alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v Thomas Loop, Respondent. Attorney General of the State of New York, Intervenor-Appellant.

[698 NYS2d 210]

—Order unanimously reversed on the law without costs, motion dismissed and matter remitted to Cattaraugus County Court for proceedings pursuant to Correction Law article 6-c *(see, People v Langdon,*258 AD2d 937). (Appeal from Order of Cattaraugus County Court, Nenno, J. — Correction Law art 6-c.) Present — Green, J. P., Lawton, Wisner, Hurlbutt and Balio, JJ.
#### § 99.5 Emergency situations.

In an emergency that requires immediate decision and action for the safety of the flight, the pilot in command of an aircraft may deviate from the rules in this part to the extent required by that emergency. He shall report the reasons for the deviation to the communications facility where flight plans or position reports are normally filed (referred to in this part as “an appropriate aeronautical facility”) as soon as possible.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

HUMBERTO CEBALLOS, JR.,

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee. §

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 1 9

- 00059

- CR

Appeal from the

34th District Court

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 20170D00479 )

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the Appellant’s motion to withdraw appeal, and

concludes the motion should be granted and the appeal should be dismissed, in accordance with

the opinion of this Cou rt. We therefore dismiss the appeal. This decision shall be certified below

for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 25TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2019.

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before Rodriguez, J., Palafox, J., and Barajas, Senior Judge

Barajas, Senior Judge (Sitting by Assignment)
#### MEYERCORD CO. v. DICKEY.

No. 19837.

Opinion Filed March 3, 1931.

David L. Carter, \Ar. R. Fain,, Jr., and W. R. AAritliington, for plaintiff in error.

Wieck & Armstrong and D. E. Hodges, for defendant in error.

KORNEGAY, J.

This is a proceeding in error from the district court of Kay county, Okla.; Claude Duval, judge. The case originated when the defendant in error, desiring to find some way to put his name upon the equipment he was handling, which was largely supplies for oil purposes, wrote to the plaintiff corporation about the matter and was referred to their agent in Seattle, Wash., Mr. P. J. Standish.

He appears to have called on the defendant in error in Seattle, where he was representing the plaintiff in error as agent, and got frpm him an order for 2,500 transfer labels, which were to be used for the purpose of putting on tanks, etc., the name of the plaintiff’s company, as a means of identi*270fication and for the purpose of securing- trade.

A part of- the order was delivered. The agent received $50 when he took this order, and $90 was paid when a part of the labels were delivered, making- the amount that was paid to the plaintiff in error and its agent $140.

The second shipment came about six months later, hut the defendant in error refused to take the labels out of the express office, and the amount claimed by plaintiff as being due it was $245. Exhibit “A,” attached to the petition, refers to the labels as follows:

> 1,750 Dickey Trade Mark transfers

> No. 85049 @ 14c Each, $245.00

The defendant in error countered with the claim for the amount that he paid on the first shipment, claiming that the labels were worthless.

According to the testimony, they (the labels,) would not work, and the local agent could not get them to work.

The trial started before a jury, and the parties made an opening- statement and the plaintiff introduced proof showing in a general way the shipment of the labels, and the defendant introduced proof showing the defects in the labels, and according to his testimony they were so defective that he could not get them to work and neither could the local agent get them to work.

At the conclusion of the evidence, both sides requested a directed’verdict. The lower court directed the verdict against the plaintiff upon its suit, and also against it on the counterclaim of the defendant below.

The plaintiff below filed its motion for a new trial, which was overruled, followed by exceptions and appeal to this court with case-made.

We have examined this cafee-made, and we have examined the briefs of the parties, and carefully considered the evidence. AVe think the trial court was right in taking this case from the jury and directing the verdict. As to the newly discovered evidence, and the motion for a new trial thereon, we think the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial on that account.

The cause is affirmed.

LESTER, O. ,T.„ CLARK, V. O. J., and RILEY, HEFNER, CULLISON, SWINDALL, ANDREWS, and McNEILL,' JJ., concur.
#### OBERLIN v THOMAS

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist, Fulton Co

No. 102.

Decided October 28, 1929

Messrs. Conn & Holloway, Toledo, for Oberlin.

Messrs. F. S. & J. M. Ham, Wauseon, for Thomas.

