alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 323.9 Objections to notices. ( a ) Any person may file an objection requesting DOT to prohibit any termination, suspension, or reduction of air transportation to an eligible place that is the subject of a notice filed under this part.
( b ) Objections shall contain: ( 1 ) Identification of the objector, including address and telephone number.
( 2 ) A statement of DOT action requested.
( 3 ) The schedules, routes, carriers, and aircraft types for all air transportation to the affected place other than that proposed to be terminated, suspended, or reduced.
( 4 ) A suggested reasonable level of essential air service to the affected place.
( 5 ) [Reserved]
( 6 ) A justification of the suggested level of essential air service.
( 7 ) Proof of service on the carrier filing the notice objected to, on all airport managers and State and local governments on whom the notice was filed, and any other person designated by DOT. The proof of service shall include the names of all carriers served and the names and addresses of all other persons served.
( c ) Objectors are strongly urged to include in their objections facts to support the suggested level of essential air service (e.g., traffic and enplanement data, other market studies, facts descriptive of the place's isolation or dependence on air transportation).
(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 3024-0030) [Doc. No. 82, 50 FR 2430, Jan. 16, 1985, as amended by Doc. No. OST-96-1269, 61 FR 19165, 19166, May 1, 1996]
**Exhibit
      32.1**











**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Tower Financial Corporation (the
      "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2005 as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Donald
      F. Schenkel, Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer of
      the
      Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec.
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1) The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








/s/
                Donald F. SchenkelDonald
                F. SchenkelChairman
                of the Board, Presidentand
                Chief Executive OfficerAugust
                10, 2005
#### UNION TRUST CO v HAWKINS

Ohio Supreme Court

No 20680.

Decided June 19, 1929

Syllabus by

MARSHALL, CJ.

DECEDENTS’ ESTATES

(220 G) Where the owner of property executes to another an instrument under or in connection with which he does not divest himself of the title to any of his estate but provides for the disposition of such property at or after his death and it becomes operative to transfer the property only at the time and by reason of his death, such instrument is testamentary in character.

(220 T) At common law a trust instrument intended to operate as a conveyance of property at and after the death of the settlor must be consummated by such a distinct and absolute delivery of property by the settlor to the trustee for the benefit of the named benefiiciaries as to be a relinquishedment of dominion over it by the settlor.

(220 Wg) The amendment of 8617 GC, effective August 14, 1921, authorizes a trust agreement, including the power to alter, amend or revoke the trust, and by virtue of that amendment a trust agreement making a transfer or conveyance of property including such power and to take effect at the death of the creator of the trust, will effect such transfer and conveyance, although the instrument be not executed in conformity with the law of wills.

Robinson, Matthias and Allen, JJ, concur. Kinkade, Jones and Day, JJ, concur in proposition 3 of the syllabus and in the judgment.
#### DePALMA v STATE

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 10131.

Decided Oct. 28, 1929

VICKERY, PJ.

Now it is important to bear this in mind because the court admitted conversations and things that the girl said while she was being outraged by the friend of p.ePalma, when De Palma was not present and, of course, that would only be admissible upon the theory of a conspiracy. Now whenever there is evidence of a conspiracy either by circumstances or by direct proof tending to establish a conspiracy, whatever anyone of the conspirators said or did in furtherance of a conspiracy may be used as evidence against the other even though he was not present.

Now here were two boys that undertook to take those two girls home. They took one home and instead of taking the other one home, or taking, her to De Palma’s place, they took her into a lonely desolate spot and there both outraged her and they had some talk in Italian which she did not understand 'while they were going there, and De Palma got out of the automobile and went back behind it while the other man accomplished the purpose in outraging this girl. He then came back, apparently as though, it was pre-arranged and he gratified his lust upon this girl likewise.

