www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 281 1 

Upon taking office in January 2009, Obama administration officials proclaimed a U.S. “return to Asia.” This pronouncement was backed with more frequent travel to the region by senior officials (Secretary of State 

Hillary Clinton’s first trip was to Asia) and increased U.S. participation in regional multilateral meetings, culminating in the decision to sign the Association 

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and to 

participate in the East Asia Summit (EAS) at the head-of-state level. The strategic 

“rebalance to Asia” announced in November 2011 builds on these earlier actions to 

deepen and institutionalize U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region.

Asia’s rapid growth and economic dynamism have greatly expanded the region’s economic and strategic weight, elevating its importance for U.S. interests 

and demanding an increased U.S. focus. This evolution has been welcomed by 

America’s Asia specialists, who have long advocated greater investment of resources and attention from high-level U.S. policymakers.1

 At a time of often 

bitter partisanship in the United States, there is broad, bipartisan consensus on 

Asia’s importance. Indeed, partisan criticism has focused primarily on whether 

the administration in power is doing enough to increase U.S. engagement in Asia 

and whether rhetorical commitment is backed with sufficient resources.2

While some initial comments about the U.S. “return to Asia” were cast in 

terms of correcting alleged neglect of the region by the administration of George 

W. Bush, senior Obama administration officials believed that the war on terror 

and U.S. military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan had produced an imbalanced global footprint. The United States was overweighted in the Middle 

East and underweighted in the Asia-Pacific.3 The phrase rebalance to Asia was 

intended to highlight the region’s heightened priority within U.S. global policy. 

The Rebalance to Asia:

U.S.-China Relations and 

Regional Security

By Phillip C. Saunders

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

About the Author

Dr. Phillip C. Saunders is Director of 

the Center for the Study of Chinese 

Military Affairs, Institute for National 

Strategic Studies (INSS), at the 

National Defense University and a 

Distinguished Research Fellow in the 

Center for Strategic Research at INSS.

Key Points

◆ The rebalance responds to the AsiaPacific region’s increased economic 

and strategic weight and seeks 

to bring U.S. global diplomatic, 

economic, and military resource 

commitments into balance with 

expanding U.S. regional interests.

◆ A key challenge is making the rebalance robust enough to reassure 

U.S. allies and partners while not 

alarming Chinese leaders to the 

point where they forgo cooperation with Washington.

◆ The rebalance is a comprehensive 

approach that involves all the tools 

of national power and devotes 

more attention to Southeast Asia, 

the Indian Ocean, and regional 

multilateral institutions.

◆ Chinese officials and scholars are 

skeptical about the U.S. rationale 

for the rebalance and criticize its 

supposed negative effect on regional security. However, China has 

also redoubled efforts to stabilize 

Sino-U.S. relations and build a “new 

type of great power relations.”

◆ To prevent unwanted strategic 

rivalry, U.S. and Chinese leaders 

should increase cooperation on 

common interests and seek to 

manage competitive aspects of 

U.S.-China relations.

August 2013

Cent

e

r for the Study of Chin

e

se Military Affairs
2 SF No. 281 www.ndu.edu/inss

(The term pivot to Asia initially used by some officials 

also suggested the transfer of resources and strategic attention from the Middle East and Europe to Asia.)

The rebalance to Asia also reflected the need to articulate U.S. global priorities in the wake of the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and the drawdown 

in Afghanistan, freeing diplomatic and military resources 

that had been committed to the Middle East for the last 

decade. Anticipated reductions in U.S. Federal spending 

and military budgets also called for a clear statement of 

strategic priorities to guide cuts and reallocate limited 

resources. For the U.S. military, this came in the form of 

the January 2012 defense strategic guidance signed by 

President Barack Obama, which declared “we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.”4

The term rebalance is not derived from “balance of 

power” thinking and does not signal U.S. intent to balance against China or any other country. Rather, the 

underlying logic is derived from the allocation of assets 

in a financial portfolio. As market conditions shift and 

new opportunities emerge, a portfolio is rebalanced to 

maximize return on investment. In this sense, the rebalance to Asia is intended to bring commitments of U.S. 

global diplomatic, economic, and military resources into 

balance with expanding U.S. political, economic, and security interests in Asia.

One of the clearest articulations of the rationale and 

strategic logic behind the rebalance is the November 

2011 Foreign Policy article by then-Secretary Clinton.5

In the context of withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, 

she argued that the United States needs “to be smart and 

systematic about where we invest time and energy, so 

that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our 

leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values.” 

The Secretary described the Asia-Pacific region’s importance as “a key driver of global politics” that spans the 

Pacific and Indian oceans, boasts half the world’s population, includes vital engines of the global economy, and is 

home to several major U.S. allies and “important emerging powers like China, India, and Indonesia.” She argued 

that “harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism is central 

to American economic and strategic interests” and that 

the United States has an opportunity to help build “a 

more mature security and economic architecture to promote stability and prosperity.” Given the importance of 

the Asia-Pacific region to America’s future, “a strategic 

turn to the region fits logically into our overall global 

effort to secure and sustain America’s global leadership.” 

She drew an explicit parallel with U.S. efforts after World 

War II to build a “comprehensive and lasting transatlantic network of institutions and relations.”

In the article, Secretary Clinton further called for 

“smart execution of a coherent regional strategy that accounts for the global implications of our choices” and a 

sustained U.S. commitment to “forward-deployed” diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific. She outlined six key lines of 

action to implement the strategy:

◆ strengthening bilateral security alliances

◆ deepening the U.S. working relationship with 

emerging powers, including China

◆ engaging with regional multilateral institutions

◆ expanding trade and investment

◆ forging a broad-based military presence that modernizes traditional basing arrangements in Northeast 

Asia while enhancing the U.S. presence in Southeast 

Asia and into the Indian Ocean

◆ advancing democracy and human rights.

A coherent regional strategy, as Secretary Clinton 

and other administration officials have noted in public 

and private remarks, requires greater integration of U.S. 

diplomatic, economic, and military actions across the region to maximize their individual and collective effect. 

One area where the Obama administration’s approach 

differs from past U.S. policy is in its strong emphasis on 

the economic, transport, and strategic linkages between 

the Indian Ocean and Pacific region.6

The Foreign Policy article not only explicates the 

strategic logic of the U.S. rebalance to Asia, but also 

reflects a midcourse correction based on the Obama 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 281 3 

administration’s experience implementing its Asia policy. Early Asia policy speeches stressed three elements: 

sustaining and strengthening bilateral ties with allies 

and partners; building a new era of cooperation with 

emerging Asian powers China and India; and building 

multilateral structures in the Asia-Pacific that facilitate regional and global cooperation.7

 U.S. officials acknowledged a tension between couching China policy 

within an activist Asia policy focused on U.S. allies and 

partners (“getting China right requires getting the region right”) and engaging China as a global actor in its 

own right.8

Obama administration officials devoted significant 

early efforts to broadening and deepening U.S.-China 

relations to better address regional and global challenges. 

Although the political need to rebrand policy precluded 

the use of the Bush administration’s “responsible stakeholder” language, the Obama administration’s view of 

China as a rising power, with expanding global interests, 

that was succeeding within the existing international 

system was very similar. Administration officials sought 

to engage China in cooperation on regional and global 

issues, including efforts to deal with North Korean and 

Iranian nuclear ambitions, address climate change, and 

mitigate the effects of the global financial crisis. Their 

expressed goal was a “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship” with China that allowed the two 

countries to work together on an expanded set of common interests.

