www.ndu.edu/inss dh No. 76 1 

The sharing of information in complex civil-military operations1

 is important, yet actors rarely do it well. U.S. and allied military forces must 

be able to communicate, collaborate, and exchange information effectively with the local populations they seek to influence, or they cannot achieve 

the goals for which they have been committed. Nonetheless, experience from 

stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, numerous humanitarian assistance/

disaster relief missions, and efforts to build the capacity of foreign partners suggest that effective information-sharing is much harder than might be expected. 

This paper sheds light on the difficulties of setting up and sustaining projects to 

share information in such situations and suggests ways to do better in the future.

The reasons are straightforward. Government practitioners are unfamiliar 

with many of the technical solutions to ineffective information-sharing. Moreover, information-sharing runs counter to long-held information-controlling 

habits. Incentives rarely reward sharing and instead punish leaks. Projects that 

try to mitigate information-sharing problems typically take a long time to develop, need broad coalitions to implement, and have results that are hard to measure 

and attribute. Many of the stakeholders do not have institutional ties and some 

actively seek to minimize relationships with each other. As has often been seen 

in projects in Afghanistan, changes in personnel and government priorities can 

make projects hard to sustain. Collectively, the impacts have been detrimental to 

information-sharing.

This paper draws on examples from Afghanistan to highlight some lessons 

that members of diverse organizations have observed over a number of years.2

Sharing to Succeed:

Lessons from Open 

Information-sharing Projects 

in Afghanistan

Defense Horizons

National Defense University

Center for 

Technology and 

National Se

curity Poli

c

y

About the Authors

Linton Wells II is the Director of the 

Center for Technology and National 

Security Policy, Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, at the National 

Defense University (NDU). James 

Bosworth is a Freelance Writer and 

Consultant based in Managua, Nicaragua. John Crowley is an Informationsharing Analyst at NDU and Research 

Fellow in the Harvard Humanitarian 

Initiative. Rebecca Linder Blachly is Director of Advancement, International 

Programs, and Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Key Points

◆ Unless U.S. and coalition forces can 

share information with the populations they seek to influence in 

complex civil-military operations, 

they cannot achieve the goals for 

which they were committed.

◆ Information, communications, 

and related support structures 

influence all aspects of complex 

operations and need to be treated 

as critical infrastructures and essential services but rarely are.

◆ Open information-sharing projects require sustained leadership 

interest plus shared and stable 

priorities among many parties. 

Absent this emphasis, changes in 

personnel, mission priorities, and 

funding levels will make it hard 

to develop, transition, and sustain 

any such effort.

◆ Observations from informationsharing projects in Afghanistan 

suggest several ways to change 

behaviors that can turn lessons 

observed thus far into lessons 

actually learned.

July 2013

by Linton Wells II, James Bosworth, John Crowley, 

and Rebecca Linder Blachly
2 dh No. 76 www.ndu.edu/inss

The first case study focuses on an informal informationsharing project near Jalalabad in Nangarhar Province 

that builds on personal relationships and technical infrastructures developed since 2006. It is colloquially referred to as the Nangarhar pilot and continues to unfold. 

The second project, termed UnityNet, went through various phases. A combination of organizations in Washington and Kabul began UnityNet in mid-2010 to build 

on experiences from Nangarhar and elsewhere to develop a globally deployable, sustainable program to share 

population-centric, or “white,” information. However, 

personnel turned over and disagreements developed over 

the purpose and scope of the project. Efforts to move 

UnityNet away from its original white information focus 

and repurpose it for “green” (government-military) intelligence collection raised concerns that associating with 

it could jeopardize people in the field who had intended 

to support only population-centric information-sharing. 

In early 2011, components of the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan proposed an 

implementation effort under UnityNet, called UnityNet 

Afghanistan, to support Village Stability Operations 

(VSO). However, the continued emphasis on green intelligence reraised the same concerns about the safety of 

associated partners and UnityNet was terminated. The 

third case relates to a new follow-on project, focused on 

both green and white information, that was named JadeA in June 2011. An assessment team evaluated its status 

in early 2012. 

The origins of the various efforts along with examples of their activities and descriptions of how different 

kinds of open information were accessed and shared are 

outlined below. Some of the organizational challenges 

that each approach encountered and the lessons available 

to be learned if behaviors can be changed—at several levels—are also included. This is important since the lessons 

are similar to those derived from other contingencies and 

may be applicable in other regions in the future.

It is also vital to distinguish some of the categories 

of information this paper addresses. Classified information involves a variety of dissemination restrictions. 

Confidential, secret, and top secret are the most well 

known, and each has its own handling rules.3

 Less sensitive official information may be designated unclassified.4

However, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, local villagers, and commercial 

firms continually exchange other important kinds of information completely outside the reach of government 

classification authorities. This information is termed 

nonclassified.5 Such information flows can provide insights into aspects of population-centric campaigns that 

may not be routinely accessible to governments. Not only 

is it important for governments to support this kind of 

sharing, but they should also participate by providing 

information, such as imagery and maps, as well as education about how to use it to improve situational awareness for all. Collectively, this paper refers to unclassified 

and nonclassified information as open information and 

concludes with recommendations on how to share open 

information more effectively.

