alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### WAGNER v TROTT

Ohio Appeals, 3rd Dist, Seneca Co

No 197.

Decided July 5, 1929

*492Charles A. Strauch, Fostoria, for Wagner.

Mark L. Leister, and Niles & Peters,.all of Tiffin, for Trott.

HUGHES, J.

Over the objection of the defendant, the plaintiff was permitted to introduce evidence of promises of the defendant, made before the proceedings in bankruptcy were started, that he would pay this note. This was clearly erroneous. Evidence of promises to pay a debt, made before the proceedings in bankruptcy, is clearly inadmissible.

At the close of the evidence and before the arguments began, plaintiff requested the court to give to the jury, two special requests. The first request is not approved by us as law. While the second request may be insufficient to be called a proposition of law covering any issue in the case but rather an attempt to procure another ruling upon the admission of this evidence referred to, still it was notice to the court that the defendant was seeking to have the jury instructed that they should not consider this incompetent evidence that had been offered, and under - the rule of practice, the court, in its general charge, should have so directed the jury. This, however, is covered by the same reasoning that makes the evidence incompetent. The court declined to give these charges solely upon the ground that the special requests were made without any notice to the court, ,and without any opportunity given counsel on the other side to examine the same. Of course this was not Sufficient reason for refusing to give a proper request made at the time these requests were made.

Inasmuch as the evidence is clearly inadmissible, the judgment recovered by the plaintiff upon his eleven hundred and thirty five dollar note must be reversed, and the cause remanded for trial upon this issue and this issue only.

The judgment for the defendant, recovered upon his cross petition for wages is attended by no error, -nd hence must be affirmed.

That we may not be misunderstood, we reiterate that the judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the one hundred and fifty dollar note, and the judgment in favor of the defendant upon his cross petition, are affirmed; and the judgment in favor of the defendant upon his eleven hundred and thirty five dollar note is reversed, and this much of the cause is remanded for a new trial. Exceptions may be noted by both parties.

Before Judges Hughes, Justice & Crow.
§ 10.12 Department of Labor requirements. ( a ) *In general.* The Executive Order minimum wage applicable from January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015 is $10.10 per hour. The Secretary will determine the applicable minimum wage rate to be paid to workers performing work on or in connection with covered contracts on an annual basis, beginning January 1, 2016.
( b ) *Method for determining the applicable Executive Order minimum wage.* The Secretary will determine the applicable minimum wage under the Executive Order, beginning January 1, 2016, by using the methodology set forth in § 10.5(b).
( c ) *Notice.* ( 1 ) The Administrator will notify the public of the applicable minimum wage rate to be paid to workers performing work on or in connection with covered contracts on an annual basis at least 90 days before any new minimum wage is to take effect.
( 2 ) *Method of notification* — ( i ) Federal Register. The Administrator will publish a notice in the Federal Register stating the applicable minimum wage rate to be paid to workers performing work on or in connection with covered contracts on an annual basis at least 90 days before any new minimum wage is to take effect.
( ii ) *Wage Determinations OnLine Web site.* The Administrator will publish and maintain on Wage Determinations OnLine (WDOL), *http://www.wdol.gov ,* or any successor site, the applicable minimum wage rate to be paid to workers performing work on or in connection with covered contracts.
( iii ) *Wage Determinations.* The Administrator will publish a prominent general notice on all wage determinations issued under the Davis-Bacon Act and the Service Contract Act stating the Executive Order minimum wage and that the Executive Order minimum wage applies to all workers performing on or in connection with such contracts whose wages are governed by the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Davis-Bacon Act, and the Service Contract Act. The Administrator will update this general notice on all such wage determinations annually.
( iv ) *Other means as appropriate.* The Administrator may publish the applicable minimum wage rate to be paid to workers performing work on or in connection with covered contracts on an annual basis at least 90 days before any such new minimum wage is to take effect in any other media that the Administrator deems appropriate.
( d ) *Notification to a contractor of the withholding of funds.* If the Administrator requests that a contracting agency withhold funds from a contractor pursuant to § 10.11(c), the Administrator and/or contracting agency shall notify the affected prime contractor of the Administrator's withholding request to the contracting agency.
#### Aaron B. Cohu, as Executor of Joseph F. Cohu, Resp’t, *v.*Joseph Husson, App’lt.

