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88–026 PDF 2014

S. HRG. 113–282 

THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, THE USE OF 

MILITARY FORCE, AND THE 2001 AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 16, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

PETER K. LEVINE, Staff Director 

JOHN A. BONSELL, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE, AND THE 2001 

AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE

MAY 16, 2013

Page 

Sheehan, Hon. Michael A., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, Department of Defense; Accompanied by MG 

Michael K. Nagata, USA, Deputy Director for Special Operations/Counterterrorism, J–37, Joint Staff; and BG Richard C. Gross, JAGC, USA, Legal 

Counsel, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ................................................. 5 

Taylor, Mr. Robert S., Acting General Counsel, Department of Defense ........... 6 

Brooks, Ms. Rosa, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center ......... 53 

Corn, Mr. Geoffrey, Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law .................... 87 

Goldsmith, Mr. Jack, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School ............................. 100 

Roth, Mr. Kenneth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch .......................... 105 

Stimson, Mr. Charles, Manager, National Security Law Program, The Heritage Foundation ..................................................................................................... 111 

(III) 

(1) 

THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, THE USE OF 

MILITARY FORCE, AND THE 2001 AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE 

THURSDAY, MAY 16, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room SD– 

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Udall, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain, Wicker, 

Ayotte, and Graham. 

Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff director; 

and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Michael J. Kuiken, professional 

staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, 

professional staff member; and Russell L. Shaffer, counsel. 

Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority staff 

director; William S. Castle, minority general counsel; Thomas W. 

Goffus, professional staff member; and Natalie M. Nicolas, minority 

staff assistant. 

Staff assistants present: Daniel J. Harder and Jennifer R. 

Knowles. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; 

Moran Banai and Brooke Jamison, assistants to Senator Gillibrand; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Marta 

McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly; Karen Courington, 

assistant to Senator Kaine; Steve Smith, assistant to Senator King; 

Joel Starr, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Christian Brose, assistant 

to Senator McCain; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Todd Harmer, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, 

assistant to Senator Wicker; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator 

Ayotte; Craig Abele, assistant to Senator Graham; and Charles 

Prosch, assistant to Senator Blunt. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. 

The committee meets today to receive testimony on the law of 

armed conflict and the use of military force, including the status 

of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). 

2 

I would like to welcome our witnesses and thank them for their 

willingness to participate in a public discussion of a particularly 

complex, contested set of issues. 

We have two panels. First, we are going to hear from the Department of Defense (DOD) witnesses, including Michael Sheehan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; Robert Taylor, the Acting General Counsel of DOD; 

Major General Michael Nagata, the Deputy Director of the Joint 

Staff for Special Operations and Counterterrorism; and Brigadier 

General Richard Gross, the Legal Advisor to the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

We will then hear from a panel of legal experts holding a variety 

of views from outside the Government. 

On September 18, 2001, Congress enacted a joint resolution authorizing the President to, ‘‘Use all necessary and appropriate force 

against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 

planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 

occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 

persons.’’ Again, this authority is referred to as the AUMF. 

Almost 12 years later now, the war in Afghanistan is winding 

down as we prepare to hand over security responsibility to Afghan 

forces, and it appears that that country no longer serves as a safe 

haven for al Qaeda attacks against the United States. Osama bin 

Laden is dead. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is in captivity. The 

ranks of the al Qaeda leaders who planned and carried out the 

September 11 attacks have been severely degraded. 

We are planning to keep a force of perhaps 6,000 to 12,000 after 

2014 when all combat forces are to be out of Afghanistan. Also, we 

continue to hold detainees at Guantanamo Bay and at Bagram in 

Afghanistan, and our fight against al Qaeda continues not only in 

Afghanistan, but also in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. This fight 

occasionally takes the form of targeted strikes against operational 

leaders of al Qaeda and associated forces, groups like al Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Shabaab in Somalia, many 

of which strikes are reportedly conducted by remotely piloted aircraft, or ‘‘drones’’. Also, there have been a number of terrorist attacks and attempted terrorist attacks against the United States 

that have not been conducted by groups affiliated with al Qaeda 

and that are presumably then not covered by the AUMF. 

Against this background, today’s hearing will examine the legal 

basis for the use of military force in accordance with the law of 

armed conflict, including the use of drones. We have asked our witnesses to help us consider a number of questions including: 

What is the continuing vitality of the 2001 AUMF a dozen years 

after its enactment? 

How will we know when the current conflict is over? 

Does the AUMF extend to organizations which played no active 

role in the September 11 attacks and may not have even existed 

in 2001? 

Should the AUMF be extended or modified by legislation to cover 

groups not associated with al Qaeda? 

What is the legal basis for military action in countries like 

Yemen and Somalia which are far away from Afghanistan where 

the September 1 attacks were planned? 

3 

What is the legal basis for drone strikes and should drone strikes 

be treated any differently than other uses of lethal military force? 

To what extent is it appropriate for U.S. Government entities, 

other than the U.S. Armed Forces, to use lethal force against al 

Qaeda and other terrorist organizations? 

Does the Law of Armed Conflict and/or the AUMF apply to any 

such use of force, for instance, by the Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA)? 

Are the issues different if the individual or individuals being targeted are U.S. citizens who have joined an enemy force? 

What if that U.S. citizen is part of an armed attack from inside 

the United States, for instance, against a U.S. military facility? 

What is the role of Congress in overseeing the use of lethal force? 

How can the process be made more transparent without compromising sensitive national security information? 

These and related matters raise challenging questions and there 

is a wide range of views on the answers. 

For example, some believe that the AUMF does not authorize the 

use of force against groups like AQAP and al Shabaab which may 

have had little or nothing to do with the September 11, 2001, attacks, while others believe that these groups are properly considered, ‘‘legal targets by virtue of their association with al Qaeda.’’ 

Some believe that the AUMF is no longer valid and should be repealed, while others believe that it should be reaffirmed or expanded to authorize a worldwide conflict with a broad range of terrorist groups. 

Some believe that drone strikes are akin to extrajudicial killings, 

while others believe they are a type of legitimate military force governed by the same rules and principles as any other military force. 

Some, including this Senator, believe that U.S. citizens who join 

a foreign group to attack the United States can be treated as 

enemy combatants subject to the law of armed conflict; others do 

not. 

A public discussion of difficult legal and policy issues like these 

is important to the functioning of our democracy and can help provide a broader understanding of the legal basis for ongoing military 

actions around the world. 

Again, I welcome all of our witnesses today and look forward to 

your testimony on these important issues and call now on Senator 

Inhofe. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Since the attacks on September 11, the AUMF has provided a 

strong legal basis for our counterterrorism efforts around the 

world. It has been used by the Supreme Court as a primary justification for its rulings, permitting the holding of detainees at 

Guantanamo Bay and the military detention of American citizens 

who have joined al Qaeda. 

There is also consensus among the three branches of government 

that the AUMF continues to provide adequate authorization for 

military force against al Qaeda and its affiliates. After 10 years, a 

court battle is in rigorous debate. Here in Congress, I believe many 

4 

would argue that AUMF has been and continues to be an effective 

tool in our efforts to keep America safe. 

As former General Counsel of DOD, Jeh Johnson said just a year 

ago, ‘‘10 years later, the AUMF remains on the books and is still 

a viable authorization today.’’ I have no reason to disagree with 

him. That is why I am greatly concerned that changes to the 

AUMF could have significant, unintended consequences and undermine our counterterrorism efforts. 

As this committee has heard from our most distinguished military and civilian leaders in recent months, al Qaeda continues to 

prove resilient. They are expanding their areas of operation in 

places like North Africa and the Middle East where they remain 

intent on attacking Americans. 

I know there are members that feel the way that I do, that the 

AUMF is an important resource and we need to at least maintain 

this baseline authority which underpins our ability to keep America safe, and because I know they value this resource, I look forward to hearing the arguments regarding this. 

This is my view. This is one of the rare times in my career that 

I come to a hearing where I am not convinced on either side, and 

maybe we are doing the right thing right now. 

I do worry about the unintended consequences. I think once you 

open it up, there may be members that have their own agenda that 

we might not agree with and might not prove best for America that 

would take advantage of the fact that it has opened up. We have 

a saying in Oklahoma that ‘‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.’’ I do not 

think it is broke, but maybe we will find out today that it is. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. 

We will now call on our first panel. I believe the administration 

has a single statement, which is going to be presented by two witnesses. So, Secretary Sheehan, do you want to begin? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, Chairman Levin. We have one statement for 

the record by myself and the acting General Counsel, and we will 

also, both of us, make very short introductory remarks, if that is 

okay with you, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Are you speaking for all four witnesses, or are 

they going to have their own statements? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. No. We will just have two statements, and then 

we will open it up to questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. But you are not necessarily in your statement 

then speaking for all four? Just for the two of you? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, all four. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Absolutely. 

Chairman LEVIN. If our other two witnesses later on want to differ with any part of it, I hope they will feel free to do that. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Absolutely. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Secretary Sheehan. 

5 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW–INTENSITY CONFLICT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY MG MICHAEL K. NAGATA, USA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS/COUNTERTERRORISM, J–37, 

JOINT STAFF; AND BG RICHARD C. GROSS, JAGC, USA, 

LEGAL COUNSEL, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF 

STAFF 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

about the legal framework for the U.S. military operations to defend our Nation. This hearing is intended to focus on the laws of 

war specifically related to our counterterrorism policy. 

With me today are Acting General Counsel of DOD, Mr. Robert 

Taylor; Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Brigadier General Rich Gross; and J–37, Major General Mike 

Nagata. 

The panel discussed basically three things: first, the legal framework governing the use of military force; second, the law governing 

whom the U.S. military may target with military force in the current conflict against al Qaeda and associated forces; third, a process of review that informs the legal, policy, and military decisions 

regarding targeting and the administration’s continued commitment to transparency. 

We have provided a longer statement for the record, as I mentioned. We will have some brief remarks and we will get to your 

questions. Mr. Taylor will focus primarily on the legal framework, 

and I would like to begin by describing the process by which we 

make decisions regarding targeting in the current armed conflict 

against al Qaeda and associated forces. 

As our statement describes more fully, when determining whom 

we may target in this war, we conduct a careful, fact-intensive assessment to identify the individuals and groups that pose a threat 

to the United States. Subsequently, we do a thorough review to determine whether these individuals and groups are appropriately 

targetable for operations outside of Afghanistan. This review continues up the chain of command through the four-star combatant 

commander and all the way to the Secretary of Defense. 

Before the Secretary makes a decision, the proposal is reviewed 

by senior military and civilian advisors, including the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs and the General Counsel of DOD. The Secretary 

also receives input from senior officials and other departments and 

agencies before approving or requesting that the President approve 

a use of military force against al Qaeda, the Taliban, or an associated force outside of Afghanistan. Military orders implementing a 

final decision are then transmitted down through the military 

chain of command to the relevant forces that carry out such operations. This process includes rigorous safeguards to protect innocent civilians. 

In closing, I would like to note that this hearing is open and unclassified and, as a result, there will necessarily be some questions 

that we must take for the record to be answered in a classified setting. This administration has made significant efforts to increase 

transparency, but the public release of certain information such as 

6 

intelligence-specific tactics and deliberate procedures could enable 

the enemy to avoid or manipulate our application of military force. 

Ultimately, we must maintain a delicate balance between transparency and protecting information from public disclosure for security reasons. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe, committee members, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to testify, 

and I will turn over the microphone to my colleague, Acting General Counsel Robert Taylor, for his remarks. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Secretary Sheehan. 

Mr. Taylor? 

STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT S. TAYLOR, ACTING GENERAL 

COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member 

Inhofe, and members of the committee for this opportunity to testify about the legal framework for U.S. military operations to defend the country. 

As Assistant Secretary of Defense Sheehan stated, first I will 

give an overview of the legal framework governing the use of military force. Second, I will discuss the law governing whom the U.S. 

military may target with military force in the current conflict 

against al Qaeda and associated forces. 

The administration has outlined the legal framework for the current conflict in numerous public speeches, including speeches by 

Attorney General Holder and former DOD General Counsel Jeh 

Johnson, which should give some sense of the extraordinary care 

with which the U.S. military ensures that its efforts to address the 

threat posed by al Qaeda and its associated forces follow all applicable law in its military operations. That means that U.S. military 

operations must comply with both U.S. domestic law and international law. 

The United States remains in a state of armed conflict against 

al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. As the September 11, 

2001, attack showed, these organizations are determined to kill 

U.S. citizens, and their actions since that time show that we continue to use military force to defend our Nation against this enemy. 

As a matter of domestic law, all three branches of our Government have recognized that the President may use military force in 

order to prosecute the conflict against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and 

associated forces. The AUMF, enacted 1 week after the attacks of 

September 11, explicitly authorizes the President to direct the use 

of military force in defending the Nation. In the AUMF, Congress 

authorized the President, ‘‘To use all necessary and appropriate 

force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.’’ Some have questioned 

whether we may continue to rely on the AUMF nearly 12 years 

after its enactment. 

As a matter of international law, the United States may use 

force in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict in order to 

prosecute its armed conflict against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks, and 

7 

the United States may also use force consistent with our inherent 

right of national self-defense. 

We believe that there will eventually come a point when our 

enemy in this armed conflict, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated 

forces, is defeated and we are no longer in an armed conflict. At 

that point, the law enforcement and intelligence professionals will 

have the lead in our counterterrorism efforts against individuals 

who are the scattered remnants of al Qaeda or who are part of 

groups unaffiliated with al Qaeda with military tools available in 

reserve to defend the Nation against imminent terrorist attacks. 

But that is a point we have not yet reached. For now, the careful 

use of military force, alongside other counterterrorism tools, remains necessary and appropriate to disrupt, dismantle, and ensure 

a lasting defeat of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. 

I believe that existing authorities are adequate for this armed 

conflict. Should a new group threaten us, the United States can, 

under both U.S. domestic and international law, respond as necessary. At that point, we would consult with Congress to determine 

whether additional tools have become necessary or appropriate. 

Some have also questioned the geographic scope of this conflict. 

The enemy in this conflict has not confined itself to the geographic 

boundaries of any one country. U.S. military operations on the territory of another state must comply with international law rules, 

including respect for another state’s sovereignty. This does not prevent us from using force against our enemies outside an active battlefield, at least when the country involved consents or is unable 

or unwilling to take action against a serious threat. 

Now I would like to discuss whom we may target in this war 

against al Qaeda, the Taliban, an associated forces. We are in an 

armed conflict, and the Law of Armed Conflict applies to our operations. In this unconventional war, we apply conventional, well-established legal principles reflected in treaties and customary international law. 

The United States is not at war with an idea, a religion, or a tactic. Instead, we are at war against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. Former DOD General Counsel Jeh Johnson has previously explained publicly the meaning of the phrase ‘‘associated 

force.’’ A group is an associated force if, first, it is an organized, 

armed group that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda, and 

second, it is a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the 

United States or its coalition partners. Individuals who are part of 

this recognized enemy may be lawful military targets. Under the 

law of armed conflict, it is well-established that a state may target 

the enemy, including known, individual members of the enemy 

force. 

Some among the ranks of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces are U.S. citizens planning attacks against their own 

country from abroad. Longstanding legal principles and court decisions confirm that being a U.S. citizen does not immunize a member of the enemy from attack. Nonetheless, if we know in advance 

that the object of our attack is a U.S. citizen, we assume the constitutional rights, including the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 

Clause, attach to a U.S. citizen even while he is abroad and we 

8 

consider those rights in assessing whether that individual may be 

targeted. 

With respect to such a military operation, the due process requirements under the Fifth Amendment are satisfied at least when 

three criteria are met. First, an informed high-level official of the 

U.S. Government determines that the individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States. Whether a 

threat is imminent incorporates consideration of the relevant window of opportunity to act and the possible harm that missing that 

window would cause. Second, capture must be infeasible, and the 

United States will continue to monitor whether capture becomes 

feasible prior to any strike. This is a fact-specific inquiry that considers the relevant window of opportunity, whether the particular 

country would consent to a capture operation, and other factors 

such as the risk to U.S. personnel. Third, the operation must be 

conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of armed 

conflict principles. We take extraordinary care to ensure that all 

military operations, not just the exceptional cases of those against 

U.S. citizens, are conducted in a manner consistent with well-established law of armed conflict principles, including: humanity, 

which forbids the unnecessary infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction; distinction, which requires that only lawful targets such 

as combatants and other military objectives, may be intentionally 

targeted; military necessity, which requires that the use of military 

force, including all measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly 

and efficiently as possible, which are not themselves forbidden by 

the law of war, be directed at accomplishing a valid military purpose; and proportionality, which requires that the anticipated collateral damage of an attack not be excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage from the attack. 

These well-established rules that govern the use of force in 

armed conflict apply regardless of the type of weapon system used. 

From a legal standpoint, the use of remotely piloted aircraft for lethal operations against identified individuals presents the same 

issues as similar operations using manned aircraft. However, advanced precision technology gives us a greater ability to observe 

and wait until the enemy is away from innocent civilians before 

launching a strike, and this minimizes the risk to innocent civilians. As Assistant Secretary Sheehan mentioned, before military 

force is used against members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, there is a robust review process that includes rigorous 

safeguards to protect innocent civilians. 

Thank you, I look forward to answering your questions along 

with my colleagues. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Taylor, Mr. Sheehan, General Nagata, and General Gross follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY MR. ROBERT S. TAYLOR, HON. MICHAEL A. 

SHEEHAN, MG MICHAEL K. NAGATA, USA, AND BG RICHARD C. GROSS, JAGC, USA 

Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the committee, for this opportunity to testify about the legal framework for U.S. military 

operations to defend our Nation. 

First, we will give an overview of the legal framework governing the use of military force. Second, we will discuss the law governing whom the U.S. military may 

target with military force in the current conflict against al Qaeda and associated 

forces. Third, we will discuss the robust process of review that informs legal, policy, 

9 

and military decisions regarding targeting, and the administration’s continued commitment to transparency. 

I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT

The administration has outlined the legal framework for the current conflict in 

numerous public speeches, including speeches by Attorney General Holder and 

former Department of Defense General Counsel Jeh Johnson, which should give you 

some sense of the extraordinary care with which the U.S. military ensures that its 

efforts to address the threat posed by al Qaeda and its associated forces follow all 

applicable law in its military operations. That means that U.S. military operations 

must comply with both U.S. domestic law and international law. 

Our legal framework recognizes that the United States remains in a state of 

armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. As the September 

11, 2001 attacks showed, these organizations are determined to kill U.S. citizens, 

and we continue to use military force to defend our Nation against this enemy. 

As a matter of domestic law, all three branches of our Government have recognized that the President may use military force in order to prosecute the conflict 

against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and its associated forces. The Authorization for the 

Use of Military Force (AUMF), enacted 1 week after the attacks of September 11, 

2001, explicitly authorizes the President to direct the use of military force in defending the Nation. In ‘‘the AUMF,’’ as it is often called, Congress authorized the President ‘‘to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.’’ With this authorization, President Obama and President Bush before him, as Commanders in Chief, as well as 

four Secretaries of Defense, have directed military operations against al Qaeda, the 

Taliban, and associated forces. 

The AUMF reflects the recognition that we are in an armed conflict with this 

enemy. The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 

Circuit have also repeatedly recognized in a long string of cases that the United 

States can use military force in its armed conflict with al Qaeda. 

Some have questioned whether we may continue to rely on the AUMF nearly 12 

years after its enactment. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2012, Congress reaffirmed the AUMF with respect to detention authority. In doing 

so, it mirrored the administration’s interpretation of the AUMF as applying to al 

Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces and implicitly reaffirmed the continued 

applicability of the armed conflict paradigm that the AUMF represents. 

As a matter of international law, the United States may use force in accordance 

with the laws of war in order to prosecute its armed conflict with al Qaeda, the 

Taliban, and associated forces, in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, and 

the United States may also use force consistent with our inherent right of national 

self-defense. 

Some have also questioned the geographic scope of this conflict. As John Brennan 

stated in a September 2011 speech, the ‘‘United States does not view our authority 

to use military force against al Qaeda as being restricted solely to ‘hot’ battlefields 

like Afghanistan.’’ Indeed, the enemy in this conflict has not confined itself to the 

geographic boundaries of any one country. To that end, there is nothing in the 

AUMF that restricts the use of military force against al Qaeda to Afghanistan. 

Moreover, because ‘‘we are engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, the United 

States takes the legal position that—in accordance with international law—we have 

the authority to take action against al Qaeda and its associated forces without doing 

a separate self-defense analysis each time.’’ 

Nonetheless, the fact that we are in an armed conflict does not mean that the 

United States is using military force everywhere the enemy is found. In many countries, we need not contemplate military operations because an al Qaeda presence, 

once discovered, would be neutralized effectively by the Nation’s law enforcement 

apparatus. In other countries, where al Qaeda’s presence is more formidable, the 

foreign state or the United States might consider military action. 

Additionally, U.S. military operations on the territory of another state must comply with international law rules, including respect for another state’s sovereignty, 

which do not prevent us from using force against our enemies outside an active battlefield, at least when the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to 

take action against the threat. 

We believe that our military operations will ultimately degrade and dismantle the 

enemy’s operational capacity and supporting networks. At that point, law enforcement and intelligence operations will be the primary tools in our counterterrorism 

efforts—against individuals who are the scattered remnants of al Qaeda, or who are 

10 

part of groups unaffiliated with al Qaeda. Military direct action will always be an 

option for the President to defend the Nation against imminent terrorist attacks. 

But that is a point we have not yet reached. For now, the careful use of both unilateral and partnered military force, alongside other counterterrorism tools, remains 

necessary and appropriate to disrupt, dismantle, and ensure a lasting defeat of al 

Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. Existing authorities are adequate for this 

armed conflict. 

Should a new group threaten us, the United States can, under both U.S. domestic 

and international law, respond as necessary. At that point, we would consult with 

Congress to determine whether additional tools are necessary or appropriate. 

II. TARGETING: WHOM DOES THE U.S. MILITARY TARGET AND WHAT LEGAL RULES APPLY?

Now, I would like to discuss whom we may target in this war against al Qaeda, 

the Taliban, and associated forces. We are in an armed conflict and the law of 

armed conflict applies to our operations. Al Qaeda is an unconventional enemy that, 

with blatant disregard for the law of armed conflict, targets innocent civilians. We 

nonetheless refuse to allow this enemy, with its inhumane tactics, to define the legal 

framework for waging war. Our efforts remain grounded in the law. In this unconventional war, we apply conventional legal principles—well-established legal principles reflected in treaties and customary international law. We have held fast to 

our principles, laws, and values, even when facing unconventional threats. 

The United States is not at war with an idea, a religion, or a tactic. Instead, we 

are at war against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. The former General 

Counsel of the Department of Defense, Jeh Johnson, has previously explained publicly the meaning of the phrase ‘‘associated force.’’ A group is an associated force, 

if, first, it is an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al 

Qaeda; and, second, it is a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the 

United States or its coalition partners. Individuals who are part of this recognized 

enemy may be lawful military targets. 

In applying these principles in this armed conflict, we conduct a careful, fact-intensive assessment to distinguish between, on the one hand, a terrorist who effectively becomes part of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or an associated force by training or 

co-locating with the group, accepting orders from its leaders, and participating in 

the group’s terrorist plotting, and, on the other hand, the terrorist, who without any 

direct connection to a member of al Qaeda, embraces extremist ideology found on 

the internet and self-radicalizes. Both are very dangerous, but the former is part 

of the congressionally-declared enemy force in a congressionally-authorized armed 

conflict; the latter, although dangerous, is not part of that enemy force. 

Under the law of armed conflict, it is well-established that a State may target the 

enemy, including known, individual members of the enemy force. For example, during World War II, U.S. Navy forces lawfully shot down the aircraft of Admiral 

Yamamoto, the commander of the Japanese navy. Today, just as in 1943, the use 

of lethal force against a particular leader of the enemy force in an ongoing armed 

conflict is entirely consistent with settled law of armed conflict principles governing 

who may be the object of attack. 

Unfortunately, however, some among the ranks of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and 

their associated forces are U.S. citizens planning attacks against their own country 

from abroad. This, too, has historical precedent. In previous conflicts, U.S. citizens 

have fought in foreign armies against the United States—such as with the Axis 

countries during World War II. Longstanding legal principles and court decisions 

confirm that being a U.S. citizen does not immunize a member of the enemy from 

attack. Nonetheless, if we know in advance that the object of our attack is a U.S. 

citizen, we assume that constitutional rights—including the Fifth Amendment’s Due 

Process Clause—attach to a U.S. citizen even while he is abroad, and we consider 

those rights in assessing whether that individual may be targeted. 

With regard to the targeting with lethal force of a U.S. citizen in a foreign country 

who is a senior operational al Qaeda leader actively engaged in planning operations 

to kill Americans, given the realities of our conflict with al Qaeda and the weight 

of the government’s interest in protecting its citizens from imminent attack, such 

an operation would be lawful at least when three criteria are met. First, an informed, high-level official of the U.S. Government determines that the individual 

poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States. Whether a 

threat is ‘‘imminent’’ incorporates consideration of the relevant window of opportunity to act, the possible harm that missing the window would cause to civilians, 

and the likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks against the United 

States. Second, capture is infeasible, and the United States will continue to monitor 

whether capture becomes feasible prior to any strike. This is a fact-specific inquiry, 

11 

but considers the relevant window of opportunity, whether the particular country 

would consent to a capture operation, and other factors, such as the risk to U.S. 

personnel. Finally, the operation is conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of armed conflict principles. 

With respect to this last criterion, we take extraordinary care to ensure that all 

military operations—not just the exceptional cases of those against U.S. citizens— 

are conducted in a manner consistent with well-established law of armed conflict 

principles, including: (1) military necessity, which requires that the use of military 

force (including all measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently 

as possible, which are not forbidden by the law of war) be directed at accomplishing 

a valid military purpose; (2) humanity, which forbids the unnecessary infliction of 

suffering, injury, or destruction; (3) distinction, which requires that only lawful targets—such as combatants and other military objectives—may be intentionally targeted; and (4) proportionality, which requires that the anticipated collateral damage 

of an attack not be excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage from the attack. 

These well-established rules that govern the use of force in armed conflict apply 

regardless of the type of weapon system used. From a legal standpoint, the use of 

remotely piloted aircraft for lethal operations against identified individuals presents 

the same issues as similar operations using manned aircraft. However, advanced 

precision technology gives us a greater ability to observe and wait until the enemy 

is away from innocent civilians before launching a strike, and thus minimize the 

risk to innocent civilians. 

III. MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Before military force is used against members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, there is a robust review process, which includes rigorous safeguards 

to protect innocent civilians. Throughout the military chain of command, senior commanders, advised by trained and experienced staffs—including intelligence officers, 

operations officers, and judge advocates—review operations for compliance with applicable U.S. domestic and international law, including the law of armed conflict, 

and for consistency with the policies and orders of superiors in the military chain 

of command. 

For operations outside Afghanistan, this review continues up the chain of command, through the 4-star combatant commander, to the Secretary of Defense. Before 

the Secretary makes a decision, the proposal is reviewed by senior military and civilian advisors, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the General 

Counsel of the Department of Defense. Department officials also receive input from 

senior officials in other departments and agencies from across our national security 

team. Military orders implementing a final decision are then transmitted down that 

chain of command to the relevant forces that carry out such operations. 

Some have expressed concern that the process for managing military operations, 

no matter how rigorous, is largely confined to the executive branch. This fact reflects related practical and legal considerations. As a practical matter, officials in 

the military chain of command must often make real-time decisions that balance the 

need to act, the existence of alternative options, the possibility of collateral damage, 

and other factors—all of which depend on expertise and immediate access to information that only the executive branch may possess in real time. 

As a legal matter, Article II of the Constitution makes the President the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The President is therefore responsible for directing military operations in the prosecution of armed conflict. By U.S. law, the 

military chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and 

then to combatant commanders. The current process appropriately reflects the 

President’s role in the chain of command; alternatives that some have suggested 

would present significant constitutional issues. 

Congress also plays a critical role in ensuring appropriate oversight of this process. The Department and the Joint Staff regularly brief members and staff of this 

committee and the House Armed Services Committee on military operations against 

al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, both on the prosecution of the conflict 

generally and specifically on each significant counterterrorism operation conducted 

outside Afghanistan. 

We have also made significant efforts to increase transparency regarding whom 

the U.S. military targets in the current conflict against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and 

associated forces and the procedures by which individual targeting decisions are 

made. Last year, for example, we declassified information about the U.S. military’s 

counterterrorism activities in Yemen and Somalia in a June 2012 War Powers report to Congress. This type of transparency helps preserve public confidence, dispel 

12 

misconceptions that the U.S. military targets low-level terrorists who pose no threat 

to the United States, and address questions raised by our allies and partners 

abroad. On the other hand, the public release of certain information, such as the 

intelligence by which current or past targets were identified, could enable the enemy 

to avoid or manipulate our application of military force. Ultimately, we must maintain a delicate balance between transparency and protecting information from public 

disclosure for security reasons. 

Thank you. We look forward to answering your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Taylor. 

We are going to have a 6-minute first round here and there may 

be the need for a second round. But we have a lot of Senators and 

a lot of witnesses and a second panel. So we are going to give it 

a go at 6 minutes for the first round. 

Let me start with you, Secretary Sheehan. In the view of the administration, should the AUMF be expanded or modified to cover 

terrorist groups that are not associated with al Qaeda or for any 

other reason? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

At this point, we are comfortable with the AUMF as it is currently structured. Right now, it does not inhibit us from prosecuting the war against al Qaeda and its affiliates. If we were to 

find a group or organization that was targeting the United States, 

first of all, we would have other authorities to deal with that situation. I was in the government prior to September 11 when we conducted strikes against groups before we had the AUMF specific 

post-September 11 authority. So, we could use other authorities to 

take on those types of organizations. But for right now, for our war 

against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their affiliates, AUMF serves its 

purpose. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, under the definition of ‘‘enemy,’’ do you 

agree that mere sympathy with al Qaeda is not sufficient to be an 

associated force for purposes of the AUMF? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, Senator. Sympathy is not enough. As Jeh 

Johnson and others have mentioned in public, it has to be an organized group, and that group has to be in co-belligerent status with 

al Qaeda, operating against the United States. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there any good reason why both Congress 

and the public should not be informed of which organizations and 

entities the administration has determined to be co-belligerents of 

al Qaeda and to promptly be informed of any additions or deletions 

from that list? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, I think that the appropriate role for Congress is in its oversight regarding the designation of groups. A lot 

of these groups have very murky membership and they also have 

very murky alliances and shifting alliances. They change their 

name and they lie and obfuscate their activities. So I think it 

would be difficult for Congress to get involved in trying to track the 

designation of which are the affiliate forces. We know when we 

evaluate these forces what they are up to, and we make that determination based on their co-belligerent status with al Qaeda and 

make our targeting decisions based on that criteria rather than on 

the shifting nature of different groups and their affiliations. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there a list now? Is there an existing list of 

groups that are affiliated with al Qaeda? 

13 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, I am not sure there is a list per se. I am 

very familiar with the organizations that we do right now consider 

as affiliated with al Qaeda, and I could provide you that list of organizations. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would you give us that list? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. We can do that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

In response to this request, we provided a classified paper to Senator Levin’s staff 

on al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. 

Chairman LEVIN. When you add or subtract names from that 

list, would you let us know? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. We can do that as well, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

The former General Counsel for the DOD, Jeh Johnson, said that 

there will come a tipping point at which we are going to be able 

to determine that the armed conflict with al Qaeda is effectively 

over. I think you are probably familiar with that speech. 

Do you agree with Mr. Johnson’s description of an eventual tipping point when the armed conflict with al Qaeda will be essentially over? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. I do, Mr. Chairman. I believe that al Qaeda, although its narrative is very powerful among certain groups, ultimately will end up on the ash heap of history, as with other previous groups. But that day, unfortunately, is a long way off. 

Chairman LEVIN. So the tipping point that you say would come 

is a long way off in your judgment. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. I believe it is at least years in advance 

based on my understanding of the organizational resiliency of al 

Qaeda and its affiliate forces. It is many years in advance. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, if that point comes and when that point 

comes, what do you do with people like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 

who have proven with deeds that they would, if they are released, 

attack us again? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, I believe that those folks that we already 

have under custody that are tried and jailed, hopefully will remain 

behind bars and not be able to threaten Americans in the future. 

Chairman LEVIN. So they must be tried. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. That is our objective. 

Chairman LEVIN. In order for them to be detained after the tipping point comes and the war is over. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. That would be the ideal. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. If they are not tried and they are detained and 

the tipping point comes, what is the basis for detaining them unless they have been tried and convicted in a military court or a civilian court? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Let me make sure I understand your question, 

Mr. Chairman. You are talking about after the AUMF is no longer 

in effect? 

Chairman LEVIN. Right. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Again, Mr. Chairman, even prior to the AUMF, we 

were able to arrest people and try them and bring them back to 

the United States with great efficacy prior to September 11. 

14 

Chairman LEVIN. No. What I am saying is that they need to be 

tried and convicted for them to continue to be detained if and when 

the AUMF is no longer in force. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. That would be my understanding. Yes, sir. I would 

defer to Bob Taylor if he wants to verify that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is that correct, Mr. Taylor? 

Mr. TAYLOR. There will come a point when our enemy in this 

armed conflict is defeated or so defeated that there is no longer an 

ongoing armed conflict. At that point, we will face difficult questions about what to do with those still remaining in military detention without a criminal conviction and sentence. However, I will 

point out that following World War II, we continued to hold some 

people for several years as part of a general mopping-up authority. 

Chairman LEVIN. Were they being held for war crimes? Were 

they being held for trial for war crimes? 

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir. They were prisoners of war but who were 

assessed that they would so disrupt the delicate situation back in 

Germany and elsewhere that we held them for a few years. We are 

not talking ad infinitum, but as part of a general mop-up authority. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you, for the record, give us that authority? 

Mr. TAYLOR. We will give you the historical—— 

Chairman LEVIN. No, not just the history, the authority. Would 

you do that, Mr. Taylor? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The military’s authority to detain under the law of war generally ends with the 

cessation of hostilities. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality); 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–81, 

§ 1021, 125 Stat. 1297, 1562 (2011) (affirming ‘‘[d]etention under the law of war 

without trial until the end of the hostilities authorized by the Authorization for Use 

of Military Force’’). However, the practice of nations under the law of war has reflected, and U.S. courts have accepted, that there is at least a limited authority to 

detain certain individuals for a period following the end of hostilities. This authority 

includes, inter alia, the ability to facilitate the safe and orderly transfer or release 

of detainees and to detain certain individuals to prosecute them for offenses committed during the hostilities. There clearly exists an authority to continue to detain 

individuals to facilitate their safe and orderly transfer or release. See Oscar M. 

Uhler et al., Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, IV Geneva Convention Relative to the 

Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War: Commentary 515 (JeanS. Pictet ed., 

Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958) (Article 133’s requirement that 

‘‘[i]nternment shall cease as soon as possible after the close of hostilities’’ ‘‘does not 

mean, in spite of the urgent wish thus expressed, that internment can always be 

brought to an end shortly after the end of active hostilities. . . . The disorganization 

caused by war may quite possibly involve some delay before the return to normal.’’); 

Jean de Preux et al., Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, III Geneva Convention Relative 

to the Treatment of Prisoners of War: Commentary 550 (JeanS. Pictet ed., A.P. de 

Heney trans., 1960) (explaining that the repatriation requirement of article 118 

‘‘does not, of course, affect the practical arrangements which must be made so that 

repatriation may take place in conditions consistent with humanitarian rules and 

the requirements of the convention. . . ’’). This authority is necessary to meet the 

fundamental obligation under the law of war that detainees be humanely treated. 

For example, the United States continued to detain prisoners of war for a few years 

after the surrender of the Axis powers in World War II. See, e.g., In re Territo, 156 

F.2d 142, 147–48 (9th Cir. 1946). The delay in the repatriation of more than 400,000 

enemy prisoners of war held in the United States during World War II resulted 

from ‘‘manpower and transportation shortages, because the war was still being 

fought against Japan, and because of the inability on the part of the European and 

Mediterranean theaters to receive prisoners of war from the United States in large 

numbers.’’ Martin Tollefson, Enemy Prisoners of War, 32 Iowa Law Review 51, 74 

(1946). This detention authority also includes the authority to detain enemy persons 

after the cessation of hostilities when criminal proceedings are pending for offenses 

15 

committed during the hostilities. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 

Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, art. 119 (‘‘Prisoners of war against whom criminal proceedings for an indictable offence are pending may be detained until the end 

of such proceedings, and, if necessary, until the completion of the punishment’’ even 

after the cessation of international armed conflict; ‘‘[t]he same shall apply to prisoners of war already convicted for an indictable offense.’’); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, art. 

