alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### § 102.88 Refusal to conduct referendum; appeal to Board.

If, after a petition has been filed, and prior to the close of the hearing, it appears to the Regional Director that no referendum should be conducted, the Regional Director will dismiss the petition by administrative action. Such dismissal will be in writing and accompanied by a simple statement of the procedural or other grounds. The petitioner may obtain a review of such action by filing a request therefor with the Board in Washington, DC, and filing a copy of such request with the Regional Director and the other parties within 14 days from the service of notice of such dismissal. The request must contain a complete statement setting forth the facts and reasons upon which the request is based.

[82 FR 11765, Feb. 24, 2017]
#### § 1602.27 Records to be made or kept.

Those portions of Report EEO-3 calling for information about union policies and practices and for the compilation of statistics on the race, color, national origin, and sex of members, persons referred, and apprentices, are deemed to be “records” within the meaning of section 709(c), title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964. Every local, independent, or unaffiliated union with 100 or more members (or any agent acting in its behalf, if the agent has responsibility for referral of persons for employment) shall make these records or such other records as are necessary for the completion of Report EEO-3 under the circumstances and conditions set forth in the instructions accompanying it, which are specifically incorporated herein by reference and have the same force and effect as other sections of this part.

(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 3046-0006)

[32 FR 10651, July 20, 1967, as amended at 46 FR 63268, Dec. 31, 1981]
EXHIBIT 23.1

               CONSENT OF INDEPENDENTCERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
               --------------------------------------------------


November 7, 2006

Board of Directors
Gateway Distributors, Ltd.
North Las Vegas, Nevada

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in this Form 10-KSB/A No. 3
filed on or about November 8, 2006 of the report dated October 24, 2006,
relating to the consolidated financial statements of Gateway Distributors, Ltd.
for the year ended December 31, 2004, and to our inclusion as a named expert.
Our report included an explanatory paragraph regarding Gateway's ability to
continue as a going concern.

/s/ Madsen & Associates CPAs, Inc.

Madsen & Associates CPAs, Inc.
Murray, Utah
<PAGE>


                                                                  EXHIBIT 99.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tower Financial Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Donald
F. Schenkel, Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


/s/ Donald F. Schenkel
--------------------------------

Donald F. Schenkel
Chairman of the Board, President
and Chief Executive Officer
August 12, 2002

                                       21
# L_2016044EN.01002003.xml

| 19.2.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 44/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.2.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 44/20

---

Corrigendum to Council Regulation (EC) No 385/96 of 29 January 1996 on protection against injurious pricing of vessels

(
  Official Journal of the European Union L 56 of 6 March 1996
  )

On page 31, Article 11(1), second sentence:

for:

‘In the absence of a proper and timely reply, a verification visit may not be carried out.’,

read:

‘In the absence of a proper and timely reply, the Commission may choose not to carry out a verification visit.’.

---
Exhibit 21.1

                          Columbus McKinnon Corporation
                  Subsidiaries and Affiliates of the Registrant

Abell-Howe Crane, Inc. (US)
ASI of Australia Pty. Ltd. (Australia)
Audubon Export, Inc. (FSC) (US)
Automatic Systems, Inc. (US)
Automatic Systems Conveyors Limited (Canada)
Camlok Lifting Clamps Ltd. (England)
CM Insurance Company, Inc. (US)
Columbus McKinnon Limited (Canada)
Columbus McKinnon Finance Corporation (Canada)
Egyptian-American Crane Co. (joint venture) (Egypt)
Endor S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)
G.L. International inc. (US)
Gaffey, Inc. (US)
Handling Systems and Conveyors, Inc. (US)
Hangzhou (LILA) Lifting and Lashing Co. Ltd. (China)
Larco Industrial Services, Ltd. (Canada)
LICO Steel, Inc. (US)
Manutention Connection (France)
Societe d'Exploitation des Raccords Gautier (France)
Spreckels Consolidated Industries, Inc. (US)
Spreckels Development Company, Inc. (US)
Spreckels Land Company, Inc. (US)
Spreckels Water Company, Inc. (US)
Univeyor A/S (Denmark)
Univeyor Conveying Systems Ltd. (England)
Univeyor Electronic A/S (Denmark)
Univeyor AB (Sweden)
Washington Equipment Company (US)
Yale Hangzhou Industrial Products Ltd. (China)
Yale Industrial Products, Inc. (US)
Yale Industrial Products Asia (Thailand) Co. Ltd. (Thailand)
Yale Industrial Products GmbH (Austria)
Yale Industrial Products GmbH (Germany)
Yale Industrial Products, Ltd. (UK)
Yale Industrial Products Pty. Ltd. (South Africa)
Yale Lifting & Mining Products (Pty.) Ltd. (South Africa)
ex10-4.htm


