The Honor able Jane A. Restani, Chief J udg e of the United States Court of I nternational * Trade , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0002n.06 F iled: Janu ary 3, 2007 06-3010 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
HUGH GAUGH AN an d T HOMAS RADDEL L , Pla int if fs -A pp e lla nts , v. CI TY OF CL EVEL AND, Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE N O R T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

Be fore : DAUGHT REY and COL E, Circuit J udg es, RESTANI , J udg e. *
RE STANI, Jud ge. T h is a p p e a l ar is e s f

r o m Pl a in ti f

f s - A p p e ll ants Hug h Gaug han and Thomas Raddell’s (c ollectively “Appe llants”) constitutional challeng e to two Cleveland, Ohio, ordinanc es, Cleveland Codifie d Or d inance s (“C.C.O.”) §§ 683.01(a) , (b) a nd 605.10(b)( 9), that regulate the play

ing of sound device s (collec tively , the “Cleve land Ordinanc es”)
. Appellants ar g ued that the Cleveland O rdinanc es violated their spe ech a nd due proc ess right s u n d er t h e F irst and Four teenth Amendme nts of the U.S. Constit ution. The district court dismissed their complaint for fa ilure to s ta te a

c la im und e r F e d. R. C iv. P. 1 2( b) (6 ). We a ff ir m.06-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

- 2 -

ORDINANC ES AT I SSUE As previously

stated, the c urre nt appea l i n v o lves two Cleveland c ity ordinanc es, C.C.O. §§ 68 3. 01 and

60 5. 10 . Se c tio n 6 83 .0 1 p ro vid e s: Section 683.01. Play ing of Sound Devices Prohibited; When (a) No person shall play any radio, musi c play er, television, audio s y stem or musical ins tr ume nt i n s uc h a

mann e r o r at su ch volum e a s to ann oy or dis tur b th e qu ie t, c omf or t or re po se of ne ig hb or inginh a

bit ants or a t a vo lum e wh ic h is pla inl y

a ud ibl e to persons ot her than those who ar e in the room in which suc h device or instrument is play ed and w ho are voluntary listeners there to. (b ) E xce pt f

or or g anize d e ve nts wh ic h h a ve re c e ive d a ny ty pe of pe rm it fr om the City in conjunction with the event, no pe rson shall play any radio, music play er, te levision or audio sy stem upon a public rig ht of way or upon other public proper ty in such a manner or at such a

volume as to di sturb the quiet, comfor t or repose of other pe rs on s. C.C.O. § 683.01. Th e se c on d c ha lle ng e d o rd ina nc e , s e c tio n 6 05 .1 0, pr ov ide s in re le va nt p art : Se c tio n 6 05 .1 0. Unne c e ssa ry No ise (a) No per s o ns h a ll ma

k e , o r c a u s e , s u f f e r , a ll o w , o r

p e r mi t t o b e ma d e w it

h in the City any unrea sonably

l o u d , disturbing a

nd unnece ssary

noise, or noises of suc h char acte r, intensity

or duration as to be detrimental to the life an d h ea l th of any ind ivi du a l. (b) L oud, disturbing a

nd unnece ssary noises in violation of this s ection shall include wi t h o u tl i m i t at i o nt h e f

o l l o wi n g:

. . . (9 ) T he maki ng of any

lou d, un se e mly

or un ne c e ssa

ry no ise in vio la tio n o f C ha

pte r 6 83 of

the se Cod if

ie d O rd ina

nc e s. C.C.O. § 605.10.

P ROCEDURAL HISTORY & F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND A p p e l l an t s ar e an t i

- a

b o rt i o n a c t i v i s t s w h o p r o t e s t a t a b o rt i o n c l i n i c s i n C l e v e l an d , O h i o . In J anuar y 2003, Appellants obtained a n audio reco rding of a 911 c all made f rom the Center

for06-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

- 3 - Wome n’ s H e a lth , a

n a bo rt ion c lin ic in C le ve land , O hio . The c a ll c on c e rn e d a re qu e st f ro m Ma rt in Ruddock, owner

and oper ator of the clinic, for emer g ency medical a ssistance for

a woman f

or whom he had just per formed a

n abortion. Duringthe ca ll, Ruddock stated: She’s stable, sh e’s f

ine. She’s an obe se y oung lady , 30 y ear s old. Idid a sec ond trimester a

bortion. She has a l ace ration on the c ervix, at 3:00 on the cervix. I
. . . s t i t ch ed[ i t ] an d

s h e h as v agi n al p ac k i n g. S h e’ s s t ab l e. Ij u s tca n ’t s t o p t h e b l ee d i n g. Ican’ t see what I ’m doing and I want her out of here
. (Am. Compl. ¶ 14.) After rec eiving the audio rec ording , Appellants play ed it during ma ny of the prote sts at the
c lin ic in or de r to “ e du c a te the wo me n a s to the lif e -t hr e a te nin g da

ng e rs inh e re ntl y

a sso c ia te d w ith abortion.” ( I d. ¶ 15.) On De c e mber 27 , 20 03 , G a ug ha n p lay e d th e re c or din g on an a ud io c a sse tte pla

y e r w hil e standing near

the re ar of the abortion clinic. On January 23, 2004, Susan Noble, an e mploy ee of the clinic, filed a

complaint aga i n s t Gaugha n, alleg ing that Gaug han violated C.C.O. § 683.01(a ) and Ohio Revised Code § 2911. 2 1 (A )(1) and (2) , which prohibits criminal trespa ss, on Dece mber 27, 2003. As a re sult of Noble’s complaint, a w arr ant was issued for Gaug han’s arr est. On J anuar y 24, 20 04 , G a ug ha n a g a in pla

y e d th e 91 1 r e c or din g wh ile sta nd ingne ar t

he re ar o f t

he c lin ic . Wh ile Ga ug ha n p lay e d th e re c or di ng, he was arr e ste d b y the Cle ve land

po lic e purs ua

nt t o th e wa

rr a nt. Gaug han paid a

$75 fine a

nd pled no con t es t t o t h e trespass c harg e. The char g e for violating § 683.01(a) was later dismissed. Afte r the a rre st, Gaug han continued to play the re cordingduring protests at the c linic. Uniformed police wer e pre sent during the protests a n d we re aw are that Gaug han wa s playing the rec ording , but did not arrest or c ite Gaug han.06-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