133 (‘‘Internees . . . against whom penal proceedings are pending . . . may be detained 

until the close of such proceedings and, if circumstances require, until the completion of the penalty. The same shall apply to internees who have been previously sentenced to a punishment depriving them of liberty.’’). Indeed, the Supreme Court has 

recognized that some authority to try violations of the law of war must continue 

after the cessation of hostilities in part because ‘‘only after their cessation could the 

greater number of offenders and the principal ones be apprehended and subjected 

to trial.’’ In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 12 (1946); see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 

339 U.S. 763 (1950) (denying writ of habeas corpus to German citizens taken into 

custody in China and tried by military commission after the Japanese surrender for 

providing intelligence to Japanese armed forces after Germany’s surrender). 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, this committee is consistently briefed by the 

servicemembers about their operations against al Qaeda and their 

affiliates. During these briefings, we routinely ask the members of 

the military what more do they need to carry out their mission 

whether that is equipment or changes in policy. Over the past 10 

years, I have never been told by those who are fighting the war 

that they lacked the legal authority to conduct their missions. 

As Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, have you encountered a situation in the fight against al 

Qaeda where you believed the special operations community did 

not have sufficient legal authority to prosecute the war against al 

Qaeda or its affiliates? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator Inhofe, in the year and a half I have been 

in this job, I have not yet once found that we did not have enough 

legal authority within DOD to prosecute—— 

Senator INHOFE. Can you envision a set of circumstances, it is 

something that is kind of hard to do and deal with the 

hypotheticals, that we would not have the authority that we need? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. You are right, Senator. I would not want to engage in hypotheticals. 

But I would say that if a terrorist organization outside of al 

Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces began to present a threat 

to the United States, did not fit under our current AUMF, then we 

might have to look at different authorities or extended authority or 

adjustment to authority to go after that organization. But right 

now, I do not see that case. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. The two generals who did not give the 

opening statement, have you ever encountered a situation where 

the Joint Staff believed it did not have sufficient authority under 

AUMF to carry out its operations from your perspective against al 

Qaeda or its affiliates? Both generals. 

General NAGATA. Sir, in my position on behalf of the chairman, 

I monitor the implementation of the various counterterrorism missions, orders, and direction that the combatant commands are 

given by the Secretary. I have been in this position now for about 

18 months, and in this monitoring role that I conduct, I have not 

16 

yet encountered a situation where there was insufficient legal authority for the combatant commander to execute the mission or the 

direction he has been given. 

Senator INHOFE. General Gross? 

General GROSS. Senator, I would agree with that. Both in my 

time as the Staff Judge Advocate at Central Command and my 

time as the Legal Counsel to the Chairman, I have not seen a situation where there was not some legal authority to be able to go 

after members of al Qaeda or associated forces. 

Senator INHOFE. Do both of you agree with the opening statements that were made by the Secretary and Mr. Taylor? 

General NAGATA. I do, Senator. 

General GROSS. Sir, I do as well. 

Senator INHOFE. I have been distressed for a long period of time. 

I know it is not a popular position to take, but the fact that we 

have a great resource in Guantanamo Bay that has not been utilized properly. I know the arguments on both sides of this thing, 

but when something like this comes up or we talk about detention, 

that is what is in the back of my mind. I do not have a question 

about that, but I may be asking you some things in writing concerning that. 

The chairman quoted Jeh Johnson. Let me quote Jeh Johnson 

again as I did in my opening statement and ask the four of you if 

you agree with Jeh Johnson’s statement when he said—and this is 

a quote, he said, ‘‘10 years later the AUMF remains on the books 

and is still a viable authorization today.’’ Do all four of you, one 

at a time, agree with that statement? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. 

General NAGATA. I do, sir. 

General GROSS. I do as well, Senator. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Secretary Sheehan or Mr. Taylor, I think this echoes one of the 

questions that the chairman raised. I presume that it is ultimately 

the President who designates who or what is an associated force of 

al Qaeda. Is that correct? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Within the AUMF, I believe we do that. Within 

the Pentagon we designate that, sir. 

Senator REED. So within the Pentagon you will designate that 

group or individual? 

Mr. TAYLOR. It might begin at the Pentagon, but it would be considered through the interagency. 

Senator REED. But going back, the decision will ultimately be 

made by the President or made by the interagency? 

Mr. TAYLOR. The decision to take military action would be subject to the President. 

Senator REED. Obviously. 

Mr. TAYLOR. But the legal conclusion that this is an associated 

force is something that would be a lawyer’s judgment. Whether 

there is any policy consequence of that would be up to the policymakers. 

17 

Senator REED. But the reality would be the Secretary of Defense 

then up to the President would be presented with operational 

plans, but the decision would already have been made that this 

group or this individual is in an associated force of al Qaeda. Is 

that the way it works? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. The issue of affiliated force has not gone to the 

presidential level, Senator. That issue is managed at a much lower 

level. 

Senator REED. Should that issue be shared with Congress, obviously in a classified setting? Should Congress have the ability to 

confirm or reject? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. The chairman specifically asked me about 

that, which groups we now consider part of the affiliated force, and 

I committed to him that I would provide that to him, as well as 

any changes that we had. 

Senator REED. My question is: would it be appropriate for Congress to have a role in not just reviewing, but deciding? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Right, sir. I would think that is a decision better 

for the executive branch. As I mentioned to the chairman, these organizations right now are quite savvy in regards to how they are 

perceived overseas, and so they are always shifting their rhetoric, 

names, and affiliations. I think that is better left to the executive 

branch. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Let me ask a question. There are operationally military personnel under title 10. There are intelligence personnel under title 

50. I presume, at least hypothetically, there could be occasions 

where both are being used in terms of operations. Does the AUMF 

give you more flexibility to operate with these different legislative 

requirements, slightly different for title 10, slightly different in 

title 50? If AUMF was pulled back, would you have operational 

problems in terms of what could be done under title 10 versus what 

could be done under title 50 or what could be done jointly? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. That is a good question, Senator. 

Go ahead, Bob. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The AUMF is our domestic law authority for considering ourselves to be in armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, 

and associated forces. So if the AUMF were to be repealed, we 

would not be in an armed conflict, and it would absolutely affect 

our title 10 authorities. 

Senator REED. It would be significantly affecting title 10. 

Some people, for example, have suggested that unmanned aerial 

strikes be shifted totally to title 10 authority. If AUMF did not 

exist and you did something like that, operationally that would 

have an effect on where you could strike and who you could strike. 

Is that a fair conclusion? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, it would. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Let me also raise another question, Mr. Taylor, which I think 

came up in your testimony. I think you focused your discussion on 

high-value individual attacks, but there is another type of attack 

which is described, at least in the press, as a signature attack. As 

I understand it, there are indications that there is a very high concentration of either al Qaeda or associated forces. Is there a legal 

18 

distinction between those two attacks right now, and would there 

be a legal distinction if the AUMF was altered? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Attack against an enemy force is something that is 

consistent with the law of armed conflict. The law of armed conflict 

in this is tied to the AUMF. So if the AUMF were repealed, it 

would absolutely affect our ability to engage in those sorts of attacks. The law of armed conflict provides authority that we have 

not fully utilized. Our approach is more focused for many policy 

reasons, but as a legal matter, under the law of armed conflict, it 

is not necessary to identify particular leaders and we can go after 

the enemy, the military forces of the enemy, without being focused 

on the leadership. But we are, indeed, focused on the leadership. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Just to follow up, Mr. Taylor, we are not talking about the law of armed conflict. We are talking about the role 

of Congress in authorizing the use of military force by the executive branch. So I appreciate your comments about the law of armed 

conflict, but that is not what this hearing is about. 

This hearing is about a resolution that was passed coming up on 

12 years ago, and I think it is important for all of my colleagues 

to read that again, which says ‘‘the President is authorized to use 

all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 

aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 

harbored such organizations or persons in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by 

such nations, organizations.’’ This authorization was about those 

who planned and orchestrated the attacks of 2001. 

Here we are 12 years later and you and the Secretary come before us and tell us that you do not think it needs to be updated. 

Well, clearly it does, and I would refer you to this morning’s Washington Post editorial revising the terms of war, the authorization 

to use force against al Qaeda should be updated, not discarded. Because it has been so long and General Nagata, you would agree the 

nature of this conflict has changed dramatically, spread throughout 

northern Africa and the Maghreb, and penetrated into other nations all throughout the Middle East. The situation has dramatically changed. So for you to come here and say we do not need to 

change it or revise or update it I think is disturbing. 

That is why we have people like Senator Dick Durbin, one of the 

highly respected individuals, I quote Senator Durbin: ‘‘None of us, 

not one who voted for the AUMF, could have envisioned we were 

about to give future Presidents the authority to fight terrorism as 

far flung as Yemen and Somalia.’’ 

Mr. Taylor, in your legal opinion, could the 2001 AUMF be read 

to authorize lethal force against al Qaeda’s associated forces in additional countries where they are now present, such as Somalia, 

Libya, and Syria? 

Mr. TAYLOR. As I indicated, we must comply with domestic 

law—— 

19 

Senator MCCAIN. I think it is a pretty straightforward question, 

Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. On the domestic law side, yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. You believe that the 2001 AUMF authorizes lethal force against al Qaeda associated forces in Mali, Libya, and 

Syria. So we can expect drone strikes into Syria if we find al Qaeda 

there? 

Mr. TAYLOR. On the domestic law side, sir. I hate to speculate 

on a hypothetical, but—— 

Senator MCCAIN. In your view, the President has the authority 

to do that. 

Mr. TAYLOR. In my view, the AUMF authorizes us to be at war 

with al Qaeda, the organization behind the September 11, 2001, attacks, and that organization continues and it has associated forces, 

forces that have joined with that organization. Yes, sir, we are authorized to attack those who have chosen to associate with that organization. 

Senator MCCAIN. You rightly say in your statement that the 

2012 NDAA reaffirmed the AUMF with respect to the authority to 

detain al Qaeda, Taliban, and associated forces. Is the authority to 

detain the same as the authority to kill? Because that was not in 

the defense bill. 

Mr. TAYLOR. It is related. It is not the same. 

Senator MCCAIN. Would it not be helpful to DOD and the American people if we updated the AUMF to make it more explicitly consistent with the realities today which are dramatically different 

from what they were on that fateful day in New York and Washington? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, I think there is a good case to be made 

that we should review this as the war goes on, and we have reviewed it. As of right now, I believe it suits us very well, and if 

there comes an opportunity where we need other authorities, we 

should come forward for those. 

I would like to add, though, that the al Qaeda that attacked us 

on September 11, 2001, was an al Qaeda that previously attacked 

us from East Africa, from Yemen. 

Senator MCCAIN. Yes, but that is not what the authorization 

states, Mr. Secretary. I know of all those things. So I appreciate 

that. I have only got 52 seconds left. 

We are now killing people in the Haqqani Network, right? Is that 

correct, Mr. Secretary? The reason why I bring that up, we did not 

even designate the Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization 

until 2012. There are published reports, which are not as a result 

of classified briefings that I have had, that we killed people where 

their direct association with al Qaeda is tenuous. In fact, there is 

one story that we killed somebody in return for the Pakistanis to 

kill somebody. 

As you stated, Congress is briefed from time to time, and I appreciate that. But the fact is that this authority, which I just read 

to you, has grown way out of proportion and is no longer applicable 

to the conditions that motivated the U.S. Congress to pass the 

AUMF in 2001. 

So I must say I do not blame you because basically you have 

carte blanche as to what you are doing throughout the world, and 

20 

we believe it does not need to be repealed. But it is hard for me 

to understand why you would oppose a revision of the AUMF in 

light of the dramatically changed landscape that we have in this 

war on Islamic extremism, al Qaeda, and others. It needs to be 

done, and I hope that this committee will address it either in a separate fashion or as part of the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, gentlemen. I want to start with a question for 

each of you in turn. It is a yes or no question. Let me lead into 

it. 

In 2011, the House Armed Services Committee included a new 

AUMF in the NDAA that would have codified the authority to use 

force against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. 

The administration, in a Statement of Administration Policy, 

strongly opposed that proposed new AUMF because it determined 

that the 2001 AUMF, ‘‘enabled us to confront the full range of 

threats this country faces from those organizations and individuals,’’ and concluded that the new AUMF, ‘‘in purporting to affirm 

the conflict would effectively recharacterize its scope and would 

risk creating confusion regarding applicable standards.’’ 

Do you agree with that Statement of Administrative Policy? I 

will start with General Nagata. 

General NAGATA. Sir, I am unfamiliar with the document you 

just described. I can only say that as I track the orders and direction the Secretary has given his combatant commanders, I have 

never encountered a moment where they did not have sufficient 

legal authority to implement those orders. 

Senator UDALL. Mr. Taylor? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I agree with the statement in the Statement of Administration Policy. 

Senator UDALL. Secretary Sheehan? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir, I agree. 

General GROSS. Sir, I would agree with General Nagata. From 

what I have seen in my military practice, the current AUMF has 

been adequate to meet the enemy we have seen to date so far. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that. 

Let me direct a question to all of you again. 

The national counterterrorism strategy states that, ‘‘the United 

States alone cannot eliminate every terrorist or terrorist organization that threatens our safety, security, or interests. Therefore, we 

must join with key partners and allies to share the burdens of common security.’’ 

Do you agree that increased cooperation with security partners 

versus unilateral action and expanded conflict should be a strategic 

goal of the United States? I will start with General Nagata again. 

General NAGATA. Sir, I do agree. Working with partner nations 

and allies is crucial. 

Senator UDALL. Mr. Taylor? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes. 

21 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. It is specifically part of the 2012 Defense 

Strategic Guidance. 

General GROSS. Yes, sir, I agree as well. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that. 

Secretary Sheehan, let me turn to you. If a negotiated settlement 

between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban were to 

be signed, would the AUMF still apply to the Taliban? In other 

words, could we be in a situation in which Afghanistan is no longer 

at war against Mullah Omar’s Taliban, but we still are? Or if we 

also accept such a negotiated settlement, could we be in a situation 

in which we are at war with al Qaeda but not the Taliban? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, again, a hypothetical, but if the question 

you asked, could that be the case, then the answer would be yes, 

it could be the case. 

Senator UDALL. We are certainly dealing with some hypotheticals 

here. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. It could be the case, yes, sir. 

Senator UDALL. Mr. Taylor, if I could turn to you. If the United 

States faces an imminent threat to which Congress could not respond in a timely fashion, does the President of the United States 

have Article II authority to use military force to repel an imminent 

threat to the safety of Americans? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir, he does. 

Senator UDALL. Secretary Sheehan, let me turn back to you. In 

your judgment, what are the potential risks and consequences associated with passing a new AUMF? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, I think the AUMF as currently structured works very well for us. So I guess we would be concerned 

that any change might restrict our combatant commanders from 

conducting their operations as they have in the past. So right now, 

we are comfortable. I think Senator Inhofe said if it ain’t broke, 

don’t fix it. I would subscribe to that policy. 

Senator UDALL. General Nagata, could I turn back to you and 

ask you? Do you believe that there are strategic risks associated 

with passing a new AUMF? 

General NAGATA. Sir, I do not know. I do know that the combatant commanders’ great familiarity and great confidence in the existing AUMF is also an important part of our assessment, that we 

have sufficient authority for the current orders and direction from 

the Secretary. 

Senator UDALL. Mr. Taylor, if I could come back to you. To your 

knowledge, has an AUMF ever been passed by Congress without a 

specific request from the President? 

Mr. TAYLOR. I am not aware of any such history, sir. I believe 

the answer is no. 

Senator UDALL. Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. This 

is a very important topic, as we all acknowledge. Thank you for 

your service. 

Mr. Chairman, I finished my questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Udall. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

From the President’s point of view, does the AUMF in any way 

restrict his ability to go after terrorist organizations that represent 

22 

a national security threat to this country in places outside of Afghanistan that are not within the hierarchy of al Qaeda that existed on September 11, 2001? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, it would not. 

Senator GRAHAM. So is there anything the President would like 

us to do differently than exists today? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, I think the AUMF provides very clear 

guidance for al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. He has 

many other authorities that you are aware of that he could use 

that he used prior to the enactment of the AUMF to deal with any 

other threats to our national security. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me the war against radical 

Islam or terror, whatever description you would like to provide, will 

go on after the second term of President Obama? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, in my judgment, this is going to go on for 

quite a while and, yes, beyond the second term of the President. 

Senator GRAHAM. Beyond this term of Congress. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. I think it is at least 10 to 20 years. 

Senator GRAHAM. I think you are absolutely right. I think we are 

involved in a generational struggle. So the lessons of September 11 

are always learned the hard way. 

So your advice to the committee is to do nothing? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, I think it is appropriate to review a law 

that was written 12 years ago. 

Senator GRAHAM. Doing nothing—Congress could be at the right 

answer more often than not. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. I think it is an appropriate time to review 

this, and we are taking this very seriously to review it. But at this 

time, we do not find that it would improve our ability to conduct 

our global campaign against these organizations. 

Senator GRAHAM. General, do you agree with that? 

General GROSS. Senator, I agree that the current AUMF is adequate for us. In the time I have had in Central Command, down 

at International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and also 

here on the Joint Staff, we have been able to go after the enemy 

that fits within the AUMF. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me, Mr. Secretary, that the 

inherent authority of the President as commander in chief would 

give him or her great latitude in terms of pursuing terrorist organizations that represent a threat against the United States apart 

from Congress? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir, I do agree. 

Senator GRAHAM. But you also would agree that when Congress, 

the President, and our courts are all aligned, we are stronger as 

a nation, when we are all on the same sheet of music? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. So the one thing I do believe would be helpful 

is if Congress does more than just criticize, that we find ways to 

empower the commander in chief and also in some ways control the 

power of the executive branch. But I tend to agree that what we 

have today is working. But we all agree that the enemy of today 

is different than it was on September 11. Do you agree with that? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Sir, they have changed a bit, but in many ways 

they have not changed very much at all. They are operating in a 

23 

very similar way that they were in 1998, out of traditional strongholds in Yemen and East Africa. They have expanded in North Africa and some other areas, but quite frankly, this has been a global 

organization since day one. 

Senator GRAHAM. But would you agree with me because of the 

pressure we have placed on the enemy in Afghanistan and Iraq, 

they are moving? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. They have always moved. Even in 2002, 

they were very active in North Africa and in parts of the Levant. 

Senator GRAHAM. I could not agree with you more. So from your 

point of view, you have all the authorization and legal authorities 

necessary to conduct a drone strike against terrorist organizations 

in Yemen without changing the AUMF. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir, I do believe that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with that, General? 

General GROSS. I do, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. General, do you agree with that? 

General NAGATA. I do, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Could we send military members into Yemen 

to strike against one of these organizations? Does the President 

have that authority to put boots-on-the-ground in Yemen? 

Mr. TAYLOR. As I mentioned before, there is domestic authority 

and international law authority. At the moment, the basis for putting boots-on-the-ground in Yemen, we respect the sovereignty of 

Yemen and it would—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I am not talking about that. I am asking: does 

he have the legal authority under our law to do that? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Under domestic authority, he would have that authority. 

Senator GRAHAM. I hope Congress is okay with that. I am okay 

with that. 

Does he have authority to put boots-on-the-ground in the Congo? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir, he does. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with me that when it comes to 

international terrorism, we are talking about a worldwide struggle? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Absolutely, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree with me the battlefield is 

wherever the enemy chooses to make it? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. From Boston to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. 

Senator GRAHAM. I could not agree with you more. 

Do you agree with that, General? 

General GROSS. Yes, sir. I agree that the enemy decides where 

the battlefield is. 

Senator GRAHAM. It could be any place on the planet and we 

have to be aware and able to act. Do you have the ability to act 

and you are aware of the threats? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. We do have the ability to react and we 

are tracking the threats globally. 

Senator GRAHAM. From my point of view, I think your analysis 

is correct. I appreciate all of your service to our country. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator Donnelly? 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

24 

Would you call the al Nusra Front in Syria an al Qaeda-affiliated 

terrorist group? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir, I would. 

Senator DONNELLY. Would you say that the AUMF applies to the 

al Nusra Front? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. That is a legal question. 

Mr. TAYLOR. As with many things with Syria, we are looking 

very hard and very carefully, and I do not have a definitive answer 

for you at the moment. 

Senator DONNELLY. Following up on Senator Graham’s question, 

would we have the ability to act against al Nusra today under the 

AUMF? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. We would have the ability to act against 

al Nusra if we felt they were threatening our security. We would 

have the authority to do that today. 

Senator DONNELLY. Do we feel today that al Nusra is threatening our security? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, in this setting, I do not want to get in 

the decisionmaking we have for how we target different groups and 

organizations around the world. 

Senator DONNELLY. Okay. 

If a terrorist group is al Qaeda-affiliated, does that inherently 

mean that they are threatening the United States? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir, although it is a bit murky, I hate to say, 

because there are groups that have openly professed their affiliations with al Qaeda, yet in fact, as a Government, we have not 

completely grappled with that as of now. But generally speaking, 

for AUMF, as we mentioned, it has to be an organized force first, 

and second that organized force has to be joined to al Qaeda as a 

co-belligerent to threaten us. So when both of those factors are in 

place, then we can move forward on AUMF. 

Senator DONNELLY. If that al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group is 

operating wholly within another country, and their actions to date 

have involved only that country, does the AUMF still apply to 

them? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Senator, as we indicated, we would do a fact-intensive, careful consideration, and as Secretary Sheehan mentioned, 

one of the conditions is that they become co-belligerent with al 

Qaeda in its hostilities against the United States or its coalition 

partners. 

Senator DONNELLY. Is that a call that you make as you see it? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir, after a very intensive, careful review, careful consideration of the intelligence and threat assessments. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, you ask a good question because when a 

group aligns itself with al Qaeda and al Qaeda has an express intent to attack Americans at home and abroad, but then does not 

take the next step to be involved in that co-belligerency, then we 

have a judgment to make. 

Senator DONNELLY. Okay. That is what I am trying to—— 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Right, I know. 

Senator DONNELLY.—where the line is—— 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Right, I got it. Yes, sir. 

Senator DONNELLY. In regards to drone activities, are we reviewing the AUMF in regards to those activities, or do you feel, as we 

25 

look at it right now, that it is sufficient to cover all of those various 

permutations that may occur? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Right now, sir, we believe it is sufficient. 

Senator DONNELLY. Okay. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Donnelly. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To the witnesses, I associate myself with comments made by the 

ranking member about this being a helpful hearing to wrestle 

through some questions that I have not fully thought through. 

I want to start with the President’s State of the Union. There 

were two paragraphs in the State of the Union this year, I will 

focus on each of them. 

‘‘Today the organization that attacked us on September 11 is a 

shadow of its former self. Different al Qaeda affiliates and extremist groups have emerged from the Arabian Peninsula to Africa. The 

threat these groups pose is evolving. . . We will need to help countries like Yemen, Libya, and Somalia provide for their own security 

and help allies who take the fight to terrorists, as we have in Mali. 

Where necessary, through a range of capabilities, we will continue 

to take direct action against those terrorists who pose the gravest 

threat to Americans.’’ 

I want to focus on the notion of groups that have emerged after 

September 11. Is it the administration’s position that groups that 

emerged after September 11 who had no connection with the attacks on September 11 are, nevertheless, covered by the AUMF? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Let me take that. If an armed group becomes an associated force with al Qaeda, that means that it has entered the 

fight alongside the organization that was responsible for those September 11 attacks and thus we believe they are fully covered by the 

AUMF. If they have not become an associated force of al Qaeda, 

then even though they may wish us harm, they are not within the 

scope of the AUMF. But, as in response to other questions, the 

President retains authority to utilize the tools that are necessary 

and appropriate to defend the Nation. 

Senator KAINE. So just back to the language of the AUMF that 

Senator McCain read, authorizing the President, ‘‘to use all necessary and appropriate force against all those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 

aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,’’ 

it is the legal position of the administration that even groups or individuals that had nothing to do with the attacks, once they become associated with al Qaeda 25 years from now, are nevertheless 

covered by the current language of the AUMF. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I do not want to say 25 years from now, but today, 

yes. 

Senator KAINE. I am just using the earlier testimony about the 

likely length of this. As long as the AUMF is in place, I gather it 

to be your legal position that individuals who were not born by 

September 11, 2001, if they become associated with a group that 

associates with al Qaeda, it is your position that the AUMF would 

cover them and those organizations. Those, as the President said, 

different affiliates and extremist groups have emerged. 

26 

Mr. TAYLOR. As long as they become an associated force under 

the legal standard that was set out—— 

Senator KAINE. Let me ask about that, and I should know the 

answer to this question and I do not. Has that particular legal rationale, that individual groups who had nothing to do with September 11, are nevertheless covered by the AUMF, has that legal 

rationale been subject to litigation and decisions by American 

courts? 

Mr. TAYLOR. In the context of detention, I believe the answer is 

yes. 

Senator KAINE. The determination is that even those not associated with the attacks on September 11 are, nevertheless, covered 

by the scope of the AUMF. 

Mr. TAYLOR. That is right. If they are an associated force with 

al Qaeda, they have become associated with that organization 

which was responsible and is the target of the AUMF, they have 

brought themselves within the scope of the AUMF. 

Senator KAINE. Does the AUMF expire by presidential declaration, congressional action, or the occurrence of an actual event in 

the world? 

Mr. TAYLOR. It is a statute. We have not determined that the 

conflict has come to an end. Precisely how that would be written 

and established is unclear. 

Senator KAINE. It is clear that if Congress retracted the AUMF, 

at that point the authority would come to an end, correct? 

Mr. TAYLOR. That is correct. 

Senator KAINE. There would still be the international Law of 

War and other doctrine that the President and Congress could operate under. But aside from Congress retracting the AUMF, whether there is an actual event or could the President take some action 

that would end the AUMF, that has not yet been determined. 

Mr. TAYLOR. That is correct, but if, for example, the President 

were to issue a declaration stating that the conflict against al 

Qaeda has been concluded, I would think that that would constitute an end. 

Senator KAINE. The second paragraph, just very quickly, in the 

President’s remarks, ‘‘As we do so,’’ fight terrorism, ‘‘we must enlist 

our values in the fight . . . In the months ahead, I will continue to 

engage with Congress to ensure not only that our targeting, detention, and prosecution of terrorists remains consistent with our laws 

and system of checks and balances, but that our efforts are even 

more transparent to the American people and to the world.’’ 

This, obviously, is part of that. Does the administration have a 

current plan for engaging in a public discussion with the American 

people and the world, or a public discussion with Congress, about 

these sort of policy and legal architectures surrounding these decisionmaking processes? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, the President has made clear that he 

wants to move forward in terms of transparency with these programs, and the administration is committed to expanding that dialogue and we will hope to continue to do that in the months ahead. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine. 

Senator King. 

27 

Senator KING. Gentlemen, I have only been here 5 months, but 

this is the most astounding and the most astoundingly disturbing 

hearing that I have been to since I have been here. You guys have 

essentially rewritten the Constitution here today. The Constitution, 

Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 clearly says that Congress has the 

power to declare war. 

This authorization, the AUMF, is very limited, and you keep 

using the term ‘‘associated forces.’’ You used it 13 times in your 

statement. That is not in the AUMF. You said at one point it suits 

us very well. I assume it does suit you very well because you are 

reading it to cover everything and anything. 

Then you said at another point, even if the AUMF does not 

apply, the general law of war applies, and we can take these actions. 

So my question is: how do you possibly square this with the requirement of the Constitution that the Congress has the power to 

declare war? This is one of the most fundamental divisions in our 

constitutional scheme that Congress has the power to declare war. 

The President is the Commander in Chief and prosecutes the war. 

But you are reading this AUMF in such a way as to apply clearly 

outside of what it says. 

Senator McCain was absolutely right. It refers to the people who 

planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks on 

September 11. That is a date. It does not go into the future. Then 

it says, ‘‘or harbored such organizations,’’ past tense, ‘‘or persons in 

order to prevent any future acts by such nations, organizations, or 

persons.’’ It established a date. 

I do not disagree that we need to fight terrorism, but we need 

to do it in a constitutionally sound way. Now, I am just a little old 

lawyer from Brunswick, ME, but I do not see how you can possibly 

read this to comport with the Constitution and authorize any acts 

by the President. You had testified to Senator Graham that you believe that you could put boots-on-the-ground in Yemen under this 

document. That makes the war powers a nullity. I am sorry to ask 

such a long question, but what is your response to this? Anybody? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, let me take the first response. I am not 

a constitutional lawyer or a lawyer of any kind, but let me make 

a brief statement about al Qaeda and the organization that attacked us on September 11, 2001. 

In the 2 years prior to that, Senator King, that organization attacked us in East Africa and killed 17 Americans at our embassy 

in Nairobi with loosely affiliated groups of people in East Africa. 

A year prior to September 11, that same organization with its affiliates in Yemen almost sunk a U.S. ship, the USS Cole, a billiondollar warship, killed 17 sailors in the Port of Aden. The organization that attacked us on September 11 already had its tentacles 

around the world with associated groups. That was the nature of 

the organization then; it is the nature of the organization now. In 

order to attack that organization, we have to attack those affiliates 

that are its operational arm, that have previously attacked and 

killed Americans and continue to try to do that. 

Senator KING. That is fine, but that is not what the AUMF says. 

What I am saying is we may need new authority, but if you expand 

28 

this to the extent that you have, it is meaningless. The limitation 

in the war power is meaningless. 

I am not disagreeing that we need to attack terrorism wherever 

it comes from and whoever is doing it, but what I am saying is let 

us do it in a constitutional way, not by putting a gloss on a document that clearly will not support it. It just does not work. I am 

just reading the words. It is all focused on September 11 and who 

was involved. 

You guys have invented this term ‘‘associated forces’’ that is nowhere in this document. As I mentioned, in your written statement, 

you use that. That is the key term. You use it 13 times. It is the 

justification for everything, and it renders the war powers of Congress null and void. I do not understand. I do understand why you 

are saying we do not need any change. Because of the way you 

read it, you could do anything. 

But why not come back to us and say this is an overbroad reading that renders the war powers of Congress a nullity? Therefore, 

we need new authorization to respond to the new situation. I do 

not understand why. I mean, I do understand it because the way 

you read it, there is no limit, but that is not what the Constitution 

contemplates. 

Mr. Taylor, what do you respond? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, sir, the organization, al Qaeda, operates as a 

central organization with very closely related groups that join with 

it. They become, in a sense, the operating arms of al Qaeda, and 

the operating arms such as AQAP did not exist on September 11, 

2001, but they have joined in with al Qaeda as part of the same 

belligerency that al Qaeda is conducting against us. We believe 

that a group like AQAP is certainly within the scope of the AUMF 

enacted by Congress and that it provides the authority to take the 

fight to AQAP just as it provides the authority to take the fight to 

al Qaeda senior leadership. 

Senator KING. I guess the definition proves too much because it 

basically is unlimited. It basically says anybody that is hostile to 

us is, therefore, aligned with al Qaeda and, therefore, falls under 

the AUMF and, therefore, does not require any further congressional oversight. According to your reading, we have granted unbelievable powers to the President, and I think it is a very dangerous 

precedent. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Let me pick up that issue because I think 

under the law of war, Senator King is wrong, but I am going to 

have to ask you that question. Let me ask you, Mr. Taylor, whether 

or not it is true that if the United States is authorized to use force 

against a foreign country or an organization under domestic and 

international law, if that authority exists, does that authority automatically extend under the law of armed conflict to co-belligerents. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. In other words, does it automatically extend 

without having to be explicit? Does it automatically extend to those 

who have aligned themselves with the entity and joined the fight 

against us aligned with them? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir, it does. 

29 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, that is the authority I believe that does 

exist under the AUMF, Senator King. Now, that is my opinion. I 

do not claim to be an expert on the subject, but I do believe that 

that is an accurate statement. Where you are authorized to use 

force under domestic law, AUMF, and under international law 

against a foreign country or organization, that the authority automatically extends under the law of armed conflict to a co-belligerent, to some entity that has aligned themselves with the specified 

entity against us, in the fight against us. 

Is that your understanding, Mr. Taylor? 

Mr. TAYLOR. That is my understanding. You have expressed it 

very well. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. I think we will have to get some further 

clarification of that because I do not want to claim to be an expert 

on that subject. But my staff has handed me—— 

Senator KING. Nor do I, Mr. Chairman. I am just concerned that 

reading essentially vitiates the congressional power to declare war. 

Chairman LEVIN. No, I do not think it does. If Mr. Taylor’s answer is correct, and I think it is, then by authorizing an attack 

against al Qaeda, I believe it automatically includes any co-belligerent with al Qaeda under law of war. 

Now, we will find out whether that is true. We have already got 

one answer from Mr. Taylor who is the counsel for the DOD. We 

will ask the Attorney General as well as to whether or not that is 

correct. 

Mr. Taylor, you have also indicated a couple times both under 

domestic law and international law, that one would need to be authorized to move into a country and attack some entity in that 

country. For instance, I think the countries Senator King used 

were Syria and Yemen. There is a sovereignty issue under international law. Is that correct? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. So the AUMF may authorize the President to 

use force against a co-belligerent of al Qaeda in Yemen under the 

AUMF, if your reading is correct and my understanding is correct, 

but it would also have to be legal under international law as well. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. TAYLOR. That is correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. That then involves sovereignty issues. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you want to explain that? 

Mr. TAYLOR. We are a sovereign state in a system of sovereign 

states. We benefit greatly by respect for each nations’ sovereignty. 

We are bound by treaty—that is, the U.N. Charter—to respect the 

sovereignty of other states. As recognized in the U.N. treaty, there 

is the inherent right of self-defense. But that is one basis for overcoming a state’s sovereignty if it is necessary for us to exercise our 

inherent right of self-defense. 

Another basis is the consent of the host country, and that is a 

very important basis for our operations outside of Afghanistan. 

Chairman LEVIN. The issue has been raised about other entities 

than the DOD using remotely piloted aircraft strikes. My question 

is, should the use of these drones be limited to DOD or should 

30 

other Government agencies be allowed to use such force as well, for 

instance, the CIA? Either one of you, Secretary or Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, the President has indicated that 

he has a preference for those activities to be conducted under title 

10. We are reviewing that right now. But I think we also recognize 

that type of transition may take quite a while depending on the 

theater of operation. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would you give us your answer to that question after your review? You are saying that is under review. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir, absolutely. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

While the review of responsibilities for the conduct of direct action against terrorist targets continues, we have provided the committee classified briefings and 

will continue to brief the committee as the review progresses. 

Chairman LEVIN. Finally, let me say that I believe every President has exercised authority and claimed authority as commander 

in chief even without the AUMF by Congress. Is that true? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir, absolutely. 

Chairman LEVIN. So I presume that this President, like other 

Presidents, would even, if there were no AUMF, claim certain 

power under the commander in chief authority of Article II. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Inhofe? 

Senator INHOFE. Just a couple of brief things here. I am looking 

at it, Senator King, as a non-lawyer because I am not a lawyer. But 

I was here back when it was passed, and I look at the language 

now. It says, those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 

planned, authorized, committed or aided terrorist attacks. It is very 

broad. Maybe at that time, we should have worded it maybe another way. 

But on the other hand as we look and observe, if there is an 

abuse of this, I will be the first one to go and change it, and we 

can do that. We are a legislative body and we can make sure that 

authority is not there if that authority, in my estimation, is abused. 

It is the most egregious attack on our Homeland in history. At 

that time, I thought we needed something broad. We had to go 

after these guys. This is not just an observation because I was 

around even during World War II. There is not an identifiable 

enemy out there. There is not a flag that we are against. This is 

something that is different than anything else, so it required the 

authority, in my opinion at the time, to do what we had to do to 

get these guys. 

If it should be abused, I am sure I would not be the only one on 

this panel that would want to make the changes necessary to preclude that abuse from taking place. 

That is the only observation I would make, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

I am just going to make part of the record a statement for the 

record which has been provided to us that says that in World War 

II, the United States was not just at war with Germany, Italy, and 

Japan, who we declared war against and was authorized by Congress, but the United States was also at war with their co-belligerents, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, among others. So I will 

make that part of the record. 

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Chairman LEVIN. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman. This is more of a 

comment. 

Based on Mr. Donnelly’s question, where this becomes very important, and I was not going to use any examples in mine because 

I think hypotheticals can get you into trouble. But Mr. Donnelly 

asked the question about al Nusra, and Secretary Sheehan’s answer was, yes, that would be an affiliated group. I think it is highly 

important that we stress to the administration that commencing 

hostilities that puts American troops or materiel in harm’s way in 

Syria without fresh congressional discussion and approval, utilizing 

the 2001 document would be enormously controversial. The testimony that I hear today suggests that the administration believes 

that they would have the authority to do that. But I do not want 

us to walk out of the room with leaving an impression that Members of Congress also share the understanding that would be acceptable. 

There may come a time when we would need to have that discussion, but I fully believe, in looking at this AUMF, that discussion 

would have to take place between the executive and Congress and 

could not rely on an expanded interpretation of the AUMF language. 

So since Senator Donnelly raised that question about Syria and 

Secretary Sheehan said that al Nusra would be included in the affiliated groups as currently interpreted by the administration, I 

just do not want to walk out of this room with any doubt that at 

least this Senator would expect under the Constitution that an administration would come back to Congress and have that discussion 

and not use this AUMF to justify commencement of hostilities in 

that theater or others. 