*687BY THE COURT

Under.the evidence in this case the jury must have found that the defendant was guilty of negligence. On the question of the negligence of the plaintiff there was a very sharp conflict in the testimony. Testimony was introduced to the effect that plaintiff said, shortly after the accident. that they were both to blame. If the jury believed this testimony, as they might do, then they may also have found that the plaintiff was himself guilty of negligence. If. the jury found that both parties were guilty of negligence proximately causing the collision, then the verdict would be correct, as neither would be entitled to recover from the other and the court is not disposed to believe that it can interfere with the judgment on the weight of the evidence.

It is urged that the court committed prejudicial error in refusing to give plaintiff’s request No. 1, which is merely a definition of right of way. We find no error in refusing, to give this instruction. The instruction does not indicate which party had the right of way, and the court is unable to see that the plaintiff was prejudiced by the failure to give the instruction.

Request No. 2, which was offered, is faulty in that it does not contain the element of ordinary care.

Request No. 4 was properly refused in that it contains the statement that if the jury finds that .the defendant saw the plaintiff approaching while there is no testimony that he 'did see the plaintiff approaching.

We find no error in the judgment assessing all of the costs ayainst the plaintiff. It was an action at law in which the right to costs is controlled by statute, and the evidence does not disclose that any costs were made exclusively in seeking to maintain the cross-petition, and as the plaintiff failed the costs were properly assessed against him. •

.We have examined all of the claimed errors, but find nothing requiring a reversal of the judgment.

Williams, Lloyd and Richards, JJ, concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND> THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM 
FAVORITE BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS FOR THE TWENTY-SIX WEEKS ENDED DECEMBER 26, 1998 INCLUDED IN FORM 10Q
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS. 
</LEGEND>
<CIK>   0001073410
<NAME>  FAVORITE BRANDS INTERNATIONAL 
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-26-1998
<PERIOD-START>                            JUN-28-1998
<PERIOD-END>                              DEC-26-1998
<CASH>                                          1,587
<SECURITIES>                                        0         
<RECEIVABLES>                                  71,093
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (20,911)
<INVENTORY>                                   100,034
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              172,575 
<PP&E>                                        302,777
<DEPRECIATION>                               (62,968)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                805,478
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                         107,168
<BONDS>                                       589,500
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                            0
<OTHER-SE>                                    106,532
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  805,478
<SALES>                                       388,436 
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              388,436
<CGS>                                         241,119         
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 241,119 
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              152,834
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             30,230
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (35,747)
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (13,305)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (22,442)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0 
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                       2,503 
<NET-INCOME>                                 (24,945)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       0
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> US DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                         325,181
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   49,523
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               415,146
<PP&E>                                         131,840
<DEPRECIATION>                                  92,813
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 749,703
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           36,478
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     2,398,855
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   749,703
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 2,782
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   41,218
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               302,648
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (341,084)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (341,084)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (341,084)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.02)