Al tho ug h G a

ug ha n a pp e ars to h a ve be e n c ha

rg e d und e r § 68 3. 01 (b ), the de sc ri pti on of his 1 offe nse come s from § 683.01( a)
. Be ca use Appe llants challeng e the a rre st as an ar

rest under § 683.01(a) , we will addr ess the constitutional issues in the context of that statute. I n t h ei r brief, Appellants dire ct their c halleng e to § 683.01(a ), and not § 683.01(b)
. 2 Appellants ac knowledg e that the district cour t must acce pt the Ohio Court of Appea l’s narr owing construction of § 683.01( b) in City of C le v e lan d v . V

e nto , No. 79 91 3, 20 02 -O hio -2 61 3, 20 02 Oh io App. L EXI S 2476 (Ohio Ct. App. May 23, 2002). - 4 - On No ve mbe r 1 3, 20 04 , G a

ug ha n p lay e d th e re c or din g wh ile sta nd ingon a pu bli c sid e wa lk
acr oss the street f

rom the re ar of

the clinic. Police informed him that “ neig hboring inhabitants” had complained a

bout the noise and thre atene d to char g e him for violating § 683.01(a) . Gaug han then moved to a public sidewa lk near the front of

the clinic and ag ain pl ay ed the rec ording
. The police told him t hat the re cording c ould be hea rd inside the clinic a

nd g ave him a c itation for violating C.C.O. § 683.01(a). The citation stated that he was playing the rec ording “in such a manner or at 1 such a volume a s to a

nnoy or disturb the quiet, comfor t or repose of neig hboring inhabitants.” Tria l was set f or Ga ug han’s violation but the cha rg e wa s la t er d i s m i s s ed. Ga ug han has not play ed the
rec ording at the clinic since November 13, 2004. On Fe bruar

y 2, 2005, Appellants broug ht suit in district court ag ainst the City of Cleveland,
a lle g ing that the Cle ve land Or din anc e s vio la te d the ir sp e e c h and du e pr oc e ss r ig hts un de r t he F ir st and F ourtee nth Amendments. Appellants argued that § 683.01(a) was unc onstitut ionally vag ue and overbr oad on its fac e and a s applied. Appe llants als o alleg ed that § 683.01(b) and § 605.10(b) (9)
wer e fa cially

impermissibly

vag ue. The district court re jected A ppellants’ ar g uments and dismissed their complaint for

failure to state a c laim under F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Appe ll an t s appea l the dis mis sa l of

e a c h o f t he ir c la ims
. 206-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

- 5 - JU RI SDI CT ION & S TA ND AR D O F RE VI EW The district cour

t h ad jurisdi ction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). This court ha s jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Th is c ourt re vie ws a dis mis sa l fo r f a ilure to s ta te a

c la im de novo
. Bloch v. Ribar , 156 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1998)
. We c onstrue the complaint in a light most favora ble to the plaintiff, and
acc ept all of t he plainti ff’ s fac tual alleg ations as true. Sis tru nk v . Ci ty of S tro ng sv ill e , 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). Dismissal is prope r “only if it is clear tha

t no relief c ould be g rante d under a ny set of fac ts that c ould be proved consistent with the alleg ations.” Hishon v. King & Spalding , 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). DI SCU SSIO N At issue here are Appellants’ void f or vagueness a

nd overbr eadth c halleng es to the Cleveland Ordinanc es. We first addr ess their a rg uments that the Ordinanc es ar e im permissibly vag ue; we the n addre ss their arguments that the Ordinanc es ar e over broad. I. Vagueness challenges Vague laws a

re disfa vored be cause they : (1) do not “ g ive the person of ordinar y intelligenc e
a re a so na ble op po rt

un ity to k no w w hat is pr oh ibi te d;” (2 ) d o n ot pr ov ide e xplic it s tand ard s f or tho se who enf orce the law, lea ding to a rbitrar y and discriminatory

enfor ceme nt ; and (3) ma y inhibit t he exercise of

basic F irst Amendment fre edoms. Gray ne d v . Ci ty of R oc k for d , 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972). An or dinance is void for vag ueness “if its prohibitions are not cle arly define d.” Id. at 108. Specifica lly , a law is impermissibly vag ue if it “de nies fair

notice of the s t andar d of conduc t for which the c itiz en is to be held a ccounta ble,” o r gi ves law e nforc ement off icials “a n unrestric ted06-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

- 6 - deleg ation of powe r which le aves the definition of its terms to [ them].” Am .- Arab An tiDi sc rim ina tio n Co mm . v . Ci ty of D e ar bo rn , 418 F.3d 600, 608–09 ( 6th Cir. 2005). A. Section 683.01(a) 1. Se c ti on 6 83 .0 1( a) is no t fa c ial ly i m pe r m iss iblyva gue . I n th e dis tr ic t c ourt , Ap pe lla nts ma inl y fo c us e d on a c la im of fa c ia l in va lid ity

a s to the fi rs t phrase of § 683.01(a ), “[n]o person shall play any radio, music play er, te levision, audio sy stem or musical instrument in such a manne r or at such volume as to a nnoy or disturb the quiet, comfor t or
re po se of ne ig hb or inginh a

bit ants ,” arguin g that § 6 83 .0 1(a) was im pe rm iss ibl y va g ue be c a

us e it contained the term “a

nn o y .” The district court re jected A ppellants’ cha lleng e. Instead, it applied
a r e a s o n a b le p e r s o ns t an d ar d t o § 6 8 3
. 0 1 ( a ) an d

f o u n d t h a ti tw a s n o ti mp e r

m i s s i b l y v a g u e . We ag ree with the district court’s c onclusion. To int e r p r e ta s t a t e o r m u n i c i p a l o r d i n an c e , f

e d e r a l c o u rt s l o o k

t o s e e w h e t h e r

s t a t e c o u rts have spoke n on the issue. See Grayne d , 408 U.S. at 109–1 1 (l o o k i n g fi rst to state court’ s int e rp re ta tio n o f t

he state statut e ); Terminiello v. C ity of Chicago , 337 U.S. 1, 6 (1949) (“ We can only take the statute as the state courts read it .”). I f a state court has not addre ssed t he ordina nce at iss ue , f e de ra l c ourt s w ill loo k to the “ wo rd s of the or din anc e its e lf , [] th e int e rp re ta tio ns the [state court] has gi v en t o analog ous statutes, and, per haps to some deg ree , . . . the interpre tation of the stat u t e given by

those cha

rg ed with enf

orcingit.” Grayne d , 4 08 U. S. at 11 0 ( fo otn ote s, c itatio ns , and interna l quotation marks omitted). Sig nif ic antl y , th e c ourt

is t o a pp ly a na rr ow ing c on str

uc tio n to a state statut e if the state c ourt s in question have applied a narrowingconstruction to a similar statute. See id. a t 11 1– 12 ; se e als o06-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