    Exhibit
10.4

     

    EXTENSION
AGREEMENT

     

    EXTENSION
AGREEMENT dated as of November 12, 2009 by and between Ingalls & Snyder LLC
(the “Holder”) and Advance Nanotech, Inc. (the “Company”).

     

    RECITALS

     

    WHEREAS
the Holder is the holder of Senior Secured Note(s) dated September 18, 2009 (as
heretofore amended, the “Note”) in the principal amount of $1,000,000 and with a
maturity date of October 15, 2009;

     

    WHEREAS
the Company desires to have the maturity date of the Note extended to December
31, 2009 and the Holder is willing to extend the maturity date and waive any
defaults arising from the Company’s failure to pay the Note on October 15,
2009.

     

    NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual representations, warranties,
covenants, agreements, terms and conditions contained herein and for other good
and valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby
acknowledged, and intending to be legally bound, the parties hereby agree as
follows:

     

    1.           The
“Maturity Date,” as such term is used in the Note, is hereby amended so that it
will be deemed to mean December 31, 2009 wherever it appears in the
Note.

     

    2.           The
Holder hereby waives any events of default arising from the failure of the
Company to pay principal and accrued interest on the Note on or after October
15, 2009.

     

    3.           Except
as expressly set forth herein, the Note shall remain in full force and effect,
without modification, alteration or amendment.

     

    IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the Holder and the Company have executed and delivered this
Extension Agreement as of the date first above written.

     

     

    
      
        
          
            
              	Date:
      November 12, 2009	Ingalls
      & Snyder LLC	 
	 	 	 
	 	By:	/s/
      Thomas O. Boucher	 
	 	 	Thomas
      O. Boucher	 
	 	 	Manager	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	ADVANCE
      NANOTECH, INC.	 
	 	 	 	 
	
                       

                    	
                      By:
      

                    	/s/ Bret
      Bader	 
	 	 	Bret
      Bader	 
	 	 	Chief
      Executive Officer
#### Bituminous Mines

June 27, 1958.

Leon Ehrlich, Deputy Attorney General, and Thomas D. McBride, Attorney General,

—You have requested our opinion whether the Department of Mines and Mineral Industries has jurisdiction *700of a .bituminous mine in whose operation only one person is engaged. , ■

The Act of June 9, 1911, P. L. 756, sec. 3, art. XXVIII, as last amended by the Act of July 17, 1957, P. L. 977, 52 PS § 1393, provides:

> “The provisions .of this act shall'apply to every bituminous coal mine in the Commonwealth, but no mine employing less than five persons on the inside in any twenty-four hour period need have a mine foreman. A person shall be designated by the operator to be equally responsible as a mine foreman under this act.”

The words of the statute as to applicability of its provisions are clear and without ambiguity, and must, therefore, be followed.

This section of the law as originally enacted in 1911 provided that the Bituminous Mine Law would not apply to mines where fewer than 10 persons were employed or engaged in work inside the mine in any one period .of 24 hours. The amendment of 1933 made the act applicable to all mines having five’ or more persons working within the mine in any one period of 24 hours, and further provided that a mine inspector could inspect and act in certain matters in mines where two to five persons were employed or worked. The legislature in 1956 made the act applicable “to every bituminous coal mine in the Commonwealth”: Act of April 4,1956, P. L. 1396, 52 P'S §1393. Since 1956 the only legislative exception allowed is the one permitting mines employing less than five persons to operate without a mine foreman. But even in allowing this one exception, the legislature required that someone be required to assume the responsibility which the law imposes on mine foremen.