</TABLE>
§ 10.54 Consent findings and order. ( a ) At any time prior to the receipt of evidence or, at the Administrative Law Judge's discretion prior to the issuance of the Administrative Law Judge's decision, the parties may enter into consent findings and an order disposing of the proceeding in whole or in part.
( b ) Any agreement containing consent findings and an order disposing of a proceeding in whole or in part shall also provide: ( 1 ) That the order shall have the same force and effect as an order made after full hearing;
( 2 ) That the entire record on which any order may be based shall consist solely of the Administrator's findings letter and the agreement;
( 3 ) A waiver of any further procedural steps before the Administrative Law Judge and the Administrative Review Board regarding those matters which are the subject of the agreement; and
( 4 ) A waiver of any right to challenge or contest the validity of the findings and order entered into in accordance with the agreement.
( c ) Within 30 calendar days after receipt of an agreement containing consent findings and an order disposing of the disputed matter in whole, the Administrative Law Judge shall, if satisfied with its form and substance, accept such agreement by issuing a decision based upon the agreed findings and order. If such agreement disposes of only a part of the disputed matter, a hearing shall be conducted on the matters remaining in dispute.
§ 1626.17 Notice of dismissal or termination. ( a ) *Issuance of Notice of Dismissal or Termination.* ( 1 ) Where a charge filed with the Commission under the ADEA is dismissed or the Commission's proceedings are otherwise terminated, the Commission will issue a Notice of Dismissal or Termination on the charge as described in paragraph (c) of this section to the person(s) claiming to be aggrieved. In the case of a charge concerning more than one aggrieved person, the Commission will only issue a Notice of Dismissal or Termination when the charge is dismissed or proceedings are otherwise terminated as to all aggrieved persons.
( 2 ) Where the charge has been filed under the ADEA and title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), or the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), the Commission will issue a Notice of Dismissal or Termination under the ADEA at the same time it issues the Notice of Right to Sue under title VII, the ADA, GINA, or the PWFA, in accordance with 29 CFR 1601.28.
( 3 ) The issuance of a Notice of Dismissal or Termination does not preclude the Commission from offering such assistance to a person receiving the notice as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate. The issuance does not preclude or interfere with the Commission's continuing right to investigate and litigate the same matter or any ADEA matter under its enforcement authority.
( b ) *Delegation of Authority To Issue Notices of Dismissal or Termination.* The Commission hereby delegates authority to issue Notices of Dismissal or Termination, in accordance with this section, to: Directors of District, Field, Area and Local offices; the Director of the Office of Field Programs; the Director of Field Management Programs, Office of Field Programs; the General Counsel; or their designees.
( c ) *Contents of the Notice of Dismissal or Termination.* The Notice of Dismissal or Termination shall include: ( 1 ) A copy of the charge;
( 2 ) Notification that the charge has been dismissed or the Commission's proceedings have otherwise been terminated; and
( 3 ) Notification that the aggrieved person's right to file a civil action against the respondent on the subject charge under the ADEA will expire 90 days after receipt of such notice.
[68 FR 70152, Dec. 17, 2003, as amended at 71 FR 26831, May 9, 2006; 85 FR 65220, Oct. 15, 2020; 89 FR 11172, Feb. 14, 2024]
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Heartland Bancshares, Inc., (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2005 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the
"Report"), the undersigned, James C. Clinard, President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, and Martha J. Kelley, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of
our knowledge:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.

By:

      /s/ James C. Clinard
      -------------------------------------
      James C. Clinard
      President and Chief Executive Officer
      August  10, 2005

      /s/ Martha J. Kelley
      -------------------------------------
      Martha J. Kelley
      Chief Financial Officer
      August 10, 2005
#### HOFFMAN v EDSON CO

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 10021.

Decided May 20, 1929

Charles A. Jilek, Cleveland, for Hoffman.

Conners & Lombard, Cleveland, for Ed-son.

Judges RICHARDS, WILLIAMS & LLOYD of the 6th district sitting.

RICHARDS, J.

In Spencer vs. Collins, et al., 156 California, 296, it was held that notice of disaffirmance need only be given to the party with whom the contract was made and need not be given to an assignee of the contract. See also Downing vs. Stone, 47 Mo. App., 144.

An infant, either before or within a reasonalbe time after becoming of age may disaffirm a contract not for necessaries. In the instant case, on electing to disaffirm, he caused the property to be returned, and this court is of the opinion that he was not required to do any more than that. While the application for credit signed by Hoffman gives his age as twenty four years, his testimony that he stated his age as twenty years and that the seller filled in the age as twenty four years is uncontradicted.

On the evidence contained in the bill of exceptions we think the trial court was in error in holding that there was no defense to the merits of the case, and for this reason the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

Williams and Lloyd, JJ, concur.
#### § 102.47 Filing of motion after transfer of case to Board.

All motions filed after the case has been transferred to the Board pursuant to § 102.45 must be filed with the Board in Washington, DC, and served upon the other parties. Such motions must be printed or otherwise legibly duplicated.
§ 77.7 Form and time of notice. ( a ) If you are required to file notice under § 77.9, you must submit to the FAA a completed FAA Form 7460-1, Notice of Proposed Construction or Alteration. FAA Form 7460-1 is available at FAA regional offices and on the Internet.
( b ) You must submit this form at least 45 days before the start date of the proposed construction or alteration or the date an application for a construction permit is filed, whichever is earliest.
( c ) If you propose construction or alteration that is also subject to the licensing requirements of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), you must submit notice to the FAA on or before the date that the application is filed with the FCC.
( d ) If you propose construction or alteration to an existing structure that exceeds 2,000 ft. in height above ground level (AGL), the FAA presumes it to be a hazard to air navigation that results in an inefficient use of airspace. You must include details explaining both why the proposal would not constitute a hazard to air navigation and why it would not cause an inefficient use of airspace.
( e ) The 45-day advance notice requirement is waived if immediate construction or alteration is required because of an emergency involving essential public services, public health, or public safety. You may provide notice to the FAA by any available, expeditious means. You must file a completed FAA Form 7460-1 within 5 days of the initial notice to the FAA. Outside normal business hours, the nearest flight service station will accept emergency notices.
# EUR-Lex - 31999D0070 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 31999D0070