- 7 - Shuttleswort h v. C i t

y o f B i r mingham , 3 82 U. S. 8 7, 91 (1 96 5) (p ro vid ingthat f e de ra l c ourt s mu st d e f e r to an y n ar r o w in g c o n s tr

u c ti o ng iv e nto s tate o r d in an c e s b y th e s tate c o u rt)
. I n Grayne d , the Supreme Court examined an a nti-noise ordinanc e of Rockford, I llinois
. 408 U.S. at 107. T he Court noted that had it bee n “lef t with j u s t t he wor ds of the ordina nce,” it would have bee n conce rned about the phrase “tends to disturb.” Id. a t 111. Th e Court , how e ve r, fo un d th a t it wa s n ot l e ft

wi th
on ly the wo rd s o f t

he or dinance be c a

us e the I lli no is Su

pr e me Court

ha d c on str

ue d a no the r s ta tut e with a similar phrase
. Id. I n th e oth e r i ns tanc e , th e I lli no is Su pr e me Court

he ld t hat a statut e wi th the phra se “te nding to disturb the peac e . . . per mitted conviction only

wher e ther e wa s ‘imminent threat of violence.’ ” Id. Be cause the I llinois state court imported the “imm inent threat of violence ” standar d to a s im il ar o r d in an c e an d

h a d r e li e d o nth o s e d e c is io n s in

in te r p r e ti n g th e Ro ckfor d ordinanc e, the Court he ld that it was proper to import an “imminent” standard to the R o ckfor d ordinanc e. Id. at 111–12. Thus, we look to see whether the Ohio courts have examined § 683.01(a) or a similar ordina

nce. Her e, the Ohio Supre me Court ha s not e x amined § 683.01(a) , but it has ex amined a similar ordinanc e in Sta te v . D or so , 446 N.E.2d 449 (Ohio 1983) . I n Do rso , the Ohio S u p reme Court examined a Cincinnati ordinance regulating the playing of sound that “disturb[s] the peac e and quiet
o f th e n e ig hb o r

h ood.” Id. at 450. I n interpre ting the statute, the cour t first noted that it was “oblig ated to indulg e ever y rea sonable interpre tation f avoring the ordinanc e in orde r to sustain it.” Id. I t then adopted the a pproac h taken in State v. Chaplinsky , 18 A.2d 754 (N.H . 1941), which
a pp lie d a re a so na ble pe rs on

sta nd ard to a Ne w H a mps hir e or din anc e to save it fro m a va g ue ne ss challeng e. Do rso , 446 N.E.2d at 452. The Do rso court held that the C incinnati ordinanc e prohibited06-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

The Cincinnati ordinanc e provide d: 3 No per son, association, firm or c orporation, opera t ing a restaur ant, hotel, summer g arde n or other pla ce of

ref reshment or

enter tainment, sh al l p ermit, nor shall any person in or a

bout such resta

urant, hotel, summer g arde n or ot h er place of ref reshment or

enter tainment eng ag e in the play ing or rendition of music of a ny kind, singing , loud talking, amplification of sound, or other noises o n o r about the premises, in such manne r a s to disturb the peac e and quie t of the neig hborhood, having due re g ard f

or the proximit y

of plac es of r esidenc e, hospi tals or other residential institutions and to any other c onditions affec ted by such noises. Do rso , 446 N.E.2d at 449 n.1. - 8 - the playing of

music and amplification of sound “in a manner which could be anticipated to offe nd the reasonable person , i.e. , the i ndividual of common sensibilities.” Id. (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T hat is , the o r d i n anc e “ pr os c ri be [d] th e tr ans mis sio n o f s ound s w hic h d isr up t th e re a so na

ble c on du c t of

ba sic human ac tiviti es, e.g. , conver sation or sleep” and “does not pe rmit the imposit ion o f c ri m i n al liability upon a par

ty whose c onduct disturbs only the hy perse nsitive.” Id. Th e Oh io c ourt the n h e ld that th is o bje c tiv e re a so na ble pe rs on

sta nd ard g a ve fa ir no tic e of the c on du c t pr oh ibi te d, and thu s, the Cincinnati ordinance was not impermissibly vag ue. Id. at 453. We will adopt the Ohio Supreme Court’s nar rowing construction in Do rso an d a p p l y a
rea sonable pe rson standar d to § 683.01(a) beca use of the s imilarities betwee n § 683.01(a) and the Cincinnati ordinance
. First, the g roup protec ted by § 683.01(a) , “neig hboring inhabitants,” and the 3

e n ti ty p r o te c te d b y th e Ci n c inn a ti o r d in an ce in Do rso , “neig hborhood,” a re similar. Webster’ s Dictio n ar y d e f in e s “ n e ig hb o r in g ” a s “ th a t [ w h ic h ] i s im me d iate ly a d ja c e n t o r r e lati v e ly

n e ar,” W e bs te r’ s Th ird Ne w I nt’ l D ic tio na ry

1514 (1981), and it defines “inha bitant” as “ a per son who dwells or re sides perma

nently in a pl ace as di stinguished from a tra nsient lodge r or visitor” a nd as06-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

