THE INDISPENSABLE

FORCE:

THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL

ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

OFFICE OF ARMY RESERVE HISTORY

UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMMAND

FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA

KATHRYN ROE COKER
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DESCRIPTION: On a dark blue disk the bust of a minuteman (Captain John 

Parker) in cocked hat on a pedestal, between two branches of olive or within a dark blue designation band with gold inner and outer borders inscribed 

UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE in gold.

SYMBOLISM: The minuteman has traditionally been used to represent the 

citizen Soldier. The wreath signifies achievement and accomplishment. Gold 

is symbolic of honor and excellence and dark blue signifies loyalty.

BACKGROUND: The emblem was approved for use as a plaque in 1972 and 

is used as an unofficial identification device of the United States Army Reserve. 

(U.S. Army Institute of Heraldry)

First Printed 2013

Copies obtained from the Office of Army Reserve History 

United States Army Reserve Command (USARC)
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EDITORS

Lee S. Harford, Jr. Director

Ressie Harris-Delgado Training and Operations Officer

Jason Wetzel Staff Historian

Christopher Ruff Museum Curator

Jennifer Friend Museum Specialist

Deborah Foster-King Archivist
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THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

CONTENTS

Acknowledgement............................................................................................xxix

Foreward ...........................................................................................................xxx 

Preface .............................................................................................................xxxii

Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1

1. Post-Cold War Defense Strategy .................................................................. 9

End of the Cold War ................................................................................. 9

National Security Strategy....................................................................... 11

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM .............................. 11

Establishment of the United States Army Reserve Command............... 40

Activation of the Regional Support Commands..................................... 45

The Base Force ........................................................................................ 47

The Bottom-Up Review.......................................................................... 50

The Off-Site Agreement.......................................................................... 52

Report of the Commission on the Roles & Missions 

 of the Armed Forces........................................................................ 54

Reshaping the Army................................................................................. 57

Contingency Force Pool.......................................................................... 59

Priority Reserve in Mobilization Enhancement ..................................... 64

Personnel Strength .................................................................................. 66

Fiscal Strength ......................................................................................... 75

Force Structure ........................................................................................ 77

BOLD SHIFT......................................................................................... 78

Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement Training 

 Support System............................................................................... 81

Other Training Developments ................................................................ 81

Equipment.............................................................................................. 101

Liaison and Contingency Operations ................................................... 122

Mobilization Exercises........................................................................... 134

Military Support to Civil Authorities and Homeland Defense ............ 134
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Soldier and Family Well Being.............................................................. 137

Base Realignment and Closure.............................................................. 144

Conclusion ............................................................................................. 148

2. Engagement and Enlargement..................................................................161

The World Scene at a Glance................................................................ 161

National Security Strategy..................................................................... 165

Quadrennial Defense Review and National Military Strategy............. 168

A Proactive Strategy and Shifting Paradigm......................................... 173

Self Study ............................................................................................... 176

Personnel Strength ................................................................................ 178

Personnel Administration and Management......................................... 182

Fiscal Strength ....................................................................................... 183

Force Structure ...................................................................................... 186

Training.................................................................................................. 193

Equipment.............................................................................................. 204

Mobilization........................................................................................... 215

Military Support to Civil Authorities and Homeland Defense ............ 221

Soldier and Family Well Being.............................................................. 231

Base Realignment and Closure.............................................................. 234

Conclusion ............................................................................................. 235

3. The Global War on Terrorism ..................................................................249

A New Day in Infamy............................................................................ 249

The Immediate Response ...................................................................... 266

The Bush Doctrine ................................................................................ 270

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM ................................................. 274

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM ............................................................. 283

National Security Strategy..................................................................... 306

Quadrennial Defense Review ................................................................ 309

Army Transformation ............................................................................ 314

Modularity.............................................................................................. 333

Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) .............................................. 335

Army Reserve Expeditionary Force....................................................... 339

Mobilization Policy................................................................................ 342

Personnel Strength ................................................................................ 344

Fiscal Strength ....................................................................................... 352

Force Structure ...................................................................................... 353

Training.................................................................................................. 368

Equipment.............................................................................................. 393

Medical Readiness.................................................................................. 407

Military Support to Civil Authorities and Homeland Defense ............ 416
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THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

Soldier and Family Well Being.............................................................. 422

Employer Partnership Program ............................................................ 433

Base Realignment and Closure.............................................................. 436

Conclusion ............................................................................................. 441

Conclusion .......................................................................................................463

Appendix A: Silver Star Recipients..................................................................473

Appendix B: The Fallen in the Global War on Terrorism.............................476

Glossary of Selected Terms .............................................................................493

Bibliography.....................................................................................................499

Index .................................................................................................................531

FIGURES 

I-1. Percentage of Forces Provided by the Army Reserve During Operation 

 DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM ................................................ 29 

I-2. Proposed Regional Support Commands .................................................. 46

I-3. Reductions Recommended By the Base Force......................................... 48

I-4. The Big Swap ............................................................................................. 54

I-5. Contingency Force Pool Concept ............................................................ 62

I-6. Reductions in Active Army Strength......................................................... 67

I-7. U.S. Army Reserve Strength, September 30, 1990................................... 71

I-8. Individual Ready Reserve Strength, 1991-1994 ....................................... 72

I-9. First Term Enlisted Retention Rates, 1991-1994..................................... 74

I-10. Percentage Distribution of Total Obligation Authority, 1994............... 75

I-11. Total Army Force Structure, September 30, 1990.................................. 78

I-12. Total Army School System....................................................................... 90

I-13. Army Reserve Soldiers Training Overseas, 1990-1994 .......................... 98

I-14. Army Reserve Wartime Equipment on Hand, 1990-1994 ..................103

I-15. Status of Required Items on Hand, 1992..............................................103
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I-16. National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation, 1990-1995....113

II-1. Projected Army End Strength Reduction Percentages, 1989-1998.....171

II-2. Projected Army End Strength Reduction, 1989-1998..........................171

II-3. Army After Next .....................................................................................177

II-4. Joint Vision 2010 ....................................................................................179

II-5. Army Manpower 1999............................................................................181

II-6. Total Army Force Support Package Units, 1997...................................192

II-7. Training Support Divisions....................................................................197

II-8. Army Reserve Percentage of Equipment On Hand, 1997-1999..........206

II-9. National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations 1995-1999....207 

II-10. Velocity Management Re-engineers Army Logistics..........................213

II-11. The Army’s Six Imperatives .................................................................235

III-1. Army Reserve Commitments, December 10, 2010.............................300

III-2. Reserve Component Activations, December 28, 2010........................301

III-3A. From Legacy to Objective Force.......................................................316

III-3B. Bridging the Gap Between Arriving Force and Later Force............316

III-4. Transformation Across The Spectrum Of Operations........................322

III-5. Elements of Army Transformation Strategy........................................324

III-6. Current to Future Force.......................................................................325

III-7. General George W. Casey, Jr.’s Four Strategic Imperatives to Restore

 Balance..................................................................................................327

III-8. ARFORGEN Force Pools....................................................................336

III-9. ARFORGEN - A Supply Based Rotational Model.............................337

III-10. Mobilization Cycle Before and After ARFORGEN.........................338

III-11. Army Reserve ARFORGEN Strategy ...............................................339

III-12. Five Year Army Reserve Expeditionary Force Cycle.........................341

III-13. Army Reserve Expeditionary Force ...................................................342

III-14. Army Reserve End Strength, FY 2002-FY 2011...............................344

III-15. Total Army Reserve Strength as of December 31, 2010 ...................346 
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THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

III-16. Army Reserve Retention Rates, 2001-2010.......................................347

III-17. Stress Factors Influencing Reenlistment............................................350

III-18. Composition of Army Forces, 2010 ...................................................356

III-19. Regional Readiness Commands.........................................................357

III-20. Regional Support Commands............................................................357

III-21. Operational Commands .....................................................................359

III-22. Functional Commands........................................................................360

III-23. Direct Reporting Units.......................................................................361

III-24. Operational and Functional Commands, Regional Support Commands,

 and Direct Reporting Units................................................................362

III-25. Army Reserve Headquarters Internal Realignment..........................368

III-26. The Army Reserve Training Strategy and ARFORGEN .................369

III-27. Army Reserve Training Strategy ........................................................370

III-28. Training Structure...............................................................................376

TABLES

I-1. Timetable, August 2, 1990 - June 1991 .................................................... 14

I-2. U.S. Army Reserve Total Strength, September 30, 1990 ......................... 71

I-3. Army Reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentees, 1992-1994 ............ 73

III-1. Total Army Reserve Mobilization Days and Mobilization Orders, Fiscal

 Year 2005-2009......................................................................................329

III-2. Army Reserve Military Personnel Class of the Total Army, 2005-2009 ..345

III-3. Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Force, Fiscal Year 2000-2010...............350

III-4. Army Reserve Appropriations Dollars in Millions............................. 352

III-5. 2001 Army Reserve Force Structure Composition of the Total Army....355
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MAPS

1. Major U.S. Combat Units at the End of the Cold War, Germany, 1990..... 8

2. Operation Desert Storm, 24-28 February 1991.......................................... 12

3. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.....................................................132

4. Ethnic Composition in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1991 ..................................162

5. Bosnia-Herzegovinia Under the Dayton Peace Agreement and the Front

 Lines At the End of 1995 ...........................................................................163 

6. Kosovo Force (KFOR) Sectors, Serbia, and Kosovo Autonomous Province,

 May 2002.....................................................................................................165

7. Major U.S. Operations, Afghanistan, October 2000-March 2002 ...........275

8. Invasion of Iraq, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, 21 March-9April 2003....284

9. East Timor...................................................................................................418

Maps 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, are courtesy of the U.S. Army Center of Military History as 

published in Richard Stewart, editor, American Military History, Volume II: The 

United States Army In A Global Era, 1917-2008, pp. 414, 422, 441, 454, 471, 484.

PHOTOGRAPHS

Armed Forces Reserve Medal .............................................................................. 4

General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr........................................................................ 4

Armed Forces Reserve Medal With M Device ................................................... 5

President Ronald Reagan at the Berlin Wall, June 12, 1987 ............................ 10

George H. W. Bush............................................................................................. 10

Michael P. W. Stone............................................................................................ 11

Saddam Hussein.................................................................................................. 11

Members of the 1176th Transportation Terminal Unit monitor loading of ships 

bound for the desert............................................................................................ 15
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THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

This desert, battle dress uniform or DBU bears the desert camouflage pattern 

adopted in 1982................................................................................................... 16 

Melvin R. Laird................................................................................................... 17

James R. Schelsinger........................................................................................... 17

General H. Norman Schwarzkoph.................................................................... 20

Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis........................................................... 20

Mopping up: The chemical warfare threat in the Middle East required that 

all soldiers undergo intensive nuclear, biological and chemical warfare training 

before being deployed ........................................................................................ 21 

Medium tents used as enlisted quarters, XVIII Airborne Corps Main Command 

Post, Rafha Airport, Northern Province, Saudi Arabia, February 5, 1991....... 24 

Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock .................................................................. 25

Major General Max Baratz................................................................................. 25

Example of a prayer cap and shawl provided to Kurdish refugees during 

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.................................................................. 27

An Army veteran and Brigadier General Peter S. Lennon, commanding general of the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, dedicate a wreath to 

the 14th Quartermaster Detachment monument in Greensburg, Pennsylvania, 

during the unit’s 20th anniversary memorial ceremony of the SCUD missile 

attack, held at the unit’s reserve center on February 25, 2011........................28

Two U.S. soldiers walk past a pile of G.I. duffle bags, decorated with small 

American flags, following a SCUD missile attack on the U.S. military barracks 

at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, February 25, 1991.................................................... 28 

Major General Roger W. Sandler...................................................................... 32

C-141 aircraft...................................................................................................... 36

General Carl E. Vuono....................................................................................... 37

Major General William F. Ward, Jr.................................................................... 40

John O. Marsh, Jr. ............................................................................................... 41

Congressman Bill Chappell, Jr. first raised the issue of the Army Reserve’s command and control with Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr.................... 41
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In February 1989, Congressman John P. Murtha, who had replaced Chappell as 

the chairman of the HAC’s Defense Subcommittee, wrote Marsh, “perhaps it is 

time we completely reexamine the entire question of command and control of 

the Army Reserve.”.............................................................................................. 42

General Edwin Burba......................................................................................... 42

Major William F. Ward, Jr. (left) and Major General Roger W. Sandler show 

the colors of the USARC flag at a change of command ceremony on August 1, 

1991, at Fort McPherson, Georgia.................................................................... 44

Shoulder sleeve insignia of the U.S. Army Reserve Command. The double eagle reflects the unit motto “Twice the Citizen.”................................................ 45

Distinguished unit insignia of the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC). 45

General Colin L. Powell..................................................................................... 47

William J. Clinton............................................................................................... 50

Les Aspin ............................................................................................................. 50

General J.H. Binford Peay III............................................................................ 52

General Gordon R. Sullivan............................................................................... 58

Richard B. Cheney.............................................................................................. 66

William J. Perry .................................................................................................. 73

The 205th Infantry Brigade, 6th Infantry Division (Roundout) soldiers practice 

“helocasting” in 1990 at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin............................................. 79

A former member of the 101st Airborne Division (airmobile), now an IRR 

member of the Army Reserve, instructs other IRR soldiers on the fine points of 

the LAW anti-tank weapon, 1991...................................................................... 84

General Frederick W. Franks, Jr......................................................................... 85

Operation BRIGHT STAR is a multinational exercise that is designed to improve readiness, interoperability, and strengthen military and professional relationships between the Third Army-led U.S. contingent, Egypt, and nine other 

nations ................................................................................................................. 99

Checking for bacteria and minerals, Major John C. Lewis examines water from 

a village well in Thailand during Operation COBRA GOLD, ’93.................. 99
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THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

4,000 - and 6,000-pound rough terrain forklifts in operation, Forward Landing Strip (FLS) at Logistical Base CHARLIE, Northern Province, Saudi Arabia 

(southeast of Rafha), February 8, 1991 ............................................................102

C-12...................................................................................................................105

The Desert Combat Uniform or DCU is made of cotton rip-stop fabric and cut 

in the same pattern as the BDU.......................................................................105

U-21...................................................................................................................108

U-8.....................................................................................................................108

A soldier operates a radio set AN/VRC-12 (RT-524A/VRC Receiver-Transmitter) during Exercise REFORGER ’86, January 22, 1986...............................109

Staff Sergeant Didler C. Phillips, motor sergeant for the 441st Medical Company at Wallops Island, Virginia, gives one of his unit’s new vehicles a quick operational check before fueling the truck and putting it out on the “line.”............110

AH-64 Apache helicopter.................................................................................114

Close-up of two CH-47Ds, 18th Aviation Brigade operations, vicinity of Logistical Base CHARLIE, Northern Province, Saudi Arabia (southeast of Rafha), 

February 11, 1991 .............................................................................................114

Staff Sergeant Glenn Green, standing on cockpit and Staff Sergeant Brad 

Woods, instruct and direct students on removal of a main middle assembly on a 

UH-60 helicopter during ADT at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 1991..............115

M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier..............................................................117

Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System.....................................120

Captain Lawrence Knapp, 402d Civil Affairs Company, listens to Kurdish 

refugees’ stories at the coalition forces built camp outside Zakho, Iraq, about 

living conditions in Northern Iraq ..................................................................122

Securing the Port-au-Prince Airport...............................................................127

An Army Reserve soldier ascends a Multinational Force Observer tower in the 

Sinai, Egypt .......................................................................................................136

Soldiers of the 33d Aviation Group, Fort Rucker, Alabama, conduct early morning pre-flight inspections before take-off and a full day searching for 

marijuana...........................................................................................................140

On the ground with machetes, a task force member begins the eradication process in a plot containing more than forty marijuana plants............................141
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Hearty Welcome: Crowd members gather to welcome returning troops 

following their participation in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT 

STORM ............................................................................................................144

A young spectator holding up a newspaper with the headline “Welcome Home” 

during the national victory celebration parade honoring the coalition forces of 

Operation DESERT STORM ........................................................................145

IFOR .................................................................................................................164

William S. Cohen .............................................................................................169

General Dennis J. Reimer................................................................................170

Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes............................................................190

Army Reserve Specialist Jason Driscoll, second from left, a civil affairs specialist 

with the 401st Civil Affairs Battalion, Webster, New York, leaves Medina Jabal, 

under the escort of soldiers from the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California ................................................198

Landing Craft Utility 2000 ..............................................................................200

An obsolete 42-ton M-60 tank is pushed from a barge in Operation REEFEX ............................................................................................................200

Litter bearers from the 405th Combat Support Hospital, Hartford, Connecticut, move a patient from an ambulance to the triage area during a mass casualty 

exercise at Fort Bliss, Texas, site of Exercise ROVING SANDS, 96.............203

Major Hal Bohlman, 830th Station Hospital, Des Moines, Iowa, fits a Guatemalan girl with glasses during Exercise FUERTES CAMINOS. At right, Specialist Rebecca Nunez gets a thankful smile..........................................................204

Specialist Christopher Tilley of the 682d Maintenance Company, Canton, 

Ohio, services communications wiring on a vehicle while on annual training in 

Germany............................................................................................................205

Military technician Jim Reichert works on a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter at 

the aviation support facility, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.............................208

Two armored D7 bulldozers out on a mission in Ramadi, Iraq .....................209

The palletized load system loads and unloads a wide range of cargo without the 

need for forklifts or other materiel handling equipment................................210

The HET is designed to haul the Abrams tank and also to fight and recover 

vehicles, howitzers, and construction equipment............................................211
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THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

Army Reserve Chief Warrant Officer 4 Gwen Schallow, the first Army woman 

(active or reserve) to qualify as a pilot in command of an Apache attack helicopter..............................................................................................................216

First rotation units return from Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, as second 

rotation units mobilize......................................................................................217

A civil affairs vehicle convoy passes through a section of the zone of separation 

near Brc ́ko .........................................................................................................218

Helicopters are guided onto a landing strip in Kosovo for a humanitarian 

mission...............................................................................................................219

A U.S. Army M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier prepares to pull an armored 

Humvee out of the mud in Bosnia and Herzgovina on May 10, 1996, during 

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR....................................................................219

Overall view of Murrah Federal building........................................................222

This photo of fireman Chris Fields and one-year-old Baylee Almon (who later 

died in a hospital) became a symbol of the most deadly pre-9/11 terrorist attack 

on U.S. soil ........................................................................................................223

The Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building two days after the attack .................224

Removing debris from what use to be the childcare center.........................225

Pipe Sergeant Kevin M. Donnelly, of the DEA Black and Gold Pipes and 

Drums, walks past the field of chairs and the reflecting pool at the Oklahoma 

City National Memorial on Monday, April 19, 2010, to start the 15th anniversary memorial ceremony of the Oklahoma City bombing................................225

Specialist Jake Panter, 854th Quartermaster Company, Logan, Utah, tests water 

quality during flood relief operations in North Dakota .................................226

Members of the Guam-based 411th Engineer Battalion, Horizontal Platoon, 

prepare materials for a culvert installed at Nimitz Hill, Guam, following 

Typhoon Paka ...................................................................................................227

The 7229th Medical Support Unit from Fort Lewis, Washington, provided the 

Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation Tribe with medical, dental, and veterinarian care here in Lame Deer, Montana, part of the Innovative Readiness 

Training program..............................................................................................228

Sergeant First Class Scott Matson from the 327th Engineer Company guides 

the removal of the temporary bridge from the Red Wing Wildlife Preserve on 

the Mississippi River.........................................................................................228
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The 7210th Medical Support Unit conducted a medical Innovative Readiness 

Training mission at the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation, Montana.............229

Thousands of Kosovo refugees became guests of the United States government 

and temporary residents of Fort Dix, New Jersey ..........................................231

General John M. D. Shalikashvili.....................................................................231

Debra Selisky (left) discusses family support issues with Command 

Sergeant Major Patti Foley, 372d Quartermaster Battalion, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico ...............................................................................................................233

George W. Bush................................................................................................249

United Airlines Flight 175 smashing into the 80th floor of the twin South 

Tower.................................................................................................................250

Donald H. Rumsfeld.........................................................................................251 

2d Lieutenant Rick Rescorla, Battle of the Ia Drang, Vietnam 1965.............252

Colonel (retired) Rick Rescorla used a bullhorn to direct the evacuation of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter’s 2,800 employees on twenty floors of World Trade 

Center 2, and 1,000 employees in World Trade Center 5..............................252

Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes and 77th Regional Support Command 

commander Brigadier General Richard S. Colt confer shortly after the 

attack............................................................................................................ 253

New York City, September 14, 2001. Soldiers of the 1179th Deployment 

Support Brigade (DSB), Fort Hamilton, Brooklyn, volunteered to assist in 

rescue and recovery operations in lower Manhattan from September 14 to 

16, 2001....................................................................................................254

Ground Zero five days after the attack............................................................255

New York City, October 19, 2001. New York City firefighters continued to 

douse out fires that smoldered from the World Trade Center rubble for 

three-and-a-half months after the attacks .......................................................256

New York City, October 19, 2001. A small part of the structure of one of the 

World Trade Center towers stood for more than a month after the terrorist 

attacks................................................................................................................257

October 19, 2001. Recovery workers worked around the clock to clear out the 

debris from the World Trade Center site. It would not be until May 2002 that 

the site would be clean......................................................................................260
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THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

Arlington, Virginia, September 11, 2001. Command Sergeant Major Alex Lackey, Command Sergeant Major of the Army Reserve, communicates on a cell 

phone outside the Pentagon on September 11 ...............................................261

Arlington, Virginia, September 17, 2001. Soldiers of the Army Reserve’s 311th 

Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) from Aguadilla, Puerto Rico – 

along with federal officials like Federal Bureau of Investigation agent Samuel 

Simon – set up operations in the north parking lot of the Pentagon ............261

Arlington, Virginia, September 14, 2001 — Three days after the attack, fire engines surrounded the damaged portion of the Pentagon ...............................263

Arlington, Virginia, October 22, 2001 -- Workers tore down portions of the 

Pentagon’s rings that had severe structural damage in order to rebuild those 

sections...............................................................................................................264

Arlington, Virginia, October 22, 2001 — An excavator uses a claw to tear down 

damaged sections and remove debris from the Pentagon ..............................265

New York, September 16, 2001. Army Reserve Colonel Gerard McEnerney 

(left) of the Regional Emergency Liaison Team 2 based in Manhattan, explains 

to Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes the responsibilities of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).....................................................270

New York, September 16, 2001. Colonel Gerard McEnerney (right) escorts 

Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes (left) and Brigadier General Richard 

Colt (center) through lower Manhattan, stopping sometimes along the way to 

explain the extent of the devastation and progress being made by local governments .................................................................................................................271

Captain Greg Hanley distributes school supplies to the Smail Kail secondary 

school in the Parwan Province on July 1, 2004. Hanley is attached to the 325th 

Field Hospital....................................................................................................278

Paktika Province, Afghanistan. Soldiers of the 934th Forward Surgical Team, 

807th Medical Deployment Support Command, unload a patient from the back 

of a field ambulance at Forward Operating Base Sharana, Afghanistan........279

Corporal Dominic M. Pileri of the 310th Psychological Operations Battalion 

from Fort Gillem, Georgia, serves in a remote mountainous section of Afghanistan, where a major part of his job is going into the local villages to assess the 

needs of the people ...........................................................................................280

Company B, 391st Combat Engineer Battalion, embarks on a route 

clearance patrol over rugged terrain in support of Task Force FURY near Naka, 

Afghanistan........................................................................................................281
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Sergeant Richard A. Darvial, kneeling, takes cover while Specialist Corey C. 

Canterbury fires mortars from a mountain top overlooking the Ganigal Valley 

in eastern Afghanistan’s Kunar province, December 11, 2010.......................282

Barack H. Obama .............................................................................................283

Then stationed at Forward Operating Base Leatherneck, the 287th Transportation Company, 143d Expeditionary Sustainment Command, hauls several U.S. 

military vehicles, including a RT rough terrain container handler (Kalmar), 

on the unit’s M1070 heavy equipment transporters (HET) and M1000 trailers 

around May 2010, down highway 1 to Forward Operating Base Leatherneck 

after a mission to Forward Operating Base Shindand, Afghanistan...............285

General Tommy R. Franks...............................................................................288

Lieutenant General James R. Helmly..............................................................288

445th Medical Detachment (Veterinary Services)..........................................290

A soldier and his military working dog, Ali, search vehicles at an entry control 

point...................................................................................................................290

Port of Shuaiba, Kuwait....................................................................................291

Oil pipeline fire near Hadithah........................................................................294

A guard with the 320th Military Police Company from St. Petersburg, Florida, 

mans a makeshift outpost at Tallil Air Base in central Iraq, watching as prisoners 

of war are transferred onto buses for transport to the coalition’s internment 

facility near Umm Qasar..................................................................................295

Specialist Jose Lopez, a sheriff’s deputy in Broward County, Florida, and a 

colleague put up some concertina wire along a yet-to-be built fence line as 

Army Reserve soldiers with the 724th Military Police Battalion find themselves pitching in to build the new enemy prisoner of war facility they will 

be guarding ..............................................................................................296

Soldiers from the 459th Engineer Company (Multi-Role Bridge) lower a bridge 

section toward the water before launching and unfolding .............................297

Soldiers with the 632d Maintenance Company, 110th Combat Sustainment 

Support Battalion, 224th Sustainment Brigade, 103d Expeditionary Sustainment Command, line up their mine resistant ambush protected vehicles before 

a mission in 2010 at the convoy staging lanes at Contingency Operating Base 

Adder, Iraq.........................................................................................................297
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Soldiers from the 741st Adjutant General Company (Postal) prepare for Exercise BRIGHT STAR 2004 at Camp Doha, Kuwait........................................301

Specialist Lisa Phillips is at the .50-caliber machine gun of one of the 630th 

Transportation Company’s gun trucks.............................................................302 

Soldiers from the 362d Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply) conduct a tanker to tanker transfer at a forward operating base east of Fallujah, 

Iraq...........................................................................................................303

Soldiers from the 108th Training Command are patrolling an Iraqi city with the 

Army...................................................................................................................304

Turret gunner Staff Sergeant Benjamin Moroni, 108th Training Division, conducts pre-combat checks on his equipment and radio before his next convoy 

security mission.................................................................................................305

Convoy commander First Lieutenant Randy Shields, 108th Training Division, 

conducts a convoy briefing prior to departure to Taji, Iraq............................306

2006 National Security Strategy.......................................................................306

Robert M. Gates ...............................................................................................307

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review...................................................................313

Admiral Mike Mullen.......................................................................................313

General Eric K. Shinseki..................................................................................314

Thomas E. White .............................................................................................315

Army Chief of Staff, General Erick K. Shinseki, with the help of Elizabeth 

Plewes, pins on Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes’ third star ................318

Certificate of Promotion for Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes............319

Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes flag .....................................................320

This Battle Dress Uniform or BDU was worn by Lieutenant General 

Thomas J. Plewes..............................................................................................320

Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes, following his promotion on 13 June 

2001, stands with all of the living former chiefs of the Army Reserve...........321

General Peter J. Schoomaker...........................................................................323

Dr. Francis J. Harvey ........................................................................................326

General George W. Casey Jr............................................................................327
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Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr...............................................................328

John M. McHugh .............................................................................................335

M915 line haul tractor......................................................................................354

The 143d Transportation Command (Forward) begins its transformation and 

reactivation as the 143d Expeditionary Sustainment Command...................363

A CH-47 Chinook helicopter from the Army Reserve’s Company B, 5th Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment, picks up three large sandbags from a staging area 

along the shore of Lake Pontchartrain............................................................364

Members of a FEMA search and rescue team prepare to board a CH-47 Chinook helicopter from the Army Reserve’s Company B, 5th Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment..................................................................................................365

Soldiers of the 206th Transportation Company turn a pallet of MREs from the 

USS Tortuga before it’s loaded by forklift onto a waiting truck for distribution 

to Hurricane Katrina relief workers in New Orleans.....................................366

The official party, which included (from left) Major General Adolph McQueen, 

Command Sergeant Major Brendan Toth and Major General Mari Eder, inspects the troops and salutes the honor guard during the 200th Military Police 

Command activation ceremony.......................................................................367

Soldiers from the 705th Transportation Company, 475th Quartermaster Group, 

haul JP-8 in a M915A5 line-haul tractor truck during Exercise QUARTERMASTER LIQUID LOGISTICS..................................................................371

As part of a live-fire exercise, soldiers carry a simulated casualty on a litter away 

from their convoy and along a Fort McCoy range in preparation for a helicopter 

evacuation..........................................................................................................372

Soldiers with the 652d Engineer Company unload a base component for a dry 

support bridge while training during Operation SAND CASTLE ..............373

A soldier from the 264th Service Company of Salinas, Puerto Rico, removes 

bolts to remove a protective rollover cage from a 10,000 pound forklift as part 

of Operation PLATINUM WRENCH at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin ............374

8oth Training Command (Total Army School System)..................................376

84th Training Command (Leader Readiness).................................................377

108th Training Command (Initial Entry Training) ........................................377
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THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

Soldiers learn how to extract a vehicle from a muddy swamp in the 63B 

Wheeled Recovery Mechanic course taught by the 80th Training Command Regional Training Maintenance at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, 

April 1, 2009......................................................................................................378

Soldiers engage in hands-on training as part of the 92W Water Treatment Specialist course taught by the 80th Training Command’s Regional TASS Training 

Center at Fort Pickett, Virginia, in April 2010................................................379

Sergeant First Class Gerald Kjornes, Regional Training Site-Maintenance instructor, trains Specialist Michael Lambach on how to use schematics to troubleshoot and diagnose faults with a 30kw generator.......................................380

The 84th U.S. Army Reserve Readiness Training Command has outfitted five 

standard Humvees with steel kits which simulate the weight and physical characteristics of an actual up-armored Humvee...................................................381

Soldiers from the 652d Engineer Company, Ellsworth, Wisconsin, constructed 

this bridge across the Arkansas River at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, during their 

annual training ..................................................................................................382

Fort Hunter Liggett, California. Brigadier General Alton Berry, commander, 

70th Training Division (Functional Training), left, and 70th Command Sergeant Major Derrick Simpson check out a rocket propelled grenade launcher 

used by OPFOR at Regional Training Center-West......................................385

Soldiers from the 783d Military Police Battalion participate in pre-mobilization 

training under the guidance of Fort McCoy’s RTC-North by firing crew-served 

weapons.............................................................................................................386

Soldiers from the 783d Military Police Battalion conduct MK-19 machine gun 

launcher training at Fort McCoy’s RTC-North............................................386

Soldiers of the 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry Regiment test their nerves as they 

show their combat presence in a small village riot depicted in a training scenario 

at the Joint Readiness Training Center............................................................387

Captain Ernesto Pinedo, a military policeman with the 382d Military Police 

Detachment, observes as Iraqi policemen conduct weapons training at a firing 

range in Baghdad ..............................................................................................387

108th Training Division Sergeant Rodney Guinyard observes Iraqi Army recruits practice drill and ceremony on the Camp Taji parade field .................388

The 351st Military Police Company of Ocala, Florida, reacts to sniper fire 

while on a mounted security patrol during mock battles at the Joint Readiness 

Training Center ................................................................................................389
xxiii

Specialist Zachary Ritter, from the 362nd Psychological Operations Company 

in Fayetteville, Arkansas, speaks with actors during a pre-deployment training 

exercise at Fort Dix, New Jersey......................................................................392

Sergeant Lori Cheplic, a concrete and asphalt engineer from the 463d Engineer 

Battalion, measures the depth and level of a footing for a school addition during 

NEW HORIZONS .........................................................................................393

Specialist Ben L. Falslev, a small engine mechanic, works on a 10KW generator 

in the motor pool of the 872d Maintenance Company..................................395

Night Vision Goggles.......................................................................................397

UH-60L Black Hawk .......................................................................................397

UH-60M Black Hawk ......................................................................................400

C-12...................................................................................................................400

The largest Army Reserve aviation brigade, the 244th Aviation Brigade, gears up 

to deploy troops and equipment to Haiti ........................................................401

Sergeant First Class Gordon, psychological operations specialist with the 346th 

Psychological Operations Company, an Army Reserve unit from Columbus, 

Ohio, rides alongside an Iraqi worker on a forklift used to load 500-pound 

rolls of high–grade paper onto flatbed trucks for transport to a central clearing 

area..................................................................................................................406 

Major Valerie Godfrey, an Army Reserve dentist, administers a dental exam to a 

soldier during the 2011 Combat Support Training Exercise, as dental technician 

Specialist Ashley Bill looks on and records.....................................................410 

Specialist Robbie Richardson, 168th Engineer Company of Fayette, Alabama, 

looks on as Sergeant Phillip McCay, 22nd Reserve Sustainment Battalion of 

Oneonta, Alabama, inserts a chest decompression needle into a manikin during 

a military medic sustainment conference held in conjunction with the National 

Federation of Licensed Practical Nurses annual convention in Birmingham, Alabama, October 20-25, 2010 ............................................................................411

The Ready Response Reserve Unit (R3U) Dental Program mission at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, is supported with soldiers from the 4220th United States Army 

Hospital and the 7238th Medical Support Unit.............................................412

Specialist Andrea Gonzalez, a dental technician with the7223d Medical Support Unit, New Orleans, prepares instruments in the dental clinic during the 

Task Force Razorback Arkansas Medical Innovative Readiness Training health 

screening clinic in Marianna, Arkansas............................................................414
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THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

The 5502d United States Army Hospital, an Army Reserve unit based out of 

Aurora, Colorado, spent a month in the summer augmenting the staff at Fort 

Carson’s Evans Army Community Hospital, to hone their skills and lesson the 

work load of the facility ....................................................................................415

New construction is destroyed in the Slidell, Louisiana area.........................416

The chief, Army Reserve Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr., right, and Major General Luis R. Visot, commanding general of the Joint Logistics Command-Haiti and the 377th Theater Sustainment Command, do a communications check prior to an aerial tour of earthquake-damaged Port-au-Prince, April 

5, 2010 ...............................................................................................................419

377th Theater Sustainment Command soldiers stand in formation awaiting an 

orientation briefing after arriving in Haiti on February 28, 2010..................420

A soldier from the 43rd Medical Detachment (Veterinary Service) assists a Haitian woman prepare her dog for vaccination in Port-au-Prince ....................421

Deep Water Horizon Oil Spill.........................................................................422

Anthony Siraco (left) hands a flag and wind catcher to Tyler Pepin, 3, Allenstown, New Hampshire, as he enters the JFK Coliseum in Manchester.......424

Brigadier General Frank A. Cippola, deputy commanding general of the 88th 

Regional Support Command in Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, presents True Patriot 

Awards to the children of the soldiers that attended the Yellow Ribbon Event 

held from June 11 to 13, 2010, in Schaumburg, Illinois.................................425

Captain Mark Gundrum of the 432d Civil Affairs Battalion registers his 

son for child care at a Yellow Ribbon Reintegration workshop in Wisconsin 

Dells, Wisconsin ...............................................................................................426 

Couples at a Strong Bonds event.....................................................................427

Laura Stultz, (in pink) wife of Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr., cuts 

the ceremonial ribbon during the grand opening of the Army Reserve’s second Army Strong Community Center located in Brevard, North Carolina on 

May 15, 2010.....................................................................................................427

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr., chief, Army Reserve and his wife, Laura, get ready to cut the ribbon at the official grand opening of the third Army 

Strong Community Center in the Technical Sergeant McGarity U. S. Army 

Reserve Center in Coraopolis, Pennsylvania, on September 18, 2010..........428
xxv

Laura Stultz, wife of Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr., chief of the Army 

Reserve, cuts and serves cake after the Army Strong Community Center’s ribbon-cutting ceremony at the Technical Sergeant McGarity U.S. Army Reserve 

Center on September 18, 2010 ........................................................................429

U.S. Congressman Tim Murphy, 18th District of Pennsylvania, explains the 

importance of the Army Strong Community Center for Pittsburgh during its 

grand opening at the Technical Sergeant McGarity U. S. Army Reserve Center 

in Coraoplis, Pennsylvania, on September 18, 2010.......................................430

Comprehensive Soldier Fitness .......................................................................431

Major Marilyn S. Chiafullo and Major Scott Barnett cut the cake at the Welcome Home Warrior-Citizen ceremony at the Hall of Heroes in the Pentagon, 

July 7, 2005........................................................................................................431

Purple Heart .....................................................................................................432

Sergeant Major Mark Papenfuss, right, and Chaplain (Major) Eric Jackson pay 

their respects at a remembrance ceremony for the five Army Reserve soldiers 

who died in the shooting at Fort Hood, Texas................................................433

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr., signs one of the most unique employer 

partnership agreements during a signing ceremony held on April 14, 2008, at 

the Inova Alexandria Hospital..........................................................................435

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr, chief of the Army Reserve, left, and General Charles C. Campbell, commander U.S. Army Forces Command, put on 

their hard hats during the ground breaking ceremony for the Army Reserve 

and Forces Command headquarters building at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on 

Monday, December 8, 2008 .............................................................................440

Ground breaking ceremony for the new USARC/FORSCOM headquarters 

building at Fort Bragg, December 8, 2008......................................................440

Specialist Jeremy Church .................................................................................474

Sergeant James Witkowski ...............................................................................474

Staff Sergeant Jason Fetty ................................................................................474

Sergeant Gregory Ruske ..................................................................................475

Specialist David Hutchinson ...........................................................................475

The ceremonial flags, combat boots, ID tags, and M4 rifle of a Fallen Soldier.....492

Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal.............................................492
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THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

ARMY ARTWORK

The General in the Desert, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden .................... 13

Saudi Arabia, January 1991. The 316th Quartermaster Company distributes 

water at an XVIII Airborne Corps site in central Saudi Arabia..................... 18 

Patriot missile site, Saudi Arabia, 1990, Sergeant First Class Sieger Hartgers... 22

On Guard At Sunset, Sergeant First Class Peter G. Varisano.......................... 26

Desert Storm, 1991, Frank Thomas .................................................................. 31

Frank Thomas’ painting, titled Baghdad Express, captures a special operations/

Delta Force Commando team defending its CH-47 Chinook helicopter from 

enemy fire during a nighttime operation........................................................... 35

The Ultimatum – Standoff at Safwan, painted by Army Reserve soldier Lieutenant Colonel Frank Thomas, displays a run-in between Iraqi and American 

forces over a piece of desert real estate.............................................................. 38 

The Audie Murphy, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden .................................... 49

An Army of One, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden.................................... 56

General Gordon R. Sullivan, Sergeant Gene Snyder......................................... 61

Taking the Point, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden.................................... 63 

Hot Wash, Master Sergeant Sieger Hartgers..................................................... 65

Rock Drill, Master Sergeant Sieger Hartgers.................................................... 68

Securing the Firing Line, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden ...................... 70

Knucklebusters, Sergeant Gene Snyder.............................................................. 76

OPFOR, Sergeant Jeffrey Manuszak.................................................................. 82

Laying an obstacle course, Sergeant Gene Snyder.............................................. 86

Buddy Assist, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden........................................... 89

OPFOR, Sergeant Gene Snyder ........................................................................ 92

M60 Range Instruction, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden ............................. 97
xxvii

Looking for OPFOR, Fort Polk, Louisiana, Joint Readiness Training Center, 

1995, Sergeant Jeffrey Manuszak....................................................................100

The Final Push Through the Rumayiah Oil Field, Marion Acevedo..............104

Loading the Rail Pre-Board Inspection, Master Sergeant Christopher Thiel.106

One More Crank, Heather Engelhart ..............................................................111

UH-60 Maintenance, Heather Engelhart........................................................116

5th MASH, Ad-Damman, Saudi Arabia, Sergeant First Class Sieger Hartgers....119

Midday Madness in Mogadishu, Master Sergeant (Ret.) Peter G. Varisano...125

Mogadishu, Somalia, Master Sergeant (Ret.) Peter Varisano..........................126

Football Army Style, Sergeant. Gene Snyder ...................................................128

Engineers, Laying a drain during Operation SAFE HAVEN, Sergeant Gene 

Snyder................................................................................................................130

Ready to Roll, 1995 HMMWs Ready to Roll, Port-au-Prince. Haiti, Sergeant 

Jeffrey Manuszak...............................................................................................135

Dry Goods, Peter Varisano ................................................................................139

Ministry in the Field, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden...........................143

Night Attack in the Persian Gulf, 1991, Mario Acevedo.................................147

Sentry at “Mud” Govern, Colonel Gary Cassidy ............................................166

Tent City, Colonel Gary Cassidy......................................................................168

Logistics at Butmir, Colonel Gary Cassidy ......................................................174

The New Bridge at Mostar, Colonel Gary Cassidy..........................................185

Peacekeepers on the Princip Bridage, Colonel Gary Cassidy............................188

Minefield, Colonel Gary Cassidy .....................................................................195

Peacekeeper, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden ..........................................220

Plan Accordingly, Gary Cassidy ........................................................................259

September 11, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden ......................................262

Waiting to Go to War, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden..........................268
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THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

Tracking Bin Laden, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden.................................273

The Hizara Province, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden ...............................276

Into the Hornet’s Nest, Timothy Lawn.............................................................286

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the 459th Engineer Company (MultiRole Bridge), an Army Reserve unit from Bridgeport, West Virginia, lays an aluminum float ribbon bridge under enemy fire across the Diyala River southeast 

of Baghdad........................................................................................................292

Sleeping Mechanic, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden ...................................394

Drivers, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden.....................................................398

Armor on the hunt, Sergeant First Class Darrold Peters................................403

Out of Commission, Heather Engelhart ...........................................................404

Keeping them clean, Afghanistan, Sergeant First Class Darrold Peters..........408

Set Perimeter in Iraq, Darrold Peters.............................................................460

Big Country, Heather Engelhart......................................................................464

Satan’s Sandbox, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden.......................................466

Brothers in Arms, Christopher Thiel ...............................................................472

Rock Drill, Heather Engelhart .........................................................................496
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my appreciation to each member of the Office of Army 

Reserve History who assisted in the editing of this manuscript. Your time and 

devotion to detail enhanced the final product. I also want to thank Jason Wetzel 

who suggested many of the figures included in the manuscript and who served 

as the contracting officer representative. From his sketches, Greg Lamb, of 

Lamb Designs, created the final sharp images. Many action officers on the staff 

of the U.S. Army Reserve Command, such as Charles Blakeney and Lieutenant 

Colonel Timothy Danaker, provided invaluable information and assistance. 

Major General Luis R. Visot, deputy commanding general (operations), was 

instrumental in getting the project through the contracting process. Dr. Lee S. 

Harford, Jr., director of Army Reserve History, provided thoughtful advice. Finally, I must express my gratitude to Lieutenant General (Retired) Jack C. Stultz, Jr., who first envisioned and requested this book. He was the driving force 

behind the project for it was he who realized the transformation of the strategic 

Army Reserve to the operational Army Reserve we so proudly have today. On 

a personal note, I must thank my family for encouraging me throughout the 

creation of this volume. 

KATHRYN ROE COKER, Ph.D.

Deputy Director of History 

U.S. Army Reserve

“TWICE THE CITIZEN”

ARMY STRONG
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THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

FOREWORD

On August 2 1990, Iraqi forces invaded their neighboring country of Kuwait. 

U.S. forces began deploying to Saudi Arabia on August 9 as Operation DESERT SHIELD commenced. As a drilling Reserve Soldier, I remember telling 

my wife, Laura, I will probably have to go and hearing her response, “they don’t 

call up the Reserves for something like this.” In November 1990, I deployed 

along with thousands of other mobilized Reservists in support of Operation 

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. As a young major, I did not realize 

the significance of this event but I believe it became a seminal point in the history of how our nation and our military viewed the role of the Reserve in our 

national defense. 

Sixteen years later I had the tremendous privilege and honor of being sworn 

in as the chief, Army Reserve and commanding general of the Army Reserve 

Command. During the next six years as I observed Reserve Soldiers performing magnificently in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, Europe, Korea, the 

Continental United States, and many other locations, I came to understand and 

appreciate what had occurred during the past twenty years. The Reserve forces 

of the United States had transformed from a Strategic Reserve Force into an 

Operational Reserve Force. I believe the importance to this transformation 

is yet to be fully understood by many. It has huge implications for our future 

National Defense Strategy with regard to force size, structure, and force mix. 

Throughout history, Revolutions in Military Affairs have occurred which 

changed the nature of battle and military strategy: the introduction of the submarine in naval warfare, aircraft in air warfare, and the tank in ground warfare. I 

view the transformation of our Reserve Forces into an Operational Force as another Revolution in Military Affairs. During my six years of service as the chief, 

Army Reserve, I engaged with military leaders around the world during conferences and visits to their countries. One question that I constantly received 

was “tell us how you have built such a viable and competent Reserve Force.” 

Whether I was in the United Kingdom or Korea with significant militaries or in 

countries such as Kenya, Uganda, or Ethiopia with much smaller armies, they 

all envied the force that we had developed and wanted to start down the path to 

replicate it in some fashion.

The book, Twice the Citizen, by James Currie and Richard Crossland, is a magnificent work that chronicles the inception of the Army Reserve as a small medical reserve force in 1908 to what it had grown to by 1995, a force of over 
xxxi

205,000 men and women. As chief, Army Reserve, I felt it was our responsibility to document the next period of history, the transformation to an Operational 

Reserve. Our great men and women who serve our nation in uniform have 

earned a place in history. They serve on the shoulders of those who came before them and laid the foundation. From those medical professionals who put 

their lives on hold in World War I to the young mother who leaves a small baby 

at home to deploy to Afghanistan, they are a national treasure and we cannot 

forget their service and the sacrifices they, their families, and in the case of the 

Reserve Soldier, their employers have made. 

To stand in front of Soldiers in Iraq or Afghanistan on Christmas Day, away 

from their spouses, children and family, getting ready to go on a mission where 

they may be asked to make the ultimate sacrifice, looking them in the eye as 

they raise their hands and volunteer to take an oath of re-enlistment, you understand how the term Hero is defined. Their dedication and commitment 

have built the finest fighting force this world has ever known and has changed 

forever the role of the Reserve Component in our National Defense. My hope 

is that this book will help preserve for their children and grandchildren the 

history that they have made.

A special thanks to Dr. Kathryn Roe Coker and Dr. Lee Harford for their dedication and efforts to make this book a reality.

JACK C. STULTZ

Lieutenant General (Retired), USA
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THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

PREFACE

The history of how the operational Army Reserve concept developed over the 

twenty years from 1990 through 2010 is a story of revolutionary change for the 

citizen-soldier. In the past, the part-time citizen army was by national policy 

and doctrine not as prepared as the professional Army for war. During the 

twentieth century, militia or reserve soldiers required months, sometimes a year, 

of pre-deployment training before being committed to the battlefield. The 

new operational concept for the twenty-first century arose to solve a problem 

for the Army’s global peacekeeping mission. How could the Army accomplish 

this task during times of relative peace with reduced budgets and less full-time 

manpower? Congress answered the challenge by more effectively utilizing the 

Army Reserve (together with the other reserve forces) and new technologies. 

Army Reserve units were maintained at comparable readiness levels and standards with active Army units. The Army Reserve and the active Army would 

now deploy together and then function as one team on the modern battlefield. 

To put it in sports terms, the Army Reserve no longer existed as the “second 

string” sitting on the bench. It was now a part of the “first string” playing important positions on the field, from the start to the finish, in the most serious 

of all contests. 

A famous quote of Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, “I claim not to have 

controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me,” seems 

to hold true for the fate of the United States Army Reserve (USAR) over the 

last twenty years. During this period, international relations changed dramatically from a divided world poised on the brink of total (nuclear) war to one 

that increasingly sought economic integration as part of a global community 

of trading partners. Throughout history, first empires and then nations had 

reverted to war to resolve disputes and for economic gain, especially in the conquest of territory and resources. By 1990, however, the leaders of most countries believed that wars or the threat of war had become too destructive and 

costly. Rejecting expansionist policies as the road to prosperity and security, 

the modernized states of the world instead sought harmony through economic 
xxxiii

cooperation. As a result, the Cold War Army Reserve mission evolved from 

one of providing forces held in “strategic reserve” for a possible World War III, 

with the massive armies of the communist bloc, to one of providing units to the 

contemporary Army’s “operational force” for peacekeeping, nation building and 

security missions across the planet. 

The second half of the Twentieth Century witnessed the evolution of a new 

global economic system. The emergence of “multinational corporations” in the 

1960s, as a result of the collapse of the old European colonial empires, quickly 

morphed into “transnational networks” in the 1990s, following the dissolution 

of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. Economic growth and national power 

no longer depended on unilateral military might and territorial expansion. Instead, the centuries old “nation-state” became the new “trading-state” where 

cooperation and multilateral participation in the international marketplace best 

served the interests of modern societies. International relations based on peacekeeping provided a secure environment for economic development and growth. 

By the Twenty-first Century, in a world where capital, labor, and technology 

had become mobile across national boundaries, wealth and power based on the 

size of a nation’s “market share” was just as important, if not more, than the size 

of its borders. Thus, a primary theme in United States foreign policy since the 

end of World War II has been to actively promote the continued growth of an 

interdependent multinational economic community. The success of this diplomacy eventually materialized as the “New World Order” for both international 

politics and economics. Existing as the sole superpower in the Post-Cold War 

era and mentor of globalization, the United States also assumed the leading role 

of protecting the trade routes and maintaining the security of this world-wide 

free-market trading system. For the last twenty years, the Army Reserve has 

played a fundamental “frontline” role in this new mission.

The responsibilities for preventing and deterring conflict had always been important duties for the Army and for citizen-soldiers. Silver-screen Hollywood 

glorified the experience as common knowledge in such films as Santa Fe Trail, 

Stagecoach, She Wore a Yellow Ribbon, and They Died with Their Boots On. These 

movies depicted domestic peacekeeping and security enforcement on the United States frontier in the Nineteenth Century, helping to develop the emerging 

American economic structure. The new global community can be viewed as 

an extension of this “American System” as envisioned by Alexander Hamilton 

in 1791 for a North American “continental-sized market” of reciprocal trade 

between the states. Such a network promised strength, harmony and prosperity for the young nation over time by encouraging the states to first integrate 

economically (as territories) and then unite politically (as states). Hamilton’s 

revolutionary multilateral concept was based on the principles of a free market 
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THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

trading process, where all participants (states of the Union) were recognized as 

equals. The federal government fostered its growth by financing “internal improvements” (roads, canals and eventually railroads) to unify communications 

and military forces to protect and secure the marketplace. The United States 

free market economy became a key element in the “patch-work” approach for 

quilting the American nation across the continent, one state at a time. Standing in opposition to this new economic arrangement was the world’s dominant 

economic system at the time called “imperialism” or the mercantilist system. 

These unilateral models existed since the beginning of civilization, in which 

the most powerful empires conquered other political entities and turned them 

into vassal states, satellite states or colonies. For Hamilton’s system, the United States Army, supported by local militia units, played a critical role on the 

frontiers in providing security for developing communities, the transportation 

infrastructure, and the trade routes as the American System spread west and 

eventually reached the Pacific Ocean, with the closing of the frontier in 1890. 

(Captain Abraham Lincoln commanded one of these militia companies from Illinois during the Black Hawk War.) One hundred years later, following the collapse of imperialism and communism, the Army and the citizen-soldiers of the 

Army Reserve rediscovered this security mission when they accomplished the 

tasks of providing security for communities and trade routes across the earth, 

as the American System evolved into the Global Economy of the New World 

Order. 

Logic and necessity dictated that the Army Reserve performed a key role in 

protecting the new global economy for the benefit of the United States and the 

world family of new trading states. The enduring strengths of the Army Reserve 

well suited the organization to provide support to expeditionary forces operating in the complex security environments across the earth. Its citizen-soldiers 

possessed an abundance of skills garnered from their normal civilian jobs which 

could be leveraged by the Army to support missions for improving infrastructure, security and institutions in nations strategically important to United States 

interests. This was especially so in areas of civil affairs, medical, transportation, 

military history and information operations. If properly structured, the Army 

Reserve could provide medical units for humanitarian assistance, engineer units 

for facilities (vertical) and transportation system (horizontal) reconstruction, 

and training units to mentor foreign military forces. Many citizen-soldiers held 

employment in private companies providing leading-edge technology in the 

information, communications, and cyber security fields, and could offer these 

critical skill sets for the management of modern military operations. Although 

the cost of citizen-soldiers was comparable to the active Army during deployments, when not mobilized, Army Reserve soldiers were maintained at much 
xxxv

lower expense: They were a cost effective means of maintaining the Total Army 

necessary for securing the global economic community. Also, reserve soldiers 

lived in “grassroots America” and were, thus, uniquely positioned to respond to 

the support or defense of the homeland. Specifically, the Army Reserve existed 

as a significant “reservoir” of military-civilian specialists available for use in facing the proliferating, ongoing contingency operations that emerged around the 

turn of the Twenty-first Century.

Using the Gulf War of 1990-1991 as the catalyst for change, this volume tells 

the story of the transformation of the Army Reserve from an organization held 

in strategic reserve to an “operational-expeditionary reserve” force. Thus, it 

traces the component’s significant events and developments during the period 

1990 to 2010, from the end of the Cold War through the height of the Global 

War on Terrorism (GWOT): A conflict that still has no foreseeable end. The 

narrative is based on primary sources, oral history interviews, and facts contained in various command and staff agency historical reports, all located in the 

United States Army Reserve Historical Research Collection (ARHRC). The 

author, Dr. Kathryn Roe Coker, selected significant source documents intending to interpret the interplay of those events, forces and policies that shaped the 

Army Reserve and to provide a historical perspective in support of the reserve 

component’s mission – ensuring the wartime readiness of those forces assigned. 

As a permanent historical reference, The Indispensable Force: The Post-Cold War 

Operational Army Reserve, 1990-2010, contains the institutional memory of 

the Army Reserve during a critical period of its history, serving as a guide for 

current and future operations. The Office of Army Reserve History (OARH) 

produced the volume for the purposes of adding historical perspective to the 

decision-making process, and orienting new personnel on the force’s mission, 

recent activities, accomplishments and issues. In fact, with the number of Army 

Reserve soldiers activated for GWOT reaching 195,707 by December 2010, 

this period passed into history as the most significant in the heritage of the 

American federal citizen-soldier since the Korean War (1950-1953). I am certain that all members of the Army Reserve will find this volume an interesting, 

useful addition to their professional libraries.

Fort Bragg LEE S. HARFORD, JR., Ph.D.

North Carolina Director of History

December 2011 United States Army Reserve
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1

INTRODUCTION

The Army Reserve of today can trace its roots as a “national” or federal citizen-soldier force back to the French and Indian War (1756-1763) on through 

the Civil War (1861-1865) to the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection (1892-1902). From its birth in 1776 through the nineteenth century, 

the United States remained a regional power, protected from invasion by the 

vast expanses of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. A large standing army was not 

required and the nation’s defense was based primarily on the militia systems of 

the individual states. 

After the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, with the absence of any real foreign threat, a small standing army was all that was needed to maintain peace on 

the frontier between the settlers and American Indians. Whenever the nation 

faced a major conflict, the federal government mobilized large citizen-soldier 

forces and trained them for combat operations. At the close of these conflicts, 

the soldiers were sent home, again leaving a small standing army. However, by 

the turn of the twentieth century, the United States emerged as a world power 

with global trade routes and security concerns beyond the Western Hemisphere.

Consequently, during this transition the United States Congress created an 

official Army Reserve organization in order to place a major portion of the 

nation’s citizen-soldier establishment under federal control during times 

of peace, as well as war. Financially, this was the best option for maintaining and 

projecting overseas a land-power force capable of facing the military might of 

the other world powers. Four significant events in United States history shaped 

the modern Army Reserve: (1) the sinking of the battleship Maine in 1898; (2) 

the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941; (3) the defeat of communism with the fall 

of the Berlin Wall in 1989; and (4) the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 

that live in infamy as “9/11” for most Americans.

At the end of the Nineteenth Century, a new “manifest destiny” wave carried 

the Americans beyond the continental United States and into the Pacific and 
2

THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

Caribbean. Consequently, on February 15, 1898, the sinking of the American battleship Maine in Havana harbor ushered in the Spanish-American War 

and Philippine Insurrection (1892-1902). Mobilization problems of the Army 

during these conflicts, specifically shortages of medical professionals, trained 

officers, and non-commissioned officers, caused the national leadership to finally establish a formal structure for federal volunteers during peacetime. 

Initially in 1908, Congress created the Medical Reserve Corps, the official predecessor of the Army Reserve. Subsequently, using its constitutional authority 

to “raise and support armies,” through the National Defense Act of 1916 and 

the sweeping amendment of that law in the National Defense Act Amendments 

of 1920, the federal government created the Organized Reserve. Redesignated 

as the Organized Reserve Corps in 1948, the new force served into the 1950s 

to provide a peacetime pool of trained reserve officers and enlisted men for 

use in war. This manpower reserve existed as the office cadre for as many as 

twenty-seven reserve infantry divisions and six reserve cavalry divisions located 

across the nation. It also included the Officers’ Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps, and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps. 

Consequently, the Army mobilized nearly ninety thousand Army Reserve officers for World War I (1917-1919), one-third of which were medical doctors. 

More than 90,000 enlisted Reserve soldiers served of which 15,000 were assigned to medical units. The individual Reserve soldiers were placed into newly organized units, were trained, and then deployed to the war zone. During 

the interwar period, the Army planned for an Organized Reserve force of thirty-three divisions, existing either as paper units or in a cadre status. 

The years between the world wars were austere, with few opportunities for 

training. A contingency for service, however, was created during the Great Depression. One of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal programs, the Civilian Conservation Corps, placed young men in barracks and military-style 

organizations to work in national forests and other outdoor projects. Between 

1933 and 1939, more than 30,000 Reserve officers served as commanders or 

staff officers at the 2,700 conservation corps camps. Reserve participation in 

the American defense effort began before the United States entered the Second 

World War in December 1941. 

The Army began calling Army Reserve officers to active duty in June 1940. 

In the year that followed, the number of Army Reserve officers on active duty 

rose from fewer than 3,000 to more than 57,000. During World War II (1941-

1945), the Army mobilized twenty-six Army Reserve (designated) infantry divisions. Approximately a quarter of all Army officers who served were reserve 
3

soldiers, including over 100,000 Reserve Officers’ Training Corps graduates. In 

total, more than 200,000 Army Reserve soldiers served in the war. World War 

II signified the beginning of a new era in national security, and from that point 

to the present, the United States took-on the role as the “arsenal of democracy” 

and “world guardian,” a new mission in which the Army Reserve would play a 

major supporting role.

The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, December 7, 1941, woke 

the American people from the century-old complacency that the United States, 

as an “island bastion,” was eternally safe behind the “ocean moats” of the Atlantic and Pacific. Air power had changed the strategic paradigm forever. The 

1940s also witnessed the emergence of strategic bombing, rocket (missile) technology, and nuclear weapons. After World War II, the world divided into two 

opposing armed camps: the Soviet Union, China and the Warsaw Pact versus 

the United States and its allies. The communist nations maintained armies with 

millions of highly trained soldiers and stood poised to overrun Europe and Asia 

at a moment’s notice. The entire world and global market lay open to conquest 

and the spread of communist dictatorships. 

To face this new threat, the United States developed a “Containment Policy” 

to check the growth of communism over the next forty-five years. For the first 

time in our history, a large military force would be required during peacetime 

to implement this new grand foreign policy. The units of this military force 

needed to be manned, equipped, trained, and ready for deployment at all times 

to a combat zone within a few month’s notice. The Department of Defense 

established a system of “unified commands” in Europe, the Far East, the Pacific, Alaska, and the Caribbean to provide strategic direction for global operations. The old days of relying on untrained citizen soldiers, which required nine 

months to a year to mobilize into deployable units, were over. To defray the 

cost of maintaining such a large military force, Congress placed heavy reliance 

on establishing and sustaining a more combat ready Army Reserve to deploy 

together with the Active Army for operations, worldwide. 

Recognizing the importance of the Organized Reserve to the World War II 

effort, Congress authorized retirement and drill pay for the first time in 1948. 

The Korean War (1950-1953) saw more than 240,000 Army Reserve soldiers 

called to active duty. That large number reflected the Army’s need for organized, trained personnel in a short period of time. More than seventy Army 

Reserve units served in Korea. While the Korean Conflict was still underway, 

Congress began making significant changes in the structure and role of the 

Reserve. These changes transformed the Organized Reserve Corps into the 

United States Army Reserve. This new organization was divided into a Ready 
4

THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. Reserve units were authorized twenty-four inactive duty training days a year 

and up to seventeen days of active duty 

(called annual training). The president was 

given authority to order up to one million 

Army Reserve soldiers of all military specialties to active duty. These congressional 

actions were directly related to experiences 

gained during the activation and subsequent 

service of Army Reserve units in the Korean 

War. Acting to signify the new vital role of 

the reserves to the nation’s defense, President Harry S Truman established the Armed 

Forces Reserve Medal by executive order in 

1950. For the first time, Army Reserve soldiers received an official award for consecutive periods of service in ten tier 

increments. 

In operations following the Korean War, for the first time, the Army intended to maintain the integrity of mobilized 

Army Reserve units. As a standard, officers 

and enlisted men were not stripped out of 

organized units and sent into operations as 

replacements. Instead, the Army attempted to mobilize and deploy fully trained and 

manned reserve units at the outbreak of the 

conflict. Thus, the lessons learned from 

the Korean War set the precedent for readiness of all Army Reserve organizations 

in future call-ups. During the period from 

1968 to 1974 and with the end of the Vietnam War (1961-1975), Congress reduced 

the Army end-strength from 1.5 million to 

785,000 Active duty soldiers. The end of 

the draft coincided with the announcement 

of the Total Force Policy in 1973. This new policy, also known as the Abrams 

Doctrine for Army Chief of Staff General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., placed an 

increased reliance on reserve component units for rapid deployment to military 

operations. It called for the United States to maintain an active force capable 

of maintaining peace and deterring aggression across the globe. Those forces 

General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.

Armed Forces Reserve Medal
5

would be reinforced, when necessary, by a well-trained and equipped reserve 

component within a month’s notice. 

The result of an all-volunteer Army and the Total Force Policy was a shift of 

important responsibilities and resources to the Army Reserve. The intent was 

to ensure that the Army would never again engage in a major conflict without 

the reserve components. To support this concept, after 1967 the Army Reserve 

became increasingly combat support and combat service support oriented, and 

in that same year, Congress established the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve 

(OCAR) within the Army Staff to give Army Reserve soldiers an official spokesman at the Department of the Army level. However, throughout the entire 

Cold War period, after the Korean War, the Army Reserve was mobilized only 

twice: over 68,500 Army Reservists for the Berlin Crisis (1961-1962) and nearly 

6,000 for the Vietnam War (1968-1969). In reality, it existed as a strategic reserve and the active Army handled most military operations without the reserve 

components. This would all change with the end of the Cold War and the 

further draw-down of the active Army in the 1990s. 

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 marked 

the symbolic end of the Cold War and a victory of the 

free world over totalitarianism. The threat from the Soviet Union seemed improbable. The world looked safer. 

Thus, in the post-Cold War period, the armed forces 

faced significant reductions in military budgets and 

manpower levels. Their mission to remain the world’s 

guardian, however, did not change. In fact, by this time, 

the unified command system had expanded to include 

Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. Meanwhile, 

the late twentieth century experienced a revolution in 

military affairs through advances in information management (digital technology), which seemed to render 

past forms of warfare obsolete. This new technology 

was significant because it allowed soldiers to view the 

battlefield in real-time and enhanced logistical management to better control supplies. Also, throughout the 

twentieth century, the demands of modern warfare caused the number of combat support and combat service support specialty branches to multiply and grow 

in complexity, making the manning of such units more difficult. 

Facing implementation of a global peacekeeping mission with a greatly curtailed military budget and active military force, Congress intended to leverage 

the reserve components and the new technologies to make up the difference. 

Armed Forces Reserve 

Medal With M Device

7

This required the Army Reserve to be manned, equipped, and trained at levels 

comparable to the active Army. Such a capability allowed the Army components to be more versatile and function as one team on the battlefield. Nothing 

signified this change in mission better than the amendments made in the 1990’s 

for the Armed Forces Reserve Medal, which authorized its award for mobilization 

and later added an “M” Mobilization Device and numbers for each different 

contingency operation a reserve soldier was called-up to serve. As told in this 

history, it was from this concept that the “Operational” Army Reserve would 

evolve over the next twenty years. 

Office of Army Reserve History

August 2011
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

8

Map 1
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

9

CHAPTER 1

POST-COLD WAR

DEFENSE STRATEGY

End of the Cold War

On November 9, 1989, East Germany dismantled the twelve foot concrete 

Berlin Wall that had surrounded West Berlin for twenty-eight years. It was a 

symbolic end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union; 

between democracy and communism; between freedom and totalitarianism. 

This first breach of the infamous “Iron Curtain” came twenty-nine months 

after President Ronald W. Reagan made his now famous speech on June 12, 

1987, at the Brandenburg Gate. He issued a challenge to Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union’s general secretary of the central committee, stating: 

“We welcome change and openness; for we believe that freedom and security 

go together, that the advance of human liberty can only strengthen the cause 

of world peace. There is one sign,” he continued, “the Soviets can make that 

would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom 

and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet 

Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization, come here to this gate. 

Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!”1

This came at a time of debate over the stationing of short range American missiles in Europe; America’s historic peacetime defense buildup; and the continuing nuclear arms race. But there was progress, as Reagan noted, not only in 

“limiting the growth of arms, but of eliminating, for the first time, an entire 

class of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.”2 It also came amidst the attempted economic reform (perestroika) in the Soviet Union and efforts to lessen 

the grip of the Soviet bureaucracy (glasnost). Evidence of this change, as Reagan 

explained, could be seen in the release of some political prisoners and unblocking of certain foreign news broadcasts. Some Communist economic enterprises 

were allowed to function with more freedom from state control.3

There were other historic developments. On November 19, 1990, the United States, the Soviet Union, and twenty other countries of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact signed the Conventional 
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

10

President Ronald Reagan at the Berlin Wall, June 12, 1987. (Ronald Reagan Library)

Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty limiting conventional, nonnuclear weapons, 

and equipment.4

While this was progress, there was instability on the horizon. The Warsaw 

Pact began to fall apart the following year with the declarations for independence by the Soviet Union’s satellite states. 

On July 1, 1991, the Warsaw Pact dissolved. 

In August, President George H. W. Bush 

and Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty (START) in Moscow 

limiting each country to 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 strategic delivery systems. 

That November, Bush announced the CFE 

Treaty to be the end of the Cold War. Gorbachev opined that START was the end of 

the arms race. In the face of this progress, there was a coup attempt in the Soviet Union in August 1991. It was quickly 

quelled with Boris Yeltsin, president of the 

Russian Republic, playing a key role. On 

December 8, Yeltsin and leaders of Ukraine 

George H. W. Bush
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

11

and Belorussia formed a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On December 25, 1991, eleven of the former Soviet republics joined the CIS. The 

Soviet Union, Reagan’s “evil empire,” collapsed into fifteen different countries.5

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the reunification of 

Germany came a change in the strategic environment.6

National Security Strategy

What did this change mean for the United States? Since the end of World War 

II, the thrust of America’s foreign policy had been the containment of communism with the Soviet Union as the central, monolithic threat. As stated in 

Bush’s 1991 National Security Strategy, the possibility of the Soviet Union posing the threat it once did seemed “unlikely.” The world seemed safer. That 

hope was soon shattered by new crises and 

instabilities.7 Countries with their regional 

and ethnic tensions, once held in check by the 

bipolar superpower struggle, surfaced creating a multi-polar threat. Recognizing this, 

Secretary of the Army Michael P. W. Stone 

stated, ‘“Our nation faces a significantly more 

complex and varied security environment 

than at any time in our history. The question 

we now face is whether our Army is properly 

structured and equipped to meet the emerging strategic requirements of the 1990s and 

beyond.’”8

Operation DESERT SHIELD/

DESERT STORM 

As the Cold War was reaching the end, any 

period of relative calm had been shattered 

on August 2, 1990, when more than 100,000 

of Saddam Hussein’s soldiers invaded Kuwait and rapidly advanced on the capital city. 

President Bush’s reaction to the aggression of 

Hussein and its damage to Kuwait’s oils supplies, exaggerated by the possible disruption 

of Saudi oil supplies, stemmed from his March 

1990 National Security Strategy. That strateMichael P. W. Stone

Saddam Hussein
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

12

gy called for the promotion of “an open and expanding international economic system with minimal distortions to trade and investment, stable currencies, 

and broadly agreed and respected rules for managing and resolving economic 

disputes.”9

 It was based on deterrence, strong alliances, forward defense, and 

force projection. 

The United States would strive for “a secure world, fostering political freedom, 

human rights, and democratic institutions.”10

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (August 2, 1990 - February 28, 1991) was almost overshadowed by the collapse of the Soviet Union. 

For the first time in twenty years (since the Vietnam War), the United States 

Army deployed a significant share of its “actual” forces. These forces were 

trained to combat Soviet forces in Central Europe or to meet in open warfare a 

former Soviet “client state.”11 Significantly, this was also the first major call-up 

of reserve forces in forty years (since the Korean War). Thus, the reserves were 

used operationally for the first time. 

Map 2
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

13

The General in the Desert, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art 

Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

14

That call to arms came on August 22, 1990, with Bush’s executive order mobilizing up to 200,000 Selected Reservists under Section 673b, Title 10, U.S 

Code.12 This allowed the Army to activate 25,000 members of the Selected 

Reserve for ninety days, with a presidential option for a ninety-day extension. 

On November 19, Bush increased the authorization to 80,000 and to 115,000 

on December 1st. As of November 13, the period of the call-up was extended 

for an additional ninety days.13

On August 25, 1990, Army Reserve units were alerted for activation. Some 

13,000 Army Reserve soldiers, from over 100 units, were now on alert. On 

August 27, the first units were activated and began reporting to mobilization 

August 2, 1990 Operation DESERT SHIELD begins 

August 22, 1990 200,000 Selected Reservists receive 

mobilization orders 

August 25, 1990 13,000 Army Reserve soldiers from 100 units 

alerted for activation 

August 27, 1990 First units activated 

August 30, 1990 First units report to mobilization station 

September 7, 1990 First units deploy 

Early October 1990 150 units alerted and 90 units get activation 

 orders 

Early December 1990 450 units alerted and 401 receive activation 

 orders 

January 16, 1991 50,000 soldiers activated from over 500 units 

January 19, 1991 Bush authorizes a partial mobilization of one 

million reservists from all the armed services 

for two years 

June 1991 1,045 units had been activated: 145,000 

Selected Reservists and 22,000 Individual 

Ready Reservists 

Table I-1: Timetable

August 2, 1990 - June 1991

The reserves were used operationally for the first time. 
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

15

stations on August 30. The first units deployed on September 7. An Army 

Reserve unit was the first reserve component organization to deploy. By early

October, about 150 Army Reserve units had been alerted and some ninety had 

received activation orders. By the first part of December, almost 450 Army Reserve units had been alerted and some 401 had received activation orders. For 

some units the time from alert to activation was as short as two days; for others 

as long as 161 days. The average alert-to-activation was 11.7 days.15

By the time Operation DESERT STORM began with the aerial bombardment 

on January 16, 1991, over 50,000 Army Reserve soldiers had been activated 

in more than 500 units or cells. More than 650 individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs) had been ordered to active duty. Almost 2,300 Army Reserve 

Members of the 1176th Transportation Terminal Unit monitor loading of ships bound 

for the desert. (Photo by J.A. Hendricks)

The average alert to activation period was 11.7 days.
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

16

soldiers were serving on temporary tour of active duty (TTAD) orders. Due 

to personnel needs, seventy retired reservists had been involuntarily recalled to 

active duty. Almost 3,000 volunteers from all parts of the Army Reserve were 

serving in the continental United States (CONUS) or abroad. At the start of 

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, Army Reserve soldiers represented over 50 percent of Total Army 

reserve activations.16

On January 19, 1991, Bush authorized 

a partial mobilization of one million reservists from all the armed services for as 

long as two years. The administration 

indicated that any call-up would be limited to 360,000 for a maximum of one 

year. Reserve soldiers provided such crucial specialties in Southwest Asia as fuel 

and water distribution, medical services, 

chemical decontamination, and many 

other combat support functions. Bush’s 

action made possible the activation of 

individual reservists from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). On January 

19, the secretary of defense issued implementation instructions. By January 

23, the first mobilization of over 20,000 

members of the IRR was under way.17

By the end of June 1991, 1,045 units 

had been activated. Over 145,000 of 

those were Selected Reservists and about 

22,000 were IRRs. Of those 1,045 units, 294 were stationed in the continental 

United States. The rest were deployed to Europe and to Southwest Asia.18 U.S. 

Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) activated Army Reserve units and individual volunteers by issuing orders through the continental U.S. Armies (CONUSAs). The Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) issued orders 

to individual volunteers from the IRR, Individual Mobilization Augmentees 

(IMA), and eligible retirees. By the middle of October 1990, ARPERCEN had 

logged more than 6,000 calls from troop program unit (TPU), IMA and IRR 

soldiers volunteering for active duty. Over 4,000 members of the Retired Reserve had also volunteered. In the same period, over 450 IMAs had been called 

to active duty. ARPERCEN worked closely with the Total Army Personnel 

Command (PERSCOM) to match personnel with requirements.19

This desert, battle dress uniform or DBU 

bears the desert camouflage pattern adopted in 1982. Popularly known as “chocolate chips” by the soldiers that wore 

them, this distinctive uniform became an 

icon of the Gulf War. (Photo by Timothy 

L. Hale, U.S. Army Reserve Command, 

Public Affairs) 
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

17

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was the first true test of 

the Army’s Total Force mobilization policy of Army Reserve soldiers since the 

Vietnam War. In the Vietnam War, only 5,181 Army Reserve soldiers were 

mobilized and 3,500 actually deployed. In Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, only 300 reservists were activated.20 In his March 1990 National Security 

Strategy, Bush had acknowledged the noteworthy role reservists played in the 

absence of a large peacetime armed force. He referred to the Total Force policy which had “placed a significant portion of . . . [the] total military power in a 

well-equipped, well-trained, and early-mobilizing reserve component. Various 

elements of that policy-the balance between active and reserve forces, the mix of units in the 

two components, the nature of missions given 

reserve forces-are likely,” he stated, “to be adjusted as we respond to changes in the security 

environment.”21 He recognized the “less expensive” nature of the reserve component as “one 

alternative for reducing costs while still hedging 

against uncertainties. It is an alternative,” he explained “we must thoroughly explore, especially 

as we better understand the amount of warning 

time we can expect for a major conflict.”22 There 

had been little warning for Hussein’s aggression.

The Total Force Policy had stemmed from the 

drawdown in Vietnam, the end of the draft, and lower defense budgets. In 

August 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird announced the Total Force 

Policy. As the active Army declined in end strength, there would be increased 

reliance on the reserves for combat support and combat service support. The 

reserves would be the first and 

main source for augmentation 

of the active forces in national 

emergencies. In 1973, Laird’s 

successor, James R. Schlesinger 

made the concept a policy with 

the Total Force study.

That study named functions and 

missions that could be eliminated or transferred from the active 

component to the reserve components, increasing the active 

combat strength. By 1973, the 

Melvin R. Laird

James R. Schlesinger
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

18

Saudi Arabia, January 1991. The 316th Quartermaster Company distributes water at an XVIII Airborne Corps site in central Saudi Arabia. The 316th, an Army Reserve unit from San Diego, California, distributed 8.4 million gallons of water during the Persian Gulf War and in support of Kurdish 

relief efforts in northern Iraq. Army Reserve soldiers contributed significantly to the Total Army’s 

success by providing the bulk of water purification and distribution, civil affairs support, enemy 

prisoner-of-war handling, postal work, petroleum handling, military history, and psychological 

operations. Other participating Army Reserve units included chemical decontamination, transportation, military police, maintenance, and engineer. (An Army Reserve Historical Painting.)
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

19

reserves provided 66 percent of combat support. The Vietnam War had minimal reserve 

participation and lacked public support. Army 

Chief of Staff General Creighton W. Abrams, 

Jr., ensured through the new policy known 

as the Abrams Doctrine that the active Army 

could no longer go to war without reserve 

units and public support. Active forces would 

be reinforced, supplemented, as needed, by 

the reserves within a few weeks to a month of 

notice.23

During the war, when the Army Reserve 

strength was 335,000, a total of 35,158 were 

deployed along with 37,692 National Guardsmen. These soldiers were part of the total 

227,800 soldiers deployed to Southwest Asia. 

Six hundred and twenty-six Army Reserve 

Six hundred and twenty-six Army 

Reserve units were called up for 

Operation DESERT SHIELD/

DESERT STORM. Over 35,000 

(35,158) soldiers were deployed. 

Over 79,000 (79,118) were activated.

By 1973, the reserves provided 66% of 

combat support.
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

20

units were called up.24 Over 79,000 (79,118) 

Army Reserve soldiers were activated.25

An example of an early deployed unit was 

the 318th Transportation Agency (Movement Control) from New York City. It 

was mobilized on September 20, 1990, and 

arrived in Saudi Arabia in October. The 

318th had a monumental task. General 

H. Norman Schwarzkopf’s ultimate battle 

plan called for the mammoth strategic lift 

of “over 230,000 U.S. and coalition soldiers, 

95,000 trucks and other wheeled vehicles, 

and 12,000 tanks and other tracked armored 

vehicles.”26 The lift started on January 17, 

1991. The 318th provided theater movement 

control throughout Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The 

unit jaunted across Saudi Arabia scheduling convoys, validating “intra-theater 

airlift requests,” requiring the control of flights for about 120 C-130 aircraft, 

and coordinating the daily movement of seventy-one railroad trains (some 

4,000 railcars).27 

Among the first to be deployed were Army Reserve military police soldiers on 

August 23, 1990. Jobs included port security in the United States and in theater. 

Then there was the job of handling Iraqi prisoners of war. The single military 

police brigade handling Iraqi prisoners 

of war was the 800th Military Police Brigade (Enemy Prisoner of War), an Army 

Reserve unit from New York City. It was 

activated on December 6, 1990, and arrived in Saudi Arabia on December 25. 

Maximum strength in theater peaked at 

7,300 soldiers. The unit was assigned to 

Lieutenant General William G. “Gus” 

Pagonis’ 22d Support Command, the 

Army’s logistical headquarters. Although the alignment was different from 

Army doctrine, it seemed to work. The 

brigade was a command and control 

headquarters. Beneath it were sixty-nine 

units; twenty-nine were Army Reserve 

units with the others belonging to the 

General H. Norman Schwarzkoph

Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

21

National Guard. Pagonis noted the success of the units in the face of difficulties. 

He wrote in his after action report: ‘“Since all engineer assets were totally 

committed elsewhere. . . the 800th Military Police Brigade (Enemy Prisoner of 

War) actually constructed the EPW [Enemy Prisoner of War] Camps they ran. 

This once again demonstrated the initiative and flexibility of this command.’”28

In 1991, about all civil affairs soldiers were Army Reserve. They, however, were 

not among the first units deployed to defend Saudi Arabia. But, when the liberation of Kuwait became part of the mission, civil affairs units were in demand. 

On December 5, 1990, Central Command (CENTCOM) asked for all Army 

Reserve civil affairs units. When the ground war began on February 24, 1991, 

about sixteen of these units had deployed to Saudi Arabia. There were 1,924 

Army Reserve civil affairs soldiers in theater.29

Service was not only in theater but also backfill for deployed active forces in 

the states and abroad. The hospital and dental units and cells that were initially activated went to installations in the United States as backfill for medical 

Mopping up: The chemical warfare threat in the Middle East required that all soldiers undergo 

intensive nuclear, biological and chemical warfare training before being deployed. (Army Reserve 

Magazine, Fall 2000)
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

22

Patriot missile site, Saudi Arabia, 1990. Sergeant First Class Sieger Hartgers. (Courtesy of the Army Art 

Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

23

personnel who had deployed with active 

component units.

There, the Army Reserve soldiers provided medical support for the families of 

deploying soldiers. Some units provided 

headquarters augmentation. Other Army 

Reserve soldiers worked at mobilization 

stations around the country aiding in preparing units for deployment. There were 

a number of infrastructure units such as 

garrison support units (GSUs). Army Reserve soldiers staffed and mainly ran the 

National Prisoner-of-War Information 

Center, part of the Army’s Office of the 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.30

In addition, there were Army Reserve 

combat units activated such as the 3d 

Battalion, 87th Infantry headquartered 

in Fort Carson, Colorado. The 3d/87th 

never got beyond Germany. It had a 

CAPSTONE assignment to the 193d 

Light Infantry Brigade, meaning it had 

been paired with its wartime headquarters and aligned according to different 

war plans (Europe and Korea before the 

end of the Cold War). The 3d/87th was 

one of forty-seven deployed to Germany 

for the build-up. Some of the units expressly supported operations in the war 

zone. The 3d/87’s mission was to supply 

security in places, particularly Frankfurt, 

vacated by active component soldiers sent 

from Europe to the war zone. Germany 

was considered a likely site for a terrorist 

attack.31

Another unit, the 946th Transportation 

Company (Terminal Transfer) from Lew-
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

24

es, Delaware, was mobilized for a CONUS mission. The soldiers “worked 

twelve-hour-shifts around the clock and on weekends, with airmen at Dover 

Air Base to support the ongoing flow of materiel to Saudi Arabia in preparation 

for Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.” By Christmas 1990, 

some 2.2 million pounds had moved daily through the Dover port. According 

to Ira Sylvester, air freight general foreman, ‘“We would never have gotten this 

done without them.’”32 Captain Lee Swift, the unit’s commander, remarked, 

‘”We’ve been training on cargo for years. Now we’ve been given the opportunity to perform a real-world mission in support of our soldiers in Saudi Arabia. 

What could be more meaningful. . . .”’33

Many activated units such as signal, infantry, theater logistics management, and 

general officers were ignored or not used. Reserve signal units supplied only 

0.6 percent of the total in theater assets. Only four Army Reserve signal units 

were mobilized. The 335th Theater Signal Command was not among them.34

The failure to mobilize the 335th was amazing to some. The unit was the 

Third Army’s signal support headquarters, the Army element of U.S. Central 

Command. It had a “CAPSTONE trace which reflected its potential command of two signal brigades: the 11th, an active component unit. . . . and the 

228th, an ARNG [Army National Guard] unit . . . .” Significantly, the 335th 

Medium tents used as enlisted quarters, XVIII Airborne Corps Main Command Post, Rafha Airport, 

Northern Province, Saudi Arabia, February 5, 1991. (XVIII Airborne Corps History Office, photograph 

by Specialist Randall R. Anderson, DS-F-151-17)
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

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served since 1986 to cultivate “plans on the 

Southwest Asia mission in support of Third 

Army.” The decision not to mobilize the 

unit may have had more to do with “personality clashes than about unit capability.” In 

any event, Colonel James C. Cannon, Third 

Army’s G-6, recommended to Lieutenant 

General John J. Yeosock, U.S. Central 

Command commander, that the unit not be 

mobilized. According to Yeosock, personalities played no part in his decision. He just 

did not require another headquarters. As a 

result, he formed a makeshift unit known as 

the 6th Signal Command, whose service resembled the 335th.35

The decision not to mobilize the 335th was 

similar in some respects to the decision not to mobilize the 377th Theater Army 

Area Command (TAACOM). The unit had a CAPSTONE “affiliation” with 

Third Army and Central Command and, therefore, had trained “with the Middle East and Southwest Asia in mind.” It had assisted in drafting ‘”the combat 

service support annexes of all the contingency operation plans for Southwest 

Asia and had geared all of its operation plans for Southwest Asia.’” Lieutenant 

General Pagonis was behind the decision. Instead of deploying the 377th, an ad 

hoc command designated as the 22d Support Command was placed in charge of 

managing the theater’s logistics. According to Pagonis, about 70 percent of the 

soldiers were from the Army Reserve. He 

applauded their capability. Pagonis had not 

wanted a general officer headquarters. Colonel John Topper, the Army Reserve advisor 

at FORSCOM, laid the decision not to deploy the unit partially at the feet of Yeosock. 

According to John T. Currie and Richard B. 

Crossland, in Twice the Citizen: A History of 

the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1995, 

Yeosock advised General Schwarzkopf that 

“only ‘shooters’ be brought to the theater in 

the beginning – not logisticians.”36

Of the thirty-one general officers in Individual Mobilization Augmentee positions, 

only one was activated. He was Major GenLieutenant General John J. Yeosock

Major General Max Baratz
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On Guard At Sunset, Sergeant First Class Peter G. Varisano. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, 

U.S. Army Center of Military History)
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

27

eral Max Baratz, then the deputy commander for reserve affairs at FORSCOM. 

In February 1994, Baratz became the chief, Army Reserve.37 He ended up mobilizing the Army Reserve and the National Guard.38

A tragic event of the war was the loss of twenty-eight Army Reserve soldiers 

from a single subsonic cruise unarmed decoy (SCUD) missile attack. Thirteen 

of the twenty-eight soldiers dead and forty-three of the one hundred wounded 

were from the 14th Quartermaster Detachment. The detachment was a water 

purification unit from Greensburg, Pennsylvania. It was mobilized in January 

1991 and had been in the desert for less than two weeks when on February 

25 the SCUD missile crashed into the Dhahran barracks, exploding its almost 

half-ton warhead. Only thirteen soldiers escaped injury. According to Currie 

and Crossland, “The 14th suffered the greatest combat loss of any U.S. Army 

unit since the Vietnam War, and the percentage of casualties taken by the 14th 

in the attack-over 80 percent-places it in the tragic first ranks of all American 

military units in any war.”39

In the end, the “Army Reserve 

provided ninety-four percent 

of the enemy prisoner-of-war 

handling (military police), sixty-nine percent of the Adjutant General postal, sixty-five 

percent of the petroleum handling, sixty-three percent of 

the psychological operations, 

and fifty-nine percent of the 

water-handling capability for 

the Total Army effort in Southwest Asia.”40 Army Reserve 

medical soldiers constituted 

“twenty-five percent of the total number of Army Reservists 

activated.”41 After the end of 

the hostilities, Army Reserve 

soldiers remained in theater 

to “restore services and facilities to Kuwait and to provide 

humanitarian relief to refugees 

in northern Iraq and Turkey as 

part of Operation PROVIDE 

Example of a prayer cap and shawl provided to Kurdish refugees during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. 

(Photo by Timothy L. Hale, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Public Affairs)
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An Army veteran and Brigadier General Peter S. Lennon, commanding 

general of the 316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, dedicate a 

wreath to the 14th Quartermaster Detachment monument in Greensburg, Pennsylvania, during the unit’s 20th anniversary memorial ceremony of the SCUD missile attack, held at the unit’s reserve center on 

February 25, 2011. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Michel Sauret)

Two U.S. soldiers walk past a pile of G.I. duffle bags, decorated with small 

American flags, following a SCUD missile attack on the U.S. military barracks at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, February 25, 1991. (AP Photo/David 

Longstreath)
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

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COMFORT.”42 According to Chief, Army Reserve Major General Roger W. 

Sandler, “Again it was our soldiers’ unique blend of military and civilian expertise which started electricity and water running in Kuwait and fed and sheltered 

the Kurdish refugees.”43

Unlike the Vietnam War, the war had wide-spread public support. Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe, General Crosbie Saint, believed that ‘“the 

early decision to call up the reserves [meaning the Army Reserve], while probably motivated by necessity, turned out to be a major catalyst in consolidating 

American public opinion behind our strategy in the Gulf. The size of the call 

up meant that everyone had players from their state.’”44

Figure I-1: Percentage of Forces Provided by the Army Reserve During

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

0

20

40

60

80

100

94% Enemy POW Militay Police 94% Enemy POW Militay Police 69% Adjutant General Postal 69% Adjutant General Postal 65% Petroleum Handling 65% Petroleum Handling 59% Water Handling 59% Water Handling 63% Psychological 63% Psychological Operations Operations 25%  Medical Medical 
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CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

31

Desert Storm, 1991, Frank Thomas. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of 

Military History)
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How had the Army Reserve performed? 

Sandler thought the accomplishments 

“proved without a question that we were 

ready. The involvement of Army Reserve units and individuals showed that 

we could mobilize and deploy on short 

notice. Reservists demonstrated that 

they could do their jobs exceptionally 

well once they were on station.”45 He 

pointed to Pagonis’ comment, in Sandler’s words, that “an observer could 

not tell a Reservist from an active-duty 

soldier while they were working because they were so totally integrated 

and performed so well.”46 Baratz pointed to the success of small highly specialized units. They were called up, sent to a ten- to twelve-day reorientation course with the Army and then went to the theater and performed well.47

Problems arose and lessons were learned. Mr. Tom Welke, a senior civilian 

readiness officer, said there were “tremendous readiness issues and challenges 

faced by both the Reserve and the Guard [which] pretty much stretched across 

the nation’s reserve at that time.” Many believed the country’s reserves were 

really in strategic reserve and would not be called up except in the case of a 

major conflict with the Soviet Union.48 There was a general understanding that 

the reserves were “a mobilization asset more so than an immediate capability 

and were to be committed ‘in time of war or national emergency.’”49 There were 

issues, for example, with equipment shortages and validation and processing of 

civil affairs soldiers who were part of the special operations forces. Testing and 

validation took about two weeks. As a result, reserve soldiers arrived in theater 

after the supported active Army soldiers had moved to their combat locations.50

According to Baratz, “to say it was messy was an understatement of the first degree.”51

Major General Roger W. Sandler

“An observer could not tell a Reservist from an active-duty soldier 

while they were working because they were so totally integrated and 

performed so well.” Major General Roger W. Sandler
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

33

Another problem was the way IRR soldiers were ordered to active duty. IRR 

use was limited to declared national emergencies and partial mobilizations. 

The existing mobilization system was “ignored when it came to filling personnel requirements.” The “ad hoc” system the ARPERCEN used resulted 

in certain “anomalies,” such as not sending soldiers to the nearest mobilization 

post. The ARPERCEN lessons learned report pointed out a number of issues, 

such as, not using the mobilization plans in place since 1980, over taxing receiving installations, unnecessary travel by mobilized soldiers, hurried development 

and transmission of information to mobilization sites, and requiring mobilization personnel to employ untried procedures for information collection on 

mobilized soldiers.52 There were problems in filling gaps in units with IRR soldiers. A Cold War concept, logistics unit productivity system (LUPS), whereby 

a family of logistics units organized with a cadre of troop program unit (TPU) 

soldiers and manned when needed with IRR soldiers, did not work and was 

scrapped.53 Still, the Army Reserve Personnel Center was able to contact over 

95 percent of the 21,000 IRR soldiers it notified for activation.54

Due to in-theater requirements and for back fill, parts of or cells of Army Reserve units, rather than the entire unit, were sometimes activated, frequently 

without their senior Army Reserve commanders and staff personnel. These 

cells were often combined into provisional organizations, which, in many cases, 

mirrored the units from which the cells had been drawn. Units and personnel 

especially affected by this practice were Army Reserve hospitals, dental, transportation, petroleum and water handling, military police, chemical decontamination, and linguist units.55 In Army Reserve planning, fillers were thought to 

be IRR soldiers, but that planning was based on having authorizations to activate the individual soldiers in the IRR. That authorization did not exist during 

the first six months.56 In the early phase of Operation DESERT SHIELD/

DESERT STORM, the mobilization process for IMAs was uncertain to some 

Department of the Army agencies. In the end, 2,364 IMA soldiers, 17 percent 

of the total IMA force, were called to active duty.57

Indeed, the general mobilization process was cumbersome and time consuming. Units and soldiers were brought together at the mobilization station and 

trained. The process could in some instances take over one hundred days.58

Training at mobilization stations was uneven and varied. Much of the post mobilization time had been used, for example, for physical examinations and dental 

treatment. The number of non-deployable, non-mobilization ready soldiers 

presented problems leading to real personnel shortages. This was not only in 

the Army Reserve. There were significant gaps in some units and vacancies in 

critical military occupational specialists, as noted below.59
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CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

35

Frank Thomas’ painting, titled “Baghdad Express,” captures a special operations/Delta Force Commando team defending its CH-47 Chinook helicopter from enemy fire during a nighttime operation. This painting was one of several pieces worked on by the Army Reserve combat artist while 

he was deployed in support of Operation DESERT STORM. (Army Reserve Magazine, Winter 2000)
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There were other issues with training and readiness. For instance, there was 

a low military occupational specialty (MOS) qualification rate for members of 

the 79th Quartermaster Company (Water Supply), a unit not considered to be 

a high priority for mobilization before the war. That changed. Consequently, 

Army Reserve Forces School instructors were placed on active duty to conduct 

a shortened MOS 77W (Water Treatment Specialist) course. Although awarded the MOS, these soldiers only knew the water purification part of the field. 

