alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### § 1602.40 Preservation of records made or kept.

Any personnel or employment record made or kept by a school system, district, or individual school (including but not necessarily limited to requests for reasonable accommodation, application forms submitted by applicants and other records having to do with hiring, promotion, demotion, transfer, layoff, or termination, rates of pay or other terms of compensation, and selection for training or apprenticeship) shall be preserved by such school system, district, or school, as the case may be, for a period of 2 years from the date of the making of the record or the personnel action involved, whichever occurs later. In the case of involuntary termination of an employee, the personnel records of the individual terminated shall be kept for a period of 2 years from the date of termination. Where a charge of discrimination has been filed, or an action brought against an elementary or secondary school by the Commission or the Attorney General, the respondent elementary or secondary school system, district, or individual school shall preserve similarly at the central office of the system or district or individual school which is the subject of the charge or action, where more convenient, all personnel records relevant to the charge or action until final disposition thereof. The term “personnel record relevant to the charge,” for example, would include personnel or employment records relating to the person claiming to be aggrieved and to all other employees holding positions similar to that held or sought by the person claiming to be aggrieved; and application forms or test papers completed by an unsuccessful applicant and by all other candidates for the same position as that for which the person claiming to be aggrieved applied and was rejected. The date of “final disposition of the charge or the action” means the date of expiration of the statutory period within which a person claiming to be aggrieved may bring an action in a U.S. district court or, where an action is brought against a school system, district, or school either by a person claiming to be aggrieved, the Commission, or the Attorney General, the date on which such litigation is terminated.

(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 3046-0040)

[38 FR 26719, Sept. 25, 1973, as amended at 46 FR 63268, Dec. 31, 1981; 56 FR 35756, July 26, 1991]
Exhibit 23.2

                CONSENT OF NETHERLAND, SEWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC.

As  independent  petroleum  consultants to The Houston  Exploration  Company and
KeySpan Exploration and Production,  LLC, we hereby consent to the incorporation
of our  report  included  in this form  10-K/A of KeySpan  Corporation  and into
KeySpan  Corporation's  previously  filed  Registration  Statements  File  Nos.:
333-53657,  333-53765,  333-920003,  333-79151, 333-40472, 333-43768, 333-60294,
and 333-82230.

                                     NETHERLAND, SEWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC.





                                     By:  /s/Danny D. Simmons
                                          -------------------
                                          Danny D. Simmons
                                          Executive Vice President


Houston, Texas
July 24, 2003
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed June 21, 2023. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D23-104 Lower Tribunal No. 21-1093

________________ I.J.B., a Juvenile, Appellant, vs. The State of Florida, Appellee. An appeal conducted pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Dawn Denaro, Judge. I.J.B., a Juvenile, in proper person. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee. Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and SCALES and LINDSEY, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed.
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<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                         667,399
<SECURITIES>                                 5,501,071
<RECEIVABLES>                                   61,486
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 6,513,456
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<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                61,667
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   18,496
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 43,171
<INCOME-TAX>                                    43,171
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             43,171
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<EPS-BASIC>                                        .28
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</TABLE>
#### STATE OF FLORIDA v KAPOOR

Case No. 88-0034AC (County Court Case No. 87-27806MM10)

Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County

August 23, 1989

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

James P. McLane, Assistant State Attorney, for appellant.

Steve M. Glerum, for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERT B. CARNEY, Circuit Judge.

THIS CAUSE having come before this Court upon appeal of the Trial Court’s Suppression of the Breath Evidence Results, and the Court having received and reviewed appellate briefs, and being fully *79advised in the premises, makes the following finds of facts and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACTS:

1. On or about November 12, 1987 the Appellee, Sohan Kapoor was arrested and later charged with driving under the influence contrary to Fla. Stat. § 316.193(1).

2. A breathalyzer test was performed on the Appellee on or about November 12, 1987. The technician who performed the test failed to enter a required percentage on the acetone test. The acetone test was performed prior to the actual testing as part of a preventive maintenance checklist required both by Fla. Stat. §316.1943(3) and Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Rule 10D-42.24. Instead of a numerical reading being placed the technician placed an “o.k.” in the blank space where the percentage is normally placed.