Nov/ the whole circumstance here, the fact that they drove this girl out of the way and. took her in the opposite direction when they said they were going to take her home, and the fact that they cooperated together in such unity in carrying' out their nefarious enterprise, all go to bear upon the question that there was an agreement or arrangement between them which showed that they both had joined in this plan to commit this crime. The record shows in this case that the girl *703resisted and was forcibly outraged against her will and that the man that she called to assist her under such circumstances not only did not assist her, but apparently aided his companion to do what he could not have done alone, if the girl’s testimony is to be believed, that but for the help that DePalma gave the other man he woujd not have been able to accomplish his purpose, and then after that he calmly used this girl, and then says that it was voluntary on her nart.

We think the evidence in this case clearly shows that this man was guilty of the crime of rape and that the court committed no error in permitting what she said to the associate, the man who had never been apprehended but fled from the authorities and is still absent from Cuyahoga County.

We think the verdict of the jury was justified and the judgment will, therefore, be affirmed.

Sullivan and Levine, JJ, concur.
#### § 1471.605 How does suspension differ from debarment?

Suspension differs from debarment in that—

| A suspending official . . . | A debarring official . . . |
| --- | --- |
| (a) Imposes suspension as a temporary status of ineligibility for procurement and nonprocurement transactions, pending completion of an investigation or legal proceedings | Imposes debarment for a specified period as a final determination that a person is not presently responsible. |
| (b) Must— (1) Have *adequate evidence* that there may be a cause for debarment of a person; and (2) Conclude that *immediate action* is necessary to protect the Federal interest | Must conclude, based on a *preponderance of the evidence,* that the person has engaged in conduct that warrants debarment. |
| (c) Usually imposes the suspension *first,* and then promptly notifies the suspended person, giving the person an opportunity to contest the suspension and have it lifted | Imposes debarment *after* giving the respondent notice of the action and an opportunity to contest the proposed debarment. |
#### INTERNATIONAL TELEPOST CO v P U C

Ohio Supreme Court

No 21294.

Decided Feb 6, 1929

Syllabus by

ALLEN, J.

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

(480 P) Under Section 614-53, General Code, the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, after authorizing a public utility to issue capital stock, may for good cause shown suspend the right of such utility to further issue and dispose of such stock within this state.

CORPORATIONS

(160 Sa) Where the record shows that such utility hasl used the order of the Public Utilities Commission authorizing it to issue its capital stock as a basis for advertising its securities and inducing their purchase in Ohio and other states, good cause for the suspension of such authority is shown.

Marshall, C J, Robinson, Jones and Day, JJ, concur. Kinkade and Matthias, JJ, not participating.
#### GALLIPOLIS (City) v CANADY GALLIPOLIS (City) v HEALEY GALLIPOLIS (City) v MILLS GALLIPOLIS (City) v GARLINGTON

Ohio Appeals, 4th Dist, Gallia Co

Nos 124, 125, 126, 127.

Decided July 15, 1929

Mr. R. M. Switzer, Gallipolis, for City.

Mr. H. *W.*Cherrington & Mr. A. J. Greene, Gallipolis, for Defendants.

BY THE COURT

The above entitled cases have been submitted upon the record made in the Common Pleas with some additional testimony in this court. The testimony taken in this court does not materially affect the cases, however. As our conclusions are in harmony with those of the Common Pleas we adopt the scholarly opinion of Judge Whit-craft in the Common Pleas as our own and direct that entries be made in the several cases accordingly.

Decree for plaintiff.

Mauek, Richards and Lloyd, JJ, concur.
#### BELL v HENRY

Ohio Supreme Court

No. 21548.

Decided June 12, 1929

Syllabus by

JONES, J.

DECEDENTS’ ESTATES

(220 W2) An election, manifested by a written instrument, signed and acknowledged by a widow pursuant to the provisions of 10571 GC (111 O L., 510), and entered upon the minutes of the Probate Court, is a valid election, if the provisions of the will and her rights under it and under the law in the event of her refusal to take under the will, have been fully explained to her prior to the making of such election.

Marshall, CJ, Kinkade, Robinson, Matthias and Day, JJ, concur.
#### § 23.2205 Interaction of systems and structures.

For airplanes equipped with systems that modify structural performance, alleviate the impact of this subpart's requirements, or provide a means of compliance with this subpart, the applicant must account for the influence and failure of these systems when showing compliance with the requirements of this subpart.
#### DAVIDSON v. ROBERTS.