This became a problem when the XVIIIth Airborne Corps cross-leveled 77W 

MOS soldiers in Saudi Arabia to find they were not entirely qualified. The 

Army stopped awarding MOSs for shortened courses. There was also a related 

issue with some Individual Ready Reserve mobilized soldiers.60

There were several issues related to the 200,000 call-up system. Difficulties in 

granting pay and benefits, processing personnel, and using information systems made for a larger call-up. Cross-leveling could have been simplified if the 

Army had had access to IRR soldiers, especially for units required very early in 

the operation. This applied, for instance, to port operations and transportation 

specialists. 

There were equipment issues. The Army Reserve was often using older 

equipment that was incompatible with active Army systems. Large amounts 

of equipment were 

cross-leveled as well 

as numbers of individuals. There were strategic lift issues, such 

as, with using the older C-141 aircraft.61 In 

some cases, units sent 

soldiers to the factory 

to pick up the equipment, took it to the 

mobilization station, 

and then straight into 

the desert.62

Another problem was the lack of a system for backfilling units. Sometimes two 

units would be called up to make one unit. That’s all that could be done.63 And, 

then there was the problem of units that had been inactivated under Project 

Quicksilver, a project to downsize the Army and the reserves following the fall 

of the Berlin Wall. Plans were made in 1990 to inactivate designated units; 

plans that were put on hold when Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT 

C-141 aircraft
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

37

STORM began. Some transportation units, for example, had been inactivated 

in the fall of 1990, but then were needed. The 660th Heavy Equipment Truck 

unit was inactivated in October 1990. Two weeks later the Army Reserve received an order from the Department of the Army to mobilize and deploy the 

unit. The unit had disbanded, the equipment had been dispersed, and soldiers 

had been detailed to other units. The entire unit had to be reconstituted. That occurred numerous times. A lesson learned 

was to make sure the right units were inactivated in the event of downsizing.64

In 1989, Army Chief of Staff General Carl 

E. Vuono stated, “The Army’s active forces 

are fully able to meet time-urgent requirements for U.S. land forces around the world 

without augmentation from our reserve 

components . . . . The U.S. Army Reserve 

and Army National Guard forces supplement the active forces and round out the 

Total Army for protracted contingencies 

or general mobilization.”65 This was the 

strategic role of the Army Reserve.

The fiscal year 1992 National Defense Authorization Act instructed the Department 

of Defense to conduct a study of the Total Force policy. On December 31, 1990, 

the Pentagon released the Total Force Policy Report to Congress. The report 

determined that in the future the active Army “should be able to deploy rapidly 

to trouble spots and to sustain themselves for the first thirty days with virtually 

no support from the reserve components. Under the plan, the active component 

would continue to use National Guard roundout brigades.”66 

At the end of fiscal year 1991, the Army observed several trends requiring alterations to the Total Force Policy. Among them was a “reduction in the requirement to maintain sizeable ready forces for rapid deployment to Europe, 

and the effect of potential demands for immediate deployment anywhere in the 

world upon the state of Army training.” A smaller active Army meant increased 

reliance on the integration of the reserves, as evidenced in Operation DESERT 

SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Reservists needed to deploy together with the 

active Army in support of extended contingency operations, to deal concurrently 

with a second major contingency, and to be prepared for large scale threats. The 

Army planned to reduce both the active and reserves to a smaller but equally 

capable Total Force during a period of several years.67

General Carl E. Vuono
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“The Ultimatum – Standoff at Safwan,” painted by Army Reserve soldier Lieutenant Colonel Frank 

Thomas, displays a run-in between Iraqi and American forces over a piece of desert real estate. 

The area had been designated as a negotiation site for upcoming peace talks. Shortly after spotting the intimidating U.S. M1 Abrams tanks, enemy troops headed out. (Army Reserve Magazine, 

Winter 2000)
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

39
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Establishment of the United States Army Reserve Command 

To strengthen the role of the Army Reserve as a strategic force, the Army 

Reserve’s budget process was transferred from the FORSCOM commander 

to the chief, Army Reserve. This transfer occurred on October 1, 1990. On 

that same date, the Army provisionally established the United States Army 

Reserve Command.68 

The origin for the United States Army Reserve 

Command can be traced back decades before 

its actual establishment in 1990. In 1967, 

Congress passed watershed legislation in the 

form of the Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and 

Vitalization Act. This act prescribed reserve 

leadership for reserve units. For the Army, the 

act created a statutory chief, Army Reserve 

(CAR) who served as an advisor to the chief 

of staff of the Army on Army Reserve matters. 

Command and control of the Army Reserve, 

however, was under the Continental Army 

Command (CONARC) until 1973 and after 

that under FORSCOM. The act also virtually eliminated bitter congressional deliberation 

over reserve component policy--for awhile.69

The House Committee on Appropriations (HAC)’s Surveys and Investigation staff 

rekindled the debate in 1988 while reviewing Chief, Army Reserve Major General William F. Ward, Jr.’s command support center concept. The staff uncovered two command and control reporting chains for the Army Reserve: one 

through the continental Army commands (CONUSAs) to FORSCOM and the 

other to the Office, Chief Army Reserve (OCAR). Congressman Bill Chappell, Jr., chairman of the HACs’ Defense Subcommittee, raised the issue with 

Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr. He also raised another issue: the 

“need for the Chief Army Reserve to become more involved in the problems 

of the Army Reserve.” Chappell directed Marsh to: “look into the practicality 

of having the Chief of Army Reserve also function as the reserve component 

Major General William F. Ward, Jr.

On October 1, 1990, the Army provisionally established the United 

States Army Reserve Command.
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

41

commander and of establishing a single reporting chain by consolidating 

the administrative units similar to 

the other Reserve components. . . .”

Chappell wanted a report back by January 15, 1989, explaining that the committee planned to turn its attention to 

this issue during hearings on the Army 

Reserve for fiscal year 1990.70

Marsh wrote in a February 7, 1989, letter to Congressman John P. Murtha, 

who had replaced Chappell as the chairman of the HAC’s Defense Subcommittee, that “perhaps it is time we completely reexamine the entire question of 

command and control of the Army Reserve.” Marsh cautioned, however, that 

the “wide-ranging ramifications of such 

an effort demand that we devote requisite time and manpower to ensure that all 

of the factors affecting this issue are fully considered.”71

What ensued were months of studies, proposals, and concept plans made by 

FORSCOM; the Army; and the Office, Chief 

Army Reserve (OCAR). Meanwhile, the HAC’s 

Survey and Investigations Team (S&I) continued 

its examination of the Army Reserve’s command 

and control structure. It was concerned, also, 

over the chief, Army Reserve’s virtual inability 

to influence the use of Army Reserve funding. 

FORSCOM and OCAR signed a memorandum 

of agreement on January 1990. It marked considerable progress on the establishment of an Army 

Reserve command. The reserve command was 

to be organized as a major subordinate command 

of FORSCOM. FORSCOM was to develop 

overall policy for the Army Reserve, supporting 

the Total Army, while the reserve command 

was to prepare implementation policies, plans, 

and programs in accordance with FORSCOM 

policies. The span of control was to be further 

developed as was the organization of the comJohn O. Marsh, Jr.

Congressman Bill Chappell, 

Jr. first raised the issue of the 

Army Reserve’s command and 

control with Secretary of the 

Army John O. Marsh, Jr.
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mand. There were remaining issues to 

be resolved, such as FORSCOM’s proposal to dual-hat the active component 

CONUSA deputy commanding generals as Army Reserve command deputy 

commanding generals.72

More planning, debate and delays continued as Congress monitored the progress. On June 1, 1990, a significant event 

occurred when Stone signed a memorandum to Ward giving him ‘“direct 

control over the allocation, distribution, 

and control of funds for the three Army 

Reserve appropriations [Reserve Personnel Army (RPA), Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR) and 

Military Construction, Army Reserve 

(MCAR) . . . effective October 1, 1990.’”73

By July 19, 1990, a plan was developed 

for presentation to Congress. The 

U.S. Army Reserve Command would 

be a major subordinate command of 

FORSCOM; it would be in Atlanta, 

Georgia; and the chief, Army Reserve 

would be a lieutenant general (which 

did not materialize), triple-hatted 

as the chief, Army Reserve, the U.S. 

Army Reserve Command’s commanding general, and FORSCOM deputy 

commanding general for reserve affairs. Control of Army Reserve units 

for training operations, mobilization, 

and deployment (TOMD) was to remain with the CONUSAs. On October 1, 1990, General Vuono told 

FORSCOM Commanding General Edwin Burba that he and the secretary 

of the Army had approved the plan. Headquarters, FORSCOM Permanent 

General Edwin Burba

In February 1989, Congressman John P. 

Murtha, who had replaced Chappell as 

the chairman of the HAC’s Defense Subcommittee, wrote Marsh, “perhaps it is 

time we completely reexamine the entire 

question of command and control of the 

Army Reserve.” 
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

43

Order 183-13, dated that day, organized the U. S. Army Reserve Command 

(Provisional), Fort Gillem, Georgia. A Planning Group, established on March 

28, 1990, led by Colonel Topper, continued its work on the details, such as the 

table of distribution and allowance (TDA) and the organization and functional 

manual for the new command.74

In October 1990, the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) began planning 

the assumption of Army Reserve functions from the CONUSAs, while building 

a staff to execute those functions. In that same month, the USARC became an 

operational command under FORSCOM and controlled 475 functions from 

the recently deactivated Fourth U.S. Army.75

Meanwhile, Congress presented its own resolution. The House version of 

the 1991 Defense Department authorization bill had not included a specific 

provision on the Army Reserve command. Added in committee was a section 

providing that the reserve component chiefs were to be ‘“solely responsible for 

administering and supervising their respective components.’” “This provision 

was part of the bill. . . reported out of the Armed Services Committee on August 3, 1990, and passed the House of Representatives on September 19, just 

twelve days before” the Army established the USARC. The Senate bill had 

no such provision. A conference committee had to be convened. The legislators were not completely satisfied with the Army’s action. It did not go far 

enough. According to the conference report, ‘“The conferees are pleased . . . 

that the Army has initiated actions to establish an Army Reserve Command. 

The conferees are concerned, however, that command and control relationships between active and reserve forces, which are perceived by many as contributing factors to the relatively low readiness status of the Army Reserve, are 

not sufficiently changed in the current Army plan to provide actual command 

and control to the Chief of the Army Reserve. Specifically, the conferees note 

that the Chief of the Army Reserve should command all non-mobilized reserve 

units with the exceptions included in the amendment [forces assigned to carry 

out functions of the Secretary of the Army specified in section 3013 of Title 10, 

United States Code].”’76

On November 5, 1990, The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 

required the establishment of an Army Reserve command under the command 

of the chief, Army Reserve as a major subordinate command of FORSCOM 

and assigned to command all Army Reserve forces in the continental United 

States, save forces assigned to the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. There 

would be a two year test period. The legislation directed the secretary of defense to establish an independent commission to assist him in evaluating the 

progress and effectiveness of the command. Twenty-three years after passage
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of the Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act, the chief, Army Reserve was in statutory command and control of the Army Reserve. And, the 

Army Reserve Command’s activation ensured that, for the first time in its history, the Army Reserve held complete resource allocation over virtually its 

entire force structure. The new command managed all Army Reserve funds.78

In the fall of 1992, the USARC became fully operational with a full strength 

staff of over 810 military and civilian employees. The staff was spread out over 

ten buildings at Forts McPherson and Gillem. In October 1992, the Independent Commission released its report. Among the recommendations were: 

making the USARC a major Army command by 1995, elevating the USARC 

Twenty-three years after passage of the Reserve Forces Bill 

of Rights and Vitalization Act, the chief, Army Reserve was in 

statutory command and control of the Army Reserve. 

Major General William F. Ward, Jr. (left) and Major General Roger W. Sandler show the colors of the 

USARC flag at a change of command ceremony on August 1, 1991, at Fort McPherson, Georgia. 

(Official U.S. Army Photo)
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

45

commander to lieutenant general, and focusing by the Army leadership on such 

core issues as adequate Army Reserve resourcing levels for full-time support, 

equipment, sustainment, personnel, and training.79 

Activation of the Regional Support Commands 

To compensate for the cuts imposed by the Off-Site Agreement, discussed below, the USARC began a study in 1994 to reduce the table of distribution and 

allowance (TDA) overhead to field as many deployable forces as possible. In 

July, the Army Reserve concluded the study. The study recommended a reduction in the TDA command and control structure as the reductions in the 

Selected Reserve continued; improved command and control management, 

competency, and value; and provided for unproblematic access to reserve units 

and personnel during crises. 

In the fall of 1992, the USARC became fully operational.

Shoulder sleeve insignia of the U.S. Army Reserve Command. The double eagle reflects 

the unit motto “Twice the Citizen.” The eagles, 

facing both directions, denote vigilance and a 

wide-ranging scope of ability and experience. 

The colors duplicate those of the flag of the 

United States. This insignia was approved on 

June 24, 1991. (Photo by Timothy L. Hale, U.S. 

Army Reserve Command Public Affairs)

Distinguished unit insignia of the U.S. Army Reserve 

Command (USARC). The tree represents the pursuit 

and preservation of peace through strength, endurance and growth. The crossed swords symbolize the 

dual responsibilities of citizenship and military service. This insignia was formally approved on March 

7, 1991. (Photo by Timothy L. Hale, U.S. Army Reserve 

Command, Public Affairs)
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This review of the Army Reserve’s command and control structure recommended inactivation of the twenty continental United States Army Reserve 

commands (ARCOMs) and activation of ten regional support commands 

(RSCs) and three regional support groups (RSGs). Troop program units were 

not affected, nor were ARCOMs in Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Germany. 

‘“We’re transforming into a new Army Reserve,’” observed Baratz, ‘“not a 

smaller version of the cold war force.’”80 Restructuring achieved the following: 

1. assigned the three RSGs to the three RSCs having the greatest numbers 

of soldiers or largest geographically, broadened missions at the command 

level to support readiness and management; 

2. streamlined pre-mobilization functions; 

3. reduced the USARC’s command and control span from forty-seven direct reporting units to thirty-one; 

4. aligned the RSCs to the ten standard federal regions. 

The RSC’s mission would be command and control of all assigned units and 

providing full service support to all Army Reserve units within their region. 

This reduced the administrative workload for deployable commanders and allowed them to focus on wartime missions. Unit readiness improved by having 

a higher percentage of full-time support soldiers in fewer headquarters. The 

RSC alignment with other federal agencies would improve the Army Reserve’s 

ability to supply military support to civil authorities. Also, this new structure 

would provide federal planning assets to Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) planners and managers at the regional level by establishing 

state and regional emergency preparedness liaison officers at each RSC.81 The 

Figure I-2: Proposed Regional Support Commands
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

47

structure would also allow the Army Reserve to “provide more efficient military support to civilian authorities and federal agencies in support of domestic 

support missions.”82 The ten RSCs would be the 63d, 77th, 88th, 89th, 94th, 

96th, 99th, 121st, 122d, and the 124th. ARCOMs scheduled to become reserve 

support groups were the 90th, 120th, and the 123d. ARCOMS scheduled for 

inactivation included the 79th, 81st, 83d, 86th, 97th, 102d and the 125th.83 Restructuring was set for September 1996.84 

The Base Force

In an effort to reshape the Total Force, there were three major official reexaminations of the U.S. military strategy and the forces requirements. The first 

was the Base Force. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin L. Powell’s Base Force executed the National Military Strategy (NMS) announced 

in 1992, which supported the National 

Security Strategy. According to Powell, 

the National Military Strategy reflected 

the new world order in which global war 

seemed “less likely . . . . Future threats 

to US interests are inherent,” he wrote, 

“in the uncertainty and instability of a 

rapidly changing world. We can meet 

the challenges of the foreseeable future 

with a much smaller force than we have 

had in recent years. Our force for the 

1990s is a Base Force ---- A Total Force 

– A Joint Force - - a carefully tailored 

combination of our active and reserve 

components. This strategy provides the 

rationale for a reduced yet appropriate 

military capability -- a capability which 

will serve the Nation well throughout 

the remainder of the 1990s.”85 This new 

policy changed the focus from a “threat based strategy” to a “capabilities based 

strategy.” The National Military Strategy consisted of a number of military 

strategic concepts: readiness, collective security, arms control, maritime and 

aerospace superiority, strategic agility, power projections, technological superiority and decisive force.86

The Base Force provided a new military strategy and force structure for the 

post-Cold War “while setting a floor for force reductions.”87 This rested on 

General Colin L. Powell
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Figure I-3: Reductions Recommended by the Base Force

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Active Army

Divisions

Reserve

Divisions

Active Army

Manuever

Brigades

Reserve

Manuever

Brigades

18

12 10 6

52

36

55

30

18

12 10 6

52

36

55

30

1990

1990

1990 1990

1995

1995

1995

1995

four foundations: strategic deterrence and defense; forward presence; crisis response; and reconstitution.88 Although the Base Force recognized the need to 

fight multiple major wars, the size of the force would be determined mainly 

by regional needs. Although the Base Force addressed the “full spectrum of 

threat,” there is not much “evidence that substantial involvement in peacekeeping and other peace operations was anticipated during its development.”89 It 

called for the Army to be reduced between 1990 and 1995 from eighteen active 

divisions to twelve and from ten reserve divisions to six. Active Army total 

maneuver brigades would be reduced from fifty-two to thirty-six and from fifty-five to thirty for the reserves.90
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

49

The Audie Murphy, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. 

Army Center of Military History)
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The Bottom-Up Review

The second major force structure review 

was Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s October 1993 Report on the Bottom-Up Review; it shaped defense planning and Army 

policy through fiscal year 1999. Aspin had 

been one of the more vocal opponents of 

the Base Force. The Bottom-Up Review 

resulted from President William J. Clinton’s 

comprehensive review of the armed services 

and American defense strategy. The Bottom-Up Review set the national defense 

to face two theoretical major regional conflicts, postulating near simultaneous contingency operations in Southwest Asia (Persian 

Gulf) and Northwest Asia (Korea) as the 

most likely scenarios.91 ‘“The Cold War is 

behind us. The Soviet Union is no more,’” 

said Aspin. ‘“The threat that drove our defense decision-making for four and a 

half decades - that determined our strategy and 

tactics, doctrine, the size and shape of our forces, the design of our weapons, and the size of 

our defense budgets - is gone.’”92

The Report on the Bottom-Up Review identified 

four dangers to U.S. security in the post-Cold 

War: nuclear weapons and weapons of mass 

destruction; regional threats; dangers to democracy and reform; and economic dangers. 

The Bottom-Up Review sized forces needed 

based on three requirements: major regional 

contingencies, peace enforcement and intervention, and forward presence. The number 

of active Army divisions would go from eighteen in the 1990 force to ten; reserve divisions 

would go from ten to eight. Active total maneuver brigades would go from fifty-two in the 

1990 force to thirty-three; reserve maneuver brigades would go from fifty-five 

to forty-two. Even though the number of divisions in the reserves, including 

cadre divisions, remained the same between the Base Force and the Bottom-Up 

William J. Clinton

Les Aspin
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

51

Review force, the number of reserve maneuver brigades increased by twelve.93

The Bottom-Up Review set the Army Reserve end strength for table of organization and equipment (TOE) units at 152,000. This totaled 208,000 soldiers.94

This new era would require the enhanced readiness of the Army Reserve. “Our 

approach,” stated the Report on the Bottom-Up Review, “is to seek ‘compensating 

leverage’: that is, to use the reserve components to reduce the risks and control the costs of smaller active forces.” Compensating leverage meant “making 

smarter use of the reserve component forces that we have by adapting them to 

new requirements, assigning them missions that properly utilize their strengths, 

and funding them at a level consistent with what will be expected of them if 

we have to use them during a crisis or war.” The roles and mission of the 

reserves must be “explicitly” defined. The Bottom-Up Review acknowledged 

the reserves’ supporting role and their need for early deployment. They would 

“augment and reinforce deployed active forces and backfill for active forces 

deployed to a contingency from other critical regions.” Guard and reserve 

forces would play a role in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian 

assistance operations. Missions would include, among others, strategic airlift, 

service support, and civil affairs. “During prolonged operations, or when active 

forces redeploy during a major regional conflict, reserve forces are available to 

provide a rotational or replacement base.”95

To realize a competent Army total force, the Army National Guard and the 

Army Reserve must adapt, as the Bottom-Up Review explained, “to the new 

defense strategy, improving and accelerating the process of readying combat 

forces for deployment, and utilizing. . . [them] in areas where they have performed effectively and responsively in the past.” The some 700,000 Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers would decline to about 575,000 by 

1999 to realign the force structure supporting the new defense strategy. The 

Bottom-Up Review recognized that combat support and combat service support units in the Army Reserve were capable of deploying rapidly and being 

“integrated effectively into the active force.” Operation DESERT SHIELD/

DESERT STORM proved that. The future “reliance” on combat service and 

combat service support units “will depend on how quickly we can activate them 

in a crisis, as well as on the size of the residual active-duty support forces needed for peacetime missions.” The Bottom-Up Review called for expanding the 

role of the Army Reserve “in key areas to provide additional support for Army 

combat units and other U.S. forces involved in combat operations.”96

The Clinton administration’s defense blueprint challenged the Army leadership to maximize reserve integration with the active Army, especially for major 
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peace operations where the mix of forces may require a high density of human 

intelligence, civil affairs, psychological operations and other support capabilities, which the active component lacked. The shift in military strategy, together 

with major contributions of the reserves during the Gulf War, offered chances 

for further developing the Total Force Policy.97

The Off-Site Agreement 

As a result of the Bottom-Up Review, on 

October 29, 1993, Vice Chief of Staff, Army 

General J.H. Binford Peay III hosted a 

meeting in which the chief, Army National 

Guard; the chief, Army Reserve; senior leaders of the active Army; and representatives 

from concerned reserve professional associations participated. The results became 

known as the Off-Site Agreement, described 

as a “dandy” by then Chief, Army Reserve 

Major General Roger W. Sandler.98 It was 

the first time the three components worked 

together on major restructuring. The OffSite Agreement, a refocusing of the reserve 

missions, helped define the Army Reserve’s 

future role in national defense as an element 

of Force XXI, described below.

The Off-Site Agreement defined reserve end strength. It stabilized and reduced 

the reserve end strength at 575,000: 367,000 for the National Guard by fiscal 

year 1999 and 208,000 by the end of fiscal year 1998 for the Army Reserve. 

The Off-Site Agreement also resulted in the swap of the majority of the Army 

Reserve’s combat units for National Guard combat service support units and 

migration of most of the Army Reserve aviation assets to the National Guard.99 

The Army’s final decision was to shift about 14,000 current Army Reserve positions—mostly in the combat arms and aviation—to the National Guard and 

to move about 10,000 current National Guard positions—in combat support 

and combat service support—to the Army Reserve. Also going to the National 

Guard were more than 4,000 soldier slots in aviation units. Remaining were 

about 2,000 slots in two AH-64 Apache battalions and in a number of fixed wing 

and CH-47 medium lift forces. Secretary of Defense Aspin announced the plan 

on December 10, 1993, as a major restructuring initiative. It was unprecedentGeneral J.H. Binford Peay III
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

53

ed in its scope. In short, the agreement stabilized reserve force structure and 

end strength reductions and led to the National Guard’s focus on combat arms 

and divisional level combat support and combat service support. For the Army 

Reserve it equated to a concentration in combat support and combat service 

support at corps levels and above. This enabled the active Army to sustain higher levels of combat troops and increased reliance on the reserves for support.100

‘”These were not easy negotiations,’” said Sandler. ‘”The units we are getting 

will continue our focus on our core competencies, and are a significant step in 

keeping all the Army Reserve in the war fight.’”101 According to Baratz, ‘”The 

swap, or transfer of specialties between the Guard and Reserve, will give us the 

additional combat service support spaces we need. At the same time, the transfer will straighten out the roles and missions of the Army Reserve and the Army 

National Guard. The Guard will be better equipped to assume its primary 

mission of providing reinforcement to the active Army’s combat units, and the 

Army Reserve will be at a higher state of readiness and will provide most of the 

Contingency Force Pool units [the power projection forces ready to deploy to 

regional crisis spots around the world].’”102

The USARC managed the transfer for the Army Reserve with execution by 

subordinate commands. To effect the transfer, the USARC published Operation Plan 94-1-1, Headquarters U.S. Army Reserve Command Swap/Migration

dated June 29, 1994. The transfer of units began in fiscal year 1994. The 

transfer, to be completed in fiscal year 1996 for all aviation units, was to reduce 

the Army Reserve’s aircraft total fleet from a high of over 650 to 150. The 

National Guard planned to turn over 128 combat support and combat service 

support units (e.g., quartermaster, transportation corps, ordnance, medical, signal and military police) containing 11,062 authorizations to the Army Reserve; 

the Army Reserve would turn over forty-four units with 14,049 authorizations. 

Over 8,000 positions were transferred in fiscal year 1995.103 The Army Reserve 

took these measures essentially to strengthen its core competencies and improve readiness for supporting the power projection force.

The Army Reserve becomes combat support focused.
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Figure I-4: The Big Swap

Army Reserve Swapping Units with the National Guard 1996 

AR Aviation Units 

Reduced 

1994 1996 

The Big Swap!!! 

28 Aviation Units

22 Combat Units

128 Combat Support Units

650

150

Report of the Commission on the Roles & Missions of the 

Armed Forces

The third major review of the military since the end of the Cold War was 

Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles & Missions of the Armed 

Forces, released in May 1995. Largely in disaffection with the Bottom-Up Review, in the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress 

mandated the Commission on Roles & Missions. The central message for the 

Department of Defense from the report was that “in the 21st century, every 

DOD [Department of Defense] element must focus on supporting the operations of the Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs). Everything else DOD 

does . . . should support that effort.” Congress asked the commission to study 

“Reserve Component roles and missions in DOD’s future Total Force.” In essence the commission recommended that the reserves be “size[d] and shape[d] 
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

55

... more consistently with national strategy needs, integrate the Reserve Forces 

better with the Active Duty Forces, improve training and evaluation, and eliminate reserves not needed.”104

The commission recommended “five general principles for sizing, shaping, and 

employing the Total Force to better integrate Reserve Components. . . . First, 

the Total Force should be sized and shaped to meet the military requirements 

of the national security strategy. . . . Maximum reliance on the Reserve forces 

conserves resources for other critical needs and involves the American people 

more broadly with their Armed Forces,” a lesson learned from the Vietnam 

War. Second, a system of “tiered resource allocation” should be adopted by 

the secretary of defense to ensure forces deployed early have “higher priority 

for training resources, personnel, and equipment.” Third, reserve “forces with 

lower priority tasks should be eliminated or reorganized to fill force shortfalls in 

higher priority areas.” The report pointed to the eight National Guard combat 

divisions that were needed to fight the Soviet Union but not required by the 

new National Security Strategy. There was a shortage of 60,000 combat support 

and combat service support personnel to adequately support all services in two 

major regional conflicts. 

As a fourth principle, the armed forces “should ensure that individuals and units 

of the Reserve Components are fully incorporated into all relevant operational 

plans and actually used in the execution of those plans . . . . Reserve Components should participate,” the report continued, “in actual contingency operations commensurate with their training, demonstrated readiness, and availability.” The fifth principle called for more “integration and cooperation” between 

the active and reserve components. “Seamless integration is the key to effective 

Reserve support of the Total Force.” The report called for training reserve units 

“to perform specific tasks to the same standards as the Active component units, 

though they might not train to the same spectrum of tasks.” The report advised 

that all reserve units in the U.S. be “assigned in peacetime to the unified command responsible for the joint training and integration of U.S.-based forces. . . .” 

To promote active/reserve integration the report recognized avenues such as 

“joint training, common management information systems, personnel exchanges 

for professional development and experience, and making duty with the Reserve 

Component career-enhancing for active duty members of all Services.” “[W]

here significant uncertainties or differences of opinion exist,” the report recommended “that DOD establish a series of tests, experiments, and pilot programs 

to determine whether Reserve Component units can perform to standards and 

whether different organizational and training arrangements would be more effective.” 105 The report recognized increased reliance on the reserves. 
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An Army of One, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. 

Army Center of Military History)
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

57

Reshaping the Army 

The Army had begun to 

reshape itself to fit the new 

strategic environment and 

had begun to transition 

from a Cold War forward 

deployed Army, prepared to 

fight the Warsaw Pact, to a 

force projection Army based 

in the United States with 

the ability to reconstitute 

(mobilize, train, and equip) 

additional forces. These 

new developments escalated 

the development of the Army’s AirLand Battle-Future 

concept during fiscal year 

1990 and 1991. There was a 

shift in AirLand Battle concepts from high-intensity to 

low-intensity conflicts. This 

meant a change from “linear,” or a broad front line, 

to “nonlinear” or asymmetrical combat operations of 

highly mobile and self-contained forces. “The corps 

would remain the centerpiece of Army doctrine, but 

divisions would be lighter 

and employ combined arms 

brigades and a simplified 

logistics system.”106 
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Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan tried to redesign the Army with 

Force XXI. Force XXI was the Army’s all-inclusive line of attack to transform 

an industrial age Army to an information age 

Army. Digital battle command in the Army 

was now the focus. The Gulf War had shown 

the need to quicken the tempo of information 

sharing on the battlefield. Propagating electronic maps and graphics, for instance, would 

speed up planning and decision making.107

Technological breakthroughs suggested what 

some termed a revolution in military affairs 

driven by the microchip.108 Force XXI meant 

an adaptable Army with new capabilities for 

the 21st century, termed Army XXI. Army 

XXI was the intermediate step to the Army 

After Next discussed below. 

Force XXI redesigned a smaller, more lethal 

and versatile 21st century Army with quality soldiers, flexible doctrine, tailorability and 

modularity, joint and multinational connectivity, versatility, and shared situational awareness. It called for key changes 

in philosophy, theory, materiel, and organization.109 Force XXI “served as the 

Army’s vehicle for modernization” throughout the 1990s.110 As General Sullivan explained, Force XXI “will be capable of achieving success - decisive victory 

- across a very broad spectrum of operations. Force XXI stretches from factory 

to foxhole, reflecting a focus on the battlefield at every level. Force XXI is about 

the integration of information-age technology across the entire force. Force 

XXI is about the seamless employment of active and reserve components’ capabilities.” General Sullivan’s Louisiana Maneuvers with its linked digital battle 

labs dependent on digital technology provided the “mechanization for synchronizing . . . [these] efforts.”111 The lighter, high technology-based Force XXI was 

a significant change from the heavier Gulf War Army of Excellence.112

The Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) Task Force took its name from the General 

Headquarters Maneuvers of 1941 directed by Chief of Staff General George 

C. Marshall to evaluate readiness concerns in 1940 and 1941, preceding World 

War II. Launched in 1992, the LAM Task Force was the Army’s process for 

determining how it wanted to be organized, equipped and trained for the remainder of the 1990s and into the next century. It resulted in a combination 

of battle labs able to test “adjustments to organization, doctrine, and weaponry 

using the latest techniques for simulation and modeling.”113

General Gordon R. Sullivan
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

59

General Sullivan cautioned that in an effort to reshape the Army it should not 

be torn apart. “The Army of today-America’s Army-did not just spring into 

being,” he told a gathering in 1992 of the Reserve Officers Association. “It is 

the product of over 20 years of hard work, sweat, and sometimes blood . . . .” 

The “challenge” he said was “to shape a new and even better Army that firmly 

retains the essence of what we are all about as soldiers.” His vision: “The Army 

of the future must be a Total Force, trained and ready to fight; serving America 

at home and abroad; it must be a strategic force capable of decisive victory.” 114

Contingency Force Pool

As the Army leadership followed the fundamental shifts in world politics and 

strategy throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s and developed a National 

Military Strategy linked to the National Security Strategy, there emerged General Sullivan’s six imperatives to transform the service into an organization capable of executing his vision: “The Army of the future must be a Total Force, 

trained and ready to fight; serving America at home and abroad; it must be a 

strategic force capable of decisive victory.” His six imperatives taken generally 

from General Vuono’s vision were: “quality soldiers; a war winning doctrine; 

tough, realistic training; continuous modernization; proper force mix; and leader development.”115

While implementing the six imperatives, the chief, Army Reserve made the 

readiness of Army Reserve units in the contingency force pool (CFP) the top 

priority. The CFP remained an evolving concept in 1993, incorporating the 

lessons of the Gulf War, the deep reductions in defense spending, and the realities of the post-Cold War era.116 “The CFP,” as Baratz explained, “is the power 

projection force that will deploy from the United States when called to regional 

crisis spots around the world.”117 The Army implemented the CFP concept for 

support units needed early in major contingency operations, recognizing the 

significance of support forces and the “severe constraint on resources for training.”118 CFP units received priority equipment and resources while non-CFP 

units were maintained at a reduced state of readiness.119 The CFP concept was 

a group of both active and reserve forces which provided highly ready combat 

support and combat service support units at the echelons above division and 

corps levels. These units could deploy with the active duty corps and divisions 

they supported and sustain these corps and divisions while in the theater. Army 

planners expected the CFP to consist of 59 percent active troops, 22 percent 

National Guard and 19 percent Army Reserve units. 120 The CFP gave the Army 

the capability of world-wide deployment of up to two corps headquarters and 

eight and two-thirds active divisions from CONUS bases. At the close of 1992, 
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plans for the Army Reserve 

envisioned four force packages 

for supporting contingencies. 

Package I would support two 

divisions and a corps element. 

Package II would support 

units reinforcing the division 

and corps base. Package III 

would support the remainder of the corps and the lead 

theater elements. Package IV 

would support the remaining 

theater elements.121

By 1995, there were some 475 

units in the CFP. The USARC 

managed all CONUS CFP 

units, except for Army Reserve 

Civil Affairs and Psychological 

Operations units, managed by 

the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. As a result 

of their priority management, 

the CFP units in 1995 received 

115 percent full-time support and 100 percent equipping and priority for training, 

maintenance, force modernization, and recruiting. The 

program had increased readiness levels by 28 percent since 

October 1992. The biggest 

advantage the Army Reserve 

brought to the CFP was cost 

savings. The Army Reserve 

could provide the capability 

the CFP needed at one third 

of the cost of fielding a similar 

active duty unit.122 “The Army 
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

61

General Gordon R. Sullivan, Sergeant Gene Snyder. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army 

Center of Military History)
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Reserve’s CFP units,” Baratz stated, “will remain our first priority for readiness 

until we can be assured that they are at the readiness level that they need to be 

for whatever contingency the Army must meet.”123

“The CFP units,” explained Baratz, “were the centerpiece of the Army Reserve’s tiered readiness and tiered readiness concepts.”124 Tiered readiness 

was the overall concept for prioritizing and managing the resourcing of Army 

Reserve units, including those in the CFP. Based on the deployment dates required to support regional operations, the Army Reserve classified its units into 

four tiers for funding, equipment, training, and recruiting in descending order 

from tier one through four. Tier 1 included Crisis Response Force units, CFP 

packages I through IV units with a latest arrival date of fourteen days or less and 

the force projection platform (ports and installations) to deploy them. Tier 2 

included CFP packages V through VII, Early Response Force units with a latest 

arrival date of more than fourteen days but less than thirty-one days, and diviCFP Concept in 1993

59% 

Active 

Troops 

19% 

Army Reserve 

22% 

National Guard 

By 1995, there were 475 units in the CFP.

Figure I-5: Contingency Force Pool Concept
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

63

Taking the Point, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. 

Army Center of Military History) 
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sions (exercise). Tier 3 included U.S. Army Reserve Forces 

Schools, regional training sites, 

area maintenance support activities, equipment concentration 

sites, and the remaining units 

in the Department of the Army 

Master Priority List (DAMPL) 

sequence. Tier 4 included inactivating units. As a result, the 

early deploying units received a 

greater share of training dollars 

and resources.125 By the end of 

fiscal year 1994, the 209 Army 

Reserve CFP units in tier 1 

were authorized to receive 100 

percent of their requirements in 

force structure program money. 

Two hundred sixty-nine units 

in tier 2 were authorized to receive 72 percent.126

Priority Reserve 

in Mobilization 

Enhancement

The tiered resourcing concept 

supported the Army Reserve 

Priority Reserve in Mobilization Enhancement (PRIME) 

project introduced in 1993. 

This “deployability enhancement program,” was mainly 

“used to provide mission-capable troop program units (TPU) 

and individual volunteers for 

short-notice Army contingen-
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

65

Hot Wash, Master Sergeant Sieger Hartgers. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army 

Center of Military History) 
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cies.”127 It increased the readiness levels of CFP units. OCAR managed PRIME 

through the USARC for CFP units and through the U.S. Special Operations 

Command for Army special operations forces, civil affairs, and psychological 

operations units.128 “During fiscal year 1993, the readiness levels of TPUs managed by PRIME increased by 20 percent. In addition, during the fiscal year, the 

Army enhanced flexibility in manning fully mission-capable units by targeting 

MOSs in the CFP for filling by the IRR. ARPERCEN developed a program 

for the IRR to identify members as replacements or fillers to support contingency operations.”129

Personnel Strength 

The war had been won; Hussein was kept in check by a continued NATO 

presence. The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The 

new world order called for the Army and the Army Reserve with its medical, logistics, finance, military police, and civil affairs units to take active 

roles in domestic support, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and nation building aimed at supporting rising democracies and political reform efforts.130

The American people and Congress expected a “peace dividend.” What did 

that mean for the Army and Army Reserve? In short, it meant a drawdown. 

In fact, the drawdown had begun in fiscal 

year 1989. In June 1990, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney had submitted a 

plan to Congress outlining a 25 percent decrease in the size of the armed services during 

the next five years. The plan provided for 

a reduction of the active Army from eighteen divisions to a base force of fourteen divisions by 1995 and reductions in active Army 

personnel strength from 770,000 to 520,000. President Bush supported 

the cuts in a speech to the Aspen Institute Symposium on August 2, 1990. 

But, he warned that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that same day accentuatRichard B. Cheney

Between fiscal year 1990 and fiscal 

year 1992, the Army budget authority 

fell over 14 percent.
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

67

Figure I-6: Reductions in Active Army Strength

0

100000

200000

300000

400000

500000

600000

700000

800000

October

1990

765,287

706,160

572,000

October

1993

September

1991
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Rock Drill, Master Sergeant Sieger Hartgers. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army 

Center of Military History)
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

69

ed the fact that the world was still 

far from safe. He wanted the reductions to be “acompanied by a 

careful and orderly restructuring of 

America’s armed forces.”131

In October 1990, active Army 

strength was 765,287. By September 1991, it had dropped to 

706,160.132 By September 1993, 

over two-thirds of the drawdown 

had been accomplished. By October 1993, there were 572,000 active duty officers, enlisted soldiers 

and U.S. Military Academy cadets. 

This was a drop of 38,000 during 

the year and almost 200,000 since 

the drawdown began. Expectations called for a continuing 

decline through 1997. The Department of Defense reported its 

lowest share of federal outlays in 

fifty years.133 The “peace dividend” 

was realized. 

In 1993, Army Reserve end 

strength for the Selected Reserve was 279,615 personnel 

and 599,965 for the Retired Reserve. The Selected Reserve end 

strength continued to fall in 1994. 

“Peace Dividend”: 1997 

lowest expenditure for 

defense in 50 years.
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Securing the Firing Line, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, 

U.S. Army Center of Military History)
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

71

The overall decrease from strength in 1990 to 1994 was 13 percent across the 

reserve component. For the Army Reserve, the authorized Selected Reserve 

end strength of 321,700 for 1990 fell to 260,000 for 1994, a 19 percent decline. 

Assigned end strength for 1994 stood at 259,856. The authorized end strength 

for 1995 was 242,000. Each of the reserve components experienced shortages 

of 10 percent or more in a range of officer, warrant officer, and enlisted skills 

affecting readiness. Except for the Marine Corps Reserve and the Coast Guard 

Reserve, each of the reserve components reported noteworthy shortages of flag 

and general officer positions.134 

Figure I-7: U.S. Army Reserve Total Strength. September 30, 1990

Total: 1,646,376

Ready Reserve 

594,319 

36% 

Retirees

471,723

29%

Troop Program 

Unit 282,200 

17% 

Individual 

Ready 

Reserve 

284,427 

17% 

Army Guard Reserve

13,707

>1%

Table I-2: U.S. Army Reserve Total Strength. September 30, 1990

Source: Army Reserve Magazine, First Issue of 1992

Ready Reserve 594,319 36%

Troop Program Unit 282,200 17%

Army Guard Reserve 13,707 1%

Individual Ready Reserve 284,427 17%

Retirees 471,723 29%

Total 1,646,376 

Figure 7: U.S. Army Reserve Total Strength. September 30, 1990 

Ready Reserve 

36% 

Retirees

29%

Troop Program 

Unit 

17% 

Individual 

Ready 

Reserve 

17% 

Army Guard/Reserve

1%
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Army Reserve enlisted paid drill end strength saw a 9,500 person reduction 

between 1990 and 1991. This reduction met the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 

Balanced Budget Emergency Deficit Control Act reduction goals. Most of the 

cuts were accomplished through personnel attrition and selectively managing 

recruiting.135 Still in 1990, the Army Reserve achieved its Selected Reserve end 

strength objectives for officer and enlisted soldiers through intensive recruiting 

and loss management. Congress authorized a 1993 Army Reserve end strength 

of 279,600, a drop of 23,300 from 1992. Most of the decline came in soldiers assigned to Army Reserve troop program units, a cut of some 22,000. There was 

a correlating structure cut. Plans had called for cuts by reducing accessions instead of increasing losses. But, the inactivation of significant numbers of TPU 

units made involuntary separations inescapable. The fiscal year 1990/1991 

Army Reserve end strength funding limitations resulted in decreased assignments to the Selected Reserve and increased assignments to the IRR.136

The IRR’s size, with no “mandated maximum end strength,” depended on the 

number of soldiers who left the active Army. Consequently, it grew “dramatiFigure I-8: Individual Ready Reserve Strength, 1991-1994

Source: Annual Report, Reserve Forces Policy Board, FY 1994; 1991 Annual Report,

U.S. Army Reserve; U.S. Army Center of Military History

Individual Ready Reserve Strength

1991-1994

595,501

1991

743,004

1992

784,210

1993

783,514

1994
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

73

cally” after 1990. The “overall increase” from 1990 to 1994 was 64.2 percent. 

At the close of 1994, the “IRR was a robust part of the Army Reserve, larger 

than it had been since 1973 and much healthier than it had been in the late 

1970s when it bottomed out at less than 200,000.”137

Like the IRR, the IMA program was strong between 1991 and 1994 as depicted in Table I-3 above.138 In 1994, 967 IMAs drilled for pay. However, most 

(12,042) were in a non-drilling category. 139

There were also decreases in the crucial full-time support program, especially for the Army Reserve and National Guard. In 1991, the Army Reserve’s 

full-time support end strength was 7.7 percent of the 

force, the lowest of any of the reserve components. 

“For FY [fiscal year] 1992, the “Army Reserve had a 

71 percent fill rate for its authorized full-time positions.” The National Guard’s full-time support stood 

at 70 percent. But, the Army Reserve “lagged far behind the [National Guard] in the ratio of Selected 

Reserve members to FTS [full-time support].”140

The trend continued for 1993. In fact, the Army 

Reserve’s “percentage of fill of authorized FTS [fulltime support] positions had dropped to 63 percent 

while its ratio of Selected Reserve strength to FTS 

had risen slightly to 13.6:1.”141 Full-time support 

manpower assigned to the Army Reserve dropped 

from 23,128 to 20,595. For 1994, “the Clinton administration proposed to cut 

the Army’s reserve components civilian technician strength by 4,000 and the 

full-time support for the other reserve components by 6,000.”142 As for civilian 

personnel strength, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry “ordered an acrossthe-board reduction . . . of 4 percent by the year 2001.” For 1994, “the ratio 

of Selected Reserve to full-time support improved slightly to 12.8:1 due to a 

William J. Perry

Table I-3: Army Reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentees, 1992-1994

Source: Annual Report, Reserve Forces Policy Board, FY 92, FY 93, FY 94

Offi cer

Budgeted/

Authorized

Offi cer 

Assigned

Enlisted 

Budgeted/

Authorized

Enlisted 

Assigned

1992 10,597 10,597 3,203 3,203

1993 13,000 10,155 4,645 2,913

1994 9,738 10,039 3,262 2,970
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decline in Army Reserve manpower. “The actual number of FTS personnel 

declined by 213 to 20,382.”143 

For reenlistment, the “rates for first term Army Reservists increased slightly 

from FY 1991 to FY 1992, rising from 84 percent to 88 percent.”144 This was 

higher than the “pre-Desert Storm rate of 60 percent in FY 1988, but Army 

Reserve retention rates did not remain this high.” First term enlisted retention 

rates varied between 1991 and 1994.146 

With the assistance from Congress on issues such as incentive programs and 

education benefits, the Army Reserve continued to attract and retain quality 

soldiers. Among the programs were the Selected Reserve Incentive Program 

(SRIP) and the Montgomery GI Bill. Through SRIP, incentives were used to 

support early deploying units, to maintain critical shortage skills, and to retain 

soldiers needed to meet readiness goals. At the end of 1990, 87,715 soldiers 

were eligible for benefits under the Montgomery GI Bill. Of that total, 58 perFigure I-9: First Term Enlisted Retention Rates, 1991-1994

Source: James Currie and Richard Crossland, Twice the Citizen: A History of the Army

Reserve, 1908-1995

60

1991

84%

1992

88%

1993

78%

1994

74%

80

100

% First Term Enlisted Retention Rates
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cent were using the program’s benefits.147 During 1992, the Army Reserve enrolled 71.2 percent (68,533) of 96,316 eligible soldiers. In 1993, the enrollment 

rate stood at 80 percent with 78,156 of the 97,400 participating. Save for the 

Marine Corps Reserve, the Army Reserve’s enrollment rate was “significantly 

higher than that of the other reserve components. . . .”148

Fiscal Strength

In 1992, the Army Reserve and National Guard formed 55 percent of the Total 

Army. However, they had only 13.8 percent (Army Reserve 4.5 and National 

Guard 9.3) of Total Army funding.149 The National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 1994 continued the downward trend in the Department of Defense budget. Indeed, the Army’s budget declined from $77.7 billion in 1990 

to $63.5 billion in 1994.150 In fact, from 1989 to 1993 the Army lost over a 

third of its effective budget. Its piece of the Department of Defense budget 

was around 26 percent throughout most of the 1990s.151 The Army Reserve 

Figure I-10: Percentage Distribution of Total Obligation Authority, 1994

Active Army

81%

% Distribution of Funds

Total Army Funds 1994: $63.5 Billion

Army

Reserve

National 7%

Guard

12%
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Knucklebusters, Sergeant Gene Snyder. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of 

Military History) 
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represented 7 percent of the total obligation authority for the Department of 

the Army. This compared to 12 percent 

for the National Guard and 81 percent 

for the active Army. Army Reserve personnel appropriations fell by 2 percent 

in 1991. On a positive note, in that same 

time frame, operation and maintenance 

funding increased from $810.8 million 

in 1989 to $935.8 million in 1991 for 

a 7 percent increase. The Army Reserve experienced a 16 percent increase 

in military construction. In 1994, the 

National Guard and Army Reserve saw 

a shortfall in operation and maintenance 

funding, logistics support, air operating 

tempo, and school travel funds. During 

1990, full-time support requirements 

were funded at over 90 percent in all reserve components, except for the Army 

Reserve and National Guard. The fulltime support requirement for the National Guard was funded at 73 percent; 

56 percent for the Army Reserve.152

Force Structure 

As of September 1990, 44 percent of 

the Total Army’s combat service support 

came from the Army Reserve; 26 percent 

of the combat support and 8 percent of 

the combat forces. The Army Reserve 
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constituted 32 percent of Total Army soldiers.153 One of those combat units was 

the 205th Infantry Brigade.

By the end of 1994, the Army Reserve had more than forty-seven major commands and two direct supporting units. There were twenty-one ARCOMs, seven divisions (institutional training), (discussed below), five divisions (exercise) 

(discussed below), one corps support command, three theater Army area commands, three engineer commands, one military police command, two transportation commands, one signal command, one infantry brigade, and one medical 

command. Additionally, fifty-six units with 8,400 force structure spaces were 

inactivated. A total of 2,400 spaces were activated. Seven hundred were conversions, updates, and reorganizations.154 

BOLD SHIFT 

One of General Sullivan’s four strategies forming part of his vision was strengthening the Total Force. “One example of this strategy,” he said, “is BOLD SHIFT. 

Figure I-11: Total Army force Structure, September 30, 1990
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Our Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM experience was a great 

success, but it was also a learning experience. I believe,” he continued, “it is 

essential for us to capitalize on that experience to improve the readiness of the 

reserve component.”155 Referring to the activation of the U.S. Army Reserve 

Command and the Independent Commission’s study, he stated, “Regardless of 

what the study ultimately recommends, the underlying purpose is to produce 

higher levels of training and readiness and that is a positive step.” 156 

In 1991, FORSCOM implemented BOLD SHIFT to improve reserve readiness in response to lessons learned during Operation DESERT SHIELD/

DESERT STORM. The Army expected most reserve units to be ready for 

rapid deployment after a short and rigorous training session. However, many 

units lacked leaders with appropriate technical skills. Pre-mobilization training frequently did not ready a unit to fulfill its mission. Most units performed 

well in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, but preparedness was a problem. This congressionally mandated initiative supported the 

One Team-One Standard concept.157 Explaining the ‘“overriding reason’’’ for 

The 205th Infantry Brigade, 6th Infantry Division (Roundout) soldiers practice “helocasting” in 

1990 at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. The 6th Infantry Division (Roundout) and the 205th Infantry Brigade were based out of Fort Snelling, Minnesota. The 6th Infantry Division (Roundout) consisted 

of the 205th Infantry Brigade along with artillery, medical, and support units. If called up it would 

support the 6th Infantry Division in Alaska. (Courtesy Lieutenant Colonel Randall Miller, 88th 

Regional Support Command) 
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BOLD SHIFT, General Burba commented, ‘“we are indeed going into a new 

war-fighting era, a contingency era and that’s going to require faster deployability-entire readiness for everybody, active and reserve components. That 

coupled with. . . budget deficits, which are going to require the reserve components to play a more important role in the defense strategy in the future. So two 

things. A more important role in . . . future strategy and an increased readiness 

and deployability right along with the AC. That’s the Bold Shift initiative.’” 158

It assigned active Army advisors to Army Reserve and National Guard brigades 

to correct the pre-and post-mobilization training problems. It involved streamlining Army Reserve, National Guard, and FORSCOM command schemes. 

Under BOLD SHIFT, active Army units developed associations with CFP 

units and assisted with reserve training and evaluations. The concentration for 

maneuver unit training was on gunnery and crew/platoon proficiency. Combat 

support and combat service support units focused on proficiency at the company level.159

BOLD SHIFT consisted of seven interrelated training and readiness programs 

which:

1. considered the demographics and proximity of schools and training areas 

for units; 

2. set up operational readiness evaluations (OREs), used by the active Army 

to examine a unit’s wartime performance of its wartime missions more 

comprehensively than monthly training drills; 

3. improved training for military occupational specialties; 

4. established accomplisher levels of pre-mobilization collective training for 

support units; 

5. improved skills of reserve unit leaders by following the qualification 

requirements of the officer and NCO educational system; 

6. emphasized training with wartime chains of command, thereby re-identifying CAPSTONE; 

7. enhanced support of reserve training and readiness requirements. 160

“We are indeed going into a new war-fighting era, a contingency era 

and that’s going to require faster deployability-entire readiness for everybody, active and reserve components.” General Edwin Burba
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The ORE assessed training and readiness in two phases. During phase one, 

evaluators determined the unit’s compliance with existing policy and guidance 

in personnel qualifications, supply management, maintenance, and security. In 

phase two, the unit demonstrated its pre-mobilization and pre-deployment 

readiness through realistic and intensive training. Evaluation teams composed 

of Continental United States Army (CONUSA) officers and noncommissioned 

officers from the active Army, the National Guard, and the Army Reserve administered the OREs.161 

During the first year of BOLD SHIFT, 291 company-size units participated; 

Total Army ORE teams from Army headquarters in CONUS evaluated almost 

fifty units. During the year, Congress increased the number of active Army 

trainers.162 Excepting full-time support, the ORE was the second most important element for improving readiness. In 1993, the Army expanded BOLD 

SHIFT to include all roundout, roundup, and CFP units. In 1994, BOLD 

SHIFT involved units from every major Army Reserve command.163 In short, 

BOLD SHIFT was designed to ‘“maintain the war-fighting edge of active and 

Reserve units and strengthen Total Army cohesion.’”164

Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement Training 

Support System

Closely related to BOLD SHIFT was FORSCOM’s Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement (GFRE) training support system. Picking up where BOLD 

SHIFT left off, the GFRE assisted commanders in measuring gunnery, lane 

training, command and staff training, as well as operational and unit readiness. 

The GFRE organizational structure was programmed to be fully operational 

by 1998, following a three year transition period (1995-1997), at which time it 

would assume the collective training mission for all reserve modified table of 

organization and equipment (MTOE) units. It evaluated unit capability and 

then assisted the unit in training to standard, which included training support 

from the five newly created Army Reserve divisions (exercise). The GFRE provided active and reserve TDA units that significantly improved pre-mobilization training and post-mobilization collective training.165

Other Training Developments 

In 1989, the Army introduced a comprehensive reserve training strategy following a study by the Reserve Components Training Strategy Task Force. The dep-
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OPFOR, Sergeant Jeffrey Manuszak. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of 

Military History)
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uty commanding generals of FORSCOM 

and the Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC) co-chaired the task force. 

The training strategy established a reserve 

goal, supported by major objectives, to improve reserve training. Strategy objectives 

were based on five dimensions of training: 

soldier, leader, collective, support, and 

management. The training strategy focused on task proficiency at battalion level 

and below. Reserve training strategy enabled commanders to develop and execute 

training plans designed to meet specific 

measurable objectives. The Reserve Components Training Development Action 

Plan, approved by the Army chief of staff, 

executed the reserve training strategy. It 

provided the Army with a single strategy 

to improve reserve training and mobilization readiness. Lessons learned from 

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT 

STORM supported the view that pre-mobilization training was crucial to minimizing post-mobilization training time.

The action plan detailed over thirty issues 

inhibiting effective training, the conditions required to resolve them, and the 

milestones for these actions. The action 

plan pulled together all reserve training 

initiatives into a balanced, comprehensive effort. It balanced requirements and 

resources, set priorities for programming 

and budgeting, and focused training development efforts for attainable goals. In 
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1991, the focus was on improving MOS qualification levels, leader development, and enhancing TPU inactive duty training. The action plan balanced 

requirements and resources, set priorities for programming and budgeting, and 

concentrated training development efforts toward achieving clearly defined, 

reachable goals. In the face of funding decrements in 1990 and 1991, resourcing of baseline programs supporting the action plan remained a high priority. 

In 1990 and 1991, some enhancement funds supported the Noncommissioned 

Officer Education System (NCOES), MOS qualification training, and officer 

basic course requirements. In 1992, the action plan funded BOLD SHIFT 

initiatives.166

Over time, the active Army, Army Reserve and National Guard developed extensive, independent school systems which were hard to manage. These separate school systems gradually developed separate standards and provided inconsistent quality of training. Due to these problems and total force downsizing, 

it was no longer efficient or economical to operate three school systems within 

the Army. In response, Army Chief of Staff General Sullivan established in 

1992 the Future Army Schools-Twenty-one (FAST) initiative under TRADOC 

to create a 21st century Total Army School System (TASS) offering cohesive 

and efficient institutional training that met standards with less resources. TASS 

objectives included: 

A former member of the 101st Airborne Division (airmobile), now an IRR member 

of the Army Reserve, instructs other IRR soldiers on the fine points of the LAW 

anti-tank weapon, 1991. (Photo by Staff Sergeant Terry Snead) 
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1. establishing a tri-component partnership between the three components; 

2. developing efficient use of facilities, 

equipment, personnel and time; 

3. establishing one standard for all soldiers and institutions;

4. allowing any soldier to attend any 

school; 

5. functionally aligning facilities and schools 

to institutional training proponents; 

6. fully integrating a catalog-based system 

using Structure Manning Decision Review and Army Training Requirements 

and Resources System processes; 

7. developing the Total Army training system courses; 

8. gaining active component support of reserve component (Title XI); 

9. leveraging the reserve component to assist with initial entry training 

mission execution; 

10. making TRADOC the responsible agent for institutional training.167

According to Mr. John Hargraves, a senior Army Reserve training officer, it was 

TRADOC’s attempt to “integrate all the Army’s disparate schoolhouses.” 168 

TRADOC Commanding General Frederick W. Franks, Jr. issued this guidance: 

‘“America’s Army needs a cohesive institutional training system that leverages available resources and investments currently in the Total Army School 

System. We need a Post Cold War Total Army School System across components. As we reduce the size of components, we must also reduce our institutional training investments.’” The goal was: ‘“A future Army school 

system which leverages AC/RC infrastructure for efficient institutional training that promotes institutional accreditation, instructor certification, standards, regional efficiencies, and sustains relevance and excellence in training and 

leader development.’”169

On August 26, 1992, Task Force FAST closed its initial data gathering phase 

with a briefing to General Sullivan. His guidance was: ‘“TRADOC will lead, 

with support of FORSCOM, NGB [National Guard Bureau], and OCAR, the 

effort to establish a first-rate cohesive and efficient Total Army School System of fully accredited and integrated AC, ARNG, and USAR schools capable of providing standardized individual training and education for the 

Total Army.’”170

General Frederick W. Franks, Jr.
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Laying an obstacle course, Sergeant Gene Snyder. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army 

Center of Military History)
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In late 1992, General Sullivan tasked the deputy chief of 

staff, operations (DCSOPS) to 

conduct a close-hold study of 

the Army’s training structure. 

DCSOPS formed the Total 

Army Training Study (TATS) 

working group and directed it 

to study training support requirements, develop a concept 

to improve the efficiency and 

effectiveness of existing collective and individual training 

support structure, and identify 

additional structure needed to 

satisfy requirements. Its goal 

was to create a system that 

trained all soldiers to the same 

standard and basically in the 

same tasks and to do so with 

fewer resources. FORSCOM 

would be responsible for 

unit and collective training 

and TRADOC would be responsible for institutional 

training. FORSCOM was 

to continue its NCO Academies. The resulting TATS 

Concept Plan submitted by 

TRADOC, initially assigned 

FAST-structured U.S. Army 

Reserve Schools (then operating as troop program 

units and primarily located 
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in ARCOMs) to Army Reserve training divisions. It incorporated FAST principles such 

as the Army Reserve assuming responsibility for managing training in officer development courses and combat support, combat 

service support, and health services courses 

in each FAST region. The National Guard 

was to assume responsibility for leadership

courses and combat arms courses in each region. The Army Reserve maintained four 

regional NCO academies while the National Guard maintained academies within seven existing State Military Academy Advisory 

Council regions. Each NCO Academy managed common core NCOES training within 

the region and could use instructors from the 

other component as required. Command and 

control remained with the component. Coordinating authority was exercised by the component with overall responsibility for leadership 

training within the region. Nine Army Reserve 

training divisions were maintained. Army Reserve initial entry training (IET) divisions were 

to change from production every third year to 

every year with no additional resources from the 

Department of the Army and increased capability from 4.5 thousand to 7.4 thousand graduates a year. Title XI soldiers provided active 

component training support to the reserves.171

Title XI was a congressionally-mandated program to provide active component support to 

the reserves for training and education in an effort to increase readiness and effectiveness. 

On December 16, 1992, Task Force FAST again 

briefed General Sullivan. He thought FAST 

was on the right track. He approved three recommendations: an immediate moratorium on 

the creation of new training institutions and 
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Buddy Assist, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. 

Army Center of Military History)
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courses; effective January 1, 1993, TRADOC was the sole accrediting authority 

for institutions conducting training for which TRADOC was the proponent; 

and beginning January 1993, Task Force FAST established and began testing a 

prototype Total Army School System (TASS) model.172

Task Force FAST established the prototype in TASS Region C, which included 

Georgia, South Carolina, Florida, North Carolina, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. 

Virgin Islands. Its purpose was to test the Task Force FAST TASS concept. 

Task Force FAST, itself, had been institutionalized into the Total Army School 

System Coordinating Activity (TASSCA) at Fort Monroe, Virginia. A regional 

coordinating element was in place at Leesburg Training Site, near Fort Jackson, 

South Carolina. Its job was to use the existing facilities and manpower within 

Region C and begin initial operations.173 TRADOC had overall responsibility 

for the TASS.174

 “The prototype sought to improve efficiency by organizing training on a regional basis and by changing schools’ missions from multi-functional (providing a variety of training courses) to specialized (limiting training to selected 

Figure I-12: Total Army School System
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courses). The prototype also aimed to lay a foundation for a longer term goalto establish a cohesive and efficient Total Army School System (TASS) “that 

would be more efficient and integrated” across the three components.175 On 

April 22, 1993, General Sullivan approved the Total Army Training Study for 

further development. The aim of the study was to develop an integrated Total 

Army Training Concept. The TRADOC piece was to examine institutional 

training. FAST was the TRADOC representative. Recommendations were: 

1. combine the reserve training divisions and reserve training institutions; 

2. designate TRADOC to be responsible for all institutional training; 

3. incorporate the Total Army Training Study into FAST; 

4. continue the initial entry training mission; and align the nine reserve 

training divisions (70th, 76th, 85th, 95th, 98th 100th, 102d, 104th, 108th) 

with the nine proposed FAST regions.176

On September 29, 1993, Task Force FAST updated General Sullivan. He was 

satisfied with FAST initiatives including Reserve Component Training Institutions (RCTIs) evaluation, evaluator certification, instructor certification, 

bringing all components onto the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS), resolving the divergent various training regulations, and 

tri-component cooperation.177

The resulting concept plans of the Total Army Training Strategy were the origin 

of the Army Reserve’s divisions (institutional training) (DIVITs) and divisions 

(exercise) (DIVEXs). In 1993, the USARC staff finalized organizational design 

for the exercise divisions. The concept for the training units originated from 

the lessons learned from Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM 

and the demands for a reduced force structure. The exercise divisions (75th, 

85th, 78th, 87th, 91st) consolidated and reorganized the existing two maneuver area training commands, nine maneuver training commands, three training 

divisions, and the existing battle projection centers into five exercise divisions. 

These divisions provided training support for company through brigade-sized 

forces, as well as squad and platoon-level lanes training. The exercise divisions’ reorganization process began in October 1993 with an effective date for 

full mission execution set for October 1, 1994. Plans called for augmenting 

the size of each of the five exercise divisions from 5,177 to 12,761 personnel. 

Also, six regional training brigades were created.178 These divisions assisted in 

training Army Reserve and National Guard combat support and combat service 

support units to include signal, military police, chemical, and engineers during 

peacetime training. During mobilizations, they helped active Army readiness 

groups with unit validation.179 In 1994, soldiers from the 75th and 87th Exercise Divisions participated in ATLANTIC RESOLVE, a JCS exercise whose 
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OPFOR, Sergeant Gene Snyder. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of 

Military History)
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goal was demonstrating the United States’ 

capabilities to establish a multi-national joint 

task force and rapidly project United States 

and allied forces into a regional crisis. The 

75th deployed twenty soldiers to Germany 

to support exercise simulation center operations. The 87th deployed sixty soldiers to 

Germany to support the simulation center as 

opposing forces (OPOR).180 

TASS provided for the realignment and assignment of Army Reserve training institutions within CONUS. The nine training divisions were transformed into nine DIVITs. 

In October 1994, a two-year test of the institutional training division concept began in 

the TASS Region C. In 1995, through an internal reorganization, the nine DIVITs were 

restructured to seven and aligned with TRADOC’s seven regional school systems. Army 

Reserve school brigades also were established. The seven geographically organized 

DIVITs (95th, 98th, 80th, 84th, 108th, 100th, 

104th) consolidated the U.S. Army Reserve 

Forces Schools (which collapsed into a number of brigades within the DIVITs), the Regional Training Sites-Maintenance, and Regional Training Sites-Intelligence to provide 

individual training within one organization, 

thereby reducing command and control. 

Plans called to deactivate the headquarters of 

the 70th Division and the 76th Division. “To 

protect soldiers and maintain regional Army 

Reserve presence, one brigade from each 

division was to be integrated into the seven 

remaining divisions.” The plan consolidated all individual training into one common 
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structure and reduced the total number of soldiers assigned to the institutional 

divisions by 23 percent. Army Reserve initial training and reception battalion 

personnel authorizations and Army Reserve Forces Schools authorizations 

were reduced from 43,500 to 27,500. This saved some 16,000 authorizations.181

This multifunctional training included initial entry training, military occupational specialty qualification, professional development, refresher training, and 

as Hargraves explained, “to a small degree ROTC [Reserve Officer Training 

Corps] adjunct faculty.”182 According to Baratz, reorganization of the training 

units “supports the Total Army Training Study, and it will strengthen our capability to be a trainer for all of the components of the Army providing realistic 

training exercises for units, and demanding skill and professional development 

education for individuals.”183 ‘“The restructuring,’” he added, ‘“expands traditional missions of the divisions to include peacetime and mobilization skill 

training of individual soldiers. . . . It also saves us money and significantly enhances readiness.’”184

A significant event in Army Reserve training during the early 1990s was the 

establishment of regional medical (RTS-MED), regional maintenance (RTSMAINT), and regional intelligence (RTS-I) training sites, critical for realistic 

and hands-on training. The RTS concentrated high-cost technical equipment 

and expertise at regional sites across the country. Reserve units and personnel went to the sites for sustainment, refresher, and enhancement training. In 

many instances, the regional training sites provided mobile teams and outreach 

programs to support units at their home stations and in the field. The Army 

began the regional training sites program in the 1980s in answer to unacceptable MOS qualification levels among reserve personnel and insufficient home 

station training facilities. Starting in 1992, the RTS-MAINTs began teaching MOS-producing courses and Phase III of the Basic Noncommissioned 

Officer Course (BNCOC) and the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer 

Course (ANCOC) for maintenance soldiers. By 1993, fifteen RTS-MAINTs 

were completed. 

RTS-Is trained enlisted soldiers and warrant officers in a sensitive, compartmented information environment, using real-time to near-real-time materials; training 

was unavailable at military intelligence unit home stations. By 1993, four RTS-Is 

were completed and one was under construction. As noted above, the DIVITs 

consolidated these to provide individual training within one organization. 

RTS-MEDs provided central locations with state-of-the-art diagnostic and 

treatment training devices and deployable medical systems. Four RTS-MEDs 

were completed by 1993.185
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95

The capabilities for enhancing reserve training increased in December 1993 

when the secretary of the Army transferred control of four FORSCOM installations to the USARC to include Fort Pickett, Virginia; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Fort Hunter Liggett, California, and Camp Parks, California. This first experience in installation ownership allowed the Army Reserve greater control of 

training. Forts Pickett, Hunter Liggett, and Camp Parks were sub-installations 

of Fort McCoy.186 According to Baratz, “Having these installations available 

to us will greatly enhance our ability to train Active and Reserve Component 

forces. They provide facilities needed to augment lanes training and Battle 

Projection Center (BPC) simulation. Camp Parks has its own BPC and the 

other three have facilities to link electronically over telephone lines with the 

nearest Battle Projection Center. The connection of live training and simulation gives commanders,” he continued, “the opportunity to observe the effects 

of their battlefield decisions and to test their combat support and combat service-support systems under realistic conditions. Being able to do this in a garrison situation maximizes the training while minimizing cost.”187 The Total Army 

Training Study (TATS) was the foundation for the simulation fielding plan to 

support the BPCs. The fielding of JANUS, the Army’s battle-focused trainer 

and brigade/battalion battle simulation (BBS), to the BCPs in 1994 enhanced 

reserve unit combat readiness.188

Another significant training event continued in the early 1990s was the overseas deployment training (ODT) program. The program incorporated current 

wartime planning and CAPSTONE unit alignments and guaranteed realistic, 

periodic training in locations where Army Reserve units might be deployed. 

Many reserve commanders stated in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT 

STORM after action reviews that overseas training was the pre-eminent preparation for actual deployment. ODT gave reserve soldiers practical training 

on mobilization, overseas deployment tasks, and wartime functions. Priority 

for ODT was based on a unit’s presence on a force deployment list, supporting a certain contingency plan, its CAPSTONE alignment, and its required 

in-country arrival date. The goal was for the earliest deploying units to conduct 

ODT a minimum of once every three years while later deploying units would 

train once every five years. In addition to being a training program, ODT 

was an important factor in enhancing soldier retention as soldiers had a sense 

of contributing to national security and training where they might actually 

fight. With the activation of the USARC, most funds for Army Reserve TPU 

training passed from OCAR to the USARC to the major U.S. Army Reserve 

Command (MUSARC). The CONUSAs coordinated and scheduled ODT for 

TPU soldiers in their respective regions. Although ODT was TPU oriented, there were some limited opportunities for IMA and IRR soldiers, which 

ARPERCEN managed. 
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During 1990, the Army Reserve sent 18,500 soldiers from 

1,350 units or cells to train in more than fifty countries. 

Due to Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, 

the scope of ODT decreased during 1991. Yet, over 12,000 

soldiers from 1,113 units or cells trained in over fifty locations. During 1992, 17,225 Army Reserve soldiers trained 

in fifty-six countries. During that same year, Army Reserve 

units deployed to Europe to aid in the permanent withdrawal 

of active forces. More than 1,150 soldiers provided logistical support. For 1993, the number rose to 19,007 and 

for 1994 it rose again to 19,476 soldiers. Training included joint exercises such as REFORGER in Germany, TEAM 

SPIRIT in Korea, BRIGHT STAR in the Middle East, and 

YAMA SAKUR in Japan. Other types of exercises ranged 

from engineer to medical readiness exercises (MEDRETEs). 

MEDRETEs provided medical, dental, veterinary, and preventive medicine training. Among them was a month long 

MEDRETE in the South American country of Guyana. This 

was a continuation of Exercise FUERTES CAMINOS in 

Panama and another Exercise MEDRETE which occurred 

in Guatemala. Thirty-two Army Reserve soldiers deployed 

in 1993 for a MEDRETE in Bolivia. The Army Reserve 

established a field medical training site (FMTS) in Panama. 

In 1993, the FMTS support cell planned, coordinated and 

supported ten to twelve OCONUS training deployments of 

Army Reserve medical units/cells to remote areas of Latin 

America, providing medical civic action assistance to the indigenous population. 

Army Reserve units travelled to Thailand for Operation COBRA GOLD ’93, a joint exercise conducted with members 

of the Royal Thai Army. Medical Army Reserve soldiers 

treated people and animals; civil affairs and engineer soldiers 

constructed a community center and a school.189 Pharmacists filled over 500 prescriptions in one day. ‘“There’s more 

than 300 different types of medicines there on the table-everything from aspirin to drugs for worming,’ said Captain 

Lynne B. Westlake,’” an Army Reserve soldier from the 

322d Civil Affairs Brigade, Fort DeRussey, Hawaii.’” Den-
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M60 Range Instruction, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, 

U.S. Army Center of Military History)
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Figure I-13: Army Reserve Soldiers Training Overseas, 1990-1994

Army Reserve Soldiers Training Overseas 

1990-1994 

1991 

12,000 

1990 

18,500 

1992 

17,225 

1993 

19,007 

1994 

19,476 

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

 Cobar Gold (Thailand) Medrete (Bolivia)

Reforger (Germany) Bright Star (Middle East)

 Team Spirit (Korea) Yama Sakur (Japan)

Medrete (Guyana) Fuertas Caminas (Panama)

tists yanked decayed teeth from more than 400 villagers. Physical therapists 

instructed some complaining of a variety of aches on how to alleviate pain.’” 

Major John C. Lewis of the 364th Civil Affairs Battalion from Portland, Oregon, commented, ‘“The physical therapist told them how to squat and use their 

legs for lifting.’” Sanitation engineers from the 351st Civil Affairs Command 

examined water, “the spilling factor for disease. . . .” Soldiers lived in “spartan conditions.”’ Sergeant First Class Scott B. Olsen, medical NCO-in-charge 

from Fort Bragg’s 96th Civil Affairs Battalion remarked, ‘“We’re not here for 

all the ‘cushies.’ We’re working long days, but no one seems to mind . . . . We’re 

drowned in patients, but we can all get a good night’s sleep knowing we’re making a difference out here.’”190 

One training initiative having long term affects on Army Reserve training and 

readiness was regular participation by Army Reserve soldiers in training at the 
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Operation BRIGHT STAR is a multinational exercise that is designed to improve 

readiness, interoperability, and strengthen military and professional relationships between the Third Army-led U.S. contingent, Egypt, and nine other nations. (Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System)

Checking for bacteria and minerals, Major John C. Lewis examines 

water from a village well in Thailand during Operation COBRA GOLD,

 ‘93. (Army Reserve Magazine, Fall 1993)
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Looking for OPFOR, Fort Polk, Louisiana, Joint Readiness Training Center, 1995, Sergeant Jeffrey 

Manuszak. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
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National Training Center (NTC) and 

at the Joint Readiness Training Center 

(JRTC), which began in 1990.191

Equipment

A major factor in evaluating the readiness 

of the Army Reserve was equipment. Department of Defense Directive 1225.6, 

Equipping the Reserve Forces, contained 

the Department of Defense policy of “first 

to deploy/employ, first to be equipped.”192

According to a 1993 General Accounting 

Office (GAO) report, “this philosophy,” 

as Currie and Crossland put it, “shortchanged the combat support and combat service support units, many of which 

. . . [were] in the Army Reserve.”193 As a 

plus, the GAO determined that ‘“A limited number of combat and combat service 

support units in the reserves have been 

designated part of the Army’s contingency 

force.’” But, the report found that ‘“Some 

combat forces outside the early deploying 

force have been given higher equipping 

priorities in the DAMPL [Department 

of the Army Master Priority List] than 

some support forces in the contingency 

force.’”194 

During 1990, some 16 percent of reporting Army Reserve units indicated difficulty in accomplishing the bulk of assigned 

wartime missions due to a shortage of 

equipment. That represented a 4 percent 
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improvement over the same reporting period for 1989.195 In fact, from 1985 

to 1990, the Army Reserve reduced the percent of units which could not meet 

their minimum combat readiness levels, due to equipment shortages, by 28 percent. Despite this progress, in 1992 the Army Reserve was short more than $4 

billion of materiel required for wartime.196 

At the end of 1990, the Army Reserve had only 62 percent of its required wartime equipment on hand, lagging behind all other reserves.197 By 1992, it had 

risen to 69 percent, yet behind the other reserves.198 By 1993, major equipment 

on hand reached 84 percent and 88 percent the following year.199 Although the 

Army Reserve seemed to be improving in equipment on hand percentages, 

“What was happening,” explained Currie and Crossland, “was actually a changing of the reporting methodology, rather than dramatic equipment get-well. 

Beginning with FY 1994, the reporting was of ‘combat essential’ equipment, 

which was a sub-set of the ‘major items’ of equipment previously reported.”200 

Still there were improvements in Army Reserve equipment readiness in the 

early 1990s. As Currie and Crossland concluded, “Even considering the statistical comparison difficulties brought about by the change in reporting methodology . . . , it was evident that the percentage of fill of essential equipment 

items increased.”201 

4,000 and 6,000-pound rough terrain forklifts in operation, Forward Landing Strip (FLS) at Logistical Base CHARLIE, Northern Province, Saudi Arabia (southeast of Rafha), February 8, 

1991. (XVIII Airborne Corps History Office photograph by PFC John F. Freund, DS-F-162-10)
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Figure I-14: Army Reserve Wartime Equipment on Hand, 1990-1994

AR Wartime Equipment on Hand

1990-1994

62%

1990/01

69%

1992

84%

1993

88%

1994

Figure I-15: Status of Required Items on Hand, 1992

Status of Required Items on Hand

1992

Active Army

89%

National

Guard

59%

Army Reserve

79%
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The Final Push Through the Rumayiah Oil Field, Marion Acevedo. (Courtesy of the Army Art 

Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
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The 1993 GAO report “compared the status of required items of equipment for the 

active component, Army National Guard, 

and Army Reserve. As of April 30, 1992, 

the active component had 89 percent of 

its required equipment, the Army National Guard was at 79 percent, and the Army 

Reserve brought up the rear with only 59 

percent.”202 

During 1994, there were major equipment shortages, for example, in C-12 

aircraft, radio and telephone equipment, 

and nuclear-biological-chemical equipment.203 Other overall shortages included 

“heavy equipment transporters, materiel handling equipment, tactical wheeled 

vehicles, water purification systems, single channel ground and airborne radio 

systems (SINCGARS) radios, tool sets, 

test sets and measuring devices and 2 1/2 

and 5 ton trucks.”204 ‘”Even the downsizing of the active component did not help 

the Army Reserve eliminate its equipment 

C-12

The Desert Combat Uniform or DCU is 

made of cotton rip-stop fabric and cut 

in the same pattern as the BDU. The 

DCU camouflage pattern comes in a 

three color scheme, nicknamed “coffee 

stain.” In 1993, it replaced the desert 

camouflage worn during the Gulf War. 

(Photo by Timothy L. Hale, U.S. Army 

Reserve Command, Public Affairs) 
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Loading the Rail Pre-Board Inspection, Master Sergeant Christopher Thiel. (Courtesy of the Army 

Art Collection, U. S. Army Center of Military History) 
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shortages” because as Deputy Chief 

of the Army Reserve Brigadier General Thomas Kilmartin said, ‘“Traditionally, the equipment we’re short is 

the same equipment the active component is short.’”205 So, “deactivating 

active component units . . . did little to 

alleviate the USAR equipment shortages.”206 “A June 1994 report of the 

Defense Secretary Board Task Force 

on Readiness” stated, ‘“Of particular 

concern . . . is the Army Reserve, which 

because of the nature of its role, has 

many high-priority support units that 

suffer readiness decrements because 

they lack low-visibility equipment 

(water purification, medical, laundry, 

decontamination, etc.) on which to 

train and operate.’” “The task force 

noted that excess equipment from 

Europe has been combat equipment, 

while the Army Reserve has need of 

non-combat items.”207

The Reserve Forces Policy Board reported as of the end of fiscal year 1992, 

‘“the Army National Guard and the 

Army Reserve are still experiencing 

equipment shortfalls as a result of the 

transfers to deploying units.’”208 Contributing to the problem was equipment left behind in theater. As of the 

end of fiscal year 1992, “equipment 

for three Army Reserve units had not 

completely returned, while the equipment for six units remained in theater 

for possible use by a stay-behind force 

in Kuwait.”209 This, however, was better than the National Guard’s return 
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of equipment rate. “Sixty-five percent of the 367 pieces of equipment withdrawn from National Guard units had not been returned.”210

A large portion of the Army Reserve’s equipment was transferred from the active Army. Often, the equipment and its maintenance mission transferred to 

the Army Reserve without the test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment 

(TMDE) and other associated support items. Sometimes, 

the active Army retained this 

equipment to support its 

mission while in others, the 

quantity on hand was not adequate to both support and 

train Army Reserve forces. 

Due to equipment shortages, the Army Reserve trained 

its maintenance personnel on 

new TMDE at RTS-Maintenance and high technology centers. While this was a 

sound and economic method 

of training in peacetime, it 

could not provide deploying units essential items of TMDE when those units 

were activated.211

Equipment obsolescence was a problem. In 1990, the Army Reserve inventory 

included obsolete and non-deployable U-21 and U-8 airplanes and helicopters. Other equipment, such as signal generators and well-drilling machines, 

required modernization to 

ensure their compatibility with active component 

equipment.212 Among obsolete and incompatible 

equipment in 1994 were 

VRC-12 series radios, 

gasoline-powered generators, and certain older 

series trucks and trailers.213 There were incompatibility problems with 

active Army equipment. 

As the Reserve Forces 

U-21

U-8
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109

Policy Board reported in 1992, ‘“Overall readiness is degraded because obsolete and incompatible equipment does not integrate with modern Active 

Army systems.’”214 

As noted before, equipment issues occurred during Operation DESERT SHIELD/

DESERT STORM. In many instances, equipment cross-leveling began before the 

mobilized unit left its home station in an attempt to reduce the time needed to 

attain the Army’s deployment standard. 

Many units arrived at the mobilization station without critical pieces of equipment. One of the lessons learned during the mobilization was that the equipping standard for Army Reserve combat and combat service support units did 

not meet the Army standard for deployment to theater. Most Army Reserve 

units received new or cross-leveled equipment to achieve the standard. The 

equipment came from war reserve assets, was cross-leveled from non-deploying 

and later deploying Army Reserve units, and/or came from Army surged production capacity which produced and delivered Dedicated Procurement ProA soldier operates a radio set AN/VRC-12 (RT-524A/VRC Receiver-Transmitter) during Exercise REFORGER ‘86, January 22, 1986. The radio sets 

AN/VRC-12 and VRC-43 through VRC-49, commonly referred to as the AN/

VRC-12-series, were the vehicular tactical radio communications equipment used extensively by combat units from the Vietnam War (1965) 

through the early 1990s.
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gram (DPP) equipment. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM 

proved to the Army Reserve that the DPP funds expended over the last few 

years had been well spent for the correct type of support equipment. 

In order to reduce the time that activated units spent at mobilization stations, 

the Army adopted a policy for later-deploying Army Reserve units of shipping 

new or replacement equipment, identified by unit identification code, to the 

theater for issuance to the unit upon its arrival in theater. Throughout the 

mobilization process and preparation for deployment, the goal was to ensure 

that equipment shortages did not delay movement to theater. Due to the significant equipment shortages in the Army Reserve, the process of fully equipping 

its units required great “flexibility” in the Army’s ability to transfer equipment 

within its components.215

Staff Sergeant Didler C. Phillips, motor sergeant for the 441st 

Medical Company at Wallops Island, Virginia, gives one of his unit’s 

new vehicles a quick operational check before fueling the truck 

and putting it out on the “line.” (Photo by Lieutenant Colonel 

Dick Devin)
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One More Crank, Heather Engelhart. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of 

Military History)
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A problem surfaced after the conflict: processing returning equipment and restoring to its pre-go-to-war condition. “At that time,” remarked Mr. John Roe, a 

senior logistician, “we felt that we should be resourced for that and do that work 

in our own shops.” But, “even with additional resources,” the Army Reserve simply could not “grow the force for that surge [needed] to that degree.” 216

The greatest improvement in Army Reserve equipment readiness was due 

largely to the Dedicated Procurement Program. Congress and the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense established the Dedicated Procurement Program in 

1981 to provide needed readiness items to units. This supplemental program 

was over and above the president’s budget request for the National Guard and 

Reserve equipment appropriations (NGREA). NGREA was the funding appropriation from Congress that resourced the Dedicated Procurement Program. Congress designated some of the funds for certain types of equipment. 

The reserves may use the rest for discretionary purchases of equipment.217

On January 4, 1992, the USARC became the executive agent for this program 

and submitted its first list of equipment to OCAR in April 1992. The chief, 

Army Reserve, as the Army Reserve program director, made the final decision 

on what items and quantities to purchase based on information provided by 

OCAR, USARC, Army component commands, and the Army staff. In 1992 

and 1993, the chief, Army Reserve placed special emphasis on improving the 

equipment on hand readiness of units in force packages I and II.218

Between 1981 and 1993, the Army Reserve’s Dedicated Procurement Program 

resulted in over 50,500 items of equipment valued at over $870 million distributed to over 1,200 units. OCAR prioritized equipment requirements for training divisions and regional maintenance sites for DPP procurement. Four large 

tugboats, the first new tugboats in the Army Reserve inventory in at least thirty 

years, were examples of the type of equipment distributed to the Army Reserve 

through DPP only. The reserves had procured or were scheduled to procure 

some $9 billion of equipment during 1989 through 1994 using NGREA funds, 

which reduced Army Reserve equipment shortages.219

NGREA for the Army Reserve in the early 1990s was uneven: $89 million in 

1990; $71 million in 1991; $104 million in 1992; $32 million in 1993; $126 

million in 1994, and $89 million in 1995. There was a sharp decline in funds 

between 1994 and 1995.220

Force modernization equipment was usually classified as a new item of equipment, a modernized system, a major product improvement, or equipment displaced from the active Army to the reserves.221 The Army’s basic moderniza-
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

113

tion strategy of distributing equipment in stages and setting priorities for units 

and activities resulted in significant Army Reserve equipment modernization. 

Modification and conversion programs diminished archaic and mismatched 

equipment. The Army Aviation Modernization Plan, for instance, called for 

replacing the Army Reserve’s dated aircraft systems with more modern aircraft. In 1992, three aviation companies and one aviation battalion received the 

more up to date, turbine-powered U-21 aircraft, eliminating the last non-deployable, fixed wing piston-driven aircraft (U-8 Seminole and T-42 Cochise). 

One aviation attack battalion converted from AH-1 Cobras to AH-64 Apache 

helicopters. The Army Reserve activated two attack helicopter battalions with 

Figure I-16: National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA),

1990-1995

National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation

(NGREA)

1990-1995

$ in Millions

30

60

90

80

70

50

40

20

10

120

130

110

100

0

1991

$89M

1992

$71M

1993

$104M

1994

$32M

1994

$126M

1994

$89M
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AH-64 Apache helicopter

Close-up of two CH-47Ds, 18th Aviation Brigade operations, vicinity of Logistical Base CHARLIE, 

Northern Province, Saudi Arabia (southeast of Rafha), February 11, 1991. (XVIII Airborne Corps 

History Office photograph by Sergeant Randall M. Yackiel, DS-F-170-06)
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115

AH-64 helicopters. Two medium helicopter companies replaced the CH-47C 

model Chinooks with CH-47Ds as part of the CH-47D Chinook modernization program. Two of five Army Reserve assault helicopter battalions received 

the remainder of their UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters in 1992.222 In 1994, 

the CH-47D program converted ten each of C-47B helicopters to the latest 

CH-47D configuration.223 Army Reserve aviation forces became responsive 

to total Army mobilization needs. Wheeled vehicle modernization continued 

in all units. 

Force modernization efforts in 1993 included reorganizing field artillery battalions equipped with 8-inch self-propelled howitzers to increase the number 

of howitzers in each of the battalion’s three firing batteries from four to eight. 

With eight howitzers in each battery, the new 3x8 organization increased the 

number of howitzers from twelve to twenty-four in each battalion. The Army 

Reserve also received older Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and UH60, and AH-64 helicopters.224 This improved equipment readiness of the 

Army Reserve. 

Staff Sergeant Glenn Green, standing on cockpit and Staff Sergeant Brad Woods, instruct and 

direct students on removal of a main middle assembly on a UH-60 helicopter during ADT at Fort 

Campbell, Kentucky, 1991. (Army Reserve Magazine, Fourth Issue 1991)
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UH-60 Maintenance, Heather Engelhart. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center 

of Military History)
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Also in 1993, Army Reserve mechanized forces were equipped with the 

M113A2 and M113A3 armored personnel carriers (APC) to operate as infantry and engineer squad carriers, medical evacuation carriers, maintenance support vehicles, and for other missions. The Army Reserve continued to convert 

M113A2 APCs to M113A3s to upgrade its resources.225 Congress directed the 

upgrades and modification to increase the survivability of the APC. In 1994, 

the M113A3 program converted eighty-seven M113A2 APCs to the latest 

M113A3 configuration.226

Among the upgrades were 

armored external fuel 

tanks, an upgraded engine and transmission to 

accommodate the added 

weight, and fixing points 

for bolt-on power. But, 

even with these upgrades, 

the M113A3 had limited mobility, firepower, 

and armor protection 

compared to the M2/M3 

Bradley fighting vehicle, 

programmed to replace the 

APCs in mechanized infantry units.227

There were developments with medical force modernization equipment. Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS) was a Department of Defense program to standardize military medical facilities and to eliminate shortages in 

health care equipment required for deployable hospitals. There were seven 

types of DEPMEDS-equipped Army hospitals, ranging from mobile Army surgical hospitals deployed far forward, close to the battlefield (MASH units), to 

general hospitals located farther to the rear. Each type of DEPMEDS hospital 

represented a different configuration of standard modules; for instance, operating rooms, laboratories, x-ray units, and wards. The fielding of DEPMEDS 

began during fiscal year 1987. During Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, eight Army Reserve hospitals operated DEPMEDS-equipped 

facilities in Saudi Arabia. By the end of fiscal year 1992, thirty-eight sets had 

been fielded. Also, fifty-two Army Reserve hospitals received their DEPMEDS 

equipment for individual and section training during IDT. The reserve components continued to receive their DEPMEDS equipment in one package under 

the total package fielding concept.228

M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier
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119

5th MASH, Ad-Damman, Saudi Arabia, Sergeant First Class Sieger Hartgers. (Courtesy of the Army 

Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
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In communications, the Army 

Reserve began upgrading its FM 

radios with the frequency hopping Single Channel Ground and 

Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), fielding Mobile Subscribe Equipment, and upgrading the digital telephone switch 

systems of echelons above corps 

communications units, allowing 

them to support joint operations 

in any theater. SINCGARS 

was fielded to the Army Reserve 

through the Dedicated Procurement Program only.229

The Army Reserve participated in the Army’s Communications-Electronics 

Command’s Coordinated Logistics Support Program. Major communications-electronic equipment needing repair was the heart of the program. Items 

were on quick turn-around. Items not available for immediate exchange were 

quickly repaired and returned. Unit readiness increased. More equipment was 

available for training and mobilization. The Army Reserve began cycling communications-electronics equipment through selected depots in 1985, thereby, 

increasing the overall readiness of the Army Reserve.230

A significant program in 1991 was the Reserve Component Automation System 

(RCAS). One goal of the RCAS program was to design, develop, and field an interactive information system capable of supporting mobilization as determined 

in Army contingency planning documents. A second goal was to improve the 

efficiency of administrative processes in the reserve components. RCAS supported Army Reserve command and control and management functions, especially functions for planning, preparing, and implementing mobilization activities. OCAR believed the RCAS would have aided the mobilization process 

for troop program unit soldiers activated for Operation DESERT SHIELD/

DESERT STORM. The Army awarded a contract in 1991 to design and deploy the RCAS.231 As Lieutenant Colonel Arthur House said, ‘“Our computers 

are a jumble of one-time buys and jerryrigged hook-ups. But all that is starting 

to change with the long-awaited coming of RCAS.’”232 By 1993, the contractor 

was installing RCAS off-the-shelf local area networks, office automation and 

electronic mail in Army Reserve units and their higher headquarters in Atlanta, 

Georgia, and Washington, D.C.233 

Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
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121

The Army Reserve’s unfunded depot maintenance requirements rose markedly 

from $1.3 million in 1993 to $52.3 million in 1994. This affected the equipment 

repair and return program, construction and engineer equipment, communications and electronic equipment, and watercraft vehicles. Increases in unfunded 

requirements in 1994 were due to transferring the Army’s watercraft-dry-dock 

mission to the Army Reserve and costs connected with the service wide medium 

tactical truck improvement plan. The increases in unfunded depot maintenance requirements were owing to programmed maintenance scheduling of the 

Army Reserve’s equipment and vehicles.234

In 1990, the Army Reserve’s equipment on hand dollar inventory experienced 

a $3.9 billion shortage.235 As of March 1993, the amount was some $4 billion. 

Although the Army Reserve was downsizing, the inventory value grew as units 

modernized and converted to the latest tables of organization and equipment 

(TOEs).236 Although the Army Reserve suffered no equipment maintenance 

backlogs in 1988 and 1989, budget reductions produced a $1.7 million depot 

maintenance backlog for 1990, producing a reduction of aircraft available for 

training.237 Budget constraints had a rippling effect. For example, due to budget 

constraints in 1990, the Depot Aviation Maintenance program suffered, delaying the repair and maintenance of some aircraft. And, as the Army procurement 

funding declined, so did the number of new combat service support systems 

provided to the Army Reserve.238 

Army Reserve soldiers were heavily involved in RETROEUR, the Return of 

Equipment from Europe, an operation begun in 1992 to return Cold War materiel to the United States, resulting from the drawdown of European based 

forces. Through RETROEUR, the USARC was able to receive needed equipment, repair it, and redistribute it at a cost savings to the Army. In 1994, the 

USARC working, with the Department of the Army and the Army Materiel 

Command allotted over 140 pieces of equipment for delivery to Army Reserve 

units. The USARC determined the equipment’s destination point and shipped 

the piece directly from Europe to an equipment concentration site or an area 

maintenance support activity for repair, thereby, saving second destination 

transportation charges. Through the program, the Army Reserve was able to 

use its maintenance facilities, existing tools and test equipment, and its management structure to add equipment to its inventory. Some of the equipment was 

prepositioned afloat for contingencies or sold to foreign countries. In 1994, 

over thirty units and 4,720 Army Reserve soldiers participated in the operation, 

a 55 percent increase over fiscal year 1993.239

One such unit was the 344th Maintenance Company, a heavy equipment outfit 

from Bogalusa, Louisiana. For their midwinter duty, the soldiers worked in 
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five shops in an Army maintenance facility in Kaiserslautern, Germany. They 

trained in over seventeen specialties. ‘“We uncrated, cleaned, inspected, honed, 

and rebuilt diesel engines,’” said Chief Warrant Officer 4 Walter Craig, “‘going 

all the way from a block to a finished engine.’” Other soldiers modified trailers, transmissions and transfer stands, did welding and body work on vehicles, 

and worked on electrical generators. Kaiserslautern, Germersheim, and Mannheim were other training sites in Germany. Units deployed to sites in Europe received special three week annual training tours. Another unit, the 143d 

Transportation Command from Orlando, Florida, worked in 1994 on a special 

RETROEUR mission out of the ports of Antwerp, Belgium, and Charleston, 

South Carolina.240 

Liaison and Contingency Operations

The Army Reserve participated in several liaison and contingency operations 

overseas. After Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, Saddam 

Hussein and his forces made several attacks on Kurds who had opposed him. 