**1999/70/EC: Council Decision of 25 January 1999 concerning the external auditors of the national central banks **

*
Official Journal L 022 , 29/01/1999 P. 0069 - 0070 *

COUNCIL DECISION of 25 January 1999 concerning the external auditors of the national central banks (1999/70/EC)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank and in particular to Article 27.1 thereof,

Having regard to the Recommendation of the European Central Bank (hereinafter referred to as the 'ECB`) of 12 November 1998 (1),

Whereas the accounts of the ECB and of the national central banks (hereinafter referred to as the 'NCBs`) are to be audited by independent external auditors recommended by the Governing Council of the ECB and approved by the Council;

Whereas the ECB has recommended the reappointment of the current external auditors appointed by each participating NCB subject to a possible later decision,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

1. KPMG Réviseurs d'Entreprises s.c., Antwerp, and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu s.c., Brussels, are hereby approved as the external auditors of the Banque Nationale de Belgique/Nationale Bank van België.

2. KPMG Deutsche Treuhandgesellschaft AG and PwC Deutsche Revision AG are hereby approved as the external auditors of the Deutsche Bundesbank.

3. Coopers & Lybrand, belonging to the international firm PricewaterhouseCoopers, is hereby approved as the external auditor of the Banco de España.

4. Mazars & Guérard, Paris, and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu-Audit, Neuilly, are hereby approved as the external auditors of the Banque de France.

5. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Dublin, is hereby approved as the external auditor of the Central Bank of Ireland.

6. Reconta Ernst and Young, spa, Rome, is hereby approved as the external auditor of the Banca d'Italia.

7. PricewaterhouseCoopers SARL (Société à responsabilité limitée), Réviseur d'Entreprises, Luxembourg, is hereby approved as the external auditor of the Banque centrale du Luxembourg.

8. Prof. Dr J.A. van Manen RA (Registered Accountant) is hereby approved as the external auditor of De Nederlandsche Bank, acting on a personal assignment, partner of PricewaterhouseCoopers.

9. Prof. DDr Kurt Neuner, Dr Pipin Henzl, Dr Peter Wolf, Mag. Christian Hofer, Dkfm. Dr Peter Christian Gormasz and Dkfm. Leopold Wundsam, all of whom are registered certified public accountants, are hereby approved as the external auditors of the Österreichische Nationalbank.

10. PricewaterhouseCoopers-Auditores e Consultores Lda., is hereby approved as the external auditor of the Banco de Portugal.

11. Arthur Anderson Oy is hereby approved as the external auditor of Suomen Pankki.

Article 2

This Decision shall be notified to the ECB.

Article 3

This Decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

Done at Brussels, 25 January 1999.

For the Council

The President

J. FISCHER

(1) OJ C 411, 31. 12. 1998, p. 11.
#### § 16.108 Awards against other agencies.

If an applicant is entitled to an award because it prevails over another agency of the United States that participates in a proceeding before the Department of Labor and the other agency takes a position that is not substantially justified, the award or an appropriate portion of the award shall be made against that agency by the adjudicative officer for the Department of Labor.
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 21

- 00341

- CV

CITY OF CEDAR PARK

v. JUAN DELAPENA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF C.D.L.P., A MINOR;

AND KORINA DELAPENA, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF

THE ESTATE OF C. D., A DECEASED MINOR

On Appeal from the 201 st District Court of Travis County , Texas Trial Court Cause No. D

- 1

- GN

- 19

- 007803

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on appeal, concludes the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and rendered . The Court orders the judgment of the trial court REVERSED and RENDERS judgment in accordance with its opinion . Costs of the appeal are adjudged against appell ee s

. We further order this decision certified below for observance. November 17, 2022