapons (SEW), to include those for which directed energy may provide the optimal solutions. SOF’s interests in LTL SEW capabilities include dissuading and disabling personnel, and rendering equipment and/or facilities functionally ineffective. Key technological challenges include smaller, light-weight and affordable power generation and multi-mode seekers for long-range precision weapons; 

LTL SEW technologies that render personnel or equipment ineffective to ensure 

mission success with greater force protection and less likelihood of civilian casualties; state-of-the-art light-weight personnel protective armor and multi-spectral sensory enhancement technologies; and broad spectrum, multi-sensory signature reduction. The critical aspect for all of these technologies is their compatibility with SOF 
66 

tactics, techniques and procedures using SOF- or GPF-provided soldier, ground, airborne, and/or maritime systems. 

b. USSOCOM’s S&T Directorate leverages other government agencies and labs, 

whenever able, to maximize the efficiency and effect of our limited RDT&E budget. 

USSOCOM’s overarching FY15–19 S&T Integrated Priority List (STIPL) which includes Comprehensive Signature Management, Anti-Access/Area Denial, SOF Small 

Unit Dominance, Human Performance, and Battlespace Awareness, requires external support to address these high priority S&T needs. 

USSOCOM’s S&T Directorate is coordinating Technology Discovery Sessions 

chaired by the SOCOM Deputy Commander and Acquisition Executive. In these sessions, SOCOM invites forward thinking senior industry and academic leaders to discuss such topics as technology investment strategies, how to avoid technological surprise, partnering opportunities, and how USSOCOM can best prepare for the future. 

SOCOM senior leadership establishes specific focused topics and invitees for two to 

three planned follow-on events per year. 

The following provide a few recent and relevant examples of collaboration with 

Service labs and centers. SOCOM S&T, in collaboration with the Systems Engineering Research Center (SERC), a University-Affiliated Research Center of the US Department of Defense, sponsored a joint SERC Capstone project with the University 

of Alabama and Stevens Institute of Technology resulting in the development of a 

SOF non-lethal capability to stop boats up to 50 meters in length. In collaboration 

with the Air Force Research Laboratory, we are developing wind sensing technologies which will dramatically increase AC–130 Gunship first-round accuracy. 

Similarly, our relationship with the U.S. Army’s Medical Research and Materiel 

Command (MRMC) has enabled efficient development of critical lifesaving technologies for special operations forces. Uncontrolled external hemorrhage remains the 

leading cause of death on the battlefield. Despite recent advances in hemorrhage 

control technologies, controlling the bleeding in large wounds (‘‘sharkbite’’) remains 

difficult and a SOCOM Commander top priority. A ‘‘Sharkbite’’ project developed a 

novel wound stasis dressing to treat SOF non-compressible hemorrhagic injuries. 

The ‘‘SharkBite Trauma Kit’’ includes three revolutionary tools that are now pending FDA approval before transition to USSOCOM’s PEO–SOF Warrior’s Tactical 

Combat Casualty Care Program of Record and SOF medics. The collaboration may 

lead to a capability for the conventional force as well. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. How are the roles of women in SOF changing? Can you outline 

for the committee on SOCOM plans for assigning women in previously closed positions? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. There are many women currently serving in SOF positions. 

Based on the January 2013 direction from Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM is reviewing all SOF positions closed to women with the intent of opening them all by 

January 2016. USSOCOM may only keep closed those positions that are specifically 

approved by both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of 

Defense. The decision to open or keep specific positions closed to women will be 

guided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s guidance to ensure ‘‘the success of our Nation’s warfighting forces... ,’’ that ‘‘all Service men and women are 

set up for success with viable career paths... ,’’ and ‘‘to retain the trust of the American people.’’ 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Can you update the committee on SOCOM’s intelligence functions, requirements, and initiatives? 

a. What specific intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements 

do you have? b. What manned and unmanned ISR systems are you investing in, and 

why? c. How do you coordinate with the Services in these areas? d. What role does 

your J2 (Intelligence) Director play in identifying and filling those unique requirements? e. How is SOCOM working to resource Theater Special Operations Command intelligence requirements? f. What role is SOCOM playing in the Defense Intelligence Agency’s new Defense Clandestine Service? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. (a) USSOCOM is working closely with SOF Theater and Component commands to refine air, ground, and maritime ISR requirements to support 

the Geographical Combatant Commanders (GCC). Future draw downs in Afghanistan do not change SOCOM’s enduring global AISR requirement, but rather reflect 

a need to shift ISR capabilities to other areas of responsibility in support of GCC 

operations outside the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Reference Memorandum for 

Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Support to Special Operations Forces 

dated 9 January 2012; or Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON) for Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in Support of Special Operations Forces 

dated 8 June 2012. 
67 

(b) USSOCOM currently operates the U–28 as its primary manned ISR platform 

along with JAVAMAN aircraft in a GOCO capacity. USSOCOM plans to transition 

to the MC–12 that is being divested by the USAF. This transition will incur an initial investment to upgrade capabilities to meet the U–28 Mission. However, the 

MC–12 provides dual-engine capability, longer flight duration, and additional capacity for ISR equipment. 