Hundreds of Kurds sought refuge in the mountains of northern Iraq along the 

border with Turkey. By April 16, 1991, U.S. forces were assisting the Kurds 

and trying to prevent mammoth starvation in what became known as Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. The 354th Civil Affairs Brigade served as the 

“on-the-ground civil affairs headquarters.”241 It took several weeks for the unit 

to arrive in Turkey. The 354th, under the command of Colonel Robert H. 

Beahm, became attached to Task Force BRAVO in Zakho, Iraq. The 354th had 

command and control of the 418th, 431st, and 432d Civil Affairs Companies. 

Captain Lawrence Knapp, 402d Civil Affairs Company, listens to Kurdish 

refugees’ stories at the coalition forces builtcamp outside Zakho, Iraq, 

about living conditions in Northern Iraq. (Photo by Staff Sergeant 

Greg Deimetl)
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For almost six weeks these units “moved, housed, clothed, and fed the hundreds 

of thousands of Kurdish refugees. The 431st Civil Affairs Company moved 

into Duhok, Iraq, to assist private organizations in the resettlement efforts in 

that city.”242 The mission was completed by June 1991 and the Army Reserve 

soldiers were redeployed. Two of them, Captain Mark Wolfenberger and First 

Lieutenant Angela Blevins, had developed a software program, the Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System, to track the relief supplies.243 

In May 1991, Army Reserve soldiers from the 351st Civil Affairs Command 

together with active Army and marines assisted in the humanitarian relief operation in Bangladesh (Operation SEA ANGEL) after a cyclone had devastated 

the country. Soldiers from the 364th Civil Affairs Brigade, the 322d Civil Affairs Group, and the 402d and 413th Civil Affairs Companies joined the 351st. 

The relief operation ended in late May. All soldiers and marines redeployed 

by June 3.244 

Also in 1992, a team of twelve Army Reserve soldiers from six civil affairs units 

across the United States, led by the 353d Civil Affairs Command, deployed to 

Cameroon. This was the 353d’s second trip to Cameroon, a central African 

country of twelve million people. The 1991 trip was a “meningitis vaccination 

campaign [which] bore fruit in early 1992 when a particularly severe outbreak 

of the dreaded annual epidemic took place in the province, but with a slight 

impact on those villagers vaccinated in 1991.” The 308th Civil Affairs Brigade 

led the 1991 mission. Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Barrager, the 353d’s operations officer recalled, “‘Transportation, potable water and resupply of heavily 

used medications for the pharmacy were daily challenges.’” Assessing the importance of the mission, Colonel Albert Grupper, mission commander of the 

American contingent, commented, ‘“Having Army Reserve civil affairs medics 

familiar with some of Africa’s diverse diseases, medical practices, and cultures 

will be a big help in a relief or contingency operation in Africa.’”245 

The USARC canvassed Army Reserve units world-wide to form a group of 

volunteer Army Reserve soldiers from seventeen different Army Reserve units 

to create the 711th Adjutant General Postal Company (Provisional) to support 

Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia. The final number of troop program unit soldiers was five officers and forty-three enlisted personnel. These 

soldiers were placed on a temporary tour of active duty for 179 days. They 

gathered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, before Christmas 1992. The unit not 

only faced the task of assembling the soldiers, but also acquiring the proper 

equipment. The 711th, under the command of Captain Tamara Dozier, arrived 

in Somalia on January 14, 1993, a relatively quick mobilization and deployment. 

They joined the 24,000 soldiers and U.S. military personnel serving in Somalia. 
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The active Army’s 129th Adjutant General Company (General Support) (Postal) had been providing postal services to the 

thousands of U.S. troops in Somalia until relieved by the 711th 

on February 1. The unit operated the whole mail system to 

include post offices at Baledogle and Kismayu. The volume of 

mail did not necessitate the number of deployed 711th soldiers. 

Consequently, by the end of March the number of soldiers was 

reduced to nineteen. The other soldiers had redeployed to Fort 

Bragg. The 711th remained in Somalia until June 1993, wherein it was relieved by the active Army’s 43d Adjutant General 

Detachment (GS Postal).246 Reflecting on his experience, Sergeant John Bjork commented, ‘“I saw an opportunity to restore 

hope. I guess, and that’s why I volunteered.”’ As First Lieutenant Edith Sneed added, ‘“Something inside me said it was 

God’s work,’ . . . . That’s why I left my civilian job to do this.’”247

Assessments of the 711th’s performance differed. Criticism 

came from the Department of the Army. An Army Inspector 

General investigation reviewed allegations of poor mail handling and delivery in addition to other issues. Others thought 

the unit performed well. Indeed, Lieutenant Colonel Mike 

Hardesty, the 10th Mountain Division G-1, said the ‘“RC 

unit could run circles around the AC unit,’” a reference to 

the 129th.248

Although the Army Reserve had in Sandler’s opinion, ‘“great 

success getting volunteers to man the 71th AG Postal Detachment. [I]t would have been easier to reach into our inventory 

of units and involuntarily called one to duty. Access to the 

Army Reserve is not easy, and it should be.’” He explained 

that the Department of Defense was ‘“considering proposing a 

mechanism to put units and members of the Individual Ready 

Reserve on active duty without elevating that decision to the 

President . . . . This will require,’’’ he continued, ‘“a change to 

the law, giving the Secretary of Defense authority to mobilize a 

small number of units and individuals - 25,000 - for duty. With 

that authority the unified and specified commanders-in-chief 

will know they can count on the Army Reserve to fulfill their 

contingency requirements.’”249 
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Midday Madness in Mogadishu, Master Sergeant (Ret.) Peter G. Varisano. (Courtesy of the Army 

Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
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Mogadishu, Somalia, Master Sergeant (Ret.) Peter Varisano. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, 

U.S. Army Center of Military History) 
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Other soldiers deployed to Somalia included volunteers from the 352d Civil Affairs Command from Riverdale, Maryland, who began arriving there in 

October 1993. The unit worked with the active Army’s 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) until that unit departed in December wherein the Army Reserve soldiers continued the mission.250 As Sandler adjudged, “The value of our 

contributions can be seen in the faces of the Somalia citizens who now, for the 

first time in years, can count on a simple meal and a peaceful home.”251

The Army Reserve participated in the Joint Military-to-Military Contact program in June 1993 by sending members and chiefs of military liaison teams to 

Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and other once 

Soviet bloc countries. Army Reserve soldiers were members of overseas traveling contact teams, sharing their skill in medicine, engineering, reserve force 

structure, and civil affairs. The emphasis was on refugee operations, emergency 

planning, and disaster relief. Over 6,000 Army Reserve soldiers participated in 

humanitarian assistance and host-nation support missions under the Joint Military-to-Military Contact program. This program and the overseas deployment 

training program allowed Army Reserve soldiers to participate in operations in 

Eastern Europe and Central and South America. The Army Reserve conducted 

several medical readiness training exercises and host-nation support operations 

in Central and South America. The biggest host-nation support exercise was 

FUERTES CAMINOS, which included road repair and expansion, water drilling, airport runway repair, and road and bridge construction.252

In 1993 and 1994, many Cubans fled their country filling the refugee camp 

at Guantanamo, Cuba. The United States persuaded Panama to agree to the 

establishment of 

a camp at Empire 

Range near the Panama Canal. While 

active Army soldiers 

operated the camp, 

Army Reserve civil affairs specialists 

were the main “contact between the Cubans and the American authorities” in 

what was known as 

Operation SAFE 

HAVEN.253

Securing the Port-au- Prince Airport
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Football Army Style, Sergeant. Gene Snyder. Playing an impromptu game of football with Cuban 

refugees during Operation SAFE HAVEN. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center 

of Military History)
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Engineers, Laying a drain during Operation SAFE HAVEN, Sergeant Gene Snyder. (Courtesy of the 

Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
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Map 3
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Reacting to Clinton’s ninety day call-up of Selected Reserve soldiers, the National Guard and the Army Reserve provided support operating in Haiti in what was 

known as Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (September 19, 1994 – March 

31, 1995). It was an intervention to remove the military regime installed by the 

1991 Haitian coup d’état, which overthrew the elected President Jean-Bertrand 

Aristide. The secretary of the Army was authorized to call-up 800 soldiers from 

the Selected Reserve. Army Reserve soldiers mobilized on September 19, 1994.

They were civil affairs and psychological operations specialists along with 

transporters from nine units. Their mission: ‘“support civil institutions in Haiti 

and serve as liaisons between military personnel and civil authorities-once civilian authorities are recognized as legitimate.’”254 The initial contribution was 

400 National Guard military police soldiers, 270 Army Reserve civil affairs and 

psychological operations specialists, ninety Army Reserve medical IMAs, and 

forty Army Reserve transportation specialists.255 Since 75 percent of the Army’s 

psychological operations units resided in the Army Reserve, the call-up of these 

soldiers was “almost a necessity.”256 They were responsible for “broadcasting 

messages to the Haitian people to insure that they understood U.S. intentions 

and policies.”257 Plans calling for continued operations in Haiti in October 1994 

led the Army to request an additional call-up; the secretary of defense authorized that call-up on October 17, 1994. Consequently, 2,093 National Guard 

and Army Reserve personnel were mobilized.258 Army Reserve Chinook helicopter units were among the last American forces to leave Haiti.259 More than 

two thirds of all reserve forces mobilized for the operation were from the Army 

Reserve.260

Due to troop reductions and the high operational tempo, in 1994 the Army decided to form a composite unit earmarked to participate in the United Nations’ 

Multinational Forces and Observers, which patrolled the Sinai Peninsula separating Egypt and Israel. The unit was designated the 4th Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment. National Guard and Army Reserve personnel were 

volunteers. Three times more reserve soldiers volunteered than were needed.261

Forty-one of the volunteers were Army Reserve soldiers from the Individual 

Ready Reserve.262 Three hundred and eighty-three soldiers were from the National Guard. The task force began training at Fort Bragg in August 1994 under 

the supervision of the 82d Airborne Division. It deployed to the Sinai in January 1995 and returned to the United States in July 1995.263 The active Army 

commander in theater believed these soldiers had served on par with any 

other soldiers.264
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Mobilization Exercises

In addition to these actual “real-life” call-ups, Army Reserve 

soldiers were involved in several mobilization exercises. Two 

were OPTIMAL FOCUS ’93 

and ’94. OPTIMAL FOCUS 

’93 occurred on January 8, 

1993. Eight thousand Army 

Reserve and National Guard 

soldiers received orders to report to reserve centers and 

armories. The exercise’s objective was to assess how well 

the Army reserve components 

were able to quickly assemble. 

Optimal Focus ’94 involved 

3,000 soldiers. The exercises 

proved that the reserves “could 

locate and bring together their 

unit members on short notice 

and be prepared to move out if 

given the order to do so.”265

Military Support to 

Civil Authorities and 

Homeland Defense

As part of the Army Reserve’s 

military support to civil authorities, in 1993 state emergency 

preparedness liaison officers 

were placed on duty in Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, and Missouri 

for flood relief operations. Civil 

preparedness support detach-
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Ready to Roll, 1995 HMMWs Ready to Roll, Port-au-Prince. Haiti, Sergeant Jeffrey Manuszak. 

(Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
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ment personnel from Battle Creek, Michigan, and Denton, Texas, supported the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with communications and 

security. The Army Reserve provided aviation support missions in Illinois and 

Missouri with units from the Aviation Support Facility on Scott Air Force Base 

in Illinois and Olathe Air Force Base in Kansas. Missions ranged from aerial reconnaissance and VIP transport to materiel transport for levee repair. The Army 

Reserve provided support to the Tampa Bay fire fighting operation.266

The domestic disaster relief mission had rested primarily on the National 

Guard. But, in the 1990s, the Army Reserve came to be used in natural disaster 

relief. That mission included hurricane relief assistance, such as in February 

1990 for Hurricane Ofa in American Samoa. Fifty-three Army Reserve soldiers 

were ordered to active duty for thirty days and sent to villages throughout the 

An Army Reserve soldier ascends a Multinational Force Observer tower in the Sinai, Egypt. (Army 

Reserve Magazine, Summer 1995)
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island to open roads and clear storm damage. Six soldiers were awarded the 

Army Achievement Medal.267 In 1992, about 800 Army Reserve soldiers volunteered for duty and assisted in South Florida for Hurricane Andrew relief 

operations. That same year saw Army Reserve soldiers rendering assistance in 

the wake of Hurricane Iniki. Army Reserve IMAs directed twelve of fourteen 

missions assigned to the Corps of Engineers by the FEMA. In 1994, Army 

Reserve soldiers cooperated with the active Army and the National Guard in a 

variety of missions including combating western wildfires. Other missions in 

1994 included the Northridge earthquake relief operation, flood support from 

tropical storm Alberto, flood support in Texas, and medical support to the Navajo Nation. The Army Reserve used its aviation assets to reduce the supply 

of illegal drugs. Under the Department of Defense’s civil-military cooperation 

program, Army Reserve soldiers became involved in a variety of missions to 

include providing needed medical assistance to those in inner cities and rural 

areas.268 These were signs of broadening Army Reserve mission capabilities. 

Soldier and Family Well Being

Taking care of soldiers and their families contributed to a ready Army Reserve. 

Before Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, there were no requirements for Army Reserve commanders to have family support programs. 

But, guidance on family assistance during mobilization and the establishment 

of family support groups was available. Some commanders had developed and 

operated family support and assistance programs since 1986. Those programs 

were put in motion during the war offering practical assistance, such as identification cards, benefits information, and extension of variable housing allowances 

to reservists called to active duty for less than 108 days and the equalization of 

pay differentials for doctors. Congress supported the designation of Southwest 

Asia as a combat zone, thereby, exempting the pay of enlisted personnel and a 

portion of the pay of officers, serving in that zone from federal income tax. 269

The family support system was successful in getting information to soldiers and 

their families about rights, benefits, and assistance services. The family support coordinators worked mainly at the major U.S. Army Reserve commands. 

They organized briefings, assembled information packets, and formed support 

groups for the families of deployed soldiers.270

The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act provided assistance and protection 

for mobilized soldiers. But, it was not meeting the needs of Army Reserve soldiers; changes were needed. A legislative proposal in September 1990 amended 

the act to make the benefits more in line with the 1990-1991 economic situation and to meet the circumstances of soldiers who had been mobilized for 
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Dry Goods, Peter Varisano. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History) 
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Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Existing provisions were 

updated and new provisions were added.271

The Persian Gulf Benefits Act of 1991 made several permanent changes to benefits. These changes included increasing Serviceman’s Group Life Insurance, 

increasing Montgomery GI Bill benefits, providing that retirees be recalled 

in the highest grade they had held during active duty, improving reemployment rights for disabled veterans, and authorizing eligibility for Department of 

Veterans Administration housing benefits if a soldier served on active duty for 

ninety days or more during the war.272

Legislation to change the method “in which reserve officers were promoted 

and careers managed” came on October 1, 1994, with passage of the Reserve 

Soldiers of the 33d Aviation Group, Fort Rucker, Alabama, conduct early morning pre-flight inspections before take-off and a full day searching for marijuana. (Army Reserve Magazine, Winter 

1993/94)
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141

Officers Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) enacted into law as Title XVI 

of the Fiscal Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act. It was scheduled 

to be effective on October 1, 1996. For example, “promotion selections for officers being considered for the rank of captain or above were now to be made on 

the basis of ‘best qualified’ officers, rather than those who were ‘fully qualified’ 

as in the past.”273

What about job protection? A Supreme Court 1991 case, King v. St. Vincent’s 

Hospital, “seemed to indicate that there was no limitation on the frequency and duration of active duty that a reservist might perform and still retain 

rights to his job.”274 But, during the 1990s, employers “became more skeptical of the time off that reservists were requesting for their military duties.”

On the ground with machetes, a task force member begins the eradication process in a plot 

containing more than forty marijuana plants. The task force consists of Army Reserve soldiers 

along with state and local law enforcement officials. (Army Reserve Magazine, Winter 1993/94) 
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Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT 

STORM veterans found themselves “left 

behind on the promotion ladder by their 

contemporaries who had not served.”275

Over 2,200 veterans requested assistance 

from the federal government in job right 

claims.276

The Uniformed Services Employment 

and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) 

signed by President Clinton on October 

13, 1994, was a significant improvement 

over the 1940 Veterans’ Reemployment 

Rights Act it replaced. This act provided 

reemployment protection and other benefits for veterans and employees who performed military service. Under USERRA, 

if a military member left his civilian job for 

service in the uniformed service, he was entitled to return to the job with accrued seniority, provided he met the law’s eligibility 

requirements. The act applied to voluntary 

and involuntary service in peacetime and 

war time. The law applied to most all civilian employers, including the federal government along with state and local governments and private employers. Size of the 

company did not matter.277

The Army Reserve worked toward its goal 

of 100 percent pre-enrollment of troop 

program unit soldiers and their families in 

the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS). Pre-enrollment of 

individual ready reserve soldiers and their 

families began on March 1, 1992.278
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Ministry in the Field, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, 

U.S. Army Center of Military History)
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The Community and Family Support Center developed standardized video-formatted preretirement and Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) briefings for reserve component soldiers nearing retirement. ARPERCEN developed a software program (REPAY) which allowed soldiers to project their retirement pay 

and SBP benefits.279 These were only some of the programs aimed at improving 

the well being of Army Reserve soldiers and their families.

Base Realignment and Closure 

In the area affecting Army Reserve facilities, on May 3, 1988, the secretary of 

defense chartered the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 

to examine issues surrounding military base realignment and closure in the 

United States, its possessions, commonwealths, and territories. The secretary 

of the Army and the secretary of defense approved the commission’s recommendations and forwarded them to Congress; they became law in May 1989. 

The commission’s recommendations affected over one hundred U.S. Army installations that were to be realigned or closed under the provisions of Public 

Law 100-526, Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act. The Department of the Army’s national Implementation Plan 

Hearty Welcome: Crowd members gather to welcome returning troops following their participation in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. (Army Reserve Magazine, Special Edition 

2001)
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dated February 13, 1989, provided guidance and designated responsible agencies, commands, and activities for implementing the action.280

During 1990, Congress passed the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act. 

It established an independent Defense Base Closure Realignment Commission, 

which met in 1991 and 1993 and was scheduled to meet again in 1995. The 

act specified the roles of the Department of Defense, the commission, and the 

A young spectator holding up a newspaper with the headline “Welcome 

Home” during the national victory celebration parade honoring the coalition forces of Operation DESERT STORM. (Army Reserve Magazine, Special 

Edition 2001)
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president together with the implementation process. The under secretary of the Army and the vice chief 

of staff, Army approved the charter 

for the Total Army Basing Study 

on December 19, 1990. The study 

group included an officer detailed 

from OCAR. 

The study group was to “conduct 

analyses based on emerging force 

structure decisions, budget deliberations, and the evolving security 

environment as it affects the Army.” 

The study was to “provide a comprehensive package of base realignment, closure and consolidation 

recommendations to insure that the 

Army has the ability to train, deploy, 

support, modernize, and care for its 

soldiers in the future.” 

The study group provided its recommendations (BRAC 91) to the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

on March 31, 1991. The recommendations were reviewed and consolidated with those from the other 

armed services and submitted by the 

secretary of defense to the commission in April 1991. The secretary of 

defense sent the recommendations 

to Congress. The Army proposed 

the closure and realignment of 

eighteen bases. Those affecting the 

Army Reserve included: 
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Night Attack in the Persian Gulf, 1991, Mario Acevedo. (Courtesy of the Army Art

Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
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a. close Fort Benjamin Harrison and Fort Sheridan, but retain a reserve 

enclave;

b. close Fort Devens but retain a reserve enclave and 4,600 acres for training;

c. close Sacramento Army Depot, but retain fifty acres for the Army Reserve;

d. realign and retain facilities and training areas at Fort Dix and Fort Chaffee 

to support reserve component training requirements only.

In the end, BRAC 1991 resulted in the closure of twenty-six installations, more 

than the sixteen closed in 1988.281 

The 1992/1993 budget estimates submitted to Congress included a number of 

projects related to base closure: constructing an administrative building costing 

$1,500,000 at Fort Sheridan; constructing an assembly hall costing $850,000 at 

Fort Sheridan; constructing vehicle parking costing $310,000 at Fort Douglas and; constructing an Army Reserve center costing $5,000,000 at Fort Des 

Moines. Only one construction project directly related to base closure was 

scheduled for 1993: constructing an Army Reserve center costing $2,100,000 

at Fort Sheridan.282 

Conclusion

With the end of the Cold War came a change in the strategic environment. 

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM ushered in a new era. In 

1991, General Vuono noted, ‘“the conditions that have undergirded our nation’s security strategy for more than four decades are being rendered obsolete.’”283The general understanding that the reserves were more so a mobilization asset rather than a force of immediate use proved wrong. In order to play 

a key role in the post-Cold War national defense and make the Army Reserve 

indispensable to the active Army, the recently formed USARC and OCAR 

moved to create a niche for the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve would become a full partner in America’s Army and an integral element in the new power 

projection force of the new world order through the provision of unique core 

competencies. Those included: being a federal force, always under active Army 

control and capable of rapid deployment; providing the bulk of the combat 

support and combat service support forces; providing command and control 

and combat service units for echelons above corps and echelons above division; 

and providing the ability to rebuild and reconstitute the force during or after 

protracted conflict. Thus, the Army Reserve’s core competencies, as defined by 

the 1993 Off-Site Agreement, revolved around non-combat skills which were 

interchangeable with the skills in civilian occupations. Some believed this to be 

the essence of the Army Reserve in the future. 
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1 Ronald Reagan Speeches, Remarks at the Brandenburg Gate, West Berlin, June 12, 1987, 

http://www.ronald reagan.com/sp_11.html. 2 Ibid. 

3 Ibid.

4 Gulnar Aybet, “The CFE Treaty: The Way Forward for Conventional Arms Control In 

Europe,” Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs, March-May, 1996, Volume III, Number 4, 

http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/news/per1-2.htm. 5 William Webb, et al., Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1990 and 1991 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1990), 155-156. 6 Richard Stewart, general editor, American Military History, Volume II, The United States Army 

In A Global Era, 1917-2003 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005), 409. 7 George H. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States: 1991-1992 (Washington, 

DC: Brassey’s –U.S., Inc., 1991), 3. 8 Webb, et al., Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1990 and 1991, 15. 9 George H. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States: 1990-1991, (Washington, 

DC: Brassey’s –US, Inc., 1990), 10. 10 George H. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States: 1990-1991, (Washington, DC: 

Brassey’s –US, Inc., 1990), 87-89. 11 Richard Stewart, War in the Persian Gulf, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, August 

1990-March 1991 (Washington, DC: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 2010), v. 12 Thomas Lippiatt, Michael Polich, Ronald Sortor and Patricia Dey, Mobilization and Train-Up 

Times for Army Reserve Component Support Units (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1992), 5-6. 13 Webb, et al., Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1990 and 1991, 43. 14 Major General William F. Ward, Jr., “Reserve Looking Toward Future With Anticipation,” The 

Officer, February 1990, 43. 15 Major General Roger W. Sandler, “Best Investment For Strong USA,” The Officer, February 

1992, 42. 16 Major General William F. Ward, Jr., Army Reserve Special Report, 1991 (Washington, DC: Office, Chief Army Reserve, no date), 7. 17 Ibid., 8.

18 Thomas Lippiatt, Michael Polich, Ronald Sortor and Patricia Dey, Mobilization and Train-Up 

Times for Army Reserve Component Support Units ( Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1992), 

6-7. 19 Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 5. 20 Ward, “Reserve Looking Toward Future With Anticipation,” The Officer, February 1991, 42 

and Stephen Duncan, The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces (Washington, 

DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, June 1992), 13. 21 Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States: 1990-1991, 105-106. 22 Ibid., 106.

23 Stewart, American Military History, Volume II, The United States Army In A Global Era, 1917-

2003, 377-378 and Christopher Koontz, “Active and Reserve Component Balance,” Information Paper, U.S. Army Center of Military History, May 28, 2010. 24 Stewart, War in the Persian Gulf, 69 and John Sloan Brown, Kevlar Legions, The Transformation 

Of the U.S. Army, 1989-2005 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2011), 

64. 25 Brown, Kevlar Legions, 64. 26 James Currie and Richard Crossland, Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army 

Reserve, 1908-1995, DA Pamphlet 140-14 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1997), 391-392. 27 Ibid., 392.
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28 Currie and Richard Crossland, Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 

1908-1995, 407-408, 416. Currie and Crossland have a detailed account of the activities of the 

command and its subordinate units. Also see John Brinkerhoff, United States Army Reserve In 

Operation Desert Storm, Enemy Prisoner of War Operations: The 800th Military Police Brigade 

(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Andrulis Research Corporation, 1992). 29 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 421-423. 30 Ibid., 416; Interview, Kathryn Roe Coker with Mr. Thomas Welke, August 27, 2010, Oral 

History Collection, U.S. Army Reserve Historical Research Collection USARHRC), Office 

of Army Reserve History (OARH), USARC; and Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 5. 31 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 420, 480-481. For more details on the mobilization 

and activities of the 3d Battalion, 87th Infantry, see John Brinkerhoff, United States Army 

Reserve In Operation Desert Storm, Countering the Terrorist Threat: The 3d Battalion, 87th 

Infantry (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Andrulis Research Corporation, 1993). 32 Gary Sheftick, “USAR terminal unit pushes cargo at aerial port,” Army Reserve Magazine, Volume XXXVII, Number 1, 1991, 13. 33 Ibid.

34 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 484, 486. 35 Ibid. For more details on the decision not to deploy the 335th Signal Command, see John 

Brinkerhoff, United States Army Reserve In Desert Storm, The Signal Support Dilemma: The 

335th Signal Command (Washington: DC, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Andrulis 

Research Corporation, 1992). 36 Ibid., 478.

37 Ibid., 484-486. 

38 Interview, Kathryn Roe Coker with Major General Max Baratz, September 27, 2010, Oral 

History Collection, OARH, USARHRC, USARC. 39 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 484-486, 386-387. 40 Sandler, “Best Investment For Strong USA,” The Officer, February 1992, 42-43. 41 Ibid., 43.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid. 

44 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 584. 45 Sandler, “Best Investment For Strong USA,” The Officer, February 1992, 44. 46 Ibid.

47 Interview, Coker with Baratz.

48 Interview, Coker with Welke.

49 Brown, Kevlar Legions, 38. 50 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 421-423. 51 Interview, Coker with Baratz.

52 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 505. 53 Interview, Coker with Welke.

54 Sandler, “Best Investment For Strong USA,” The Officer, February 1992, 42. 55 Major General William F. Ward, Jr., “Reserve Looking Toward Future With Anticipation,” 

The Officer, February 1990, 42 and Major General William F. Ward, Jr., Army Reserve Special 

Report 1991, A Statement by Major General William F. Ward, Jr., before the Committees and 

Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, 4-5. 56 Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 6. 57 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 511. 58 Interview, Coker with Welke.
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59 Ibid and Ronald Sortor, Thomas Lippiatt, and Michael Polich, Planning Reserve Mobilization: 

Inferences from Operation Desert Shield (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1993), xi-xii. 60 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 384-385, 494-495. 61 Interview, Coker with Welke.

62 Interview, Coker with Batatz.

63 Ibid.

64 Interview, Coker with Welke.

65 General Carl E. Vuono, “Today’s U.S. Army: Trained and Ready In an Era of Challenge,”

1989-1990 Army Green Book, October 1989, 22. 66 Webb, et al., Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal year 1990 and Fiscal Year 1999, 

104. 67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Kathryn Roe Coker, The U.S. Army Reserve Command: The First Years (Atlanta, Georgia: Office of the Command Historian, USARC, 1994), 1. 70 Ibid., 6-7. 

71 Ibid., 8.

72 Ibid., 8, 16, 18-19, 23-25 and Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 324, 328-329. See these 

two sources for detailed accounts on these developments. 73 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 334. 74 Ibid., 338-339; Coker, The U.S. Army Reserve Command: The First Years, 37, 59 and Sandler, 

“Best Investment For Strong USA,” The Officer, February 1992, 6. 75 Major General Max Baratz, “Creating Single Standard,” The Officer, April 1994, 22. 76 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 340. 77 Coker, The U.S. Army Reserve Command: The First Years, 2, 70. 78 Lee Harford, Jr., Kathryn Roe Coker, Edward Shanahan and Donna Murphy, United States 

Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1993 (Atlanta, Georgia: Office of the Command Historian, USARC, 1994), 3 and Ward, “Reserve Looking Toward Future With Anticipation,” The Officer, February 1991, 44. 79 Harford, Coker, Shanahan and Murphy, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1993, 4 and Baratz, “Creating Single Standard,” The Officer, April 1994, 22. 80 Anonymous, “New Shape of Army Reserve supports new missions,” Army Reserve Magazine, 

Summer 1994, 5. 81 Martin L. Kaplan, and Cherly Morai-Young. Department of the Army Historical Summary, 

1994 ( Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2000), 72-73. Much of this 

is verbatim from the source. 82 Anonymous, “New Shape of Army Reserve supports new missions,” Army Reserve Magazine, 

Summer 1994, 5. 83 Ibid. 

84 Kaplan and Morai-Young, Department of the Army Historical Summary, 1994, 72-73. 85 General Colin Powell, The National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: 

Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1992). 86 Ibid and Harry Rothman, Forging A New Military Strategy In A post-Cold War World: A Perspective From The Joint Staff (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, February 1992), 2-3. 87 Eric Larson, David Orlesky and Kristin Leuschner, Defense Planning in a Decade of Change: 

Lessons from the Base, Bottom-Up Review and Quadrennial Defense Review (Santa Monica, 

California: RAND, 2001), xiv. 88 Ronald Sortor, Army Active/Reserve Mix: Force Planning for Major Regional Conflicts (Santa 

Monica, California: RAND, 1995), 7.
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89 Larson, Orlesky and Leuschner, Defense Planning in a Decade of Change: Lessons from the Base, 

Bottom-Up Review and Quadrennial Defense Review, xiv-xv. 90 Sortor, Army Active/Reserve Mix: Force Planning for Major Regional Conflict, 7, 9. 91 Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, DC: Secretary of Defense, October 1993), 2; Jeffery Charlston, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1999 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2006), 5; Sortor, Army Active/Reserve 

Mix: Force Planning for Major Regional Conflict, 8 -9 and Larson, Orlesky and Leuschner, 

Defense Planning in a Decade of Change: Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review and 

Quadrennial Defense Review, xix. 92 Anonymous, “Aspin studies easier RC call-up,” Army Reserve Magazine, Fall 1993, 7. 93 Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, 2; Charlston, Department of the Army Historical Summary: 

Fiscal Year 1999, 5; Sortor, Army Active/Reserve Mix: Force Planning for Major Regional Conflict, 8 -9 and Orlesky and Leuschner, Defense Planning in a Decade of Change: Lessons from the 

Base Force, Bottom-Up Review and Quadrennial Defense Review, xix. 94 Sortor, Army Active/Reserve Mix: Force Planning for Major Regional Conflict, 17. 95 Les Aspin, Report On The Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, 91. 96 Ibid., 93.

97 Kathryn Roe Coker, Lee Harford, Jr., Edward Shanahan and Deborah Foster-King, United 

States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1994 (Atlanta, Georgia: Office of 

the Command Historian, USARC, 1996), 6-7. 98 Interview, Kathryn Roe Coker with Major General Roger W. Sandler, September 3, 2010, Oral 

History Collection, USARHRC, OARH, USARC. 99 Interview, Coker with Baratz.

100 Ibid and Anonymous, “Army Reserve faces major restructuring of forces,” Army Reserve Magazine, 

Winter 1993/94, 5. 101 Anonymous, “Army Reserve faces major restructuring of forces,” Army Reserve Magazine, Winter 1993/94, 5. 102 Major General Max Baratz, “Creating the future Reserve,” Army Reserve Magazine, Summer 

1994, 4. 103 Harford, Coker, Shanahan and Murphy, United States Army Reserve Command Annual 

Command History, 1993, 9, 101-102; Coker, Harford, Shanahan and Foster-King, United 

States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1994, 191-192; Coker and Shanahan, 

United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1995, 244; Interview, Coker 

with Sandler; OPLAN 94-1-1, Headquarters, U.S. Army Reserve Command Swap/Migration, 

USARHRC, OARH, USARC; Togo West, Jr. and General Dennis J. Reimer, A Statement 

on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1997, Presented to the Committees and 

Subcommittees of the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives, February 1996; Kaplan, 

Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1994, 71-72 and Brown, Kevlar Legions, 127. 104 Commission on Roles & Missions of the Armed Forces, Directions For Defense: Report of the 

Commission on Roles & Missions of the Armed Forces (Darby, Pennsylvania: Diane Publishing 

Company, no date), ES-1. 105 Ibid., ES-1, ES-5, 2-23-2-25. 106 William Webb, et al., Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1990 and 1991, 

5, 13. 107Robert Cameron, To Fight or Not to Fight, Organizational and Doctrinal Trends in Mounted 

Maneuver Reconnaissance from Interwar Years to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 2010), 336. 108 Stewart, American Military History, Volume II, The United States Army In A Global Era, 1917-

2003, 411.
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

153

109 Togo West, Jr. and General Dennis Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States 

Army, Fiscal Year 1997, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1997), 7. 110 Cameron, To Fight or Not to Fight, 337. 111 General Gordon Sullivan “America’s Army-Focusing on the Future,” 1994-1995 Army Green 

Book, October 1994, 23, 25; West and Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States 

Army, Fiscal Year 1997. 112 Cameron, To Fight or Not to Fight, 335 and Colonel Gregory Fonenot, Lieutenant Colonel J. 

Degen and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom: On Point 

(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, Combat Studies Institute, 2004), 9. 113 Stewart, American Military History, Volume II, The United States Army In A Global Era, 1917-

2003, 424 and Harford, Coker, Shanahan and Murphy, United States Army Reserve Command 

Annual Command History, 1993. 114 General Gordon Sullivan, “Army Session Luncheon of the Reserve Officers Association (ROA) 

Mid-Winter Conference, January 21, 1992” in Jerry Bolzak, editor, The Collected Works of the 

Thirty-Second Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army, 

June 1991-June 1995 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, no date), 

29-30. 115 Sullivan, “Army Session Luncheon of the Reserve Officers Association (ROA) Mid-Winter 

Conference, January 21, 1992” in Bolzak, editor, The Collected Works of the Thirty-Second Chief 

of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army, June 1991-June 1995, 

29-31 and Brow, Kevlar Legions, 66. 116 Harford, Coker, Shanahan and Murphy, United States Army Reserve Annual Command 

History, 1993, 7-8 and Coker, Harford, Shanahan and Foster-King, United States Army Reserve 

Command Annual Command History, 1994, 15. 117 Major General Max Baratz, “Army Reserve Committed Force of Citizen-Soldiers,” 1997-

1998 Army Green Book, October 1997, 97. 118 Coker, Harford, Shanahan and Foster-King, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1994, 15; Harford, Coker, Shanahan and Murphy, United States Army 

Reserve Annual Command History, 1993, 7 and Sortor, Army Active/Reserve Mix, xii. 119 Major General Roger W. Sandler, “Somalia shows value of Reserve, Army Reserve Magazine, 

Winter 1993, 7. 120 Dwight Oland and David Hogan, Jr., Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal 1992, 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2001), 56. 121 Baratz, “Creating Single Standard,” The Officer, April 1994, 23 and Oland and Hogan, 

Department of the Army Historical Summary, 1992, 56. Much of this is verbatim from the latter 

source. 122 Baratz, “Creating Single Standard,” The Officer, April 1994, 23 and Major General Max Baratz, 

“Nation Needs Reserve Force,” The Officer, February 1995, 42. 123Baratz, “Nation Needs Reserve Force,” The Officer, February 1995, 42. 124 Baratz, “Army Reserve Committed Force of Citizen-Soldiers,” 1997-1998 Army Green Book, 

October 1997, 98. 125 Harford, Shanahan and Foster-King, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command 

History, 1994, 17-18 and Baratz, “Nation Needs Reserve Forces,” The Officer, February 1995, 

42. 126 Harford, Shanahan and Foster-King, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command 

History, 1994, 16 and Kaplan, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1994, 75. 127 Everett and Kaplan, Department of the Army Historical Summary, 1993, 79. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid and Coker, Harford, Shanahan and Foster-King, United States Army Reserve Command 

Annual Command History, 1994, 18.
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130 Major General Roger W. Sandler, “Bridging the Gap-New Reserve Roles,” 1993-1994 Army 

Green Book, October 1993, 126. 131 William Webb, et al., Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1990 and 1991, 5. 132 William Webb, et al., Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1990 and 1991, 

33. 133 Togo West, Jr., and General Gordon Sullivan, A Statement on the Posture of the United States 

Army, Fiscal Year 1995, Presented to the Committees and Subcommittees of the United States 

Senate and House of Representatives, February 1994, 38, 42 and Jeffrey Charlston, Department of 

the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1999 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 2006), 4. 134 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1990 Report of the 

Reserve Forces Policy Board (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 1991), 

xv; Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, FY 1994 Report of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 1995), x-xi, 

36-37; Anonymous , U.S. Army Reserve Report, 1991 and Everett and Kaplan, Department 

of the Army Historical Summary, 1993, (Washington, DC: U. S. Army Center of Military 

History, 2002), 76. 135Ward, “Reserve Looking Toward Future With Anticipation, The Officer, February 1991, 46. 136 Ibid., 41, 43 and Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 37, 45. 137 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 566. 138 Ibid, 567. Currie and Crossland used statistics from the Annual Report, Reserve Forces Policy 

Board, FY 92 (page 54), FY 93 (page 77), FY 94 (page 42). 139 Ibid, 567. 140 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 573. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid., 573. 144 Ibid., 574. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid., 39 and Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 32. 148 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 568. 149 Oland and Hogan, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal 1992, 53, 150 Stewart, War in the Persian Gulf, 69. 151 Brown, Kevlar Legions, 481. 152 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1990 Report of the 

Reserve Forces Policy Board, xvi, 10 and Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, 

FY 1994 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, x, xiii, 5, 7. 153 Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 13-15. 154 Kaplan and Morai-Young, Department of the Army Historical Summary, 1994, 73. This is largely verbatim from the source. 155 General Gordon Sullivan, “Army Session Luncheon of the Reserve Officers Association (ROA) 

Mid-Winter Conference, January 21, 1992” in Jerry Bolzak, editor, The Collected Works of the 

Thirty-Second Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army, 

June 1991-June 1995, 32. 156 Ibid. 157 Harford, Coker, Shanahan and Foster-King, United States Army Reserve Command Annual 

Command History, 1994, 18; Webb, et al., Department of the Army Historical Summary, 1990 

and 1991, 76 and Oland and Hogan, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 

1992, 63. Use of much of the DA historical summaries is verbatim.
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

155

158 Anonymous, “FORSCOM chief discusses the future of the Army Reserve and the Bold Shift

initiative in an exclusive interview,” Army Reserve Magazine, Second Issue of 1992, 13. 159 Harford, Coker, Shanahan and Foster-King, United States Army Reserve Command Annual 

Command History, 1994, 18; Webb, et al, Department of the Army Historical Summary, 1990 and 

1991, 76 and Oland and Hogan, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1992, 

63. Use of much of the DA historical summaries is verbatim. 160 Harford, Coker, Shanahan and Foster-King, United States Army Reserve Command Annual 

Command History, 1994, 18-19 and Oland and Hogan, Department of the Army Historical 

Summary, Fiscal Year 1992, 63. Use of much of the latter source is verbatim. 161 Harford, Coker, Shanahan and Foster-King, United States Army Reserve Command Annual 

Command History, 1994, 18-19 and Kaplan and Morai-Young, Department of the Army Historical 

Summary, 1994, 75-76. 162 Oland and Hogan, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1992, 64. 163 Ibid., 64 and Everett and Kaplan, Department of the Army Historical Summary, 1993, 77. 164 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 549. 165 Harford, Coker, Shanahan and Foster-King, United States Army Reserve Command Annual 

Command History, 1994, 19; USARC Regulation 350-2 Training, Intelligence Training in 

the U.S. Army Reserve Command and Everett and Kaplan, Department of the Army Historical

Summary, 1993, 77. 166 Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 51; Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 44-45; 

Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1993, 44 and Oland and Hogan, Department of the Army 

Historical Summary, 1992, 62. 167 Headquarters, TRADOC, Total Army School System (TASS) OPLAN-1, Future Army 

Schools-21, April 1, 1994, v, xi-xii and John D. Winkler, et al., Assessing the Performance of the 

Army Reserve Components School System (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1996), xv. 168 Interview, Kathryn Roe Coker with Mr. John Hargraves, August 9, 2010, Oral History Collection, OARH, USARHRC, USARC. 169 Headquarters, TRADOC, Total Army School System (TASS) OPLAN-1, Future Army 

Schools-21, April 1, 1994, iv-v. 170 Ibid., v. 171 Ibid., vii-viii. 172 Ibid., vi. 173 Headquarters, TRADOC, Total Army School System (TASS) OPLAN-1, FAST Future Army 

Schools-21, April 1, 1994, vi. 174 Harford, Coker, Shanahan and Murphy, United States Army Reserve Command Annual History, 

1993, 98 and Interview, Coker with Hargraves. 175 Winkler, et al., Assessing the Performance of the Army Reserve Components School System, xv and 

John D. Winkler, et al., Training Requirements and Training Delivery in the Total Army School 

System (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1999), iii. 176 Winkler, et al., Training Requirements and Training Delivery in the Total Army School System

(Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1999), iii. 177 Ibid. 178 Harford, Coker, Shanahan and Murphy, United States Army Reserve Command Annual 

Command History, 1993, 10, 119; Coker, Harford, Shanahan and Foster-King, United States 

Army Reserve Command History, 1994, 269; Major General Roger W. Sandler, “Somalia shows 

value of Reserve,” Army Reserve Magazine, Winter 1993, 7 and Kaplan and Morai-Young, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1994, 76. 179 Baratz, “U.S. Army Reserve: ‘More Ready, More Focused and More Capable,’” 1995-1996 

Army Green Book, October 1995, 95.
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180 Coker, Harford, Shanahan and Foster-King, United States Army Reserve Command History, 

1994, 269-270. 181 Interview, Coker with Hargraves; Harford, Coker, Shanahan and Murphy, United States Army 

Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1993, 10; Kaplan and Morai-Young, Department 

of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1994, 76-77 and Anonymous, “Reorganization will 

chop two training division HQs,” Army Reserve Magazine, Fall 1995, 5. 182Interview, Coker with Hargraves; Interview, Kathryn Roe Coker with Mr. John Schultz, 

October 25, 2010, Oral History Collection; USARHRC, OARH, USARC; Harford, Coker, 

Shanahan and Murphy, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1993, 

10; Kaplan and Morai-Young, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1994, 

76-77. 183 Major General Max Baratz, “Nation Needs Reserve Force,” The Officer, February 1995, 41. 184 Anonymous, “Reorganization will chop two training division HQs,” Army Reserve Magazine, 

Fall 1995, 5. 185 Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 19; Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 55 

Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1993, 53; Major General Roger W. Sandler, “Reserve: 

Finding Steel As It Slims, Reshapes,” The Officer, October 1992, 127 and Webb, et al., Department 

of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1990 and 1991, 69. 186 Harford, Coker, Shanahan and Murphy, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1993, 10, 85 and Kaplan and Morai-Young, Department of the Army Historical 

Summary, Fiscal Year 1994, 77. 187 Baratz, “Nation Needs Reserve Forces,” The Officer, February 1995, 41-42. 188 Kaplan and Morai-Young, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1994, 78. 189 Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 63-65; Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 

52-53; Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1993; Sandler, “Bridging the Gap-New Reserve 

Roles,” Army, October 1993, 134; Oland and Hogan, Department of the Army Historical Summary, 

1992, 62; Lieutenant Colonel Paul Adams, “Bolivian Smiles,” Army Reserve Magazine, Spring 

1993, 24 and Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 550-551. There is a discrepancy in the 

number of soldiers taking part in ODT in fiscal year 1992. 190 Staff Sergeant Keith D. Butler, “COBRA GOLD,” Army Reserve Magazine, Fall 1993, 19. 191 Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 53. 192 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy 

Board, Fiscal Year 1994, xiii, 86. 193 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 577. 194 Ibid., 577-578. 195 Anonymous, U.S. Army Reserve Report ‘91, 6 and Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 71. 196 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy 

Board, Fiscal Year 1990, 106 and Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 60. 197 Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 18. 198 Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 59. 199 Kaplan and Morai-Young, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1994, 89; 

Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy 

Board, Fiscal Year 1994, 93-94 and Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 67. 200 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 577. 201 Ibid., 578. 202 Ibid. 203 Kaplan and Morai-Young, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1994, 89; 

Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy 

Board, Fiscal Year 1994, 93-94 and Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 67. 
CHAPTER 1. POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE STRATEGY

157

204 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 575. 205 Ibid., 578. 206 Ibid. 207 Ibid. 208 Ibid., 575. 209 Ibid. 210 Ibid. 211 Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 67. 212 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy 

Board, Fiscal Year 1990, 116. 213 Kaplan and Morai-Young, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1994, 89-90. 214 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 575-576. 215 Anonymous, US Army Reserve Report ‘91, 6 and Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 18-19, 

71-72. This is almost verbatim from the latter source. 216 Interview, Kathryn Roe Coker with Mr. John Roe, September 3, 2010, Oral History Collection, 

USARHRC, OARH, USARC. 217 Harford, Coker, Shanahan and Murphy, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command 

History, 1993, 72. 218 Ibid., Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 66 and Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 

1993, 61. 219 Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 74; Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 65-66 

and Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1993, 60-61. 220 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1993, Report of the 

Reserve Forces Policy Board, January 1994, 115 and Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component 

Programs, 1993, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Year 1994, 87. 221 Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1993, 59 and Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component 

Program, Report of the Reeve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Year 1994, 89. 222 Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1993, 57; Duncan, The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, 15; Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 73 and Sandler, Army 

Reserve Special Report, 1993, 57 and Oland and Hogan, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal 1992, 61. 223 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Program, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy 

Board, Fiscal Year 1994, 90. 224 Everett and Kaplan, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1993, 80. This is 

virtually verbatim from the source. 225 Everett and Kaplan, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1993, 80. This is 

virtually verbatim from the source. 226 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy 

Board, Fiscal Year 1994, 90. 227 Everett and Kaplan, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1993, 80. This is 

virtually verbatim from the source. 228 Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 77; Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 62 and 

Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1993, 57. 229 Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1993, 61. 230 Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 72-73 and Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1993, 

56. 231 Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 75; Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 63-64 

and Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1993, 58-59. 232 Lieutenant Colonel Paul Adams, “RCAS! Is it here at last?” Army Reserve Magazine, Summer 

1993, 13.
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233 Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 75; Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 63-64 

and Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1993, 58-59. 234 Kaplan and Morai-Young, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1994, 88. 

This is virtually verbatim from the source. 235 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy 

Board, Fiscal Year 1990, xvii. 236 Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1993, 55. 237 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy 

Board, 1990, 117. 238 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1993, Report of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board, 89 and Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 73. 239 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 552; Baratz, “Army Reserve: Committed Force of Citizen-Soldiers,” 1994-1995 Army Green Book, October 1994, 98, and Baratz, “Creating Single 

Standard,” The Officer, April 1994, 24. 240 Lieutenant Colonel Arthur E. House, “Final days of the Cold War,” Army Reserve Magazine, 

Spring 1994, 14. 241 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 555-556. 242 Ibid., 556. 243 Ibid., 556-557. 244 Ibid., 557. 245 Major Mark Dushnyck, “Cameroon, A Lesson for Somalia,” Army Reserve Magazine, Winter 

1993, 15. 246 Ibid. 558 and Lieutenant Colonel Jim Nielsen, “Moving the mail in Mogadishu,” Army Reserve 

Magazine, Winter 1993, 13. 247 Nielsen, “Moving the mail in Mogadishu,” Army Reserve Magazine, Winter 1993, 13. 248 Ibid., 558-560. 249 Major General Roger W. Sandler, “We need ‘ready-to-roll’ reserve units,” Army Reserve Magazine, 

Spring 1993, 6. 250 Ibid., 557-558. 251 Major General Roger W. Sandler, “Somalia shows value of Reserve,” Army Reserve Magazine, 

Winter 1993, 7. 252 Kaplan and Morai-Young, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1994, 81. 

Much of this is verbatim from the source. 253 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 560. 254 Ibid., 561. 255 Stephen Gammons and William Donnelly. Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal 

Year 1995 (Washington, DC: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 2004), 61. 256 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 562. 257 Ibid. 258 Gammons and Donnelly, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year1995, 61. 259 Major General Max Baratz, “A Reorganized Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready,” 1997-1998 

Army Green Book, October 1997, 97. 260 Ibid., 100. 261 Gammons and Donnelly, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year1995, 61. 

This is largely verbatim from the source. 262 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 563. There is a discrepancy in the number of Army 

Reserve soldiers serving in this mission. See Gammons and Donnelly, Department of the Army 

Historical Summary: Fiscal Year1995, 61. 263 Gammons and Donnelly, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year1995, 61. 

This is largely verbatim from the source.
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159

264 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 563-564. 265 Ibid., 565. 266 Harford, Coker, Shanahan, and Murphy, United States Army Reserve Command, 1993, 118-119. 267 Lieutenant Colonel Jim Nielsen, “Army Reserve rebuilds American Samoa after hurricane,” 

Army Reserve Magazine, Third Issue of 1990, 9-10. 268 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 553-554; Harford, Coker, Shanahan, and Murphy, 

United States Army Reserve Command, 1993, 118-119; Coker, Harford, Shanahan, and 

Foster-King, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1994, 238-242, 

247-248 and Baratz, “Creating Single Standard,” The Officer, April 1994, 25. 269 Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 8-9. 270 Ward, “Reserve Looking Toward Future With Anticipation,” The Officer, February 1990, 44 

and Sandler, “Best Investment For Strong USA,” The Officer, February 1992, 44. 271 Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 33 and Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 27. 272 Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 27. 273 Currie and Crossland, Twice the Citizen, 571. 274 Ibid., 564. 275 Ibid. 276 Ibid. 277 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy 

Board, Working Draft, Fiscal Year 1998 (Washington, DC: no date), 58 and USERRA Overview, 

http://www.military.com/benefits/legal-matters/userra/overview. 278 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy 

Board, Working Draft, Fiscal Year 1998, 25. 279 Ibid. 280 Ward, Army Reserve Special Report, 1991, 81. 281 Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 69-70; Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1993, 

63-64 and Dennis K. Bohannon, “BRAC 2005,” Soldiers Magazine, August 2011, 35. 282 Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 1992, 69-70 and Sandler, Army Reserve Special Report, 

1993, 63-64. 283 Brown, Kevlar Legions, 65.
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160
CHAPTER 2. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

161

 CHAPTER 2

ENGAGEMENT AND

ENLARGEMENT

The World Scene at a Glance

Worldwide instability continued in the 1990s with the collapse of the Warsaw 

Pact and the Soviet Union. Although Saddam Hussein’s aggression had been 

checked by open warfare, his failure to abide by provisions of the cease fire 

agreement still posed a threat in the region and added to its volatility. It meant 

a continued and expanded United States mission as part of the NATO presence 

to enforce no-fly zones in the northern and southern regions of Iraq.1 

Coupled with that was the crumbling of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was “a postWorld War I construct that artificially conglomerated” a number of ethnic 

groups such as the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims.2 After World War 

II, Yugoslavia was divided into six republics. Serbia was the largest republic. 

There was peace until the death of the Yugoslav dictator, Josef Tito, in 1980 and 

the breakdown of communism throughout Eastern Europe. That led nationalist and ethnic majorities to claim self-determination and their desire to separate 

from Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in 1991 “in sharp, 

relatively brief wars of independence.”3 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia 

did the same over the next two years.4

 Ethnic rivalries and a Serb revolution 

in Bosnia-Herzegovina led to ethnic cleansing. The United States wanted to 

play no role in the Balkans. It gradually became involved as the United Nations 

Protection Force, deployed in 1992 to enforce cease fires and assist with humanitarian relief, came under attack from the Bosnian Serbs. In August 1995, 

the conflict intensified when Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo allegedly fired a mortar 

round into a crowded market square, killing thirty-seven people. NATO took 

action with a three week air raid on Serbian held positions; the majority of the 

sorties were American. The United States also deployed an infantry battalion 

to Macedonia in what was known as Operation ABLE SENTRY. In the end, 

the Serbs withdrew from Sarajevo. 
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162

Ethnic composition before the war in BiH (1991)

Map 4
CHAPTER 2. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

163

Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Dayton Peace Agreement

and the front lines at the end of 1995

Map 5
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The explosive situation in Croatia intensified. Franjo Tudjman built his army, 

with the assistance of some contracted American advisers, to mount an offensive against Serbs who retained some Croatian lands. On August 4, 1995, he 

launched a successful attack and then assisted allied Bosnian Muslims and Croats who engaged the Serbs. As a result, the Bosnian Serbs, who had controlled 

almost three-fourths of Croatia, were driven out and were left controlling less 

than half of the country. 

In an effort to reach a diplomatic settlement between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, in November 1995 the United States hosted peace talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio. A peace agreement was reached 

(Dayton Agreement or Dayton Accords) on November 19, 1995, followed by 

a formal signing in Paris on December 14, 1995. This ended the three-and-ahalf year old war in Bosnia, but not United States involvement. Code named 

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the United States became part of the NATO 

Implementation Force (IFOR), initially contributing 20,000 soldiers from the 

1st Armored Division.5

 IFOR more than doubled the 

fire power of the United Nations Protective Force as 

compared to 1993 and 1994.6 The mission of IFOR 

was in Secretary of Defense Perry’s words, ‘“to oversee and enforce implementation of the military aspects 

of the peace agreement: Cessation of hostilities, withdrawal to the agreed lines, creation of a zone of separation, return troops and weapons to cantonments.’”7

When the IFOR “mandate” ended on December 20, 

1996, those involved “agreed to continue the missions 

with a UN-sanctioned, NATO-led stabilization force 

(SFOR).”8

 

The Serbian province of Kosovo to the south of Bosnia was another hotbed. 

Despite its Serbian roots, by the 1990s 90 percent of Kosovo was Albanian. 

Slobodan Milosevic moved to contain “the local autonomy these Albanian 

Kosovars had previously enjoyed.”9 What ensued was brutal violence. By early 

1999, over 800,000 ethnic Albanians had fled Kosovo, forced out by Serbian 

forces under Milosevic, “while as many as twelve thousand may have been murdered in a wave of ethnic cleansing that horrified the world.”10 Working with 

European allies, United States forces entered Kosovo in June 1999 in what was 

known as Operation JOINT GUARDIAN. American involvement ranged 

from providing humanitarian relief, temporary refugee settlement at Fort Dix, 

New Jersey, and providing sorties in the Kosovo air campaign to deploying Task 

Force HAWK. Task Force HAWK consisted of a “brigade-size mix of attack 

helicopters, rocket artillery, and mechanized forces deployed into Albania.”11 

IFOR
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The task force became a contingent of the NATO ground forces as part of the 

Kosovo Force (KFOR). The allies were finally able to enforce a tentative peace 

by October of 1999.12 

National Security Strategy 

U.S. involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Kosovo, and in other peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions stemmed from Clinton’s 1994 National 

Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement. Its “mutually supportive” 

goals in Clinton’s words were: “to credibly sustain our security with military 

Map 6
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Sentry at “Mud” Govern, Colonel Gary Cassidy. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army 

Center of Military History) 
CHAPTER 2. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

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forces that are ready to fight. To bolster America’s economic revitalization. To promote democracy abroad.” 

The United States must be engaged 

“actively abroad . . . to open foreign 

markets and create jobs . . . .” A revitalized economy would “sustain [America’s] military forces, foreign initiatives 

and global influence. . . .” Promoting 

democracy abroad would make for a 

safer America as “democratic states . . . 

[were] less likely to threaten. . .[America’s] interests and more likely to cooperate with the U.S. to meet security 

threats and promote sustainable development.” “Our national security 

strategy,” he wrote, “is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a 

range of threats to our nation, our allies 

and our interests.”13 Democracy must 

be enlarged while remaining engaged 

at home and abroad. 

The National Security Strategy recognized the need to re-size and posture 

the military’s capability to win two 

(nearly) simultaneous major regional 

conflicts while at the same time possessing the ability to respond to other 

conflicts, as clearly enunciated in the 

Bottom-Up Review. It also acknowledged the importance of land forces. 

Forces must be prepared to combat 

aggression together with allies, but 

unilaterally (alone without any allies), if 

needed.14 Added to the goals later was 

the May 1997 National Security Strat-
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egy for a New Century’s objective of promoting human rights abroad.15 The 

increased operational tempo was seen in the fact that Army deployments for 

missions went from an average of one every four years during the Cold War 

to fourteen every four years in the post-Cold War era.16 The division between 

domestic and foreign policy became more and more “blurred” as the United 

States lived in a more “global village.”17

Quadrennial Defense Review and National Military Strategy

A strategic justification for the president’s defense program and examining the 

country’s defense needs through 2015 was the focus of the 1997 QuadrenniTent City, Colonel Gary Cassidy. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of 

Military History)
CHAPTER 2. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

169

al Defense Review. The Commission on the Roles & Missions of the Armed 

Forces recommended a strategy review at four-year intervals, which came to 

be known as the quadrennial defense review. Congress made it a statutory requirement with passage of the Armed Forces Structure Act of 1996 as part of 

the National Defense Authorization Act for 1997.18

The Quadrennial Defense Review scrutinized the national defense strategy, 

force modernization plans, infrastructure, the budget plan, “and other elements 

of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view towards 

determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.”19 According to Senator 

Joseph Lieberman, a sponsor of the legislation, “‘Our intent in supporting this 

legislation was to drive the defense debate to a strategy-based assessment of our 

future military requirements and capabilities, not to a budget-driven incremental massage of the status quo.’”20 

The Quadrennial Defense Review was the 

fourth comprehensive review of the military 

since the end of the Cold War. It built on the 

policy and forces of the 1991 Base Force Review, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, and the 

1995 Commission on the Roles & Missions 

of the Armed Forces. As stated in Secretary 

of Defense William S. Cohen’s Report of the 

Quadrennial Defense Review, it was “intended 

to provide a blueprint for a strategy-based, balanced, and affordable defense program.”21

The Quadrennial Defense Review addressed 

the global security environment, defense 

strategy, alternative defense postures, forces 

and manpower, force readiness, transforming 

U.S. forces for the future, achieving a 21st 

century defense infrastructure, and defense resources. The world remained a 

“dangerous and highly uncertain place,” in which the U.S. was likely to confront 

a variety of challenges between then and 2015. It was a period likely to be free 

of a ‘“global peer competitor’” given the end of the Cold War. The U.S. was the 

sole superpower and was anticipated to “remain so throughout the 1997-2015 

period.” This “projection” of the security environment rested on two “assumptions:” the country would remain engaged in world affairs and it would “maintain military superiority over current and potential rivals.”22 

William S. Cohen
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As stated in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Military Strategy

was one of “shape, respond and prepare now.” The armed forces must be able 

to shape the international environment and create conditions favorable to U.S. 

interests and global security. Shaping the international environment involved 

promoting regional stability where the U.S. had vital interests, preventing or 

reducing conflicts and threats which meant maintaining forces overseas and 

conducting “peacetime engagement activities,” and deterring aggression and 

coercion on a daily basis through peacetime deployment of military forces 

abroad.23 Shaping was not new, but an extension of operations already a vital 

part of the Army’s missions.24

The U.S. must be able to respond to crises anywhere across the globe and to 

respond to the full spectrum of crises in an effort to protect the country’s interests. That response could range from “deterring an adversary’s aggression 

or coercion in crisis and conducting concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations to fighting and winning major theater 

wars.”25 Responding compelled the Army 

to be “prepared for rapid deployment of its 

forces anywhere in the world and to sustain 

them as long as necessary to achieve our national objectives.”26

The country must prepare now, as Army 

Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer 

said for an “uncertain future-to be able to 

change the Army in a very fundamental 

way to meet the asymmetrical threats that 

we will face in the future and to adjust to 

the world that is changing very rapidly.”27

Preparing now had several parts: modernization to replace “aging systems and incorporate cutting-edge technologies into the 

force;” exploiting the Revolution in Military Affairs; improving the country’s 

“ability to perform near-term missions, and meet future challenges;” exploiting the Revolution in Business Affairs to radically reengineer DoD infrastructure and support activities;” and taking steps today to position the country to 

“respond more effectively to unlikely, but significant, future threats . . . in a 

“resource-constrained environment.” Both active and reserve forces must be 

“multi-mission capable, proficient in their core warfighting competencies and 

able to transition from peacetime activities and operations to enhanced deterGeneral Dennis J. Reimer
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Figure II-1: Projected Army End Strength Reduction, 1989-1998

Army Force Reductions Under QDR

1989-1998

1989 AR Active Army NG

35%

37%

20%

1998

Figure II-2: Projected Army End Strength Reduction, 1989-1998

Army Force Reductions Under QDR

1989-1998

1989 1998

319,000

200000

250000

300000

350000

150000

100000

208000
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rence in crises, to war.” Full spectrum forces needed a “balanced mix of overseas 

presence and power projection capabilities.”28

The defense budget was approximately $250 billion in “constant 1997 dollars 

per year.” The Quadrennial Defense Review recognized that barring any “deterioration in world events, the nation . . .[was] unlikely to support significantly greater resources dedicated to national defense. . . . Indeed, any slowing of 

progress in reaching deficit reduction targets could generate pressure to lower 

DoD spending.” Tensions existed in resource priorities, such as in funds for 

procurement and funds for operations and support activities.29

Among the Quadrennial Defense Review decisions supporting the security environment was the Army’s retention of ten active, combat ready divisions. There 

would be an acceleration of Force XXI. A reduction of approximately 15,000 

active duty personnel was to be implemented though “deactivation, consolidation and realignment of headquarters and support facilities to improve overall 

support to the combat organizations.”30

 The Quadrennial Defense Review recognized that the reserves had become an 

“even larger percentage of the Total Force and . . . [were] essential participants 

in the full spectrum of operations. . . . No major operation can be successful 

without them.” The Army would restructure the reserve component. “Elements of the Reserve component, the traditional Cold War strategic reserve can 

be reduced and transitioned into capabilities that have greater utility across the 

entire spectrum.” Toward that end, there would be less of a combat structure 

and the conversion of some units from combat to combat support and combat service support would be quickened. This restructuring would result in an 

end strength reduction of some 45,000 personnel by September 2001. Under 

this plan recommended by the Quadrennial Defense Review and directed by 

the secretary of defense, the National Guard would lose 38,000 soldiers; the 

Army Reserve would lose 7,000.31 There would be a reduction in end strength 

from 208,000 to 205,000 in 2000, with a reduction of 2,000 spaces in 2001 

and 2002.32 Baratz explained “That allocation, based on the power-projection 

strategy and modernization goals of America’s Army would be sensible and fairshared.” He referred to the fact that between 1989 and 1998 the Army Reserve was taking a 35 percent reduction in end-strength, going from 319,000 

to 208,000. That was compared to the active Army’s 37 percent reduction, but 

above the National Guard’s 20 percent reduction. According to Baratz, “The 

Quadrennial Defense Review did more than shape the force. More importantly, 

it reaffirmed this country’s need for a capable and ready Army Reserve as part 

of the National Military Strategy. . . . America today cannot go to war without 
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173

the Army Reserve . . . .”33 When the reductions were completed, the National 

Guard and the Army Reserve would be reduced 32 percent from Cold War 

levels compared with a 38 percent active Army reduction.34

A Proactive Strategy and Shifting Paradigm 

Much of the world embraced democratic ideals. The threat of nuclear war 

decreased and diplomatic efforts helped create a more stable world. Still, there 

were uncertainties posed by regional dangers; asymmetric challenges, such as 

weapons of mass destruction and cyber-terrorism (computer virus attacks); 

transnational threats, including drug trafficking and terrorism; and “wild card” 

threats such as the unanticipated loss of key allies or the emergence of new 

technologies.35 Shaping the international environment while using a conservative allocation of personnel and funds and at the same time “preparing for 

worldwide contingencies became as important, conceptually, as responding to 

major crises after they had already occurred. Shaping and preparing [effecting 

the National Military Strategy] argued for intense multinational activity during 

periods of peace or operations other than war and for developing capabilities 

useful worldwide at all levels of the combat spectrum rather than those focused 

narrowly on a specific threat.”36

What did this proactive strategy, requiring an expanded role for the military, 

mean for America’s Army and for the Army Reserve? It meant commitments to 

forward presence operations larger than at any peacetime era during the Cold 

War.37 Although the Army was smaller than at any time since before World 

War II, it was being called upon for more missions. In 1995, the Army had an 

average of 22,200 soldiers operationally deployed to over seventy countries on 

any given day.38 By 1997, the Army was averaging over 31,000 soldiers deployed 

to ninety-one countries.39 In fact, by 1997 the country had committed forces 

in response to crises almost forty times since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Those 

varied missions included counterdrug operations, noncombatant evacuation, 

and providing nation assistance along with humanitarian relief. Between 1989 

and 1997, the Army had encountered a 300 percent increase in operational deployments.40 In the forty years between 1950 and 1989, the Army conducted 

By 1997, the country had committed forces in response to crises

almost forty times since the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
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Logistics at Butmir, Colonel Gary Cassidy. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center 

of Military History) 
CHAPTER 2. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

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ten major deployments; from 1990 to 1997, 

twenty-five were conducted.41 As the century ended, the active Army’s and the reserve 

components’ operational tempo continued 

to increase and, according to General Reimer, “proved higher than expected” as the 

Army continued the mission in Bosnia, conducted various domestic operations, provided forces to reinforce the U.S. presence in 

Southwest Asia, and responded to aid foreign countries.42

For the reserves, it meant a shift in the paradigm from a limited-use reserve force to 

a call for an integrated total force.43 It was 

no longer a question of whether or not the 

reserves would be activated; it was, in the 

words of an assistant secretary of defense for 

reserve affairs, ‘“a question of how much.’”44

By 1997, no longer would the reserves be 

called to duty only for national emergencies 

or World War III type scenarios.45 

In September 1997, Secretary of Defense 

Cohen issued a memorandum on the integration of the reserve and active components. He wanted to “create an environment 

that eliminated all residual barriers, structural and cultural, for effective integration 

within . . . [the] Total Force.” ‘“Our goal,’” 

he wrote, ‘“as we move into the 21st century, 

must be a seamless Total Force that provides 

the National Command Authorities the flexibility and interoperability necessary for the 

full range of military operations.’”46 Total 

force integration would become a reality 

when four basic principles were achieved: 
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1. senior leaders throughout the Total Force “clearly” understanding “responsibility for and ownership of the Total Force;” 

2. “clear and mutual understanding of the mission for each unit - Active, 

Guard and Reserve – in service and joint/combined operations, during 

peace and war; 

3. commitment to provide the resources needed to accomplish assigned 

missions;” 

4. “leadership by senior commanders – Active, Guard and Reserve - - to 

ensure the readiness of the Total Force.”47

In his April 1997 annual report to the president and Congress, Cohen stated that the “Army Reserve is now a seamless component of the Army.”48 The 

following year he reported, “The Total Force increasingly will depend on the 

Reserve component to serve not only in their traditional wartime role, but also 

to provide a rotational base to ease operating and personnel tempo for a busy 

active component.”49

Self Study 

In the midst of this proactive strategy and shifting paradigm, the armed forces 

and the Army continued to redesign and reexamine itself. In the spring of 1996, 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published Joint Vision 2010, an operationally based model, template for the evolution of the armed forces into the 

twenty-first century. It provided “direction for developing unique service capabilities within a joint framework of doctrine and programs.” Joint Vision 2010

sought in the twenty-first century “full spectrum dominance – the capability 

to dominate an opponent across the full range of military operations.” That 

dominance rested on four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision 

engagement, full dimensional protection and focused logistics enabled by information superiority, and technological innovations. Information superiority and 

technological innovations ensured the ability to collect, process, and disseminate the steady flow of information across the battlefield needed to secure operational objectives and prevent an adversary from doing the same. Joint Vision 

2010 foresaw the country’s involvement in a wide range of deterrent, conflict 

The “Army Reserve is now a seamless component of the Army.”

William S. Cohen
CHAPTER 2. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

177

prevention and peacetime endeavors most often with allies. To effect this, 

power projection and an overseas presence would most probably remain the 

basic strategy of the twenty-first century force.50 

The Army was key to the success of Joint Vision 2010. Its road map of how 

the Army would fulfill Joint Vision 2010 was Army Vision 2010, published in 

November 1996. Army Vision 2010 concentrated on the inferences the concepts in Joint Vision 2010 would have on the Army’s primary ability of “conducting prompt and sustained operations on land across the entire spectrum 

of military operations.” Army Vision 2010 also recognized the importance of 

land power “as the force of decision” in future operations. It pointed to Bosnia 

and the need of ground forces to enforce the peace accords as a testament to 

that. The Army would implement its responsibilities through six archetypes of 

operations to be performed in war and other military operations: project the 

force, protect the force, shape the battle space, decisive operations, sustain the 

force, and gain information dominance.51

Army Vision 2010 connected the ongoing Force XXI with the Army After Next 

(AAN), the long term vision (out to 2025) of a capabilities-based, logistically 

unencumbered, radically different Army. “The purpose of AAN . . . [was] to 

conduct a broad range of studies of warfare to the year 2025, frame issues critical to the development of the Army during that period, and integrate them into 

the Force XXI process.”52 Force XXI was the process used to fulfill, as General 

Reimer said, the third “pillar” of the National Military Strategy: prepare now 

for future land power.53

Figure 11-3: Army After Next
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The first near term product of Force XXI would be Army XXI, “a versatile 

army with capabilities” the country would need in the twenty-first century to 

be fielded by 2010. Army XXI would be a flexible, agile, versatile, lethal, power 

projection and digitized force, evidencing improvements in combat systems and 

the addition of information technology better able to provide the country full 

spectrum dominance.54 It would be a technological and cultural transformation, a revolution in military affairs.55 Army XXI would be the “bridge” to the 

next century. The Army would “design a networked and digitized division--the 

basic, self-sustaining element of landpower--as its initial Army XXI organization.56

According to General Reimer, “Force XXI, Army Vision 2010 and AAN [Army 

After Next] work collaboratively to identify the types of capabilities and areas 

of technology applications that will accommodate their respective environments and the implications for doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers.” These three would “establish a continuum 

of orderly change, assuring a disciplined approach to meeting the challenges of 

an uncertain future and maximizing the innovations of the military, academia, 

and industry.”57

As noted in the Quadrennial Defense Review, Force XXI was accelerated. In 

1995, the Army created the Force XXI Experimental Force (EXFOR). The 

EXFOR would select systems to develop and incorporate into a tactical framework. The EXFOR worked ‘“to experiment with and test new organization designs, warfighting/operational concepts, training, and equipment that produces 

enhancements in the lethality, survivability, tempo, sustainability, deployability, 

joint/combined linkages, and versatility of the force.’”58 The EXFOR was a 

“test bed” for Force XXI. It was developed on a brigade combat team from the 

4th Infantry Division (Mechanized).59

By 1997, Force XXI developments went from concept to reality with advancements in computer and digital communications, which “made possible the goal 

of building a combat unit whose components shared a common, automatically 

updated view of the battlefield.” In March 1997, Advanced Warfighting Experiment Task Force XXI illustrated this. At the National Training Center, the task 

force used a brigade trained on more dependable digital equipment.60

Personnel Strength

This call for integration and a proactive strategy came during a period of continued drawdown. The most immediate, visible difference between the Army 

of 1989 and 1995 was its size. By September 1995, the active Army’s strength 

stood at 508,559, a reduction of about 32,000 from the final 1994 end strength.61
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179

Figure II- 4: Joint Vision 2010
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In 1996, the Total Army’s strength of 1,087,200 soldiers was the smallest it had 

been since the end of World War II. In that year, the U.S. Army dropped to 

the eighth largest in the world.62 Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and 2000, 

the number of active forces dropped by more than a third while the reserve 

forces declined by more than one-fourth. However, the use of the reserves had 

grown steadily.63 At the end of the century, actual active Army end strength was 

479,426.64 Deploying a smaller active Army would require greater integration 

with the reserves for combat units and combat support units.

Army Reserve end strength went from a high of 319,000 soldiers in 1989 to 

208,000 in 1998, a 35 percent reduction in personnel. Indeed, between 1989 

and 1996 the reserves declined by 22 percent; the worst being in the Army Reserve. Yet in 1996, the Army Reserve offset 5.8 million active component mandays, the most of any reserve component.65 By fiscal year 1999, reserve component man-days of service doubled in five years to 12.5 million man-days.66

The Army Reserve declined 12.1 percent in its IRR force, going from 783,514 

assigned personnel in 1994 to 688,754 assigned in 1995.67 By 1998, the Army 

Reserve constituted 16 percent of the total military force compared to 28.3 percent for the National Guard and 17.7 percent for the IRR.68 In 1999, the Army 

Reserve and the National Guard comprised 44 percent of the Army.69

Military technician strength fell as did active guard reserve (AGR) strength.70 

In fiscal year 1996, 11,576 AGR soldiers and 4,540 military technicians served 

full-time in the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve received the lowest level of 

full-time support of the reserve components, yet some 70 percent of its units 

were rated as ready for war.71 In 1997, 9 percent of all Army Reserve personnel 

were full-time support, the lowest level of any Department of Defense reserve 

component.72 In 1999, the Army Reserve’s full-time support personnel authorization fell to 12,895 positions, 37.5 percent short of the number required.73

The Army Reserve had an attrition rate of 35.4 percent in fiscal year 1997 for 

enlisted soldiers compared to 32.6 percent in fiscal year 1998. The attrition rate 

for officers was 18.9 percent in fiscal year 1997 compared to 17.6 percent in fiscal year 1998. Declining attrition rates were attributed to a number of factors, 

including a retention office reporting to the chief, Army Reserve; regulations 

This call for integration and a proactive strategy came during a period 

of continued drawdown. 
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181

involving commanders, senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and civilian 

employees in the retention effort, especially for first timer soldiers; making retention a quantifiable statistic on each commander’s officer evaluation report; 

increasing the number of retention NCOs in 1998 by some 500; standardizing 

all retention training through the Army Reserve Readiness Training Center; 

and updating the U.S. Army’s reenlistment program to include the expanded 

retention program and making changes to improve the reenlistment process.74 

One initiative the Army Reserve took to reduce attrition and to improve recruitment was deploying contractors to Europe to tender Army Reserve opportunities to soldiers leaving active duty.75 Highest attrition rates occurred among 

E-1 to E-4 soldiers.76 

In 1999, the recruitment and retention of health care professionals became a 

problem and raised readiness issues. This was in spite of the sizeable increases 

in the health profession loan repayment program provided in the Fiscal Year 

Figure II-5: Army Manpower 1999

1999

Army Manpower

Army Reserve

&

National Guard

44%

Active Army

56%
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1998 National Defense Authorization Act. But, no funds were appropriated to 

guarantee the continued financial attraction of Army Reserve service to health 

care professionals.77 Overall, in 1999 the Army Reserve missed its recruiting 

goal by 10,000; the active Army missed it by 6,000.78

There were a number of programs to boost retention, including the continuing 

Selected Reserve Incentive Program. Non-prior enlistees could choose to use 

the Student Loan Repayment Program during their initial contract, providing 

their loan did not go over $10,000. Other incentives included the Civilian Acquired Skills Program which gave all enlistees a $5,000 bonus. Soldiers who 

reenlisted or extended their tours were eligible to receive a $2,500 bonus.79

Personnel Administration and Management

In the personnel administration arena, in October 1994, Congress passed the 

Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROMPA), effective on October 1, 

1996. Its purpose: update and consolidate statutes governing all reserves (except the Coast Guard); standardization for all services and between reserve and 

active forces; and simplify reserve officer appointments, promotions, separations and transfer to retired status of reserve commissioned officers (excluding 

warrant officers). Significant changes included: 

1. eliminated time-in-service requirements for promotions; 

2. eliminated promotions based on position vacancies; 

3. eliminated Senate approval of promotions for colonel and below; 

4. best qualified policy for promotion replaced by fully qualified; 

5. 200 changes to existing laws for management of commissioned officers.

ROMPA included the first significant changes to the laws affecting reserve officers 

since the 1954 Reserve Officer Personnel Act. ROMPA equated to the Defense 

Officer Personnel Management Act for active duty commissioned officers.80

In answer to lessons learned from Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT 

STORM, Section 511 of the Fiscal Year 1998 National Defense Authorization Act created the Individual Ready Reserve Activation Authority (IRRAA). 

During the Gulf War, later deploying units were activated to supply soldiers to 

fill earlier deploying units. This cross-leveling jeopardized the cohesion and 

readiness of the later deploying units. The IRAA was intended to foster the 

availability of certain trained and qualified members of the IRR to fill selected shortfalls in early mobilizing and deploying active component and reserve 

component units. Section 511 amended Section 10144 of Title 10, U.S. Code 
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183

to create a new category of IRR members subject to involuntary call to active 

duty under a presidential selected reserve call-up. Also, Section 511 amended 

Section 12304 of Title 10, U.S. Code to authorize the president to call as many 

as 30,000 members of the new IRR category from all services; there was no 

definite limit to the number of qualified people who could volunteer. There 

were certain eligibility requirements and IRRA members were not required to 

attend drills or annual training, although they had priority for available refresher training and training opportunities with units that needed their skills.81

A personnel management tool arrived in May 1996 with the approval of the 

Reserve Associate Support Program. This improved war fighting capabilities 

and lowered shortfalls in the active Army. Soldiers could complete initial training in the Army Reserve, serve a required two year active tour of duty and then 

return to their units as drilling reserve soldiers to finish their four year obligation. While in the active duty stage, soldiers completed Skill Level 1 training 

tasks. The program supplied the high priority force support package units with 

well trained and experienced soldiers.82 One hundred Army Reserve soldiers 

participated in fiscal year 1997.83

Fiscal Strength 

Manning and maintaining a robust force and funding shortfalls presented challenges. In 1995, the Army’s Department of Defense modernization budget was 

13 percent, as General Reimer said, the “smallest piece of a small pie.”84 Since 

1989, reductions in defense spending provided a significant “peace dividend.” 

He told the Senate’s Committee on Armed Services in March 1991, “More than 

a decade of decreased defense spending has resulted in more than $750 billion 

dollars in savings that has helped energize the economy and turn the budget 

deficit into a surplus for the first time in thirty years. Proportionally, we spend 

far less on defense today than we have in our recent history. In fact, the total 

budget for the Department of Defense accounts for less than 3 percent of the 

Gross Domestic Product, the lowest spending on defense since before Pearl 

Harbor.” General Reimer said the 1999 budget included supplemental funding for the Army of about $1.4 billion for contingency operations and $375 

million that addressed near-term readiness issues.85

Between 1989 and 1998, the Army’s buying power declined 39 percent.86 The 

1999 budget marked thirteen years of straight decline in real buying power for 

the Army.87 On a positive note, the 1997 Department of Defense appropriation 

included an additional $64 million over original Department of Defense budget 

requests for the Army Reserve. “That’s a good indicator,” said Baratz, “of the 
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confidence Congress has in the 

relevance of the Army Reserve, 

and its commitment to increase 

USAR readiness.”88 Still in 1998, 

the Army Reserve accounted for 

5 percent of total Army funding. Its total obligation authority was 7 percent. In 1998, the 

Army Reserve was underfunded 

by over $509 million in its operations and maintenance program. 

There were shortages in civilian 

pay, real property maintenance, 

information management, base 

communications, operational 

tempo, and depot maintenance. 

Schools and special training were 

underfunded in the personnel account. With shortages of school 

training dollars in the Army Reserve accounts, annul training 

dollars were spent on sending 

soldiers to school instead of unit 

annual training. This was good 

for individual professional development, but not for unit collective training. Operations and 

maintenance funds in 1998 were 

insufficient to support the National Military Strategy of fighting two simultaneous major theater wars. There was a shortfall 

for certain later deploying and 

support units. The Army recognized this shortfall in planning, 

programming and budgeting and 

funded resources on a “first to 

fight” basis.89 
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The New Bridge at Mostar, Colonel Gary Cassidy. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army 

Center of Military History)
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Force Structure

For the Army Reserve, the results of redesigning itself were the command and 

control reorganization of the Army Reserve, first announced in 1994. This 

increased the USARC’s training and mobilization of Army Reserve units and 

reduced the table of distribution and allowance overhead. In 1994, 20,000 soldiers were taken out of the Army Reserve. As Baratz noted, “you just can’t take 

soldiers down, with that you have to take overhead down.”90

Based on the study mentioned in chapter one, in April 1995, ten regional 

support commands replaced twenty Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs). 

Regional support commands were based in California, New York, Alabama, 

Minnesota, Kansas, Arkansas, Massachusetts, Utah, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Three regional support groups, which supported command and control missions of those regional support commands with large troop program 

units, were in South Carolina, Indiana, and Texas. Three ARCOMs remained in 

Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Germany. As noted previously, the regional support 

commands provided command and control for assigned units in their territory. 

They managed and maintained unit readiness for base operations of Army Reserve units in their region and for the initial management of mobilizing units. 

This included cross-leveling of personnel and equipment.91 Plans called for a 

garrison support unit to be established at each of the seven inactivating ARCOM locations, making a home for many of the soldiers assigned to the inactivating ARCOMs.92 According to Baratz, “The overhead – the ARCOMs – is 

expensive, and was based on the old Cold War and the activities that related 

to the Cold War. By taking down the overhead from 20 ARCOMs to 10 new 

commands with new missions, we’ve given the Army Reserve a much more robust command structure.”93 ‘“The reorganization,’” he added, ‘“will make us 

relevant, affordable, and prepare us for the future.’”94

Functions were restructured between the OCAR and the USARC, the U.S. 

Army Reserve Personnel Center (AR-PERCEN) and the Full-Time Support 

Management Center. The headquarters level goal was to improve services to 

Army Reserve units and individuals. OCAR operations, force development, 

“In fact, the total budget for the Department of Defense accounts for 

less than 3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, the lowest spending on defense since before Pearl Harbor.” General Dennis R. Reimer
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force integration, and training functions transferred to the USARC. The headquarters restructuring and the command and control reorganization saved over 

2,000 civilian and military positions.95

On October 16, 1997, the AR-PERCEN in St. Louis, Missouri, became the 

U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM). This was in response to the Bottom-Up Review effort to reduce redundant systems, while 

improving efficiency. This was done in the face of decreased defense spending. 

AR-PERSCOM became permanent on October 1, 1998, with the recommendation by an Army Reserve Council of Colonels. The council met in 1994 

to determine how the functions and structure of the Army Reserve fitted into 

Force XXI. The council concluded that Army Reserve policy functions, personnel management and service could be simplified. The group recommended 

consolidating these functions, spread across four agencies (OCAR’s Personnel 

Division, Army Reserve Personnel Center, Full-Time Support Management 

Center and USARC’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel), into one command. 

The AR-PERSCOM became the sole source supporting Army Reserve personnel management in peacetime and during mobilization. It improved mobilization support capability between the Total Army Personnel Command and the 

Army Reserve. The AR-PERSCOM executed business processes to improve 

personnel readiness for Army Reserve soldiers. The AR-PERSCOM functions 

included personnel management, strength accounting, personnel actions, personnel system automation, and identification of personnel life cycle requirements to support total Army Reserve force readiness. The AR-PERSCOM was 

a personnel management organization more in sync with the Department of the 

Army’s Personnel Command.96 Innovations included the personnel electronic 

record management system (PERMS), which converted paper and microfiche 

records into electronic data. That alleviated the paper bottleneck.97 

To increase the readiness of the Army Reserve contingency force base (including transportation terminal units and medical units), in 1995 the USARC established more garrison support units (GSUs). The units backfilled installation 

base operations activities vacated by active Army units deployed to contingency 

operations. In 1995, twelve new GSUs were established. This was in response 

to problems which surfaced in the mobilization system for Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. In June 1996, three GSUs mobilized for 

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. GSUs also assisted active Army units during 

peacetime. By January 1996, thirteen of the fifteen power projection platforms 

had GSUs assigned.98 Two power projection platforms belonged to the Army 

Reserve: Fort Dix and Fort McCoy.99 They were two of the former eight active 

component installations operated by the Army Reserve.100
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Peacekeepers on the Princip Bridage, Colonel Gary Cassidy. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, 

U.S. Army Center of Military History)
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The Army Reserve reorganized 

port/terminal, military intelligence, medical augmentation hospitals, and movement control units. 

Such units enhanced the Army 

Reserve’s power projection to be 

ready on the first day of a contingency.101

On November 1, 1995, the USARC established the Office of Installation Management and Policy. Its mission was to oversee the 

Installation Management program 

within the Army Reserve and advise the chief, Army Reserve. This 

office supported installation operations with planning and execution. An example of the office’s 

first action was the inactivation on 

March 31, 1996, of Fort Devens, 

Massachusetts, in accordance with 

the Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990. Department of 

the Army General Order 2, dated 

April 1, 1996, marked the activation of the Devens Reserve Forces 

Training Area in Massachusetts. 

Command and control of Devens 

became the responsibility of Fort 

McCoy, an Army Reserve installation already under USARC command and control. In September 

1996, the Office of Installation 

Management became responsible 

for all reserve issues on installations scheduled for transfer to 

the Army Reserve. Plans began 
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to transfer Fort Dix, New Jersey, and the Charles E. Kelly Support Facility in 

Pennsylvania, to the Army Reserve for command and control. Then, the office 

broadened command and control from Fort Dix over the Charles E. Kelly 

Support Facility and the Devens Reserve Forces Training Area and planned 

to inactivate Fort Pickett. On September 30, 1997, the Virginia National 

Guard assumed control of Fort Picket, which was inactivated under BRAC. 

Regional support commands became responsible for installation management and base operations as the Army Reserve assumed those functions from 

the active Army.102 

The Department of Defense ordered the military services to integrate their 

active and reserve components into the Total Force to renew its pledge to depend on the reserves. One way to do that was through designing composite 

units. They were comprised of soldiers from all Army components and other 

military services. Active Army and full time support Army Reserve personnel 

assigned to these units provided an instant response cell during mobilization 

and deployment. An example was the 310th Chemical Company (Biological Integrated Detection), activated in September 1996 at Fort McClellan, Alabama. 

It was one of the Army’s two biological integrated detection system companies. 

Four platoons, the company headquarters, and support elements belonged to 

the Army Reserve, while one operational platoon belonged to the active Army. 

In another example, on October 16, 1999, the 3d Medical Command activated 

as a composite unit. The unit was located in Decater, Georgia, and consisted of 

200 Army Reserve and twenty-nine active Army positions.103

The U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) 

was an example of a multi-component unit. 

It commanded and controlled active and 

Army Reserve civil affairs and psychological operations units. An Army Reserve 

general officer led it and most of its assets 

were Army Reserve. Chief, Army Reserve 

Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes said 

the command was “a model for the seamless” multi-component unit concept.104

Another example of the multi-component 

concept was the integration in 1999 of the 

reserves into the 4th Infantry Division, de- Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes
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signed to offset the reduction of authorized personnel. National Guard and 

Army Reserve soldiers were to fill the 4th Infantry Division’s modified table of 

organization and equipment positions that were designated as “required, not 

authorized.”105 

After a review of wartime staffing, the Joint Staff created joint readiness units 

(JRUs) to integrate personnel into unified command staffs to meet wartime 

mission needs. The Army’s contribution was active, National Guard and Army 

Reserve personnel, individual mobilization augmentees, and troop program 

unit soldiers to these units. Soldiers in these units were integrated into the staff 

of the commanders-in-chief. Army Reserve soldiers in JRUs were subject to 

presidential selected reserve call-up, augmenting the Army commanders’ abilities to respond to contingency operations.106 In 1998, there were 1,940 Army 

Reserve soldiers serving in joint reserve units. They were distributed as follows: 

350 in the U.S. Atlantic Command, 373 in the U.S. European Command, 530 

in the U.S. Pacific Command, 311 in the U.S. Central Command, 192 in the 

U.S. Southern Command, 109 in the U.S. Special Operations Command, 1 in 

the Strategic Command, 34 in the Space Command, and 40 on the Joint Staff.107

The Army continued its “first to fight” for funding, personnel, training, and 

equipment. The force support package (FSP) replaced the contingency force 

pool (CFP). The FSP included strategic force packages of combat service and 

combat service support units to support five and one third (5 1/3) CONUS 

based combat divisions for a regional conflict. The FSP supported one full 

Army corps with five and one third Army divisions, the headquarters, and major 

subordinate commands of a second corps together with enough combat service 

and combat service support units to brace a full theater in a major regional 

conflict environment. It also included several major subordinate commands 

to open a second theater, thereby, making the FSP a functional entity supporting the “first to fight” units.108 Tier 1 units, including force support package 

units, special operations support package units, continental U.S. support package units and early deployers, were highly trained and first to receive resources 

and prepared to deploy by dates designed in commanders-in-chief operations. 

To make certain that Tier 1 units were at a sharp state of readiness all the 

time, the Army presented them with 100 percent funding for Operations and 

Maintenance, Army Reserve; 100 percent fill of full-time support personnel, 

high priority for training school allocations, and equipment enhancements. 

Tier 2 units and lower received resources coinciding with their mobilization 

missions or their position on major operations plan time-phased force deployment data lists. 
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Force Support Package 1 units supported 4-1/3 divisions, 1 full corps headquarters, and 1 theater slice (elements of a theater Army). Force Support 2 units 

supported 1 division, 1 partial corps headquarters, and 1 theater-opening slice. 

In 1997, the Total Army had 1,134 FSP units. Of those, 363 were from the 

Army Reserve; 209 from the National Guard.109 In 1995, the FSP included 356 

Army Reserve units. Two hundred and forty-seven of these were previous CFP 

units. 110 In 1997, there was a 3 percent decline in FSP readiness attributed to a 

2 percent decline in the number of qualified soldiers and a 3 percent decline in 

equipment on hand resulting from reorganization and modernization.

111 

In 1997, the Army’s two theater-level command and control signal units, two 

theater Army area commands, the round-out structure for the two active theater Army commands, and the only deployable medical command came from 

the Army Reserve.112 

Although much of the Army Reserve’s aviation structure was transferred or inactivated as a result of the Off-Site Agreement, the Army Reserve kept comFigure II-6: Total Army Force Support Package Units, 1997

363 Units

Army Reserve

32%

209 Units

NG

18%

562 Units

Active Army

50%
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bat support and combat service support core competency aviation units. In 

1997, that force included two attack helicopter battalions operating the AH94A Apache, three medium helicopter companies flying the CH-47C Chinook, 

and four theater fixed-wing aviation companies flying the C-12 along with the 

command, control and support organizations. Beginning in 1997, the Army 

Reserve added the UC-35 jet to its fixed-wing fleet.113 

In 1999, the Army Reserve supplied 45 percent of the Army’s combat service 

support units and 26 percent of its combat support units. These were distributed as follows: 

1. 100 percent of the Army’s individual and collective training support divisions and railway units, enemy prisoner of war brigades and chemical 

brigades; 

2. 97 percent of its civil affairs units; 

3. 85 percent of its psychological operations units; 

4. 80 percent of the medical brigades; 

5. 80 percent of the transportation groups; 

6. 69 percent of the petroleum supply battalions; 

7. 62 percent of its chemical and biological defense resources. 