One of the instruments used to build this relationship was the bilateral U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), which is designed to address 

a wider range of issues, improve U.S. policy coordination, and bring the right actors to the table. Other 

mechanisms included holding regular meetings and 

communications at the Presidential level, highlighting 

areas of cooperation and praising positive Chinese contributions, encouraging a greater Chinese role in global 

governance, seeking continuity in military-to-military 

relations to help avoid crises and increase cooperation, 

and trying to avoid embarrassing Chinese leadership 

when taking actions such as meeting with the Dalai 

Lama or arms sales to Taiwan.

These efforts to build a deeper partnership with 

China produced relatively meager results. Despite formal engagements through the S&ED, reciprocal summit 

visits, and periodic meetings on the margins of multilateral forums, Chinese leaders remained suspicious and reluctant to expand cooperation with Washington or take 

on more international responsibilities. For many Obama 

administration officials, integrating China more fully in 

international institutions was a means of giving Beijing a 

greater voice and spurring Chinese leaders to make more 

international contributions. A more prominent Chinese 

role could strengthen both the legitimacy and potential 

effectiveness of international institutions, albeit at the 

cost of reduced U.S. dominance. In this sense, U.S. endorsement of greater Chinese representation was a signal 

of trust and confidence.

Chinese leaders, however, viewed enhanced multilateral cooperation as an effort to sustain a U.S.-dominated 

global order and to lock China into binding commitments 

on issues such as carbon emissions and a revalued currency in ways that might hinder future Chinese growth. 

While Beijing now participates in most major international and regional organizations, Chinese leaders tend to 

view these as vehicles for pursuing or defending Chinese 

national interests and remain wary of taking on international “costs, risks, and commitments.”9

 Chinese scholars 

spoke of “China responsibility theory” as a Western plot to 

blame China for global economic problems and to force it 

administration officials sought to 

engage China in cooperation on 

regional and global issues, including 

efforts to deal with North Korean 

and Iranian nuclear ambitions, 

climate change, and the global 

financial crisis
4 SF No. 281 www.ndu.edu/inss

to take on international commitments beyond its limited 

capacity.10 Moreover, in the context of the unfolding financial crisis that damaged the U.S. (and then the global) 

economy, Chinese leaders may have initially misinterpreted Obama administration efforts to increase cooperation 

as a sign of U.S. weakness and an opportunity to press 

Washington for concessions. The net result was intensified 

bilateral engagement that was characterized by extensive 

process and relatively few tangible results.

The period of 2009–2010 also saw a more assertive 

Chinese posture on a wide range of bilateral, regional, and 

global issues.11 From 1998 to 2008, China achieved remarkable success in improving relations with its neighbors 

in Asia through a combination of economic cooperation, 

diplomatic outreach, and military restraint (even as it continued to increase its military budget and modernize its 

forces). Within the space of 18 months, Chinese bullying, 

assertiveness, and apparent lack of concern for Asian and 

international reactions undid most of these gains. In particular, efforts to advance Chinese maritime sovereignty 

claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea did 

considerable damage to Beijing’s efforts to persuade others 

of China’s peaceful rise. The May 2009 deadline for submissions to the United Nations Convention on the Law of 

the Sea (UNCLOS) spurred many countries to reinforce 

their claims to disputed islands and waters. Sometimes 

China initiated contentious actions, such as increased patrolling in disputed waters; other times Chinese nationalists clamored loudly for strong reactions to actions by 

countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan that 

challenged Chinese sovereignty claims. Beijing employed 

economic coercion in some sovereignty disputes, including a temporary ban on exports of rare earth elements to 

Japan and import restrictions on Philippine bananas.12

China also took a tough line on its interpretation of military activities permitted in its exclusive economic zone, 

acting to interfere with U.S. ships and aircraft (such as the 

March 2009 incident off Hainan Island when Chinese 

paramilitary vessels attempted to snag the towed sonar array of the USNS Impeccable).13

For a U.S. administration emphasizing the importance of unimpeded access to the “global commons” for 

economic growth, Beijing’s actions in the South China 

Sea represented a clear threat to regional peace and stability, freedom of navigation, open sea lines of communication, and commerce. For China’s neighbors, Beijing’s 

assertive actions raised concerns about whether Chinese 

restraint would disappear as its military capabilities improved and its economic and diplomatic power increased 

relative to the United States.

These concerns found political expression in the July 

2010 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting, when 

12 states joined Secretary Clinton in expressing concerns 

about freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, despite the best efforts of Chinese diplomats to discourage 

them from raising the issue. Chinese Foreign Minister 

Yang Jiechi gave an angry speech during the meeting in 

which he wagged his finger at the Singapore representative and pointedly stated that “China is a big country 

and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a 

fact.”14 Public and private pleas from countries in East 

and Southeast Asia urged the United States to take a 

more active role in Asian security, including speaking out 

against efforts to use threats and intimidation in territorial disputes. Countries also expressed a willingness to 

engage in deeper security cooperation with the United 

States via participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises and by providing access to U.S. forces for common 

security goals.

This political context—heightened concerns about 

Chinese behavior and regional demands for a stepped 

up U.S. security role—is also a significant part of the 

Beijing’s assertive actions raised 

concerns about whether Chinese 

restraint would disappear as its 

military, economic, and diplomatic 

capabilities improved
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 281 5 

political rationale for the U.S. strategic rebalance to 

Asia. However, this does not mean that the United 

States has abandoned efforts to cooperate with China 

or to build a more stable Sino-U.S. relationship. The 

broad U.S. strategy of seeking to integrate China more 

fully within the current global order, while discouraging 

any efforts to reshape that order by the use of force or 

intimidation, remains in place. A key implementation 

challenge is making the rebalance robust enough to reassure U.S. allies and partners of its capability and will 

to maintain a presence in Asia over the long term while 

not alarming Chinese leaders to the point where they 

forgo cooperation with Washington in favor of a more 

confrontational approach. Finding and maintaining 

this sweet spot in U.S. policy poses a difficult challenge.

Implementation of the U.S. 

Strategic Rebalance

A common element in explications of the rebalance by U.S. officials is that it encompasses diplomatic, 

economic, and military elements, all of which must be 

applied in a coordinated manner for maximum effect. 

Because of the considerable continuity between the “return to Asia” and the “strategic rebalance to the AsiaPacific,” this paper assesses U.S. diplomatic, economic, 

and military efforts from the beginning of the Obama 

administration.

Diplomatic Engagement. Perhaps the clearest success lies on the diplomatic front. The administration 

proclaimed the importance of enhancing high-level 

diplomatic engagement in the Asia-Pacific, and it has 

delivered on that promise. President Barack Obama 

visited Asia 5 times in his first 4 years in office, with 

visits to 10 Asia-Pacific countries (including China) 

and participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit and East Asia Summit.15 Secretary 

Clinton visited Asia 14 times during her tenure in office, traveling to all of the ASEAN member states and 

regularly participating in key regional meetings. U.S. 