*(New York Superior Court,*

*General Term,*

*Filed March 5, 1889.)*

Costs—In actions bt executors—Who entitled to — Code Civ. Pro., § 3246.

Under Code Civil Procedure, section 3246, where defendant, in an action brought by an executor as such, recovers judgment on a set-off, he is entitled to costs.

Appeal from an order of special term, denying defendant’s application to reverse the decision of the clerk in refusing to enter judgment for him for costs.

*Edward P. Wilder,*for app’lt; *Abram Piling,*for resp’t.

Sedgwick, Oh. J.

The action was upon a promissory note made by defendant. The plaintiff assumed to represent the estate of Joseph F. Cohu, deceased. The answer, among other things, alleged that the amount of a certain note made by one Henry Cohu should be offset against the plaintiff’s demand. The defendant succeeded in establishing this, for reasons not necessary to consider. It is not material that Henry Cohu had died. It may be material to say that the offset would not lead to a recovery of a judgment for any sum of money against the plaintiff representing Joseph F. Cohu, and that the defense of offset was equivalent to a defense of extinguishment or payment. The result was that the plaintiff failed to establish his action. And for that reason he was not entitled to costs. The defendant was entitled to them unless the plaintiff was exempt from liability for costs because he was an executor. Section 3246 of the Code says that in an action brought by an executor in his representative capacity, costs must be awarded as in an action by a person prosecuting in his own right, except as otherwise prescribed by sections 1835 and 1836. These last sections regulate only the award of costs in an action brought against an executor. I think, therefore, that the clerk should have taxed the costs, and have inserted in the judgment an award of them in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff. Section 3246 directs as to whether the estate or the plaintiff personally shall pay them. This is not a question here.

The order should be reversed, with ten dollars costs, and an order entered reversing decision of clerk, with proper directions to him.

Dugro, J., concurs.
§ 33.85 Calibration tests. ( a ) Each engine must be subjected to those calibration tests necessary to establish its power characteristics and the conditions for the endurance test specified § 33.87. The results of the power characteristics calibration tests form the basis for establishing the characteristics of the engine over its entire operating range of speeds, pressures, temperatures, and altitudes. Power ratings are based upon standard atmospheric conditions with no airbleed for aircraft services and with only those accessories installed which are essential for engine functioning.
( b ) A power check at sea level conditions must be accomplished on the endurance test engine after the endurance test and any change in power characteristics which occurs during the endurance test must be determined. Measurements taken during the final portion of the endurance test may be used in showing compliance with the requirements of this paragraph.
( c ) In showing compliance with this section, each condition must stabilize before measurements are taken, except as permitted by paragraph (d) of this section.
( d ) In the case of engines having 30-second OEI, and 2-minute OEI ratings, measurements taken during the applicable endurance test prescribed in § 33.87(f) ( 1 ) through ( 8 ) may be used in showing compliance with the requirements of this section for these OEI ratings.
[Doc. No. 3025, 29 FR 7453, June 10, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 33-6, 39 FR 35468, Oct. 1, 1974; Amdt. 33-18, 61 FR 31328, June 19, 1996]
II 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3976 

To amend the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act to 

extend the authorization of appropriations for the Lead Exposure Registry, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 17, 2020 

Ms. STABENOW (for herself and Mr. PETERS) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment and 

Public Works 

A BILL 

To amend the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the 

Nation Act to extend the authorization of appropriations 

for the Lead Exposure Registry, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Flint Registry Reau5 thorization Act’’. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 3976 IS

