alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
125 STAT. 4 PUBLIC LAW 112–2—FEB. 17, 2011 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S. 188: 

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 157 (2011): 

Feb. 1, considered and passed Senate. 

Feb. 9, considered and passed House. 

Æ 

Public Law 112–2 

112th Congress 

An Act 

To designate the United States courthouse under construction at 98 West First 

Street, Yuma, Arizona, as the ‘‘John M. Roll United States Courthouse’’. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. JOHN M. ROLL UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE. 

(a) DESIGNATION.—The United States courthouse under 

construction, as of the date of enactment of this Act, at 98 West 

First Street, Yuma, Arizona, shall be known and designated as 

the ‘‘John M. Roll United States Courthouse’’. 

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation, 

document, paper, or other record of the United States to the United 

States courthouse referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed 

to be a reference to the ‘‘John M. Roll United States Courthouse’’. 

Approved February 17, 2011. 

Feb. 17, 2011 

[S. 188] 


ccoleman on DSK8P6SHH1PROD with PUBLIC LAWS
#### § 1471.640 May a settlement include a voluntary exclusion?

Yes, if we enter into a settlement with you in which you agree to be excluded, it is called a voluntary exclusion and has governmentwide effect.
§ 1620.16 Jobs requiring equal effort in performance. ( a ) *In general.* The jobs to which the equal pay standard is applicable are jobs that require equal effort to perform. Where substantial differences exist in the amount or degree of effort required to be expended in the performance of jobs, the equal pay standard cannot apply even though the jobs may be equal in all other respects. Effort is concerned with the measurement of the physical or mental exertion needed for the performance of a job. Job factors which cause mental fatigue and stress, as well as those which alleviate fatigue, are to be considered in determining the effort required by the job. “Effort” encompasses the total requirements of a job. Where jobs are otherwise equal under the EPA, and there is no substantial difference in the amount or degree of effort which must be expended in performing the jobs under comparison, the jobs may require equal effort in their performance even though the effort may be exerted in different ways on the two jobs. Differences only in the kind of effort required to be expended in such a situation will not justify wage differentials.
( b ) *Comparing effort requirements of jobs.* To illustrate the principle of equal effort exerted in different ways, suppose that a male checker employed by a supermarket is required to spend part of his time carrying out heavy packages or replacing stock involving the lifting of heavy items whereas a female checker is required to devote an equal degree of effort during a similar portion of her time to performing fill-in work requiring greater dexterity—such as rearranging displays of spices or other small items. The difference in kind of effort required of the employees does not appear to make their efforts unequal in any respect which would justify a wage differential, where such differences in kind of effort expended to perform the job are not ordinarily considered a factor in setting wage levels. Further, the occasional or sporadic performance of an activity which may require extra physical or mental exertion is not alone sufficient to justify a finding of unequal effort. Suppose, however, that men and women are working side by side on a line assembling parts. Suppose further that one of the men who performs the operations at the end of the line must also lift the assembly, as he completes his part of it, and places it on a waiting pallet. In such a situation, a wage rate differential might be justified for the person (but only for the person) who is required to expend the extra effort in the performance of his job, provided that the extra effort so expended is substantial and is performed over a considerable portion of the work cycle. In general, a wage rate differential based on differences in the degree or amount of effort required for performance of jobs must be applied uniformly to men and women. For example, if all women and some men performing a particular type of job never perform heavy lifting, but some men do, payment of a higher wage rate to all of the men would constitute a prohibited wage rate differential if the equal pay provisions otherwise apply.
EXHIBIT 32.1 -- CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL
OFFICER OF FIRST CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL, INC., PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 AND SECTION 1350 OF 18 U.S.C. 63.


I,  Alex  Genin,  the Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of
First  Capital  International,  Inc.  hereby  certify  that  First  Capital
International, Inc.'s periodic report on Form 10QSB and the financial statements
contained therein fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of  the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934  (15  U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d) and that
information  contained  in  the  periodic report on Form 10QSB and the financial
statements  contained  therein  fairly represents, in all material respects, the
financial  condition  and  results  of  the  operations  of  First  Capital
International,  Inc.


Date: November 13, 2006     /s/ Alex Genin
                            Chief Executive Officer and
                            Principal Financial Officer
#### FEATHERSTONE, etc v CLEVE RY CO.

