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S. Hrg. 113–370 

WHISTLEBLOWER RETALIATION AT THE HANFORD 

NUCLEAR SITE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND 

CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 11, 2014 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEIKAMP, North Dakota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Deputy Staff Director 

KEITH B. ASHDOWN, Minority Staff Director 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

LAUREN CORCORAN, Hearing Clerk 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

MARGARET DAUM, Majority Staff Director 

RACHEL WEAVER, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD, Chief Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statement: Page 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 2014 

Bill Eckroade, Deputy Chief of Operations, Office of Health, Safety and Security, U.S. Department of Energy ......................................................................... 3 

Matt Moury, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Safety, Security and Quality 

Programs, Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy ............ 5 

James Taylor, Senior Vice President, Global Management and Operations 

Services, URS Corporation .................................................................................. 15 

Michael Graham, Principal Vice President, Bechtel National, Inc. .................... 17 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Eckroade, Bill: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared statement with attachment ............................................................. 31 

Graham, Michael: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 17 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45 

Moury, Matt: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35 

Taylor, James: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 40 

APPENDIX 

Information submitted for the Record: 

The memorandum submitted by Mr. Eckroade ............................................. 33 

Information submitted by Mr. Moury ............................................................. 49 

Statement submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey .................................... 50 

Statement submitted by Dr. Walter L. Tamosaitis ....................................... 52 

Statement submitted by Tom Carpenter, Executive Director, Hanford 

Challenge with attachment .......................................................................... 79 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record: 

Mr. Eckroade ..................................................................................................... 238 

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 254 

Mr. Graham ...................................................................................................... 260 

(1) 

WHISTLEBLOWER RETALIATION AT THE 

HANFORD NUCLEAR SITE 

TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 2014 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:12 a.m., in 

room 628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claire McCaskill, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators McCaskill and Johnson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL 

Senator MCCASKILL. This hearing will now come to order. 

The waste treatment plant is a Federal nuclear facility in Hanford, Washington that is supposed to convert hazardous, highly radioactive nuclear waste into a more stable and safe form for permanent disposal. 

Last June, I held a hearing on contract management by the Department of Energy (DOE), which looked specifically at the waste 

treatment plant (WTP), at Hanford because the plant, which is 

under a design and construction construct in terms of how the contracts were given, has a litany of cost overruns and schedule 

delays. 

Today, however, we are here to examine another aspect of the 

plant—allegations that the Department of Energy and its contractors, Bechtel and URS, are engaging in retaliation against employees who raise concerns about the safety of the plant’s design and 

construction. 

The Department of Energy has a specific nuclear safety policy 

that states, ‘‘It is the policy of the Department of Energy to design, 

construct, operate and decommission its nuclear facilities in a manner that ensures adequate protection of workers, the public and the 

environment.’’ 

However, Federal agencies that have looked at safety issues at 

Hanford have repeatedly found key safety-related weaknesses, including the lack of quality assurance, safety culture and Federal 

oversight. 

Most recently, URS Manager for Environmental and Nuclear 

Safety Donna Busche has alleged that she was fired because she 

raised concerns that basic nuclear safety fundamentals had not 

been considered from the beginning of construction. 
2 

Another official associated with the waste treatment plant, the 

Manager of waste treatment plant Research and Technology, Dr. 

Walter, Tomasaitis, who testified before this Subcommittee in 

2011, also claims to have suffered professional damage, including 

termination, after raising major nuclear safety issues. 

These individuals and many more who have chosen to remain 

anonymous have brought their concerns forward to their employers, to DOE and to Congress. 

I do not think anyone wants to be a whistleblower. Reporting 

your colleagues, who may be your friends, for actions that look like 

waste, fraud, abuse or a danger to others is not an easy decision 

for most people, and life after you have blown the whistle is not 

easy either. 

But the job that whistleblowers do is tremendously important 

and valuable. That is why when courageous men and women feel 

compelled to speak out, we do not want to silence them. We want 

to give them a process that allows them to report that information 

without fear of retaliation. 

Before this hearing began, I took the opportunity to hear from 

Ms. Busche and Dr. Tomasaitis. I also heard from Mr. Carpenter, 

who represents many more whistleblowers through his work at 

Hanford Challenge. They describe an atmosphere in which they 

and other individuals faced severe retaliation for raising concerns 

about Hanford. 

Whether Ms. Busche or Dr. Tomasaitis or any of the other individuals that have come forward to this Subcommittee is right about 

the science behind the safety at Hanford is not a matter on which 

I or the people in the room at this hearing will be able to reach 

a final conclusion about. 

But the fact that Ms. Busche and Dr. Tomasaitis were fired, despite being known to have raised their concerns, has created the 

appearance of a chilled atmosphere to safety and the belief of employees that management suppresses technical dissent. That demands attention by Congress, and it certainly demands attention 

by the people who have oversight over this project. 

Today, we will hear from two witnesses from the Department of 

Energy, with responsibility for the safety culture at Hanford. We 

will also hear from Bechtel, the prime contractor at the waste 

treatment plant, and URS, the subcontractor to Bechtel, who is the 

employer of both Ms. Busche and Dr. Tomasaitis. 

I thank the witnesses for being here and look forward to their 

testimony. 

And we will begin with Mr. Eckroade and Mr. Moury. I will introduce both of you, and you can take your oath. 

And the reason I am a little frantic is that we are going to start 

votes at 11:30, which is really going to mess this up, and this is 

going to prolong the hearing in a way that did not seem efficient 

to me. 

And, since this is a Subcommittee about efficiency and effectiveness in government, it is hard for me to accommodate what seems 

to me an antiquated notion that members of the government cannot sit at the same table with contractors. That flies in the face of 

the reality that our government is filled with contractors working 

side by side, sometimes indistinguishable from each other in terms 
3 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Eckroade appears in the Appendix on page 31. 

of their work function and what they are doing. The notion that we 

have to have two tables to make sure the government people do not 

have to intermix with the company people seems to be somebody 

holding onto some notion that makes no sense in terms of today’s 

government and its operation. 

But I know you two are not responsible for that decision, so I will 

not yell at you. I will save my wrath for the person who actually 

made that decision, which will come at a later time. 

Mr. Eckroade is Deputy Chief of Operations, Office of Health, 

Safety and Security at the U.S. Department of Energy. Mr. 

Eckroade previously served as Principal Deputy Chief for Mission 

Support Activities in the Office of Health, Safety and Security and 

Director of the Office of Independent Oversight. 

Matt Moury is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Safety, Security 

and Quality Programs, Environmental Management at the U.S. 

Department of Energy, where he executes operational safety and 

awareness programs and oversees quality assurance programs. Mr. 

Moury previously spent almost 20 years at the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, which we referenced earlier, where he led the 

Board’s efforts to ensure the Department of Energy’s nuclear stockpile and defense nuclear research operations met health and safety 

standards. 

Thank you both for being here. It is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear all witnesses, if you would stand. 

Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to give before this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth; so help you, God. 

Mr. ECKROADE. I do. 

Mr. MOURY. I do. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you both. 

And we will begin with you, Mr. Eckroade. 

Am I pronouncing your name correctly, I hope? 

Mr. ECKROADE. Yes, Madam Chairman, you are. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF BILL A. ECKROADE,1 DEPUTY CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, OFFICE OF HEALTH SAFETY AND SECURITY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. ECKROADE. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Johnson 

and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity 

to provide testimony regarding safety culture and related issues at 

the Department of Energy’s Hanford site, waste treatment and immobilization plant, or WTP. 

I would like to take a brief moment to describe the unique role 

of the Independent Oversight Program within the Office of Health, 

Safety and Security, which has conducted safety culture reviews at 

Hanford and elsewhere. The mission of this program is to provide 

DOE line management, Congress and other stakeholders with an 

independent evaluation of the effectiveness of DOE policy and line 

management performance in safety and security. This mission is 

accomplished by conducting performance-based assessments designed to verify the Department’s security interests are protected, 
4 

that the Department can effectively respond to emergencies and 

the Department’s operations are conducted in a manner that protects its employees, the public and the environment. 

Our team has completed two safety culture assessments at WTP, 

one in 2010 and one in 2012. These assessments included interviews with employees of the Office of River Protection (ORP), and 

the contractor, Bechtel National, Incorporated (BNI), as well as a 

detailed review of their safety programs, processes and procedures. 

Detailed reports of these assessments and their recommendations 

have been provided to the Committee, and I will summarize their 

findings briefly. 

In the 2010 assessment, we found that most personnel who were 

interviewed expressed that their managers encouraged a questioning attitude and that they were comfortable with raising safety 

concerns. However, some individuals believed that there was a 

chilled environment that discouraged reporting of safety concerns, 

and some BNI employees expressed fear about retaliation. Our report contained a number of detailed recommendations for both ORP 

and BNI. Among those recommendations were that BNI strengthen 

procedures for the resolution of nuclear safety concerns, identify 

mechanisms to strengthen the trust among the workforce and better communicate information to employees. 