Benefits of and Impediments to 

Information-sharing

In early 2010, the Deputy Chief of Staff of Intelligence for ISAF, then–Major General Michael T. Flynn, 

USA, along with coauthors Matt Pottinger and Paul D. 

Bachelor published Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intel Relevant in Afghanistan. The authors argued 

that the coalition in Afghanistan had been too focused 

on intelligence about enemy forces and actions, or “red” 

information. The paper noted, “a single-minded obsession with IEDs [improvised explosive devices] that while 

understandable is inexcusable if it causes commanders 

to fail to outsmart the insurgency and wrest away the 

initiative.”6

 Instead, particularly in a population-centric 

campaign, the authors recommended that the coalition 

focus more on collecting information about local populations—white activities—and host government structures, 

policies, and personnel—green activities.7

 Much of this 

white and green information would begin as nonclassified, incorporating knowledge that might be critical for 

success in population-centric operations. Nonetheless, in 
www.ndu.edu/inss dh No. 76 3 

the context of Fixing Intel, the collection of white information, even though population-centric, is still an intelligence function. This needs to be kept in mind when 

dealing with NGOs and others who might be wary of 

dealing with the military.

Independent activities by NGOs, international organizations, and others can generate extensive nonclassified information that can provide links to local conditions that may be beyond the normal reach of military 

operators or intelligence-gathering players. At the same 

time, government entities often have information including maps, imagery, and historic data that can be useful to NGOs, local populations, and commercial firms. 

Sharing these can benefit many parties and help overcome mutual suspicions and misunderstandings, as well 

as legitimate differences of opinion and objectives.

Open information is not restricted by explicit classification, but its sharing is frequently limited in several 

ways. NGOs and sometimes even coalition partners 

complain that open information provided to government 

sources quickly gets posted to classified networks for intragovernment sharing but rarely reemerges from them 

in unclassified form even though the information could 

contribute to common objectives. In other cases, authorities may classify aggregated amounts of open information “by compilation,” though the rules for that are rarely 

clear.8 The net result is that many outsiders are reluctant 

to share information with the government because they 

see the knowledge flow as a “one-way street.”9 That only 

compounds the natural concerns of NGOs and other 

private organizations working in hazardous environments. They believe they are risking vital relationships, 

and maybe their existence, to associate with the military 

while getting little in return.10 Even in the best of times 

they work hard to maintain a neutral stance, believing 

strongly that neutrality is key not only to their operational effectiveness but also to the safety of their people. 

However, if the collective result is a lack of shared situational awareness, it could increase the risks to all.

Other restrictions to sharing information may arise 

as well. Budgetary rules can impede exchanges as arcane 

budget classifications sometimes keep money from being 

spent on such things as key enabling information communications technologies (ICT)11 or fuel for generators. 

Future deliberate leaks of classified information, such 

as occurred through WikiLeaks, will probably lead to 

further calls to reduce sharing. As this paper notes later, 

though the Nangarhar pilot project had no connection 

to classified information systems, government people 

still expressed concerns about possible compromises and 

misuses, which complicated open information-sharing.

In trying to bridge the cultural gap between coalition forces and NGOs and other nongovernment entities, it is useful to understand that “intelligence” may be 

considered as “information” in a specific context. Consider a request from a local party for an ambulance to take a 

wounded citizen to a hospital. The original request would 

clearly be nonclassified information. The same information could become intelligence if it was acquired by a 

military unit and helped expose the state of a conflict. At 

the same time, NGOs and other civilian organizations 

use official information for their own purposes. The fact 

that government entities similarly make use of nonclassified information should not be a cause for these organizations to censure such government actions.

It is not surprising that NGOs and similar organizations are wary of the “militarization” of their information 

as intelligence even though they may grudgingly admit 

that broadly based situational awareness is part of providing security. Governments, in turn, resent the unwillingness of NGOs to share their information, often not 

recognizing the genuine concerns the organizations have 

NGOs and sometimes even coalition 

partners complain that open 

information provided to government 

sources quickly gets posted to 

classified networks
4 dh No. 76 www.ndu.edu/inss

about putting their own people and those they seek to 

help at risk. In any case, given that the same facts could 

have different uses depending on context, all parties 

should understand the mutual benefits of shared situational awareness. 

Successes and Shortfalls

In November 2005, a key Department of Defense 

(DOD) directive formalized the importance of support to stability, security, transition, and reconstruction 

operations, now commonly called stability operations, 

and gave them comparable priority, conceptually at least, 

with major combat operations.12 This included direction to the U.S. military “to collaborate with other U.S. 