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co.

No. 9140.

Decided Jan 14, 1929.

Moore, Mahon, Miller & Moore, Cleveland, for Featherstone.

Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, for Ry Co.

VICKERY, J

Apparently the theory of the court below was that, in as much as the driver, in order to save a person on the street, applied the brakes thus suddenly, he was guilty of no negligence and, therfore, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. There is one thing, however, that the court left out of his consideration, and that was the speed of the bus. Now it must be remembered that from Ninth Street to a point at the Williamson Building is one of the busiest parts of the busy City of Cleveland. The streets are constantly being .crossed by pedestrians and vehicles of all kinds are drawing out from the curb or going along the street, and the street is not a particularly wide one. Now, in order to escape responsibility, the driver of the bus must have his car tinder such control and drive at such a speed that he can stop his car if the emergency arises, without causing injury to the passengers who have paid for a safe ride hi the bus. In other words, he must drive his car in such manner that he can anticipate and look out and protect his passengers if some emergency should arise, or something appear in front of the bus, and have it stopped without causing serious damages, or any damages to his passengers. Now, in this case, the plaintiff’s testimony was that the bus was going twenty-five miles or more an hour. This may or may not be negligence. It depends entirely upon the situation. It depends entirely upon the traffic upon the street. It is prima facie negligence in driving the car more than fifteen miles in a closely built up district as this is.

This was a question for the jury to determine. If this case had been submitted to a jury they might have found that the driver was guilty of no negligence, that the emergency was so sudden that even though the car had been going slower, the accident would have happened just the same. But those are questions of fact which the court could not determine. There was surely more than a scintilla of evidence in this record to show that the defendant company was guilty of negligence in the speedy operation of this bus and we think, therefore, that the court erred in directing a non-suit and in entering up a judgment in favor of the defendant before all the evidence was head.

The jugment, therefore, will be reversed and the cause remanded to the Municipal Court for a new trial.

Sullivan, PJ, and Levine, J, concur.
**Exhibit
        32.2**
 
  **CERTIFICATION
        PURSUANT TO**
 **18
        U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**
 **AS
        ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**
 **SECTION
        906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
 
 In
        connection with the Quarterly Report of Tower Financial Corporation (the
        "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2006 as filed
        with
        the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
        I,
        Michael D. Cahill, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of the Company,
        certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to
§ 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
  (1) The
        Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
        the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2) The
        information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
        the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 
 /s/
        Michael D. Cahill
 
 Michael
        D. Cahill
 Chief
        Financial Officer and Secretary
 November
        13, 2006
#### § 1401.1 Purpose and scope.

This subpart contains the regulations of the Service concerning procedures to be followed when a subpoena, order, or other demand of a court or other authority is issued for the production or disclosure of (a) any material contained in the files of the Service; (b) any information relating to material contained in the files of the Service; or (c) any information or material acquired by any person as a part of the performance of his official duties or because of his official status, while such person was an employee of the Service.
#### WILL et v WILL

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist, Erie County

No 292.

Decided April 22, 1929

John A Nieding, Cleveland, for plaintiffs in error.

Henry Hart, Sandusky, and H R Williams, Vermilion, for defendant in error.

WILLIAMS, J.

The sole question involved is whether Henry Will took the property by devise or by purchase. If he took it by devise' it was ancestral property. If he took it by purchase it w,as non-ancestral property.

By the terms of 8575 GC and 8574 GC, in force at the time of the decease of Henry Will, the widow took a life estate in ancestral property and an estate in fee simple in non-ancestral property. We think the principle announced in Haus vs. Vorndren, Admr., 116 Ohio St., 327, is not applicable. In that case the testator made a will by which he provided that his son should have the privilege of buying his farm upon certain terms and conditions and when he acquired title thereto by complying with such terms, it was held that the title was acquired by purchase. In the instant case the testator devised to Henry Will certain property, stipulating that he should pay certain legacies which would be a lien thereon, and under the terms of such will the devisee, by acceptance, would acquire the property by devise, and paying off the legacies which were a lien upon the prop*312erty would not change the character of his title.

Case vs. Hall, Admrx., 52 Oh. St., 24.