Two years later, in 2012, we performed a second comprehensive 

assessment to measure the State of the safety culture at the WTP. 

For this assessment, we engaged external independent experts 

with extensive experience in safety culture reviews to complement 

the highly experienced nuclear safety expertise of our staff. That 

helped us more effectively diagnose the safety culture and attributes at WTP and learn things we did not learn in our 2010 assessment. In 2012, we found that most personnel at WTP believed 

that safety was a high priority. However, a significant number of 

Federal and contractor staff expressed reluctance to raise safety or 

quality concerns. Fear of retaliation was identified in some BNI 

groups. Employee willingness to raise safety concerns without fear 

of retaliation is an essential element of a healthy safety culture. 

Our conclusion was that significant management attention was 

needed to improve safety culture at WTP. We found that, while 

managers espoused support for a healthy nuclear safety culture, 

they did not have a full appreciation of the current culture or the 

nature and level of effort needed to foster a healthy safety culture. 

We are currently conducting a followup assessment of safety culture at WTP, our third review. That review will be completed this 

spring and a written report presented to management. We look forward to sharing the results of that assessment with the Committee 

when it is complete. 

A strong safety culture starts with strong, ongoing support by 

the most senior leaders of the organization. We want to assure the 

Members of the Subcommittee that this is a very high priority for 

Secretary Moniz and Deputy Secretary Poneman. 

With the permission of the Subcommittee, I would like to introduce for the record a copy of a September 20, 2013 memorandum 

signed by both the Secretary and Deputy, titled ‘‘Personnel Com-
5 

1The memorandum referenced by Mr. Eckroade appears in the Appendix on page 33. 

2The prepared statement of Mr. Moury appears in the Appendix on page 35. 

mitment to Health and Safety through Leadership, Employee Engagement and Organizational Learning.’’1

The memorandum provides a visionary leadership and a deep 

personal commitment to building an organization we can all be 

proud to work in. A vibrant and healthy organizational culture will 

help the Department to achieve its national security, scientific and 

environmental missions safely and securely. We are committed to 

helping the Department achieve this goal. 

I would be glad to answer any questions that the Committee may 

have. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much. Mr. Moury. 

TESTIMONY OF MATT MOURY,2 DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SAFETY, SECURITY AND QUALITY PROGRAMS, 

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. MOURY. Well, good morning. Thank you, Chairman 

McCaskill, Ranking Member Johnson and Members of the Subcommittee. 

I am here today to discuss the Department of Energy’s efforts to 

improve workplace safety culture. In the interest of time, with your 

permission, I would like to give a brief summary of my testimony 

and then submit my full testimony for the record. Creating and 

maintaining a robust safety culture, including a workplace where 

all employees feel free to raise concerns, is essential to achieving 

our mission at the Hanford site in Washington State and across the 

DOE complex. 

As you mentioned earlier, in terms of my background, I am an 

engineer by training, and I have 30 years of experience in the nuclear field, including almost 20 years at the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. I also began my career as a nuclear trained submarine officer and recently retired with the Captain in the Navy 

Reserves. 

I spent much of my career working to ensure adequate protection 

of the health and safety of the workers and the public. At DOE, 

my office executes operational safety and awareness programs. 

At DOE, we believe safety culture is best described as an organization’s values and behaviors that are modeled by its leaders, internalized by its members and serves to make the safe performance 

of work the overriding priority to protect the workers, public and 

the environment. Improving safety culture across the Department 

remains a top priority. 

In September of last year, as Mr. Eckroade mentioned, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Energy reaffirmed their commitment to health and safety in a memorandum to all employees. The 

memo recognized that DOE can advance its challenging missions 

only if it provides all employees a safe and healthy work environment and fosters a culture in which workers at all levels are empowered to raise problems, participate in the development of solutions and are engaged appropriately in decisions that affect their 

work. 
6 

In addition, DOE has taken actions to improve safety culture at 

Hanford. Shortly after his confirmation, the Secretary of Energy 

traveled to the site to gain a firsthand understanding of the technical issues at the waste treatment plant. The Secretary continues 

to engage DOE senior leadership and employees to underscore the 

importance of a robust safety culture. 

In particular, the efforts taken over the last 2 years by DOE to 

improve safety culture at Hanford are extensive and varied. 

First, new leadership has been put in place. The new leadership 

has the qualifications, experience and safety values to put the 

waste treatment plant on a sustainable path. 

Second, the Department clarified formal roles and responsibilities for management in the waste treatment plant project execution plan, which is the DOE document that communicates to the 

contractor project objectives and how they will be accomplished. 

The Department also revised the waste treatment plant contract 

performance evaluation measurement plan to better balance the 

priorities and emphasize quality and safety culture elements. 

Third, DOE implemented a safety culture oversight process at 

the waste treatment plant. Senior management meets regularly 

with contractor management to formally review the contractor’s 

progress in executing its safety culture improvement action plan. 

Likewise, senior headquarters managers meet with ORP managers 

to discuss their progress and the progress of their contractors. 

Fourth, the Department designed training to assist in reinforcing 

a positive safety culture and engaged in an extensive effort to provide this training. Beginning in December 2011, a team of Federal 

and contractor subject matter experts from across the Department 

began to design, develop and deliver a course on safety culture and 

provided that training to more than 1,800 of our senior Federal and 

contractor leaders. 

Rules and slogans do not drive culture change. Leaders drive this 

change, personally. Leaders must recognize the message that their 

actions will convey to their employees. This course was designed to 

provide the tools necessary for leaders to improve our safety culture. 

Finally, the Department is working to strengthen the avenues to 

address issues raised by contractor and Federal employees. A comprehensive Issues Management System has been established at 

ORP to ensure that new and previously identified issues are addressed and tracked to closure. The Department has also strengthened the Hanford Employee Concerns Program, hired a new Employee Concerns Manager at Hanford and continues to administer 

its Differing Professional Opinion process, both of which provide 

additional avenues for employees to raise issues. 

Madam Chairman, with respect to claims of whistleblower retaliation by contractors, let me be clear. DOE is strongly committed 

to a workplace where all workers, both Federal and contractor employees, are free to speak out. They are free to voice concerns or 

lodge complaints without any fear of retaliation. Contractors are 

statutorily and contractually bound not to retaliate against employees for protected whistleblower conduct. 

While I cannot speak to the specifics of the claims under review, 

DOE was not asked to and did not approve Ms. Busche’s recent ter-
7 

mination. This termination has raised questions about the potential of an improper reprisal for having raised health, safety or other 

protected concerns. 

For this reason, the Department has asked the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to review the circumstances surrounding the 

termination of Ms. Busche. The Department will take appropriate 

action based on the outcomes of any IG investigation. 

In conclusion, while the Department has undertaken a broad 

array of activities to improve its safety culture, there still is work 

to be done. Safety culture is a continuum, and we continue to move 

along this continuum as we strive to improve. 

We recognize this is an ongoing process, a journey, not a destination and one which calls for continuous improvement. A safety culture built on these principles requires sustained effort by the Department’s leadership and senior managers. The Department remains fully committed to this effort. 

Madam Chairman, this completes my comments. I would be 

happy to answer your questions at this time. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you both very much for being here. 

We appreciate it very much. 

I, very rudely, blew right past my colleague’s and friend’s, Senator Johnson’s, opening statement. So I am going to defer my questions and allow him to go first in the spirit of bipartisan cooperation that we try to work on in this Committee. 

Senator JOHNSON. Nothing rude about it. I took no offense. I 

know we are trying to hustle through this. So I appreciate you letting me ask some questions. 

Mr. Eckroade and Mr. Moury, both of you are talking about studies and processes and all kinds of, no offense, bureaucratic gobbledygook. 

What I want to get to is I want to find out what control is in 

place right now. You are the customer. You should be in control of 

this process. 

What should someone like Ms. Busche do? What course of action 

should she be taking, and what kind of protections are available to 

her in the Department of Energy, currently, Mr. Moury? 

Mr. MOURY. Well, she should be—as I mentioned earlier, the Department is fully committed to her being able to raise any issue 

that—— 

Senator JOHNSON. What was the first step she should have 

taken? 

Is there somebody in the Department of Energy, somebody at the 

site, where somebody like Ms. Busche could go to and then really 

be able to speak very freely and kind of establish, hey, listen, I am 

a whistleblower; I need some protection? 

Mr. MOURY. Well, I mean there is certainly a series of steps she 

can go through to elevate her concerns, first, starting with her line 

organization, the people that she works for. 