Chairman LEVIN. If I can use your time just to comment, I happen to agree with you that this administration or any other administration would be very wise to come back to Congress before they 

did what you said in your hypothetical, which was to put boots-onthe-ground in Syria based on this authority. They would be wise 

to do it. 

However, I think we all have to face the question as to whether 

or not if they decided to use a drone against al Nusra, if they decided al Nusra was affiliated with al Qaeda, whether they would 

have the authority to use a drone, for instance, against al Nusra. 

I am not sure that would be the same question that you raised in 

terms of boots-on-the-ground in terms of the wisdom of a President 

coming to Congress to discuss that. 

I think Senator King has raised an extremely important question. It needs to be answered, I believe, in a much more definitive 

way for the record by the Attorney General as to whether or not 

the affiliated language applies to subsequent affiliations, for instance, I think that is an important one, of somebody that was not 

even an entity in existence at the time of 2011. 

So, Senator King, it is your turn. 

Senator KING. Senator Kaine made my point somewhat less passionately than I did, but I think he made the point. 

I want to be clear. I believe that fighting terrorism is an absolute 

paramount responsibility of this Government and this President or 

52 

any President. I think we have to be able to respond. I am uncomfortable doing it through gloss on a legal document that, to my 

view, does not support it and would much rather do it in a 

straightforward way. Senator Inhofe said if there was an abuse, he 

would be the first to act on it. My concern is that when there is 

an abuse, it may be too late to act on it. The whole idea of the Constitution is that Congress makes that initial decision. 

I actually worked here in the 1970s when the War Powers Act 

was negotiated. I am well aware that this is not an easy question. 

It is not a clear, bright question about declaring war. But I do 

think this is an erosion of legislative authority that was expressly 

granted to Congress, and I think we need to take care that it does 

not happen through an overly broad reading of a 12-year-old legal 

document that I think absolutely, clearly does not apply to many 

of these new threats that we are dealing with. It does not mean 

we do not have to deal with them, but I just do not like the idea 

of reading a 12-year-old document so broadly that it renders the 

congressional authority and the importance of congressional authority for using military force abroad of no force and effect. That 

is my only concern. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. We will ask the Attorney General this question 

that you have raised as to whether or not the authority exists 

under the AUMF to go after affiliated groups that are not named 

and which subsequently become affiliated with al Qaeda. 

The questions which my colleagues have raised I think are important questions, including the one on al Nusra. It struck me as 

well. In that situation, is there authority? Because if we find that 

they are affiliated, apparently they are, with al Qaeda, is there authority to go after them and using what mechanism? I think it is 

a little easier in your assumption, Senator Kaine, your hypothetical, to say you should come back to Congress if we are talking 

about boots-on-the-ground against al Nusra. On the other hand, if 

it is a drone attack on them, how is that different from drone attacks which have been used against affiliates of al Qaeda in other 

places. 

Senator KING. Mr. Chairman, I would point in response to a 

question from Senator Graham, the panel responded affirmatively, 

and I wrote down the quote. ‘‘The President has authority to put 

boots-on-the-ground in Yemen or the Congo under this Act.’’ I believe that was the testimony, and that is where I am getting very 

concerned. 

Chairman LEVIN. It has to not only be affiliated, I want to make 

clear, under my question to the panel, but they must join the fight 

against us as well. 

Now, one other point that you just made, Senator King. I believe 

it was Mr. Taylor who was trying to answer Senator Graham saying there is not only authority domestically, there is a question 

under international law as well. That also becomes involved in, I 

believe, Senator Graham’s hypothetical. 

I must say that if this power were abused, I would be joining 

Senator Inhofe as to who would be first in line to object to an abuse 

of this authority. We would have to fight for who is first in line to 

53 

take on any abuse of this authority. But it is a very important 

question which has been raised here. 

We are very grateful. If there are no additional questions by our 

colleagues, we are grateful to this panel. We will have a lot of additional questions for the record in addition to the ones that have 

been raised here. The staff will prepare the letter to the Attorney 

General setting out the question which has been raised by Senator 

King. We thank you all. Yes, Secretary Sheehan? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Senator, just one clarification. When I was asked 

whether the President had authority to put boots-on-the-ground 

which, by the way, is not legal term and that he did have the authority to put boots-on-the-ground in Yemen or in the Congo, I was 

not necessarily referring to that under the AUMF. Certainly the 

President has military personnel deployed all over the world today 

in probably over 70 or 80 countries, and that authority is not always under AUMF. So I just want to clarify for the record that we 

were not talking about all of that authority subject to AUMF. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. I am satisfied with that. Thank you for 

that clarification. 

We will call the second panel now with thanks to our first panel. 

Our second panel today is a number of legal experts on the topics 

under discussion. We have Ms. Rosa Brooks, Professor of Law, 

Georgetown University Law Center; Mr. Geoffrey Corn, Professor 

of Law, South Texas College of Law; Mr. Jack Goldsmith, Professor 

of Law, Harvard Law School; Mr. Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch; Mr. Charles Stimson, who is Manager 

of the National Security Law Program at The Heritage Foundation. 

We very much appreciate your willingness to appear at this hearing today. We look forward to your testimony. Your full testimony, 

your written testimony, will be made part of the record. We, of 

course, want you to make opening statements. If you can, restrict 

your opening statements to 6 minutes. We arranged our witnesses 

alphabetically. So we are going to start with you, Ms. Brooks. 

STATEMENT OF MS. ROSA BROOKS, PROFESSOR OF LAW, 

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 

Ms. BROOKS. Thank you, Chairman Levin and Senator Inhofe. It 

is great to be here. I really appreciate your holding these hearings 

because these issues are incredibly important. 

I spent 21⁄2 years working at DOD as Counselor to the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy, so I also want to say how much respect I have for the accomplishments and talents of the members 

of the first panel. I also want to extend my sympathies to them because I think they were put in a position where I have, frankly, 

never seen such an accomplished, talented group of people give 

such muddled and incoherent answers to some fairly straightforward questions. I think they have created what my military colleagues call a target-rich environment for those of us on panel two. 

It is a little tough to know where to start here. 

So let me try to start by talking a little bit about the context in 

which the AUMF was passed, and this is something you, obviously, 

know much more about than I do. Right after September 11, while 

the World Trade Center was still smoking, the Pentagon was still 

smoking, is when the first discussions of passing an AUMF ocVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:10 May 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\88026.TXT JUNE
54 

curred. At that time, as you recall, the Bush administration initially came to this body and asked for a more open-ended authorization to use military force than was ultimately passed. I believe 

that the language that the Bush administration had proposed at 

that time was that the AUMF authorized the President to use force 

to, ‘‘deter and preempt any future acts of terrorism or aggression 

against the United States.’’ 

Now, even a few short days after the September 11 attacks, Congress was reluctant to give the administration such an open-ended 

authorization to use force because I think they saw, very rightly, 

that would have the potential to be an open-ended declaration of 

war against an undefined enemy which could routinize the use of 

force in a way that would be totally unconstrained. I think Senator 

King quite rightly commented that Congress is given not only the 

power to declare war but a wide range of associated powers. I think 

Congress quite rightly felt at that time that such a broad authorization, what would amount to a declaration of war legally speaking, which would then trigger the applicability of armed conflict, 

was too broad and Congress would cede too many of its powers to 

the executive branch. As you all know, frankly, once you cede 

power to the executive branch, it is awfully hard to get it back 

again. 

Instead, as has already been stated, the AUMF that was passed 

was fairly clearly restricted in terms of manifesting congressional 

intent: (A) to those responsible in some way or another for the September 11 attacks; and (B) for the purpose of preventing attacks 

against the United States; not for the purpose of preventing terrorist attacks of all sorts everywhere against anyone, but for the 

purpose of preventing such attacks by such specified groups responsible for September 11 against the United States itself. 

My sense is that even at that very frightening moment when 

emotions ran very high and the threat was far greater, I think, 

than it is today, Congress was very careful to try to not send a signal to the executive branch that Congress was effectively delegating its war powers permanently. 

Nevertheless, I think we have seen, and I think this came 

through in the previous panel, the existing AUMF has effectively 

been interpreted as creating exactly the open-ended grant of authority for an ongoing armed conflict with no limitations that Congress sought to avoid initially. That is primarily through this concept of associated forces. 

Now, the representatives of the administration are quite correct 

to say that under law of armed conflict, the authorization to use 

force does extend to co-belligerents. The difficulty is that today, unlike in World War II, it is a lot harder to know how to apply that 

rule, particularly outside of so-called hot battlefields. I do not quite 

know what it means or what the criteria are for entering the fight, 

for instance, what that means outside of hot battlefields. I do not 

know what happens if the al Qaeda core is decimated and ceases 

to exist. Can we still have associates of al Qaeda, in that case forever, as long as they indicate their sympathy, and if so, what kind 

of constraint does that pose? 

I also do not quite know what it means if we simultaneously say, 

as members of the first panel quoted Jeh Johnson saying, that to 

55 

be an associated force you have to be an organized force, but then 

say we cannot give Congress list of such forces because they are too 

disorganized. Their membership is too shifting. Their alliances are 

too murky. It has to be one or the other, it seems to me, and I 

think that is a pretty incoherent standard. 

What has happened, as a result, is that we now appear, and obviously, I am going only on publicly available information, to be 

using armed force against such entities as Somalia’s al Shabaab, 

which not only appears to have no connection to the September 11 

attacks, but does not appear, according to our own Director of National Intelligence, to pose any particular threat to the United 

States insofar as its ambitions are primarily local. 

What has happened, essentially, is that this idea of associated 

forces has been used as a back door to shoehorn into the AUMF 

everything with virtually no limits, and I think we have heard that 

here. 

So what do we do? You have three options. One is, I think, to 

do nothing. You do nothing and you let the administration continue 

to make something of a mockery of Congress’ intent as I take it to 

have been. Two, you can expand the AUMF to effectively explicitly 

authorize what is going on right now, which would have the virtue 

of clarity and honesty. Or three, if what is being done at the moment exceeds what, from a policy perspective, you consider wise, 

you should, in fact, amend or revise the AUMF to place limits on 

what the executive branch can do without additional authorizations 

from you. 

In my own view, an expanded AUMF would be neither wise nor 

necessary. 

I think that this is as much a policy question as it is a legal 

question. We, frankly, have a choice of legal regimes here, and I 

will talk more about that in a minute. 

My own view is that expanding beyond those who actually pose 

a sustained, intense threat to the United States is not a very good 

idea. I, frankly, think it is counterproductive. I think we run the 

risk of doing what Donald Rumsfeld asked during the Iraq War 

which is creating new terrorists faster than we can kill them. 

I also think at the moment we risk alienating some of our key 

European allies whose view of the applicable international law is 

very different from ours and who may become somewhat reluctant 

to share intelligence information with us because they are also operating in a different domestic legal regime and face potential liability in their own courts if they are complicit in what their courts 

choose to see as extrajudicial killings. 

I also think it is unwise for separation of powers reasons. As I 

said, once you cede power open-endedly to the executive branch, it 

is hard to get it back. Just from an institutional perspective, I 

would urge you to be quite careful, measured, and detailed in precisely what you mean when you authorize the executive branch to 

use force on the theory that it is always easier to give more if it 

becomes necessary than to take back what has been improvidently 

given. 

I also think that it is unnecessary to expand the AUMF. Here 

I think maybe this will get to the root of the earlier discussion beVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:10 May 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\88026.TXT JUNE
56 

tween Senator King and Senator Levin on what exactly does the 

administration have the authority to do. 

The authority to use force is not the same as the authority to 

enter an armed conflict. It is not an all-or-nothing matter. It is not 

as though either we have an armed conflict and you can use force 

against threats or you do not have an armed conflict and you cannot. Both from a constitutional perspective, the President clearly 

has the inherent authority to use force if necessary to protect the 

United States against a specific imminent threat, and equally 

under international law even if there is no armed conflict, the 

President clearly has the authority to use military force to protect 

the United States against an imminent threat. 

So the President either way, AUMF or no AUMF, if there is a 

threat to the United States of the nature that al Qaeda presented 

on September 11 or even, frankly, a good deal less, if the threat 

is imminent and specific against the United States, there is no 

question that whatever this body does, I think, the U.S. public, 

Congress, and international community would be fully supportive 

of the President’s legal right and indeed responsibility to use force 

to protect the Nation. 

That is because we have two different legal constructs here. One 

is the law of armed conflict. One is the international law of selfdefense and they roughly track what Congress could give in the 

AUMF and what the President has even in the absence of an 

AUMF. 

With the law of armed conflict, it is the most permissive legal regime with regard to executive authority to use force in an ongoing 

way. It has the fewest constraints on executive discretion. Once the 

law of armed conflict has been triggered and authorized by this 

Congress, the President can use force against threats that are not 

imminent. He can use force against people based on their status, 

e.g., their membership and affiliations rather than their actual activities. You can target a sleeping enemy under the law of armed 

conflict, and the authorization to use force is continuous until such 

time as the conflict actually comes to an end. 

In the international law of self-defense, in contrast, which the 

President, I believe, has the right to use under his inherent constitutional authorities, there are more legal constraints. There are 

more legal constraints because it does not require congressional approval, the President is presumed to be limited to using force to the 

extent necessary to respond to an imminent, specific threat and the 

authorization under that inherent regime essentially could be seen 

as expiring either when the threat has been addressed or at such 

time that Congress has been able to act to replace it with some 

other kind of legal regime. 

So in my view, I think that it would be more appropriate if Congress wants to do something to limit the President’s ability to continue to use force under the existing AUMF with a sunset clause 

or something similar. You do not need to fear that leaves the 

United States vulnerable at all. I think, in whatever muddled way, 

the first panel was trying to say this. There is already enough authority to respond to imminent threats. The question for you as a 

body is, do you want to make that authority where the President 

has to come back to you and ask for more if he needs it as a default 

57 

1 I will use the term ‘‘hot battlefields’’ interchangeably with ‘‘traditional battlefields,’’ ‘‘traditional territorially bounded battlefields’’ or ‘‘active theaters of combat.’’ The intent is not to assert that there is a clear legal distinction between these concepts (that, after all, is part of what 

is at issue today), but rather to distinguish descriptively between bounded geographical locations 

in which the existence of an armed conflict is legally uncontroversial and universally acknowledged—such as Afghanistan, or Iraq prior the the withdrawal of U.S. troops—and situations in 

which the existence of an armed conflict and/or the applicability of the law of armed conflict 

is precisely what is controversial. 2While drone strikes have garnered the most media attention, most of the analysis in this 

testimony applies equally to strikes carried out by manned aircraft and to strikes or raids that 

involve ‘‘boots-on-the-ground,’’ such as those carried out by Special Operations Forces. 3These have variously been termed ‘‘drones,’’ ‘‘unmanned aerial vehicles,’’ and ‘‘remotely piloted vehicles.’’ I will generally use the term ‘‘drone’’ as shorthand. 4See http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/06/did—the—us—launch— 

a—drone—stri.php and http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/03/05-drones-philippines-ahmed 5So called ‘‘signature strikes.’’ 

6See http://articles.cnn.com/2012–09–05/opinion/opinion—bergen-obama-drone—1—dronestrikes-drone-attacks-drone-program 

or where the President gets to go on at his own discretion without 

ever having to return as the default, as I think the first panel suggested they thought was legally the case. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Brooks follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MS. ROSA BROOKS

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members and staff of the Committee on Armed Services, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today 

on the law of armed conflict, the use of military force, and the 2001 Authorization 

for Use of Military Force (AUMF). These are extraordinarily important issues, and 

I appreciate your commitment to taking a fresh look at them. 

I am a law professor at Georgetown University, where I teach courses on international law, constitutional law, and national security issues. I am also a Bernard 

L. Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, and I write a weekly 

column for Foreign Policy magazine. From April 2009 to July 2011, during a public 

service leave of absence from Georgetown, I had the privilege of serving as Counselor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the Department of Defense. 

This testimony reflects my personal views only, however. 

Mr. Chairman, almost 12 years have gone by since the passage of the AUMF on 

September 14, 2001. The war in Afghanistan—the longest war in U.S. history—has 

begun to wind down. But at the same time, a far more shadowy war has quietly 

accelerated. 

I am referring to what many have called the ‘‘drone war’’: the increased use of 

military force by the United States outside of traditional, territorially bounded battlefields,1 carried out primarily, though not exclusively,2 by missile strikes from remotely piloted aerial vehicles.3 In recent years this shadowy war has spread ever 

further from ‘‘hot’’ battlefields, migrating from Afghanistan and Iraq to Yemen, 

Pakistan, and Somalia, and perhaps to Mali and the Philippines as well.4

Most information about U.S. drone strikes and other U.S. uses of military force 

outside ‘‘hot battlefields’’ remains classified. As a result, virtually all of what is publicly known has had to be pieced together from leaked U.S. Government documents, 

court filings, nongovernmental organizations, media investigations, and occasional 

statements from government officials of foreign states. Everything in this testimony 

is therefore subject to the caveat that I can only comment on publicly available information, which is inevitably partial and (in some cases potentially misleading). 

Subject to that caveat, however, it appears that U.S. drones strikes, which began 

as a tool used in extremely limited circumstances to target specifically identified 

high-ranking al Qaeda officials, have become a tool relied on to go after an everlengthening list of bad actors, many of whom appear to have only tenuous links to 

al Qaeda and the September 11 attacks, and many of whom arguably pose no imminent threat to the United States. Some of these suspected terrorists have been identified by name and specifically targeted, while others have reportedly been targeted 

solely on the basis of behavior patterns deemed suspect by U.S. officials.5

We also appear increasingly to be targeting militants who are lower and lower 

down the terrorist food chain,6 rather than high-ranking terrorist planners and 

58 

7See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/20/ 

AR2011022002975.html 8See http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones 

9See http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones; http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/04/09/ 

188062/obamas-drone-war-kills-others.htmlUZF-Xncq9QI; and http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 

wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/20/AR2011022002975.html 10http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/uploads/2013–5–7-corrected-koh-oxford-union-speech-as-delivered.pdf 11http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th—century/lieber.asp 

operatives.7 Although drone strikes are thought to have killed well over 3,000 people 

since 2004,8 analysis by the New America Foundation and more recently by the 

McClatchy newspapers suggests that only a small fraction of the dead appear to 

have been so-called ‘‘high-value targets.’’9

The increasing use of weaponized drones to target individuals who only tenuous 

links to al Qaeda and the September 11 attacks raises critical legal and policy questions, particularly when such drone strikes occur outside of traditional battlefields. 

Most pertinent for today’s hearing, such strikes raise significant domestic legal 

questions about whether current U.S. targeted killing policy is fully in conformity 

with Congress’ 2001 AUMF. 

In my view, current U.S. targeted killing policy has grown increasingly difficult 

to justify under the 2001 AUMF. As I will discuss, however, I believe it is neither 

necessary nor wise to expand the AUMF to give the President broad additional authorities to use force. Expanding the AUMF would effectively cede to the executive 

branch powers our Constitution entrusts to Congress. This would undermine the 

separation of powers scheme so vital to sustaining our constitutional democracy, and 

could easily lead to an irresponsible and unconstrained executive branch expansion 

of what has already been termed ‘‘the forever war.’’10

Expanding the AUMF is also wholly unnecessary. Even without any AUMF, the 

President already has both the constitutional power and the right under international law to use military force to defend the United States from an imminent 

attack, regardless of whether the threat emanates from al Qaeda or from some new 

and unrelated terrorist organization. 

If Congress chooses to revise the AUMF, it would be far more appropriate to add 

geographic and temporal limitations—or clarify Congress’ assumptions about the nature of the force authorized—than to expand it. The 2001 AUMF created a domestic 

legal framework that assumes an indefinitely continuing state of armed conflict and 

gives the President advance authorization to use force more or less as he chooses, 

without regard to geography and without regard to the gravity or imminence of any 

threats posed to the United States. But as the threat posed by al Qaeda dissipates 

and U.S. troops begin to withdraw from Afghanistan, it is appropriate for the 

United States to transition to a domestic legal framework in which there is a 

heightened threshold for the use of military force. 

Congressional authorization for the President to use military force should be reserved for situations in which there is a sustained and intense threat to the United 

States. If this President or any future President identifies a specific new threat of 

that nature, he can and should provide Congress with detailed information about 

the threat, and request that Congress authorize the use of military force in a manner tailored to address the specific threat posed by a specific state or organization. 

In the event that the President becomes aware of a threat so imminent and grave 

that it is not feasible for him to seek congressional authorization prior to using military force, he can rely on his inherent constitutional powers to take appropriate action—by force if needed—until the threat has been dissipated or until Congress can 

act. There is simply no need for Congress to preemptively authorize the President 

to use military force indefinitely against inchoate threats that have not yet emerged. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States is usually credited with the first modern codification of the rules of armed conflict. In 1863, President Abraham Lincoln signed 

General Order 100, ‘‘Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States 

in the Field’’—better known as the Lieber Code—outlining the core rules of armed 

conflict with which he expected the Union Army to comply. In Article 29, the Lieber 

Code makes a bold declaration: ‘‘Peace is [the] normal condition; war is the exception. The ultimate object of all modern war is a renewed state of peace.’’11

This rings as true today as in 1863, when the United States faced a truly existential threat. It invites us to ask a broad policy question in addition to a legal question: do we want to live in a world of perpetual, open-ended war? If not, how do 

we begin to turn the page on the September 11 era? What congressional action will 

ensure that we retain the ability to protect ourselves when necessary, while at the 

same time ensuring that peace, rather than war, once again becomes our norm? 

59 

Difficult as this question is, I am certain of one thing: an expanded AUMF will 

do nothing to prevent a ‘‘forever war.’’ On the contrary, it would likely lead only 

to thoughtless further expansion of our current shadowy drone war—and this, I believe, would both undermine the rule of law and represent an act of supreme strategic folly. 

Moving well beyond the issue of the AUMF, U.S. drone strikes outside traditional 

battlefields also raise significant questions about U.S. compliance with international 

law principles, and even about what international legal framework is the appropriate framework for evaluating current U.S. targeted killing policy. Is it the international law of armed conflict? The international law concerning the right of states 

to use force in self-defense? International human rights law? Some combination of 

all these, or a different framework depending on the factual circumstances unique 

to each situation? Even more broadly, current U.S. policy raises grave questions 

about what it means to respect the rule of law when the law itself appears to be 

ambiguous or indeterminate. 

I recently testified at a hearing on ‘‘The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing’’ held by the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights. In my written 

statement submitted for the record for that April 23 hearing (see Appendix), I addressed a number of broader issues that I believe are also of interest to the Committee on Armed Services. 

Specifically, my April 23 testimony discussed what I view as some of the most 

common but unfounded criticisms of U.S. drone strikes, and identified some advantages of using drones as weapons delivery systems. I argued that drones present no 

new legal issues as such, but drone technologies lower the perceived costs of using 

lethal force across borders. As a result, they have facilitated a steady expansion of 

the use of force beyond traditional battlefields, which will likely have long-term 

strategic costs for the United States. 

My April 23 testimony also addressed the significant rule of law challenges posed 

by current U.S. targeted killing policy. I discussed the international legal framework 

in which U.S. drone strikes occur, focusing specifically on the law of armed conflict 

and the international law of self-defense, and arguing that existing international 

law frameworks offer only ambiguous guidance with regard to the legality of U.S. 

targeted killings. This creates a grave rule of law problem: when the legal framework for assessing U.S. targeted killings is uncertain and contested, the ‘‘legality’’ 

of such killings becomes effectively indeterminate. My April 23 testimony also addressed the question of what precedent U.S. targeted killing policy risks setting for 

other less scrupulous nations, and concluded by highlighting a number of possible 

ways for Congress to ensure that U.S. targeted killing policy does not continue to 

undermine vital rule of law norms. 

Rather than restate these arguments in this testimony prepared for the Committee on Armed Services, I will focus today solely on questions relating to the 2001 

AUMF. However, I am including as an appendix to today’s written testimony the 

statement I submitted on April 23 to the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on 

the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, and I respectfully request that 

you consider it part of the record for today’s hearing as well. 

THE 2001 AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Mr. Chairman, our Constitution gives Congress vital powers relating to the use 

of military force. Congress is given the power to declare war and the power to raise, 

support, and make rules regulating the armed forces and to make rules concerning 

‘‘captures on land and water.’’ Congress is also given the constitutional power to call 

forth ‘‘the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel 

invasions,’’ as well as the power to ‘‘define and punish . . . offenses against the law 

of nations.’’ The constitutional grant of these powers to Congress is essential to our 

scheme of separation of powers, and Congress has rightly been vigilant against executive usurpation of its constitutional prerogatives. 

The original AUMF was passed on September 14, 2001. It gives the President congressional blessing to: 

‘‘[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 

the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 

organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of interVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:10 May 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\88026.TXT JUNE
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12Pub. L. No. 107–40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note). 13See 147 CONG. REC. S9950–51 (daily ed., Oct. 1, 2001) (statement of Senator Byrd) (providing the text of the administration’s initial proposal); see also id. at S9949 (‘‘[T]he use of force 

authority granted to the President extends only to the perpetrators of the September 11 attack. 

It was not the intent of Congress to give the President unbridled authority . . . to wage war 

against terrorism writ large without the advice and consent of Congress. That intent was made 

clear when Senators modified the text of the resolution proposed by the White House to limit 

the grant of authority to the September 11 attack’’). 14See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594–95 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 

519–21 (2004) (plurality opinion). 15See, e.g., Rosa Brooks, Take Two Drones and Call me in the Morning, Foreign Policy, Sept. 

12, 2012. Available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/12/take—two—drones— 

and—call—me—in—the—morning 16http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq—Resolution 17 Hon. Leon Panetta, Sec’y of Def., ‘‘The Fight Against al Qaeda: Today and Tomorrow,’’ 

Speech Before the Center for a New American Security (Nov. 20, 2012), available at http:// 

www.cfr.org/defense-strategy/panettas-speech-al-qaeda-november-2012/p29547. 

national terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.’’12

Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe, as you and your colleagues on this committee 

undoubtedly recall, the Bush administration initially proposed a broader, more 

open-ended AUMF, one that would authorize the use of force to ‘‘deter and pre-empt 

any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States.’’13 But even 

in those frightening days right after the September 11 attacks—even as bodies continued to be pulled from the rubble of the Pentagon and the Twin Towers—Congress 

refused to give the executive branch what would have amounted to an unnecessary 

and open-ended declaration of permanent war against an inchoate, undefined 

enemy. 

Congressional power once ceded to the executive branch tends never to be regained, and in 2001, Congress rightly wished to ensure that its authorization to use 

force would not end up eviscerating its vital role in the constitutional scheme. As 

a result, the language of the 2001 AUMF was drafted with great care. The 2001 

AUMF is forward looking, insofar as its language is focused on prevention rather 

than retaliation; but it is also backward looking, insofar as force is explicitly authorized only against those with responsibility for the September 11 attacks. 

The 2001 AUMF does not authorize the United States of military force against 

every terrorist or anti-U.S. extremist the world contains. Instead, it focuses squarely 

on those ‘‘nations, organizations, or persons who specifically ‘‘planned, authorized, 

committed, or aided’’ the September 11 attacks, as well as those who ‘‘harbored’’ 

such organizations or persons. 

The AUMF also does not authorize force for the open-ended purpose of preventing 

any and all future acts of terrorism. Instead, it authorizes force for a limited and 

defined purpose: ‘‘to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the 

United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.’’ (emphasis added). This 

language, on its face, does not authorize the use of force for the purpose of preventing terrorist acts not directed against U.S. territory or U.S. persons, and it also 

does not authorize the use of force for the purpose of preventing terrorist attacks 

by nations, organizations, or persons who with no culpability for September 11. Furthermore, as the U.S. Supreme Court has several times emphasized, the AUMF 

must be construed as authorizing force only to the degree that it is also consistent 

with the international laws of war. This in turn means that any use of force under 

the AUMF must be consistent with longstanding law of war principles relating to 

necessity, proportionality, humanity, and distinction.14

For much of the last dozen years, the AUMF provided adequate domestic legal 

authority both for the conflict in Afghanistan and for most U.S. drone strikes outside hot battlefields, since most of the individuals targeted in early U.S. strikes 

were reportedly senior Taliban or al Qaeda operatives. Early U.S. drone strikes 

could of course still be criticized on other grounds—as strategically foolish, or as 

lacking in transparency and protections against abuse 15—but strictly from the perspective of domestic authorizing legislation, most of the early U.S. drones strikes appeared comfortably within the scope of the congressionally-granted authority to use 

force. I believe that this has changed in the last few years. 

The September 11 attacks have receded into the past, the war in Iraq—which had 

its own independent AUMF16—is over, the war in Afghanistan is winding down, 

and al Qaeda no longer poses the urgent, intense, and sustained threat it posed in 

September 2001. As former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said in November 

2012, the ‘‘core’’ of al Qaeda has been ‘‘decimated.’’17 In his March 2013 testimony 

before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Director of National intelligence 

61 

18 Arguably, post-September 11 U.S. counterterrorism policy has increased, rather than decreased, the number of people in this category. 19http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf 20http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/04/09/188062/obamas-drone-war-kills-others.html.UZFXncq9QI 21 Indeed, the AUMF notwithstanding, the United States would be justified under international self-defense principles in using force against persons or organizations posing an imminent threat to U.S. personnel, subject to the principles of necessity and proportionality. 

James Clapper similarly observed that ‘‘core’’ al Qaeda has been ‘‘degraded . . . to 

a point that the group is probably unable to carry out complex, large-scale attacks 

in the west.’’ 

This does not, of course, mean that the world no longer contains any terrorists 

or anti-U.S. extremists. The world is unfortunately replete with people who resent 

the United States or oppose U.S. policies. Some subset of those people self-identify 

with the distorted brand of Islam favored by al Qaeda and the Taliban, and a further subset may be willing to use violence to further their ends.18

Not all these people and organizations pose serious or urgent threats to the 

United States, however. I am not privy to classified military or intelligence evaluations of the capabilities of foreign terrorist organizations, but publicly available information suggests that while extremists and terrorists abound, few have both the 

intent and the ability to plan and implement actual attacks against the United 

States. 

Indeed, in his March 2013 testimony SSCI testimony, DNI James Clapper did not 

highlight any organization known to have both the current intent and the current 

capacity to carry out attacks against the United States. He noted, for instance, that 

al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to view attacks on U.S. soil 

as ‘‘part of [its] transnational strategy,’’ but he also suggested that AQAP has regional and internal priorities that its leaders may view as taking precedence over 

U.S. operations, given its limited number of ‘‘individuals who can manage, train, 

and deploy operatives for U.S. operations.’’19 DNI Clapper suggested that other 

known international terrorist organizations are primarily local or regional in their 

interests and reach. Al Qaeda in Iraq’s ‘‘goals inside Iraq will almost certainly take 

precedence over U.S. plotting,’’ while ‘‘Somalia-based al Shabaab will remain focused 

on local and regional challenges.’’ Clapper offered similar assessments of Syria’s al 

Nusra Front, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Nigeria’s Boko Haram, and 

Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Tayibba. 

Nevertheless, the publicly available evidence suggests that the United States continues to use military force outside hot battlefields not only against the remnants 

of ‘‘core’’ al Qaeda and the Taliban, but also against known or suspected members 

of other organizations—including Somalia’s al Shabaab—as well as against individuals identified by U.S. intelligence only as ‘‘militants’’, ‘‘foreign fighters’’, and ‘‘unknown extremists.’’20

Insofar as such groups and individuals were unconnected to the September 11 attacks and are not planning or carrying out terrorist attacks against the United 

States, the use of force against these groups and individuals—at least outside of traditional battlefields—does not appear to be authorized by the 2001 AUMF. 

The Obama administration has countered this argument by asserting that insofar 

as Congress intended the AUMF to be the functional equaivalent of a declaration 

of war, the AUMF must be read to include the implied law of war-based authority 

to target groups that are ‘‘associates’’ of al Qaeda or the Taliban. 

However, it is not clear that Congress intended to authorize the use of force outside of traditional territorial battlefields against mere ‘‘associates’’ of those responsible for the September 11 attacks. It is also not clear how the executive branch defines ‘‘associates’’ of al Qaeda, and the Obama administration has not offered any 

public explanation of which groups it considers to be ‘‘associates’’ of al Qaeda or the 

Taliban. 

The international law of war unquestionably permits parties to a conflict to target 

‘‘co-belligerents’’ of the enemy. On a traditional battlefield—such as within the territorial confines of Afghanistan—it would clearly be permissible for the United States 

to target individuals and groups that are fighting alongside the Taliban or al 

Qaeda.21 It is less clear that this is the case outside ‘‘hot battlefields.’’ In this 

murkier context, it is far harder to determine what would constitute ‘‘co-belligerency’’ with al Qaeda, and executive branch officials have provided no clear criteria, 

nor even a simple list of those it regards as ‘‘associates’’ under a co-belligerency theory. 

As a result, there is a real danger that the administration’s assertion that the 

AUMF authorizes the use of force against AQ ‘‘associates’’ even outside of tradiVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:10 May 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\88026.TXT JUNE
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22See, e.g, Military Commissions Act of 2006 (2006 MCA), Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 

2600 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 2241) 23http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf 24See NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1021(b)(2), 125 Stat. at 1562 (authorizing detention of ‘‘A 

person who was a part of or substantially supported al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces 

that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any 

person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of 

such enemy forces’’). 25 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03–6696.ZS.html 26http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627 

tional battlefields could become a backdoor way of expanding the AUMF far beyond 

Congress’ intent. 

As noted earlier, in 2001 Congress refused to acquiesce in Bush administration 

proposals to that the AUMF authorize force to ‘‘deter and pre-empt any future acts 

of terrorism or aggression,’’ and instead opted for language that was far more specific and limiting. If Congress now accepts Obama administration claims that force 

can be used against a broad category of persons and organizations determined 

(based on unknown criteria) to be al Qaeda ‘‘associates,’’ this would effectively turn 

the AUMF into precisely the open-ended authorization to use force that Congress 

chose to avoid in 2001. 

Congress bears some responsibility for enabling the executive branch to assert 

such virtually unlimited authority to use force, however. In the 2006 and 2009 Military Commissions Acts, for instance, Congress gave military commissions jurisdiction over individuals who are ‘‘part of forces associated with al Qaeda or the 

Taliban,’’ along with ‘‘those who purposefully and materially support such forces in 

hostilities against U.S. coalition partners.’’22

This allowed the Bush administration and later the Obama administration to 

argue that if Congress considers it appropriate for U.S. military commissions to 

have jurisdiction over al Qaeda and Taliban associates—including over those ‘‘associates’’ who were detained in geographical locations far from traditional battlefields—Congress must believe the executive branch has the authority to detain such 

associates found far from traditional battlefields, and the authority to detain must 

stem from the authority to use force. Indeed, by 2009 the Obama administration 

was arguing in court that at least when it comes to detention, the AUMF implicitly 

authorizes the President ‘‘to detain persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al Qaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities 

against the United States or its coalition partners.’’23 (My emphasis). 

But note how far this has shifted from the original language of the AUMF: at 

least with regard to detention, the administration’s focus is no longer merely on 

those who were directly complicit in the September 11 attacks, but on a far broader 

category of individuals. This broadened understanding of executive detention authority was later given the congressional nod in the National Defense Authorization 

Act (NDAA) 2012, which used virtually identical language.24

The key subsequent move in the executive branch’s gradual expansion of the 

scope of the 2001 AUMF was the conflation of detention authority with the authority to target using lethal force. Logically, as the Supreme Court noted in 2004,25

a party to a conflict must have the power to lawfully detain all persons it has the 

lawful power to kill. The greater power must include the lesser: if it would be lawful 

to shoot an enemy combatant, it must be lawful to capture and hold him instead. 

Working backward from this principle, the Obama administration appears to have 

reasoned that if it is lawful to detain an individual, it is equally lawful to use force 

against him. 

This does not follow: while the existence of the greater power implies the existence of the lesser power, congressional authorization of the lesser power (detention) 

should not be construed—in the absence of express, unambiguous manifestations of 

congressional intent—to include congressional authorization of the greater power 

(the use of military force to target and kill ‘‘associates’’ of al Qaeda). However, Congress’ failure to clarify its intent with regard to the AUMF has enabled the executive to read congressional silence as approval. 

Notwithstanding executive branch efforts to shoehorn the vague category of ‘‘associates’’ into the AUMF, few would dispute that as the ‘‘drone war’’ expands, it has 

become more and more difficult to view all current Obama administration uses of 

force as congruent with the limited authorities granted by Congress on September 

14, 2011. In February 2012, then-Pentagon General Counsel Jeh Johnson insisted 

that the 2001 AUMF remains the domestic legal ‘‘bedrock’’ of the military’s drone 

strikes,26 and administration representatives have repeatedly affirmed this view. 