The Army Reserve had a large proportion of many other critically needed and 

often used units.114 

Training 

Training continued to be a key factor of force readiness. The reserves used the 

Status of Resources and Training Systems (SORTS) to give the commander a 

unit’s readiness status. The Army Reserve and National Guard were required 

to report pre-mobilization training in SORTS. The Army Reserve used several 

programs to measure and evaluate combat readiness. That included LANES, a 

process for training smaller units on mission essential task list related functions; 

the training assessment model; command post and field training exercises; Joint 

Readiness and Training Center and National Training Center rotations; and 

battle command training program exercises. Budget constraints and operational tempo affected training evaluations.115 Tiered resourcing also affected 

training seats, additional drill assignments, regular individual duty training, and 

annual training allocations.116 Affecting post-mobilization training was a unit’s 

readiness. This included qualified personnel, equipment on hand, and equipment readiness upon mobilization. Training ranged from fourteen to over forty 

days based on the unit’s readiness status.117
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The BOLD SHIFT program continued to improve individual, collective and leader training. The 

Operational Readiness Evaluation 

program continued, whereby Army 

headquarters in CONUS sent 

teams to examine reserve training 

and readiness.118 

Section 1132 of Title XI broadened the Army’s Active Component Support to Reserve Component Program from 2,000 active duty 

personnel to 5,000. These were full 

time advisors to the National Guard 

and Army Reserve. During 1995, 

the Army began assigning more 

personnel to this duty.119 

The divisions (institutional training) (DIVITs) as part of the Total 

Army Training System (TASS) 

continued to manage individual 

training within a geographic area, 

to include initial entry training, 

one-station unit training, MOS 

qualification and refresher training, and professional development. 

The professional development 

training included the Primary 

Leadership Development course, 

the Advanced Noncommissioned 

Officer course, the Combined 

Arms and Service Staff School, and 

the Command and General Staff 

Officers course. In fiscal year 1997, 

the Army Reserve prepared for an 
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Minefield, Colonel Gary Cassidy. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of 

Military History)
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expanded mission to conduct ROTC basic and advanced summer camps. Army 

Reserve soldiers from the DIVITs began serving as ROTC instructors at three 

universities in a trial program.120 

As planned, in 1994 the five Army Reserve divisions exercise (DIVEX) more 

than doubled in size. The increase was to accommodate the divisions’ responsibilities to conduct small unit lane and brigade/battalion staff computer simulation training for the reserve components. During mobilizations, they helped 

active Army readiness groups with unit validation.121

The DIVEXs used lanes training to enhance the tactics and skills of units. 

They used the Brigade Command and Battle Staff Training Program to plan, 

conduct, and implement staff training for combined arms, combat support, and 

combat service support units.122 In 1996, the DIVEXs trained 405 Army Reserve and National Guard units through lanes training and 167 units through 

battle command and battle staff training.123 

In 1996, the USARC provided guidance to establish responsibilities, processes, requirements, and milestones for the exercise divisions, implementing the 

Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement (GFRE) program mentioned in chapter one. GFRE, an element of the Total Army School System, outlined a training partnership of active and reserve units to accentuate pre- and post-mobilization training.124 

In October 1999, the Army Reserve formed five training support divisions, 

(75th, 78th, 85th, 87th, 91st), entirely integrated active and reserve organizations. These came from the Army Reserve’s five DIVEXs to provide dedicated 

training support to all components of the Total Army.125 Army Reserve major 

generals commanded the five training support divisions, which were under the 

operational control of the two continental armies.126 The five training support 

divisions managed synchronized and integrated training support to all component priority units at either their unit locations or designated training locations. 

Their objectives were to achieve mobilization training goals along with high 

readiness levels and to reduce the time required for post-mobilization training 

prior to operational deployment. The Army Reserve commanded the divisions 

and battalions while the active Army commanded the brigades. The conversion 

resulted in twenty relocations and inactivation of seven Army Reserve brigades, 

eight battalions, and four logistics support battalions.127

In 1997, the Army Reserve began the Reserve Associate Support Program 

(RASP) with one hundred Army Reserve soldiers. The RASP was a training 

program that enhanced readiness by providing soldiers fully trained in critical 
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197

skills. Soldiers who enlisted in RASP completed initial-entry training and then 

were attached to an active Army unit for the remainder of a two-year active duty 

for training obligation before serving a minimum of four years with their Army 

Reserve unit. The extended active duty tour allowed soldiers to complete skill 

level 1 training tasks before returning to their Army Reserve unit. Through 

RASP, active Army personnel shortages were reduced, war fighting capabilities 

were augmented and when the training period was completed, Army Reserve 

units reaped the benefits of having fully trained, field-tested soldiers.128 

Regional Training Sites-Medical provided comprehensive, integrated, progressive training tailored to the widely multi-faceted needs of the various medical 

units within the Total Army. The Quadrennial Defense Review determined that 

fewer hospitals were required to support America’s Army in the future. The 162 

hospitals that were needed to meet the threat during the Cold War dropped 68 

percent to just fifty-two hospitals under the Army analysis 2003 threat conditions. In 1994, there were seven training sites (two in the National Guard and 

Figure II-7: Training Support Divisions 
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five in the Army Reserve). In 1997, the two National Guard sites converted 

to medical company training sites. In October 1997, the Army Reserve site at 

Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, established as the last Regional Training Site-Medical 

in 1994, closed. In March 1997, the Army Reserve chose to close the site at the 

Devens Reserve Forces Training Area.129 

Participation at combat training centers (CTC) was a critical training concept. 

It was the Army’s most demanding training event. Rotations through the CTC 

undeniably improved training readiness. The training strategy’s first year focused on crew, squad and platoon; the second year on platoon and company; 

the third year on the company and battalion; and the fourth year on company 

through brigade operations. Training for the fifth year replicated the first year; 

the sixth year replicated the second year; the seventh year replicated the third 

year and incorporated combat support and combat service support training 

with augmentation units. The latter training continued in the eighth year. 

Concomitantly, leader training was conducted throughout the eight-year 

training cycle.130 

Army Reserve Specialist Jason Driscoll, second from left, a civil affairs specialist with the 401st Civil 

Affairs Battalion, Webster, New York, leaves Medina Jabal, under the escort of soldiers from the 

3d Armored Cavalry Regiment at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. (Defense Video 

and Imagery Distribution System)
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Training continued at the joint training facilities available at the National 

Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; the Joint Readiness Training Center 

at Fort Polk, Louisiana; the Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, 

Germany; and the Battle Command Training program at Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas. In 1998, nearly 4,000 soldiers provided deployment and redeployment 

support for two rotations to the National Training Center. Over 5,000 soldiers 

from more than fifty units provided combat support and combat service support to units at the Joint Readiness Training Center.132 

Using technological developments, the Total Army School System moved from 

traditional institutional training to distance learning. The Army Reserve participated in the Total Army Distance Learning program to increase readiness, cost 

savings, and more time for the soldier. Distance learning facilities covered 95 

percent of all soldiers.133 Distance learning brought crucial training to the active Army and reserve soldier and allowed soldiers to finish training away from 

traditional training locations.134 

The Army Reserve continued to mature, incorporate, and improve automation 

systems for training. In 1998, the Army Reserve fielded the Battle-Focused 

Training Management System. It assisted training management at company, 

battalion, and brigade levels. It facilitated the development of the unit mission 

statement and the mission essential task list. The system was upgraded to work 

with the Center Level Application System in collecting and transmitting the 

training assessment model through the chain of command to be forwarded to 

U.S. Army Forces Command. These were short term steps leading to the Reserve Level Automation System (RLAS). RLAS managed Army Reserve personnel, financial resources, unit and individual training, and official orders production. It embodied the Army Reserve’s business applications for the Reserve 

Component Automation System (RCAS).135 “RCAS consist[ed] of hardware, 

software, and technical assistance and was designed to be installed in 4,700 

Army Reserve centers and National Guard armories. The contract for RCAS 

was awarded in October 1991, ending four years of development effort.” The 

RLAS integrated local and wide area networks to bring current information to 

decision makers.136 On September 15, 1999, the Army Reserve fielded RLAS 

to all regional support commands, direct reporting commands, and subordinate 

commands and units.137 

Exercises continued to be a useful training tool. Equipment was sometimes 

pre-positioned while on exercises, which allowed units to train without degrading their own equipment.138 In 1996, in Exercise RIFLES MOVE, the 

Army Reserve planned and carried out transportation support to move the 3d 

Armored Cavalry from Fort Bliss, Texas, to Fort Carson, Colorado, which re-
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lieved active Army units from making the move. For the first time, Army Reserve units were solely responsible for convoy operations and they assisted in 

rail loading at Fort Bliss. The Army Reserve set up a trailer transport point in 

Santa Fe, New Mexico, and convoyed 850 loads of cargo, totaling 2,472 pieces 

(some 13,265.6 short tons) from Fort Bliss to Santa Fe and then to Fort Carson. Three thousand soldiers participated in the exercise, used by battalion and 

higher headquarters to conduct training under operational conditions. Operational readiness stood at 87 percent.139

Operation REEF-EX in 1995 was an example of the Army Reserve’s involvement in domestic civil-military missions. This Department of Defense program used obsolete military equipment, like tanks, to create artificial reefs off 

the coastlines. Army Reserve soldiers were responsible for planning and executing the operation. That involved cleaning equipment to Environmental 

Protection Agency standards, hauling it to a point offshore and placing it on 

the seabed. The exercise provided Army Reserve transportation, ordnance, and 

maintenance units valuable training in how to plan for and move major items 

of equipment.140 

In 1997, the Army Reserve’s 143d Transportation Command used rail, boat, 

and truck units to move the active Army’s 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade from Fort Lewis, Washington, to Fort Bliss, Texas, during Operation 

An obsolete 42-ton M-60 tank is pushed from a barge in Operation REEF-EX. (Army Reserve 

Magazine, Fall 1994)
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PATRIOTS MOVE. Soldiers 

used 101 landing craft utility 

2000s, the most modern vessel 

of its type within the Department of Defense. According 

to Baratz, this exercise showcased just “how Army Reserve 

force development, training and 

procurement meld to support 

America’s Army.”141 

In 1997, the Army Reserve was involved in Exercise ROVING SANDS, an exercise held every other year since 1989. It was the world’s largest air and missile 

defense exercise. It emphasized joint and combined interoperability of Joint 

Forces Air Component Command (JFACC), Joint Missile Defense Command, 

and Air Area Defense Command. Over 15,000 soldiers participated. Over 

3,000 soldiers rotated through the National Training Center and another 3,512 

through the Joint Readiness Training Center.

Throughout the year, the Army Reserve deployed 11,091 soldiers to fifty countries to participate in military exercises. Soldiers from the Army Reserve’s 555th 

Quartermaster Platoon (Mortuary Affairs) stationed in Dover, Delaware, deployed to Puerto Rico to participate in Exercise HEAVEN STORM, a joint 

training exercise for military morticians. Others participating in the exercise 

included the active Army’s 54th Quartermaster Company from Fort Lee, Virginia, the Army Reserve’s 246th Quartermaster Company, 331st Quartermaster 

Company (Mortuary Affairs), and the 551st Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) from Puerto Rico. In the exercise, mortuary specialists processed 

simulated casualties in a mock chemical environment.142 

In 1998, there were over thirty major training exercises. Exercise RIO BRAVO, the largest chemical training exercise since World War II, involved Army 

Reserve chemical unit support to an array of headquarters and maneuver units. 

Exercise CALL FORWARD, which assessed the ability of Army Reserve installations to accomplish their mobilization missions during a simulated mobilization surge, occurred at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Polk, Louisiana; 

Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico.143 In 1998, the exercise 

consisted of thirteen Army Reserve units; 848 soldiers participated. POSITIVE 

FORCE was a joint chiefs of staff-sponsored worldwide command post exercise 

that evaluated national capabilities to conduct mobilization and deployment 

operations, supporting two regional contingencies. POSITIVE FORCE used 

Landing Craft Utility 2000
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the presidential selected reserve call-up and the partial mobilization decision 

process. In 1998, eighty-seven Army Reserve units participated in the exercise.144 

Approximately 45,000 reserve soldiers participated in overseas deployment 

training, annually.145 The chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff directed an engineer 

and medical training exercise, NUEVOS HORIZONTES, to be conducted in 

Panama. Since the late 1970s, Army Reserve units have participated in Southern Command exercises in Latin America. They were originally called BLAZING TRAILS in the 1970s, then FUERTES CAMINOS and finally NUEVOS 

HORIZONTES. Task Force 411 deployed on January 18, 1997, from Fort Dix 

to Panama by air and sea to conduct humanitarian and civic assistance, engineer 

related construction, and medical readiness training exercises. Reconstitution 

occurred at Fort Dix on June 14, 1997, through September 21, 1997. Among 

the mission accomplishments were: the construction and rehabilitation of six 

schools and medical clinics; drilling and repairing four wells for potable water; 

upgrading and repairing five kilometers of farm-to-market roads; preparing local sporting facilities (i.e., soccer and baseball fields); conducting three medical 

readiness training exercises serving 4,000 patients and 200 livestock; and the 

interaction of American soldiers with the local Panamanian population.146 

In 1999, exercises occurred in El Salvador and in Guatemala. The exercises 

were in support of hurricanes Mitch and George disaster relief efforts. The 

deployment window was March 15 to August 27. Missions included base camp 

upgrades, river crossing operations, dike and bridge repairs, construction of 

schools and fresh water wells, road fill projects, and potable water wells. Approximately 7,200 soldiers from the Army Reserve participated.147 

The USARC participated in constructing a temporary life support base and 

in performing required exercise related construction in Egypt as part of Exercise BRIGHT STAR. This overseas deployment training was from July 5 

to September 25, 1997. The 416th Engineer Command acted as the Army 

Reserve action agent and developed task force requirements. The 416th also 

was responsible for supervising the construction and coordinating the task force 

for deployment and redeployment. The 980th Engineer Battalion (Combat 

Heavy) from the 90th Regional Support Command planned and administered 

the mission. The battalion rotated three company plus size construction task 

forces. Major Army Reserve participants included fifty-five soldiers from the 

416th Engineer Command, 440 soldiers from the 980th Engineer Battalion 

(Combat Heavy), forty-five soldiers from the 728th Engineer Detachment 

(Utilities), and twenty-three soldiers from the 353d Engineer Group. The active component provided communications and medical teams; the host nation 

furnished an engineer team. BRIGHT STAR was an excellent collective train-
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203

ing exercise for the deployment, construction, sustainment, and redeployment 

for both engineer units and support teams.148 

Overseas deployment training afforded Army Reserve units the opportunity 

to simulate operational deployment and to participate in combined and joint 

exercises. In 1996, 21,132 Army Reserve soldiers from 1,938 cells/units participated in overseas training. That number dropped to 13,347 from 1,297 cells/

units in fiscal year 1997. In 1998, the number was 13,654 soldiers from 2,038 

cells/units.150 

Litter bearers from the 405th Combat Support Hospital, Hartford, Connecticut, 

move a patient from an ambulance to the triage area during a mass casualty 

exercise at Fort Bliss, Texas, site of Exercise ROVING SANDS, ‘96. (Army Reserve 

Magazine, Summer 1996)
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Equipment

Between 1989 and 1998, the Army’s buying power declined by 39 percent.151 

The Army took what General Reimer called a “procurement holiday.” From 

1985 to 1999, “Army procurement in real terms. . . dropped 67 percent. The 

Army . . . terminated or restructured over 100 programs since 1987.” The Army 

“deferred and stretched modernization programs and research and development to ensure . . . [it] maintained minimum essential near-term readiness and 

the trained and ready forces that have served the Nation so well over the last 

decade.” General Reimer warned that to maintain “our strategic edge,” soldiers 

must have the “best equipment available.” Force XXI and advanced war fighting experiments were demonstrating “real world capabilities that . . . [could be 

fielded] right now to harness the potential of information age warfare.” Army 

After Next war games were identifying the “future capabilities” needed for immediate development. Force XXI and the Army After Next were the “roadmap 

that. . . [was] focusing the procurement and research and development required 

to prepare the Army for the 21st century.” There were “pressing modernization shortfalls” including “replacing aging equipment, modernizing the Army’s 

Major Hal Bohlman, 830th Station Hospital, Des Moines, Iowa, fits a Guatemalan girl with glasses 

during Exercise FUERTES CAMINOS. At right, Specialist Rebecca Nunez gets a thankful smile. 

(Army Reserve Magazine, Fall 1995)
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Reserve component, implementing . . . Force XXI digitization initiatives, and 

procuring next generation munitions and combat systems. The longer we delay these key modernization efforts,” he cautioned, “the greater risk the force 

assumes.”152 On a positive note, the nearly two-third decrease in procurement 

since 1989 was being reversed in 1999 with the aid of reinvested savings gained 

through efficiencies, base closures, and personnel cuts.153 

Specialist Christopher Tilley of the 682d Maintenance Company, 

Canton, Ohio, services communications wiring on a vehicle 

while on annual training in Germany. (Army Reserve Magazine

Fall 1995)

Department of Defense Directive 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve 

Forces, required the reserves be equipped to accomplish all assigned 

missions, including the ability to respond along with the active 

component in supporting two nearly simultaneous major wars. 
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Department of Defense Directive 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Forces, required the reserves be equipped to accomplish all assigned missions, including 

the ability to respond along with the active component in supporting two nearly 

simultaneous major wars. It established the department’s long range goal of 

filling the wartime equipment requirements of the reserves in accordance with 

the Total Force Policy.154 

Army Reserve equipment needs were met in the order of precedence set by the 

Department of the Army Master Priority List, which supported the “first to 

fight, first to equip” policy. This system helped the highest-priority units field 

equipment congruent with that of active Army units, but low-priority units did 

not receive the equipment they required to sustain compatibility.155 

There were definite challenges to modernizing the reserves. The reserves depended on redistribution of equipment as a prime source of equipment modernization. Military downsizing slowed redistribution. As Department of Defense 

budgets remained constant, the pressure on procurement and modernization 

accounts increased the challenge to adequately equip the reserves.156 

Figure II-8: Army Reserve Percentage of Equipment On Hand, 1997-1999 

Readiness Indicator 

AR Percentage of Equipment On Hand 

77.1% 

82.8% 

87.2% 

0 

20 

10 

30 

50 

70 

90 

40 

60 

80 

100 

% of Equipment On Hand

1997 1998 1999 
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In 1995, the Army Reserve experienced significant equipment shortfalls affecting its readiness. About 27 percent of Army Reserve units were not deployable due to shortages. Thirteen percent of the planned early deploying units 

had major problems. The shortages included communications and electronics 

equipment, medical equipment, power generation equipment, water purification equipment, combat support equipment, and line haul equipment. Attempted remedies included redistribution of equipment; a dedicated procurement program; and an increase in depot maintenance funding. In 1997, 77.1 

percent of equipment was on hand. It had improved by 1998 to 82.8 percent 

and by 1999 to 87.2 percent. 

By 1999, the Army Reserve reported 84 percent of its major equipment needs 

as met, up from 75 percent in 1998. While this was behind the other reserve 

components and the Department of Defense reserve component average of 96 

percent, the trend was encouraging. Still the high operational tempo and the 

Army’s mounting integration of the active Army and reserves had a negative 

effect on equipment and personnel.159 

Figure II-9: National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA),

1995-1999

National Guard and Reserve (NGREA) 

Equipment Appropriations 

1995-1999 

Uneven Funding Affected Equipment Upgrades, 

Modernization and Equipment Training 

$ in Millions

1995 

$133M 

1996 

$90M 

1997 

$114M 

1998 

$75M 

1999 

$20M 

0 

30 

60 

90 

80 

70 

50 

40 

20 

10 

120 

110 

100 

150 

140 

130 
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The active Army continued to provide support for the reserves through new 

equipment purchases and in-service equipment transfers to reserve units. Also, 

the reserves procured new equipment through direct purchases using National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA) funds. National 

Guard and Reserve equipment appropriations for the Army Reserve continued 

to be uneven: $133 million in 1995; $90 million in 1996; $114 million in 1997; 

$75 million in 1998 and $20 million in 1999.160 The decline of funds from 1997 

to 1999 was of particular concern in its affect on equipment upgrades, modernization, and equipment training. In 1998, the Army Reserve’s plans for purchasing new equipment were in sync with known Army modernization plans. 

Military technician Jim Reichert works on a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter 

at the aviation support facility, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. As a reserve 

soldier, he is assigned to the 5038th U.S. Army Reserve Forces School. 

(Army Reserve Magazine, Summer 1996)
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These equipment purchases helped to surmount Army funding shortfalls by using NGREA funding to afford new equipment for Army Reserve first-to-fight 

and first-to-support units, thereby, improving force readiness. When mobilized, 

reserve soldiers had been trained on equipment used in active units.161 

Depot maintenance programs were used to modernize and improve equipment 

and also lengthen service life in an attempt to extend funds. In 1996, programs 

included U-21 aircraft modernization, generator and trailer conversions, computer upgrades, trailer and tank modernization, and wheeled vehicle remodeling. Additionally, the Army Reserve placed increased reliance on civilian industry to maintain, repair, and remanufacture equipment. The Army Reserve also 

pursued vehicle leasing programs, management of satellite maintenance garages, maintenance of vehicles stored for deployment, and vehicle maintenance.162 

Unfunded depot maintenance requirements were $41.2 million in 1996; rising 

in 1997 to $49.2 million and then dropping to $42.3 million in 1998.163 

In 1996, the Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, together with 

the Army Reserve, managed a depot maintenance rebuild and re-warranty program for all D7F bulldozers. Caterpillar, the bulldozer manufacturer, inspected, 

repaired, and returned each bulldozer with new warranties through its dealers. 

Dealers within 200 miles of reserve units serviced the equipment. Caterpillar also 

rebuilt rough terrain container handlers.164 

Two armored D7 bulldozers out on a mission in Ramadi, Iraq.
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The Army Reserve benefitted from the remanufacture of 2 1⁄2 ton trucks by AM 

General Corporation. Under this extended service program, AM General took 

existing vehicles and disassembled them. Useable components were rebuilt 

while obsolete components were replaced. Examples included a more powerful, 

fuel efficient turbocharged diesel engine that met Environmental Protection 

Agency standards; a four-speed automatic transmission; and super single radial 

tires with central inflation. The result was a vehicle with a fifteen year life expectancy and improved performance, safety, and reliability.165

A foremost concern for the active Army and reserves was the continuing shortage of funds to fully automate the logistics system. In 1998, the Logistics Standard Management Information System operated in less than 50 percent of the 

Army Reserve. But, on a positive note, by 1998 the entire Army Reserve was 

automated in the area of supply support.166 

Shop Smart was a major equipping program. Prior to 1991, the Army Reserve’s 

support from the Army’s installations in CONUS was support in kind; the installation was funded directly for the support level. “So,” said senior logistician 

Mr. John Roe, “the money was given to the installation directly and the service 

was provided as a service in kind and we as the consumer didn’t at that time see 

much of a correlation between resource levels and support levels . . . .”167 Then 

that changed; the money came directly to the Army Reserve as the customer. 

The Army Reserve would reimburse the installation for service in kind. If the 

appropriation was not used, the funds reverted to the Army Reserve. This gave 

the Army Reserve the option to compete. An Army Reserve unit could shop 

around, either on or off the installation for the best value for services. For 

example, if the Army Reserve could take a piece of its commercially equivalent 

equipment “downtown to be repaired at a Caterpillar dealer for less money than 

The palletized load system loads and unloads a wide range of cargo without the need for forklifts 

or other material handling equipment. (Army Reserve Magazine, Spring 1995) 
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at the installation,” the Army Reserve “had that option to do” it under the Shop 

Smart program. “So we felt,” Roe commented, “that was a big improvement in 

accountability, efficiency in terms of how the resources were applied.” It also 

made the installation compete for the work.168 In 1995, the Army Reserve 

conducted a limited Shop Smart program at the 125th ARCOM. This showed 

that the program was a more cost effective and efficient way of doing business. 

Supplies and services in some cases could be purchased more economically, 

locally. In other situations, there was a savings in travel, time, fuel, tolls and 

temporary duty travel.169 

In 1995, the world’s largest producer of heavy-duty tactical military vehicles, 

the Osh-kosh Truck Corporation, produced two new generation heavy-duty 

tactical military vehicles for the Army Reserve. The systems increased mobility 

and lowered operational costs. They included palletized load system (PLS) 

vehicles and heavy equipment transporters (HET). The PLS was an innovative 

handling system which allowed cargo to be transported faster with fewer people 

and items of equipment. One PLS vehicle with one operator could transport 

300 percent more cargo than the Army’s previous heavy cargo handler. The 

main mission for the HET was to pull trailers carrying the 70-ton M1A1 main 

battle tank.170 

The HET is designed to haul the Abrams tank and also to fight and recover vehicles, howitzers, 

and construction equipment. (Army Reserve Magazine, Spring 1995) 
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There were conversion initiatives such as the 1998 Army Reserve M915A4 program. Through this program, M915 line haul tractors were refurbished with a 

commercial glider kit. The glider kit program used Army Reserve mechanics 

from transportation units who worked with civilian staff at Fort McCoy to strip 

down deteriorated vehicles received from the field. Parts from the glider kit 

replaced vehicle support systems such as the frame, front axle, brakes, fuel tanks, 

air-conditioned cab, electrical wiring, and other replaceable parts. The result 

was a virtually new vehicle, designated as the M915A4. Soldiers received practical experience and training as they upgraded their unit’s vehicles.171 The converted trucks cost approximately $52,000 less than a new one.172 Plewes wrote 

in 1999 that the Army Reserve “[was] operating more efficiently by adopting 

proven business techniques.” One of those he cited was the glider kit program. 

“By using this kit, he stated, “to replace deteriorated vehicle support systems, we 

can save 55 per cent of the cost of purchasing a new vehicle.”173 

Other programs in 1998 included the conversion of seventeen five-ton cargo vehicles to the drop-side configuration and sixteen 3⁄4-ton trailers from 

the M101A2 model to the M101A3. Thirteen generators were converted 

from gasoline to diesel engines. One hundred and thirty-three high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) were converted from M1037 

shelter carrier models to M998 hard-top models. All the conversions used 

Army Reserve-owned equipment instead of replacing old equipment with 

newer models.174

In 1999, the Army Reserve converted thirty five-ton cargo trucks to dropside 

trucks, 139 gasoline-powered generators to diesel, sixty M915 line haul tractors 

to the updated M915A4 configuration, 295 gasoline-powered compressors to 

diesel, and twenty-seven heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks to common 

bridge transporters. Other conversions included forty-three M967A1 fuel tankers to the multifunctional fuel tanker configuration of the same designation, 

nine M101A1 trailers to the M101A2 model, nine M101A2 models to M101A3 

models, and 180 M1037 HMMWV shelter-carriers to the standard M998.175

In 1998, the Army Reserve deployed an assortment of new equipment to 

improve Army strategic and operational mobility. In June 1998, the Army 

Reserve christened the Army’s first floating crane in Baltimore, Maryland. Its 

name, the Keystone State, honored the memory of the thirteen Army Reserve 

soldiers from the 14th Quartermaster Detachment from Greensburg, Pennsylvania, who were killed in an Iraqi SCUD missile attack in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The 

floating crane had a lift capacity of 115 long tons and a 175-foot reach, sufficient to lift the Army’s heaviest cargo, including the M1 main battle tank. The 
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949th Transportation Company (Floating Craft) based in Baltimore owned 

the crane.176 

In August 1998, the Army Reserve unveiled its new heavy equipment mobile 

transport (HEMTT) common bridge transporter. The transporter was a remanufactured truck with improved capability to transport concurrently a float 

bridge and a fixed bridge. Then float and fixed bridge units could be consolidated into multi-bridge companies. The Army Reserve’s 459th Engineer 

Company (Multi-Role Bridge) was the first such bridge company in the Army.177 

The Return of Equipment from Europe (RETROEUR) program, mentioned 

in chapter one, which had provided cascaded equipment improving the readiness and survivability of units, ended in fiscal year 1998.178 

One concept receiving considerable attention was velocity management. Velocity management re-engineered the Army’s logistics process. Velocity management championed improved speed and accuracy within the logistics system, 

substituted velocity for mass, and improved the processes to abolish non-value-added activities, replacing them with value-added ones. Velocity management included order and ship time, stockage determination, repair, retrograde, 

and financial management.179 General Reimer evidenced the importance given 

by the Department of the Army to velocity management when he stated in OcFigure II-10: Velocity Management Re-engineers Army Logistics

Repair 

Insufficient 

Down Time 

Between 

Deployments 

Retrograde 

Velocity Management Re-engineers Army Logistics 

The Six Parts of Velocity Management: 

Order

Time

Ship 

Time 

Stockage 

Determination 
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tober 1998 that “There will not be a revolution in military affairs unless there is 

a revolution in logistics. This means putting our faith in concepts like velocity 

management and total asset visibility, giving up the comfort of stockpiling supplies on an iron mountain [huge depots].”180 

The Department of the Army, under the direction of its deputy chief of staff 

for logistics, the deputy commanding general of the Army Materiel Command, 

and the commanding general of the Combined Arms Command were responsible for implementing velocity management. The Department of the Army 

established four process improvement teams. These teams and the major Army 

commands, the National Guard, and the Army Reserve were responsible for 

implementing velocity management throughout the Army.181 

In December 1995, the USARC’s deputy chief of staff for logistics formed the 

Army Reserve velocity management process improvement team. The team was 

responsible for identifying Army Reserve-unique supply and maintenance processes and issues and to reengineer Army Reserve logistics to meet the Army’s 

goals. In 1996, the team conducted a walk-through of each regional support 

command and installation to review requisition processes and supply and maintenance support. By 1997, velocity management had reduced order ship time 

by 20 percent, well below the annual goal. During 1998, the average ship time 

for the Army Reserve was reduced from forty to twenty-six days, a 35 percent 

improvement.182 

On March 31, 1996, the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) (version 2) was re-established in the Army Reserve with the signing of the materiel 

fielding agreement. The project manager for RCAS, the USARC’s deputy chief 

of staff for information management, and the information manager at OCAR 

signed the document. The agreement laid out the fielding plan and priorities 

and order of fielding within the Army Reserve and enumerated the missions 

and answerability of each part to the final RCAS solution. As of April 1996, the 

USARC’s deputy chief of staff for information management represented the 

Army Reserve in fielding matters, the first time the deputy chief of staff for information management received a tasking to officially support units outside the 

USARC. The 7th and 9th ARCOMs were included in the fielding. Hawaii’s 

9th ARCOM became the first OCONUS command to be fielded. The fielding 

was in conjunction with a National Guard fielding initiative. In April 1996, the 

99th Regional Support Command became the operational site for testing the 

system for the Army Reserve. The 143d Transportation Command became 

the pilot command for full installation of the system to its entire command and 

control structure.183 
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Mobilization

In October 1994, Congress extended from ninety to 270 days the limits of involuntary service for reserve units called to active duty under the presidential 

selected reserve call-up (PSRC). The extension increased continuity, dependability, and integration of the reserves into military operations. The Army continued to seek congressional authority to bring soldiers of the IRR under the 

PSRC. Access to the IRR was limited to periods of declared national emergencies and partial mobilization.184 

In another congressional action, the Fiscal Year National 1998 Defense Authorization Act allowed the president to mobilize up to 30,000 members of the IRR 

to fill vacancies in deploying reserve units. Army Reserve soldiers in this special 

IRR pool had to be activated under the PSRC authority. The IRR activation 

authority used individual replacements to bring activated reserve units to full 

strength without lowering the readiness levels of non-deploying sister units.185 

The Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

1998 enabled the presidential mobilization of reserves for emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction.186

Every year some 20,000 Army Reserve soldiers deployed to fifty countries to 

support military operations. The percentage of Army Reserve soldiers mobilized to support Total Army operations increased while that of the National 

Guard’s decreased.187 During 1998, the Army Reserve provided over 2.2 million person-days to active component missions. About 48 percent of its annual 

training (AT) and 34 percent of its active duty for training (ADT) supported the 

active component.188 

On December 8, 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12982, calling to active duty 3,800 reservists for operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This 

was the third mobilization of the Selected Reserve in five years. The Army was 

tasked with providing most of the reserve force strength. Secretary of Defense 

Perry signed a memorandum outlining the reserve contribution. The Army 

would supply not more than 3,388 reserve soldiers. On December 11, 1995, 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense released a memorandum for selecting reservists for mobilization. Over fifty Army Reserve units initially were 

mobilized in the first rotation for what became known as Operation JOINT 

ENDEAVOR. Hundreds of volunteers were mobilized from the IRR. At the 

Army’s request, the number of reservists to be called to duty was increased by 

500 to 4,300 on January 16, 1996. By May 1996, the PSRC had been extended 

to 8,181.189 
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Under the PSRC, the Army Reserve provided units to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 

Hungary, Croatia, and the backfill of units in Europe. The mobilization was 

characterized by calling up individuals and partial units.190 In 1996, the Army 

Reserve mobilized 2,799 soldiers from 104 units for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in two nonmedical and three medical rotations. In January of that 

year, the Army Reserve deployed fourteen legal support soldiers whose specialArmy Reserve Chief Warrant Officer 4 Gwen Schallow, the 

first Army woman (active or reserve) to qualify as a pilot in 

command of an Apache attack helicopter. In the summer of 

1999, Schallow and her unit, the 8th Battalion, 229th Aviation 

Regiment, deployed to Bosnia where the Army Reserve unit 

provided air support for the 10th Mountain Division. This 

was another first: the first time a reserve component unit 

performed the combat mission in Bosnia. (Army Reserve 

Magazine, Spring 2000)
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217

ties were in administrative law, criminal law, legal assistance, tax return preparation, contract law claims, and operational law to European commands and 

Bosnia. The Army Reserve also provided legal support to the Fort Benning 

and Fort Dix mobilization stations. In May 1996, the Army Reserve deployed 

twenty-nine legal support soldiers, most of whom were staff judge advocates, 

to Germany, Belgium, Hungary, and Bosnia. The public affairs units that had 

deployed in December 1995 to Bosnia and had established radio support to the 

soldiers, supplied maneuver brigade commanders with public affairs support 

and had answered news media requests to travel with or visit reserve units in 

theater, returned in July 1996. The Army Reserve also provided Serb-Croatian linguists and had to activate the 272d Military Intelligence Company 

(Linguist) in October 1995 to fill the need. Medical personnel, such as OBGYN doctors, pediatricians, internists, medical and surgical nurses, optometrists, and medical logistics specialists, were mobilized for 140 days rather than 

270, but could extend to 270 days.191 In December 1995, the USARC’s Chaplain’s Office staffed twenty-three chaplains and seventeen chaplain assistants for 

back fill in Germany.192 Rail units were called up for the first time since World 

War II.193 

First rotation units return from Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, as second rotation units mobilize. Soldiers from the 4005th U.S. Army Hospital, Lubbock, 

Texas, landed at Fort Benning, Georgia, and were among the first to redeploy 

after more than four months on active duty. (Photo by Sergeant First Class 

Gregory Deimel)
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By 1997, almost three fourths of all reserve forces mobilized for Operation 

JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARDIAN were Army Reserve soldiers.194 

On any given day in 1997, about 25 percent of Army forces in Bosnia were 

from the National Guard and the Army Reserve.195 By the following year, the 

Army Reserve had provided over 11,000 soldiers in some 437 units to support 

Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR, JOINT GUARD, and JOINT FORGE.196 

By 1997, the Army Reserve had provided 71 percent of all reserve component 

deployments for Operation JOINT GUARD.197 As of February 10, 1997, the 

Army Reserve had deployed 928 civil affairs soldiers and 269 psychological 

operations soldiers.198 Several thousand Army Reserve individual augmentees 

volunteered during Operation JOINT GUARD between 1996 and 1998.199 By 

July 1998, almost 17,000 National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers had supported these operations.200 In 2000, the Army Reserve supported Operation 

JOINT GUARDIAN in Kosovo with 1,935 soldiers and 345,701 man-days. 

In that same year, the Army Reserve supported Operation JOINT FORCE 

in Bosnia with 2,913 soldiers and a total of 526,683 man-days.201 Under the 

PSRC, the tour of duty was for 270 days.

Activities included operating mobilization stations at Fort Benning, Fort Dix, 

Fort Bragg, and the 7th ARCOM in Schwetzingen, Germany; backfilling active 

Army units in Germany; deploying solders to Hungary to assist in the forward 

operations of U.S. Army Europe; and controlling traffic over the Sava River. A 

A civil affairs vehicle convoy passes through a section of the zone of separation near 

Brc ́ko. The zone is often the scene of intense civil affairs effort to relocate refugees 

and rebuild homes. (Photo by Sergeant First Class Mark Martello)
CHAPTER 2. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

219

A U.S. Army M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier prepares to pull an armored Humvee 

out of the mud in Bosnia and Herzegovina on May 10, 1996, during Operation JOINT 

ENDEAVOR. The spring-time mud presented a challenge to the soldiers and their 

equipment deployed as part of the NATO Implementation Force. (Department of Defense photo by Staff Sergeant Jon Long) 

Helicopters are guided onto a landing strip in Kosovo for a humanitarian mission. 

(Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System)
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Peacekeeper, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. 

Army Center of Military History)
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major portion of medical support for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR came 

from the Army Reserve. In Bosnia itself, Army Reserve soldiers ran the information bureau and provided civil affairs, psychological operations, postal, 

and other supporting functions. Psychological operations units published the 

Herald of Peace, a newspaper printed in three languages to inform civilians on 

the status of the peace accords, on mine awareness, and other subjects.202 Units 

removed mines, improved the road and rail network, did some construction, 

improved the water quality, and bolstered military authority.203 

During the initial stages of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Army Reserve 

C-12R fixed-wing airplanes were the only Army aircraft, active or reserve, with 

the avionics required to get in and out of Sarajevo during severe weather.204 

On December 16, 1998, Army Reserve soldiers deployed to the Middle East to 

support Operation DESERT FOX, the destruction of sites in Iraq related to 

weapons of mass destruction. About forty soldiers from the 310th Chemical 

Company (Biological Integrated Detection) and a liaison team from the 490th 

Chemical Battalion supported this operation by supplying early warning of any 

probable biological threat.205 The 310th was one of the most mobilized units in 

the Army Reserve.206 Another mission came in 1999 with Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (Kuwait/Saudi Arabia).207

What did Army Reserve soldiers think about mobilization? An Army Reserve 

survey on returning soldiers from Bosnia indicated that some 52 percent would 

volunteer for future mobilizations while 35 percent said they were unlikely or 

very unlikely to volunteer. Almost 70 percent said they would not complain 

if called for future mobilizations. Over 66 percent of those surveyed stated 

that the maximum period of mobilization should not be more than one hundred and eighty days. Thirty-four percent of physicians mobilized for Bosnia 

had left the Selected Reserve by 1998. Other mobilized physicians indicted 

they remained in the Selected Reserve only because time remained on their 

service contracts.208

Military Support to Civil Authorities and 

Homeland Defense

As part of the Army Reserve’s military support to civil authorities, many tasks 

included medical evacuation support to ground operations, heavy lift support, 

and aviation support to the National Guard and the U.S. Drug Enforcement 

Agency (DEA). In addition, the Army Reserve played a role in anti-drug intelligence operations, drug trafficking and money laundering operations, intelligence analysis for the DEA, and linguists to translate foreign documents 
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concerning narcotics trafficking and gang activities in the United States.209

During 1997, the Army Reserve conducted 178 missions with 1,785 soldiers for 

counterdrug operations.210 The following year, the Army Reserve conducted 

158 counterdrug operations involving over 350 soldiers.211

On April 19, 1995, at 9:02 A.M. local time, a truck bomb with about 5,000 

pounds of explosives exploded in the front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 

Building in Oklahoma City. The explosion killed 168 people (including nineteen children) and injured over 500. It damaged or destroyed an additional 300 

buildings. The explosion was heard as far away as 30 miles. President Clinton 

declared a state of emergency. The Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) established a disaster relief field office. The Department of Defense 

designated a defense coordinating officer to correlate department assets and resources in a federal attempt to respond to and direct recovery operations. The 

USARC staffed the disaster field office with seven officers and two enlisted 

soldiers for seventy days. The 353d Engineer Group, located in the vicinity 

of the federal building, supplied ten soldiers along with tents to erect a command post, veterinary shelter, and supply point for a total of sixty days. The 

Army Reserve served our nation during the worst act of terrorism in U.S. 

history, to that date.212 

Overall view of Murrah Federal building. (NASA Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team)
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The Army Reserve served our nation during the worst act of terrorism 

in U.S. history, to that date. 

This photo of fireman Chris Fields and one-year-old Baylee Almon (who later died in a hospital) 

became a symbol of the most deadly pre-9/11 terrorist attack on U.S. soil.
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The Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building two days after the attack.
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Pipe Sergeant Kevin M. Donnelly, of the DEA Black and Gold Pipes and Drums, walks 

past the field of chairs and the reflecting pool at the Oklahoma City National Memorial on Monday,April 19, 2010, to start the 15th anniversary memorial ceremony 

of the Oklahoma City bombing. (Sue Ogrocki/AP)

Removing debris from what used to be the childcare center. (NASA Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team)
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The Army Reserve’s new mission in 1997 came with passage of the Defense 

Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996. The Army Reserve had the 

preponderance of the Army’s chemical and medical units. It also contributed 

transportation, quartermaster, communications, civil affairs, and engineer resources in the event of a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction. 

The Army Reserve appointed state emergency preparedness liaison officers, 

regional emergency preparedness liaison officers for Federal Emergency ManSpecialist Jake Panter, 854th Quartermaster Company, Logan, Utah, tests water quality during 

flood relief operations in North Dakota. (Army Reserve Magazine, Summer 1997)
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227

agement regions, and emergency preparedness liaison officers to serve with 

each numbered U.S. Army. The Army Reserve established a Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD) Domestic Preparedness Branch in Atlanta, Georgia, to 

manage all of the WMD plans.213 By September 1998, Army Reserve soldiers 

provided instruction on WMD defense in twenty-two U.S. cities. During fiscal 

year 1998, Army Reserve teams provided WMD instruction to several federal agencies, including the Department of Veterans Affairs, the U.S. Customs 

Service, and the U.S. Probation Department. The Army Reserve held exercise 

WMD CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT, simulating a terrorist attack on 

Augusta, Georgia.214 

In 1997, 1,010 IRR soldiers were called to active duty to support emergency operations.215 Water purification units, such as the 370th Quartermaster Battalion 

(Water Supply) and the 854th Quartermaster Company, supported flood relief 

operations in North Dakota by supplying purified, potable water. Engineers 

in New Hampshire helped a town recover from a dam break. Army Reserve 

dentists provided dental care on the Navajo Indian Reservation in Arizona.216

When floodwaters threatened the people of Littleton, Iowa, in May 1998, soldiers from the 445th Transportation Group, 89th Regional Support Command, 

drove to their rescue. Also in May, soldiers from the 95th Division (InstitutionMembers of the Guam-based 411th Engineer Battalion, Horizontal Platoon prepare materials 

for a culvert installed at Nimitz Hill, Guam, following Typhoon Paka. (Army Reserve Magazine, 

Summer 1998)
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The 7229th Medical Support Unit (MSU) from Fort Lewis, Washington, 

provided the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation Tribe with medical, dental, and veterinarian care here in Lame Deer, Montana, part of the 

Innovative Readiness Training (IRT) program. Shown here is Major Dana M. 

Dobbs with the 7229th. (U.S. Army Reserve photo by Master Sergeant Enid 

Ramos-Mandell, Army Reserve Medical Command Public Affairs)

Sergeant First Class Scott Matson from the 327th Engineer Company guides the removal of the 

temporary bridge from the Red Wing Wildlife Preserve on the Mississippi River. (Army Reserve 

Magazine, Summer 1995)
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229

al Training) helped people recover from tornadoes in Kansas and Oklahoma.217

In 1998, the Army responded to several crises including Typhoon Paka on 

Guam; ice storms in the northeastern United States; a large snowstorm in Marion, Virginia; a tornado in Washington, Iowa; droughts in Texas; severe storms 

in Fort Scott, Kansas; and floods and wildfires in the southern United States. In 

addition, the Army Reserve assisted in the relief efforts stemming from several 

hurricanes. Army Reserve units also provided a myriad of community services 

support, such as erosion control and road construction.218 In January 1995, the 

327th Engineer Company from Ellsworth, Wisconsin, erected a bridge to help 

the Red Wing Wildlife League support the Red Wing Wildlife Preserve’s bird 

nesting habitat.219

The 7210th Medical Support Unit conducted a medical Innovative Readiness Training (IRT) mission at the Fort Belknap 

Indian Reservation, Montana. Shown here is Staff Sergeant Fabian Basurto from the 7210th making dentures for a patient. 

(U.S. Army Reserve photo by Captain Michael Condon, Central Medical Area Readiness Support Group, Army Reserve 

Medical Command Public Affairs)
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230

The Civil-Military Innovative Readiness Team (IRT) program resulted from 

President Clinton’s “rebuild America” initiative and follow-on legislation. The 

IRT program provided the Army, especially the National Guard and the Army 

Reserve, with the chance to combine combat service support training, operational deployment, and civil support into one mission within the United States. 

During 1999, Army Reserve dental teams deployed to the Rosebud Indian Reservation in Rosebud, South Dakota, and to the Crow-Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation in the Crow Agency, Montana, as part of Operation WALKING SHIELD. The Walking Shield of American Indian Society envisioned 

this deployment. 

The deployment, consisting of two teams totaling three dentists and two dental 

technicians, provided the soldiers with operational and mobilization training 

and, in the mean time, improved the quality of life among Native Americans. In 

two weeks, the teams completed about 100 oral surgeries, sixty pediatric dental 

procedures, forty root canals, 150 extractions, 150 restorations, and over 1,500 

dental cleanings and examinations. Other IRT missions included Operation 

WHITE FANG, a deployment of a dental team to the Arctic Slope region 

of Alaska, and Operation ARTIC CIRCLE, involving the deployment of the 

109th Medical Detachment (Veterinary) from the 63d Regional Support Command, to provide services to Native Americans in Alaska.220

In 1999, Army Reserve Brigadier General Mitchell M. Zais headed Joint Task 

Force Provide Refuge at Fort Dix. The task force provided assistance to over 

4,000 ethnic Albanians who were expelled from Kosovo by Serb forces.221 Zais 

commented, ‘“We want to welcome these people to America the way we might wish 

our grandparents and great-grandparents had been welcomed to Ellis Island.’”222

The USARC sent eighty Active Guard Reserve soldiers to augment the joint 

staff. The USARC provided the task force’s logistics officer for this logistics 

heavy mission. Joint Task Force Provide Refuge’s logistics staff procured more 

than thirteen million dollars in equipment and services; successfully coordinated the arrival of nine flights from Macedonia to McGuire Air Force Base; 

provided over 280,000 meals; and drove 2,800 injury-free miles.223 Four Army 

Reserve soldiers were activated to support the language requirement of the task 

force: two Serbo-Croatian linguists and two Albanian linguists.224 An Army 

Reserve officer served as the task force’s staff judge advocate, providing legal 

advice to the task force. The office authored the official documents addressing 

the task force’s rules of engagement for interacting with the refugees.225

In 1999, Army Reserve soldiers provided assistance in the wake of Hurricane 

Mitch and Hurricane Georges. Between January and August 1999, 20,800 Army 
CHAPTER 2. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

231

Reserve soldiers deployed to Honduras and other islands including Puerto Rico. 

They distributed relief supplies and provided emergency support. Engineer 

units built medical facilities, repaired roads and bridges, and dug new wells.226

Soldier and Family Well Being 

Joint Chiefs of Staff General John M. D. 

Shalikashvili stated, ‘”No single investment we make is more important than 

our people . . . . We will not continue to 

attract quality young people if incentives 

and benefits subside. If we don’t take care 

of our people in uniform, our civilians and 

their families, we will not retain the career 

professionals we need to lead our forces into the next century.’”227 Echoing his 

sentiments, General Reimer stated, “They 

deserve to have their entitlements and 

benefits safeguarded from erosion. They 

deserve a quality of life equal to that of 

the society they have pledged their lives to 

defend. We must never allow our commitment to quality soldiers to diminish.”228

Thousands of Kosovo refugees became guests of the United States government and temporary 

residents of Fort Dix, New Jersey. (Photo by Master Sergeant Greg Deimel)

General John M. D. Shalikashvili
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232

The heart of the Army family quality of life program was the Army Family 

Action Plan established in 1984.229 The Army Family Action Plan increased 

readiness and retention by improving the quality of life for America’s soldiers 

and their families at the grassroots. Annual forums kicked off the plan. At these 

forums, delegates raised issues, suggested ways to resolve them, and reported 

the results to installation commanders. Issues requiring a higher level of authority were forwarded to the major Army command level or the Department 

of the Army. 

In 1998, eighteen delegates attended the USARC’s first Army Family Action 

Plan process action team. The delegates evaluated issues forwarded from local 

forums across the Army and briefed the five most critical issues to the vice chief 

of staff, Army. The chief of staff, Army approved inclusion of new issues into 

the Family Action Plan. They were: retirement benefits/entitlements; financial 

planning education; lack of benefits due to geographic location; shortage of 

professional marriage and family counselors; and lack of choice in the family 

member dental plan. The process action team voted that the most valuable services were: medical/dental services; housing; child development services; youth 

services; and commissary privileges. Accomplishments under the Army Family 

Action Plan in 1998 included an increase from twelve days to twenty-four days 

of reserve component access to the commissary, an increase to $100 per month 

in family separation allowance, indexing basic allowance for housing to local 

housing costs, retiree and reserve dental insurance, expanded use of volunteers 

throughout the Army, and tuition assistance for spouses overseas.230

In December 1994, the USARC held the first meeting of the Army Reserve 

Family Action Program Advisory Council (FPAC) to promote family well being. The purpose of the FPAC was to advise and assist the chief, Army Reserve 

in improving policy for family programs. The council amplified readiness and 

retention by guaranteeing the Army Reserve family program was useful, sympathetic, and meaningful in meeting the needs of the Army Reserve community. In 1995, more than 2,030 volunteers and key personnel received training 

through the twelve regional family program academies.231

The Army Reserve conducted fourteen regional family program academies or 

workshops in 1996 for 2,600 participants, training volunteers, full time per-

“No single investment we make is more important than our people.”

General John M. D. Shalikashvili
CHAPTER 2. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

233

sonnel, and leaders. Each regional support command and the 65th ARCOM 

conducted one academy. Army Reserve soldiers attended Department of the 

Army family team building classes and then returned to their installations to 

train family members. A training program of forty-one classes developed self 

sufficient family members with information on basic military terms and customs, community resources, and problem solving techniques.232 

The Army Reserve went from nearly zero family support to an extensive system 

and network. The USARC instituted a Family Support Division at the regional 

support commands to provide family support for soldier well being.233 

The 1994 Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 

(USERRA) provided reemployment protection and other benefits to veterans 

and employees. A 1998 amendment made it applicable to employers outside 

the United States if they were affiliated with U.S. corporations. This was significant because about 2,000 Selected Reserve members lived outside the country. 

Another amendment applied to states as employers.234

Debra Selisky (left) discusses family support issues with Command Sergeant Major Patti Foley, 

372d Quartermaster Battalion, Albuquerque, New Mexico. (Army Reserve Magazine, 1999)
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234

Base Realignment and Closure 

By General Reimer’s March 18, 1999, testimony before the Senate’s Armed 

Services Committee, over seven hundred bases had been closed or realigned 

in the United States and overseas.235 The chief impact of BRAC was on long 

range major construction planning. Many Army Reserve facilities were over 

thirty years old and were becoming more costly to repair than to replace. The 

Army Reserve’s BRAC goal was to obtain good buildings to replace old ones or 

leased property. The process did a first rate job of obtaining training areas but 

not quality buildings. One BRAC impact affected readiness if reserve soldiers’ 

travel to training installations was increased.236 

Army Reserve command and control of Fort Pickett and Fort Devens ended 

with their closure. Annual training facilities were to remain available at Forts 

Indiantown Gap, Pickett, Chaffee, and McClellan through Army Reserve enclaves, with the required training areas and ranges. In 1995, military construction support to Army Reserve BRAC actions was approximately $48 million.237

BRAC affected Myrtle Beach Air Force Base. The Department of Defense 

transferred two buildings on more than three acres at the airbase to the Army 

Reserve. This eliminated a $66.5 million substandard lease. In 1996, the Army 

Reserve acquired property at the Dallas Naval Air Station. Long range plans 

were made for the construction of a new Army Reserve center at the Red River 

Army Depot. The transfer of command and control of Fort Dix to the Army 

Reserve was a BRAC action.238 In addition to Fort Pickett, Fort Indiantown 

Gap and Fort Chaffee, reserve component enclaves were created at Camp Pedrickson, New Jersey; Camp Kilmer, New Jersey; McWhethy Army Reserve 

Center at Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, Colorado; Fort Missoula, Montana; Defense Distribution Depot, Ogden, Utah; Oakland Army Base, California; March Air Force Base, California; and Fort Hunter Liggett, California.239 
CHAPTER 2. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

235

Figure II-11: The Army’s Six Imperatives

Appropriate 

Force 

Mix 

Modern 

Equipment 

Tough 

Training 

“Trained and Ready” 

Leader

Development

Quality 

People 

Right 

Doctrine 

Conclusion

As the twentieth century ended, the United States remained engaged in a more 

complex post-Cold War world. The country had moved beyond containment 

to one of global leadership and enlargement. That change was apparent in the 

National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy of shape, respond 

and prepare. Although smaller, like the active Army, the Army Reserve was 

to be a full partner in that strategy as it became almost 100 percent combat 

support and combat service support oriented. Operation DESERT SHIELD/

DESERT STORM and other conflicts meant no mission belonged exclusively to any single component. The mission now belonged to the forward-positioned, full spectrum, threat-adaptive, capabilities-based, power projection 

Total Army. Overseas deployment was becoming more of an expectation and a 

standard. This was evident in the extension of the presidential selected reserve 

call-up authority from 90 to 270 days. The reserves like the active Army shifted 

concentration from a single theater to multiple contingencies overseas. The 

reserves were being called upon to assume selected complex missions. The 

reserves were more capable and intermingled with the active component than 

at any time in the past. The Army’s six imperatives remained constant: quality 

people, the right doctrine, the appropriate force mix, tough training, modern 

equipment, and leader development. The challenge, according to General Reimer was to “remain trained and ready, while conducting the most fundamental 

transformation since the end of World War II, in an era of constrained resources.”240
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236

1 Charlston, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1999, 8.

2 Stewart, American Military History, Volume II, The United States Army In a Global Era, 

1917-2003, 439.

3 Ibid., 440.

4 R. Cody Phillips, Operation Joint Guardian: The U.S. Army in Kosovo (Washington, DC: U. S. 

Army Center of Military History, 2007), 6.

5 Stewart, American Military History, Volume II, The United States Army In a Global Era, 1917-

2003, 439-443. 

6 Staff Sergeant Michael Warren, The United States Army Reserve in Joint Endeavor: Volume II, 

Mobilization & Deployment, Army Staff Perspective (Atlanta, Georgia: Office of the Command 

Historian, USARC, 1996), 12.

7 Major Neil Rogers, The United States Army Reserve In Operation Joint Endeavor: Volume I, 

Mobilization & Deployment, Major Army Command Perspective (Atlanta, Georgia: Office of the 

Command Historian, USARC, 1996), 21.

8 Stewart, American Military History, Volume II, The United States Army In a Global Era, 1917-

2003, 439-443.

9 Ibid., 446.

10 Phillips, Operation Joint Guardian: The U.S. Army in Kosovo, 3.

11 Stewart, American Military History, Volume II, The United States Army In a Global Era, 1917-

2003, 447.

12 Ibid., 446-449. 

13 William Clinton, National Security Strategy of the United States, 1994-1995, Engagement and 

Enlargement (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1995), xiii-xiv, 6. 

14 William Clinton, National Security Strategy of the United States, 1994-1995, Engagement and 

Enlargement, 19, 27 and General Dennis J. Reimer, “Force of Decision. . .Capabilities for the 

21st Century,” 32 in Carafano, editor, Soldiers Are Our Credentials: The Collected Works And 

Selected Papers Of The Thirty-Third Chief Of Staff Army (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center 

of Military History, 2000). 

15 William Clinton, A National Security Strategy For A New Century (Washington, DC: The 

White House, December 1999), iii. 

16 Robert M. Walker and Dennis J. Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 

Fiscal Year 1999, Presented to the Committees and Subcommittees of the U.S. Senate and the 

House of Representatives, February 1998, ix.

17 General Dennis J. Reimer, “Where We’ve Been-Where We’re Headed,” Address at the Dwight 

David Eisenhower Luncheon, Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Amy, 

October 17, 1995, in Carafano, editor, Soldiers Are Our Credentials: The Collected Works And 

Selected Papers Of The Thirty-Third Chief Of Staff Army, 9. 

18 “Quadrennial Defense Review: From 1997 to 2001,” Defense Report from AUSA’s Institute of 

Land Warfare June 2000. 

19 William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of 

Defense, May 1997), 1; Congressional Record, August 5, 1999, p. H7527; and Jeffrey D. Brake, 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): Background, Process, and Issues, CRS Report for Congress, 

(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, June 21, 2001), CRS-3. 

20 Quoted in “Quadrennial Defense Review: From 1997 to 2001,” Defense Report from AUSA’s 

Institute of Land Warfare, June 2000. 
CHAPTER 2. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

237

21 Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 1.

22 Ibid., 5.

23 Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 9-11 and Joint Chiefs of Staff, National 

Military Strategy, 1997.

24 General Dennis J. Reimer, “Preparing Now To Meet 21st Century Challenges,” in Carafano, 

editor, Soldiers Are Our Credentials: The Collected Works And Selected Papers Of The Thirty-Third 

Chief Of Staff Army, 149. 

25 Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 9-11 and Joint Chiefs of Staff, National 

Military Strategy, 1997.

26 Reimer, “Preparing Now To Meet 21st Century Challenges,” in Carafano, editor, Soldiers Are 

Our Credentials: The Collected Works And Selected Papers Of The Thirty-Third Chief Of Staff 

Army, 150.

27 General Dennis Reimer, Remarks to the Reserve Officers Association, January 25, 1999, 

http://apps.business.ualberta.ca/rfield/Speeches/Dennis%20Reimer%20Jan%2025%2109. 

28 Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 14-16.

29 Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 59.

30 Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, vii. 

31 Ibid., vii, 29, 32.

32 Major General Max Baratz, “A Reorganized Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready,” 1997-1998 

Army Green Book, October 1997, 97. 

33 Major General Max Baratz, “QDR validates USAR as ready, relevant,” Army Reserve Magazine, 

Volume 43, Number 2 (Fall 1997), 2. 

34 Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 33.

35 Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, 1997 and Walker and Reimer, A Statement on 

the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1999, 13.

36 Stewart, American Military History, Volume II, The United States Army In A Global Era, 1917-

2003, 438.

37 Togo West, Jr. and General Gordon R. Sullivan. A Statement on the Posture of the United States 

Army, Fiscal Year 1995, Presented to the Committees and Subcommittees of the U. S. Senate 

and House of Representatives, February 1994, 3.

38 General Dennis Reimer, “Where We’ve Been-Where We’re Headed: Maintaining a Solid 

Framework While Building for the Future, “ Army October 1995 in Carafano, editor, Soldiers 

Are Our Credentials: The Collected Works And Selected Papers Of The Thirty-Third Chief Of Staff 

Army, 4. 

39 General Dennis J. Reimer, “Preparing Now To Meet the 21st Century Challenges,” Army, October 1997, in Carafano, editor, Soldiers Are Our Credentials: The Collected Works And Selected 

Papers Of The Thirty-Third Chief Of Staff Army, 148.

40 Togo D. West, Jr. and General Dennis J. Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States 

Army, Fiscal Year 1997, Presented to the Committees and Subcommittees of the United States 

Senate and the House of Representatives, Executive Summary, http://www.army.mil/aps/97/

exsum.htm.

41 West, Jr. and Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1997, 

Presented to the Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House 

of Representatives, Executive Summary, http://www.army.mil/aps/97/exsum.htm.
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238

42 General Dennis J. Reimer, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, First 

Session, 106th Congress, on the Fiscal Year 2000 Budget and Posture of the United States 

Army, March 18, 1999.

43 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board (Washington, DC: Reserve Forces Policy Board, March 1999), xxiii.

44 Major General William M. Rajczak, “Uncertain Path for Reserve Components,” The Officer, 

February/March 2009, 48.

45 Ibid. 

46 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Working Draft, Fiscal Year 1998 Report 

of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Washington, DC: Reserve Forces Policy Board, March 1999), 

3.

47 Ibid., 9.

48 William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, April 1997, (Washington, 

DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 1997), 220.

49 William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 1998, (Washington, DC: 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998), http://www.dod.gov/exesec/adr98/chap9.html.

50 West and Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United Sates Army, Fiscal Year 1998, Executive 

Summary, http://www.army.mil/aps/98/TITLE.HTM.

51 Ibid.

52 Walker and Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1999, 31-32. 

53 General Dennis J. Reimer, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 

First Session 106th Congress, on the Fiscal Year 2000 Budget and Posture of the United States 

Army, March 18, 1999.

54 Ibid and General Dennis Reimer, “Challenge and Change: A Legacy for the Future,” Military 

Review, July/August 1997, in Carafano, editor, Soldiers Are Our Credentials: The Collected 

Works And Selected Papers Of The Thirty-Third Chief Of Staff Army, 121. 

55 Reimer, “Preparing Now To Meet 21st Century Challenges “ 151 in Carafano, editor, Soldiers 

Are Our Credentials: The Collected Works And Selected Papers Of The Thirty-Third Chief Of Staff 

Army. 

56 Walker and Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1999, 31.

57 General Dennis J. Reimer, “Army Vision 2010, US Army Chief of Staff White Paper, November 12, 

1996 , 81-82 in James Carafano, editor, Soldiers Are Our Credentials: The Collected Works And 

Selected Papers Of The Thirty-Third Chief Of Staff Army. 

58 Cameron, To Fight or Not to Fight, 339.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Stephen Gammons and William Donnelly, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal 

Year 1995 (Washington, DC: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 2004), 23.

62 Connie Reeves, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1996 (Washington, 

DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2002), 4, 46.

63 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 2000 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 32.

64 Charlston, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1999, 26.
CHAPTER 2. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

239

65 Baratz, “A Reorganized Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready,” 1997-1998 Army Green Book, 

October 1997, 94; No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005), 65 and Brown, Kevlar Legions, 161. 

66 Brown, Kevlar Legions, 180.

67 Gammons and Donnelly, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1995, 55, 56, 57.

68 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board, 51. 

69 Reimer, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, First Session, 106th 

Congress, on the Fiscal Year 2000 Budget and Posture of the United States Army, March 18, 1999. 

70 No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997, 129.

71 Reeves, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1996, 91.

72 No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997, 129. 

73 Charlston, Department of The Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1999, 68.

74 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board, 58, 61.

75 No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997, 128.

76 Reserve Forces Policy Board , Reserve Component Programs, 1998 Report of the Reserve Forces 

Policy Board, 58.9

77 Charlston, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1999, 68.

78 Stewart, American Military History, Volume II: The United States Army In A Global Era, 1917, 

2008, 458.

79 Reeves, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal 1996, 89.

80 Gammons and Donnelly, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1995, 56; 

No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997, 131 and Reserve 

Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 

Working Draft, 1998, 55.

81 Haworh, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year, 1998, 68-69.

82 Reeves, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1996, 89.

83 Ibid and No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997, 130.

84 Reimer, “Where We’ve Been-Where We’re Headed,” Address at the Dwight David Eisenhower 

Luncheon, Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Amy, October 17, 1995, in 

Carafano, editor, Soldiers Are Our Credentials: The Collected Works And Selected Papers Of The 

Thirty-Third Chief Of Staff Army, 9.

85 Reimer, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, First Session, 106th 

Congress, on the Fiscal Year 2000 Budget and Posture of the United States Army, March 18, 1999.

86 West and Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United Sates Army, Fiscal Year 1998, Executive 

Summary, http://www.army.mil/aps/98/TITLE.HTM.

87 Reimer, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, First Session, 106th 

Congress, on the Fiscal Year 2000 Budget and Posture of the United States Army, March 18, 1999.

88 Major General Max Baratz, “Success is our call,” Army Reserve Magazine, Fall 1996, 4.

89 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998, Report of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board, 31-32, 36 and Haworth, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal 

Year 1998, 66-67. Much of this is verbatim from the sources.
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240

90 Interview, Coker with Baratz and Major General Max Baratz, “Creating the future Reserve,” 

Army Reserve Magazine, Summer 1994, 4.

91 Kathryn Roe Coker and Edward Shanahan, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command 

History, 1995 (Atlanta, Georgia: Office of the Command Historian, USARC, 1997), xxvi-xxvii; 

Major General Max Baratz, “U.S. Army Reserve: ‘More Ready Focused and More Capable,’” 

1995-1996 Army Green Book, October 1995, 92 and Major General Max Baratz, “A Restructured 

Army Reserve,” 1996-1997 Army Green Book, October 1996, 98. 

92 Anonymous, “Army Reserve streamlines command structure,” Army Reserve Magazine, Summer 

1995, 5.

93 Major General Max Baratz, “Staying ready and relevant,” Army Reserve Magazine, Summer 

1995, 4.

94 Anonymous, “Army Reserve streamlines command structure,” Army Reserve Magazine, Summer 

1995, 5.

95 Baratz, “U.S. Army Reserve: ‘More Ready Focused and More Capable,’” 1991-1992 Army 

Green Book, October 1991, 92.

96 Kathryn Roe Coker, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1997,

(Atlanta: Georgia, Office of the Command Historian, USARC, 1999), 6-7 and Haworth, 

Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1998, 68.

97 Baratz, “A Reorganized Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready,” 1997-1998 Army Green Book,

October 1997, 100 and Interview, Coker with Baratz.

98 Baratz, “A Reorganized Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready,” 1997-1998 Army Green Book,

October 1997, 100; Coker and Shanahan, United States Army Reserve Annual Command History, 

1995, xxvii, 283, 287 and Togo West Jr., and General Dennis J. Reimer, A Statement on the 

Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1998 Presented to the Committees and Subcommittees 

of the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives, February 1997, http://www.army.mil/

aps98/chapter2.htm. Power projection platforms were: Forts McCoy, Lewis, Sill, Carson, 

Riley, Bragg, Stewart, Dix, Benning, Polk, Bliss, Drum, Hood, Campbell and Eustis. 

99 Coker, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1996, x.

100 Baratz, “A Restructured Army Reserve,” 1996-1997 Army Green Book, October 1996, 103.

101 West and Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1998, http://

www.army.mil/aps98/chapter2.htm.

102 Coker and Shanahan, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, Fiscal 

Year 1995, 2, 4; Coker, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1997, 

52-53 and Reeves, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1996, 86-87.

103 No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1997, 125-126; Coker, 

United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1996, 112; Kathryn Roe 

Coker, Lee S. Harford, Jr., and David Hilkert, United States Army Reserve Command Annual 

Command History, 1999 (Atlanta, Georgia: Office of the Command Historian, USARC, 2000), 

147-148, and Baratz, “A Reorganized Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready,” 1997-1998 Army 

Green Book, October 1997, 98.

104 Major General Thomas J. Plewes, “The Indispensable Army Reserve: One Part of a Synchronized 

Force,” 1999-1998 Army Green Book, October 1999, 120. 

105 Coker, Harford and Hilkert, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 

1999, 19.

106 Major General Thomas J. Plewes, “Army Reserve: A True Partner In America’s Army,” 1998-

1999 Army Green Book, October 1998, 111. 
CHAPTER 2. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

241

107 No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997, 126. This is largely 

verbatim from the source.

108 Coker and Shanahan, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1995, 30.

109 No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997, 127. This is largely 

verbatim from the source. 

110 Coker and Shanahan, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1995, 33.

111 No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997, 127. This is largely 

verbatim from the source. 

112 Baratz, “A Reorganized Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready,” 1997-1998 Army Green Book, 

October 1997, 96.

113 Ibid., 97.

114 Plewes, “The Indispensable Army Reserve: One Part of a Synchronized Force,” 1999-2000 

Army Green Book, October 1999, 118-119 and Charlston, Department of the Army Historical 

Summary: Fiscal Year 1999, 62.

115 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board, 80.

116 Ibid., 83.

117 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board, 94.

118 Gammons and Donnelly, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1995, 59. 

This is largely verbatim from the source.

119 Ibid.

120 No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997, 131.

121 Baratz, “U.S. Army Reserve: ‘More Ready, More Focused and More Capable,’” 1995-1996 

Army Green Book, October 1995, 95 and Harford, Coker, Shanahan, Murphy, United States 

Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1994, 119. 

122 No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997, 131-132. This is 

largely verbatim from the source.

123 Baratz, “A Reorganized Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready,” 1997-1998 Army Green Book, 

October 1997, 96.

124 Coker, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1996, 106 and Reeves, 

Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1996, 92.

125 No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997, 131-132 and Interview, 

Coker with Hargraves. 

126 Plewes, “Army Reserve: A True Partner In America’s Army,” 1998-1999 Army Green Book, 

October 1998, 106 and Coker, Harford and Hilkert, United States Army Reserve Command 

Annual Command History, 1999, 150.

127 Coker, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1998, 95.

128 Baratz, “Reorganized Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready,” 1997-1998 Army Green Book, 

October 1997, 98 and Plewes, “Army Reserve: A True Partner In America’s Army,” 1998-1999 

Army Green Book, October 1998, 108.

129 Coker, Harford and Hilkert, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 

1999, 64-65.

130 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board, 95.
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131 Ibid., 103.

132 Haworth, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1998, 75. This is virtually 

verbatim from the source.

133 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board, 96 and No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 

1997, 132.

134 Walker and Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1999, 37.

135 Haworth, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1998, 71; Reserve Forces 

Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy 

Board, 96, 101; and Coker, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 

2000, 49.

136 Haworth, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1998, 71 and Reserve 

Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve Forces 

Policy Board, 96, 101. 

137 Kathryn Roe Coker, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 2000

(Atlanta, Georgia: Office of Army Reserve History, USARC, 2001), 49.

138 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board, 85.

139 Reeves, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1996, 92 and Coker, United 

States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1996, 106. This is largely verbatim 

from the former source.

140 Baratz, “ U.S. Army Reserve: ‘More Ready, More Focused and More Capable,’” 1995-1996 

Army Green Book, October 1995, 97.

141 Baratz, “A Reorganized Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready,” 1997-1998 Army Green Book, 

October 1997, 97.

142 No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997, 136. This is largely 

verbatim from the source.

143 Haworth, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1998, 71. This is largely 

verbatim from the source.

144 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 89.

145 West and Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1997, http://

www.army.mil/aps/97/DEFAULT.HTM.

146 Coker, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1997, 77.

147 Coker, Harford and Hilkert, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 

1999, 128. 

148 Coker, Harford and Hilkert, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 

1999, 77-78.

149 Charlston, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1999, 71.

150 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board, 104.

151 Walker and Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1999, 35.

152 Reimer, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, First Session, 106th 

Congress, on the Fiscal Year 2000 Budget and Posture of the United States Army, March 18, 1999. 

153 Walker and Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1999, xi.
CHAPTER 2. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

243

154 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 108-109.

155 Haworth, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1998, 79 and Charlston, 

Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1999, 77. This is largely verbatim 

from the sources. 

156 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the 

Reserve Forces Policy Board, 108.

157 Gammons and Donnelly, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1995, 65. 

This is largely verbatim from the source.

158 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 111.

159 Charlston, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1999, 77, 80. This is largely 

verbatim from the source.

160 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the 

Reserve Forces Policy Board, 108, 113.

161 Ibid., 116 and Haworth, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1998, 79. 

This is largely verbatim from the latter source. 

162 Reeves, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1996, 98. This is largely 

verbatim from the source.

163 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal 1998 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 124.

164 Reeves, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1996, 98. This is largely 

verbatim from the source.

165 Baratz, “A Restructured Army Reserve,” 1996-1997 Army Green Book, October 1996, 107. 

This is virtually verbatim from the source.

166 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal 1998 Report of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board, 123.

167 Interview, Kathryn Roe Coker with Mr. John Roe, September 3, 2010, Oral History Collection, USARHRC, OARH, USARC. 

168 Ibid and Coker and Shanahan, United States Army Reserve Command History, 1995, xxix.

169 Baratz, “U.S. Army Reserve: ‘More Ready, More Focused and More Capable,’” 1995-1996 

Army Green Book, October 1995, 93 and Coker, Shanahan and Foster-King, United States Army 

Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1995, xxix, 187.

170 Linda Syth, “New load system speeds cargo handling,” Army Reserve Magazine, Spring 1995, 

21.

171 Haworh, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1998, 80 and Plewes, “The 

Indispensable Army Reserve: One Part of a Synchronized Force,” Army Green Book, October 

1999, 122. This is largely verbatim from the former source.

172 Kathryn Roe Coker, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1998

(Atlanta, Georgia: Office of the Command Historian, USARC, 1999), 52.

173 Quoted in Coker, Hilkert and Harford, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1999, 94. 

174 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal 1998 Report of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board, 116 and Haworh, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal 

Year 1998, 80. This is largely verbatim from the sources.
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175 Charlston, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1999, 78-79. This is verbatim from the source.

176 Haworth, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1998, 80-81 and Plewes, 

“Army Reserve: A True Partner In America’s Army,” 1998-1999 Army Green Book, October 

1998, 108.

177 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 113; Haworth, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal 

Year 1998, 80-81 and Plewes, “Army Reserve: A True Partner In America’s Army,” 1998-1999 

Army Green Book, October 1998, 108.

178 Haworth, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1998, 81.

179 Coker, Hilkert and Harford, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 

1999, 92.

180 Quoted in Coker, Hilkert and Harford, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1999, 92. 

181 Coker, United States Army Reserve Annual Command History, 1996, 68.

182 Coker, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1997, ix, 39-40 and 

Coker, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1998, 49.

183 Coker, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1996, 36-38. 

184 Gammons and Donnelly, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1995, 55. 

This is largely verbatim from the source.

185 Plewes, “Army Reserve: A True Partner In America’s Army, “ 1998-1999 Army Green Book, 

October 1998, 106. 

186Haworth, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year, 1998, 72. This is virtually 

verbatim from the source.

187 Reeves, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year1996, 93. This is largely verbatim from the source.

188 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 89.

189 Rogers, The United States Army Reserve In Operation Joint Endeavor: Volume I, Mobilization 

& Deployment, Major Army Command Perspective, 20, 22, 31; Warren, The United States Army 

Reserve in Joint Endeavor: Volume II, Mobilization & Deployment, Army Staff Perspective, 63; 

News Release, Department of Defense, “Reserve Units Begin Mobilization for Rotation To 

Support Operation JOIN ENDEAVOR, May 10, 1996, http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=878; Reeves, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year1996, 

93; and William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 1999 (Washington, 

DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1999), 94.

190 Interview, Kathryn Roe Coker with Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes, November 15, 

2010, Oral History Collection, USARHRC, OARH, USARC.

191 Reeves, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year1996, 94-95. This is largely 

verbatim from the source.

192 Coker and Shanahan, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1995, 

80, 84.

193 Interview, Coker with Baratz.

194 Baratz , “A Reorganized Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready,” 1997-1998 Army Green Book, 

October 1997, 100. 
CHAPTER 2. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

245

195 Walker and Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1999, 6.

196 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 89. Operation JOINT GUARD began on December 20, 1996, and 

ended on June 20, 1998, which marked the transition of the NATO-led Stabilization Force in 

Bosnia-Herzegovina to a slightly smaller follow-on force. Simultaneously, Operation JOINT 

GUARD ended and Operation JOINT FORGE began.

197 No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997, 126. Operation 

JOINT ENDEAVOR began November 20, 1995, and ended December 19, 1996. Operation 

JOINT GUARD began on December 20, 1996, and ended on June 20, 1998.

198 Jerry Sullivan, “The Reserve’s commitment to Special Operations,” Army, April 1997, http://

findarticles.com/p/arttcles/mi_qa3723/is_199704/ai_n8766135/. 

199 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 86.

200 News Release, Department of Defense, “Army Reserve, Guard Forces Identified For Possible Call-Up In Operation JONT FORGE,” July 2, 1998, http://www.defense.gov/releases/

release.aspx?releaseid=1751. 

201 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 2000 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Washington, DC: Reserve Forces Policy Board, May 2001), 17. 

202 Baratz, “A Reorganized Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready,” 1997-1998 Army Green Book, 

October 1997, 98; Baratz, “A Restructured Army Reserve, 1996-1997 Army Green Book, October 1996, 103 and Warren, The United States Army Reserve in Joint Endeavor: Volume II, 

Mobilization & Deployment, Army Staff Perspective, 73.

203 Reeves, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year1996, 94. 

204 Baratz, “A Reorganized Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready,” 1997-1998 Army Green Book, 

October 1997, 97.

205 Charlston, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year, 1999, 73.

206 Plewes, “The Indispensable Army Reserve: One Part of a Synchronized Force,” 1999-2000 

Army Green Book, October 1999, 116.

207 Charlston, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year, 1999, 72.

208 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 105.

209 Gammons and Donnelly, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1995, 63. 

This is largely verbatim from the source.

210 No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997, 140. This is largely 

verbatim from the source. 

211 Haworth, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1998, 78.

212 Coker and Shanahan, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1995, 

226-227.

213 No author, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1997, 141. This is largely 

verbatim from the source. 

214 Haworth, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1998, 77. 

215 Baratz, “A Reorganized Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready,” 1997-1998 Army Green Book, 

October 1997, 97.

216 Ibid.
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217 Plewes, “The Indispensable Army Reserve: One Part of a Synchronized Force,” 1999-2000 

Army Green Book, October 1999, 118.

218 Haworth, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1998, 77.

219 Major Mark Zimmer, “A Bailey Bridge for the Birds,” Army Reserve Magazine, Summer 1995, 

15. 

220 Charlston, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year, 73-74. This is virtually 

verbatim from the source.

221 Linda Kozaryn, “Today’s Refugees Recall America’s Past, American Forces Press Service, no 

date, http://www.defense.gov/specials/provide_refuge/2arrival.html and Plewes, “The Indispensable Army Reserve: One Part of a Synchronized Force,” Army Green Book, October 1999, 116. 

222 Kozaryn, “Today’s Refugees Recall America’s Past, American Forces Press Service, no date, 

http://www.defense.gov/specials/provide_refuge/2arrival.html.

223 Coker, Harford and Hilkert, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 

1999, 91, 128.

224 Coker, Harford and Hilkert, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 

1999, 49.

225 Coker, Harford and Hilkert, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 

1999, 60.

226 Plewes, “The Indispensable Army Reserve: One Part of a Synchronized Force,” 1999-2000 

Army Green Book, October 1999, 116 and Charlston, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1999, 74. 

227 General Dennis J. Reimer, “Where We’ve Been-Where We’re Headed: Maintaining a Solid 

Framework While Building for the Future, “ Army October 1995, in Carafano, editor, Soldiers 

Are Our Credentials: The Collected Works And Selected Papers Of The Thirty-Third Chief Of Staff 

Army, 5. 

228 Reimer, “Where We’ve Been-Where We’re Headed,” Address at the Dwight David Eisenhower Luncheon, Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Amy, October 17, 

1995, in Carafano, editor, Soldiers Are Our Credentials: The Collected Works And Selected Papers 

Of The Thirty-Third Chief Of Staff Army, 11. 

229 Walker and Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1999, 46 

and Brown, Kevlar Legions, 343.

230 Coker, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1998, 12-13.

231 Coker and Shanahan, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1995, 59-60.

232 Reeves, Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1996, 90 and Coker, United 

States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1996, 20.

233 Interview, Coker with Baratz.

234 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy 

Board, Working Draft, 1998, 58-59.

235 Reimer, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, First Session, 106th 

Congress, on the Fiscal Year 2000 Budget and Posture of the United States Army, March 18, 

1999.

236 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1998 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 93. 

237 Coker and Shanahan, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1995, 128.
CHAPTER 2. ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT

247

238 Coker, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1996, 75-76, 117.

239 Coker, United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1997, 54 and Coker, 

United States Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1998, 58.

240 General Dennis J. Reimer, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 

First Session106th Congress, on the Fiscal Year 2000 and Posture of the United States Army, 

March 18, 1999.
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CHAPTER 3. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

249

CHAPTER 3

THE GLOBAL WAR

ON TERRORISM

A New Day in Infamy 

Throughout the 1990s, the smaller Army was engaged on several fronts. The 

front lines were geographically distant from the American people. Daily life 

was largely unaffected. Americans could go about their daily business with 

little disruption from conflicts and turmoil in such places as Haiti, Somalia, 

Bosnia, and Kosovo. The world seemed relatively safe and secure for those back 

home. That sense of security evaporated on September 11, 2001. America and 

its way of life was changed forever. A new day of infamy dawned. 

It was a clear, sunny Tuesday morning on the 

east coast; just another work day for most 

Americans. That changed at 8:46 A.M. American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the 96th 

floor of the 110-story North Tower of New 

York’s World Trade Center, the second tallest building in the country. Twenty thousand 

gallons of aviation fuel burst into flames at almost 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit. Was this an 

accident? That question was answered sixteen 

minutes later when United Airlines Flight 175 

smashed into the 80th floor of the twin South 

Tower. As Americans watched on television, at 

9:59 A.M. the South Tower collapsed from one 

hundred and ten stories to become one hundred 

and fifty feet of rubble. The North Tower collapsed within thirty minutes. Thousands ran from the dark, foreboding clouds 

of smoke and the crumbling buildings and chaos surrounding them.1 White 

House Chief of Staff Andy Card told President George W. Bush, who was in 

Sarasota, Florida, ‘”America is under attack!’”2

 

George W. Bush
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United Airlines Flight 175 smashing into the 80th floor of the twin South Tower. (AP/Moshe Burswker)
CHAPTER 3. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

251

The scope of that attack escalated when American Airlines Flight 77 crashed 

into the western wing of the Pentagon at 9:38 A.M. Then, within hours, another plane crashed in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, killing the thirty-three passengers, seven crewmembers, and the four highjackers. Later, it was 

learned that the passengers evidently foiled another terrorist attack. Each plane 

had been seized by terrorists posing as passengers. They wrestled control of the 

aircraft and piloted each plane. “A total of 2,435 workers, 343 firemen, and 23 

policemen died in the Twin Towers and another 125 employees and servicemen 

in the Pentagon.”3

 Nine Army Reserve soldiers were killed; seven in New York 

City and two at the Pentagon.4 They were: Warrant Officer 1 Ronald P. Bucca; 

Staff Sergeant Frederick J. Ill; Colonel (retired) Ronald F. Golinski; Captain 

Michael D. Mullen; Lieutenant Colonel William H. Pohlmann; Sergeant Shawn 

Powell; Colonel (retired) Rick Rescorla; Colonel David M. Scales; and Captain 

Mark P. Whitford.

In his first public statement that day, Bush declared ‘”Terrorism against our nation will not 

stand.’”6 At 9:40 A.M., the Federal Aviation Administration halted all flights at U.S. airports.7

 

In what he termed his “first decision as a wartime commander in chief,” Bush authorized the 

shooting down of any suspicious plane which 

failed to land peacefully after being ordered.8 

Bush approved Secretary of Defense Donald H. 

Rumsfeld’s decision to raise the military readiness level to DefCon Three, the first time since 

the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.9

 

“America is under attack!” Andy Card, White House Chief of Staff

Donald H. Rumsfeld

“Terrorism against our nation will not stand.” President George W. Bush
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2d Lieutenant Rick Rescorla, Battle of the Ia Drang, Vietnam 1965

Colonel (retired) Rick Rescorla used 

a bullhorn to direct the evacuation 

of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter’s 

2,800 employees on twenty floors 

of World Trade Center 2, and 1,000 

employees in World Trade Center 

5. Rescorla reminded everyone to 

“be proud to be an American,” and 

sang “God Bless America” and other songs over his bullhorn to help 

evacuees stay calm as they left the 

building. Rescorla had most of Morgan Stanley’s 3,800 employees and 

people working on other floors of 

World Trade Center 2 safely out of 

the buildings by the time United 

Airlines Flight 175 hit World Trade 

Center 2 at 9:07. After having 

reached safety, Rescorla returned to the building to rescue others still inside. He was last seen 

heading up the stairs of the tenth floor of the collapsing World Trade Center 2. He was posthumously awarded the first New Jersey Vietnam Service Medal. (Photo unknown)
CHAPTER 3. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

253

Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes and 77th Regional Support Command Commander 

Brigadier General Richard S. Colt confer shortly after the attack. (Photo by Sergeant First 

Class Christina Steiner, 311th Military History Detachment)
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New York City, September 14, 2001. Soldiers of the 1179th Deployment Support Brigade (DSB), 

Fort Hamilton, Brooklyn, volunteered to assist in rescue and recovery operations in lower Manhattan from September 14 to 16, 2001. From left to right: Sergeant First Class Harry Bass, Specialists 

William Schau and Rosa Arrunategui, Sergeants First Class James Farran, Tino Collura, and Captain Joseph Micelotta. In late October 2001, the 1179th mobilized for up to two years for Operation NOBLE EAGLE. (Photo courtesy of the 1179th DSB)
CHAPTER 3. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

255

Ground Zero five days after the attack. (Photo by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 311th 

Military History Detachment)
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New York City, October 19, 2001. New York City firefighters continued to douse out fires 

that smoldered from the World Trade Center rubble for three-and-a-half months after 

the attacks. (Photo by Major Robert Bensburg, 31th Military History Detachment)
CHAPTER 3. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

257

New York City, October 19, 2001. A small part of the structure of one of the World Trade Center 

towers stood for more than a month after the terrorist attacks. (Photo by Sergeant First Class 

Christina Steiner, 311th Military History Detachment)
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CHAPTER 3. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

259

Plan Accordingly, Gary Cassidy. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U. S. Army Center of Military 

History) 
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October 19, 2001. Recovery workers worked around the clock to clear out the debris from 

the World Trade Center site. It would not be until May 2002 that the site would be clean. 

(Photo by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 311th Military History Detachment)
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261

Arlington, Virginia, September 11, 2001. Command Sergeant Major Alex Lackey, Command 

Sergeant Major of the Army Reserve, communicates on a cell phone outside the Pentagon on 

September 11. Smoke is still coming from the Pentagon. Inside the building when the plane hit, 

he exited the Pentagon, then formed a litter team and tried to rescue survivors. Prevented from 

re-entering the building because of the fire and the threat of an additional attack, he supported 

the soldiers of the 3d Infantry Regiment (“the Old Guard”) who rushed from Fort Myer to the 

Pentagon. (Photo by Master Sergeant Jacqueline Gopie, OCAR)

Arlington, Virginia, September 17, 2001. Soldiers of the Army Reserve’s 311th Quartermaster 

Company (Mortuary Affairs) from Aguadilla, Puerto Rico – along with federal officials like Federal 

Bureau of Investigation agent Samuel Simon – set up operations in the north parking lot of the 

Pentagon on the morning of September 17, 2001. The men and women of the 311th had the 

grim task of searching through tons of debris from the Pentagon attack, searching for remains of 

victims and personal affects. They deployed and were operational within seventy-two hours of 

the call for volunteers reaching them. (Photo by Lieutenant Colonel Randy Pullen, OCAR Public 

Affairs Office) 
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September 11, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. 

Army Center of Military History)
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263

Arlington, Virginia, September 14, 2001 — Three days after the attack, fire engines surrounded the 

damaged portion of the Pentagon. At that time, efforts had shifted from rescue to recovery and 

the 311th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) used its knowledge of mortuary affairs 

to assist. In the days following the attack, Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes stated that 

the Army Reserve focused on gaining accountability of its personnel in both New York and 

Washington, raising security conditions at the reserve sites around the nation and overseas, 

and examining Army Reserve assets to provide assistance at the Pentagon and in New York. 

(Courtesy of the Pentagon Renovation Project Collection)
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Arlington, Virginia, October 22, 2001 -- Workers tore down portions of the Pentagon’s rings 

that had severe structural damage in order to rebuild those sections. Their work left behind 

debris including cabling, rods, and piping. (Photo by Specialist Kelly Strand, 46th Military 

History Detachment)
CHAPTER 3. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

265

Arlington, Virginia, October 22, 2001 — An excavator uses a claw to tear down damaged sections 

and remove debris from the Pentagon. (Photo by Specialist Kelly Strand, 46th Military History 

Detachment)
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The Immediate Response 

The Army and the Army Reserve were quick to respond. New York Governor 

George E. Pataki declared a state of emergency. Then Adjutant General Thomas 

P. Maguire ordered 8,000 National Guardsmen to report for state active duty. 

Guard soldiers had been gathering in their armories. By the night of September 

11, 1,500 were at Ground Zero, as the World Trade Center attack site came to 

be known.10 “Among the great heroes of that day,” claimed Plewes, “were Army 

Reservists. They displayed the highest qualities of courage and selflessness, 

whether that meant rushing into the World Trade Center, helping injured comrades out of the burning Pentagon or organizing rescue and recovery activities 

regardless of personal safety concerns.”11 Some died while performing their duty. 

When the attacks on America took place, the Army Reserve’s measured readiness was at the highest level in history at 77 percent, with 87 percent of its force 

deployable. According to Plewes, “This readiness -- along with our magnificent 

soldiers themselves -- is what enabled the Army Reserve to respond immediately and so effectively on September 11. . . .”12

The 77th Regional Support Command in Flushing, New York, Commanding 

General Brigadier General Richard S. Colt led the Army Reserve’s response to 

the World Trade Center attacks. The command identified support items and 

delivered them speedily to aid in the disaster recovery effort. The command 

offered other support by providing help to the rescue workers at Ground Zero. 

Also responding promptly and vital to the rescue and recovery operation were 

the Army Reserve emergency preparedness liaison officers in the New York 

City area. They arrived on scene immediately to support operations from civilian agencies. In a short time, crisis action teams were operational in every major 

Army Reserve command. Military police units were stationed at vital facilities. 

The Army Reserve response mushroomed. Army Reserve soldiers stepped forward first as volunteers and then as part of the partial mobilization ordered by 

“Among the great heroes of that day were Army Reservists. They 

displayed the highest qualities of courage and selflessness, whether that meant rushing into the World Trade Center, helping injured comrades out of the burning Pentagon or organizing rescue 

and recovery activities regardless of personal safety concerns.” 

Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes
CHAPTER 3. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

267

President Bush on September 14, only three days after the attack. In contrast, 

a partial mobilization was not ordered during the Gulf War until five months 

after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The first call-ups started on September 22. By that time, and reminiscent of the Gulf War, the Army Reserve had 

seven units, one installation, six facilities, and some 2,300 personnel supporting 

operations. Most of the units and personnel were in a training status.13 

Past mobilization procedures did not work in Operations NOBLE EAGLE 

(home front) and ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan). There was no 

time to allow for thirty, sixty, ninety, or 180 days to mobilize. Hasty mobilizations from twenty-four hours to ten days became the norm. “The way we 

did business,” said Plewes, “just doesn’t work anymore.” A case in point was 

the 311th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) from Aguadilla, Puerto Rico. On September 13, the call went out to the 65th Regional Support 

Command. On September 14, eighty-five soldiers volunteered and mobilized 

the same day. By the morning of September 17th, they were at work in the 

Pentagon’s north parking lot. There was only seventy-two hours between the 

time they were called up and the time they were operational. On September 26, 

another 105 soldiers were on the scene. “By this time,” explained Plewes, “they 

were all under partial mobilization orders. The orders had caught up with a 

unit that had already been ‘at war’ for more than a week.” Other units followed 

the same example, conducting hasty mobilizations or mobilizing after they deployed.14 The majority of those units called up were in support of Operation 

NOBLE EAGLE. Their missions included: force protection and security at 

installations and facilities, intelligence and investigation support, training and 

training validation, headquarters augmentation, garrison support, legal support, communications, postal and personnel support, engineer support, military 

history, logistics, and transportation operations.15 One example of a unit deployed for NOBLE EAGLE was the 1880th Medical Detachment (Logistics 

Support) from St. Louis, Missouri. The unit, alerted on November 23, 2001, 

provided augmentation to the 32nd Medical Logistics Battalion, 44th Medical 

Command, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for Class VIII supplies, optical single-vision lens fabrication, and medical equipment maintenance support.16 By 

the end of 2001, over 11,000 Army Reserve soldiers were on duty in the war on 

terrorism.17 

September 11, 2001 was a watershed in the history of the United States. It had 

a profound effect on the country which “moved,” in President Bush’s address 

that night to the nation, “A great people . . . to defend a great nation.” Bush set 

the tone for his evolving doctrine by stating the U.S. “will make no distinction 

between terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.” On 
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Waiting to Go to War, Master Sergeant Henrietta Snowden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, 

U.S. Army Center of Military History)
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September 20, 2001 in a joint session of Congress, Bush further defined his 

policy by stating, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From 

this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will 

be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”18

The Bush Doctrine

On September 17, 2002, Bush released his National Security Strategy, which 

altered the way the U.S. guaranteed its national security. The National Security

The United States “will make no distinction between terrorists 

who committed these acts and those who harbor them.” 

