alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Lake, use of Hall, *v.*Brown.

When it appeared, from the weight of evidence, that a set-off, which was filed against a note, was purchased after notice of assignment, a new trial was awarded by the court for the correction of errors.

IN ERROR from the circuit court of the county of Yallabusha.

Baine, for plaintiff in error,

cited 1 Chit. PI. 486; Bull. N. P. 181; Cowper, 56; 6 Rand. 519; 19 Com. Law Rep. 241; 14 ibid. 63; Collyer, 626; 6 Term Rep. 488, 493.

*Per Curiam.*

The plaintiff sued on a promissory note, and the defendant set up, as an offset, the notes of the Grenada Savings Institution, Bryarly & Lake being partners in that concern. The jury, it seems, allowed the offset, and the plaintiff moved for a new trial, which was refused.

To constitute a good offset against a note which has been assigned, the defendant must have held such offset before notice of assignment. He cannot afterwards purchase the liabilities of the assignor, and bring them in as offsets. And it makes no difference whether the suit be brought in the name of the assignor for the use of the assignee, or not, the rule is the same. Barbour on Set-Off, 63-4.

It seems that Brown was notified of the assignment in January, 1841. In March or April, 1841, it appears that three members of the savings institution took up what notes Brown, the defendant, then held on the company. This was a strong circumstance, tending to show that he acquired the notes after notice of assignment.

*662Another witness testified that he saw the defendant’s attorney when he was filing the notes as a set-off, and that he took them to be the same which Brown had received but a short time before, perhaps about four or five weeks before *they were*filed as an *offset.*The suit was brought in April, 1841, so that if the notes were received by Brown five weeks before that time, it was after notice of assignment. These circumstances amount to almost positive proof that the offset was obtained after notice of assignment.

On this ground the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted.
§ 1614.605 Representation and official time. ( a ) At any stage in the processing of a complaint, including the counseling stage § 1614.105, the complainant shall have the right to be accompanied, represented, and advised by a representative of complainant's choice.
( b ) If the complainant is an employee of the agency, he or she shall have a reasonable amount of official time, if otherwise on duty, to prepare the complaint and to respond to agency and EEOC requests for information. If the complainant is an employee of the agency and he designates another employee of the agency as his or her representative, the representative shall have a reasonable amount of official time, if otherwise on duty, to prepare the complaint and respond to agency and EEOC requests for information. The agency is not obligated to change work schedules, incur overtime wages, or pay travel expenses to facilitate the choice of a specific representative or to allow the complainant and representative to confer. The complainant and representative, if employed by the agency and otherwise in a pay status, shall be on official time, regardless of their tour of duty, when their presence is authorized or required by the agency or the Commission during the investigation, informal adjustment, or hearing on the complaint.
( c ) In cases where the representation of a complainant or agency would conflict with the official or collateral duties of the representative, the Commission or the agency may, after giving the representative an opportunity to respond, disqualify the representative.
( d ) Unless the complainant states otherwise in writing, after the agency has received written notice of the name, address and telephone number of a representative for the complainant, all official correspondence shall be with the representative with copies to the complainant. When the complainant designates an attorney as representative, service of all official correspondence shall be made on the attorney and the complainant, but time frames for receipt of materials shall be computed from the time of receipt by the attorney. The complainant must serve all official correspondence on the designated representative of the agency.
( e ) The Complainant shall at all times be responsible for proceeding with the complaint whether or not he or she has designated a representative.
( f ) Witnesses who are Federal employees, regardless of their tour of duty and regardless of whether they are employed by the respondent agency or some other Federal agency, shall be in a duty status when their presence is authorized or required by Commission or agency officials in connection with a complaint.
[57 FR 12646, Apr. 10, 1992, as amended at 64 FR 37661, July 12, 1999]
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<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 0
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<INCOME-TAX>                                     0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (509,407)
<DISCONTINUED>                              12,289
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  0
<CHANGES>                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                              (497,118)
<EPS-BASIC>                                 .010
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§ 1630.9 Not making reasonable accommodation. ( a ) It is unlawful for a covered entity not to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified applicant or employee with a disability, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its business.
( b ) It is unlawful for a covered entity to deny employment opportunities to an otherwise qualified job applicant or employee with a disability based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to such individual's physical or mental impairments.
( c ) A covered entity shall not be excused from the requirements of this part because of any failure to receive technical assistance authorized by section 507 of the ADA, including any failure in the development or dissemination of any technical assistance manual authorized by that Act.
( d ) An individual with a disability is not required to accept an accommodation, aid, service, opportunity or benefit which such qualified individual chooses not to accept. However, if such individual rejects a reasonable accommodation, aid, service, opportunity or benefit that is necessary to enable the individual to perform the essential functions of the position held or desired, and cannot, as a result of that rejection, perform the essential functions of the position, the individual will not be considered qualified.
( e ) A covered entity is required, absent undue hardship, to provide a reasonable accommodation to an otherwise qualified individual who meets the definition of disability under the “actual disability” prong (§ 1630.2(g)(1)(i)), or “record of” prong (§ 1630.2(g)(1)(ii)), but is not required to provide a reasonable accommodation to an individual who meets the definition of disability solely under the “regarded as” prong (§ 1630.2(g)(1)(iii)).
[56 FR 35734, July 26, 1991, as amended at 76 FR 17002, Mar. 25, 2011]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-10623