But as a recent Hoover Institution white paper authored by former Obama official 

Bobby Chesney, former Bush officials Jack Goldsmith and Matt Waxman, and the 

63 

27 Robert Chesney et al., Hoover Inst., A Statutory Framework for Next-Generation Terrorist 

Threats (2013), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Statutory-Framework-forNext-Generation-Terrorist-Threats.pdf. 28http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/administration-debates-stretching911-law-to-go-after-new-al-qaeda-offshoots/2013/03/06/fd2574a0–85e5–11e2–9d71-f0feafdd1394— 

print.html 

Brookings Institution’s Ben Wittes concludes, ‘‘in a growing number of circumstances, drawing the requisite connection to the AUMF requires an increasingly 

complex daisy chain of associations—a task that is likely to be very difficult . . . in 

some cases, and downright impossible in others.’’27

John Bellinger, former State Department Legal Advisor under President Bush, is 

equally blunt: the AUMF is ‘‘getting a little long in the tooth.’’ Like it or not, the 

language of the AUMF is still clearly ‘‘tied to the use of force against the people 

who planned, committed, and/or aided those involved in September 11,’’ says 

Bellinger. ‘‘The farther we get from [targeting] al Qaeda, the harder it is to squeeze 

[those operations] into the AUMF.’’ those involved in September 11,’’ says Bellinger. 

‘‘The farther we get from [targeting] al Qaeda, the harder it is to squeeze [those operations] into the AUMF.’’ 28

If the administration’s use of force outside traditional battlefields is increasingly 

hard to justify under the AUMF, what should Congress do in response? 

Congress could, of course, choose to do in 2013 what it refused to do in 2001, and 

broaden the existing AUMF to expressly permit the executive branch to use force 

to deter or preempt any future attacks or aggression towards the United States or 

U.S. interests. But such an expansion of the AUMF would give this and all future 

administrations virtual carte blanche to wage perpetual war against an undefined 

and infinitely malleable list of enemies, without any time limits or geographical restrictions. 

In my view, this would amount to an unprecedented abdication of Congress’ constitutional responsibilities. In effect, Congress would be delegating its warpowers almost wholesale to the executive branch. While such a broad authorization to use 

military force could in theory be narrowed or withdrawn by a subsequent Congress, 

history suggests that the expansion of executive power tends to be a one-way ratchet: power, once ceded, is rarely regained. 

Mr. Chairman, my guess is that few members of this committee would wish to 

contemplate such a broadened AUMF. What is more, it is worth emphasizing once 

again that while the Bush administration requested such open-ended authority to 

use force immediately after September 11, Congress refused to provide it—even at 

a moment when the terrorist threat to the United States was manifestly more severe than it is now. 

Today, the Obama administration has not requested or suggested that it sees any 

need for an expanded AUMF. It would be utterly unprecedented for Congress to give 

the executive branch a statutory authorization to use force when the President has 

not requested it. 

Similar flaws characterize proposals to revise the AUMF to permit the President 

to use force against any organizations he may, in the future, specifically identify as 

posing a threat to the United States, based on criteria established by Congress. This 

is the proposal made by the Hoover Institute White Paper co-authored by my colleague Jack Goldsmith. He and his co-authors argue that Congress could pass a revised AUMF containing ‘‘general statutory criteria for presidential uses of force 

against new terrorist threats but requir[ing] the executive branch, through a robust 

administrative process, to identify particular groups that are covered by that authorization of force.’’ 

While it would surely be useful for Congress to provide greater clarity on what, 

in its view, constitutes a threat sufficient to justify the open-ended use of military 

force—amounting to a declaration of armed conflict—such a revised AUMF would 

still effectively delegate to the President constitutional powers properly entrusted to 

Congress. Once delegated, these powers would be difficult for Congress to meaningfully oversee or dial back—and, once again, it is notable that the President has not 

requested such a power. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, if what we’re concerned about is protecting the 

Nation, there is no need for an expanded AUMF. With or without the 2001 AUMF, 

no one disputes that the President has the constitutional authority (and the international law authority) to use military force if necessary to defend the United States 

from an imminent attack, regardless of whether the threat emanates from al Qaeda 

or from some as yet unimagined terrorist organization. 

If Congress chooses to revise the AUMF, it would be far more appropriate to limit 

it than to expand it. The 2001 AUMF established—at least as a matter of domestic 

64 

U.S. statutory law—an indefinitely continuing state of armed conflict between the 

United States, on the one hand, and those responsible for the September 11 attacks, 

on the other hand. This has enabled the executive branch to argue (both as a matter 

of U.S. law and international law) that it is the principles of the law of armed conflict that should govern the U.S. use of armed force for counterterrorism purposes. 

But if the law of armed conflict is the applicable legal framework through which 

to understand the AUMF and through which to evaluate U.S. drone strikes outside 

of traditional battlefields, there are very few constraints on the U.S. use of armed 

force, and no obvious means to end the conflict. 

Compared to other legal regimes, including both domestic law enforcement rules 

and the international law on self defense, the law of armed conflict is extremely permissive with regard to the use of armed force. The law of armed conflict permits 

the targeting both of enemy combatants and their co-belligerents. It also allows 

enemy combatants to be targeted by virtue of their status, rather than their activities: it is permissible to target enemy combatants while they are sleeping, for instance, even though they pose no ‘‘imminent’ threat while asleep, and the lowestranking enemy soldier can be targeted just as lawfully as the enemy’s senior-most 

military leaders. Indeed, uniformed cooks and clerks with no combat responsibilities 

can be targeted along with combat troops. 

It is this highly permissive law of armed conflict framework that has enabled the 

executive branch to assert that ‘‘associates’’ of al Qaeda and the Taliban may be targeted beyond traditional battlefields, even though this expansion of the use of force 

beyond those responsible for September 11 was not contemplated by Congress in the 

2001 AUMF. Similarly, it is the law of armed conflict framework that has permitted 

the executive branch to assert the authority to target ever lower-level terrorists and 

suspected ‘‘militants,’’ rather than restricting drone strikes to those targeting the 

most dangerous ‘‘senior’’ operatives. It is also the law of armed conflict framework 

that permits the executive branch to assert that it may target even those individuals and organizations that pose no imminent threat to the United States, in the 

normal sense of the word ‘‘imminent.’’ 

But as the threat posed by al Qaeda dissipates and U.S. troops withdraw from 

Afghanistan, it is appropriate for the United States to transition to a domestic (and 

international) legal framework in which there are tighter constraints on the use of 

military force. Congress can help this transition along by clarifying that the existing 

AUMF is not an open-ended mandate to wage a ‘‘forever war,’’ and requiring the 

President to satisfy more exacting legal standards before military force is authorized 

or used. 

In the event that the President becomes aware of a threat so imminent and grave 

he cannot wait for congressional authorization prior to using military force, there 

is no dispute that he can rely on his inherent constitutional powers to take appropriate action until the threat has been eliminated or until Congress can act. However, by expressly granting the power to declare war and associated powers to Congress, our Constitution presumes that the President will only in rare circumstances 

rely solely on his inherent executive powers to use military force. Historically, noncongressionally authorized uses of force by the President have generally been reserved for rare and unusual circumstances, and this is as it should be. 

Beyond these rare situations of extreme urgency, if the President believes that 

there is a sustained and intense threat to the United States, he can and should provide Congress with detailed information about the threat, and request that Congress 

authorize the use of military force to address the specific threat posed by a specific 

state or organization. 

Congress should authorize the use of military force in these circumstances only— 

there is no need for Congress to preemptively authorize the President to use military force indefinitely against unspecified threats that the President has not yet 

identified. If Congress does authorize the use of military force at the President’s request, the force authorized should be carefully tailored to the specific threat. Furthermore, Congress should be explicit about whether an AUMF is acknowledging or 

authorizing an ongoing armed conflict, on the one hand, or whether it is simply authorizing the limited use of force for self-defense, on the other hand. 

International law imposes criteria for the use of force in national self-defense that 

are far more stringent than the criteria for using force in the course of an armed 

conflict that is ongoing. Unlike the international law of armed conflict, the international law of self-defense permits states to use force only to respond to an armed 

attack or to prevent an imminent armed attack, and the use of force in self defense 

is subject to the principles of necessity and proportionality. Under self defense rules 

(unlike law of armed conflict rules) individuals who pose no imminent threat cannot 

be targeted, and inquiries into imminence, necessity and proportionality tend to restrict the use of force in self defense to strikes against those who—by virtue of their 

65 

29http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/04/fp—survey—future—of—war 30http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/index.htm 31http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/weather/news/story/2012–01–09/lightning-deaths-stormsweather/52504754/1 

operational seniority or hostile activities—pose threats that are urgent and grave, 

rather than speculative, distant, or minor. 

For this reason, I believe that if Congress wishes to refine or clarify the AUMF, 

it should consider limiting the AUMF’s geographic scope, limiting its temporal duration, limiting the authorized use of force to that which would be considered permissible self defense under international law, or all three. 

Expressly limiting the AUMF’s geographic scope to Afghanistan and/or other 

areas in which U.S. troops on the ground are actively engaged in combat, for instance, would clarify that the ongoing armed conflict (and the applicability of the 

law of armed conflict) is limited to these more traditional battlefield situations. As 

noted above, such a geographical limitation would by no means undermine the 

President’s ability to use force to protect the United States from threats emanating 

from outside of the specified region. Such a geographical limitation would merely 

make it clear that any presidential desire to use force elsewhere would require him 

either to request an additional narrowly drawn congressional authorization to use 

force, or would require that any non-congressionally authorized use of force be justified—constitutionally and internationally—on self defense grounds, by virtue of the 

gravity and imminence of a specific threat. 

Limiting the AUMF’s temporal scope could be accomplished by adding a ‘‘sunset’’ 

provision to the AUMF. The current AUMF could be set to expire when U.S. troops 

cease combat operations in Afghanistan, for instance, or in 2015, whichever date 

comes first. Here again, such a limitation would not preclude the President from requesting an extension or a new authorization to use force, if clearly justified by specific circumstances, nor would it preclude the President from relying on his inherent 

constitutional powers if force becomes necessary to prevent an imminent attack. 

Finally, the AUMF could be revised to clarify Congress’ view of the applicable 

legal framework. Congress could state explicitly that it authorizes the President to 

engage in an ongoing armed conflict within the borders of Afghanistan between the 

United States and al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their co-belligerents, but that it does 

not currently authorize the initiation or continuation of an armed conflict in any 

other place, and expects therefore that any U.S. military action elsewhere or against 

other actors shall be governed by principles of self-defense rather than by the law 

of armed conflict. 

There are many possible ways for Congress to signal its commitment to preventing the AUMF from being used to justify a ‘‘forever war.’’ Each of these approaches has both benefits and drawbacks, and each would require significant further discussion. But I believe that Congress’ focus should be on ensuring that war 

remains an exceptional state of affairs, not the norm. At a minimum, this should 

preclude any Congressional expansion of existing AUMF authorities. 

Mr. Chairman, let me close with a plea for perspective. We live in a dangerous 

world: adversarial states such as North Korea and Iran remain bellicose; the changing role of near-peer powers such as China and Russia poses challenges to U.S. interests and global stability; the Middle East remains awash in violence, and technological advances could place lethal tools in the hands of irresponsible actors. We also 

face unprecedented challenges from our increased global interdependence: climate 

change, the interdependence of global financial systems and our ever-increasing reliance on the internet all create new vulnerabilities. Against the backdrop of these 

many dangers, old and new, the fear of terrorist attack should not be the primary 

driver of U.S. national security policy. 

Terrorism is a very real problem, and we cannot ignore it, any more than we 

should ignore violent organized crime or large-scale public health threats. Like everyone else, I worry about terrorists getting ahold of weapons of mass destruction. 

At the same time, we should recognize that terrorism is neither the only threat nor 

the most serious threat the United States faces.29 With the sole exception of 2001, 

terrorist groups worldwide have never succeeded in killing more than a handful of 

Americans citizens in any given year. According to the State Department, 17 American citizens were killed by terrorists in 2011, for instance. The terrorist death toll 

was 15 in 2010 and 9 in 2009.30

These deaths are tragedies, and we should continue to strive to prevent such 

deaths-but we should also keep the numbers in perspective. On average, about 55 

Americans are killed by lightning strikes each year,31 and ordinary criminal homiVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:10 May 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\88026.TXT JUNE
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32http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61—06.pdf 33http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism—strategy.pdf 34http://www.justice.gov/cjs/ 35http://m.npr.org/news/Politics/178753575?textSize=small 36http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/9787912/Stanley-McChrystalcriticises-reliance-on-drones-as-strikes-hit-Pakistan.html 37http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0711/60199.htmlixzz2NUC4UwYa 

cide claims about 16,000 U.S. victims each year.32 No one, however, believes we 

need to give the executive branch extraordinary legal authorities to keep Americans 

from venturing out in electrical storms, or use armed drones to preemptively kill 

homicide suspects. 

What’s more, we should keep in mind that military force is not the only tool in 

the U.S. arsenal against terrorism.33 Since September 11, we’ve gotten far more effective at tracking terrorist activity, disrupting terrorist mmunications and financing, catching terrorists and convicting them in civilian courts,34 and a wide range 

of other counterterrorism measures. Much of the time, these non-lethal approaches 

to counterterrorism are as effective as targeted killings. In fact, there’s growing reason to fear that the expansion of U.S. drone strikes is strategically counterproductive. 

Former Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright recently 

expressed concern that as a result of U.S. drone strikes, the United States may have 

‘‘ceded some of our moral high ground.’’ 35 Retired General Stanley McChrystal has 

expressed similar concerns: ‘‘The resentment created by American use of unmanned 

strikes . . . is much greater than the average American appreciates. They are hated 

on a visceral level, even by people who’ve never seen one or seen the effects of one,’’ 

and fuel ‘‘a perception of American arrogance.’’ 36 Former Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair agrees: the United States needs to ‘‘pull back on unilateral actions . . . except in extraordinary circumstances,’’ Blair told CBS news in January. 

U.S. drone strikes are ‘‘alienating the countries concerned [and] . . . threatening the 

prospects for long-term reform raised by the Arab Spring . . . [U.S. drone strategy 

has us] walking out on a thinner and thinner ledge and if even we get to the far 

extent of it, we are not going to lower the fundamental threat to the United States 

any lower than we have it now.’’ 37

Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, I believe it is past time for a serious overhaul of 

U.S. counterterrorism strategy. This needs to include a rigorous cost-benefit analysis 

of U.S. drone strikes, one that takes into account issues both of domestic legality 

and international legitimacy, and evaluates the impact of targeted killings on regional stability, terrorist recruiting, extremist sentiment, and the future behavior or 

powerful states such as Russia and China. If we undertake such a rigorous costbenefit analysis, I suspect we may come to see scaling back on kinetic counterterrorism activities less as an inconvenience than as a strategic necessity—and we may 

come to a new appreciation of counterterrorism measures that don’t involve missiles 

raining from the sky. 

This doesn’t mean we should never use military force against terrorists. In some 

circumstances, military force will be justifiable and useful. But it does mean we 

should rediscover a longstanding American tradition: reserving the use of exceptional legal authorities for rare and exceptional circumstances. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

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Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Corn? 

STATEMENT OF MR. GEOFFREY CORN, PROFESSOR OF LAW, 

SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW 

Mr. CORN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to share my views on these important questions. I should note at the outset that these views are informed significantly by my own personal background, having spent 22 years 

in the Army both as an intelligence officer and as a judge advocate, 

including my last year as the Army’s senior advisor on the law of 

war. 

The authority for, the scope of, and the means used to prosecute 

the armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated 

forces are clearly impacted by complex considerations of law, policy, 

strategy, intelligence, and diplomacy. The AUMF reflects the combined will of our Nation’s political branches to include the full 

might of the U.S. Armed Forces within the range of available options for addressing this threat. 

Although the AUMF provides a very general grant of authority, 

this authority is not unlimited or a blank check to wage war anywhere in the world against any group or perhaps individual who 

is hostile against the United States. Instead, I believe the scope, 

methods, and means are all rationally framed by both the authorization’s language and its implicit incorporation of the law of armed 

conflict. 

Because I do not believe there is inconsistency between the nature of U.S. operations to date and these inherent limitations, I do 

not believe it is necessary at this point in time to modify the 

AUMF. Instead, I believe that Congress should continue to engage 

in oversight to remain fully apprised of the strategic, operational, 

and at times tactical decisionmaking processes that result in the 

employment of U.S. combat power pursuant to the statute, enabling Congress to ensure that such use falls within the scope of an 

authorization targeted at al Qaeda, intended to protect the Nation 

from future terrorist attacks, and that these operations reflect unquestioned commitment to the principles of international law that 

regulate the use of military force during any armed conflict. 

I believe the AUMF effectively addresses the belligerent threat 

against the United States posed by terrorist groups. I emphasize 

the term ‘‘belligerent’’ for an important reason. It is obvious that 

the AUMF has granted authority to use the Nation’s military 

power against threats falling within its scope. Therefore, only those 

organizations that pose a risk of sufficient magnitude to justify invoking the authority associated with armed conflict should be included within that scope as a result of their affiliation with al 

Qaeda. Determining what groups properly fall within this scope is, 

therefore, both critical and challenging. 

The AUMF provides the President with the necessary flexibility 

to tailor U.S. operations to the evolving nature of this unconventional enemy, maximizing the efficacy of U.S. efforts to deny al 

Qaeda the freedom of action they possessed in Afghanistan prior to 

Operation Enduring Freedom. 

88 

In reaction to this evolution, the United States has employed 

combat power against what the prior panel referred to as associated forces or co-belligerents of al Qaeda, belligerent groups assessed to adhere to the overall terrorist objectives of the organization and engage in hostilities alongside al Qaeda directed against 

the United States or its interests. 

The focus on shared ideology, tactics, and indicia of connection 

between high-level group leaders seems both logical and legitimate 

for including these offshoots of al Qaeda within the scope of the 

AUMF as co-belligerents, a determination that, based on publicly 

available information, has to date been limited to groups seeking 

the sanctuary of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas, Yemen, or 

Somalia. 

If Congress does, however, choose to revise the AUMF, I do not 

believe that the revision should incorporate an exclusive list of defined co-belligerent groups, a geographic scope limitation, or some 

external oversight of targeting decisions, all of which would undermine the efficacy of U.S. operations by signaling to the enemy limits on U.S. operational and tactical reach. 

It is an operational and tactical axiom that insurgent and nonstate threats rarely seek the proverbial toe-to-toe confrontation 

with clearly superior military forces. Al Qaeda is no different. Indeed, their attempts to engage in such tactics in the initial phases 

of Operation Enduring Freedom proved disastrous. Incorporating 

such limitations into the AUMF would, therefore, be inconsistent 

with the operational objective of seizing and retaining the initiative 

against this unconventional enemy and the strategic objective of 

preventing future terrorist attacks against the United States. 

Finally, I believe to target decisionmaking during armed conflict 

is a quintessential command function and that the President, acting in his own capacity or through subordinate officers, should 

make these decisions. He and his subordinates bear an obligation 

to ensure compliance with the law of armed conflict and other principles of international law when employing U.S. combat power. 

Every subordinate officer in the chain of command is sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution which, by implication, also requires compliance with this law. 

I believe the level of commitment to ensuring such compliance in 

structure, process, education, training, and internal oversight is 

more significant today than at any time in our Nation’s history. As 

one familiar with all these aspects of the compliance process, I am 

discouraged by the common assertion that there is insufficient 

oversight for targeting decisions. 

Furthermore, I believe few people better understand the immense moral burden associated with a decision to order lethal attack than experienced military leaders who never take these decisions lightly. If our confidence in these leaders to make sound military decisions is sufficient to entrust to them the lives of our sons 

and daughters—and on this point, again I must admit my self-interest as my son is a second-year cadet in the U.S. Air Force Academy and my brother is a serving colonel in the United States 

Army—I believe it must be sufficient to judge when and how to employ lethal combat power against an enemy. These leaders spend 

their entire professional careers immersed in the operational, 

89 

moral, ethical, and legal aspects of employing combat power. I just 

do not believe some external oversight mechanism or a Federal 

judge is more competent to make these extremely difficult and 

weighty judgments as the people that this Nation entrusts for that 

responsibility. 

Finally, I would like to make one comment on the very hotly discussed issue of associated forces and the scope of the AUMF. In my 

view, when the administration refers to an associated or affiliated 

force, it is referring to a process of mutation that this organization 

undergoes. Obviously, we are dealing with an enemy that is going 

to seek every asymmetric tactic to avoid the capability of the 

United States to disrupt or disable its operations. Part of that tactic, I think, is to recruit and grow affiliated organizations. 

I certainly understand the logic of wanting to include those organizations within the scope of a revised AUMF. My concern echoes 

that of Senator Inhofe, where the risk is if you open that Pandora’s 

box, what other changes to this authority might be included in the 

statute which, I believe, could denigrate or limit the effectiveness 

of U.S. military operations. So while I believe Congress absolutely 

has an important function to ensure that the use of force under the 

statute is consistent with the underlying principles that frame the 

enactment of the AUMF, which is to defeat al Qaeda as an entity 

in the corporate sense and protect the United States from future 

terrorist attacks, I do not believe at this point in time it is necessary to modify the statute. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Corn follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MR. GEOFFREY S. CORN

The authority for, scope of, and means used to prosecute the armed conflict with 

al Qaeda are all critically important questions for our Nation, our Armed Forces, 

and elected officials responsible for establishing U.S. national security policy. As in 

the prosecution of any armed conflict, each of these issues is impacted by complex 

considerations of law, policy, strategy, intelligence, and diplomacy. The Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) enacted by Congress in response to the 

attacks on September 11, 2001, has served and continues to serve as the key source 

of constitutional authority for the conduct of military operations directed against 

these belligerent opponents. This Joint Resolution expressly manifests the combined 

will of our Nation’s political branches to include the full might of the U.S. Armed 

Forces within the range of available options for addressing this threat. It does not, 

however, explicitly define the scope of such military operations, nor limitations on 

the methods or means of warfare utilized during the course of such operations. This 

is consistent with past practice of providing similar authorizations for the conduct 

of armed hostilities, and is therefore unsurprising. 

The undefined scope does not, however, suggest an unlimited grant of authority, 

or what some have characterized as a ‘‘blank check’’ to wage war anywhere in the 

world against any group (or perhaps individual) deemed by the President to present 

a threat of future terrorist attacks. Instead, as I will explain in more detail below, 

the scope, methods, and means are all rationally framed by both the authorization’s 

language and its implicit incorporation of the law of armed conflict. Because I do 

not believe there is sufficient indication of any inconsistency between the nature of 

U.S. military operations conducted pursuant to the AUMF and these inherent limitations, I respectfully oppose any effort to modify the Joint Resolution. Instead, I 

believe that Congress should work with both the executive and the Department of 

Defense to remain fully appraised of the strategic, operational, and at times tactical 

decisionmaking process that results in the employment of U.S. combat power pursuant to the AUMF. This will enable Congress to ensure that these operations continue to fall within the scope of an authorization targeted at al Qaeda, the specific 

terrorist belligerent group assessed as responsible for the September 11 terrorist attacks, and that these operations reflect unquestioned commitment to the principles 

90 

of international law that regulate the use of military force, namely the law of armed 

conflict. 

In support of this opinion, I will address the questions provided by the committee, 

although I note that in some cases I have paraphrased these questions. 

1. What persons and organizations are covered by the existing AUMF and does 

it cover al Qaeda and associated forces that may have had nothing to do with 

the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001? 

I believe the AUMF, properly interpreted, covers al Qaeda as a belligerent organization, including offshoots of what is generally understood to be the ‘‘original’’ al 

Qaeda. Determining enemy ‘‘order of battle’’ (identifying the enemy organization) is 

a complex endeavor in any armed conflict, but is an essential foundation for effective threat identification. In the current conflict, this process has apparently resulted in the determination that al Qaeda, as an organization, has evolved since the 

enactment of the AUMF. In reaction to this evolution, the United States has employed combat power against new iterations of al Qaeda, and also against ‘‘associated forces,’’ or cobelligerents, of al Qaeda—belligerent groups that adhere to the 

overall terrorist objectives of the organization and engage in hostilities ‘‘alongside’’ 

al Qaeda [quoting Jeh Johnson] intended to further these objectives (including 

threats directed against the United States, its Armed Forces, and its interests 

abroad)—in Pakistan, the Arabian peninsula, and the Horn of Africa. I believe this 

is both operationally logical and consistent with the AUMF. By providing authority 

to use all ‘‘necessary and appropriate’’ force against those groups responsible for the 

September 11 attacks in order to prevent future attacks, the AUMF provided the 

President with the necessary flexibility to tailor U.S. operations to the evolving nature of this unconventional threat. In this asymmetric struggle, the authority in the 

AUMF provided a logical method to ensure that the efforts of al Qaeda both to 

morph in response to the overwhelming U.S. combat capability and to seek sanctuary in locations that they believe provide the freedom of action they possessed in 

Afghanistan prior to Operation Enduring Freedom would not hinder the efficacy of 

the U.S. response. In short, just as the nature of the threat has evolved, the scope 

of military operations conducted pursuant to the AUMF must also evolve. 

Identifying a group as a ‘‘co-belligerent’’ with al Qaeda is therefore the critical intelligence determination that justifies subjecting that group (and its belligerent operative members) to operations pursuant to the AUMF. In my opinion, the executive 

has acted rationally and in good faith in making these assessments. While I am not 

privy to this decisionmaking process, open source information indicates that the al 

Qaeda co-belligerent determination has been limited to groups seeking sanctuary in 

Afghanistan/Pakistan border areas, Yemen, and Somalia. It should be obvious that 

this co-belligerent determination cannot be based on traditional indicia of co-belligerency applicable in inter-state hostilities, such as mutual defense treaties or involvement in hostilities of regular armed forces. The focus on shared ideology, tactics, and indicia of connection between high-level group leaders therefore seems to 

emphasizes both logical and legitimate intelligence indicators of which offshoots of 

al Qaeda fall into the category of co-belligerent, and therefore within the scope of 

the AUMF. For example, in prosecuting Somali terrorist Ahmed Warsame, Federal 

prosecutors stated in court papers that leaders of the Shabaab group in Somali had 

sent Warsame to Yemen for training with the ‘‘core’’ al Qaeda offshoot, al Qaeda 

in the Arabian Peninsula. This is an example of reliance on indicia of collaboration 

in training and operational tactics as factors that would demonstrate co-belligerent 

status. 

Finally, I do not believe the AUMF should be amended to incorporate either a list 

of defined co-belligerent groups or the co-belligerent assessment criteria. This would 

undermine the efficacy of U.S. threat identification efforts by signaling to this unconventional enemy exactly where to seek sanctuary and how to avoid the consequence of falling within the scope of the AUMF. In so doing, it would unnecessarily provide a windfall to al Qaeda and enhance enemy freedom of action, a consequence that would be fundamentally inconsistent with the strategic and operational military objective of keeping this enemy constantly off balance and retaining 

initiative for U.S. forces. 

2. Does the AUMF appropriately cover current threats against the United States, 

and should it be expanded to cover terrorist groups that are not associated 

with al Qaeda? 

Based on publically available information, and the fact that President Obama has 

not publically asserted a need to expand the scope of the AUMF, I believe the 

AUMF does currently address the belligerent threat against the United States posed 

by terrorist groups. I emphasize the term belligerent for an important reason. It is 

obvious that the AUMF is a grant of authority to use the Nation’s combat power 

91 

against threats falling within its scope. As such, it should be limited to only those 

organizations that, as the result of both the organization and intensity of their 

threat capabilities, justify crossing the threshold from law enforcement response to 

armed hostilities. I do not believe that the existence of a terrorist threat to the 

United States alone justifies crossing this threshold. The United States has for decades confronted terrorist threats that fall below this threshold, and will certainly 

continue to confront such threats in the future. Expanding the AUMF to include 

such threats would be inconsistent with the fundamental structure of the law of 

armed conflict, which seeks to limit situations of armed conflict to those that indicate a level of intensity that indicates a de facto departure from peacetime law enforcement response authorities. I emphasize, however, that this opinion is based on 

publically available information. If classified information were to indicate that other 

terrorist groups represent a threat of analogous magnitude to that of al Qaeda, including them within the scope of the AUMF would be legitimate. 

From the inception of the military response against al Qaeda, even the inclusion 

of this group within the scope of the AUMF created substantial legal controversy, 

controversy that continues to this day. Many legal scholars, and some of our closest 

allies, reject the U.S. position that a nation may properly claim to be engaged in 

an armed conflict against a transnational terrorist group like al Qaeda. While I disagree with this interpretation of international law, and believe that for the United 

States this is no longer subject to debate, I do not believe that there is a legitimate 

justification to characterize the response to all terrorist threats—existing or emerging—as armed conflicts. 

Accordingly, while it is almost certain that there are indeed some terrorist threats 

that do not fall within the scope of the AUMF (because they are not properly characterized as members of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or co-belligerents), this does not mean 

the AUMF is either under-inclusive or that it should be amended to include all such 

groups within its scope. If these groups are not considered by the commander in 

chief to be co-belligerents, they are properly excluded from the scope of the authorization. Nor should the AUMF be amended to include within its scope any jihadist 

motivated terrorist group. First, no terrorist group should be considered for incorporation into the authority provided by the AUMF unless and until it poses a threat 

of analogous magnitude as that associated with al Qaeda—considerations that, as 

noted above, would justify incorporating them within the scope of the AUMF (assuming also that such groups posed a threat of sufficient magnitude and imminence 

to trigger the inherent right of self-defense pursuant to the jus ad bellum). Second, 

if at some point either the President and/or Congress believes that although not affiliated with al Qaeda, a terrorist group manifests a level of organization and risk 

that justifies subjecting it to this authority, then at that point they can addressed 

through a distinct authorization for the use of force, assuming the use of such force 

would satisfy international law requirements. Such a response would be equally applicable if and when the threat to an ally posed by such a group was considered 

of such significance as to necessitate a U.S. military response. 

Finally, responses to this question must also incorporate the President’s authority 

to always act to defend the Nation from an actual or imminent threat of armed attack against the Nation or its Armed Forces overseas (and to rescue Americans 

threatened overseas). This authority extends to threats posed by non-state groups, 

including terrorist organizations that are not considered al Qaeda co-belligerents. 

The conclusion that ‘‘other’’ terrorist threats do not fall within the scope of the 

AUMF therefore does not subject the Nation to any type of risk that has not existed 

for decades. On the contrary, the consensus government view that a terrorist threat 

may trigger this inherent defensive authority (an interpretation that while not unprecedented, was not nearly as clear before the terrorist attacks of September 11) 

suggests that this risk is less substantial today than before enactment of the AUMF. 

3. What is the geographic scope of the AUMF and under what circumstances may 

the United States attack belligerent targets in the territory of another country? 

In my opinion, there is no need to amend the AUMF to define the geographic 

scope of military operations it authorizes. On the contrary, I believe doing so would 

fundamentally undermine the efficacy of U.S. counterterrorism military operations 

by overtly signaling to the enemy exactly where to pursue safe-haven and de facto 

immunity from the reach of U.S. power. This concern is similar to that associated 

with explicitly defining co-belligerents subject to the AUMF, although I believe it 

is substantially more significant. It is an operational and tactical axiom that insurgent and non-state threats rarely seek the proverbial ‘‘toe to toe’’ confrontation with 

clearly superior military forces. Al Qaeda is no different. Indeed, their attempts to 

engage in such tactics in the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom proved 

disastrous, and ostensibly caused the dispersion of operational capabilities that then 

92 

necessitated the co-belligerent assessment. Imposing an arbitrary geographic limitation of the scope of military operations against this threat would therefore be inconsistent with the strategic objective of preventing future terrorist attacks against the 

United States. 

I believe much of the momentum for asserting some arbitrary geographic limitation on the scope of operations conducted to disrupt or disable al Qaeda belligerent 

capabilities is the result of the commonly used term ‘‘hot battlefield.’’ This notion 

of a ‘‘hot’’ battlefield is, in my opinion, an operational and legal fiction. Nothing in 

the law of armed conflict (LOAC) or military doctrine defines the meaning of ‘‘battlefield.’’ Contrary to the erroneous assertions that the use of combat power is restricted to defined geographic locations such as Afghanistan (and previously Iraq), 

the geographic scope of armed conflict must be dictated by a totality assessment of 

a variety of factors, ultimately driven by the strategic end state the Nation seeks 

to achieve. The nature and dynamics of the threat—including key vulnerabilities— 

is a vital factor in this analysis. These threat dynamics properly influence the assessment of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities, which in turn drive the formulation of national strategy, which includes determining when, where, and how to leverage national power (including military power) to achieve desired operational effects. Thus, threat dynamics, and not some geographic ‘‘box’’, have historically driven and must continue to drive the scope of armed hostilities. The logic of this 

premise is validated by (in my opinion) the inability to identify an armed conflict 

in modern history where the scope of operations was legally restricted by a conception of a ‘‘hot’’ battlefield. Instead, threat dynamics coupled with policy, diplomatic 

considerations and, in certain armed conflicts the international law of neutrality, 

dictate such scope. Ultimately, battlefields become ‘‘hot’’ when persons, places, or 

things assessed as lawful military objectives pursuant to the LOAC are subjected 

to attack. 

I do not, however, intend to suggest that it is proper to view the entire globe as 

a battlefield in the military component of our struggle against al Qaeda, or that 

threat dynamics are the only considerations in assessing the scope of military operations. Instead, complex considerations of policy and diplomacy have and must continue to influence this assessment. However, suggesting that the proper scope of 

combat operations is dictated by a legal conception of ‘‘hot’’ battlefield is operationally irrational and legally unsound. Accordingly, placing policy limits on the scope 

of combat operations conducted pursuant to the legal authority provided by the 

AUMF is both logical and appropriate, and in my view has been a cornerstone of 

U.S. use of force policy since the enactment of the AUMF. In contrast, interpreting 

the LOAC to place legal limits on the scope of such operations to ‘‘hot’’ battlefields, 

or imposing such a legal limitation in the terms of the AUMF, creates a perverse 

incentive for the belligerent enemy by allowing him to dictate when and where he 

will be subject to lawful attack. 

I believe this balance between legal authority and policy and diplomatic considerations is reflected in what is commonly termed the ‘‘unable or unwilling’’ test for 

assessing when attacking an enemy belligerent capability in the territory of another 

country is permissible. First, it should be noted that the legality of an attack 

against an enemy belligerent is determined exclusively by the LOAC when the country where he is located provides consent for such action (is the target lawful within 

the meaning of the law and will attack of the target comply with the targeting principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in the attack). In the unusual 

circumstance where a lawful object of attack associated with al Qaeda and therefore 

falling within the scope of the AUMF is identified in the territory of another country 

not providing consent for U.S. military action, policy, and diplomacy play a decisive 

role in the attack decisionmaking process. Only when the United States concludes 

that the country is unable or unwilling to address the threat will attack be authorized, which presupposes that the nature of the target is determined to be sufficiently 

significant to warrant a non-consensual military action in that territory. I believe 

the executive is best positioned to make these judgments, and that to date they have 

been made judiciously. I also believe that imposing a statutory scope limitation 

would vest terrorist belligerent operatives with the benefits of the sovereignty of the 

state they exploit for sanctuary. It strikes me as far more logical to continue to 

allow the President to address these sovereignty concerns through diplomacy, focused on the strategic interests of the Nation. 

4. What role should Congress play in the designation of organizations against 

which—and countries in which—lethal force may be used? Should there be a 

formal requirement to notify Congress of new designations and should such 

designations be subject to congressional approval of disapproval? 

93 

I believe Congress plays an essential constitutional role in authorizing the use of 

U.S. military force. When confronting a conventional state threat, it is obvious that 

in exercising this role, Congress will designate the object of such an authorization. 

However, even in this situation, Congress has not designated the ‘‘groups’’ falling 

within the scope of the authorization. Instead, that determination is left to the 

President in his capacity as commander in chief. Nor would Congress ordinarily dictate the scope of such operations, but rather, as noted above, allows the President 

to respond appropriately to threat dynamics. This authorization modality is obviously more complicated when the object is a non-state transnational organization. 

However, I believe that the nature of such a threat in no way justifies deviation 

from this modality. The AUMF did not identify any single group or location as the 

object of the U.S. military response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, instead leaving to the executive the responsibility to ‘‘take care that the law be faithfully executed’’ by assessing the intelligence related to those attacks and rendering 

judgments as to what type of response was ‘‘necessary and appropriate.’’ I believe 

that process continues in full force to this day, and has provided the necessary strategic and operational flexibility to meet the threat effectively and efficiently. 

I do believe Congress, in exercising its authorization function, does have both a 

right and a responsibility to remain seized of the nature of operations conducted 

pursuant to the AUMF. In so doing, Congress will be better able to continually assess whether the link between the objectives of the authorization and the nature 

of U.S. operations conducted pursuant thereto remains sufficient. In this regard, 

Congress always retains an ‘‘approval/disapproval’’ process through its ability to 

amend or even repeal the AUMF. Thus, while I encourage continued efforts to inform Congress of such operations, I believe that altering the current statutory 

framework should only be considered if and when Congress believes this link has 

become unjustifiably attenuated. 

5. What is the duration of the AUMF and how will we know when this conflict 

is over? 