President George W. Bush

New York City, September 16, 2001. Army Reserve Colonel Gerard McEnerney (left) of the Regional 

Emergency Liaison Team 2 based in Manhattan, explains to Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes 

the responsibilities of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). As a reservist, 

Colonel McEnerney worked as a regional emergency preparedness liaison officer – a liaison 

between FEMA and the Army Reserve. He worked at several FEMA operations centers for 

a few days following 9-11. (Photo by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 311th Military 

History Detachment).
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New York City, September 16, 2001. Colonel Gerard McEnerney (right) escorts Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes (left) and Brigadier General Richard Colt (center) through lower Manhattan, stopping sometimes along the 

way to explain the extent of the devastation and progress being made by local governments. (Photo by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 311th Military 

History Detachment)

Strategy outlined the threat of terrorists to freedom and the country’s intent to 

defend the “peace by fighting [those] terrorists and tyrants.” This document 

addressed an overview of America’s international strategy, aspirations for human dignity, preventing enemies from threatening America and its allies with 

weapons of mass destruction, global economic growth through free markets 

and free trade, opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy, 

and transforming America’s national security institutions to meet the challenge 

and opportunities of the twenty-first century. American strategy in the past 

concentrated on defense against tyrants with “great armies and great industrial 

capabilities.” But, now “shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.” 

The strategies that won the Cold War, containment and deterrence, will not 

work against such dangers, “because those strategies assumed the existence of 

identifiable regimes led by identifiable leaders operating by identifiable means
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from identifiable territories.” Today’s enemies “see weapons of mass 

destruction as weapons of choice. . . . 

We cannot let our enemies strike 

first.”19

The new National Security Strategy for combating terrorism reformulated America’s foreign policy, 

including preemption to handle 

rogue states and terrorists with 

weapons of mass destruction: the 

“Bush Doctrine.”20 It was a major shift in military posture from 

“shape, respond, prepare” to “assure, dissuade, deter forward, and 

decisively defeat.” Bush said this 

is “a matter of common sense and 

self defense. . . .”21 There was a legal basis for preemption, international law, which recognized “that 

nations need not suffer an attack 

before they can lawfully take action 

to defend themselves against forces 

that present an imminent danger 

of attack.” The National Security 

Strategy preferred multilateral preemption. “The United States will 

constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community.” But, “we will not hesitate to act 

alone, if necessary, to exercise our 

right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, 

to prevent them from doing harm 

against our people and our coun-
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Tracking Bin Laden, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. 

Army Center of Military History)
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try.” It reinforced the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance which stated that “the 

United States should be postured to act independently when collective action 

cannot be orchestrated.” The fundamental goal of U.S. strategy must be to 

spread democracy everywhere, thereby, removing terrorism and tyranny.22 This 

proactive strategy set the stage for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It affected how the 

Army reshaped and transformed itself. Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis 

said this National Security Strategy “could represent the most sweeping shift in 

U.S. grand strategy since the beginning of the Cold War.”23 

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

Military intelligence determined that Osama bin Laden’s Islamic al-Qaeda was 

responsible for the September 11 attacks. Al-Qaeda’s base of operations was 

in Afghanistan where the fundamentalist, repressive Taliban regime controlled 

the country. A loose coalition, the Northern Alliance, opposed the Taliban. On 

October 7, 2001, less than a month after the September 11 attacks, the U.S., 

with support from Great Britain, launched an air and naval attack. The campaign pinpointed airfields and air defenses along with command and control 

centers. In a national address, Bush said the military action was aimed to “cut 

the military capability of the Taliban regime.” Rumsfeld explained that the 

assault was intended to “make it increasingly difficult for terrorists to use Afghanistan as a base of operations.” However, this campaign was ineffective in 

loosening the Taliban control.24

The ground war, or “boots on the ground,” began October 19, 2001. Several 

twelve-man Special Forces Operational Detachment A teams joined the Northern Alliance in fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda. By January 2002, the U.S. 

and its allies set the stage for tactical Operation ANACONDA which began on 

March 2, 2002, to destroy al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in eastern Afghanistan. 

That operation ousted the Taliban. Ground forces included the 10th Mountain 

Division, 101st Airborne Division, the 3d Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, and Afghan government soldiers. By November, the alliance had 50,000 

personnel in combat on the ground, sea, and air. They were in a support mode 

to the Afghans. Remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda forces finally fled into the 

Tora Bora Mountains where they were pursued by local anti-Taliban forces with 

assistance from Special Forces. Many eventually fled through the mountains 

into Pakistan. Osama bin Laden eluded capture. A mounting number of American ground forces were in theater and secured areas. With U.S. support the 

alliance had terrorists on the run.25 Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

marked the first commitment of American forces in simultaneous combat operations across multiple theaters of war since World War II.26
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Map 7
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The Hizara Province, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. 

Army Center of Military History)
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Army Reserve soldiers were serving alongside active component 

soldiers from the beginning of the 

ground war. Army Reserve public affairs soldiers went into the 

mountains of eastern Afghanistan 

with the 101st Airborne Division in 

Operation ANACONDA.27 The 

911th Forward Surgical Team supported the 10th Mountain Division 

during medical assistance missions 

in Afghanistan. The 310th Psychological Operations Battalion 

served in the isolated mountain regions of Afghanistan, determining 

the needs of the people and organizing the delivery of non-perishable foods, bottled water, and medical aid. Army Reserve engineers 

improved facilities at Kandahar as 

medical soldiers treated casualties 

at Bagram Air Base. The 1863d 

Medical Detachment combated 

bacterial and airborne viruses. The 

947th Forward Surgical Team built 

a hospital in the Orgun Valley and 

trained Afghanis in contemporary 

medical standards.28 The 345th 

Military Intelligence Detachment 

assisted the Coalition Forces Land 

Component Command (CFLCC) 

in intelligence operations leading to the identification, location, 

and targeting of the Taliban and 

al-Qaeda. The soldiers’ tasks were 

“vital to the war on terrorism.” One 

soldier said, “We helped out the active duty forces that were there and 

needed the augmentation.” Some 
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civil affairs units, known for their humanitarian aid and rebuilding projects, 

found themselves on the front lines in combat together with the infantry.29 

In January 2004, the 325th Field Hospital from Independence, Missouri, was 

activated and deployed to Afghanistan on March 15, 2004. The hospital staffed 

three locations at Bagram, Salerno, and Kandahar, providing Level III medical 

care. Soldiers from the unit helped support Task Force 325 Medical comprised 

of active Army and Army Reserve soldiers along with Navy and Air Force personnel. The mission of Task Force 325 Medical was to provide U.S. coalition 

service members, Department of Defense civilians, and other qualified personnel outpatient and inpatient care. Medical care spanned from basic family 

practice medicine to stabilization surgery for traumatic injuries from motor 

vehicle accidents, gunshot wounds, stabbings, rocket attacks, improvised explosive devices, and other injuries. Task Force 325 Medical also treated Afghan 

citizens whose injuries were beyond the care of local medical facilities. In the 

first nine months of operation, the task force treated more than 30,000 patients, admitted almost 1,500 patients, performed over 1,000 surgeries, filled 

over 50,000 prescriptions, took more than 16,000 x-ray photographs, analyzed 

more than 18,000 lab tests, and fabricated more than 4,000 pairs of eyeglasses. 

Captain Greg Hanley distributes school supplies to the Smail Kail secondary school in the Parwan 

Province on July 1, 2004. Hanley is attached to the 325th Field Hospital. (DOD photo by Sergeant 

First Class Sandra Watkinskeough)
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In that time, the task force saw approximately 9,000 local nationals. During 

the first presidential inauguration held in the country, Task Force 325 Medical 

sent a team to provide medical support for Afghanistan’s first president and for 

distinguished visitors. Task Force 325 Medical also assisted in humanitarian aid 

projects, such as distributing shoes, clothing, toys, and school supplies to the 

populace. The task force adopted a school in Charikar which taught both girls 

and boys.30 

In 2006, soldiers from the 391st Engineer Battalion, York, South Carolina, were 

the Army’s improvised explosive device hunters in Afghanistan.31 In fighting 

terrorists, there was no front line. Other units like the 342d Military Police 

Detachment (Law and Order), which provided security for U.S. forces at Uzbekistan air bases, were not on the front line.32 

For the 361st Engineer Battalion, service in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM meant a tour in Afghanistan from February 2005 to April 2006. A Company was from Asheville, North Carolina, while the other three companies were 

based in South Carolina. The unit totaled 570 Army Reserve soldiers. “Sappers 

Paktika Province, Afghanistan. Soldiers of the 934th Forward Surgical Team, 807th Medical 

Deployment Support Command, unload a patient from the back of a field ambulance at Forward Operating Base Sharana, Afghanistan. The 934th is responsible for reducing battlefield 

mortality rates by providing medical care within one hour of injury and preparing patients for a 

higher level of medical care. (Photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sergeant Demetrius Lester, Paktika 

Provincial Reconstruction Team Public Affairs)
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(explosive ordnance-clearing agents) from 2nd. Plt. Co. B, operated out of a 

forward operating base at Aned.”33 Their task was eliminating improvised explosive devices (IEDs). According to Sergeant Paul Hardy, ‘“You know you’re 

making a difference when you are pulling IEDs out of the middle of the road. . . . 

We’ve saved a lot of lives, so you feel like you’re a part of something that really 

works well.’”34 

They used Buffalo armored personnel carriers to travel. As squad leader Sergeant Joseph Plant said, ‘“This vehicle has taken a [blast from a] double-stacked 

anti-tank mine and everybody survived it. . . .’”35 But that was not always the 

case. In June 2005, Sergeant First Class Dereck Ware, a Persian Gulf War veteran of B Company was in a minefield with three airmen. “One tripped a line 

mine and one man lost a leg. But Ware’s quick thinking helped save all their 

lives, earning him a Bronze Star for the sapper.”36

Matters proved lethal on another occasion. “On March 12, 2006, in eastern 

Kunar Province, a roadside bomb claimed the lives of four engineers from A 

Corporal Dominic M. Pileri of the 310th Psychological Operations Battalion from Fort Gillem, 

Georgia, serves in a remote mountainous section of Afghanistan, where a major part of his job 

is going into the local villages to assess the needs of the people. With an Afghani child and an 

interpreter, Pileri arranges for the delivery of such items as non-perishable foods, bottled 

water, and medical aid to the villagers as part of a larger humanitarian effort. (Courtesy of 

Dominic Pileri, Sr.) 
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Company while they were clearing a route west of Asadabad in the Pech Valley. 

Two of the men were Iraq veterans.”37

One of the units A Company, which was assigned to Combined Task Force 

Spartan, supported was the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines. According to Marine 

Sergeant Gerald Calvin of C Company, ‘“They have one of the most dangerous 

jobs in the entire military. . . . What it comes down to is that those four soldiers 

gave their lives saving the lives of others.’”38

Company B, 391st Combat Engineer Battalion, embarks on a route clearance patrol over 

rugged terrain in support of Task Force FURY near Naka, Afghanistan. (Army Reserve Magazine, 

Summer 2006)
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As Base Air Force Chaplain Kerry Abbott told Stars & Stripes, ‘“There’s not 

many of them here, they’re Reservists, they’ve known each other for a long 

time, they are friends. They know each other’s families.’”39 The 361st Engineer 

Battalion lost a total of five during their deployment in Afghanistan.40 

Also serving in Afghanistan was C Troop, 7th Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment. 

The unit, from Conroe, Texas, was deployed from October 2005 to October 

2006. The unit operated from Bagram Airfield. The commander, Lieutenant 

Colonel Andrew Doehring, observed, ‘“Flying in one of the most demanding 

environments in the world. . .the unit carried out deliberate attack missions, 

provided quick reaction and performed armored escort missions. In 12 months, 

Sergeant Richard A. Darvial, kneeling, takes cover while Specialist Corey C. Canterbury 

fires mortars from a mountain top overlooking the Ganigal Valley in eastern Afghanistan’s 

Kunar province, December 11, 2010. Darvial and Canterbuty are assiged to Company 

B, 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, 143d Expeditionary Sustainment Command. 

(Photo by Sergeant Mark Burrell, 201th MPAD, 143d ESC)
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C Troop’s eight AH-64A attack helicopters flew in excess of 4,979 hours 

of combat.’”41

In his January 2002 state of the union address, 

President Bush told the American people “in 

four short months,” the country had “rallied 

a great collation, captured, arrested, and rid 

the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed 

Afghanistan’s terrorist training camps, saved 

a people from starvation, and freed a country 

from brutal oppression.”42 But, as seen later, 

the terrorists rallied, albeit in a weakened state. 

The U.S. continued fighting in Afghanistan. 

On December 1, 2009, President Barack H. 

Obama announced his strategy for escalating 

the war and committed 30,000 more soldiers 

to the war fight, thereby, increasing the number 

of Army Reserve soldiers on duty beyond the 

1,528 already there as of June 22, 2009.43 The 

Obama administration’s December 2010 assessment of the war’s progress stated 

the strategy was succeeding in meeting its two primary military objectives: degrading the leadership of the Pakistani-based al-Qaeda terrorists who attacked 

the U.S. and breaking the strength of the Taliban militants who once provided 

them haven in Afghanistan.44

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

The other major front in the Global War on Terrorism was Iraq. The concept for 

what later became Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was long in the making, dating 

back some viewed to March 1, 1991, the day after DESERT STORM. Based 

upon the belief that Saddam Hussein had developed weapons of mass destruction, President Bush decided that a regime change in Iraq was warranted. He 

also based his decision on Iraq’s connection with terrorists and the belief that Iraq 

posed a danger to the stability of the Middle East. Hussein’s use of weapons of 

mass destruction in deadly poison gas attacks on Kurdish villages in northern Iraq 

was another factor. As some of America’s allies questioned the threat of Hussein, 

Bush was prepared to act alone to crush what he had once included in his “axis 

of evil” made up of Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Others wanted to wait on 

the results of recently readmitted United Nations weapons inspectors. Britain 

sided with Bush as his determination for a regime change in Iraq increased.45

Barack H. Obama
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Map 8
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In a statement to the United Nation’s General Assembly on September 10, 

2002, Bush said:

My nation will work with the UN Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq’s regime defies us again, the world must move 

deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the 

UN Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes 

of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will 

be met -- or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its 

legitimacy will also lose its power.46

Then stationed at Forward Operating Base Leatherneck, the 287th Transportation Company, 

143d Expeditionary Sustainment Command, hauls several U.S. military vehicles, including 

a RT (rough terrain) container handler (Kalmar), on the unit’s M1070 heavy equipment 

transporters (HET) and M1000 trailers around May 2010, down highway 1 to Forward Operating Base Leatherneck after a mission to Forward Operating Base Shindand, Afghanistan. 

The HET and M1000 trailer are the only system capable of hauling the RT 240 Kalmar in 

Afghanistan. (Photo by Specialist David Emigh, 287th Transportation Company) 
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Into the Hornet’s Nest, Timothy Lawn. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of 

Military History) 
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When Bush made his address to the United Nations, plans were already in the 

making for a campaign against Iraq. In fact on December 4, 2001, General 

Tommy R. Franks, commander of the U.S. Central Command, briefed the secretary of defense 

on the first draft war plan. By February 1, 2002, 

General Franks had plans for a four-phased war: 

connecting Special Forces with CIA teams, an air 

campaign, a ground war, and stabilization.47

In the winter of 2002 and the spring of 2003, National Guard and Army Reserve units mobilized 

as the ground war began on March 21, 2003. 

These units were largely combat service support units or logistics units. They provided the 

majority of soldiers involved in operating ports, 

hauling fuel, repairing equipment, and supporting the theater on a broad-spectrum. Combat 

service units such as military police battalions, 

engineer bridge companies, civil affairs detachments, and psychological operations units mobilized and met vital requirements. Since they were essential to 

the operation, rapid mobilization and deployment was the objective, one that 

was not always met. Many Army Reserve soldiers found themselves at mobilization stations different from the prewar plans. The quick paced mobilization 

sometimes resulted in reduced post-mobilization training of units and soldiers. 

This was training completed after mobilization and prior to deployment. Individual Army Reserve mobilization was another challenge. Moving through 

continental replacement centers often proved trying.48

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM had all the characteristics of war in the twenty-first century: the 

requirements for speed, agility, flexibility and the 

need for a more robust rotational base. Evidence 

of that was the 3d Infantry Division’s (Mechanized) ability to move two hundred miles to An 

Najaf within twenty-four hours.49 According 

to Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, chief, 

Army Reserve (CAR), “We didn’t miss one requirement . . . . We [won] at all the missions. But 

further we didn’t break the force; we don’t have 

any case of just literally losing everything--soldiers, equipment as well. . . . We met all the operational missions. . . .”50

General Tommy R. Franks

Lieutenant General 

James R. Helmly
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Numerous Army Reserve units answered the call. The 459th Engineer Company (Multi-Role Bridge), an Army Reserve unit from Bridgeport, West Virginia, 

built bridges across the Diyala and Euphrates Rivers sometimes under direct 

enemy fire for the I Marine Expeditionary Force in its successful advance on 

Baghdad. As a bridge unit, it was common tactics that the 459th be a part 

of the spearhead elements, charging deep into enemy territory. Engineer assets, particularly bridges, were critically important, assuming the enemy would 

deny their bridges around Baghdad to coalition forces. After a week in place 

at the Baghdad bridge sites, the 459th transferred to Camp Dogwood, south of 

Baghdad, leaving maintenance crews behind to tend the bridges. At Dogwood, 

the unit’s mission changed dramatically when the unit became one of the prime 

movers in Task Force BULLETT, a military operation to haul captured enemy munitions from around Baghdad to coalition ammunition storage sites to 

be accounted, used, or destroyed. There were other missions as well, such as 

directing traffic on the hard bridge across the Diyala and preventing civilians 

from using it. The 459th exemplified the integration of the Army Reserve into 

the active Army.51 

Another example was the 377th Theater Support Command, which deployed 

with Third Army under Central Command, providing support services in 

Southwest Asia for the Southwest Asian Theater. The unit was comprised of 

active Army and Army Reserve soldiers.52 

The 362d Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply) from Kinston, North 

Carolina, deployed in January 2003, hauling fuel to support the V Corps. The 

unit successfully accomplished its mission by delivering 61 million gallons of 

aviation fuel, 6.6 million gallons of diesel fuel and 3.3 million gallons of gasoline, and 124,000 gallons of water.53 For the 802d Ordnance Company (Ammunition) from Gainesville, Florida, combat service support meant recovering, 

cleaning, packing, hauling, and reissuing enormous amounts of war munitions to 

coalition forces.54 

The 445th Medical Detachment (Veterinary Services) mobilized on February 

24, 2003. Upon its deployment to Kuwait on May 6, 2003, the unit began 

assuming control over an area of operations which included ten countries in 

two continents, supporting four branches of U.S. services and coalition forces. 

“We didn’t miss one requirement . . . . We [won] at all the missions. . . . We 

met all the operational missions. . . .” Lieutenant General James R. Helmly
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The 445th was responsible for veterinary services in Kuwait as well as U.S. 

camps in Iraq, Qatar, Djibouti, Bahrain, and Kyrgyzstan. The 445th conductA soldier and his military working dog, Ali, search vehicles at an 

entry control point. Handlers working side by side with their 

dogs search vehicles for illegal drugs and explosives. The 445th 

Medical Detachment (Veterinary Services) was one unit responsible for the care of military working dogs. (Defense Video and 

Imagery Distribution System).

445th Medical Detachment (Veterinary Services)
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ed additional short term missions in Kenya, Jordon, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. 

Its mission included maintaining quality assurance of food inspection, providing zoonotic disease control, and caring for over seventy-five U.S. and coalition 

military working dogs. The 445th inspected over seventy-two million pounds 

of subsistence amounting to ninety-five million dollars. The volume of subsistence inspected was over eighteen million meals served with no outbreak of 

food borne illness reported. In the early stages of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, theater conditions were primitive with inadequate storage facilities for 

Class I and operational rations. The unit provided much needed assistance on 

this issue to ensure rations were stored in appropriate environmentally controlled facilities, thereby preventing further degradation or condemnation of 

the rations. Being responsible for the health of military working dogs involved 

the training and education of their handlers in emergency veterinary medicine. 

The 445th served in the theater of operations until February 2004.55 

The 323d Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting) from El Dorado, Kansas, deployed to Iraq in April 2003. The unit’s duties included extinguishing fires, such 

as an oil pipeline fire, inspecting structures, and serving as a base fire department and an aircraft crash and rescue team.56 

For the 195th Contract 

Supervision Detachment 

from Orlando, Florida, supporting the war fight meant 

supervising longshoremen, 

stevedores, labor crews, 

and military personnel contracted to load and off-load 

military cargo ships at the 

ports of Shuaiba and Shuwaikh, Kuwait. The 724th 

Military Police Battalion 

from south Florida built an 

enemy prisoner of war facility near Camp Bucca. The 320th Military Police 

Company from St. Petersburg, Florida, guarded a captured Iraqi air base in 

Tallil.57 

The 369th Transportation Company was ordered to active duty on December 

20, 2003. The company’s mission was to support 1st Infantry Division units and 

the 30th Brigade Combat Team; haul all classes of supply to supported forward 

operating bases; and provide command and control, force protection (convoy security), and maintain open lines of communication with supported units.58 

Port of Shuaiba, Kuwait
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During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the 459th Engineer Company (Multi-Role Bridge), an Army 

Reserve unit from Bridgeport, West Virginia, lays an aluminum float ribbon bridge under enemy 

fire across the Diyala River southeast of Baghdad. The spearhead of the I Marine Expeditionary 

Force required the crossing in order to expand its dismounted infantry bridgehead with tank 

support before entering Baghdad. Other missions accomplished by the 459th included bridging 

the Euphrates River and convoy security. (An Army Reserve Historical Painting)
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Sixty-six soldiers of the 1184th 

Transportation Terminal Battalion 

from Mobile, Alabama, supported 

the 101st Airborne’s equipment 

needs. The 13th Psychological 

Operations Battalion from Arden 

Hills, Minnesota, recorded simple 

instructional messages that helped 

Iraqi prisoners understand and 

follow rules of an enemy prisoner 

of war camp.59 The 353d Engineer Group from Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, worked to restore Iraq’s 

infrastructure, which included renovating the power grids and waste 

and sewer systems, and rebuilding 

housing and commerce.60 

“By September 2003, 144,000 National Guardsmen and reservists 

were on duty, with 28,000 of these 

mobilized for homeland security.”61 

By October 2003, 35 percent of the 

Army Reserve’s strength had been 

mobilized, which accounted for almost half of its deployable units.62 

By the end of 2003, a total of 2,322 

Army Reserve units had been mobilized.63 Helmly described the 

mobilization as “for percentage 

wise the largest mobilization we’ve 

had since World War II.”64 

By 2005, the Army Reserve committed nearly 80 percent of its aviation assets to the war fight with 
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the arrival of its only two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter companies and one 

AH-64 Apache Battalion. The three units were D Company, 158th Aviation 

Regiment; Company C, 159th Aviation Regiment, both Black Hawk; and the 

8th Battalion, 229th Aviation Regiment.65 The Army Reserve was no longer a 

supplemental force, a force of last resort, but rather one contributing immediately to military operations.66

By October 2003, 35 percent of the Army Reserve’s strength had been

mobilized, which accounted for almost half of its deployable units.

Oil pipeline fire near Hadithah. Soldiers from the 323d Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting) 

spray down the bulldozers with water which kept them from lighting up. (Photo by 323d 

Engineer Detachment (Firefighting)) 
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In a 2004 message to Army Reserve soldiers and their families, Helmly told 

them: “Today the nation is asking Army Reserve Soldiers to be prepared to 

serve on active duty when called. Just as the generation of World War II answered the call to service,” he continued “we are being called upon to sacrifice 

in defense of our Nation in the Global War on Terrorism.”67 As a result of the 

unstable situation in Iraq, “the Department of the Army,” he explained, “announced that our Soldiers will be on the ground, in the theater of operations 

for 12 months.”68

A guard with the 320th Military Police Company from St. Petersburg, Florida, mans a makeshift 

outpost at Tallil Air Base in central Iraq, watching as prisoners of war are transferred onto buses 

for transport to the coalition’s internment facility near Umm Qasar. (Photo by Sergeant Frank N. 

Pellegrini)

“Today the nation is asking Army Reserve Soldiers to be prepared 

to serve on active duty when called. Just as the generation of World 

War II answered the call to service, we are being called upon to 

sacrifice in defense of our Nation in the Global War on Terrorism.” 

Lieutenant General James R. Helmly
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Specialist Jose Lopez, a sheriff’s deputy in Broward County, Florida, and a colleague put 

up some concertina wire along a yet-to-be built fence line as Army Reserve soldiers 

with the 724th Military Police Battalion find themselves pitching in to build the new 

enemy prisoner of war facility they will be guarding. (Army Reserve Magazine, Fall 2003)
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Soldiers from the 459th Engineer Company (Multi-Role Bridge) lower a bridge section 

toward the water before launching and unfolding. A motor boat stands ready to engage 

the floating section and push it into place. (Specialist Bradley Miller)

Soldiers with the 632d Maintenance Company, 110th Combat Sustainment Support 

Battalion, 224th Sustainment Brigade, 103d Expeditionary Sustainment Command, line 

up their mine resistant ambush protected vehicles before a mission in 2010 at the convoy staging lanes at Contingency Operating Base Adder, Iraq. (U.S. Army photo by First 

Lieutenant Seth Church)
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Part of that sacrifice was the call up of Army Reserve soldiers often with less 

than forty-eight hours notice who were mobilized and sent to Iraq or to another theater. In fact, in 2003 more than 50 percent of Army Reserve units had 

less than a fifteen-day notice. Helmly described 2003 as an “absolutely volatile, 

tumultuous year.”69

Many Army Reserve soldiers along with active Army soldiers were told they 

would be mobilized longer than expected. This placed stress on the soldier, 

the family, the employer, and the community, especially since during the Cold 

War many Army Reserve soldiers believed they would never be mobilized, or if 

mobilized, it would only be a six month deployment, like those in the Balkans. 

The active Army seemed not prepared for the new style of rapid mobilization 

either. Some 8,000 soldiers were mobilized, and then demobilized as not being 

needed, and a month later remobilized. “The pressures on the institution,” explained Helmly, “were extraordinary.” Soldiers were surprised by the size and 

speed of mobilization, the long deployments, and as Helmly explained, “the 

volatility of the mobilizations in terms of having to change the length of time 

the soldiers would be deployed -- the suddenness.” All this unforeseen change 

had to be communicated to the soldiers and their families. That meant a “massive command information communications campaign . . . .”70

On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared “mission accomplished.”71 However, 

as with Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the insurgents were relentless 

and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and the Global War on Terrorism continued with the nonstop mobilization of Army Reserve soldiers. For the 11th 

Military Police Brigade, service in the Global War on Terrorism meant taking 

command and control from June 2008 to June 2009 of Task Force MILITARY 

POLICE-NORTH. Its mission was to conduct internment and resettlement 

operations and counterinsurgency operations for over 4,000 detainees, as well 

as coordinating the release and transfer of thousands of more detainees.72 

For the 416th Theater Engineer Command, it meant deployment in November 2008 to provide leadership and engineering staff capabilities to the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers’ Gulf Region Division supporting Multi-National 

Forces-Iraq. These and other Army Reserve soldiers provided essential combat 

support to ongoing operations. 

The Army Reserve has been mobilized continuously since December 1995.73 

December 8, 2010, found 12 percent of the force currently mobilized.74 Figure 

III-1 represents worldwide Army Reserve commitments. The war entered a 

new phase when on August 31, 2010, the Army’s 4th Stryker Brigade left Iraq, 

marking the end of U.S. combat operations.75 Operation NEW DAWN began 
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on September 1 with the shift from “combat and counterinsurgency activities to 

a more limited focus on training and advising the Iraqi security forces, conducting targeted counterterrorism operations, providing force protection for U.S. 

military and civilian personnel and facilities, and supporting civilian agencies 

and international organizations in their capacity-building efforts.”76 As of December 29, 2010, 195,707 Army Reserve soldiers have been mobilized in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM and NEW 

DAWN since September 11, 2001.77 (See figure III-2.) The Army Reserve 

as an integral, operational force continued providing nonstop combat support, 

calling upon its soldiers to expect routine mobilization and deployment. 

As of December 29, 2010, 195,707 Army Reserve soldiers have been 

mobilized in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI 

FREEDOM and NEW DAWN since September 11, 2001.

Figure III-1: Army Reserve Commitments, December 10, 2010
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Figure III-2: Reserve Component Activations, December 28, 2010

Unique SSAN Activations as of:

change from 

last week

Currently Activated:

Deactivated Since 9/11:

Reserve 

Component

ARNG 41 326 408 46 34 291 304 338 038

701,485

793,567

Reserve Components 

NOBLE EAGLE / ENDURING FREEDOM / NEW DAWN

92,082 (-778)

December 28, 2010

Total:

Total 

Activated 

Since 9/11 

* Current 

Involuntary 

Activations 

** Current 

Voluntary 

Activations

Total 

Currently 

Activated

Total 

Deactivated 

Since 9/11 

ARNG 41,326 (-384) 5,408 (+20) 46,734 (-364)

USAR 16,487 (-527) 8,922 (+12) 25,409 (-515)

USNR 5,678 (-133) 112 (-3) 5,790 (-136)

USMCR 2,893 (-5) 2,167 (-3) 5,060 (-8)

ANG 2,351 (+62) 1,897 (-58) 4,248 (+4)

USAFR 1,032 (+127) 3,030 (+114) 4,062 (+241)

USCGR 370 (+1) 409 (-1) 779 (+0)

TOTAL 70,137 (-859) 21,945 (+81) 92,082 (-778)

change from 

last week

change from 

last week

change from last 

week

Notes:

* Includes members placed on Active Duty under 10 USC Sections 688, 12301(a), 12302 and 12304 

** Includes members placed on Active Duty under 10 USC 12301(d) and members categorized as unknown in CTS statute code

DRS# 21800

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6,905

701,485

338,038

195,707

58,127

47,718

60,390

85,903

7,684

793,567

291,304

170,298

53,067

41,928

56,328

81,655

Soldiers from the 741st Adjutant General Company (Postal) prepare for Exercise BRIGHT STAR 2004 at Camp Doha, Kuwait. The unit arrived in Kuwait in 

April 2003 and departed in May 2004.
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Specialist Lisa Phillips is at the .50-caliber machine gun of one of the 630th Transportation 

Company’s gun trucks. The trucks provide force protection on convoys in Iraq. (Photo by 

Master Sergeant Jack Gordon)
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Soldiers from the 362d Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply) conduct a tanker to tanker 

transfer at a forward operating base east of Fallujah, Iraq. (Army Reserve Magazine, Spring 2006) 
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Soldiers from the 108th Training Command are patrolling an Iraqi city with the Army. These eleven man teams are assigned with the Iraqi Army as advisors and also serve as liaisons between 

Iraqi/U.S. forces during critical mission requirements. (Photo by Major Voris McBurnette)
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Turret gunner Staff Sergeant Benjamin Moroni, 108th Training Division, conducts pre-combat 

checks on his equipment and radio before his next convoy security mission. Turret gunners are 

the eyes and firepower behind convoy security missions. Capable of a 360 degree view of the 

convoy, truck commanders and drivers rely on the sharp eyes and analysis of the gunner. (Army 

Reserve Magazine, Spring/Sumer 2007)
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National Security Strategy 

U.S. involvement in the Global War on Terrorism was in sync with the 2002 National Security 

Strategy. The updated National Security Strategy released four years later on March 16, 2006, 

was founded on two pillars: (1) “promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity-working to end 

tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to 

extend prosperity through free and fair trade and 

wise development policies;” and (2) “confronting 

the challenges of our time by leading a growing 

community of democracies.” “Free governConvoy commander First Lieutenant Randy Shields, 108th Training Division, conducts a convoy 

briefing prior to departure to Taji, Iraq. Every convoy begins with a briefing to reiterate rules of 

engagement, current intelligence reports, rally points, order of march and overall safety. (Army 

Reserve Magazine, Spring/Summer 2007)

2006 National 

Security Strategy
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ments do not oppress their people or attack free nations.” Goals included 

ending tyranny and promoting effective democracies. The United States must 

join with others to “deny terrorists what they need to survive. . . .”78 Like Bush’s 

predecessors, the 2006 National Security Strategy adopted a multilateral approach. The U.S. would lead democratic nations in overcoming challenges.79 

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates agreed with that approach. “Perchance”, 

he opined, “the most important component in the war on terror is not the fighting we do ourselves but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend 

and govern their own countries.” Victory is measured in how well the country 

molds the “behavior of friends, adversaries and 

most importantly, the people in between” rather 

than “imposing one’s will on another.”80 

The 2006 National Security Strategy addressed 

a number of issues. Those included: 

a. championing aspirations for human dignity; 

b. strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks 

against the U.S. and its allies; 

c. working with others to defuse regional 

conflicts; 

d. preventing the nation’s enemies from 

threatening us and our allies and friends 

with weapons of mass destruction; 

e. igniting a new era of global economic growth through free markets and 

free trade; 

f. expanding the circle of development by opening societies and building 

infrastructures of democracy; 

Robert M. Gates

 “America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the 

smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”

President George W. Bush
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g. developing agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of 

global power; 

h. engaging opportunities and confronting the challenges of globalization 

and transforming the nation’s national security institutions to meet the 

challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century. 

That last issue directly referenced the Department of Defense’s war on terrorism. The Department of Defense was transforming to meet four types of asymmetric threats recognized in the National Security Strategy and in the 2005 

National Defense Strategy: 

1. traditional (conventional armed forces); 

2. irregular (state and non-state agents using methods such as terrorism and 

insurgency); 

3. catastrophic (weapons of mass destruction, pandemic disasters); 

4. disruptive (use of technologies such as biotechnology to counter U.S. 

safety measures). 

Sustaining transformation was the way ahead.81 

With the change in the national administration came an updated National 

Security Strategy in May 2010. This strategy relied heavily on diplomacy and 

engagement, economic development, and other avenues of influence together 

with U.S. military capabilities. It identified real and potential security challenges to which the United States would take a multilateral approach. “The burdens of a young century cannot fall on America shoulders alone. . . .” Existing 

alliances must be strengthened while they must be “modernized to meet the 

challenges of a new century.”82 

The document called for U.S. national security strategy to pursue four enduring national interests: security of the country, its people, allies and partners; 

prosperity in the form of a “strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an 

open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;” “respect for universal values at home and abroad;” and international order 

“advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity 

through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.”83

The 2010 National Security Strategy identified several top security priorities 

for American strategy: fortify security and resilience at home; defeat al-Qaeda and its violent extremist affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the 

world; turnaround the spread of nuclear and biological weapons and secure 

nuclear materials; promote peace, security, and opportunity in the greater Mid-
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dle East; invest in stalwart and capable partners; and secure cyberspace.84 The 

National Security Strategy recognized the primary threat to the nation was a 

nuclear weapon delivered by terrorists. Consequently, the country must be prepared to pursue a campaign aimed at destroying those harboring these weapons 

and “denying them sanctuary anywhere in the world.”85 

The United States will continue its global operations to disrupt, dismantle, and 

defeat the transnational terrorist group al-Qaeda and its affiliates. “The frontline of this fight is Afghanistan and Pakistan, where we are applying relentless 

pressure on al-Qaeda, breaking the Taliban’s momentum, and strengthening the 

security and capacity of our partners.” In his introduction, Obama stated, “As 

we face multiple threats-from nations, nonstate actors and failed states-we will 

maintain the military superiority that has secured our country, and underpinned 

global security, for decades.”86 The military must be prepared to protect the 

homeland and critical interests, meet treaty requirements, stay engaged with 

our allies and work with other nations for regional stability and assuage future 

crises. 87 The military then had two distinct roles: to maintain conventional 

superiority and to “act in an advisory capacity to developing and transnational 

nations and emerging allies.”88 Although the 2010 National Security Strategy

placed less emphasis on the use of force and more stress on gaining wide support and “isolating problematic regimes from the international scene” than the 

2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies, the continued deployments of the 

active Army and the Army Reserve was assured.89 

Quadrennial Defense Review

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review called for more transformation. There 

must be, stated Rumsfeld, a “transformation of U.S. forces, capabilities, and institutions to extend America’s asymmetric advantages well into the future.”90 A 

central objective was replacement of a “threat-based defense strategy” with a 

“capabilities-based strategy.”91 

The new strategy concentrated on “how an adversary might fight rather than 

specifically whom the adversary might be or where a war might occur.”92 Un-

“As we face multiple threats-from nations, nonstate actors and 

failed states - we will maintain the military superiority that has secured our country, and underpinned global security, for decades.” 

President Barack H. Obama
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der this strategy, forces were no longer sized and shaped for two major theater 

wars. Forces would be shaped and sized to defend the homeland, the highest 

priority. Forces would thwart aggression and coercion in crucial areas overseas. 

Wars would be fought in two countries, simultaneously. This would give the 

president the option to declare victory in one of them. The victory could be 

either a regime change or occupation.93 At the same time, forces would be able 

to conduct smaller, limited worldwide contingency operations. Capabilities 

would evolve to defeat enemies who used surprise, deception, and asymmetric 

warfare. A paradigm shift occurred in force planning. The global posture of 

the United States shifted from Western Europe and North East Asia to the 

Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Gulf.94 

The security environment had changed. As demonstrated by the September 11 

attacks, the United States’ geographic position no longer guaranteed “immunity from direct attack on its population, territory, and infrastructure.”95 While 

there was no “peer competitor,” there were certain regional security developments stretching from the Middle East to Northeast Asia which potentially 

could threaten stability in regions critical to U.S. interests. “To secure U.S. interests and objectives despite the challenges of the future security environment 

. . . [was] the fundamental test for U.S. defense strategy and U.S. Armed Forces.” 

U.S. forward-deployed and “first to fight” forces were trained and ready. But, 

other operational units were less ready. “The readiness of the Army’s highest 

priority units. . . [had been] sustained at the expense of non-divisional and Reserve Component units and the institutional Army.”96 

The Department of Defense developed a “new strategic framework to defend 

the nation and secure a viable peace.” That framework depended on four policy goals: “assuring allies and friends; dissuading future military competition; 

deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests; and if deterrence fails, 

decisively defeating any adversary.”97 

The current force structure, active and reserve components, was the “baseline from which the Department [of Defense] . . . [would] develop a transformed force for the future. The department had begun an “ambitious 

transformation of U.S. military forces to meet” the security challenges. 

The Quadrennial Defense Review recognized the continued reliance on the 

reserve components to support the nation’s defense strategy and called for a 

“comprehensive review of the Active and Reserve mix, organization, priority 

missions, and associated resources. This review . . . [was to] build on recent 

assessments of Reserve Component issues that highlighted emerging roles for 

the Reserve Components in the defense of the United States, in smaller-scale 

contingencies, and in major combat operations.”98 
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The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review focused on a lighter, more agile, more 

deployable joint, and streamlined force. It concentrated on fighting the “long 

war,” (as in Vietnam) reorienting capabilities and forces, reshaping the defense 

enterprise, developing a twenty-first century total force, and achieving unity 

of effort. The theme was transforming the military to meet the challenges of 

the future. According to Rumsfeld, the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review “reflects a process of change that has gathered momentum since the release of its 

predecessor Quadrennial Defense Review in 2001. Now in the fifth year of this 

global war, the ideas and proposals in this document are provided as a roadmap 

for change, leading to victory.”99 It validated the strategic direction of the Army 

Plan.100

The strategic foundation of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review was the National Defense Strategy which included its national military strategic requirements. 

The National Defense Strategy supported the National Security Strategy. It 

called for the armed forces “to be able to conduct joint, multinational operations anywhere across the spectrum of conflict.” That spectrum extended from 

accenting “stability and civil support operations” and unconventional warfare to 

accenting “major combat operations,” concentrating on the more traditional offensive and defensive operations. That National Defense Strategy mirrored the 

current strategy. Army doctrine in the post 9/11 world reflected this change. 

The change affected the manning, training, educating and equipping of the 

Army’s force.101 

The strategy meant the Department of Defense will confront the twenty-first 

century challenges. The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review offered a “new direction for accelerating” the department’s transformation to “focus more on the 

needs of Combatant Commanders and to develop portfolios of joint capabilities 

rather than individual stove-piped programs.” This was driven by today’s “complex strategic environment” of the “long war.” This atmosphere was more demanding and put pressure on the Department of Defense’s all volunteer, Total 

Force. “The Total Force of active and reserve military, civilian, and contractor 

personnel must continue to develop the best mix of people equipped with the 

right skills needed by the Combatant Commanders.”102 

In reaching that mix, the total force must be reconfigured. In addition, the 

reserves “must be operationalized, so that select Reservists and units are more 

accessible and more readily deployable than today.” The reserves would no 

longer be a strategic reserve. This was needed in the Cold War, but not for the 

Global War on Terrorism. The Army Plan called for this basic change in direction.103 The Quadrennial Defense Review’s call for an operational reserve was 

not the first use of the term. That had occurred in 2005 when Assistant Secre-
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tary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Thomas H. Hall testified before Congress 

that an operational reserve ‘”support[ed] day-to-day defense.’”104 

The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review reconfigured the total force. Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted the need “to rebalance military skills between and within the Active and Reserve Components.”105 Consequently, the 

military departments rebalanced some 70,000 positions within or between the 

active and reserve components. The distinction between war and peace was less 

clear at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The long war called for the 

United States to “face large and small contingencies at unpredictable intervals. 

To fight the long war and conduct other future contingency operations, joint 

force commanders need to have more immediate access to the Total Force. In 

particular, the Reserve Components must be operationalized, so that select Reservists and units are more accessible and more readily deployable than today. 

During the Cold War, the Reserve Component was used, appropriately, as a 

‘strategic reserve,’ to provide support to Active Component forces during major 

combat operations. In today’s global contest, this concept is less relevant.”106

Accordingly, the Department of Defense would pursue several options, including increasing the period authorized for presidential selected reserve call-up from 

270 days to 365 days. It would: 

1. focus better the “use of the Reserve Components’ competencies for homeland defense and civil support operations; 

2. seek. . . changes to authorities to improve access to Guard and reserve consequence management capabilities and capacity in support of civil authorities; 

3. achieve the revision of Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up authorities 

to allow activation of Military Department Reserve Components for natural disasters in order to smooth the process for meeting specific needs 

without relying solely on volunteers; 

4. allow individuals who volunteer for activation on short notice to serve 

for long periods on major headquarters staffs as individual augmentees;

5. develop select reserve units that train more intensively and require 

shorter notice for deployment.”107 

The reserves “must be operationalized, so that select Reservists and 

units are more accessible and more readily deployable than today.” 

Quadrennial Defense Review
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The reserve component would continue its progression from a strategic reserve to a force of regularly deployed units manned and equipped like the 

active component. 

Like the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, the 

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review recognized 

the “critical contribution” of the reserve component to the nation’s defense (twenty-five to thirty percent of U.S. Central Command forces) and 

called for operationalizing the reserve component. Continued use of the reserve would likely be needed to prevent and deter conflicts. The 

reserve component had proven their “readiness 

and ability to make sustained contributions to ongoing operations. . . . The 

challenges,” read the Quadrennial Defense Review, “facing the United States 

today and in the future will require us to employ National Guard and Reserve forces as an operational reserve to fulfill requirements for which they 

are well suited in the United States and overseas.”108 An operational reserve would be ‘“available, trained, and equipped for predictable deployment.’”109 According to the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department of 

Defense would find ways to ‘“rebalance its reliance on the Reserve Component 

to ensure the long-term viability of a force that has both strategic and operational capabilities.’”110 The Quadrennial Defense Review stated the country needed 

a ‘“force generation model that provided sufficient strategic depth.’”111 One 

of the Quadrennial Defense Review’s primary objectives was to preserve and 

enhance the all-volunteer force. It called for 

a five year demobilization period following 

every one year of mobilization for National 

Guard and Army Reserve units and a two year 

dwell time for one year deployed ratio for the 

active component.112 In his formal assessment 

of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael G. Mullen 

wrote: “we could not have accomplished what 

we have these past eight years were it not for 

our Reserve and National Guard forces.”113 

The Quadrennial Defense Review was a comprehensive assessment of reserve policies. 

According to Admiral Mullen, the Quadren2010 Quadrennial 

Defense Review

Admiral Mike Mullen
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nial Defense Review would “consider the proper balance of maintaining the 

operational capabilities and strategic depth of the Reserve Component as an 

integrated force to meet requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. Access to the Reserve Component,” he continued, “remains a critical lever for 

meeting global operational demands without substantially increasing the size 

of the active force.”114 The Department of Defense had begun studies to examine “issues associated with employing the RC on a routine, rotational basis as 

part of the total operational force, changing the AC/RC mix, and/or changing 

the role of the RC.”115 One such study was The Independent Panel Review of Reserve Component Employment in an Era of Persistent Conflict, which 

was released as a for-official-use-only document on November 2, 2010, by its 

authors, General (retired) Reimer, Lieutenant General (retired) Helmly and 

Lieutenant General (retired as Army National Guard director) Roger C. Schultz. 

Army Transformation 

The Army continued reshaping itself to the 

post-Cold War shift in strategy and tactics. Cold 

War era strategy and tactics focused mainly on 

the Soviet Union and on large scale, maneuver 

warfare. This was a bygone era. Post-Cold War 

campaigns were planned for contingency operations. The Army needed to transform to a force 

designed for continuous operations in a new era 

dominated by unconventional warfare (low-intensity, asymmetric conflict). In June 1999, General Eric K. Shinseki became the thirty-fourth 

Army chief of staff. At that time, he stated that 

he would transform the Cold War Army into a 

“nimble, light, lethal” force that could “perform 

peacekeeping missions or to fight an all-out war 

against a country like North Korea or Iraq.” He wanted to “wean the Army 

from the tanks and armored fighting vehicles it loves, and replace them with 

systems so advanced that they couldn’t be detected by the enemy, using technology not yet invented.” He cautioned unwilling subordinates, “‘If you don’t 

“Access to the Reserve Component remains a critical lever for meeting 

global operational demands without substantially increasing the size 

of the active force.” Admiral Michael G. Mullen

General Eric K. Shinseki
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like change, you’re going to like irrelevance a lot less.’” He was concerned 

that if the Army did not move resolutely toward change, the political structure would force change and not necessarily on the Army’s conditions.116 Four 

months later in October, he and Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White announced the bold vision of the Army of the twenty-first century: “Soldiers on Point for the Nation

. . . . Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War.”117 

Transformation became General Shinseki’s uppermost personal priority. As depicted in a popular 

briefing slide, the transformed Army would be 

‘“Responsive, Deployable, Agile, Versatile, Lethal, 

Survivable, and Sustainable.’”118 

The goal of the Army vision was to evolve the 

Army into a “force that is strategically responsive 

and dominant at every point of the spectrum of operations.”119 The transformation aspect was to be 

accomplished over three axes: the Legacy Force, 

the Objective Force, and the Interim Force. 

The bold vision of the Army of the twenty-first century: “Soldiers on 

Point for the Nation. . . . Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War.”

The Legacy or Current Force was in essence the Army XXI that was emerging 

from Force XXI.120 The Legacy Force “must be prepared to fight the Nation’s 

wars and be able to supplement the capabilities of the Objective Force until 

2032.”121 A “trained and ready Legacy Force,” explained General Shineski, “affords The Army the necessary time and flexibility to pursue investments needed 

to get the Objective Force right.”122 The Legacy Force must be ready to “fight 

and win decisively against any threat for the next 15 to 20 years.”123 This is the 

Army’s war-fighting force. The Legacy Force meant modernization and recapitalization of selected units and systems. Priority was given to systems for the 

Objective Force. Yet, there were systems that must be continued (e.g., heavy 

equipment transporters) regardless of whether they would be part of the Objective Force. 

The Objective Force was similar to the Army After Next, yet on a more ambitious timeline. It would feature an array of “sensors, communications nodes, 

unmanned aircraft, robotics, and other advanced hardware but at its core would 

Thomas E. White
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be the common vehicle platform of the future combat system . . . .”124 The 

Objective Force would “provide the National Command Authority with an 

increased range of options for regional engagement, crisis response, and sustained land force operations.” “The Objective Force,” said General Shineski, 

“will be more responsive, more deployable, more agile, more versatile, more leFigure III-3A: From Legacy to Objective Force

Objective Force Objective Force 

Interim Force Interim Force 

Legacy Force 

(CURRENT) 

Legacy Force 

(CURRENT) 

Where you 

want to be 

Where you 

are 

How you get 

there 

Responsive; 

Deployable; 

Agile; Versatile; 

Lethal; Survivable; 

Sustainable 

“The Army of 

the Future” 

The Army’s 

“Warfighting Force” 

The Current Army 

Connects the

Current to the Future

(Stryker Brigades)

Figure III-3B : Bridging the Gap Between Arriving Force and Later Force

Striker

Interim

Force

Current

Force

Objective

Force

Bridging the Gap Between

Arriving Force and Later Force

Bridging the Gap Between

Arriving Force and Later Force
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thal, more survivable and more sustainable than today’s force.”125 His goal 

for achievement of this force was by the end of the decade. The Army had 

reprogrammed 96 percent of science and technology spending through 2007 

to develop the Objective Force platforms and equipment. The Army planned 

to start production of the future combat system in year 2008 and to field the 

first unit by 2010. The Objective Force would give the Army the capability to 

place a combat brigade anywhere in the world in ninety-six hours, put a division 

on the ground in 120 hours, and put five divisions on the ground in theater in 

thirty days.126 

The Interim Force, a new concept, would connect today’s force and the Objective Force. The Interim Force would bridge the gap between existing capabilities of an early arriving force and the later arriving force. Heavy forces slowly 

deployed and were hard to sustain. Light forces were too light. The Interim Force would “build and deploy brigade-sized units of intermediate weight 

equipped with the most advanced technologies immediately available.”127 This 

began with the interim brigade combat teams (IBCTs), later known as Stryker 

Brigades. The IBCT, a combat brigade task force, was concentrated on the 

interim armored vehicle.128 The first IBCT was the 2nd Infantry Division’s 3d 

Brigade. It was certified as ready to deploy in May 2003.129 

The 2001 Defense Planning Guidance required each service to submit a transformation roadmap for review by the secretary of defense. General Shineski and White submitted the Army’s transformation roadmap. The roadmap 

outlined the Army’s transformation strategy and detailed how this transformation supported six crucial operational goals. Those goals, as stated in the 2001 

Quadrennial Defense Review were: 

1. protect base operations at home and abroad and defeat the threat of 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons; 

2. assure information systems in the face of attack and conduct effective 

information operations; 

3. project and sustain U.S. forces in distant hostile environments; 

4. deny enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, 

and rapid engagement; 

5. enhance the capability and survivability of space systems; 

6. leverage information technology and innovative concepts to develop interoperable joint command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. 

The roadmap described how the Army transformed. Its section titles highlighted the roadmap’s purpose of denoting “timelines in which . . . [the Army] will 
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develop Service-unique capabilities necessary to meet the defense strategy and 

DoD’s critical operational goals for Transformation.”130

“The [transformation] plan,” wrote General Shineski, “reflects the qualities of 

a campaign: It is complex, of long duration, phased, with multiple lines of operation driven by multiplicity of participants.” The Global War on Terrorism 

only strengthened the need for a transformed Army that was more “strategically 

responsive, deployable, lethal, versatile, survivable, and sustainable than current 

forces.” Those were the characteristics of the Objective Force--the end result 

of Army transformation.131 

The fiscal year 2001 Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act, 

passed by the U.S. Congress in late 2000 and signed by Clinton on October 

30, 2000, directed the military 

services to promote reserve 

chiefs to three 

star rank within 

one year after 

the act’s passage. 

On April 27, 

2001, Rumsfeld 

announced that 

President Bush 

had nominated 

Major General Plewes and 

the Director, 

Army National Guard Major 

General Roger 

C. Schultz, for 

appointment to 

lieutenant general. The Senate 

confirmed these 

appointments on 

May 24, 2001.132 

At the promotion ceremony, 

Army Chief of Staff, General Erick K. Shinseki, with the help of Elizabeth 

Plewes, pins on Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes’ third star. (Photo 

by Master Sergeant Vicki Washington)
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General Shineski said:

Two years ago, we made a bold declaration -- that we were ‘The Army 

-- totally integrated, with a unity of purpose -- no longer the total 

Army, no longer the one Army.’ We acknowledged our components 

and their unique strengths and made it clear that we would ‘march into 

the 21st century as The Army.’ Today, that’s exactly what we’re doing, 

and today’s ceremony is symbolic of the unity our Army has demonstrated over the past two years serving on point for the nation.133

With the promotion came an opportunity to engage in three-star command 

briefings and be an equal, comparable voice for the Army Reserve.134 It was another sign of the Army Reserve’s transformation and its integration into the total 

Army. 

Certificate of Promotion for Lieutenant General Thomas J. 

Plewes. (Photo by Timothy L. Hale, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Public Affairs) 
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This Battle Dress Uniform or BDU was worn by Lieutenant 

General Thomas J. Plewes. The BDU was replaced by the 

Army Combat Uniform or ACU in 2005. (Photo by Timothy 

L. Hale, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Public Affairs) 

Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes flag. Red flags 

with the appropriate number of stars are routinely 

flown whenever a general officer is present within the 

headquarters.This example is crafted of durable nylon. 

(Photo by Timothy L. Hale, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Public Affairs) 
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In February 2003, General Shineski and White presented A Statement on the 

Posture of the United States Army to Congress. They reiterated the Army’s 

vision and stated that transformation had “achieved sustainable momentum 

[and] the framework . . . [was] in place to see the Objective Force fielded this 

decade.” When the statement was published, there were more than 110,000 

reserve soldiers mobilized for Operation NOBLE EAGLE and Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM. 

The strategic environment mandated Army transformation. As stated in the 

posture statement, the force must be properly manned and managed to “fully 

capitalize” on the “warfighting expertise” of its soldiers. Recruiting and retaining the force were essential to Army transformation. There must be a transformation in the way the Army fights which leads to a transformation across 

the spectrum of operations --- logistics, personnel, installation management, 

acquisition, aviation, and business practices. Readiness must be fostered in orLieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes, following his promotion on 13 June 2001, stands with all 

of the living former chiefs of the Army Reserve. Left to Right: Brigadier General (Retired) Harry J. 

Mott III; Major General (Retired) Roger W. Sandler; Major General (Retired) William F. Ward, Jr.; Lieutenant General Plewes; Major General (Retired) J. Milnor Roberts; Major General (Retired) William 

R. Berkman; and Major General (Retired) Max Baratz. (Photo by Lieutenant Colonel Randy Pullen, 

Public Affairs and Liaison Directorate, Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve)
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der to win the nation’s wars. The force must be properly trained. The technological revolution in combat power must be leveraged. Science and technology 

must be harnessed to meet the demands of a twenty-first century Army.135 An 

information enabled Army must apply technology to Army Knowledge Management. That would lead to network centric warfare; the military application of digital technology in the Information Age. Through network centric 

warfare, computers and communications systems would connect all weapons 

systems. Network centric warfare together with modern communications, adequate bandwidth, and skilled personnel, provided a “real-time shared battlefield picture by all parties involved.”136 Two advantages were a smaller logistical footprint in theater and knowledge of enemy locations leading to more 

exact targeting.137 

The posture statement recognized that the reserves supplied more than 50 percent of the Army’s soldiers and was key to the success in the war on terrorism 

and homeland defense. The posture statement addressed transformation iniFigure III-4: Transformation Across the Spectrum of Operations

Aviation 

Sciences 

& 

Technology 

Network 

Centric 

Warfare 

The Way the Army Fights 

“Transformation in the Full Spectrum of Operations Improves Readiness” 

Logistics

Business

Practices

Personnel 

Installation 

Management 

Acquisition 
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tiatives in the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve provided a technically trained 

and responsive force that assisted the active Army in conducting extended campaigns in multiple theaters and to sustain joint operations. The Army Reserve 

had become a totally integrated force, spanning the full spectrum of warfare.138 

Completing the integration of the reserves was one of General Shinseki’s six 

objectives. His other objectives were: “increasing strategic responsiveness, developing a clear long-term strategy to improve operational jointness, developing leaders for joint war fighting and change . . . manning warfighting units, and 

providing for the well-being of soldiers, civilians, and family members.”139 

Later in 2003, Army Chief of Staff General Peter J. 

Schoomaker presented the first annual update to 

the Army’s transformation roadmap per the secretary of defense’s Transformation Planning Guidance.140 The U.S. Army 2003 Transformation 

Roadmap addressed the transformation of the 

Current Force (the operational Army of today), the Future Force (the operational force 

the Army seeks to become), and the Joint Force 

(an interoperable, inter-dependent force).141 

The roadmap detailed the Army’s “actions to 

identify and build required capabilities now, allowing for better execution of joint operations 

by the Current Force while developing Future 

Force capabilities essential to provide relevant, ready, responsive and dominant 

land power to the Future Joint Force.” The Army’s transformation strategy 

had three elements: the transformation of Army culture, the transformation of 

processes using the Current to Future Force construct, and the “development 

of inherently joint transformational capabilities.” The soldier was the heart of 

transformation, “the ultimate combat system.” Soldier well being, along with 

that of civilians, was coupled to Army readiness.142

In 2004, the Army was redesigning its force to respond in the first fifteen days 

of an operation. The Army depended on both active and reserves to successfully provide “rapid expeditionary capabilities and the ability to conduct sustained land campaigns across the full spectrum of conflict.” The Current Force 

provided the “correct mix” between the active and reserve forces--to rebalance 

the force. Adequate active and reserve follow-on forces must provide combat 

support to reach operational and strategic objectives and to execute continuous land operations. The reserves gave strategic power to strengthen the war 

fight; underpin stability operations; and provide homeland defense. Active and 

General Peter J. Schoomaker
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reserve forces must be integrated and interchangeable. Both forces must be 

“modular, tailorable, and capable of coming together in a number of force and 

capabilities packages.” This would reduce mobilization and training time and 

give combatant commanders the required forces and means.143

The U.S. Army 2003 Transformation Roadmap also concerned balancing risk 

and resourcing the Army’s transformation. Current and projected operational 

commitments caused the Army to revisit its risk assessment. Force management risk involved the Army’s people, programs, and its force structure. 

The Current Force was at a high operational tempo, stemming from the war 

on terrorism and other obligations. As a result, force management risk was 

higher than expected. The Army was taking dynamic steps to decrease risk in 

the near term. One action focusing on reducing risk was the active component/

reserve component balance. Force structure operations must be developed to 

Figure III-5: Elements of Army Transformation Strategy

Army Transformation Strategy: 

Three Elements 

Processes

(Current to Future Forces)

Joint

Capabilities

Army

Culture
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foster a modular Army and an appropriate blend of the active and the reserve 

component. According to the The U.S. Army 2003 Transformation Roadmap, 

the AC/RC balance was one of the “smart business decisions or actions” toward 

increasing the Army’s “flexibility, utility, and effectiveness as part of the joint 

force.”144 Achieving that balance was one of General Schoomaker’s initial focus 

areas as was optimizing the mix between the active component and the reserves.145

On July 9, 2003, Rumsfeld issued a memorandum, Rebalancing Forces. The 

memorandum directed the implementation of force restructuring initiatives. 

He wrote, “We have too few forces with the skills sets that are in high demand, 

and too many forces with the skills that are not in high demand.”146 The armed 

forces undertook a far-reaching rebalancing or “optimizing” of their make up 

in order to relieve the pressure on specific high-demand, low-intensity units, 

especially those available in the reserve forces. There were four imperatives 

to Rumsfeld’s memorandum and a Department of the Army briefing on Army 

rotational analysis and planning dated June 4, 2003, which stressed stability and 

predictability. Those imperatives were: minimize force turbulence, mission 

flexibility, resource distribution, and force structure supportability.147 

Figure III-6: Current to Future Force
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 Approaches to rebalancing the force included improving “early responsiveness, 

resolving stressed career fields,” and using inventive management practices.148 

Out dated force structure would be transformed to functional forces to meet 

current operational requirements. That would lead to a “flexible, optimized 

and modular Army Reserve that provided stability and predictability.”149 As 

the Army Reserve Transformation Study concluded: “To be fully expeditionary 

and responsive to mission requirements some high-demand, low-intensity units 

may need to be shifted to the active force and some select CS/CSS [combat 

support/combat service support] units may need to be shifted from the active to 

AR to balance the force requirements as envisioned in Army Transformation.”150

Accordingly, some 100,000 active Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve positions were identified for restructuring and rebalancing.151 General 

Schoomaker explained that soldiers in those positions would be “retrain[ed] 

and reallocat[ed], thereby, converting Cold War structure to more relevant 

structure.”152 Some would simply be eliminated as Cold War over structure. 

Helmly wrote in A Statement on the 2005 Posture of the United States Army 

Reserve, “Sustained operations will be the norm for the future, so we must optimize our capabilities to meet this reality.”153 In answer to those sustained operations, Helmly had warned in December 2004 that certain “past “dysfunctional 

practices and policies,” “governing mobilization, training and reserve component manpower management,” such as the use of only volunteers, coupled 

with the high operational tempo and the need to “reset and regenerate forces 

for follow-on and future missions” placed the Army Reserve in danger of becoming a “broken force.”154 Changes were required as evidenced in the Government Accountability Office report issued in July 2005 entitled RESERVE 

FORCES: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel 

and Equipment Issues.

155 General Schoomaker compared transforming the Army in the 

midst of war like “tuning an engine while the 

car is moving - - complex and potentially dangerous.”156

Addressing transformation, Secretary of 

the Army Dr. Francis J. Harvey wrote in 

2006, “We cannot be satisfied with the status quo.”157 The National Security Strategy

made that clear. Enemies and threats had 

changed while the armed forces continued 

their forward presence and kept the peace in 

areas of strategic importance. The fight had 

changed and so must the Army.158 According Dr. Francis J. Harvey
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to Secretary of Defense Gates, the Army had to strike a balance to maintain its 

advantage in conventional warfare while responding to low-intensity conflicts. 

For the foreseeable future asymmetric warfare had replaced the linear battlefield.159 

Army Chief of Staff General George W. Casey, Jr. supported Gates’ view. The high operational tempo was stressing soldiers, their 

families, and support services in the face of 

multiple deployments and insufficient recovery time. The Army was out of balance. 

The demand for forces over the last decade 

in Iraq and Afghanistan surpassed the supply. The Army was challenged to meet all 

contingency requirements. Readiness was 

being expended as quickly as it was being 

built.160 General Casey had four strategic imperatives to restore balance: sustain the Army’s soldiers, families, and civilians; prepare General George W. Casey Jr.

Figure III-7: General George W. Casey, Jr.’s Four Strategic Imperatives

to Restore Balance

Casey’s Four Strategic Imperatives 

to Restore Balance 

Prepare for 

Success in 

Current 

Conflicts 

Sustain 

Soldiers, 

Families, 

Civilians 

Reset

Returning

Units

Meet Demands

of 21st century

Warfare
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forces for success in the current conflicts; reset returning units; and transform 

the Army to meet the demands of the twenty-first century. He set the Army on 

a four year plan to reestablish balance. This would allow the all volunteer Army 

to respond at a predictable and sustainable rate to the high operational tempo.161 

He told the Senate Armed Services Committee in November 2007 that the 

reserves were “performing an operational role for which they were neither originally designed nor resourced.”162 

General Casey recognized the need for a paradigm change, a change from a 

“strategic reserve only mobilized in national emergencies, to an operational 

reserve, employed on a cyclical basis to add depth to the active force.” The 

reserves fulfilled their role in the Global War on Terrorism and would continue to fight in an era of persistent conflict. He defined persistent conflict as 

“protracted confrontation among state, non-state and individual actors that use 

violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.”163 The total Army must 

be thoughtfully transformed while not impeding readiness.

In 2006, Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr., 

chief, Army Reserve, recognized like Casey a 

change in the paradigm for the Army Reserve: 

We’re a federal operational force. The 

old Army Reserve was a strategic force 

and we advertised it as such, one weekend a month, two weeks in the summertime. That all changed after 9/11 

-we’re now an operational force. Our 

nation is involved with the Global War 

on Terrorism on an enduring basis. To 

support that need we have to be an operational force. We have to be much 

more active and ready on a regular basis 

in supporting the war.164

Lieutenant General 

Jack C. Stultz, Jr.

“The old Army Reserve was a strategic force and we advertised 

it as such, one weekend a month, two weeks in the summertime. 

That all changed after 9/11 - we’re now an operational force.” 

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr. 
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As an operational reserve, soldiers must revamp their mentality from that of the 

Cold War to the current long war. Today’s Army Reserve soldiers know mobilization is a probability, not a possibility. That can be seen in the Army Reserve’s 

total mobilization days and number of mobilization orders between fiscal year 

2005 and fiscal year 2010, represented in table III-1.165

As Stultz stressed, “We have to be more active and ready on a regular basis in 

supporting the war.”166 In 2006, Lieutenant General Helmly wrote, “Army 

Reserve soldiers must be poised and available for active service, as if they 

knew the hour and day they would be called.”167 

As General Casey explained in his statement on the Army’s strategic imperatives before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the U.S. House of 

Representatives on November 15, 2007, transformation produced evolutionary 

and revolutionary changes to improve Army and joint force capabilities to meet 

current and future full-spectrum requirements.168 Transformation was critical 

to the Army’s ability to effectively manage, generate, and sustain a balanced 

Army for the twenty-first century.169 Transforming the Army Reserve to an operational force was initiative four of General Casey’s seven initiatives set forth 

in 2008. Initiative four, Transition the Reserve Component to an Operational 

Force, included six tasks: 

1. adapt pre- and post-mobilization training cycles; 

2. adapt the reserve component generating force; 

3. adapt incentives for citizen-soldiers, their families, and employers; 

4. adapt reserve component pre-mobilization equipping strategies; 

5. facilitate a continuum of service; 

6. adapt necessary statutes, policies, and processes.170 

Table III-1: Total Army Reserve Mobilization Days and Mobilization Orders,

FiscalYear 2005-2010 Source:ALLMOB.dbf.

Fiscal Year Total Mobilization Days Number of Mobilization

 Orders

FY 05 13,927,909 75,484

FY 06 11,140,778 64,391

FY 07 10,011,840 57,827

FY 08 9,675,372 56,363

FY 09 10,329,999 59,512

FY 10 10,476,387 59,721
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He projected transformation of the reserve components to an operational 

force through changing how units are trained, equipped, resourced, and mobilized for completion by 2012.171 Stultz believed transformation was the “most 

dramatic change to Army Reserve structure, training and readiness since World 

War II.”172 His six implementation imperatives were:

1. reengineer the mobilization process from one of train, alert, train, and 

deploy to train, alert and deploy; 

2. transform command and control; 

3. restructure units; 

4. improve human resources staff, technologies, and business practices; 

5. build a rotational based-force; 

6. improve individual support to combatant commanders.173

On October 29, 2008, Gates issued Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, 

Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force.174 This revolutionary document unmistakably recognized the reserve component as a strategic and operational force when it stated: 

The RCs [reserve components] provide operational capabilities and 

strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their respective operational roles, the RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services force 

generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an 

established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for 

the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national 

defense strategy. As such, the RCs provide strategic depth and are 

available to transition to operational roles, as needed.175

“Transformation is the “most dramatic change to Army Reserve structure, training and readiness since World War II.” 

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr.

“The RCs [reserve components] provide operational capabilities and 

strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict.” Robert M. Gates 
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The directive set forth nine elements of Department of Defense policy: 

1. reserve components provide operational capabilities and strategic depth; 

2. Total Force concept; 

3. recognition of homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities; 

4. connection to and commitment to the American public; 

5. continuum of service creating variable service options; 

6. utilization rules governing the “frequency and duration of activations,” 

thereby, “enhance[ing] predictability and judicious and prudent use of 

the” reserve components; 

7. voluntary duty;

8. adequate resourcing to meet readiness requirements tracking of those

resources; 

9. outreach services for reserve component soldiers, their families, and employers throughout the mobilization and reintegration process.176

The directive then tasked the military to implement that policy. The service 

secretaries were to ensure their reserves “participate across the full spectrum of 

missions at home and abroad in providing operational capabilities according 

to the national defense strategy, their service force management plans, and operational requirements.” They were to ensure the reserves would accomplish: 

1. force rebalancing and restructuring; 

2. unit integrity; 

3. operational readiness; 

4. depth of unit and individual capabilities; 

5. policies, incentives, compensation, and flexible options to sustain 

volunteerism; 

6. the flow of individuals between active military, reserve military, and 

civilian service defined as the continuum of service; 

7. domestic response capabilities; 

8. support for the train-alert-deploy construct; 

9. resources for medical and dental readiness, legal assistance resources, 

adequate training facilities; 

10. the acceleration of force modernization. 

This era of persistent conflict mandated transformation of the reserves. The 

reserves were to transform to an operational force to comply with the directive. 

The white paper, Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,

published by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 
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in October 2008, supported the directive. The white paper developed the directive’s nine principles into three groups: roles and characteristics of the ready 

reserve components, the fundamental philosophy of the total force concept, 

and management. Its purpose was to simplify how the military managed the 

reserves as an operational force. It improved active and reserve integration, 

resource augmentation, and training developments.177 

On November 24, a month after issuing the directive, Gates released a forty-one page memorandum on implementing the recommendations from the 

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. In its January 2008 report, 

Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force, the commission identified systemic problems which had evolved over 

time and recommended changes. “At the core of these changes,” the report 

stated:

is the explicit recognition of the evolution of the reserve components 

from a purely strategic force, with lengthy mobilization times designed 

to meet Cold War threats from large nation-states, to an operational force. This operational reserve must be readily available for emergencies at home and abroad, and more fully integrated with the active 

component. Simultaneously, this force must retain required strategic 

elements and capabilities. The Commission concludes that there is 

no reasonable alternative to the nation’s continued increased reliance 

on reserve components as part of its operational force for missions at 

home and abroad.178

Gates called for wide-ranging policy changes in a memorandum sent to every senior uniformed and civilian Pentagon leader, with copies to three cabinet 

secretaries. Endorsing eighty-two of the commission’s ninety-five recommendations, Gates “directed that the Army and Marine Corps restore their reserve 

components to the highest readiness levels ‘as soon as possible’ but not later 

than 2015.” The Congress, the commission, and the Pentagon, he wrote, “all 

recognize that the National Guard and the Reserves are integral to the Total 

Force and had assumed a greater operational role in today’s force.”179 

Speaking of the integration of the total force, in an address to the Reserve Officers Association on February 2, 2009, Admiral Mullen observed that when 

visiting soldiers abroad, he could not distinguish just by looking at them which 

were active duty and which were reserve. He declared, “It is a clarion call to a 

future that is more and more integrated.”180

In addition to an integrated force, Admiral Mullen emphasized the significance 

of the operational reserves to the national security when he stated, ‘“The 
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National Guard and the Reserve are vital to our national security. They represent a key operational reserve capability at the federal level and perform critical 

state functions. They have been truly brilliant in fighting these wars and transforming themselves in recent years. . . . We couldn’t do without them. . . .’”181

Stultz said evidence of integration was the fact that the Army Reserve kept from 

ten to twelve brigade-or-higher level headquarters deployed at any given time. 

The reserves primarily constituted the senior-level headquarters in theater that 

were not in the combat arms. Stultz thought the Army Reserve was now more 

integrated than ever and had the greatest combat experience.182 On any given 

day, some 45,000 Army Reserve soldiers were on active duty.183 The increased 

demands of combat commanders and the size of the active component required 

the continued integration and transformation of the reserves as part of the operational force.184 

Modularity 

As stated in The 2003 U.S. Army Transformation Roadmap, force structure 

operations must develop to a modular Army. The Army’s force structure must 

change to remain ready and relevant to fight a new kind of protracted threat. 

The Army and America faced challenges in what General Schoomaker and Secretary of the Army Harvey described in their 2005 Statement on the Posture of 

the United States Army as “potentially catastrophic.”185 A new era of combat required rapidity, mobility, nimbleness, and the interoperability of forces: a modular, fungible expeditionary force of active and reserve resources.186 

The Army changed from a division to a brigade-based force. This was in response to lessons learned in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Greater flexibility was needed to fight asymmetric wars. Brigades were more flexible than 

divisions. Brigades were designed as modules. They were self-sufficient and 

standardized. Brigade combat teams were more readily deployed. They combined easily with other Army and joint forces to confront changing tactics. The 

combatant commander can rapidly adjust fire in a fast-paced fight. The combat 

commander can get exactly the structure needed for the mission at hand.187 

The Army restructured its organizations to create stand-alone and modular 

forces while retaining broad-spectrum capability. The Army was returning to 

a traditional tactical echelon - - the brigade—to restructure today’s Army. The 

brigade was smaller and more agile than the division.188 Modular units were 

more tailorable, deployable, and versatile.189 Modularity allowed self-sufficient 

organizations to enter and exit from unit formations with negligible amplification or restructuring. The Army called this its “plug and play mode.” Stan-
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dardized units could be readily exchanged with each other, as required. The 

modular brigade combat team was the fundamental combined arms building 

block for force projection.190 A brigade combat team was a “permanently structured, self-contained combined arms team.” The new brigade combat teams 

were smaller, which allowed more to be organized without a major increase in 

end strength. The modular redesign increased the number of regular Army brigades, reducing the deployment tempo of each brigade and increasing available 

training time.191 Brigades now have capabilities previously found at division 

level and higher.192 

The Army Reserve embraced modularity and incorporated it into its restructuring and rebalancing scheme. According to that plan, eight modular modified 

table of organization and equipment sustainment brigades were activated from 

existing structure in 2006, 2007, and 2008.193 Two combat support brigades 

(maneuver enhancement) were activated in fiscal year 2008. Helmly believed 

that modularity equated to “sustainability and predictability” and circumvented 

across-the-board cross-leveling and its associated negative effects on the force. 

It improved management and concentrated training on skills and specialties the 

combatant commander required rather than focusing on peacetime needs. The 

modular Army supported a tailorable and more responsive logistical support 

structure. The Army Reserve, which handled the greater part of the Army’s 

theater-level support, profited from modularity. It allowed the Army Reserve to 

“plug and play” discrete capability packages to meet the combatant commander’s requests.194 

The Army’s plan called for the conversion of all 302 brigades from Cold War 

formations to these more deployable, tailorable and versatile modular formations.195 For example, the 3d Infantry Division, the “vanguard” for the invasion 

of Iraq, returned to Iraq as a restructured modular force.196 By October 2010, 

the Army had completed the conversion of 288 of the brigades.197 The Army 

has reached a 98 percent completion of the modular conversion.198 

Modular heavy, stryker, and light brigades form a versatile mix of forces. These 

are easily combined to meet a range of warfighting needs from peacetime engagements to major combat operations.199 

Together with modularity came a program to rebalance skills. The Army converted formations that were appropriate in the Cold War to ones more relevant 

in the twenty-first century. By October 2010, the Army had rebalanced over 

124,000 positions. The modularity conversions and rebalancing was the largest 

reorganization of the Army since World War II.200 
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Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)

ARFORGEN (Army Force Generation) was the process used to transform the 

Army Reserve from a strategic reserve to an operational expeditionary force. In 

July 2003, Rumsfeld sent a directive to the deputy assistant secretary of defense 

for reserve affairs. The directive called for a thorough examination of the rebalancing of the active Army with the National Guard and the Army Reserve.201 

ARFORGEN was the Army’s response to this directive. ARFORGEN was an 

Army-wide five year model, or roadmap, for expeditionary deployment of forces on a rotational basis. As stated in the implementation plan (Annex F to the 

Army Campaign Plan), “ARFORGEN is the structured progression of increased 

unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, 

ready and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of 

civil authorities and combatant commanders requirements. ARFORGEN is 

an Army process that applies to all components across the operating and generating force. The Army will continue to adapt and improve ARFORGEN over 

time to generate ready forces to meet operational requirements more effectively and efficiently.”202 Full implementation of ARFORGEN was delayed. This 

delay was caused by increased operational demands and the need to rebalance 

active component/reserve component capabilities.

203 The overriding purpose 

of ARFORGEN is “to provide combatant commanders and civil authorities 

with a steady supply of trained and ready units that are task organized in modular expeditionary force packages and tailored to joint mission requirements.”204 

In 2006, the secretary of the Army approved 

implementing ARFORGEN. FORSCOM 

managed ARFORGEN for the Army.205 Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh’s and 

General Casey’s A Statement on the Posture of 

the United States Army, 2011 said, “ARFORGEN fundamentally transformed the Army’s 

Cold War-era linear and tiered readiness construct for force generation into a sustainable 

and more efficient process.”206

ARFORGEN is based on three successive 

force pools or phases of unit capabilities and 

readiness through which units rotate: Reset, 

Train/Ready and Available.207 Each of the 

three force pools contains a versatile force 

package, available at varying time intervals 

based on its readiness levels. Each force pool consists of an operation headJohn M. McHugh
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quarters (a corps), five division headquarters, twenty brigade combat teams, and 

90,000 enablers, about half of which are National Guard and Army Reserve. 

Each will be capable of full spectrum operations once the ratio of time deployed 

(“boots on the ground”) to time at home (dwell) of 1:2 for the active component 

and 1:5 for the reserve component is reached. By fiscal year 2012, the reserve 

component’s ratio should be 1:4. Many units rotated on cycles shorter than the 

ARFORGEN goals. Another goal is to provide a unit’s notice of a mission two 

years in advance with an alert order one year in advance.208 

Figure III- 8: ARFORGEN Force Pools

ARFORGEN (Army Force Generation) was the process used to transform the Army Reserve from a strategic reserve to an operational expeditionary force. 
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During Reset, the unit’s concentration is on reintegrating soldiers with their 

families and completing individual education, development, and institutional 

training. During this phase, the institutional Army focuses on manning and 

equipping the unit so it can conduct collective training. 

The mainstay of the Train/Ready force pool is restoring full spectrum operations war-fighting capability through unit collective training and on finishing a 

culminating collective training event. That event guarantees the unit achieves 

the capability needed for operational requirements. Upon entering the Available pool, a unit may be a deployed expeditionary force with an identified deployed mission or a contingency expeditionary force with a mission to grow full 

spectrum capabilities in order to respond to a global contingency. Contingency 

expeditionary forces are ready to engage in combatant commander training exercises and global theater security cooperation events.209 Army Reserve units 

can deliver “integral enablers” from this pool for “required surge capability.”210

Units in the Available pool are at the highest state of training and readiness. 

They will be the first to fight. Active component units are primed to deploy. 

Reserve component units are ready for alert, mobilization, required post-mobilization training, validation, and deployment.211 The goal is to have a predictable, ready force of units and soldiers prepared for operational deployment. 

Figure III-9: ARFORGEN-A Supply Based Rotational Model
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“Through ARFORGEN synchronization conferences, units are assigned to deployment or contingency expeditionary packages and task organized to either 

execute planned operational missions as part of Deployment Expeditionary 

Forces (DEF) or respond to unplanned contingencies as part of contingency 

expeditionary forces (CEF).”212 

ARFORGEN increases predictability. Under ARFORGEN, the reserves remain an integral part of the operational force.213 The inefficient mobilization 

cycle before ARFORGEN was “alert, mobilize, train and deploy.” Under this 

old cycle National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers spent months training 

after mobilization, but before deployment, in preparation for a mission. Under 

ARFORGEN, units will now use the “train, mobilize, and deploy” cycle. Reserve soldiers would now spend the early years of the ARFORGEN cycle focusing on schools and individual training in their specialties. Later in the cycle, 

training would shift from individual to collective training. By the last year of 

the cycle, units are fully prepared for deployment, dedicating nearly all their 

time on active duty to performing the actual mission.214 

In 2005, about 75 percent of the Army Reserve’s mobilized units were from 

the ARFORGEN model. In 2007, 80 percent of Army Reserve forces aligned 

into ARFORGEN.215 According to the 2011 Statement on the Posture of the 

United States Army, “When fully implemented in Fiscal Year 2012, the supFigure III-10: Mobilization Cycle Before and After ARFORGEN

Alert, Mobilize, Train, Deploy 

Train, Mobilize, Deploy 

Mobilization Cycle Before and After ARFORGEN 

BEFORE 

AFTER 
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339

ply-based ARFORGEN will posture the Army to accomplish both emerging 

and enduring operational requirements.”216 

Army Reserve Expeditionary Force 

With the Global War on Terrorism, enlistment in the Army Reserve implied 

deployment. Soldiers with civilian careers and employers needed predictability. 

In answer, the Army Reserve designed the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force 

(AREF). In 2004, Helmly described the AREF as a “dynamic new strategy 

that revolutionizes our force structure so that we can better mobilize, train and 

equip Army Reserve units for the fight.”217 The AREF used a five year cyclic 

approach to manage Army Reserve force readiness in answer to the high operational tempo and increased reliance on its capabilities. The AREF applied 

Army rotational force doctrine to decisions concerning training, equipping, 

education, and leader development. The AREF, pre-dating ARFORFEN but 

later in concert with it, altered the way the Army Reserve generated and prepared trained, ready forces to meet the operational requirements of combatant 

commanders. It was flexible to meet the volatile demands of twenty-first century war fighting. AREF was the comprehensive strategy for the Army Reserve 

as it strove to fulfill the demand for units and soldiers to support the Global 

Figure III-11: Army Reserve ARFORGEN Strategy
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War on Terrorism. The AREF supported ARFORGEN through a seamless 

integration effort. As such, the AREF was a major institutional response to the 

changing nature of war and a significant departure from historical Army mobilization and management models that had not contemplated sustained reserve 

deployments as an essential feature of military campaigns.218 The Army Reserve transformed to the modular force centered on the brigade combat team, 

as previously discussed.219 

The AREF was based on ten operational packages with planned available one 

year deployment periods. Units were assigned to one of the packages. Under 

partial mobilization authority, two operational packages moved into the available pool, annually, beginning October 1 of each fiscal year. Assigning each 

unit to an AREF package also determined its five year ARFORGEN cycle and 

when and how much each unit was to be resourced in the next five years of the 

ARFORGEN cycle. Resourcing was progressive from the beginning to the 

end of the ARFORGEN cycle. The master list of units was updated, periodically. Updating the AREF list ensured that all Army Reserve units that were 

previously not included in ARFORGEN were included and units that were 

previously included, but no longer in the force structure, were eliminated from 

the AREF master list in support of ARFORGEN. 

Each package consisted of units which moved through a progressive readiness 

cycle. The units that were low density or unique were evenly grouped across 

the packages. Each packaged unit spent two years in the Reset/Train pool, two 

years in the ready pool as ready one and ready two, and one year in the Available pool. While package changes could be made in accordance with adopted 

USARC procedures and directives, they were kept at a minimum to avoid disrupting the established ARFORGEN cycle of the majority of units.

In the first year of AREF, soldiers concentrated on training, professional 

schools, and qualification courses. In the second and third years, units began 

to come together as they trained at company and higher levels. In the fourth 

year, units were engaged in complex collective training, spanning from squad 

and section level to detachment and platoon level. By the fifth year soldiers 

were fully trained and became available for missions. This strategy, then, was 

built upon having trained combat support and combat service support units 

and soldiers on hand at any given time. 

In 2004, the Army Reserve began using the AREF to ascertain the preparation 

and resourcing of units for deployment. In 2005, some 75 percent of the mobilized units came from AREF packages one and two. That number was 53 

percent and 78 percent for 2006 and 2007, respectively.220 For fiscal year 2008, 
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31.5 percent of total requirements were sourced from packages seven and eight. 

For fiscal year 2009, that figure rose to 61 percent, sourced from packages nine 

and ten. For fiscal year 2010, 58 percent of total requirements were sourced 

from packages one and two. And for fiscal year 2011, 62.6 percent of total requirements were sourced from packages three and four.221 

Figure III-12: Five Year Army Reserve Expeditionary Force Cycle

Five Year AREF Cycle 

YEAR ONE

Units In Complex Collective 

Training from Squad and 

Section Levels to Detachment 

and Platoon Level 

YEAR FOUR 

Soldiers Fully Trained and 

Available for Missions YEAR FIVE 

YEARS TWO-THREE 

Training; Professional Schools; 

Qualification Course 

Units Train at Company Level 

and Higher 

SOLDIERS: 

UNITS: 
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Mobilization Policy

The Army Reserve was becoming an operational and expeditionary force. The 

active Army continued to rely more heavily on the reserves in an era of persistent conflict. Mobilization practices and policies needed to change. The 

time honored automated time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL) was 

used to reach a suitable ratio of combat, combat support, and combat service 

support forces. TPFDL proved to be inflexible with meeting the mobilization 

demands of the Global War on Terrorism. Being unable to deploy through 

Turkey only complicated an already taxed system. Too many reserve soldiers 

mobilized under the detailed planning of TFDL found themselves waiting with 

little to do before deploying and then reaching the theater without the equipment or resources needed to do the mission.222 For the Army Reserve, a unit’s 

latest arrival date was entered in the Joint Operations Plans Execution System 

(JOPES) as part of TPFDL. This date was used to plan all backwards movement and training for the mobilizing unit.223

On December 14, 2006, General Schoomaker told the Commission on the 

National Guard and Reserves that the current mobilization policies were “not 

Figure III-13: Army Reserve Expeditionary Force
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343

right.” General Schoomaker said access to the reserve component was crucial 

to readiness. Policies and practices written fifty years ago were not meeting today’s operational tempo.224 They may have worked for a conscripted force and 

a strategic reserve but not for the evolving operational reserve. At that time, 

many Army Reserve soldiers had been mobilized for active duty between fifteen 

and eighteen months. He said the Army went to a sixteen month model to get 

twelve months “boots on the ground” due to the Cold War practice of having 

soldiers and units re-certified as ready after they arrived at the mobilization 

station. This made some 90,000 National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers 

available out of more than 520,000. The deployment cycle in the Global War 

on Terrorism was running four to five times that of the Cold War, making it 

unprecedented. This increased the burden on the active Army. Cross-leveling 

was being used to fully man units with qualified soldiers. The commission’s 

chairman, Major General (retired) Arnold Punaro, stated that 62 percent of 

Army Reserve soldiers were being cross-leveled to a deploying unit. General 

Schoomaker called this “evil.” He explained, “Military necessity dictates that 

we deploy organized, trained, equipped, cohesive units; and you don’t do that 

by ‘pick-up’ teams.”225

But, there were times when cross-leveling was unavoidable in order to meet 

the needs of theater commanders. For example, this may be required to fill 

high demand military occupational specialties or as the former Army Reserve 

G-3 Colonel Less Carroll pointed out to fill non-structured mission or special 

requirements. Significant cross-leveling has remained in effect as the Army 

Reserve endeavored to maintain continuity.226 

On January 19, 2007, Gates issued a memorandum on utilization of the total 

force. It made changes to Department of Defense policy. He addressed several 

issues. First, involuntary mobilizations for members of the reserve components 

were to be for a maximum of one year at any one time. That meant if, for example, it took six months to get ready, then there was only six months “boots on 

the ground” left. This period could exclude individual skill training necessitated by deployment and post-mobilization leave. Second, mobilization of ground 

combat, combat support, and combat service support was to be managed on a 

unit basis, which would foster cohesion and predictability in how units were 

trained and deployed.227 Gates had to approve any exceptions. The third issue 

concerned “the planning objective for involuntary mobilization of Guard/Reserve units. . . .” The ratio of one year mobilized for five years deployed was to 

remain in effect as the goal. But, Gates recognized that the high operational 

tempo would necessitate the mobilization of some reserve units sooner than the 

objective. For most units, the active Army ratio was 1:1 instead of the 1:2 goal. 

He wrote, “ Just as we are asking the active forces to do more in this time of 

national need, so we must ask more of our Reserve components.”228 
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These changes affecting reserve mobilization were vital in sustaining the “high 

levels of strategic demand for Army forces, and to better manage stress across 

the force” and fulfilled the National Security Strategy, including the transitioning operational Army Reserve.229

Personnel Strength 

Stultz believed building personnel strength “is the most important priority for 

the Army Reserve.”230 The Army Reserve’s end strength between fiscal year 

2002 and fiscal year 2011 is depicted in figure III-14.

“Just as we are asking the active forces to do more in this time of 

national need, so we must ask more of our Reserve components.” 

Robert M. Gates

Figure III-14: Army Reserve End Strength, FY 2002-FY 2011
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345

By the end of 2005, the Army totaled 600,000 soldiers on active duty. Of that 

number, 41,000 were from the Army Reserve; 72,000 were from the National 

Guard.231 In January 2007, the president approved and the Congress authorized 

the Grow the Army plan to restore balance to the force. The 74,200 soldier 

increase included a growth of 65,000 in the active component, 8,200 in the National Guard, and 1,000 in the Army Reserve. In September 2007, the secretary 

of defense approved the Army chief of staff’s initiative to accelerate growth. In 

2009, the secretary of defense approved an additional temporary end-strength 

increase of 22,000 soldiers, 7,000 of whom were integrated in 2010.232

In 1990, the Army Reserve constituted 20.9 percent of the total Army. By 1992, 

that number had risen to a high of 22.7 percent.233 Table III-2 depicts what 

percentage of the total Army the Army Reserve by military personnel class constituted between 2000 and 2009.234 Figure III-15 represents total Army Reserve 

strength as of December 31, 2010.

As recognized in The United States 2020 Army Reserve Vision & Strategy Statement, “The Army Reserve must shape the force through targeted recruiting, 

retention, and transition activities.” Until fiscal year 2000, the Army Reserve 

had not achieved its recruiting goal in a decade. In the middle of 2001, the 

Army Reserve exceeded its goals. By the end of 2001, the Army Reserve surpassed the recruiting goal by 102 percent. Part of that was due to the September 11 attacks. The war on terrorism produced a rise in recruiting, especially 

OFFICER WO ENLISTED TOTAL

2000 29.1% 13.0% 18.7% 19.9%

2001 28.9% 12.8% 18.7% 19.9%

2002 28.3% 12.4% 18.7% 19.8%

2003 27.8% 12.3% 19.1% 20.1%

2004 26.7% 11.7% 18.7% 19.6%

2005 25.8% 11.8% 17.8% 18.7%

2006 25.3% 11.8% 17.4% 18.3%

2007 24.7% 11.7% 17.1% 17.9%

2008 24.1% 11.5% 17.2% 18.0%

2009 23.3% 11.6% 17.9% 18.5%

Table III-2: Army Reserve Military Personnel Class of the Total Army, 

2000-2009 Source: Defense Manpower Data Center
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among prior service soldiers.236 For 2002, the Army Reserve recruiting goal 

was 28,825. A total of 31,319 Army Reserve soldiers were recruited. The U.S. 

Army Recruiting Command stated the goal for Army Reserve soldiers recruited 

in 2005 was 22,175. Yet, only 19,400 were recruited.237 According to the Recruiting Command, in 2006 the goal was 25,500; the actual number successfully 

recruited was 25,378. In 2007, 39,055 soldiers were recruited. The recruiting 

goals for fiscal year 2007 were met for the first time since 2004.238 By 2008, the 

number recruited had risen to 44,455 soldiers with 16,523 reenlisted for a net 

gain of 7,142 soldiers, 110.6 percent of the goal. Reenlistment goals were not 

only met but exceeded.239 They were among the 290,000 soldiers who enlisted 

and reenlisted in the total Army in 2008. According to the deputy under secretary of defense for military personnel policy, fiscal year 2009 was the first time 

all components across the Department of Defense met their number and quality goals since the military became an all volunteer force in 1973.240 In 2009, the 

Army met 104 percent of its recruiting goals and achieved both numeric goals 

and quality benchmarks for new recruits. All components exceeded 105 percent 

of their reenlistment goals.241 (See figure III-16 for Army Reserve retention 

rates between 2002 and 2010.)242

Total U.S. Army Reserve 

Ready Reserve 

Selected Reserve 

PAID DRILL 

STRENGTH 

TPU STR AGR 

IRR 

IMA 

Standby 

Reserve 

1,678 

Enl: 845 

Off/WO: 833 

64,048 

Enl: 56,727 

Off: 6,999 

WO: 322 

Individual 

Ready 

Reserve 

205,651 

Enl: 169,400 

Off: 33,114 

WO: 3,137 

3,081 

Enl: 657 

Off: 2,307 

WO: 117 

Individual 

Mobilization 

Augmentee 

16,103 

Enl: 11,825 

Off: 3,588 

WO: 690 

Active/ 

Guard 

Reserve 

186,467 

Enl: 156,918 

Off: 27,219 

WO: 2,330 

Troop 

Program 

Unit 

770,958 

Enl: 582,128 

Off/WO: 188,830 

Retired 

Reserve 

269,699 

Enl: 226,127 

Off: 40,113 

WO: 3,459 

1,042,335 

Enl: 809,100 

Off/WO: 233,235 

Source: 31 Dec 10 RCCPDS Strength Summary Report and HQC 307 Report 

Figure III-15: Total Army Reserve Strength as of December 31, 2010
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While successful recruiting added more soldiers in the lowest three pay grades, 

thousands of midgrade noncommissioned and commissioned officer vacancies 

existed in 2010. Overall, the Army Reserve was short some 10,000 officers in 

the grades of captain and major. Contributing to this shortage was the active 

Army’s need for these soldiers and the subsequent lack of those soldiers coming 

from the active Army to the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve was challenged 

to develop and retain senior midgrade noncommissioned officers (staff sergeants and sergeants first class). Senior grades were over strengthened at 118 

percent. These were unnecessary imbalances in the force. One initiative the 

Army Reserve advocated to combat the loss in midgrade ranks was the continuum of service for a fully integrated force-active and reserve. Recruiting efforts 

directed incentives to more prior-service recruits who had more experience 

than most first term soldiers. These experienced soldiers were critical to filling 

shortages among mid-level commissioned and noncommissioned officers.243 

The continuing, persistent Global War on Terrorism and its high operational 

tempo challenged the Army Reserve to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of 

quality soldiers to meet immediate personnel requirements. This was part of 

General Casey’s strategic imperative of sustaining the force. He stated, “Our 

warriors are our ultimate asymmetric advantage, the one thing that no enemy 

can duplicate now or in the future and we need to keep them with us.”244 SusArmy Reserve Retention Rates Number of Soldiers 

Mission 

Achieved 

Year 

20,000 

18,000 

16,000 

14,000 

12,000 

10,000 

8,000 

6,000 

4,000 

2,000 

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 

119% 

93% 

99% 101% 

103% 

119% 

111% 

105% 

106% 

119% 

93% 

99% 101% 

103% 

119% 

111% 

105% 

106% 

0 

Figure: III-16 Army Reserve Retention Rates, 2001-2010
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taining the force meant “transforming quality recruits into Soldiers who are 

physically tough, mentally adaptive and live the Warrior Ethos.”245 Stultz said, 

“Recruiting in this period of protracted war is one of the greatest challenges in 

the history of the all-volunteer force. . . .”246 

There were several incentives the Army Reserve used to recruit soldiers, especially those in high demand military occupational specialties. The Army 

Reserve offered targeted incentives for new soldiers and re-enlisting soldiers. 