The objective of the mining laws of the Commonwealth is the safety of not only those persons *employed,*but those persons *operating*a mine, and statutory con*701struction should favor safety provisions, even were the wording of the act not as clear as it is.

■We are of the opinion, - and you are accordingly advised, that the jurisdiction of your department under this act extends to every bituminous coal mining operation whether operated with or without employes and regardless of the number of persons engaged in its operations.
#### HEYDENBURK v BRADACH

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 9635.

Decided Feb 11, 1929

E. D. Lewis, Cleveland, for Heydenburk.

Locher. Green & Woods, Cleveland, for Bradach.

*180LEVINE, J.

There is no doubt that the principle-enunciated in the case is still the law but in our opinion the same has no application to the case at bar. That case merely stated that no liability exists for acts of negligence causing mere fright or shock unaccompanied by contemporaneous injuries, but in the case at bar it is quite .clear that there was a collision between the two vehicles of a rather violent character. Immediately after the impact between the two vehicles, the evidence shows that she screamed, threw up her hands and complained of being hurt and suffering pain. She became white, stiffened and began to shake as though suffering from a severe shock. It was necessarv to lift her from the automobile. She was taken directly to the emergency room of a nearby hospital. There is some evidence in the record consisting of the testimony of the nurse and physician in charge to the effect that Mrs. Heydenburk suffered two fractured ribs, being the' 9th and 10th right which were sharply broken off in their point of junction with the spinal column. It is not, however, necessary that there be evidence of a fracture in order to entitle plaintiff to recover. There was undoubtedly some evidence of a physical injury to Mrs. Heydenburk due to the collision. We are not concerned with the extent of the injury at this time.

In view of the action of the trial court in barring any recovery in the case we hold that the trial court was in error in sustaining the motion of defendant for judgment at the conclusion of plaintiff’s testimony. Judgment reversed ' and case remanded for further proceedings according to law.

Vickery, PJ, and Sullivan, J, concur.
§ 1471.1020 Voluntary exclusion or voluntarily excluded. ( a ) *Voluntary exclusion* means a person's agreement to be excluded under the terms of a settlement between the person and one or more agencies. Voluntary exclusion must have governmentwide effect.
( b ) *Voluntarily excluded* means the status of a person who has agreed to a voluntary exclusion.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 12, 2018

No. 04

- 18

- 00418

- CV

IN RE WOOD GROUP PSN INC. , Miller Environmental Services L.L.C., Star Tex Gasoline

& Oil Distributors Inc., Basic Energy Services Inc., Cameron Inc., Chacho ’ s Vacuum Service

Inc., Coastal Chemical Co. L.L.C., Flint Energy Services Inc., FTS International Services L.L.C.,

Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., Mission Petroleum Carriers Inc., Murphy

Exploration & Production Company

- USA, Mu rphy Oil Corporation, Plains All American

Pipeline L.P.

Original Mandamus Proceeding 1

ORDER

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Ch ief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice (dissent ing )

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice 2

Irene Rios, Justice

On October 3, 2018, this court conditionally granted in part and denied in part relators’

petition for writ of mandamus. On November 2, 2018, the real part y in interest filed a motion for

rehearing , which was denied on November 9, 2018. On November 16, 2018, the real party in

interest filed a motion to confirm the stay of the underlying proceedings. On November 19,

2018 , the real party in interest filed a motion for en banc reconsideration.

After considering the motion for en banc reconsideration, the motion is hereby DENIED.

The real party in interest’s motion to confirm the underlying stay is DENIED AS MOOT.

It is so ORDERED on December 12, 2018

.