3. The Appellee at the trial court filed a motion to suppress the breath evidence. This motion was granted by the trial court and the results of the tests were suppressed. The trial court held that the procedures implemented by the technician were not in substantial compliance with the Statute or HRS rules.

BASED ON THE FOREOING THIS COURT MAKES THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

A. Pursuant to *Florida Statute Section*316.1934(3), a chemical analysis of a person must have been performed in substantial compliance in accordance with methods approved by the HRS. The Statute further provides that “[A]ny insubstantial differences between the approved techniques and actual procedures . . . shall not render the test or test results invalid.”

B. In *Ridgeway v State,*514 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1DCA 1987) the court held that failure to timely inspect the [breathalyzer] machine did not constitute a substantial deviation from HRS rules which would warrant an invalidation of the test results.

C. Pursuant to *Ridgeway*and Fla. Stat. §316.1934(3) both the courts and legislature did not intend for the substantial compliance language to be interpreted in such a strict manner to result in the suppression of evidence in cases where the deviations are insubstantial in preventive maintenance procedures.

D. Accordingly, we find that the insubstantial differences between the approved procedures and those implemented by the technician are in substantial compliance and do not warrant the test results to be found inadmissible.

*80WHEREFORE, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Trial Court’s Order Suppressing the Breath Evidence Results is REVERSED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at the Broward County Courthouse, 201 Southeast Sixth Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301, this 23rd day of August, 1989.
<PAGE>

                                   EXHIBIT 21

                                  SUBSIDIARIES
                                  ------------

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

NAME                                              STATE/COUNTRY OF INCORPORATION

<S>                                               <C>
Applied Business teleCommunications, Inc.         California

Men's Apparel Guild in California, Inc.           California

Advanstar Editora E Comunicacoes Ltda.            Brazil

Advanstar Expositions Canada Limited              Canada

Advanstar Communication (UK) Ltd.                 United Kingdom, under the laws
                                                  of England and Wales

Telebusiness Business Exhibitions Limited (fka    United Kingdom, under the laws
Starform                                          of England and Wales

Advanstar Asia Ltd.                               Hong Kong

Advanstar Communications (BVI) Ltd.               British Virgin Island Company

Gruppe 21 Informationsdienste GmbH & Co. KG       Germany

Advanstar Holdings GmbH                           Germany

Advanstar Partners GmbH                           Germany

Brand & Licensing Ltd.                            United Kingdom

SeCA                                              France
</TABLE>
#### Thomas *v.*Posey, *et al.*

Detinue.

(Decided December 19, 1916.

73 South. 747.)

1. Husband and Wife; Ownership of Property. — The evidence examined and held to show the property sued for belonged to plaintiff, the wife, that she did not sign a mortgage covering the property given by her husband to defendant, and that defendant acquired no title thereto.

2. Same; Evidence. — The mere fact that the husband used the wagon belonging to his wife would not impair her title,- or afford any inference that the husband owned it, and the possession will be referred to the title.

3. Trial; Argument of Counsel. — Where the attorny in his argument to the jury said that defendant was' a reputable white man and that plaintiff was a negro woman, the argument was improper, and should have been excluded.

Appeal from Montgomery City Court.

Heard before Hon. C. P. McIntyre.

Detinue by Cornelia Thomas against J. B. Posey and another. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff claimed under a purchase, while defendant claimed under a mortgage executed by Ben Thomas, the husband of Cornelia Thomas, the plaintiff, and a taking of the wagon under the mortgage. It was admitted that Cornelia did not sign the mortgage. In his argument to the jury the attorney for defendant said that Mr. Posey was a reputable white man, a conductor on a railroad train, and that plaintiff was a negro woman, but in making up your verdict you must not let this interfere one way or the other.

W. R. Brassell, for appellant.

Warren S. Reese, for appellee.

BROWN, J.