That was based on where the soldier fell in ARFORGEN. Some of those incentives for initial enlistment included up to $20,000 for a six year term under 

the non-prior service enlistment bonus. The Army Reserve offered the “quick 

ship payment” for non prior service enlistees, if they agreed to ship within a 

certain amount of time in an effort to fill nearest training seats first. For prior 

service, there were, among others, the officer/warrant officer accession bonus 

and the Active Guard Reserve (AGR) reenlistment bonus.247 Stultz initiated a 

twenty-four month stability initiative for soldiers coming from the active Army 

whereby they remained in a non-mobilization status for that period of time.248 

On July 1, 2007, the Army Reserve began a new recruiting initiative, the Army 

Reserve Recruiting Assistance Program (AR-RAP). The Army Reserve G-1 

was the proponent of the program and had oversight of it. This was a civilian 

contracted program which rewarded Army Reserve soldiers who served on a 

voluntary basis as recruiting assistants. The recruiting assistants acted as liaisons between the prospective recruit, the Army Reserve recruiter, and leadership from the assigned unit. Soldiers could receive up to $2,000 for each 

recruit. In essence, each soldier could be a recruiter.249 As of June 8, 2009, the 

program had generated 77,087 recruiting assistants, 24,919 referrals, and 7,492 

total accessions since its inception.250

Particular retention initiatives included, for example, the secretary of defense-authorized command responsibility pay bonuses for officers serving in 

positions of special responsibility. The number of officers eligible for bonuses 

was capped within each officer grade. Another retention initiative was ARFORGEN designated unit pay. This program was included in the 2006 National 

Defense Authorization Act. It afforded payment for non-obligated soldiers in 

key critical skills and units such as those soldiers belonging to ARFORGEN 

units earmarked for deployment and who made a service commitment. The 

intent was to lower the need to cross-level soldiers by raising more volunteers 

and keeping soldiers in high priority units.251 

One measure to combat a shortage of personnel was through the Critical Skills 

Retention Bonus-Army Reserve initiative. On February 29, 2008, the Army 
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Reserve implemented the Critical Skills Retention Bonus-Army Reserve (CSRB-AR) for captains; the CSRB-AR on June 4, 2008, for staff sergeants and 

sergeants first class; and the CSRB-AR on December 22, 2008, for warrant officers to address shortages of soldiers in critical skills at the selected grades that 

have been resigning or retiring from the TPU in the Selected Reserve. The 

bonus was for up to $20,000 for soldiers in specific critical skills who agreed to 

remain in an Army Reserve TPU in the Selected Reserve for three years. There 

were some eligibility restrictions. For example, military technicians and Active 

Guard Reserve soldiers were not eligible for the noncommissioned officer bonus. Accepting the bonus did not increase the likelihood of mobilization. The 

CSRB-AR was paid at lump sum or an installment rate. There were several 

conditions under which the entitlement to the bonus could be terminated. The 

Army Reserve designated a number of Army officer career (AOC) fields for 

captains as critical for CSRB purposes. Those included, among others, aviation 

combined arms operations, combat engineer, counterintelligence, patient administration, marine and terminal operations, motor/rail transportation, explosive ordnance disposal, and health services systems management. By June 30, 

2008, over 700 captains and twenty noncommissioned officers had committed 

for three years by accepting the CSRB.252 As of June 5, 2009, 1,257 agreements 

had been approved for captains; thirty agreements for chief warrant officer 3s 

and 275 agreements for staff sergeants and sergeants first class.253

According to a 2006 Congressional Budget Office study, factors that service 

members cited as negatively affecting their intention to remain in the military 

were stress associated with high workload and long work hours while deployed, 

uncertainties surrounding deployment dates, short-notice deployments, insufficient downtime between deployments, and family separation.254 

Crucial to maintaining and improving unit readiness was full-time support. 

The Army Reserve continued to have the lowest level of full-time support of 

any reserve component. In fiscal year 2005, the Department of Defense fulltime support manning level was 21 percent of end strength. The total for the 

Army Reserve was just 11.3 percent.255 As can be seen in Table III-3, there has 

been progress in the AGR portion of full-time support.256 Continuing to add 

more full-time support to include military technicians and civilians was an ongoing goal.

The Army Reserve needed more variable full-time support programs to adequately function as an operational force. As Stultz explained in 2010, full-time 

support “remains a strategic reserve legacy.” Legislative and policy modification were needed to alter personnel support processes. The Army Reserve 

was making efforts to “create additional full-time support capability to provide 
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Table III-3: Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Force, Fiscal Year 2000-2010

Source: USARC-G1

Fiscal Year On Hand Required Fill Rate

2000 12,855

2001 13,106

2002 13,406

2003 14,072

2004 14,602

2005 15,393

2006 15,308

2007 15,603

2008 16,901 15,870 106%

2009 16,271 16,170 101%

2010 16,251 16,251 100%

Figure III-17: Stress Factors Influencing Re-enlistment

Uncertainties 

Surrounding 

Deployment 

Dates 

Insufficient 

Down Time 

Between 

Deployments 

Short-Notice 

Deployments 

Reasons Cited for Not Re-enlisting 

Stress Caused by: 

Family

Seperation

High 

Workload 

Long Hours 

While 

Deployed 
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much-needed continuity in the generating forces. Continuing, he remarked, 

“These changes will allow eligibility for enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, 

education loan repayment and other incentives. We are also planning to create 

a new category of non-dual status technician, which allows retention and direct 

hire from outside the selected Reserve.”257 

In an effort to increase personnel readiness and training and the well being of 

soldiers, the Army Reserve initiated in 2003 the transient, trainee, holdee, and 

student (TTHS) account to manage Army Reserve soldiers while they were in 

training or otherwise in an unready status. Commanders then could concentrate on improving readiness and training. The ready force was divested of a 

less relevant structure, unready units, and over structure. The TTHS account 

fostered readiness, training, and mobilization actions and freed commanders 

of administrative duties. Soldiers were more easily incorporated into the unit. 

The desired end state was an increased percentage of duty military occupational 

specialty qualified soldiers in troop program units, resulting in a higher state of 

readiness as reflected in unit status reports, less hollow structure, and improved 

unit capability.258 In November 2004, seven commands began the TTHS program. About 5,000 soldiers returned to their unit ready and deployable.259 By 

2011, the Army Reserve had programmed 4,000 spaces for the TTHS. 

An operational Army Reserve and the Total Force require a continuum of service that manages reserve members over a career. When continuum of service 

initiatives become a program of record, they will aid a soldier’s transfer from 

one Army component to another in a seamless, well-organized way, meeting 

the needs of the soldier, their families, and their civilian careers together with 

the readiness requirements of the Total Force.260 As declared in The 2020 Army 

Reserve Vision & Strategy Statement, “a continuum of service allows for the 

flexibility and optimization of the special skills and functions which make up 

a significant portion of Army Reserve capabilities-all of which are essential to 

the Total Force.”261 Continuum of service and an operational reserve are mutually dependent. It will ensure adaptability in management and a gateway to 

manpower.262 

An operational Army Reserve and the Total Force require a continuum 

of service that manages reserve members over a career. 
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Fiscal Strength 

The fiscal year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act authorized $668.8 

million for National Guard and Army Reserve military construction, an increase 

of $446.8 million above the president’s budget. The 2001 military construcTable III-4: Army Reserve Appropriations

Dollars in Millions

Sources: Annual Report, Reserve Forces Policy Board, FY90, 93, 94, 99, 2000 

and Defense Finance and Acccounting System

Fiscal Year Personnel Operation & 

Maintenance

Military

Construction

Total

1989 2,240.8 810.8 85.8 3,137.4

1990 2,199.2 868.0 99.1 3,166.3

1991 2,368.7 935.8 77.4 3,381.9

1992 2,314.2 1,017.9 *108.9 *3,441.0

1993 2,182.2 1,037.2 42.2 3,261.6

1994 *2,146.8 *1,072.7 102.0 3,326.6

1995 2,161.9 1,240.2 57.2 3,459.3

1996

1997 2,059.0 1,140.8 57.0 3,256.8

1998 2,040.0 1,211.1 74.2 3,325.3

1999 *2,182.9 *1,258.5 102.1 *3,543.5

2000 2,318.1 1,481.3 123.1 1,481.3

2001 *2,466,691 *1,561,913 **108,465 4,137,069

2002 2,682,391 1,766,544 **165,136 4,614,071

2003 3,124,348 2,123,962 **100,554 5,348,864

2004 3,358,192 1,993,005 **88,451 5,439,648

2005 3,666,180 1,989,559 **92,377 5,748,116

2006 3,144,165 1,968,324 **151,043 5,263,532

2007 3,279,102 2,164,928 **166,000 5,610,030

2008 3,709,968 2,459,040 **148,133 6,317,141

2009 4,023,661 2,607,703 **282,607 6,913,971

2010 4,286,480 2,617,469 **431,566 7,335,515

Data Unavailable Data Unavailable Data Unavailable Data Unavailable

*There is a discrepancy between Reserve Forces Policy Board reports. The latest dated 

report is used. The 2001 data is from the Defense Finance and Accounting System.

**MCAR for 2001 through 2010 is appropriated and not execution amounts only. 
CHAPTER 3. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

353

tion authorization was $24.2 million more than the previous fiscal year. This 

increased construction funds for sixty-one new projects for National Guard 

and Army Reserve facilities. The legislation authorized some $2.3 billion for 

National Guard and Army Reserve equipment, which included the president’s 

budget request of $1.3 billion along with $1 billion added on by Congress.263 

As generally seen in America’s wars, with Operation IRAQI FREEDOM even 

more funds began to flow. Much of this was through supplements, instead of 

the base budget. “The Army’s base budget in 2005 and 2006 was $100 billion 

each year, for example, but the Army received supplements of $60 billion in 

2005 and $70 billion in 2006.264 Funding for Army Reserve personnel, operation and maintenance and construction between 1989 and 2010 is depicted in 

Table III-4.265 By 2010, the Army Reserve appropriation of $7.9 billion represented 4 percent of the total Army budget.266

Force Structure 

A significant force structure action in 2000 was the activation of nineteen 

multi-component units. Among the multi-component units activated were 

four engineer platoons as part of the 249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power) 

Multi-Component unit. The 40th, 360th, and 416th multi-component transportation truck companies activated in 2000. They were composed of 121 active 

component soldiers and forty-five Army Reserve soldiers. The Army Reserve 

soldiers were 88M (motor transport operators) driving M915 line haul tractors 

and operating 7.5K petroleum tankers. The regional support command that 

managed units located in the same area as the active component unit was to 

assist and provide guidance on reserve specific personnel, promotion, legal, supply, recruiting, and budget actions and procedures. The 40th Transportation 

Truck Company was located at Fort Lewis, Washington; the 360th Transportation Truck Company at Fort Carson, Colorado; and the 416th Transportation 

Truck Company at Hunter Army Airfield, Savannah, Georgia.267

U.S. Army Japan reorganized and activated a multi-component unit formed 

mostly of Army Reserve soldiers. The 9th Theater Support Command activated on October 16, 2000. It consisted of forty active duty soldiers at Camp Zama, 

Japan, and 400 Army Reserve soldiers at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. After fifty-three 

years, the senior logistics headquarters in the Army Reserve, the 310th Theater 

Support Command, cased its colors and merged with the forty-year-old 9th 

Theater Army Area Command (the Army’s last theater Army area command) 

to form the new 9th Theater Support Command headquartered in Japan. The 

9th Theater Support Command benefitted from the skills and experiences that 
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Army Reserve soldiers brought to multi-component units, enhancing mission 

success of logistics support to the Pacific Command.268

The Army Reserve composition of the total Army in 2001 is depicted in Table 

III-5.269

In 2007, more than 96 percent of all civil affairs forces were in the Army and 

93 percent of those forces were in the Army Reserve.270 Over 63 percent of 

the Army’s psychological operations forces resided in the Army Reserve. The 

Army Reserve had eighty-eight unique skill sets.271 By 2010, the Army Reserve 

contributed to the Army’s Total Force 100 percent of the theater engineer commands, civil affairs commands, training divisions, biological detection companies, railway units, and replacement companies. It contributed more than two 

thirds of the Army’s medical brigades, civil affairs brigades, psychological operations groups, expeditionary sustainment commands, dental companies, combat 

support hospitals, Army water craft, petroleum units, mortuary affairs units, and 

military history detachments. The Army Reserve contributed nearly half of 

the Army’s military police commands, information operations groups, medical 

units, and supply units.272

M915 line haul tractor.
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The restructure or transformation in command and control was aimed at creating a more flexible, adaptable, and deployable force. That was done partly by transforming the ten regional support commands to ten regional readiness commands. Helmly directed this change on September 6, 2002. The 

Department of the Army approved the concept plan on April 1, 2004, with an 

effective date of October 16, 2005. The concept plan provided the reasoning behind shifting the command and control support-based structure found 

in the regional support commands to more concentrated readiness, training, 

and mobilization preparedness-focused institutions found in the regional readiness commands. Essentially, the regional readiness commands concentrated 

on training and readiness of units. Base operations, facilities, and land management transitioned to the assistant chief of staff for installation management.273 

According to Helmly, “The days of TDA (table of distribution and allowances), non-deploying headquarters commanding all of our deployable forces are 

over.”274 Command and control of units were to be transferred to operational 

and functional commands. In short, operational units needed to be under operational commands.275

Table III-5: 2001 Army Reserve Force Structure 

Composition of the Total Army

Source: The 2002 Army Reserve Historical Summary

Command and Control 2%

Combat Forces 1%

Training Support 17%

Combatant Commander/

Service Support

6%

Combat Support 23%

Combat Service Support 51%

Training Divisions 100%

Prisoner of War Brigades 100%

Railroad Units 100%

Civil Aff airs 97%

Medical Brigades 67%

Hospitals 70%

Logistics Support 40%
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Existence of the regional readiness commands was short lived. In September 

2006, four newly-created regional support commands entered carrier status 

within the Army Reserve. This was done to align them with their mission 

requirements. This transformation in command and control was directed by 

BRAC 2005 legislation and conformed to one of Stultz’s six imperatives. In a 

phased schedule, the regional support commands replaced the regional readiness commands in providing base operations support to Army Reserve units 

in their respective regions. The Army Reserve disestablished the ten regional readiness commands on September 16, 2008, and designated the new commands as the 63d, 81st, 88th, and 99th Regional Support Commands. Fort 

McCoy, Wisconsin, was the home for the 88th; Moffett Field, California, for 

the 63d; Fort Dix, New Jersey, for the 99th; and Fort Jackson, South Carolina, 

for the 81st. These commands provided personnel, information and resource 

management facilities, and equipment support to the Army Reserve units in 

Figure III-18: Composition of Army Forces, 2010

Engineer Commands Civil Affairs 

Commands 

Training Division 

Composition of Active Army Forces 

2010 

100% 

AR 

100% 

AR 

100% 

AR 

100% 

AR 

100% 

AR 

100% 

AR 

100% 

AR 

100% 

AR 

100% 

AR 

Biological Detection 

Companies 

Railway 

Units 

Replacement 

Companies 

100% 

AR 

100% 

AR 

100% 

AR 
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Figure III-19: Regional Readiness Commands

Figure III-20: Regional Support Commands

Regional Readiness Commands Replaced With Regional Support Commands
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their geographic regions. The former missions of command and control and 

training and readiness oversight shifted to twenty-two operational and functional commands. 

The operational and functional commands were created to organize, equip, and 

administer deployable units and provide available deployable missions. Operational and functional commands were focused on a specific function.276 All units 

remaining aligned to the regional readiness commands had to be reassigned. 

Where possible, units were assigned to the operational and functional commands. Those units without functional alignments were assigned to the U.S. 

Army Reserve Readiness Command.277 

Stultz explained that “This shift enables us to source more operational units 

from the space savings that result from reductions in overhead throughout the 

Army Reserve.”278 A lot of low demand or overhead has been taken down to 

stand up high demand operational forces.279 He pointed to the deactivation of 

one of these regional readiness commands and in its place the activation of the 

316th Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC). The 316th deployed less 

than twelve months later and “took command of over 20,000 active, National 

Guard, and Army Reserve soldiers in Iraq, providing logistical support for all 

U.S. forces, coalition forces, and Iraqi forces from,” as Stultz put it, “beans to 

bullets, from fuel to parts. The 316th ESC demonstrated the ability of the 

Army Reserve to quickly transform while at war.”280

In repositioning the Army Reserve’s structure from its TDA-type organizations 

into a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) deployable force, 

the Army Reserve will increase MTOE structure from some 128,500 to 145,000 

positions. These changes were in sync with Decision Point 57 to the Army 

Campaign Plan, which addressed the overall reduction of tables of distribution 

and allowance structure in an effort to convert it to operational force structure. 

Accordingly, the Army Reserve moved its structure from the TDA organizations and placed it under the operational and functional commands.281 At the 

beginning of 2008, 78 percent of Army Reserve units had been realigned from a 

Cold War strategic reserve configuration of geographically based headquarters 

to operational and functional commands. By May 2009, the realignment was 92 

percent complete and by December 2009, Stultz declared transformation was 

“essentially complete.”282 The Army Reserve moved from a legacy structure 

serving a strategic reserve to command and control of an operational, deployabe 

reserve.283

Among the operational and functional commands was the Military Intelligence 

Readiness Command (MIRC). The Army Reserve created this command, pro-
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visionally, on July 1, 2003. It was responsible for the “ongoing intelligence 

requirements of the U.S. Army, combatant commands, combat support agencies, and other services by providing trained and ready soldiers, mission-tailored teams and units, and state-of-the-art intelligence production and training 

facilities.”284 Command and control of all continental U.S. Army Reserve military intelligence forces transferred from the regional readiness commands and 

the United States Army Reserve Readiness Command at Fort Jackson, South 

Carolina, to the Military Intelligence Readiness Command.285

September 15, 2007, marked the activation of the 11th Aviation Command at 

Fort Knox, Kentucky, another operational and functional command. The Army 

Reserve transferred aviation command and control from the 244th Aviation 

Brigade to the 11th Aviation Command in order to execute modular aviation 

unit conversion. Activation of the 11th was significant as it symbolized the 

growth and importance of aviation to the Army Reserve. The 11th will oversee 

transformation of every aviation unit in the Army Reserve. The command supplied air traffic services, airfield management, aero medical evacuation, combat 

aviation brigade reinforcement, theater aviation support, and coordination of 

Figure III-21: Operational Commands
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aviation staging and onward movement in order to support corps, Army or joint 

operations in theater. When deployed, the headquarters operated as a theater 

aviation command.286 

Army Reserve aviation has been a significant force multiplier in the Global 

War on Terrorism. Elements of Army Reserve aviation have been forward 

deployed in the Southwest Asia area of responsibility since Operation DESERT SPRING in 1999. Every rotation of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM has 

involved soldiers from Army Reserve aviation.287 

Multiple rotations of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM have involved aviation soldiers to include relief efforts in Pakistan after the earthquake in 2005. 

Army Reserve aviation not only provided highly qualified and trained soldiers 

for overseas deployment, but also provided critical aviation support for disasters 

at home such as hurricanes Katrina and Rita.288 

On October 16, 2005, the Army Reserve established another operational and 

functional command, the Army Reserve Medical Command (AR-MEDCOM). 

Figure III-22: Functional Commands
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AR-MEDCOM will remain as a command and control headquarters for all 

TDA medical units.289 By 2010, AR-MEDCOM included the four Medical 

Area Support Groups, the Medical Readiness and Training Command, and the 

Army Professional Medical Command. It encompassed seventy-six units and 

9,654 soldiers.290 

Two other operational and functional commands were the 311th and 335th 

Theater Signal Commands (TSC). Their mission was to provide communications support in the theater of operations to the Army Service Component 

Commander, Army Forces (ARFOR), joint, and coalition forces. They provided command and control of all assigned and attached signal units and formulated and implemented signal support plans, policies, and procedures.291 

Under transformation, the 311th became the Pacific Command’s theater signal 

command and had full responsibility for the Pacific LandWarNet. This was the 

strategic and tactical network for all installations and deployed forces in the region.292 According to the commander, “Our systems and Soldiers have worked 

superbly during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING 

Figure III-23: Direct Reporting Units
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FREEDOM. I am very pleased with how our network came together and continues to serve the war fighter.”293 

The two theater engineer operational commands, the 412th and 416th, 

conducted theater-level engineer operations in support of assigned theater 

commanders. These units participated in joint and combined regional contingency operations. They also supported continental U.S.-based engineer 

requirements, as directed. Like other commands, transformation will be compounded as each command’s structure changes in the midst of meeting its 

global missions.294 

The 200th Military Police Command was another operational and functional command. The command’s force design update received approval on December 13, 2006. The command activated on April 16, 2008. It was the first 

multi-component military police theater command in the history of the Army. 

The organization comprised more than 120 subordinate commands, including units transferred from the disestablished regional readiness commands. It 

Figure III-24: Operational and Functional Commands, Regional Support Commands, and 

Direct Reporting Units
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was comprised of over 12,000 Army Reserve military police soldiers and supporting staff from across the nation. Its operational mission was to provide 

command and control for two to five assigned/attached military police brigades 

with subordinate units (battalions, companies, detachments) performing military police battlefield functions. During peacetime operations, the command 

provided command and control and training readiness oversight for organizations under its control. Activation of the command was a direct result of lessons 

learned during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM. Properly structured, the 200th Military Police Command was 

an appropriate mix of reserve and active soldiers to simultaneously support the 

Global War on Terrorism, major combat operations, and small scale contingencies. The integration of both reserve and active soldiers ensured seamless and 

rapid transition from peacetime to wartime operation and enhanced readiness 

through mutually supporting training. The command provided command and 

control of military police combat support and internment/resettlement brigades and other military police units engaged in theater-level Army, joint and 

multinational military police operations to support a commander’s priorities.295 

The 143d Transportation Command (Forward) begins its transformation and reactivation as the 

143d Expeditionary Sustainment Command. Brigadier General Keith L. Thurgood, center, and 

Command Sergeant Major Michael Schultz, left, case the unit’s colors as Major General Dennis 

Hardy, right, observes during the deactivation ceremony held in December 2006, at Camp Arifjan, 

Kuwait. (Photo by Staff Sergeant James Martin) 
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The 377th Theater Sustainment Command, another operational and functional command, was the lead integrator of Army Reserve sustainment forces. It 

provided command and control of all assigned, attached and operational conA CH-47 Chinook helicopter from the Army Reserve’s Company B, 5th Battalion, 159th Aviation 

Regiment, picks up three large sandbags from a staging area along the shore of Lake Pontchartrain. The reserve unit, called to help with the Hurricane Katrina relief effort, dropped more than 

one million pounds of the sandbags to help repair damaged flood levees around New Orleans. 

(Army Reserve Magazine, Winter 2005)
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trol (OPCON) units. The command provided sustainment planning guidance 

and support. This will become the largest command in the Army Reserve. 

The 377th assumed command and control of the 103d, 143d, 310th, 311th and 

316th Expeditionary Sustainment Commands, the Army Reserve Sustainment 

Command, and the Deployable Support Command. It had command and control of over 500 down trace units throughout the United States, Puerto Rico, 

Guam, and the Virgin Islands. The ESCs were a critical component to the 

Army Reserve’s theater sustainment role, designed to forward deploy in an austere theater and provide combat service assets and services.296 

In a realignment action, effective October 1, 2006, the Department of the Army 

realigned command and control of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) and all Army Reserve civil affairs and 

psychological operations units and soldiers from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command to the USARC. This was a Quadrennial Defense Review

Members of a FEMA search and rescue team prepare to board a CH-47 Chinook helicopter from 

the Army Reserve’s Company B, 5th Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment. This mission, near the 

devastated town of Empire, Louisiana, was one of the many conducted by Company B during the 

unit’s deployment to the Gulf Coast region in support of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. The unit, 

headquartered at Fort Eustis, Virginia, was the first Army Reserve unit mobilized for the recovery 

operations. (Army Reserve Magazine, Winter 2005) 
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decision and supported the Army Reserve’s plans to create and sustain trained 

and ready civil affairs and psychological operations forces. Between 2008 and 

2011, Army Reserve civil affairs spaces were expected to grow by some 900 

spaces and psychological spaces to about 1,230 spaces. Tactical civil affairs will 

grow from sixty-four to 112 tactical companies. This will increase support to 

the conventional force and to the ARFORGEN model.297 

Perhaps one of the most important restructuring actions was the secretary of 

the Army’s October 16, 2006 letter and General Order Number Fifteen, designating the USARC as a direct reporting unit to the Army chief of staff. This 

was in accordance with Decision Point 58 to the Army Campaign Plan and 

efforts to more effectively administer and support operating forces.298 

“Effective October 1, 2010, the Army Reserve Headquarters was realigned internally to better reflect . . . the new management culture [known as the enterprise approach wherein]. . . leaders function for the good of the enterprise, not 

just their functional area or staff agency. . . . Lines of authority and supervisory 

Soldiers of the 206th Transportation Company turn a pallet of MREs from the USS Tortuga before 

it’s loaded by forklift onto a waiting truck for distribution to Hurricane Katrina relief workers in 

New Orleans. (Army Reserve Magazine, Spring 2006)
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oversight . . . changed to best incorporate senior-level emphasis on the four 

Core Enterprises: (1) Human Capital, (2) Readiness, (3) Materiel, and (4) Services and Infrastructure (aligned with HQDA [Headquarters Department of 

the Army] Institutional Adaptation and Army Enterprises).” This “new management culture” “realigns Army Reserve Headquarters assets into one combined enterprise and more fully integrates ‘one headquarters at two different 

locations,’ . . . OCAR staff . . . and . . . USARC staff . . . .”299 (See figure III-25 for 

a depiction of the Army Reserve Headquarters internal realignment.) 

On August 14, 2008, the Department of the Army, in accordance with the Army 

Campaign Plan, approved the USARC’s request to transform the existing Army 

Reserve garrison support unit structure into two CONUS and one OCONUS 

mobilization support groups. The transformation provided additional strucThe USARC is designated as a direct reporting unit to the Army chief 

of staff.

The official party, which included (from left) Major General Adolph McQueen, Command 

Sergeant Major Brendan Toth and Major General Mari Eder, inspects the troops and salutes the 

honor guard during the 200th Military Police Command activation ceremony. Eder passed the 

reigns to McQueen. (Warrior-Citizen, Summer 2008)
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ture to assist in managing the increased rotational support for ten mobilization 

stations.300 

Training 

As noted before, “preparing forces to succeed in the current conflict” was one 

of General Casey’s strategic imperatives. Training soldiers was a priority. Casey told Congress in November 2007, “We will continue to provide tough, demanding training at home stations and in our combat training centers to give 

our Soldiers and their leaders the confidence they need to succeed.”301 

The cornerstone of full spectrum training for the Army Reserve was the Army 

Reserve Training Strategy (ARTS). ARTS outlined how the Army Reserve will 

 Figure III-25: Army Reserve Headquarters Internal Realignment
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produce a sustainable force capable of supporting joint and Army operational requirements. This is achieved by means of training and readiness cycles 

through which all deployable Army Reserve units will rotate. ARTS was based 

on the train-alert-deploy operational reserve model rather than the alert-traindeploy strategic reserve model, as specified in Stultz’s imperatives for transformation. It used the ARFORGEN cyclic readiness construct, providing the 

time sequence to train units. ARTS established progressive training and readiness cycles that prioritized resources, managed readiness levels, and provided 

predictable training. The strategy reduced post-mobilization training time to 

maximize the time soldiers were deployed. ARTS was the Army Reserve’s application of ARFORGEN. ARTS was the means to providing the framework to 

create and sustain a trained, ready operational Army Reserve.302

Warrior exercises were an integral part of ARFORGEN and ARTS. They were 

the first major externally evaluated company level collective training venue for 

most units. During the warrior exercise, units were required to function in 

a multi-functional, multi-echelon training environment across the live-virtual-constructive (L-V-C) domain with operational force (OPFOR) pressure 

Figure III-26: The Army Reserve Training Strategy and ARFORGEN
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during a five-day field training exercise. Observer controller/trainers evaluated warrior exercise units. Units were expected to successfully accomplish “P” 

(practices) proficiency on all core-mission essential task list (C-METL) tasks 

prior to entering the Train/Ready 3 (T/R3) training year of the ARTS training 

cycle. The warrior exercise is evolving as the cumulative training event for the 

Ready 1 phase. These exercises simulated in theater mobilization, deployment, 

and employment.303 Lessons learned from the Global War on Terrorism enhanced realistic training. In June 2005, at Fort Bliss, Texas, the 90th Regional Readiness Command executed the first warrior exercise which trained over 

3,500 soldiers.304 

An example of individual soldier training was the ten-week Exercise PACIFIC 

SURVIVOR conducted in August 2006 at Fort Hunter Liggett, California. It 

was designed to provide each soldier with the opportunity to participate in a 

training environment focused on individual combat skills and knowledge. The 

four training categories were weapons ranges (qualification and familiarization), convoy operations training, selected warrior training tasks (e.g., first aid, 

land navigation, hand grenade course), and classroom instruction covering law 

Figure III-27: Army Reserve Training Strategy
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of land warfare and cultural awareness training. The latter became one of the 

most popular training events for soldiers who had been deployed for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM and for those soon 

to deploy. 

One example of the Reset/Train2 phase of ARFORGEN in 2006 was Exercise 

QUARTERMASTER LIQUID LOGISTICS for water purification, water production, and petroleum, oil and lubricants units. There were other exercise opportunities for military police, transportation, maintenance, and medical units. 

An example of the annual medical-based training was Exercise GOLDEN 

MEDIC, the Army Reserve’s largest annual medical command and control 

exercise. It culminated the training year’s individual and small unit collective 

training events. Soldiers set up and managed an improvised medical complex 

with equipment found in an American hospital. Soldiers learned how to respond to medical situations on a battlefield such as evacuating casualties to a 

theater hospital.

In 2006, the Army Reserve conducted eight-day Exercise PATRIOT WARRIOR and Exercise RIVER WARRIOR. In June 2006, the 88th Regional 

Soldiers from the 705th Transportation Company, 475th Quartermaster Group, haul JP-8 in a 

M915A5 line-haul tractor truck during Exercise QUARTERMASTER LIQUID LOGISTICS. (U.S. Army 

photo by Sergeant First Class John Fries)
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Readiness Command executed PATRIOT WARRIOR at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. Twenty-three of the units participating were ARFORGEN Reset/Train 

3 units. This warrior exercise provided year three units with an external evaluation of training and readiness for entry into the ready pool. During the field exercise, soldiers trained collectively at platoon level and concentrated on improving company level readiness. It provided a realistic battle-focused environment, 

incorporating all the battle operating systems and components/services on the 

battlefield to enhance battle drill training and sustain technical proficiency.

In June 2006, the 11th Military Police Brigade executed PATRIOT JUSTICE 

at Fort McCoy. The purpose of the exercise was to provide mission-based 

training to Army Reserve military police soldiers, officers, units, and support 

military occupational specialties with theater specific individual and collective 

METL training. The exercise prepared forces to deploy to any geographical 

combatant command on order or to perform missions in the homeland supporting civilian authorities.

Patriot Warrior 

As part of a live-fire exercise, soldiers carry a simulated casualty on a litter away from their convoy and along a Fort McCoy range in preparation for a helicopter evacuation. The soldiers 

from the 401st Engineer Company, an Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Army Reserve unit, were 

preparing at the installation to deploy to support Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. (Fort McCoy 

Public Affairs Office)
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In July 2006, the 89th Regional Readiness Command planned and executed a 

river warrior exercise at Fort Chaffee, Arizona. The command’s mission was to 

improve unit collective training in a tactical environment and prepare ARFORGEN with Ready/Train 3 units for validation and entry into the Ready pool. 

There was heavy use of engineer units together with boat units engaged in executing a shore-to-shore bridging operation.305 Another example of ARFORGEN Ready phase training was Operation SAND CASTLE, which simulated 

engineer operations in a desert environment and implemented anti-terrorism 

force protection measures. 

Before progressing to ARFORGEN’s Available pool, soldiers had to complete 

a combat training center event or its equivalent and had to certify their combat skills. An example was Operation PLATINUM WRENCH. Operation 

PLATINUM WRENCH was a USARC G-4/G-7 maintenance initiative to 

integrate Army Reserve maintenance into the Army sustainment maintenance 

capability, to provide fully trained, ready, and relevant Army Reserve direct support (DS), general support (GS), and to develop a collection and classification 

(C&C) maintenance structure.306 Warrior exercises have continued to be a 

useful aspect of ARTS.

In 2003, the training structure went from seven divisions (institutional training) 

(DIVITs) to six. The extra division, the 84th DIVIT, once multifunctional, 

Soldiers with the 652d Engineer Company unload a base component for a dry support bridge 

while training during Operation SAND CASTLE. The 652d, an Army Reserve unit from Ellsworth, 

Wisconsin, is using this training to simulate war time scenarios to ensure it is equipped and 

ready to accomplish the mission. (Warrior-Citizen, Summer 2008)
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became responsible for leader training. It took charge of the three noncommissioned officer academies, the Army Reserve Readiness Training Center, 

and all officer and professional military education training which at the time 

consisted of the Commanding General Staff College and the combined service schools. This was in sync with Army Reserve transformation.307 Each 

DIVIT was uniquely structured to support its area of responsibility for military occupational specialty reclassification, professional development, and 

ROTC support requirements. Each DIVIT also had unique initial military 

training (e. g, drill sergeant) structures. Each DIVIT had a share of the Army 

A soldier from the 264th Service Company of Salinas, Puerto Rico, 

removes bolts to remove a protective rollover cage from a 10,000 pound 

forklift as part of Operation PLATINUM WRENCH at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. (Photo by Rob Schuette)
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program for individual training mission, provided summer surge capability for 

TRADOC, and supported both ROTC camps and the U.S. Army Military 

Academy. DIVITs provided command and control and trainers for foreign 

Army training requirements.308 

Under Decision Point 74 (Army Reserve Institutional Training Structure) to 

the Army Campaign Plan approved on February 26, 2006, the Army Reserve 

modified yet again its institutional training structure. The six divisions and the 

U.S. Army Reserve Readiness Training Command (ARRTC) were transformed 

into three training commands and seven training divisions to be realigned under the commands.309 This was in an effort to functionalize training and reduce 

command and control.310 The Army Reserve reorganized and re-designated 

the training divisions and ARRTC to the following: 

80th Training Command (Total Army School System), effective September 16, 2008; 

108th Training Command (Initial Entry Training), effective September 16, 2008; 

84th Training Command (Leader Readiness), effective October 17, 2007. 

The Army Reserve reorganized and re-designated four existing training divisions:

95th Training Division (Initial Entry Training), effective September 16, 2008; 

98th Training Division (Initial Entry Training), effective September 16, 2008; 

100th Training Division (Operations Support), effective September 16, 2008; 

104th Training Division (Leader Training), effective October 17, 2007.

The Army Reserve activated three new divisions effective September 16, 2008:

70th Training Division (Functional Training), 

94th Training Division (Force Sustainment), 

102d Training Division (Maneuver Support). 

The 80th Training Command (Total Army School System) has command and 

control of the 94th, 100th, and 102d Training Divisions. The 108th Training 

Command has command and control of the 95th and the 98th Training Divisions. The 84th Training Command has command and control of the 70th 

and 104th Training Divisions. The various brigades within the current divisions (institutional) were to be reorganized by specialty and training opportunities were consolidated at select training sites, while supporting functional 

alignment.311 
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Training commands are responsible for routine training of Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard soldiers through classroom and “hands on” training. 

Organized into entry, advanced individual training schools, leader development 

and brigade command training organizations, each training command is responsible for specialized units throughout the United States.

More specifically, the 80th Training Command (Total 

Army School System) (TASS) trains soldiers in twelve 

career military fields for combat support and combat service support. Under the career military fields, sixty-three 

military occupational specialties are taught at eight TASS 

training centers, four Regional Training Sites-Maintenance, and two high tech training centers. The 80th 

also teaches nine additional skill identifiers, sixteen certifications, twenty-five senior leadership courses, and fifty-three advanced leadership courses. All together, the 

command teaches 166 individual courses. The career 

Figure III-28: Training Structure

80th Training 

Command

 (Total Army 

School System)
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management fields cover a wide range of instruction from engineering to health 

services and from quartermaster to civil affairs/psychological operations. The 

command also provides specified instructor personnel from its school brigades, 

as directed, to any TRADOC installation to support military occupational specialties-specific training requirements.312

The 84th Training Command (Leader Readiness) 

plans, coordinates, and conducts: warrior exercises and combat support training rotations; basic and 

advanced weapons training and training on theater-directed tasks. The command trains and assesses 

Army Reserve units in ARFORGEN in accordance 

with USARC and TRADOC directives in support 

of operational and functional commands. As directed, the command provides training to joint, combined 

and active Army forces.313 

The 108th Training Command (Initial Entry Training) 

provides highly professional, trained, and ready drill 

sergeants, instructors, cadre and units to conduct initial 

military training and leader training in support of TRADOC and the U.S. Army Accessions Command to train, 

advise and assist joint, multi-component and multi-national forces. The 108th Training Command is the 

sole nationwide reserve command for initial military 

training, representing one half of the total basic training capacity of the Army.314 

As a result of Army Campaign Plan Decision Point 72, 

five Army Reserve training support division headquarters and their subordinate 

units were re-aligned or restructured under several new headquarters. Two 

were re-missioned and retained due to BRAC (78th and 91st); one was restructured into a battle command training division (75th), and the remaining two 

(85th and 87th) were restructured to administrative support commands for the 

many Army Reserve battalions operationally controlled by First Army.

315

Training support commands provide customized, realistic, unit-and-operation-specific training. Training support commands plan, conduct, and evaluate 

training exercises for Army, Army Reserve and National Guard units. Training 

support commands are organized under the United States First Army into two 

subordinate units, First Army East and First Army West. 

84th Training 

Command 

(Leader Readiness)

108th Training 

Command 

(Initial Entry Training)
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The Army Reserve developed the regional training center (RTC) concept (with 

provisional execution in 2008) in direct response to the secretary of defense’s 

twelve month mobilization policy, Utilization of the Total Force, issued on January 19, 2007, referenced above. The memorandum had an immediate impact on 

Army Reserve “boots on the ground” time available to combatant commanders 

due to the time necessary to perform post-mobilization training requirements. 

First Army, together with the Army Reserve and FORSCOM, identified 130 of 

160 tasks trained during post-mobilization that would migrate to pre-mobilization training for the reduction of pre-and post-mobilization training for deployment expeditionary force (DEF)-sourced Army Reserve units in the Ready 

phase of ARFORGEN. Migrating post-mobilization theater specific required 

training - to pre-mobilization training reduced the existing model from seventy 

days to less than thirty-eight days. Department of the Army codified this requirement in HQDA EXORD 150-08, Reserve Component (RC) Deployment 

Expeditionary Force (DEF) Pre- and Post-Mobilization Training (PPMT) 

Strategy. The RTCs supported the HQDA G-3/5/7 Collective Training DiviSoldiers learn how to extract a vehicle from a muddy swamp in the 63B Wheeled Recovery 

Mechanic course taught by the 80th Training Command Regional Training Site Maintenance at 

Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, April 1, 2009. (Courtesy of Fort Indiantown Town Gap Regional Training Site-Maintenance) 
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Soldiers engage in hands-on training as part of the 92W Water Treatment Specialist course 

taught by the 80th Training Command’s Regional TASS Training Center at Fort Pickett, Virginia, in 

April 2010. (Courtesy of 94th Division) 
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Sergeant First Class Gerald Kjornes, Regional Training Site-Maintenance instructor, trains 

Specialist Michael Lambach on how to use schematics to troubleshoot and diagnose 

faults with a 30kw generator. (Army Reserve Magazine, Spring 2006).
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sion guidance on Army warrior training. Further, the RTC program supported 

sustainment of associated Army warrior training and warrior tasks and battle 

drill individual and collective tasks in ARFORGEN Train/Ready 3. The RTCs 

conducted individual soldier, leader and collective training skills supporting 

theater specific individual required training and warrior tasks and battle drills. 

The RTCs used mobilized soldiers and equipment from Army Reserve institutional training divisions (e.g., 108th Training Command) with elements from 

small arms readiness groups and observer controller/trainer teams.316

The three RTCs located at Fort Hunter Liggett, Fort Dix, and Fort McCoy 

supported the training strategy and trained individual warrior tasks and some 

collective training tasks. According to one senior USARC G-7 officer, “RTC is 

the final catch-all, ensuring individual tasks are accomplished prior to units and 

soldiers being mobilized in the execution of the train-alert-deploy construct.”317 

The regional training centers and the combat support training centers (discussed below) ensured that the contemporary Army Reserve supported the oneyear-in-five deployed ARFORGEN cycle. 

The 84th U.S. Army Reserve Readiness Training Command has outfitted five standard Humvees 

with steel kits which simulate the weight and physical characteristics of an actual up-armored 

Humvee. (Army Reserve Magazine, Spring 2006)
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Should the mobilization authority be completely rescinded or restricted, the 

RTC was a pre-mobilization capability which could be decreased and ramped 

up as required to support the reserve component deployment expeditionary 

force.318 The first RTC rotation began in October 2007 with 6,061 soldiers 

trained in 2008. That number grew to 12,422 in 2009 and then rose again in 

2010 to 13,084.319 

Combat Support Training Centers (CSTC), aimed at reducing post-mobilization training and increasing “boots on the ground,” were operational at 

Fort Hunter Liggett, Fort McCoy, and Fort Dix. CSTC capability provided 

combat training-center like experiences for maneuver support and force sustainment units, similar to the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center training environments for Army maneuver units. The 

brigade - run exercises focused on company level training with platoon executed LANES where units received training through free play events with 

opposing force (OPFOR) pressure during an eight-day field training exercise. 

Soldiers from the 652d Engineer Company, Ellsworth, Wisconsin, constructed this bridge across 

the Arkansas River at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, during their annual training.(Photo by Specialist 

Cory Meyman)
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Brigade and battalion staffs received military decision making process training 

and units received external evaluations from observer/controllers. CSTC rotations targeted Train/Ready 3 units, which were part of the deployment expeditionary force, sourced in support of overseas contingency operations within 

180 days of their mobilization dates.320

The Army Reserve was committed to providing appropriate platforms to support crucial home station training for its units. Army Reserve home stationing 

included reserve centers, local training areas, regional training sites, and installations. Home stations depicted the operational environment in training venues, 

facilities, constructive live, virtual (simulators), and constructive simulations to 

include gaming technologies. Modernizing the Army Reserve’s infrastructure 

through more military construction and retrofitting its facilities with state of 

the art classrooms and simulator/simulation rooms augmented individual and 

collective training such as weapons simulator rooms in new Army Reserve centers. Upgrading existing local training areas and regional training sites with 

ranges and training facilities gave units the ability to master crucial tasks while 

training near home.321 

To support combatant commanders, the Army initiated the Foreign Army 

Training and Assistance Command (FA-TRAC), the only unit of its kind. 

“The FA-TRAC concept began as an Army Reserve initiative to fill a U.S. Army 

need for creating a trained and ready, deployable organization” to train the Iraqi 

Army.322 Leading its first mission, the Army Reserve’s 98th Division (Institutional Training) (the Iroquois Warriors) from Rochester, New York, deployed 

to Iraq in late 2004 to train the Iraqi National Army and other Iraqi security 

forces. Brigadier General Richard Sherlock was the 98th’s assistant division 

commander for operations who was to serve as the deputy commanding general 

of the Coalition Military Assistance Team. He stated, “Our Soldiers are looking 

forward to this opportunity in assisting the Multi-National Security Transition 

Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and in helping build an Iraqi Army capable of 

supporting a stable, sovereign Iraq nation.’”323 

The main components of the 98th Division’s advisor support team mission in 

Iraq consisted of the command and control cell and over thirty advisor teams 

who worked mainly with the 1st, 3d, and 5th Iraqi Divisions. A few worked 

Army Reserve units deploy to train the Iraqi Army.
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with Iraqi Army engineer and logistics units. The teams found the Iraqi units 

at varying levels of organization, knowledge, experience, training, and readiness 

partly due to previous advisory teams. While most advisors had believed they 

were to train the Iraqi forces on a “safe compound,” they found themselves “advising their units on combat missions.”324

Living conditions were often Spartan. Describing the often times isolation, one 

soldier remarked, ‘“We really had no idea what was going on in the outside 

world. For all intents and purposes, we were in the middle of Iraq on our own, 

doing what we needed to do. It was a big shock for me.’”325 While the quantity 

of food was usually not a problem its quality was debatable. Equipment proved 

to be a foremost concern.326 

By providing “train-the-trainer” non-commissioned officer and officer training 

and basic military skills, the division expanded that nation’s ability to build an 

Iraqi Army capable of stabilizing Iraq.327 In 2005, 741 soldiers were mobilized 

for this mission. Twenty-three percent of the soldiers were cross-leveled. Four 

percent were Individual Ready Reserve soldiers. The unit also fielded a detachment of soldiers to Afghanistan to help with training cadets for the nation’s 

National Military Academy.329 While FA-TRAC as a name no longer exists, the 

mission of providing Army Reserve soldiers to train security forces in Iraq and 

Afghanistan still does.

There had been some debate and resistance to using a division (institutional 

training) unit. Still, the 98th Division’s presence was appreciated. Speaking of 

the unit under his command, General David Petraeus said: ‘“We were happy to 

have them. We were just glad to get somebody over there to help us out-and 

the sooner the better. . . . I think they should be justly proud of what they did. 

In some cases they did missions for which they were completely suited; in other 

cases, just like everybody else in Iraq, they did missions that were not familiar 

to them and they responded admirably in each case. . . . To say we couldn’t have 

done it without . . . the 98th would be a huge understatement, so they ought 

“I think they [98th Division] should be justly proud of what they did. . . . 

To say we couldn’t have done it without . . . the 98th would be a huge 

understatement, so they ought to look on this episode in their history 

with pride.” General David Petraeus
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to look on this episode in their history with pride.’”330 According to another assessment, “The 98th Division’s performance is a testament to the ever-increasing 

professionalism of the Army’s Reserve Component soldier and their leaders.”331

Fort Hunter Liggett, California. Brigadier General Alton Berry, commander, 70th Training Division 

(Functional Training), left, and 70th Command Sergeant Major Derrick Simpson check out a rocket propelled grenade launcher used by OPFOR at Regional Training Center-West. (Courtesy of 

84th Training Command)
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Soldiers from the 783d Military Police Battalion conduct MK-19 machine gun launcher training 

at Fort McCoy’s RTC-North. (Photo by Rob Schuette)

Soldiers from the 783d Military Police Battalion participate in pre-mobilization training under 

the guidance of Fort McCoy’s RTC-North by firing crew-served weapons. (Photo by Rob Schuette)
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Soldiers of the, 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry Regiment test their nerves as they show their combat presence in a small village riot depicted in a training scenario at the Joint Readiness Training 

Center. (Army Reserve Magazine, Spring 2005)

Captain Ernesto Pinedo, a military policeman with the 382d Military Police Detachment, observes 

as Iraqi policemen conduct weapons training at a firing range in Baghdad. (Army Reserve 

Magazine, Spring 2003)
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The 80th Division and the 108th Training Division also were deployed to assist in standing up the Iraqi Army, its police, and border police. “In the original 

concept,” remarked Stultz, “they never had a mission of deploying. Their mission 

was to mobilize and fill out the training base here in the United States. We’ve 

changed that. They are deploying forward and doing great work, part of the way 

ahead is trying to get the Iraqi Army to take responsibility for its own security.”332

Three hundred and fifty soldiers from the 108th mobilized for the MNSTC-I 

mission in March 2005. About 225 were assigned to positions in the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT). CMATT was one of the 

MNSTC-I’s two subordinate commands. Their main mission was to train and 

equip the Iraqi Army. “CMATT was essentially the Institutional side of the 

108th Training Division Sergeant Rodney Guinyard observes Iraqi Army recruits practice drill and 

ceremony on the Camp Taji parade field. (Army Reserve Magazine, Fall 2007)
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American Advisory effort supporting the Iraqi Army, serving in a smaller but 

similar role for the Iraqi Army. . . .”333 108th CMATT soldiers were stationed 

throughout the country. That ranged northward to Zakho, near Syria and Turkey, and southward toward Az Zubayr, near the Kuwaiti border. 

Living conditions varied. Some of the soldiers were embedded with the Iraqis, 

living on isolated far distant bases. Others worked on sizeable combined coalition-Iraqi bases. They had improved facilities and good transportation. And 

some lived and worked in Baghdad’s Green Zone.334 

The 351st Military Police Company of Ocala, Florida, reacts to sniper fire while on a mounted 

security patrol during mock battles at the Joint Readiness Training Center. (Army Reserve Magazine, Summer 2001) 
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U.S. Army personnel did the majority of the training while mentoring their 

counterparts. According to Sergeant Rodney Guinyard, one of the instructor-advisers with the unit at Camp Taji, by 2007 ‘“we’ve gone from standing 

right over them and telling them what to do, to standing way off to the side 

and just observing as they conduct all the training. . . . We have a good professional working relationship with the Iraqis.”’335 Training included drill and 

ceremony, rifle marksmanship, first aid, movement training, and searching and 

clearing buildings. The 2007 camp had twenty-two advanced courses, ranging 

from computer training to vehicle and weapon repair, with a capacity for 1,000 

students. By 2007, Camp Taji graduated 8,010 commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers.336 

In 2003, Helmly began a yearlong Army Reserve leadership campaign plan. 

He set 2004 as The Year of the Leader in the Army Reserve. The plan was 

Helmly’s “vision and strategy to change the leadership culture.”337 The plan 

instituted new methods to train leaders. Among them was the Company Team 

Leader Development course for company commanders, first sergeants, and 

unit assistors. Leader development guides for officers and noncommissioned officers stressing leadership instead of a career were part of the 

campaign plan. 

Other features of the plan were a mentorship program and a Senior Leader 

Training program. The latter program concentrated on entrenching the intellectual proficiency senior leaders require to effect change in the Army Reserve. 

All general-officer level commands and the Army Reserve staff participated in 

this part of the program. 

The Army Reserve instituted concrete standards to use when selecting leaders. 

For example, the Army’s transformation of the Officer Education System affected the Army Reserve at a number of professional military education levels. 

Introduced was an Army Reserve combat leadership validation program and 

systems to perform command climate assessments. Part of the campaign was 

to enroll more officers in the Army’s leadership institutions, such as the Army 

War College. 

In 2004, the Army abolished the Combined Arms and Services Staff School. 

The reserve components were able to convince the Department of the Army 

that the officers needed the school. The Army Reserve developed the sixteen-day Combined Arms Exercise course conducted in one active duty training 

period. In July 2005, the 98th Training Division (Institutional Training) completed the Army Reserve’s pilot of the Intermediate Level Education-Common 

Core course. In 2005, twenty-five Army Reserve officers attended the resident 
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Army War College. Three officers attended the National Management Course 

at Syracuse University. In 2005, five Reserve Component-Captains Career 

courses were operational. The leadership campaign initiated an Army Reserve 

combat validation program together with systems for command climate assessments. Army Reserve training guidance was recognized for its leadership, warrior tasks, and readiness. The Noncommissioned Officer Education System 

was the key to developing and preparing those soldiers for leadership roles.338 

Overseas deployment training continued to be a vital training resource. In 

2000, 3,734 Army Reserve soldiers participated in overseas deployment training; 22,057 participated in exercises. The number of soldiers receiving overseas 

deployment training rose to 7,488 in 2001 with another 15,004 participating in 

exercises. By 2006, 9,932 soldiers participated in overseas deployment training 

in thirty-five countries. The numbers fell to 6,325 soldiers in forty-six countries for 2010.339

Among the exercises was ROVING SANDS, a ten-day exercise in 2000 involving more than 18,000 U.S. and multi-national participants. TRANSLOTS 

(Transportation Logistics Over the Shore) was a multi-component, multi-service transportation operation conducted in the area around Fort Eustis and 

Fort Story. More than 2,000 soldiers from forty-six units participated in the 

exercise. The lead unit for the exercise was the 143d Transportation Command. The 143d Transportation Command from Orlando, Florida, mobilized 

and deployed to Virginia with war trace units to conduct a tough transportation 

mission: a bare breach, joint-over-the-shore operation. This operation gave 

Army Reserve soldiers and active duty soldiers a chance to work together along 

with the Navy. The operation replicated what would happen in wartime when 

a port was damaged, closed, or incapable of handling large ships. In this operation, supplies, equipment, and troops could be transported from the larger ships 

ashore by smaller boats, which could more easily access landing areas.340 

The Army Reserve conducted BRIDGEX (Bridge Exercise) in July 2000 at Fort 

Chaffee, Arizona. The sponsor was the 90th Regional Support Command’s 

420th Engineer Brigade. The command’s 493d Engineer Group (Combat) acted as the crossing force engineer with active component, National Guard, and 

Army Reserve engineer units participating. BRIDGEX was a river crossing 

field-training exercise focusing on ribbon bridge launching, bridge boat operatory training, rafting operations, bridge completion, bridge anchorage, and 

bridge recovery. Eight units and 1,103 soldiers participated.341 

The 335th Theater Signal Command was the USARC action agent in planning 

and operating a theater-level communications network in the U.S. Army Signal 
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Command’s GRECIAN FIREBOLT exercise held in 2000. Active and reserve 

component signal units participated in this worldwide exercise at various continental U.S. locations and in southwest Asia. GRECIAN FIREBOLT provided 

communications support and connectivity between active and reserve component exercise sites. Thirteen units and 1,542 soldiers participated.342 

In 2001, the Army Reserve continued to support exercises, operations, and training worldwide. Among them were BRIGHT STAR, NEW HORIZONES, 

ROVING SANDS 2001, Operation DANGEROUS WIND 2001, and CONSEQUENCE ISLAND 2001. The latter two were weapons of mass destruction exercises that occurred before September 11. From February 12 through 

May 20, 2007, thousands of Army Reserve soldiers deployed in seven rotations 

of two-week increments to conduct engineer and medical support training missions at selected sites in Bocas del Toro Province, Panama, as part of NUEVOS 

HORIZONTES 2007. The Army Reserve’s participation in these and other 

exercises and operations demonstrated its relevance and that it no longer was a 

for-emergency-only organization but rather a vital partner in the Army.343

Specialist Zachary Ritter, from the 362nd Psychological Operations Company in Fayetteville, Arkansas, speaks with actors during a pre-deployment training exercise at Fort Dix, New Jersey. 

PSYOP instructors from the 1st Training Brigade, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operation Command (Airborne), conducted the exercise. (Staff Sergeant Sharilyn Wells)
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Equipment

The Army Reserve continued to coordinate equipment requirements with 

the Department of the Army, deputy chief of staff, G8, and the Army Materiel Command. Army Reserve priorities mandated equipment distribution, new 

equipment fielding, cascading of excess equipment, and resetting of equipment. 

The Army Reserve based these priorities on a unit’s position in ARFORGEN. 

The Army Reserve Materiel Core Enterprise staff could use its judgment to reSergeant Lori Cheplic, a concrete and asphalt engineer from 

the 463d Engineer Battalion, measures the depth and level 

of a footing for a school addition during NEW HORIZONS. 

(Photo by Staff Sergeant Amy Gunnerson)
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Sleeping Mechanic, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. 

Army Center of Military History) 
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move equipment from units to foster training or transfer it to other top priority 

units to meet readiness aim points.344 

In 2001, National Guard and reserve equipment shortages included 19.2 percent for the Army National Guard; 22.6 percent for the Army Reserve; 2.5 percent for the Naval Reserve; 0.7 percent for the Marine Corps Reserve; 0.7 percent for the Air National Guard; and 0.4 percent for the Air Force Reserve.345 

Specialist Ben L. Falslev, a small engine mechanic, works on a 10KW 

generator in the motor pool of the 872d Maintenance Company. 

The generator has a blown head gasket. (Army Reserve Magazine, 

Spring 2006)
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December 2004 found the Army Reserve with 76 percent of its required equipment on hand.346 By 2010, the Army Reserve had 90 percent of its required 

equipment on hand. Sixty-five percent of the on hand equipment was classified 

as modernized. 347 For example, while the Army Reserve in 2010 had 75 to 78 

percent of the required HUMVEEs on hand, only 13 percent were modernized. 

Less than 49 percent of the truck fleet was modernized.348 The Army Reserve 

projected modernization to increase to 68 percent by October 2012.349

The Army Reserve, however, remained short in several areas of crucial equipment. Some 35 percent of required equipment lines were at less than 65 percent 

on hand. These shortages included tactical communications networks (satellite 

and terrestrial), command and control systems, and night vision systems. The 

Army Reserve met current deployment requirements by relying on significant 

internal cross-leveling and theater provided equipment. Cross-leveling created turbulence and an unsustainable level of friction where a crucial amount of 

equipment was not immediately available since the equipment was in transit, 

undergoing maintenance or awaiting deployment. Also, some equipment was 

already deployed. In fact, between 2001 and 2005, the Army Reserve had to 

transfer 205,000 pieces of equipment to fill shortages of deploying units. The 

Army Reserve did maintain its equipment at or beyond the Army standard of 90 

percent fully mission capable. That guaranteed obtainable equipment for training and mobilization supporting the operational force within ARFORGEN.350 

Congressional plus ups and NGREA appropriations helped fill gaps between 

current unit shortages and Army planned procurement. NGREA funding averaged $112 million per year for 2006 to 2010.351

Problems in modernization and equipment on hand stemmed in part from the 

Cold War strategic reserve policy. This policy categorized combat support and 

combat service support units as echelon above division or echelon above corps 

units that operated in the rear. The Army Reserve was challenged by not being 

originally designed or equipped for prolonged operational capacity, functioning 

in a combat forward environment.352 It was not equipped, for example, with the 

night-vision gear, .50-caliber machine guns, and command and control capability that front line forces were provided. In the post-Cold War era, equipment 

needs changed along with the battlefield. On today’s nonlinear, asymmetrical 

The Army Reserve projected modernization to increase to 68 percent 

by October 2012.
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battlefield, the rear no longer exists. All soldiers 

must expect and be prepared to engage the enemy and defend themselves at all times. Army 

Reserve units spanned the entire spectrum on 

the battlefield. 

Strategic stationing was an essential aspect of 

Army Reserve transformation. In 2001, that 

meant the re-introduction of a medium-lift 

helicopter capability within the Army Reserve, 

which put Army Reserve aviation on point in 

the Army Reserve’s transformation. In the fiscal 

year 2001, National Defense Authorization Act, Congress appropriated over 

$78 million for eight UH-60L Black Hawk helicopters for the Army Reserve.353

In December 2001, the 

Army Reserve took 

delivery of six new 

UH-60L aircraft. This 

marked the first return 

of utility helicopters to 

the Army Reserve since 

execution of the 1993 

Off-Site Agreement 

which transferred all 

rotary wing utility assets to the National 

Guard.354 

In 2001, the Army Reserve had 100 percent 

of the fixed-wing theater aviation battalions, 100 percent of all continental 

United States based theater aviation companies, 63 percent of all fixed-wing 

theater aviation companies worldwide, and 50 percent of the Army’s theater 

aviation brigades. It also had 50 percent of the theater and corps heavy helicopter battalions and 50 percent of the theater and corps heavy helicopter 

companies.355

On September 7, 2001, the Army announced a major acceleration of the aviation modernization plan, a critical part of Army transformation. The acceleration advanced the retirement of aging aircraft and lowered the number of 

helicopters in the active Army and reserves by 1,000. According to Plewes, 

“Aviation modernization is a good news story for the Army Reserve. It brings us 

Night Vision Goggles

UH-60L Black Hawk
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Drivers, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center 

of Military History)
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the medium-lift capabilities of UH-60 Black Hawk companies, enabling us to 

more effectively support Army missions, and it also modernizes our Chinooks 

and Apaches.”356 By 2008, Army Reserve aviation modernization continued 

along two lines: modernization of the utility fleet through a combination of 

new and recapitalized aircraft and the modernization of the cargo and attack 

fleet through the cascade of modernized aircraft as the active component fielded new aircraft. By 2010, the Army Reserve had more than 198 rotary wing and 

fixed wing aircraft, supporting full spectrum operations.357

Four principle aviation systems were 

partially or fully resourced in 2008, 

filling critical equipment gaps in new 

or existing aviation 

force structure. The 

Department of the 

Army’s G-8 coordinated and approved 

the complete unit set 

fielding of two Army 

Reserve air ambulance companies with twelve new UH-60M each, totaling 

twenty-four UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters in 2010 and 2011 ($451.2 million). The Army Reserve resourced 

an air traffic control simulation system ($1.5 million) through the 2008 

NGREA to meet critical training and 

readiness requirements. The Army 

Reserve resourced the initial procurement of five C-12 aircraft ($43.4 million) to replace ten TF ODIN aircraft 

through the fiscal year NGREA. The 

procurement of the remaining five 

aircraft was worked in the fiscal year 

2009 NGREA.358

The Army Reserve endeavored to fulfill ARFORGEN requirements while 

balancing equipment and logistics constraints. That required having the right 

equipment available in the right place at the right time and having adequate 

resources. The train-alert-deploy strategy under ARFORGEN and the twelve 

month mobilization policy required higher levels of equipment use to meet 

UH-60M Black Hawk

C-12
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training and readiness objectives for an operational Army Reserve. Assisting in 

the location of those resources were the thirty-one equipment concentration 

sites (ESCs). These were established in the 1970s to help unit commanders 

store equipment. The Army Reserve has thirty-one ECSs across the United 

States including Puerto Rico and Guam. A total of 2,004 employees store some 

164,353 pieces of unit equipment of 4.5 million pieces of equipment that the 

Army Reserve has on its books.359

Largely in response to ARFORGEN, AREF, and the Army Reserve training 

strategy, the Army Reserve developed a new equipment and training strategy, 

replacing the ARLOG XXI (Army Reserve Logistics for the Twenty-First Century) program, which had served as a readiness enabler for the USARC roadmap to support the expeditionary force. The new strategy included maintaining 

equipment at four main areas: individual training sites, home station, collective 

training sites, and strategic deployment sites. The Army Reserve positioned 

go-to-war equipment at the various sites to provide training to soldiers as 

The largest Army Reserve aviation brigade, the 244th Aviation Brigade, gears up to deploy troops 

and equipment to Haiti. The UH-60 Blackhawk, a four-bladed, twin-engine, medium-lift utility 

helicopter, is designed for air assault, air cavalry, and aeromedical evacuation. (U.S. Army photo 

Sergeant Major James Peter Matthews)
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they went through ARFORGEN/

AREF. In the new strategy, units 

moved to the equipment located at the training sites instead of 

moving equipment to the units. 

Creating these centrally located 

sites fostered efficient resourcing 

and maintenance of equipment.360 

The Army Reserve optimized the 

distribution of its most modern 

equipment to maximize the training opportunities for its soldiers 

and units while resetting its units 

for missions.361

The lack of depot maintenance 

was one of the Army Reserve’s 

major challenges. The Army Reserve’s 2000 depot maintenance 

program was funded at 80 percent 

of the force packages (FP I and II) 

requirements and 60 percent of the 

remaining force package requirement.362 In 2000, the Army Reserve depot maintenance program 

was funded at acceptable levels for 

early-deploying units, less trucks. 

The Army Reserve’s main concern was providing more funding 

to late-deploying units and maintaining the tactical wheeled vehicle (truck) fleet. Unit readiness, 

while low in some late-deploying 

units, was being maintained at efficient levels through equipment 

redistribution and funding change 

implementation during program 

execution.363 
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Armor on the hunt, Sergeant First Class Darrold Peters. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. 

Army Center of Military History) 
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Out of Commission, Heather Engelhart. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center 

of Military History)
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Program Budget Decision 813, dated June 22, 2001, adjusted the Army Reserve 2002 depot maintenance program by adding $18.3 million in total obligation authority. This was a Department of Defense initiative to meet optimal depot maintenance funding requirements not later than 2004. The depot 

maintenance program supported the repair and overhaul of major equipment 

end items and their return to service for the combat forces. Major changes in 

the program included performing complete overhauls on end items rather than 

Sergeant First Class Gordon, psychological operations specialist 

with the 346th Psychological Operations Company, an Army Reserve 

unit from Columbus, Ohio, rides alongside an Iraqi worker on a 

forklift used to load 500-pound rolls of high–grade paper onto flatbed 

trucks for transport to a central clearing area. (Army Reserve Magazine, 

Winter 2003) 
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the “inspect and repair only as necessary” policy, overhaul of tactical wheeled 

vehicles, and recapitalization of key war-fighting legacy systems.364 The total 

funding of the depot maintenance program for 2005 equated to 74.8 percent 

of the validated requirement ($95,618 million) and 85.9 percent of the critical 

requirement ($83,268 million).365 The total funding for the 2007 program was 

almost $129.2 million. Late in that year, $15.2 million was reprogrammed from 

under-executed, lower priority programs into the depot maintenance program, 

resulting in a $144.373 million execution rate for the year. Over 4,000 pieces 

of equipment were overhauled as part of the program. In 2006, the USARC 

inducted 5,337 major end items and 30,725 items for calibration into depot 

maintenance.366 In 2009, the Army Reserve leveraged the depot maintenance 

program to have 4,300 end items overhauled to extend their service life, reduce 

sustainment costs, and improve safe operations. The Army Reserve tracked the 

redeployment and equipment reset of 192 units with 32,052 items and tracked 

523 turned-in items to automatic reset induction. The total funding for the 

2008 program was $130,033,000. Year end plus-up of $27,543,967 increased the 

program to $157,576,967. The year 2009 was initially funded at $108,191,000. 

The Department of the Army reduced the funding to $94,555,000. The Army 

Reserve received additional funding of $14,549,302 and executed a total depot 

maintenance program of $109,504,302. Major programs (overhaul-rebuild) 

included electronic and communications equipment, watercraft, material handling equipment-primary forklifts, and the CH-47D Chinook helicopter rotor 

head.367 While the Army Reserve improved equipment levels, upgraded, and 

modernized equipment, shortfalls continued in 2010 due to legacy funding.368 

An operational Army Reserve can ill afford a six month build up time as seen 

with a strategic reserve.369 According to Stultz, although the Army Reserve was 

able to “meet the needs of our deploying units, looked holistically, the Army 

Reserve faces monumental equipping challenges.”370 

Medical Readiness 

Medical readiness was another element of an operational Army Reserve; it continued to be a major challenge. But, there was progress in successfully managing the medical readiness of soldiers. Improved medical care of soldiers resulted in improved medical readiness. That rose from 23 percent on October 1, 

2008, to 60 percent as of September 23, 2010.371 

The Reserve Health Readiness Program (RHRP), which replaced the former 

Federal Strategic Health Alliance (FEDS_HEAL) Program, provided medical 

and dental readiness services to soldiers and units during soldier readiness processing (SRP). The RHRP network has been leveraged to accomplish most 
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Keeping them clean, Afghanistan, Sergeant First Class Darrold Peters. (Courtesy of the Army Art 

Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History)
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routine and pre-mobilization readiness 

tasks and in completing dental restorations for deploying soldiers.372 In 

the first six months of 2010, the RHRP 

provided approximately 978,750 individual medical readiness exams and 

services to Army Reserve soldiers at a 

cost of some $53,865,275. The total 

number of services and expenditures 

was the largest provided in a six month 

period in the seven-and-one half year 

history of the program. The significant increase in the number of examinations completed was attributed to 

several major factors including but not 

limited to: Department of Defense 

mandated replacement of the five-year 

periodic physical examination with an 

annual periodic health assessment; the 

Army Selected Reserve Dental Treatment Program and command emphasis on seasonal flu, H1N1 flu vaccinations and overall medical readiness 

on the whole; and to command emphasis placed on medical readiness by 

the command leadership. As a result 

of this increase in examinations completed, the Army Reserve recognized 

an improvement in six of the eight 

individual medical readiness requirements (DNA, HIV, immunization, 

dental readiness, limited duty profile, 

and PHA), a decrease in one of eight 

requirements (medically non-deployable) and no statistical change in one of 

eight requirements (pregnancy). The 

overall medical readiness classification 

percentage increased by 10 percent.373 
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As an operational force, the manpower loss related to influenza complications 

can negatively impact the Army Reserve’s ability to meet mission requirements. 

Seasonal influenza vaccination was the primary method for protecting the force 

from influenza infection and its severe complications. As a result, the Department of Defense and the vice chief of staff of the Army required 100 percent 

seasonal flu vaccination compliance by no later than 1 December 2009. In 

2010, the Army Reserve achieved a seasonal flu vaccination rate of 78 percent, 

the highest vaccination rate ever.374

Major Valerie Godfrey, an Army Reserve dentist, administers a dental exam to a soldier during the 2011 Combat Support Training 

Exercise, as dental technician Specialist Ashley Bill looks on and 

records. (Sergeant Crystal Milton)
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The H1N1 influenza posed a similar risk to medical readiness. The Department of Defense and the vice chief of staff of the Army required 100 percent 

seasonal flu vaccination compliance no later than 1 April 2010. In 2010, the 

Army Reserve achieved a 79 percent compliance rate for H1N1.375

Specialist Robbie Richardson, 168th Engineer Company of Fayette, Alabama, 

looks on as Sergeant Phillip McCay, 22nd Reserve Sustainment Battalion of 

Oneonta, Alabama, inserts a chest decompression needle into a manikin during 

a military medic sustainment conference held in conjunction with the National Federation of Licensed Practical Nurses annual convention in Birmingham, 

Alabama, October 20-25, 2010. (U.S. Army Reserve photo by Specialist Amber 

Hoy, 314th Public Affairs Operation Center, on assignment for the Army Reserve 

Medical Command)
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The Army Select Reserve Dental Readiness System (ASDRS) was a successful 

initiative in the health care arena.376 Historically, Army Reserve soldiers have 

reported to the mobilization platform at a dental readiness stature of some 50 

percent. Dental deficiencies have prevented soldiers from deploying and receiving adequate mandatory pre-mobilization training. Dental readiness was 

the single constant factor that has lagged among all fully medical ready determinants. Dental treatment at the mobilization station averaged over 11.5 

duty hours and caused less than optimal treatment options for many deploying soldiers.377 In 2010, overall mobilization dental readiness improved to over 

74.1 percent.378

The Army Reserve, National Guard Bureau, active component, and the Office 

of the Surgeon General developed a three-pronged attack to address reserve 

The Ready Response Reserve Unit (R3U) Dental program mission at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, is 

supported with soldiers from the 4220th United States Army Hospital and the 7238th Medical 

Support Unit. Shown here is Major Juana Luster from the 7238th examining a patient. (U.S. Army 

Reserve photo by Captain Michael Condon, Central Medical Area Readiness Support Group, Army 

Reserve Medical Command Public Affairs)
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component dental readiness deficiencies. The Army Select Reserve Dental 

Readiness System was implemented on October 1, 2008. It provided dental 

class three and class four examinations to soldiers regardless of their unit’s rotation within ARFORGEN. That system combined with the First Term Dental 

Readiness (FTDR) program, already in place, and the addition of the Demobilization Dental Reset (DDR) initiative on November 16, 2008, will improve 

readiness. The Army Reserve should no longer lag behind the other services 

with 52.5 percent dental readiness.379 

Soldiers were scheduled to receive care through the RHRP, the major component of the three pronged plan to increase dental readiness. Demobilization 

Dental Reset, the last part of the attack, reset all demobilizing soldiers. Soldiers were examined and those identified as class three were to receive care to 

convert to a readiness status.380 In the last six months of 2009, dental readiness 

increased from approximately 58 percent to 65 percent. The Army Reserve 

continued to take great strides in bringing awareness to the ASDRS program 

and benefits available to soldiers through several different initiatives, including 

for example an Army Reserve dental webpage and newsletter.381 

In 2006, the Post Deployment Health Reassessment program (PDHRA), 

under the guidance of the assistant secretary of defense for health affairs 

(OSD-HA), began. The program provided education, screening, assessment, 

and an opportunity to access information for a variety of questions and concerns soldiers may have after returning from deployment. The program enabled soldiers to address their deployment-related health concerns with a 

health care professional. By completing a questionnaire during the three to 

six month time period after returning from deployment, soldiers had a chance 

to report mental and physical health concerns that had occurred or worsened 

since their return home. This “cooling off” period allowed soldiers to reintegrate into their daily lives and then determine the affects of their deployment. 

The Army Reserve identified several areas for improvement resulting in steady 

numbers of PDHRA screenings and improved program operations. PDHRA 

was available to all soldiers returning from deployments or mobilization since 

September 11, 2001.382 

As of December 31, 2009, 54,553 soldiers required mandatory participation 

and 51,634 soldiers had been screened. This was 95 percent compliance. Of 

the soldiers who had completed the PDHRA, 30 percent had been referred for 

further behavioral health evaluation and 57 percent had been referred for further physical health evaluation. The Army Reserve continued to work closely 

with Army G-1 to ensure the success of this program by identifying and contacting eligible soldiers and their commanders. The Army Reserve PDHRA 
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compliance sustained the standards of the vice chief of staff of the Army and 

continued to meet all requirements.383

The Army Reserve was the last remaining Army component using paper based 

medical and dental records, which impacted on unit readiness. The Army Reserve pursued a digitized medical record system known as the Health Readiness 

Record (HRR), a web-based medical record repository and an application of the 

Medical Operational Data System. Access to HRR was role restricted, ensuring protected health information was accessible to authorized personnel, only. 

HHR implementation began at the end of fiscal year 2009 and was expected to 

be fully operational across the Army Reserve no later than October 2011. The 

Specialist Andrea Gonzalez, a dental technician with the 7223d Medical 

Support Unit, New Orleans, Louisiana, prepares instruments in the dental 

clinic during the TaskForce Razorback Arkansas Medical Innovative Readiness Training health screening clinic in Marianna, Arkansas. (Timothy Hale)
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335th Signal Command was the first command to begin implementing the process.384 The process has involved over 200,000 Army Reserve soldiers.385

The Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application (AHLTA), a 

military electronic health record system, gave healthcare providers access to 

data about soldiers’ conditions, prescriptions, diagnostic tests, and additional 

information essential to providing quality care. The Army Reserve received 

an AHLTA trainer in November 2009 and the first AHLTA training class was 

held on December 16, 2009.386 Remote access to AHLTA was established for 

the Army Reserve in January 2010. The system was implemented by utilizing a 

central server with users accessing AHLTA via Citrix. Remote access promoted 

continuity of care for soldiers, maximized unit and medical readiness, reduced 

The 5502d United States Army Hospital, an Army Reserve unit based out of 

Aurora, Colorado, spent a month in the summer augmenting the staff at Fort 

Carson’s Evans Army Community Hospital, to hone their skills and lesson the 

work load of the facility. Shown here is Specialist Ga Li with the 5502d working 

in the pharmacy. (U.S. Army Reserve photo by Captain Michael Condon, Central Medical Area Readiness Support Group, Army Reserve Medical Command 

Public Affairs)
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cost by eliminating duplication of tests and examinations, and improved access 

to care and benefits for wounded warriors.387

Military Support to Civil Authorities and Homeland Defense 

The Army Reserve continued its support to civil authorities and provided 

homeland defense. By 2002, twenty-five Army Reserve chemical units had 

been cross-trained and equipped to execute domestic casualty decontamination. 

Three chemical reconnaissance units were trained and equipped to perform 

nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance in domestic incidents.388 Providing federal first response capabilities for domestic operations was one of the 

chief, Army Reserve’s primary intentions. As a case in point, in 2005 the Army 

Reserve sent two truck companies and five CH-47 Chinook helicopters and 

their soldiers to hurricane Katrina relief efforts and ten CH 47s to aid victims 

of hurricane Rita’s devastation. Army Reserve aviators transported over 2,100 

people and more than 5,200 tons of cargo. The Army Reserve provided two 

military history detachments to document the operations.389 The ground support units tasked for relief efforts were reportedly the first unit sized elements 

ever provided to a Continental United States based disaster relief effort. Six 

units totaling 360 soldiers supported the relief efforts. Army Reserve soldiers, 

such as those from the 5-159th Aviation Battalion, participated in the hurricane 

New construction is destroyed in the Slidell, Louisiana area. Hurricane Katrina damage photos 

from Slidell, Louisiana. (Cooper aerial photo edited by IllinoisPhoto.com)
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relief efforts for example by rescuing victims, transporting two million sandbags 

to rebuild levies, lifting equipment, and transporting food and supplies to victims. Forty-nine emergency preparedness liaison officers deployed for a total 

of 532 man-days. Accountability of Army Reserve soldiers, civilians, and their 

families was another crucial aspect of the relief efforts. Responding to the tragedy, Helmly remarked, “The courage and determination of our Soldiers cannot 

be washed away by floodwaters or blown away by hurricane winds.”390 

In 2000, elements of the 322d Civil Affairs Brigade deployed to East Timor to 

support a United Nations humanitarian operation.391 A new unit, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Support unit, coordinated the replacement 

of military heavy-lift helicopters with civilian contract aircraft to transport refugees and to distribute food, water, and fuel. Soldiers from the unit executed a 

$10 million contract with a civilian helicopter firm. That released U.S. Marine 

helicopters and U.S. Navy ships for other missions.392

As part of the general plans in preparation for the 2006 hurricane season, the 

Army Reserve coordinated efforts with regional readiness commands and units 

in fifteen states. In March 2006, the Army Reserve created regional and state 

hurricane task forces to prepare equipment and soldiers for hurricane support 

operations. The Army Reserve positioned over 1,996 pieces of equipment along 

the eastern seaboard and the Gulf Coast.393 Testifying before the Commission 

on the National Guard and Reserves, Stultz said, “The Army Reserve’s ability 

to position capabilities, without regard to state borders, and provide neighborhood-based support directly to our communities, states, and federal agencies 

ensures our commitment to our homeland endures, even as we continue to support operations throughout the world.”394

In preparation for the 2007 hurricane season, in April 2007 the Department of 

the Army directed specific equipment actions to mitigate Army National Guard 

shortages within the states of Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, 

North Carolina, South Carolina, and U.S. Territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, 

and the U.S. Virgin Islands.395

“The courage and determination of our Soldiers cannot be 

washed away by floodwaters or blown away by hurricane winds.” 

Lieutenant General James R. Helmly
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On October 22, 2007, the combat support training center at Camp Parks and 

Fort Hunter Liggett, California, received a request to deploy firefighters and 

equipment in support of the southern California wildfires. Through mutual aid 

agreements with the California Office of Emergency Services, Camp Parks and 

Fort Hunter Liggett sent eight firefighters and three pieces of equipment to 

support various wildfires in the area.396 

In February 2010, the 377th Theater Sustainment Command quickly deployed 

170 soldiers to Haiti to assume command of the Joint Logistics Command-Haiti 

Map 9
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as part of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE to assist that country in hurricane 

relief operations.397 The transfer of authority from the 3d Expeditionary Sustainment Command of Fort Knox, Kentucky, to the 377th Theater Sustainment 

Command became effective March 6. It took place after a one-week transition 

period coordinated by both organizations at a Logistical Support Area in PortAu-Prince, Haiti. Major General Luis Visot, commanding general of the 377th 

Theater Sustainment Command, an Army Reserve unit headquartered in Belle 

Chasse, Louisiana, worked with the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and non-governmental agencies to help restore Haiti 

to a pre-earthquake condition. “In addition to bringing their military experience and training to Haiti, many of our Soldiers also bring the heart-felt compassion and empathy of ones who have been affected by a natural disaster. They 

have experienced this pain and want to help alleviate it for the people of Haiti,” 

Major General Visot said. “It is that kind of experience and perseverance that 

makes them perfect candidates for the job.” Assuming the mission, the 377th 

The chief, Army Reserve Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr., right, and Major General Luis R. 

Visot, commanding general of the Joint Logistics Command-Haiti and the 377th Theater Sustainment Command, do a communications check prior to an aerial tour of earthquake-damaged 

Port-au-Prince, April 5, 2010. Stultz later visited Joint Task Force Haiti headquarters to visit with 

Army Reserve soldiers and other service members. (Captain Jose Emperador)
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Theater Sustainment Command built on the foundation laid by the 3d Expeditionary Sustainment Command. The command staffed and operated the Joint 

Logistics Command headquarters, managed the acquisition, transportation and 

distribution of supplies and commodities, and moved units out of Haiti when 

their missions were accomplished. The 377th Theater Sustainment Command 

also provided sustainment to service members.398

The Army Reserve provided a total of thirty specially trained units as part of 

a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive consequence management response force and provided 156 state and regional emergency preparedness liaison officers to support USNORTCOM/USPACOM in 

homeland security and defense support of civil authority operations.399 

In 2007, twenty-six chemical companies with specialized equipment were on 

the ready to execute mass causality decontamination and respond to chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazardous materials (HAZMAT). 

377th Theater Sustainment Command soldiers stand in formation awaiting an orientation briefing 

after arriving in Haiti on February 28, 2010. The 377th Theater Sustainment Command is preparing to assume the Joint Logistics Command - Haiti mission from the 3d Expeditionary Sustainment 

Command. (Lieutenant Colonel Michael Perez)
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The Army Reserve offered support to the 20th Support Command in its efforts to thwart CBRN. The Army Reserve supported the Special Operations 

Command in countering terrorism. First Army requested assistance to train and 

validate the training for the 704th Chemical Company prior to its deployment 

for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The 392d Chemical Company provided 

HAZMAT operations training. On January 20, 2007, the USARC’s G-3 Homeland Defense Division conducted a site visit to the 392d Chemical Company in 

Iraq to review and assess HAZMAT detection and sampling capabilities in theater. A recommendation stemming from this visit was that the Army Reserve 

and First Army combine interests and identify 392d Chemical Company Army 

Reserve soldiers willing to volunteer for tours of duty to provide pre-mobilization training to the next Army Reserve chemical units in the Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM HAZMAT rotation.399 

In March 2010, heavy rains and storms hit the Northeastern United States. 

The Army Reserve responded by deploying members of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) program to support flooding operations. 

A soldier from the 43rd Medical Detachment (Veterinary Service) assists a Haitian woman prepare her dog for vaccination in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The 43d Medical Detachment is deployed 

in support of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, the humanitarian disaster relief effort in earthquake-ravaged Haiti. (Lieutenant Colonel Michael Perez)
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On May 2, 2010, EPLOs mobilized to support the defense coordinating officer 

in FEMA Region VI for the Deep Water Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The Army Reserve provided EPLOs for multiple operational periods over 

the four-month operation to cap the well and reduce the environmental impact. 

Army Reserve EPLOs mobilized again in the month of August 2010 to assist 

federal, state, and local agencies during Hurricane Earl, which affected many 

states along the east coast and caused damage in Massachusetts, Vermont, and 

Maine. 

Calendar year 2010 ended with a major incident which directly affected the 

Army Reserve. A tornado outbreak on New Year’s Eve in Missouri caused 

major damage to equipment concentration site 66, located on Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri. The 

88th Regional Support 

Command managed the 

recovery operations at the 

site to include security 

of sensitive items, assessment of facility and equipment damage, planning 

and executing movement 

of operational equipment to other locations, 

and developing a plan 

to document destroyed 

equipment. Members 

of the 995th Engineer 

Company volunteered 

to conduct security operations at the site during recovery operations until fence repairs were 

completed. Many staff sections from the USARC provided direct 

support to the 88th Regional Support Command throughout the response and 

recovery operations.401 

Soldier and Family Well Being

The Army’s culture evolved with the shift to an expeditionary force, especially 

regarding family life. In March 2005, Secretary of the Army Harvey said the 

“well-being of soldiers and their families was his number one priority.”402 Two 

years later in September 2007, General Casey stressed its importance as part 

of his strategic imperative on sustaining the force when he testified before the 

Deep Water Horizon Oil Spill
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House Armed Services Committee: “We recognize the strain on Families, and 

we are aware that Families play an important role in maintaining the readiness 

of our all-volunteer force. We will, therefore, ensure that their quality of life 

is commensurate with their quality of service. We will also ensure that our 

Wounded Warriors are cared for and reintegrated into the Army and society 

and we will never forget our moral obligation to the spouses, children and Families who have lost their Soldier since September 11th.”403 He further stated 

when addressing the need to reset units: “we must also revitalize our Soldiers 

and Families by providing them time and opportunity to recover in order to 

reverse the cumulative effects of sustained high operational tempo.”404 In November 2009, McHugh stated, “‘Our mission – No. 1- must be to ensure that 

our Soldiers and their families are provided a quality of life that is equal to their 

extraordinary sacrifices.’”405 In short, the Army recognized that the well-being 

of families was critical to the well-being and readiness of soldiers. 

This extended to the Army Reserve. According to Stultz, “We need to rededicate ourselves to acknowledge the sacrifice and commitment of families

and employers. Our military is an all volunteer force that needs a stronger 

connection with ‘home town America and our ‘Army Reserve Communities’ are 

critical nodes in that support network.”406 

Providing adequate, continuous health care was vital to the well-being of soldiers and their families. Multiple deployments were causing trouble with the 

Army’s TRICARE coverage. Providing continuous health care was of concern, 

for example, in treating post traumatic stress syndrome and traumatic brain 

injuries that may take months to surface and was complicated when the soldier 

and family moved out of the TRICARE system. The goal was to provide seamless heath care. A more holistic approach was needed. Among the available 

heath care benefits was one affecting soldiers on active duty service for thirty 

consecutive days after which they and their families were entitled to comprehensive health care. As of October 1, 2007, Selected Reserve (SELRES) soldiers 

became eligible for TRICARE health coverage.407 TRICARE was especially 

useful to Army Reserve families, given their greater geographical dispersal.

“We must understand that we’re asking more of our Soldiers today, 

and we must ensure that the quality of life our Soldiers and their 

families enjoy matches the quality of service they give the nation.” 

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr.
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Another development in health care was passage in 2007 of the Wounded Warrior Assistance Act, a part of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. It 

provided better care and benefits for wounded soldiers and their families and 

helped the transition of new veterans to civilian life. Section 114 authorized 

reserve soldiers the option of using medical care facilities closest to home rather 

than closest to the base from which the soldier deployed.408 

Another example of the commitment to the well-being of soldiers was the 

Army Reserve Warrior and Family Assistance Center. Stultz directed support 

to Army Reserve “wounded warriors” -- those soldiers (warriors in transition) 

requiring medical care resulting from military service and others requesting 

information on existing services. The center, established in October 2007, was 

the proponent. It enabled subordinate commands to render direct support to 

soldiers and ensure an accurate and timely relay of information through the 

Army Reserve chain of command and the families of soldiers in need. The center’s 

slogan, “Soldiers first, Families always,” epitomized its mission and purpose.409

The center’s staff had as their most immediate mission to contact Army Reserve 

soldiers who were assigned to warrior transition units (designed to improve 

support to those soldiers and approved by the Department of the Army in OcAnthony Siraco (left) hands a flag and wind catcher to Tyler Pepin, 3, Allenstown, New Hampshire, 

as he enters the JFK Coliseum in Manchester. Pepin attended the 94th Military Police Company’s 

homecoming to see his father, Sergeant Christopher Pepin, after almost two years deployment in 

Iraq. (Army Reserve Magazine, Winter 2004-05)
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tober 2007), community-based health care organizations, and Veterans Administration poly-trauma centers. The center assigned a reserve soldier to serve as 

a caseworker for each wounded soldier.

In addition to medical issues, the center provided assistance on a variety of other issues, such as finance, education, housing, administrative, and pastoral concerns. In essence, the Warrior and Family Assistance Center provided responsive, 

flexible, and adaptable support to the war fighter, their families, and units.410

Another family service was the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration program. The 

Yellow Ribbon Reintegration program was a national combat veteran reintegration program to provide information, services, referral, and proactive outreach programs to soldiers and their families throughout the deployment cycle. 

The goal of the program, legislated in Section 582 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, was to prepare soldiers and families for 

mobilization, sustain families during mobilization, and reintegrate soldiers with 

their families and community upon redeployment, leading to self-sufficient and 

resilient soldiers and families. Commanders provided soldiers preparing for 

deployment of ninety days or more and family members the opportunity to 

attend a day-long event after alert and again at pre-mobilization. Additional reBrigadier General Frank A. Cippola, deputy commanding general of the 88th Regional Support 

Command in Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, presents True Patriot Awards to the children of the soldiers 

who attended the Yellow Ribbon Event held from June 11 to 13, 2010, in Schaumburg, Illinois. 

(Sergeant Joe Villnes)
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quirements included one-day activities for family members twice during the 

mobilization, two-day reintegration activities for soldiers and their families at 

thirty and sixty days after redeployment or release from active duty (REFRAD), 

and a two-day event for soldiers ninety days after deployment or REFRAD. 

In 2009, the Army Reserve conducted over 250 Yellow Ribbon events, serving 

some 12,000 redeploying soldiers and 12,000 family members.411 That number 

rose in fiscal year 2010 to 525 Yellow Ribbon events serving 26,000 soldiers and 

28,000 family members.412

Family life chaplains oversaw the successful Strong Bonds program. Congress 

approved resources for the program. During 2010, the Army Reserve conducted over 300 Strong Bonds events throughout the United States and its territories. Some 12,500 soldiers and family members participated in these events 

and received the training, enhancing soldier and family communications and 

relationship skills.413 

The Family Programs Virtual Installation/Army Strong Community Center 

(ASCC) venture was a significant new initiative created to fill gaps in services. 

Virtual installations brought the services and resources found only on active 

military installations to geographically dispersed military families of all branchCaptain Mark Gundrum of the 432d Civil Affairs Battalion registers his son for 

child care at a Yellow Ribbon Reintegration workshop in Wisconsin Dells, Wisconsin. The workshop provided soldiers and their families the opportunity 

to network and learn about post deployment services offered to them. (Warrior-Citizen, Spring 2009)
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Couples at a Strong Bonds event. (USARC Chaplain’s Office) 

Laura Stultz, (in pink) wife of Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr., cuts the ceremonial ribbon 

during the grand opening of the Army Reserve’s second Army Strong Community Center located 

in Brevard, North Carolina on May 15, 2010. (Sergeant First Class Mark Bell) 
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es of the armed service. The concept, first initiated in 2007 by Mrs. Laura 

Stultz, became a reality in September 2009 with the official opening of the first 

center at the Wadswoth Army Reserve Center in Rochester, New York.414

On May 15, 2010, the Army Reserve opened a second Army Strong Community Center at Brevard, North Carolina. Speaking at the grand opening, Lieutenant General Stultz remarked, ‘“Thank you for hosting us in God’s country. 

I’m glad to be here to celebrate what America is really about. For me, at least, 

it brings you back home to places like Brevard, N.C., and to see really what the 

strength of America is.”’415 Located more than 160 miles from Fort Jackson, 

South Carolina, and more than 250 miles from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 

Brevard was selected because of its remote location from a major military installation. As Lieutenant General Stultz explained, ‘“If you build it, they will 

come,” quoting from a famous line from the movie “Field of Dreams.”416 

The general credited his wife, Laura, for the community center concept. She 

said she remembers not being able to attend numerous family readiness group 

meetings because of the distance to travel and her life as a temporary single 

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr.,chief, Army Reserve and his wife, Laura, get ready to cut the 

ribbon at the official grand opening of the third Army Strong Community Center in the Technical 

Sergeant McGarity U. S. Army Reserve Center in Coraopolis, Pennsylvania, on September 18, 2010. 