If she does not achieve satisfaction through them, I mean, clearly, the best position we would be in is if the Department took those 

issues and a contractor took those issues, tracked them, worked 

them to closure and communicated the closure of those issues. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK, but that did not happen. 

So, if you are in a position as a whistleblower—— 
8 

Mr. MOURY. So, if that did not happen—— 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. You end up having to go to the 

customer, the government. What system is in place right now to 

address that type of situation? 

Mr. MOURY. Well, there are a number of different programs that 

are available that—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Well, there is a problem right there—a number of different programs. 

I mean, is there one specific approach that she should have 

taken? 

Is there somebody in the Department of Energy overseeing that 

contract that she could have gone to, that everybody from the contractor base knows that if I have a serious safety concern I go to 

this office right there to get this thing taken care of? 

Mr. MOURY. Well, the next step would be to go the Employee 

Concerns Program that is out at the waste treatment plant that is 

run by the Richland office. It is a combined Employee Concerns 

Program. We have expended an incredible amount of time upgrading that program, as I mentioned earlier in my statement. So that 

would be the next step. 

How she pursues her issues is really up to her. It is up to the 

individual. She can then take it to the headquarters and go 

through the Department of Energy’s program, or she can go directly to the Department of Labor (DOL), if she feels the need to 

raise her issues through those programs. 

Senator JOHNSON. Do you know if she availed herself of any of 

those programs? 

Mr. MOURY. I am not aware of her availing herself of the Hanford Employee Concerns Program. I do know that she has used the 

Department of Labor’s program. But other than that, I would have 

to get back to you with more details. 

Mr. MOURY. OK. Mr. Eckroade, can you add anything to that? 

Mr. ECKROADE. Ms. Busche, in the last couple of years, has used 

the DOE headquarters Employee Concerns Program a number of 

times. I am familiar with a couple of different employee concerns 

that she has sent forward. Most dealt with her concerns with actions of her managers that appear to be retaliatory in nature. 

She did use the mechanisms that were available to her to share 

her concerns, and I was aware of some of those, as well as other 

managers in the Department of Energy. 

Senator JOHNSON. Now was she in a unique position in terms of 

safety within the site, where her management, those contractors, 

had to consult with the Department of Energy, the customer, prior 

to her dismissal? 

Mr. MOURY. The Department was not consulted nor did we approve the termination of Ms. Busche. 

Senator JOHNSON. But was she in a position where according to 

the contract, according to the rules, that she was supposed to—that 

the Department of Energy should have been notified prior to her 

dismissal? 

Mr. MOURY. I am not an attorney. As I mentioned before, I am 

an engineer, not a contracting officer. I am not aware of the specifics of what was required prior to URS terminating Ms. Busche. 
9 

Senator JOHNSON. Well, that would be a pretty significant control, I would think, from the customer on their contractor—that if 

you have key safety positions, that prior to anybody—if one of 

those safety officers is raising an issue, prior to any termination or 

any type of action being dealt with that employee, the Department 

of Energy would have to be consulted and would have to be brought 

into that process. 

I mean, does that control exist? 

Mr. MOURY. I am not familiar with that specific element of the 

contractor. What I would like to do with your permission is to take 

that question for the record and provide you with an answer at a 

later date. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. Mr. Eckroade, do you have—are you 

aware of a particular control in place through the Department of 

Energy, governing these contracts, of employees of the contractor 

having a heightened status and because safety is such a huge 

issue, that the contractor must consult with the customer, the Department of Energy, prior to taking any employer action against an 

employee? 

Mr. ECKROADE. Just like my colleague, Mr. Moury, I am not a 

lawyer as well, and I am not familiar with any departmental policy 

that would govern the provision that you just mentioned. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. Can you point—because, again, we have 

talked about all these studies. You were going to say, specifically, 

this is what we have done. I just did not hear any specifics. 

I heard, like I say, studies, processes, formal review systems. 

I mean, specifically, what kind of controls are in place to afford 

whistleblower protection, to ensure that people who have legitimate 

safety concerns, where those concerns are adequately aired and addressed? 

Mr. ECKROADE. I will just talk about my office. 

The one thing that the Department has done is become aware of 

the importance of a healthy safety culture in its organizations. A 

few years ago, had the awakening when Mr. Tomasaitis raised his 

issues and he was removed from his position and the Defense 

Board raised concerns, and that was the beginning of our and my 

office’s first review of safety culture. 

We have learned about safety culture and how to assess it, but 

the Department growing its competencies in this area as we understand the results of safety culture reviews. We brought in external 

experts from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), who are 

helping us understand this very different aspect of safety, including 

things such as behavioral sciences that really help inform us about 

how we have to interface and communicate with our employees 

much better. 

Although the Department has not reached maturity in healthy 

safety culture, we are clearly learning the importance of it and 

growing in our abilities to manage it, but we still have a lot of 

problems left to manage. 

Senator JOHNSON. The Department has been around how many 

years? The Department of Energy—when was it created? 

Mr. ECKROADE. If you go back to the Manhattan Project, a long 

time. 
10 

Senator JOHNSON. And it has been overseeing these nuclear 

waste sites for how many years? 

Mr. ECKROADE. Over 50 years. 

Senator JOHNSON. And so now you are saying that the Office of 

Health Safety and Security, 2 years ago, was just really kind of 

coming into understanding and dealing with safety and security 

issues. 

Mr. ECKROADE. Right. The whole Department has really had an 

awakening since the 2010 timeframe. We did not stick our heads 

in the sand. We ventured out to try to learn about this. And we 

are learning, and we are growing, but we are not mature. 

Senator JOHNSON. I appreciate that you had an awakening 2 

years ago, but what is shocking, literally—I have been in business, 

and trust me, frequently, because of governmental actions, things 

like the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 

businesses have been concerned about safety and security for decades. It has been a top priority within the private sector. 

It is a little mind-boggling and a little jaw-dropping that within 

the Department of Energy, overseeing an incredibly complex—I will 

give you that—very difficult issue. 

I would not have to grapple with this. It has really been the last 

couple of years that we are kind of pulling our heads out of the 

sand and going, boy, we really ought to take a look at the safety 

and security concerns. 

I mean, I am just saying—just a commentary on that. 

Mr. ECKROADE. Just one comment, if I could, sir. The Energy Department has a very strong technical safety program. We have our 

own internal regulations that drive a lot of very good aspects of the 

occupational safety and health of our employees, and we had that 

awakening about 20 years ago. 

The issue of safety culture is very different. It is a new kind of 

study of safety. 

Senator JOHNSON. And what I am saying is in business the idea 

of a safety culture is not new, not by any stretch of the imagination. You have to have specific controls so that your employees and 

people that work with you know exactly what they need to do to 

raise safety concerns so they can be addressed very quickly. That 

is what has to happen. 

But thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

Assuming there are 10 minutes left on the vote, I am going to 

go ahead and go. 

Senator JOHNSON. Do you want me quick do it and come back? 

Senator MCCASKILL. That would be great. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. 

Senator MCCASKILL. She was a key personnel. She is still listed 

on the contract as key personnel—Ms. Busche. And, as key personnel, she could not be fired without DOE approval. 

We know that happened. We know she was fired without DOE 

approval. What is the recourse DOE has against the contractor for 

doing that? 

Mr. MOURY. Well, Bechtel provided to the Department a letter 

that said they were going to be changing the key personnel list, 

adding two and removing one. However, having said that, at no 
11 

time was the Department asked or approved the dismissal of Ms. 

Busche. 

And, as I mentioned before, her dismissal did raise some concerns about reprisal for the fact that she had been raising issues. 

So that is why the Department has taken the step to engage the 

IG to take a look at the circumstances surrounding her removal, 

and if, in fact, reprisal is found to exist, then the Department will 

take action. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And what would that be? 

Mr. MOURY. I do not know exactly what those actions would be. 

They would be dependent on the results of the review. I can get 

back to you with the very specifics about the actions or the steps 

that they could take. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Does it surprise you that they, 2 weeks 

after the Secretary, who I am a big fan of, Secretary Moniz—2 

weeks after he signed the memorandum about safety and a culture 

of safety, that they would choose that time to get rid of Dr. 

Tomasaitis and then just a few months later fire Ms. Busche? 

Do those seem to be the actions of a contractor that is concerned 

about a culture that welcomes whistleblowers? 

Mr. MOURY. I do not know the specifics of Ms. Busche’s termination. I believe you will have to ask the next panel to get into 

some of the specifics of why she was fired. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I am sure that we will not get into the specifics because I am sure that they will say it is in litigation. 

Mr. MOURY. We have certainly made it very clear to our contractors that reprisal against whistleblowers or people raising issues is 

totally unacceptable. We have different processes available to us if 

we do find that retaliation has occurred. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is what I am going to really watch 

carefully—— 

Mr. MOURY. That also includes award fees. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. Because you did the report in 

2012. Now you are doing another one. You have called the IG. 

Meanwhile, the money keeps flowing, costs keep escalating, performance bonuses keep being given. 