Government . . . agencies and with foreign governments 

and security forces, international governmental organizations, [NGOs], and private sector firms as appropriate 

to plan, prepare for, and conduct stability operations.”13

The directive also tasked the military to “develop policies and systems for sharing classified and unclassified 

information during stability operations among [these 

same components].”14 At about the same time, the Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 

Information Integration and DOD’s chief information 

officer increased support for efforts to improve information-sharing connections among the disparate actors 

involved in postdisaster and postconflict environments.15

The Nangarhar pilot project was an example of how this 

kind of sharing might work in the field.

The Nangarhar Pilot Project. In 2006, several individuals with ties to various NGOs and DOD went to 

Nangarhar Province to find open information-sharing 

solutions that could be useful in Afghan operational 

environments.16 This group, called the Synergy Strike 

Force (SSF),17 has continued these visits several times 

a year ever since. The SSF consisted of an eclectic array of individuals with a wide range of talents who were 

interested in helping Afghanistan build toward peace 

and stability. The SSF hoped to identify opportunities 

for collaboration, identify potential partners, and facilitate accomplishment of shared goals. To help implement 

the pilot project, SSF members chose a guesthouse near 

Jalalabad as a “neutral space” where social, cultural, and 

bureaucratic barriers could be reduced and a technological infrastructure for information-sharing could bring 

significant value. Initially, the team provided connectivity to the guesthouse through Internet hookups and 

technological infrastructure. Throughout the next several 

years, the team added participants and enhanced the level of information-sharing. The pilot identified three basic 

findings about effective information-sharing.

The first finding was that people are more important 

than technology. The selection of people on all sides is 

therefore key. In practice, this required having stakeholders who could bridge social and cultural divides between 

coalition forces and Afghans. In that context, a review 

of lessons from the pilot identified two key positions: a 

synergist outside of government and a facilitator inside. 

The relationship between those members is essential.

The synergist bridges gaps among systems, organizations, and individuals and engages in problem-solving 

with local stakeholders. Synergists are almost always 

chosen from outside the governmental-bureaucratic 

system, are technologically knowledgeable, and must be 

able to work with a wide range of partners to cross social, cultural, language, and technological divides in austere environments. That is not to say that a synergist has 

total freedom of action, an unfettered call on resources, 

and no accountability but rather that it is vital to engage 

someone who can work “outside the wire” with nontraditional mission participants. The facilitator works within 

the governmental-bureaucratic system and is able and 

inclined to support the synergy operation to the extent 

possible. Through knowledge of key bureaucracies and 

procedures, the facilitator can help the operation overcome impediments. Thus, the two must work together. 

Synergists can engage in creative local problem-solving 

only because facilitators have provided the operational 

space and perhaps some resources.

In addition to the synergist-facilitator dyad, a central necessity for open information-sharing has been developing personal relationships early with actors who are 
www.ndu.edu/inss dh No. 76 5 

seen as working in the local community’s best interest 

rather than for their own political agendas. An important 

lesson from the commendable La Jolla Golden Triangle 

Rotary Club initiative and the San Diego–Jalalabad Sister City Program18 has been the need to find the right 

institutions to serve as partners and provide the organizational credibility on which the extraordinary work 

of the committed individuals involved can build. Being 

able to extend the relationships of organizations that already have local contacts greatly increases the likelihood 

of successful information-sharing and synergy.

The second finding is that open Internet connectivity itself can facilitate social collaboration and knowledge 

creation. Many DOD and NGO personnel did not have 

access to the open Internet in their work environments 

because they could not afford wideband connectivity 

in the field. Providing bandwidth, strengthening local 

computing power, working with available technologies 

even if they are only cell phones, and providing stable 

power supplies help reinforce personal relationships 

that facilitate further sharing. Increased access to connectivity also acts as a catalyst for greater cooperation 

and innovation.

The third finding is that incentives are important. The 

combination of maps, imagery, an open-hosting platform 

(computer), and bandwidth, as well as food, drink, and 

a neutral social space, brought together a diverse set of 

actors at the Nangarhar pilot site who then shared information across their organizational boundaries. Incentives 

varied with attendees—alcohol was not served when Afghans were present, for example. The group practiced a 

form of radical inclusion, allowing nearly anyone with 

peaceful intentions to enter the neutral space and collaborate with others.19 The synergists used this space to 

focus on identifying and bringing in groups and individuals who wanted to collaborate. They did not waste 

significant energy trying to change the minds of those 

reluctant to share. The motto was “Save the willing first.”

