alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# AGENCY:

 Environmental Protection Agency. 

# ACTION:

 Notice; request for public comment. 

# SUMMARY:

 Notice is hereby given that a proposed prospective purchaser agreement associated with the Oronogo-Duenweg Mining Belt Superfund Site, located in Jasper County, Missouri, was executed by the Agency on December 29, 1999. The Site is part of an inactive lead and zinc mining area known as the Tri-State Mining District. The Site encompasses approximately 270 square miles, with large volumes of abandoned and uncontrolled mining wastes spread throughout the Site. The mining wastes at the Site contain elevated levels of lead, which is a hazardous substance as defined by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1986 (“CERCLA”). The Prospective Purchaser Agreement would resolve certain potential EPA claims under CERCLA against the Missouri Highway Transportation Commission (“MHTC”), the prospective purchaser (“the purchaser”). 

The settlement requires the purchaser to utilize large quantities of materials from past mining activities as fill, which would become part of the construction of the “Rangeline Bypass.” The purchaser must ensure that upon completion of construction, clean cover is in place over all mine materials. The purchaser will handle the mine material in accordance with a work plan that is designed to ensure that contamination is not spread during construction. The purchaser agrees to provide to EPA access to the property. EPA may at any time conduct an inspection of the property, including sampling, to ensure the work is being performed in accordance with the work plan. 

For thirty (30) days following the date of publication of this document, the Agency will receive written comments relating to the proposed settlement. 

# DATES:

 Written comments must be submitted on or before February 18, 2000. 

# ADDRESSES:

 Comments should reference the “Oronogo-Duenweg Mining Belt Superfund Site” and should be forwarded to D. Mark Doolan, Remedial Project Manager, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region VII, 901 North 5th Street, Kansas City, Kansas 66101. A copy of the proposed agreement may be obtained from Venessa Cobbs (913) 551-7630. 

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

 David Cozad, Senior Associate Regional Counsel, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Region VII, 901 North 5th Street, Kansas City, Kansas 66101, (913) 551-7587. 

Dated: January 4, 2000. 

Dennis Grams,

Regional Administrator, Region 7. 

[FR Doc. 00-1213 Filed 1-18-00; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
§ 25.1207 Compliance. Unless otherwise specified, compliance with the requirements of §§ 25.1181 through 25.1203 must be shown by a full scale fire test or by one or more of the following methods: ( a ) Tests of similar powerplant configurations;
( b ) Tests of components;
( c ) Service experience of aircraft with similar powerplant configurations;
( d ) Analysis.
[Amdt. 25-46, 43 FR 50598, Oct. 30, 1978]
Editorial Note on Part 47
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 47 appear at 75 FR 41979, July 20, 2010.

§ 47.2 Definitions. The following are definitions of terms used in this part: *Citizen of the United States or U.S. citizen* means one of the following: ( 1 ) An individual who is a citizen of the United States or one of its possessions.
( 2 ) A partnership each of whose partners is an individual who is a citizen of the United States.
( 3 ) A corporation or association organized under the laws of the United States or a State, the District of Columbia, or a territory or possession of the United States, of which the president and at least two-thirds of the board of directors and other managing officers are citizens of the United States, which is under the actual control of citizens of the United States, and in which at least 75 percent of the voting interest is owned or controlled by persons that are citizens of the United States.
*Registry* means the FAA, Civil Aviation Registry, Aircraft Registration Branch.
*Resident alien* means an individual citizen of a foreign country lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States as an immigrant in conformity with the regulations of the Department of Homeland Security (8 CFR Chapter 1).
[Doc. No. FAA-2015-7396; Amdt. 47-30, 80 FR 78645, Dec. 16, 2015]
#### SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO v PRICE etc

Ohio Appeals, 1st Dist, Hamilton Co

No 3257.

Decided Jan 14, 1929

Maxwell & Ramsey and Frank H Graydon, all of Cincinnati, for Southern Pacific.

Hightower, O’Brien & Porter, Cincinnati, for Price.

ROSS, J.

The measure of damages in this case is the difference in the market value of the fruit on Monday, when it should have been delivered, and the market value on Wednesday, when it was delivered. Wyler Ackerland & Co. v. Rd. Co., 83 Ohio St. 293.