At some point in time, the customer here needs to do something 

other than ask for another report because, clearly, it does not appear that even the Secretary of Energy issuing a memorandum had 

much of a chilling effect on the company doing what they had to 

know was going to be two high profile dismissals. There are no two 

people at that plant that had a larger profile for having the courage to stand up on technical safety issues than those two people. 

Would you disagree with that statement, either one of you? 

Mr. MOURY. No. 

Senator MCCASKILL. After the Secretary of Energy, the most 

powerful person in the country in regards to their contract, signs 

a written memorandum basically saying, we cannot have this kind 

of culture, they say, you know what, we are going to get rid of the 

two biggest, highest profile whistleblowers in the whole Hanford 

treatment facility. 

And then let me ask you about the next piece of this. 
12 

Have you all discussed—and this may be for someone other than 

the two of you, but—this notion that contractors can litigate on our 

dime? 

Do you know how much we have forwarded them for legal costs 

at this point surrounding the dismissal of these two people? 

Mr. MOURY. I do not have that information with me. We can provide that information to you at another time. 

Senator MCCASKILL. The notion that they defend themselves 

without telling you they were firing her, they sent in something 

that they are going to try to argue, I am sure, means they were 

getting rid of her, but they did not tell you that. They just said 

they were changing key personnel. 

These cases go on for years, millions of dollars in legal costs, and 

at the end of that, if they settle the case without admitting any 

wrongdoing, then the taxpayer stays on the hook, correct? 

Mr. MOURY. I am sorry, Madam Chairman. Would you repeat 

that last piece? 

Senator MCCASKILL. At the end of a lengthy litigation—— 

Mr. MOURY. Correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. With expensive lawyers being 

paid by the government, if they settle at the end of this lengthy— 

or if they wear down the other side because the other side does not 

have the resources the U.S. Government has—you can imagine if 

you are an individual trying to sue a company that is being 

bankrolled by the U.S. Government. 

I mean, talk about hard. 

So there is a concept in litigation called wearing them down. Papering them to death. Overwhelming them with the resources of 

one side versus the other side. 

So let’s assume just a hypothetical case, not these individuals 

and a hypothetical case. They wear someone down 5, 6, 7 years. Finally, the person on the other side is out of money. Their lives have 

been on hold. Their careers have been on hold. And many times, 

they settle because they cannot go on anymore. 

And, if they settle and the defendant does not have to admit any 

kind of wrongdoing, then we stay on the hook. We end up having 

to cover all of those costs. 

Should there be something that would incentivize litigants that 

we are funding, that if it goes past a certain time or a certain 

amount of money spent, that they have to have skin in the game 

in this legal fight? 

Mr. MOURY. Well, I would say, Madam Chairman, that the costs 

to the contractor is not a done deal. It is up to the contracting officer to determine whether the legal costs are appropriate in the 

event that a case is settled. Whether they will be fully allowable 

or partially allowable is up to the contracting officer. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, that is good to know because I will 

have some questions for the contracting officer on this case. 

What if we had a rule that if you did not inform DOE, your customer, that you were firing key personnel that you had to absorb 

all the legal costs of litigation surrounding that firing yourself and 

not ask the government for reimbursement? 
13 

Mr. MOURY. I mean, that is an interesting concept. I would like 

to spend some more time thinking about it, and maybe we can provide you with some additional details. 

Senator MCCASKILL. There just seems to be something wrong 

with this. 

Mr. MOURY. Our system is also based on the presumption that 

our contractors are not liable based on an assertion by the contractor’s employees. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Of course not, and nor would I want there 

to be an assumption. 

I just know that in terms of resourcing litigation this is not an 

even playing field, and the way it is set up does not incentivize a 

quick resolution of the dispute. It incentivizes lengthy litigation as 

opposed to a quick resolution. 

And it seems to me that we could work on doing something in 

that regard that might level the playing field slightly—— 

Mr. MOURY. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. So that everyone had an opportunity to actually have their case adjudicated by an impartial jury. 

Mr. MOURY. Right. Ma’am, I understand—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. The vast majority of these never get there. 

Mr. MOURY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I understand your frustration, especially with the length of time 

that some of these issues take to be resolved. 

We do follow the processes that were set up by Congress, and we 

are always looking for ways to improve the Department’s processes, 

and the whistleblower is one that we are also looking at also. 

Senator MCCASKILL. We have discussed earlier today the Defense 

Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. I did not realize at the time that 

you had given so many years of service there and to your country 

in the military. 

You are the perfect witness to ask this question of. Why couldn’t 

we give DNFSB some kind of jurisdiction as a third party oversight 

on a facility like Hanford? 

Mr. MOURY. This is a little bit outside of what we were going to 

talk about today. 

I would say that the Board, in all my tenure there—I have been 

gone for a number of years. But it was really focused on the role 

of the Board to help the Department complete their mission, and 

in that context, their evaluations are based on the Department’s requirements and evaluating the implementation of those specific requirements. 

So to give them a separate, independent role—I think it removes 

what the purpose of the Board was put in place for when they were 

first established back in 1988. 

Senator MCCASKILL. At the end of the day, this controversy boils 

down to technical concerns, highly technical concerns, by two professionals in the field that had been given positions of great trust 

by your contractors. 

Do you feel comfortable, Mr. Moury, that their technical concerns 

have received the airing that they should? And, as somebody with 

your background, you know that they are not alone in the field 

with some of the technical concerns that they expressed. 
14 

Mr. MOURY. Well, we have asked the contractor to put a consolidated list of all the issues that both Dr. Tomasaitis and Ms. Busche 

have voiced. I am well aware of many of those issues, and many 

of those issues were raised by other people and are being pursued. 

Once we have that list, we will evaluate them based on the technical merit of the issues that they have raised and make a determination at that time. But those issues are being worked. 

I mean, many of these issues—since this is a one-of-a-kind facility, it is incredibly complex. The technical issues are very complex, 

and they take a long time to resolve. 

So sometimes our failure is in the fact that it takes us—we have 

not in the past done a good job of getting the word back to the people that are raising these issues on where exactly in the process 

resolution of their issues stands, and that is one of the key things 

that we have been working on. 

And I think it is important to preventing this chilled work environment, to make sure that people understand where those issues 

are being addressed and that they are not being ignored. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Either of you, are you familiar with the people that have been tasked with their responsibilities now at Hanford? 

Mr. ECKROADE. Could you be a little more specific? 

Senator MCCASKILL. The two jobs that they were removed from, 

two very important jobs, one in the technical capability and one in 

the safety EM capability. They were both high-level people at that 

facility. Who has replaced them; do you know? 

Mr. ECKROADE. I am not aware. 

Mr. MOURY. I do not know the answer. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Have you heard anything from either of 

those people about any of the same concerns? 

Mr. MOURY. The people that replaced them? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Correct. 

Mr. MOURY. I have not heard anything. I am not sure who is replacing those two individuals. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Would it be a smart thing for the Department of Energy to go to their replacements and go through 

that list of concerns and see if they have the same ones, to take 

the impetus yourselves to ask those questions? 

Mr. MOURY. Well, I think it would be appropriate certainly to 

work with them and go through this list of issues and to determine 

the validity of those technical issues. I think that is fully appropriate. 

Senator MCCASKILL. If you did that, if you took the impetus to 

do that, that would remove the necessity of them being branded as 

whistleblowers, and it would also give credibility to the concerns 

that were raised in the first place—that you were asking about 

those same concerns. 

In other words, you cannot just replace these two people and 

have the concerns go away. 

Mr. MOURY. That is correct. 

In the real world, I mean, I understand the benefit that whistleblowers have provided to our country on a number of different 

areas. 
15 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor appears in the Appendix on page 40. 

If we were in an ideal world, we would have very few whistleblowers because when their issues are raised initially at those 

lower levels we would address them; we would track them to closure; we would keep them informed of how we were progressing. 

And that whole process is something that we have been expending a lot of time trying to strengthen. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I appreciate very much. 

I have to go vote. If you have more questions, great. If not, this 

is the introduction for the two witnesses that will—— 

Senator JOHNSON. You want to hear the testimony, right? 

Senator MCCASKILL. No, you can go ahead. I have read it. 

Senator JOHNSON [Presiding.] Well, thank you. I will, I guess, 

dismiss you two. 

Senator MCCASKILL. If you would not mind staying, in case we 

have questions after the other two witnesses testify, we would really appreciate it. 

Mr. ECKROADE. Certainly. 

Mr. MOURY. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. So I will ask the other witnesses to come 

forward then. 

Again, thank you for being willing to appear before our Subcommittee. 