T h e Ohio court held that an ordina ry person would unde rstand this definition of 4 neig hborhood. Do rso , 446 N.E.2d at 451. - 9 - “one that makes its habitat or is commonly found i n a plac e,” id. at 1163. Mea nwhile, Do rso define d “neig hborhood” as “the quality or state of being immediately

adjac ent or re latively

near ,” “a place
or re g ion near,” a nd

“ the pe op le liv ingne ar o ne ano the r. ” 44 6 N .E .2 d at 45 1. Thus , b oth 4 ordinanc es appe ar to prote ct a similar g roup of pe ople. Second, the two or dinance s addre ss the same ty pe of be havior. The phrase in § 683.01(a), “distur b th e qu ie t, c o mf

o rt o r r e p o s e ” is r e ma

r k a b ly s im il ar to th e p h r a s e “ d is tu

r b th e p e a c e and qu ie t,” in t

he Cin c inn a ti or din anc e . Th e e xtra wo rd in § 68 3. 01 (a ), “ re po se ,” is d e fi ne d a s “ a state of resting a fter e x ertion or stra in,” W e bs te r’ s Th ird Ne w I nt’ l D ic tio na ry at 1926, and ha s a similar meaningto the definition of the wor ds “quiet” a nd “comf ort.” These phrases all conjure imag es of
re lie f, re st, and

re la xati on . T hu s, the a dd iti on of the wo rd

“ re po se ” do e s n ot s ig nif ic a ntl y dif fe re nti a te § 6 83 .0 1( a ) f

ro m th e Cin c inn a ti o rd ina nc e . F ina lly , b oth

or din anc e s r e g ulate the us e of sound device s. Com

pa re Do rso , 446 N.E.2d at 450 (stating that the or dinance regulated the playing of music or amplify ing of sound), with C.C.O. § 683.01(a) (“N o person shall play any radio, music play er, television, audio s y stem or m usical i nstrument in such a manne r . . . .”) . Given that the Oh io c ourt s im

po rt e d a re a so na ble pe rs on

sta nd ard to a ve ry sim ila r s ound or din anc e , the Oh io courts would also likely

import a rea sonable pe rson standar d to § 683.01(a). This conclusion i s further supported by the Ohio appe llate cour

t’s decision in Ve nto , 2002 Ohio App. L EXI S 2476. I n Ve nto , the Ohio Court of Appe als exam i n ed C
. C
. O. § 683.01(b) a nd found that § 683.01(b) was similar to the sound ordinanc e discussed in Do rso . Ve nto , 2 00 2 O hio06-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

- 10 - App. L EXI S 2476, at *9. The Ve nto court then applied a rea sonable person standard to § 683.01(b) and held that it was not impermissibly vag ue on its fac e. Id. at *9–*10. Ve nto further

indicates that the O hio courts would apply the re asonable person standa rd used in Do rso to c onstrue § 683.01(a) narr owly beca use the ordina

nce e x amined in Ve nto , § 683.01(b), i s also simil ar to § 683.01(a ). F irst, the two subsections share a sig nificant amount of identical lang uag e. B oth subsections share parts of the phrase “no person sha ll play any radio, music play er, te le vis ion , o r a

ud io s y ste m” and

pa rt s o f t he ph ra se “ in s uc h a

mann e r or at su ch a vo lume a s to disturb the quiet, comfort or repose .” See C.C .O . § 68 3. 01 (a ) & (b ). Se c on d, bo th s ub se c tio ns a lso regulate the use of sound device s. Id. I n light of the se sig nificant similarities, Ve nto fu rt he r s up po rt s the c on c lus ion

that th e Oh io c ourt s w ou ld e xten d th e re a so na ble person s tand ard

a pp lie d in § 683.01(b) to § 683.01(a ). I n sum, both Do rso and Ve nto ind ic a te that w e sh ou ld ap ply a re a so na ble pe rs on

sta nd a rd to § 683.01(a) . Acc ording ly , we inter pret § 683.01(a ) as pr eventingthe playing of sound on a sound device in suc h a manner or at such a volume as to a nnoy or disturb the quiet, comfort or re pose of
a re asonable neig hboring inhabitant. L ike t he Cincinnati ordinanc e in Do rso , § 683.01(a) “does not permit the imposition of criminal liabilit y upon a par

ty whose c ond u ct disturbs only the hy perse nsitive.” Do rso , 446 N.E.2d at 452. No tw ith s t an d i n g t h e n ar r o w i n g c o n s t r

u c t i o n , A p p e l l an t s m a i n t a i nt h a t§ 6 8 3
. 0 1 ( a ) is i mp e r m i s s i b l y v a g u e b e c a

u s e i tc o n t a i n s t h e t e r

m “ an n o y. ” A p p e l l an t s ar g u e t h a tt h e t e r m “ an n o y” is inherently

vag ue and a llows for subjective e nforc ement. Appe llants also ar g ue that the district06-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

The Court distinguished Coates fr om Cha pli ns k yv . Ne w H

am ps hir e , 315 U.S. 568, 573 5 (1942), in w hich the New Hampshire Supreme Court g ave a nar rowing construction to a state statute. Coates , 402 U.S. at 613 n.3. - 11 - court’s inter

pretation of t he term “annoy” depr ives it of independe nt meaning within the ordinance
. We d isa g re e wi th A

pp e lla nts
. First, the use of the term “annoy” or “annoy ing” does not a

utomatically make a

n ordinanc e impermissibly

vag ue. Appe llants’ citation of Coa te s v . Ci ty of Cinc inn ati , 4 02 U. S. 611 (1 97 1) , to
s u p p o rt it s p o s it io n , is u n a v a il in g . I n C o a t es , beca use the Ohio Supreme Court did not give a
narr owing construction to a Cincinnati ordinanc e, the Supre me Court was “ rele g ated
. . . to the words of the ordina

nce itself.” Id. at 614. The Court thus held that a Cincinnati ordinanc e conta ining the te rm “ ann oying ” wa s im

pe rm iss ibl y

va g ue be cause the or din anc e “ did no t in dic a te up on

wh os e sensitivity

a violation does depe nd – the sensitivity of the judg e or jury , the sensitivi t y of the
arr esting office r, or the se nsitivi ty of a hy pothetical re asonable man.” Id. at 613. Unli ke Coates , 5 in this case, we are not left with the mere wo rd s o f the ordina nce, but a

re guided by

a nar row
cons truction of the statute. H ere , a violation of § 683.01(a ) depe nds upon the sensitivity of a
rea sonable pe rson. Se c on d, an or din anc e do e s no t ne c e ssa ri ly a llo w fo r su

bje c tiv e e nf

or c e me nt m e re ly

be c a us e it con t ai n s t h e t er m “annoy” or “ annoy ance .” Sa ia v . Ne w York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), cited by Appellants i n this reg ard, is inapposite. In Sa ia , th e Su p r e me Co u rt h e ld th at anordinanc e wa s unconstitutional on it s fac e bec ause “ it establishes a previous restra int on the rig ht of fre e spee ch” by requiringa per son to obtain a permit from the c hief of p o lice prior to using a loud speaker or06-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