(Sergeant First Class Alyn-Michael McLeod)
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mom. ‘“I knew 

there was something missing,’” she 

said.417 ‘“I didn’t 

feel connected.”’418

All that changed, 

she claimed, when 

her husband was 

sworn in as Army 

Reserve chief in 

May 2006. ‘“I said, 

‘This is it. This is 

my chance,”’ she 

stated about helping families left 

behind while their 

spouses deploy 

overseas. ‘“I wanted to bring a military installation to 

the communities.”’ 

Mrs. Stultz said 

she was happy to 

assist in the opening of the Army 

Reserve’s second 

center and hopes 

there will be many 

more in the future. 

She envisions local 

communities coming together with 

area military residents to help those in need. ‘“I have every confidence that the 

people of North Carolina will step up and support their local military families,”’ 

she said.421

A third center opened in the Technical Sergeant McGarity U. S. Army Reserve 

Center in Coraoplis, Pennsylvania, on September 18, 2010.422 The centers offered “hands-on problem resolution and follow-up for a myriad of concerns 

ranging from military benefits and entitlements to community resources.”423 

Since September 2009, the centers served some 31,689 contacts and people.424

Laura Stultz, wife of Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr., chief, Army 

Reserve, cuts and serves cake after the Army Strong Community 

Center’s ribbon-cutting ceremony at the Technical Sergeant McGarity U.S. Army Reserve Center on September 18, 2010. The Army 

Strong Community Center serves as a “virtual installation” designed 

to support military service members, their families and veterans by 

assisting those who are holding down the home front, far from the 

nearest military installation, when their loved ones deploy. (Sergeant 

1st Class Alyn-Michael McLeod)
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On August 1, 2002, the USARC established the Individual Ready Reserve/Individual Mobilization Augmentee Family Program Office. It was responsible 

for providing information on benefits, entitlements, resources, and referrals to 

the families of IRR/IMA soldiers. Later, services were extended to the families of the USARC Augmentation Unit. This was in answer to the specialized 

assistance and communication needs of these families. By 2005, the office had 

distributed over 10,000 mobilization packets.425

In July 2004, the Army Reserve G-1 implemented and sponsored a training 

program for Rear Detachment Operations. In that year, over 400 Rear Detachment Operations personnel received training on deployment, redeployment, 

family support, reunion, information referral, TRICARE/Dental, role of the 

chaplain, benefits, and other significant areas. “The intended end-state of RDO 

[Rear Detachment Operations] and family readiness is to develop and sustain 

Soldiers and have self reliant families that understand and use Army and volunteer support programs during times of separation.”426 

In the realm of educational benefits, the Army Reserve Voluntary Education 

Services program was of particular importance to the chief, Army Reserve. This 

U.S. Congressman Tim Murphy, 18th District of Pennsylvania, explains the importance of the 

Army Strong Community Center for Pittsburgh during its grand opening at the Technical Sergeant McGarity U.S. Army Reserve Center in Coraoplis, Pennsylvania, on September 18, 2010. 

(Sergeant 1st Class Alyn-Michael McLeod)
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was a DoD-mandated commanders’ program promoting lifelong opportunities for Selected Reserve soldiers through voluntary education services that 

enhanced recruiting, retention, and readiness of Army Reserve soldiers. Some 

major educational programs included the Montgomery GI Bill, the Reserve 

Educational Assistance program, and the Army/American Council on Education Registry Transcript System.427

The Army Reserve implemented an array of strategies 

to reduce the rising suicide rate. One such effort was 

the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program to foster 

soldier, family, and civilian coping skills. The program 

aimed to reduce the stigma connected with asking for 

help. It was available to geographically dispersed soldiers, family members, and civilians. In 2009, the Army 

Reserve hosted five Applied Suicide Intervention Skills 

Training courses and certified over 120 instructors. As 

of June 2010, more than 182,000 soldiers had completed stand-down suicide training.428

To honor and recognize those soldiers who have been deployed and returned 

home, the Army Reserve began the Welcome Home Warrior-Citizen Award 

program enacted by Congress and signed into law by President Bush in 2004. 

Comprehensive Soldier 

Fitness

Major Marilyn S. Chiafullo and Major Scott Barnett cut the cake at the Welcome Home Warrior-Citizen ceremony at the Hall of Heroes in the Pentagon, July 7, 2005. (Army Reserve Magazine, Winter 2005) 
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The award occurred within ninety days of a soldier’s demobilization. Unit commanders conducted a formal welcome 

home ceremony. Returning soldiers received an encased 

American flag, a commemorative coin, a lapel pin for the 

soldier and spouse, and a welcome home warrior-citizen 

flag.429 

The Army Reserve supported the families of fallen soldiers. 

By the end of 2010, the Army Reserve had lost 191 warrior 

citizens in the Global War on Terrorism. One thousand 

three hundred and sixty-six had been wounded.430 “We recognize the ultimate sacrifice these Soldiers and their Families have made for the cause of freedom,” remarked Stultz, 

“and we proudly honor our fallen comrades in ceremonies 

and personal tributes. By remembering the distinguished 

service of our fallen,” continued Stultz, “their selfless acts of 

bravery and leadership in the Army Reserve remains Army Strong.”431 

The fallen were not only on the battlefield. On November 5, 2009, a soldier 

brandishing two fire arms entered a soldier processing center at Fort Hood, 

Texas. He killed thirteen soldiers before being stopped. Among the fallen were 

five Army Reserve soldiers: Lieutenant Colonel Juanita L. Warman, Major Libardo E. Caraveo, Captain John P. Gaffaney, Captain Russell G. Seager, and 

Staff Sergeant Amy S. Krueger. Twenty-one of the thirty-seven solders wounded were Army Reserve soldiers. 

On November 18, the USARC held a memorial ceremony. Addressing the 

attendees, Stultz remarked: “Losing fellow Soldiers is among our most difficult 

of challenges. That is why we are extremely grateful for their lives - for their 

lives were ones of service to the country, to their community and to their fellow 

man. . . . Their lives speak to the strength and dignity of all who serve.”432

“We recognize the ultimate sacrifice these Soldiers and their 

Families have made for the cause of freedom. . . . By remembering 

the distinguished service of our fallen their selfless acts of bravery and leadership in the Army Reserve remains Army Strong.” 

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr.

Purple Heart
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Employer Partnership Program 

What did employers think of their reserve duty employees? According to a survey of employers conducted by the Department of Defense between October 

1999 and January 2000, most American employers had a favorable attitude toward their employees who served in the National Guard and Army Reserve. 

Only 6 percent of all businesses in the country employed reserve component 

members; those employers were generally indifferent to the reserve status of 

their job applicants. Although 90 percent of those interviewed thought that 

their reservist-employees kept them sufficiently informed about their military 

obligations, the survey found that the higher the employee’s level of military 

participation, the more likely the employer was to report not having received 

adequate notice. Overall, a majority of employers indicated that absences due to 

military obligations were too long. Almost one-half thought that absences over 

fourteen days caused problems, while 80 percent were affected by absences of 

Sergeant Major Mark Papenfuss, right, and Chaplain (Major) Eric Jackson pay their respects at 

a remembrance ceremony for the five Army Reserve soldiers who died in the shooting at Fort 

Hood, Texas. The ceremony was held at the Headquarters, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort 

McPherson, Georgia, on November 18, 2009. (Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System) 
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more than thirty days. The impact was greater on small businesses, especially 

in the increased workload on co-workers. Only 45 percent were supportive of 

employees who volunteered for additional duty, training, or professional development. More than one-third thought that increased reliance on the National 

Guard and Army Reserve would cause problems in the workplace in the future. 

When problems did happen, respondents reported that 70 percent of the time 

the problems were resolved between the employee and the employer without 

reference to outside employer-employee support mechanisms. But, 44 percent 

of the larger companies in the survey reported having contacted reserve commanders to resolve a problem. Large companies were much more likely to 

choose this approach than smaller companies. Eighteen percent of companies 

that employed reservists indicated having a preference for recruiting and hiring 

members who served in the National Guard and the Army Reserve. It appeared 

that it made little difference whether or not those firms had experienced problems regarding reserve service.433

At a ceremony held at the headquarters of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on 

June 8, 1998, the secretary of defense, the president/CEO of the U.S. Chamber 

of Commerce, and the Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve national 

chair signed a statement of support for employee participation in the National 

Guard and Army Reserve. By the close of fiscal year 2000, 1,070 chambers, 

representing about 520,000 members had signed statements of support.434 

In 2000, the Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) joined in a 

commitment with the Society for Human Resources, representing 88,000 businesses, to strengthen a long-standing partnership aimed at providing employers and employees with information regarding their rights and responsibilities 

under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. 

The Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve became a formal block of 

instruction at the Army Reserve’s retention noncommissioned officer course.435

Under the leadership of the ESGR national chair and executive director, in 

2000 a strategic approach was evolved to manage and minimize the impact on 

employers of the increased OPTEMPO for the National Guard and the Army 

Reserve. That included profiling of employers who employed members of the 

National Guard and the Army Reserve, developing a database of employers of 

reserve force members, targeting media and marketing efforts toward affected 

employers, developing and improving partnerships with employer professional 

associations, and exploring the possibility for employer compensation to offset 

the burden for the limited number of employers who employed members of 

the National Guard and Army Reserve and who were being most impacted by 

the high OPTEMPO.436 
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The operational Army Reserve presented new challenges to employer-employee relationships. To assist efforts in promoting good employer-employee 

relations, in 2005 the Army Reserve established the Army Reserve Employer 

Relations (ARER) program. This was a Department-of-Defense-mandated 

program. The program was intended to build positive and enduring relationships with employers of Army Reserve soldiers in order to enhance readiness 

and retention and preserve the strength of the Army Reserve. The program 

sustained readiness and strength by providing a variety of programs and assistance venues to soldiers and their civilian employers. The programs included 

employer recognition and awards, mediation and intervention services, employer and community outreach, and training and assistance in the Uniformed 

Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. These programs assisted 

commanders and supervisors in managing a shared workforce.437 

“Employers of Army Reserve Soldiers,” stated Stultz in 2009, “remain a key 

building block in the foundation that supports our Army Reserve Soldiers.”438 

His 2009 posture statement recognized the significance of employer support 

and highlighted the Employer Partnership Initiative. It was a joint venture 

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr., signs one of the most unique employer partnership agreements during a signing ceremony held on April 14, 2008, at the Inova Alexandria Hospital. From 

left to right of Stultz: Knox Singleton, president and CEO, Inova Health Systems; The Honorable 

Thomas H. Hall, assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs; and Congressman Jim Moran, 

Northern Virginia democrat. (Warrior-Citizen, Summer 2008)
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436

designed to give business leaders real world benefits for employing and sharing soldiers-employees. It was designed to “build a bridge to employers who 

benefit . . . from Soldier’s training and skills.”439 This initiative was especially important given the constant deployment and strain on the work force. 

It was a win-win situation for employers and Army Reserve soldiers as skills 

were cross-leveled between the battlefield and the civilian sector. The American Trucking Association and Inova Health Systems of Northern Virginia were 

the first formal partners to sign agreements on April 14, 2008.440 In 2009, this 

initiative was expanded beyond serving only Army Reserve soldiers to serving 

members in all seven reserve components, family members, wounded warriors, 

and veterans. The change in name to the Employer Partnership of the Armed 

Forces in 2010 reflected the change in scope. There were over 1,300 participating employers, which represented 95 percent of the 2010 Forbes Fortune 

500 companies. “The partnerships forged with civilians build operational capacity for the Army Reserve and the Reserve components. . . .”441 The partnership program demonstrated a positive investment in America.442 

Base Realignment and Closure 

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations for the Department 

of Defense, including the Army Reserve, announced on May 15, 2005, became 

law on November 8, 2005. The Army used BRAC to “increase operational 

capacity and war fighting capability and to take advantage of the efficiencies 

presented through consolidation and joint activities. The BRAC process also 

facilitated efficient and effective utilization of installation infrastructure.”443 In 

2005, the Army plan was to use BRAC as a chance to “streamline installations, 

enhancing their value to the military through transformation, rebasing overseas units and supporting joint operations and functions.”444 Previous BRAC 

actions concentrated on ridding the Army of surplus Cold War capacity. With 

the 2005 BRAC, the “Army focused its efforts on returning installations that 

were no longer relevant or effective in supporting the joint and expeditionary 

Army. The end result of the strategy was to reduce costs and reinvest those 

savings in the service’s long-term infrastructure.”445 BRAC provided the main 

mechanism and foundation for locating forces on installations and aided quick 

deployment supporting worldwide requirements against would-be adversaries. 

The Army’s portion was eighteen billion dollars, 47 percent of the overall Department of Defense BRAC program, three times the total of the four previous 

BRAC actions.446 BRAC 2005 was historic in that it supported the “Army’s largest organizational transformation since World War II.”447 It helped the Army 

in its “move from brigade-centric to modular forces, thus enabling Soldiers to 

be more relevant and ready to meet future defense missions.”448 
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Senior Army Reserve soldiers were involved in the two years of preparation 

prior to its formal release. Responding positively to the actions, Helmly equated the importance of BRAC to the AREF.449 He saw BRAC as a catalyst for 

change: “BRAC 2005 provides the Army Reserve an unprecedented opportunity for deep, profound and enduring change. . . . it has been visionary, well 

developed, and consistent with our transformation goals. Throughout the 

process, every effort has been made to make transitions smooth for affected 

personnel and their families. The bottom line is that BRAC will generate a 

stronger, more responsive Army Reserve, now and into the future.”450 

Among the changes were stationing Army Reserve soldiers in modern facilities, 

lowering overhead expenditures, and reforming command and control. “BRAC 

2005 delivers the engine to accomplish these changes. . . .” The Army Reserve 

was to close or realign 176 facilities and move into 125 new armed forces reserve centers. These actions were at a higher percentage rate than any other 

service. They were to eradicate surplus centers and further the reformation of 

Army Reserve command and control. These centers were to be equipped with 

distance learning and video teleconferencing resources, fitness centers, family 

readiness centers, and improved maintenance and equipment storage facilities.451

BRAC will transform some Army Reserve facilities into multi-functional installations that enhance unit readiness, increase training opportunities, and generate operational efficiencies for an operational Army Reserve. These facilities 

will be able to perform soldier readiness processing and home station mobilization. They will lower the number of second-rate and too small facilities 

and increase anti-terror force protection of units and personnel. Older reserve 

centers and changes in the population/demographics have altered where the facilities need to be located. These changes should also support effective recruiting and retention while adding Army Reserve capabilities to assist in homeland 

security and defense. 

Obviously, BRAC was not just about changing brick and mortar. Under BRAC 

soldiers will be better positioned which will lead to better training, mobilization, and readiness. BRAC proposals were an aspect of the essential groundwork of transforming the Army Reserve’s infrastructure to meet emerging mis-

“BRAC 2005 provides the Army Reserve an unprecedented opportunity for deep, profound and enduring change. . . .” 

Lieutenant General James R. Helmly
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sions and revised defense strategies. As directed by legislation, stationing plans 

and force structure were incorporated into the BRAC analysis. BRAC played 

a significant role in how the force was redesigned. It fostered joint operations, 

advanced readiness, and effected savings. It was a forcing mechanism for profound change.452 

Changes involved streamlining command, control and support structure and 

reinvesting non-deployable units into deployable units. These changes will be 

to such a degree not evidenced since World War II. Eighteen general officer 

table of distribution and allowances headquarters were to be reduced to six. 

In buttressing that initiative, the Army Reserve decided to establish the four 

regional support commands, as previously discussed, to replace the ten regional readiness commands. The remaining RRC headquarters were converted to 

deployable, functionally structured command and control headquarters to support modularity.453 “For the first time, Helmly stated, “the Army Reserve will 

have all of its operational deployable forces commanded by operational deployable command headquarters.”454 This will advance the Army Reserve’s ability to 

supply “those unique, skill-rich capabilities that the Army Reserve brings to the 

force.”455 In Helmly’s mind, these BRAC initiated changes made the Army Reserve more pertinent to an “expeditionary Army that is part of the joint American force.”456 He opined: “BRAC 2005 is good for the Army Reserve because it 

allows us to take better care of our people and set ourselves for the challenges of 

the future instead of remaining comfortably poised for the past.”457 

The Army Reserve has made significant strides in executing BRAC. That included: synchronizing military construction activities with deployment operations and Army Reserve force structure updates; synchronizing 125 Army Reserve BRAC projects worth over $3.1 billion; awarding fifteen projects worth 

$383.6 million in 2006 and 2007; and establishing the Base Transition Coordinators (BTC) program and twelve BTCs regionally focused to facilitate BRAC 

property disposals, key to closing the 176 Army Reserve centers. In 2007, the 

Army Reserve initiated twenty-three BRAC and military construction projects 

to build fourteen armed forces centers, five centers, and four training support 

projects.458 Fifty-one facilities have been closed.459 Completing the construction 

of sixty-one armed forces centers was the major priority for execution in 2011.460

According to General Casey, “As an essential component of Army transformation, BRAC 2005 actions optimize infrastructure to support the Army’s current 

and future force requirements. The disposal of Cold War era infrastructure,” 

he asserted, “and the implementation of modern technology to consolidate activities frees up financial and human resource.” As General Casey explained 

in May 2009, “over 1,100 discrete actions are required for the Army to suc-
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439

cessfully implement our BRAC 2005 requirements. The extent and impact of 

these actions,” he adjudged, “are far greater than all four previous BRAC rounds 

combined and are expected to create significant annual savings. In total, over 

380,000 Soldiers, Family members, and Army Civilians employees will relocate 

as BRAC 2005 is implemented. . . . To accommodate the units relocating from 

the closing National Guard Readiness and Army Reserve Centers, BRAC 2005 

authorizes 125 multi-component Armed Forces Reserve Centers and realigns 

U.S. Army Reserve command and control structure.” The plan “awarded 26 

Reserve Component projects in 18 states. . . .”461 

The largest BRAC transformation project for the Army Reserve affected the USARC and OCAR. OCAR will move from Arlington, Virginia (Crystal City) to a new facility being constructed at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and the USARC will move to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, by September 

2011. Stultz broke ground for the new USARC headquarters on December 

8, 2008. The USARC and FORSCOM will share the building. Stultz said 

the two commands “from an operational standpoint are linked at the hip.” At 

the ground breaking ceremony, FORSCOM commander General Charles 

C. Campbell remarked, ‘“Today is an important milestone. We’re making 

a real and tangible step forward.’”462 Combining the two commands at the 

same headquarters was indicative of the Army Reserve’s integration with the 

total Army and the evolving operational Army Reserve. The new headquarters building will be certified at the silver level of LEED (leadership in energy 

and environmental design) by the U.S. Green Building Council. It will use 40 

percent less water than standard buildings and 17 percent less energy, among 

other savings.463
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Ground breaking ceremony for the new USARC/FORSCOM headquarters building at 

Fort Bragg, December 8, 2008. (Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System)

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr, chief of the Army Reserve, left, and General 

Charles C. Campbell, commander U.S. Army Forces Command, put on their hard hats 

during the ground breaking ceremony for the Army Reserve and Forces Command 

headquarters building at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on Monday, December 8, 2008. 

(Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System)
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441

Conclusion

The wretched events of September 11, 2001, changed the face and destiny of 

America forever. From that day, the country has been engaged in constant 

warfare in the Global War on Terrorism. The Army Reserve has been fully engaged and mobilized from the beginning. September 11 accelerated the 

transformation of the Army Reserve from a strategic to an operational force in 

sync with Army transformation. The continuing transformation of the Army 

to a more agile and expeditionary force came in answer to the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, which transfigured America’s 

foreign policy in combating terrorism. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review

calling for transformation of America’s forces as a “capabilities-based strategy” 

replaced a “threat-based defense strategy.” It and subsequent reviews recognized the critical role the reserves have played in the warfight. The Army Reserve will continue to transform as it meets its global requirements in that fight. 
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1 Stewart, American Military History, Volume II: The United States Army In A Global Era, 1917-

2003, 459. 2 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 127. 3 Stewart, American Military History, Volume II: The United States Army In A Global Era, 1917-

2003, 459-460. 4 Major Robert Bensburg, CW02 Michael Werner and Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 

The Role of the Army Reserve in the 11 September Attacks: New York City (Atlanta, Georgia: 

Office of the Command Historian, USARC, 2003), iii, 73. 5 Captain Suzanne Summers; Sergeant William Miller and Specialist Imelda Salazar, The Role of 

the Army Reserve in the 11 September Attacks: The Pentagon (Atlanta, Georgia: Office of Army 

Reserve History, 2003), iii-iv. 6 Bush, Decision Points, 128. 7 Bensburg, Werner and Steiner, The Role of the Army Reserve in the 11 September Attacks: New 

York City, xv. 8 Bush, Decision Points, 129. 9 Ibid., 133.

10 Stewart, American Military History, Volume II: The United States Army In A Global Era, 1917-

2003, 460. 11 Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes, “Army Reserve Overview,” Statement Before the Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, February 13, 2002, 

https://usarcintra/cioweb/CdrsCorner/ AROverview,13 Feb02.htm, 2. 12 Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes, “Reflections from LTG Thomas J. Plewes at the Close 

of a 36-Year Career,” May 20, 2002, https://usarcintra/cioweb/CdrsCorner/ltgplewesretmsg.htm. 13 Ibid.

14 Ibid and Linda Kozaryn, “Army Reserve Duty Has ‘Changed Forever,” January 22, 2002, 

https://usarcintra/cioweb/CdrsCorner/ArmyResDutycgmsg.htm. 15 Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes, “Army Reserve Overview,” Statement Before the Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, February 13, 2002, 

https://usarcintra/cioweb/CdrsCorner/ AROverview,13Feb02.htm, 3. 16 Captain Daniel Wilborn, Unit After Action Report, December 12, 2002, Global War on Terrorism Unit History Collection, USARHRC, USARC. 17 Kathryn Roe Coker, The 2001 Army Reserve Historical Summary (Atlanta, Georgia: Office of 

Army Reserve History, 2003), xxxi. 18 President George W. Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, September 11, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/2001/09/20010911-16.html. 19 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United State of America, September 17, 2002; Anonymous, “Chronology: The Evolution of the Bush Doctrine,” 

http:www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/cron.html and John Gaddis, “A 

Grand Strategy Of Transformation,” Foreign Policy, November/December 2002, 51-52. 20 Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy Of Transformation,” Foreign Policy, November/December 2002, 50. 21 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United State of America, September 17, 

2002; Anonymous, “Chronology: The Evolution of the Bush Doctrine,” http:www.pbs.org/

wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/cron.html; Anonymous, “Chronology,” http://www.

pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/lonroad/etc/cron.html; Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy Of 

Transformation,” Foreign Policy, November/December 2002, 51-52; and Colonel Gregory 

Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degan and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, US Army in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: ON POINT (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 

2004), 23. 
CHAPTER 3. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

443

22 Excerpts From 1992 Draft Defense Planning Guidance, http://www/pbs.org/wgbh/pages/

frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html; Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United State 

of America, 17 September 2002; and Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy Of Transformation,” Foreign 

Policy, November/December 2002, 52-53. 23 Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy Of Transformation,” Foreign Policy, November/December 2002, 52. 24 Major General John Brown, Coordinating Draft American Military History (Washington: DC: 

U.S. Army Center of Military History, no date), 8; Anonymous, “Afghanistan wakes after night 

of intense bombings,” http:/archives.cnn.com/2001/US/10/07gen.america.under attack/index, html, October 7, 2001 and Anonymous, “Defense officials” Air Operations to last several 

days, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/1007/ret.attack.pentagon/. 25 Brown, Coordinating Draft American Military History, chapter 29, 9-17 and News Story, 

Joe Burlas, subject: “Shinseki pins on medals on Anaconda heroes,” April 10, 2002. Also see 

Charles Briscoe, Richard Kiper, James Schroder, and Kalev Sepp, Weapons of Choice: U.S. 

Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies 

Institute, 2003). 26 Fontenot, et al., US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 24. 27 Dana L. Smith, editor, 2010 Reserve Forces Almanac, (Falls Church, Virginia: Uniformed Services 

Almanac, Inc., 2010) 138. 28 Ibid.; Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “The Army Reserve Engaged in the Global War 

on Terrorism,” April 2004, http:/ww4.army.mil/USAR/news/word-01.php; Photo caption, 

“Cpl. Dominic M. Pileri,” Army Reserve Magazine, Volume 49, Number 1, 2003, 27; and Anonymous, “Units That Serve,” Army Reserve Magazine, Volume 49, Number 1, 2003, 18, 19. 29 Anonymous, “The Units That Serve,” Army Reserve Magazine, Volume 49, Number 1, 2003, 

19-20. 30 325th Family Readiness Group. Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan, March 2004-

March 2005 Presented to CJTF 325 Soldiers, Global War in Terrorism Unit History Collection, USARHC, USARC. 31 Captain Jeffrey T. Burroughs, “Bulldogs’ Hunt IEDS In Afghanistan,” Army Reserve Magazine, 

Volume 52, Number 1, Summer 2006, 26. 32 See Dennis Hatcher, The Global War on Terrorism: Operation Enduring Freedom, 342nd Military Police Detachment (Law and Order), (Atlanta, Georgia: Office of Army Reserve History, 

USARC, 2008). 33 Editors, “391st Engineers Saving Lives,” Afghanistan War: A 10th Anniversary Commemorative, 

VFW Magazine, 2011, 36. 34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 President George Bush, “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/200020129-11.html. 43 Read ahead for Lieutenant General Jack Stultz’s interview with USA Today, June 22, 2009. 44 Ben Fuller, “Obama: U.S. on track in Afghanistan, Pakistan,” Army Times, December 16, 2010, 

http://www.army.times.com/news/2010/12/ap-obama-says-us-on-track-in-afghanistan-pakistan. 45 Fontenot, et al., US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, xxii and Brown, Coordinating Draft, 

American Military History, chapter 29, 27.
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444

46 President George Bush, President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, September 10, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html. 47 Bush, Decision Points, 194 and General Tommy Franks, American Soldier (Harper Collins: New 

York, 2004), 366. 48 Fontenot, et al., US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 72-73, 91. 49 John Brown, Kevlar Legions: The Transformation Of The U.S. Army, 1989-2005 (Washington, 

DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2011), 232. 50 Interview, Kathryn Roe Coker with Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, 11 March 2004, Oral 

History Collection, OARH, USARHRC, USARC and Anonymous, Interview with Lieutenant 

General James R. Helmly, “Transforming While Mobilizing, Part One,” Army Reserve Magazine, Volume 49, Number 1, 8. 51 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “The Army Reserve at War And Marching to the Future,” 2003-2004 Army Green Book, October 2003, 105, 106. For more information on the 

459th Engineer Company (Multi-Role Bridge) see Lieutenant Colonel Gerard Healy, “Two 

Weeks In The Desert: A Soldier’s Journal to the March to Baghdad,” Army Reserve Magazine, 

Volume 49, Number 2, 2003, 14-19; John Black, “The Faces Of Courage,” Army Reserve 

Magazine, Volume 49, Number 1, 2003, 17-18; and Dennis Hatcher, The Global War on Terrorism: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 459th Engineer Company (Multi-Role Bridge Company), (Atlanta, 

Georgia: Office of Army Reserve History, USARC, 2008). 52 Major General David Kratzer, “The Role of the 377th Theater Support Command,” Army 

Reserve Magazine, Volume 49, Number 3, 2003, 28-35. 53 See Kathryn Roe Coker, The Global War on Terrorism: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 362nd Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply), (Atlanta, Georgia: Office of Army Reserve History, USARC, 2007) and Kathryn Roe Coker, “362nd Quartermaster Battalion Serves with Distinction 

in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM,” Army Reserve Magazine, Volume 51, Number 4, Spring 

2006, 13. 54 See Dennis Hatcher, The Global War on Terrorism: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 802nd Ordnance 

Company (Ammunition), (Atlanta, Georgia: Office of Army Reserve History, USARC, 2008). 55 445th Medical Detachment (Veterinary Services), Unit History Narrative, no date, GWOT 

Unit History Collection, U.S. Army Reserve Historical Research Collection, Office of Army 

Reserve History, U.S. Army Reserve Command. 56 See Dennis Hatcher, The Global War on Terrorism: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 323rd Detachment 

(Firefighting), (Atlanta, Georgia: Office of Army Reserve History, USARC, 2009). 57 Anonymous, “Scenes from the Desert,” Army Reserve Magazine, Fall 2003, 27, 29. 58 369th Transportation Company PLS, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II, Yearbook, 2005, Global 

War on Terrorism Unit History Collection, U.S. Army Historical Research Collection, Office 

of Army Reserve History, U.S. Army Reserve Command. 59 Anonymous, “Scenes from the Desert,” Army Reserve Magazine, Fall 2003, 27, 29. 60 Anonymous, “Update on Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Army Reserve Magazine, Volume 50, 

Number 2, 19. 61 Richard W. Stewart, general editor, American Military History, Volume II: The United States In 

A Global Era, 1917-2008, (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2010), 514. 62 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “The Army Reserve at War And Marching to the Future,” 2003-2004 Army Green Book, October 2003, 110. 63 Kathryn Roe Coker, The 2003 Army Reserve Historical Summary (Atlanta, Georgia: Office of 

Army Reserve History, USARC, 2006), xxxiv. 64 Interview, Kathryn Roe Coker with Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, March 11, 2004, 

Oral History Collection, USARHRC, OARH, USARC.
CHAPTER 3. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

445

65 Paul Adams, “Army Reserve Aviation Units Mobilized To Support Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 

Army Reserve Magazine, Volume 50, Number 4, Spring 2005, 23. 66 Colonel David W. Spence, “Army Reserve: An Integral Part Of The 21st Century Operational 

Force,” (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, March 2008), 2. 67 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “The Army Reserve Engaged in the Global War on 

Terrorism,” April 2004, http://ww4.army.mil/USAR/news/word-01.php. 68 Ibid. 

69 Interview, Coker with Helmly, March 11, 2004.

70 Ibid and Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “The Army Reserve at War And Marching to 

the Future,” 2003-2004 Army Green Book, October 2003, 108. Also see Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “The Army Reserve Engaged in the Global War on Terrorism,” http://

www4.army.mil/USAR/news/word-01.php. 71 Kathleen Rhem, “President Bush proclaims end to major combat operations in Iraq,” May 2, 

2003, http: //www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123004771. 72 11th Military Police Brigade, Task Force Military Police-North, Executive Summary-Detainee 

Operations and Counterinsurgency, August 1, 2009, 1. 73 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “Reserve Officers Association Keynote Speech,” February 

15, 2005. 74 Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Danaher, “What’s Left/Never Mobilized,” CAR Pocket Cards, 

December 3, 2010. 75 Manuel Valdes, “4th Stryker troops start returning to Lewis,” Army Times, August 19, 2010. 76 Robert Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2010), 12. 77 Contingency Tracking System, Defense Manpower Data Center, Reserve Components Activations 

for Noble Eagle. Enduring Freedom, New Dawn, December 28, 2010. 78 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, 

Introduction, 1, 3-8. 79 Ibid., ii.

80 Anonymous, “Balancing Act,” AUSA News, Volume 31, November 2007, 2. 

81 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 4. 82 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy May 2010 (Washington, DC: White House, May 

2010), Introduction. 83 Richard Kugler, “New Directions In U.S. National security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy, A Review Of Official Strategic Documents,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 3-4. 84 Obama, National Security Strategy May 2010, 4. 85 Douglas Schaffer, “The (New?) National Security Strategy,” National Security Watch, The 

Institute of Land Warfare, NSW 10-1, 20 July 2010, 2. 86 Obama, National Security Strategy May 2010, Introduction and Anonymous, “Obama Seeks Security Through Peace, Cooperation,” May 27, 2010, http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2010/May/ 20100527121611dmslahrellek0.6. 87 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy May 2010, Introduction. 88 Schaffer, “The (New?) National Security Strategy,” 3. 

89 Ibid., 4.

90 Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 30, 2001), iv. 91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.
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93 Ibid., 17 and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Review of Reserve 

Component Contributions To National Defense, (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, December 20, 2002), 10-11. 94 Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2001, iii-iv, 2. 95 Ibid., 3.

96 Ibid., 4, 8.

97 Ibid., 11.

98 Ibid., 22-23.

99 Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 

February 6, 2006), iii. 100 Francis Harvey, “Building for the Future While Serving Our Nation,” 2006-2007 Army Green 

Book, October 2006, 14. 101 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 5. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid., 6. 104 Howard Keebler, “Is the Army Reserve an operational force, a strategic force or a mix of both?” 

( Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General and Staff College, 2009), 38. 105 Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2006, i, 76. 106 Ibid., 76-77. 107 Ibid., 77. 108 Robert M. Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 

2010), 93 and Jim Greenhill, “Defense review foresees long-term role for National Guard,” 

http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2010/02/020110-Role.aspx?src=rss. 109 Bob Feidler, “2010 Quadrennial Defense Review & The Reserve Component,” Briefing, Reserve Officers Association, no date. 110 Jim Greenhill, “Defense review foresees long-term role for National Guard,” http://www.

ng.mil/news/archives/2010/02/020110-Role.aspx?src=rss. 111 Ibid. 112 Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review, v, xii. 113 Ibid., 102. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid., 93. 116 Peter Boyer, “Is the Army Becoming Irrelevant?” New Yorker, 1 July 2002, 54. 117 “The Army Vision,” http:www.army.mil/vision/linkgs.html and General Eric Shinseki and Mr. 

Thomas White, “Transformation Roadmap,” 5. 118 Brown, Kevlar Legions, 197. 119 Association of the United States Army, Information paper, subject: AUSA Transform Panel 

Briefing, October 26, 2000. 120 Brown, Kevlar Legions, 197. 121 Association of the United States Army, Information paper, subject: AUSA Transform Panel 

Briefing, October 26, 2000. 122 Shinseki, “The Army Vision: A Status Report,” 2001-2002 Army Green Book, October 2001, 32. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid and Brown, Kevlar Legions, 198. 125 General Eric Shinseki, “The Army Vision: A Status Report,” 2001-2002 Army Green Book, 

October 2001, 24.
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126 Association of the United States Army, Information paper, subject: AUSA Transform Panel 

Briefing, October 26, 2000; General Eric Shinseki, “The Army Vision: A Status Report,” 

2001-2002 Army Green Book, October 2001, 24; and Report w/enclosures, Master Sergeant 

Neubauer, DAAR-OSI, subject: Army Transformation, January 20 2002, USARHRC, OARH, 

USARC. 127 Brown, Kevlar Legions, 197. 128 Association of the United States Army, Information paper, subject: AUSA Transform Panel 

Briefing, 26 October 2000 and Shinseki, “The Army Vision: A Status Report,” 2001-2002 

Army Green Book, October 2001, 32-33. 129 Brown, Kevlar Legions, 202. 130 Mr. Thomas White and General Eric Shinseki, “Transformation Roadmap,” i, iii-vii and 

Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 41-45. 131 Anonymous, “The Army Vision: The Army Transformation,” http://www.monroe.army.mil/

pao/dex/dcxindex.html and General Eric Shinseki, “...a respectable Army...one...competent 

to every contingency,” 2002-2003 Army Green Book, October 2002, 30. 132 Coker, The 2001 Army Reserve Historical Summary, 46. 133 Anonymous, “Guard, Reserve chiefs get third star,” ArmyLINK News Story, http://www.dtic.

mil/armylink/news/ Jun2001/a20010614three-star.html and Lieutenant Colonel Randy Pullen, “Army Reserve Gains Its First Three-Star Chief,” June 21, 2001, http://www.army.mil/

usar/newsstories/plewes3star.html. 134 Interview, Coker with Plewes. 135 General Eric Shinseki and Mr. Thomas White, A Statement on the Posture of the United States 

Army, 2003 presented to the Committees and Subcommittees of the Senate and House of 

Representatives, February 11, 2003. 136 Brown, Coordinating Draft American Military History, chapter 29, 56 and Frank Tiboni, 

“Army transformation changes direction,” 13 October 2000, http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2003/1013/cov-army-10-13-03.asp. Also see Director, Force Transformation, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare, January 5, 2005. 137 Brown, Coordinating Draft American Military History, chapter 29, 56. 138 Shinseki and White, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2003. 139 Brown, Kevlar Legions, 194. 140 Marcia Triggs, “”New chief of staff takes office,” Army News Service, 4 August 2003. General 

Peter J. Schoomaker became the Army Chief of Staff on August 1, 2003 141 General Peter J. Schoomaker and R.L. Brownlee, US Army 2003 Transformation Roadmap, 

November 1, 2003, ix - xi 142 General Peter J. Schoomaker and R.L. Brownlee, US Army 2003 Transformation Roadmap, November 1, 2003, ix - xi and Strategic Communications, OCAR, Information Packet, General 

Peter J. Schoomaker, The Way Ahead, 2003, 4, 7. 143 General Peter J. Schoomaker and R.L. Brownlee, US Army 2003 Transformation Roadmap, 

November 1, 2003, 1-11 to 1-12 and General Peter J. Schoomaker, “The Army: A Critical 

Member of the Joint Team Serving the Nation at War,” 2003-2004 Army Green Book, October 

2003, 28. Also see Schoomaker, The Way Ahead. 144 General Peter J. Schoomaker and R.L. Brownlee, US Army 2003 Transformation Roadmap, 

November 1, 2003, 9-1, 9-2, 9-6, 9-7. 145 Brown, Kevlar Legions, 248. 146 Donald Rumsfeld, “New Model Army,” http:www.jwar.org.uk/news-archive, no date. 147 Strategic Communications, OCAR, Talking Points, “Mobilization of Individual Ready Reserve Soldiers,” July 30, 2004.
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148 Joe Burlas, “Focus: Balancing AC/RC force structure impacts 100k positions,” http://www4.

army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story, no date and Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Readiness, Training, and Mobilization), “Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve,” January 15, 2004, 9. 149 Lieutenant General James R, Helmly, “A Component for Change,” Armed Forces Journal, May 

2005, 43. 150 Training and Doctrine Command, Army Reserve Transformation Study, TRADOC Analysis 

Center, 14. 151 Coker, The 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 16. 152 General Peter J. Schoomaker, “Our Army: Continuity and Change,” 2004-2005 Army Green 

Book, October 2004, 29. 153 Helmly, A Statement on the 2005 Posture of the United States Army Reserve, Submitted to the 

Committees and Subcommittees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, March 

2005, 10. 154 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Army, subject: 

Readiness of the United States Army Reserve, December 20, 2004. 155 U.S. Government Accountability Office, RESERVE FORCES: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to 

Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment Issues, July 2005. 156 General Peter J. Schoomaker, “Our Army: Continuity and Change,” 2004-2005 Army Green 

Book, October 2004, 27-28. 157 Dr. Francis Harvey, “Building for the Future While Serving Our Nation,” 2006-2007 Army 

Green Book, October 2006, 14. 158 Ibid. 159 AUSA, “Balancing Act,” AUSA News, Volume 31, Number 1, November 2007, 2. 160 General George W. Casey, Jr., “The Strength of the Nation,” 2007-2008 Army Green Book, 

October 2007, 21. 161 John M. McHugh and General George W. Casey, Jr., A Statement on the Posture of the United 

States Army, 2011, submitted to the Committees and Subcommittees of the U.S. Senate and 

House of Representatives, March 2011, Introduction. 162 General George W. Casey, Jr., Statement On the Army’s Strategic Imperatives Before the 

Senate Armed Services Committee and U.S. House of Representatives, November 15, 2007, 

http://www.army.mil/-speeches/2007/11/15/6144-chief-of-staff-if-the-army-statement. 163 Casey, “The Strength of the Nation, 2007-2008 Army Green Book, October 2007, 20. 164 Anonymous, Army News Service, “Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz.”USAR: Vision for the 

Army Reserve,” June 29, 2006, http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read. 165 Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Danaher, USARC G-1, Email: subject: Reserve Component 

Contribution In Duty Days, 2006-2010, April 20, 2011. Data is from the ALLMOB.dbf. This 

is a listing of individual soldier mobilization orders, not individual soldiers and includes operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. 166 Anonymous, “Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, “USAR: Vision for the Army Reserve,” Army 

News Service, June 29, 2006, http://www4.army.mil.ocpa/read. 167 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, The United States Army Reserve 2006 Posture Statement submitted to the Committees and Subcommittees of the U.S. Senate and House of 

Representatives, 5. 168 General George W. Casey, Jr., Statement On the Army’s Strategic Imperatives, Before the 

Senate Armed Services Committee and U.S. House of Representatives, November 15, 2007, 

http://www.army.mil/-speeches/2007/11/15/6144-cheif-of-staff-of-the-armty-statement. 169 McHugh and Casey, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2011, 8. 
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170 Kathryn Roe Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, (Atlanta, 

Georgia: Office of Army Reserve History, USARC, to be published), 7 and Robert Feidler, 

“Imperatives and Initiatives,” The Officer, January 2009, 17. The other initiatives were: grow 

the Army; enhance support to soldiers and families; modernize the force; develop leaders, 

adapt institutional polices, programs and procedures and build strategic communications capability. 171 General George W. Casey, Jr, Statement Before the House Committee on Appropriations, 

Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies, May 6, 2009. 172 Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, “Army Reserve: No Longer a Strategic Reserve,” Army,

October 2007, http://findarticles.com/p/articvles/mi. 173 Spence, “Army Reserve: An Integral Part Of The 21st Century Operational Force,” 9. 174 DoD Directive 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,” October 29, 2008. 175 Ibid. 176 Ibid. 177 Keebler, “Is the Army Reserve an operational force, a strategic force or a mix of both?” 11-14. 178 Commission On the National Guard and Reserves, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force, January 31, 2008. The commission was established 

by Congress in the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2005. 179 Robert Gates, Memorandum, subject: Recommendations of the Commission on the National 

Guard and Reserves, November 24, 2008. 180 Jim Garamore, “Reserve play a key role in U.S. military might, Mullen Says,” American Forces 

Press Service, March 12, 2009. 181 Lieutenant Colonel Robert Feilder (Ret.), “A Legacy Force,” The Officer, May 2008, 22. 182 Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, “State of the Army Reserve,” Excerpts of Reserve Chief’s 

Panel During the 2009 Reserve Officers Association Mid-Winter Conference,” The Officer,

April 2009, 60. 183 Lieutenant General Jack Stultz’s Remarks at George Washington Chapter AUSA, December 

15, 2009. 184 John McHugh and General George W. Casey, Jr., A Statement on the Posture of the United States 

Army, 2010, Presented to the Committees and Subcommittees of the U.S. Senate and House 

of Representatives, February 2010, 13. 185 General Peter J. Schoomaker and Dr. Francis Harvey, A Statement on the Posture of the United 

States Army, 2005, Presented to the Committees and Subcommittees of the United States 

Senate and the House of Representatives, February 6, 2005. 186 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, The United States Army Reserve 2005 Posture Statement

submitted to the Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House 

of Representatives, March 2005, 6. 187 Schoomaker and Harvey, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2005, ii and Ned 

Bedessem, “Army Organizational Changes-The New Modular Army,” in John J. McGrath, 

editor, An Army At War: Change in the Midst of Conflict, The Proceedings of the Combat Studies 

Institute 2005 Military History Symposium (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 33-35. 188 Stewart, American Military History, Volume II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-

2003, 496-497. 189 McHugh and Casey, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2010, 12 and McHugh 

and Casey, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2011, 8.
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190 Colonel John Bonin and Lieutenant Colonel Telford Crisco, “The Modular Army,” Military 

Review, March-April 2004, 21. 191 Bedessem, “Army Organizational Changes-The New Modular Army,” in John J. McGrath, 

editor, An Army At War: Change in the Midst of Conflict, The Proceedings of the Combat Studies 

Institute 2005 Military History Symposium, 33, 35. 192 McHugh and Casey, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2010, 12. 193 Coker, The 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 31. 194 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “A component for change,” Armed Forces Journal, May 

2005, 42 and Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “Standing Up for His Troops,” Military 

Officer, April 2004, 48. 195 Casey, “The Second Decade,” 2010-2011 Army Green Book, October 2010, 21-22. 196 Schoomaker and Harvey, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2005, ii. 197 Casey, “The Second Decade,” 2010-2011 Army Green Book, October 2010, 21-22. 198 McHugh and Casey, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2011, 9. 199 Ibid., 12. 200 Casey, “The Second Decade,” 2010-2011 Army Green Book, October 2010, 21-22. 201 Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Garshak, “Analysis Of The U.S. Army’s Two-Reserve Structure: 

Is A Federal Army Reserve Force Necessary?” (U.S. Army War College, March 18, 2006), 13. 202 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 21 and Joseph E. Whitlock, 

“How To Make Army Force Generation Work For The Army’s Reserve Components,” 5. 203 Whitlock, “How To Make Army Force Generation Work For The Army’s Reserve Components,” Strategic Studies Institute, August 2006, 5. 204 McHugh and Casey, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2010, Addendum F, 

1, 2. 205 Whitlock, “How To Make Army Force Generation Work For The Army’s Reserve Components,” Strategic Studies Institute, August 2006, 4 and McHugh and Casey, A Statement on the 

Posture of the United States Army, 2010, Addendum F, 1. 206 McHugh and Casey, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2011, Addendum F, 1. 207 Ibid. 208 McHugh and Casey, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2010, 13 and 

McHugh and Casey, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2011, Reserve Component (RC) as Part of the Operational Force information paper, 1 and Equipping the Reserve 

Component (RC) information paper, 1. 209 Ibid., Addendum F, 1. 210 Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, The United States Army Reserve 2002 Vision & Strategy 

Statement, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 2011, 3. 211 McHugh and Casey, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2010, 13. 212 Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, The United States Army Reserve 2020 Vision & Strategy 

Statement, 4. 213 McHugh and Casey, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2010, 13. 214 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 2006, 5. 215 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual History of the Army Reserve, 22-23. 216 McHugh and Casey, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2011, March 2011, 

Addendum F, 1. 217 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “Courage to Change,” in Reserve Forces Policy Board, 

The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 2004, 64. 218 Coker, The 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 34. 219 Ibid., 41. 220 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual History of the Army Reserve, 24-25. 221 Lieutenant Colonel David Nichols, Email, subject: AREF, May 17, 2011, USARC. 
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222 Stewart, American Military History, Volume II, The United States Army In A Global Era, 1917-

2003, 496. 223 Lieutenant Colonel David Nichols, Email, subject: TPFDL, May 20, 2011. 224 AUSA, Press Release, “Schoomaker: Access Policies to Guard and Reserve Must be Changed,” 

December 18, 2006, http://www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptHome.nsf/byid/JRAY-6WLJW2. 225 Ibid. 226 Interview, Kathryn Roe Coker with Colonel Less Carroll, April 7, 2008, Oral History Collection, USARHRC, OARH, USARC and Lieutenant Colonel Michael Ryan, Email, subject: 

Mobilization Policies for Operational History, May 9, 2011, USARC. 227 Robert M. Gates, Memorandum, subject: Utilization of the Total Force (Washington, DC: 

Secretary of Defense, January 11, 2009). 228 Ibid. 229 Lieutenant Colonel Michael Ryan, Email, subject: Mobilization Policies for Operational History, May 9, 2011, USARC. 230 Stultz, “A Positive Investment For America,” 2009-2010 Army Green Book, October 2009, 132. 231 Brown, Kevlar Legions, 281. 232 General Gorge W. Casey, Jr., “The Second Decade,” 2010-2011 Army Green Book, October 

2010, 21 and McHugh and Casey, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2011, 

6, Accelerate Army Growth information paper, 1. 233 Lieutenant Colonel Timothy, Email w/attachment: subject: Army Reserve Operational History, April 5, 2011, USARC. The Defense Manpower and Data Center at Monterey, California, is the source of the data. 234 Ibid. 235 Stultz, The Army Reserve 2020 Vision & Strategy Statement, 24. 236 Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes, “Reflections from LTG Thomas J. Plewes at the Close 

of a 36-Year Career,” May 20, 2002, https://usarcintra/cioweb/CdrsCorner/ltgplewesretmsg.

htm; Article, Linda Kozaryn, “Army Reserve Duty Has ‘Changed Forever,’” January 22, 2002, 

https://usarcintra/cioweb/CdrsCorner/ ArmyResDutycgmsg.htm; and Lieutenant General 

Thomas J. Plewes, “Engaged Around the World Supporting Our Vital Interests,” 2001-2002 

Army Green Book, October, 2001, 108. 237 Kathryn Roe Coker, The 2002 Army Reserve Historical Summary (Atlanta, Georgia: Office of 

Army Reserve History, 2004), xxvi. 238 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 45. 239 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 13, 18. 240 Ibid. 241 McHugh and Casey, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2010, 7. 242 Major Jonathan Pontius, Email, subject: Reup History, April 28, 2011, USARC. 243 Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, “Army Reserve Returns On America’s Investment,” 2010-

2011 Army Green Book, October 2010, 115-116; Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 14 and Interview, Kathryn Roe Coker with Lieutenant General Jack 

C. Stultz, Jr., August 3, 2010, Oral History Collection, USARHRC, OARH, USARC. 244 Anonymous, AUSA Press Release, “Casey identifies four imperatives for the Army’s future,” 

October 10, 2007, http://www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptHome.nsf/byid/WEBF-77UNLO

and Casey, Statement on the Army’s Strategic Imperatives Before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee and U.S. House of Representatives, November 15, 2007, http://www.army.mil/-

speeches/2007/11/15/6144-chief-of-staff-of-the-army-statement. 245 Casey, Statement on the Army’s Strategic Imperatives Before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee and U.S. House of Representatives, November 15, 2007, http://www.army.mil/-

speeches/2007/11/15/6144-chief-of-staff-of-the-army-statement. 246 Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, “Sustain, Prepare, Rest, Transform,” The Officer, December 
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2007, 239. 247 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 30. 248 Interview, Coker with Stultz. 249 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 47. 250 OCAR, Read Ahead for Lieutenant General Jack Stultz’s Interview with USA Today, June 22, 2009. 251 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 47. 252 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 15. 253 OCAR, Read Ahead for Lieutenant General Jack Stultz’s Interview with USA Today, June 22, 2009. 254 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 47. 255 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, The United States Army Reserve 2006 Posture Statement

submitted to the Committees and Subcommittees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, 21. 256 Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Danaher, Email, subject: Full Time Support, April 29, 2011, 

USARC. 257 Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, “Army Reserve Returns On America’s Investment,” 2010-

2011 Army Green Book, October 2010, 116. 258 Kathryn Roe Coker, The 2002 Army Reserve Historical Summary (Atlanta, Georgia: Office of 

Army Reserve History, USARC, 2004), xxxi. 259 Coker, The 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 50. 260 Reserve Forces Policy Board, The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 2005, 15 

and Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz and Command Sergeant Major Michael Schultz, The 

United States Army Reserve 2011 Posture Statement, 5. 261 Stultz, The Army Reserve 2020 Vision & Strategy Statement, 22. 262 G. Kim Wincup, chairman Reserve Forces Policy Board, Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, subject: Maximizing Reserve Component Effectiveness and Possible Recommendations 

for the Transition Team, December 5, 2008. 263 Anonymous, “Reserve Forces begin to reap benefits from National Defense Authorization Act, 

Spring 2001, CAR Forum, Volume V, Number I, 1. 264 Brown, Kevlar Legions, 481. 265 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, FY 1990 (p. 10); FY 

1991 report (p.35); FY 1994 report (p. 15); FY 1995 report (p. 8); 2001 report (p. 29) and Sun 

Madaio, Email w/attachment, subject: Fiscal Strength Information, May 23, 2011, USARC. 266 Stultz, “Army Reserve Returns On America’s Investment,” 2010-2011 Army Green Book, October 2010, 118. 267 Coker, U.S. Army Reserve Command 2000 Annual Command History, 155. 268 Ibid., 156. 269 Coker, The 2002 Army Reserve Historical Summary, xxxvii. 270 Lieutenant General Jack C., Stultz, Jr., The United States Army Reserve 2007 Posture Statement

Submitted to the Committees and Subcommittees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, March 2007, 13. 271 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 28. 272 Stultz and Schultz, The United States Army Reserve 2010 Posture Statement, Army Reserve snapshot. 273 Coker, The 2003 Army Reserve Historical Summary, 71-72 and Coker, The 2004/2005 Biannual 

History of the Army Reserve, 25. 274 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “The Changing Army Reserve,” Army Reserve Magazine, 

Winter 2005, 11. 275 Ibid., 11-12; Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “The Army Reserve: Focus on the Future,” 

Army, February 2006, 28-29; and Coker, The 2004/2005 Biannual History of the Army Reserve, 

25-26. 276 Stultz, The Army Reserve 2020 Vision & Strategy Statement, 18 and Interview, Coker with Stultz.
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277 Kathryn Roe Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary (Atlanta, 

Georgia: Office of Army Reserve History, USARC, 2008), 18 and Coker, Draft 2008/2009 

Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 68, 70. 278 Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, “Return on Investment,” The Officer, December 2008, 28. 279 Interview, Kathryn Roe Coker with Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Jr., August 3, 2010, 

Oral History Collection, USARHRC, OARH, USARC. 280 Ibid. 281 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 12. 282 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 67 and Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, “Sustain Commitment: Prepare for Unexpected. Army Reserve reshapes 

the force to serve Soldiers and the nation better,” http://www.roa.org/site/PageServer?pagename=0912_USAR. 283 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 68. 284 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 13. 285 Coker, The 2004/20005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 29. 286 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 13. 287 Ibid. 288 Ibid. 289 Ibid., 13-14. 290 AR-MEDCOM, AR-MEDCOM 2010 Annual Historical Summary, 5, USARHRC, OARH, 

USARC. 291 Ibid., 15. 292 Ibid. 293 Lowell Detamore, “335th TSC commander’s view,” Army Communicator, Summer, 2005. 294 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 15. 295 Ibid., 15-16 and Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 73. 296 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 71. 297 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 14. 298 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 20. 299 Stultz, The Army Reserve 2020 Vision & Strategy Statement, 16. 300 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Army Reserve Historical Summary, 76. 301 General George W. Casey, Jr., Statement on the Army’s Strategic Imperatives Before the 

Senate Armed Services Committee and U.S. House of Representatives, November 15, 2007, 

http://www.army.mil/-speeches/2007/22/25/6144-chief-of-staff-of-the-army-statement. 302 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 25 and Interview, Coker 

with Hargraves. 303 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 25, 27-28. 304 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 36. 305 Ibid., 36-37. 306 Ibid., 39. 307 Interview, Coker with Hargraves. 308 Ibid and Briefing, USARC G-7. U.S. Army Reserve DIV (IT) & DIV (TS) Executive Summary, no date. 309 Helen Wheat, Email, subject: Training Commands, May 3, 2011, USARC. 310 Interview, Coker with Hargraves. 311 Gregory Nell, “Army Transformation: Transformation Means Future Force Relevance, Readiness,” Army Reserve Magazine, Volume 52, Number 4 (Spring/Summer 2007), 15-16 and Helen Wheat, Email, subject: Training Commands, May 3, 2011, USARC. 312 Anonymous, 80th Training Command (TASS), http://www.usar.mil/arweb/organization/
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commandstructure/USARC/TNG/80Tng/P. 313 Anonymous, 84th Training Command (TASS), http://www.usar.mil/arweb/organization/

commandstructure/USARC/TNG/84tng/Pa. 314 Anonymous, 108th Training Command (TASS), http://www.usar.mil/arweb/organization/

commandstructure/USARC/TNG/108tng/Pa. 315 Nell, “Army Transformation: Transforming Means Future Force Relevance, Readiness,” Army 

Reserve Magazine, 16; Chris Scammon, Email, subject: Training Commands, May 3, 2011, 

USARC and John Hargraves, Email, subject: Realignment of TSDs, July 18, 2011, USARC. 316 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve History, 31-32. 317 Major Paul Nichols. Email, subject: CSTC and RTC, March 10, 2008, USARC. 318 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 31-32. 319 Carl Matthews, Email, subject: Training Statistics, January 14, 2011, USARC. 320 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 32. 321 Stultz and Schultz, The United States Army Reserve 2011 Posture Statement, 16. 322 Anonymous, N.Y. Army Reserve Unit To Train Iraqi Security Forces,” Army Reserve Magazine, 

Volume 50, Number 3, Winter 2004-05, 21. 323 Anonymous, “N.Y. Army Reserve Unit To Train Iraqi Army Security Forces,” Army Reserve 

Magazine, Volume 50, Number 3, Winter 2004-05, 21. 324 Steven E. Clay, Iroquois Warriors in Iraq (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute 

Press, no date), 115, 117, 127. 325 Ibid., 122. 326 Ibid., 123-124. 327 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “Courage to Change,” in Reserve Forces Policy Board, 

The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 2004, 64-65. 328 Coker, The 2004/2005 Biannual History of the Army Reserve, 45. 329 David Moore and Captain Antonia Greene, “Task Force Scorpion Full Training Mode,” Air, 

Land and Sea Newspaper, May 5, 2011. 330 Clay, Iroquois Warriors in Iraq, 222. 331 Ibid., 227. 332 Read ahead with attachment for Lieutenant General Jack Stultz’s Interview with Military Update, 

May 28, 2009. 333 Lieutenant Colonel Voris W. McBurnette, editor, The 108th Training Command: A History of 

Embracing Innovation & Shaping the Future (Charlotte, North Carolina: Palette Communications, Inc., 2010), 91. 334 Ibid. 335 Sergeant First Class Steve Opet, “108th Rough Riders Help Train New Iraqi Soldiers,” Army 

Reserve Magazine, Volume 3, Number 1, Fall 2007, 21. 336 Ibid. 337 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly,” A Campaign for Cultural Change, Army Reserve Magazine,

Volume 50, Number 2, 12. 338 Coker, The 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 48. 339 Carl Matthews, Email, subject: Statistics, January 14, 2011, USARC. 340 Coker, U.S. Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 2000, 186 and Coker, The 2001 

Army Reserve Historical Summary, 110. 341 Coker, U.S. Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 2000, 187. 342 Ibid., 189-190. 343 Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes, Statement by Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes 

Before the Subcommittee On Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 18 July 2001; CAR Forum, Volume V, Number II, 5-6; Lieutenant General Thomas J. 

Plewes, “Army Reserve Overview,” Statement by Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes Before 
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455

the Subcommittee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 13 March 2002, 18-19, 25-

26, and Jack Gordon, “Joint Task Force Panama Base Camp,” Army Reserve Magazine, Volume 

53, Number 1, Fall 2007, 26. 344 Stultz, The Army Reserve 2020 Vision & Strategy Statement, 20. 345 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 2000 Report of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board, 82-83. 346 Coker, The 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 39. 347 Stultz and Shultz, The United States Army Reserve 2011 Posture Statement, 20. 348 Interview, Coker with Stultz. 349 Lieutenant Colonel Roy Moss, Email w/attachment, subject: SAC-D Hearing Prep Slides, 

April 15, 2011, USARC. Slide prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Yim, G33. 350 Stultz and Shultz, The United States Army Reserve 2011 Posture Statement, 20 and Keebler, “Is 

the Army Reserve an operational force, a strategic force or a mix of both? 18. 351 Lieutenant Colonel Roy Moss, Email w/attachment, subject: SAC-D Hearing Prep Slides, 

April 15, 2011, USARC. Slide prepared by Colonel Carol Leighton, G4. 352 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 41. 353 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 2000 Report of the 

Reserve Forces Policy Board, 82-83 and Lieutenant Colonel Randy Pullen and Major Jean McGinnis, “The Army Reserve In Transformation; Army Reserve Aviation,” The Officer, October 

2001, 20. 354 Coker, The 2001 Army Reserve Historical Summary, 95. 355 Lieutenant Colonel Randy Pullen and Major Jean McGinnis, “The Army Reserve In Transformation: Army Reserve Aviation,” The Officer, October 2001, 21-22. 356 Ibid. 357 Stultz and Schultz, The United States Army Reserve 2011 Posture Statement, 17. 358 Ibid., 48. 359 Mike Akins, Email, Subject: Equipment Concentration Site Information, May 11, 2011, USARC. 360 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, A Statement on the 2006 Posture of the United States Army 

Reserve, Submitted to the Committees and Subcommittees of the U.S. Senate and House of 

Representatives, 18-19. 361 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 43. 362 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 2000 Report of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board, 64. 363 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 2000 Report of the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board, 88-89. 364 Coker, The 2001 Army Reserve Historical Summary, 14-15. 365 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “The Year of Equipping In the Army Reserve,” Army, 

February 2005, 34. 366 Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, The United States Army Reserve 2007 Posture Statement 

Submitted to the Committees and Subcommittees of the U.S. Senate and House of 

Representatives, 22. 367 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 45. 368 Stultz, “Army Reserve Returns On America’s Investment,” 2010-2011 Army Green Book, October 2010, 116. 369 Keebler, “Is the Army Reserve an operational force, a strategic force or a mix of both?” 19. 370 Ibid., 41-42 and Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, “A Positive Investment for America,” 2009-

2010 Army Green Book, October 2009, 133-134. 371 Stultz and Schultz, The United States Army Reserve 2011 Posture Statement, 9. 
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372 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 38. 373 Ibid.; Major (P) Urbanek, subject: Post Deployment Health Reassessment Program, January-June 2010 Semi-Annual Historical Report, Surgeon, USARC and Major Todd Traver, 

subject: Medical Readiness, January-June 2010 Semi-Annual Historical Report, Surgeon, 

USARC. 374 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 38; and Major Todd Traver, subject: Medical Readiness, January-June 2010 Semi-Annual Historical Report, Surgeon, 

USARC and Major Todd Traver, subject: Medical Readiness, July-December 2010 Semi-Annual Historical Report, Surgeon, USARC. 375 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 38 and Major Todd Traver, subject: Medical Readiness, January-June 2010 Semi-Annual Historical Report, Surgeon, 

USARC. 376 Stultz and Schultz, The United States Army Reserve 2011 Posture Statement, 9. 377 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 39. 378 Colonel Derrick Carter, subject: Dental Readiness Initiatives, January-June 2010 Semi-Annual Historical Report, Surgeon, USARC and Colonel Derrick Carter, subject: Dental Readiness Initiatives, July-December 2010 Semi-Annual Historical Report, Surgeon, USARC. 379 Ibid and Stultz and Schultz, Army Reserve 2010 Posture Statement, iv. 380 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 39. 381 Ibid. 382 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 55. 383 Ibid., 40. 384 Ibid.; Lieutenant Karen Williams and Major Missy Delk, subject: Conversion of Medical/

Dental Records, January-June 2010 Semi-Annual Historical Report, Surgeon, USARC and 

Major Missy Delk, subject: Conversion of Medical/Dental Records, July-December 2010 

Semi-Annual Historical Report, Surgeon, USARC. 385 Major Missy Delk, Email, subject: Medical Readiness, September 25, 2011, USARC. 386 Coker, Draft 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 40. 387 Major Frank Battle, subject: Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application 

and Clinical Education Programs, January-June 2010 Semi-Annual Historical Report, 

Surgeon, USARC. 388 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Review of Reserve Component 

Contributions To National Defense, 38. 389 Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, “Army Reserve: Integral Component Of the Worlds’ Best 

Army,” 2006-2007 Army Green Book, October 2006, 132. 390 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “The Army Reserve: Focus on the Future,” Army, February 2006, 28; Lieutenant General James Helmly, “Army Reserve Response to Hurricane Katrina,” http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/ARWEB/NEWS/Word/Katrina.htm, 6 September 

2005; and Coker, The 2004/2005 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 11. Also see 

Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “Army Reserve Response to Hurricane Katrina,” http:www.usar.army.mil/ARNEWS/WORD/20050906.htm. 391 Coker, U.S. Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 2000, xxii. 392 Coker, U.S. Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 2001, xxxii-xxxiii. 393 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 59. 394 Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Testimony before the Commission on the National Guard 

and Reserves, July 19, 2006. 395 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 59. 396 Ibid. 397 Captain Jose Emperador, “Army Reserve Chief Visits Soldiers Supporting Missions In Haiti,” 
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457

http://www.usar.army.mil/arweb/organization/commandstructure/USARC/OPS/377Sus/n. 398 Captain Jose Emperador, “377th Theater Sustainment command takes the reins in Haiti,” 

March 8, 2010, Defense Video and Information Distribution System. 399 Lieutenant Colonel Roy Moss, Email w/attachment, subject: SAC-D Hearing Prep Slides, 

April 15, 2011, USARC. Slide prepared by Mr. Mike Costa, G33 HLD. 400 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 59-60. 401 Mike Costa, Email, History Update, June 7, 2011, USARC. 402 Department of Defense Transcripts, subject: Defense Department Special Brief on Iraq and 

Afghanistan, March 23, 2005. 403 Testimony, Lieutenant Colonel Martha Granger, CSA Draft Remarks, HASC Oral Statement, 

version 4, September 26, 2007. 404 Ibid. 405 Gerry Gilmore, “Gates, Casey welcome new Army secretary,” November 3, 2009, http://army.

mil/-news/2009/11/03/29752-gates-casey-welcome-ne-army-secretary/index.html. 406 Memorandum, Brigadier General Anderson, subject: Commander’s Vision and Intent, 

November 13, 2006. 407 Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, The United States Army Reserve 2008 Posture Statement, 

January 31, 2008 Draft, 18-19. 408 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, Wounded Warrior Assistance Act of 2007 and 

Anonymous, “Wounded Warrior Provisions Signed Into Law, VFW Magazine, 2007. 409 Coker, The 2006/2007 Biannual History Army Reserve Historical Summary, 56. 410 Ibid. 411 Coker, Draft, 2008/2009 Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 54-55. 412 Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz and Command Sergeant Major Michael D. Schultz, The 

United States Army Reserve 2011 Posture Statement submitted to the Committees and Subcommittees of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, March 2011, iv, 7. 413 Stultz and Schultz, The United States Army Reserve 2011 Posture Statement, 8. 414 Donna Miles, “Virtual Installation Concept Becomes Physical Reality with ‘Fort Rochester,” 

The Officer, November 2009, 23. 415 Sergeant First Class Mark Bell, “Army Reserve Opens Second Community Center,” Office of 

the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs, May 17, 2010. 416 Ibid. 417 Ibid. 418 Ibid. 419 Ibid. 420 Ibid. 421 Ibid.

422 Janine Boldrin, “Virtual Installation Comes to Life,” The Reserve & National Guard, 

March 2011, 16. 423 Stultz and Schultz, The United States Army Reserve 2011 Posture Statement, 10. 424 Janine Boldrin, Virtual Installation Comes to Life,” The Reserve & National Guard, March 

2011, 15. 425 Anderia Georgia, “Army Reserve Family Program Office Reaches Out To the Families of Mobilized IRR/IMA/UAU/IA Soldiers,” Army Reserve Magazine, Winter 2004-05, Volume 50, 

Number 3, 17, 19. 426 Major Ted Hart, “Well-Being/Family Readiness,” Army Reserve Magazine, Volume 50, Number 4, 

Spring 2005, 18-19. 427 Helmly, United States Army Reserve 2006 Posture Statement, 22 and Stultz, United States Army 
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458

Reserve 2007 Posture Statement, 30. 428 Stultz, “Army Reserve Returns On America’s Investment,” 2010-2011 Army Green Book, October 2010, 118. 429 Al Schilf, “Army Reserve Soldiers Returning Home From Iraq and Afghanistan To Receive 

‘Welcome Home Warrior-Citizen’ Honor,” News Release, OCAR, no date. 430 Master Sergeant Daryl Perry, USARC G-1. Email w/attachment, subject: AR Daily Causality 

Report for 30 December 2010, December 30, 2010, USARC. This total includes those killed 

in action and non-battle deaths. Of this total, one hundred and twenty-three were killed in 

action. 431 Lieutenant General Jack Stultz’s Remarks, U.S. Army Reserve Bn Pre-Command Course, January 25, 2009. 432 Lieutenant Colonel Deirdre Kane, subject: Behavioral Heath Strategic Initiative, January-June 

2010 Semi-Annual Historical Report, Surgeon, USARC and Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, 

Remarks at Fallen Soldier Ceremony, November 18, 2009. 433 Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Year 2000 Reserve Component Programs, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 43-44. 434 Ibid., 44-45. 435 Ibid., 45. 436 Ibid. 437 Stultz, The United States Army Reserve 2007 Posture Statement, 31-32 and Coker, The 2006/2007 

Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary, 57-58. 438 Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, Pre-Decisional Closing Remarks SLWC, May 6, 2009. 439 Read ahead, for Lieutenant General Jack Stultz’s Interview with Stars & Stripes, July 21, 2009. 440 Stultz, “Return On Investment,” The Officer, December 2008, 29. 441 Stultz and Schultz, The United States Army Reserve 2011 Posture Statement, 11. 442 Ibid. 443 McHugh and Casey, The United States Army Posture Statement, 2011, BRAC information paper, 1-2. 444 Dennis K. Bohannon, “BRAC 2005,” Soldiers Magazine, August 2011, 28. 445 Ibid. 446 Ibid and McHugh and Casey, The United States Army Posture Statement, 2011, BRAC information paper, 1-2. 447 Bohannon, “BRAC 2005,” Soldiers Magazine, August 2011, 28. 448 Ibid., 29. 449 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “The Army Reserve: Focus on the Future,” Army, 

February 2006, 30 and Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “Changing To a 21st Century 

Army Reserve,” 2004-2005 Army Green Book, October 2005, 109. 450 Major Monica Griffin, “Five Things To Know About BRAC 2005,” Army Reserve Magazine, 

Fall 2005, 12 and Anonymous, “Army Reserve and BRAC 2005,” http:www.armyreserve.army.

mil/usar/news/arbrac.aspx. 451 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “Changing to a 21st-Century Army Reserve,” 2005-

2006 Army Green Book, October 2005, 109; Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “The Army 

Reserve: Focus on the Future,” Army, February 2006, 3; Lieutenant Colonel Randy Pullen, 

“Change is in your hands, reserve chief tells Soldiers,” http://www.emilitary.org/article.php?-

4875; Anonymous, “Army Reserve and BRAC 2005,” http:www.armyreserve.army.mil/usar/

news/arbrac.aspx; and Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, Where the Army 

Stands on BRAC 2005 Implementation Briefing, no date. 452 Anonymous, “Army Reserve and BRAC,” http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/usar/news/ar-
CHAPTER 3. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

459

brac.aspx and Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “BRAC 2005: It’s About the Future, Not 

the Past,” The Officer, July/August 2005, 34-36. 453 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “BRAC and the Army Reserve,” Army Reserve Magazine, 

Fall 2005, 11 and Griffin, “Five Things To Know About BRAC 2005,” Army Reserve Magazine, 

Fall 2005, 13. 454 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “The Army Reserve on the Future,” Army, February 

2006, 32; Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “Change or Become Obsolete,” The Officer, 

December 2005, 27; and Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “Chief, Army Reserve’s Farewell Message,” Army Reserve Magazine, Spring 2006, 10. 455 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “BRAC 2005: It’s About the Future, Not the Past,” The 

Officer, July/August 2005, 34. 456 Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, “BRAC and the Army Reserve,” Army Reserve Magazine, 

Fall 2005, 11. 457 Helmly, “BRAC 2005: It’s About the Future, Not the Past,” The Officer, July/August 2005, 

34-36. 458 Stultz, United States Army Reserve 2008 Posture Statement, January 31, 2008 Draft, 12. 459 Assistant Chief of Staff of Installation Management, Briefing Slides, subject: Where the Army 

Stands on BRAC 2005 Implementation, no date. 460 Stultz and Schultz, The United States Army Reserve 2011 Posture Statement, 18. 461 General George W. Casey, Jr., Statement Before the House Committee on Appropriations, 

Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies, May 6, 2009. 462 Anonymous, “BRAC: Balancing people and missions,” March 2010, http://www.army.mil/-

news/20009/06/21943-brac-balancing-people-and-missions. 463 Lieutenant Colonel James Billings, “’Green’ buildings contribute to Army ‘triple bottom 

line,’” April 14, 2011, Army Reserve Public Affairs Office, USARC.
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Set Perimeter in Iraq, Darrold Peters. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of 

Military History)
CHAPTER 3. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

461
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462
CONCLUSION

463

CONCLUSION

Historically, the reserves were war fighting forces trained and held in reserve 

for low-probability/high intensity conflicts. As Secretary of Defense William 

S. Cohen stated in his 2001 annual report, “During the Cold War, the National 

Guard and reserve forces numbered over one million personnel but contributed support to the active forces at a rate of less than one million man-days per 

year.”1 Service in the reserves “meant being kept in reserve, waiting for the 

advent of World War III and the cataclysmic contingency that would call them 

to duty on the front line in the fight against communism in Europe or Asia.”2

The Army Reserve remained a strategic reserve; the active Army managed most 

operations without the reserves. However, the end of the Cold War and the 

call-up of almost 267,000 members of the reserves for Operation DESERT 

SHIELD/DESERT STORM signaled the beginning of the end of a select 

strategic reserve. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was 

a successful test of the Army’s 1973 Total Force policy. This was known as 

the Abrams Doctrine, named for Army Chief of Staff General Creighton W. 

Abrams, Jr., which placed increased reliance on the reserves. General Abrams 

was the first to implement the new policy in 1974. 

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM ended with the expectation of a “peace dividend.” What resulted was a drawdown in the armed forces 

from a peak in 1989 of 769,741. In 1996, the total Army’s strength of 491,163 

was the smallest it had been since the end of World War II. The U.S. Army 

dropped to the eighth largest in the world. The reserves decreased by 13 percent from 1990 to 1994. Between 1990 and 1994, the Army Reserve’s authorized Selected Reserve end strength declined by 19 percent. Both manpower 

and budgets were cut. By 1993, the Department of Defense reported its lowest 

share of federal revenue in fifty years. 

The operational tempo rose in a new era of engagement and enlargement that 

emerged in the post-Cold War era to meet National Security Strategy requirements. The active Army and the reserves assumed increasingly active roles 

in domestic support, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and nation building aimed 

at supporting emerging democracies and political reform efforts. The Army 

had ten major deployments between 1950 and 1989, compared to twenty-five 

from 1990 -1997. Consequently, the Army Reserve “began its transition to 

an integral component of the Army’s operational force and solidified its role 
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464

Big Country, Heather Engelhart. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of 

Military History)
CONCLUSION

465

as a critical provider of combat support and combat support capabilities to the Total 

Army.”3 As the century ended, the active Army’s and the 

reserves’ operational tempo 

continued to climb. By 2001, 

866,000 reserve soldiers were 

providing nearly thirteen 

million man-days of support 

per year, a drastic contrast to 

the Cold War contribution. 

The National Guard and 

Army Reserve comprised 54 

percent of the Total Army.4

 

Smaller budgets, together 

with the rising operational 

tempo, saw the reserves used, 

increasingly, to lessen operational tension on the active 

force. This meant a shift 

from a limited-use reserve 

force to a demand for an integrated total force. 

As personnel and funding 

shortfalls continued, the 

Army began to reshape itself 

to fit the new strategic environment. The Army transitioned from a Cold War 

“forward deployed force,” 

prepared to fight the Soviet 

Union and the Warsaw Pact, 

to a “force projection Army” 

based in the United States. 

The Army could now react 

to crises with the ability to 
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466

Satan’s Sandbox, Sergeant First Class Elzie Golden. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. 

Army Center of Military History)
CONCLUSION

467
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

468

reconstitute additional forces. Large scale, maneuver warfare represented a bygone era. Force XXI and Army XXI were resulting initiatives to modernize the 

Army with the capabilities the country needed for the 21st century. Army Vision 

2010 connected the ongoing Force XXI with the Army After Next. The Objective Force, the Legacy Force, and the Interim Force were concepts to evolve 

the Army into a strategically responsive and lighter force. Now, the Army would 

dominate at every point of full spectrum operations. 

Major official reexaminations of U.S. military strategy came in the form of the 

1991 Base Force, the 1993 Report on the Bottom-Up Review, the 1995 Commission on the Roles & Missions of the Armed Forces, and the 1997 Quadrennial 

Defense Review. The result: each study recognized an increased reliance on the 

reserves. 

The 1993 Off-Site Agreement restructured the post-Cold War Army Reserve. 

It steadied reserve force structure and end strength reductions. It led to the 

National Guard’s focus on combat arms and divisional level combat support 

and combat service support. For the Army Reserve it meant a concentration in 

combat support and combat service support at corps levels and above. Thus, 

the active Army increased its own combat troop strength, as its reliance on the 

reserves grew. The Base Force and other studies had recommended this. 

The horrific terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, drew a dividing line in the 

nation’s history. The Army Reserve was fully engaged from the beginning. 

Hasty mobilization became the norm. Army Reserve soldiers soon expected 

mobilization as a probability, not a possibility. Business as usual, one weekend 

a month and two weeks in the summer, became a dim memory. That was the 

old legacy, the old solely strategic reserve, not the evolving operational, expeditionary Army Reserve. The seeds of this force were planted in the 1990s. 

Army Reserve soldiers and their families shared the burden of the new world 

order with their active Army counterparts. Properly manning, training, equipping, and funding the reserves for greater demands became critical for the 

Army leadership.

Since those shocking attacks, the country has been at war. The overseas conflicts caused changes in battle doctrine and force generation. The mobilization 

lead time, for example, would no longer take months. ARFORGEN guaranteed predictable and cyclical reserve readiness. 

These changes meant the reserves would become an operational force. This 

was mandated in Department of Defense directive 1200.17, “Managing the 

Reserve Components as an Operational Force” and recognized in the Com-
CONCLUSION

469

mission on the National Guard and Reserves’ report, Transforming the 

National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force. The 2010 

Quadrennial Defense Review called for a “Reserve Component that can serve 

in an operational capacity-available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine deployment.”5

 The National Guard and Army Reserve would now make 

sustained contributions to the Global War on Terrorism. The reserves were 

expecting to function as an operational force then, and into the future. As has 

been seen, reserve component deployments overseas rose increasingly through 

the post-Cold War era. With the advent of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, 

they soared. 

In the contemporary strategic environment, victory was possible only with a 

total, integrated Army. That modular, expeditionary Army must fight in persistent full spectrum operations. It must defend the homeland, defend civil 

authorities, deter conflict in crucial areas, and react quickly to small scale wars. 

Thus, the Army Reserve became a full partner with the active Army. No longer 

a supplemental or a “just in case” after thought; the Army Reserve evolved to a 

“just in time” operational force. 

The challenge now is to continue the Army Reserve’s “institutional adaptation 

and transformation to an enduring operational force” within the Total Army, 

as the nation enters the second decade of the twenty-first century in an era of 

unrelenting, persistent conflict.6 As U.S. combat forces drawdown in Iraq and 

in Afghanistan, there still will be a critical need for combat support and combat 

service support, capabilities resident, in some cases exclusively or predominately, within the Army Reserve. Army Reserve forces are “ideally suited to support 

missions that improve infrastructure, security, and institutions within foreign 

nations of strategic interest to the U.S.”7

 In the “absence of assigned DEF 

or CEF missions,” the Army Reserve will support “steady-state security cooperation missions . . .” allowing it to “retain its operational culture and sustain 

itself as an element of the operational force, also ensuring utilization during the 

ARFORGEN Available Year.”8 Global requirements, both expeditionary and 

domestic, require an indispensable Army Reserve trained and equipped with 

ready soldiers and cohesive units. That is its core mission. The Army Reserve 

has become a “crucial element of the Army’s overall deployable strength and 

war fighting team,” no longer “supplemental reinforcements,” but “routinely 

called upon as the force of first choice for ready enablers” to be drawn from the 

operating force and the generating force.9 It is a ubiquitous force. Deployment sooner or later is a near certainty. One weekend a month, two weeks in 

the summer is anachronistic. The Army Reserve vision is to maintain recognition as an enduring operational force drawn into the vortex of an expeditionary 
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470

Army. One that is part of the base budget and not solely dependent on contingency funding, accessible to the combatant commander, and serving as America’s premier force provider of military-civilian skills in support of missions at 

home and abroad. As McHugh and General Casey stated in the 2011 Army 

Posture Statement, “One thing is certain across every echelon of this Army: we 

cannot relegate the Army National Guard and Army Reserve back to a strategic 

reserve. The security of the nation can ill afford a reserve force that is undermanned, under-equipped or at insufficient levels of training and readiness.”10

The Army Reserve is a force of warrior citizens adding strategic and operational 

depth to the Total Force. Challenges remain in institutional and statutory barriers to a fully operational reserve force with a less unwieldy unit mobilization 

process. The reserves support the National Security Strategy, as they continue 

to grow and change. As an indispensable operational force, the Army Reserve 

is always ready, leaning forward to defend America in an increasingly dangerous 

world.

“One thing is certain across every echelon of this Army: we cannot 

relegate the Army National Guard and Army Reserve back to a strategic 

reserve.” John M. McHugh and General George W. Casey, Jr.
CONCLUSION

471

1 William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 2001 (Washington, DC: 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001). 2 Ibid. 

3 Stultz, The United States Army Reserve 2020 Vision & Strategy Statement, 2. 4 Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 2001, 137-138.

5 Stultz, The United States Army Reserve 2020 Vision & Strategy Statement, 1. 6 Ibid., 13.

7 Ibid., 8.

8 Ibid., 13.

9 Stultz, The United States Army Reserve 2020 Vision & Strategy Statement, 3. 10 McHugh and Casey. The United States Army Posture Statement, 2011, 12.
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472

Brothers in Arms, Christopher Thiel. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of 

Military History)
APPENDIX A

473

 APPENDIX A:

SILVER STAR RECIPIENTS
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474

Specialist Jeremy Church 

Specialist Jeremy Church of the 724th Transportation 

Company was the first Army Reserve soldier to 

earn the Silver Star in Iraq after driving the convoy 

commander’s vehicle through a four mile kill-zone 

and rendering assistance to fellow soldiers under 

an ambush from Iraqi insurgents in Balad, Iraq, on 

April 9, 2004.

Sergeant James Witkowski

Sergeant James Witkowski of the 729th Transportation 

Company received the Silver Star, posthumously, 

after shielding other soldiers in his company from a 

grenade while conducting a combat logistics mission 

near Balad, Iraq, on October 26, 2005. 

Staff Sergeant Jason Fetty

Staff Sergeant Jason Fetty with the Joint Provisional 

Reconstruction Team of the 364th Civil Affairs 

Brigade was the first Army Reserve soldier to 

earn the Silver Star in Afghanistan after battling 

with a suicide bomber’s attack at the opening of 

an emergency room at the Khost hospital on 

February 20, 2007. 
APPENDIX A

475

Sergeant Gregory Ruske

Sergeant Gregory Ruske with the Combined 

Joint Task Force 101 received the Silver Star for 

battling Taliban operatives and rescuing two Afghan 

National policemen in Afghanistan’s Kapisa 

Province on April 21, 2008. 

Specialist David Hutchinson

Specialist David Hutchinson (then a Private 

First Class) with the 420th Engineer Brigade 

Personal Security Detail received the Silver Star 

as a gunner who placed accurate and effective 

fire on insurgents while in a convoy enroute to 

Afghanistan’s Forward Operating Base Orgun-E on 

May 21, 2008.
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476

APPENDIX B:

FALLEN WARRIORS IN THE GLOBAL 

WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-2012
APPENDIX B

477

Command Status Date of 

Death OP Location of 

Death Rank Name HOR Unit

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

03-Nov-12 OEF Paktiwa, 

Afghanistan

SSG Dain T. Venne Ticonderoga, 

NY

412 TEC, 444 Eng Co, 

178 Eng Bn, Oswego, 

NY 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

03-Nov-12 OEF Alarm, 

Afghanistan

SGT Brett E. 

Gornewicz

Cheektowaga, 

NY

412 TEC, 444 Eng Co, 

178 Eng Bn, Oswego, 

NY 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

02-Nov-12 OEF Keystone, 

Afghanistan

SPC Ryan P. Jayne Elmira, NY 412 TEC, 444 Eng Co, 

178 Eng Bn, Oswego, 

NY 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

19-Aug-12 OEF Kandahar, 

Afghanistan

SFC Coater B. 

Debose

Moss Point, 

MS

87th, 158th Infantry 

Brigade, Camp 

Shelby, MS

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

25-Feb-12 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SSG Altaie, Ahmed 

K.

Ann Arbor, MI TAC 1, TAC Cmd 

Posts, 4 AR HQ, Fort 

Hood, TX

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

06-Aug-11 OEF Wardak 

Province, 

Afghanistan

CW2 Bryan J. Nichols Hays, KS Co B, 7th Bn, 158th 

Avn, 244th Avn Bde, 

11 Avn Cmd

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

06-Aug-11 OEF Wardak 

Province, 

Afghanistan

SPC Alexander J. 

Bennett

Tacoma, WA Co B, 7th Bn, 158th 

Avn, 244th Avn Bde, 

11 Avn Cmd 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

06-Aug-11 OEF Wardak 

Province, 

Afghanistan

SPC Spencer C. 

Duncan

Olathe, KS Co E, 7th Bn, 158th 

Avn, 244th Avn Bde, 

11 Avn Cmd

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

16-Jul-11 OEF Bar Kunar 

District, 

Afghanistan

CPL Raphael R. 

Arruda

Ogden, UT 744th En Co, 54th 

Engineer Battalion, 

416 TEC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

15-Jul-11 OND Basrah, Iraq SPC Daniel L. Elliott Youngsville, 

NC

805th MP Co, 1-12 

CAV, 3 BCT, 1 CD 

(USD-S)

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

23-Jun-11 OEF FOB 

Selarno, 

Afghanistan

CPT Joshua M. 

McClimans

Akron, OH 807 MDSC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

26-Mar-11 OEF Saubalgay, 

Afghanistan

CPL Justin D. Ross Green Bay, WI 416th TEC, 428 EN 

CO 03 PLT (MOB 

AUG), Wausau, WI 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

3-Nov-10 OEF Nar-Kariz, 

Afghanistan

CPL James C. Young Rochester, IL 412th TEC, 323 EN 

CO 02 PLT Clearance, 

Spartanburg, SC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

13-Nov-09 OEF Wardak, 

Afghanistan

SPC Christopher J. 

Coffland

Baltimore, MD USACAPOC, Co C, 

321 MI Bn, Round 

Rock, TX, MIRC 

SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

478

Command Status Date of 

Death OP Location of 

Death Rank Name HOR Unit

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

02-Oct-09 OEF Murcheh, 

Afghanistan

PFC Alan H. Newton, 

Jr.

Asheboro, NC USACAPOC, 360th 

CA Cmd, 422d CA Bn, 

Greensboro, NC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

02-Oct-09 OEF Murcheh, 

Afghanistan

CPT Benjamin 

Sklaver

Medford, MA USACAPOC, 360th 

CA Cmd, 422d CA Bn, 

Greensboro, NC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

01-Oct-09 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SPC Paul Andersen Dowagiac, MI 377th TSC, 855th QM 

Co

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

18-Aug-09 OEF Kabul, 

Afghanistan

1SG Jose S. 

Crisostomo

Inarajan HRC - St. Louis

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

26-May-09 OEF Parwan, 

Afghanistan

1SG Blue C. Rowe Summers, AR USACAPOC, 351st 

CA Cmd, CA

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

21-May-09 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

MAJ Jason E. 

George

Tehachapi, CA HRC - St. Louis

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

24-Feb-09 OEF Kandahar, 

Afghanistan

CPT Brian M. 

Bunting

Potomac, MD HRC - St. Louis

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

24-Feb-09 OEF Kandahar, 

Afghanistan

SGT Daniel J. 

Thompson

Madison, WI HRC - St. Louis

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IMA

25-Dec-08 OIF Mosul, Iraq MAJ John P. Pryor Moorestown, 

PA

HRC - St. Louis/3d 

MDSC, 1st Med Det 

FWD Surg Tm, Ft. 

Totten, NY

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

16-Oct-08 OEF FOB Boris, 

Afghanistan

SGT Federico G. 

Borjas

San Diego, CA USACAPOC, 416th 

CA Bn, San Diego, CA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

28-Aug-08 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SPC Michael L. 

Gonzalez

Spotswood, 

NJ

77th RRC, 340th MP 

Co, Fort Totten, NY

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

24-Jun-08 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq (after 

injuries from 

Sadr City, 

Iraq)

MAJ Dwayne M. 

Kelley

Willingboro, 

NJ

USACAPOC, 432d CA 

Bn, Green Bay, WI

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

3-Jun-08 OEF Zormat, 

Afghanistan

MAJ Scott A. Hagerty Stillwater, OK USACAPOC, 451st 

CA Bn, Det 4, 

Pasadena, TX

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

6-Apr-08 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

MAJ Stuart A. Wolfer Coral Springs, 

FL

84 Cmd, 104th Regt, 

11th Bn, Boise, ID 

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

6-Apr-08 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

COL Stephen K. 

Scott

New Market, 

AL

HRC - St. Louis

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

21-Mar-08 OIF North of Abu 

Ghurayb, 

Iraq

SSG Keith M. Maupin Batavia, OH 88 RRC, 724th TC Co, 

Bartonville, IL

SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION
APPENDIX B

479

SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION

Command Status Date of 

Death OP Location of 

Death Rank Name HOR Unit

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

12-Mar-08 OIF Talill, Iraq SPC Dustin C. 

Jackson

Arlington, TX 89 RRC, 103d ESC, 

350th AG Co, Grand 

Prairie, TX

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

28-Nov-07 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SFC John J. 

Tobiason

Bloomington, 

MN

377 TSC, 847th AG 

Bn, Fort Snelling, MN

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

10-Oct-07 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SSG Lillian L. 

Clamens

Lawton, OK 143 ESC, 834th AG 

Co, Miami, FL

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

10-Oct-07 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

CPL Samuel F. 

Pearson

Westrville, OH 88 RRC, 376th FIN 

Co, Whitehall, OH

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

5-Oct-07 OIF Bayji, Iraq CPL Rachael L. 

Hugo

Madison, WI 88 RRC, 303d MP Co, 

Jackson, MI

USARC Deployed 

AGR

28-Aug-07 OIF Kirkuk, Iraq SGT James S. 

Collins, Jr.

Rochester 

Hills, MI

88 RRC, 303d MP Co, 

Jackson, MI

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

12-Aug-07 OEF Kuzkalakhel, 

Afghanistan

SGT Charles B. 

Kitowski, II

Farmers 

Branch, TX

USACAPOC, 345th 

PO Co, Dallas, TX

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

14-Jun-07 OIF Kirkuk, Iraq SPC Farid El Azzouzi Paterson, NJ HRC - St. Louis

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

24-May-07 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SSG Russell K. 

Shoemaker

Sweet 

Springs, MO

108th DIV(IT), 2d Bde, 

Det 7, Garner, NC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

3-May-07 OIF Ar Ramadi, 

Iraq

SSG Coby G. 

Schwab

Puyallup, WA 70 RRC, 321st EN Bn, 

Hayden Lake, ID 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

3-May-07 OIF Ar Ramadi, 

Iraq

CPL Kelly B. Grothe Spokane, WA 70 RRC, 321st EN Bn, 

Hayden Lake, ID 

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

14-Apr-07 OIF Fallujah, Iraq SGT Joshua A. 

Schmit

Wilmar, MN HRC - St. Louis

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

14-Apr-07 OIF Fallujah, Iraq SGT Brandon L. 

Wallace

St. Louis, MO HRC - St. Louis

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

8-Feb-07 OIF Karmah, Iraq SGT James J. 

Holtom

Rexburg, ID 70 RRC, 321st EN Bn, 

Boise, ID

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

8-Feb-07 OIF Karmah, Iraq SGT Ross A. 

Clevenger

Givens Hot 

Springs, ID

70 RRC, 321st EN Bn, 

Boise, ID

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

8-Feb-07 OIF Karmah, Iraq PFC Raymond M. 

Werner

Boise, ID 70 RRC, 321st EN Bn, 

Boise, ID

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

31-Jan-07 OIF Balad, Iraq 

(after injuries 

from AR 

Ramadi, 

Iraq)

CPL Stephen D. 

Shannon

Guttenburg, IA 88 RRC, 397th EN Bn, 

Wausau, WI

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

26-Jan-07 OIF Sof Duwig, 

Iraq

MAJ Alan R. Johnson Yakima, WA USACAPOC, 402d CA 

Bn, Tonawanda, NY

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

20-Jan-07 OIF Karbala, Iraq CPT Brian S. 

Freeman

Temecula, CA USACAPOC, 412th 

CA Bn, Whitehall, OH
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

480

Command Status Date of 

Death OP Location of 

Death Rank Name HOR Unit

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

5-Jan-07 OIF Fallujah, Iraq MAJ Michael L. 

Mundell

Brandenburg, 

KY 

108 DIV(IT), 1st BDE, 

Det 6, Spartanburg,SC

USARC Mobilized SC

TPU

1-Jan-07 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SGT Thomas E. 

Vandling, Jr.

Pittsburgh, PA USACAPOC, 303d PO 

Co, Oakdale, PA

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

17-Oct-06 OIF Taji, Iraq SSG Ronald L. 