Our first witness is James Taylor. He is Senior Vice President, 

Global Management and Operations Services at URS Corporation, 

where he oversees strategic initiatives, business development activities and administrative and operations support functions. Mr. 

Taylor leads the business unit responsible for URS’s work at the 

waste treatment plant at Hanford. Mr. Taylor has 26 years of experience in the nuclear industry, including as Director of the Savannah River National Lab. 

So, Mr. Taylor, welcome. 

And our second witness is Michael Graham. He is the Principal 

Vice President at Bechtel National, Inc. Mr. Graham has worked 

at four major Department of Energy sites across the country and 

previously led a project to evaluate the impacts of Hanford waste 

on groundwater in the Columbia River. 

So, again, it is the tradition of this Subcommittee to ask people 

to swear in, so if you would stand. 

Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 

the truth? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I do. 

Mr. GRAHAM. I do. 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Taylor, why don’t you start your testimony? 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES N. TAYLOR,1 SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, 

GLOBAL MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS SERVICES, URS 

CORPORATION 

Mr. TAYLOR. Good morning, Ranking Member Johnson and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear 

before you today. 
16 

My name is James Taylor. I am the General Manager responsible for the environmental cleanup work under URS’s Energy and 

Construction Division, the role I assumed in January of this year. 

I am grateful to lead a team of nearly 20,000 dedicated professionals working at 18 major cleanup projects in the United States 

and abroad. My business unit is responsible for our work on the 

waste treatment plant at the Department of Energy’s Hanford nuclear site in Richland, Washington. I would like to provide you a 

brief introduction to the work we do at the waste treatment plant 

and discuss our companywide commitment to safety. I also want to 

be very clear. URS has zero tolerance for retaliation against whistleblowers. This is firmly embedded in our company’s culture and 

goes hand in hand with our dedication to safety. 

As you are aware, projects at the Hanford site are intended to 

address once-in-a-lifetime environmental challenges, and we will 

eventually build a one-of-a-kind facility. There are currently more 

than 56 million gallons of nuclear waste stored in underground 

tanks at the Hanford site. The waste is a byproduct of nine nuclear 

reactors that operated at Hanford from World War II through the 

Cold War. Some of these tanks were constructed as early as the 

1940s, and many are well beyond their design life. 

When operational, the waste treatment plant will be the first 

chemical waste processing facility in the world with the capacity to 

separate and stabilize nuclear waste. Our role at the waste treatment plant is to work with Bechtel, DOE’s prime contractor at the 

site, to design, construct and startup this treatment facility. We 

work under the direction of DOE and Bechtel. DOE is charged with 

managing the Hanford site and has the ultimate authority over the 

project from design to completion. 

It is imperative that we continue to develop and implement the 

technology needed to process this waste and complete the waste 

treatment plant as soon as safely possible. 

Understanding the unique safety and environmental demands of 

this project, we listen very seriously to feedback from congressional 

leaders, experts in the field, our employees, and members of the 

public, and we are always open to new ideas. 

I know how important it is to get this right from a national perspective but also from a local perspective. Hundreds of our employees live and work in this community, and no one is more committed 

than we are to the success of the waste treatment plant. 

We are proud of the safety record that we have built over many 

years at many facilities in the United States and abroad. We know 

we need to remain ever-vigilant to protect and extend that record, 

which is why our corporation, our corporate culture, makes safety 

our highest priority. 

URS encourages its employees to raise safety concerns, and we 

are methodical in addressing the concerns they identify. We work 

closely with our employees to promote an open atmosphere because 

the complex issues we tackle demand a questioning attitude and 

creative solutions. Critical feedback and dissent are vital parts of 

our process, which is one of the reasons we encourage employees 

to raise concerns and challenge the status quo. We address all 

identified concerns and value these important contributions to our 
17 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Graham appears in the Appendix on page 45. 

safety culture. We also continue to improve the safety culture at 

the waste treatment plant through internal and external reviews. 

Ms. Busche joined the waste treatment plant project in March 

2009. On February 18, 2014, Ms. Busche’s employment was terminated for cause due to her conduct and behavior. Ms. Busche was 

not retaliated against because she raised safety concerns. Given 

the privacy interests at stake and the pending litigation relating to 

Ms. Busche’s employment, I am limited in what I am able to say 

about this matter. I can say with confidence, however, that URS 

counts on our employees working at the front lines to remain vigilant about safety. For this reason, we have effective policies and 

procedures in place to encourage employees to raise safety concerns 

and a zero tolerance policy against retaliation to protect them when 

they do. 

I am proud of the work we at URS do to address some of our 

country’s most difficult environmental challenges. We will continue 

to work with DOE and others to ensure the waste treatment plant 

is designed and constructed safely with the best available technology. 

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this hearing, and 

I am happy to answer your questions. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Taylor. Mr. Graham. 

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL GRAHAM,1 PRINCIPAL VICE 

PRESIDENT, BECHTEL NATIONAL, INC. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Senator Johnson, I am Michael Graham, Principal 

Vice President of Bechtel National, Incorporated. 

Bechtel designed and engineered the defense waste processing facility at the Savannah River site in South Carolina. It is the only 

plant in the Nation that currently converts liquid high-level nuclear waste into solid glass, a process known as vitrification. This 

is the same process that will be used at WTP. 

The waste treatment plant at Hanford is being designed and 

built to meet a U.S. Government commitment to the State of Washington to immobilize the highly radioactive waste stored in 177 

aging underground tanks. These legacy tanks of World War II and 

the Cold War date back to the 40s, and 67 of these tanks have been 

reported to have leaked over a million gallons of radioactive waste. 

The plant will take the radioactive tank waste, mix it into glass 

and package it into robust containers for permanent disposal. 

This mission to safely dispose of the radioactive waste that has 

been accumulated over generations is a challenge that has been 

handed to our generation by our parents and our grandparents. It 

is, and will continue to be, difficult, costly and time-consuming venture. We owe it to our children and our grandchildren to undertake 

this task and to bring it to successful conclusion. 

An essential element of our success in completing technically 

challenging projects like WTP is creating and maintaining a strong 

safety culture that values a questioning attitude toward technical 

and safety issues. Raising and resolving technical issues is an integral part of our fundamental work process. All personnel are ex-
18 

pected to fully and collaboratively participate in the identification 

and resolution of issues and concerns. 

In most instances, differences in professional opinions are resolved as a routine part of interactions between colleagues and 

management, but if these interactions do not effectively address a 

question, there are multiple avenues for project personnel to raise 

issues and concerns. 

The first is the Project Issues Evaluation Report (PIER) process. 

It is a tool for managing WTP’s technical issues and opportunities 

for improvement. Issues raised in the PIER process are fully transparent to the Department of Energy. This readily available process 

provides a mechanism for the resolution of any and all issues, be 

they raised by a project personnel or an external reviewer. 

The next level is the Employee Concerns Program (ECP), and it 

provides all personnel at WTP with an independent avenue for reporting and resolving concerns. 

And yet another level is the Differing Professional Opinions 

(DPO) process. This process is a formal mechanism for WTP personnel to resolve questions and concerns about the adequacy of the 

technical design or if there is a legitimate disagreement regarding 

the appropriate technical path. The DPO process provides a formal 

review of the disputed issues by a technically qualified and independent panel with oversight by a DPO review board. 

So, collectively, these represent a robust, best-in-class process for 

identifying and tracking and resolving issues and concerns. 

I can assure you the WTP project will not be completed until all 

open technical questions have been resolved to the satisfaction of 

our team and the Department of Energy. The facility will then undergo a rigorous multiyear operational readiness review process. 

Operational testing will use surrogate materials to demonstrate 

that the plant will safely operate as designed and will be performed 

before any hot nuclear operations can begin. 

This process took many years to complete when DWPF, the plant 

in South Carolina, was started up in the 90s. 

Finally, you have asked what role our company had in Ms. 

Busche’s dismissal. Ms. Busche was an employee of URS, and URS 

alone made the decision related to the termination of Ms. Busche. 

It is my understanding that we were informed by URS that they 

were considering terminating Ms. Busche’s employment for cause. 

I also understand that we were informed by URS that they intended to proceed with termination, and we received a letter from 

URS, formally notifying us of Ms. Busche’s departure, which we 

then forwarded to the Department of Energy. 

We at Bechtel are extremely proud of our work at Hanford. It is 

an honor to serve as the government’s lead contractor for this vitally important project. We welcome thoughtful criticism as a 

foundational component for our commitment to continuing improvement. 

It is important to note that there are many enormous successes 

at the WTP project, and we are committed to reaching that day 

when the plant is operating and safely processing nuclear waste to 

protect the Columbia River and the people of the Pacific Northwest. 

Thank you. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you both for your testimony. 
19 

Let me just first ask, were either of you in the room when we 

were talking with Ms. Busche? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. 

