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OAR Box 1818 

Prepped by Ollie Stewart 

Document Number: 

56) ll-D-28 

Docket Number: 

A-87-11 

Printed 11/6/2008 3:12:45 PM Sheet 56 of 79 
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July 28, 1987 

The Honorable Diane K. Steed 

Administrator 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 

Department of Transportation 

400 Seventh Street,"s. W. 

Washington, D. C. 20590 

::Nv**>^r 

AUG •.) 0 jogp 

Dear Ms. Steed: >sc 

that 

1987 

you testify before our 

in Room 2123 of the 

10:00 a.m. The hear-

? , 3_, vehicle and vehicle 

including those discussed in the three 

This confirms my staff's request 

Subcommittee on Monday, September 21, . 

Rayburn House Office Building beginning at 

ing will cover, among other things, motor 

fuel safety issues, 

K'U.v^., 

letters dated July 21 from the Environmental 

(EPA) that our staff '-:>. s previous 

earlier correspondence. 

Protection Agency 

to you in our 

Despite a specific 

Clean Air Act regarding 

slow to begin at EPA unt 

Institute for Highway Sa 

the matter. Given the f 

regulating the same vehi 

President, it seems iog.i 

Executive Branch would b 

coordination without any 

satisfied, at least, tha 

available. Indeed, EPA' 

hardly reassuring and ra 

consultation provision since 1977 in the 

onboard controls, such consultation was 

il this Subcommittee and the Insurance 

fety began to escalate the importance of 

act that your agency and EPA are 

cles and that you both operate under one 

cal that adequate provision within the 

e made to insure consultation ancia.-

statutory directive. But I am not 

t any sure-fire formal mechanism is 

s July 21 letter about coordination is 

ther patronizing. EPA said: 

Your second 

betwtn EPA and 

impacts of actio 

and NHTSA do coo 

that regulations 

agencies will no 

economy problems 

issues in their 

could impact the 

discussions with 

NHTSA has the op 

concern related to 

NHTSA on the safety 

ns affecting the aut 

rdinate, whenever ne 

issued and actions 

t create safety, emi 

; When EPA becomes 

rulemaking proposals 

safety of motor veh 

NHTSA on these issu 

portunity to comment 

coordination 

and environmental 

o industry. EPA 

cessary, to assure 

taken by the two 

ssion or fuel 

aware of any such 

or actions which 

icles, we initiate 

es. Furthermore, 

on any of our 
P.3 

The Honorable Diane K. Steed 

Page 2 

a,. rulemaking proposals during a public comment period if 

if' they have a safety concern. Also, if other agencies or 

interested parties raise any genuine safety concerns on 

a proposed rulemaking, EPA will coordinate with NHTSA 

to evaluate these concerns. Safety is an important 

concern to-EPA in our rulemakings. We would not implement any motor vehicle emission standard if it would 

degrade motor vehicle safety. 

EPA's letters to the Insurance Institute and the Center for 

Auto Safety on safety issues are of the same vein. The thrust is 

that if someone discovers a safety issue, some form of consultation will occur. But it is not automatic for all. EPA mobile 

source related regulations. I think it should be. I .request 

that your testimony address that issue. 

In the case of onboard controls, your agency expressed 

concerns late last year and last June about safety.- Yet the 

regulations proposed by EPA last week do not reflect those 

concerns. At page 180, EPA states a beliof that "practical and 

effective onboard systems can be designed and built, at a 

reasonable cost, that will not adversely affect vehicle safety." 

Further, at page 187, EPA states a "leadtime" of "at least two 

years may be adequate for the vast majority, if not all, vehicle 

families." Neither statement appears consistent with your 

agency's ietcers. Z • y;u agree? 

EPA states that it has incorporated NHTSA's June 11 comments 

in its technical report. Do you agree? 

Rather than require EPA to withdraw the proposals or change 

the proposals to advance rulemaking, I understand that at the 

insistence of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), EPA's 

proposal was changed (at page 193(a)) to state that "EPA will 

reopen the record cr this rulemaking" (and I assume the directly 

related volatility rule) "when the Agency receives the comments 

from the Secretary of Transportation and will repropose the rule 

for comment to assess changed circumstances." In a July 23 

letter to me, Vice President Bush said this "commitment to 

repropose converts the initiative to the equivalent" of an 

"ANPRM" and "will provide the Task Force with ample opportunity 

to consider the safety concerns of the Department of Transportation as well as any other developments, including, but not 

limited to, those related to any leadtime requirements that may 

be established." While I consider this "commitment" an improvement over the Redborder version submitted to OMB by EPA and 

applaud OMB for its imagination, it is nevertheless a rather 

costly way to resolve these safety concerns. Enclosed is an 

editorial from the Detroit News that is critical of the rules for 

safety and other reasons. 
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The Honorable Diane K. Steed 

Page 3 

fi in a July 21 letter to the Subcommittee, EPA states: 

-Our analysis of the safety issue indicates that 

relatively straightforward engineering solutions exist 

to the potential safety problems identified, and no 

technological barriers exist to the safe implementation 

of onboard controls. On the surface, the trade 

association and manufacturer comment letters mentioned 

above questioned onboard safety. However, upon careful 

reading their positions are basically the same as that 

taken by EPA, except for disagreements concerning ho* 

much leadtime is needed. Referring to the onboard 

safety issue, AIA says: 

"the automobile indusry has developed technologies 

in the past to deal with many different challenges 

and this problem is no different. While we think 

onboard systems can be designed to be safely 

incorporated into a motor vehicle, adequate leadtime must be allowed to properly design and test 

such systems to ensure that no safety problems 

exists." 