Secretaries of Defense Robert Gates and Leon Panetta 

traveled to Asia 13 times during President Obama’s first 

term in office. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, 

Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael 

Mullen and General Martin Dempsey, and several U.S. 

military Service chiefs also traveled regularly to AsiaPacific countries, including China. This level of travel 

to the Asia-Pacific by senior Obama administration 

officials was significantly greater than that during the 

first administration of George W. Bush. The number 

of trips was similar to the second Bush administration 

but with more time spent in the region by Secretary 

Clinton, many more trips and much more time spent in 

the region by Secretaries of Defense Gates and Panetta, 

and a greater emphasis on Southeast Asia and on participation in regional multilateral meetings.16

This list of travel by senior administration officials 

does not include those with specific responsibilities for 

the Asia-Pacific region, such as U.S. Pacific Command 

commanders Admiral Robert F. Willard and Admiral 

Samuel J. Locklear, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt 

Campbell, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for AsiaPacific Security Affairs Mark Lippert. Given that the 

scarcest resource in government is high-level attention, 

the Obama administration amply demonstrated the 

heightened priority of the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, 

the administration delivered on its commitment to expand U.S. involvement in regional institutions by signing 

the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and by 

participating in the East Asia Summit.17 Concurrently, 

U.S. officials also demonstrated their ability to mobilize 

regional opinion, most notably in effective U.S. bilateral 

and multilateral diplomacy before and during the July 

2010 ARF meeting.

the rebalance encompasses 

diplomatic, economic, and military 

elements, all of which must be 

applied in a coordinated manner for 

maximum effect
6 SF No. 281 www.ndu.edu/inss

Economic Engagement. Asia’s economic dynamism 

and rapid economic growth are important to the wellbeing of almost all countries in the region, and therefore to the stability and legitimacy of their governments. 

Asia’s booming market is also important to the United 

States, whose economy is still recovering from recession. 

Fulfilling President Obama’s commitment to double U.S. 

exports between 2010 and 2015 requires greater access 

to Asian markets. Enhanced economic engagement is 

therefore a critical element of the U.S. rebalance.

American allies and partners in the region have advocated enhanced U.S. economic engagement with Asia as a 

key means of demonstrating U.S. staying power. The Obama 

administration has faced a number of obstacles in increasing trade and investment ties with Asia. In addition to the 

demands placed on senior economic officials by the global 

financial crisis, these obstacles include the loss of U.S. jobs 

in the manufacturing sector, criticism of China’s undervalued 

currency, concern about labor conditions and environmental 

pollution in Asia, and the current lack of trade negotiating 

authority (that is, Trade Promotion Authority, formerly called 

“fast track”). Trade expansion is always a difficult issue for 

Democratic Presidents whose coalition includes significant 

support from labor unions and other groups seeking protection from what they view as “unfair” competition. Moreover, 

in the U.S. system most economic activity is performed by the 

private sector; the U.S. Government cannot create a favorable 

business environment in Asia-Pacific countries. Attracting 

more U.S. trade and investment requires Asian governments 

to speed up the pace of domestic economic reform, which is 

often politically difficult.

What the U.S. Government can do with Asia-Pacific countries is to enter into bilateral and regional economic agreements that facilitate trade and investment. 

The Obama administration succeeded in securing congressional approval of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (“KORUS”), the most significant agreement of its 

kind since the North American Free Trade Agreement. 

U.S. Exports U.S. Imports Total Chinese Exports Chinese Imports Total

NE Asia 216,078 567,966 478,044 409,679 381,550 791,229

SE Asia 91,609 123,892 215,501 139,109 155,616 294,725

SW Asia* 20,475 35,205 55,681 44,198 21,627 65,825

All Asia-Pacific* 328,162 727,064 1,055,226 592,986 640,516 1,486,288

Total 1,287,442 2,103,641 3,391,083 1,429,000 1,132,000 2,561,000

Percent to Asia 25.5 34.6 31.1 41.5 56.6 58

*U.S. data do not include Afghanistan

Sources: U.S. Census Foreign Trade, available at <www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/bycountry>; CEIC China database.

U.S. Exports U.S. Imports Total Chinese Exports Chinese Imports Total

NE Asia 258,989 620,537 879,527 606,028 503,039 1,109,067

SE Asia 100,956 124,948 225,904 245,589 286,446 532,035

SW Asia* 22,327 47,974 70,301 70,404 22,985 93,389

All Asia-Pacific* 382,273 793,459 1,175,731 922,021 812,470 1,734,491

Total 1,416,439 2,098,011 3,514,450 2,048,935 1,817,826 3,866,761

Percent to Asia 27 37.8 33.5 45 44.7 44.9

*U.S. data do not include Afghanistan

Sources: U.S. Census Foreign Trade, available at <www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/bycountry>; CEIC China database.

Table 1. U.S. and Chinese 2008 Trade with Asia-Pacific Countries (USD million)

Table 2. U.S. and Chinese 2012 Trade with Asia-Pacific Countries (USD million)
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 281 7 

Several other bilateral trade agreements dating from the 

Bush administration were also approved.

The centerpiece of the administration’s regional 

trade efforts is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), described as “an ambitious, next-generation Asia-Pacific 

trade agreement that reflects U.S. economic priorities and 

values.” The TPP is intended to be a “high-quality” trade 

agreement that sets high standards for environmental and 

labor regulations, protection of intellectual property, financial services, government procurement, and competition policy. As of June 2013, 12 countries are participating in TPP negotiations (Australia, Brunei Darussalam, 

Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 

Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam). TPP 

is an example of “open regionalism,” meaning that other 

Asia-Pacific countries willing to meet TPP standards will 

eventually be able to join the agreement.18

The empirical record indicates some success for the 

Obama administration’s efforts to enhance U.S. trade, aid, 

and investment ties with the Asia-Pacific region. Tables 1 

and 2 show that despite the economic headwinds caused 

by the global financial crisis, U.S. exports and overall trade 

with Asia-Pacific countries increased from 2008 to 2012, 

and the region’s share in U.S. exports and overall trade 

also increased. When compared with China’s trade with 

the region, the 2012 data indicate that the United States 

is still a very important market for Asian countries (including China). Moreover, despite China’s nominal status 

as the number one market for countries such as Japan and 

South Korea, a significant percentage of Asian exports 

to China are components for assembly and re-export 

to North American, European, and other third country 

markets.

Similarly, data for the U.S. direct investment stock 

in Asia-Pacific countries (table 3) show an increase from 

$477 billion in 2008 to $599 billion in 2011—an overall 

increase of $122 billion over a 3-year period. This compares with a 2011 total stock of Chinese investment in 

the Asia-Pacific of about $315 billion, of which $262 billion is invested in Hong Kong. (Some of this Chinese 

investment has stayed in Hong Kong, some has returned 

to China disguised as “foreign” investment, and some is 

invested elsewhere in Asia.)19

During the same 2008–2011 period, annual U.S. 

nonmilitary aid to Asia-Pacific countries increased from 

$1.69 billion to $2.83 billion (not counting an additional 

$2.7 billion in aid to Afghanistan in 2011). The AsiaPacific’s share in U.S. Agency for International Development disbursements increased from 6.4 percent in 2008 

to 9.1 percent in 2011, with a shift toward Southeast and 

Southwest Asia.20 Although most of this trade, investment, and aid data predate the formal announcement of 

the U.S. strategic rebalance, the numbers indicate that efforts to increase U.S. economic ties with the Asia-Pacific 

region have paid dividends.