Appellants also conte st the district court’s interpr etation of the phr ase “ annoy or disturb the 6 quiet, comfort or

repose of neig hboring inhabitants.” The district c ourt inte r prete d the phra se “a

nnoy or disturb the qui et, comfort or repose of neig hboring inhabitants” as “ annoy . . . the quiet, comfor

t or re pose of ne ighbor ing inha bitants.” (J.A. 81–82.) Appellants disag ree with the district court’s interp re t at i o n , arguing that “‘re pose’ is not annoy ed, pe op le are annoy ed.” ( Appellants’ B r. 44.) Even if so, Appe llants’ interpre tation does not rende r the statute va g ue. Ap pe lla nts br ie fl y a rgue tha t th e § 6 83 .0 1( a ) i s impe rm iss ibl y va g ue be c a us e the fi rs t c la

us e 7 of the ordina

nce, “ [n] o person sha ll play any radio, music play er, te levision, audio sy stem or musical ins tr ume nt i n s uc h a

mann e r or a t suc h volume a s to ann oy or dis tur b the qu ie t, c omf

or t or re po se - 12 - amplifier. Id. at 559–60. The discr etion of the c hief of police was unfetter ed. Id. at 560. The Court
wa s n ot f a c e d w itha

statut e that ha d b e e n n arr ow e d b y the state c ourt s. Finally , while the wor ds of a statute ma y simply be used t o cl ar ify

other wor ds, the term “annoy” appe ars to have a n independe nt and spec ific mea ning in the c ontext of the statute. Webster d ef i n es “a n n o y ” a s “t o i rr i t at e w i t h a n et t l i n g o r e x as p er at i n g ef fe ct es p [ ec i al l y ] b y

b ei n g a continuous or repe atedly rene wed source of vexation.” W e bs te r’ s Third Ne w I

nt’ l D ic tio na ry

at 87. Thus, annoy ance may be more direc tly connec ted to a manne r of utilizi ng sound device s other than loud volume. I n sum, t h e i m position of a rea sonable pe rson standar d to § 683.01(a) c reates an objec tive standard a g ainst which the ordinanc e can be enfor ced. A ccor dingly , § 683.01(a) provides fa ir notice of the prohibited c onduct and is not impermissibly vag ue on its fac e. 6 2. Section 683.01(a) is not vague-as-applied to Gaughan B e c a us e § 6 83 .0 1( a ) i s n ot v a g ue on its fa c e but pro vi de s f

a ir no tic e of the c on du c t th a t is prohibited, Appellants re ceive d sufficie nt notice that their conduct wa s prohibited. Thus, we r ejec t Appellants’ va g ue-a s-applied c halleng e. 706-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

of neig hboring inhabitants” does not specify the location of the prohibited ac tivity while the sec ond clause of the ordina

nce, “ at a volume whic h is plainly audible to per sons othe r than those who a re in the room in which such de vice or instrument is play ed and who are voluntary listeners there to,” a pp e ars to r e fe r t o th e ind oo r u se of so un d d e vic e s. Ap pe lla

nts argue that be c a

us e the fi rs t c la

us e of the ordina

nce doe s not specify

a location, the indoor location specifie d in the second c lause of the ordinanc e contr ols the scope of the ordinanc e. Thus, Appe lla n t s ar gu e that the ordinanc e wa s applied improper ly to G aug han beca use the ordinanc e applies to the indoor, and not outdoor, use of so un d d e vic e s. Appellants did not raise this issue in the district court. “ When a p ar t y fa i l s t o prese nt an argument to the district court, we have disc retion to resolve the issue only wher e the pr oper resolution is bey ond any doubt, or where injustice mig ht otherwise r esult.” Enertec h Elec., I nc. v. Ma ho nin g Co un ty

Com m’ rs , 8 5 F. 3 d 2 5 7 , 2 6 1 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g Br own v . Cr owe , 963 F.2d 895, 89 7– 98 (6 th C ir . 1 99 2) ; Newmyer v. P h i l a t el i c Leasing, Lt d. , 888 F.2d 385, 387 ( 6th Cir. 1989)). The Ohi o co u rt s have not de cided whe ther § 683.01(a ) is limit ed to re gulating the indoor use of so un d d e vic e s, and

we c ann ot s ay

tha t th e statut e c le arl y

a pp lie s o nly

to s ound generate d in do or s. Fur ther, be cause of the confusion as to w hether Gaug han was c harg ed under § 683.01(a) or (b) , see su pra note 1, it was important to raise this cha lleng e in the trial leve l court
. W e d o not find that injusti ce w ould result from dec lining to rule on the deb at ab l e p o i nt that neither side ha d the opportunity

to addre ss fully

in district court. Appell an t s , h o wever, ar g ue that we must resolve the issue be cause the district court dismiss ed their c ase f

or fa ilure to state a c laim, and that we c an af firm the dismiss al only

if it is clear that no relief

could be granted under a ny set of fa cts that could be pr oved consistent with the a lle g a tio ns . App ella

nts e sse nti a lly

argue that ou

r s tand ard of re vie w f or dis mis sa ls und e r F e d. R. Civ. P . 12(b)( 6) circ umvents the pri n ci p l e s t ated above. Appe llants, however , point to no law support i n g t heir position that an appe llate cour t must consider all arguments, whether or not they wer e deve loped fully

in the court below, simply beca use the district cour

t below had dismissed the case for failure to state a

claim. See Borkins v. U.S. Postal Serv . Employe es , 9 7 F . App ’x 32 , 3 5 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) ( aff irming a dismiss al under

Fe d. R. Civ. P
. 12(b)( 6) and not consider ing an ar g ument that was not ra ised in the court be low). - 13 - B. Section 605.10(b)(9) I n a dd iti on

to t he ir c ha lle ng e to § 68 3. 01 (a ), Ap pe lla nts arg ue th at § 605. 10 (b )( 9) is impermissibly

vag ue on it s fac e because the words “unsee mly ” and “unnec essar y ” ar e imprec ise and06-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

Appellants mainly

confine their ar g uments to the t erms “unseemly ” and “ unnece ssary ,” and 8 n o tt h e t er m “l o u d
. ” ( Ap p el l an t s ’ B r. 2 7