Opinions differ as to the extent that this sharing 

has supported U.S. Government and coalition objectives, 

but participants believe the Nangarhar pilot has not only 

provided valuable exchanges20 but also demonstrated that 

more parties find constructive uses for information and 

network access than destructive uses. Access provides opportunities to populate networks with beneficial data and 

to address information that could pose a risk. Providers 

or managers can filter truly sensitive imagery before it is 

disseminated, but activities at the guesthouse over several 

years indicate that erring on the side of sharing imagery 

has had generally positive effects without incurring the 

negative consequences detractors have postulated.21

UnityNet. In the fall of 2009, the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force (TF) in Washington, 

DC, designated funding for “Non-Traditional Sources” 

and an “Open Sharing Environment” quick reaction 

capability concept. As noted earlier, the publication of 

the Fixing Intel paper in January 2010 had a significant 

impact on thinking about the uses of green and white 

information in the Afghan War. This led directly to a 

white paper on a concept called UnityNet.22 According 

to the preface:

“Fixing Intel” . . . served as a tipping point in 

operationalizing concepts of Counterinsurgency 

(COIN) and Stability [operations] doctrine in 

a way that will forever change how we view our 

military role in Afghanistan and other areas of 

conflict throughout the world. A new tested and 

proven information-sharing model now exists 

that directly supports the concepts that “Fixing 

Intel” establishes by providing an ISR platform 

that “senses” population-centric atmospherics 

and information critical to COIN and stability 

the Nangarhar pilot has 

demonstrated that more parties find 

constructive uses for information and 

network access than destructive uses
6 dh No. 76 www.ndu.edu/inss

operations. This model, termed Unity Net, 

enables host-nation, open-information-sharing 

environments in areas around the world of interest 

to the United States. Unity Net’s primary function 

is to expose grassroots, population-centric, socioeconomic and governance information that is not 

readily accessible to military commanders, civilian 

policymakers, and other civilian aid organizations 

seeking to execute development programs, stability 

operations or counterinsurgency doctrine.23

The white paper concluded that the “Jalalabad experience of bringing people and technology together in an 

open-source process model has evolved into a force that 

has brought significant change to Nangarhar Province. 

It is this experience that we propose to emulate in the 

future form of UnityNet.” As described above, through 

the exposure of white information, UnityNet initially 

was seen as a way of applying the ideas, concepts, and 

experiences from the Nangarhar pilot to other Afghan 

regions and even other theaters.

A series of developments, mainly in Afghanistan, 

undercut support for UnityNet. Personnel rotations reduced interest in previously approved projects while 

changes in the security situation reduced the priority 

of white information. Additionally, since intelligence 

organizations and funding supported UnityNet, returnon-investment calculations had to be based entirely on 

the project’s value to intelligence, not on a more broadly 

based view of its contributions to the entire populationcentric campaign. The shift of the intelligence emphasis 

to red and green activities from a white focus reduced 

UnityNet’s perceived value. Accordingly, the ISR TF terminated the use of the term UnityNet in December 2010, 

as well as the quick reaction capability associated with it.

Nonetheless, in late March 2011, ISAF submitted 

an operational needs statement for a project called UnityNet Afghanistan to U.S. Central Command as a way 

to implement a variant of the original UnityNet concept.24 UnityNet Afghanistan was meant to serve as an 

information-sharing and collaboration medium among 

the various levels of the Afghan government, Afghanistan National Security Forces, ISAF coalition members, 

and other mission partners in support of governance, 

security, and stability operations. It was to use the Internet to facilitate both formal and informal exchanges 

of essential green and white information among local, 

district, provincial, regional, and national populations 

and organizations in underserved rural and urban areas 

of Afghanistan. Another goal was to help develop the capacity of Afghan governance to share information, with 

a particular emphasis on support to Afghan governance 

and security forces. To encourage long-term success, 

ISAF intended UnityNet Afghanistan to be sustainable at a set of designated sites with a minimum of 12 

months of operational support provided once installation 

was complete.

By late spring 2011, a combination of factors led 

to UnityNet Afghanistan being downscoped. Essentially it became the implementation of Internet access 

at five sites, along the lines of the architecture and template from the Nangarhar pilot (described in more detail below). However, the lack of an agreed concept of 

operations bedeviled the project, and there were questions about what the scope of an analytical assessment 

should be. The questions included whether the assessment should cover the role of voice (cell phone), data 

(information technology [IT]), or the amount of effort 

that could be devoted to peripheral capabilities such as 

power and buildings, within the authorities of Overseas 

Contingency Operations funds. Moreover, participants 

in and out of government still had concerns that the shift 

to green intelligence collection could endanger those in 

UnityNet initially was seen as a way 

of applying the ideas, concepts, and 

experiences from the Nangarhar 

pilot to other Afghan regions and 

even other theaters
www.ndu.edu/inss dh No. 76 7 

the field seen as being associated only with white population-centric information-sharing projects. Because of 

these problems, the UnityNet Afghanistan project was 

also suspended.

Jade-A. In the spring of 2011, distinct from the 

UnityNet Afghanistan efforts described above, Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) outlined requirements for a project to support VSO by providing voice, 

video, data, and other related support elements such as 

power sources to facilitate collaboration, informationsharing, and governance while supporting mission 

partners and district-level governance in Afghanistan. 