As long as the AUMF is in force, and the executive determines that al Qaeda and/ 

or al Qaeda co-belligerents continue to represent viable threats to the Nation, the 

AUMF will provide legal authority for military operations executed to disable and/ 

or disrupt such threats. When this conflict will be over is a far more complex question. Ultimately, I believe the answer must be dictated by the assessment—ideally 

made cooperatively between the President and Congress—that the nature of the 

threat falling within the scope of the AUMF has been degraded to such an extent 

that there is no longer a legitimate necessity to utilize U.S. combat power as a responsive measure. Lacking the insight into the threat dynamics that I believe are 

essential to make this assessment, I cannot opine as to the appropriate indicia to 

justify this conclusion. 

6. Has the AUMF lost its legal force, is it still relevant to the current conflict, 

or would it be better to modify or repeal it? 

It is evident from my prior answers that I believe the AUMF has not lost its legal 

force and that it is indeed still relevant to the current conflict. The use of U.S. military capability in a manner that implicitly relies on the LOAC to justify the methods and means of operations can be justified only pursuant to such an authorization 

or in the exercise of self-defense against an actual or imminent attack against the 

Nation or its Armed Forces. Accordingly, the AUMF continues to provide the principal source of authority to attack enemy belligerent operatives and their capabilities, to detain them upon capture, and to subject them to trial by military commission for violations of the laws and customs of war. 

It is equally evident from my answers above that I do not believe that it is necessary or logical to repeal or amend the AUMF. 

7. Detention authority and the AUMF. 

I believe that the enactment of section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2012 is relevant to the limited extent that it reaffirmed congressional support for both the AUMF and the need to utilize authority derived from 

the LOAC to address the al Qaeda threat. Would military detention authority be 

affected if Congress were to enact a new AUMF? The answer must be yes, but the 

nature of the authorization would dictate how. First, should such an authorization 

expand the scope of groups subject to the use of force, then captured members of 

these groups would arguably fall within the scope of military detention authority, 

as this expansion would presumably indicate a U.S. determination that armed conflict exists with these additional groups (unless Congress chose to restrict detention, 

which seems illogical and improbable). Second, such authorization might also explicitly authorize detention of captured members of groups within its scope. While I do 

94 

not believe such express authority would be necessary to justify such detention, it 

would certainly strengthen the requisite legal basis. Finally, such authorization 

might include actual detention criteria, which could either expand or constrict existing military detention authority separately from an express authorization or limitation on that authority. 

Assuming that Congress chooses not to modify the existing AUMF, the question 

of enhanced process for individuals subjected to long-term preventive detention 

seems especially significant. Although this detention is based on in large measure 

on the unquestioned authority of belligerents to prevent captive enemy operatives 

from returning to hostilities, the unconventional nature of this conflict does raise 

troubling questions about the legitimacy of extending this authority to a functionally 

indefinite conflict. It should, however, be recognized that the existing detention authorization and review process has incorporated a level of procedural protection 

against arbitrary detention that is truly unprecedented in any prior armed conflict 

in U.S. history. Should more process be incorporated? If doing so would facilitate 

a more effective assessment of continued detention necessity, and enhance the perception of legitimacy, I believe the answer is yes. What that additional process 

should be is a much more difficult question. One idea might be to adopt a presumptive detention termination point, requiring the government to rebut a presumption 

of termination in an adversary proceeding by an appropriately weighty burden of 

proof. In my view, if such a process were adopted, the tribunal should be composed 

primarily of military officers, presided over by a judicial officer—although inclusion 

of several civilian legal or judicial experts might also be logical—and should provide 

detainees with a right to appellate review. 

8. Remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) and controlling legal authority. 

Despite the substantial controversy surrounding the increased use of RPVs to attack belligerent operatives, I believe that this weapon system need not be analyzed 

or critiqued differently from any other weapon system. Simply stated, RPVs are just 

weapons, and good ones. The way they are employed must be dictated by the type 

of careful targeting analysis that is required for any deliberate attack against a lawful object of attack during an armed conflict. To that end, all the principles of the 

LOAC are applicable to their use: they must only be used to attack lawful military 

objectives; such attacks must be cancelled when the commander anticipates that the 

collateral damage or incidental injury (to non-combatants) will be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated (the so called proportionality principle); they must not be otherwise indiscriminate (an unlikely risk considering the precision of such weapons) or cause unnecessary suffering; and commanders must take all feasible precautions to mitigate the risk to civilians and civilian property (including making best efforts to confirm the nature of the nominated 

target). 

In my opinion, these principles do in fact guide our targeting process, irrespective 

of the weapon systems employed. It is no exaggeration to state that at no time in 

history have legal advisors been more integrated into this process than today. If 

anything, use of RPVs, because they are normally utilized in a deliberate (as opposed to time sensitive) targeting process, will almost inevitably involve multiple 

layers of operational and legal review. Commanders ultimately make targeting judgments, but these judgments are guided consistently by the legal principles summarized above in order to ensure, as best as possible under the conditions prevailing 

at the time of decision, that employing deadly combat power is operationally and 

legally justified. 

This process should not be modified if the target is not in an area of active combat 

operations involving U.S. ground forces. As noted above, I reject the idea that the 

notion of a ‘‘hot’’ battlefield limits belligerent targeting authority against lawful objects of attack during armed conflict. Once the strategic decision is made to address 

a target in that armed conflict with combat power outside of such an area, these 

principles provide the appropriate and logical measure of attack authority. The location of the nominated target is irrelevant in this process, however. Certainly, relative proximity to ongoing combat operations is a relevant factor in the target analysis process. Accordingly, while I am not privy to the target decisionmaking process 

currently utilized by the United States, I believe it is fair to assume that when a 

potential target is located outside an area of ongoing active combat operations, compliance with these principles almost certainly demands a greater degree of certitude 

that the individual in fact qualifies as a lawful target. Ultimately, however, once 

an individual is assessed as an enemy belligerent operative, his location may influence the decision to utilize the full scope of armed conflict targeting authority, but 

that authority is in no way altered as a result. Rather, targeting authority is dictated by this status determination, and not by location. 

95 

9. How should we decide who is an appropriate military target outside an area 

of active combat operations, and should ‘‘imminence’’ be an aspect of this determination? 

As evidenced by my answer to the prior question, I believe the answer is clear: 

the decision that an individual qualifies as ‘‘an appropriate military target’’ should 

be re-characterized: does the individual qualify as a lawful object of attack pursuant 

to the law of armed conflict? If the answer is yes, that individual’s proximity to an 

area of ‘‘active combat operations’’ in no way alters the legal authority to attack (although as noted above it may result in self-imposed limitations based on policy and/ 

or diplomatic considerations). Proximity to such an area of operations is better understood as just one of a range of threat identification criteria that impact a totality 

analysis of lawful target. 

Imminence is simply not an element of this target decisionmaking legal equation. 

Instead, when attacking an individual, the key analytical focal point is whether that 

individual is properly identified as a member of an enemy belligerent group. If so, 

that status alone triggers lawful attack authority. This is perhaps the most fundamental difference between peacetime and armed conflict use of force authority. In 

peacetime, the use of deadly force is limited to a measure of last resort, and justified 

only when the individual’s conduct manifests an actual threat that necessitates that 

use of force. Thus, employing deadly force is justified only when the individual poses 

an ‘‘imminent’’ threat of death or grievous bodily harm. In contrast, once an individual is identified as a member of an enemy belligerent group in armed conflict, 

that individual is presumed to represent a threat justifying attack by virtue of that 

status alone. Thus, unless and until that individual is removed from the control of 

enemy belligerent leadership (either by capture or physical incapacitation), attack 

with combat power creating a high probability of causing death is legally justified. 

This target validation process obviously involves a complex and at times challenging analysis of a variety of factors that indicate an individual is in fact a belligerent operative of al Qaeda or other enemy forces. Because of the unconventional 

and dispersed nature of al Qaeda operations, this threat identification process must, 

by necessity, focus on indicia that are less obvious than those relied on to positively 

identify enemy belligerent operatives in the context of more conventional inter-state 

hostilities. It is, however, erroneous to suggest that threat identification, even in the 

conventional conflict context, is ‘‘easy.’’ On the contrary, the intensity and pace of 

modern warfare make threat identification challenging in any type of armed conflict. 

It is, however, obvious that the complexity of threat identification is magnified in 

an armed conflict with an unconventional and highly dispersed enemy belligerent 

group. It is therefore logical and appropriate to rely on multiple factors to guide 

threat identification of this enemy. These factors will almost certainly include patterns of activity, association, location, signals and human intelligence indicating activities and intentions, and the nature of the individual’s contribution to the belligerent objectives of al Qaeda. 

While reliance on such factors may appear to be a significant departure from ‘‘traditional’’ threat identification methodology, this is not the case. Similar methodologies and indicia have been used in prior conflicts involving unconventional enemy 

opponents. Indeed, having begun my military career as a tactical intelligence officer 

in Panama in the mid-1980s, I can personally attest to the reliance on such indicia 

in other contexts. Assigned to one of the few Army commands focused almost exclusively on what is today called counterinsurgency operations (at that time called low 

intensity conflict), our forces routinely trained to engage unconventional enemies in 

low- to mid-intensity hostilities. Unable to rely on traditional threat identification 

criteria such as uniforms or obvious military equipment, threat identification instead focused on similar indicia as those ostensibly used today. Ultimately, whether 

engaged in armed conflict with a conventional or unconventional belligerent opponent, the process for and legal authority resulting from positive threat identification 

is identical: a determination of enemy belligerent status triggering the authority derived from the LOAC to attack such individuals based solely on this belligerent status. Even when the threat identification criteria rely heavily, by necessity, on an 

individual’s conduct, the ultimate question was and remains a determination of status. 

The nature of this question seems to reflect what has been an increasingly vocal 

aversion to exercising belligerent attack authority outside of the so-called ‘‘hot’’ battlefield. Indeed, I believe this aversion has been a driving force behind the creation 

of the ‘‘geography of war’’ fiction discussed above. This aversion is fundamentally 

flawed as a matter of law. Although, as noted above, the threat identification process may be more complex due to the individual’s attenuation from an area of active 

combat operations, that attenuation in no way modifies or restricts the attack authority resulting from this determination. 

96 

I believe it is important to bear in mind that U.S. forces involved in hostilities 

against an unconventional enemy engage in this complex threat identification process on a daily basis in Afghanistan, a process that is not constrained by a requirement to assess the imminence of the threat. It seems somewhat ironic that proponents of an ‘‘imminence’’ requirement outside the so-called ‘‘hot’’ battlefield seem 

untroubled by reliance on the same threat identification criteria they consider insufficient to justify attack when it is utilized to make difficult targeting decisions in 

the ‘‘hot’’ battlefield. This irony is magnified because the extent of deliberation and 

layers of review associated with attacks outside the ‘‘hot’’ battlefield might actually 

produce increased certainty as to the nature of the target. If we trust our commanders to make complex targeting judgments in the context of a ‘‘hot’’ battlefield, 

I find it perplexing that we would impose an additional attack criteria—one drawn 

from the peacetime use of force legal framework and never intended to limit belligerent attack authority—on analogous decisions simply because the nominated target 

is geographically attenuated from that battle space. 

10. What is our obligation to ensure lethal military force is directed only at appropriate military targets, and do we need to legislate or codify the principles 

that guide these decisions? 

My prior answers clearly indicate that I believe it is the law of armed conflict, 

brought into force as the result of the armed conflict between the United States and 

al Qaeda, that provides the authority to attack persons, places, or things as a measure of first resort. Accordingly, as noted above, this attack authority is triggered by 

determinations that a proposed target qualifies as a lawful military objective pursuant to that law. The LOAC mandates compliance with the obligations of distinction, 

proportionality and precautions, as explained above. 

I see no value in attempting to codify the principles of the LOAC in an amended 

or new AUMF. The President is obligated to ensure respect for this law once the 

United States is engaged in an armed conflict, as are all subordinate officers of the 

Department of Defense, each military department, and all other government agencies. Department of Defense Directive, incorporated into the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement, mandates compliance with these 

principles during all military operations, which is reinforced by military doctrinal 

manuals related to the targeting process, and professional military education. Legal 

advisors at every echelon of command are educated in this law and fully integrated 

into the targeting process. Even during the initial phase of U.S. belligerent detention operations, when the executive took the position that the detainees did not fall 

within the scope of the humane treatment obligation of Common Article 3 to the 

Geneva Conventions of 1949, there was never any assertion that targeting operations were exempt from compliance with these LOAC principles. 

Finally, in my view the obligation to comply with the LOAC is already inherent 

in the AUMF authorization to use ‘‘appropriate’’ force. This, coupled with the fact 

that the U.S. considers itself engaged in an armed conflict not of an international 

character (a situation that triggers customary LOAC principles as a matter of law), 

leads me to reject the question’s assertion that these principles have heretofore been 

applied only as a matter of policy. To the contrary, from the inception of this armed 

conflict, I believe they have applied (and have been understood to apply) as a matter 

of law. 

11. Who should sign off on such targeting decisions? What degree of confidence 

should be required? Should judicial or some other independent review be required for these decisions? 

I believe that once the United States is engaged in an armed conflict, target decisionmaking is a quintessential commander in chief function. This function is applicable in an armed conflict authorized by Congress, or when responding to an attack 

thrust upon the Nation pursuant to the President’s inherent constitutional authority 

to defend the Nation. Accordingly, I believe that it is the President, acting in his 

own capacity or through subordinate officers, who is responsible for making decisions to attack a nominated target during armed conflict. 

Accordingly, I believe any attempt to subject this decisionmaking process to judicial or some other type of external review would represent a genuine and unjustified 

intrusion into the President’s express Article II powers. Nor do I believe there is 

any legitimate justification for such review. The obligation to ‘‘take care that the law 

be faithfully executed’’ includes, by implication, ensuring compliance with the LOAC 

when engaged in hostilities. Every subordinate officer in the chain of command is 

sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution, which by implication also requires 

compliance with the LOAC during hostilities. As noted in several prior questions, 

the level of commitment to ensuring such compliance—in structure, process, education, training, and internal oversight—is more significant today than at any time 

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in our history. As one intimately familiar with all of these aspects of the compliance 

process, I am perplexed at the common assertion that there is insufficient oversight 

for targeting decisions. 

Even a cursory review of the deliberate target decisionmaking process indicated 

multiple levels of review. Furthermore, Department of Defense Directives mandate 

investigation into any credible indication of a violation of the law of armed conflict, 

and the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides a highly credible mechanism for 

holding individuals accountable for such violations. This mosaic of process, training, 

and accountability is more than sufficient to mitigate any risk of abuse of power. 

Furthermore, the obligation imposed by the LOAC both to attack only military objectives (which includes enemy belligerents) and to make all feasible efforts to mitigate the risk to civilians by implication imposes an obligation to limit attack to only 

individuals reasonably assessed to qualify as enemy belligerents. While the law does 

not include an express articulation of a ‘‘burden of proof’’ that must be satisfied to 

justify attack, it is relatively clear that to qualify as reasonable, the decision must 

be made on the best available information and must at least render it more likely 

than not that the individual is not a civilian. 

I certainly understand why there may be those who question the efficacy of this 

process, and who call for some external review and/or authorization mechanism. 

There are no more momentous decisions than those resulting in the taking of 

human life, and those who worry about abuse of authority understandably demand 

greater transparency and oversight. However, our division of constitutional authority entrusts the executive branch with these decisions, and transparency will always 

present increased risk of disclosing sensitive information. It strikes me that vesting 

trust to leverage the Nation’s combat power wisely and lawfully in those trained 

and devoted to the process of leading military forces represents a logical balance of 

interests. 

I also recognize how the undisputed evidence that innocent civilians are killed 

during attacks on belligerent targets may seem to many to be inconsistent with the 

law. This, however, is not the case. The LOAC regulates armed hostilities, an endeavor that involves the use of highly destructive combat power and the inevitable 

suffering associated with such use. While the law obligates parties to a conflict to 

take all feasible measures to mitigate this suffering, especially when civilians are 

the potential victims, it also includes a necessary recognition that when unavoidable 

and justified pursuant to proportionality analysis, such suffering may occur. Likewise, the consternation that it is too ‘‘easy’’ to decide who is a lawful target is, in 

my view, fundamentally flawed. I would suggest that few people who have not experienced the human cost of armed conflict better understand the immense moral burden associated with a decision to order a lethal attack than experienced military 

leaders. These are the individuals who must live with these difficult decisions, and 

to suggest that they take this responsibility lightly is unfortunately ill informed. 

In this regard, I find it particularly ironic that our Nation entrusts these same 

leaders with the judgment to make decisions to place our own sons and daughters 

into harm’s way. Yet there is no suggestion that these decisions must be subject to 

some external review process. If our trust in their judgment to make sound military 

decisions is sufficient enough to entrust our sons and daughters to them, how is it 

insufficient when the potential consequence is an attack on an enemy belligerent? 

These leaders spend their entire professional careers immersed in the operational, 

moral, ethical, and legal aspects of employing combat power to ‘‘fight and win’’ the 

Nation’s wars. They also rise through the ranks, demonstrating the expertise and 

judgment necessary to achieve selection for the highest levels of authority, including 

Senate confirmation. How a Federal judge, or some external oversight mechanism, 

could be more competent to make these difficult decisions than these leaders is perplexing. 

I do not question the ability of those tasked with such external oversight to master the complexities of the law of armed conflict. However, I believe that these individuals could rarely (if ever) match the type of contextual understanding—namely 

expertise in the planning and execution of military operations for the purpose of 

achieving strategic, operational, and tactical objectives—essential for truly understanding the proper application of this law. Ultimately, it should be those whom our 

Nation trains and prepares to command the execution of military operations that 

are entrusted with the awesome responsibility of target selection and engagement. 

12. What is the legal authority for targeting a U.S. person and should a different 

legal standard or process apply to such targeting? 

I do not believe that citizenship is a relevant factor in assessing the legality of 

attacking a nominated target in the context of an armed conflict. Instead, like any 

other individual, the LOAC dictates when a U.S. citizen is the lawful object of atVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:10 May 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\88026.TXT JUNE
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tack. It is certainly not unprecedented for U.S. citizens to join the ranks of enemy 

belligerent forces, and when they do so they become subject to lawful attack pursuant to the identical legal criteria applicable to their belligerent comrades. Thus, 

when a U.S. citizen who has been properly identified as such a member is subject 

to attack with lethal combat power, that citizen has received the process he is due. 

Of course, there may be compelling policy considerations that warrant narrowing 

the scope of this targeting authority. There is nothing unusual about imposing such 

policy restrictions on otherwise lawful belligerent targeting. Rules of engagement 

are utilized routinely to impose such restrictions where the President or subordinate 

commanders determine that the cost/benefit equation justifies such restriction. Accordingly, requiring satisfaction of an additional layer of policy-based considerations—such as a requirement to exhaust all feasible, less harmful means to subdue 

the individual—as a precondition to targeting known U.S. citizens with lethal combat power is certainly not inconsistent with the law of armed conflict. It is not, however, legally mandated, and therefore should be left to the realm of policy. 

13. Should use of RPVs and other methods and means of employing combat power 

be restricted to Department of Defense operations, and if not, should the same 

legal authorities apply to such operations? 

In my opinion, the LOAC establishes the controlling legal framework for ‘‘lethal 

targeting’’ regardless of which entity employs combat power on behalf of the United 

States. No individual should be subject to attack with potentially deadly combat 

power unless that individual is legitimately determined to be an enemy belligerent 

operative or a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities in the context of an armed 

conflict. In all other contexts, I do not believe that domestic law, policy, or international law permit government agents to resort to deadly force as a measure of 

first resort. 

It is also my opinion that the conduct of such operations should be restricted to 

the Department of Defense. However, I do not believe that I, or anyone else lacking 

access to highly classified information, can legitimately claim to know with certainty 

the nature of ongoing operations involving other U.S. Government agencies. Although there is what I consider to be substantial speculation on the nature of these 

operations, there may be aspects of them (for example, joint target analysis and selection, or integration of DOD assets into the operational capabilities of other agencies) that ensure significant DOD involvement in the targeting process. 

Nor do I feel competent to comment on potentially sensitive and complex issues 

of diplomacy and policy that may necessitate utilization of other government agencies to conduct such operations. However, I strongly believe that if this is in fact 

occurring, those agencies and the President bear a legal obligation to ensure the use 

of a targeting process that fully complies with the law of armed conflict. Ultimately, 

my opinion that these operations are best left in the hands of the Department of 

Defense is based on the same considerations that lead me to object to calls for external review or oversight of targeting decisions—namely my inherent confidence in 

the culture and processes embedded within DOD to ensure that such operations 

comply with the law of armed conflict. While I have the greatest respect for the professionalism and valor of the devoted patriots who serve in other government agencies—service that often involves equal if not greater personal risk than their DOD 

counterparts—I simply do not believe that these organizations are built on the type 

of warfighting culture that exists in the military. From the inception of a military 

officer’s professional career, he or she is immersed in a culture that focuses on developing morally grounded warriors—individuals who understand the unfortunate 

necessity to employ combat power on behalf of the Nation but also understand that 

doing so in a manner that is legally compliant and morally sound is essential to 

strategic success. I believe leaders developed in this culture are best-suited to make 

use of force decisions on behalf of our Nation. 

14. Under what circumstances could lethal military force be used in the United 

States and is such use authorized by the AUMF? 

I believe this question is largely hypothetical in nature. To my knowledge, there 

has been no indication by the executive branch of an intent to employ, or even consideration of employing, combat power within the territory of the United States. 

Even during the Bush administration, during oral argument in the case of Jose 

Padilla, when Justice Kennedy challenged the acting Solicitor General on whether 

Padilla could have been shot while exiting a commercial aircraft in Chicago airport, 

the response emphatically disavowed any such consideration. 

Is it conceivable that a situation in extremis might lead a President to determine 

that it was necessary to utilize such force to protect the Nation from a threat within 

our territory? Although I believe the answer is yes, I also believe that no President 

would resort to such a response unless it was a genuine option of last resort. I beVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:10 May 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\88026.TXT JUNE
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lieve the immediate response to the September 11th terrorist attacks provides a useful example of such a situation in extremis. In response to the uncertainty regarding 

the potential for further aviation-borne suicide attacks, military aircraft were ordered to shoot down, if necessary, commercial aircraft flying in restricted airspace 

above New York or Washington, DC. In my view, this was a lawful order, based 

on the fact that the executive assessed that the Nation was under attack (which indicated the existence of an armed conflict), and that such aircraft would have qualified as lawful objects of attack pursuant to the law of armed conflict. In no other 

situation has there been any suggestion of resorting to combat power to respond to 

a terrorist threat within U.S. territory, which I believe indicates that while such use 

is theoretically possible, situations triggering such use are highly unlikely to arise. 

Nonetheless, were the Nation subject to an attack of a sufficient magnitude to 

render a law enforcement response ineffective, conducted by members of al Qaeda 

or co-belligerent forces, I believe the AUMF would authorize a military response to 

defend the Nation. 

15. What is the role of Congress in overseeing the use of lethal force pursuant 

to the AUMF, and can the process be made more transparent without compromising operational security? 

As noted in several prior questions, I believe Congress has an essential role in 

ensuring that ongoing military operations fall within the proper scope of the AUMF. 

Central to this role is the need to ensure consistency between the scope of authority 

provided by the AUMF and principles of international law related to the use of military force to protect vital U.S. national interests, principles that have guided such 

uses of force by our Nation from inception. Accordingly, Congress must respond cautiously and judiciously to any call for expanding the scope of the AUMF, and must 

be animated by analogous prudence in response to calls to revoke this statute. Furthermore, Congress must ensure that any expansion to the scope of the AUMF is 

consistent with principles of international law, and therefore only consider such expansion to cover terrorist groups that present a threat level sufficient to reasonably 

justify characterizing the U.S. response as an armed conflict. 

I also believe Congress, through close coordination and collaboration with the executive, must contribute to dialogue regarding when the nature of the al Qaeda 

threat has been degraded sufficiently to justify reversion back to a pure law enforcement modality for addressing this threat. However, I do not believe that congressional oversight extends to review of specific targeting decisions or imposing any 

type of oversight mechanism that would require congressional endorsement of these 

decisions. In short, Congress should allow the executive, acting principally through 

the Department of Defense, to continue to plan and execute operations for the purpose of disrupting and/or disabling the al Qaeda threat, but should also periodically 

review such operations, and the process associated with them, to ensure the AUMF 

is being faithfully executed. 

In terms of increased transparency, it is my opinion that Congress should be extremely cautious in demanding public disclosure of aspects of the targeting process 

beyond those that have already been disclosed by the executive. To that end, I believe it is important to note that the executive has disclosed substantial aspects of 

this process. In fact, in my 30 years of military and academic service, I cannot recall 

a period of time where executive officials have been anywhere as open in disclosing 

strategic and operational decisionmaking processes than during this conflict. I believe demanding more transparency poses significant operational risk, and is, at this 

point in time, unjustified and unnecessary. 

While calls for greater transparency are certainly understandable, I believe each 

additional layer of disclosure risks compromising the effectiveness of U.S. operations. Ultimately, it is this effectiveness that must remain the priority interest in 

the transparency debate. It must also be noted that this risk is exacerbated by the 

nature of the threat and the threat identification methodology. Disclosing target 

identification methodology to a conventional enemy poses little risk—that enemy 

knows exactly what indicia of threat identification friendly forces will rely on, and 

cannot modify that indicia. With an unconventional enemy, this is not the case. Instead, disclosure of these indicia will enable the enemy to alter patterns of behavior 

in order to avoid attack. In my view, Congress certainly has a legitimate interest 

in being made aware of such indicia in a forum that ensures operational security. 

However, like so many wartime decisions, the public appetite for greater insight into 

these processes must yield to considerations of operational success. 

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Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Corn. 

Mr. Goldsmith. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JACK GOLDSMITH, PROFESSOR OF LAW, 

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Thank you, Senator Levin, Senator Inhofe, 

members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify. 

I have been thinking, talking, and arguing about the AUMF for 

a long time and on the need for Congress to reengage with the 

meaning of that statute, the scope, and its operation. Nothing could 

have demonstrated that need more than the testimony on the last 

panel which made clear that the enemy we face has changed quite 

a lot since September 11, that al Qaeda itself has become dispersed 

geographically and organizationally, and that the United States 

has, both the military and the CIA, changed to meet this threat. 

The war is now taking place in many countries around the world, 

as acknowledged today. The Secretary tried to wind it back a little 

bit at the end, but he said that at one point the AUMF included 

force against groups in Mali, Libya, Syria, and Congo. He walked 

it back a little bit at the end by saying he did not necessarily mean 

that there was authority under the AUMF. He did not deny that 

there was, just it did not necessarily mean that. This war has 

changed quite dramatically since September 11. 

I believe that the basic principles of interpretation that the executive branch has been using to expand the AUMF are legitimate. 

I believe that co-belligerency is a basis for extending the scope of 

the AUMF. I think that is a traditional basis in our history. 

But through a series of steps, each of which are legitimate, we 

have come to a place that is quite different from where we began. 

The question is: is Congress on board for that? A lot of the Senators seemed surprised at the scope of the AUMF, as it has been 

interpreted by DOD. Indeed, I learned more in this hearing about 

the scope of the AUMF than in all of my study in the last 4 or 5 

years. I learned that the war under the AUMF is probably going 

to go on for 10 or 20 years, that in fact, as I suspected, the enemy 

is murky and difficult to pin down, and the organizational structures are changing a lot and it is difficult to know which groups 

are associated with al Qaeda and not. 

I think it is very important that Congress engage this issue. If 

nothing else, I think asking these questions and all the questions 

you asked in your request to this panel were interesting. All those 

questions are important to be answered in one form or another. I 

think it is more important to ask those questions and to surface 

the answers than it is to reach any particular resolution. 

Let me just say briefly there are two potential avenues for reform. One is: what do you think about the AUMF and how it has 

been interpreted? Are you satisfied with the process whereby the 

executive branch interprets it to extend to places as the first panel 

suggested? It seems to me that is the first order of business, to figure out what is going on under the AUMF and whether you are 

satisfied that the process of expansion of the war is appropriate, is 

legally appropriate, and that you understand what is happening. 

The second question is: what to do with entities that fall outside 

of the AUMF, extra-AUMF threats? Frankly, as Senator King said, 

101 

1 Robert Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism, 112 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013) (available at http://ssrn.com/ 

abstract=2138623) 

if you interpret the AUMF broadly enough, you do not need to 

worry about extra-AUMF threats. So when the panelists from DOD 

were saying they are very satisfied with current authorities, one 

would like to know what that means, how broadly are they interpreting the AUMF, how broadly are they interpreting Article II to 

be satisfied? 

It seems to me that the first question is the AUMF and then the 

question of extra-AUMF threats should be addressed especially 

since DOD said that this war will be going on for 10 or 20 years 

at least. 

With regard to extra-AUMF threats, I have suggested proposals 

about how to deal with them. The basic question is: are you satisfied with the President’s Article II powers to address extra-AUMF 

threats. I believe and this panel, to my surprise, appears to 

robustly believe, that the President has robust Article II powers to 

exercise self-defense against emerging threats. I think those powers 

are robust. I do not think they are appropriate for long-term conflict against the same set of groups. So if a group arises that we 

are in armed conflict with that presents a persistent threat, I do 

not believe it is outside the AUMF. I do not believe that Article II 

will suffice for that. I think Congress needs to engage and authorize that. 

I will stop there. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Goldsmith follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MR. JACK GOLDSMITH

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify. 

The committee’s 15 questions cover a wide range of topics that do not admit of 

simple or brief answers. I will try to get at some of the relevant issues in three 

parts. I will first explain how the nature of the war against Islamist terrorists has 

changed in the past dozen years. Then I will then explain why these changes warrant Congress’s reconsideration of the contours of and oversight for the war. I will 

finally discuss particular reforms. 

I. HOW THE WAR HAS CHANGED

On September 14, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military 

Force (AUMF). The AUMF, as it is called, authorized the President ‘‘to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order 

to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by 

such nations, organizations, or persons.’’ 

The AUMF focused on entities responsible for September 11. In the fall of 2001 

those entities, including al Qaeda, were located primarily in Afghanistan. In the last 

dozen years, al Qaeda has undergone what Professor Robert Chesney describes as 

an ‘‘extraordinary process of simultaneous decimation, diffusion, and fragmentation, 

one upshot of which has been the proliferation of loosely-related regional groups 

that have varying degrees of connection to the remaining core al Qaeda leadership.’’ 1 The executive branch expanded the kinetic and intelligence war beyond Afghanistan to other places around the globe against al Qaeda affiliates that were not 

in existence on September 11, much less responsible for the September 11 attacks. 

Both legal and organizational innovations accompanied and made possible the expansion of the war. On the legal side, the executive branch interpreted the AUMF 

to extend to organizations associated or affiliated with al Qaeda, under the theory 

that they are co-belligerents. It also interpreted the AUMF—which, unlike some 

prior congressional approvals of military force, lacks geographical limitation—to auVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:10 May 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\88026.TXT JUNE
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2 I believe both interpretive moves are legitimate. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 

Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2047, 2107–2127 

(2005). 3See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife, The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the 

Ends of the Earth (2013); Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul 

of the Obama Presidency (2012); David Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and 

Surprising Use of American Power (2012). 4 Inaugural Address by President Barack Obama, January 21, 2013. 

5 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘‘How to End the Forever War,’’ Speech to the Oxford Union, May 7, 

2013, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/2013–5–7-corrected-koh-oxfordunion-speech-as-delivered.pdf; Jeh Charles Johnson, Jr., ‘‘The Conflict Against Al Qaeda and its 

Affiliates: How Will It End?,’’ Speech to the Oxford Union, November 30, 2012, http:// 

www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/jeh-johnson-speech-atthe-oxford-union/. 6See New America Foundation, The Year of the Drone, available at http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones; Craig Whitlock, Pentagon Deploys Small Number of Troops in 

War Torn Mali, Washington Post, April 30, 2013; Thom Shanker, Military Sees Broader Role 

for Special Operations Forces, in Peace and War, New York Times, April 2, 2013; Bradley 

Klapper, U.S. training Syrian Forces in Jordan, Associated Press, March 26, 2013; Craig 

Whitlock, Drone Base in Niger Gives U.S. a Strategic Foothold in West Africa, Washington Post, 

March 21, 2013; Greg Miller and Karen DeYoung, Administration Debates Stretching 9/11 Law 

to Go After New al-Qaeda Offshoots, Washington Post, March 6, 2013. 

thorize force in many nations outside Afghanistan where affiliated or associated al 

Qaeda forces are found.2

On the organizational side, both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the 

Defense Department changed quite a lot. The CIA became committed to targeted 

killing via unmanned aerial vehicles, or ‘‘drones’’, and reorganized its intelligence 

mission to support drone warfare. The Defense Department’s Joint Special Operations Forces (JSOC) grew rapidly and engaged in an expanded array of stealth operations (including but not limited to drone fire operations) and intelligence missions (including human intelligence missions) needed to support these operations. 

These innovations have undergirded a mostly officially secret geographical expansion of the ‘‘war on terrorism’’ since the fall of 2001. This committee presumably 

knows the details of this ‘‘shadow war,’’ including its lethal force elements and any 

rendition, proxy detention, proxy force, and related elements. But U.S. citizens know 

very few details, at least from official U.S. Government channels, because the operations are highly classified and often covert. Presidential Reports under the War 

Powers Resolutions were designed to ensure that Congress and the American people 

were aware of presidential expansions of war. But these Reports now regularly contain classified annexes, and they do not purport to cover CIA operations in any 

event. As a result, the American people know about the shadow war primarily 

through journalistic accounts. These accounts report that the United States has 

since September 11 engaged in military or paramilitary operations in at least a 

dozen countries, and probably a much higher number.3

President Obama proclaimed in his second inaugural address that a ‘‘decade of 

war is now ending.’’ 4 It does appear that heavy-footprint war against the Taliban 

in Afghanistan is winding down. Two former senior legal officials in the Obama administration have given speeches that some interpret to indicate that the shadow 

war outside Afghanistan is also winding down or will end soon.5 I do not know the 

intelligence basis for these speeches. I nonetheless do not believe the shadow war 

will end any time soon. 

Consider a few recent news reports. The United States has engaged in over a 

dozen drone strikes this year in Pakistan and Yemen; it is expanding its drone capabilities in North Africa to address the growing Islamist (including al Qaeda affiliate) 

threats there; JSOC now has boots-on-the-ground in Mali (among many other 

places); the United States is training Syrian opposition forces; U.S. Special Operations Command is planning to significantly increase its presence in Africa, Asia 

and Latin America; the Obama administration is debating whether the AUMF extends to Ansar al-Sharia in Libya and the al-Nusra Front in Syria; it is also debating whether the AUMF extends not just to associates of al Qaeda, but also to ‘‘associates of associates.’’6

These and similar reports suggest that the shadow war against Islamist terrorist 

threats is morphing but not winding down. I will proceed on this assumption—an 

assumption I believe is implicit in most of the questions this committee asked the 

panelists to address. 

II. WHY CONGRESS MUST ENGAGE

Congress’ main engagement with the shadow war is the AUMF, which is nearly 

a dozen years old. It is long past time for Congress as a body to scrutinize the shadVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:10 May 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\88026.TXT JUNE
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7Senator Durbin on the Budget, Social Security, Drones, Washington Wire, Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2013, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/03/20/transcript-sen-durbin-on-the-budget-social-security-drones/. 8The Honorable Michael E. Leiter, Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on 

Foreign Relations Counterterrorism Policies and Priorities: Addressing the Evolving Threat, 

March 20, 2013, at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Michael—Leiter—Testimony.pdf. 9Miller and DeYoung, Supra note 5. 

ow war fought pursuant to the AUMF and to clarify publicly its legal basis and 

proper oversight mechanisms. 

The AUMF is out of date in two ways. First, through a series of executive branch 

interpretations, each legitimate in itself, the AUMF is now deemed to authorize a 

war that is quite different from the one Congress contemplated a dozen years ago. 

As Senator Durbin recently said, ‘‘I don’t believe many, if any, of us believed when 

we voted for [the AUMF] that we were voting for the longest war in the history of 

the United States and putting a stamp of approval on a war policy against terrorism 

that, 10 years plus later, we’re still using.’’ 7 To the extent Senator Durbin’s views 

are widely shared, Congress should determine whether it approves of the shadow 

war being fought pursuant to the AUMF, including the method by which the AUMF 

conflict expands. 

Second, emerging al Qaeda-inspired Islamist terrorist organizations are increasingly difficult to fit within the AUMF. Michael Leiter, the former Director of the 

National Counterterrorism Center, recently testified: ‘‘With the continued evolution 

of the terror threat and most notably its increasing distance from the September 

11 attacks and core al Qaeda, I believe it is the time to re-evaluate the AUMF to 

better fit today’s threat landscape.’’ 8 Similarly, an unnamed senior Obama administration official recently told the Washington Post that ‘‘[t]he farther we get away 

from September 11 and what this legislation was initially focused upon . . . we can 

see from both a theoretical but also a practical standpoint that groups that have 

arisen or morphed become more difficult to fit in.’’ The official added that the waning relevance of the AUMF is ‘‘requiring a whole policy and legal look.’’ 9 That policy 

and legal look should not only take place in secret within the executive branch. It 

should also take place in Congress and in public. 