It has been urged that in order to establish market value, it is necessary to prove sales on the day in question. - It is urged that the testimony of one of the witnesses who compiled the market reports for a current newspaper, did not constitute any evidence on the question of market value, for the reason that such testimony did not cover actual sales upon the day in question. We think that the testimony of the witness, refreshing his recollection from these market reports, as published in the newspaper and as compiled by him, and supported by his further statement that he acquired this information by interviewing the trade and consulting other published market reports, was competent, relevant, and material. The reports themselves would have been competent evidence under the rule laid down by many authorities. See: Jones on Evidence, 2nd Ed. Vol. 4, sections 1753, 1754. R. C. L. Vol. 10, page 1167, “Evidence”, section 367. R. C. L. Supplement, Vol. 2, page 1163, “Evidence”, section 367.

We find no error in the record, prejudicial to the plaintiff in error. For this reason, the judgment of the court of common pleas, in favor the plaintiff, is affirmed.

Hamilton, PJ and Cushing, J, concur.
#### McClure *vs.*Hall and others.

Where there are three defendants, one of whom suffers a default, and the others plead to issue, and on the trial prove payment of the plaintiff’s demand, the jury have no right to assess damages against the other defendant.

This was an action of *assumpsit*against three defendants, ' one of whom suffered a default, and the others plead to issue. On the trial, the defendants who had appeared, proved payment of the plaintiff’s demand, notwithstanding which the jury assessed damages against the defendant who had suffered the default, and found a verdict accordingly. A motion was now made to set aside the verdict, which was granted.
§ 1627.3 Records to be kept by employers. ( a ) Every employer shall make and keep for 3 years payroll or other records for each of his employees which contain: ( 1 ) Name;
( 2 ) Address;
( 3 ) Date of birth;
( 4 ) Occupation;
( 5 ) Rate of pay, and
( 6 ) Compensation earned each week.
( b ) ( 1 ) Every employer who, in the regular course of his business, makes, obtains, or uses, any personnel or employment records related to the following, shall, except as provided in paragraphs (b) (3) and (4) of this section, keep them for a period of 1 year from the date of the personnel action to which any records relate: ( i ) Job applications, resumes, or any other form of employment inquiry whenever submitted to the employer in response to his advertisement or other notice of existing or anticipated job openings, including records pertaining to the failure or refusal to hire any individual,
( ii ) Promotion, demotion, transfer, selection for training, layoff, recall, or discharge of any employee,
( iii ) Job orders submitted by the employer to an employment agency or labor organization for recruitment of personnel for job openings,
( iv ) Test papers completed by applicants or candidates for any position which disclose the results of any employer-administered aptitude or other employment test considered by the employer in connection with any personnel action,
( v ) The results of any physical examination where such examination is considered by the employer in connection with any personnel action,
( vi ) Any advertisements or notices to the public or to employees relating to job openings, promotions, training programs, or opportunities for overtime work.
( 2 ) Every employer shall keep on file any employee benefit plans such as pension and insurance plans, as well as copies of any seniority systems and merit systems which are in writing, for the full period the plan or system is in effect, and for at least 1 year after its termination. If the plan or system is not in writing, a memorandum fully outlining the terms of such plan or system and the manner in which it has been communicated to the affected employees, together with notations relating to any changes or revisions thereto, shall be kept on file for a like period.
( 3 ) When an enforcement action is commenced under section 7 of the Act regarding a particular applicant or employee, the Commission or its authorized representative shall require the employer to retain any record required to be kept under paragraph (b) (1) or (2) of this section which is relative to such action until the final disposition thereof.
(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 3046-0018) (Pub. L. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (44 U.S.C. 3501 *et seq.*))
[44 FR 38459, July 2, 1979, as amended at 46 FR 63268, Dec. 31, 1981; 56 FR 35756, July 26, 1991]
#### § 1471.635 May the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service settle a debarment or suspension action?

Yes, we may settle a debarment or suspension action at any time if it is in the best interest of the Federal Government.
#### CITY ICE & FUEL CO v KARLINSKY

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 9804.

Decided April 22, 1929

White, Cannon & Speith, Cleveland, for Ice & Fuel Co.

Thomas Long and Cerrezin & Wilson, all of Cleveland, for Karlinsky.

*287VICKERY, PJ.

We think the question in this case is whether this man received his injury while in the course of his employment. Now upon that there can be but one answer, and that is he was employed to deliver coal for the plaintiff in error company, and was returning with their team and wagon from delivering coal when this accident occurred. Whether that injury resulted in his death might be questionable, but that he received an injury in the course of his employment, there can be but one answer, and that to the effect that he did receive such an injury and even though he was intoxicated, it would not make him any the less an employee of the company, nor would it make him any the less entitled to compensation.