1 SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR LEAD 

2 EXPOSURE REGISTRY. 

3 Section 2203(d) of the Water Infrastructure Im4 provements for the Nation Act (42 U.S.C. 300j–27(d)) is 

5 amended— 

6 (1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as 

7 subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and indent8 ing appropriately; 

9 (2) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) 

10 (as so redesignated), by striking ‘‘There’’ and insert11 ing the following: 

12 ‘‘(1) FISCAL YEARS 2017 THROUGH 2021.— 

13 There’’; and 

14 (3) by adding at the end the following: 

15 ‘‘(2) FISCAL YEARS 2022 THROUGH 2031.— 

16 There is authorized to be appropriated for the period 

17 of fiscal years 2022 through 2031 $50,000,000 to 

18 carry out subsection (b).’’. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
#### Nathan Klein, Individually and as President of Local No. 52 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, et al., Respondents, *v.*Paul J. Morrin, Individually and as President of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, et al., Defendants, and Joseph Boyen, Individually and as President of Local No. 447 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Appellant.

Argued January 20, 1937;

decided March 9, 1937.

*554
      *Harold Stern*for appellant.

*Louis B. Boudin*for respondents.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Loughran, Finch and Rippey, JJ. Taking no part: Hubbs, J.
#### Coster *vs.*Waring.

ALBANY,

Feb. 1838.

A plaintiff is not at liberty to treat a demurrer to a declaration as a nullity, and enter the defendant’s default for not pleading; and the court, on a motion to set aside such default, will not pass upon the question of the validity of the demurrer.

The defendant put in a general demurrer to the declaration. The plaintiff’s attorney supposing, that under the 88th *general rule*of this court, the defendant should have specified the objections in matters of substance as well as form upon which he intended to rely, treated the demurrer as a nullity, entered the defendant’s default for not pleading, and gave notice of assessment. The defendant moved to set aside the default. The demurrer was served on the twenty-ninth day of December. It was now insisted, on behalf of the plaintiff, that the leave to amend without costs, given by the 88th rule, was not the ouly penalty for a disobedience of the rule; but that if, on inspection of the declaration, it should be seen that there was no cause of demurrer, and that the object of the defendant must have been delay, the plaintiff would be sustained in the course he bad adopted.

*By the*Court,

Bronson, J.

The sole object of the 88th rule was to regulate the costs of amendment after demurrer. We cannot look into the pleadings, on a motion of this kind, in a case circumstanced like the present. If the plaintiff’s attorney considered the demurrer frivolous, he should have moved for judgment on that ground.

Motion granted.
#### § 1401.20 Purpose and scope.

This subpart contains the rules that the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (“FMCS” or “the Agency”) follows in processing requests for records under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. 552. The regulations in this subpart should be read in conjunction with the text of the FOIA and the Uniform Freedom of Information Act Fee Schedule and Guidelines published by the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB Guidelines”). Requests made by individuals for records about themselves under the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, are processed in accordance with Privacy Act criteria as well as under this subpart.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-1319
PAUL VERNON SMITH, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus HOUCHENS INDUSTRIES, d/b/a Save-A-Lot, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge. (6:06-cv-03405-HFF) Submitted: July 27, 2007 Decided: August 15, 2007 Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Paul Vernon Smith, Appellant Pro Se. Wade Edward Ballard, FORD & HARRISON, LLP, Spartanburg, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Paul Vernon Smith seeks to appeal the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation Smith seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-05-00397-CR

Nereida Flores Jacobs, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY

NO. 04-4871-1, HONORABLE SUZANNE BROOKS, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury found appellant Nereida Flores Jacobs guilty of driving while intoxicated. See

Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 49.04 (West 2003). The punishment is thirty days’ incarceration and a $500

fine, probated.

Appellant was represented by retained counsel at trial. She filed a pro se notice of

appeal and requested appointed counsel for the appeal. After appellant failed to appear at a

scheduled indigency hearing, the court found that she is not indigent and denied the request.