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 13

- 05

- 11980

- DCVAJA , styled County of Dimmit v. Murphy Exploration

& Production Co., et al. , pending in the 365th Judicial District Court

, Dimmit County, Texas, the Honorable Amado

J. Abascal, III presiding.

2 Not participating.PER CURIAM

ATTESTED TO:

__________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE

, Clerk of Court
Section 9 Functional Classification—Operating Revenues 3900 Transport Revenues. This classification is prescribed for all air carrier groups and shall include all revenues from the air transportation of traffic of all classes. It shall consist of the following subclassifications: 3100 *Scheduled Services.* This subclassification shall include revenues from the transportation by air of individual passengers or cargo shipments (as opposed to charter flights) pursuant to published schedules, including extra sections and other flights performed as an integral part of published flight schedules. 3200 *Nonscheduled Services.* This subclassification shall include revenues from the transportation by air of traffic applicable to the performance of aircraft charters, and other air transportation services not part of services performed pursuant to published flight schedules (but shall not include data applicable to flights performed as extra sections to published flight schedules, which shall be reported in the subclassification 3100 Scheduled Services).
[ER-755, 37 FR 19726, Sept. 21, 1972, as amended by ER-1401, 50 FR 243, Jan. 3, 1985] 4800 Transport-Related Revenues. ( a ) This classification is prescribed for all air carrier groups and shall include all revenues from the United States Government as direct grants or aids for providing air transportation facilities and all revenues from services which grow from and are incidental to the air transportation services performed by the air carrier.
( b ) Revenues related to services of a magnitude or scope beyond an incidental adjunct to air transportation services shall not be included in this classification (see section 1-6(b)). Revenues applicable to such services shall be included in profit and loss classification 8100, Nonoperating Income and Expense-Net, and the accounting modified to conform with that of a nontransport division whether or not the service is organized as a nontransport division.
[ER-841, 39 FR 11997, Apr. 2, 1974]
EXHIBIT 32.1



PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned certifies that (1) this Annual
Report of LiquidGolf Holding Corporation. (the Company) on Form 10-KSB for the period ended December 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (this Report), fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and (2) the information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition of the Company as of December 31, 2003 and 2002,
and its results of operations for each of the years in the two-year period ended December 31, 2003.



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.



Date: March 26, 2004



/s/ Dwain Brannon

| | 
| | 

Dwain Brannon

Chief Executive Officer,

President and Secretary
#### § 1602.51 Penalty for making of willfully false statements on report.

The making of willfully false statements on Report EEO-6 is a violation of the United States Code, title 18, section 1001, and is punishable by fine or imprisonment as set forth therein.
#### McCormack v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Co.

(No. 2)

*539*Richter, Lord & Levy,*for plaintiff.

*Barnes, Dechert, Price, Myers & Rhoads,*for defendant.

April 28, 1958.

Alessandroni, P. J.,

Defendant, proceeding under rule 4003 (a) (2), filed written interrogatories to be exhibited to and answered by three doctors who had treated plaintiff. It does not appear whether or not the treatment concerned injuries which arose out of the subject matter of this trespass action. Pa. R. C. P. 4003(a) (2) provides for the taking of the testimony either by written interrogatories or oral deposition for use in open court, of a witness who is more than 100 miles from the courthouse.

Plaintiff petitioned for and' obtained a rule upon defendant to show cause why the interrogatories should not be stricken. Plaintiff’s petition and rule are based on an opinion and order of this court, dated April 7, 1958, 15 D. & C. 2d 483, wherein discovery proceedings on behalf of defendant were attempted after pretrial conference was had. It was there held that the certificates required to be filed to list a case for a pretrial conference precluded further discovery without leave of court being first obtained. In that proceeding defendant had neither sought nor obtained leave of court and the interrogatories were stricken.

Rule 4003 is not a discovery rule; it is a rule for obtaining testimony for use in court. Such a proceeding is not within the certification required by Pretrial Regulation P-11. Plaintiff argues that although rule 4003 is not a discovery rule, that discovery is defendant’s purpose, and therefore defendant is bound by our previous order.