USSOCOM’s FY15–16 budget includes unmanned MQ–9 baseline investment 

funding to enable continued rapid development and integration of permissive ISR 

capabilities critical to global SOF operations on up to 50 MQ–9s and associated 

ground equipment to meet current and future permissive ISR requirements. This 

enables USSOCOM to transition from MQ–1/9 unmanned aircraft to a full MQ–9ER 

fleet by leveraging the replacement of USAF provided MQ–1B with USAF provided 

Extended Range MQ–9 Reapers. 

(c) USSOCOM is partnering with the Services to mitigate shortfalls like initiatives to promote best practices in full-motion-video (FMV) exploitation and develop 

relationships where SOF and Services can share the burden of exploitation. 

USSOCOM is working with the Services to ensure budget reductions of Service-provided assets, like permissive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft, 

are protected to so that SOF can contend with future global threats and challenges. 

(d) USSOCOM J2 Intelligence Director conducts weekly ISR Councils to discuss/ 

evaluate SOF ISR requirements and issues. USSOCOM J2 participates in both deliberate and urgent requirements, planning processes through Service Warfighter 

Talks, and formal requirement document coordination through either their Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS) or the similar SOF Capability Integration Development System (SOFCIDS). USSOCOM coordinates closely with 

USD(I), ISR Task Force, Services, Components, and TSOCs to refine requirements, 

synchronize efforts, and advocate for ISR capability. 

(e) USSOCOM is working to capture Theater Special Operations Command intelligence requirements through weekly ISR Councils and TSOC Deep Dives as well 

as addressing requirements identified by TSOC Commanders during monthly Commander Decision Roundtables (CDRT). Requirements are validated through the 

JCIDS or SOFCIDS process and then resourced through the USSOCOM Strategic 

Planning Process. 

(f) USSOCOM fully supports the Defense Intelligence Agency’s new Defense Clandestine Service. Over the past year DCS has established a presence in USSOCOM 

Headquarters to ensure we align our efforts and requirements. Due to classification, 

discussions on USSOCOM specific roles and interaction with the Defense Clandestine Service will need to be addressed in a closed session. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARSON 

Mr. CARSON. Do you anticipate that this pace of deployment of SOCOM forces will 

change as we withdraw from Afghanistan? And given budget cuts, the unique training needs of special operators, and the necessarily small force size, how can SOCOM 

continue meeting its deployment requirements? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. I anticipate as SOF requirements go down in Afghanistan, we 

will redistribute forces to other regions in a manner that is aligned to current, 

emerging threats and to achieve a more balanced SOF posture across the Geographic Combatant Commands. The Department considered this redistribution of 

SOF during the FY 2015 program review, and we believe we have properly 

resourced USSOCOM for training, readiness, and sustainment requirements in the 

years ahead. 

Mr. CARSON. Once we have withdrawn from Afghanistan, which areas or countries 

do you believe will be the primary recipients of SOCOM deployments? And can you 

give us an idea of the types of missions you expect they will see, either alone or 

with partner nations? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Our goal is to realign and redistribute SOF across the Geographic Combatant Commands in a manner that is aligned to current and emerging 

threats. Consistent with the approach of working bilaterally when possible, SOF will 

retain the capability to advise and assist partners to take action to counter enemy 

threats and disrupt their planning, training, and recruitment. We will be postured 

to conduct direct action to protect U.S. persons from attack when necessary. At the 

same time, we will expand and enrich our engagement with security partners to 

build capacity, improve capabilities, and foster greater cooperation. This includes expanding bilateral exercises, joint exchanges, and other training events with international SOF partners. 
68 

Mr. CARSON. Do you anticipate that this pace of deployment of SOCOM forces will 

change as we withdraw from Afghanistan? And given budget cuts, the unique training needs of special operators, and the necessarily small force size, how can SOCOM 

continue meeting its deployment requirements? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Recently, we have been deploying between 8,000 to 10,000 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel throughout the globe, on a daily basis. 