Summary Calendar

AMANDA KYZER DARBY,

Petitioner–Appellant,

v.

JODY R. UPTON,

Respondent–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:16-CV-138

Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and ELROD, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Amanda Kyzer Darby, federal inmate # 54622-018, was sentenced in the 

U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida to 120 months of 

imprisonment following her guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to distribute 

50 grams or more of methamphetamine. Her direct appeal was dismissed, and 

her first 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion was denied. Now incarcerated in the 

Southern District of Texas, Darby filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, which the 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 12, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-10623 Document: 00513833850 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/12/2017
No. 16-10623

2

district court denied as seeking relief unavailable through such a petition. We 

review issues of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Wilson v. Roy, 

643 F.3d 433, 434 (5th Cir. 2011).

Construing her appellate brief liberally, Darby has failed to identify any 

error in the district court’s disposition of her motion. Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 

222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993); Brinkmann v. Dallas Cty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 

F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 16-10623 Document: 00513833850 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/12/2017
WILLIAM MULDROW, JR.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D16-3116

_____________________________/

Opinion filed September 27, 2016.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Angela C. Dempsey, Judge.

John M. Leace, of Brooks, LeBoeuf, Bennett, Foster & Gwartney, P.A., 

Tallahassee, for Appellant; William Muldrow, Jr., pro se, Appellant. 