– 2 9
. ) T h e t er m “l o u d ” h as s u rv i v eda v agu en es s ch al l en ge in the Supreme Court. See Kovacs v. Coope r , 336 U.S. 77, 79 (1949) (statingthat the term “ loud” ha s “ thr ou g h d a ily

us e a c qu ir e d a

c on te nt t hat con ve y s to any

int e re ste d p e rs on

a su ff ic ie ntl y a c c ur a te conce pt of what is forbidde n”). The ordina

nces in the c ases c ite d

b y Appellants we re not na

rrowe d by judicial interpre tation. 9 See J i m C r o c k e t t P r o m o t i o n , I

n c . v . C i t yo f C ha rlo tte , 706 F.2d 486, 489–90 ( 4th Cir. 1983) (ana ly zing “unne cessa

ry noise” sepa

rate ly from “unr easona

bly loud noises” and holding that
“ un ne c e ssa

ry” is unc on sti tut ion a lly

va g ue ); U.S. Labor Party v. Pome rleau , 557 F.2d 410, 412–13 (4 th Cir
. 19 77 ) (h old ing that a so un d o rd ina

nc e e sta bli sh inga ma ximumde c ibe l le ve l pe rm itt e d in differ ent zones in Baltimore w as impermissibly vag ue because the m ethod for measuringthe dec ibel le ve l de pe nd e d u

po n th e su

bje c tiv e op ini on

of the inv e sti g a tor ); Du

pr es v . Ci ty

of N e wpo rt , 9 78 F. S u p p . 4 2 9 , 4 3 3

– 3 4 (D
. R
. I
. 1 9 9 7 ) ( fi n d i n g t h at a s o u n d o rd i n an ce co n t ai n i n g t h e wo rd s “d i s tu rb i n g, or unnec essa ry n o i s e” was unc onstitut ionally vag ue bec ause the ordinanc e did not have a ny “qualify ing la ng uag e” that made it “ possible f or individuals to dete rmine what conduct is prohibited - 14 - do no t pr e se nt an ob

je c tiv e c ri te ri a fo r the pu

bli c to fo llo w o r f

or the po lic e to e nf

or c e . Ap pe lla

nts 8 also fault § 605.10(b) (9) f or not setting a

“dec ibel measure men t level, or a limit ed conte x tual application.” ( Appellants’ B r. 28 (quotation mar ks & f ootnotes omitt ed).) The na r r o w in te rpre tation applied to § 68 3
. 0 1 (a), howeve r, also applies to § 605.10(b) (9). He re, § 605.10( b)(9) ref ers specific ally to “[t] he making of any loud, unseemly or unnecessar y noise in violation of Chapter 683 of these Codified O rdinanc es.” C.C.O. § 605.10(b) (9 ). Beca use a r easona

ble per son standard
a pp lie s to § 6 83 .0 1( a ) a

nd (b ), a nd be c a us e § 6 05 .1 0( b) (9 ) r e fe rs sp e c if ica lly to n ois e s ma de in vio la tio n o f § 68 3, the re a so na ble pe rs on

sta nd ard and a ll the lim itatio ns of

§ 6 83 also a

pp ly to § 605.10(b)( 9). Our na rrow c ons t ru ct i o n o f § 605.10(b) (9) disting uishes this case f rom the ca ses that Appellants cite in a

rg uing that ordinanc es containing ter ms such as “unne cessa

ry ” and “ unseemly ,”
or ca ses that lack a decibe l measure ment level are unconstitut ionally vag ue. Unlike the ordina nces 906-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

. . . . Under

the New port ordinanc e, the leg ality of a pe rson’s conduc t i s j udg ed solely by the su bje c tiv e c ha

ra c te ri sti c s a ssi g ne d to it by any on e e xpos e d to it” ) ( c itatio n o mit te d) ; Da e W oo Kim v . Ci ty of N e w York, 774 F. Supp. 164, 170 (S
. D. N. Y. 1 9 9 1 ) (finding that a sound ordinance prohibiting “ unnece ssary noise” wa s impermissibly vag ue becau s e it did not provide objective sta nd ard fo r e nf or c e me nt) ; Frati e llo v . M an c us o , 653 F. Supp. 775, 790 (D.R.I
. 1987) (holding that a so un d o rd ina

nc e pr oh ibi tin g “ un ne c e ssa ry no ise s or sound s” wa s unc on sti tut ion a lly va g ue be c a

us e it d id n ot p ro vid e an o bje c tiv e c ri te ri a fo r i ts e nf

or c e me nt b y

pu bli c of fi c ia ls) ; Pritikin v. Thurman , 311 F. Supp. 14 0 0 , 1 4 0 2 –03 (S.D. Fla . 1970) (holding that without a narr owing construction, a sound ordinance that prohibits languag e or conduct that disturbs or is calculated to disturb the peac e was impermissibly

vag ue). Although the Ohi o S u p reme Court and the Ohio Court of Appe als have not examined 10 § 605.10(b)( 9), a municipa l cour t has examined § 605.10 and he ld that, as a whole , the ordinanc e was not unconstitutionally vag ue on its fac e. See Cit y of Cl e v e lan d v . P owe ll , 584 N.E.2d 1386, 138 9 (C leveland Mun. Ct. 1991). The Ohio court found that “[t] he g ener al lang uag e [of the ordinanc e] is more than s ufficie ntly modified by the ni ne sections of examples which desc ribe the ty pes of noise w hich the law se eks to forbid.” Id. - 15 - in the case s ci t ed by

Appellants, § 605.10(b) (9) is suffic iently limit ed by

§ 683 so that it provides
no tic e to c iti zen s o f the ty

pe s of co nd

uc t tha t ar e pr oh ibi te d a

nd the re fo re , it

is n ot u nc on sti tut ion a lly vag ue on its fac e. 10 II. Overbreadth As ind ic a te d, Ap pe lla

nts a lso c ha lle ng e the Cle ve land Or din anc e s a s o ve rb ro a d. Ap pe lla nts argue that both § 683.01(a ) and § 605.10(b)( 9) are fac ially overbr oad. Appe llants further a rg ue that § 6 83 .0 1( a ) i s o ve rb road as app lie d to Ga ug ha n in div idu a lly . We a g a in r e je c t App e lla

nts ’
argume nts
. A. The Cl e ve lan d Or dina nc e s a r e notfac ial ly o ve r br oa d. Ap pe lla nts argue tha

t § 68 3. 01 (a ) an d § 60 5. 10 (b )( 9) are ov e rb ro a d b e c a us e the y “ br oa dly p r o h ib it a ll f

o r ms o f s p e e c h , in c lu d in g Pl a in ti f f s ’ r e li g io u s an d p o li ti c a l s p e e c h , p la y e d throug h a06-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