Another reason why Congress should now engage is that its authorizing and oversight processes are outdated. The CIA component of the shadow war is conducted 

pursuant to a very thin legal framework for covert action that was not designed to 

be a central legitimating tool for warfare and that contains open-ended reporting requirements and no identified substantive constraints. Congress should determine 

whether this framework suffices for modern stealth warfare, and if not, how it 

should be changed. Congress should similarly consider this committee’s even-lessspecified oversight mechanisms for Defense Department operations. I am told that 

the members of this committee are satisfied with these mechanisms. But the mechanisms are mostly grounded in secret custom, not public law, and the American people cannot assess them and thus cannot know whether to have confidence in them. 

This last consideration points to another reason why Congress should engage: the 

shadow war is unnecessarily—and, increasingly, self-defeatingly—secretive. There 

are growing indications, and complaints, that our heavy reliance on drones is a strategic failure. This is obviously a vital issue for the Nation, but it cannot be debated 

intelligently in public because our drone operations are classified. More broadly, excessive executive branch secrecy is weakening trust in the administration’s conduct 

of the shadow war. A good deal of the misplaced concern about drone strikes in the 

homeland against Americans has resulted from the administration’s stilted explanations about the legal limits and secret processes for killing U.S. citizen al Qaeda 

suspects. These stilted explanations, in turn, are driven by the requirements of classified information and covert action. Excessive secrecy also underlies growing mistrust and doubts—at home, and abroad—about the administration’s claims about 

the rate of civilian casualties, the soundness of its legal analyses, and the quality 

of its internal deliberations. Congress can and should help the executive branch 

bring the shadow war out of the shadows, even if it makes the conduct of the war 

harder abroad. 

The final reason why Congress should engage on this issue is constitutional. The 

precise constitutional allocation of warpowers between the first two branches of government is contested. But one need not resolve that constitutional issue to conclude 

that Congress has important constitutional powers and duties in this area, and that 

pursuant to them Congress (and not some subset of the institution) should engage 

in fundamental review, guidance, and approval of the basic conduct of a war at least 

every dozen or so years. 

104 

10 Id. 11 I and others discuss the complicated pros and cons of these approaches in Robert Chesney, 

Jack Goldsmith, Matthew C. Waxman, and Benjamin Wittes, A Statutory Framework for NextGeneration Terrorist Threats, Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law, pp. 8– 

12, at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Statutory-Framework-for-Next-Generation-Terrorist-Threats.pdf. 

III. REFORMS

It is much more important for Congress to engage in a thorough and open review 

of the United States’ shadow war than that it adopt any specific reform. Moreover, 

it is very difficult to make firm reform recommendations without detailed intelligence information about the nature of the threat that the public lacks. With these 

large caveats in mind, below I outline what I think are the contours of proper reform. 

A. AUMF Threats 

The executive branch appears to have interpreted the AUMF to extend to the 

Haqqani network in Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, and 

perhaps to al Qaeda in Iraq and al Shabaab in Somalia (or at least to some elements of these latter groups). The administration is reportedly debating whether the 

AUMF should further extend to the al-Nusra Front in Syria and Ansar al-Sharia 

in Libya, and to extend its reach to associates of associates of al Qaeda.10

There are legal advantages to continuing to tie the expansion of the shadow war 

to the AUMF, because the link to September 11, however tenuous, puts a potential 

substantive limit on the expansion of the war. But Congress must play a more extensive role in this process of expansion, which threatens to continue indefinitely 

on the basis of secret executive branch interpretations even as those interpretations 

become more tenuous. At a minimum Congress should state whether it approves 

this piecemeal expansion of the AUMF; whether it agrees that the proper standard 

for expansion is co-belligerency; and what the standard for co-belligerency should 

look like precisely. Congress could also adopt a more extensive role in approving any 

expansion of the war under the AUMF to new groups. It could do this by requiring 

the administration to inform it of proposed groups to be added under the AUMF, 

subject to an approval process in Congress. Or it could establish an administrative 

process for expansion within the executive branch, built on the model of the State 

Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization designation process. 

B. Extra-AUMF Threats 

Newly threatening terrorist groups inspired by al Qaeda but insufficiently tied to 

it to come under the AUMF present a growing and difficult legal problem. What to 

do about this threat depends on the severity, scope, and resilience of the threat. To 

the extent an extra-AUMF group presents a discrete and non-recurring threat of attack to the United States, the President’s traditional Article II authorities to use 

self-defensive force probably suffice. To the extent the extra-AUMF group presents 

a more persistent and dangerous threat that rises to armed conflict or imminently 

threatened armed conflict, and to the extent it thus requires long-term U.S. military 

engagement, constitutional principle and political prudence counsel Congress to assess the threat and approve military force. Congress should also assess and approve 

the basic authorities entailed by such force, including whether the nature of a specific armed conflict and our strategic and tactical interests warrant authority for 

law-of-war military detention. There are several architectural options here, including discrete group-by-group congressional authorization (either with or without a 

process of executive branch recommendation), or a general congressional articulation 

of the standard for the use of force combined with a congressionally-sanctioned administrative designation process and significant ex post scrutiny by Congress.11

C. Statutory Accoutrements 

With regard to both statutory guidance for AUMF threats and a potentially new 

statutory authorization for extra-AUMF threats, Congress should clarify a number 

of contentious matters. One matter, already mentioned, is the availability and scope 

of detention authority. Congress should also weigh in on whether American citizens 

are included within the use of force, whether the use of force extends to the homeland, and under what circumstances force is warranted in either context. These important matters, on which Americans are divided, should not be left to the device 

of secret legal interpretation by administration lawyers. Congress should also calibrate whether the AUMF applies anywhere outside the United States where covered 

persons are found, any appropriate limiting criteria, and whether standards for targeting and detention are identical. I also recommend a sunset provision for any clarVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:10 May 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\88026.TXT JUNE
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ification of the AUMF or authorization of force against extra-AUMF threats. A sunset provision belies the notion of temporally unlimited war, and ensures renewed 

congressional engagement in light of new information. 

D. Accountability and Openness 

The shadow war is inherently secret, and secrecy is the enemy of accountability. 

Secrecy is often necessary to make operations abroad more effective or more acceptable to the foreign government. But it comes at a cost to democratic self-governance 

at home. It also adversely affects trust in the war and in the presidency to the extent that it prevents open and candid explanation of what is going on in the war. 

Congress should push the executive branch to disclose more fully those matters 

that can be discussed openly, including the number of strikes and operations, their 

geographic sweep, estimates of civilian casualties, and the basis for these estimates. 

It should demand maximum feasible openness about the procedural elements for 

listing groups as covered entities and for targeting determinations, as well as the 

legal opinions or at least legal determinations that underlie the war framework. 

Congress can also do more—as it has done in the last few years in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act context—to require detailed classified reporting and auditing from relevant department and agency inspectors general as to both the vitality 

of internal processes and the integrity of the intelligence underlying the listings and 

claims about civilian and enemy deaths. 

These proposals may portend to some an erosion of traditional presidential authority to conduct war, but I do not see them that way. The conflict we are engaged 

in is entirely novel in its unusual enemy, its temporal and geographic scope, and 

its myriad stealth aspects. The legal regime for the conflict—including the accountability and openness mechanisms for that regime—needs to reflect these realities. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Goldsmith. 

Mr. Roth? 

STATEMENT OF MR. KENNETH ROTH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 

Mr. ROTH. Thank you very much, Chairman Levin, Senator 

Inhofe, and members of the committee. 

My organization, Human Rights Watch, monitors rights in about 

90 countries around the world, including basically in every situation where there is an armed conflict where we have people on the 

ground. My testimony today is going to be from a rights perspective, and I have to say that from that perspective, probably the 

most important distinction is the one between war and peace. 

In peace, one can still kill if you are a law enforcement agent, 

but only if necessary to meet an imminent lethal threat. One can 

still detain but only with full due process. 

In war, in many cases those rules are significantly liberalized. 

One can kill a combatant on a battlefield. One can detain often 

without charge or trial. 

So the basic rights to life and liberty are at stake in this war/ 

peace distinction. That is especially true with the kind of threat 

that this Nation faces where there is not a traditional battlefield 

or traditional enemy to limit the application of warpowers. 

With that in mind, while I fully recognize the seriousness of the 

threats facing this Nation, I also want to stress the importance of 

pursuing those threats in a way that maximizes the protection of 

our rights. I am concerned here not simply about the actions of the 

U.S. Government but also about the precedents that the U.S. Government sets for other governments that may pay much less attention to the rights of their citizens or others. 

Just to illustrate the concern, there are many serious security 

threats that are out in the world, not just terrorism, but also drug 

traffickers, international criminal gangs, and the like. What is to 

106 

stop a nation from simply declaring a war against, say, a drug trafficking organization, not the metaphorical war against drugs that 

we are all used to, but a real war? I think we have to be careful 

in the precedents that we set in going after terrorist groups that 

may pose a threat but that may be more appropriately pursued 

through more traditional law enforcement means rather than resort to exceptional warpowers. 

This is not just a concoction in my mind. China already came 

very close to using a drone to summarily kill a drug trafficker that 

it was trying to pursue. In the end, it captured him. But it is easy 

to imagine the Chinas or the Russias of the world deciding to declare war on the Dalai Lama and his splittists or Uighur nationalists or Chechen nationalists and the like. We have to be very careful about the precedents set when the United States sets aside the 

traditional rights associated with law enforcement and resorts to 

the exceptional treatment of rights that exist in time of war. 

Now, there is going to come a time when the AUMF’s authority 

will end. There was a debate this morning about how soon that is, 

but it is quite foreseeable that the war with the Taliban is going 

to end fairly quickly. Certainly the core al Qaeda is close to being 

decimated. The definition of associated forces, the topic of much debate this morning, I think if properly understood, is limited to cobelligerents and clearly does not include groups like al Nusra 

which, despite their ideological affinity with al Qaeda, there is zero 

evidence that they are pursuing the United States in a threatening 

manner. 

So I think we have to be very careful about extending or expanding warpowers unnecessarily because of the rights costs involved. 

So my recommendation would be, first of all, to note that there 

is plenty that the President and the U.S. Government have to defend ourselves without extending those warpowers. Certainly our 

intelligence and monitoring capacities are greatly bolstered since 

September 11, 12 years ago. We have had much discussion about 

the inherent authority of self-defense or Article II powers. I would 

add to that simply the police powers the President has to use law 

enforcement means, including lethal force in appropriate circumstances. The President certainly has not asked for any extended war authorization, and what we do not want, I think, is any 

kind of revamp of the AUMF which would amount to an openended forever-war authority, one in which war becomes routine 

rather than exceptional. 

The proposal that new groups be periodically listed I think would 

be very difficult given the morphing character of many of these 

groups, and I worry very much about one of the proposals that has 

been bandied about, that Congress, in essence, writes a blank 

check allowing the administration to write in the names over time 

of the latest security threat. I actually think that would put Congress in a weaker authority with respect to its warpowers rather 

than insisting on the President coming and asking for authority to 

pursue any particular group not currently covered by the AUMF. 

I want to take a moment, if I could, to address the drone issue 

because I fully recognize that the use of drones can actually be an 

improvement from the perspective of protecting civilians, given 

their precision, given the ability to linger before actually firing, 

107 

they do have that capacity. But my concern is with the lack of a 

clear articulation by the administration of what the rules are limiting its ability to mount these lethal attacks. We certainly did not 

hear it this morning. There were lots of vague references to the 

laws of armed conflict, but there is no transparency, no clear definition about what cannot be done. So as a result, we have deep 

concerns about whether the drones in fact are being deployed lawfully. 

There was mention of the reported signature strikes. Assistant 

Secretary Sheehan said that was only for core leaders, but there 

is considerable evidence that is not the case, that the factors going 

into making one a signature strike target include things like bearing arms openly or hanging out with the wrong people, which 

frankly are attributes of many, many people in places like Yemen, 

Somalia, or northwestern Pakistan. Drivers, cooks, doctors, and financiers in these areas could all very well be associated with the 

local al Qaeda or al Shabaab. They could very well be appropriate 

terrorist concerns, but they would not be combatants under the 

laws of armed conflicts. I am very concerned that this loose definition of signature strikes is allowing these people who may have 

criminal associations to be treated as combatants and summarily 

killed when they should not be. 

There is also the question as to combatants against whom. Even 

if some of these people are combatants, there is very little evidence 

that we have seen that they are plotting against the United States 

rather than against the Yemeni Government or the Somali Government, and I think many Americans would be surprised to learn 

that the drone attacks are being launched in defense of other nations rather than in defense of ourselves. We do not know any of 

this for sure because of the shroud of secrecy, but there is deep reason for concern. 

I want to stress that you do not need a war to use drones. The 

policing power allows drones to be used to meet an imminent 

threat. But there is a real question as to whether even that limitation is being respected, given the lack of transparency and the 

vague standards being used. 

A final point on Guantanamo. I think it is fair to say that Guantanamo at this stage is an unmitigated disaster for the United 

States. It is hurting, not helping, our security. I would not want 

to do anything in extending or amending the AUMF that makes it 

easier to keep Guantanamo open. I think we have seen by now that 

Federal trials are much tougher and a much more certain way of 

prosecuting terrorist suspects. There is a much lesser recidivism 

rate of people who have gone through the U.S. criminal justice system as terrorist suspects as opposed to people who have gone 

through Guantanamo. Guantanamo is not a long-term solution. 

Even the Bush administration felt pressure to release people. We 

have to recognize that given the difficulties of military commission 

prosecutions, we are going to face the moment sooner rather than 

later when a war theory is no longer going to allow detention at 

Guantanamo, and if we have squandered the opportunity for criminal prosecutions in the regular courts, the United States is going 

to be less safe, not more safe. 

108 

So again, coming back to the core issue, this is yet one more reason why I think our aim should be to wind down the AUMF as 

quickly as possible, certainly not to expand it or amend it further. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Roth follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MR. KENNETH ROTH

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, other members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify at this important hearing. My name is Kenneth Roth. I am the executive director of Human Rights Watch, an independent 

nongovernmental organization operating in some 90 countries worldwide for the 

purpose of investigating and reporting on human rights conditions and defending 

basic rights. Human Rights Watch holds governments and others to the standards 

of international human rights law and, in times of armed conflict, to international 

humanitarian law, or the laws of war. In this testimony, I will address three main 

issues: (1) how the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) should 

be understood today and whether it should be extended or modified; (2) what laws 

should govern drone attacks; and (3) what should be done about Guantanamo and 

long-term detention without trial. 

THE AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE

When it comes to our most basic rights, there is probably no more important distinction than the line between peace and war. In peacetime, the government can use 

lethal force only if necessary to stop an imminent threat to life, and it can detain 

only after according full due process. But in wartime, the government can kill combatants on the battlefield, and it has greatly enhanced power to detain people without charge or trial. So, safeguarding the right to life and liberty depends in important part on ensuring that the government is not operating by wartime rules when 

it should be abiding by peacetime rules. 

Human Rights Watch does not ordinarily take positions on whether a party to a 

conflict is justified in taking up arms. Rather, once armed conflict breaks out, we 

generally confine ourselves to monitoring how both sides to the conflict fight the 

war, with the aim of enforcing international standards protecting noncombatants. 

In the Latin terms used among legal experts, we focus on jus in bello, not jus ad 

bellum. 

However, the combination of a declared global war and the newly enhanced capacity to kill individual targets far from any traditional battlefield poses new dangers 

to basic rights—ones that will only grow as the U.S. role in the Afghan armed conflict winds down. That leaves only al Qaeda and similar armed groups but without 

the elements that traditionally limit use of the war power: the control of territory 

and a recognizable battlefield. To paint the problem most starkly, might a government that wants to kill a particular person simply declare ‘‘war’’ on him and shoot 

him, circumventing the basic due-process rights to which the target would ordinarily 

be entitled? Or, might a government intent on wiping out a drug gang simply declare ‘‘war’’ on its members? If a government wants to be less draconian but still 

avoid the burden of mounting a criminal prosecution, might it declare ‘‘war’’ on drug 

trafficking and detain without trial any participants it picks up? 

These are not fanciful scenarios. Drug traffickers pose a violent threat to many 

Americans and are almost certainly responsible for more American deaths than terrorism. Already we talk of a metaphorical war on drugs. Why not a real war? 

I hope we cringe at that thought. Detested as drug traffickers are, I hope we recoil 

at the thought of summarily killing or detaining them. But that is the risk if we 

allow the government unhindered discretion to decide when to apply war rules instead of peace rules. This threat of an end run around key constitutional rights 

highlights the need to articulate clear limits to any war related to terrorism. 

Some have suggested that mere transparency around the war-peace distinction 

should be enough—that Congress might authorize ongoing war against terrorist 

groups present and future so long as the administration states clearly at any given 

moment the groups with which it is at war. But that open-ended authorization is 

dangerous, because governments will be tempted to take the easy path of war rules 

over the more difficult path of respecting the full panoply of rights that prevail in 

peacetime. We cannot trust that public scrutiny is enough to restrain abuse given 

how easy it is to vilify alleged terrorist groups. 

If a particular group poses such a serious threat that it can be met only with war, 

focused war authorization can be sought. But an open invitation to live by war rules 

makes it too easy for the government to circumvent key rights. 

109 

Indeed, it is perilous enough when the government entrusted with the power to 

set aside certain peacetime rights is the United States. But once the U.S. Government takes this step, we can be certain that governments with far less sensitivity 

to rights will follow suit. The Chinas and Russias of the world will be all too eager 

to seize this precedent to pursue their enemies under war rules, be they ‘‘splittist’’ 

Tibetans or ‘‘subversive’’ dissidents. 

Even without the AUMF, the United States is hardly defenseless against the 

scourge of terrorism. Since the September 11 attacks nearly a dozen years ago, the 

United States has vastly enhanced its intelligence, surveillance, and prosecutorial 

capacities. Should these tools prove insufficient to meet a particular threat, the 

right of self-defense still allows resort to military force. However, because of the fundamental rights at stake, war should be an option of necessity, not a blank check 

written in advance, as some are proposing for a revamped AUMF. Now that the Afghan war is winding down, it is time to retire the AUMF altogether. 

DRONE ATTACKS

The problem of excessive reliance on the rules of war for using deadly force is illustrated by the use of drones to kill suspects. Drone attacks do not necessarily violate international human rights or humanitarian law. Indeed, given their ability to 

survey targets for extended periods and to fire with pinpoint accuracy, drones may 

pose less of a threat to civilian life than many alternatives. Still, their use has become controversial because of profound doubts about whether the Obama administration is abiding by the proper legal standards to deploy them. For example, killing 

Taliban and al Qaeda forces fighting U.S. troops may be lawful in a traditional 

armed conflict like the one still underway in Afghanistan, but what is the justification for killing people who are not part of these groups in places like Yemen and 

Somalia? Where does northwestern Pakistan fit? 

The Obama administration has offered several possible legal rationales for drone 

strikes, but with little clarity about the concrete, practical limits, if any, under 

which it purports to operate. Beyond the risk to people in these countries who face 

possible wrongful targeting, the lack of clarity denies Congress and the American 

public the ability to exercise effective oversight. It also makes it easier for other 

countries that are rapidly developing their own drone programs to interpret that 

ambiguity in a way that is likely to lead to serious violations of international law. 

One possible rationale for drone strikes comes from international humanitarian 

law governing armed hostilities. The Obama administration has formally dropped 

the Bush administration’s use of the phrase ‘‘global war on terror,’’ but its interpretation of the AUMF as authorizing ‘‘war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated 

forces’’ looks very similar. This expansive view of the ‘‘war’’ currently facing the 

United States cries out for a clear statement of its limits. Does the United States 

really have the right to attack anyone it might characterize as a combatant against 

the United States anywhere in the world? We would hardly accept summary killing 

if the target were walking the streets of London or Paris. 

John Brennan has said that as a matter of policy the administration has an ‘‘unqualified preference’’ to capture rather than kill all targets. But what are the factors 

leading the administration to decide that this preference can be met? Will it kill 

simply because convincing another government to arrest a suspect may be difficult? 

If so, how much political difficulty will it put up with before launching a drone attack? Will it kill simply because of the risk involved if U.S. soldiers were to attempt 

to arrest the suspect? If so, how much risk is the administration willing to accept 

before pulling the kill switch? The truth is that we have no idea. We don’t know 

whether these decisions are being made with appropriate care or not. We do know 

that other governments are likely to interpret this ambiguity in ways that are less 

respectful than we would want of the fundamental rights involved. 

Moreover, away from a traditional battlefield, international human rights law requires the capture of enemies if possible. As noted, failing to apply that law encourages other governments to circumvent it as well—to summarily kill suspects simply 

by announcing a ‘‘war’’ against their group without there being a traditional armed 

conflict anywhere in the vicinity. Imagine the mayhem that Russia could cause by 

killing alleged Chechen ‘‘combatants’’ throughout Europe, or China by killing 

Uighur ‘‘combatants’’ in the United States. In neither case is the government where 

the suspect is located likely to cooperate with arrest efforts. These precedential fears 

are real: China recently considered using a drone to kill a drug trafficker in Burma. 

Even leaving aside the scope of the ‘‘war’’ in which the United States is engaged, 

the existence of armed conflict entitles the warring parties to shoot at only the other 

side’s combatants, not civilians. Indeed, under the laws of war, all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid harm to civilians, and in case of doubt a person 

110 

1 Jonathan Landay, ‘‘Obama’s drone war kills ‘others,’ not just al Qaeda leaders,’’ McClatchy 

Newspapers, April 9, 2013; Mark Mazetti, ‘‘A secret deal on drones, sealed in blood,’’ The New 

York Times, April 6, 2013. 

must be considered a noncombatant. How does the Obama administration square 

these legal limitations with its alleged use of ‘‘signature strikes,’’ that is, its attacks 

on people whose identities are unknown but who are seemingly deemed to be combatants by virtue of behavior that is shared by people who are not directly participating in hostilities against the United States. For example, in places like Yemen 

or Somalia, many people carry weapons openly without being part of any combat 

force, let alone one challenging the United States. Nor does a person become a combatant merely by associating with others who might be planning to attack Americans, given that international humanitarian law recognizes many such people—drivers, cooks, doctors, financiers—as noncombatants. The administration’s lack of 

transparency means we have no idea whether or not in launching drone attacks it 

is applying a legally defensible definition of a combatant. 

There is also the question of whose war the United States is fighting. Most assume that it is targeting only people plotting to attack the United States, but there 

are reasons to doubt that assumption. The vagueness of the signature-strike criteria 

means it is quite possible that the people being targeted are at war with the Governments of Yemen or Pakistan, not the United States. In one recently reported 

case, the United States appeared to target someone in Pakistan whom the Pakistani 

Government wanted to eliminate but who was not engaged in any hostilities against 

the United States; the killing reportedly occurred as a quid pro quo for allowing the 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to operate its drone program in Pakistan.1 There 

is no law barring the United States from fighting other nations’ wars, but that is 

not what most Americans think the drone program is doing. 

Even in the absence of a combatant at war with the United States, the U.S. Government is entitled to use lethal force in certain limited circumstances under international human rights law. A police officer on the streets of Washington, for example, is entitled to shoot a suspect if it is the last feasible resort to avoid an ‘‘imminent’’ threat to life—such as when a hostage-taker is holding a gun to a victim’s 

head. That same standard might justify targeting people overseas as well (leaving 

aside questions of sovereignty, which would depend on the consent of the relevant 

government). 

At times, the Obama administration has used this language of imminence but it 

has done so in a way that seems to render it infinitely elastic. The administration 

has argued that it should not have to wait until the last possible moment to avert 

a planned attack—a fair point—but in certain circumstances it appears to be lethally striking targets where no reasonable claim of an imminent threat can be 

made. The alleged use of signature strikes provides perhaps the clearest illustration 

of the problem. The lack of clarity and transparency surrounding the drone program 

leaves the impression that people are being targeted for no more than carrying 

weapons and associating with unsavory people. The administration’s unwillingness 

in many cases to articulate anything remotely resembling an imminent threat 

makes it seem that human rights standards on policing, insofar as they are being 

relied upon to justify drone strikes, are being flouted. 

GUANTANAMO

International human rights law prohibits prolonged detention without charge or 

trial, yet many detainees have been held in Guantanamo for 11 years without 

charge. For many of them, the administration says it has no plan ever to prosecute. 

The administration sought to justify these detentions at first by reference to international law governing armed conflict between governments, but the conflict between the United States and Afghanistan ended in 2002. The administration now 

clings to the AUMF, but the factual predicate for it—U.S. involvement in the conflict with the Taliban and al Qaeda—is also coming to an end. In any event, people 

detained in the context of an armed conflict between a government and an armed 

group—such as the current conflict in Afghanistan—should be charged and tried, 

not detained. The administration’s misuse of the AUMF to rationalize prolonged detention without trial in Guantanamo is another reason why the AUMF should not 

be extended. 

Moreover, when it comes to combatants in an armed conflict, the power to detain 

can easily be linked to the power to kill. If the United States is going to claim the 

right to detain ‘‘combatants’’ without end on the basis of a global war unconnected 

to a traditional battlefield, against a non-state enemy that does not control any substantial territory, other nations will undoubtedly make similar claims. Once governVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:10 May 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\88026.TXT JUNE
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ments identify people as combatants, however wrongful that may be, they will inevitably claim the power not only to detain them without charge or trial but also to 

kill them. Although the United States currently detains many people who are clearly not combatants—those drivers, cooks, doctors and financiers, among others—it 

should be mindful of how its policies can be interpreted. 

The best solution is still to try suspects in regular Federal courts, with their entrenched procedural protections designed to provide fair trials. Security concerns 

can reasonably be handled; for example, if trials in the regular U.S. Courthouse for 

the Southern District of New York are deemed too difficult despite its long history 

of trying dangerous criminals such as drug czars and mafia dons, trials could be 

held securely and with little disruption on nearby Governor’s Island. However, the 

United States has already tried former CIA- and Guantanamo-detainee Ahmed 

Ghailani without incident in the regular courthouse for the Southern District of 

New York. 

By contrast, Congress’ insistence on using military commissions at Guantanamo 

has been an unmitigated disaster. The only two convictions obtained after full trials 

have both been overturned by the United States Court of Appeals for the District 

of Columbia Circuit; the five other convictions obtained were by plea bargain. During the same time that the military commissions have obtained these seven convictions, Federal courts have prosecuted some 500 terrorism suspects. In addition, 

there are profound and legitimate concerns about the fairness of a system that, 

among other things, permits the introduction into evidence of coerced statements 

from witnesses, allows the military to hand-pick the jury pool, and severely compromises the attorney-client privilege. 

Roughly half of the Guantanamo detainees have theoretically been approved for 

transfer to their home or third countries, and those transfers can proceed if the administration certifies that appropriate security arrangements have been made. The 

administration should accelerate its efforts to make those arrangements. 

However, the administration also claims that there remains a category of detainees who are ‘‘too dangerous’’ to release but who cannot be tried because either there 

is insufficient admissible evidence to prosecute them or their acts did not amount 

to a chargeable crime. The administration purports to hold these men under the 

above-described war powers. But even under war rules, the purpose of detention is 

to keep the enemy from returning to the battlefield. As the U.S. involvement in the 

Afghan war winds down, it is not clear what war the men released from Guantanamo would return to. If the fear is that they would join in criminal activity, the 

answer lies in criminal prosecution, including for such inchoate crimes as conspiracy 

or attempt, not the ‘‘Minority Report’’ approach of detaining them for crimes that 

they might at some future point plan to commit. 

Given Guantanamo’s enormous stain on America’s reputation, there is good reason to believe that these continuing detentions are causing more harm than good 

to America’s security and counterterrorism efforts. President Obama himself has 

stated that keeping Guantanamo open weakens U.S. national security. For the same 

reasons that long-term detention without trial is wrong and counterproductive in 

Guantanamo, it would be wrong and counterproductive if moved to the United 

States. That would simply replicate Guantanamo in another locale. 

One of Congress’ most solemn duties is to protect human rights, especially the 

fundamental rights to life and liberty. War is sometimes necessary, but before embarking on that dangerous path, the risk to rights should be weighed carefully. This 

nation has now been on a war footing for an extraordinarily long time. Security 

risks will never be eliminated. But, as the Afghan war winds down, we have arrived 

at the stage where those risks can be managed without the danger to rights that 

further declared ‘‘war’’ entails. It is time to retire the AUMF and the unlawful practices it has spawned and sustained. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Roth. 

Mr. Stimson. 

STATEMENT OF MR. CHARLES STIMSON, MANAGER, NATIONAL 

SECURITY LAW PROGRAM, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. STIMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe and 

distinguished members of the committee for inviting me here 

today. 

I found particularly helpful the 15 questions that the committee 

put to all the witnesses. I have tried to weave answers to many of 

112 

the themes running throughout those questions in my written responses, and I am going to focus on one aspect of that today. 

My views are informed much like Professor Corn’s by my 20-plus 

years in uniform as a Navy Judge Advocate General, but also as 

my time as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of 

detainee policy when I had the privilege in the second part of the 

Bush administration to testify before this committee regarding the 

Army field manual on interrogations and detainee policy. 

I want to explain and defend why I believe it would be unwise, 

at least at this time, to amend or repeal the AUMF and suggest 

some principles going forward for any additional legislation aimed 

at those organizations or entities that pose a substantial terrorist 

threat to our country but who are not specifically covered by the 

current AUMF. 

Let me just say as a third generation Navy man, let me be blunt. 

Nobody, especially anybody in the U.S. military, wants to be in the 

state of armed conflict. Any authorization for use of military force, 

be it from legislation or even Article II powers or both, must be 

done only when absolutely necessary and only as a last resort. 

Both the Bush and Obama administrations have concluded that 

our country is at war and that it is, indeed, engaged in an armed 

conflict with al Qaeda. The 2001 AUMF directed the President in 

the preamble to, ‘‘protect the United States citizens both at home 

and abroad,’’ and authorized him to use all necessary and appropriate force against—and then the chairman quoted it in the beginning of his comments—‘‘those nations, organizations, or persons he 

determined planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 

attacks on September 11 or aided or harbored same.’’ 

I take Senator King’s point about the past tense. But I would say 

to that that the U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed our engagement 

in an armed conflict, and consistent with the law of armed conflict, 

the United States may use force, including lethal force, against its 

enemies. The AUMF, as you heard from the first panel, has and 

continues to act as the legal framework for, among other things, 

detention and targeting decisions. 

I want to address something that Senator King brought up and 

I think is floating around the room about the AUMF. The AUMF 

is actually self-limiting. 

First, it is limited to al Qaeda, the Taliban, and persons and 

forces associated with those organizations. It is not a mandate to 

use force against any terrorist organization or other entity that 

may threaten U.S. national security. 

Second, it is limited by the principle that force should be deployed only, ‘‘in order to prevent any future acts of international 

terrorism against the United States.’’ That comes from the AUMF 

itself. 

Third, as you have heard from the first panel, it is limited by the 

law of armed conflict. Both administrations have taken the rather 

realistic and unremarkable position that there is no geographic 

limit to the AUMF. The enemy is where the enemy is. 

The current AUMF is consistent with the law of armed conflict 

and our national and international obligations. It is not, as some 

have argued, a boundless source of tyranny and infringement upon 

other nations’ sovereignty. 

113 

Now, I would be remiss if I did not point out the obvious—that 

we have made, obviously, great strides in defeating or at least degrading the capacity of the narrow class of groups and individuals 

subject to the AUMF. But until and unless those subject to the 

AUMF no longer pose a substantial national security threat to the 

United States, the AUMF should remain in place. Repealing or 

amending the AUMF prematurely would be unwise. It will, hopefully, obsolete itself as al Qaeda and the Taliban and associated 

forces are eventually defeated, which I think we can all agree on 

is a worthy goal. 

At the same time, I would commend the committee to read additional materials, especially the one proposed by Professor Goldsmith and some colleagues, to start thinking about what comes 

after the AUMF because the day when it will no longer be sufficient to meet the evolving terrorist threat I think is approaching. 

I think we can debate how long or how close we are, but I think 

it is approaching. Assessing that evolving terrorist threat, as I detail more in my written comments, is a critical first step. If that 

particular evolving terrorist threat from groups that do not fall 

within the narrow bounds of the AUMF poses a substantial national security threat to the United States, then acting under the 

principle of national self-defense, Congress may, and I stress the 

word ‘‘may’’, need to consider additional legislation to confront that 

threat. 

I would respectfully suggest keeping these principles in mind 

when considering additional legislation, which I go into more detail 

in my written submission to the committee. 

One, any additional legislation must grow out of an actual national security threat to the United States and a need for that legislation. 

Two, it should follow the substance of the current AUMF and authorize the President to use, ‘‘all necessary and appropriate force.’’ 

I want to pick up on Professor Corn’s comments to that regard. 

Three, crafting the legislation consistent with Youngstown Sheet 

& Tube should be done in a way that is an open and transparent 

manner and brings the three branches of the Government, or at 

least the two branches of the Government, together. 

Finally, I want to touch on something Mr. Roth said. We must 

not forget that we have greatly enhanced our Nation’s capability to 

confront international terrorist threats since September 11. Any 

additional legislation must be measured against the already existing intelligence gathering, law enforcement, and other capacities 

we have as a country and then only authorized if necessary. 

In closing, I want to commend this committee for holding the 

hearing. Counterterrorism strategy and the defense of our country 

should not be a partisan issue. We can and must debate these different approaches, but we need to do so in a civil, apolitical manner. The threat of international terrorism is indeed real. I commend the committee for trying to work together to craft answers 

to these 15 tough questions and others the committee may have. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stimson follows:] 

114 

1Department of Defense Instructions 2310.01E, found here: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/ 

Detainee—Prgm—Dir—2310—9–5–06.pdf 2Formally known as FM 2–22.3 (FM 34–52), Human Intelligence Collector Operations, published September 2006. Electronic copy here: https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2–22–3.pdf 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MR. CHARLES STIMSON

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of the committee, thank 

you for inviting me to testify on the law of armed conflict, the use of military force, 

and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). My name is Charles 

Stimson, and I am a Senior Legal Fellow and Manager of the National Security Law 

Program at in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International 

Studies at The Heritage Foundation. Before joining the Davis Institute in May 2013, 

I served as Heritage’s Chief of Staff, and as a Senior Legal Fellow in Heritage’s 

Center for Legal and Judicial Studies. I have written, lectured, testified, and debated widely on subjects including the law of armed conflict, military commissions, 

detention and interrogation policy, and other pressing national security policies. The 

views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. 

Prior to joining Heritage in 2007, I served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Detainee Affairs, where I advised both Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Gates on global detention policy and matters regarding the detainees within 

the custody or effective control of the Department of Defense, including those in 

Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay. During my tenure at the Pentagon, we finalized and eventually published the overarching Department of Defense instruction 

related to detainees,1 drafted the Military Commissions Act of 2006, republished the 

Army Field Manual on interrogations,2 accepted transfer of the 14 High Value Detainees from the Central Intelligence Agency to Guantanamo Bay, presented the 

United States’ Second Periodic Report to the United Nations Committee Against 

Torture, and undertook many other crucial actions dealing with detainee policy. 

I have also served as a local, State, Federal, and military prosecutor and defense 

counsel, most recently having served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District 

of Columbia, where I was a homicide/violent crimes prosecutor. I currently serve as 

the Deputy Chief Trial Judge and Executive Officer for the Navy-Marine Corps 

Trial Judiciary, Reserve component, where I hold the rank of Commander. In my 

20 years in the Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps (JAG), I have served three 

tours on active duty, including one assignment overseas. Additionally, in the spring 

of 2000, I deployed as Force Judge Advocate with Commander of Amphibious Group 

Two to East Africa as part of Operation Natural Fire, a joint military training exercise. In the spring of 2001, I deployed with the Navy SEALS as part of Naval Special Warfare Group Two as their Joint Special Operations Task Force JAG to take 

part in joint task force exercise. The views I express here are mine, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Departments of Defense or Navy, or the U.S. Navy JAG 

Corps. 

Today’s topics are particularly timely given the fact that over a decade has passed 

since the September 11, 2001, attacks and the September 18, 2001, AUMF joint resolution came into force. I commend this committee for holding this hearing and for 

putting together a thoughtful set of questions for today’s witnesses. It is an honor 

to appear before you with my co-panelists, all of whom are experts in this field. It 

is vitally important that this committee and Congress as a whole take stock of the 

current terrorist threats to our security and provide those tools necessary and lawful to those charged with its defense, consistent with the principles of oversight and 

accountability. 

The committee’s invitation included 15 interrelated questions that cover a broad 

range of topics, from the scope and duration of AUMF to its current efficacy and 

the principles underlying the use of remotely piloted aircraft. Providing thorough 

answers to these important questions could easily take up several law review articles. Given the committee’s focus and the limited time to prepare for this hearing, 

I have focused my testimony on several themes that run throughout the committee’s 

questions. 