The facts alleged in the separate cross petitions of the defendants Charles Will, John Will and Alice Schaatz were sufficient to constitute a cause of action ag.ainst the plaintiff. The court committed prejudicial error in overruling the demurrer to such cross petitions. The facts alleged in the petition as well as in the cross petitions show that each of the three cross-petitioners is the owner of an undivided one-third of the premises in question, subject to the life estate of the plaintiff, Anna C. Will, it follows that the petition itself does not state a cause of action.

For the reasons given the judgment of the court below will be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to overrule the demurrer of the plaintiff and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this ' opinion.

Lloyd and Richards, JJ, concur.
<TABLE>
                                                                  Exhibit 11

                                   Rymer Foods Inc.
                           Computation of Earnings Per Share
              for the periods ended October 30, 1999 and October 31, 1998
                         (in thousands, except per share data)






                                           Fiscal Year         Fiscal Year
                                             Ending              Ending
                                             Oct. 30,           Oct. 31,
                                              1999               1998
                                          ---------------    ---------------
                                          Basic   Diluted    Basic   Diluted
                                          -----   -------    -----   -------
 <S>                                     <C>      <C>      <C>       <C>
 AVERAGE SHARES OUTSTANDING
   1  Average shares outstanding          4,300    4,300     4,300     4,300
   2  Net additional shares outstanding
       assuming exercise of stock
       options*                              -       378        -         -
   3  Net additional shares assuming
       conversion of preferred stock not
       considered a common stock
       equivalent at issuance                -        -         -         -
                                          -----    -----     -----     -----
   4  Average number of common
       shares outstanding                 4,300    4,678     4,300     4,300
                                          =====    =====     =====     =====
 EARNINGS
   5  Income (loss) from
        continuing operations            $   33   $   33   $(2,017)  $(2,017)
                                          =====    =====     =====     =====
   6  Net Income (loss)                  $   33   $   33   $(2,017)  $(2,017)
                                          =====    =====     =====     =====
 PER SHARE AMOUNTS
      Income (loss) from
        continuing operations
         (line 5 / line 4)               $ 0.01   $ 0.01   $ (.047)  $ (0.47)
                                          =====    =====     =====     =====
      Net Income (loss)
       (line 6 / line 4)                 $ 0.01   $ 0.01   $ (0.47)  $ (0.47)
                                          =====    =====     =====     =====

 Note:  Earnings per share amounts for all other reporting periods as it
        relates to the predecessor company is not meaningful due to the
        reorganization.



       * Since there is a net loss  for the year ended October 31,  1998,
       common stock equivalents  are excluded from  the diluted  earnings
       per share calculations since they would be antidilutive.

</TABLE>
§ 91.1703 Compliance and eligibility. ( a ) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, no person may manipulate the controls, act as PIC, act as second-in-command, or provide pilot training for a Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane unless that person meets the requirements of this subpart.
( b ) A person who does not meet the requirements of this subpart may manipulate the controls of a Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane if a pilot in command who meets the requirements of this subpart is occupying a pilot station, no passengers or cargo are carried on board the airplane, and the flight is being conducted for one of the following reasons— ( 1 ) The pilot in command is providing pilot training to the manipulator of the controls;
( 2 ) The pilot in command is conducting a maintenance test flight with a second pilot or certificated mechanic; or
( 3 ) The pilot in command is conducting simulated instrument flight and is using a safety pilot other than the pilot in command who manipulates the controls for the purposes of § 91.109(b).
( c ) A person is required to complete *Initial/transition training* if that person has fewer than— ( 1 ) 50 hours of documented flight time manipulating the controls while serving as pilot in command of a Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane in the preceding 24 months; or
( 2 ) 500 hours of documented flight time manipulating the controls while serving as pilot in command of a Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane.
( d ) A person is eligible to receive *Requalification training* in lieu of Initial/transition training if that person has at least— ( 1 ) 50 hours of documented flight time manipulating the controls while serving as pilot in command of a Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane in the preceding 24 months; or
( 2 ) 500 hours of documented flight time manipulating the controls while serving as pilot in command of a Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane.
( e ) A person is required to complete *Recurrent training* within the preceding 12 months. Successful completion of Initial/transition or Requalification training within the preceding 12 months satisfies the requirement of Recurrent training. A person must successfully complete Initial/transition training or Requalification training before being eligible to receive Recurrent training.
( f ) Successful completion of Initial/transition training or Requalification training is a one-time requirement. A person may elect to retake Initial/transition training or Requalification training in lieu of Recurrent training.
( g ) A person is required to complete Differences training in accordance with an FAA approved MU-2B training program if that person operates more than one MU-2B model as specified in § 91.1707(c).
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kenneth Lee Hall, Appellant.