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

WOLF, BILBREY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.
§ 1640.10 Section 504 agency review of deferred complaints. ( a ) *Deferral by the section 504 agency.* When a section 504 agency refers a complaint to the EEOC pursuant to § 1640.6(c)(2) or when it is determined that, as between the EEOC and a section 504 agency, the EEOC is the agency that shall process a dual-filed complaint or charge under § 1640.8(a)(1) or § 1640.8(e), the section 504 agency shall defer further action until: ( 1 ) The EEOC issues a no cause finding and a notice of right-to-sue pursuant to 29 CFR 1601.19; or
( 2 ) The EEOC enters into a conciliation agreement; or
( 3 ) The EEOC issues a cause finding and a notice of failure of conciliation pursuant to 29 CFR 1601.21, and: ( i ) If the recipient is not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, the EEOC completes enforcement proceedings or issues a notice of right-to-sue in accordance with 29 CFR 1601.28; or
( ii ) If the recipient is a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, the EEOC refers the charge to the Civil Rights Division in accordance with 29 CFR 1601.29, and the Civil Rights Division completes enforcement proceedings or issues a notice of right-to-sue in accordance with 29 CFR 1601.28(d); or
( 4 ) The EEOC or, when a case has been referred pursuant to 29 CFR 1601.29, the Civil Rights Division, otherwise resolves the charge.
( b ) *Notification of the deferring agency.* The EEOC or the Civil Rights Division, as appropriate, shall notify the agency that has deferred processing of the charge upon resolution of any dual-filed complaint or charge.
( c ) *Agency review.* After receipt of notification that the EEOC or the Civil Rights Division, as appropriate, has resolved the complaint or charge, the agency shall promptly determine what further action by the agency is warranted. In reaching that determination, the agency shall give due weight to the findings and conclusions of the EEOC and to those of the Civil Rights Division, as applicable. If the agency proposes to take an action inconsistent with the EEOC's or the Civil Rights Division's findings and conclusions as to whether a violation has occurred, the agency shall notify in writing the Assistant Attorney General, the Chairman of the EEOC, and the head of the EEOC office that processed the complaint. In the written notification, the agency shall state the action that it proposes to take and the basis of its decision to take such action.
( d ) *Provision of information.* Upon written request, the EEOC or the Civil Rights Division shall provide the section 504 agency with any materials relating to its resolution of the charge, including its findings and conclusions, investigative reports and files, and any conciliation agreement.
#### Robert Price, esq. *against*Jacob Summers, assignee &c. of David Van Doren.

ON CERTIORARI.

Bond given ^.e^by^as-' sault and batgatísfectiMi^6 and prevent fegafand.011’ (a)

(a)

*Den vs. Moore, ante 474. Grover vs. Bruere, 4 Hal. 319. Whitenack vs. Ten Eyck, 2 Gr. Ch. 249. Owens vs. Owens, 8 C. E. Gr. 60. Brittin vs. Chegary, Spen.*625.

Kirkpatrick C. J.

It appears from the papers sent up with this return, that *David Van Doren,*the assignor, was about to go before the grand jury to make complaint against *Robert Price,*the plaintiff here, for an assault and battery which he alleged he had made upon him; that *Price,*in order to satisfy *Van Doren*and to prevent him from making his complaint, gave him his obligation 50 dollars; that *Van Doren*assigned this obligation to *Summers,*the defendant here, and that this action is brought upon that obligation.

It is now objected that this obligation is for an unlawful consideration, and therefore void; that it is made to stifle a prosecution for an offence against the public peace, and to let the guilty escape punishment.

This would be carrying the doctrine too far. It is always lawful to make satisfaction for a direct private injury of this kind, and by that means to *prevent*a public prosecution. Indeed, even after the prosecution has been commenced, if satisfaction be made to the injured, the punishment, generally, will be but nominal. To *prevent*a prosecution by making satisfaction to the injured, and to *suppress*a prosecution already commenced by bribing the *668witnesses, are wholly different things. Let the judgment affirmed.

Southard J.

expressed a doubt, whether the bond was not void, being given to prevent a criminal prosecution.