We do not understand that if a person is seeking compensation, he is debarred because of his own negligence. We do not understand that the law in Ohio anywhere says that if a man is intoxicated when he is working for' another and is injured, he cannot recover compensation.

We think that the record shows that this man died from the injuries that were received while he was in the course of his employment ,and that the defendant in error was a dependent and filed her claim in the proper manner, and that being refused, a proper appeal was taken to the Common Pleas Court and the case was properly tried and we can see no error in the judgment rendered.

The judgment of the court below will, therefore, be affirmed.

Sullivan and Levine, JJ, concur.
§ 102.128 Types of on-the-record proceedings; categories of Board agents; duration of prohibition. Unless otherwise provided by specific order of the Board entered in the proceeding, the prohibition of § 102.126 will be applicable in the following types of on-the-record proceedings to unauthorized *ex parte* communications made to the designated categories of Board agents who participate in the decision, from the stage of the proceeding specified until the issues are finally resolved by the Board for the purposes of that proceeding under prevailing rules and practices: ( a ) In a pre-election proceeding pursuant to Section 9(c)(1) or 9(e), or in a unit clarification or certification amendment proceeding pursuant to Section 9(b) of the Act, in which a formal hearing is held, communications to the Regional Director and the Director's staff who review the record and prepare a draft of the decision, and Board Members and their staff, from the time the hearing is opened.
( b ) In a postelection proceeding pursuant to Section 9(c)(1) or 9(e) of the Act, in which a formal hearing is held, communications to the Hearing Officer, the Regional Director and the Director's staff who review the record and prepare a draft of the report or decision, and Board Members and their staff, from the time the hearing is opened.
( c ) In a postelection proceeding pursuant to Section 9(c)(1) or 9(e), or in a unit clarification or certification amendment proceeding pursuant to Section 9(b) of the Act, in which no formal hearing is held, communications to Board Members and their staff, from the time the Regional Director's report or decision is issued.
( d ) In a proceeding pursuant to Section 10(k) of the Act, communications to Board Members and their staff, from the time the hearing is opened.
( e ) In an unfair labor practice proceeding pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Act, communications to the Administrative Law Judge assigned to hear the case or to make rulings upon any motions or issues therein and Board Members and their staff, from the time the complaint and/or Notice of Hearing is issued, or the time the communicator has knowledge that a complaint or Notice of Hearing will be issued, whichever occurs first.
( f ) In any other proceeding to which the Board by specific order makes the prohibition applicable, to the categories of personnel and from the stage of the proceeding specified in the order.
[82 FR 11778, Feb. 24, 2017]
Federal Aviation

Administration

Memorandum

Date: January 19, 2017

To: Docket FAA-2014-0504

From: Sheri Pippin, Air Transportation Division

Subject: Pilot Professional Development Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: FAA

Attendance at Pilot Professional Development Conference

On January 11, 2017, the FAA attended the Pilot Professional Development Conference 

in Indianapolis, IN. The FAA presented an overview of the Pilot Professional 

Development Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and associated draft Advisory Circulars. 

The air carrier, union, and university representatives present at the meeting had an open 

discussion about various methods and programs currently being used to mentor pilots and 

to provide leadership training.
#### John Rozek et al., Respondents, v Vigo J. Kuplins et al., Appellants.

[698 NYS2d 866]

—In an action, *inter alia,*to permanently enjoin the defendants from interfering with the right of the plaintiffs to unimpeded access across an express right-of-way and for a judgment declaring the validity of the *446right-of-way, the defendants appeal from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cohalan, J.), dated June 29, 1998, which, *inter alia,*granted those branches of the plaintiffs’ motion which were for partial summary judgment declaring the validity of the right-of-way and for a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants from obstructing or otherwise interfering with passage over the right-of-way, and (2) a judgment of the same court dated August 19, 1998, which declared the validity of the right-of-way, described by its metes and bounds, and permanently enjoined the defendants from obstructing or otherwise interfering with the plaintiffs’ passage over the right-of-way.

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that the respondent is awarded one bill of costs.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action *(see, Matter of Aho,*39 NY2d 241, 248). The issues raised on appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal of the judgment *(see,*CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

“[T]he extent of an easement claimed is to be determined by the language of the grant” *(Ledley v D.J. & N.A. Mgt.,*228 AD2d 482; *see, Phillips v Jacobsen,*117 AD2d 785, 786). “[T]he terms of the grant are to be construed most strongly against the grantor in ascertaining the extent of the easement” *(Ledley v D.J. & N.A. Mgt., supra,*at 482; *see, Phillips v Jacobsen, supra,*at 786).