Security Engagement. Although much of the analysis of the military side of the U.S. rebalance to Asia has 

focused on changes to deployments of U.S. forces within 

the Asia-Pacific region, the rebalance also includes enhanced efforts to develop new capabilities to maintain 

access to the region. These include targeted initiatives to 

defeat antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities and 

increased emphasis on cyber defense and the ability to 

sustain operations in a competitive space environment. 

Military cuts focused on reducing ground forces while 

seeking to minimize cuts in naval capabilities and to devote more attention to the Indian Ocean as a strategic 

area linked to U.S. interests in East Asia.21

In terms of deployments of U.S. forces, the goal 

is a stronger U.S. military presence in Asia that is 

2008 2011

NE Asia 234,248 270,839

SE Asia 223,945 302,714

SW Asia* 19,189 25,867

All Asia-Pacific* 477,382 599,420

Total 3,232,493 4,155,551

Percent to Asia 14.8 14.4

Table 3. U.S. Direct Investment Stock in

Asia-Pacific (USD million)

*U.S. data do not include Afghanistan

Sources: U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, available at

<www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal.htm>.
8 SF No. 281 www.ndu.edu/inss

Army “The Army itself plans to align 70,000 troops to the Asia Pacific region as part of its new general 

regional alignment, which heavily weights the Asia-Pacific region” (Carter).

Navy “We are moving more of our Navy to the Pacific Ocean than to the Atlantic Ocean, so that in a 

few years, in fact it will be 60/40 and it will probably go further” (Carter).

Marines “The Marine Corps will have up to 2,500 Marines on rotation in Australia” (Carter).

“About 9,000 Marines will relocate from Okinawa, with about 5,000 moving to Guam and the rest 

transferring to other locations in the Pacific such as Hawaii and Australia” (Parrish).

Air Force “The U.S. Air Force has allocated 60 percent of its overseas-based forces to the Asia-Pacific—including tactical aircraft and bomber forces from the continental United States. The Air Force is 

focusing a similar percentage of its space and cyber capabilities on this region. . . . [T]his region will 

see more of these capabilities as we prioritize deployments of our most advanced platforms to the 

Pacific, including the F-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter deployments to Japan” (Hagel).

Table 4. U.S. Military Rebalance to Asia by Service

Sources: Ashton B. Carter, “Remarks by Deputy Secretary Carter at the Von der Heyden Fellows Program Endowment Fund Lecture Series at Duke 

University,” Durham, NC, November 29, 2012; Ashton B. Carter, “Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Carter at the Woodrow Wilson Center,” 

Washington, DC, October 3, 2012; Chuck Hagel, Speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Shangri-La Dialogue), Singapore, June 

1, 2013; Leon Panetta, “Remarks by Secretary Panetta at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, December 18, 2012. Karen Parrish, “U.S., Japan 

Agree on Okinawa Troop Relocation, “ American Forces Press Service, April 27, 2012.

Table 5. U.S. Military Rebalance to Asia by Partner

Australia Rotational deployments of 2,500 Marines; expanded cooperation on cyber security and space situational awareness; agreement to deploy an Australian warship in a U.S. carrier strike group (Hagel).

China Positive military-to-military developments include the “first-ever joint counter-piracy exercise in the 

Gulf of Aden . . . U.S. invitation for China to participate in RIMPAC . . . [and an] agreement to cohost a Pacific Army Chiefs Conference with China” (Hagel).

India “We’re deepening our security cooperation, technology sharing and defense trade with India” (Carter).

Indonesia “working together on humanitarian assistance and disaster response preparedness, maritime security, 

international peacekeeping, and combating transnational threats” (Hagel).

Japan “Over the past year, we reached major agreements with Japan to realign our forces and jointly develop Guam as a strategic hub . . . locating our most advanced aircraft in the Pacific, including new 

deployments of F-22s and the MV-22 Ospreys to Japan, and laying the groundwork for the first 

overseas deployment of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to Iwakuni in 2017” (Panetta).

Malaysia “We are expanding maritime cooperation, including the first-ever visit of a U.S. aircraft carrier to 

Sabah” (Hagel).

Myanmar “We are beginning targeted, carefully calibrated military-to-military engagement aimed at ensuring 

the military supports ongoing reforms, respects human rights, and a professional force accountable 

to the country’s leadership” (Hagel).

New Zealand “The signing of the Washington Declaration and associated policy changes have opened up new 

avenues for defense cooperation in areas such as maritime security cooperation, humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief ” (Hagel).

Philippines “With the Philippines, we’re exploring options for rotational force deployments in priority areas. 

We are focused on building the Philippines maritime security presence and capabilities, and 

strengthening their maritime domain awareness” (Carter).

Singapore “We will have four Littoral Combat Ships stationed forward in Singapore” (Carter).

South Korea “strengthen cooperation with the Republic of Korea in space, in cyberspace, in intelligence” (Panetta).

Thailand Joint Vision Statement for alliance, “the first such bilateral document in over 50 years” (Hagel).

Vietnam “We are expanding our cooperation—as set forth in a new memorandum of understanding—in 

maritime security, training opportunities, search-and-rescue, peacekeeping, military medical exchanges, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief ” (Hagel).
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 281 9 

“geographically distributed, operationally resilient, 

and politically sustainable.”22 This presence includes 

shifting some of the most advanced U.S. air and naval assets to the Asia-Pacific region or to U.S. bases 

on the West Coast, in Hawaii, or on the territory of 

Guam (see table 4). Within the Asia-Pacific region, 

there is less emphasis on permanent bases and more 

emphasis on access agreements and rotational deployments that will allow the U.S. military to conduct exercises and operations that demonstrate its commitment and help protect allies and partners. Tables 4 and 

5 draw upon statements by U.S. officials to illustrate 

several military dimensions of the rebalance.

In terms of implementing the security aspects of 

the rebalance, U.S. Pacific Command has expanded the 

size and scope of its robust exercise and engagement program focused on “maintaining a credible defense posture, 

strengthening relationships with our allies, expanding our 

partner networks, and preparing to accomplish the full 

range of military contingencies.”23 This program, costing 

over $100 million, includes 18 major exercises involving 

joint military forces, interagency activities, and 30 partner nations. U.S. military forces also participate in more 

than 150 Service exercises in the Asia-Pacific region annually. The United States has worked hard to reinvigorate and modernize relations with its treaty allies in the 

region (including increased emphasis on the Philippines 

and Thailand), while also expanding military engagement 

with Brunei, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, and other partners.24 These efforts are supported by 

efforts to shift U.S. military capacity and investments toward the Asia-Pacific region, and include air and ground 

capabilities, special operations forces, and intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. The U.S. Navy will 

also base a fourth attack submarine in Guam in 2015 and 

transfer six destroyers from Europe to the Asia-Pacific as 

part of efforts to increase the U.S. naval presence in the 

Pacific from 52 to 62 ships by 2020.25 The program also 

includes increased funding that will significantly increase 

the number of students attending the Asia-Pacific Center 

for Security Studies in Hawaii.26

Taken as a whole, these diplomatic, economic, and 

military measures demonstrate a significant increase in 

U.S. strategic attention to the Asia-Pacific region, which 

has been matched by significant commitments of resources. The rebalance has not addressed all concerns of 

U.S. allies and partners, with the issue of increased Chinese assertiveness on maritime territorial disputes being 

a key concern for Japan and for Southeast Asian states 

who are parties to the disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 

islands in the East China Sea and the Spratly Islands in 

the South China Sea.27 Nevertheless, the rebalance has 

played an important role in reassuring countries that the 

United States has the ability and will to fulfill its commitments in the Asia-Pacific region for decades to come.