Senator JOHNSON. Anything from that discussion that you want 

to respond to, Mr. Taylor? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, I only heard the very end of her testimony. I 

do not have any comments from that. 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Graham. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Was your question, was I here at the earlier session roundtable? 

Senator JOHNSON. Correct. 

Mr. GRAHAM. I was not, sir. 

Senator JOHNSON. Oh, OK. 

There was, let’s say, a description of—I would call it—regulatory 

capture or basically that the contractors themselves so overwhelm 

the Department of Energy, in terms of design and safety concerns, 

that it almost renders the Department of Energy moot in terms of 

their safety concerns. Would you agree with that assessment? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I would not. I think there is adequate oversight by 

the Department of Energy. I have worked at a number of the sites 

and in partnership with DOE to work on these very difficult problems. 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I agree. I think there is adequate oversight by DOE. 

We certainly focus on our oversight of our projects. 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Graham, it sounded like you were informed by URS that Ms. Busche was going to be terminated and 

then you reported that to the Department of Energy. Is that correct? 

Mr. GRAHAM. That is my understanding, yes. 

Senator JOHNSON. Is that your duty under your contract? 

Because I was asking the folks from the Department of Energy 

and they did not seem to be aware of any kind of contractual or 

legal obligation of let’s say a protected bunch of employees for a 

contract, dealing with safety, to notify the Department of Energy. 

Is it your understanding that there is that contractual obligation 

or legal obligation? 

Mr. GRAHAM. It is my understanding that there is not a contractual obligation for us to get DOE’s approval if we are dismissing 

an employee for cause. 

Senator JOHNSON. Regardless of what position that employee 

may be in? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. Well, that creates a problem for a whistleblower if it is a safety issue because a company could always 

then not notify and take the position that you are obviously taking 

in this case, that the termination was for cause. Is that a little bit 

of a problem in the control process there? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I think this is a very interesting situation. 

And, again, this was a URS employee, and URS took the action. 

We were informed. 

Senator JOHNSON. Let me state, as I did in that earlier meeting, 

I do not think this is the place to adjudicate an employer-employee 

dispute. To a certain extent, that is part of this issue, but you also 
20 

have the very legitimate concerns of whistleblower protection and 

raising safety issues that, I mean, I would like to think that everybody working on this project is highly concerned about. 

So let’s go into the types of controls that should be in place. 

Mr. Graham, you talked about a number of steps that somebody 

who has a safety issue or concern can go through. At what point 

in those areas—because it sounded like there was the PIER and 

then you had the Employee Concern avenue appeal to an independent body. I mean, what independent body? 

Mr. GRAHAM. So, if there is an issue that raises to a differing 

professional opinion, then resources outside the project with known 

expertise in these areas are brought in to help resolve the issue. 

Senator JOHNSON. But who pays for those resources? 

Mr. GRAHAM. My understanding is that is paid for by the project 

as an allowable cost. 

Senator JOHNSON. So, really, it would be the contractor employing or contracting with the subcontractor to provide that expertise. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Right. 

Senator JOHNSON. There would probably be some issues of independence there, wouldn’t you agree? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, I think all of our processes are very transparent. 

And so, just as we have done in the commercial nuclear industry, 

that first tier of the opportunity for people to raise concerns is a 

very low-threshold, high-volume process. And so it has in there 

issues like they do not like somebody smoking at the work site to, 

other concerns about safety or other things. And those are all 

tracked to closure, and all those will be reviewed before the plant 

enters into any kind of a startup phase. 

Senator JOHNSON. Reviewed by whom? 

Mr. GRAHAM. So it is reviewed by the Department of Energy—— 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. 

Mr. GRAHAM [continuing]. And by our management team. 

Senator JOHNSON. So somebody who has a real safety concern 

and goes through these processes can be assured that the Department of Energy is going to be well aware of somebody raising an 

issue. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Absolutely. 

Senator JOHNSON. I was certainly concerned about just differing 

professional opinions, and we talked about the Fukushima site 

where apparently the experts back in the design phase said we 

should have built higher tsunami walls to protect the diesel generators, the cooling generators. 

I have spoken with some nuclear experts in the past, that that 

instance has resulted in really a different design idea, that what 

we ought to do is just put a big ole tank of water over the reactor 

so it can be filled with any power source. To me, that makes a lot 

of sense. 

Now there is a difference of expert opinion prior to, basically, a 

continuous improvement process where you actually have an instance that says, well that would not have worked either; this 

works better. 
21 

Describe the resolution in differing professional expert opinions 

which can be pretty strongly held? How do you resolve those 

things? 

Who in the end is the arbiter? Who makes the decision on what 

could be some very strongly held differences of expert opinion? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, I think, at the end of the day, we are the 

project manager, and we would take our recommendations forward 

to the Department of Energy, and we would gather input from the 

best and brightest. 

As we talked about, this is an incredibly complex plant. And so 

I think just to put it into perspective, the footprint of WTP is over 

60 acres, and the Pentagon sits on about 41 acres. So it is huge. 

Senator JOHNSON. But in the end, it would be the Department 

of Energy. If you have a pretty close call, a technical issue—— 

Mr. GRAHAM. Right. 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. If there is a difference opinion 

and a decision has to be made, is that the contractor that makes 

the decision on that, or is it the Department of Energy that in the 

end is the customer and makes the final call? 

Mr. GRAHAM. It would be our recommendation with DOE’s approval. 

Senator JOHNSON. So you would make a recommendation, but 

DOE in the end has control of the process. They will decide between the alternatives based on the information you are providing 

them. 

Mr. GRAHAM. And with a lot of input from the external Defense 

Board and others. 

Senator JOHNSON. Again, I understand the constraint here, 

which is the reason this is not a very good place to adjudicate the 

employer-employee issue here. But, within that constraint, can you 

describe to me; what is the area of disagreement between the two 

whistleblowers that we talked to earlier and Bechtel or URS and 

the Department of Energy in terms of the safety issues? Can you 

at least describe that? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I am obviously not steeped in all the details of that 

plant and these issues, but I can give you a landscape picture. 

The issues, as I understand it, that have been raised by these individuals are, as was stated earlier, issues that other people have 

also raised. I can assure you that each of these issues is being formally tracked and will be tracked to closure in those systems that 

I described. 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Taylor, do you have anything to add 

there? Can you get a little more specific in terms of what is the 

issue at hand? 

I mean, we heard some pretty scary things about hydrogen explosions and some relatively scary issues being raised here. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Senator, I, unfortunately, cannot get into more detail. I just took over the position as General Manager approximately 8 weeks ago. 

I have asked my Executive Vice President to go investigate the 

concerns that were raised, the nuclear safety concerns at the site. 

He has investigated those. What I am told is that all of the issues 

that have been raised are being tracked and corrective actions put 

in place and that it is a work in progress. 
22 

Senator JOHNSON. And when you say tracked, this is going to be 

going through a process that is very transparent, and the Department of Energy is well aware of these things, correct or incorrect? 

I mean, is this just being tracked internally within the contractor 

and subcontractor base, or is the Department of Energy fully engaged, fully looking over your shoulders in terms of what issues are 

being discussed, what concerns are being raised? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I have not been engaged at that level of detail to 

know the details of the list, but I have been told that they are 

being tracked. 

Senator JOHNSON. But, again, when you say tracked, that means 

full transparency and the Department of Energy being involved in 

these. 

Mr. TAYLOR. That is correct. That is my understanding. 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Graham, do you have anything to add to 

that? 

Mr. GRAHAM. No, that is correct. 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Graham, you were talking about—I think 

it was you. 

No, actually, Mr. Taylor, you were also Director of the Savannah 

River National Lab. 

One of the questions I had during the earlier session was, is 

there—it sounds like those cleanup sites are progressing. The 

plants have been constructed. We are actually solving the problem 

there. 

Is there something dramatically different at the Hanford site 

versus other sites that are currently operating? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I can provide a little background on that. The Hanford site used five different processes to separate the plutonium 

through the years. The Savannah River site had one. And so the 

complexity of the 56 million gallons of waste that is sitting in these 

failing tanks is much more complicated than it is at Savannah 

River. 

And so even though the fundamental aspect of making glass is 

well understood and is operating well within Savannah River, 

these different processes in the early days of the Manhattan 

Project makes this a much more challenging project. 

Senator JOHNSON. Would either of you be willing to, or care to, 

comment on your own evaluation in terms of the expertise that resides within the government agencies that are involved with you? 

Does the government have enough resources? 

Do they have manpower? 

Do they have the requisite skills of the people in the position to, 

with transparency, with tracking process, really understand what 

the issues and be in the position that when you make a recommendation on different ideas in terms of how to handle these 

problems, that in the end the Department of Energy is well enough 

versed and has the expertise to make the intelligent decision there? 

I realize that might be kind of a difficult question to ask, but—— 

Mr. GRAHAM. No, actually, I think absolutely. 