A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

Both the Obama and Bush administrations have concluded that our country is at 

war—in particular, that it is engaged in an ‘‘armed conflict’’ with al Qaeda and associated forces. President Obama reiterated the point during his first inaugural 

speech, and his administration has since repeatedly restated that position. The Supreme Court has affirmed our engagement in an armed conflict in, among other deVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:10 May 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00118 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\88026.TXT JUNE
115 

3Operational Law Handbook, International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center & School, U.S. Army. 2007. Pages 12–16. Link found here: http:// 

www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA469294 4See Steven Groves, Drone Strikes: The Legality of U.S. Targeting Terrorists Abroad, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2788, April 10, 2013, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/drone-strikes-the-legality-of-us-targeting-terrorists-abroad. 5See generally Benjamin Wittes, Drones and the War on Terror: When Can the U.S. Target 

Alleged American Terrorists Overseas? Testimony Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, February 27, 2013, at http://www.brookings.edu/∼/media/Research/Files/Testimony/2013/02/ 

27%20drones %20wittes/Feb%2027%20Drones%20Wittes%20Testimony.pdf. 

cisions, that of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld in 2004. A country in a state of armed conflict 

may resort to that body of law called the law of armed conflict. 

Those who study the law of armed conflict come to know and understand the basic 

principles and purposes of that rich body of law. It is worth reviewing those basic 

principles for purposes of setting the stage for the questions posed by the committee. 

I studied the law of war as a JAG, and refer the committee to the Army’s Operational Law Handbook,3 wherein it states: 

The law of war is defined as that part of international law that regulates 

the conduct of armed hostilities. It is often termed the law of armed conflict. The fundamental purposes of the law of war are humanitarian and 

functional in nature. The humanitarian purposes include: 

(1) Protecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering; 

(2) Safeguarding persons who fall into the hands of the enemy; and 

(3) Facilitating the restoration of peace. 

The functional purposes include: 

(1) Ensuring good order and discipline; 

(2) Fighting in a disciplined manner consistent with national values; and 

(3) Maintaining domestic and international public support. 

The law of war rests on four basic principles: 

(1) The principle of necessity—which authorizes that use of force required to accomplish the mission; 

(2) The principles of distinction or discrimination—the requirement that combatants be distinguished from non-combatants, and that military objectives 

be distinguished from protected property or protected places; 

(3) The principle of proportionality—the concept that the anticipated loss of life 

and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained; 

and 

(4) The principle of humanity or unnecessary suffering—a military force must 

minimize unnecessary suffering and is forbidden from employing arms or 

materials calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. 

These principles are particularly important to keep in mind when, for example, 

discussing the committee’s questions concern the use of remotely piloted aircraft, or 

‘‘drones.’’ Although the technology may be new, drones are simply tools subject to 

the same principles for deployment as any other weapons system employed under 

the law of armed conflict. As my colleague Steven Groves has explained in an exhaustively detailed report on the legal basis for drone warfare, the Obama administration’s framework for carrying out targeted strikes with drones appears to adhere 

to recognized principles of the law of war described above.4 Indeed, drones may 

allow a greater degree of distinction than previous generations of weapons technology, reducing expected collateral damage and injuries. In this way, the United 

States may carry out the necessities of warfare in a highly efficient and targeted 

fashion. 

I also agree with the point raised by the Brookings Institution’s Benjamin Wittes 

that any thoughtful discussion of drone warfare must distinguish between policy 

and means. Much criticism of drone warfare is actually criticism of broader policies, 

such as the application of the law of armed conflict to the present conflict, geographical limitations on such conflict, and targeting decisions. Whether a strike is 

carried out by a drone or an airplane (with the pilot in the vehicle itself) has little 

or no bearing on these broader policy issues.5 As Wittes explains, drone use is appropriate in the context of an armed conflict: 

The ability to target the enemy in an armed conflict with lethal force is a simple, 

and lawful, operational necessity in a world in which enemy organizations in countries and locations impossible to reach by law enforcement continue to threaten the 

United States. The fact of armed conflict—and the consequent availability of targeting—does not mean automatic recourse to hostilities, of course. There are many 

116 

6 Ibid. at 6. 

7 Note that Congress considered and rejected the Bush administration’s initial request for authority to ‘‘deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United 

States,’’ without regard to the entities involved. See generally Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, 

Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2047, 2079 (2005). 8See, e.g., Pub. L. 15–101, 3 Stat 532, 532–33 (1819) (authorizing force against slavers); Pub. 

L. 15–77, 3 Stat. 510, 510–11 (1819) (authorizing force against pirates); Pub. L. 17–7, 3 Stat. 

721 (1823) (same); 33 U.S.C. §§ 381–82 (same). 

places in the world where the United States can and does pursue terrorists through 

law enforcement, interdiction of terrorist financing, and other non-hostilities-based 

tools of counterterrorism. But there are other places in the world that are weakly 

governed, ungoverned, or simply hostile to the United States, where terrorist groups 

responsible for September 11 have fled, or in which associated terrorist groups or 

cells have arisen and joined the conflict against the United States. The armed conflict framework, and the inherently-tied authority to target the enemy with lethal 

force, is essential to reaching these actors and denying them sanctuary from which 

to attack this country.6

I agree, as well, with Wittes’s conclusion that this point should engender no particular controversy. 

The law of armed conflict, in addition to authorizing a country to use force against 

its enemies—which, by the way, may consist of both state and non-state actors— 

also authorizes the country to detain such enemies for the duration of the hostilities, 

without criminally charging them. The fact that we do not know when the hostilities 

against al Qaeda will end does not change the fact that the United States has the 

legal authority to hold captured al Qaeda members during ongoing hostilities. As 

a practical matter, however, the United States has transferred or released the vast 

majority of captured al Qaeda and Taliban combatants, even as we kill or capture 

others. 

THE SEPTEMBER 18, 2001, AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE

In response to the devastating attacks against our Homeland, Congress passed a 

joint resolution a week after the attack, on September 18, 2001. The preamble to 

the AUMF directs the President ‘‘to protect U.S. citizens both at home and abroad.’’ 

The operative text authorizes the President to use ‘‘all necessary and appropriate 

force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 

2001, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.’’ 

This authorization for the use of force has acted, and still acts, as the legal framework for, among other things, targeting and detention operations. Two administrations have relied on the AUMF to engage those actors who were responsible for, 

aided, or harbored those responsible for September 11. 

Ninety-eight Senators voted for the Joint Resolution along with 420 members of 

the House of Representatives. The AUMF has served the country well. It has enabled our warfighters, intelligence professionals, and other stakeholders to carry out 

their work, knowing that Congress has given express authorization for the use of 

appropriate and proportional force to confront an enemy that was responsible for the 

worst attack against our country since Pearl Harbor. 

It is important to note the ways in which the AUMF is self-limiting. First, it is 

limited to al Qaeda, the Taliban, and persons and forces associated with those ‘‘organizations.’’ It is not a mandate to use force against any terrorist organization or 

other entity that may threaten U.S. national security.7 Second, it is limited by the 

principle that force should be deployed only ‘‘in order to prevent any future acts of 

international terrorism against the United States.’’ Third, as described above, it incorporates and is limited by the law of armed conflict. In these respects, the AUMF 

is consistent with prior force authorizations that have targeted non-state actors.8

The AUMF, by its own language, does not have an expiration date, nor should 

it. While it is true that over the decade we have made hard-fought gains against 

the al Qaeda leadership, and key members of the Taliban and associated forces, 

other elements of those organizations still pose a continuing threat to the United 

States. I base this opinion not on current intelligence briefings—to which I no longer 

have access—but my reading of open source materials. That said, Congress does 

have access to classified intelligence briefings, and I encourage a thorough and dispassionate evaluation of the current threats by Congress. 

117 

9 Address at Northwestern School of Law of March 5, 2012. Text found here: http:// 

www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html 

As to the committee’s question regarding the geographic scope of the AUMF, both 

administrations have taken the unremarkable position that by its terms, and in 

practice, there is no geographic limit or scope to the AUMF. Rather, the AUMF 

gives the President the authority to confront the enemy wherever he deems the 

enemy resides. Just last year, in a major address at Northwestern University, Attorney General Eric Holder stated, ‘‘Our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in Afghanistan. Indeed, neither Congress nor our Federal courts have limited 

the geographic scope of our ability to use force to the current conflict in Afghanistan.’’ 9

The notion that we are at war, and that the war (and by implication the AUMF) 

has no geographical boundaries is anathema to some, but is nevertheless lawful and 

consistent with the law of armed conflict and our national and international obligations. It is also not the boundless source of tyranny and infringement upon other 

nations’ sovereignty that detractors profess; rather, the national security power of 

the politically accountable branches are subject to all of the checks and balances 

within our constitutional form of government, as well as the more modern checks 

detailed by fellow witness Jack Goldsmith in his book Power and Constraint. It is 

commensurate, in this case, with the enemy, an international terrorist movement 

that does not respect political or any other boundaries and that considers the people 

and assets of the United States and its allies, wherever they may be, to be its targets. 

As to the committee’s question regarding whether the AUMF should be modified, 

or by implication repealed, I would suggest that repealing the AUMF prematurely 

would be unwise. Repealing the AUMF would signal, legally, that the war against 

al Qaeda is over, at a time when al Qaeda and associated forces continue, in fact, 

to wage war against the United States. It may have more specific consequences, for 

example, involving the continued detention of those terrorists currently in captivity 

and not subject to military commission or Federal court proceedings. 

Repealing or substantially narrowing the existing AUMF could also have substantial repercussions on other sensitive operations, including but not limited to the targeted killing program. 

In short, the current AUMF should remain in place unless and until the narrow 

class of persons under its scope no longer poses a substantial threat to our national 

security. Keeping the current AUMF does not authorize a permanent state of war, 

as some critics have alleged. It merely retains the legal framework that has worked 

and served us well, to date, and acknowledges that those subject to the AUMF, although greatly diminished in number and efficacy, should not be allowed to regain 

their footing. 

In the context of the AUMF, keeping the AUMF as is does not necessarily mean 

that the executive branch, this one or the next, will want to or need to employ the 

full extent of its authority. We cannot foresee with precision when or if the threats 

posed by those subject to the narrow jurisdiction of the AUMF will be defeated or 

become so insignificant as to not warrant this particular AUMF. 

THE AUMF AND DETENTION AUTHORITY

Despite the fact that the express language of the AUMF does not include the 

words ‘‘detention,’’ each of the three branches of the Federal Government, including 

the executive branch across two administrations, has recognized that the AUMF 

necessarily includes the power to detain those subject to the boundaries of the 

AUMF. 

In June 2002, the Bush administration argued in its brief before the Fourth Circuit in the case of United States v. Hamdi, that the authority to detain Yasser 

Hamdi flowed from the Commander in Chief’s Article II powers and from the ‘‘statutory authorization from Congress . . . Furthermore, the President here is acting with 

the added measure of the express statutory backing of Congress.’’ It cited the 

AUMF. 

Similarly, in its brief before the Supreme Court in Hamdi in 2004, the Bush administration argued that its detention authority stemmed, in part, from the AUMF 

as that authority ‘‘comes from the express statutory backing of Congress.’’ 

As is well known by now, the Supreme Court held in Hamdi that ‘‘Congress has 

in fact authorized Hamdi’s detention, through the AUMF.’’ As the Court explained, 

citing longstanding, consistent executive practice and the law of war, ‘‘detention of 

individuals [who fought against the United States as part of the Taliban], for the 

duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental 

118 

10 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004). 11See http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 

and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to use.’’ 10 The Bush administration relied on the AUMF’s detention authority in subsequent cases, including those 

regarding Jose Padilla and Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri. 

The Obama administration has continued to rely on the AUMF for detention authority. In its first brief before a court on the matter—here, in the context of habeas 

litigation from three Guantanamo detainees—the administration argued that ‘‘The 

United States bases its detention authority as to such persons on the Authorization 

for the Use of Military Force.’’11 Their brief went on to say that ‘‘detention authority 

conferred by the AUMF is necessarily informed by principles of the laws of war,’’12

which is a position also taken by the Bush administration and the courts in numerous instances. In particular, it arrived at the following ‘‘definitional framework,’’ 

premised on the application of the law of armed conflict to the AUMF, that has subsequently been upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit: 

The President has the authority to detain persons that the President determines 

planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those responsible for those attacks. The 

President also has the authority to detain persons who were part of, or substantially 

supported, Taliban or al Qaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who 

has committed a belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such 

enemy armed forces.13

Congress, in turn, ratified that framework in section 1021 of the 2012 National 

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). That provision ‘‘affirms’’ the authority of the 

President under the AUMF to detain certain ‘‘covered persons’’: 

(1) A person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks 

that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored those responsible for those 

attacks. 

(2) A person who was a part of or substantially supported al Qaeda, the Taliban, 

or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States 

or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces. 

Although there have been differences between the two administrations in terms 

of their reliance on Article II powers and detention authority, the fact remains that 

both administrations have consistently relied on the AUMF to justify detention of 

members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. 

Furthermore, both administrations have relied on the AUMF as a lawful basis for 

its targeted killing programs. Such a program, under proper supervision within the 

executive branch and appropriate oversight from Congress, is a necessary and invaluable tool. 

ASSESSING THE THREAT

Al Qaeda today remains a threat. The organization has evolved substantially from 

the relatively insular group that planned and carried out the September 11 attacks. 

Over the past decade, al Qaeda has ‘‘franchised’’ its name, its techniques, and its 

terrorist mission to any number of associated groups, including al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. That period has also seen the 

rise of a number of terrorist groups with similar goals and varying relationships to 

the ‘‘core’’ al Qaeda organization. They include al Shabaab, Boko Haram, Jabhat alNusra, and Lebanese Hizballah. 

Robert Chesney’s 2012 law review article entitled ‘‘Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond 

al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism’’ describes the 

strategic and legal complexity of the terrorist battlefield today. At the same time 

that al Qaeda itself has splintered, a number of groups have allied themselves with 

its mission, its techniques, and only sometimes al Qaeda itself. A few examples are 

illustrative of this trend: 

Al Qaeda has been linked in relatively unspecified ways to a group of 

Islamist extremists in northern Nigeria known as Boko Haram. The Algerian extremist group formerly known as the Salafist Group for Call and 

Combat has embraced the al Qaeda brand more formally, becoming ‘‘al 

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,’’ and has recently seized territory in Northern Mali working in close concert with a local armed group of extremists 

119 

14 Robert Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism, at 29–30 (footnotes omitted). 15http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Statutory-Framework-for-Next-Generation-Terrorist-Threats.pdf 

known as Ansar Dine (‘‘Defenders of the Faith’’). Multiple al Qaeda-linked 

groups have emerged in the area of the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, including 

a group calling itself the Mujahideen Shura Council and another called 

Ansar al Jihad. Iraq famously became the home of al Qaeda in Iraq in the 

years following the U.S. invasion, and was famously (and foolishly) reluctant to conform its operations to the dictates of al Qaeda’s senior leadership 

in Pakistan in its first iteration; after nearly being eliminated a few years 

ago, it is now enjoying a substantial resurgence. As the civil war in Syria 

unfolds, there are claims in the media regarding the presence of ‘‘al Qaeda’’ 

fighters appearing, though whether this represents an influx of al Qaeda 

in Iraq members, of homegrown extremists appropriating al Qaeda’s brand, 

something else, or mere propaganda is far from clear at this time. The point 

being, each of these groups may differ markedly from one another in terms 

of their actual degree of connection to al Qaeda itself, their interest in conducting operations targeting American or other western targets outside the 

confines of the state in which they usually operate, and in terms of their 

own organizational coherence.14

As Chesney concludes, al Qaeda has embraced an increasingly decentralized 

model, while seeking ties to already existing regional terrorist actors. The trend 

makes ever more tenuous the assumption underlying the AUMF that al Qaeda-style 

terrorism necessarily bears any direct or substantial relationship to al Qaeda itself, 

as is necessary to fall under the terms of the AUMF. As this trend continues, the 

day will come when substantial threats to the United States are no longer encompassed within the existing force authorization. For the present, however, al Qaeda’s 

enormous organizational flexibility—perhaps its chief strength—has allowed us to 

defer addressing that issue. 

ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES TO CONFRONT THE EVOLVING THREAT

Still, it is not too early to begin thinking about what comes after the AUMF, because the day when it will no longer be sufficient to meet the terrorist threat is approaching. At this stage, the most important thing may be to frame how we approach this problem. In general, I commend to your attention a recent white paper 

by the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security and Law entitled ‘‘A 

Statutory Framework for Next-Generation Terrorist Threats’’15 co-authored by fellow panelist Jack Goldsmith. In particular, a few key points are worth discussing 

here: 

First, the central consideration on whether to enact additional authorizations for 

the use of military force must be our national security needs. As al Qaeda continues 

to splinter, and new groups unassociated with al Qaeda proliferate, threats beyond 

the scope of the AUMF will become increasingly prevalent. At the outset, these may 

be addressed by greater attenuation of AUMF authority—a phenomenon that has 

already begun—and by non-military means. But as these threats grow, those methods will become infeasible. Congress and the President, working together, have a 

duty to ensure that appropriate legal authority exists to address these threats. That 

will require cooperation between the branches and a relationship of trust, particularly if the nature of this emerging threat requires greater flexibility in targeting 

than allowed by the AUMF. 

Second, the substance of the AUMF’s force authorization should be followed. The 

AUMF’s allowance that the President may bring to bear ‘‘all necessary and appropriate force’’ against the entities encompassed by it is consistent with our constitutional architecture, with centuries of precedent, and with the need for flexibility in 

fighting a diverse and always evolving threat. Congress has never attempted to regulate the specific means by which the President has exercised his power as Commander in Chief. Beyond raising serious constitutional questions, limits on that authority would be folly because they would constrain the President’s ability to wage 

war successfully on non-state actors whom Congress has already identified as the 

Nation’s enemies. The better course is to separate the substance of a force authorization from its breadth. 

Third, narrowly tailored, flexible legislation by Congress, prepared in an open and 

transparent manner, best serves the interests of the American people. As Justice 

Jackson observed in his famous opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube, ‘‘[w]hen the 

President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his auVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:10 May 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00123 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\88026.TXT JUNE
120 

16 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 

thority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus 

all that Congress can delegate.’’16 Consistent with that principle, when the President acts with the support of Congress, his actions bear greater legitimacy both domestically and internationally, in the courts and in these chambers. When the President acts on his own, as sometimes he must, his powers are more constrained and 

therefore may be less effective, while at the same time subject to less oversight and 

fewer checks by Congress and the courts. But make no mistake: the President has 

a duty to protect the Nation’s security, and any President will, if and as necessary, 

rely on his Article II powers to carry out that duty in the face of imminent threats, 

even where Congress has not provided additional authority. Congress therefore 

weakens not only the President but also itself when and if it declines to face up 

to the threats against our Nation. 

Fourth, Congress must build on the AUMF, not replace it. To replace the AUMF 

would be risky and unwise at this time, because doing so would cast uncertainty 

on the legal basis for so many aspects of our campaign against al Qaeda. Any modification to the core AUMF grant of authority is risky for that reason. Over time, 

the AUMF will obsolete itself, as al Qaeda and the Taliban fade into oblivion, and 

when that process is finally complete, the AUMF will no longer have any purpose 

or meaning. We are not yet at that day, however. Therefore Congress may need to 

build on the AUMF, expanding its authority to reach new threats, rather than altering it at this time. 

Finally, Congress must always strive to balance the need for expediency in addressing threats with appropriate congressional control and oversight. No one suggests handing the President a blank check to carry out the power to declare war. 

The Constitution reserves that power to Congress. It also reserves to Congress the 

power of the purse and the power to regulate the armed services. These powers are 

essential to ensuring accountability for results and for the protection of Americans’ 

rights, consistent with our values, as we fight enemies that reject those rights and 

those values. 

CONCLUSION

In summary, the United States remains in a legal state of armed conflict with 

those responsible for the September 11 attacks. The current AUMF authorizes the 

use of force against this enemy and also allows this enemy to be detained under 

the law of war. The mere existence of the AUMF does not, in and of itself, authorize 

an endless war, as some critics contend. Rather, it merely authorizes the Commander in Chief to use those lawful authorities to confront and ultimately to defeat 

this enemy. Although those subject to the AUMF’s narrow jurisdiction are now on 

the run and arguably degraded in their capabilities, the fact remains that they still 

pose a national security threat to the United States. As such, the current AUMF 

is in the process of becoming obsolete; but unless and until this enemy no longer 

poses a substantial national security threat to our country, the current AUMF 

should not be repealed or replaced. 

That said, other transnational terrorist groups may pose a substantial national 

security threat to the United States. The looser the affiliation they have with al 

Qaeda and those responsible for September 11, the more difficult it is to shoehorn 

them into the existing AUMF. As such, Congress has the opportunity to assess what 

threat, if any, they pose to our national security, and if substantial, the obligation 

to craft appropriate legislation to confront the threat. 

I commend the committee for their work in this area. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify and for this committee’s leadership on these 

tough issues. The nation’s security is a sacred duty, and we can and must balance 

security with personal liberties and the utmost respect for the rule of law. 

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is privately supported and receives no funds from any government at any level, nor 

does it perform any government or other contract work. 

The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the United 

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121 

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of its 2012 income. The Heritage Foundation’s books are audited annually by the 

national accounting firm of McGladrey & Pullen. A list of major donors is available 

from The Heritage Foundation upon request. 

Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their 

own independent research. The views expressed are their own and do not reflect an 

institutional position for The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees. 

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you very much, Mr. Stimson. We 

thank you all. 

Mr. Stimson has laid out the limits inside AUMF on its use, and 

I am wondering whether, Ms. Brooks, you agree with those limits. 

Ms. BROOKS. I agree that those are the limits in the AUMF on 

its face. I think that there are a couple of separate questions. One 

is there is some ambiguity, I think, in the AUMF as to congressional intent which I do not think can be resolved by reference to 

the language itself. So I do not think my former colleagues from 

the Obama administration are saying anything implausible at all 

when they say that it could be construed to provide precisely the 

authorities they interpreted it as providing. That is why, in a way, 

I suggested that this is a policy decision for you as much as anything else. It is a question of: do you want them to have such potentially open-ended authorities? I also should emphasize I have 

enormous respect for their good faith and the great care that they 

take in their decisions, but I think that is a separate question. 

Chairman LEVIN. I agree, but basically you do not disagree with 

the statement of Mr. Stimson that there are limits on the face of 

the AUMF? 

Ms. BROOKS. I believe there are limits, and I believe that that 

was Congress’ intent. 

Chairman LEVIN. Good, that is good. 

The question of co-belligerents: under the law of war, for co-belligerents to be included in who the target or who the named source 

of attack is, they must, as I understand it, join with the named belligerent and that they must also be participating in an attack on 

the United States. Would you agree with that, Mr. Roth? 

Mr. ROTH. Yes, but I would add one other thing which I think 

is critical here, which is that the original belligerent has to still 

exist. 

Chairman LEVIN. The original? 

Mr. ROTH. The original belligerent has to still exist. 

Chairman LEVIN. Right. 

Mr. ROTH. I think we are very much facing the prospect of al 

Qaeda central being decimated. You cannot then have co-belligerents. That is a different authorization. 

Chairman LEVIN. But as long as al Qaeda exists, I think you all 

would probably agree that the co-belligerent doctrine would require 

that co-belligerent join in an attack on the United States. 

Mr. ROTH. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. That gets to the point of al Nusra. By the way, 

I think I misspoke in suggesting that al Nusra then might come 

under that doctrine because unless they joined in an attack on the 

United States, I do not think that. So I will just confess error on 

that because I think I was too sloppy in terms of my statement 

about al Nusra, and we will let Senator Kaine comment if he wishes later on. 

122 

The next question I have is the 10- to 20-year reference that we 

heard from a member of the first panel. I do not think that was 

a reference to AUMF’s life. I think it was a reference to how long 

that particular witness thought we would be facing the kind of belligerency which he described. So I will just say that in clarification 

of what I believe was the statement. 

Let me ask now about the question of U.S. persons and whether 

or not the law of armed conflict requires a different decisionmaking 

process or different standards be applied when targeting a U.S. 

person. If a U.S. person joins an enemy force, is that person subject 

to being designated an enemy combatant? Let me start with that, 

Mr. Corn? 

Mr. CORN. I think the answer is clearly yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Does anyone disagree with that? No. 

Everyone shakes their head no. 

I want to get to this due process issue in the couple of minutes 

I have left. Assume that there is strong evidence that another attack takes place through the air and that one of the three planes 

attacking us has already hit a target in the United States. It is 

clear from the evidence that this is an al Qaeda attack on us with 

three small planes. It is also clear that the second and third planes 

are piloted by U.S. citizens, and strong evidence, however, is that 

they are part of an attack by al Qaeda on us. Somehow or other, 

they get into U.S. airspace. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Stimson. I will start with you on this one. 

Can the Air Force shoot that plane down? 

Mr. STIMSON. In the fog of war where information is always imperfect, under your hypothetical it is entirely likely that the President may decide that that is necessary. 

Chairman LEVIN. Without due process for those Americans on 

board? 

Mr. STIMSON. Without ex ante judicial process, but process within the executive branch under the exigencies of inherent self-defense. 

Chairman LEVIN. But you would say that there does not need to 

then be a judicial proceeding before that plane could be shot down? 

Mr. STIMSON. Number one, there may not be any court you could 

even go to to get a judicial process, but second, I think time alone 

would prevent your ability to go to court. 

Chairman LEVIN. Does anyone think that those Americans on 

that plane that are piloting that plane under the hypothetical I 

gave you are entitled to due process? Does anybody think that? Mr. 

Corn? 

Mr. CORN. I think they are entitled to due process. I think it begs 

the question what process is due. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Due process in the ordinary sense of the 

term. 

Mr. CORN. No, not in the ordinary sense of having to go get a 

warrant or a judicial authorization. Furthermore, I do not think a 

police officer would be required to do that under that exigency even 

in peacetime. 

Chairman LEVIN. I agree with you, but I am talking about the 

military. Does anybody think the military here has to provide any 

due process under normal definition? Mr. Roth? 

123 

Mr. ROTH. I think it is important to say that the rules governing 

the military and the police in the situation of an imminent threat 

to American life are not different in that sense. In other words, if 

an American citizen walked in and held a gun to your head, the 

police could shoot to kill if that was the last resort to stop— 

Chairman LEVIN. I agree, but I am talking about the military. 

Mr. ROTH. If it was a soldier, he could do the same thing. 

Chairman LEVIN. So the military can shoot that plane down. 

There is no doubt in anybody’s mind about that. Is that correct? 

Okay. 

My time is up. Thank you. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to make 

mine very brief. As you well know, I have the senior position on 

the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, and starting in 3 minutes, there is probably one of the most controversial 

nominees coming up for our confirmation and I must be there. 

In my opening statement, you guys may not have all been here 

at that time because you are the second panel, I confessed, and 

confession is good for the soul, that I was not really firm on either 

side of this. I wanted to hear, I wanted to learn, and I have. I will 

have to say the testimony has been very enlightening to me more 

so than I think any other hearing that we have had. 

Let me say to you, Mr. Roth, that I am coming from a prejudiced 

perspective when I say this, but you helped me make up my mind 

probably more than anyone else did, not that it is all made up yet. 

But I have probably spent as much time looking at this asset that 

we have called Guantanamo Bay as anybody else that is up here 

at this table. While there is not time to go into the details, we also 

look at what is a good deal and not a good deal for the American 

people because we are responsible for the expenditure of the 

money. One of the few good deals we have had since 1904, even if 

you did not like the way they operate, would be Guantanamo Bay. 

It is $4,000 a year and about half the time, Castro does not even 

bill us for it. So it is a pretty good deal that we have there. 

I have also looked at the resources that are there, and I very 

strongly disagree with you in terms of the proper use of that facility, and it is a resource and an asset that should be properly used. 

Mr. Stimson, you were Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense 

for Detainee Affairs under both Rumsfeld and Gates. Is that correct? 

Mr. STIMSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. You finalized the overarching DOD instruction 

related to detainees, drafted the Military Commission Act of 2006, 

and republished the Army field manual on interrogations. 

Mr. STIMSON. It was a team effort, sir, but they were done during 

my time. 

Senator INHOFE. You were involved. 

Mr. STIMSON. I was. 

Senator INHOFE. I consider you to be an expert or be very knowledgeable certainly. 

Do you agree with Mr. Roth that Guantanamo is an ‘‘unmitigated 

disaster’’? 

124 

Mr. STIMSON. No. I believe that we need to have a place, when 

we are in a state of armed conflict, to detain the enemy. I have 

been somewhat agnostic about the ZIP code of where we hold them. 

I understand that, for example, if we bring them to the United 

States, there may be additional rights and privileges that would accrue to them. I also believe that when I was in office, President 

Bush announced that he would very much like to close it, and there 

are now 166 people there compared to the 779. But we have expended tremendous resources there. So I think even if it was ordered closed tomorrow for purposes—— 

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Stimson, I would say what we cannot do is 

debate that right now because there also is another problem of detention or incarceration in the United States. The very nature of 

a terrorist, his mission is to make other people terrorists. I do not 

want to get into that, although I would love to have a hearing on 

this sometime, Mr. Chairman. But nonetheless, you have answered 

my question. 

How about you, Mr. Corn? From a military perspective, are you 

familiar with the center there? 

Mr. CORN. Yes, Senator. 

Senator INHOFE. Do you agree that it is an unmitigated disaster? 

Mr. CORN. I think that characterization is certainly overbroad. I 

think that Guantanamo, because of events that occurred there initially, carries with it a connotation of overreaching, or maybe inconsistency, with core principles that guided our treatment of detainees throughout the history of our Armed Forces. I think if the 

conditions and the standards began as they are today, it would not 

have that imprimatur. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I applaud you on this 

panel. It has been very helpful, and I yield back. 

Mr. ROTH. Senator, could I just maybe give a brief word? 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. I have a serious problem upstairs on the 

fourth floor, but go ahead. 

Mr. ROTH. The reason I say this—— 

Senator INHOFE. I was not saying this as critically as perhaps it 

sounded. There just was not time to elaborate. 

Mr. ROTH. I understand. 

Senator INHOFE. Go ahead. 

Mr. ROTH. My reasoning is this. In the 12 years since September 

11, there have been about 500 successful prosecutions in civilian 

court of terrorists. There have been two trials in Guantanamo, both 

of which have been reversed, and then five guilty pleas. We are 

spending $1.5 million a year per detainee. It is a scar on America’s 

reputation. It is not a sustainable situation. That is why I 

think—— 

Senator INHOFE. Again, I do think if we have a hearing on this, 

I will encourage the majority to invite you as a witness. 

Mr. ROTH. I appreciate it. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been a great 

hearing and it has helped me crystallize my thinking a bit. 

There is a constitutional ambiguity that goes back to the language in Article I and Article II. The Article I language, and I 

125 

think Congress is in Article I, the first article for a reason establishes that Congress has that power to declare war, and the executive power in Article II talks about the President’s powers, somewhat undefined but clearly expansive as Commander in Chief. 

That somewhat vague line, which I think we have to assume was 

written vaguely intentionally by those who wrote the language, and 

additional political realities to me suggest that we have a situation 

where throughout our history, there has often been executive overreach in matters of war and I think excessive deference by Congress. I think that those two trends are actually perhaps getting 

more severe for a variety of reasons that I do not need to go into. 

In response to a point made by Professor Corn, I strongly believe 

that decisions about targeting, tactics, et cetera are for the executive. There should be congressional discussion and oversight certainly. But you are right. If we trust our military leaders to do 

what we empower them to do, then we should not be making those 

decisions. So in terms of the prosecution of hostilities, I think it is 

extremely important that power be an executive power and that we 

give broad latitude to it. 

But I believe even more strongly that Congress has to jealously 

guard its prerogative to commence hostilities and to decide against 

whom those hostilities will be commenced. So the power to declare 

war is not just who we are in a state of hostility, but also a pretty 

clear definition of who are we hostile to. Who is this war to be commenced against? The thing about the hearing that has been important for me is getting at this notion under the AUMF of who exactly was the AUMF authorizing hostilities against. 

There was discussion in the first panel about traditional law of 

war and co-belligerents, and that is a very important and fairly 

longstanding doctrine. Yet, the questions to the first panel suggested to me that they viewed associated groups under the AUMF 

as not the same as co-belligerents because they acknowledge certain groups as associated groups under the AUMF against whom, 

according to their interpretation, we could take action that have 

not declared any particular hostility to the United States. They 

may have chosen to ally with al Qaeda in one theater or another, 

but they have not declared any particular hostility to the United 

States. 

That is what concerns me, Mr. Chairman, about this. Does the 

AUMF broadly allow associated groups to include groups that have 

popped up long after September 11 who have not yet declared hostility to the United States, but get swept into the AUMF purely because they have declared an allegiance for some reason to al 

Qaeda? That causes me grave concern about this jealous prerogative, against whom are we declaring war, that Congress needs to 

guard. 

So the only real question I have is for each of you, and it is great 

to have so many law professors here at once. Courts have validated 

that associated groups, who had no connection with September 11, 

who popped up after September 11, or in the President’s words 

from his State of the Union, have emerged. I asked a question to 

the panel about whether the legal authority is clear, insofar as it 

has been litigated, that groups that had no connection with SepVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:10 May 30, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Z:\DOCS\88026.TXT JUNE
126 

tember 11 that have popped up since are, in fact, encompassed 

within the legal framework of the AUMF? 

Ms. BROOKS. Senator Kaine, I do not think it is clear. I would 

actually refer back to a point that Senator McCain made earlier. 

Most of the litigation on this is related to the scope of detention 

authority in which we have both clear legislation and a clear expression of its interpretations of the AUMF by the executive branch 

in court filings. But I would note that, as Senator McCain suggested earlier, the power to detain is a lesser included power of the 

power to lawfully target, but the power to lawfully target is, obviously, not necessarily an included power in the power to detain. I 

think those are distinct issues and should properly be seen as such. 

But anyway, I think that in terms of your question, is there clarity 

from litigation, no. 

Senator KAINE. Professor Corn or others? 

Mr. CORN. I think one thing we have to recognize is that even 

the judicial review of the detention issues, in those cases, the 

courts have shown great deference to the judgments of the executive as to who is or who is not properly designated as falling under 

the scope of the AUMF. So even if there are judicial decisions that 

endorse the detention of individuals from associated forces, it in 

many ways is just a ripple effect of the executive’s determination. 

I tend to disagree with Professor Brooks. I do believe that this 

litigation has basically permitted detention as an element of the exercise of the principle of military necessity which is invoked 

through the AUMF which, by implication, would extend to targeting as well. So I think you could read those decisions to support 

or to validate the executive judgment of which groups fall within 

this category. 

But ultimately I agree with you, Senator, that Congress absolutely does have the prerogative to set limits on the scope of the 

AUMF, who the enemy is, the duration, and the geographic scope. 

I do agree with Professor Brooks, that is really the policy question 

more than the legal question that Congress has to work through. 

Mr. ROTH. Senator Kaine, if I could. I disagree with Mr. Corn in 

the sense that in an armed conflict, the power to detain extends beyond combatants. You can have a security threat who may not be 

a combatant and still be authorized to detain them. So the fact that 

the courts have interpreted the AUMF fairly expansively with respect to associated forces to allow detention does not necessarily 

imply the same expansion with respect to targeting. 

As to your basic point, logically, of course, a new force can join 

a war later. So if al Qaeda central is fighting along and a new force 

that did not exist 12 years ago joins it, yes, that is a co-belligerent. 

It could be attacked too. But if the original belligerent disappears, 

which I think we are nearing the prospect of, the concept of co-belligerency no longer makes sense for the purpose of the AUMF. So 

this expansive view, that you can keep adding associated forces, 

stops working not only because they may or may not have joined 

arms against the United States, but also because the original focus 

of the AUMF, al Qaeda, I think is in the process of disappearing. 

Mr. STIMSON. Senator, I would just add a couple points. One is 

to your broader first point. I think it is actually very helpful, and 

has proven to be helpful in the last 10 to 12 years, when Congress 

127 

does engage, focus, and work with the executive branch on these 

tough issues. I would commend to your attention, the committee’s 

attention, the work done by Congress on the FISA Amendments 

Act, the Patriot Act amendments to that, the Military Commissions 

Act of 2009 where there was a consensus over time that additional 

safeguards are needed to be put in place. So when you made the 

point earlier that you would very much hope that the administration would come to Congress when they were considering kinetic 

action in Syria, I think that is an excellent point. 

Another thing that I would add, is to Senator King’s comment 

about the associated forces piece. There has been very quietly and 

methodically a great deal of law made by the DC Circuit and the 

DC District Court in the habeas litigation where not only the Bush 

administration but then the Obama administration has, as Professor Brooks pointed out, put forth their position that al Qaeda, 

the Taliban, and associated forces and thereby defines them because they have to put forward some evidence, consists of X, Y, and 

Z. The courts have actually had to look at that, as courts do, to see 

whether the evidence is there to justify detention. Some decisions 

have resulted in them declaring them to be not enemy combatants. 