[698 NYS2d 521]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Mullen, J.), rendered January 9, 1998, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We have reviewed the record and agree with the defendant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted *(see, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Paige,*54 AD2d 631; *cf., People v Gonzalez,*47 NY2d 606). Krausman, J. P., McGinity, Feuerstein and Smith, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Charles Enriquez, Appellant.

[698 NYS2d 51]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hall, J.), rendered October 8, 1996, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that the trial court’s charge on the justification defense was erroneous because it did not explain the subjective nature of “reasonable belief’ is raised for the first time on appeal. Because the defendant neither made an objection or took an exception to the charge and because he requested no supplemental instruction, the claim is unpreserved for appellate review *(see, People v Riley,*200 AD2d 692; *People v Udzinski,*146 AD2d 245).

In any event, while we agree that the charge did not conform to the requirements set forth by the Court of Appeals in *People v Wesley*(76 NY2d 555, 559) and *People v Goetz*(68 NY2d 96, 114-115), the court’s error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence that the defendant failed to retreat when he knew it was safe to do so and that he used excessive force in defending himself against his victim, firing several shots into the victim as he lay on the ground *(see, People v Rivera,*205 AD2d 807, 808; *People v Major,*116 AD2d 594, 595).

The sentence imposed was not excessive *(see, People v Delgado,*80 NY2d 780, 781-782; *People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). Bracken, J. P., O’Brien, Santucci and Altman, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION

I, Woody M. McGee, Chief Executive Officer and I, Donald L. Paliwoda, Chief
Financial Officer of Davel Communications, Inc., certify, pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

1. The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period
ended September 30, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: November 15, 2004             /s/ WOODY M. MCGEE
                                   -------------------------------------------
                                    Woody M. McGee, Chief Executive Officer

                                    /s/ DONALD L. PALIWODA
                                   -------------------------------------------
                                    Donald L. Paliwoda, Chief Financial Officer

                                       28
Exhibit
      32.1





CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002














In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Greens Worldwide Incorporated (the
      “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2005 as filed with
      the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, R.
      Thomas Kidd, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
      certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





1. The
      Report fully complies with requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2. The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.









December
 15,
      2005





/s/
      R.
      Thomas Kidd




R
      Thomas
      Kidd


Chief
      Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
#### William Ates, *Appellant,*v. John L. Langley, *Appellee.*

Where an entry of appeal is filed and recorded on July 7th and made returnable October 6th, the appeal will be dismissed, as the statute requires the return day to be more than thirty days and not more than ninety days from the date of the appeal, the period from July 7th to October 6th being more than ninety days.

This case was decided by Division A.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County.

The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

*Laird*<£- *MeQeadhy,*for Appellant;

*W. W. O'larlc,*for Appellee.

Per Curiam.-

The entry of appeal in this cause was filed and recorded on July 7th, 1910, and made returnable October 6th, 1910.

Chapter 5638, Acts of 1907, requires that a writ of error “shall be returnable to a day either in term time or vacation more than thirty days and not more than ninety days from the date of the writ.” Under section 1912, of the General Statutes of 1906, an appeal in a chancery cause is governed as to the return day by the provisions as to writs of error. Parker v. Evening News Publishing Co., 54 Fla., 482, 44 South. Rep., 718.

As October 6th is “more than ninety days from the date of the” appeal, the entry of appeal is not made in accordance with the statue and the appeal is .dismissed.

*505Whitfield, C. J., and Shackleford and Cockrell, J. J., concur;

Taylor, Hooker and Parki-iill, J. J., concur in the opinion.
[No. 47902-4-I.

Division One.

December 16, 2002.]

#### Rhoda Kairis, et al., *Respondents,*v. Noreen C. Faulkner, et al., *Appellants.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 98-2-13201-9, Michael Heavey, J., entered December 4, 2000. *Affirmed in part, reversed in part,*and *remanded*by unpublished opinion per Appelwick, J., concurred in by Baker and Schindler, JJ.