(1, 2) The uncontroverted evidence shows that the wagon in controversy was the property of the plaintiff, that she did not sign the mortgage held by the defendant, and that, he acquired no title or interest in the wagon through said mortgage. The mere fact that Ben Thomas, the husband of the plaintiff, used the wagon, would not impair plaintiff’s title, or *420afford an inference that Ben owned the wagon. In such a case, the possession will be referred to the *title.*— Rollins *v. State,*98 Ala. 79, 13 South. 2820.

The plaintiff’s motion for new trial should have been granted; and for the error committed by the court in refusing a new trial, the judgment of the city court is *reversed.*— Cobb *v. Malone,*92 Ala. 630, 9 South. 738.

(3) That portion of the argument of defendant’s counsel excepted to was highly improper, and should have been excluded.

Reversed and remanded.
[Sac. No. 560.

Department Two.

December 29, 1899.]

#### WILLIAM T. MILLER et al., Respondents, v. J. O. CARLISLE et al., Defendants. PAUL H. BOGGS, Appellant.

Mechanics’ Liens—Invalid Claims oe Lien—Several Demands Below Jurisdiction—Joint Personal Judgment.—A joint personal judgment in excess of three hundred dollars, in favor of several plaintiffs, in an action to enforce mechanics’ liens, where the several demands of each lien claimant were less than three-hundred dollars, and the claims of lien were found invalid, held erroneous, and not within the jurisdiction of the superior court, upon the authority of *Miller v. Carlisle, ante,*p. 327.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Butte County. John C. Gray, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court and in the opinion rendered in the case of *Miller v. Carlisle, ante,*p. 327.

*332Nicoll *&*Orr, for Appellant.

Warren Sexton, for Respondents.

THE COURT.

This appeal is hy the defendant Boggs from the personal judgment in the action rendered against him and his codefendant Carlisle. The facts necessary to an understanding of the case are stated in the opinion rendered on the appeal (Sac. No. 584, *ante,*p. 327) from the order denying the motion of Carlisle for new trial. For the reasons there given it appears that the court helow had no jurisdiction to render the judgment appealed from; the judgment is also erroneous in that it awards a recovery in favor of the plaintiffs jointly, their demands being several; it is therefore reversed.
Form of Incentive Stock Option Agreement



 Exhibit 10.1 
 July 1, 2009 
 PAULSON CAPITAL CORP. 
 FORM OF 
 INCENTIVE
STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT 
 UNDER 1999 STOCK OPTION PLAN 
 This INCENTIVE STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT is made between PAULSON CAPITAL CORP. (the “Company”), an Oregon corporation, and
                    (the “Optionee”), pursuant to the Company’s 1999 Stock Option Plan (the “Plan”). The Company and
the Optionee agree as follows: 
 1. Option Grant: The Company hereby grants to the Optionee, on the terms and
conditions of this Agreement and the Plan, the right and the option (the “Option”) to purchase all or any of              shares (the “Grant Shares”) of the
Company’s Common Stock at a purchase price of $1.13 per share. The terms and conditions applicable to grants of options of the Company’s Common Stock, as set forth in the Plan, are hereby incorporated into and made part of this Agreement.

 2. Time of Exercise of Option. The grant date of this Option is effective as of July 1, 2009(the
“Grant Date”). Subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein and until the Option expires or is terminated as provided in the Plan, the Option may be exercised from time to time to purchase Grant Shares as follows: 
 On July 1, 2009, this Option shall become immediately exercisable to purchase all of the Grant Shares. 
 3. Expiration: The Option shall continue in effect until the earlier of June 30, 2016, or the date thirty days after the
Optionee’s service with the Company terminates (other than by reason of death or total disability, in which case the Option shall terminate 12 months after such termination of service), unless earlier terminated as provided in the Plan.

  
  

							
	PAULSON CAPITAL CORP.	 		 	OPTIONEE
				
	By:	 	  
	 		 	  

		 	Jacqueline M. Paulson	 		 	
		 	Corporate Secretary
§ 1603.202 Administrative law judge. The administrative law judge shall have all the powers necessary to conduct fair, expeditious, and impartial hearings as provided in 5 U.S.C. 556(c). In addition, the administrative law judge shall have the power to: ( a ) Change the time, place, or date of the hearing;
( b ) Enter a default decision against a party failing to appear at a hearing unless the party shows good cause by contacting the administrative law judge either prior to the hearing or within 2 days after the scheduled hearing and presenting arguments as to why the party or the party's representative could not appear; and
( c ) Take any appropriate action authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C. appendix).
[62 FR 17543, Apr. 10, 1997, as amended at 89 FR 47852, June 4, 2024]
Exhibit 12.1



CERTIFICATIONS

I, Jean-Pierre Clamadieu, certify that:

1.