China’s Perceptions of the U.S. 

Rebalance

U.S. officials have used many of the mechanisms 

discussed above to explain Washington’s new regional 

strategy to Beijing. These issues have been discussed 

bilaterally at summits, through the annual S&ED 

(which includes Chinese military representatives and 

a new Strategic Security Dialogue to discuss issues 

such as nuclear, space, cyber, and maritime security), 

by reciprocal bilateral visits by senior officials including the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and 

National Security Advisor, and through regular security 

dialogues such as the Defense Consultative Talks (at 

the Under Secretary of Defense level), Defense Policy 

Consultative Talks (at the Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense level), and at the working level through the 

Military Maritime Consultative Agreement.

Increased U.S. engagement in multilateral meetings such as the East Asia Summit, the EAS and ARF 

ministerial meetings, ARF Defense Ministers Meeting 

Plus, and unofficial meetings such as the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore also provides frequent opportunities 

for senior U.S. officials to meet Chinese officials and senior People’s Liberation Army officers. These efforts are 

supplemented by formal U.S.-China military-military 

ties (which have become somewhat less susceptible to 
10 SF No. 281 www.ndu.edu/inss

interruptions due to policy disagreements) and informal interactions on a range of security issues (including 

nuclear, space, cyber, and maritime security issues) in a 

variety of track 2 (academic) and track 1.5 (academic/

official) settings.28

U.S. officials have had ample opportunity to explain 

the U.S. regional strategy to their Chinese counterparts. 

The explanations offered in these meetings paralleled the 

public strategic rationale discussed above, namely that 

the U.S. rebalance is based on pursuing expanding U.S. 

interests in Asia as military engagement in the Middle 

East winds down; that it involves a comprehensive diplomatic, economic, and military approach; that the timing 

was dictated largely by the need to offer a clear statement of priorities to guide force development in an era 

of declining spending; and that demand by U.S. allies 

and partners for an increased U.S. economic and security 

commitment to the region played an important role in 

shaping the rebalance.

U.S. officials have been careful to stress that the rebalance is not “all about China,” intended to contain China, 

or seeking to build an anti-China coalition. However, they 

have noted that lack of transparency about Chinese military 

capabilities and strategic intentions, and the more assertive 

Chinese behavior discussed above, have heightened U.S. 

and regional concerns. U.S. officials have also complained 

about intrusions into U.S. Government and private sector 

(including defense contractor) computer systems, “some of 

which appear to be attributable directly to the Chinese government and military.”29 The United States has sought to 

expand the scope and depth of U.S.-China military cooperation, including through regular high-level visits, exchanges 

of student delegations, counterpiracy and humanitarian affairs and disaster relief (HA/DR) exercises, an invitation for 

China to participate in the 2014 RIMPAC exercise, and an 

agreement to co-host a Pacific Army Chiefs Conference.

Broadly speaking, the official Chinese reaction has 

been to express concern and skepticism about the stated 

U.S. rationale for the rebalance to Asia, lament the “lack 

of strategic trust” between Washington and Beijing, urge 

greater respect for Chinese “core interests,” stress negative consequences of the rebalance for Asian security 

(especially its supposed role in emboldening U.S. allies 

and partners to challenge Chinese maritime territorial 

claims), and redouble efforts to stabilize Sino-U.S. relations, most notably through efforts to build a “new type 

of great power relations” with Washington. Despite significant concerns about the effect of the U.S. rebalance 

on Chinese interests, enhanced efforts to build a stable 

partnership with Washington have arguably been the 

most important element of China’s response.

In the Chinese narrative, Beijing has not changed 

its foreign policy goals, expanded its territorial claims, or 

adopted a more assertive attitude toward maritime territorial disputes. Rather, other countries, emboldened by 

passive or active U.S. support, have stepped up their efforts 

to challenge China’s long-established territorial claims, 

forcing China either to allow them to trample on Chinese sovereignty or to take appropriate measures in response. Chinese officials, academics, and military officers 

stress that China’s policy environment has changed, and 

that leaders must now be more responsive to the concerns 

of Chinese citizens, including nationalists who advocate 

a tough line on sovereignty disputes.30 Chinese officials 

have also argued that China has not taken any actions 

that violate legitimate freedom of navigation and that its 

policies of seeking to resolve territorial disputes through 

peaceful dialogue and its willingness to set aside sovereignty and pursue joint exploitation of resources in disputed areas remain unchanged.31 Chinese officials insist that 

sovereignty disputes must be resolved on a bilateral basis 

and have urged Washington not to interfere or take sides.

Although most mainstream Chinese scholars and 

analysts have adopted significant elements of this official narrative, two divergent schools of thought have 

China has responded to the 

rebalance with efforts to build a 

stable partnership with Washington
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 281 11 

emerged. One focuses on the relative balance of power 

between China and the United States and questions the 

U.S. long-term capability to implement the rebalance. 

This school highlights China’s continued rapid growth, 

accumulation of comprehensive national power, and 

development of much more capable military forces and 

contrasts this with slower U.S. economic growth, large 

budget deficits, and challenges in maintaining the size 

of current U.S. military forces. This group views the 

United States as a power in relative decline and questions the U.S. ability to maintain its regional power, 

influence, and alliance structure over the longer term. 

This implies that China should not overreact to the U.S. 

rebalance since Washington will be unable to sustain it 

over the long term.

A second viewpoint tends to view the U.S. rebalance 

in much more alarmist terms. For this school, China is 

clearly the target of the U.S. rebalance and of American efforts to step up deployments of military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific. To this group, the reinvigoration 

of U.S. alliances and expansion of security partnerships 

in the Asia-Pacific reflect a strategy of encircling and 

containing China. This group tends to focus heavily on 

the military elements of the rebalance, especially U.S. 

military deployments, development of new military capabilities, and expanded security cooperation with allies 

and partners. All of these actions are viewed as aimed 

against China. Some in this school even argue that the 

United States is using its allies and partners as proxies to 

challenge Chinese sovereignty and provoke China into 

military overreactions that would damage its strategic 

position in Asia.32

Chinese officials and scholars have levied specific 

complaints about some aspects of the rebalance and associated U.S. policies. One complaint involves the way 

the January 2012 Department of Defense strategic guidance lumped China and Iran together in a discussion of 

the challenge posed by the A2/AD capabilities of potential adversaries: “States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power 

projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology will extend to non-state 

actors as well.”33 Chinese officials complained about the 

implication that China is a “potential adversary” and objected to being lumped together with Iran.

China has also complained about the emerging U.S. 