Paulsen

Vancouver, 

WA

USACAPOC, 414th 

CA Bn, Utica, NY

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

23-Sep-06 OIF Hor Al Bosh, 

Iraq

SSG Carlos NMN 

Dominguez

Savannah, GA USACAPOC, 414th 

CA Bn, Utica, NY

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

20-Sep-06 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

MSG Robb G. 

Needham

Vancouver, 

WA

91st DIV(TS), 1/356th 

Regt (Log Spt), Fort 

Lewis, WA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

17-Sep-06 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SGT Adam L. Knox Columbus, OH USACAPOC, 346th 

PO Co, Parma, OH

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

8-Sep-06 OEF Kabul, 

Afghanistan

SFC Merideth L. 

Howard

Alimeda, CA USACAPOC, 351st 

CA Cmd, 364th CA 

Bde, Portland, OR

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

8-Sep-06 OEF Kabul, 

Afghanistan

SSG Robert J. Paul The Dalles, 

OR

USACAPOC, 351st 

CA Cmd, 

Mountainview, CA 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

9-Jun-06 OIF Al 

Diwaniyah, 

Iraq

SPC Benjamin J. 

Slaven

Plymouth, NE 89 RRC, 308th TC Co, 

Lincoln, NE

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

9-Jun-06 OIF Kirkuk, Iraq SGT Jose M. Velez Bronx, NY 77 RRC, 773d TC Co, 

Fort Totten, NY

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

15-May-06 OIF LRMC (after 

MEDEVAC 

w/injuries 

from Al 

Hillah, Iraq)

CPT Shane R. 

Mahaffee

Gurnee, IL USACAPOC, 352d CA 

Cmd, 489th CA Bn, 

Knoxville, TN

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

5-May-06 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

1SG Carlos N. Saenz Las Vegas, NV USACAPOC, 351st 

CA Cmd, 490th CA 

Bn, Abilene, TX

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

5-May-06 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SPC Teodoro Torres Las Vegas, NV USACAPOC, 351st 

CA Cmd, 490th CA 

Bn, Abilene, TX

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

5-May-06 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SSG Nathan J. Vacho Janesville, WI USACAPOC, 352d CA 

Cmd, 489th CA Bn, 

Knoxville, TN

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

28-Mar-06 OIF Al 

Taquaddum, 

Iraq

SSG Robert 

Hernandez

Silver Spring, 

MD

80 DIV(IT), HQ, 

Richmond, VA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

12-Mar-06 OEF Asadabad, 

Afghanistan

SSG Joseph R. Ray Asheville, NC 81 RRC, 391st EN Bn, 

Asheville, NC

SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION
APPENDIX B

481

Command Status Date of 

Death OP Location of 

Death Rank Name HOR Unit

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

12-Mar-06 OEF Asadabad, 

Afghanistan

SGT Kevin D. Akins Burncville, NC 81 RRC, 391st EN Bn, 

Asheville, NC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

12-Mar-06 OEF Asadabad, 

Afghanistan

SGT Anton J. Hiett Mount Airy, NC 81 RRC, 391st EN Bn, 

Asheville, NC

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

12-Mar-06 OEF Asadabad, 

Afghanistan

SPC Joshua L. Hill Fairmount, IN 81 RRC, 391st EN Bn, 

Asheville, NC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

13-Feb-06 OEF North of Deh 

Rawod, 

Afghanistan

SSG Clinton T. 

Newman

San Antonio, 

TX

USACAPOC, 492d CA 

Bn, Phoenix, AZ

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

28-Dec-05 OEF Asadabad, 

Afghanistan

1SG Tobias C. 

Meister

Jenks, OK USACAPOC, 492d CA 

Bn, Phoenix, AZ

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

24-Dec-05 OIF Kirkuk, Iraq SGT Myla L. 

Maravillosa

Wahiawa, HI MIRC, 203d MI Bn, 

Aberdeen Proving 

Grounds, MD

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

23-Dec-05 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SGT Regina C. Reali Fresno, CA USACAPOC, 351st 

CA Cmd, 448th CA 

Bn, Fort Lewis, WA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

23-Dec-05 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SGT Cheyenne C. 

Willey

Fremont, CA USACAPOC, 351st 

CA Cmd, 

Mountainview, CA

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

10-Nov-05 OIF Taqaddum, 

Iraq

SGT Joshua A. 

Terando

Morris, IL HRC - St. Louis

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

31-Oct-05 OIF BAMC (after 

MEDEVAC 

w/injuries 

from FOB 

Speicher, 

Iraq)

SFC Matthew R. 

Kading

Madison, WI 88 RRC, 983d En Bn, 

Monclova, OH

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

31-Oct-05 OIF Balad, Iraq SSG Wilgene T. Lieto Saipan, 

Northern 

Mariana

9 RRC, 100th In Bn, 

Saipan, MP

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

31-Oct-05 OIF Balad, Iraq CPL Derence W. 

Jack

Saipan, 

Northern 

Mariana

9 RRC, 100th In Bn, 

Saipan, MP

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

26-Oct-05 OIF Landstuhl/G

E (after 

MEDEVAC 

w/injuries 

from Balad, 

Iraq)

SGT Evan S. Parker Arkansa, KS 9 RRC, 100th In Bn, 

Honolulu, HI

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

26-Oct-05 OIF Basraf, Iraq SGT James 

Witkowski

Surprise, AZ 63 RRC, 729th TC Co, 

Fresno, CA

SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

482

Command Status Date of 

Death OP Location of 

Death Rank Name HOR Unit

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

19-Oct-05 OIF Tikrit, Iraq SPC Kendell K. 

Frederick

Randallstown, 

MD

88 RRC, 983d En Bn, 

Monclova, OH

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

20-Sep-05 OIF Landstuhl/G

E (after 

MEDEVAC 

w/injuries 

from 

Ramadi, 

Iraq)

SGT Pierre A. 

Raymond

Lawrence, MA HRC - St. Louis

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

19-Sep-05 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SFC Lawrence E. 

Morrison

Yakima, WA USACAPOC, 490th 

CA Bn, Fort Sill, OK

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

30-Aug-05 OIF Al 

Iskandariyah

Iraq

MAJ Gregory J. 

Fester

Grand Rapids, 

MI

USACAPOC, 351st 

CA Cmd, 322d CA 

Bde, Fort Bragg, NC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

21-Aug-05 OIF Samarra, 

Iraq

SGT Joseph C. Nurre Wilton, CA 99 RRC, 463d En Bn, 

Weirton, WV

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

11-Aug-05 OEF Orgun E, 

Afghanistan

SGT Edward R. 

Heselton

Easley, SC 81 RRC, 391st En Bn, 

Greenville, SC 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

5-Aug-05 OIF Tal Uwaynat, 

Iraq

SFC Robert V. 

Derenda

Ledbetter, KY 98 DIV(IT), 1st Bde, 

1/417, Pennsauken, 

NJ 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

2-Aug-05 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SSG James D. 

McNaughton

Middle Village, 

NY

77 RRC, 306th MP Bn, 

Uniondale, NY

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

17-Jul-05 OIF Balad, Iraq SSG Frank F. Tiai Pago Pago, 

American 

Samoa

9 RRC, 100th In Bn, 

Pago Pago, AS

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

28-Jun-05 OIF Baqubah, 

Iraq

SPC Robert E. Hall, 

Jr.

Pittsburgh, PA 81 RRC, 467th En Bn, 

Greenwood, MS 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

8-Jun-05 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SGT Roberto Arizola, 

Jr.

Laredo, TX 90 RRC, 850th CS Co, 

Laredo, TX

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

7-Jun-05 OIF Tal Afar, Iraq LTC Terrence K. 

Crowe

New York, NY 98 DIV(IT), 4th Bde, 

Lodi, NJ

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

31-May-05 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SGT Miguel A. 

Ramos

Mayaguez, 

P.R.

65 RRC, 807th Sig 

Co, Puerto Nuevo, PR

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

20-May-05 OIF Balad, Iraq SGT Brad A. Wentz Gladwin, MI 88 RRC, 180th TC Co, 

Muskegon, MI 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

8-May-05 OIF Balad, Iraq SGT Gary A. Eckert, 

Jr.

Toledo, OH 88 RRC, 983d En Bn, 

Monclova, OH 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

22-Apr-05 OIF Tal Afar, Iraq SPC Gavin J. 

Colburn

Frankfort, OH 88 RRC, 542d TC Co, 

Kingsbury, IN 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

4-Apr-05 OIF Baladruz, 

Iraq

SSG Christopher W. 

Dill

Tonawanda, 

NY

98 DIV(IT), 2d Bde, 

2/390, Det 4, Webster, 

NY

SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION
APPENDIX B

483

Command Status Date of 

Death OP Location of 

Death Rank Name HOR Unit

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

21-Dec-04 OIF Mosul, Iraq MSG Paul D. 

Karpowich

Bridgeport, PA 98 DIV(IT), 1st Bde, 

Pennsauken, NJ

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

13-Nov-04 OIF Camp 

Victory, Iraq

SGT Catalin D. Dima White Lake, 

NY

77 RRC, 411th En 

Bde, New Windsor, NY

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

9-Nov-04 OIF Fallujah, Iraq SSG Todd R. Cornell West Bend, WI 84 DIV(IT), 1/339th 

MI, Fort Benning, GA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

8-Nov-04 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SGT Bryan L. 

Freeman

Lumberton, NJ USACAPOC, 353d CA 

Cmd, 443d CA Bn, 

Warwick, NJ

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

13-Oct-04 OIF Mosul, Iraq LTC Mark P. Phelan Green Lane, 

PA

USACAPOC, 350th 

CA Cmd, 416th CA 

Bn, Norristown, PA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

13-Oct-04 OIF Mosul, Iraq MAJ Charles R. 

Soltes, Jr.

Irvine, CA USACAPOC, 351st 

CA Cmd, 426th CA 

Bn, Upland, CA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

5-Oct-04 OIF Latfiyah, Iraq SSG Richard L. 

Morgan, Jr.

St. Clairsville, 

OH

88 RRC, 660th TC Co, 

Zanesville, OH

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

30-Sep-04 OIF BAMC (after 

MEDEVAC 

w/injuries 

from 

Anaconda, 

Iraq)

SPC Allen D. Nolan Marietta, OH 88 RRC, 660th TC Co, 

Zanesville, OH

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

8-Sep-04 OIF Balad, Iraq SPC Lauro G. 

DeLeon, Jr.

Floresville, TX 90 RRC, 644th TC Co, 

Beaumont, TX

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

6-Sep-04 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

PFC Devin J. Grella Medina, OH 88 RRC, 706th TC Co, 

Mansfield, OH

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

6-Sep-04 OIF Ivo 

Qayyarah 

West, Iraq

SPC Brandon M. 

Read

Greeneville, 

TN

81 RRC, 125th TC Co, 

Lexington, KY

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

17-Jul-04 OIF Bayji, Iraq SFC David A. 

Hartman

Akron, MI 88 RRC, 401st TC Co, 

Battle Creek, MI

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

1-Jul-04 OIF WRAMC 

(after 

MEDEVAC 

w/injuries 

from Mosul, 

Iraq)

SSG Stephen G. 

Martin

Rhinelander, 

WI

88 RRC, 330th MP 

Co, Sheboygan, WI

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

24-Jun-04 OIF Mosul, Iraq SSG Charles A. Kiser Cleveland, WI 88 RRC, 330th MP 

Co, Sheboygan, WI

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

16-Jun-04 OIF Balad, Iraq SGT Arthur S. 

Mastrapa

Apopka, FL 81 RRC, 351st MP Co, 

Ocala, FL 

SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

484

Command Status Date of 

Death OP Location of 

Death Rank Name HOR Unit

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

16-Jun-04 OIF Balad, Iraq SPC Jeremy M. 

Dimaranan

Virginia 

Beach, VA

99 RRC, 302d TC Co, 

Fort Eustis, VA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

9-Jun-04 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

PFC Thomas D. 

Caughman

Lexington, SC 81 RRC, 391st En Bn, 

Greenville, SC 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

6-Jun-04 OIF Taji, Iraq SGT Melvin Y. Mora Columbia, MO 89 RRC, 245th CS Co, 

St. Louis, MO 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

29-May-04 OEF Qalat, 

Afghanistan

SPC Joseph A. 

Jeffries

Beaverton, OR USACAPOC, 7 

PSYOPS, 320th PO 

Co, Portland, OR

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

14-May-04 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SGT James W. 

Harlan

Owensboro, 

KY

88 RRC, 660th TC Co, 

Cadiz, OH

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

26-Apr-04 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SGT Lawrence A. 

Roukey

Westbrook, 

ME

98 DIV(IT), 7th Bde, 

3/304, Det 1, 

Lewiston, ME

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

23-Apr-04 OIF Unknown, 

Iraq

SGT Elmer C. Krause Greensboro, 

NC

88 RRC, 724th TC Co, 

Bartonville, IL

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

9-Apr-04 OIF Route 

Cardinal, 

Iraq

PFC Gregory R. 

Goodrich

Bartonville, IL 88 RRC, 724th TC Co, 

Bartonville, IL

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

10-Mar-04 OIF BaQubah, 

Iraq

SPC Bert E. Hoyer ELLSworth, WI 88 RRC, 652d En Co, 

Ellsworth, WI

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

16-Feb-04 OIF BaQubah, 

Iraq

SPC Nichole M. Frye Lena, WI USACAPOC, 353d CA 

Cmd, 415th CA Bn, 

Kalamazoo, MI

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

5-Jan-04 OIF BAMC (after 

MEDEVAC 

w/injuries 

from Ar 

Ramadi, 

Iraq)

SPC Luke P. Frist West 

Lafayette, IN

88 RRC, 209th QM 

Co, Lafayette, IN

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

25-Dec-03 OIF BaQubah, 

Iraq

SSG Thomas W. 

Christensen

Atlantic Mine, 

MI

88 RRC, 652d En Co, 

Marquette, MI

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

25-Dec-03 OIF BaQubah, 

Iraq

SSG Stephen C. 

Hattamer

Gwinn, MI 88 RRC, 652d En Co, 

Marquette, MI

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

15-Nov-03 OIF Mosul, Iraq SFC Kelly M. L. Bolor Whittier, CA 63 RRC, 137th QM 

Co, (FS)(DS), South 

El Monte, CA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

9-Nov-03 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SGT Nicholas A. 

Tomko

Pittsburgh, PA 99 RRC, 307th MP 

Co, New Kensington, 

USARC Mobilized PA

TPU

20-Sep-03 OIF Abu Gareeb, 

Iraq

SGT David T. 

Friedrich

Hammond, NY 94 RRC, 325th MI Bn, 

B Co, Waterbury, CT

SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION
APPENDIX B

485

Command Status Date of 

Death OP Location of 

Death Rank Name HOR Unit

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

29-Aug-03 OIF Balad, Iraq SSG Mark A. Lawton Hayden, CO 96 RRC, 244th En Bn, 

Boulder, CO

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

27-Aug-03 OIF Al Hallia, 

Iraq

SGT Gregory A. 

Belanger

Narragansett, 

RI

94 RRC, HHSC 325th 

MI Bn, East Windsor, 

CT

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

18-Aug-03 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SGT Eric R. Hull Uniontown, PA 99 RRC, 307th MP 

Co, New Kensington, 

USARC Mobilized PA

TPU

26-Jul-03 OIF Dogwood, 

Iraq

SPC Jonathan M. 

Cheatham

Camden, AR 90 RRC, 489th En Bn, 

N. Little Rock, AR

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

21-Jul-03 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

CPL Mark A. Bibby Watha, NC USACAPOC, 360th 

CA Cmd, 422d CA Bn, 

Greensboro, NC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

16-Jul-03 OIF Biap, Iraq SPC Ramon ReyesTorresCaguas, P.R. 65 RRC, 432d TC Co, 

Ceiba, PR

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

9-Jul-03 OIF BaQubah, 

Iraq

SFC Dan H. 

Gabrielson

Spooner, WI 88 RRC, 652d En Co, 

Ellsworth, WI

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

19-Jun-03 OIF Tampa, Iraq SPC Paul T. 

Nakamura

Santa Fe 

Springs, CA

63 RRC, 437th Med 

Co, Moreno Valley, CA

OND 1

OEF 31

OIF 103

TOTAL 135

SOLDIERS KILLED IN ACTION

Command Status Date of 

Death OP Location of 

Death Rank Name HOR Unit

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

29-Aug-03 OIF Balad, Iraq SSG Mark A. Lawton Hayden, CO 96 RRC, 244th En Bn, 

Boulder, CO

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

27-Aug-03 OIF Al Hallia, 

Iraq

SGT Gregory A. 

Belanger

Narragansett, 

RI

94 RRC, HHSC 325th 

MI Bn, East Windsor, 

CT

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

18-Aug-03 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

SGT Eric R. Hull Uniontown, PA 99 RRC, 307th MP 

Co, New Kensington, 

USARC Mobilized PA

TPU

26-Jul-03 OIF Dogwood, 

Iraq

SPC Jonathan M. 

Cheatham

Camden, AR 90 RRC, 489th En Bn, 

N. Little Rock, AR

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

21-Jul-03 OIF Baghdad, 

Iraq

CPL Mark A. Bibby Watha, NC USACAPOC, 360th 

CA Cmd, 422d CA Bn, 

Greensboro, NC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

16-Jul-03 OIF Biap, Iraq SPC Ramon ReyesTorresCaguas, P.R. 65 RRC, 432d TC Co, 

Ceiba, PR

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

9-Jul-03 OIF BaQubah, 

Iraq

SFC Dan H. 

Gabrielson

Spooner, WI 88 RRC, 652d En Co, 

Ellsworth, WI

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

19-Jun-03 OIF Tampa, Iraq SPC Paul T. 

Nakamura

Santa Fe 

Springs, CA

63 RRC, 437th Med 

Co, Moreno Valley, CA

OND 1

OEF 31

OIF 103

TOTAL 135
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

486

Command Status Date of 

Death OP Location of Death Rank Name Unit

USARC Mobilzed 

TPU

06-Jul-12 OEF Afghanistan CPT McFarlane, 

Bruce A.

HHC, 1186th DDS Battalion, 1189th 

Transportation Bde, Jacksonville, FL

USARC Mobilzed 

TPU

26-Jun-12 OEF Kandahar, 

Afghanistan

SSG Leach, Mathew 

J.

108th trng Cmd, 334 Regt, 1st Bn, 

Det 2

USARC Mobilzed 

TPU

22-Sep-11 OND Baghdad, Iraq SGT Morales, Andy 

C.

196 TC 77 SB 310 ESC196, 377 

TSC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

17-Sep-11 OEF Bagram, 

Afghanistan

SGT Eppinger Jr, 

Garrick L.

395th OD CO, 142nd CSSB, 101st 

SBDE, JSC-A, 377 TSC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

17-Jan-11 OND Tikrit, Iraq MAJ Michael, Evarts

S

807th MDSC, 256 MC HSP CSH 

Det 20 Twinsburg, OH

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

12-Jan-11 OEF Salerno, 

Afghanistan

MAJ Evan J. Mooldyk 377 TSC, USAR Sustainment 

Command, AL 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

19-Nov-10 OEF Balad, Iraq SSG Gandy, Loleni w 377th TSC, 103 CS CMD HHC 

SUST (EXP), Des Moines, IA 

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

24-Sep-10 OIF IVO Kuwait 

City

SPC Whisenant, 

Marc C.

124th IN DIV, 46 AG BN RECP ES, 

FT KNOX, KY 40121

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

4-Jun-10 OEF IVO Kuwait 

City

SGT Theobald, Steve 

M

143 ESC 0287 TC CO DET 1 (CBT 

HET) ANNISTON ,SC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

22-Apr-10 OEF Kandahar, 

Afghanistan

CSM Laborde, John K 143th ESC 649th Combat Support 

Group, Cedar Rapids,IA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

4-Apr-10 OIF Baghdad, Iraq SGT Kruize, Kurt E 416th TEC (ENCOM),367 EN BN CO 

A (FWD SPT) ST CLOUD, MN

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

13-Mar-10 OIF Mosul, Iraq SPC Bishop J. 

Steven 

USACAPOC, 422nd CA Bn, 

Greensboro, NC 

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

15-Jan-10 OEF Kabul, 

Afghanistan

SFC Shannon, 

Michael

HRC-St. Louis /ISAF Joint Command

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

24-Jun-09 OIF Zubayr, Iraq SPC Casey L. Hills HRC-St. Louis / C Co. 100th Bn

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

25-Jun-09 OIF Arifjan, Kuwait SPC Joshua T. 

Hazlewood

377th TSC, 614th TC Det. Houston, 

TX

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

19-Jun-09 OIF Baghdad, Iraq SPC Chancellor A. 

Keesling

416th ENCOM, 961 En Co. 

Anderson, IN

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

11-May-09 OIF Baghdad, Iraq PFC Jacob D. Barton 416th TEC (ENCOM), 277th En Co. 

San Antonio, TX

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

11-May-09 OIF Baghdad, Iraq MAJ Matthew P. 

Houseal

807th MDSC, 55th MC Co., 

Indianapolis, IN

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

9-May-09 OIF Baghdad, Iraq SPC Omar M. Albrak HRC-St. Louis

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

18-Sep-08 OEF Bagram, 

Afghanistan

LTC James L. Wiley 0 88 RRC, 685th TC Co, Hobart, IN

NON BATTLE DEATHS
APPENDIX B

487

Command Status Date of 

Death OP Location of Death Rank Name Unit

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

17-Sep-08 OIF Baghdad, Iraq CPT Darrick D. 

Wright

0 70 RRC, 671st En Co, Portland, 

OR

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

14-Sep-08 OIF Camp 

Buehring, 

Kuwait

LTC Ralph J. Marino 0 88 RRC, 342d MP Co, Columbus, 

OH

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IMA

7-Aug-08 OIF Arifjan, Kuwait MSG Danny E. 

Maybin

HRC-St. Louis

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

1-Jun-08 OIF Ar Ramadi, 

Iraq

SPC Christopher D. 

McCarthy

0 88 RRC, 685th TC Co, Hobart, IN

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

22-Jan-08 OIF Kirkuk, Iraq SGT Michael R. 

Sturdivant

0 70 RRC, 671st En Co, Portland, 

OR

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

28-Oct-07 OEF Kabul, 

Afghanistan

MSG Thomas L. 

Bruner

0 88 RRC, 342d MP Co, Columbus, 

OH

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

29-Sep-07 OIF Diwaniyah, 

Iraq

SGT Chirasak 

Vidhyarkorn

HRC-St. Louis

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

14-Jun-07 OIF Talill, Iraq SPC Dustin R. Brisky 0 USACAPOC, 416th CA Bn, San 

Diego, CA

USARC Deployed 

AGR

11-Mar-07 OIF Iraq SFC Douglas C. 

Stone

0 77th RRC, 340th MP Co, Fort 

Totten, NY

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

28-Jan-07 OIF LSA Adder, 

Iraq

SPC Carla J. Stewart 63 RRC, 250th TC Co, El Monte, CA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

13-Nov-06 OIF Kaiserslautern

, Germany

LTC Peter E. 

Winston

143 TRANSCOM (Fwd), Orlando, FL

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

3-Jun-06 OIF Haditha, Iraq SSG Darren Harmon MIRC, 203d MI Bn, Aberdeen 

Proving Grounds, MD

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

7-Jan-06 OIF Umm Qasar, 

Iraq

SPC Robert T. 

Johnson

81 RRC, 805th MP Co, Raleigh, NC 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

7-Jan-06 OIF Zambar 

Mountain, Iraq

MAJ Stuart M. 

Anderson

89 RRC, 3rd COSCOM, Des Moines, 

IA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

7-Jan-06 OIF Umm Qasar, 

Iraq

SGT Nathan R. Field 89 RRC, 414th MP Bn, Joplin, MO

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

5-Nov-05 OIF Tallil, Iraq LTC Thomas A. 

Wren

80 DIV(IT), HQ, Richmond, VA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

25-Oct-05 OIF Ali Al Saleem, 

Kuwait

SPC Benjamin D. 

Hoeffner

USACAPOC, 324th PO Co, Aurora, 

CO

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

25-Oct-05 OIF Umm Qasar, 

Iraq

SPC Christopher T. 

Monroe

88 RRC, 785th MP Bn, Fraser, MI

HRC - St. 

Louis

Mobilized 

IRR

3-Oct-05 OIF WRAMC 

(after 

MEDEVAC 

w/injuries 

SGT Larry W. 

Pankey, Jr.

81 RRC, 467th En Bn, Greenwood, 

MS

NON BATTLE DEATHS
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

488

Command Status Date of 

Death OP Location of Death Rank Name Unit

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

27-Jul-05 OIF Al 

Taqqaddum, 

Iraq

CPT Benjamin D. 

Jansky

88 RRC, 983d En Bn, Monclova, OH

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

19-Jul-05 OIF Camp Arifjan, 

Kuwait

SSG Jeffrey J. 

Farrow

77 RRC, 146th CS Co, Fort Totten, 

NY

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

29-May-05 OIF Doha, Qatar LTC Albert E. Smart USACAPOC, 351st CA CMD, 321st 

CA Bde, Fort Bragg, NC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

6-Apr-05 OEF Ghazni, 

Afghanistan

MAJ David S. 

Connolly

94 RRC, 1173d USA Trans TTU, 

Brockton, MA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

8-Feb-05 OEF Kandahar, 

Afghanistan

SPC Richard M. 

Crane

89 RRC, 325th MC Co, 

Independence, MO

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

13-Dec-04 OIF North of 

Cedar, Iraq

SGT Tina S. Time 63 RRC, 208th TC Co, Tucson, AZ

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

7-Nov-04 OIF Kenton, OH 

(after 

MEDEVAC 

w/illness from 

Unknown, 

Iraq)

SFC Otie J. McVey 88 RRC, 706th TC Co, Kenton, OH

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

3-Oct-04 OIF BAMC (after 

MEDEVAC 

w/injuries 

from 

Unknown, 

Iraq)

SSG James L. 

Pettaway

99 RRC, 223d TC Co, Norristown, 

PA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

27-Aug-04 OIF Fallujah, Iraq PFC Luis A. Perez 99 RRC, 223d TC Co, Norristown, 

PA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

25-Aug-04 OIF Tikrit, Iraq SPC Charles L. 

Neeley

88 RRC, 454th TC Co, Columbus, 

OH

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

24-Aug-04 OIF Fallujah, Iraq SSG Donald N. Davis 88 RRC, 660th TC Co, Zanesville, 

OH

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

12-Jul-04 OEF Bagram, 

Afghanistan

SPC Juan M. Torres 90 RRC, 453d TC Co, Houston, TX 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

4-Jul-04 OEF LRMC (after 

MEDEVAC 

w/illness from 

Bagram, 

Afghanistan)

SPC Julie R. Hickey USACAPOC, 352d CA CMD, 412th 

CA Bn, Ft Bragg, NC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

14-May-04 OIF Baghdad, Iraq CSM Edward C. 

Barnhill

USACAPOC, 350th CA CMD, 431st 

CA Bn, North Little Rock, AR

NON BATTLE DEATHS
APPENDIX B

489

Command Status Date of 

Death OP Location of Death Rank Name Unit

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

9-May-04 OIF Baghdad, Iraq SGT Rodney A. 

Murray

81 RRC, 351st MP Co, Ocala, FL

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

18-Mar-04 OIF Balad, Iraq SPC Doron N. Chan 77 RRC, 411th En Bde, New 

Windsor, NY

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

25-Feb-04 OEF Kabul, 

Afghanistan

SPC David E. Hall 81 RRC, 805th MP Co, Raleigh, NC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

29-Jan-04 OEF Ghazni, 

Afghanistan

SFC Curtis Mancini USACAPOC, 350th CA CMD, 486th 

CA Bn, Tulsa, OK

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

29-Jan-04 OEF Ghazni, 

Afghanistan

SGT Danton K. 

Seitsinger

USACAPOC, 350th CA CMD, 486th 

CA Bn, Tulsa, OK

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

29-Jan-04 OEF Ghazni, 

Afghanistan

SPC Adam G. Kinser USACAPOC, 7 PSYOPS, 304th PO 

Co, Sacramento, CA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

29-Jan-04 OEF Ghazni, 

Afghanistan

SSG James D. 

Mowris

81 RRC, 805th MP Co, Raleigh, NC

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

19-Dec-03 OIF Balad, Iraq SPC Charles E. 

Bush, Jr.

USACAPOC, 352d CA CMD, 402d 

CA Bn, Tonawanda, NY

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

26-Nov-03 OIF Qayyarah, 

Iraq

SGT David J. 

Goldberg

96 RRC, 52d En Bn (Multicompo), 

Fort Carson, CO

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

3-Oct-03 OEF Incirlik, 

Turkey

LTC Paul W. 

Kimbrough

416 ENCOM, 28th FET, Moon 

Township, PA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

7-Sep-03 OIF WRAMC, 

(after 

MEDEVAC 

w/injuries 

from Cedarl, 

Iraq)

SGT Jarret B. 

Thompson

99 RRC, 946th TC Co, Lewes, DE

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

1-Sep-03 OIF Camp Arifjan, 

Kuwait

SSG Cameron B. 

Sarno

63 RRC, 257th TC Co, Las Vegas, 

NV

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

27-Aug-03 OIF Camp Arifjan, 

Kuwait

LTC Anthony L. 

Sherman

USACAPOC, 353d CA CMD, 304th 

CA Bde, Philadelphia, PA

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

20-Aug-03 OIF Scania, Iraq SGT Kenneth W. 

Harris, Jr. 

81 RRC, 212th TC Co, Chattanooga, 

TN 

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

12-Aug-03 OIF Ar Ramadi, 

Iraq

SSG Richard S. 

Eaton, Jr.

99 RRC, 323d MI Bn, Ft Meade, MD

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

13-Jul-03 OIF Babylon, Iraq CPT Paul J. Cassidy USACAPOC, 352d CA CMD, 352d 

CA Bn, Kalamazoo, MI

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

13-Jul-03 OIF Ad Diwaniyah, 

Iraq

SGT Jaror C. PuelloCoronado77 RRC, 310th MP Bn, Uniondale, 

NY

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

1-Jul-03 OIF Dogwood, 

Iraq

1SG Christopher D. 

Coffin

USACAPOC, 352d CA CMD, 352d 

CA Bn, Riverdale, MI

NON BATTLE DEATHS
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

490

Command Status Date of 

Death OP Location of Death Rank Name Unit

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

22-Apr-03 OIF Iraq SPC Roy Buckley 88 RRC, 685th TC Co, Hobart, IN

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

22-Mar-03 OIF Iraq SPC Brandon Tobler 70 RRC, 671st En Co, Portland, OR

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

24-Sep-02 OEF Guantanamo 

Bay, Cuba

SSG Ryan D. Foraker 88 RRC, 342d MP Co, Columbus, 

OH

OND 2

OEF 21

OIF 51

TOTAL 74

NON BATTLE DEATHS

Command Status Date of 

Death OP Location of Death Rank Name Unit

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

22-Apr-03 OIF Iraq SPC Roy Buckley 88 RRC, 685th TC Co, Hobart, IN

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

22-Mar-03 OIF Iraq SPC Brandon Tobler 70 RRC, 671st En Co, Portland, OR

USARC Mobilized 

TPU

24-Sep-02 OEF Guantanamo 

Bay, Cuba

SSG Ryan D. Foraker 88 RRC, 342d MP Co, Columbus, 

OH

OND 2

OEF 21

OIF 51

TOTAL 74
APPENDIX B

491

AR KIA

1

31

103

TOTAL 135

AR NON BATTLE DEATH OCONUS

OPERATION NEW DAWN 2

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 21

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

OPERATION NEW DAWN

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

51

TOTAL 74

GRAND TOTAL 209

KIA WIA Total 

OEF 31 384 415

OIF/OND 104 1563 1667

TOTAL 135 1947 2082

AR Casualties 

CASUALTY SUMMARY

AR KIA

1

31

103

TOTAL 135

AR NON BATTLE DEATH OCONUS

OPERATION NEW DAWN 2

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 21

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

OPERATION NEW DAWN

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

51

TOTAL 74

GRAND TOTAL 209

KIA WIA Total 

OEF 31 384 415

OIF/OND 104 1563 1667

TOTAL 135 1947 2082

AR Casualties 
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

492

The ceremonial flags, combat boots, ID tags, and M4 rifle of 

a Fallen Soldier.

Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
GLOSSARY

493

GLOSSARY OF SELECTED TERMS

AGR: Active Guard/Reserve. AGR refers to National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers serving on active duty or full-time National Guard duty in the 

AGR program in support of the reserve component. It also applies to active 

Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve headquarters, commands, agencies, 

and units having active guard/reserve soldiers assigned or attached.

Asymmetric: In the realm of military affairs and national security, asymmetry 

is acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action. Asymmetric can be used to refer to unconventional warfare such as weapons of mass destruction and cyber-terrorism. 

Cadre Division: The cadre division is the nucleus of trained professional 

soldiers forming the basis for the training of new units.

Combat Support: Combat support forces provide direct support of the forces 

on the battlefield by providing intelligence, communications, engineering, and 

chemical warfare services of immediate impact on the course of the battle. 

Combat Service Support: Combat service support forces provide administrative and technical (logistical) services to ensure that the combat and combat 

support forces are sufficiently manned, fed, fueled, maintained, and moved as 

required. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of 

war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. 

Cross-Level: Cross-level refers to a soldier who is voluntarily or involuntarily 

assigned from one unit/major subordinate command/component to another in 

order to increase personnel readiness in an alerted or sourced unit. This action 

can be done between reserve and active components. Cross-leveling between 

the Army Reserve and National Guard is not authorized. Cross-leveling between Army Reserve and major subordinate commands requires commanding 

general and USARC approval. 
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

494

Downtrace: Downtrace refers to units that fall under other units for command and control. 

Forward/Main: Forward usually denotes closer to the enemy while main is 

in the rear.

IMA: Individual Mobilization Augmentee. An IMA is an individual reservist attending drills who receives training and is pre-assigned to an active 

component organization, a Selective Service System, or a Federal Emergency 

Management Agency billet that must be filled on, or shortly after, mobilization. Individual Mobilization Augmentees train on a part-time basis with these 

organizations to prepare for mobilization. Inactive duty training for individual 

mobilization augmentees is decided by component policy and can vary from 

zero to forty-eight drills a year.

IRR: Individual Ready Reserve. The Individual Ready Reserve consists of 

those Ready Reservists not in the Selected Reserve. 

Maneuver Brigades: Maneuver brigades are major combat units of all types 

of divisions. They can also be organized as separate units.

MTOE: Modified Table of Equipment. A Modified Table of Equipment is 

an authorization document that prescribes the modifications to a basic TOE 

which are necessary to adapt its mission, capabilities, organization, personnel, 

and equipment to meet the needs of a specific unit or group of units. The Modified Table of Equipment gives the major Army command (MACOM) commander a way to modify the standard TOE for one or more of the TOE units 

under his command. The Modified Table of Equipment authorizes the reorganization of a specific unit to meet the requirements of the command to which 

the unit is assigned. A Department of the Army (DA)-published Modified Table 

of Equipment is the official authorization document for the TOE units and is 

the authority for organization property on hand in the organization. In short, 

it is a table of organization and equipment that has been approved and is what 

a unit uses to determine what personnel and equipment it needs to complete 

its mission.

MOS: Military Occupational Specialty. The military occupational specialty is 

a code used to identify jobs in the U.S. Army. MOSs provide a simple way for 

commanders to identify the personnel needs for their units. 

NCO: Noncommissioned Officer. A noncommissioned officer is an enlisted 

member of the armed forces, such as a corporal, sergeant, or petty officer, appointed to a rank conferring leadership over other enlisted personnel.
GLOSSARY

495

Operational Force: An operational force is a force of first resort, deployed 

immediately in an operation. It is a complimentary force.

OPTEMPO: Operational Tempo. OPTEMPO refers to the rate of military 

actions or missions. 

Power Projection Platforms: Power projection platforms are Army installations that strategically deploy one or more high priority active component 

brigades or larger and/or mobilize and deploy high priority Army Reserve component units. Their primary function is to train and deploy fully capable and 

ready forces to combatant commanders. 

Ready Reserve: The Ready Reserve is comprised of military members of the 

reserve and National Guard, organized in units or as individuals, both of which 

are subject to recall to active duty to augment the active component in time of 

war or national emergency. The Ready Reserve consists of the Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, and Inactive National Guard. 

Selected Reserve: The Selected Reserve of the Army consists of those units 

and individuals in the Ready Reserve designated as so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other Reserves. The Selected Reserve includes officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers who are:

1. Members of the Army National Guard

2. Assigned to troop program units of the Army Reserve

3. Serving on active duty (Title 10 USC 12301(d)) or full-time duty (Title 

32 USC 502f) in an Active Guard/Reserve status

4. Individual Mobilization Augmentees

Strategic Force: Strategic force refers to a force of secondary resort and deployed later in an operation. It is a supplemental force. 

TDA: Table of Distribution and Allowances. The Table of Distribution and 

Allowances is a document which prescribes the organizational structure, personnel, and equipment authorizations, and requirements of a military unit to 

perform a specific mission for which there is no appropriate table of organization and equipment. Army units are divided between table of organization 

and equipment units that are doctrinally defined operational Army field unit, 

and table of distribution and allowances non-tactical, non-doctrinal units such 

as fixed facilities, command and control headquarters, and other Army/joint 

organizations, both in the continental United States and overseas.
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

496

Rock Drill, Heather Engelhart. (Courtesy of the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of 

Military History)
GLOSSARY

497
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

498

TOE: Table of Organization and Equipment. The Table of Organization and 

Equipment is a document which prescribes the normal mission, organizational 

structure, and personnel and equipment requirements for a military unit, and is 

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Plewes, Lieutenant General Thomas J. “Army Reserve Overview,” Statement Before the Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on Armed 

Services, U.S. Senate, February 13, 2002, https://usarcintra/cioweb/

CdrsCorner/ AROverview,13 Feb02.htm, Historian’s files, U.S. Army 

Reserve Command.

_____. “Reflections from LTG Thomas J. Plewes at the Close of a 36-Year 

Career,” May 20, 2002, https://usarcintra/cioweb/CdrsCorner/ltgplewesretmsg.htm, Historian’s files, U.S. Army Reserve Command.

Pullen, Lieutenant Colonel Randy. “Army Reserve Gains Its First Three-Star 

Chief,” June 21, 2001, http://www.army.mil/usar/newsstories/plewes3star.html, Historian’s files, U.S. Army Reserve Command.

_____. “Change is in your hands, reserve chief tells Soldiers,” http://www.emilitary.org/article.php?-4875, Historian’s files, U.S. Army Reserve Command.

Reimer, General Dennis J. Remarks to the Reserve Officers Association, January 25, 1999, http://apps.business.ualberta.ca/rfield/Speeches/Dennis%20Reimer%20Jan%2025%2109, Historian’s files, U.S. Army Reserve Command.
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

530

Rhem, Kathleen. “President Bush proclaims end to major combat operations in Iraq,” May 2, 2003, http: //www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123004771, Historian’s files, U.S. Army Reserve Command.

Ronald Reagan Speeches. Remarks at the Brandenburg Gate, West Berlin, June 

12, 1987, http://www.ronald reagan.com/sp_11.html, Historian’s files, 

U.S. Army Reserve Command.

Rumsfeld, Donald. “New Model Army,” http:www.jwar.org.uk/news-archive, 

no date, Historian’s files, U.S. Army Reserve Command.

Santana, Rebecca. “U.S. enters final phase of Iraq,” Army Times, http://www.

army.times.com/news/2010/09/ap-final-phase-of--iraq-war-090110/, 

Historian’s files, U.S. Army Reserve Command.

Spradin, Specialist Jennifer. “Chief of the Army Reserve visits troops in Kandahar,” http://www.army.mil/news/2011/01/25/50771-chief-of-the-army-reserve-troops-in-kandahar/, Historian’s files, U.S. Army Reserve 

Command.

Stultz, Lieutenant General Jack C. Jr. “Sustain Commitment: Prepare for Unexpected Army Reserve reshapes the force to serve Soldiers and the 

nation better,” http://www.roa.org/site/PageServer?pagename=0912_

USAR, Historian’s files, U.S. Army Reserve Command.

Sullivan, Jerry. “The Reserve’s commitment to Special Operations,” Army,

April 1997, http://findarticles.com/p/arttcles/mi_qa3723/is_199704/

ai_n8766135/, Historian’s files, U.S. Army Reserve Command.

Tiboni, Frank. “Army transformation changes direction,” October 13, 2000, 

http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2003/1013/cov-army-10-13-03.asp, 

Historian’s files, U.S. Army Reserve Command.

Valdes, Manuel. “4th Stryker troops start returning to Lewis,” Army Times, August 19, 2010, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/08/ap-armyiraq-stryker-brigade-returns-to-lewis, Historian’s files, U.S. Army 

Reserve Command.

West, Togo, Jr. and General Dennis J. Reimer. A Statement on the Posture of 

the United States Army Fiscal Year 1998, Presented to the Committees 

and Subcommittees of the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives, February 1997, Executive Summary, no date, http://www.army.mil/

aps/98/TITLE.HTM, Historian’s files, U.S. Army Reserve Command.
INDEX

531

Units

1st Armored Division 164

1st Battalion, 3d Marines 281

1st Infantry Division 291

1st Training Brigade, U.S. Army 

Civil Affairs and Psychological Operation Command 

(Airborne) 392

3d Armored Cavalry Regiment xv, 

198

3d Battalion, 87th Infantry 23

3d Expeditionary Sustainment 

Command 419, 420

3d Infantry Division 334

3d Infantry Regiment 261

3d Medical Command 190

3d Princess Patricia’s Canadian 

Light Infantry 274

4th Infantry Division 190, 191

4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) 

178

4th Psychological Operations 

Group (Airborne) 104

4th Stryker Brigade 299

4th U.S. Army 43

5-159th Aviation Battalion 416

7th ARCOM 218

8th Battalion, 229th Aviation Regiment 216, 294

9th ARCOM 214

9th Theater Army Area Command 

353

9th Theater Support Command 353

10th Mountain Division 124, 216, 

274, 277

11th Aviation Command 359

11th Military Police Brigade 299, 372

14th Quartermaster Detachment xii, 

27, 28, 212

20th Support Command 421

22d Support Command 20, 25

22nd Reserve Sustainment Battalion 

xxiii, 411

30th Brigade Combat Team 291

32nd Medical Logistics Battalion, 

44th Medical Command 267

33d Aviation Group xiv, 140

40th Transportation Truck Company 

353

43d Adjutant General Detachment 

(GS Postal) 124

43d Medical Detachment (Veterinary 

Service 421

54th Quartermaster Company 201

63d Regional Support Command 230, 

356

65th ARCOM 233

70th Division 93

70th Training Division (Functional 

Training) xxii, 375, 385

INDEX
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

532

75th Battle Command Training 

Division 377

75th Division (Exercise) 91

75th Training Support Division 196

76th Division 93

77th Regional Support Command 

xvii, 253, 266

78th Operations Group 377

78th Training Support Division 196

79th Quartermaster Company (Water Supply) 36

80th Division 388

80th Division (Institutional Training) 93

80th Training Command Regional 

Training Maintenance xxii, 

378

80th Training Command (Total 

Army School System) 375, 

376

81st Regional Support Command 

356

82d Airborne Division 133

84th Division (Institutional Training) 93

84th Training Command (Leader 

Readiness) 375, 377

84th U.S. Army Reserve Readiness 

Training Command xxii, 

381

85th Training Support Division 196

87th Division (Exercise) 91

87th Training Support Division 196

88th Regional Readiness Command 

371

88th Regional Support Command 

356, 422, 425

89th Regional Readiness Command 

373

89th Regional Support Command 

227

90th Regional Readiness Command 

370

90th Regional Support Command 

202, 391

91st Operations Group 377

91st Training Support Division 196

94th Military Police Company xxiv, 

424

94th Training Division (Force Sustainment) 375

95th Division (Institutional Training) 

93, 227

95th Training Division (Initial Entry 

Training) 375

96th Civil Affairs Battalion 98

96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) 127

98th Division (Institutional Training) 

93, 383

98th Training Division (Initial Entry 

Training) 375

99th Regional Readiness Command 

358

99th Regional Support Command 

214, 356

100th Battalion, 442d Infantry Regiment xxii, 387

100th Division (Institutional Training) 93

100th Training Division 375

101st Airborne Division 274, 277

103d Expeditionary Sustainment 

Commands 365

104th Division (Institutional Training) 93

104th Training Division (Leader 

Training) 375

108th Division (Institutional Training) 93

108th Training Command xx, 304
INDEX

533

108th Training Command (Initial 

Entry Training) 375, 377

108th Training Command (Total 

Army School System) 377

108th Training Division xx, xxii, 

305, 306, 388

109th Medical Detachment (Veterinary) 230

125th ARCOM 211

129th Adjutant General Company 

(General Support) (Postal) 

124

143d Expeditionary Sustainment 

Command 363, 365

143d Transportation Command 

122, 200, 214, 391

143d Transportation Command 

(Forward) xxi, 363

168th Engineer Company xxiii, 411

195th Contract Supervision Detachment 291

200th Military Police Command 

xxi, 362, 367

205th Infantry Brigade, 6th Infantry 

Division (Roundout) xiii, 79

206th Transportation Company 

xxi, 366

244th Aviation Brigade 401

249th Engineer Battalion (Prime 

Power) Multi-Component 

353

264th Service Company xxi, 374

272d Military Intelligence Company (Linguist) 217

287th Transportation Company, 

143d Expeditionary Sustainment Command xix, 285

308th Civil Affairs Brigade 123

310th Chemical Company (Biological Integrated Detection) 

190, 221

310th Expeditionary Sustainment 

Command 365

310th Psychological Operations Battalion xviii, 277, 280

310th Theater Support Command 

353

311th Expeditionary Sustainment 

Command 365

311th Quartermaster Company 

(Mortuary Affairs) xviii, 261, 

263, 267

311th Theater Signal Command 361

316th Expeditionary Sustainment 

Command xii, 28, 358, 365

316th Quartermaster Company 18

318th Transportation Agency (Movement Control) 20

320th Military Police Company xix, 

291, 295

322d Civil Affairs Brigade 96, 417

322d Civil Affairs Group 123

323d Engineer Detachment (Fire 

Fighting) 291, 294

325th Field Hospital 278

327th Engineer Company xvi, 228, 

229

335th Theater Signal Command 24, 

361, 391

342d Military Police Detachment 

(Law and Order) 279

344th Maintenance Company 121

345th Military Intelligence Detachment 277

346th Psychological Operations Company xxiii, 406

351st Civil Affairs Command 98, 123

351st Military Police Company xxii, 

389

352d Civil Affairs Command 127

353d Civil Affairs Command 123

353d Engineer Group 202, 222, 293
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

534

354th Civil Affairs Brigade 122

360th Transportation Truck Company 353

361st Engineer Battalion 279

362d Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply) xx, 289, 303

362nd Psychological Operations 

Company 392

364th Civil Affairs Battalion 98

364th Civil Affairs Brigade, Joint 

Provisional Reconstruction 

Team 474

369th Transportation Company 

291

370th Quartermaster Battalion 

(Water Supply) 227

372d Quartermaster Battalion xvii, 

233

377th Theater Army Area Command 25

377th Theater Support Command 

289

377th Theater Sustainment Command xxiv, 364, 418, 419, 

420

382d Military Police Detachment 

xxii, 387

391st Combat Engineer Battalion 

281

391st Engineer Battalion 279

392d Chemical Company 421

401st Civil Affairs Battalion xv, 198

401st Engineer Company 372

402d Civil Affairs Company xiv, 

122, 123

405th Combat Support Hospital xv, 

203

411th Engineer Battalion, Horizontal Platoon xvi, 227

412th Theater Engineer Command 

362

413th Civil Affairs Company 123

416th Engineer Command 202

416th Theater Engineer Command 

299, 362

416th Transportation Truck Company 

353

418th Civil Affairs Company 122

420th Engineer Brigade 391

420th Engineer Brigade Personal 

Security Detail 475

431st Civil Affairs Company 122

432d Civil Affairs Battalion xxiv, 426

432d Civil Affairs Company 122

441st Medical Company xiv, 110

445th Medical Detachment (Veterinary Services) 289, 290

445th Transportation Group 227

459th Engineer Company (Multi-Role 

Bridge) 213, 289, 292, 297

463d Engineer Battalion xxiii, 393

490th Chemical Battalion 221

493d Engineer Group (Combat) 391

505th Parachute Infantry Regiment 

133

551st Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) 201

555th Quartermaster Platoon (Mortuary Affairs) 201

630th Transportation Company xx, 

302

632d Maintenance Company, 110th 

Combat Sustainment Support 

Battalion, 224th Sustainment 

Brigade, 103d Expeditionary 

Sustainment Command xix, 

297

652d Engineer Company xxi, xxii, 

373, 382

660th Heavy Equipment Truck 37

682d Maintenance Company xv, 205

704th Chemical Company 421
INDEX

535

705th Transportation Company, 

475th Quartermaster Group 

xxi, 371

711th Adjutant General Postal 

Company (Provisional) 123, 

124

724th Military Police Battalion xix, 

291, 296

724th Transportation Company 

474

728th Engineer Detachment (Utilities) 202

729th Transportation Company 

474

741st Adjutant General Company 

(Postal) 301

783d Military Police Battalion xxii, 

386

800th Military Police Brigade 

(EPW) 20, 21

802d Ordnance Company (Ammunition) 289

830th Station Hospital xv, 204

854th Quartermaster Company xvi, 

226, 227

872d Maintenance Company xxiii, 

395

911th Forward Surgical Team 277

934th Forward Surgical Team, 

807th Medical Deployment 

Support Command xviii, 

279

946th Transportation Company 

(Terminal Transfer) 23

947th Forward Surgical Team 277

949th Transportation Company 

(Floating Craft) 213

980th Engineer Battalion (Combat 

Heavy) 202

1176th Transportation Terminal 

Unit xi, 15

1179th Deployment Support Brigade 

(DSB) xvii, 254

1184th Transportation Terminal Battalion 293

1863d Medical Detachment 277

1880th Medical Detachment (Logistics Support) 267

4005th U.S. Army Hospital 217

4220th United States Army Hospital 

xxiii, 412

5038th U.S. Army Reserve Forces 

School 208

5502d United States Army Hospital 

xxiv, 415

7210th Medical Support Unit xvii, 

229

7223d Medical Support Unit 414

7229th Medical Support Unit (MSU) 

xvi, 228

7238th Medical Support Unit xxiii, 

412

A

Abbott, Chaplain Kerry 282

Abrams Doctrine 4, 19, 463

Abrams, General Creighton W., Jr. 4, 

19, 463

A Company, 361st Engineer Battaliion 

279, 280, 281

Active Component Support to Reserve Component Program 

194

Active Guard Reserve 180, 349

Advanced Noncommissioned Officer 

Course 94, 194

Advanced Warfighting Experiment 

Task Force XXI 178

Afghanistan xviii, xix, 267, 274, 277, 

278, 279, 281, 283, 285, 309, 

312, 327, 333, 384, 469

Aguadilla, Puerto Rico xviii, 261, 267
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

536

AH-1 Cobra 113

AH-64 Apache 113

AH-94A Apache 193

Air Area Defense Command 201

Air Force Reserve 395

AirLand Battle 57

AirLand Battle-Future 57

Air National Guard 395

Alabama xiv, xxiii, 140, 186, 190, 

417

Alaska 3, 79, 230

Albania 127

Alberto tropical storm 137

Albuquerque, New Mexico xvii, 

233

Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building 

222

Allenstown, New Hampshire xxiv, 

424

al-Qaeda 274, 277, 283, 309

American Trucking Association 

436

AM General Corporation 210

Aned, Afghanistan 280

Antwerp, Belguim 122

Applied Suicide Intervention Skills 

Training 431

Arab-Israeli War 251

Arden Hills, Minnesota 293

Arizona 227, 373, 391

Arkansas xxii, 186, 382

Arkansas River xxii, 382

Arlington, Virginia xviii, 261, 263, 

264, 265

Armed Forces Health Longitudinal 

Technology Application 415

Armed Forces Reserve Medal 4

Armed Forces Reserve Medal with 

M Device 5, 7

Armed Forces Structure Act of 1996 

169

Army After Next 177, 178, 204, 468

Army/American Council on Education Registry Transcript 

System 431

Army Family Action Plan 232

Army Force Generation 335, 336, 338, 

339, 340, 348, 366, 369, 371, 

372, 373, 378, 381, 393, 396, 

400, 401, 402, 468, 469

Army Knowledge Management 322

Army Materiel Command 121, 214, 

393

Army National Guard 21, 24, 27, 32, 

37, 51, 52, 53, 55, 59, 73, 75, 77, 

80, 81, 84, 85, 88, 91, 105, 107, 

133, 134, 136, 137, 172, 176, 

180, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 

197, 199, 214, 215, 218, 221, 

230, 266, 288, 293, 313, 326, 

333, 335, 336, 343, 345, 353, 

358, 377, 395, 417, 433, 434, 

463, 465, 468, 469, 470

Army of Excellence 58

Army Reserve Command (ARCOM) 

186

Army Reserve Council of Colonels 

187

Army Reserve Employer Relations 

(ARER) Program 435

Army Reserve Expeditionary Force 

339, 340

Army Reserve Family Action Program 

Advisory Council 232

Army Reserve Forces Schools 94

Army Reserve Logistics for the 

Twenty-First Century (ARLOG-XXI) 401

Army Reserve Medical Command 

360

Army Reserve Personnel Center 16, 

33, 66, 95, 144, 187
INDEX

537

Army Reserve Recruiting Assistance Program 348

Army Reserve Sustainment Command 365

Army Reserve Training Strategy 

368, 369

Army Reserve TSD East 377

Army Reserve TSD West 377

Army Reserve Voluntary Education 

Services Program 430

Army Select Reserve Dental Readiness System 407, 412, 413

Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command 209

Army Training Requirements and 

Resources System 91

Army Vision 2010 177, 468

Army War College 390

Army XXI 178, 468

Arrunategui. Specialist Rosa 254

Asadabad, Afghanistan 281

Asheville, North Carolina 279

Asia 3

Aspen Institute Symposium 66

Aspin, Les 50, 52

Atlanta, Georgia 42, 120, 227

ATLANTIC RESOLVE 91

Augusta, Georgia 227

Aurora, Colorado xxiv, 415

Aviation 52, 53, 113, 115, 136, 137, 

192, 221, 293, 321, 349, 360, 

397, 400

Aviation Support Facility (Scott Air 

Force Base) 136

Az Zubayr, Iraq 389

B

Baghdad, Iraq xxii, xxviii, 289, 292, 

387, 389

Bagram, Afghanistan 278

Bagram Air Base 277

Bahrain 290

Balad, Iraq 474

Balkans 161, 333

Baratz, Major General Max 25, 32, 53, 

59, 62, 94, 95, 172, 186, 201

Barnett, Major Scott xxv, 431

Base Force 47, 50, 169, 468

Base Realignment and Closure 144, 

148, 190, 234, 436, 437, 438, 439

Base Realignment and Closure Act 

189

Base Transition Coordinators (BTC) 

Program 438

Basic Noncommissioned Officer 

Course 94

Bass, Sergeant First Class Harry 254

Basurto, Staff Sergeant Fabian 229

Battle Command Training Program 

199

Battle Creek, Michigan 136

Battle-Focused Training Management 

System 199

Battle Projection Center 95

B Company, 361st Engineer Battalion 

280

Beahm, Colonel Robert H. 122

Belarus 127

Belgium 122, 217

Belle Chasse, Louisiana 419

Belorussia 11

Berlin Wall 1, 5, 9, 36, 180

Berry, Brigadier General Alton xxii, 

385

Bill, Specialist Ashley 410

bin Laden, Osama 274

Birmingham, Alabama xxiii, 411

Bjork, Sergeant John 124

BLAZING TRAILS 202

Blevins, 1st Lieutenant Angela 123

Bogalusa, Louisiana 121

Bohlman, Major Hal xv, 204
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

538

BOLD SHIFT 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 194

Bolivia 96

Bosnia-Herzegovina 161, 164, 165, 

215, 216, 217, 219, 221

Bottom-Up Review 50, 51, 52, 54, 

167, 169, 468

Brevard, North Carolina xxiv, 427, 

428

Bridgeport, West Virginia 289, 292

BRIDGEX 391

Brigade Command and Battle Staff 

Training Program 196

BRIGHT STAR 96, 202, 392

Broward County, Florida xix, 296

Bucca, Warrant Officer 1 Ronald 

P. 251

Bulgaria 127

Burba, General Edwin 42, 80

Bush, George H. W. 10, 11, 14, 16, 

17

Bush, George W. 249, 251, 267, 272, 

283, 288, 299, 431

C

C-12 aircraft 105, 400

C-47B helicopter 115

C-141 aircraft 36

California xv, xxii, 95, 186, 198, 234, 

385, 418

CALL FORWARD 201

Calvin, Sergeant Gerald 281

Cameroon 123

Camp Arifjan 363

Campbell, General Charles C. xxv, 

439, 440

Camp Dogwood 289

Camp Doha, Kuwait 301

Camp Kilmer 234

Camp Parks 95, 418

Camp Pedrickson 234

Camp Taji 390

Cannon, Colonel James C. 25

Canton, Ohio xv, 205

CAPSTONE 23, 24, 25, 80, 95

Caraveo, Major Libardo E. 432

Card, Andy 249

Carroll, Colonel Less 343

Casey, General George W., Jr. 327, 

328, 329, 335, 347, 368, 422, 

438, 470

Center Level Application System 199

CH-47C Chinook 115, 193

CH-47 Chinook xxi, 364, 416

CH-47D Chinook 115, 407

Chappell, Bill, Jr. 40, 41, 42

Charikar, Afghanistan 279

Charles E. Kelly Support Facility 190

Charleston, South Carolina 122

Cheney, Richard B. 66

Chiafullo, Major Marilyn S. xxv, 431

Chief, Army Reserve 40, 43, 52, 59, 

180, 189, 288, 328, 416, 430

China 3

Church, Specialist Jeremy xxv, 474

Cippola, Brigadier General Frank A. 

425

Civilian Acquired Skills Program 182

Civilian Conservation Corps 2

Civil-Military Innovative Readiness 

Team 230

Civil War 1

Clinton, William J. 50, 51, 73, 133, 

142, 165, 215, 222, 230, 318

Coalition Forces Land Component 

Command (CFLCC) 277

Coalition Military Assistance Training 

Team 388

Coast Guard Reserve 71
INDEX

539

Cohen, William S. 169, 175, 176, 

463

Cold War 5, 9, 10, 11, 23, 33, 47, 50, 

54, 57, 59, 121, 148, 168, 169, 

172, 173, 186, 271, 274, 311, 

312, 314, 326, 329, 332, 334, 

335, 343, 358, 396, 438, 465

Collura, Sergent First Class Tino 

254

Colorado 199, 234, 353

Colt, Brigadier General Richard S. 

xvii, 253, 266

Columbus, Ohio xxiii, 406

Combat Maneuver Training Center 

199

Combat Support Training Center 

382

Combat Training Centers 198

Combined Arms and Service Staff 

School 194, 390

Combined Arms Command 214

Combined Arms Exercise Course 

390

Combined Joint Task Force 101 

475

Combined Task Force Spartan 281

Command and General Staff Officers Course 194

Commission on Base Realignment 

and Closure 144

Commission on the National Guard 

and Reserves 332, 342, 417

Commission on the Roles & Missions of the Armed Forces 

54, 169, 468

Commonwealth of Independent 

States 11

Community and Family Support 

Center 144

Company B, 2nd Battalion, 327th 

Infantry Regiment, 143d 

Expeditionary Sustainment 

Command 282

Company B, 5th Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment xxi, 364, 365

Company B, 391st Combat Engineer 

Battalion xviii, 281

Company C, 159th Aviation Regiment 

294

Comprehensive Soldier Fitness xxv

Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CFS) 

Program 431

Condon, Captain Michael 412

Congressional Budget Office 349

Continental Army Command 40

Contingency Force Pool 59, 60, 62, 64, 

66, 80, 81, 191

Contingency Operating Base Adder, 

Iraq xix, 297

Contingency Support Package 192

Continuum of Service 329, 331, 347, 

351

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) 

Treaty 9

Coordinated Logistics Support Program 120

Coraoplis, Pennsylvania 429, 430

Craig, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Walter 

122

Critical Skills Retention Bonus-Army 

Reserve 348

Croatia 161, 164, 216

Crossland, Richard B. 25, 27, 101, 102

Crow Agency 230

Crow-Northern Cheyenne Indian 

Reservation 230

Cuba 127

Current Force 323, 324
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

540

Currie, James T. 27, 101, 102

Czech Republic 127

D

D7F bulldozers 209

Dallas Naval Air Station 234

Darvial, Sergeant Richard A. xix, 

282

Dayton Accords 164

Dayton, Ohio 164

D Company, 158th Aviation Regiment 294

Decater, Georgia 190

Dedicated Procurement Program 

109, 110, 112, 120

Deep Water Horizon 422

Defense Against Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Act 226

Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and 

Realignment Act 144

Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Act 145

Defense Base Closure Realignment 

Commission 145

Defense Distribution Depot 234

Defense Enrollment Eligibility 

Reporting System 142

Defense Planning Guidance 274, 

317

Defense Secretary Board Task Force 

107

Defense Secretary Board Task Force 

on Readiness 107

Delaware 24, 201

Demobilization Dental Reset 413

Denton, Texas 136

Department of Defense 3, 37, 54, 55, 

69, 75, 101, 117, 137, 145, 170, 

180, 183, 190, 201, 205, 206, 

207, 222, 234, 308, 310, 311, 

312, 313, 314, 331, 343, 346, 

349, 351, 406, 431, 433, 435, 

436, 463

Department of State 419

Department of the Army 5, 33, 37, 77, 

88, 121, 144, 187, 213, 214, 232, 

233, 295, 325, 355, 365, 367, 

378, 390, 393, 400, 407, 417, 424

Department of the Army Master Priority List 64, 101, 206

Department of Veterans Administration 140

Department of Veterans Affairs 227

Deployable Medical Systems 117

Deployable Support Command 365

Depot Maintenance 121, 184, 207, 

209, 402, 406, 407

Des Moines, Iowa xv, 204

Devens Reserve Forces Training Area 

189, 198

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia 27

Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System 123

Divisions (Exercise) 91, 196

Divisions (Institutional Training) 78, 

91, 93, 196, 373

Diyala River xxviii, 289, 292

Djibouti 290

Dobbs, Major Dana M. 228

Donnelly, Pipe Sergeant Kevin M. xvi, 

225

Dover Air Base 24

Dozier, Captain Tamara 123

Driscoll, Specialist Jason xv, 198
INDEX

541

E

East Germany 9

East Timor 417

Eder, Major General Mari xxi, 367

Egypt xiv, 136, 202, 291

El Dorado, Kansas 291

Ellsworth, Wisconsin xxii, 229, 373, 

382

El Salvador 202

Emergency Preparedness Liaison 

Officer (EPLO) Program 

421

Empire, Louisiana 365

Employer Partnership Initiative 

435

Employer Partnership Office 436

Employer Partnership of the Armed 

Forces 436

Employer Support of the Guard and 

Reserve 434

Environmental Protection Agency 

200, 210

Erskine, Specialist Amanda 104

Estonia 127

Euphrates River 289

Europe 3, 23

Evans Army Community Hospital 

xxiv, 415

F

Fallujah, Iraq xx, 303

Falslev, Specialist Ben L. xxiii, 395

Family Programs Virtual Installation/Army Strong Community Center 426

Family Support 137, 231, 232, 233, 

299, 422

Farran, Sergeant First Class James 

254

Fayette, Alabama xxiii, 411

Fayetteville, Arkansas 392

Federal Aviation Administration 251

Federal Emergency Management 

Agency 46, 136, 137, 222

Fetty, Staff Sergeant Jason xxv, 474

Field Medical Training Site-Panama 

96

First Lieutenant Angela Blevins 123

First Lieutenant Edith Sneed 124

First Lieutenant Randy Shields xx, 

306

Fiscal Strength 75, 183, 352

Fitzsimons Army Medical Center 234

Florida 90, 122, 249, 289, 389

Flushing, New York 266

Force Modernization 112, 115

Force Support Package 191, 192

Force XXI 58, 172, 177, 178, 187, 468

Force XXI Experimental Force 178

Foreign Army Training and Assistance Command 383

Fort Belknap Indian Reservation xvii, 

229

Fort Belvoir 353, 439

Fort Benjamin Harrison 148

Fort Benning 217, 218

Fort Bliss xv, 199, 200, 203, 370

Fort Bragg xxv, 123, 124, 133, 201, 

218, 267, 428, 439, 440

Fort Buchanan 201

Fort Campbell xiv, 115

Fort Carson xxiv, 199, 200, 353, 415

Fort Chaffee xxii, 148, 198, 234, 373, 

391

Fort DeRussey 96

Fort Des Moines 148
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

542

Fort Devens 148, 189, 234

Fort Dix xvii, 148, 164, 187, 190, 

202, 217, 218, 230, 231, 234, 

381, 382, 392

Fort Douglas 148

Fort Eustis 365

Fort Gillem xviii, 280

Fort Hamilton xvii, 254

Fort Hood xxv, 432, 433

Fort Hunter Liggett xxii, 95, 234, 

370, 381, 382, 385, 418

Fort Indiantown Gap xxii, 234, 378

Fort Irwin xv, 198, 199

Fort Jackson 90, 359, 428

Fort Knox 359, 419

Fort Leavenworth 199

Fort Lee 201

Fort Leonard Wood 422

Fort Lewis xvi, 200, 228, 353

Fort McClellan 190, 234

Fort McCoy xiii, xxi, xxii, xxiii, 79, 

95, 187, 189, 212, 372, 374, 

381, 382, 386, 412, 425

Fort McPherson xiii, 44, 433

Fort Missoula 234

Fort Monroe 90

Fort Pickett xxii, 95, 190, 234, 379

Fort Polk xxvii, 100, 199, 201

Fort Rucker xiv, 140

Fort Scott 229

Fort Sheridan 148

Fort Sill 201

Fort Snelling 79

Forward Operating Base Leatherneck xix, 285

Forward Operating Base Orgun-E, 

Afghanistan 475

Forward Operating Base Sharana, 

Afghanistan xviii, 279

Forward Operating Base Shindand 

xix, 285

Franks, General Frederick W., Jr. 85

Franks, General Tommy R. 288

FUERTES CAMINOS xv, 96, 127, 

202, 204

Full-Time Support 46, 60, 73, 77, 81, 

180, 191, 349

Full-Time Support Management Center 186, 187

Future Army Schools Twenty-one 84, 

87, 88, 91

Future Force 323

Future Joint Force 323

G

Gaffaney, Captain John P. 432

Gainesville, Florida 289

Ganigal Valley, Afghanistan xix, 282

Garrison Support Unit 23, 187

Gates, Robert M. 307, 327, 330, 332, 

343, 344

General Accounting Office 101

Georgia xiii, xviii, 44, 90, 120, 190, 

217, 227, 417, 433

Germany xi, 23, 46, 93, 96, 122, 186, 

199, 205, 217, 218

Germersheim, Germany 122

Glider Kit Program 212

Global War on Terrorism 283, 295, 

299, 306, 311, 318, 328, 339, 

343, 347, 360, 363, 370, 432

Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal xxv, 492

Godfrey, Major Valerie 410

GOLDEN MEDIC 371

Golinski, Colonel (retired) Ronald 

F. 251

Gonzalez, Specialist Andrea 414

Gorbachev, Mikhail 9

Gordon, Sergeant First Class xxiii, 

406
INDEX

543

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Emergency 

Deficit Control Act 72

GRECIAN FIREBOLT 392

Greensburg, Pennsylvania xii, 27, 

28, 212

Green, Staff Sergeant Glenn xiv, 

115

Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement Training Support 

System 81, 196

Ground Zero xvii, 255, 266

Grupper, Colonel Albert 123

Guam xvi, 227, 229, 365, 401, 417

Guatemala 96, 202

Guinyard, Sergeant Rodney xxii, 

388, 390

Gulf Coast 417

Gundrum, Captain Mark xxiv, 426

Guyana 96

H

Hadithah, Iraq xix, 294

Haiti 133, 249, 401, 418, 420

Hall, Thomas H. 312, 435

Hanley, Captain Greg xviii, 278

Hardesty, Lieutenant Colonel Mike 

124

Hardy, Major General Dennis 363

Hardy, Sergeant Paul 280

Hargraves, John 85, 94

Hartford, Connecticut xv, 203

Harvey, Francis J. 326, 333, 422

Hawaii 46, 96, 186, 417

Health Readiness Record 414

HEAVEN STORM 201

Heavy Equipment Mobile Transport 

(HEMTT) Common Bridge 

Transporter 213

Helmly, Lieutenant General James 

R. 288, 293, 295, 299, 314, 326, 

334, 339, 355, 390, 417, 437, 438

Honduras 231

Horizontal Platoon 227

House, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur 

120

Hungary 216, 217, 218

Hunter Army Airfield 353

Hurricane Andrew 137

Hurricane Earl 422

Hurricane George 202

Hurricane Georges 230

Hurricane Iniki 137

Hurricane Katrina xxi, 360, 364, 366, 

416

Hurricane Mitch 202, 230

Hurricane Ofa 136

Hurricane Rita 360, 416

Hussein, Saddam 11, 17, 161, 283

Hutchinson, Specialist David xxv, 475

I

Illinois xv, 134, 136, 208

Ill, Staff Sergeant Frederick J. 251

I Marine Expeditionary Force 289, 

292

Implementation Force 164

Independence, Missouri 278

Indiana 186

Individual Mobilization Augmentee 

15, 16, 33, 73, 95, 133, 137, 191

Individual Ready Reserve 16, 33, 36, 

66, 72, 73, 95, 133, 180, 182, 

183, 215, 227

Individual Ready Reserve Activation 

Authority 182

Individual Ready Reserve/Individual 

Mobilization Augmentee Family Program Office 430
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

544

Innovative Readiness Training 

(IRT) xvi, xvii, 228, 229

Inova Health Systems 435, 436

Interim Brigade Combat Team 317

Interim Force 315, 317, 468

Intermediate Level Education-Common Core Course 

390

Iowa 134, 204, 227, 229

Iran 283

Iraq xiv, xx, 122, 123, 267, 274, 283, 

285, 288, 290, 291, 295, 299, 

302, 303, 306, 312, 314, 327, 

333, 334, 358, 383, 384, 421, 

469, 474

Duhok 123

Safwan xxvi, 38

J

Jackson, Chaplain (Major) Eric 

xxv, 433

Japan 96

Joint Forces Air Component Command 201

Joint Logistics Command-Haiti 

xxiv, 418, 419, 420

Joint Military-to-Military Contact 

Program 127

Joint Missile Defense Command 

201

Joint Operations Plans Execution 

System 342

Joint Provisional Reconstruction 

Team, 364th Civil Affairs 

Brigade 474

Joint Readiness Training Center 

xxii, xxvii, 100, 101, 199, 382, 

387, 389

Joint Readiness Units 191

Joint Task Force Provide Refuge 

230

Joint Vision 2010 176, 177

Jordon 291

K

Kaiserslautern, Germany 122

Kandahar, Afghanistan 277, 278

Kansas 136, 186, 199, 229

Kapisa Province, Afghanistan 475

Kentucky xiv, 115, 359, 419

Kenya 291

Keystone State 212

Kilmartin, Brigadier General Thomas 

107

King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital 141

Kinston, North Carolina 289

Kismayu, Somalia 124

Kjornes, Sergeant First Class Gerald 

xxii, 380

Knapp, Captain Lawrence xiv, 122

Korea 23, 50

Korean War 4, 5

Kosovo xvii, 164, 165, 218, 230, 231, 

236, 249

Kosovo Force 165

Krueger, Staff Sergeant Amy S. 432

Kunar Province, Afghanistan 280

Kurds 29

Kuwait 11, 21, 27, 29, 66, 107, 221, 

267, 290, 301, 363, 389

Kyrgyzstan 290

L

Lackey, Command Sergeant Major 

Alex xviii, 261

Laird, Melvin R. 17

Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana xxi, 

364

Lambach, Specialist Michael xxii, 380

Lame Deer, Montana xvi, 228
INDEX

545

Latin America 96, 202

Legacy Force 315, 468

Lennon, Brigadier General Peter S. 

xii, 28

Lewis, Major John C. xiii, 98, 99

Liaison and Contingency Operations 122

Lieberman, Joseph 169

Li, Specialist Ga 415

Littleton, Iowa 227

Logan, Utah xvi, 226

Logistical Support Area 419

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Support 417

Logistics Standard Management 

Information System 210

Logistics Unit Productivity System 

33

Lopez, Specialist Jose xix, 296

Louisiana xxvii, 100, 201, 417

Louisiana Maneuvers 58

Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) Task 

Force 58

Lubbock, Texas 217

Luster, Major Juana 412

M

M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle 

117

M101A1/M101A2/M101A3 Trailer, 

3/4 ton 212

M113A2/M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier 117, 219

M915A4 Line-Haul Tractor 212

M915 Line-Haul Tractor 212

M967A1 Semitrailer, Tank 212

M998 High Mobility Multipurpose 

Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Truck 212

M1037 High Mobility Multipurpose 

Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) 

212

Macedonia 161, 230

Maguire, Thomas P. 266

Maine 422

Mannheim, Germany 122

March Air Force Base 234

Marianna, Arkansas 414

Marine Corps 332

Marine Corps Reserve 71, 75, 395

Marion, Virginia 229

Marshall, General George C. 58

Marsh, John O., Jr. 40, 41, 42

Massachusetts 186, 189, 422

Matson, Sergeant First Class Scott 

xvi, 228

McCay, Sergeant Phillip xxiii, 411

McGuire Air Force Base 230

McHugh, John M. 335, 423, 470

McQueen, Major General Adolph 

xxi, 367

McWhethy Army Reserve Center 234

Medical Operational Data System 

414

Medical Readiness 96, 127, 202

Medical Reserve Corps 2

MEDRETE 96

Micelotta, Captain Joseph 254

Michigan 136

Middle East 25, 96, 221

Military Decision Making Process 

383

Military History Detachment 416

Military Intelligence Readiness Command 358

Milosevic, Slobodan 164

Minnesota 79, 186

Mississippi 417

Mississippi River xvi, 228

Missouri 134, 136, 267, 278, 422
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

546

Mobile, Alabama 293

Mobile Subscribe Equipment 120

Mobilization Policy 342

Modularity 333, 334

Mogadishu xxvii, 125

Montana xvii, 228, 229, 230, 234

Montgomery GI Bill 74, 140, 431

Moran, Jim 435

Moroni, Staff Sergeant Benjamin 

xx, 305

Mullen, Admiral Michael G. 313, 

314, 332

Mullen, Captain Michael D. 251

Multi-National Forces-Iraq 299

Murphy, Tim 430

Murtha, John P. 41, 42

Myrtle Beach Air Force Base 234

N

National Defense Authorization Act 

for 1997 169

National Defense Strategy 308, 311

National Federation of Licensed 

Practical Nurses xxiii, 411

National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations 112, 

208, 209, 396, 400

National Guard Bureau 85, 412

National Military Strategy 47, 59, 

168, 170, 172, 173, 177, 184, 

235

National Prisoner-of-War Information Center 23

National Security Strategy 11, 17, 

47, 59, 165, 167, 270, 272, 

307, 308, 309, 311, 344, 463

National Training Center xv, 101, 

198, 199, 382

NATO Implementation Force 219

Navajo Indian Reservation 227

Navajo Nation 137

Naval Reserve 395

New Hampshire 227, 424

NEW HORIZONES 392

New Jersey xvii, 164, 190, 231, 234

New Mexico 200

New Orleans, Louisiana xxi, xxiii, 

364, 366, 414

New York 186, 198, 266

New York City, New York xvii, 20, 

249, 251, 254, 256, 257, 263, 

266, 270, 271

Noncommissioned Officer Course 94

Noncommissioned Officer Education 

System 84, 88, 391

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 9, 

66, 161, 164

North Carolina xxiv, xxv, 90, 123, 201, 

267, 279, 289, 417, 427, 428, 

429, 439, 440

North Dakota xvi, 226, 227

Northern Alliance 274

Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation Tribe xvi, 228

North Korea 283, 314

Northridge earthquake relief operation 137

NUEVOS HORIZONTES 202

Nunez, Specialist Rebecca xv, 204

O

Oakland Army Base 234

Obama, Barack H. 283, 309

Objective Force 315, 317, 318, 321, 

468

Ocala, Florida xxii, 389

Office, Chief Army Reserve 5, 40, 41, 

66, 85, 95, 112, 120, 146, 148, 

186, 187, 214, 439

Office of the Surgeon General 412

Officer Education System 390
INDEX

547

Off-Site Agreement 45, 52, 148, 192, 

397, 468

Ogden, Utah 234

Ohio xxiii, 164, 205, 406

Oklahoma 201, 229

Oklahoma City National Memorial 

xvi, 225

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 222, 

293, 372

Olathe Air Force Base 136

Olsen, Sergeant First Class Scott 

B. 98

Oneonta, Alabama xxiii, 411

Operation ABLE SENTRY 161

Operation ANACONDA 274, 277

Operation and Maintenance Army 

Reserve (OMAR) 353

Operation ARCTIC CIRCLE 230

Operation COBRA GOLD, ‘93 xiii, 

96, 99

Operation CONSEQUENCE ISLAND 2001 392

Operation DANGEROUS WIND 

392

Operation DESERT FOX 221

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM 11, 12, 15, 16, 

17, 20, 24, 33, 36, 37, 51, 79, 

83, 91, 95, 96, 109, 110, 117, 

120, 122, 137, 140, 142, 182, 

187, 212, 235, 463

Operation DESERT SPRING 360

Operation DESERT STORM 283

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

267, 274, 299, 300, 321, 360, 

361, 363, 371

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

xxviii, 283, 288, 292, 299, 300, 

353, 360, 361, 363, 371, 421

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR 

187, 215, 216, 218, 219, 221

Operation JOINT FORCE 218

Operation JOINT FORGE 218

Operation JOINT GUARD 218

Operation JOINT GUARDIAN 164, 

218

Operation JUST CAUSE 17

Operation NEW DAWN 299, 300

Operation NOBLE EAGLE 254, 267, 

321

Operation PATRIOTS MOVE 200

Operation PLATINUM WRENCH 

373, 374

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT 27, 

122

Operation REEF-EX xv, 200

Operation RESTORE HOPE 123

Operation SAFE HAVEN 127, 128

Operation SAND CASTLE xxi, 373

Operation SEA ANGEL 123

Operation SOUTHERN WATCH 221

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE 

419, 421

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY 

133

Operation WALKING SHIELD 230

Operation WHITE FANG 230

OPTIMAL FOCUS ‘93 134

OPTIMAL FOCUS ‘94 134

Oregon 98

Organized Reserve 3

Organized Reserve Corps 2

Orgun Valley, Afganistan 277

Orlando, Florida 122, 291, 391

Osh-kosh Truck Corporation 211

Overseas Deployment Training 95, 

202, 203, 391

P

Pacific LandWarNet 361

PACIFIC SURVIVOR 370
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

548

Pagonis, Lieutenant General William G. 20, 25

Pakistan 274, 309, 360

Paktika Province, Afghanistan 

xviii, 279

Panama 96, 127

Panama Canal 127

Papenfuss, Sergeant Major Mark 

xxv, 433

Parwan Province, Afghanistan 

xviii, 278

Pataki, George E. 266

PATRIOT JUSTICE 372

PATRIOT WARRIOR 371, 372

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 1, 3

Peay III, General J.H. Binford 52

Pech Valley, Afghanistan 281

Pennsylvania xxii, 27, 186, 190, 212, 

378

Pentagon xviii, xxv, 251, 261, 265, 

266, 267, 431

Pepin, Tyler xxiv, 424

Perry, William J. 73, 164, 215

Persian Gulf Benefits Act of 1991 

140

Personnel Electronic Record Management System 187

Personnel Strength 178, 180, 182, 

344, 345, 347, 348, 349, 351

Philippine Insurrection 1, 2

Phillips, Specialist Lisa xx, 302

Phillips, Staff Sergeant Didler C. 

xiv, 110

Pileri, Corporal Dominic M. xviii, 

280

Pinedo, Captain Ernesto xxii, 387

Plant, Sergeant Joseph 280

Plewes, Elizabeth xx, 318

Plewes, Lieutenant General Thomas 

J. xvii, xx, 190, 212, 253, 263, 

266, 267, 318, 397

Pohlmann, Lieutenant Colonel William H. 251

Poland 127

Port-au-Prince, Haiti xxiv, 419, 421

Portland, Oregon 98

POSITIVE FORCE 201

Post Deployment Health Reassessment Program 413

Powell, General Colin L. 47

Powell, Sergeant Shawn 251

Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up 

183, 191, 202, 215, 216, 218, 312

Primary Leadership Development 

Course 194

Priority Reserve in Mobilization Enhancement 64

Project Quicksilver 36

Puerto Rico 46, 90, 186, 201, 231, 261, 

267, 365, 401, 417

Punaro, Major General (retired) 

Arnold 343

Purple Heart xxv, 432

Q

Qatar 290

Quadrennial Defense Review 168, 

170, 172, 178, 197, 309, 311, 

312, 313, 317, 365, 468, 469

QUARTERMASTER LIQUID LOGISTICS xxi, 371

R

Ready Reserve 3

Ready Response Reserve Unit (R3U) 

Dental Program xxiii, 412

Reagan, Ronald W. 9, 11

Red River Army Depot 234

Red Wing Wildlife League 229

Red Wing Wildlife Preserve xvi, 228, 

229
INDEX

549

REFORGER 96

Regional Intelligence (RTS-I) Training Site 93, 94

Regional Maintenance (RTSMAINT) Training Site 93, 

94, 108

Regional Medical (RTS-MED) 

Training Site 94

Regional Support Commands 46

Regional Support Groups 46

Regional Training Center 378, 381

Regional Training (RTS-MED) 

Training Site 197

Reichert, Jim xv, 208

Reimer, General Dennis J. 170, 175, 

177, 178, 183, 204, 213, 231, 

234, 235, 314

Rescorla, Colonel (retired) Rick 

xvii, 251, 252

Reserve Associate Support Program 

183, 196

Reserve Component Automation 

System 120, 199, 214

Reserve Component Deployment 

Expeditionary Force Preand Post- Mobilization 

Training Strategy 378

Reserve Components Training Development Action Plan 83

Reserve Components Training 

Strategy Task Force 81

Reserve Component Training Institutions 91

Reserve Educational Assistance 431

Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and 

Vitalization Act 40, 44

Reserve Forces Policy Board 107, 

108

Reserve Level Automation System 

199

Reserve Officer Personnel Act 182

Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act 182

Reserve Officers Association 59, 332

Reserve Officers Personnel Management Act 140

Reserve Officers’ Training Corps 196

Retired Reserve 4, 16, 69

RETROEUR 121, 122, 213

Richardson, Specialist Robbie xxiii, 

411

RIFLES MOVE 199

RIO BRAVO 201

Ritter, Specialist Zachary 392

Riverdale, Maryland 127

RIVER WARRIOR 371

Rochester, New York 383, 428

Roe, John 112

Rosebud Indian Reservation 230

Rosebud, South Dakota 230

ROVING SANDS xv, 201, 203, 391

ROVING SANDS 2001 392

Rumsfeld, Donald H. 251, 274, 311, 

325, 335

Ruske, Sergeant Gregory xxv, 475

S

Sacramento Army Depot 148

Saint, General Crosbie 29

Salerno, Afganistan 278

Salinas, Puerto Rico xxi, 374

San Diego, California 18

Sandler, Major General Roger W. 29, 

32, 44, 52

Santa Fe, New Mexico 200

Sarajevo 161

Sarasota, Florida 249

Saudi Arabia 20, 21, 24, 36, 117, 212, 

221, 291

Savannah, Georgia 353

Sava River 218
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

550

Scales, Colonel David M. 251

Schallow, Chief Warrant Officer 4 

Gwen xvi, 216

Schaumburg, Illinois 425

Schau, Specialist William 254

Schlesinger, James R. 17

Schoomaker, General Peter J. 323, 

333, 342, 343

Schultz, Command Sergeant Major 

Michael 363

Schultz, Lieutenant General Roger 

C. 314, 318

Schwarzkopf, General H. Norman 

20, 25

Scott Air Force Base xv, 136, 208

Seager, Captain Russell G. 432

Selected Reserve 14, 45, 69, 72, 73, 

133, 215, 233, 423

Selected Reserve Incentive Program 

74, 182

Senior Leader Training Program 

390

Shalikashvili, General John M. D. 

231

Shanksville, Pennsylvania 251

Sherlock, Brigadier General Richard 383

Shields, 1st Lieutenant Randy xx, 

306

Shinseki, General Eric K. xx, 314, 

315, 317, 318, 321

Shop Smart 210

Shuaiba, Kuwait 291

Shuwaikh, Kuwait 291

Silver Star 474, 475

Simpson, Command Sergeant Major Derrick xxii, 385

Sinai 133

Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System 105, 

120

Singleton, Knox 435

Siraco, Anthony xxiv, 424

Slidell, Louisiana xxiv, 416

Slovenia 161

Sneed, 1st Lieutenant Edith 124

Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act 

137

Somalia 123, 127, 249

South Carolina 90, 122, 186, 279, 359, 

417

South Dakota 230

Southern Command 191

Southwest Asia 16, 19, 25, 27, 50, 137

Soviet Union 3, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 32, 55, 

66, 161, 465

Space Command 191

Spanish-American War 1, 2

Special Forces Operational Detachment A 274

State Military Academy Advisory 

Council 88

Status of Resources and Training 

Systems 193

St. Louis, Missouri 267

Stone, Michael P. W. 11, 42

St. Petersburg, Florida xix, 291, 295

Strategic Command 191

Strong Bonds Program 426

Student Loan Repayment Program 

182

Stultz, Laura xxiv, xxv, 427, 428, 429

Stultz, Lieutenant General Jack C., Jr. 

xxiv, xxv, 328, 333, 344, 356, 

369, 388, 407, 417, 419, 423, 

424, 427, 428, 429, 432, 435, 

439, 440

Sullivan, General Gordon R. 58, 59, 

78, 84, 85, 87, 88, 91

Swift, Captain Lee 24

Sylvester, Ira 24

Syria 389
INDEX

551

T

T-42 Cochise 113

Taliban 274, 277, 283, 309

Tallil Air Base, Iraq xix, 295

Tallil, Iraq 291

Tampa Bay fire fighting operation 

136

Task Force 325 Medical 278

Task Force BRAVO 122

Task Force BULLETT 289

Task Force FAST 85, 88, 90, 91

Task Force HAWK 164

Task Force MILITARY POLICE-NORTH 299

TaskForce Razorback Arkansas 

Medical Innovative Readiness Training 414

TEAM SPIRIT 96

Technical Sergeant McGarity U.S. 

Army Reserve Center 429, 

430

Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic 

Equipment 108

Texas xv, xxv, 136, 137, 186, 199, 

200, 203, 217, 229, 370, 432, 

433

TF ODIN aircraft 400

Thailand 96

Third Army 25, 289

Thomas, Lieutenant Colonel Frank 

xxvi, 38

Thurgood, Brigadier General Keith 

L. 363

Tilley, Specialist Christopher xv, 

205

Time-Phased Force Deployment 

List 342

Tito, Josef 161

Topper, Colonel John 25, 43

Tora Bora, Afghanistan 274

Total Army Distance Learning Program 199

Total Army Personnel Command 16, 

187

Total Army School System 84, 85, 90, 

91, 93, 199

Total Army Training Study 87, 95

Total Force 55, 59, 172, 175, 176, 190, 

311, 351, 470

Total Force Policy 5, 17, 37, 52, 206

Toth, Command Sergeant Major 

Brendan xxi, 367

Training and Doctrine Command 83, 

84, 85, 87, 90, 91, 377

Training Support Divisions 196

Transient, Trainee, Holdee, and Student (TTHS) 351

TRANSLOTS 391

TRICARE 423

Troop Program Unit 16, 72, 84, 95

Tudjman, Franjo 164

Turkey 389

Typhoon Paka xvi, 227, 229

U

U-8 aircraft 108

U-8 Seminole 113

U-21 aircraft 108, 113, 209

UC-35 jet 193

UH-60 Black Hawk 115, 400, 401

UH-60L Black Hawk 397

UH-60M Black Hawk 400

Ukraine 10

Umm Qasar, Iraq xix, 295

Uniformed Services Employment 

and Reemployment Rights Act 

142, 233

United Nations 288
THE INDISPENSABLE FORCE: THE POST-COLD WAR OPERATIONAL ARMY RESERVE, 1990-2010

552

United Nations’ Multinational Forces and Observers 133

United Nations Protection Force 

161

United Nations Protective Force 

164

United States xxxiii, xxxiv, 1, 2, 3, 4, 

9, 11, 12, 16, 20, 43, 57, 59, 93, 

121, 123, 127, 133, 144, 161, 

164, 167, 168, 169, 229, 230, 

233, 235, 267, 270, 272, 285, 

307, 308, 309, 310, 312, 313, 

365, 376, 388, 397, 426, 465

United States First Army 377

USARC Augmentation Unit 430

U.S. Army Accessions Command 

377

U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command 190, 365

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Gulf 

Region Division 299

U.S. Army Europe 218

U.S. Army Forces Command 25, 

40, 41, 42, 43, 79, 81, 83, 85, 

87, 95, 199, 335, 378

U.S. Army Japan 353

U.S. Army Military Academy 375

U.S. Army Recruiting Command 

346

U.S. Army Reserve Command 40, 

42, 53, 60, 66, 79, 91, 95, 112, 

121, 123, 148, 186, 187, 189, 

196, 202, 214, 217, 222, 230, 

232, 233, 365, 367, 391, 401, 

407, 421, 439

U.S. Army Reserve Command Independent Commission 43

U.S. Army Reserve Forces Schools 

64, 93

U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center 

186, 187

U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Command 187

U.S. Army Reserve Readiness Training Command 358, 375

U.S. Army Signal Command 391

U.S. Army Special Forces Command 

43

U.S. Army Special Operations Command 365

U.S. Army’s Reenlistment Program 

181

U.S. Atlantic Command 191

U.S. Central Command 21, 24, 25, 

191, 288, 289, 313

U.S. Chamber of Commerce 434

U.S. Customs Service 227

U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency 221

U.S. European Command 191

U.S. Green Building Council 439

U.S. Pacific Command 191

U.S. Probation Department 227

U.S. Southern Command 191

U.S. Special Operations Command 

191

U.S. Virgin Islands 90, 417

Utah 186, 226, 234

Uzbekistan 279

V

V Corps 289

Velocity Management 213

Vermont 422

Veterans Administration 425

Veterans’ Reemployment Rights Act 

142

Vietnam War 4, 5, 12, 17, 19, 27, 29, 

55
INDEX

553

Virginia xxii, 90, 95, 110, 201, 229, 

261, 263, 264, 265, 353, 365, 

379, 391, 439

Virgin Islands 365

Visot, Major General Luis R. xxiv, 

419

Vuono, General Carl E. 37, 42, 59

W

Wadswoth Army Reserve Center 

428

Walking Shield of American Indian 

Society 230

Wallops Island, Virginia xiv, 110

Ward, Major General William F., Jr. 

xiii, 40, 42, 44

Ware, Sergeant First Class Dereck 

280

Warman, Lieutenant Colonel Juanita L. 432

Warrior and Family Assistance 

Center 424, 425

Warsaw Pact 3, 9, 10, 57, 66, 161, 

465

Washington xvi, 120, 186, 200, 228, 

229, 263, 353

Washington, D.C. 120

Weapons of Mass Destruction 221, 

227

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

(WMD) Domestic Preparedness Branch 227

Webster, New York xv, 198

Welcome Home Warrior-Citizen 

Award program 431

Welke, Tom 32

Westlake, Captain Lynne B. 96

West Virginia 289

White, Thomas E. 315, 317

Whitford, Captain Mark P. 251

Wisconsin xiii, xxi, xxiii, 79, 95, 229, 

372, 374, 412

Wisconsin Dells, Wisconsin xxiv, 426

Witkowski, Sergeant James xxv, 474

WMD CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT 227

Wolfenberger, Captain Mark 123

World Trade Center xvii, 249, 256, 

257, 260, 266

World War I 2

World War II 2, 3, 11, 161, 173, 180, 

201, 217, 295, 438, 463

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base 164

X

XVIIIth Airborne Corps 36

Y

YAMA SAKUR 96

Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program 

425

Yeltsin, Boris 10

Yeosock, Lieutenant General John 

J. 25

York, South Carolina 279

Yugoslavia 161

Z

Zais, Brigadier General Mitchell M. 

230

Zakho, Iraq 122, 389