(Decided April 20, 1916.)

Appeal from Birmingham City Court.

Heard before Hon. H. A. Sharpe.

No counsel marked for appellant. Harsh, Harsh & Harsh, for appellant.

Per Curiam.

Appeal dismissed by agreement.
# EUR-Lex - 31996H0129 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 31996H0129

**96/129/EC: Commission Recommendation of 12 January 1996 supplementing recommendation 93/216/EEC on the European firearms pass **

*
Official Journal L 030 , 08/02/1996 P. 0047 - 0049 *

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 12 January 1996 supplementing recommendation 93/216/EEC on the European firearms pass (96/129/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular the second indent of Article 155 thereof,

Whereas Council Directive 91/477/EEC of 18 June 1991 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons (1), provides for the introduction of a European firearms pass;

Whereas, in its recommendation 93/216/EEC (2) on the European firearms pass, the Commission called on the Member States to introduce the pass in conformity with the specimen annexed to that recommendation;

Whereas the specimen European firearms pass must be modified following the accession of the new Member States,

RECOMMENDS THAT:

Article 1

The Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden should introduce the European firearms pass in conformity with the specimen annexed hereto.

Article 2

The other Member States which already issue the European firearms pass in conformity with the specimen annexed to recommendation 93/216/EEC should introduce the pass as based on the specimen annexed hereto as and when stocks of the old pass run out, and at the latest by 1 January 1998.

Done at Brussels, 12 January 1996.

For the Commission

Mario MONTI

Member of the Commission

>REFERENCE TO A FILM>

>REFERENCE TO A FILM>

(1) OJ No L 256, 13. 9. 1991, p. 51.

(2) OJ No L 93, 17. 4. 1993, p. 39.
#### § 1620.25 Equalization of rates.

Under the express terms of the EPA, when a prohibited sex-based wage differential has been proved, an employer can come into compliance only by raising the wage rate of the lower paid sex. The rate-reduction provision of the EPA prohibits an employer from attempting to cure a violation by hiring or transferring employees to perform the previously lower-paid job at the lower rate. Similarly, the departure of the higher paid sex from positions where a violation occurred, leaving only members of the lower paid sex being paid equally among themselves, does not cure the EPA violations.
§ 1403.1 Definitions. As used in this part, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise; ( a ) The term *commerce* means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia, or any Territory, or between points in the same State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign country.
( b ) The term *affecting commerce* means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor-management dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.
( c ) The term *labor union* or *labor organization* means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
( d ) The term *State or other conciliation services* means the official and accredited mediation and conciliation establishments of State and local governments, which are wholly or partially supported by public funds.
( e ) The term *proffer its services,* as applied to the functions and duties of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, means to make mediation services and facilities available either on its own motion or upon the request of one or more of the parties to a dispute.
#### STATE OF FLORIDA v PERALA

Case No. 90-61 AC

Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County

December 27, 1990

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Joel Silvershein, Assistant State Attorney, for appellant.

Gene Reibman, Esquire, for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT

MOE, L., Circuit Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon the appeal of a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution entered against the State of Florida in the case of *State of Florida v Thomas Denton Perala,*(case #90-92 MM) on July 17, 1990

Before a jury was sworn in to try this case, the State told the trial judge that it was not prepared to go forward with the case, and moved *55the Court for an order continuing the trial. The defendant’s attorney then moved to dismiss the case for lack of prosecution. The trial court denied the motion for continuance and granted the motion to dismiss. There was no evidence of prejudice to the defendant by a continuance or determination or consideration of alternatives to dismissal.

The Second District Court of Appeals stated in *State v Hamilton,*387 So.2d 555, 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), “dismissal of an otherwise valid information is too extreme a sanction where there is no showing of prejudice or unfairness to the appellee.” The trial court had a less severe alternative to dismissal in that it could have denied the continuance and proceeded with jury selection. At this point the Appellant could have gone to trial or enter a nolle prosequi. By failing to use this less severe alternative, as several appellate courts have ruled, the trial court abused its discretion. *State v S.M.F.,*546 So.2d 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); *State v Lundy,*531 So.2d 1020 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); *State v Evans,*418 So.2d 459 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); *Hamilton,*387 So.2d at 556.