This was a far more focused requirement than UnityNet or UnityNet Afghanistan, and it became known 

as Jade-A.25

VSO uses security, governance, and development 

lines of operations to harden at-risk villages and communities against insurgent influence, intimidation, and 

ideology. Jade-A was planned to support VSO by using 

ICT tools and Internet connectivity to facilitate both 

formal and informal exchanges including essential green 

and white information among local, district, provincial, 

regional, and national populations and organizations in 

underserved rural and urban areas of Afghanistan. The 

goal was to enable governance and socioeconomic development, which are essential components of stability 

operations and counterinsurgency.

The notional Jade-A architecture was derived primarily from a draft of a 2010 UnityNet Strategic Plan 

and refined in a November 2010 presentation to senior 

leaders in Kabul and Washington, DC. The initial Internet access concept matured into a wireless IT network 

supporting district-level governance and security needs 

as well as selected access for schools and medical clinics, 

providing an opportunity to collect both green and white 

information. Jade-A had four objectives:

◆ deploy a common medium for exchanging reports 

and essential information among local, district, provincial, and national elements

◆ increase the level of communication among participating organizations at designated locations enabling 

them to exchange information and identify and resolve 

information-sharing problems

◆ support development of sustainable formal and 

informal information-sharing environments among participating partners

◆ create a useful leave-behind capability for the government, security forces, and people of Afghanistan.

Coalition forces in coordination with CFSOCC-A 

selected five Jade-A pilot sites. They based site selection 

on VSO district-level security, stability assessments and 

objectives, and strategic location. They selected locations in four strategic provinces—one in the west, two 

in the south, and one in the east. Since Jade-A capabilities were intended to complement CFSOCC-A VSO, 

the introduction of Jade-A was coordinated carefully 

through district governments and security services by the 

CFSOCC-A representative. In addition to the district 

sites, a Jade-A test bed and hub was established at Camp 

Julien, Kabul. The hub provided service to U.S. Consolidated Stability Operations Center analysts and a school 

for underprivileged children sponsored by the Ministry 

of Borders and Tribal Affairs.

The Center for Technology and National Security 

Policy at the National Defense University commissioned 

a team to conduct site assessments on behalf of the task 

force, and it went to Afghanistan in January 2012. To 

help theater leadership determine whether the Jade-A 

pilot project added enough value to remain in service, 

coalition representatives asked that the report primarily 

assess the status of the Jade-A pilot rather than broad 

the initial Internet access concept 

matured into a wireless IT network 

supporting district-level governance 

and security needs 
8 dh No. 76 www.ndu.edu/inss

VSO support requirements. After several adjustments in 

tasking, the team was asked to use the assessment process 

to address three specific questions: 1) Does Jade-A provide value to the Intelligence Community? 2) Is Jade-A 

of value to Afghans, and how is it being used? 3) Can 

Jade-A be transitioned to and sustained by Afghans?

The assessment team found that even with limited 

insights into operational experience from recent implementation, Jade-A clearly had the potential to provide 

value to the Intelligence Community. The challenge was 

to put in place a concept of operations, strategy, plan, 

organization, and the resources to engage appropriately 

and actively to develop a more informed understanding 

of how to use and leverage Jade-A’s value. The Special 

Operations Task Force–West team at Shindand was especially supportive.

Second, Afghans showed a high level of interest in 

Jade-A capabilities. They were enthusiastic about using 

Jade-A to improve information-sharing, office operations, and the way they do business. However, they asked 

for training and mentoring to improve computer and Internet skills and wanted to use IT to enhance business 

processes, support information exchange among players, share information with elements in each provincial 

headquarters, and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of organization operations.

Finally, the team believed that Afghans could be 

trained to sustain Jade-A. At the time, however (early 

2012), the district-level Afghan government teams were 

not ready to accept operational and business responsibilities, and they were probably not capable of sustaining Jade-A as an operational capability unless they could 

contract a local vendor to do it for them. This lack of capacity was in part an IT skills issue, but it also extended 

to a lack of IT business practices and business process 

skills to take over budgeting, business plans, and the operation and sustainment of the network services. Provision of reliable and sustainable power was another challenge in terms of a transition plan. In sum, there was a 

need for a strategy to ensure transition and sustainment.

Assessing the Impact of 

Information Flows

Assessment approaches need attention early in any 

project and refinement throughout its life. At a basic 

level, metrics for these types of operations can include 

information such as the amount of data shared, bandwidth available, attendance at social events, and positive 

or negative responses to the initiative by those working 

in the region. These can be measured by comments in 

communications or surveys. However, such metrics do 

not cover the most important aspects of synergy operations: social relationships and their development 

over time. Most metrics are quantitative measurements of the attribute of a noun, capturing its current 

state, velocity, or rate of change when acted upon by an 

outside force. Synergy operations, on the other hand, 

focus mainly on the existence and rate of creation of 

relationships among nouns, usually among people and 

organizations. Such precise metrics have not yet been 

developed or validated. In the interim, the assessment 

approaches that should be followed while more precise 

measures of effectiveness are developed must include a 

focus on human relationships and improving the ability 

to work with unstructured data.