I personally know Kevin Smith who is the head of DOE’s operation at Hanford for the Office of River Protection. I had the honor 

of working with him when I was at Los Alamos, managing the 

cleanup of that site. 
23 

I have had a lot of experience with the Department of Energy 

Environmental Management over the years, and they have a depth 

and breadth of expertise that I know that the Japanese, when they 

had their issues with Fukushima, turned to the Department of Energy here for support. 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I think the Department of Energy has significant 

resources, No. 1. They are well trained and qualified. 

Many of the DOE folks have worked in the commercial world. So 

they have worked for contractors like Bechtel and URS. 

So I would agree that they have the expertise to work with the 

contractors and provide good oversight. 

Senator JOHNSON. Again, you are probably not the best people to 

ask this question. But, can you think of anything in the Department of Energy or any of the government agencies overseeing your 

work, any controls that are in place that simply do not work or 

that are just burdensome, that could be replaced by better controls 

that would provide better transparency and certainly address and 

protect whistleblowers? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I do not have anything that comes to mind at this 

point. 

Senator JOHNSON. One of my concerns is the disparity of just 

who pays legal fees. As it was described in the earlier meeting, the 

legal fees to mount a defense for the contractors is really reimbursed by the government. The whistleblowers themselves, apparently—I would imagine it is because they were terminated with 

cause—have no one in terms of paying for legal fees, which ends 

up really putting them at huge disadvantage. 

Do you agree with that fact, that it puts them at a disadvantage? 

Is there a better process for whistleblower protection potentially 

right within the Department of Energy? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I think we would be happy to engage in those discussions, but I did not come prepared to talk about that aspect of 

this situation. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I do not have anything to add. 

We could provide our technical experts inside our company to 

support you on that. 

Senator JOHNSON. I think that is really what we have to—I think 

this Committee really has to be taking a look at that and how can 

we offer the appropriate whistleblower protection and how can we 

ensure safety. 

To me, the government is the customer, and they ought to be in 

charge. That is certainly the way it was in my business. 

I mean, we had pretty well—when our customers said jump, we 

jumped, and we did what they required. 

So we surely want to look—but, again, I want to design these 

things to facilitate safety, as cooperative a process as possible. 

I would like to just turn to, from my standpoint, a little bit of 

a conundrum certainly that I would be concerned about—trying to 

find any company willing to work on this project. This is a oncein-a-lifetime problem. It is a very difficult problem. 

How many companies in the world could be viewed as viable contractors to do something like this? 
24 

I mean, what is the universe, the known universe, of potential 

suppliers here? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I think if you look at the companies that have the 

expertise, the capabilities and experience to do this work, there are 

only a handful. 

I think that URS, from an operations standpoint and startup and 

test of significant facilities like this, we are one of the leaders. 

I think Bechtel in the same sense; when it is doing the engineering, procurement, construction, they are known to be the best in 

the world. 

And, if you look outside that, there are other companies that operate similar facilities. For example, in France, there is Areva. And 

I know there are other companies outside, in Japan and other 

countries, that also have that capability. 

But, in the United States, it is a very small group, and I would 

say that URS and Bechtel are the leaders in this business. 

Senator JOHNSON. Do you know of any companies that might 

have the capability that just refuse to do it, or started working on 

a project like this and just walked away out of sheer frustration 

and mounting losses? Did that ever happen? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I am not aware of that happening. 

Mr. GRAHAM. I am not aware. 

I would just say that, we are—and I will not speak for URS, but 

I think we are fully committed to this really critical and difficult 

mission, and we have thick skins, and we are going to stick it out. 

Senator JOHNSON. This is kind of harkening back to the hearing 

we had back in June, but just refresh my memory. Talk about how 

these contracts are tailored. What is the review process? How often 

are they renegotiated? What are the cost escalator provisions? 

Can you just really kind of describe in detail how this all comes 

about and how it is managed on an ongoing basis? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, yes, and I was here in June when we discussed this. 

The original contract for waste treatment plant was for to fasttrack a pilot plant to get on with the waste. That scope was expanded, and it now includes the future larger plant that was going 

to be a phase two. So it was to do it all at once. 

That change was managed through a very formal change management program for contract management within DOE. And so all 

changes in scope, all issues associated with managing through 

these complex things are handled through formal change control 

with approval of the contracting officer for the Department of Energy. 

Senator JOHNSON. Are those all cost-plus contracts? 

How do you—— 

Mr. GRAHAM. This particular contract is cost-plus. 

Senator JOHNSON. What is the plus? 

I mean, what do you expect above your costs? 

What do you—and, again, your costs are fully loaded? I mean, is 

that a full costing system then plus a profit? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Incentive fees or—right. But the cost is our cost of 

our materials and people. 

Senator JOHNSON. So, in terms of your contract so far, how much 

have you been paid by the government? 
25 

Mr. GRAHAM. I would be glad to provide for the record later. I 

am not prepared to answer that today. 

Senator JOHNSON. I would appreciate that information. 

And do you have any sense for just your percent profitability? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I do not. 

Senator JOHNSON. What is the plus of the cost-plus? Do you 

know what that percentage is that is called out in the contracts? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I do not. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. Well, again, I would certainly appreciate 

that for the record. 

Mr. GRAHAM. You bet. 

Senator JOHNSON. With that, Madam Chairman, I will turn it 

back over to you. Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL [Presiding.] Thank you very much. Thank 

you for helping us accommodate, and thank you all for helping us 

accommodate, an aggressive schedule of voting at the same time 

that we are trying to have hearings with people who have disrupted their schedules to accommodate ours. 

So it is the chaos of the scheduling of the Senate, and I apologize 

for it. 

Let me first make sure I understand both of your positions, especially URS. 

Mr. Taylor, about notification of DOE about removing two folks— 

both of you should answer this. 

About what you feel like your legal obligation is in terms of notifying your customer over firings of two people who had a very high 

profile in terms of discussing technical concerns relating to safety, 

do you feel that either of you had an obligation to tell DOE that 

you were letting these folks go? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I will speak to Ms. Busche. Out of courtesy, we routinely notify our customers if we have significant issues—for example, in regards to Ms. Busche, we did have some individual raise 

concerns about her conduct and behavior, and they were severe. 

And, basically, I needed to notify DOE to let them know because 

Donna is a key person, because these are severe claims against her. 

I needed to let them know, especially given that she is a whistleblower. 

Absolutely, we do not support action or retaliation against whistleblowers. So we just needed to let DOE know. So we felt that because of that there was an obligation. 

From a personnel issue, when you are terminating an employee 

for cause, my understanding—and I am not an attorney or an expert on the matter, but notifying DOE is not formally required. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So it is not formally required. 

Are you saying that you did it? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I am saying that I notified my counterpart in DOE 

that we have significant issues associated with an employee, Ms. 

Busche, about her conduct and behavior, and that they were severe, and it was just a notification. 

They were not notified that we had actually done the investigation, that we confirmed the findings, and then we moved to terminate her. They did not know that we had terminated her until after 

the fact. 
26 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. And it is your belief that that is not legally required? 

Mr. TAYLOR. That is my belief. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And let’s assume it may not be legally required. But, do you think it might be a good idea to tell them that 

you were firing her under all those circumstances that you just delineated, just from a management perspective? 

What would be the reason you would not want to tell them? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, from a human resources standpoint—I have 

experts that basically inform me that these are private issues with 

employees. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Wait. You just said you already told them 

you had severe issues with her conduct. You did that. You were not 

worried about her privacy then—that you had serious ongoing conduct issues. So you did not hesitate to already poison the well, so 

to speak. 

But you did not think that somehow telling that you had fired 

her was somehow a kinder thing to her since you had already done 

that? 

I mean, that does not make sense to me. Why would you go to 

them in the first place and tell them you had problems with her, 

unless you were papering the file? 

Mr. TAYLOR. It was out of courtesy to our primary customer to 

notify them that we had these allegations and we are investigating. 

Senator MCCASKILL. But you did not think it was a courtesy to 

let them know that you fired her. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Following the termination, we did call—I called my 

counterpart and informed them about the conditions around her 

termination at a very high level. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Let’s talk a little bit about the nondisclosure form. I have had a chance to—my staff has had a 

chance, I should accurately say, to look at the nondisclosure form. 

It is my understanding that there is nothing in the nondisclosure 

form that delineates the ongoing superior rights of an employee to 

report safety concerns to either an IG or to Congress, that is not 

included in your disclosure report. Is that correct? [No response.] 

Your nondisclosure agreement that someone has to sign when 

they come to work for you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I am not an attorney or an expert on the legal 

issues around a nondisclosure form. So I really cannot address 

that. 