Air-Sea Battle concept, a set of ideas focused on how the 

Air Force and Navy can work together to ensure the continued U.S. ability to project power in the face of growing 

A2/AD capabilities. The Services were tasked to develop 

the concept by then–Defense Secretary Gates in 2009, 

and many details remain classified.34 Initial public debate 

about Air-Sea Battle focused on publications by authors 

at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 

a Washington, DC, think tank with close ties to some 

Pentagon officials.35 These publications clearly identified China as the motivation for efforts to develop the 

concept and speculated about its application in the AsiaPacific region.

Official U.S. statements and writings on the AirSea Battle concept have focused on the strategic need 

to maintain U.S. ability to project power despite adversary capabilities and the budget-driven desire to improve 

Air Force–Navy interoperability.36 U.S. officials have 

been careful to discuss responses to A2/AD capabilities 

in generic terms, citing concerns about their potential 

employment by a number of countries and by nonstate 

actors. Nevertheless, China is clearly making significant 

investments in developing and deploying systems such as 

conventional attack submarines, conventional precision 

strike missiles, antisatellite weapons, and antiship ballistic missiles that appear to be aimed at contingencies 

involving the United States.37 China refers to these as 

“counter-intervention” capabilities and denies that they 

are targeted at “any specific country.”

The current focus of regional tensions involves China’s 

maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea and 

East China Sea. As a matter of policy, the United States 

does not take a position on the question of the ultimate 

sovereignty of the various disputed islands, rocks, and 

other land formations. The United States does recognize 

Japanese administrative control over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
12 SF No. 281 www.ndu.edu/inss

islands, and U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that the 

islands fall under the scope of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. U.S. officials have emphasized the importance of handling the disputes in accordance with principles such as 

peaceful resolution of disputes, compliance with relevant 

international law (especially UNCLOS), and respect for 

freedom of navigation. U.S. officials have also supported 

ASEAN efforts to negotiate a binding code of conduct for 

the South China Sea and have urged China to deal with 

the disputes via multilateral means.38

When crises have flared, as in the April 2012 Scarborough Reef incident, U.S. officials reiterated these 

principles publicly and urged the parties involved to act 

with restraint. U.S. officials have also sometimes played 

a quiet diplomatic role in crafting face-saving ways for 

the parties to de-escalate the crisis. In the Scarborough 

Reef case, the United States reportedly brokered an 

agreement for both China and the Philippines to withdraw ships from the disputed area.39 When China subsequently redeployed paramilitary ships to Scarborough 

Reef and acted to reinforce administrative control over 

the area, a State Department spokesman issued a public 

statement singling out Chinese behavior.40 When China 

responded to the Japanese government purchase of some 

of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands from a private Japanese 

owner with increased air and sea patrols, senior U.S. officials reiterated that the islands are covered under the 

U.S.-Japan security treaty and warned that the United 

States opposes “any unilateral actions that would seek to 

undermine Japanese administration” of the islands.41

While avoiding taking sides in these sovereignty 

disputes, the United States has sought to reinforce the 

principles discussed above, promote international rules 

and mechanisms for managing and resolving disputes, 

and fulfill its alliance commitments (including by helping its allies improve surveillance and naval capabilities). 

Secretary Hagel stated in June 2013 that “the United 

States stands firmly against any coercive attempts to alter the status quo. We strongly believe that incidents and 

disputes should be settled in a manner that maintains 

peace and security, adheres to international law, and protects unimpeded lawful commerce, as well as freedom of 

navigation and overflight.”42

Conversely, China appears to be looking for opportunities to reinforce its sovereignty claims and expand its 

effective control over the disputed territories and waters, 

redefining the status quo in its favor via actions on the 

ground and in disputed waters.43 Given the high domestic political costs of abandoning maritime sovereignty 

claims, Japan and Southeast Asia countries are also unlikely to either give up their claims or reach an accommodation with China. As a result, regional tensions over 

maritime sovereignty disputes and associated regional 

concerns about Chinese military capabilities and actions 

are likely to continue and potentially increase.

Given this situation, one must consider the U.S. rebalance in light of the alternative policy of not responding 

to Chinese assertiveness. If the United States remained 

passive, Chinese nationalists would likely be emboldened 

and increase calls for China to use its military power to 

resolve outstanding territorial disputes. U.S. allies and 

partners in the region, already wary of China, would likely increase efforts to build their own military capabilities, 

perhaps even reconsidering longstanding nonproliferation commitments. The result might have been increased 

regional instability and a potential unraveling of the U.S. 

alliance structure with nothing to replace it.

Conclusion: U.S.-China Relations 

and Regional Security

Despite China’s negative reaction, the U.S. rebalance 

has had a positive effect on regional security dynamics by 

reaffirming U.S. commitment to sustaining a long-term 

U.S. policymakers have been careful 

to frame Asia policy in terms of U.S. 

interests in the region, not in terms 

of containing China or frustrating its 

legitimate aspirations
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 281 13 

diplomatic, economic, and military presence in the AsiaPacific and raising the costs of potential Chinese efforts 

to resolve its maritime sovereignty claims through the 

use of coercion or force.

The United States faces a number of challenges in 

implementing the rebalance over time. One of the most 

pressing is sustaining U.S. military capabilities and commitments in the face of budget pressures. This is why the 

Obama administration has sought to wrap the different elements of the rebalance in an integrated package. 

A second challenge is maintaining the willingness of the 

President and senior officials to travel to Asia regularly 

to participate in multilateral meetings. A third challenge 

is managing the domestic politics of regional free-trade 

agreements in ways that help the United States shape regional norms and are politically sustainable at home. This 

challenge delayed the Obama administration’s efforts to 

formulate a regional trade policy. A fourth challenge is 

matching U.S. military and diplomatic commitments with 

increased private sector business activity. A fifth challenge 

is ensuring that a stepped up U.S. security presence does 

not encourage allies and partners to undertake destabilizing actions, especially with respect to territorial disputes. 

A final challenge is limiting the competitive dynamics of 

U.S.-China relations at global and regional levels.

Although the Chinese media and Chinese scholars 

and military officers have criticized the U.S. rebalance 

to Asia as a source of heightened regional security tensions, it is not clear that the increased U.S. commitment 

to the Asia-Pacific region has necessarily been bad for 

Sino-U.S. relations, much less that it signals the start of 

a new Cold War as some have argued.44 U.S. policymakers have been careful to frame American Asia policy in 

terms of U.S. interests in the region, and not in terms 

of containing China or frustrating its legitimate aspirations. Moreover, the countries share many important interests, including their common stake in an open global 

economic system and a stable Asia-Pacific region within 

which both can prosper.

The United States has repeatedly provided assurances that it does not seek to contain or break up China; 

Beijing has repeatedly provided assurances that it does 

not seek to expel the United States from Asia or challenge U.S. global leadership. The problem is that neither 

side fully believes the other’s assurances nor trusts that 

they will last as the balance of relative power between 

the United States and China changes. The lack of strategic trust between U.S. and Chinese leaders described 

by Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi is certainly real.45

But strategic trust cannot be built by pretending that 

U.S. and Chinese strategic interests are perfectly aligned, 

or by ignoring the competitive element in U.S.-China 

relations. The United States and China certainly do not 

have a zero-sum relationship, but strategic competition is 

increasingly evident on a range of military and strategic 

issues. Each side is focused on the other’s military modernization, deployments, and exercises. Improvements in 

Chinese military capabilities (especially A2/AD capabilities) are attracting significant attention from U.S. strategists; many of these Chinese development programs have 

been under way for many years and appear to be targeted 

specifically at U.S. military capabilities. Ignoring these 

competitive dynamics will not make them go away.