Accordingly, it is hereby,

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the decision of the trial court is REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DONE AND ORDERED in chambers, at the Broward County Courthouse, 201 Southeast 6th Street, Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida this 20th day of December, 1990.
Exhibit 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                               ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES--OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report of Baron Capital Properties, L.P.
(the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2002 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, J. Stephen Miller, Vice President - Accounting of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes--Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.

      May 29, 2003

                                BARON CAPITAL PROPERTIES, L.P.


                                By:  /s/ J. Stephen Miller
                                   -----------------------------
                                   J. Stephen Miller
                                   Vice President - Accounting
                                   (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)


                                       55
#### § 101.6 Dismissal of charges and appeals to the General Counsel.

If the complainant refuses to withdraw the charge as recommended, the Regional Director dismisses the charge. The Regional Director thereupon informs the parties of this section, together with a simple statement of the grounds therefor, and the complainant's right of appeal to the General Counsel in Washington, DC, within 14 days. If the complainant appeals to the General Counsel, the entire file in the case is sent to Washington, DC, where the case is fully reviewed by the General Counsel with staff assistance. Oral presentation of the appeal issues may be permitted a party on timely written request, in which event the other parties are notified and afforded a like opportunity at another appropriate time. Following such review, the General Counsel may sustain the Regional Director's dismissal, stating the grounds of affirmance, or may direct the Regional Director to take further action.
#### William B. Mead, App'lt, *v.*Charles A. Mead *et al.,*Resp’ts.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department,*

*Filed May 13, 1889.)*

Mortgage— Partition — Sale—When purchases hat repuse to complete SALE.

In an action in partition, a sale was ordered, but the purchaser refused to take title, it appearing that there was a mortgage outstanding which was a lien on the property sold. The only proof tending to show that the mortgage was paid, was an affidavit of plaintiff’s attorney to the effect that for ten years before her death—she died in 1887, the sale took place in 1888—the deceased owner of the property claimed that it was free from all incumbrances. *Held,*insufficient to throw upon the purchaser the risk of its present existence; that the purchaser is entitled to a merchantable title.

Appeal from, an order made at the Kings county special term.

The order denied a motion made on behalf of the infant defendant, Mary Lord, to compel the purchaser to take title to certain premises sold in partition, unless said infant defendant procure a mortgage, alleged to be an outstanding lien on the property sold, to be canceled of record.

*Edward W.*Sheldon, for app’lt; *Bacon &*Merritt, for resp’ts.

Barnard, P. J

The case shows that there is a mortgage outstanding which is an apparent lien on the property sold in partition. The deed proposed to be given by the referee will be subject to this lien, if it exists. The mortgage was dated and re*456corded in 1830, and the mortgagor took a re-conveyance in 1848,-subject to this mortgage.

This deed of reconveyance was not recorded until 1873. The mortgagor died in 1865, leaving a son and daughter, and the son -conveyed to the daughter. She conveyed away the property and took a reconveyance, and died in 1887, the owner.

There is no mention of the mortgage of 1830 in the deed from the mortgagor’s son to his sister, nor in her deed to her grantee, nor in the deed back again. The purchaser is entitled to a merchantable title. Presumably the mortgage was good in 1873 when the deed of reconveyance-to Daniel Walden, the mortgagee, was recorded as against the owners of the title. The only proof to show the mortgagor paid, is that of the plaintiff's attorney, who makes an affidavit that, for ten years before his death, the deceased owner of the property claimed that it was free of all incumbrances.

The evidence is not sufficient to throw upon the purchaser the risk of its present existence. The condition in the order in respect to a cancellation under the statutes was reasonable, and we think the statute sufficient to include this casa

If proof be made of the facts as shown in the affidavits, and there is no response to the notice given by the court, the proof of payment will be sufficient to order the cancellation.

The order should be affirmed, with costs and disbursements.

Pratt, J., concurs.