It is not my understanding that that is a document that gets in 

the way of any employee raising concerns. We have to have an 

open environment. Folks have to have the opportunity to raise safety concerns. We cannot startup these complicated high-risk nuclear 

facilities if there is any risk of safety to our employees, the environment, and the public. 

So it is my understanding that that does not prevent employees 

from coming forward. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Do you acknowledge, either one of you, that 

you have an issue with the culture there, that people do not believe 

they can come forward? 

Do you see that as a problem that you need to manage? 
27 

Mr. GRAHAM. We obviously, take this very seriously. We will continue to encourage people to bring any issues that they have forward. 

As I said in my oral testimony, we have several mechanisms for 

people to do that. If they want to remain anonymous, they can. 

And all of those issues are openly tracked. DOE has access to 

that information. And we make sure that we track those and appropriately close those issues. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Do you believe the issues that were raised 

by the two people that were terminated have been adequately 

tracked and taken care of? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I can assure that all of the issues that they raised 

or were—as was pointed out earlier—raised by others, are being 

formally tracked to closure within our system. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So, if we have a list of those, you could 

give us that information for the Committee record? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, Madam Chairwoman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So are there any technical issues that either 

of these people raised that you thought did not—that were off the 

wall or irrational or reflected something other than a sincere desire 

to point out technical problems that they foresaw could arise, or 

safety problems that could arise? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, I just would say that, in our process, we go 

through and make sure that each of those is vetted by appropriate 

individuals. 

And I am not in a position to prejudge how those matters will 

be resolved. That would not be appropriate. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Have any of them been resolved that 

they—because some of these go back years, especially Dr. 

Tomasaitis. 

Mr. GRAHAM. I do not have those details, but I would be glad to 

provide the status of all the issues. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think some of them were raised as early 

as 10 years ago. I would hope they have been tracked and resolved. 

Mr. GRAHAM. I am just not prepared to give you the details 

today. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Mr. GRAHAM. But I will be glad to—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. If you would get those details for us, we 

would like to see how those concerns have been tracked and resolved. 

Mr. GRAHAM. OK. Absolutely. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let’s talk about legal fees. How much have 

you guys spent defending yourself on these lawsuits; do you know? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I have no firsthand knowledge of what the legal fees 

have been. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Do you know, Mr. Graham? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I am sorry. I do not. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is there somebody at your company that 

would know? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, obviously, we will be glad to provide that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Do you have any idea what the hourly rate 

is that you are being charged for representation? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I have no idea at this time. 
28 

Senator MCCASKILL. We would like that, too. 

It is my understanding all that is government money that is paying for that. 

Mr. GRAHAM. OK. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right? Do you know that? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I do not know. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Mr. GRAHAM. I know there are some splits in what is covered 

and what is not. I am just not an expert on that. I am sorry. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Well, we will have a series of questions 

about that because there is a real uneven playing field as it relates 

to having a case adjudicated of this nature. 

I do not know who is right and who is wrong, honestly. It is not 

my place. That is a court of law. 

But I know how expensive it can be to get to a court of law, especially if one side has a lot of resources and the other side has zip. 

It puts the side with the superior resources in a commanding position, and you can see how that could be offensive if, in fact, those 

commanding resources are coming from the U.S. Government. 

I mean, it is one thing to fight your employer when you feel like 

that you have been treated badly. It is a whole other thing when 

they are being bankrolled by the U.S. Government. And that is 

why I think we have to look at this issue—because as long as you 

guys do not admit guilt it is my understanding that the Federal 

Government picks up the tab. 

So, hypothetically, not that you are doing that in this case or not 

that you would do this, but hypothetically, a contractor could draw 

out a case as long as possible, weaken the plaintiff significantly, financially and over time, and then get a settlement and never have 

to pay a dime of their own money for their legal defense, whereas, 

the other side, who wanted an adjudication, is denied that opportunity just by being worn down. 

And that is what I would like to get at, and so we are going to 

ask a lot of questions around that in terms of timing, how long 

these cases take, has anyone availed themselves of arbitration, are 

they willing to or, more importantly, is it maybe an issue where at 

a certain point in time, if you go so long and spend so much, that 

it begins to be the company’s dime rather than the United States 

Government’s dime. 

I do not want to chill people wanting to do business with the 

Federal Government by them thinking that they are going to be 

subjected to costly litigation. On the other hand, this does not seem 

fair to me—the way this is currently situated. 

I did not have a chance to hear your testimony live. I wanted to 

give both of you an opportunity if there were points you made in 

your testimony that you want to make sure that I hear. 

I try very hard to read everything, both before and after hearings, but I want to confess that there are times that I do not get 

a chance to read everything. So I did not want to dismiss either 

one of you without you having a chance to point out anything to 

me that you think I need to know. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Chairman, I would just like to state, and I stated 

it in my opening remarks, that URS has a zero tolerance for retal-
29 

iation against whistleblowers. We did not terminate Ms. Busche as 

retaliation for the nuclear safety issues she brought up. 

We are very concerned about any issues that are raised at our 

sites because of the consequences that exist at these high-hazard 

nuclear operations. So we want to make sure we have an open environment at our sites for people to raise concerns so that they can 

be addressed appropriately. 

It is unfortunate, and it was one of the toughest decisions I have 

made in my career. I took over as a General Manager eight weeks 

ago. It was brought to my attention through our Employee Concerns Program that we had employees that filed complaints against 

Ms. Busche’s conduct and behavior. We investigated those. We validated those concerns. And I had to make the really hard decision 

to terminate Ms. Busche. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You go ahead, Mr. Graham, if you had anything that you wanted to bring to my attention. 

Mr. GRAHAM. I think the only thing I wanted to put into perspective is that the real risk is in doing nothing and that we have 56 

million gallons of high-level waste sitting in failing tanks and that 

this is a very long and complex mission that we are fully dedicated. 

And we will not be successful if we do not have this open process 

for people to raise their issues and concerns. We do that in government work. We do that in the private sector. 

And so we are fully committed to completing the mission, starting up the plant safely. It will go through a very rigorous startup 

process that will take multiple years. 

And so a lot of the issues that are raised of what if when the 

plant is operating—we will get there, and I look forward to the day 

when we are—when the plant is operational and we are protecting 

the people of the Northwest and the Columbia River. 

Senator MCCASKILL. We are captured by the severity of the situation and the technical expertise that is required, but I want to 

make sure that in our effort to address that that we are not taking 

shortcuts—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Absolutely. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. That we will look back and regret. 

And I think, as we talked about in the previous hearing, the design-build concept for something like this is literally like trying to 

build an airplane in the air. 

The delays that have occurred and the budget increases that 

have occurred, but looking back, it might have been better to design first, and probably now that we know how long this is going 

to take, it may have actually saved time in the long run. 

Let me ask a little bit about Dr. Tomasaitis. In 2010, he came 

to the managers of Bechtel and URS with a list of about 50 serious 

technical concerns at WTP. 

And shortly after he raised those concerns, the Bechtel manager, 

Frank Russo, wrote Bechtel and URS officials and said, ‘‘We need 

to kill this BS now. Walt is killing us. Get him in your corporate 

office today.’’ 

And then he was ultimately reassigned. 
30 

Now were there issues with Dr. Tomasaitis that you allege were 

true, that he was difficult to work with and a behavioral and so 

forth? 

Those are the allegations you are making against Donna Busche. 

You understand that this looks very bad in terms of a culture that 

encourages people to come forward with technical concerns. 

Do you have any response to someone calling this, talking about 

him killing us and this BS after he has raised these concerns? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Chairman, I am new to the job. I do not know if you 

caught that part of the message. I have been on this job about 8 

weeks. Before that, I was in charge of business development. 

I have no firsthand knowledge of Dr. Tomasaitis and the actions 

that were taken at that point in time. So I can get back with you 

and provide additional information, working with my team that 

was around at that time. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I think that is important, and I think 

that we need to know your perspective on that because the essence 

of this hearing is I understand what your words are, but we have 

outside agencies, time and time again, citing problems with the culture at that facility in terms of people feeling like they can come 

forward with concerns. 

And the way these two cases have been handled—the courts will 

decide. I hope the courts get a chance to decide. I hope that this 

is not one of those that they get worn down and everybody agrees 

to settlements that nobody ever gets to know about. But that is not 

my say. That is the litigants’ decision as to what happens. 

But you guys have a serious problem in terms of whistleblower 

culture out there, and we are going to have to do something to 

make sure that people understand that they are not going to be 

moved to the basement; they are not going to be laid off; they are 

not going to be fired for raising legitimate concerns. 

And we will look forward to your additional information that you 

will give us, and we will have some more questions for the record. 

Unfortunately, the bell is calling me again to go vote. So we will 

conclude the hearing at this point, but we will have followup questions for both you and for the DOE, and then we will share the 

Committee record with all those that are interested. 

Thank you very much for being here today. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:44 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 
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