The plaintiffs were granted an easement in general terms, with no limitations, which described the right-of-way over a private road by its metes and bounds. We agree with the trial court’s determination that the plaintiffs were granted a right-of-way over the entire 66-foot width of the private road *(cf., Fairfield Props. v Pepe,*56 AD2d 883). The Supreme Court also properly directed the defendants to remove a fence from the strip contiguous to the plaintiffs’ front yard *(see, Minogue v Kaufman,*124 AD2d 791), a gate placed across the private road *(see, B.J. 96 Corp. v Mester,*262 AD2d 732), as well as other debris which impeded the plaintiffs’ access to the right-of-way. Ritter, J. P., Joy, Goldstein and McGinity, JJ., concur.
#### PLISKE v. VILLAGE OF ROCKY RIVER.

Ohio Appeals, 3th Dist., Cuyahoga Co.

No. 9059.

Decided Oct. 8, 1928.

Phillip Bártell, Cleveland for appellant.

Price, Carpenter, Smith & Graves, Cleveland, for appelleés.

SULLIVAN, P. J.

The Miagistrate had jurisdiction over the person, and unquestionably had authority to pass sentence under the Municipal law.

The question is raised that there was no power on the part of the Magistrate, to sentence the plaintiff to the jail or workhouse of Stark county, but, upon an examination of Section 12384 General Code of Ohio, we find that Counties having no workhouse may contract with a municipality of the State of Ohio wherein there is a workhouse, and an agreement can be had with the City Council or other authorities having control of the workhouse in any other County, with the Board of District Workhouses having a workhouse, upon terms- and conditions agreed upon, and it is provided that prisoners sentenced for violation of ordinances may be sent to and received in such workhouse, even though the same may be beyond the coniines of the County where the crime has been committed.

*12A reading of the Section discloses that under the law it is simply a question of contract and it appears to be a conceded fact that the Village of Rocky River is authorized' to contract with the authorities of Stark County Workhouse for the commitment of .its prisoners under the above section, and the same section is supplemented by G. C. 12384-1.

Therefore it is our judgment that there is ample authority in the statute for the sentence imposed by the court.

There is another phase of the question which precludes the granting of any injunctive relief as prayed for in the petition, and that is, it is conceded by the record that upon a conviction before the Magistrate the appelent, Pliske, by error proceedings commenced in the Court of Appeals- of the Eighth District, submitted her case to this Court and upon a hearing had, judgment was rendered, affirming the decision of the magistrate and remanding the cause to the Common Pleas Court where previously it had been heard on error by that Court..-'

Prom the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the plaintiff herein did not appeal or pursue error proceedings to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio, and therefore the judgment of the Court of Appeals became final, and it became the duty of the Common Pleas Court and the Magistrate Court, to carry the judgment of the Court of Appeals into execution, and undoubtedly the same would have been done were it not for the injunction proceedings in the case at bar.

Thus it will be seen that there is no ■basis in law for the injunctive relief prayed for, in' the Court of Common Pleas and in the. Court of Appeals. The . adequate remedy at. law, the existence'bf which is violative of the injunctive'-process, existed because of the Statue providing for the proceedings to vacate or reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the Supreme Court of the State.

Holding to these views, the relief sought for is denied.

Vickery and Levine J. J., concur.
§ 102.14 Service of charge. ( a ) *Charging Party's obligation to serve; methods of service.* Upon the filing of a charge, the Charging Party is responsible for the timely and proper service of a copy upon the person against whom such charge is made. Service may be made personally, or by registered mail, certified mail, regular mail, private delivery service, or facsimile. With the permission of the person receiving the charge, service may be made by email or by any other agreed-upon method.
( b ) *Service as courtesy by Regional Director.* The Regional Director will, as a matter of courtesy, serve a copy of the charge on the charged party in person, or send it to the charged party by regular mail, private delivery service, email or facsimile transmission, in any manner provided for in Rules 4 or 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or in any other agreed-upon method. The Region will not be responsible for such service.
( c ) *Date of service of charge.* In the case of service of a charge by mail or private delivery service, the date of service is the date of deposit with the post office or other carrier. In the case of delivery by email, the date of service is the date the email is sent. In the case of service by other methods, including hand delivery or facsimile transmission, the date of service is the date of receipt.