I anticipate our pace of deployment to drop below our current deployed numbers in 

the near term if we draw down in Afghanistan, and will increase to comparable 

numbers of 8–10K deployed SOF as we mature our SOF Campaign Plan. This plan 

will focus our efforts on building partner nation capacity through persistent regional 

SOF presence, while posturing a SOF capability that can conduct direct actions 

against emerging terrorist threats—both requiring a trained and ready deployed 

force. Through prioritization of resources, we can continue to meet our deployment 

requirements with our current and proposed future budgets. 

Mr. CARSON. Once we have withdrawn from Afghanistan, which areas or countries 

do you believe will be the primary recipients of SOCOM deployments? And can you 

give us an idea of the types of missions you expect they will see, either alone or 

with partner nations? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. First, I believe that SOF will continue to be deployed to Afghanistan in some operational capacity. As we have drawn down from Iraq in December 2011 and now, Afghanistan, SOF personnel capacity has become available 

to deploy to other geographic regions. Since that time, the African continent has experienced the largest increase in deployed SOF personnel, and I believe will continue to be one of the primary recipients of SOF deployments in the future. As our 

SOF Campaign Plan focuses on building partner nation capacity, we will continue 

to execute those missions of Foreign Internal Defense, Civil Affairs, Information Operations, Stability Operations, and Humanitarian Assistance, while also executing 

direct actions against emerging terrorist threats. These direct actions will range 

from advise and assist, precision reconnaissance, and unconventional warfare, with 

a focus on Counter-terrorism. We will strive to partner with foreign nations at every 

opportunity to conduct direct and indirect operations, but we will always be prepared to execute alone. At the present time, the preponderance of our SOF operations on the African continent is being conducted with the support of other partner 

nations. Finally, I believe that the demand for SOF by the Geographic Combatant 

Commanders will outweigh our SOF capacity for future SOF Campaign Plan requirements. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIBSON 

Mr. GIBSON. What are some recommendations for improving intelligence collaboration across the whole-of-government? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. DOD works with its partners in the Intelligence Community 

to ensure relevant intelligence information is shared appropriately. Recent initiatives include DOD funded inter-agency collaboration in the areas of counterterrorism, countering transnational organized crime (CTOC), and maritime domain 

awareness. DOD also provides domestic agencies with valuable instruction in the 

detection of improvised explosive devices, conducting terrorism analysis, and mapping cultural terrain. Lastly, DOD fosters interagency integration via the embedding of DOD personnel in other agencies, including the National Counterterrorism 

Center, FBI Field Intelligence Groups, and FBI joint terrorism task forces. 

Mr. GIBSON. What are some recommendations for improving intelligence collaboration across the whole-of-government? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Intelligence collaboration has increased significantly as a result of 10+ years of war. The single thread that forced this collaboration, across the 

whole-of-government, is our national security interest. Looking toward the future, 

we must continue to wrap our challenges with policies, authorities, process, and information sharing architectures with this common unifying force of national security. 

We must continue to create conditions for success. For instance, we must resource 

efforts like the Department of Defense Intelligence Information Enterprise (DI2E) 

and the Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE), and 

force convergence between these communities of interest. DI2E and IC ITE convergence has the potential to significantly increase the speed of knowledge to decision/ 

action by our most senior leaders of government. It will increase information transparency and knowledge sharing at all levels. Increased resources for DI2E and IC 

ITE will only achieve a technical solution and many could argue that technology is 

not a limiting factor. To a certain extent, they would be correct. Any advances to 
69 

force convergence, from a technology perspective, must be accompanied by reformation of policy that inhibits collaboration. 

The policies that protect our nation’s critical information and intelligence are the 

same policies that inhibit collaboration. The Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and 

Diplomatic communities operate within complicated yet essential frameworks to 

conduct the business of national security. We must continue to explore policy reforms that simultaneously safeguard our knowledge and increase transparency, 

while being mindful of intelligence oversight and information assurance. Likewise, 

any changes in policy must account for one of our greatest force multipliers, our coalition partners. 

The decade of war has been complimented by the efforts of our coalition partners. 

At the lowest tactical echelons, we achieve remarkable success on the battlefield. We 

must continue to seek reform in policies that enable government to government information sharing by empowering senior leaders and Commanders with greater latitude to make the call, ease restrictions, and increase collaboration. 

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