The language of rule 4003 does not support plaintiff’s position; its language confers the privilege of taking depositions under the circumstances therein set forth as of right. In the absence of an affirmative *540showing of a present intention to pervert the rules of court, or to use the rules to harass a party, defendant is entitled to proceed under rule 4003.

*Order*

And now, to wit, April 28, 1958, plaintiff’s rule upon defendant to show cause why the interrogatories should not be stricken, is discharged.
#### Joseph Hull, *et*al., *Appellants,*v. Arthur E. Burr, as Trustee, *Appellee.*

On Rehearing.

Per Curiam.

— The holding of the court is that the application made to the trial court to dismiss the cause because the plaintiff was not authorized to prosecute the writ, is not such a plea or other pleading that it operates as an abandonment of the answers on file to which the plaintiff had filed replications. This court has not actually or in effect held that the appellee is a proper planififf in the cause. An application made to this court by the appellants to order the suit dismissed because the appellee was not authorized to prosecute it, was denied because the alleged defect of parties plaintiff occurred if at all before the decrees appealed from were entered, and the question of proper parties to the suit was therefore for the trial court to determine primarily. There was nothing to indicate that the application was not made in good faith’. Defendants have a right in the making of proper parties plaintiff in suits in the courts of this State, and the qúestion as to who are proper parties is primarily for the trial court to determine. Rehearing denied.

Whitfield, C. J., and Shackleford and Cockrell, J. J., concur;

Taylor, Hocker and Parkhill, J. J., concur in the opinion.
#### Cornelius *v.*Lowery.

Assumpsit.

(Decided October 26, 1915.

Rehearing denied December 8, 1915.

70 South. 305.)

Courts; City; Judgment; Jurisdiction. — Where the appeal is from a judgment rendered by the city court of Bessemer in an action where the amount claimed was $38.20, and there was nothing in the record to show that the case originated elsewhere, and that the city court of. Bessemer was exercising appellate jurisdiction, the appeal will be dismissed since the amount sought to b recovered is less than the minimum amount of which the city court has jurisdiction under Acts 1901, p. 1854, and § 3255, Code 1907.

Appeal from Bessemer City Court.

Heard before Hon. J. C. B. Gwin.

Assumpsit by S. M. Lowery against Pink Cornelius. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals.

Appeal dismissed.

Bumgardner & Sturdivant, for appellant. T. J. Reynolds, for appellee.

BROWN, J.

In *Gunter v. Mason,*125 Ala. 644, 27 South. 843, it was ruled that, unless the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter in controversy was affirmatively disclosed by the record, the proceedings of the court were coram non' judice, and the judgment thereof void, and in the case of *Adams v. Wright,*129 Ala. 305, 30 South. 574, that a void judgment or decree can neither be affirmed nor reversed, that an *455appeal taken therefrom does not confer jurisdiction upon the appellate tribunal, and the only judgment that can be rendered is one dismissing the appeal. These rulings have been reaffirmed in *Wertheimer v. Ridgeway,*157 Ala. 398, 47 South. 569*; Gartman v. Lightner,*160 Ala. 206, 49 South. 412; *Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Coursen,*8 Ala. App. 589, 62 South. 977; *Ill. Central R. R. Co. v. Burleson,*4 Ala. App. 384, 59 South. 230. The case of *Gunter v. Mason*was one in which the record disclosed the fact that the case originated before a justice of the peace; this fact appearing from a transcript made by the justice and filed in the circuit court, unaccompanied by certificate or appeal bond. In that case the appeal was dismissed ex mero motu, as it was in some of the other cases above cited.

The aggregate amount claimed in the complaint incorporated in this record is $38.20, considerably less than the minimum amount over which the city court of Bessemer is authorized by law to entertain original jurisdiction (Gen. & Loc. Acts 1901, p. 1854; Code 1907, § 3255), and there is nothing in the record to show that the case originated elsewhere, and that the city court was exercising its appellate jurisdiction therein.

The judgment will not support the appeal, and the only judgment that can be here rendered is one dismissing the appeal!

Appeal dismissed.