Judgment affirmed.
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             17,236
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§ 450.131 Probability of failure analysis. ( a ) *General.* For each hazard and phase of flight, a flight safety analysis for a launch or reentry must account for vehicle failure probability. The probability of failure must be consistent for all hazards and phases of flight. ( 1 ) For a vehicle or vehicle stage with fewer than two flights, the failure probability estimate must account for the outcome of all previous flights of vehicles developed and launched or reentered in similar circumstances.
( 2 ) For a vehicle or vehicle stage with two or more flights, vehicle failure probability estimates must account for the outcomes of all previous flights of the vehicle or vehicle stage in a statistically valid manner. The outcomes of all previous flights of the vehicle or vehicle stage must account for data on any mishap and anomaly.
( b ) *Failure.* For flight safety analysis purposes, a failure occurs when a vehicle does not complete any phase of normal flight or when any anomalous condition exhibits the potential for a stage or its debris to impact the Earth or reenter the atmosphere outside the normal trajectory envelope during the mission or any future mission of similar vehicle capability.
( c ) *Previous flight.* For flight safety analysis purposes— ( 1 ) The flight of a launch vehicle begins at a time in which a launch vehicle lifts off from the surface of the Earth; and
( 2 ) The flight of a reentry vehicle or deorbiting upper stage begins at a time in which a vehicle attempts to initiate a reentry.
( d ) *Allocation.* The vehicle failure probability estimate must be distributed across flight phases and failure modes. The distribution must be consistent with— ( 1 ) The data available from all previous flights of vehicles developed and launched or reentered in similar circumstances; and
( 2 ) Data from previous flights of vehicles, stages, or components developed and launched, reentered, flown, or tested by the subject vehicle developer or operator. Such data may include previous experience involving similar— ( i ) Vehicle, stage, or component design characteristics;
( ii ) Development and integration processes, including the extent of integrated system testing; and
( iii ) Level of experience of the vehicle operation and development team members.
( e ) *Observed vs. conditional failure rate.* Probability of failure allocation must account for significant differences in the observed failure rate and the conditional failure rate. A probability of failure analysis must use a constant conditional failure rate for each phase of flight, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different conditional failure rate for a particular vehicle, stage, or phase of flight.
( f ) *Application requirements.* An applicant must submit: ( 1 ) A description of the methods used in probability of failure analysis, in accordance with § 450.115(c); and
( 2 ) A representative set of tabular data and graphs of the predicted failure rate and cumulative failure probability for each foreseeable failure mode.
13343

#### STATE v. BOLIN

(162 S. E., 466)

*Mr. G. W.*Speer, for appellant,

*Mr. S. R.*Watt, Solicitor, for respondent.

February 3, 1931.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Stabler.

. The defendant was indicted and tried for violation of the prohibition law. When the State rested, counsel for the defense made the following motion, which was refused by the Court: *“I*want to ask for a non-suit in this case, there is no evidence that the defendant had any liquid that was intoxicating.” When all the testimony was in, the solicitor announced that the State would rely alone upon the third count of the indictment, which charged unlawful possession. Thereupon the defendant made a motion — which was likewise denied- — for a directed verdict on the ground that there was no evidence that he had in his possession any intoxicating liquors, and that, even if possession was shown, there was no evidence that it was unlawful. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he now appeals to this Court, assigning error to the trial Judge in refusing his motions.

A review of the testimony would serve no useful purpose. It is sufficient to say that a careful examination of the record *376discloses that there was some evidence adduced which tended to establish the charge of possession as laid in the indictment, and which warranted the submission of that question to the jury.

The exceptions, therefore, are overruled, and the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Mr. Chiee Justice BlEase, and Messrs. Justices Carter and Bonham, and Mr. Circuit Judge W. H. Townsend concur.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 95 (Tuesday, May 16, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 31157]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-12264]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. RP91-229-029]


Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company; Notice of Compliance Filing

May 11, 2000.
    Take notice that on May 4, 2000, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line 
Company (Panhandle) tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas Tariff, 
First Revised Volume No. 1, the following revised tariff sheet to be 
effective June 1, 2000:

1st Rev Twenty-Third Rev Sheet No. 19

    Panhandle states that the purpose of this filing is to comply with 
the Commission's Letter received onMay 3, 2000 in Docket No. RP91-229-
028 to correct the pagination.
    Panhandle states that copies of this filing are being servd on all 
affected customers, applicable state regulatory agencies and parties to 
this proceeding.
    Any person desiring to protest this filing should file a protest 
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE, 
Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Section 385.211 of the 
Commission's Rules and Regulations. All such protests must be filed as 
provided in section 154.210 of the Commission's Regulations. Protests 
will be considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate 
action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to 
the proceedings. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission 
and are available for public inspection in the Public Reference Room. 
This filing may be viewed on the web at http://www.ferc.fed.us/online/rims.htm (call 202-208-2222 for assistance).

David P. Boergers,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 00-12264 Filed 5-15-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M