What is important is for the two sides to find ways to 

expand and deepen the scope of cooperation on common 

interests and to find ways to limit and manage the competitive aspects of U.S.-China relations.46 Senior political 

leaders on both sides need to remain actively engaged and 

make full use of summits and other mechanisms to articulate common interests and areas for expanded bilateral 

cooperation. Actions and statements by top leaders set the 

overall tone for bilateral relations, especially in China. U.S. 

and Chinese leaders should also consider decisions about 

it is important for the two sides to 

find ways to expand cooperation on 

common interests and to limit and 

manage the competitive aspects of 

U.S.-China relations
14 SF No. 281 www.ndu.edu/inss

military capabilities and regional policies in light of the 

potential impact on bilateral relations.

In this light, the June 2013 Sunnylands summit 

meeting in California between President Obama and 

President Xi Jinping is a significant and encouraging sign. 

According to a U.S. official, the summit is intended to 

provide a “wide-ranging, informal setting for discussions 

between the two leaders” that will “allow them to cover 

the broadest possible agenda, but also to forge a working 

relationship that we will be relying on very much in the 

years to come.”47 As National Security Advisor Donilon 

put it, “We do not want our relationship to become defined by rivalry and confrontation . . . a better outcome 

is possible. But it falls to both sides—the United States 

and China—to build a new model of relations between 

an existing power and an emerging one. Xi Jinping and 

President Obama have both endorsed this goal.”48

There are several specific measures the two sides 

could adopt to manage the competitive aspects of bilateral relations:

◆ Keep the competitive dimensions of U.S.-China 

relations within the context of a broader, generally cooperative relationship that is vital to both countries. Both sides 

should be careful not to let concerns about worst-case 

scenarios and unlikely contingencies drive the broader relationship and limit cooperation on important issues.

◆ Avoid zero-sum conceptions of regional security 

and competition for influence. Stated U.S. and Chinese 

regional goals are not necessarily incompatible; a loss 

for China is not necessarily a gain for the United States, 

and vice versa. Both countries should recognize that 

smaller countries want the United States and China 

competing for their favor, which is not necessarily in 

either’s interest.

◆ Place some limits on competition that might 

make both sides worse off. For example, unrestrained 

nuclear competition or all-out efforts to weaponize space 

would require huge investments that might ultimately 

produce no strategic advantages once the other side’s 

response is factored in.49

◆ The United States should continue to encourage 

and support Chinese efforts to acquire a stronger voice in 

global institutions and to take on more responsibility for 

sustaining and supporting the international system; China, like other responsible leading nations, should look 

for opportunities where it can contribute to shared goals 

even if this entails some domestic economic sacrifices.

◆ Expand bilateral and multilateral security cooperation. Competitive dynamics will limit cooperation 

in some areas, but there are important opportunities 

in matters such as peacekeeping, humanitarian affairs 

and disaster relief, infectious disease control, counterpiracy, and energy security where both countries can 

make important contributions. Cooperation on these 

issues could help balance the more competitive aspects 

of relations.

◆ Prepare for the unexpected. Developments on 

the Korean Peninsula or elsewhere might require both 

the United States and China to respond using military 

forces. The two militaries should find ways to discuss 

potential contingencies and how they might share information, deconflict operations, or work together in 

various scenarios.

Acknowledgments

An earlier version was presented at an S. Rajaratnam 

School of International Studies workshop on “The 

Growth of Chinese Power and the Changing Security Dynamics in Asia” in Singapore, February 22, 

2013. The author thanks Katrina Fung for research 

assistance throughout and Min Jie (Terry) Zeng for 

research assistance on Chinese views of the rebalance. James Przystup, Cynthia Watson, Ellen Frost, 

Drew Thompson, and Evelyn Goh provided useful 

comments and suggestions.
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 281 15 

Notes 1 Examples include the Asia Foundation’s reports on “America’s 

Role in Asia” from 1992, 2000, 2004, and 2008; and Ralph A. Cossa et 

al., The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: Security Strategy for the 

Obama Administration (Washington, DC: Center for a New American 

Security, February 2009), available at <www.cnas.org/files/documents/

publications/CampbellPatelFord_US_Asia-Pacific_February2009.pdf>.

2 The Obama administration’s effort to increase attention and 

resources focused on Asia extends a trend dating back at least to the 

George H.W. Bush administration’s East Asia Strategy Initiative in 

1990. See the positive remarks about the Bush administration’s Asia 

policy in Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account 

of America’s Asia Strategy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 

Press, 2012); and the analysis in Evan A. Feigenbaum, Strengthening 

the U.S. Role in Asia (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 

November 16, 2011).

3 See National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, “The United 

States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013,” Speech to the Asia Society, 

New York, March 11, 2013.

4 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 

Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012), 2, 

available at <www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf>.

5 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy

189 (November–December 2011), 56–63. Also see “Remarks by 

President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” Canberra, Australia, 

November 17, 2011, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>.

6 See the excellent report by Mark Manyin et al., Pivot to the 

Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia, R42448 

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 28, 2012).

7 See James B. Steinberg, “Remarks at National Bureau of Asian 

Research Conference Engaging Asia 2009: Strategies for Success,” 

Washington, DC, April 10, 2009; and Hillary Clinton, “Remarks on 

Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities,” Honolulu, 

HI, January 12, 2010.

8 This phrase appeared in Richard L. Armitage and Joseph Nye, 

The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020 (Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], February 

2007), but was used regularly by Assistant Secretary of State Kurt 

Campbell, who was a member of the Armitage-Nye study group. The 

report outlines the findings of a bipartisan panel of Asia specialists 

co-chaired by Armitage and Nye.

9 See Marc Lanteigne, China and International Institutions: Alternative Paths to Global Power (New York: Routledge, 2005); the point 

about Chinese reluctance to take on “costs, risks, and commitments” 

is from Robert Sutter, U.S.-China Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic 

Present (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010).

10 “Chinese experts lash out at ‘China responsibility’ theories,” 

Xinhua News Agency, August 20 2010; Zhang Zhouxiang, “Onus not 

binding on China,” China Daily, February 17, 2011.

11 See Bader, chapter seven; and Michael D. Swaine, “China’s 

Assertive Behavior Part One: On ‘Core Interests,’” China Leadership 

Monitor No. 34 (Winter 2011), available at <http://media.hoover.

org/documents/CLM34MS.pdf>; Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor 

Fravel, “China’s Assertive Behavior—Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,” China Leadership Monitor No. 35 (Summer 2011), available 

at <http://media.hoover.org/documents/CLM35MS.pdf>; Michael 

D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior Part Three: The Role of the 

Military in Foreign Policy,” China Leadership Monitor No. 36 (Winter 

2012), available at <http://media.hoover.org/documents/CLM36MS.

pdf>; and Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior Part Four: 

The Role of the Military in Foreign Crises,” China Leadership Monitor

No. 37 (Spring 2012), available at <http://media.hoover.org/documents/CLM37MS.pdf>.