I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Rhodia S.A.;

2.

based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.

based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.

the Companys other Certifying Officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Company and have:

(a)

designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared,

(b)

evaluated the effectiveness of the Companys disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation, and

(c)

disclosed in this report any change in the Companys internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Companys internal control over financial reporting; and

5.

the Companys other Certifying Officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Companys auditors and the Audit Committee of the Companys Board of Directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a)

all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Companys ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information, and

(b)

any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Companys internal control over financial reporting.









|Date: May 5, 2005 | /s/ Jean-Pierre Clamadieu                   
|----------------- | --------------------------------------------
|                  | Jean-Pierre ClamadieuChief Executive Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Stuart Bennett, Appellant.

[699 NYS2d 122]

—Appeal by the defendant from a. judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Marrus, J., at hearing; Juviler, J., at trial and sentence), rendered November 7, 1996, convicting him of kidnapping in the first degree, burglary in the first degree, and attempted robbery in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

At the trial, the defense counsel requested permission to introduce evidence of allegedly false prior statements by the defendant to prove that the defendant’s confessions were also false, since the defendant was a “person with a propensity to make grandiose statements about himself’. The Supreme Court ruled that this evidence was admissible. However, the Supreme Court also ruled that the People could, in rebuttal, introduce the defendant’s testimony at the *Huntley*hearing *(see, People v Huntley,*15 NY2d 72), that his confessions were true. As a result, the defendant chose not to introduce his prior allegedly false statements and contends that the ruling deprived him of his Constitutional right against self-incrimination and his right to present a defense. It is well settled that evidence offered in rebuttal must counter some affirmative fact which the defendant attempted to prove *(see, People v Blair,*90 NY2d 1003; *People v Harris,*57 NY2d 335, 345, *cert denied*460 US 1047). Here, the ruling was proper since the People’s rebuttal would have countered the defendant’s argumént that his confessions were false *(see, People v Grant,*256 AD2d 418; *People v Gibson,*140 AD2d 453).

The defendant’s contention that the Supreme Court improperly ruled that the People could introduce a portion of his *Huntley*hearing testimony during the People’s rebuttal case is without merit. Santucci, J. P., Sullivan, Florio and Schmidt, JJ., concur.
#### ALBRECHT GROCERY CO v OVERFIELD

Ohio Appeals, 9th Dist, Summit Co

No 1618.

Decided May 3, 1929

Musser, Kimber. & Huffman, Akron, for Grocery Co.

*356Roetzel, Hunsicker & Olds, Akron, for Overfield.

Syllabus by

PARDEE, J.

1. In the absence of a municipal ordinance or resolution establishing main thoroughfares in addition to those created by law and designating what vehicles shall haye the right of way at intersections, the police department of a city does not have the power to make such designations, and its attempt to do so by the placing of legible and appropriate signs at such intersections, does not have any legal effect and does not deprive the driver of a motor vehicle of the rights at such intersections given him by the general laws of the state.

2. At the,close of all of the evidence in a civil case, one of the two attorneys for the plaintiff made an opening argument to the jury; at the conclusion of which the attorney for the defendant declined to make an argument; thereupon the other attorney for the plaintiff asked and was granted permission by the trial court, over the objection and exception of defendant’s attorney, to make an argument to the jury — both of said arguments being within the time allotted for that purpose to plaintiff’s attorneys. The court then gave the attorney for the defendant another opportunity to make an argument to the jury under the changed circumstances, which he declined.

Held: that the trial court did not commit any prejudicial error, it not having abused its discretion under the circumstances.

(Editor’s Note) This opinion will be published, in full, in other Ohio Publications. For citations, watch the Omnibus Index.