Most have upheld that. So I think, even though Congress is typically the body that legislates, the courts have had to fill in this gap 

and provide more clarification to those narrow definitions. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

If I could just ask the witnesses a series of short questions, and 

then I would like for you to elaborate on your answers as you so 

choose. I will go down, beginning with you, Professor Brooks. 

Do you believe that al Qaeda, even though having morphed in 

many respects, is on the increase or decreasing? 

Ms. BROOKS. I am only able to evaluate based on what I see in 

the media, obviously. So subject to that caveat, my sense is that 

al Qaeda as such is on the wane, that it has less popular support 

in the Arab and Islamic world, that we have succeeded in significantly, words like ‘‘decimating’’ have been used by the President 

and the DNI, al Qaeda core. I do believe that it has popped up in 

franchise form elsewhere, but my sense, at least from a careful 

read of the March testimony by DNI Clapper, is that the administration, at least publicly, does not appear to see an imminent 

threat to the United States coming from any of its offshoots. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Corn? 

Mr. CORN. First off, I would like to qualify my answer by acknowledging I do not have access to sensitive information and 

again as a former intelligence officer, I think that would be very 

important. 

But my sense is that al Qaeda, as we know it, is following classic 

insurgent doctrine, which is to recede when pressure is against it, 

regroup, reorganize with a goal of coming back, and being able to 

find other vulnerabilities. So I am reluctant to say if it is stronger 

or weaker. I think it is in a different phase of operations now. 

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I basically agree with the first two panelists. I 

only know what I read in the newspapers. It seems like that the 

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core is weakening and that it is popping up in other places with 

an uncertain threat to the United States. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Roth? 

Mr. ROTH. I agree. I think the principal threat posed by the franchises is actually to local governments, not to the United States. 

There is obviously some threat to the United States, but al Qaeda 

core seems to be pretty decimated. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Stimson? 

Mr. STIMSON. I will incorporate by reference the previous answers. I do not have access to that information from a classified 

level. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you believe that the AUMF ought to be 

abandoned, allowed to expire, updated, or replaced? 

Ms. BROOKS. If I were in your shoes, Senator, I think I would 

want to take the current AUMF and put a sunset on it with the 

understanding that if the administration does feel that there are 

intense, sustained, ongoing threats, it should come back and with 

some specificity say to you and your colleagues here what the 

threat is, what we know about it at this moment, and the scope of 

authorization that we believe we need to successfully combat it. 

Here is a question that I would love to have you pose to the Attorney General: what is it that you believe that you need to do that 

you do not believe can be done under your inherent Article II powers? There is a policy question, which is a separate one. There is 

the legal question. But it seems to me that if what the administration is saying, we believe we ought to and can protect the Nation 

while limiting our use of force to prevent imminent threats of attack to the United States, then I do not see that the AUMF is 

needed. 

Senator MCCAIN. Wow. In other words, we should go out and kill 

people and it is really okay? That is a very interesting answer. 

Mr. Corn, outright replacement, updating, allowing it to expire, 

or leave it as it is? 

As I said in my statement, I believe it is not necessary to update 

it now. I do not think it would be a terrible thing to update it, but 

I just do not think it is necessary at this point. 

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Senator, I believe that Congress should get its 

hands around what is going on under the AUMF and figure out 

how the AUMF is being used to authorize the executive to use force 

in various countries. I would perhaps, after getting my arms 

around that, require closer collaboration with Congress on how the 

AUMF is updated by the executive through interpretation. Only 

after you figure out what is going on under the AUMF, what the 

nature of the extra-AUMF threats are, and whether Article II powers are enough to meet those threats can you address legislation 

for extra-AUMF threats. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Roth? 

Mr. ROTH. Senator, with the U.S. war against the Taliban winding down by our choice, with al Qaeda Central decimated by the 

President’s view, I think the AUMF is reaching its expiration date 

very quickly, and I would hasten that. 

Your question to Professor Brooks, does that mean we can just 

run out and kill people? No. There are still strict laws limiting 

129 

that, although killing people is sometimes possible. To come back 

to the chairman’s example, if there is an imminent threat to life 

and there is—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I am not talking imminent threats, Mr. Roth. 

We are all in agreement on imminent threats. 

Mr. ROTH. But then if there are other groups that do not pose 

an imminent threat but there is a desire on the President’s part 

to use military force against them, he should seek congressional 

authorization rather than using the vague terms of the AUMF 

which are coming to an end. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Stimson? 

Mr. STIMSON. I think you keep it as is for now, but at the same 

time, this hearing and others like it need to probe exactly what 

Professor Goldsmith is saying. Figure out whether the AUMF is 

being properly applied and follow the narrow strictures as written, 

whether there are extra-AUMF threats that fall outside but need 

to be addressed by legislation, and conduct vigorous oversight. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. But, my friends, I suggest you take a trip to the region. Al 

Qaeda is all over Mali. Al Qaeda is in Syria in a bigger and bigger 

way every day. Al Qaeda is in Libya. Al Qaeda is morphing all over 

the entire region, maybe not as they were on September 11 and 

maybe the ‘‘core of al Qaeda has been decimated,’’ but from my extensive visits to the region, al Qaeda is on the march. They have 

just morphed into a different kind of threat. 

Could I just ask yes or no? Close Guantanamo? 

Ms. BROOKS. Yes, but it does not address the key point which is 

what do we do, yes for symbolic reasons, but we still have the problem. 

Senator MCCAIN. Implicit in my question is that we figure out 

what to do with the detainees that are there. 

Ms. BROOKS. Yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Corn? 

Mr. CORN. If we figure out what to do with the detainees, then 

yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. My time has expired, but would it not be just 

an act of courage on the part of Congress to find a place to put 

them and designate it? It is not rocket science. 

Mr. CORN. I agree, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Goldsmith? 

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Senator, I think that really does turn on the alternative in the United States because some people confuse closing 

Guantanamo with releasing military detainees. There is also the 

question whether their conditions of confinement will be better or 

worse in the United States. I think probably worse based on all the 

proposals I have seen. But if it truly is a strategic problem and we 

really can find a replacement that would lessen the problem, which 

I am doubtful of, then I would say yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. It is also an image problem and reputation 

problem. 

Mr. GOLDSMITH. But it might be a reputation problem as well if 

we just transfer 150 people to maximum security prisons in the 

United States. It might not just be the location that is the problem. 

That is what I want to suggest. 

130 

Senator MCCAIN. Good point. 

Mr. Roth? 

Mr. ROTH. I agree with that. I think creating ‘‘Guantanamo 

North’’ is not the answer. We should prosecute as many as possible 

in regular court and then release the rest. There may be some risk 

involved in that, but there are a lot of people around the world who 

hate the United States who are not detained. There is just a group 

of legacy detainees in Guantanamo who happen to be detained and 

everybody is afraid to release them. But I think that their continued detention, as the President has pointed out, is at this stage 

doing more harm than good. If they are a real threat, prosecute 

them. Otherwise, I think this continued stain on America’s reputation is not doing us any good. 

Mr. STIMSON. Yes, Senator, I think it should be closed with two 

provisos. One, a very sober, legal, political assessment of what additional rights or privileges they would have here in the United 

States, and we could hold them under the law of armed conflict. 

Two, with the very bare understanding that closing Guantanamo 

still will not cause al Qaeda to love us. There was no Guantanamo 

before September 11. There was no Guantanamo during the USS 

Cole bombing. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you 

for your indulgence. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. 

Senator King. 

Senator KING. Professor Goldsmith, you were here, I think. You 

heard my line of questioning and discussion with the prior panel. 

Here is my question. 

Clearly we are in a different kind of situation. This is not World 

War II where you have a beginning and end, peace treaties, declaration of war, Axis powers, and all those kinds of things. It is a 

kind of twilight struggle with groups that are metamorphosing all 

over the world. 

How do we breathe life into the principle of Congress having the 

power to declare war and the President having the power to prosecute it in this kind of new set of circumstances? That is the issue 

that I am struggling with here. 

Mr. GOLDSMITH. That is a great question, Senator. 

There are many ways to do that. I think that it is important that 

Congress stay closer in touch with how the President is prosecuting 

the war under congressional authorizations. One of the things that 

this hearing has revealed is that perhaps the executive branch has 

an interpretation of the AUMF that is interpretation upon interpretation, each one legitimate, but with the enemy morphing everywhere and with the way we are fighting the war changing quite a 

lot to a more stealth war, that it has taken us to a place that is 

quite different from 12 years ago through a legitimate process. 

I do not believe that terminating the AUMF is a good idea. I do 

not think it is feasible frankly. But I do think Congress, as I said 

to Senator McCain, should try to get its hands around how the 

AUMF is being interpreted and whether you agree with it. I think 

there was progress made when Senator Levin said he would like 

to know a list of groups under the AUMF from DOD and DOD said 

it would answer that question. That is extraordinary. I do not know 

131 

what groups DOD thinks is covered by the AUMF. Anything we 

can do to figure out what the executive branch is doing under the 

AUMF and determine whether you think it is appropriate to be engaged in war, in those countries, against those groups. 

Then there is the question, maybe not for now, but for later, if 

the war against extra-AUMF threats is going to go on for decades. 

There will be a question later about how you deal with threats that 

are not under the AUMF, groups that do threaten the United 

States. I think there needs to be a process worked out between 

Congress and the President for authorizing the President to use 

force under the authorization of Congress. 

I have made a proposal with some co-authors about setting up 

an administrative process inside the executive branch that would 

notify Congress about what groups are actually our enemies. Some 

have characterized that as an expansion of warpowers, but I see 

that as fleshing out who the President thinks the enemy is and 

who the President is going to be using force against so that Congress can know and act upon that. 

But let me say figuring out how separation of powers works in 

this new type of war is very tricky. There are many options open 

to Congress, but I feel very strongly that every 12 years or so, it 

is time to engage and figure out whether you agree with the scope 

of the—— 

Senator KING. Just to pick an arbitrary number. 

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING. Mr. Stimson, do you have some thoughts on this 

problem? 

Mr. STIMSON. No. I would associate myself with Professor Goldsmith’s comments and only add the point I made to Senator Kaine. 

It seems that there have been certain inflection points in the last 

12 years where the courts have periodically and uncharacteristically, for that matter, engaged in issuing opinions with respect to 

wartime issues, specifically detention. But then periodically Congress jumps in and weighs in on various counterterrorism and 

other tools. I think to Jack’s point, perhaps a 12-year period might 

be too long. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Professor Brooks, do you have a thought about how do we make 

this principle that was written 200 years ago work in the time of 

a war that really was not contemplated at that time? I happen to 

think it is an important principle. I want to know how to, as I said, 

breathe life into it. 

Ms. BROOKS. I think it is very tough. I guess I would emphasize 

that we actually have a choice of legal frameworks for how to deal 

with the ongoing threat from terrorism, and I think everybody here 

is in complete agreement that we want to make sure that the 

United States and the executive branch has the authority to protect us with military force if necessary against imminent attack. No 

question, everybody is in agreement. 

I think there is a strategic and a legal question and they are 

interrelated. One is, what is the best way to do that in the long 

run? Does that mean to limit the use of military force to the really 

imminent, big threats, or is that to go after everybody who is an 

affiliate of an affiliate of an affiliate because we think that is the 

132 

smart way to fight terrorism in the long run? That is the strategic 

question. 

Then the legal question, which I think is frankly driven by how 

we answer that first question. If we think it is the former, if we 

think that the legal framework that permits us to use force against 

imminent threats but sort of restricts it, unless something new 

emerges, then we should not be in the armed conflict framework. 

We should be in the self-defense and inherent presidential powers 

framework, and Congress can do that by taking away the AUMF 

when the war in Afghanistan ends, for instance, by sunsetting it 

or—— 

Senator KING. The problem is, though, with a threat like terrorism where it comes up periodically over a long period of time, 

self-defense could be used to justify what amounts to a—— 

Ms. BROOKS. I am not sure I agree with that, and I think this 

is the question. It seems to me—— 

Senator KING. I am not sure I do either, but that is what I see. 

Ms. BROOKS. I think I see the self-defense framework as more restrictive than the armed conflict framework. The self-defense 

framework requires essentially the satisfying of a higher threshold 

of imminence and gravity before force is used than the armed conflict framework which says you do not need to have the threat be 

imminent in the normal sense. You can target people based on 

their status, not their activities, and so forth. 

So to me authorization to use force in an ongoing armed conflict 

against an undefined enemy amounts to far fewer constraints and 

far less ability for Congress to exercise oversight than saying, no, 

if there is an imminent threat, use force. Here I very much agree 

with what several of my colleagues on this panel have said. If the 

nature of al Qaeda core on September 11, 2001, does emerge, then 

by all means return to Congress and request a narrowly tailored 

authorization to use force to address that. 

My husband is an Active Duty Army officer, and he has to go 

where he is sent. It sure would give me a lot more comfort to feel 

like where he is sent, whether I agree with the policy or not, that 

he is being sent wherever in harm’s way only if both Congress and 

the executive branch agree and have seriously thought about the 

need for that. Right now, I think we have tilted a little too much 

towards just the executive branch. 

Senator KING. I agree and I think what you just characterized 

was exactly the way the Framers thought about it. 

Thank you all very much. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. I think this has been a very important 

panel and day’s hearing, and thank you for setting it up. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much for your presence. Those 

of us who were here today I think gained an awful lot from this 

hearing. 

I want to read something that I think very clearly gets into the 

issue which many of us have raised and the panels have addressed. 

It will take me about 2 minutes, but I think it really encapsulates 

something. It is part of Jeh Johnson’s speech. 

He says the AUMF, the statutory authorization from 2001, is not 

open-ended. It does not authorize military force against anyone the 

executive labels a terrorist. Rather, it encompasses only those 

133 

groups or people with a link to the terrorist attacks on September 

11 or associated forces. 

Known as the concept of an associated force, an open-ended one, 

as some suggest, this concept too has been upheld by the courts in 

the detention context, and it is based on the well-established concept of co-belligerency in the law of war. The concept has become 

more relevant over time as al Qaeda has, over the last 10 years, 

become more decentralized and relies more on associates to carry 

out its terrorist aims. 

An ‘‘associated force,’’ as we interpret the phrase, has two characteristics to it: one, an organized armed group that has entered the 

fight alongside al Qaeda something we talked about before and I 

was a bit sloppy on when I talked about al Nusra, and two, is a 

co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States 

or its coalition partners. 

In other words, the group must not only be aligned with al 

Qaeda, it must have also entered the fight against the United 

States or its coalition partners. Thus, an associated force is not any 

terrorist group in the world that merely embraces the al Qaeda ideology. More is required before we draw the legal conclusion that 

the group fits within the statutory AUMF passed by Congress in 

2001. 

Now, I view that as an extremely careful, thoughtful description 

of the AUMF and what it authorizes and what it does not authorize. I will ask our panel and then I will give my colleagues a chance 

also to weigh in, if they want to, further. This was a long speech 

of his, and I only picked three paragraphs but I think it really addresses the concerns that are raised here today. 

Let me go down the line. Ms. Brooks, do you agree with that? 

Ms. BROOKS. I think the devil is in the details. I am not sure 

what it means to join the fight or fight alongside outside of hot battlefields. I would like to see some clarification from the administration on what it thinks that means. 

I would also like to know some of the legal and factual reasoning 

that gets us from that to, for instance, strikes against Somalia’s al 

Shabaab because I do not see how they could be said to satisfy 

those criteria. 

Chairman LEVIN. Well, no, that is different. I am talking about 

the criteria. Do you agree with not whether al Shabaab is listed or 

meets this criteria? Do you agree with this criteria in general? 

Ms. BROOKS. I think in this context the criteria are sufficiently 

vague as to in practice, as we see with the targeting of al Shabaab, 

become virtually meaningless. 

Chairman LEVIN. So this is too vague for you. 

Mr. Corn? 

Mr. CORN. I agree with it. I would also like to see more information on how these decisions are made. I do not think I should because I do not have access to classified information and I think 

that one of the great challenges here is you are dealing with an opponent that follows an asymmetric pattern of behavior, and if you 

disclose this information publicly, you are basically signaling to the 

enemy exactly what the criteria are that the United States uses to 

designate a group of co-belligerents which could have a negative 

consequence. 

134 

I think what that speech reflects implicitly is that this is not a 

characterization that is made lightly, that it is based on an intense 

focus on all available intelligence, and I think that is the function 

of the commander in chief and his subordinate officers when you 

are engaged in a conflict. 

Chairman LEVIN. To the extent that it is possible to describe in 

words what the AUMF does in terms of its authority, in terms of 

the way it limits it, do you agree with this description? 

Mr. CORN. Absolutely. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Goldsmith? 

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Yes, sir, I think it is a perfect description and 

brief of how the AUMF should be interpreted. But I have to say 

my confidence in what it means was shaken a little bit today by 

the first panel’s scope and the breadth in which they thought the 

President was authorized to use force against groups outside of 

countries that we, at least in the public, know we are operating in. 

So with that caveat, yes, I do think it—— 

Chairman LEVIN. I did not ask the first panel if they agreed with 

this. I should have. 

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I am sure that they do. I think that is the administration’s official position, and I am sure those are the principles that they are applying. 

Chairman LEVIN. But you agree with those principles. 

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. You may not agree with the application. 

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I thought I knew what the application meant, 

but I am less confident now after this morning’s testimony. 

Chairman LEVIN. In terms of application, but in terms of the 

principles, as laid out here, you like those principles. 

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Roth? 

Mr. ROTH. I think we are all saying roughly the same thing. As 

a statement of principle or as a statement of the law, that is fine. 

We all have real qualms about how it is being applied. 

As for Congress’ role, which is what this is really about here, my 

recommendation would be to move as quickly as possible from a 

situation where the administration on its own is interpreting this 

in ways that are giving a lot of us pause, to a situation where they 

have to ask congressional approval for particular expansions. 

That is why I think that retiring the AUMF as quickly as possible, not replacing it with a blank check where some administrative procedure determines this, but rather insisting that the executive ask Congress if particular groups are to be added to a list of 

groups with which the United States is at war. That would be the 

way to proceed. That would be the only way that Congress would 

have a meaningful role. Otherwise, we are all going to be sitting 

here guessing what facts are justifying seemingly strained interpretations of that principle by the administration. 

Chairman LEVIN. In terms of a statement of principles, do you 

agree with the principles? 

Mr. ROTH. The principles are fine, yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Stimson? 

135 

Mr. STIMSON. Senator, I agree with the language you read from 

Jeh’s speech. I actually think he gave that over at The Heritage 

Foundation about a year and a half ago. 

I would say that this administration, especially in the first term, 

has done a fairly good job with some high-level keynote speeches 

on various topics like the AUMF. It probably would have served 

them well had they done more with respect to the drones issue 

early on and it would not have caught up to them the way it did. 

I would encourage the administration to continue, to the extent 

practicable, to give these high-level speeches at key venues. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Chair, while I might agree with those principles as stated, if I heard you right, I do not think that is a fair 

characterization of the congressional language in the AUMF. I will 

tell you why. Again, I just heard it. I did not read it. 

Under the principle as stated in those paragraphs, a group that 

popped up long after September 11 and had no role, therefore, on 

September 11 that decided to join the fight with al Qaeda and 

joined it not against the United States, but against a coalition partner—— 

Chairman LEVIN. It says or its coalition partners. 

Senator KAINE.—the AUMF would allow us to commence hostilities against a coalition partner, to commence hostilities against 

a group that had no connection to September 11 and that had no 

intention of engaging in hostilities against the United States. 

Again, while we might have that discussion and as Congress decides what should be done, if that is in fact the administration’s interpretation of the AUMF, it would allow the commencement of 

war, absent additional congressional approval, in a way that I 

think was clearly not contemplated by Congress when it passed the 

AUMF. 

Chairman LEVIN. Putting aside that coalition partner reference—— 

Senator KAINE. The rest of it I think is a fair statement of what 

the AUMF attempted to do. 

Chairman LEVIN. That is interesting. 

Mr. ROTH. Senator, if I could answer. I missed that and I think 

you are absolutely right to bring that up. I think we tend to think 

of coalition partner as a NATO partner or a government for whom 

there is a treaty obligation to come to their defense. But I do not 

think it is meant that narrowly here. It may well mean Yemen or 

Mali, in which case it does under the administration’s—— 

Chairman LEVIN. I do not think that they would fit any coalition—— 

Mr. ROTH. I do not know. In other words, the governments with 

whom we are fighting. So it is worth asking that question. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think at the time this was given, it is the coalition referred to as probably the Afghanistan coalition. 

Mr. STIMSON. Probably so. 

Chairman LEVIN. Probably. So in that context, it may or may not 

have satisfied a very legitimate concern that Senator Kaine has 

just raised. It may or may not satisfy it if it is referring to that 

coalition in Afghanistan. 

136 

Senator King, do you want to close off? 

Senator KING. I am more concerned less about the specifics of the 

AUMF or its continued vitality than with the underlying principle 

of how we deal with the separation of powers issue on this important subject. The AUMF was a way of dealing with it. My concern 

after this morning’s hearing was that it was being interpreted in 

such a way that essentially it had no limits. I take the point that 

you made, and in fact, that exact language was in the prepared testimony of one of the witnesses this morning. But I am still troubled 

by the open-ended nature of the authorization and my question to 

Professor Goldsmith. How do we deal with this issue of Congress 

having the responsibility to declare war in a time where there is 

no clear beginning/ending, and especially as you interpret it? 

So, anyway, I really appreciate what we have discussed here this 

morning, and I think it bears more discussion. My concern is not 

about fighting terrorism. My concern is about open-ended authority 

to the executive to wage war and send our people into harm’s way. 

That is exactly what the Framers were worried about and that is 

why they gave that power to Congress. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think the fear of open-ended authority is one 

that hopefully all of us share and I think that is probably the case 

because it is a very legitimate concern. 

We thank you all. You have been a great panel. You have really 

helped us. 

We will stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK UDALL

AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE

1. Senator UDALL. Secretary Sheehan, in your testimony you clarified that with 

regard to ‘‘the authority to put boots-on-the-ground in Yemen or Congo,’’ you were 

‘‘not necessarily referring to that under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military 

Force (AUMF). Certainly the President has military personnel deployed all over the 

world today, in probably over 70 to 80 countries, and that authority is not always 

under AUMF. So I just want to clarify for the record that we weren’t talking about 

all that authority subject to AUMF.’’ Can you please provide a very specific answer 

to this question: what authority or authorities, other than the AUMF, were you referring to in your testimony? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. I was referring to several security cooperation authorities under 

which U.S. military forces are engaged in foreign countries with foreign military and 

civilian partners. For example, the Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund (under 

title 10, U.S.C., section 166a) may be used for joint overseas exercises to maintain 

the proficiency of U.S. military forces and build the capacity of foreign partners. 

DOD may also provide transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide (under title 10, U.S.C., section 2561). 

In the realm of Special Operations Forces (SOF), the Joint Combined Exchange 

Training authority (title 10, U.S.C., section 2011) permits DOD to fund deployments 

to foreign countries of SOF for training with Armed Forces and other security forces 

of friendly foreign countries. SOF also deploy to provide counternarcotics training 

to partner nation forces, improving partner nation skills against illegal narcotics 

and other related illicit trafficking (under section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1991, as amended). 

Subject to appropriate approval processes, these and other efforts taken together 

enable DOD to engage with the military forces of numerous partner nations. 

I note that a deployment could be subject to the requirements of the War Powers 

Resolution, depending on the nature of the deployment, including whether the forces 

are equipped for combat and whether they are deployed into hostilities or situations 

where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. 

137 

2. Senator UDALL. Secretary Sheehan, under what authority or authorities does 

the President and could the President, deploy military personnel, to include Special 

Operations Forces, all over the world today? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. In addition to the President’s authority as Commander in Chief, 

to order the deployment of military forces, there are several security cooperation authorities under which U.S. military forces are engaged in foreign countries with foreign military and civilian partners. For example, the Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund (under title 10, U.S.C., section 166a) may be used for joint overseas 

exercises to maintain the proficiency of U.S. military forces and build the capacity 

of foreign partners. DOD may also provide transportation of humanitarian relief and 

for other humanitarian purposes worldwide (under title 10, U.S.C., section 2561). 

In the realm of SOF, the Joint Combined Exchange Training authority (title 10, 

U.S.C., section 2011) permits DOD to fund deployments to foreign countries of SOF 

for training with armed forces and other security forces of friendly foreign countries. 

SOF also deploy to provide counternarcotics training to partner nation forces, improving partner nation skills against illegal narcotics and other related illicit trafficking (under section 1004 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1991, as amended). 

Subject to appropriate approval processes, these efforts taken together enable 

DOD to engage with the military forces of numerous partner nations. 

I note that a deployment could be subject to the requirements of the War Powers 

Resolution, depending on the nature of the deployment, including whether the forces 

are equipped for combat and whether they are deployed into hostilities or situations 

where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR. 

AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE

3. Senator KING. Secretary Sheehan, in your testimony you stated that with regard to the ‘‘authority to put boots-on-the-ground in Yemen or Congo,’’ you were, 

‘‘not necessarily referring to that under the 2001 AUMF. Certainly the President 

has military personnel deployed all over the world today, in probably over 70 to 80 

countries, and that authority is not always under AUMF. So I just want to clarify 

for the record that we weren’t talking about all that authority subject to AUMF.’’ 

What authority, other than the AUMF, were you referring to in your testimony? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. I was referring to several security cooperation authorities under 

which U.S. military forces are engaged in foreign countries with foreign military and 

civilian partners. For example, the Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund (under 

title 10, U.S.C., section 166a) may be used for joint overseas exercises to maintain 

the proficiency of U.S. military forces and build the capacity of foreign partners. 

DOD may also provide transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide (under title 10, U.S.C., section 2561). 

In the realm of SOF, the Joint Combined Exchange Training authority (title 10, 

U.S.C., section 2011) permits DOD to fund deployments to foreign countries of SOF 

for training with Armed Forces and other security forces of friendly foreign countries. SOF also deploy to provide counternarcotics training to partner nation forces, 

improving partner nation skills against illegal narcotics and other related illicit trafficking (under section 1004 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1991, as amended). 

Subject to appropriate approval processes, these and other efforts taken together 

enable DOD to engage with the military forces of numerous partner nations. 

I note that a deployment could be subject to the requirements of the War Powers 

Resolution, depending on the nature of the deployment, including whether the forces 

are equipped for combat and whether they are deployed into hostilities or situations 

where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. 

4. Senator KING. Secretary Sheehan, under what authority does the President, 

and could the President, deploy military personnel all over the world today? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. In addition to the President’s authority as Commander in Chief, 

to order the deployment of military forces, there are several security cooperation authorities under which U.S. military forces are engaged in foreign countries with foreign military and civilian partners. For example, the Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund (under title 10, U.S.C., section 166a) may be used for joint overseas 

exercises to maintain the proficiency of U.S. military forces and build the capacity 

of foreign partners. DOD may also provide transportation of humanitarian relief and 

for other humanitarian purposes worldwide (under title 10, U.S.C., section 2561). 

In the realm of SOF, the Joint Combined Exchange Training authority (title 10, 

U.S.C., section 2011) permits DOD to fund deployments to foreign countries of SOF 

138 

for training with armed forces and other security forces of friendly foreign countries. 

SOF also deploy to provide counternarcotics training to partner nation forces, improving partner nation skills against illegal narcotics and other related illicit trafficking (under section 1004 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1991, as amended). 

Subject to appropriate approval processes, these efforts taken together enable 

DOD to engage with the military forces of numerous partner nations. 

I note that a deployment could be subject to the requirements of the War Powers 

Resolution, depending on the nature of the deployment, including whether the forces 

are equipped for combat and whether they are deployed into hostilities or situations 

where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY A. AYOTTE

MILITARY CUSTODY

5. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Taylor, based on your interpretation of current laws and 

authorities, if he had chosen to do so, could President Obama have designated 

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev an enemy combatant and placed him in military custody for 

several weeks or months for interrogation and intelligence collection and then 

placed him back in our civil justice system for trial as a U.S. citizen? 

Mr. TAYLOR. We are aware of no information that indicates that Dzhokar 

Tsamaev is an ‘‘enemy combatant’’ subject to military detention under the AUMF. 

The evidence we possess does not indicate that he was ‘‘part of’’ or ‘‘substantially 

supporting’’ al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces. 

6. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Taylor, under current law, once placed in military custody, would Tsarnaev have been entitled to file a habeas petition in a civilian court 

challenging his detention as an enemy combatant? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes. The Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld determined, among 

other things, that the Constitution requires that a U.S. citizen-detainee receive due 

process sufficient to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant, and held 

that ‘‘[a]bsent suspension of the writ [of habeas corpus] by Congress, a citizen detained as an enemy combatant is entitled to this process.’’ 542 U.S. 507, 537 (2004). 

DETENTION AUTHORITY

7. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Taylor, in your joint statement you say that the, ‘‘United 

States remains in a state of armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces.’’ You also state that, ‘‘existing authorities are adequate for this armed 

conflict.’’ Are existing authorities adequate for the detention operations that are part 

of this armed conflict? 

Mr. TAYLOR. The 2001 AUMF implicitly authorizes the detention of enemy combatants in the armed conflict against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. 

This interpretation has been upheld by the courts in habeas corpus litigation and 

reaffirmed by Congress in section 1021 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012. This detention authority is adequate for the detention operations that are part of the ongoing armed conflict. 

8. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Taylor, what authorities does the administration rely on 

to capture and detain foreign members of al Qaeda and associated forces at Guantanamo? 

Mr. TAYLOR. The 2001 AUMF implicitly authorizes the capture and detention of 

enemy combatants in the armed conflict against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. This interpretation has been upheld by the courts in habeas corpus litigation and reaffirmed by Congress in section 1021 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 

2012. 

9. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Taylor, will these authorities to conduct detainee operations at Guantanamo derived from the international law of war and U.S. law, 

change when the combat operations end in Afghanistan or when U.S. troops eventually leave Afghanistan? 

Mr. TAYLOR. There will eventually come a point when our enemy in this armed 

conflict is so defeated that we are no longer in an ongoing armed conflict. At that 

point we will need to face the difficult questions of what to do with those who still 

remain in U.S. military detention without a criminal conviction and sentence. But 

that is a point we have not yet reached, and the end of the U.S. combat role in Afghanistan will not necessarily mark that point. 

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10. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Taylor, will the authority to detain and interrogate foreign members of al Qaeda and associated forces at Guantanamo remain unchanged 

after combat operations end in Afghanistan or U.S. troops leave Afghanistan? 

Mr. TAYLOR. There will eventually come a point when our enemy in this armed 

conflict is so defeated that we are no longer in an ongoing armed conflict. At that 

point we will need to face the difficult questions of what to do with those who still 

remain in U.S. military detention without a criminal conviction and sentence. But 

that is a point we have not yet reached, and the end of the U.S. combat role in Afghanistan will not necessarily mark that point. 

LACK OF DETENTION POLICY

11. Senator AYOTTE. General Nagata, based on your role as the Deputy Director 

for Special Operations and Counterterrorism (J–37) on the Joint Staff, if we captured Ayman al Zawahiri tonight, can you tell me where we would detain him for 

long-term law of war detention and interrogation? 

General NAGATA. If we captured Ayman al Zawahiri, the location and circumstances of his detention would be dependent, in part, on the circumstances of 

his capture. If it were determined that law of war detention and interrogation were 

appropriate, as opposed to detention under criminal law (and law enforcement interrogation), the Department of Defense (DOD) has a number of options that would 

be decided by the President after receiving a recommendation by the senior members of the President’s national security team. 

VALUE OF MILITARY CUSTODY FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

12. Senator AYOTTE. General Nagata, has intelligence collected from members of 

al Qaeda and associated forces held in military custody provided intelligence that 

we have used to prevent attacks, protect Americans, or help us capture other terrorists? 

General NAGATA. [Deleted.] 

13. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Sheehan and General Nagata, did we gather intelligence from detainees at Guantanamo that helped us find Osama bin Laden? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes. Intelligence gathered from detainees at Guantanamo improved 

our understanding of the al Qaeda organization, which was helpful in our efforts 

to find Osama bin Laden. 

General NAGATA. [Deleted.] 

14. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Sheehan and General Nagata, months or years 

later, did we go back to detainees at Guantanamo and ask subsequent questions 

that were helpful in finding Osama bin Laden? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes. DOD asked subsequent questions of detainees, the answers to 

which were helpful in our efforts to find Osama bin Laden. 

General NAGATA. [Deleted.] 

15. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Taylor, Secretary Sheehan, General Nagata, and General 

Gross, what is the primary purpose of military custody for members of al Qaeda and 

associated forces? 

Mr. TAYLOR. As the Supreme Court recognized in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 

507, 518–19 (2004), detention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield and 

from taking up arms once again is a long-recognized and fundamental incident of 

waging war. It is not a punitive measure. It is our preference to capture suspected 

terrorists whenever feasible so that, among other reasons, we can gather valuable 

intelligence. Capture and detention of enemy belligerents are traditional military 

practices and part and parcel of armed conflict. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. The purpose of military detention is to keep enemy combatants off 

the battlefield. Detention facilitates the collection of intelligence that could prevent 

future terrorist attacks. 

General NAGATA. Detention serves a number of purposes, including providing intelligence on enemy operations and in removing enemy forces from the battlefield 

so that they are prevented from taking up arms again. 

General GROSS. As the Supreme Court recognized in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 

507, 518–19 (2004), detention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield and 

from taking up arms once again is a long-recognized and fundamental incident of 

waging war. It is not a punitive measure. It is our preference to capture suspected 

terrorists whenever feasible—among other reasons, so that we can gather valuable 

140 

intelligence that we might not be able to obtain any other way. In fact, the members 

of al Qaeda that we or other nations have captured have been one of our greatest 

sources of information about al Qaeda, its plans, and its intentions. Once in U.S. 

custody, we often can prosecute them in our Federal courts or reformed military 

commissions—both of which are used for gathering intelligence and preventing further terrorist attacks. Viewed within the context of conventional armed conflict, as 

they should be, capture and detention by the military are both lawful and necessary 

practices. 

TARGETED KILLING AND DETENTION POLICY

16. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Taylor, if the administration believes that it has the authority to kill a U.S. citizen with a drone who is a member of al Qaeda or associated 

forces, does the administration also believe it has the authority to detain a U.S. citizen who is a member of al Qaeda or associated forces in military custody for purposes of law of war interrogation and intelligence collection? 

Mr. TAYLOR. It is our preference to capture suspected terrorists whenever feasible 

so that, among other reasons, we can gather valuable intelligence. In Hamdi v. 

Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that the AUMF authorized the detention of individuals who are part of or supporting enemy forces, and the DC Circuit has repeatedly endorsed the administration’s interpretation of the scope of its detention authority under the AUMF in the ongoing habeas litigation. All three branches of government agree that the administration may hold in military custody individuals who 

are ‘‘part of’ or ‘‘substantially support’’ al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces. 

The Supreme Court stated in Hamdi that there is ‘‘no bar to this Nation’s holding 

one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant.’’ Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (U.S. 

2004). A U.S. citizen, no matter where held, would have the right to seek a writ 

of habeas corpus to test the legality of his detention. 

Hamdi concerned an individual initially captured by the military in Afghanistan. 

Law of war detention of U.S. citizen terrorist suspects apprehended in the United 

States, however, would present serious legal and policy questions. With exceptions 

for individuals like Ali al-Marri and Jose Padilla, both of whom were apprehended 

during the previous administration, the usual practice of the U.S. Government 

(under both the current and prior administrations) has been to arrest and detain 

under Federal criminal law all U.S. citizen terrorist suspects who are apprehended 

in the United States. 

17. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Taylor, from where does the authority come to detain 

U.S. citizens in military custody for purposes of law of war detention? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Title 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) provides that ‘‘[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.’’ With respect to the conflict against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated 

forces, the Supreme Court has held that the AUMF, enacted on September 18, 2001, 

grants authority within the meaning of § 4001(a) to detain certain U.S. citizens in 

military custody for purposes of law of war detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 

507, 517 (2004) (plurality opinion); accord Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 587 

(2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). President Obama, in signing the NDAA for Fiscal 

Year 2012, stated unequivocally that the Obama administration will not authorize 

the indefinite military detention without trial of U.S. citizens. 

18. Senator AYOTTE. Mr. Taylor, since September 11, has the U.S. Government 

detained members of al Qaeda or associated forces who are U.S. citizens in law of 

war military custody for purposes of interrogation and intelligence collection? 

Mr. TAYLOR. There have been occasions since September 11, 2001, when U.S. citizens have been detained in military custody under the law of war and interrogated 

for purposes of intelligence collection. Any detention under the law of war must 

comply with the Constitution, the laws of war, and all other applicable law. President Obama, in signing the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, stated unequivocally that 

the Obama administration will not authorize the indefinite military detention without trial of American citizens. 

[Whereupon, at 12:44 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

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