12 Bonnie S. Glaser, China’s Coercive Economic Diplomacy—A 

New and Worrying Trend, PacNet Number 46 (Honolulu, HI: Pacific 

Forum CSIS, July 23, 2012), available at <http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-46-chinas-coercive-economic-diplomacy-new-andworrying-trend>.

13 See Mark Redden and Phillip C. Saunders, Managing SinoU.S. Air and Naval Interactions: Cold War Lessons and New Avenues 

of Approach, China Strategic Perspectives, No. 5 (Washington, DC: 

NDU Press, 2012), available at <www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/chinaperspectives/ChinaPerspectives-5.pdf>.

14 John Pomfret, “U.S. takes a tougher tone with China,” The 

Washington Post, July 30, 2010.

15 All travel statistics in this paragraph omit travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan that was focused on the conflicts there.

16 In his second term, President George W. Bush spent 33 days 

in Asia on 6 trips, versus 27 days on 5 trips for President Barack 

Obama in his first term. Secretary Condoleezza Rice spent 73 days in 

Asia on 14 trips, compared to 101 days on 14 trips for Secretary Hillary Clinton. President Bush’s Secretaries of Defense spent 33 days in 

the region on 7 trips, versus 58 days on 13 trips for President Obama’s 

Secretaries of Defense.

17 Signing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Treaty of 

Amity and Cooperation was a prerequisite for joining the East Asia 

Summit.

18 See the fact sheets from the U.S. Trade Representative’s office, 

available at <www.ustr.gov/tpp>; and Jeffrey J. Schott, Barbara Kotschwar, 

and Julia Muir, Understanding the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Washington, 

DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2013).

19 Data derived from Chinese Ministry of Commerce, accessed 

on May 8, 2013, through CEIC China database.

20 See U.S. Agency for International Development, “Foreign Assistance Data By Country,” available at <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.

gov/data/country.html>.

21 See the priorities enumerated in Sustaining U.S. Global 

Leadership, 4.

22 See David Helvey, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East 

Asia, Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, April 25, 2013, 

available at <www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Helvey_Testimony.pdf>; and Statement of Joseph Y. Yun, Acting Assistant 

Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, April 

25, 2013, available at <www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/

Yun_Testimony2.pdf>.

23 Statement of Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, USN, commander, 

U.S. Pacific Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee 

hearing on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, April 9, 2013.

24 For details, see the Helvey and Yun statements before the 

Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs, April 25, 2013; the figure of “over $100 million” 

is from Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Speech delivered at the 

International Institute for Strategic Studies (Shangri-La Dialogue), 

Singapore, June 1, 2013, available at <www.defense.gov/Speeches/

Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1785>.

25 William Cole, “Navy Vessels Due in Asia-Pacific Area,” 

Honolulu Star-Advertiser, April 10, 2013, B1; Dan De Luce, “US 

Shift to Asia on Track Despite Budget Cuts: Admiral,” Agence 

France-Presse, May 6, 2013.

26 Hagel.
16 SF No. 281 www.ndu.edu/inss

27 China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines all claim some islands in the South China Sea; China, Taiwan, 

and Japan claim the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.

28 Recent editions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

annual report to Congress on military and security developments 

involving the People’s Republic of China discuss U.S.-China militarymilitary contacts; also see Shirley A. Kan, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, RL32496 (Washington, DC: Congressional 

Research Service, April 7, 2013).

29 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (Washington, DC: Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, May 2013), 36, available at <www.defense.

gov/pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf>.

30 See Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, New Foreign Policy Actors 

in China, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 

Policy Paper No. 26 (Stockholm: SIPRI, September 2010), available 

at <http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=410>.

31 China pursued joint seismic exploration with the Philippines 

and Vietnam from 2007 to 2009 and reached an agreement with 

Japan on joint exploitation of natural gas in the East China Sea, but 

implementation of that agreement has stalled, largely due to domestic 

opposition in China.

32 Interviews in Shanghai, May 2012.

33 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, 4.

34 See Philip DuPree and Jordan Thomas, “Air-Sea Battle: 

Clearing the Fog,” Armed Forces Journal, May 2012, available at <www.

armedforcesjournal.com/2012/05/10318204>; and Air-Sea Battle: 

Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges, 

Air-Sea Battle Office, May 2013, available at <http://navylive.dodlive.

mil/2013/06/03/overview-of-the-air-sea-battle-concept/>.

35 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? (Washington, DC: 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 19, 2010), 

available at <www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/02/why-airseabattle/>; and Jan van Tol et al., AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure 

Operational Concept (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments, May 18, 2010), available at <www.csbaonline.

org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/>.

36 See the article by then–Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton A. Schwartz and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan W. 

Greenert, “Air-Sea Battle: Promoting Stability in an Era of Uncertainty,” The American Interest, February 20, 2012, available at <www.

the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1212>.

37 See Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013.

38 See testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell before the East Asian and Pacific 

Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

hearing on “Maritime Territorial Disputes and Sovereignty Issues in Asia,” September 20, 2012; and the Joint Press Conference 

with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Leon 

Panetta, Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario, 

and Philippine Secretary of National Defense Voltaire Gazmin, April 

30, 2012.

39 Jane Perlez, “Philippines and China Ease Tensions in Rift at 

Sea,” The New York Times, June 18, 2012; Campbell testimony.

40 Patrick Ventrell, State Department Office of Press Relations, 

Press Statement, “South China Sea,” Washington, DC, August 3, 

2012, available at <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/08/196022.htm>.

41 Jane Perlez, “China Criticizes Clinton’s Remarks About Dispute With Japan Over Islands,” The New York Times, January 20, 2013.

42 Hagel.

43 See M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Island Strategy: ‘Redefine the 

Status Quo,’” The Diplomat, November 1, 2012, available at <http://

thediplomat.com/china-power/chinas-island-strategy-redefine-thestatus-quo/>.

44 Lanxin Xiang, “China and the ‘Pivot,’” Survival 54, no. 5 

(October–November 2012), 113–128.

45 Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.-China 

Strategic Distrust, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series, Number 4 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, March 

30, 2012), available at <www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/

papers/2012/3/30%20us%20china%20lieberthal/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf>.

46 This section draws upon Phillip C. Saunders, Managing 

Strategic Competition with China, INSS Strategic Forum, No. 242 

(Washington, DC: NDU Press, July 2009), available at <www.ndu.

edu/inss/docuploaded/SF242China_Saunders.pdf>.

47 The White House, “Background Conference Call by Senior 

Administration Officials on the President’s Meetings with President 

Xi Jinping of China,” June 4, 2013.

48 Donilon.

49 See David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, The Paradox 

of Power: Sino American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability

(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2011), available at <www.ndu.edu/

press/paradox-of-power.html>.

The Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs 

(CSCMA) within the Institute for National Strategic Studies 

serves as a national focal point and resource center for 

multidisciplinary research and analytic exchanges on 

the national goals and strategic posture of the People’s 

Republic of China. The center focuses on China’s ability to 

develop, field, and deploy an effective military instrument 

in support of its national strategic objectives.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

William T. Eliason

Director

NDU Press

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Linton Wells II

Interim Director

INSS

Phillip C. Saunders 

Director

CSCMA