Ap pe lla nts ’ o ve rb re a dth

c la im i s b a se d in

pa rt on the a sse rt ion

th at th e or din anc e s in 11 question were not subjected to a limiting c onstruction for “ rea sonablene ss” by Ohio state cour ts. As discussed pre viously , the district court c orre ctly found that the re g ulations are su b j ec t t o s uch a limit ing c onstruction. The pa rties do not contest that the c ontent of Appe llants’ speec h is protected. 12 - 16 - sound device if is it subj ectively deeme d ‘annoy

ing’ or ‘unne cessa

ry ’ by someone e lse.” 11 (Appe llants’ Br . 49–50.) A re g ulatio n is ov e rb ro a d if it “ ‘r e a c he s a

su bs tanti a l numbe r o f i mpe rm iss ibl e a pp lic a tio ns ’ relative to [ its] leg itimate sweep.” O d l e v . D e c a t u r

C o u n ty , 4 2 1 F.3d 386, 393 (6th Cir. 2005) (q u o t i n g De

ja V u o f Na sh v ill e, I

nc . v . Me tro

po lit an Go v ’t of N

as hv ill e & Da v ids on Cou nty , 274 F.3d 377, 387 (6th Cir. 2001) ). Cases that run afoul of the overbr eadth doctrine uniforml y i nvolve
re g ulatio ns that inf

ri ng e the e xer c ise of pr ote c te d a c tiv iti e s th a t do no t c on sti tut e the ha zar d o r e vil which the r eg ulation is designe d to preve nt. F or instance, restric tions on public g ather ings of any size are ov e rb ro a d b e c a

us e sma ll g a the ri ng s d o n ot a ffect the pu bli c int e re st i n “ c ro wd

and tr a ff ic control, prope rty

maintenanc e, and pr otection of the public w elfa re.” Am.-Arab Anti-Disc rim in a tion Comm. , 418 F.3d at 608. Thus, althoug h the g overnme nt ma y place a rea sonable time, place, a nd manner

regulation up on pr ote c te d s pe e c h in p ub lic fo ra , th e re g ulatio n mu st: (1 ) b e c on te nt n e utr a l; ( 2) be na rr ow ly 12 tailored to ser

ve a sig nificant g overnme ntal interest; and ( 3) leave open a lternative c hannels of communication. W

ar d v . R oc k Ag ain st R ac ism , 4 9 1 U. S
. 7 8 1 , 7 9 1 (1 9 8 9 ) ( ci t i n g Clark v

. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violenc e , 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). We e x amine ea ch re quirement in turn.

1. The Cl e ve lan d Or dina nc e s a r e c ont e nt ne ut r al.06-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

A “he ckler ’s veto” is de fined a s “an attempt by those who dislike a speake r to c reate such 13 a disturbanc e that the spe aker must be silenced.” Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids , 980 F.2d 1538, 1553 ( 6th Cir. 1992). Be cause § 605.10(b)( 9) refer s to § 683 and because Appellants do not specific ally use the 14 lang uag e of § 605.10( b)(9) in its overbrea dth arguments, we a ddress the la ng uag e of § 683.01( a). - 17 - Appellants contend that the Cleveland Ordinanc es impose a “subjec tive” standa rd, allowing “any . . . person who disa g ree s with or is o ff en d ed by the 911 audio re cording[t o] ex erc ise the ‘hec kler’s ve to’ option gr anted them b y t h e City to effe ctively

squelch Plaintiffs’ spee ch.” 13 (Appe llants’ Br . 50.) We disag ree . Fa cially , the Cleveland O rdinanc es ar e c o nte nt n e utr a l. A s previously discussed, § 683.01(a ), which § 6 0 5
. 1 0 ( b ) ( 9 ) in c o r p o r a te s , p r o h ib it s th e p la y in g o f s o u n d in s u c h a ma n n e r o r a t s u c h a 14 volume as to annoy

or d i s t u rb rea sonable ne ighbor ing inha bitants. As such, the Cleveland Ordinanc es cle arly

regulate the manner and volum e of the s ound projec ted, but do not regulate the content of the messag e that is projec ted. Thus, while the Cleveland Or dinance s regulate how sound i s p ro j ec t ed , t h ey d o n o tco n t ai nan y l an gu age re gu l at i n g what is projected. See Ve nto , 2 00 2 O hio Ap p. L EX I S 24 76 , at *1 3 ( fi nd ingthat a si mil ar s e c tio n, § 6 83 .0 1( b) , is c on te nt n e utr a l be c a us e it
re str ic ts o nly

the ma nn e r a nd vo lum e of

sp e e c h) . T he fa c t that the re g ulatio n a pp lie s b ro a dly

to a ll ty pes of speec h does not a lter this a spect of the over brea dth analy sis. See Hill v. Colorado , 5 30 U. S. 70 3, 73 1 ( 20 00 ) ( “ [T]he c omp re he ns ive ne ss o f th e sta tut e is a vir tue , n ot a vic e , b e c a

us e it i s evidenc e ag ainst there be ing a discriminatory

g overnme ntal motive.”). Be cause the Cleveland O rdinanc es prohibit the playing of sound in such a ma nner or at such a volume as to a

nnoy or disturb the reasonable person, they do not g rant the hy perse nsitive person06-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

- 18 - or per son who strong ly

believes in a

bortion rig hts a “he ckler ’s veto” over Appellants’ r ight to fr ee speec h. Acc ording ly , the Cleveland O rdinanc es ar e conte nt neutral a nd pass the first prongof the
ov e rb re a dth

te st. 2. The Cl e ve lan d Or dina nc e s ar e nar r owly ta ilo r e d to se r ve a s ign if icant pub lic intere st. The Supreme Court has held that “a regulation of the t ime, place , or manne r of pr otected speec h must be narr owly tailored to se rve the g overnme nt’s leg itimate, content-ne utral intere sts but that it need not be the least restrictive or least i ntrusive m eans of doing so.” Hi ll , 530 U.S. at 726
n . 3 2 (q u o t i n g W

ar d , 491 U.S. at 798). The n arrow-tailoringrequire ment is met if the regulation “‘pr omotes a substantial g o v ernment interest that would be a chieve d less eff ectively absent the regulation.’” W