Three principles of information-sharing suggest 

useful interim metrics. These principles were formulated 

by one of the participants in the Nangarhar pilot, Todd 

Huffman, who had extensive collaborative experience in 

many environments. If these principles are not followed, 

the effectiveness of data-sharing will be blunted over time. 

Similarly, the wariness between government and nongovernmental parties will continue if data-sharing between 

Afghans were enthusiastic 

about using Jade-A to improve 

information-sharing, office 

operations, and the way they do 

business 
www.ndu.edu/inss dh No. 76 9 

them is not reciprocal. At the same time, effective datasharing creates a positive feedback loop among the parties 

and can offer large and far-reaching benefits in terms of 

accuracy and credibility. The three principles are:

◆ create immediate value for anyone contributing 

data; contributors should get an immediate return for 

their efforts

◆ return contributors’ data to them with improvements; any data that goes in should be available to be 

downloaded back out again; furthermore, any data 

should come back better than it went in

◆ share derivative works such as analyses, spreadsheets, 

charts, and reports with the data-sharing community; urge 

users who create derivative works from shared data to contribute their products back to the group.26

These principles suggest that the best measurements 

of performance and effectiveness for such operations are 

not easily quantified, but progress over time should be observable by the synergists and others working on the project. The most important goal is to measure the quality and 

durability of relationships built through the efforts of the 

team, to which social network analytics may contribute.

Additional and more quantifiable measures of effectiveness may focus on the quantity and quality of datasharing and participation at the neutral site, recognizing 

the caveat noted above that the social networks and trust 

built through information-sharing may be more important and enduring than numbers indicate. Certain negative indicators including the inability to sustain technological solutions or bandwidth, or a hostile reception by 

local organizations, should be early red flags for projects 

and indications that major changes or withdrawal should 

be considered.

Template for Information-sharing

The ideas, concepts, and experiences from the Nangarhar pilot suggest an initial template for future operations in other locations as they become accessible. 

The template is designed to be adaptable and iterative. 

It could be adjusted to address local circumstances and 

could also incorporate lessons learned from future operations. The assessment team, SSF, and others should focus 

the template on an initial 90-day project setup in which 

the relationship-building efforts are to be conducted and 

the enabling technology installed. While creating relationships for information-sharing usually takes longer 

than 90 days, the model contains the principles noted 

above that attempt to capture initial indicators of success as well as red flags that indicate a project should be 

modified or cut. Its five major elements are:

◆ Personnel. Information-sharing operations require 

both an external synergist and one or more government 

facilitators, as described earlier. Typically, two levels of 

facilitators are needed: one to address issues at senior levels and the other working closer to the field to provide 

logistic and other support as needed.

◆ Neutral sites. A candidate site should be identified based on three elements: a need that can be met by 

information-sharing; mobility (freedom of movement by 

all parties); and a social fabric open to accepting such 

collaboration. Those working on the project should use 

their experience and knowledge to judge whether a proposed location will be suitable.

◆ Partners. Successful information-sharing operations generally encourage anyone to join who would be a 

productive participant. In the early stages, energy should 

be spent identifying those who want to be included 

rather than trying to persuade those who are reluctant to 

participate. While an ideal system would have the same 

the ideas, concepts, and 

experiences from the Nangarhar 

pilot suggest an initial template for 

future operations in other locations
10 dh No. 76 www.ndu.edu/inss

people interacting across time, synergy should be built 

on the expectation of high turnover in staff, enhancing 

the importance of institutional memory and relationship 

networks to a project’s continued success—hence the 

need to capture that knowledge and save it for others to 

reference via a hosted open platform.

◆ Connectivity. Most complex operations proceed 

without a way to share information across organizations, or even among elements of the same organization. 

This limitation derives both from issues of connectivity 

and specific policies limiting information flow over existing pathways. The synergist needs to cross-ventilate 

these stovepipes, building relationships that function 

as trusted pathways for information flow and enabling 

those relationships to communicate over newly established information and communication technologies 

infrastructures.

◆ Iterative project cycles. Because information-sharing operations are built around the connection of people 

and the construction of trusted networks in a dynamic 

environment, they are not linear projects. Instead, they 

proceed through what may be thought of as iterative 

cycles. The synergist must reallocate effort and resources 

to dynamics that are working well. These dynamics can 

change dramatically in complex operations, especially as staffs rotate in and out of theater, new problems 

challenge existing assumptions, and new opportunities 

arise. Operations in these environments become cycles, 

measurable by the success with which the synergist and 

partners adapt and make progress in support of productive collaborations and mutually valued objectives.

Conclusion

This study leads to several broad conclusions and specific observations. To begin, the U.S. and allied national 

security community, especially policymakers, commanders, and ambassadors, must treat information-sharing as 

a critical enabler to mission success in population-centric 

environments. Absent this emphasis, changes in personnel, mission priorities, and funding levels would make it 

hard to develop, transition, and sustain any informationsharing program.