Similarly, MVMA agrees that: 

"additions to fuel systems co no: need to 

compromise safety," 

and that: 

"onboard refueling vapor recovery would require 

that manufacturers must be given sufficient 

leadtime to ensure no compromise." 

The comments received from Mazda, Toyota, and 

Nissan focused more on leadtime and cost concerns; none 

said that implementing onboard controls safely was 

technologically infeasible. Furthermore, while NHTSA 

recently provided some technical comments on our draft 

safety analysis, their June 11, 1987 letter to EPA 

acknowledged that no technical breakthroughs are necessary to design and develop safe onboard systems and 

that the key element in completing this process is the 

provision of adequate leadtime. 

Thus, it appears to be. a consensus of the 

commenters that onboard safety is more an issue of 

leadtime, and perhaps to some degree cost, rather than 

one of technological feasibility. . Undoubtedly, leadtime will be a key issue in an onboard rulemaking, and 

a determination of the leadtime needed to implement 

onboard controls vill be based on analysis of comments 
P.5 

•*• 

The Honorable Diane K. Steed 

Page 4 

I do not quarrel about the issue of "technological breakthrough." But I understood from your agency's letters, that you 

believed (as does the industry) that the technology is "complex," 

not "simple." Am I correct? 

I also note that you stated a belief "that there will be 

some unquantifiable, increased risks of crash and non-crash fire 

associated with onboard controls" and that you have not changed 

that belief. Is that correct? 

On the other hand, EPA states that based on its analysis, 

"straightforward, reliable engineering solutions exist for each 

of the potential problems identified" and that "the overall fuel 

system safety for in-use vehicles could improve with implementation of onboard controls". What is your understanding about 

these "solutions" and possible "fuel system safety" improvements? 

what are the cost and engineering resource implications of these 

solutions? In lizr.z .z page 193: a: of the rulemaking, and in 

light of the natural reluctance of the industry to suggest (for 

lots of reasons, including product liability and competition) 

that their vehicles may face safety problems, how does your 

agency plan to address this issue so as to provide the best 

possible comments to EPA pursuant to page 193(a) of the proposed 

rule? 

Your testimony should also address the fuel volatility 

safety issues that youare familiar with in regard to the Ford 

ambulance case, as well as the concerns of the Center for Auto 

Safety in-regards to Colorado's oxygenated fuels program and the 

extent of consultation over these matters between EPA and NHTSA. 

Please note the EPA reply to the Center and EPA's letter to the 

Subcommittee indicate no plans to consult with your agency. 

As to the Ford ambulance issue, I note that for model year 

1988 Ford announced that it would no longer sell gasoline-powered 

vehicles because of the use of catalysts to meet new emission 

standards. Please discuss the extent to which your agency was 

consulted by EPA in regard to the development of the applicable 

standards concerning any such safety issues for model year 1988 

vehicles. Do you think that safety problems cited by Ford exist 

only in regard to ambulances? What about other vehicles of 

various manufacturers that must use catalysts? Please explain. 
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The Honorable Diane K. Steed 

Page 5 

* * 

Also, please tell us of your involvement in regard to the 

heavy duty truck regulations of EPA applicable to model years 

1991 and 1994 from the standpoint of safety, particularly in 

regard to the use of trap technology. Are you looking into the 

matter now? Please explain. 

Please limit your oral statement to six pages, double-spaced 

on non-legal size paper. Your detailed statement for the record 

may be of any length. Please deliver at least 30 copies of each 

to our Subcommittee office by September 17, 1987 and bring 75 

copies of each to the hearing room for distribution by our staff. 

Enclosed is a copy of the Subcommittee rules. 

Please confirm (by calling our staff office at 225-4441) 

that you will testify on September 21, 1S37. 

With best wishes 

JOHN D. DINGELL 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on 

er sight and Ir.vestiga: 

Enclosures 

cc: The Honorable Thomas J. Bliley, Jr., Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

The Honorable George Bush 

Vice President of the United States 

The Honorable Elizabeth Hanford Dole, Secretary 

Department of Transportation 

The Honorable Lee M. Thomas, Administrator 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Thv Honorable James C. Miller III, Director 

Office of Management and Budget 

The Honorable Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General 

General Accounting Office