Appellant did not obtain a reporter’s record and, after she was given notice and an opportunity to

cure, the appeal was submitted for decision without a reporter’s record. See Tex. R. App. P.

37.3(c)(1). Appellant did not file a brief or respond to this Court’s notices. See Tex. R. App. P.

38.8(b)(4). We have examined the record before us and find no fundamental error that should be

considered in the interest of justice.
2

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

__________________________________________

W. Kenneth Law, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Patterson and Pemberton

Affirmed

Filed: October 13, 2005

Do Not Publish
#### Price *v.*The State.

Robbery.

(Decided May 30, 1916.

71 South. 972.)

Appeal and Error; Transcript; Matter Necessary; Statutes. — Acts 1915, p. 708, amending § 6256, Code 1907, being merely a matter of procedure, and in no wise invading any substantive right of defendant, took effect from and after its passage as to all matters to be reviewed on appeal, irrespective of the date of the trial.

Appeal from Mobile City Court.

Heard before Hon. O. J. Semmes.

George Price was convicted of robbery, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

No counsel marked for appellant. W. L. Martin, Attorney General, for the State.

*90EVANS, J.-

Appellant was convicted of robbery and sentenced on July 7, 1915, to serve a term of 20 years in the penitentiary. Appellant presented no bill of exceptions within the time allowed by law, and an inspection of the record proper reveals no question of law-thereon as to demurrers, charges, or otherwise.

In obedience to the mandate of section 6264, Code 1907, we have examined the record for error,apparent thereon. The transcript does not disclose that any order was made for a special venire to be drawn as in cases of capital felonies. A recent act approved September 22,1915, so amends section 6256, Code 1907, as specifically to authorize the omission of such an order in making up the transcript on appeal. The question then arises: Has the act in question any operation or effect in this case, as the judgment of conviction antedated the passage of the act? The act in question incorporated into the statute what was already provided by rule of practice 27, adopted by the Supreme Court, and harmonized said rule and section 6256, Code 1907. The purpose of the act and rule was merely to direct and control the clerks of various nisi prius courts in the making up of their transcripts so that the same should not be incumbered with formal and routine matters unless some point or question was raised thereon. The act in question is merely a matter of procedure, in no wise invading any substantive right. The purpose and object sought was to give force and effect to the operation of the act from and after its passage as to all matters to be reviewed on appeal, irrespective of the date of trial.

The proceedings and judgment entry appearing in all things to be regular, the judgment of the court below is *affirmed*.—Tay*lor v. State, infra,*70 South. 949; *Woodson v. State,*170 Ala. 87, 54 South. 191.

Affirmed.
#### SCHWANDT v CLEVELAND (city)

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

Nos. 9051 & 9052.

Decided Dec. 24, 1928

M. J. Firestone, Cleveland, for Schwandt.

Leo Weil, Cleveland, for city.

VICKERY, J.

These cases have been heard before and the court being advised of -the circumstances held that the two cases charged but one offense and only one punishment should be allowed ■ and, therefore^ reversed the judgment in the careless driving case, No. 9051, because it was taken care of in the case of driving while intoxicated; and in the instant case the game entry will be made: in the careless driving case the judgment will be reversed and the defendant discharged, because of being punished in the case of driving while intoxicated.

In case No. 9052 we think the record sustains the judgment of the court below and it simply resolves itself into a question of the weight of the evidence. The party admits that he was intoxicated but he claims he was not driving the car. His claim is he was too intoxicated to drive a car and, therefore, he got a friend who, when the accident occurred disappeared from the scene. The defendant admits that he was the owner of the car and was the only man in the car after the accident. He was sitting on the right side of the car and not in the driver’s seat, but it would not be a great stretch of the imagination to think of him shifting from the left to the right side of the ear and when he testifies it was driven by a friend who does not appear in any way, nor was seen upon the ground, one cannot blame the court below for not putting much credence in that testimony.

Besides, there is the testimony of the police officers to the effect that he admitted he was driving the car, and there is abundant evidence from the officers that he was intoxicated when taken to police headquarters.

The judgment is fully warranted by the evidence and will, therefore, be affirmed.

Sullivan, PJ, and Levine, J, concur.
# solo Techn i sche M itteilung Seite 1 von 2 

### Serv ice Bu lleti n Kl.EINMOTOREN GMBH Page 1 of 2 Po stfach 6 0 01 52 . D 71050 S i ndel fi naen 

### Nr. 4603 -13 Kennblatt Nr. Type Certificate Data Sheet No . 4603 Ausgabe 6 vom 23. September 2005 4603 I ssue 6 , September 23 r d, 2005 Gegenstand Subjekt
Dring l ichkeit Urgency Vorgang Cond ition Maf1nahmen

Actions

Materi al Material Kontrolle der Achse 20 31 211 auf Risse und gegebenenfalls Austausch des Teils . Motoren 2 350 C Eingebaut in Flugzeuge DG 1OOOT Check of t he axle 20 31 211 for cracks and if necessary replacement of the part. Engines 2 350 C i nstall ed in aircrafts DG 1000 T Bei nachste r 25 Std Kontrolle jedoch spatestens 6 Monate nach Veroffentlichung der entsprechenden AD. With the next 25 h inspection but latest 6 month after release of the correspond i ng AD. In zwei Fall en trat e in Bruch der Exzenterachse des Riemengetriebes auf, der du rch Materialfehler verursacht wurde. In two occasions the excentric axle of t he reduction gear broke caused by material errors . Ausbau der komplette n Riemenscheibe mit der Achse und DurchfOhrung einer R issprOfung im Obergangsbe reich der exzentrischen Achse. Wenn Risse erkennbar sind ist die komplette Baugruppe ins Werk zum Tausch der Achse einz u senden . A l s RissprOfungsverfahren konnen eine Magnetp u lver RissprOfung nach D I N EN ISO 9934 oder das Farbeindringverfahren nach EN ISO 3452 angewendet werden. Removal of the complete pulley wi t h the axle and carryi ng out a crack detection in the trans iti on region of the eccentric shaft. If cracks can be fo u nd the compete module has to be sent to the m anufacture r fo r replacing the axle. T he crack detection can be a magneti c particle c r

ack detec t ion acco rding to DIN EN ISO 9934 or a dye p enet rant crack detection acco rding to EN I SO 3452. Wenn erforde rlich Achse 20 31 211 S i ehe Explosionszeichnung unten If necessary axle 20 31 211. See exp l oded v iew below

ersetzte Ausgabe Verantw. Fachgebiet W. Emmerich MP L A. Hedrich

# solo Technische Mitteilung Seite 2 von 2 

### Servi ce Bulletin KLEINMOTOREN GMBH Page 2 of 2 Po stfach 60 01 52 D 71050 S indelfl ngen 

### Nr. 4603-13 Hinweis Note

Pos N r. Teil Nr. Pos No. Part No. 1 20 15 220 2 00 50110 3 20 31211 4 00 28143 Die Maf1nahmen mOssen in einem zertifiz ierten lnstandhaltungsbetrieb du rchgefOhrt werden. Alternativ kann die komplette Baugruppe zum Motorhersteller (SOLO) gesendet werden. The measures have to be performed in a certified maintenance organization. As alternative the complete module can be sent to the engine manufacturer (SOLO).

4 2 2 3

Menge Benennung Quantity Description Keilriemensch e ibe 1 be lt pulley Kugellager - 25 x 52 x 15 - 6205 - 2 RS 2 beari ng Ach se 1 shaft GKT.MU . M20 x 1,5 937 1 hex nut



### ersetzte Ausgabe Verantw . Fachgebiet W. Emmerich Anmerkung Annotation

MPL A. Hedrich