Information-sharing project leaders should engage key operational leaders and staff before they deploy and make them participants in the project. This 

also could help outgoing leaders who have had nontraditional information-sharing projects to get buy-in 

from successors. Often new commanders will start 

their own projects while downplaying or ignoring 

their predecessor’s initiatives. Staff turnover certainly 

affected UnityNet.

Projects need to have broad bases of support from 

multiple directorates and agencies. Project leaders 

should seek facilitators in several key directorates of 

the participating organizations. It also is important to 

have the support of the appropriate ministries of the 

host nation.

DOD and coalition members need high-level support and policy guidance to engage in “responsible” information-sharing. Success requires that national security institutions themselves develop some level of tolerance 

for the risks of these kinds of sharing activities.

Cooperative arrangements could make coalition 

members and NGOs work more effectively toward creating stable and secure conditions. When international 

actors share situational awareness and lessons learned, 

expertise is less likely to be lost in the rapid turnovers 

characteristic of turbulent settings. When information is 

more available, it empowers decisionmaking at all levels, 

reduces redundancies, and helps create new opportunities for collaboration.

The Nangarhar pilot established relationships, provided connectivity for actors on the ground, incentivized 

information-sharing, and acted as a catalyst for increased 

coordination, connectivity, and collaboration. The essential features to support these tasks include synergists, 

facilitators, partners, neutral spaces, social networks, and 

technical connectivity. With all these in place, the project 

could be refined iteratively and adjusted to meet changing circumstances and local needs. It would be useful for 

policy guidance to be issued at appropriate levels among 
www.ndu.edu/inss dh No. 76 11 

key participants to encourage elements that contribute to 

success. This could facilitate more frequent synergy operations by the international community. However, since 

there will never be “unity of command” in complex civilmilitary operations, “unity of effort” must be encouraged 

at every opportunity. Policies that encourage collaboration could go a long way to this end.

At the same time, solutions that promote cooperation need to recognize that there always will be changing 

priorities among red, green, and white information, differing local security situations, and personnel turnovers that 

may affect the level of official support for synergy operations over time. Practitioners need to design programs to 

be inoculated against these predictable challenges. They 

also need to address the inevitable gaps in trust created by 

the “information vs. intelligence” issue continuously. Open 

information-sharing is not the same as white intelligence 

collection. All parties need to promote a better understanding of different organizations’ information needs and 

the impact those needs may have on others.

The lessons observed and best practices outlined 

here apply to a wide range of contexts and geographic 

areas. Accordingly, they should inform policymakers and 

operators both in and out of government. That said, practitioners must use combinations of training, exercises, 

and education to turn the lessons observed into lessons 

genuinely learned.

The basic principle is valid anywhere: incentivized, 

responsible sharing of open information is a core element in building sustainable socioeconomic capacity in 

partner nations, whether in contested or uncontested 

environments.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Dr. Dave Warner, 

Mr. Michael C. Davies, and Mr. Andrew Masciola 

for their help in developing this paper.

Notes

1 Complex operations are defined as those that require close civil-military planning and cooperation including stability operations, 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief at home and abroad, and 

building the capacity of partner nations when civil-military activities 

are involved. This definition is adapted from Hans Binnendijk and 

Patrick M. Cronin, eds., Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations 

(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2009), 10. This differs from most 

official definitions, which focus on subsets of this space. But since 

many similar capabilities and procedures can be applied to multiple 

missions, there is value in addressing them comprehensively.

2 Observers include representatives from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, National Defense University, Defense Information Systems Agency, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 

others.

3 For definitions of each level, see Department of Defense 

(DOD) Manual Number 5200.01, vol. 1, DoD Information Security 

Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification (Washington, 

DC: DOD, February 24, 2012), 34.

4 Even if unclassified, there still may be sharing restrictions, such as the “for official use only” caveat or other forms of 

“controlled unclassified information.” See DOD 5200.01, vol. 1, 

69, and vol. 4.

5 Nonclassified is not defined in DOD security regulations. The 

term is used to highlight the need for U.S. Government cultures, 

particularly those of DOD and the Intelligence Community, to take 

into account the kind of information that may be important to the 

campaign but does not normally get much attention.

6 Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan

(Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2010), 24.

7 Usually, “Fusion Centers and CJ2 shops are overwhelmingly 

focused on ‘red’ activity—concerning the enemy—devoting relatively 

little effort to ‘white’ activity—the Afghan population, economy, 

development, and government.” Ibid., 21.

8 See DOD 5200.01, vol. 4, 12, 18, 37. Whether such “classification by compilation” can be done systematically or controlled in 

an Internet age remains to be seen.

9 In about 2005, DOD initiated a network project called “harmonieweb.org” to encourage information-sharing with nontraditional mission participants (such as NGOs). During a meeting with 

DOD officials in 2011, an NGO representative began the conversation with “Don’t ever ask us to use harmonieweb!” The reason was, 

“We never get anything back. Everything we provide to the government disappears into a black hole.”