ar d , 4 9 1 U. S
. at 7 9 9 (q u o t i n g United States v. Albertini , 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). The re g ulation, however , cannot bur den substantially more spee ch tha n nece ssary to further

the g overnme nt’s interest. Id. Th e Cle ve land

Or din anc e s w e re na

rr ow ly ta ilo re d to se rv e a sig nif ic ant pu bli c int e re st. F ir st, Cleveland e nacte d its sound ordin an ce s to protect its citizens from unwelcome noise, and the Supreme Court has h el d t hat this is a leg itimate public interest. See id. at 796. Second, the Cleveland Or dinance s are direc ted t owar d sound that is play ed fr om a device only in a manner

that would annoy

or disturb a re asonable person. The y do not ban the use of all sound devices, they do
no t ban the pr oje c tio n of sound a t a ll v olume s, and

the y do no t r e g ulate the pr oje c tio n o f s ound in any other manne r other tha

n throug h the use of sound de vices. F inally , absent the O rdinanc es, the g overnme nt would be less ef fec tive in protecti n g i t s citizens from unrea sonably annoying or06-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

- 19 - dis tur bin g pr oje c tio ns of

so un d fr om sou

nd de vic e s. Thus , th e Cle ve land Or din anc e s are na

rr ow ly ta ilo re d to se rv e a

sig nif ic ant g ov e rnme nt i nte re st. 3. The r e ar e alt e r nat ive c hanne ls fo r c om m unic at ion . The Supreme Court ha s held that “‘pe ople who wish to pr opag andize protests or views’ ” do not have a constitutional rig ht to do so “‘w heneve r and howeve r and wher ever they please .’” United States v. Grace , 4 6 1 U
. S
. 1 7 1 , 1 7 7

– 7 8 (1 9 8 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Adderley v. Florida , 385 U.S. 39, 47–48 (1966)) . The g overnme nt may impose regulations upon protected spe ech a s long a s it leaves open alternative channe ls of communication. W ar d , 491 U.S. at 791. The Clevela

nd Ordinanc es do not ban all methods of c ommunication. They only regulate, and do n o t b an , th e p r o

je c ti o n o f s o u n d f

r o m s o u n d d e v ic e s . A d d it io n a ll y , A p p e ll an ts h a ve not argued that they

are shut off from other cha nnels of communication, and there is no indication that Appellants ca

nnot convey

the content of

t h ei r au d io rec ording in another ma nner. Thus, the Cleveland Or dinance s leave open alter native cha

nnels of communication. I n sum, the C leveland Ordinanc es survive all three hurdles of the overbr eadth test, a nd they
are not fac ially

overbr oad. B. Se c ti on 6 83 .0 1( a) is no t o ve r br oa d as appl ie d. “An or dinance which is not overbr oad on i ts face may never theless be unc onstitut ional as applied if it is enfor ced ag ainst a protected activity .” Felix v . Y oung , 536 F.2d 1126, 1134 ( 6th Cir. 19 76 ). He re , G a

ug han (i nd ivi du a lly

) a rgue s th a t § 6 83 .0 1( a ) w a s o ve rb ro a d a s a pp lie d to him
. Gaug han base s his ch al l enge on his two a rre sts for violations of § 683.01(a) . We hold that § 683.01(a) is not overbroa d as applied to Ga ug han.06-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

- 20 - Gaug han cla ims that he was ar rested on the first occa sion beca use an e mploy ee of

the clinic, who disliked the content of the rec ording , had complained about his c onduct. Appellants stated that an employ ee of

the clinic had sworn a c omplaint under oath that Ga ug han violated § 683.01( a) a nd that afte rwa

rds, a wa rra nt was issued for

his arre st. ( Am. Compl. ¶ 17.) Although G aug han alleg es that the e mpl oy e e wa s motiv a te d by he r dis ple a su re wi th the c on te nt of the a ud io re c or din g , h e did not alleg e t h at t he employ ee told the police that she disliked the content of the audio re cordingor that the police a cted be cause of the employ ee’ s displeasure with the content of the rec ording . Rather, based on G aug han’s own c omplaint, it appears that he was arr ested beca use of a c omplaint sworn under oath that he violated the ter ms of § 6 8 3
. 0 1 (a) . (I d.) Ac cording ly , § 683.01(a) was not
ov e rb ro a dly

a pp lie d to Ga

ug ha n d ur inghis fi rs t arr e st. We a lso se e no iss ue s w ithGa ug ha n’ s se c on d a

rr e st. Ga ug ha n w a s a rr e ste d a se c on d ti me af ter the Cleve land police r ece ived two complaints about his playing of the audio re cord i n g. Gaug han states that ne ighbor ing residents had complained about his pla y ing of the audio re cording while standing on a public sidewa lk a cross the street from the rea r of the c linic. (Am. Compl. ¶ 24.) After police informe d Gaug han about the complaint, Gaug han moved to the front of t he clinic and continued play

ing the rec ording at the same volume. Offic ers then informed Gaug han that they had
rec eived a

nother c omplaint from an emplo y ee of the clinic and a

rre sted him for violating § 683.01(a) . (Am. Compl. ¶ 25.) Althoug h Gaug han alleg es that the police arr ested him based upon the se c o n d

c o mp la in t b y

th e e mp lo y e e o f

th e c li n ic , h e d id

n o t a ll e g e s p e c if

ic a ll y th a t t h e p o li ce
arr ested him based upon the clinic employ ee’ s objection to the content of his sp e e c h. (A m. C omp l. ¶ 27.) Rathe r, Ga

ug han’s own a

mended c omplaint indicates that afte r re ceivingtw o c o mp laints from06-3010

Gaug han v. City

of Cleveland

- 21 - neig hboring inhabitants, the police a rre sted him for “pla

y [i ng ] an audio sy stem in such a manne r or at such a volume as to ann o y o r d i s t urb the quiet, c omfort or re pose of ne ighbor ing inha bitants.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 27.) As with the first arr est, there is no indication that the police a cted be cause of the content of the speec h. Acc ording ly , § 683.01(a) was not unc onstitut ionally applied to Gaug han. CO NC LU SION For the fore g oing r easons, we reje ct Appe l lants’ constitutional challeng es to C.C.O. §§ 68 3. 01 (a ) a

nd 60 5. 10 (b )( 9) . A c c or din g ly , w e AF F I RM the de c isi on of the dis tr ic t c ourt
.