10 For a more in-depth discussion of these issues, see Solomon Major, “Cross Roads or Cross Purposes? Tensions Between 

Military and Humanitarian Providers,” Parameters 42, no. 2 

(Summer 2012), 86–96; Also see “Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian 

Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments,” 

Interaction.org, January 2011, available at <www.interaction.org/

sites/default/files/Sec16_2011_FABB_Policy%20Paper_CivMilGuidelines.pdf>.

11 For example, funds for bandwidth come from different accounts than those for hardware and software.

12 DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, 

Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, November 

28, 2005, available at <www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_05.pdf>. 

This directive was reissued as Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations, 

September 16, 2009, available at <www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/

pdf/300005p.pdf>.
12 dh No. 76 www.ndu.edu/inss

13 International organizations, NGOs, and private-sector firms 

do not conduct stability operations, but the military may interact with 

them in the course of such activities.

14 DOD Instruction 3000.05, 9.

15 A history of these efforts is outlined in Linton Wells II et al., 

STAR-TIDES and Starfish Networks: Supporting Stressed Populations with Distributed Talent, Defense Horizons 70 (Washington, 

DC: NDU Press, December 2009), 6–7, available at <www.ndu.edu/

CTNSP/docUploaded/DH%2070.pdf>.

16 These efforts are described in Chickasaw Nation Industries 

Technical Services (CNITS), LLC, Research and Analysis Project for 

UNCLASSIFIED Information-sharing in Afghanistan: A Model for U.S. 

Military and Coalition Commanders, the U.S. Intelligence Community, 

and U.S. Homeland Security (Albuquerque, NM: CNITS, January 28, 

2011).

17 Synergy is defined as two or more people collaborating to 

achieve a result that could not be achieved individually. Synergy 

operation is used to refer to an operation directed at improving the 

connectivity, coordination, and collaboration of complex operations in 

contested environments.

18 San Diego and Jalalabad have been sister cities since 2004. See 

<www.sandiegojalalabadsistercities.org/>; Claire Harlin, “Del Mar 

Man Meets Afghanistan President Karzai,” Del Mar Times, May 29, 

2012, available at <www.delmartimes.net/2012/05/29/del-mar-manmeets-afghanistan-president-karzai/>.

19 A neutral space is a physical location that no actor overtly tries 

to control, though informal control mechanisms usually are in place. 

Not all encounters will take place here, but it functions as the hub 

for a social network and a virtual space that goes beyond the physical 

infrastructure.

20 Intelligence Community leaders were initially supportive of 

the pilot project and its data-sharing innovations, but some intelligence personnel in Afghanistan subsequently came to believe that 

much of the shared information was either redundant or less applicable to intelligence needs as their focus shifted from white activities 

back toward green and red data. It is unclear that a systematic, as 

opposed to an anecdotal, analysis of the Nangarhar pilot data has ever 

been done by the U.S. Government.

21 As an example of how an open information-sharing environment helped to avert a potentially destructive situation, a road was 

being built near the Tora Bora mountains. The construction would 

have entailed rolling equipment over a cemetery. Members of the 

United Nations Office for Project Services had already built a relationship with villagers and were able to show them high-resolution 

imagery obtained through interactions at the Jalalabad project house. 

The images were viewed at a shura so elders could be shown that in 

order to build the road, the only place for trucks to turn around was in 

the cemetery. The elders asked for time to relocate their dead before 

construction. A peaceful resolution was enabled by freely available imagery that allowed a local governance structure to make the decision.

22 Gary H. Thompson and David W. Muench, UnityNet-—A 

Globally Deployable Sensor for White Information (Washington, DC: 

Defense Intelligence Agency, May 5, 2010). Also see the commentary 

by Linton Wells II, “UnityNet Offers Information-sharing Boon,” 

SIGNAL Magazine 64, no. 12 (August 2010), 88. Sometimes the 

concept was written as Unity Net.

23 Thompson and Muench, 1. Civil affairs and special operations forces also collect population-centric and other information for 

commanders.

24 The full operational needs statement for UnityNet Afghanistan is North Atlantic Treaty Organization Restricted. The account 

above is based on an unclassified summary. The statement references 

International Security Assistance Force Headquarters Fragmentary 

Order 046, Establishment of the Civilian-Military Integration Program 

in Afghanistan, February 26, 2011.

25 Since the project was to focus on a mix of white and green 

information, the variable mix of green and white was termed Jade, 

with the A representing Afghanistan.

26 Tyler M. Koziol et al, “Information-sharing in Village Stability Operations: Field Experiences and Policy Considerations,” Risk, 

Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy 2, no. 2 (2011), 8.

The Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

(CTNSP) within the Institute for National Strategic Studies 

helps national security decisionmakers and their staffs understand emerging impacts of technology and integrate 

them effectively into policies through research, teaching, 

and outreach. CTNSP supports the Department of Defense 

leadership and Congress while also encouraging wholeof-government and public-private collaboration.

The Defense Horizons series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndupress.edu.

Linton Wells II

Interim Director, INSS

Director, CTNSP

William T. Eliason

Director

NDU Press

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES