U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,

http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,

U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202–512–1800, or 866–512–1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

i 

86–075 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–68] 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION 

PROGRAMS: MILITARY, TECHNICAL, AND 

POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 

THE B61 LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM 

AND FUTURE STOCKPILE STRATEGY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 29, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, October 29, 2013, Nuclear Weapons Modernization Programs: Military, Technical, and Political Requirements for the B61 Life Extension 

Program and Future Stockpile Strategy ............................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, October 29, 2013 ...................................................................................... 27 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2013 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS: MILITARY, TECHNICAL, AND POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE B61 LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM AND FUTURE STOCKPILE STRATEGY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Garamendi, Hon. John, a Representative from California, Subcommittee on 

Strategic Forces .................................................................................................... 2 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Cook, Dr. Donald L., Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National 

Nuclear Security Administration ........................................................................ 7 

Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense ......................................................... 3 

Kehler, Gen C. Robert, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command .............. 5 

Hommert, Dr. Paul J., President and Laboratories Director, Sandia National 

Laboratories .......................................................................................................... 9 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Cook, Dr. Donald L. .......................................................................................... 51 

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces .............................................................. 33 

Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R. ............................................................................... 36 

Hommert, Dr. Paul J. ....................................................................................... 59 

Kehler, Gen C. Robert ...................................................................................... 43 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 31 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Department of Energy and Department of Defense documents concerning 

B61 Life Extension Program ........................................................................ 73 

Letter from former military commanders of U.S. Strategic Command 

and Strategic Air Command ........................................................................ 84 

Letters from European parliamentarians ....................................................... 85 
Page

IV 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD—Continued 

Mr. Turner August 16, 2013, letter to R.W. Knops M.A., Member of 

Parliament, Netherlands .............................................................................. 108 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 113 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Brooks ......................................................................................................... 132 

Mr. Carson ........................................................................................................ 138 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 132 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 120 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 134 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 130 

Mr. Nugent ........................................................................................................ 138 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 117 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 125 
(1) 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS: MILITARY, TECHNICAL, AND POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS 

FOR THE B61 LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM AND FUTURE STOCKPILE STRATEGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, October 29, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. Good afternoon. I want to welcome everybody to 

this hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee and our hearing 

on nuclear weapons modernization programs. This subcommittee 

has been tracking this program—or these programs very closely, 

and this hearing is about digging into one in particular, the B61 

Life Extension Program, or LEP. 

Our distinguished witnesses all play important roles in the B61 

LEP from a variety of angles. The witnesses comprise the key leaders responsible for the policy, military and operational requirements, program and oversight, and technical and program execution on the LEP. They will help us understand the details of the 

program, the requirements that are driving it, its history and current status, and its outlook for the future. 

Our witnesses include the Honorable Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense; General Robert Kehler, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, also known as short-timer. He has got about another month before he retires on us. And we are going to be sad 

to see you leave, by the way. 

General KEHLER. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Donald Cook, Deputy Administrator for Defense 

Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration; Dr. Paul 

Hommert, President and Laboratories Director, Sandia National 

Laboratories. 

I appreciate your taking the time to prepare for this hearing. I 

know it takes a lot of time and effort, and we do appreciate it, because it is very helpful to us. We always appreciate your contributions that each of you make for your country. 

I am going to keep my statement very brief so that we can have 

the maximum time possible for questions and answers, but I do 
2 

want to take a moment to highlight one issue: the misconceptions 

and misinformation that we see in the public discourse on the B61 

LEP. We have seen massively uninformed editorials and articles 

out there on the B61; arguments that NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] should pay for the LEP, despite this being a U.S. 

nuclear weapon that we need for our own strategic deterrent; arguments that the B61 doesn’t need to be rebuilt now, despite clear 

testimony to the contrary from our lab directors and military commanders, including General Kehler and Dr. Hommert; arguments 

that there is a reduced scope option for the LEP that would cost 

less and still meet requirements, despite numerous statements and 

documents from the administration showing the exact opposite is 

true. 

The list goes on and on, and I plan to get into this during the 

questioning period. We will engage in a bit of myth-busting today 

and lay out the clear, undeniable facts about this critical program. 

For now I would like to introduce for the record a series of documents provided to the committee by the DOD [Department of Defense] and DOE [Department of Energy] that clearly shows reality. 

And without objections, those will be submitted. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 73.] 

Mr. ROGERS. It is time to leave aside the misinformation and fantasy that has seeped into the public debate, and deal with the real 

world. 

Along the same lines, I offer the reality of military perspective. 

I would like to introduce for the record this letter we received from 

four commanders—from four former commanders of U.S. Strategic 

Command and its predecessor command. And without objection, 

those will be submitted. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 84.] 

Mr. ROGERS. These four retired senior officers eloquently summarized why cuts to the B61 LEP, as recommended by only one of the 

four congressional committees, would not only harm the U.S. deterrent, but also have major negative impacts on our allies and our 

nonproliferation goals. 

Thank you again to our witnesses. I look forward to this discussion. And with that, let me turn to our ranking member today, Mr. 

Garamendi of California, for any statement that he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN GARAMENDI, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, and thank the 

witnesses for participating in what is going to be a very important 

hearing. 

Mr. Cooper could not be here today, and he asked that I sit in 

in his chair. I will do so as best I can, and I will read his statement 

quickly, or I will stop halfway through and put it in the record. 

‘‘President Obama in the Nuclear Posture Review laid out a 

strategy for maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable arsenal, while 

pursuing further nuclear weapons reductions and strengthening 
3 

nonproliferation. In this context we must understand what investments are necessary to carry out an effective strategy and maintain 

a credible nuclear deterrent to meet post-cold war threats in an era 

of constrained budgets. 

‘‘First with respect to the B61, there are concerns about the cost 

and complexity of the current planned B61 life extension and 

whether they are necessary for extended deterrence in the longterm. The administration is embarking on a $10 to $12 billion program, the most expensive life extension ever undertaken. This cost 

includes the warhead life extension program done by the National 

Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA], estimated to cost $8.1 

billion to $10.1 [billion], and the Department of Defense’s cost estimate of the program evaluation office, CAPE, added $1.6 billion required a new tail kit for the Air Force, bringing the total cost over 

$10 billion. 

‘‘We must better understand why a less expensive alternative, 

notably the 1E LEP option, is not being pursued. How long do we 

plan to keep the B61s deployed anyway? What constitutes credible 

political reassurance for our allies, and what reductions in the 

number of nuclear weapons are planned, and what safety risks are 

associated with forward-deployed B61? Former Secretary Sam 

Nunn recently wrote that today tactical nuclear weapons in the 

Euro-Atlantic region are more of a security risk than an asset to 

NATO. Is he correct? 

‘‘Second, more generally, we cannot consider the B61 in a vacuum. We must prioritize. And how do we plan for affordable, yet 

strong and effective nuclear deterrence?’’ 

I think what I will do is to stop there and put the rest of it in 

the record. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

And now we will go to our witness statements, and we will remind you we would like you to summarize your statement for 5 

minutes. And we will start with the Honorable Secretary Madelyn 

Creedon. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary CREEDON. Thank you very much, Chairman Rogers, 

Ranking Member Garamendi sitting in for Mr. Cooper, distinguished members—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you. 

Secretary CREEDON [continuing]. Distinguished members of the 

Strategic Forces Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to 

testify today about the importance of the B61–12 Life Extension 

Program and the integrative part it plays in the administration’s 

long-term modernization strategy for both the nuclear forces and 

the supporting nuclear infrastructure. I am pleased to join Deputy 

NNSA Administrator Dr. Cook, Sandia National Lab Director Dr. 

Hommert, and General Kehler for this discussion. 

In the June 2013 nuclear employment guidance, the President 

reiterated and clarified two key policy elements that rely upon the 
4 

successful completion of the B61–12 Life Extension Program and 

execution of the long-term modernization strategy. The first is the 

commitment that the United States will retain a credible nuclear 

deterrent, supported by the nuclear triad, including the capability 

to forward-deploy nuclear weapons with heavy bombers and dualcapable fighter aircraft anywhere in the world. The second is the 

approach to hedge, so that we maintain the ability to hedge against 

technical and geopolitical risk that will lead to more efficient management of the nuclear weapons stockpile. This approach will 

allow, in time, reductions in the total number of weapons, while 

still maintaining the nondeployed weapons needed to ensure the 

U.S. stockpile is well positioned to provide the needed flexibility to 

respond to any contingency. 

The joint NNSA and DOD long-term plan to manage and sustain 

the nuclear stockpile and associated infrastructure programs is presented in NNSA’s Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan. This plan provides the framework around which the 

new guidance will be implemented. At its heart is the baseline 

modernization strategy, also known as the ‘‘3+2’’ strategy. This 

strategy, if successful, will allow the consolidation of the 12 unique 

warhead types used today into 3 interoperable warhead designs for 

use on a submarine and land—for use on submarines and landbased missiles and 2 aircraft-delivered weapons, the B61–12 gravity bomb and the follow-on standoff cruise missile replacement. 

This modernization strategy will permit hedging between the 

land and sea-based legs of the triad, reduce the size of the stockpile, and still maintain a sufficient hedge capability. 

The tremendous benefit of the 3+2 strategy is that over time, it 

would reduce our stockpile life—stockpile life cycle sustainment 

costs and reduce the strain on our surveillance resources, while simultaneously increasing the safety, security, and effectiveness of 

our nuclear deterrent with fewer weapons. 

The B61–12 is the first component of the 3+2 modernization 

strategy. A successful B61–12 Life Extension Program facilitates 

consolidation of four B61 types into one variant, and it also allows 

the eventual retirement of two other strategic air-delivered gravity 

bombs, the B61–11 and the B83. 

To be sure, modernization work of this kind is expensive, but 

there is no doubt that the investment, which directly enables our 

commitment to effective nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation, is 

necessary. As you know, very early cost estimates of the B61–12 

have grown as we sought to exercise national nuclear weapon engineering and design skills that had atrophied. 

Having now finished the costing and developed a good baseline, 

we expect that any future cost growth is less likely to stem from 

technical or production costs than from difficult choices made by 

the Department of Defense and Energy to deal with ongoing budgetary uncertainty. Sequestration cuts, for example, have already 

delayed the design, development, and production schedules by several months. 

These budgetary constraints led the Department to a quick, prudential analysis of a possible alternative to the B61–12 that would 

provide the military and deterrent characteristics of a gravity 

bomb. This analysis was not intended to substitute for the previous 
5 

efforts in judgment of the Nuclear Weapons Council, but to take an 

objective look at other options during a period of at least shortterm budgetary churn. If nothing else, this study served to validate 

the Department’s commitment to the program, and, in fact, it 

quickly demonstrated that there is not a cost-effective alternative 

that meets military requirements and policy objectives of the B61– 

12 LEP. 

Both Departments and the administration remain firmly committed to the 3+2 strategy and the long-term fiscal and national security benefits that it presents. 

Finally, let me make an important comment about the B61’s 

roles. As I previously mentioned, under the current modernization 

strategy, the B61–12 will become the only gravity bomb in the U.S. 

inventory for both the strategic bomber and the dual-capable aircraft fleets. The B61–12 will also be a critical part of NATO’s nuclear deterrent, and it is equally important to our allies in Asia. 

This LEP will reassure our nonnuclear allies and partners that 

their security interests will be protected, leaving no need for them 

to develop nuclear-deterrent capabilities of their own. 

I cannot emphasize this point enough. The B61–12 is critical to 

U.S. nuclear deterrence and is viewed by the administration and 

others as the cornerstone of our extended deterrence commitment 

to allies around the globe. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Creedon can be found in 

the Appendix on page 36.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Creedon, I very much appreciate that 

statement. 

General Kehler, you are up. Five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF GEN C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, 

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General KEHLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Garamendi, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am 

pleased to be here as well with all of you today and my colleagues 

to discuss the B61 Life Extension Program and how it fits within 

a broader operational and stockpile strategy. 

Mr. Chairman, our Nation’s nuclear forces perform three key 

functions. First, they deter potential adversaries via credible nuclear capabilities and effective plans; second, they assure our allies 

and partners of our extended deterrence commitments to them; and 

third, in the unlikely event deterrence fails, they achieve national 

security objectives as directed by the President. 

To accomplish these functions, the Nation requires a safe, secure, 

and effective nuclear force composed of well-trained people, modern 

nuclear delivery systems and warheads, an assured command-andcontrol network, and the highly specialized infrastructure necessary to sustain them. 

I am 100 percent confident in the ability and dedication of our 

people and the operational viability of today’s nuclear force, but 

aging issues exist, and I remain concerned that the force requires 

significant investment in the midst of a very difficult financial period. The investments we request are guided by a policy-based, 

long-term strategy and implementation plan that will allow us to 
6 

sustain the nuclear triad of delivery vehicles, enable critical improvements to our national command-and-control systems, and systematically extend the life of essential weapons in the stockpile to 

meet our military needs. 

The 3+2 strategy that Secretary Creedon mentioned, which is so 

named because it will ultimately result in three updated ballistic 

missile warheads and two updated air-delivered warheads, allows 

us to retain a highly effective and sustainable nuclear stockpile to 

address 21st century threats and uncertainty. From my military 

perspective, the 3+2 strategy underpins all of our initiatives to 

meet the new national guidance issued by President Obama last 

June, and the B61 Life Extension Program is the next critical step 

within that strategy. 

There are several reasons why I believe this is to be true. First, 

our recently updated nuclear employment guidance directs us to retain a triad of nuclear delivery vehicles, and that is, of course, a 

construct that continues to provide the Nation with a deterrent 

that is responsive, survivable, and flexible. The current and future 

nuclear bomber force is a key component of the triad, and arming 

that force with a life-extended B61 and eventually with a followon to the air-launched cruise missile is a top priority. 

Second, the life-extended B61–12 is envisioned to be the only nuclear gravity weapon in the future arsenal. The B61–12 LEP will 

extend the weapon’s safety, security, and effectiveness for decades 

and consolidate multiple variants into a single design, which offers 

opportunities for significant stockpile reductions, while maintaining 

national security objectives and extended deterrence commitments. 

Third, the meaningful work being done on the B61 can be leveraged for future life extension programs and provide the impetus to 

develop and retain the critical workforce skills the United States 

needs to sustain its deterrence force. 

Importantly, the B61–12 Life Extension Program has been optimized in both scope and timing to match the throughput capacity 

of the nuclear industrial complex. Failure to conduct this life extension now will discard that leverage and increase costs of future life 

extension programs. 

Finally, the B61 is the only weapon in the stockpile that can arm 

both the B–2 bomber and dual-capable fighter aircraft deployed by 

the U.S. and NATO in Europe. As such, it contributes greatly to 

the foundation of U.S. extended deterrence around the globe. Extending the life of the B61 will reassure our allies and partners 

and will further our nonproliferation efforts. 

I continue to endorse the 3+2 strategy and give my strongest 

support to the B61–12 Life Extension Program, but I remain concerned that these substantial modernization efforts come in the 

midst of this difficult financial period. In my view, the need for sustained investments increases as we decrease the number of deployed weapons to New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] 

levels. From a military perspective, smaller numbers of weapons 

means that the quality and reliability of each weapon must be 

high. 

As we face budgetary constraints, we will examine and pursue 

every possible alternative to drive costs down, but we must stay 

the overall course that we have set to the maximum possible ex-
7 

tent. The B61 LEP is the next step to sustain our deterrent force, 

and I ask for your continued support. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in the 

Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. Very well done. 

Dr. Cook, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DR. DONALD L. COOK, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Dr. COOK. Chairman Rogers, Mr. Garamendi, and distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, I also thank you for having me here 

to discuss the President’s plans for nuclear weapon modernization 

that are focused on the B61 Life Extension Program and the NWC 

[Nuclear Weapons Council] strategy, 3+2, as has already been described. 

I am also pleased to be here with my colleagues. And I want 

right off to thank you for your continuing and ongoing support of 

the men and women of the National Nuclear Security Administration across the country, the work that they do, and your bipartisan 

leadership of some of the most challenging national security issues 

of our time. This support has helped keep the American people 

safe, it has assured our allies, and it has enhanced global security. 

I am here today to state how critically important it is for the 

United States to have an unambiguous and effective strategy to 

achieve the goals articulated very clearly by the President, first at 

Prague in 2009, again in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, and 

most recently in Berlin this June, to ensure a safe, secure, and effective deterrent, while reducing the number and types of nuclear 

weapons. That national strategy is the 3+2 strategy advocated by 

U.S. Strategic Command, endorsed by the Nuclear Weapons Council, and with congressional support, will be implemented by the 

NNSA and the DOD services. 

I would like to take a moment to discuss an integral part of the 

3+2 strategy, which is the B61, and why your continued support is 

essential to achieve a significant reduction in our stockpile of nuclear bombs, while meeting the President’s commitment to maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary 

and to guarantee that defense to our allies. I will not go through 

further details on the 3+2 strategy, because that has already been 

covered. 

I would like to emphasize the United States has already reduced 

the size of our nuclear stockpile very substantially, by more than 

80 percent since its peak during the cold war. Today we have the 

smallest stockpile since the Eisenhower administration. The interoperability provided by implementing the 3+2 strategy you have 

heard discussed will allow the United States to reduce further its 

hedge against technical failure and geopolitical surprise, while 

maintaining an effective deterrent through a balanced and flexible 

stockpile. 

So on the B61, the B61 is one of the oldest nuclear weapons in 

a stockpile that has never been older, and it requires the refurbishment of some of its components in order to remain viable for years 
8 

to come. The B61 has major strategic and tactical requirements, to 

which the DOD will speak further, and from the NNSA perspective, we are charged with maintaining the health of the B61 

variants currently in the active stockpile and also conducting the 

life extension program on this important aspect of our nuclear 

deterrent. 

On February 12—I am sorry, February 27, 2012, the NWC authorized the U.S. Air Force and NNSA to begin Phase 6.3 engineering development for the B61–12 LEP. This LEP will consolidate all 

of the existing B61 variants, also known as mods 3, 4, 7, and 10, 

into the mod 12 to provide both strategic and extended deterrence 

for an additional 20 years following the first production unit in 

2020. 

Regarding the NWC process that led to the decision to choose the 

final scope of the 61–12 LEP, I would like to be very clear that the 

resulting decision supported the lowest-cost option that meets 

threshold military requirements. For 3 years, from 2010 to 2012, 

the NNSA, in consultation with the NWC, evaluated four major options for the 61 LEP, with many suboptions beyond that, before selecting the current 61–12 design approach. The chosen option, 

known as Option 3B, maximizes the reuse of both nuclear and nonnuclear components, while meeting the needed design life. The option foregoes the newest surety technologies and instead improves 

security and safety of the bombs using somewhat older, but proven 

technologies. 

And although two of the other options had lower initial costs, 

their life cycle costs were higher, not as—as a result of not addressing all known aging concerns. Because of this, these two options 

would necessitate starting another life extension program after initial alterations in order to address the remaining concerns. 

Now, lastly, I would say the 61–12 LEP is really making good 

progress. We are in the second year of full-scale engineering development. The program has met its development milestones, it is on 

schedule, and it is on budget. Today the most significant risk the 

program faces is not technical risk, but uncertainty of consistent 

funding. However, because of the demonstrated success we have 

had to date, confidence from U.S. Strategic Command and the Nuclear Weapon Council has been sufficient to expand planning for 

the consolidation of nuclear bombs by including the future retirement of the B83 in the overall strategy. 

This allows, in summary, for a reduction in the total active and 

inactive number of U.S. nuclear gravity bombs by a full factor of 

two within a few years after completion of the 61–12 LEP. And the 

reduction in numbers of bombs and the decision to use the lowestyield variant from today’s stockpile can reduce the total amount of 

special nuclear material in the total active and inactive number of 

gravity bombs by more than a factor of six. That is 80 percent. 

So in summary, I want to thank you for your support thus far 

and get on to the questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cook can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much, Dr. Cook. 

Dr. Hommert, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 
9 

STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL J. HOMMERT, PRESIDENT AND LABORATORIES DIRECTOR, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES 

Dr. HOMMERT. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Garamendi, 

and distinguished members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. 

First I would like just to take a moment to congratulate General 

Kehler on his upcoming retirement and thank him for his leadership of the Strategic Command. He has been a great partner for 

those of us in the nuclear security arena. Thank you. 

My testimony today will focus on the B61 warhead system and 

the B61 Life Extension Program. In this regard I would like to 

make the following key points. In order to sustain high confidence 

in the safety, security, and reliability of the B61 into the next decade, it is our technical judgment that we must complete the life extension program currently being executed. I make this statement 

for reasons that have been documented in annual assessment letters by me and my predecessor for a number of years now, all having to do either with technology obsolescence or aging, not surprising for a system the oldest units of which were manufactured 

and fielded in the late 1970s with some components dating to the 

1960s. 

Second, we are well into the full-scale engineering development 

phase of the life extension program, with the baseline design review now scheduled for September 2015. This program addresses 

all known aging or technology obsolescence issues, as I can illustrate by a comparison of 1960s vintage vacuum tubes now in our 

stockpile to be replaced by modern integrated circuit technology in 

a radar now tested successfully, and is the minimum program that 

addresses the threshold requirements that have been provided to 

us by the Department of Defense and the NNSA. 

To date, we have costed $253 million of the $2.65 billion estimated incremental costs for Sandia on the B61 LEP through the 

completion of production, which was specified in the weapon development cost report provided in June 2012. Furthermore, at Sandia 

we met all major fiscal year 2013 program milestones for the B61 

LEP on or under cost, although sequestration caused some of the 

work scope to be deferred to fiscal year 2014. 

We have put in place rigorous project management expertise to 

ensure ongoing adherence to the plan for all our modernization efforts. We have drawn upon resources and expertise nurtured 

through our interagency work on broader national security challenges at our laboratory to meet the urgent demands of our core 

nuclear weapons mission, most notably staffing; however, the impacts both to schedule and life cycle costs of ongoing fiscal year 

2014 budget decisions have yet to be established. And I have to 

say, from what I know now, it is likely they will have impact on 

schedule and potentially on cost. 

Finally, let me just end with more of a personal note. In a professional career now spanning some 37 years, I have had the extraordinary privilege to work at three institutions whose core responsibility is nuclear weapons: the Atomic Weapons Establishment in 

the United Kingdom, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and, of 

course, Sandia National Laboratories. In that time I have worked 

with many exceptional individuals who have dedicated their profes-
10 

sional lives to the innovation, science, and engineering excellence 

required to ensure that these unique devices of mankind are safe, 

secure, and reliable. 

I fully recognize the fiscal environment in which we are operating, and throughout my written testimony I have indicated our 

focus on cost management and cost efficiency; however, my experience deeply reminds me that nuclear weapons are the last place for 

half measures or corner cutting. 

Thank you for your support, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hommert can be found in the Appendix on page 59.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much, Dr. Hommert, for that comment and for your service. 

We are moving into questions now, and I want to start with my 

questions. You heard me make reference in my opening statement 

to some misinformation in the public discourse about this, and one 

is a New York Times editorial from May, and which I will read 

without objection. The editorial says, ‘‘...many experts doubt that 

the B61 warheads need to be rebuilt now, if at all. Governmentfinanced nuclear labs have a rigorous program protecting them to 

make sure that they still work,’’ close quote. 

Dr. Hommert, you are the director of one of those governmentfinanced labs, and the government pays you to be the expert to inform us as to whether or not we can ensure the safety, security, 

and reliability of these weapons. Do you agree with the New York 

Times observation in that editorial? 

Dr. HOMMERT. I agree that we have a rigorous program to attest 

and evaluate these annually. We certainly do that. And it is, in 

fact, that program that has provided the basis of information that 

leads me to make the statement I made. There are physical processes occurring in these weapons that we see across a number of 

arenas, from decay, isotopic decay, to polymers, to HE [high explosive], that all together require that we execute this life extension 

program. 

Mr. ROGERS. So you are saying that you don’t agree with their 

observation that we don’t need to take action on the B61 now, if 

at all? 

Dr. HOMMERT. Absolutely. I categorically disagree with that 

statement. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

Dr. Cook, let’s briefly discuss the editorial statement that ‘‘when 

all is said and done, experts say the cost of the rebuilding program 

is expected to total around $10 billion—$4 billion more than an 

earlier projection.’’ You provided us a written explanation in the 

documents I previously introduced for the record, but please walk 

us through the cost history here. What figure do you stand behind 

for what this LEP will cost? We hear a lot of misinformation on 

what the LEP is going to cost. 

Dr. COOK. Sir, I stand behind the first baseline provided under 

my signature formerly to the Congress, which is called a selective 

acquisition report. I entered that in May of 2013, just this year, 

and that was once we are into full-scale engineering design and 

after some time, this is a legal requirement. I have updated that 
11 

once already in a following quarter and am ready to do that in the 

second quarter. 

With regard to the costs, the $4 billion number is often thrown 

around as some kind of a baseline. That was never a baseline. We 

had a very initial position in a budget several years ago that said 

we believe that the cost will be at least in the $4 billion range, and 

we prepared, as we usually do then, to undertake the work. At that 

point, no engineering work had been done, no design work had yet 

been—begun on the B61, and with a predecessor system, the W76, 

we were not yet into stable manufacturing. So it was a placeholder, 

and nothing more than that. 

As we went through the Nuclear Weapon Council deliberations, 

and over the course of the years which I mentioned, 2010, 2011, 

and 2012, we evaluated quite a number of options. The council ultimately selected Option 3B. The weapon design and cost report 

came out after we moved from the consideration of alternatives and 

Phase 6.2 into engineering development, which is Phase 6.3. That 

report was issued, and aside from the costs that were in that report, we have added only management contingency. The details remain the same. 

One additional effect, though, was caused by sequestration, and 

that struck in March of this year. That caused the first production 

unit to be slid out in schedule by 6 months, from 2019 to March 

of 2020, and it caused us to increase the cost estimate by $244 million simply because of that single sequestration event. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. General Kehler, is there a ‘‘reduced scope’’ 

option that meets minimum military requirements and costs less 

than the B61–12 design that is currently being pursued in this 

LEP? 

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think there is any 

longer. At one time we looked at some options in the Nuclear 

Weapons Council. Early on it appeared that there might be a 

lower-cost option that these gentlemen to my left are more than 

prepared to discuss. The farther we have gone down the road in investigating the scope of work that needs to be done, as I look at 

this today, there is not a minimum option that is going to fulfill 

all the military requirements that we have laid on. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you. 

Secretary Creedon, the editorial calls the administration’s decision to pursue the B61 LEP, quote, ‘‘a nonsensical decision, not 

least because it is at odds with Mr. Obama’s own vision,’’ close 

quote. It further states, quote, ‘‘Mr. Obama advocated the longterm goal of a world without nuclear arms and promised to reduce 

America’s reliance on them. He also promised not to build a new 

and improved warhead.’’ 

Secretary Creedon, what do you think of this statement by the 

Times? Is the B61 contradictory to the President’s visions and 

goals? 

Secretary CREEDON. No, sir. It is absolutely consistent with the 

President’s goals. It is very important to remember that there are 

sort of two—two points to all this. One is that he has been very 

strong that the stockpile remain safe, secure, and reliable, and that 

that remain that way as long as there are nuclear weapons. 
12 

That said, he clearly has indicated that he would like to entertain reductions, and that he would like to entertain these reductions along—along with Russia, but until such time as that happens, it is absolutely consistent, the B61–12 is absolutely consistent, with the President’s goals as well as our commitments to 

our allies. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. And thank all the witnesses. 

I yield now to the ranking member for any questions he may 

have. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. We are going to spend a considerable amount 

of money on the B61–12 program, but before we get into that, why 

do we need the B61? General Kehler. 

General KEHLER. Sir, our requirement to deter nuclear attack is 

a military mission. This B61 weapon arms the B–2, it will arm the 

future long-range strike platform, it arms the current dual-capable 

aircraft that are forward-stationed in Europe as well as those of 

our NATO allies that maintain dual-capable aircraft, and it is the 

candidate weapon to arm the F–35 in that dual-capable aircraft 

role. 

It is about deterring, it is about assuring our allies of our extended deterrence commitment to them, and, from a military 

standpoint, it is about being able to offer the President a series of 

options that include nuclear options in extreme circumstances as 

among those from which he can choose. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Are there other gravity bombs available to 

achieve this same task? 

General KEHLER. There is another gravity weapon today. It is 

the B83 gravity weapon. It is different than the B61. We have 

looked very carefully at whether—and technically you could use the 

B83, so don’t let me mislead you. You could certainly use the B83 

to arm the B2, and we have looked at that, but on balance, when 

we look at the combinations of features that are associated with 

both of these weapons, and we look at the appeal of the B61 as a 

candidate to incorporate all the best features as we go forward, we 

have come to the conclusion that both from a military standpoint 

and from a standpoint of future safety, security, and surety in the 

stockpile, that the B61 is the best of the choices to go forward. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So there is another bomb, the B83; is that what 

you said? 

General KEHLER. There is. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. That could achieve the same purpose? 

General KEHLER. It is a gravity—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What are its shortcomings? 

General KEHLER. It is a gravity weapon, but over the long term, 

we think that it has some shortcomings that—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Which are? 

General KEHLER. Well, one, is it has a very high yield, and we 

are trying to pursue weapons that actually are reducing in yield, 

because we are concerned about maintaining weapons that—that 

would have less collateral effect if the President ever had to use 

them, which may sound—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yes, it does sound like a strange way to use collateral effect on a nuclear weapon, but go ahead. 
13 

General KEHLER. Well, however, there is a direct relationship between yield and collateral damage. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am sure there is. 

General KEHLER. And so—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And with a lot of collateral damage at the outset. 

General KEHLER. Without getting too ‘‘Strangelove-y’’ in here, I 

think that the fact of the matter is that for the B83 and the B61, 

when you stack them next to one another, and you look at both 

their current capabilities to meet military requirements and their 

future potential to be the investment of choice as we go to the future, the B61 has come out on top. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Does the B83 need to be—have life extension? 

General KEHLER. It will eventually, but not in the same pace as 

the B61. It is not necessary immediately. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. When would it have to have the same kind of 

extension? 

General KEHLER. I will defer to my colleagues down the table. 

Dr. HOMMERT. There will have to be some—how could I say it— 

a smaller adjustment to its subcomponent system in the next decade involving generators and gas transfer. That is a much smallerscope activity, but that has to occur. A full-scale LEP, at least of 

the magnitude here, would not be needed for over a decade. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. There is some information that the B61 would 

be scheduled for a new LEP in 2033; is that correct? 

Dr. COOK. That comes directly out of the Stockpile Stewardship 

and Management Plan, which we have issued regularly and did so 

this year. The logic here is that it takes about 10 years to conduct 

a life extension program, and if you look at the B61, by the time 

we get to first production unit, it will be about 10 years. 

The lifetime of the weapons that we put in the arsenal is about 

20 years, and so about 10 years after one weapon is inserted into 

service, a life extension program would be needed to begin to put 

new systems in, replace systems in 20 years after the initial one. 

That is what the logic comes from. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Dr. Hommert, when would the B83 have to be— 

have its life extended? 

Dr. HOMMERT. Well, again, it will have—it has a couple of components that we would have—we have to do work on in this decade, right? At some point it will begin to face some of the same 

aging issues we now see in the 61, but that is certainly not for another decade or more. All right? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So going at this from the beginning, like asking 

the question why, I am going to pursue it a bit. If I understand, 

General Kehler, there is another gravity bomb called the B83 that 

has a deficiency in that it is too powerful. Are there any other deficiencies? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. It is about flexibility for us as we look to the 

future. The weapon is not as flexible as the B61. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What does ‘‘flexible’’ mean? 

General KEHLER. In terms of our ability to use various yields 

that would be matched to the targets. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Does the B61 have variable yield? 

General KEHLER. It does at the lower end, yes, sir. 
14 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And the B83, Dr. Hommert, does it have a variable yield? 

Dr. HOMMERT. Yes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So both have variable yield, but one is at a 

higher variability, and the other is at a lower variability. So flexibility has to do with the size of the explosion; is that right, Dr. 

Cook? 

Dr. COOK. Let—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Or wherever else you want to go, so—— 

Dr. COOK. Let us see. I am trying to provide some information 

to answer your question. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

Dr. COOK. So in my remarks I said that we have agreement that 

a B61–12 LEP suitably conducted could replace the B83, which is 

the last megaton gravity bomb. So I am supporting what General 

Kehler said. There is considerable difference in collateral damage 

between the yield of a much smaller weapon. And these yields are 

classified, so we cannot describe them here. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I understand. 

Dr. COOK. But I should also emphasize that the B83 is not currently compatible with NATO aircraft nor with fighters of the U.S., 

and so if one wanted to go down a different path, and my recollection says that the life extension for the B83 comes due to begin in 

a period of about 15 years or less. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The B61, is it compatible with the—— 

Dr. COOK. It is compatible. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The LEP on the B61 is to make it compatible 

with future bombers and the F–35; is that correct? 

General KEHLER. Right. Right. The B61 is compatible with all of 

the aircraft that I mentioned, and it will be made compatible with 

the future aircraft as well. The B83 is not. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So the B83 could not be used for the F–35? 

General KEHLER. I would have to get that answer specifically for 

the record for you. I think I know the answer, but I don’t want to 

speculate. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 113.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I think you know where I am going with the questions. I am going to a $12 billion question here. Do we really 

need the B61 modified? Does the B83 suffice? Presumably this entire discussion has to do with deterrence, not with the tactical. 

General KEHLER. Well, yes, sir, except I would offer deterrence 

is about the credibility of the military force that is used to carry 

it out, and so we have always made sure that our deterrence statements are backed with credible military forces. That includes reliable weapons, that includes trained people, plans to use them if we 

needed to, et cetera. And so just having the weapons isn’t enough, 

we don’t think, to say that we have a credible deterrent. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, thus far in the discussion—excuse me, Mr. 

Rogers. I am going to wrap up in just a very few seconds here. 

The discussion thus far would indicate that we do have a B83 

bomb that works. It is going to need some modifications that are 

apparently not terribly expensive and achievable in the short term; 

is that correct, Dr. Hommert? 
15 

Dr. HOMMERT. Yes. Those modifications are planned, yes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am sorry. They are? 

Dr. HOMMERT. Yes. They are planned to be executed over the 

next decade, yes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So they are already in the process of being determined. 

The question has to do with the deterrent. Apparently the B83 

can be delivered by the current strike bombers? 

General KEHLER. Can be delivered by the B2. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. B2. 

General KEHLER. I am not 100 percent sure. We will get for the 

record whether it can be delivered, for example, by the F–15E. I 

don’t believe it can, but I don’t know that for sure. I need to get 

that for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 113.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I think I have gone about as far as I can go in 

this format. 

General KEHLER. And if I could add another thing. Yes, we are 

currently planning to do some things to the B83. Until we get to 

the point where we have gone far enough in the B61 LEP, we intend to reduce the numbers of B83s and then eliminate the B83. 

That is what we will do. So we are not spending money twice here. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I understand that would be wise, but on the 

other hand, if the B83 is good with some repairs over the next decade or more, why do we need the B61? Dr. Cook. 

Dr. COOK. From a technical perspective, since NNSA and its labs 

and plants design, develop, qualify, manufacture, certify these 

weapons and then place them into the hands of the DOD. Let me 

emphasize that the intent with the B61–12 is to replace the current mods 3, mod 4, mod 7, mod 10, and because we are in the second year of full-scale engineering, about to enter the third, we have 

built sufficient confidence among the nuclear weapon complex 

member units to retire the B83. If we did not do that, and we will 

need to do a life extension of the B83, I—you know, I said it will 

be not sooner than 10 years, but not longer than 15 years. It will 

be a larger life extension. It will be more expensive. We will have 

to do compatibility with aircraft which don’t currently fly it, and 

we will not have the basis to do that at anywhere near the cost of 

the B61–12. All I can say right now is it would be considerably 

more expensive, in my opinion, my technical opinion. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. We are going to be—call for votes in 

about 10 or 15 minutes, so—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Mr. Garamendi asked a great question, and I thought everybody 

covered it in their opening statements, but I want to give each one 

of you a chance to restate it. In your professional opinion, do we 

need to move forward with the B61 LEP, yes or no? Ms. Creedon. 

Secretary CREEDON. Yes. And I want to add a policy take on 

this—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

Secretary CREEDON [continuing]. For just a second. One of the 

things with respect to the B83 is it is—it truly is a megaton-class 
16 

weapon. It is the relic of the cold war. And when we look at the 

forward-deployed B61s and what a B61–12 would provide for us, 

particularly in Europe, the B83 is not compatible with the European aircraft, and the idea of introducing a megaton warhead into 

Europe is almost inconceivable to me at this point. So—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Secretary CREEDON [continuing]. We need the 61. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Kehler, your professional opinion. Do we 

need to move forward with the B61? 

General KEHLER. We do need to move forward with the B61. We 

have looked across the B61 and B83 and come to the conclusion 

that that is the best way forward. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

Dr. Cook. 

Dr. COOK. Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Hommert. 

Dr. HOMMERT. Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Obviously you all aren’t lawyers. The lawyer 

has to expound upon it. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from Colorado is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And you all have a key role in helping to maintain our deterrent, 

and I want to thank each and every one of you for the work that 

you do. And, General Kehler, you in particular, you are about to 

retire. I met you first in Colorado Springs, and you went on to 

Omaha from there, and I just want to say I appreciate your career 

and your service to our country. Thank you. 

General KEHLER. Thank you. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And I will come back to you for a question, if I 

can, but first, Dr. Cook, I would like to ask you briefly about the 

production plants being brought in with the fiscal year 2014 budget 

requests, including Y–12 and Pantex. And these two plants have 

been operating under short-term contract extensions for nearly 3 

years. There have been some bid protests. This must be distracting 

for the workforce there. 

So are you concerned about the plants being able to retain and 

attract quality personnel under these uncertain circumstances, and 

do you think the Department will consider cancelling the RFP [request for proposal] and taking the time to redo the contract? 

Dr. COOK. You had two parts of a question. First part, yes, I am 

concerned about the health and well-being of the workforce no matter where they are, the labs, the plants, and Nevada. 

Second part of the question, with regard to contractual things, I 

cannot answer. I could say there was a statement yesterday about 

the timing in which NNSA intended to award a contract. I would 

refer you to that, but I don’t have any personal knowledge. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. 

And, General Kehler, let me ask you and Secretary Creedon 

about—and this builds on a question that the chairman asked a 

few minutes ago about the B61–12. I know one of the options that 

was considered, and I—it is displayed on this posterboard over here 

was the ‘‘Triple Alt’’ [alteration] option. How do those two compare? 

How does the Triple Alt compare to the B61–12 option, especially 
17 

looking at cost and important factors like that? Either one of you, 

or both. Both of you. 

General KEHLER. I will start, sir, and then ask, again, my colleagues from NNSA to really describe the differences. But, again, 

when we entered the conversation about what we had to do with 

the B61 initially, there was an alternative that was proposed that 

would have done only the most critical things that we thought existed, the problems that we thought existed at the time. One of 

those—and this is an unclassified hearing, so we can provide more 

details for the record—but one of those was radar, and—— 

Mr. LAMBORN. Is that on the Triple Alt line, that row on the top 

there? 

Dr. HOMMERT. Radars, yes. 

General KEHLER. It is. Don, if you want to—— 

Mr. LAMBORN. Can you see that okay? 

Dr. COOK. May I just address a couple—some comments on the 

chart for everybody here? The Triple Alt covers three critical components that do need to be improved. Dr. Hommert can speak more 

about each of these. The first is radar, second is the power supply, 

and the third is neutron generators. Although there is no immediate life-threatening—meaning in the next year—issue on B61 in 

these components, they all have long-term issues. So if you look at 

all of the other categories of the decisionmaking, you can see that 

falls in red block. 

There are issues with that specific LEP that are not resolved, 

and one of those is there is a degradation in warhead electronics 

internal to the bomb in its present radiation environment. 

If you look at the next option, the 1E option would solve what 

I just mentioned, that is, internal electronics, but it would be constrained only to nonnuclear life extension program. And so we 

would not do any fixes to the nuclear explosive package, primary, 

secondary or interstage, and we would have to come back and address those units in a separate LEP. So with a 1E, first we would 

do, you know, a nonnuclear LEP, and then we would have to come 

back to do a nuclear LEP. That would be a more expensive approach. If you look at the nonnuclear portion, the first portion only, 

well, that is less expensive than the 3B. But if you look at both, 

it is more expensive, so that is why I address the full through-life 

cost. 

You can see option 3B is the first option that meets all of the requirements. And when we said meets minimum requirements, you 

can see option 2C. Anywhere there is a B or a C, you can imagine 

there were A’s, there were other variants. This is just a short rendition of the options. Option 2C, though, made step improvements 

in safety by having direct optical initiation, so no electrical connection to the detonators, and multipoint safety, too detailed for this 

hearing. We chose, though, not to take that option because it was 

more expensive. 

Mr. LAMBORN. So it is your opinion that of all the four options, 

3B is the best one by far? Well, it addresses all of the issues after 

detailed and extensive analysis? 

Dr. COOK. That is correct. Not only that, it has the lowest 

through-life cost of all of these options listed. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And you all would agree with that? 
18 

Dr. HOMMERT. Absolutely. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

General KEHLER. Yes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentlemen’s time has expired. 

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez, is recognized. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

So first, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the record 

some letters, I know that you have already received them, from a 

lot of other Parliamentarians from other countries, in particular 

our allies, who are asking us that the modernization for the deployment of the B61 is a waste of resources for both the U.S. and the 

particular countries they come from, many of them. I would like to 

put it into the record. 

Mr. ROGERS. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 85.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman—— 

Mr. TURNER. Will the gentlelady yield for just one moment, kindly? I had received a similar letter when the members of the NATO 

Parliamentary Assembly were in from—Raymond Knops, a member 

of Parliament from the Netherlands, to which we responded, detailing the specific issues that related to the letters that you are entering into the record. 

With the chairman’s consent, I would like to introduce that letter. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Sounds great. 

Mr. TURNER. Also as—as—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Sounds great. I would like to have it into the 

record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 108.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. And then we would also—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Now reclaiming my time, please. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Your choice. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Because I didn’t give him the time, you did. 

You gave away my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. We all have our faults. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So I want to talk about the deterrence value and 

the military value, because I remember General Cartwright saying 

something to the effect of we lose no military value if we don’t have 

the B61. 

So my question to the general and to Secretary Creedon is how 

much have our allies contributed to the cost of the B61 Life Extension Program? Has potential withdrawal or other measures to provide reliable extended deterrence been discussed in consultation 

with NATO capitals? Why or why not? Is it possible to provide reliable extended deterrence without forward-deploying the B61? And 

have you discussed NATO contributing to the B61 LEP programs? 

And this all comes from the whole issue of Cartwright saying we 

have other military things that take care of this whole spectrum— 

basically, that is what he has said to us—and this is more of a po-
19 

litical value. So can you speak to the three or four questions I put 

forward before you? 

Secretary CREEDON. Thank you. First let me take the value of 

the 61 to our NATO allies. 

I have the privilege of chairing what is referred to as the High 

Level Group, which is an interesting name, but it is a senior NATO 

group that deals with nuclear policy in the context of NATO, and 

it reports to the defense and foreign ministers sitting in what is referred to as the Nuclear Planning Group format. And it is a longstanding NATO committee, and one of the things that that committee looks at is nuclear policy within NATO, including political 

guidance. 

And the High-Level Group just completed, over the course of the 

last year and a half, a whole review on what exactly nuclear policy 

in NATO should be. It was initially reflected in the NATO Defense 

Posture Review, which was—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So you are eating up my time here. 

Secretary CREEDON [continuing]. 2012, but it said NATO will remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are they providing money—— 

Secretary CREEDON. Yes, they are. 

Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing]. For this life extension? 

Secretary CREEDON. So not—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How much? What percentage? 

Secretary CREEDON. So not for the life extension itself. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. No. Have they provided money for the—— 

Secretary CREEDON. It is a—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing]. Life extension? 

Secretary CREEDON. The life extension—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. This is what we are concerned about here. 

Secretary CREEDON. The life extension, it is the life extension for 

a U.S. weapon. As a U.S. weapon, the U.S. pays for the life extension program. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So they are not; so they are not putting their 

money where their mouth is. 

Secretary CREEDON. NATO contributes and has contributed over 

170 million euros, and NATO provides for the security. The host 

bases provide for the security, and also they also provide all their 

own aircraft. So there is a—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Ms. Creedon—— 

Secretary CREEDON [continuing]. Substantial NATO contribution. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Ms. Creedon, I would like to ask you another question since you kind of ate up my time there, and I am now a 

minute or under. Also Mr. Chairman did, or actually—— 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentlelady is allowed 38 seconds to make 

up—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you know exactly how much the Department 

of Defense spends for maintaining and deploying nuclear weapons? 

Would including personnel costs in understanding which bases are 

counted provide a more accurate estimate of the full costs of nuclear? Can you give us a cost estimate of what it costs to do these 

things? 

Secretary CREEDON. We can give you the personnel costs, we can 

give you O&M [operation and maintenance] costs. We have done 
20 

over time various estimates as the cost for DOD of maintaining the 

nuclear weapons and delivery systems. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Because I asked for this in fiscal year 2013. It was 

taken out. I have asked for it in fiscal year 2014. NDAA goes forward. Would you support figuring how much it is really costing us 

to do this? 

Secretary CREEDON. We can provide those figures. I mean, we 

can certainly provide the figures. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Perfect. 

I will end on time, because I know we have got votes on the floor, 

Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Dr. 

Fleming, for 5 minutes. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, panel. 

I am going to turn the question around a little bit, and I will 

start with General Kehler, but others can answer. What if we descoped or cancelled? And I get what you say about the flexibility, 

and that makes perfect sense to me about the B61 LEP program, 

but what if we didn’t do that? What would be the result? What 

would we find in the following years for not moving forward with 

that? 

General KEHLER. Sir, the reliability of the deterrent continues to 

decline. As you heard our colleagues from the Department of Energy say, these, the weapons, almost across the board now, are approaching 20-plus years of lifetime, some of them older than that. 

In some cases they are based on components and designs that are 

older than that. And so from my perspective, what we watch very 

carefully is the reliability when we do nonnuclear explosive testing 

on the weapons and component surveillance testing, the things that 

the labs do to talk to us about the weapons that provide us with 

an annual way to look at the viability of the stockpile. 

The trend is for reliability to continue to decrease unless we take 

the actions that we are laying out here in our strategy. So in every 

case here, there are components in our weapons that must be addressed. If we don’t address those, then we have reliability issues. 

At some point in time, we will have to—we have weapons that 

what we call ‘‘turn red.’’ That is not a safety issue, but that is a 

performance issue. So we don’t want to put the country in a place 

where, as long as we are asked to provide the nuclear deterrent, 

that we can’t do that with weapons that are credible. 

Dr. FLEMING. Yeah. General, would that then create a situation 

where a future President in outyears and when that reliability begins to decline, in a certain situation certain options would be 

taken off the table, and he or she may have less choices; we might 

even have to choose a conventional solution that might be inadequate simply because we don’t have the flexibility of that upgrade 

and the modernization? 

General KEHLER. Sir, I think that that is clearly an issue, and 

I do agree with what you just said. I think that you could—you 

could be removing options and flexibility from a future President. 

I also think that there is impact on our ability to deter those 

kinds of uses to begin with. The ultimate objective of the nuclear 
21 

deterrent is to make sure that the weapons are never used, and yet 

we use them every day—— 

Dr. FLEMING. Yes. 

General KEHLER [continuing]. To do that. It is almost counterintuitive, from people who aren’t informed, but we use those weapons 

every single day. The credibility of our deterrent depends on the 

credibility of the weapons and the forces and the people that are 

associated. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. Well, then, let me ask this, and, again, anyone on the panel is welcome to answer this question. In moving forward with our LEP and what we learned from doing that, the technology developed, how can that be expanded to other modernization 

programs or other programs in general? Yeah. Dr. Hommert. 

Dr. HOMMERT. Yeah. From the outset as we have gone into this 

LEP, we have looked at as many components that we can do here. 

The radar is an example. This radar will go into two additional 

LEPs. There are also devices that—you can think of them as 

switches, but highly specialized switches, which assure safety. 

Those that will go into the 61 will also be options for us in future 

LEPs. 

So there is a fair amount of cost buy-down implicit by going 

through the very admittedly thorough and therefore costs associated with qualifying these components now in the 61, but we expect to reap benefit from that on future extension programs, life extension programs. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. Thank you. 

And, finally, how would this affect the follow-on cruise missile, 

long-range standoff missile that will replace the air-launched cruise 

missile? 

Dr. COOK. I will provide a technical answer. As we are looking 

at options for the long-range standoff, as Dr. Hommert has just 

said, we have found that we would be able to apply considerable 

reuse of the nonrecurring engineering expense; in other words, they 

would be less expensive. So the things like arming and firing the 

safety switches that Dr. Hommert addressed, in the terms of the 

nonnuclear elements, a great deal of leverage is applied. 

Dr. FLEMING. Right. Yes, go ahead, General. 

General KEHLER. Sir, I would just add that today in the strategic 

force, we have two gravity weapons, the B61 and the B83, as Mr. 

Garamendi mentioned. We want to eliminate the B83. And we also 

have a cruise missile today. Our view is that for the future we 

would like to keep that mixture, a gravity weapon and a cruise 

missile, because of the military capabilities that they give us, and 

because of the problems that would present to any adversary. 

Dr. FLEMING. Great. Thank you so much, and I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Cook, the fiscal year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan confidently proclaims that the 3+2 strategy is an 

executable plan; however, the report also notes that many of the 

plan’s proposed life extension programs are in the early study 

phase, and the cost estimates are not complete. It also notes that 
22 

NNSA is unlikely to be able to complete the scope of work it 

planned to complete in fiscal year 2013 due to budget reductions, 

to say nothing about future years. 

Given these and other caveats presented in the report, how can 

NNSA proclaim that 3+2 vision achievable? 

Dr. COOK. Thank you for the question. I will be direct in the answer. 

I have already mentioned the applicability of the B61 component 

development and how that will carry across to the long-range 

standoff missile. There is similar applicability to the first interoperable of three that are in the 3+2 strategy. Decisions have been 

made and endorsed by the Nuclear Weapon Council with regard to 

improvements in safety and security, and we are on a path of technology development and component maturation. So the fact that we 

developed confidence in the development and can actually have 

metrics that tell us where we are, that is where part of the confidence comes from. 

I will also say, however, 2013, fiscal year 2013, is over. We are 

into fiscal year 2014. It would be wonderful to have a budget, it 

would be wonderful not to have sequestration, but we are where we 

are. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, let me ask this question, Dr. Cook: What is 

the impact on other LEPs if the B61 schedule slips? 

Dr. COOK. The short answer is if the 61 slipped, and the other 

LEPs did not slip, then the—more of the early development costs 

would be borne by the other LEPs, and so their cost would increase. 

Mr. JOHNSON. General Kehler and Ms. Creedon, are you concerned about potential schedule slips? 

Secretary CREEDON. Absolutely. And as we have covered, the 

greatest risk to the B61–12 and, frankly, to the entire 3+2 strategy 

at the moment doesn’t appear to be technical risk, it really is budgetary risk. And it is the ongoing implications of sequestration. 

Mr. JOHNSON. General Kehler. 

General KEHLER. Sir, I agree with that. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Dr. Cook, how does NNSA plan to manage four to five concurrent LEPs without cost increase and schedule delays? 

Dr. COOK. I could give you many details, but I don’t have the 

time. So first I will say these LEPs are in different stages, ranging 

from stable production where we are with the life-extended ballistic 

system for the Navy, 76–1, to very early considerations where we 

are with the long-range standoff option. The B61 is in between: at 

engineering development. So being very clear about the interdependencies is the first point. 

Secondly, we are applying the rigor of earned-value management 

systems across the board. We are using industry-standard tools, 

like Primavera, and we are basically providing resource-loaded 

schedules that give us the confidence that we can execute these in 

detail. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Dr. Cook, one last question. The currently proposed B61 LEP appears to be premised on a number of 

assumptions that may be outdated. For example, the program 

seems to assume that the United States would continue to forward- 
23 

deploy tactical versions of the B61 in Europe, even though President Obama has stated his desire to negotiate with Russia to remove these weapons. In addition, the new high-level nuclear weapons policy guidance signed by President Obama in June could reduce the number of strategic gravity bombs that are required for 

deterrence. 

How might changes to the existing deterrence requirements alter 

the currently proposed scope of the B61 LEP? 

Secretary CREEDON. Sorry, sir. Since that is more of a policy 

question than a technical question, if you don’t mind. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. 

Secretary CREEDON. So at the moment the President has been 

very clear that he would like to entertain conversations with Russia and with NATO allies to look at possible reductions. In the 

meantime, however, the B61 is, in fact, forward-deployed at NATO, 

and our NATO allies, as I mentioned earlier, have reaffirmed the 

need for that. 

But it is not just the ability to forward-deploy in Europe. I mean, 

when we look at the 61, it is the total package. It is the strategic 

as well as the ability to move forward not only in Europe, but also 

in the Asia-Pacific region should we need it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Gentleman’s time has expired. 

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Nugent, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate this 

panel’s candor in regards to where we stand on the LEP as relates 

to B61. 

I do want to make a comment. I know where my good friend Mr. 

Garamendi was coming from, I think I do at least, trying to say, 

hey, listen, if we have something that works, why are we repairing 

something that needs to be repaired today? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Very conservative thought. 

Mr. NUGENT. Conservative thought. I appreciate that from the 

gentleman on the left there. But I also—it is not impossible. 

But I also have heard you loud and clear, particularly as it relates to the B61 and the flexibility that that gives you versus the 

83, and particularly in regards to launch platform, and, secondly, 

the yield that it would do or collateral damage that it would do. 

So I want to make sure that I am clear, particularly from the forward-deployed standpoint. That is part of our posture, is it not, in 

how we are dealing with possible belligerent countries? Is that important to you? 

Secretary CREEDON. That is correct. 

Mr. NUGENT. And I would suggest that, you know, we talk about 

Europe, but we also have an issue as relates to North Korea that 

is threatening one of our allies in South Korea. So I think you have 

all answered this very clearly is that you feel that it is imperative 

that we follow the strategic advice of the experts in this particular 

issue, Dr. Cook and Dr. Hommert, in regards to moving forward 

with the transition of the B61; is that correct? 

Dr. HOMMERT. Yes. Absolutely. 

Dr. COOK. Yes. 

Mr. NUGENT. And what is the negative consequence if we don’t? 

What position does that put us in? 
24 

Dr. HOMMERT. Well, if we don’t execute the life extension program, then we will observe the gradual decay of reliability of this 

weapon over the next decade, and it will reach a point somewhere, 

in my view, technical judgment, in the next decade in which it will 

simply not have the sufficient reliability to do something that General Kehler could have confidence as part of his force. 

Dr. COOK. I am going to give the other perspective. If we do not 

do the 61–12 LEP, we will not be able to retire the B83, the last 

of the megaton-class weapons. We will not be able to reduce the 

number of nuclear weapons by a factor of two, nor will we be able 

to reduce both the amount of special nuclear material in air-delivered bombs because of the number of reductions in numbers and 

the B83, and—or the destructive power by 80 percent. Those are 

the nonproliferation, arms control, and very important aspects of 

conducting the 61 LEP. None of those would be achieved if we don’t 

do the 61–12. 

General KEHLER. Sir, investing in the B61 sustains a military capability for us that will go away if we do not. 

Secretary CREEDON. And investing in the B61 also provides the 

extended deterrence to our allies around the world. And in the absence of that reliable extended deterrence, there is a real concern 

that some of those allies who have the ability to develop their own 

nuclear weapons would, in fact, do so. 

Mr. NUGENT. I appreciate all of your comments, and I will yield 

back my time. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

The chair recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Bridenstine, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be quick; I 

know we are voting right now. 

Just one quick question for you, General. You talked about the 

credibility of our weapons being necessary for the credibility of the 

deterrence. And, of course, we are reducing our—the number of our 

weapons, and we are reducing our hedge. Do you see any value in 

proving the credibility of our weapons by maybe doing an underground test of one? 

General KEHLER. Sir, not at this time. We consult with the experts, and we are asked annually to assess for the President 

whether we think that it is necessary to conduct a nuclear explosive test. They do extensive testing on these weapons, not to include nuclear explosive testing. And at this point in time I don’t 

think we gain something that I believe is militarily necessary by 

doing a nuclear explosive test. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So you are comfortable, given the data you are 

provided, that the hedge is sufficient and our bombs will work? 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. I am very confident of that. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. Thank you. That is all I wanted to 

know. Thanks. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Dr. Cook, you made a statement, your last 

statement, and you laid out the nonproliferation scenarios. We 

don’t have time now because we are going to go to vote. I would 

appreciate a detailed explanation of each one of the issues you 

raised. 
25 

Dr. COOK. I would be happy to provide that. It is also in my written testimony and backed up by a number of classified briefings we 

have done. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Then let us do both. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 113.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

Before I go to my colleague from Arizona, General Kehler, do you 

believe the B61 nuclear bombs serve a military purpose in Europe? 

General KEHLER. I do. Nuclear deterrence is a military mission, 

and we—what we would offer is options that—military options in 

extreme circumstances that that would be available for the President. I believe all of that is a military mission. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you. 

I recognize my friend and colleague from Arizona, Mr. Franks, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you. 

General Kehler, I also want to single you out. I consider you a 

friend and consider you a friend to human freedom. And I would 

suggest to you that, as I often have, that my 5-year-old twins have 

a better chance to walk in the light of liberty someday because men 

like you lived and wore those stars. And I really appreciate you 

very, very much. 

And with that, I am going to move on to somebody else and ask 

a question here. 

Dr. Cook, how much has been spent to date on the B61 LEP? 

Dr. COOK. Just a bit over $1.2 billion. 

Mr. FRANKS. And how much of that work that has been done to 

date would be scrapped in the event that we de-scoped options pursued for the B61? 

Dr. COOK. Most of it, but not all of it. 

Mr. FRANKS. And now that we are already in engineering development, component qualification, the LEP, would it be easy to descope the program? 

Dr. COOK. No, it would not. If we did so, it would set us back 

about 2 years, and any of the path options that we have identified 

would be more expensive than continuing with the 61–12. 

Mr. FRANKS. So it wouldn’t save us any money. 

Dr. COOK. It would not. 

Mr. FRANKS. Do any of the witnesses think it makes any sense 

to reduce the scope of this LEP? 

Secretary CREEDON. No. 

Dr. HOMMERT. No. 

General KEHLER. No. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I have other questions, but I am 

going to stop right there and thank the panel and thank the chairman for the time. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. Thank all of you very much. 

It has been very helpful. You did a great job. And we are now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:49 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

OCTOBER 29, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 29, 2013 

(31) 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 29, 2013 

(73) 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

OCTOBER 29, 2013 

(113) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

General KEHLER. That is mainly correct. As it stands today, the B83 is not compatible with the F–35 or any other dual-capable fighter aircraft. The F–35 is being 

fielded as a survivable platform with a modern, digital-only weapon control system. 

To make the B83 work on the F–35 would require significant and extensive modifications to the weapon, the supporting infrastructure and perhaps the platform 

itself, all at a much higher cost than the planned B61 program. For example, the 

B83 would require a complete replacement of its outdated analog technology as well 

as an overhaul of its security features. Such a full scope, nuclear and non-nuclear 

re-design would require extensive testing and certification before deploying on the 

F–35. Finally, all overseas storage vaults and maintenance equipment would need 

modification to support the B83. [See page 14.] 

General KEHLER. The B83 can be delivered by the B–2 and B–52. It is not certified for delivery on any other current aircraft. [See page 15.] 

Dr. COOK. The B61–12 LEP with guided tail kit assembly will replace four of the 

five current variants of the B61, resulting in a single variant after the B61–11 is 

retired. U.S. Strategic Command determined that with the accuracy provided by a 

tail kit, the yield provided by today’s lowest yield B61 variant would be sufficient 

to meet all of the strategic and non-strategic requirements for gravity systems. Having a single variant will enable a reduction in the number of deployed and non-deployed air-delivered nuclear gravity weapons in the stockpile, while increasing the 

safety and security of this aging system. Additionally, by balancing reduced yield 

with improved accuracy, this LEP would allow us to pursue retirement of the B61– 

11, and the B83 gravity bomb, once confidence in the B61–12 stockpile is gained; 

as provided in the FY 2014 NNSA Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. 

All of these aspects above allow the majority of the air delivered gravity weapons 

to be removed from the U.S. nuclear stockpile (active and inactive), a very large reduction in the total amount of nuclear material utilized by air delivered gravity 

weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, and a significant reduction in the total nuclear yield (i.e., mega-tonnage) produced by air-delivered gravity weapons in the 

U.S. nuclear stockpile. Additionally, information can be provided in a classified 

forum upon request. [See page 25.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

OCTOBER 29, 2013 

(117) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. Secretary Creedon, you are the U.S. representative to NATO’s High 

Level Group, which discusses nuclear weapons aspects of NATO defense posture. 

What are the consequences to NATO and our relationship with our NATO allies if 

we fail to deliver on the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP)? 

a. We’ve heard some people say that NATO should pay for part of the B61 LEP. 

Does the Administration think it is appropriate for a foreign country to pay for 

sustainment of U.S. nuclear weapons? Would that violate any treaties? Does it violate common sense? 

b. Do you anticipate NATO changing its policy on nuclear weapons any time soon? 

Secretary CREEDON. a. NATO contributes to the Alliance’s nuclear posture in two 

ways. First, through the NATO Security Investment Program, NATO allies provide 

funding for security and infrastructure enhancements and upgrades at European 

nuclear weapons storage sites. Second, NATO allies burden-share in the nuclear 

mission by assigning pilots and dual-capable aircraft to the mission, and by supporting the nuclear mission with conventional operations (such as the SNOWCAT 

program—‘‘Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Air Tactics’’). I do not 

think it is appropriate for a foreign country to pay for sustainment of U.S. nuclear 

weapons because it would subject classified U.S. nuclear data to be disclosed to foreign nations and will open contributing nations to charges of proliferation. Moreover, these are U.S. weapons and the U.S. must remain responsible for their 

sustainment. 

b. The 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review concluded that nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defense, 

alongside conventional and missile defense forces; and that the Alliance’s nuclear 

force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense 

posture. Moreover, the DDPR states that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO 

will remain a nuclear Alliance. Since the security environment since 2012 has not 

changed appreciably, I do not anticipate NATO changing its policy on nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is our non-NATO allies’ interest in the B61 LEP? 

a. What do you foresee as potential impacts on some of our Asian allies, in particular Japan and South Korea, if we fail to execute the LEP? 

b. Wouldn’t we be endangering the credibility of our extended deterrent if the B61 

LEP isn’t funded? 

Secretary CREEDON. The B61 plays a critical role in the U.S. nuclear posture in 

East Asia because it serves both as an assurance and deterrence function for Japan 

and South Korea. The B61 assures our allies by providing them with a tangible 

demonstration of the seriousness of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe our extended deterrent assurances to allies lose credibility if we continue to slip deadlines for modernizing our stockpile? 

Secretary CREEDON. In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review report, the Administration stated that it was committed to the full scope life extension of the B61. Both 

the Administration’s 2013 nuclear employment guidance and the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization’s 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review rely, in part, on 

this commitment. The U.S. nuclear employment guidance states that the United 

States will maintain the capability to forward-deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons 

(i.e., the B61) with heavy bombers and dual-capable aircraft in support of extended 

deterrence and assurance of U.S. allies and partners. Similarly, as the only U.S. nuclear weapon assigned to NATO, the B61 supports the Alliance’s commitment in the 

DDPR that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons 

exist and to maintain the current nuclear posture. Based on these commitments, it 

is critical that the United States complete the B61 LEP as scheduled. 

Mr. ROGERS. If we decided tomorrow to withdraw all B61s forward-deployed in 

support of NATO, would we still need to execute the B61 LEP? 

a. Is the need for the B61 LEP driven by our NATO Alliance commitments, or 

by our own nuclear deterrent needs? 

Secretary CREEDON. Both the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the June 2013 

U.S. nuclear employment guidance state that the United States will maintain a nu-
118 

1 As a result of sequestration, NNSA slipped the First Production Unit (FPU) from September 

2019 to March 2020 and added $244M to the management reserve to offset the potential increased costs and associated risks with delaying the program by six months. The first B61–12 

Selected Acquisition Report to Congress, which formally documents weapon program cost and 

schedule, included the sequestration impacts. 

clear Triad consisting of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear capable bombers—including heavy bombers and dual-capable aircraft. Further, this guidance states that the United States will retain the 

capability to forward deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), like the B61. 

Additionally, as a result of the retirement of the B83, the B61 will be the only gravity weapon to support the B–2 mission. Retaining all three legs of the Triad best 

maintains strategic stability at reasonable cost while hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities. To maintain an effective and credible Triad— 

which includes the ability to forward deploy NSNW—the B61 LEP is necessary 

whether or not it remains a component of NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. 

Finally, benefits of the B61–12 LEP are not limited to commitments to NATO. 

The technical work performed for this LEP will be leveraged for future LEPs, providing potential cost savings to other programs. 

Mr. ROGERS. We have heard from various disarmament advocates that the B61 

LEP is premised on a number of assumptions that may be outdated. This includes 

an assumption that the U.S. will continue to forward-deploy B61s in Europe, even 

though President Obama has stated his desire to negotiate with Russia to remove 

these weapons. Also, President Obama has said he believes we can reduce the number of nuclear weapons further, so maybe we just don’t need the B61 going forward. 

So, do you think deterrence requirements are changing, and therefore we should reexamine the scope of the B61 LEP or its existence altogether? 

Secretary CREEDON. The role of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in 

Europe was recently re-evaluated by the NATO Alliance in May 2012 as part Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR). As part of the DDPR all NATO members agreed that ‘‘Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defence alongside conventional and missile defence forces’’; 

that ‘‘As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance’’; and 

‘‘While seeking to create the conditions and considering options for further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO, Allies concerned will ensure that all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure, and effective for as long as NATO remains a nuclear alliance.’’ 

The President has stated his desire to further reduce the amount and role of nuclear weapons and the B61–12 LEP is an important step towards achieving those 

objectives. Once the B61–12 LEP program is completed and confidence in its capabilities are established the U.S. will be able to reduce the number of nuclear gravity 

bombs by over 50 percent and the amount of nuclear material utilized in those gravity bombs by over 80 percent. The B61–12 LEP is a key component of the Administration’s requirement that the U.S. retain the capability to forward deploy nuclear 

weapons on tactical fighters and heavy bombers, most recently expressed in the revised nuclear employment guidance in June 2013 and also in the Nuclear Posture 

Review in 2010. 

Mr. ROGERS. a. NNSA’s final cost estimate for the B61–12 LEP came in at around 

$8 billion. I understand that DOD’s CAPE office has put forward an estimate of over 

$10 billion. Please describe the level of rigor and effort that went into developing 

this estimate. 

Dr. COOK. a. NNSA used a high level of rigor and effort to develop the B61–12 

cost estimate. The current cost estimate for the B61–12 life extension program 

(LEP) reported in the September 2013 Selected Acquisition Report to Congress is 

$8.1B which includes $7.3B in direct B61–12 funding and another $0.8B in other 

NNSA funds. The estimate is based on the Weapon Design and Cost Report (WDCR) 

published in July 2012 and has not changed with the exception of the impacts due 

to the FY 2013 sequestration cuts.1 NNSA submits quarterly updates to Congress 

on cost and schedule and will formally update the cost estimate following the Baseline Design Review to establish an Acquisition Program Baseline in FY 2016. The 

WDCR cost estimate is the initial cost estimate for the weapon program. NNSA 

used a bottom-up cost estimating approach involving more than 40 product realization teams with representatives from each of the NNSA design and production agencies. The WDCR cost estimate followed the GAO cost estimating guidance using 

three-point estimates, risk based contingency analysis, and included management 

reserve. Component level costs are directly linked to the life extension option and 

comprise both direct costs associated with design, development, procurement, and 

testing as well as system level integration and testing costs. The estimate was inter-
119 

nally, but independently, reviewed and represents a formal commitment by each site 

on expected costs for the weapon program. The estimate will be updated in the 

Baseline Cost Report following completion of the Baseline Design Review and prior 

to entry into Phase 6.4 in FY 2016. 

Mr. ROGERS. b. Would you please describe how CAPE arrived at this number? 

Dr. COOK. b. The DOD CAPE developed their cost estimate independently. NNSA 

must defer to the DOD to answer questions on the process they used. One major 

difference between the CAPE estimate and that provided by the NNSA WDCR was 

an extended schedule. CAPE assumed an additional three years of development 

work. 

Mr. ROGERS. c. What is your professional opinion of this number by CAPE? 

Dr. COOK. c. CAPE developed their cost estimate independently. Therefore, NNSA 

cannot offer an opinion. 

Mr. ROGERS. d. Which number do you stand by? 

Dr. COOK. d. The NNSA stands by the $8.1 billion cost estimate published in the 

September 2013 Selected Acquisition Report. 

Mr. ROGERS. a. What are the impacts to the B61 LEP if sequestration is allowed 

to continue for the duration of FY14? 

Dr. COOK. a. The impact of additional sequestration cuts to the program schedule 

is being assessed but is expected to be less than 3 months to the March 2020 first 

production unit (FPU). If funding for the B61–12 and related activities is restored 

to the President’s Budget Request (PBR) level, the LEP would be able to maintain 

its current March 2020 FPU commitment reported in the September 2013 Selected 

Acquisition Report (SAR). Funding at the $537M PBR level versus the $561M B61– 

12 SAR estimated requirement will increase risk to the FPU as less funds will be 

available for risk mitigation. In addition, funding for NNSA infrastructure investments is also limited. This could cause system- or facility-level failures in the nuclear security enterprise that would preclude safe and secure operations, causing 

unplanned delays in the B61 LEP and other programs. 

Mr. ROGERS. b. If a continuing resolution is passed for much of FY14, what are 

the effects if the B61 LEP does not receive an ‘‘anomaly’’ that enables it to spend 

at the level of the President’s budget request? 

Dr. COOK. b. Under the current CR, the B61–12 is being held to $369M as op- posed to the PBR of $537M or the Selected Acquisition Report estimated requirement of $561M. If the program is held at the $369M level through FY 2014, it would 

significantly impact NNSA’s ability to meet the B61–12 LEP FPU date. The reduced 

funding would require a reduction in the current B61–12 technical staff levels, 

elimination of development hardware procurements, and cancellation of joint test 

activities with the USAF. The lack of new hardware also impacts component development activities and testing for FY 2015. The FPU in March 2020 could not be 

achieved and could possibly slip into FY 2021. 

Mr. ROGERS. As the principal design agent for this LEP, Sandia did the bulk of 

the work that led to the final cost estimate of around $8 billion. Please describe the 

level of rigor and effort that went into developing this estimate. I understand that 

DOD’s CAPE office has put forward an estimate of over $10 billion. Would you 

please describe how CAPE arrived at this number? What is your professional opinion of this number by CAPE? Which number do you stand by? 

Dr. HOMMERT. When NNSA provided to Congress the B61–12 Weapon Design and 

Cost Report (WDCR), the overall estimate of approximately $8 billion over 12 years 

for the full program included the production and deployment of the required number 

of nuclear bombs. Within that cost estimate, Sandia’s portion is $2.65 (note, this is 

the design agency cost) billion estimated total incremental cost for work on the B61 

LEP specified in the WDCR. 

The rigor of this estimate met my expectation for capturing the uncertainty and 

risks associated with a program in the conceptual design phase. This estimated cost 

includes an appropriate amount of risk informed contingency. Sandia’s estimate includes a task based estimate of cost for each major component and sub-systems in 

the life extension program and was developed by our nuclear weapons experts. A 

high level of confidence in the cost estimate was achieved through close coordination 

with both NNSA and DOD staff, resulting in a mature understanding of negotiated 

threshold and programmatic requirements. We also complied with NNSA direction 

to utilize the Government Accountability Office standards for cost estimating. 

Sandia conducted internal management and independent reviews of our estimate 

before forwarding it to NNSA. Our review process also included external experts 

who concluded that SNL’s estimate met the NNSA-directed WDCR criterion that 

the estimate be accurate, repeatable, auditable, and defensible. 

CAPE completed a program risk assessment of the entire NNSA B61–12 WDCR 

rather than a detailed independent cost estimate. CAPE’s review was requested by 
120 

NNSA. The WDCR is the only definitive cost estimate. The primary driver for the 

differential in CAPE’s assessment was reducing Sandia’s schedule overlap for the 

B61–12 which meets the Nuclear Weapon Council’s requirement to complete weapon 

first production in fiscal year 2019. CAPE also used a different cost assumption for 

its labor rates for its assessment instead of utilizing the NNSA labor rates in the 

WDCR. 

With respect to technical risk, I have the highest level of confidence that technical 

issues will NOT cause impact to Sandia’s schedule performance, as we demonstrated 

through progress in FY13. I say this for two reasons. First, we do not view this program as inherently high technical risk, especially when compared with other product development programs conducted at Sandia. Second, we manage our contingency 

funds (∼10%) in a manner that continuously buys down risk against a formalized 

risk register. Our FY13 and FY14 labor rates were at or below the labor rates included in the WDCR. 

With respect to budgetary changes, FY13 sequestration impacts caused some technical activities to be moved into FY14. We estimated the schedule impact of those 

shifts to be relatively small—on the order of 2 to 3 months over the life of the program (within overall schedule contingency). However, at the time of this testimony, 

we are operating against a FY14 resource allocation that, on an annual basis, is at 

least 23% below the FY14 requirement, as contained in the most recent NNSA-approved Baseline Change Requests to the Selected Acquisition Report, approved in 

October 2013. Obviously, unless addressed, budgetary changes of this magnitude 

will have significant schedule impact. As with any large program activity, schedule 

slip will result in an increase in overall program cost. 

As noted, CAPE completed a risk assessment of the entire NNSA B61–12 estimate 

rather than a detailed independent cost estimate. The CAPE team, working collaboratively with NNSA and Sandia, acted within the severe time constraints assigned 

to it by the Nuclear Weapons Council to complete the risk assessment and the 

unique characteristics of a nuclear weapon program which operates differently than 

conventional Defense Department acquisition process. Sandia benefited from the 

CAPE engagement and their review. We share their goal of wisely and appropriately 

managing the program to the WDCR estimate to meet the schedule and expected 

labor rates. The major drivers leading to a significant difference in the CAPE prediction from the SNL estimate are consistent as previously explained. If these drivers are experienced, cost will increase. 

Sandia National Laboratories made a commitment to deliver the B61–12 to the 

estimate provided to NNSA as our portion of the Weapon Design and Cost Report 

(WDCR) which included contingency funding, and leveraging other NNSA programs 

The Laboratories continue to stand by that estimate. Assuming all the WDCR obligations are met, including contingency and NNSA programs supporting the B61–12, 

I expect to continue to meet the commitments. At the time of my testimony, we had 

costed $253 million of the $2.65 billion. Against those expenditures, we have met 

all major milestones on (or under) cost. These milestones include system-level mechanical environment tests, radar flight performance tests, and functional electrical 

compatibility tests. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. Are there expected cost-savings from doing the B61–12? 

Secretary CREEDON. Yes. The B61–12 will become the only gravity-dropped nuclear weapon in the U.S. nuclear stockpile. It will fulfill both the strategic and nonstrategic requirements of the airborne component of the U.S. nuclear Triad. It will 

allow the retirement or consolidation of six different types of nuclear gravity weapons that are currently maintained in the U.S. nuclear stockpile significantly reducing the costs associated with stockpile, surveillance and testing, and eliminating the 

need to perform additional, costly life-extension programs (LEP) for these weapons 

that would otherwise be required within the next decade. Without the B61–12 LEP 

these cost savings cannot be realized. 

Mr. COOPER. What drives the requirement of approximately 500 B61s? What dries 

the requirement for the number of forward-deployed B61s? Has the Administration 

considered performing a LEP on a lower number of B61s? 

Secretary CREEDON. The requirements for the numbers and types of weapons in 

the stockpile come from the recommendations of Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their recommendations reflect 

the amount and types of weapons needed to defend our nation and our Allies, and 

to deter other nations that might use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against 
121 

the United States or our Allies. Roughly 80 percent of the cost of the B61–12 LEP 

is needed to produce the first weapon and the remaining 20 percent of the costs are 

associated with the follow-on weapons produced. As such, any reduction in the number of B61–12s produced would result in very little cost savings. The current number of B61–12s planned still allows for a more than 50 percent reduction in the total 

number of nuclear gravity bombs in the U.S. nuclear stockpile and a more than 80 

percent reduction in the total amount of nuclear material contained within those remaining bombs. 

Mr. COOPER. Are you confident that NNSA can manage a workload which includes 

4–5 concurrent life extension programs? 

Secretary CREEDON. We are confident that NNSA can manage the current scope 

of work required to meet long-term requirements. Concurrency of work remains a 

concern, and therefore our plan is structured not to exceed the capacity of NNSA 

facilities by sequencing programs and by utilizing reuse of components where possible to minimize both costs and infrastructure utilization. 

Mr. COOPER. The administration has pledged that it would not develop new capabilities. Specifically on the B61, the lower yield is being compensated by higher accuracy provided by a new tailkit. However, if you now have approximately 500 B61– 

12s which could theoretically all be used as strategic assets, would this provide new 

capability? 

Secretary CREEDON. The B61–12 tail-kit assembly (TKA) does not provide a new 

capability to the weapon. The TKA simply improves the reliability of the bomb. This 

improved reliability permits us to utilize a design with a lower maximum yield, one 

that is already in the active stockpile, to address both strategic and non-strategic 

targets. 

Mr. COOPER. What is status on the plans for the three interoperable warheads? 

Secretary CREEDON. The interoperable warheads are still an essential element of 

the long-term modernization strategy for the nuclear deterrent. Current fiscal constraints are causing us to consider delaying the development of the first interoperable warhead. Even though there may be a delay in obtaining these warheads, the 

plan is still to pursue an interoperable warhead capability. 

Mr. COOPER. Is there a risk that new interoperable warheads planned under the 

3+2 plan will increase the likelihood that the United States might need to return 

to testing? What is the risk of having 3 new (and unproven) interoperable warheads 

account for most of the U.S. stockpile? 

Secretary CREEDON. We have a suite of computational and experimental tools that 

we currently use to certify the stockpile, and those tools would be used to certify 

the interoperable designs. We see no increased risk in the interoperable designs because we plan to reuse current design and underground-tested assets. 

Mr. COOPER. Could the Long-Range Stand Off (LRSO) cruise missile and warhead 

be carried on the F–35? 

Secretary CREEDON. We conducted an abbreviated review of this option and determined that it is both technically infeasible and impractical. We could physically attach the missile with the warhead onto the F–35 aircraft if we made a shorter 

version of the missile. The missile would have to be carried externally and would 

cause the F–35 to lose all stealth capability, greatly diminishing aircraft survivability and the probability of successful weapon delivery. 

Using LRSO in place of a B61–12 would create significant treaty compliance, Alliance, and infrastructure issues. 

Mr. COOPER. Are there expected cost-savings from doing the B61–12? [Question 

#16, for cross-reference.] 

Dr. COOK. The cost of the B61–12 LEP versus an alternative strategy that maintains the current family of B61s and the B83 is estimated to be approximately half 

the cost in both the 25-year planning window as well as the 50-year planning window. The alternative strategy requires NNSA to maintain the current B61 Mod configurations and the B83–1 bombs to meet military requirements for U.S. strategic 

and extended nuclear deterrence missions. The cost for the alternative strategy includes two B61 alterations, a B83 alteration, and full LEPs for both bombs to ensure 

capability over the two planning windows assessed. There are additional benefits beyond cost savings enabled by the B61–12 LEP including: 

• The majority of the air delivered gravity weapons will be removed from the U.S. 

nuclear stockpile (active and inactive). 

• A very large reduction in the total amount of nuclear material utilized by air 

delivered gravity weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile. 

• Significant reduction in the total nuclear yield (i.e., mega-tonnage) produced by 

air-delivered gravity weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile. 

These planned reductions in the numbers of weapons, amounts of nuclear material, and total yield are dependent upon the successful completion of the B61–12 
122 

LEP. They are a key part of the Administration’s long-term plan to demonstrate 

that we are making progress on our Non-Proliferation Treaty Article VI obligations. 

Mr. COOPER. What is the updated cost difference between the B61 option 1E and 

B61 option 3B? [Question #17, for cross-reference.] 

Dr. COOK. Switching to the B61 1E today is not a lower cost option. Because the 

B61–12 is in the second year of engineering development using the current requirements, making a dramatic change now would require major component redesign and 

a restart of most systems engineering. This would delay the program for 1 to 2 

years. Further, NNSA’s Defense Programs, Office of Program Integration completed 

a B61 Alternatives Analysis in FY 2013. The analysis considered the current mod 

consolidation strategy versus an alternative that would maintain the current family 

of B61s and the B83 without the B61–12 LEP. While the analysis did not specifically call out option 1E, sufficient similarities exist to make this comparison applicable. The analysis compares the costs to maintain the B61–12 versus the existing 

gravity bombs stockpile (B61 family and B83) over 25-year and 50-year planning 

windows. For the B61–12 LEP the analysis assumed a 20 year stockpile life and 

a second LEP is required in the 50 year planning window. For the existing bombs 

stockpile the analysis assumed non-nuclear alterations on the B61–3, B61–4, B61– 

7 and B83–1 would be performed prior to 2030 and full LEPs on both bomb families 

before 2040. This analysis demonstrated that the costs of the B61–12 LEP approach 

are approximately half as much as maintaining the existing bombs stockpile. The 

B61–12 LEP, as currently authorized by the Nuclear Weapons Council and requested in the Administration’s FY 2014 budget request, is the lowest cost option 

that meets military requirements. Any other alternative would not meet military requirements and would drive-up lifecycle costs for these modernization activities, 

which are necessary to realize the President’s nuclear security vision. 

Mr. COOPER. a. How did the government shutdown affect the schedule of the B61 

Life Extension Program? 

Dr. COOK. a. A combination of the government shutdown and the CR funding level 

is expected to result in a 3-month slip to the Baseline Design Review from FY 2015 

to FY 2016. Further delays were mitigated through the use of carry-over funding. 

If funding is restored to the PBR level of $537M by January, the program would 

be able to maintain its current March 2020 FPU but at increased risk because funding is below B61–12 SAR estimated requirement of $561M. The reduced funding 

will result in less-than-planned program contingency to reduce risk. In addition, 

funding for NNSA infrastructure investments is also limited. This could cause 

system- or facility-level failures in the nuclear security enterprise that would preclude safe and secure operations, causing unplanned delays in the B61 LEP and 

other programs. 

Mr. COOPER. b. Are any additional costs expected because of the shutdown? 

Dr. COOK. b. While the CR funding level of $369M will have an impact as noted 

above, there are no additional costs attributed specifically to the shutdown. 

Mr. COOPER. c. And what will the impacts be if sequester remains in FY14? 

Dr. COOK. c. The impacts of additional sequestration cuts to the program is being 

assessed but is expected to be less than 3 months to the March 2020 FPU. 

Mr. COOPER. What is the NNSA’s current estimated total cost for the B61 Life 

Extension Program? 

Dr. COOK. The current cost estimate for the B61–12 life extension program reported in the September 2013 Selected Acquisition Report to Congress is $8.1B, 

which includes $7.3B in direct B61–12 funding and another $0.8B in other NNSA 

funds. This estimate is based on the Weapons Design and Cost Report published in 

July 2012 and has not changed with the exception of the impacts due to FY 2013 

sequestration cuts. 

Mr. COOPER. a. Since NNSA B61 costs rose from $7.9 billion to $8.1 billion due 

to sequestration impacts, can we expect a similar cost increase (and further delay 

occur) if sequestration continues into FY14? 

Dr. COOK. a. If sequestrations cuts extend the program, there will be an increase 

in the estimated total program cost. Current analysis indicates if the B61–12 receives funding at the President’s Budget Request (PBR) versus the B61–12 Selected 

Acquisition Report (SAR) estimated requirement of $561M, the program would be 

able to maintain its current March 2020 first production unit, albeit at a higher 

risk. Funding below the request due to sequestration may result in an additional 

1–3 month delay. Schedule assessment is underway along with the re-planning effort resulting for the 3 month CR at $369M. The analysis is also assessing how 

other programs that support the B61 12, such as the science and engineering campaigns, would also be affected by FY 2014 sequestration. 

Mr. COOPER. b. Assuming no sequestration in FY14 and full funding, can you 

guarantee that the B61–12 will be delivered by FY 2020 for under $8.1 billion? 
123 

Dr. COOK. b. NNSA is confident we can meet a 2020 first production unit if the 

program is fully funded as defined in the B61–12 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) 

in FY 2014 and subsequent years. NNSA has high confidence in the cost estimate 

developed in the B61–12 Weapons Design and Cost Report and reported in the B61– 

12 SAR. Our initial cost estimate was developed using sound principals, reasonable 

assumptions, and was independently verified. However, it is an initial estimate that 

NNSA will update in FY 2016 as part of the Baseline Cost Report prior to authorizing Phase 6.4 when the LEP design is approximately 90% complete and the program is beginning final design, pre-production, and system qualification activities. 

The estimate in the Baseline Cost Report will be the Acquisition Program Baseline. 

Currently the program is on schedule with the greatest risk being funding uncertainty and not technical challenges. This response also assumes that limited infrastructure funding does not result in any operational impacts due to safety or security concerns. 

Mr. COOPER. c. What is the risk of delay or cost increase if NNSA does not receive 

full funding for the B61 not only in FY14 but in the next five years? 

Dr. COOK. c. The risk of sequestration cuts over the next five years is unplanned 

cost growth by extending the development and production periods. This will also 

complicate maintaining schedule alignment with the USAF, potentially driving additional DOD costs as well. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 the impacts of sequestration reduced NNSA’s total resources by 7.8 percent and stressed the nuclear enterprise’s 

ability to support the long-term aspects of the ‘‘3+2’’ modernization strategy in order 

to try to protect its near-term commitments like the W76 LEP. Sequestration has 

already resulted in a roughly six-month delay to the first production unit of the 

B61–12 from 2019 to 2020. Without a solution to the current fiscal crisis in FY 2014 

the DOD and DOE will be forced to make even more difficult decisions that could 

reduce the long term financial benefits of the ‘‘3+2’’ strategy. In addition, funding 

for NNSA infrastructure investments is also limited. This could cause system- or facility-level failures in the nuclear security enterprise that would preclude safe and 

secure operations, causing unplanned delays in the B61 LEP and other [Editor 

note: answer as sent was incomplete.] 

Mr. COOPER. How does the cost per unit for the B61–LEP compare with previous 

LEP costs? 

Dr. COOK. Cost per unit is dependent on the total production quantity, which is 

classified and available in the classified addenda of the B61–12 and W76–1 Selected 

Acquisition Reports. These unit costs are consistent between the programs in terms 

of the relative complexity and total production quantities. 

Mr. COOPER. Do you agree with CAPE’s conclusions that cost will reach $10.1 billion and schedule could slip to FY22? 

Dr. COOK. I am confident that B61–12 FPU can be achieved by FY 2020 provided the program is fully funded at the SAR estimated requirement of $8.1B. Today, the 

greatest risk to holding schedule is annual budget uncertainty rather than technical 

risk. Our estimate for the program is $7.3B in direct B61–12 funding with an additional $0.8B leveraged from other NNSA science and engineering campaigns. This 

cost estimate has not changed, with the exception of sequestration impacts, from the 

original cost estimate in the B61–12 Weapon Design Cost Report published on July 

25, 2012. 

Mr. COOPER. What is status on the plans for the three interoperable warheads? 

Dr. COOK. In November 2012, the Nuclear Weapons Council selected a baseline 

stockpile life extension plan that implements the ‘‘3+2’’ vision in which three interoperable warheads for ballistic missiles is an integral part. The baseline plan was 

detailed in a Nuclear Weapons Council memorandum dated January 15, 2013. The 

Nuclear Weapons Council plan establishes the framework to develop more detailed 

implementation plans for deployment of interoperable warheads. Over the coming 

months, NNSA and the Department of Defense will work together to continue to 

analyze cost, scope, schedule and other implications of this vision as means to inform future decisions regarding the nuclear weapons enterprise. 

Mr. COOPER. The FY 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan states 

that the ‘‘3+2’’ strategy is ‘‘an executable plan.’’ However, given the costs of the 

interoperable warheads and budget constraints does NNSA still believe the ‘‘3+2’’ 

vision is still achievable? 

Dr. COOK. Yes, we believe the vision is achievable, but it may require some modification and/or delay. NNSA is working with the Department of Defense, through 

the Nuclear Weapons Council, to analyze cost, scope, schedule and other implications of the current baseline plan as means to inform future decisions regarding the 

nuclear weapons enterprise. Among the factors the two departments are analyzing 

are affordability, feasibility, and synchronization with delivery platform modernization plans. 
124 

Mr. COOPER. a. Is there a risk that new interoperable warheads planned under 

the 3+2 plan will increase the likelihood that the United States might need to return to testing? 

Dr. COOK. a. No. LEPs developed to enable interoperable warheads will not result 

in an increased likelihood of an underground test. On the contrary, all LEPs (past 

and future) are intended to reduce the likelihood of a need for a return to testing. 

By eliminating effects of aging and increasing performance margins, LEPs result in 

a stockpile that will continue to be safe, secure, and reliable without a need to return to testing. In particular, all of the design and manufacturing changes proposed 

for the W78/88–1 LEP are subject to intense peer review and evaluation by all three 

labs. The use of modern stockpile stewardship tools allows all LEP changes to be 

thoroughly vetted and understood through modeling and experiments without a 

need for nuclear explosive testing. 

Mr. COOPER. b. What is the risk of having 3 new (and unproven) interoperable 

warheads account for most of the U.S. stockpile? 

Dr. COOK. b. Certification of interoperable warheads will be based on simulations, 

experiments tied to previous underground tests (UGTs), and expert judgment. Improvements in simulations and experiments provide confidence that there will not 

be a need to return to UGTs. 

Mr. COOPER. Do you agree with CAPE’s conclusions that cost will reach $10.1 billion and schedule could slip to FY22? 

Dr. HOMMERT. There has been considerable discussion about schedule slip or cost 

growth on the B61 LEP. With respect to this topic, I can only address Sandia’s role; 

however, as the predominant design agent for the LEP, we recognize the impact of 

our work on the overall enterprise schedule. 

Regarding schedule, there are two overarching causes for slip: technical issues 

and budgetary changes. With respect to technical risk, I have the highest level of 

confidence that technical issues will NOT cause impact to Sandia’s schedule performance, as we demonstrated through progress in FY13. I say this for two reasons. 

First, we do not view this program as inherently high technical risk, especially 

when compared with other product development programs conducted at Sandia. Second, we manage our contingency funds (∼10%) in a manner that continuously buys 

down risk against a formalized risk register. 

With respect to budgetary changes, I cannot be as sanguine. In FY13, sequestration impacts caused some technical activities to be moved into FY14. We estimated 

the schedule impact of those shifts to be relatively small—on the order of 2 to 3 

months over the life of the program (within overall schedule contingency). However, 

at the time of this testimony, we are operating against a FY14 resource allocation 

that, on an annual basis, is at least 23% below the FY14 requirement, as contained 

in the most recent NNSA-approved Baseline Change Requests to the Selected Acquisition Report, approved in October 2013. Until the final FY14 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill is enacted, NNSA does not have the authority to provide a definitive funding level for the program. Obviously, unless addressed, budgetary changes of this magnitude will have significant schedule impact. As with any 

large program activity, schedule slip will result in an increase in overall program 

cost. In addition to the points above, Sandia is aware of the fiscal challenges this 

program imposes on Congress. To further adherence to the schedule and cost, we 

are aggressively implementing an increased level of project management rigor to the 

B61–12 program. Our technical experts are partnered with project management professionals, skilled practitioners using a suite of formal tools, such as resource-loaded 

schedules, requirements tracking systems, and sophisticated risk management and 

mitigation methods. We are moving to an Earned Value Management System 

(EVMS), which is a way of quantitatively measuring where one is in the execution 

of a project regarding schedule and cost. While these approaches add to execution 

overhead, they provide essential insights and early indicators for a project of this 

scope and duration. With EVMS, we can use tailored assessments to look at cost 

and schedule performance indicators on a monthly basis, examine each subsystem, 

and track more accurately how each team is doing in developing those subsystems— 

and we can make immediate, early changes if necessary, applying more or fewer resources to each particular element of the project, as required. 

We believe Sandia has an achievable plan and the technical risk is manageable 

under the WDCR, and at the time of my testimony we continued to be on schedule 

and on budget relative to the March 2020 first production unit (FPU) documented 

in the Selected Acquisition Report. We are adjusting our plans as the fiscal situation 

evolves and are confident that we have the expertise and tools in place to effectively 

manage the program going forward. 
125 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Secretary Creedon, you noted that only after rigorous and thorough 

evaluation of each possibility did the Nuclear Weapons Council unanimously conclude that the B61–12 full-scope LEP was the least expensive long-term option that 

could meet military requirements. Was a detailed cost study done for the 1E option 

and presented to the Nuclear Weapons Council? 

Secretary CREEDON. Yes a detailed cost study was done for the 1E option, it was 

presented to the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) and they rejected it in favor of 

the B61–12 LEP (3B option). The NWC rejected the 1E option primarily because it 

did meet all threshold requirements established by the NWC and it would require 

a second life extension program over its planned service life, significantly increasing 

the overall long-term cost. Option 1E also failed to consolidate any of the non-strategic variants of the B61 preventing significant reductions in the nuclear stockpile 

and any long-term cost savings this could provide. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is the reason for consolidating the B61 mods? Is there a reason other than simplicity/streamlining the stockpile? Does it save NNSA or the Air 

Force money? If so, how much? 

Secretary CREEDON. Consolidation of the B61 modifications provides cost savings 

over the long-term associated with simplifying and streamlining the surveillance, 

maintenance, and training requirement for the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Air Force, and this was a factor in the decision. Consolidating also 

meets the President’s goals of reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons in the U.S. 

inventory by ultimately allowing a more than 50 percent reduction in the numbers 

of nuclear gravity bombs, and more significantly a more than 80 percent reduction 

in the amount of nuclear material contained within those bombs. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What are the expected cost-savings from doing the B61–12? 

Secretary CREEDON. The largest and most substantial cost savings realized from 

completing the full scope B61–12 Life Extension Program (LEP) will be derived from 

other LEPs that will not be needed. It allows us to retire the B83 warhead, avoiding 

a refurbishment roughly estimated by the National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) to cost between $4 and $5B. By completing a single, full-scope LEP of the 

B61 instead of two separate, limited scope refurbishments, it will save roughly an 

additional $2B during the service life of the bomb. In addition, a limited amount 

of cost-savings will be found in the reduced requirements for NNSA surveillance, 

and Air Force training and maintenance due to retirement and consolidation of current gravity bombs into the single B61–12 bomb. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Since our allies are not contributing any funds to the $10–$12 billion cost of the B61 life extension program, have other measures to provide reliable 

extended deterrence been discussed in consultations with NATO capitals? Why, why 

not? Has the Administration discussed NATO contributing to B61 LEPs? 

Secretary CREEDON. NATO Allies have not been asked to contribute funds to the 

cost of the B61 LEP, which is a U.S. weapon. Alliance members do contribute to 

the nuclear mission both with conventional support and with regard to NATO’s nuclear posture. In this latter respect, through the NATO Security Investment Program, NATO allies provide funding for security and infrastructure enhancements 

and upgrades at European nuclear weapons storage sites. Moreover, NATO Allies 

burden-share in the nuclear mission both by assigning pilots and dual-capable aircraft to the mission, and by conventional support operations, such as the SNOWCAT 

program (‘‘Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Air Tactics’’). It would 

not be appropriate to ask NATO Allies to contribute to the cost of the B61 LEP both 

because it would subject classified U.S. nuclear data to disclosure to foreign nations, 

and because it could subject nations to charges of proliferation. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How much funding does NATO contribute to enabling the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe? 

Secretary CREEDON. NATO Allies contribute to deterrence through the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP), which funds security and infrastructure enhancements and upgrades at European nuclear weapons storage sites. There have 

been four NATO weapons storage-related upgrades (Capability Package upgrades) 

since the original NATO Capability Package was approved in 2000: 

Project Total (M)1

Initial WS3 Installation approx. $215M USD 

Basic Capability Package (Jul 2000) 12.8M EUR 

Addendum 1 (Feb 2005) 17.9M EUR 

Addendum 2 (Apr 2006) 13.0M EUR 

Addendum 3 (Mar 2009) 13.0M EUR 
126 

Addendum 4 (Aug 2011) 108M EUR 

1 NATO common funding derives from U.S. and other contributions. The 

U.S. burden-share costs are generally 24 percent of the NATO budget. The 

U.S. burden-share is generally 22–24 percent of the total NSIP costs. As a 

result, the NATO funds above include the U.S. contribution to NATO. 

Additionally, bilateral agreements require the host-nation to provide ‘‘missionrelated facilities, services, supplies and other logistical support’’ for our units at 

each of the six sites. These may generally be scoped down to facilities and utilities, 

but the type and level of services, as well as funding for services provided, vary at 

each location. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In the medium term, would it be possible to provide reliable extended deterrence without forward-deploying B61s? 

Secretary CREEDON. The B61 warhead serves a unique and important role. It is 

the only non-strategic nuclear weapon in the U.S. arsenal, which means it can be 

delivered by tactical fixed-wing aircraft, such as F–15, F–16, and future F–35 jet 

fighters—including aircraft flown by our Allies in NATO. As such, it is one of the 

few areas where Allies can burden-share in the nuclear deterrence mission. The inability to forward deploy B–61s will undermine important U.S. assurance and deterrence commitments set forth in both the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the June 

2013 nuclear employment guidance. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Senator Sam Nunn recently suggested that forward-deployed B61s 

in Europe are becoming more of a security risk than an asset for NATO. What is 

the security risk of having B61s forward-deployed? Are B61s currently safe and secure? 

Secretary CREEDON. U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are safe and secure. The Weapon Storage and Security System (WS3), security, and custodial forces 

all combine to meet the Nuclear Weapon Security Standard. The NATO High Level 

Group Vice-Chair for Safety, Security, and Survivability oversees the efforts to ensure the security standards are continuously met—the same standards as the U.S.- 

based systems. Under the HLG authority, the Joint Theater Surety Management 

Group (JTSMG) manages the day-to-day nuclear surety mission in NATO. The security system is continuously evaluated to identify opportunities for further enhancement. Currently, there are several NATO-funded security enhancement projects in 

progress to enhance security force detection and awareness capabilities, and improve security response effectiveness at all storage sites in Europe. Additionally, all 

contributing nations continually work together to improve command and control, 

and security force techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) through semi-annual 

modeling and joint force-on-force exercises. As a result, the B–61s assigned to NATO 

are safe and secure. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Where are we on the 3+2 strategy? Is this on track to be funded? 

What are the discussions to date? If the 3+2 plan is pursued, when would nuclear 

reductions occur? 

Secretary CREEDON. We remain committed to the strategy and want to see it implemented in order to obtain its benefits, which include nuclear reductions. Our first 

Life Extension Program (LEP) implementing this strategy is the B61–12, and we 

won’t know if that funding is on track until Congress completes its Fiscal Year (FY) 

2014 budget work. The reductions from sequestration and delays in fiscal year 2013 

funding from the continuous resolution have already caused a slip for first production unit from FY 2019 to FY 2020. 

Reductions in the number of nuclear weapons resulting from the B61–12 deployment would begin in the mid to late 2020s, dependent upon when confidence is 

achieved in the B61–12 through surveillance testing. Nuclear reductions would typically occur about 7–9 years after first production unit of a modernized weapon depending upon the number of surveillance tests performed and the results of those 

tests. 

The 3+2 strategy is at risk due to current budget constraints. Inter-operable 1 and 

the long-range stand-off weapons may also be delayed to fit within current budget 

constraints. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. As part of the currently proposed plan for the B61 LEP, it appears 

the assumption is that the United States will continue to forward-deploy tactical 

versions of the B61 in Europe for the next 50 years. In addition, the new high-level 

nuclear weapons policy guidance signed by President Obama in June could reduce 

the number of strategic gravity bombs that are required for deterrence. How might 

changes to existing deterrence requirements alter the currently proposed scope of 
127 

the B61 LEP? And what is the assumption for the timeline for forward-deploying 

these weapons in Europe? 

Secretary CREEDON. Both the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review report, and the Administration’s 2013 nuclear employment guidance acknowledged the fact that the 

international security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the 

Cold War. Even with this change, however, the guidance set out in both documents 

acknowledged the importance of extended deterrence—both to send a credible signal 

to adversaries that any perceived benefits of attacking the United States and its Allies and partners are outweighed by the costs that our response would impose; and 

to assure Allies and partners that the United States is committed to their defense. 

Together, these documents demonstrate the U.S. nuclear posture—including current 

plans for the B61 LEP—is suited to the current security environment and, by extension, to existing deterrence requirements. Currently, the First Production Unit for 

the B61–12 is scheduled for 2020 to support commitments. That said, we will continue to seek the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Would the planned surety enhancements that require changes to 

the nuclear package be required if B61s were kept in the U.S. rather than forwarddeployed in NATO countries? 

Secretary CREEDON. There are no planned changes to the nuclear package of the 

B61–12. The planned security enhancements would still need to be included as part 

of the B61–12 Life Extension Program regardless of the status of weapons based in 

NATO countries because of the Administration’s stated requirement to retain the 

capability to forward deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers and 

heavy bombers outside of the continental United States. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. a. What is the reason for consolidating the B61 mods? 

Dr. COOK. a. The consolidation of the B61 Mods is an opportunity afforded by the 

Air Force Tail Kit, which eliminates the need to extend multiple B61 modifications 

and associated Air Force integration and sustainment costs. Additionally, there are 

significant benefits that will be gained by completing the B61–12 LEP, including: • The majority of the air delivered gravity weapons will be removed from the U.S. 

nuclear stockpile (active and inactive). • A very large reduction in the total amount of nuclear material utilized by air 

delivered gravity weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile. • Significant reduction in the total nuclear yield (i.e., mega-tonnage) produced by 

air-delivered gravity weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile. 

These planned reductions in the numbers of weapons, amounts of nuclear material, and total yield are dependent upon the successful completion of the B61–12 

LEP. They are a key part of the Administration’s long-term plan to demonstrate 

that we are meeting our Non-Proliferation Treaty Article VI obligation to make 

progress towards disarmament. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. b. Is there a reason other than simplicity/streamlining the stockpile? 

Dr. COOK. b. As stated above, there is a strong arms control component to Mod 

consolidation. Further, the use of the Air Force tail kit eliminates the need to reestablish production of the unique parachutes used by today’s B61. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. c. Does it save NNSA or the Air Force money? If so, how much? 

Dr. COOK. c. Yes. Beyond reducing long term project Alt and LEP costs by approximately 50% (see answer to Question 16 & 17), there is a reduced sustainment 

cost to NNSA for a single B61–12 and no B83. Any reduced cost for the Air Force 

will have to be answered by the service. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What are the expected cost-savings from doing the B61–12? 

Dr. COOK. NNSA’s Defense Programs, Office of Program Integration, completed a 

B61 Alternatives Analysis in FY 2013. The analysis considered the current B61–12 

mod consolidation strategy versus an alternative that would maintain the current 

family of B61s and the B83. The analysis demonstrated that the costs of the B61– 

12 LEP approach are approximately half of what would be required to maintain the 

existing bombs stockpile without Mod consolidation. The analysis compared the 

costs to maintain the B61–12 versus the existing gravity bombs stockpile (B61 family and B83) over 25-year and 50-year planning windows. For the B61–12 LEP, the 

analysis assumed a 20 year stockpile life and a second LEP is required in the 50 

year planning window. For the existing bombs stockpile, the analysis assumed nonnuclear alterations on the B61–3, B61–4, B61–7 and B83–1 would be initially performed prior to 2030 and full LEPs on both bomb families before 2040. The B61– 

12 LEP, as currently authorized by the Nuclear Weapons Council and requested in 

the Administration’s FY 2014 budget request, is the lowest cost option that meets 

military requirements. Any other alternative would not meet military requirements 

and would drive-up lifecycle costs for these modernization activities, which are necessary to realize the President’s nuclear security vision. 
128 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How does the cost per unit for the B61–LEP compare with previous 

LEP costs for other nuclear weapons? 

Dr. COOK. Cost per unit is dependent on the total production quantity, which is 

classified and available in the classified addenda of the B61–12 and W76–1 Selected 

Acquisition Reports. These unit costs are consistent between the programs in terms 

of the relative complexity and total production quantities. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. We’ve known about many of the aging issues regarding certain critical non-nuclear components in the B61 for at least a decade. Why have we waited 

to address the highest priority aging issues in the B61 and why have we not replaced aging non-nuclear components such as vacuums tubes earlier? 

Dr. COOK. NNSA prioritized stockpile modernization in accordance with funding, 

capacity, and assessed stockpile reliability. Replacement of the radars was originally 

planned to be addressed in conjunction with a non-nuclear life extension program 

(NNLEP) with a target FPU date in 2012. The target date was aligned with other 

limited life component (LLC) expirations. Due to competing priorities on the W76– 

1 program, the ability to field LLC expirations and other stockpile sustainment commitments the NNLEP and associated study was delayed. With the Phase 6.2/2A 

study conducted between 2009 and 2011, refurbishment of the nuclear explosive 

package was deemed necessary to avoid a second costly LEP in the near future. The 

consolidation of non-nuclear and nuclear work also limits the movement of weapons 

to and from deployed locations, minimizing any vulnerability associated with the 

movement of weapons. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Where are we on the 3+2 strategy? Is this on track to be funded? 

What are the discussions to date? If the 3+2 plan is pursued, when would nuclear 

reductions occur? 

Dr. COOK. In November 2012, the Nuclear Weapons Council selected a baseline 

stockpile life extension plan that implements the ‘‘3+2’’ vision of which three interoperable warheads for ballistic missiles is an integral part. The baseline plan was 

detailed in a Nuclear Weapons Council memorandum dated January 15, 2013. The 

Nuclear Weapons Council plan establishes the framework to develop more detailed 

implementation plans for deployment of interoperable warheads. Over the coming 

months, NNSA and the Department of Defense will work together to continue to 

analyze cost, scope, schedule and other implications of this vision as a means to inform future decisions regarding the nuclear weapons enterprise. The FY 2015 President’s Budget Request is under development. The budget requests will describe 

funding plans for the ‘‘3+2’’ vision for the next several years. Per the FY 2014 Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan, the vision is achievable, though it may require 

some modification and/or delay in the current funding environment. Stockpile quantities are determined by the Department of Defense. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. As part of the currently proposed plan for the B61 LEP, it appears 

the assumption is that the United States will continue to forward-deploy tactical 

versions of the B61 in Europe for the next 50 years. In addition, the new high-level 

nuclear weapons policy guidance signed by President Obama in June could reduce 

the number of strategic gravity bombs that are required for deterrence. How might 

changes to existing deterrence requirements alter the currently proposed scope of 

the B61 LEP? And what is the assumption for the timeline for forward-deploying 

these weapons in Europe? 

Dr. COOK. Uncertainty in the existing deterrence requirement reinforces the current B61–12 LEP option. The current option provides global flexibility in the strategic and tactical employment of the B61–12 and optimizes our hedging options. Assumptions for the timeline of forward deploying weapons must be addressed by 

DOD. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Would the planned surety enhancements that require changes to 

the nuclear package be required if B61s were kept in the U.S. rather than forwarddeployed in NATO countries? 

Dr. COOK. Yes. Even without the requirement to forward deploy the B61, this 

scope would be required. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The CAPE cost study noted Sandia’s view that the B61 is 3 or 4 

times more complex than the W76 LEP. Do you still agree? What are the challenges 

for Sandia related to the planned work scope for the B61? 

Dr. HOMMERT. Following direction from the B61–12 Project Officers Group, 

chaired by the U.S. Air Force, the B61 LEP will consolidate four of the current 

versions, or Mods, of B61 bombs (the B61–3, B61–4, B61–7, and B61–10) into a single Mod, the B61–12. The result will be reduced U.S. Air Force nuclear weapon 

management complexity, as well as reduced U.S. Air Force cost for ongoing maintenance, training, and stockpile evaluation. This Mod consolidation is made possible 

through use of a Tail Kit, which is the responsibility of the U.S. Air Force and is 

designed to maintain existing military capability. 
129 

Complexity suggested in the question needs to be answered in relative to the technical work scope. I have the highest level of confidence that technical issues will 

NOT cause impact to Sandia’s schedule performance, as we demonstrated through 

progress in FY13. I say this for two reasons. First, we do not view this program 

as inherently high technical risk, especially when compared with other product development programs conducted at Sandia. 

At the system level complexity between the B61–12 and W76–1, Sandia’s scope 

in the B61–12 involves more components and has the additional challenge to make 

the B61–12 compatible with five aircraft platforms 

Sandia is applying documented lessons learned from our design work for the 

W76–1 and incorporating it to the B61–12 program throughout component work and 

system design. And, as we learn lessons from the B61–12 program, they will be utilized for the other programs underway and planned. The B61 LEP does not involve 

significant changes to environmental or functionality requirements; therefore, the 

inherent technical risk is lowered and will not impact the March 2020 FPU if the 

WDCR funding profile is sustained. 

Challenges Sandia has faced and addressed are the impacts of the FY13 sequestration. We managed sequestration by moving some technical activities into FY14. 

Additionally, staffing up for the B61–12 was also a challenge. The staffing requirement for these modernization efforts exceeds 1,000 people. I am pleased to report 

that, despite numerous periods of budget uncertainty over the past two years, we 

have been extremely successful at staffing the program against a very aggressive 

staffing plan. Two staffing approaches have allowed us to achieve the required staffing levels for the modernization programs: (1) internal staff movements from other 

Sandia programs that require skills synergistic with those for the nuclear weapons 

program and (2) external hiring. Since 2010, we have hired some 500 advanced-degree scientists and engineers. The overall number of members of the workforce at 

the Laboratory remained essentially flat through this period. Of those we hired new 

to Sandia, approximately 58% are early in their professional careers. The modernization program provides opportunities for these new technical staff to work 

closely with our experienced designers: from advanced concept development to component design and qualification, and ultimately to the production and fielding of nuclear weapon systems. 

We believe Sandia has an achievable plan and the technical risk is manageable 

under the WDCR, and at the time of my testimony we continued to be on schedule 

and on budget relative to the March 2020 first production unit (FPU) documented 

in the Selected Acquisition Report. We are adjusting our plans as the fiscal situation 

evolves and are confident that we have the expertise and tools in place to effectively 

manage the program going forward. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The technology for many of the LEP components were at TRL 3 

or 4 as of August 2012. Are you on schedule and when do you plan to have most 

components at TRL 6 or higher? 

Dr. HOMMERT. Yes, we are on plan for the technology maturation for the B61– 

12 components. The qualification plan for each major component includes a technology readiness forecast describing the required technological demonstrations required for the remaining TRL steps and a projection of when those steps will be 

reached. Based on the documented criteria for Technology Readiness Level 6, the 

components must demonstrate performance in the B61–12 flight conditions. Based 

on the schedule at the time of the testimony, these flight tests were planned for fiscal year 2015 prior to baseline design review assuming full WDCR funding. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you agree that NNSA and DOD must prioritize what it needs 

from the labs and sites over the next several years? And are the LEP schedules realistic from a lab perspective? 

Dr. HOMMERT. The B61 LEP is the first and most urgent in a series of LEPs and 

ALTs required to sustain the U.S. nuclear stockpile into the future. We will support 

the Nuclear Weapons Council to maintain the stockpile for sustained deterrence for 

the coming decades. Accomplishing this work will require prioritization to achieve 

the appropriate strategy set by policymakers. Sandia will be poised to provide cost 

efficient, innovative, and successful strategies to future stockpile work based on the 

B61–12 and other programs. Our successful record of using common technologies 

and components across multiple systems that have been deployed in the U.S. stockpile has helped reduce development risk and manage development costs. We are extending this approach to development of the Arming, Fuzing, and Firing (AF&F) 

system. Today, a modular AF&F design is being developed for the W88 ALT 370, 

the Mk21 Fuze Replacement, and potentially for the W78/88–1 LEP. 
130 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Under the current modernization plan, what happens to the B– 

83s? Will they be dismantled or kept in reserve? 

Secretary CREEDON. Our plan is to retire the B83 warhead in the late 2020s and 

then dismantle it. It is the last megaton weapon in our stockpile, and we plan to 

eliminate it because we no longer need that much output from a weapon to meet 

our security needs. If we were to keep it, it would require a Life Extension Program 

to start within the next few years. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What role does the B–61 play in deterrence that cannot be 

achieved by ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or other means, particularly in extended deterrence in Europe? 

Secretary CREEDON. The B61 warhead serves a unique and important role that 

cannot be achieved by other means, including ballistic or cruise missiles. It is the 

only non-strategic nuclear weapon in the U.S. arsenal, which means it can be delivered by dual-capable (i.e., tactical fixed-wing) aircraft, such as F–15, F–16, and future F–35 jet fighters—including ones flown by NATO. Moreover, unlike a nuclear 

weapon in an underground silo or in an underwater submarine, it assures Allies and 

partners by providing them with a visible and tangible demonstration of the seriousness of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment. Finally, it is flexible in that, even 

after being dispatched on a mission, the aircraft can be recalled any time before delivering its ordnance. Based on these differences, the B61 plays a vital role in U.S. 

extended deterrence. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are there military missions filled by the B–61 that cannot be met 

by other systems? Would the requirement for the B–61 persist if gravity weapons 

were removed from Europe? How would development of the LRSO affect the need 

for the B–61? 

Secretary CREEDON. There are still some military missions that cannot be filled 

by conventional weapons or other components of the nuclear Triad and require a 

nuclear gravity bomb. The requirement for the B61–12 Life Extension Program 

would remain regardless of the status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. The Administration requires that the DOD maintain the capability to forward deploy U.S. 

nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers and heavy bombers and the B61 is the 

only nuclear weapon currently capable of being carried on a tactical fighter bomber. 

Development of the long-range standoff weapon would not change the need for the 

B61–12 LEP as both air delivered weapons provide distinctively different and complementary capabilities and employment options. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. NNSA has a very aggressive modernization portfolio to manage, 

with 4–5 concurrent life extension programs for many years into the future. How 

does the NNSA plan to manage these without cost and schedule issues, particularly 

given the complexity of the B–61 LEP? 

Dr. COOK. The 4–5 concurrent LEPs referred to are in different phases that place 

different demands on the nuclear security enterprise. Phase 6.2/2A (Feasibility and 

Cost Study) activities tend to be focused on technology maturation and 

computationally supported analysis and mostly involves the weapons laboratories. 

Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering) is focused on the design and testing of components and subsystems that make use of design and computational capabilities along 

with testing facilities at the laboratories and preliminary production engineering at 

the potential production facilities. Phase 6.3 continues as Phase 6.4 ramps up as decisions on specific technologies and designs are decided upon and the production facilities perform process prove-in to ensure war reserves (WR) quality parts can be 

reliably produced. Laboratory involvement in the LEPs tends to peak just prior to 

FPU after which their support is required to resolve production issues. Production 

facilities carry most of the workload/effort following Phase 6.5 (FPU) and into Phase 

6.6 full rate production. The W76 LEP is currently in full rate production to be completed by FY 2019. The B61 LEP will reach FPU in FY 2020 with Phase 6.3 activities currently underway. The cruise missile and IW–1 LEPs have FPUs in FY24 and 

FY25, respectively so most of their Phase 6.3/6.4 activities will occur after Phase 

6.5/6.6 activities have commenced for the B61. The scheduling of these LEPs has 

been subject to enterprise modeling to establish the feasibility of their concurrent 

execution and to identify and resolve potential ‘‘choke points’’ in capability. Additionally, the recent workforce prioritization study conducted by NNSA determined 

that the NNSA sites were capable of staffing these activities in addition to staffing 

other ongoing critical activities such as surveillance and assessment (contingent on 

the provision of sufficient funding). Critical to planning and integrating all these activities will be federal leadership. Defense Programs recently reorganized to establish the Office of Major Modernization Programs (NA–19) to focus management of 

LEPs and major construction projects in support of modernization of key capabilities 
131 

separate from the day to day maintenance of the stockpile. Defense Programs also 

established the Office of Systems Engineering and Integration (NA–18) to put systems engineering and integration tools in place to better apply these tools to the 

LEPs, major construction efforts, and the overall program. In addition, the Office 

of Infrastructure and Operations was established to focus on maintaining, operating, 

and modernizing the National Security Enterprise. It is critical to remember that 

funding for NNSA infrastructure investments is also limited. Funding for NNSA infrastructure investments is also limited. This could cause system- or facility-level 

failures in the enterprise that would preclude safe and secure operations, causing 

unplanned delays in the B61 LEP and other programs. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Under the current modernization plan, what happens to the B– 

83s? Will they be dismantled or kept in reserve? 

Dr. COOK. Defense officials have stated that once the B61–12 LEP is completed, 

and the Department of Defense has sufficient confidence in the resulting warhead, 

the Defense Department would be in a position to pursue retirement of the B83 

gravity bomb. Retired warheads are no longer part of the stockpile and are eventually dismantled. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Dr. Cook, in November 2011, the cost estimate for the B–61 was 

$5 billion. In July 2012, it was $7.9 billion, and now it is at $8.1 billion, and reports 

are that the 2012 CAPE estimate is over $10 billion. What accounts for these increases? If sequestration continues in FY14, can we expect further increases in cost? 

And frankly, why should we have faith in the current estimates? 

Dr. COOK. NNSA reported a $4B number in the FY 2012 Stockpile Stewardship 

Management Plan (SSMP) and stated that the ‘‘definitive estimate’’ would not be 

established until after the completion of the Weapon Design and Cost Report 

(WDCR) and Phase 6.2A study in 2011. By ‘‘definitive’’ NNSA meant an official cost 

estimate for the program using formal criteria based cost estimating process. This 

$4B number reported in the FY 2012 SSMP was based on a parametric estimate 

developed in 2009 prior to the establishment of the B61–12 product teams, documentation and assessment of military requirements, and completion of the feasibility and cost study. Following the 6.3 decision, NNSA and the U.S. Air Force finalized the requirements for the selected LEP option, and finalized the B61–12 WDCR 

in July 2012. After further work on risk mitigation and schedule integration, the 

NNSA submitted the initial cost estimate for the B61–12 LEP to Congress in May 

2013, with the first formal Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). Other than to account 

for the added schedule driven by sequestration cuts in FY 2013, that baseline cost 

estimate has not deviated from the WDCR from July 2012. The current cost estimate reported in the September 2013 Selected Acquisition Report to Congress is 

$8.1B which includes $7.3B in direct B61–12 funding and another $0.8B in other 

NNSA funds. NNSA is submitting quarterly updates to Congress on cost and schedule and will formally update the cost estimate following the Baseline Design Review 

to establish an Acquisition Program Baseline in FY 2016. The official WDCR estimate is founded on firm military requirements and a disciplined approach to product realization informed by historical data. This is a significant investment consistent with other major weapon-system acquisitions. To keep the program on schedule and to control cost, NNSA has implemented rigorous systems engineering and 

program management practices. As required each quarter, NNSA will submit to 

Congress our continued progress in subsequent Selected Acquisition Reports. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What cost components to the B–61 LEP will have to be incurred 

as part of future LEPs, regardless of any changes to the B–61 LEP? 

Dr. COOK. The $811M ‘‘other program funds’’ that are reported in the B61–12 Selected Acquisition Report are enabling technologies and production capabilities that 

will be utilized by future LEP and ALTs. Additionally, many of the component designs and technologies being deployed on the B61–12 will support other programs. 

Examples include: 

• Common radar and associated testers and tooling is a common technology that 

is shared between the W88 ALT 370 and expected to be deployed on future 

LEPs 

• B61–12 stronglink technologies and associated testers and tooling are common 

with the W88 ALT 370 and expected to be deployed on future LEPs 

• B61–12 weapon control unit, system II interface and aircraft integration testing 

will support future air delivered LEP and ALTs including a cruise missile warhead for the Air Force Long Range Standoff program. 

• Qualification and certification of PBX9502 Insensitive High Explosives (IHE) 

production capabilities will support future LEPs. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What cost components to the B–61 LEP will have to be incurred 

as part of future LEPs, regardless of any changes to the B–61 LEP? 
132 

Dr. HOMMERT. Regarding the B61, in recent years, my annual assessment letters 

have documented concerns related to technology obsolescence and aging. While the 

B61 is currently safe and secure, these concerns continue to increase. For example, 

in the past three years, we have observed time-dependent degradation not seen before in electronic, polymer, and high-explosive components. This observation is not 

surprising given the age of the B61 weapon system, the oldest units of which were 

manufactured and fielded in the late 1970s with some components dating back to 

the 1960s. To sustain the B61 into the next decade and beyond requires these 

known issues to be addressed as planned and being executed by Sandia. The program is also addressing technology obsolescence. Electronic components of the B61 

were designed and manufactured decades ago. Outdated technologies, such as vacuum tubes, are exhibiting performance degradation and are difficult to evaluate and 

assess with confidence. 

Any scope changes to the B61–12 have a cost impact on the other programs currently underway. Wherever possible, component technologies have been selected to 

facilitate incorporation into emerging designs for the W88 ALT 370, Mk21 Fuze replacement, and other additional potential modernization efforts. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. Given that the B61 LEP is an extremely expensive life extension 

program, do you believe that our NATO allies should bear a financial burden for 

their security, especially in light of the current budget environment in the U.S.; and 

the fact that one of the most oft-stated rationales for the LEP is to support U.S. 

commitments to NATO? 

Secretary CREEDON. NATO Allies already bear a financial burden for Alliance security both with their conventional forces and in regard to NATO’s nuclear posture. 

In this latter respect, through the NATO Security Investment Program, NATO allies 

provide funding for security and infrastructure enhancements and upgrades at European nuclear weapons storage sites. Moreover, NATO Allies burden-share in the 

nuclear mission both by assigning pilots and dual-capable aircraft to the mission, 

and by supporting the nuclear mission with conventional operations (such as the 

SNOWCAT program—‘‘Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics’’). 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS 

Mr. BROOKS. I understand the Senate Appropriations Committee has proposed 

cutting the B61 LEP by 31% for FY14 and is encouraging NNSA to reduce the scope 

of the LEP. For all of our witnesses, what would be the impact of this cut, were 

it to be become law? a. If the B61 LEP were canceled or de-scoped to the ‘‘triplealt’’ today, what would be the short term cost savings? What would be the long-term 

cost increases? b. The Senate Appropriations Committee has also cut all money for 

the Air Force’s tail kit portion of the B61 LEP. If the tail kit is not funded, what 

are the impacts on the LEP? What are the cost impacts? Is it possible to do the 

LEP without doing the tailkit? 

Secretary CREEDON. To cut the B61 LEP to such an extent this year would significantly delay its delivery, and dramatically increase the overall cost to complete any 

LEP of the bomb. a) There would be absolutely zero short-term cost savings 

achieved by canceling or ‘‘descoping’’ the B61–12 LEP. There would be several longterm cost increases, many of which would be transferred to future planned LEPs 

that had intended to leverage cost savings by utilizing many of the same non-nuclear components being developed for the B61–12. Additionally, we would be unable 

to retire the B83 warhead, forcing us to begin a costly LEP of that bomb roughly 

estimated by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to cost $4–$5B, 

and we would also need to start planning a second LEP of the B61 to refurbish 

those components that were not included in the ‘‘triple-alt.’’ That second B61 LEP 

is roughly estimated by NNSA to cost $5–$6B dollars. b) If funding for the B61– 

12 tail kit assembly (TKA) were cut, the B61–12 would not be possible, and this 

would not be the only nuclear gravity-dropped weapon in the nuclear stockpile. 

Without the TKA the currently planned consolidation of four versions of B61 and 

the planned retirement of the B83 could not happen. As mentioned previously, if 

it is not possible to retire the B83 it will need a separate LEP estimated by NNSA 

to cost roughly $4–$5B. The Air Force and NNSA could conduct an LEP on the various variants of the B61, but in the absence of the TKAS the consolidation would 

not happen. 
133 

Lastly if either the B61–12 LEP is de-scoped/cancelled or the B61–12 TKA is cancelled, it will be impossible to achieve the planned 53 percent reduction in total nuclear gravity weapons or the 83 percent reduction in total nuclear material contained within the nuclear gravity weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile. 

Mr. BROOKS. a. I understand the Senate Appropriations Committee has proposed 

cutting the B61 LEP by 31% for FY14 and is encouraging NNSA to reduce the scope 

of the LEP. For all of our witnesses, what would be the impact of this cut, were 

it to be become law? What would be the long-term cost increases? The Senate Appropriations Committee has also cut all money for the Air Force’s tail kit portion 

of the B61 LEP. If the tail kit is not funded, what are the impacts on the LEP? 

What are the cost impacts? Is it possible to do the LEP without doing the tailkit? 

Dr. COOK. a. The Nuclear Weapons Council in December 2011 selected the Option 

3B with an FPU in 2019 as the program for the B61–12 LEP. This option was chosen to satisfy the threshold (minimum) requirements at the lowest life cycle cost. 

The B61–12 LEP is now in its second year of full scale engineering development and 

is no longer a study. Any significant change in scope requires NNSA to renegotiate 

military requirements with the DOD and develop a new Weapon Design and Cost 

Report, cost estimate and schedule. There would also be impacts on component designs carried forward into the new scope which would require re-design to make 

them backwards compatible with multiple legacy B61 modifications. The renegotiation of requirements, new schedule and re-design effort would delay any new scope 

for 1–2 years. If the B61 12 LEP were not able to maintain its current schedule, 

then the program would face delays and increased costs. The B61–12 LEP would 

continue, but the savings from consolidations and retirements would also be delayed, further increasing future costs. 

Mr. BROOKS. b. If the B61 LEP were canceled or de-scoped to the ‘‘triple-alt’’ 

today, what would be the short term cost savings? 

Dr. COOK. b. Although there may be some initial savings, NNSA would need to 

begin a new life extension study effort to address aging in components not addressed by the smaller scoped ‘‘triple alt.’’ There will be additional costs to NNSA 

and the DOD to sustain the multiple modifications over the next two decades and 

NNSA would not be able to plan for the retirement of the B83. The life cycle costs 

are roughly double with the piece meal approach. In summary, canceling the B61 

12 LEP would offer few, if any, short-term budgetary advantages while creating significant long-term strategic and budgetary challenges 

Mr. BROOKS. c. The Senate Appropriations Committee has also cut all money for 

the Air Force’s tail kit portion of the B61 LEP. If the tail kit is not funded, what 

are the impacts on the LEP? 

Dr. COOK. c. In the early 2000s, the U.S. made the decision to discontinue the 

capability to produce the special parachutes used in the legacy nuclear bombs. The 

last technician with experience making these parachutes retired years ago. Additionally, some of the delivery modes that used the parachutes were the most challenging to certify and the most dangerous for our Air Force pilots. The decision to 

use an Air Force-provided tail kit improves the survivability of our pilots, reduces 

the certification challenge for our laboratories, and eliminates the need for a parachute. As an additional benefit, U.S. Strategic Command determined that with the 

accuracy provided by a tail kit, the yield provided by today’s lowest yield B61 variant would be sufficient to meet all of the strategic and non-strategic requirements 

for gravity systems. As a result, there is no longer any need to design, develop, certify, or maintain multiple variations of the B61. 

Mr. BROOKS. d. What are the cost impacts? 

Dr. COOK. d. The scope of the LEP or LEPs would need to be re-negotiated without Mod consolidation. Costs will also increase to sustain the four nuclear explosive 

packages (NEP) types versus one to meet another 20-year service life. The magnitude of the increase is dependent on what is deemed adequate for reuse and what 

must be remanufactured. Many non-nuclear components can be common but unique 

NEP designs require some different electronics and components to meet specific 

fuzing modes and surety themes. The renegotiation of requirements, qualification 

programs, and redesigns would take up to 24 months to implement and push FPU 

to 2021–2022. 

It is difficult to assess how much the total costs will increase without the re-negotiation of requirements, re-design and assessment on component reuse or remanufacture, including parachutes, as part of a new Phase 6.2A study and development 

of a Weapon Design and Cost Report. However, it is clear that this new scope will 

delay FPU and increase overall costs. Also, by not consolidating and producing 

quantities consistent with Nuclear Weapon Council decisions, DOD will still require 

the B83 1. Based on current aging trends and limited life component data, additional life extension work on the B83–1 will be required with a FPU as early as 
134 

2027. This cost is above and beyond the costs of performing multiple LEPs on the 

various B61 modifications. 

Mr. BROOKS. I understand the Senate Appropriations Committee has proposed 

cutting the B61 LEP by 31% for FY14 and is encouraging NNSA to reduce the scope 

of the LEP. For all of our witnesses, what would be the impact of this cut, were 

it to be become law? a. If the B61 LEP were canceled or de-scoped to the ‘‘triplealt’’ today, what would be the short term cost savings? What would be the long-term 

cost increases? b. The Senate Appropriations Committee has also cut all money for 

the Air Force’s tail kit portion of the B61 LEP. If the tail kit is not funded, what 

are the impacts on the LEP? What are the cost impacts? Is it possible to do the 

LEP without doing the tailkit? 

Dr. HOMMERT. For a cut of this magnitude, significant schedule slips would be expected to the Sandia portion of the B61–12 development scope planned for FY14. 

Although the final FY14 budget is not finalized, there are risks from FY14 funding lower than requested by NNSA. In FY13, sequestration impacts caused some 

technical activities to be moved into FY14. We estimated the schedule impact of 

those shifts to be relatively small—on the order of 2 to 3 months over the life of 

the program (within overall schedule contingency). However, at the time of this testimony, we are operating against a FY14 resource allocation that, on an annual 

basis, is at least 23% below the FY14 requirement, as contained in the most recent 

NNSA-approved Baseline Change Requests to the Selected Acquisition Report, approved in October 2013. Until the final FY14 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill is enacted, NNSA does not have the authority to provide a definitive funding level for the program. Obviously, unless addressed, budgetary changes 

of this magnitude will have significant schedule impact. As with any large program 

activity, schedule slip will result in an increase in overall program cost. We recognize the overall fiscal environment in which we are operating and will work at all 

times to minimize cost growth as a result of budget-induced schedule slip. 

First, it is my strongly held view that the current scope for the B61 LEP is the 

minimum necessary to meet the threshold requirements for the B61 provided by the 

Department of Defense and NNSA. (Any change to the current scope being executed 

at Sandia will have a short term cost increase. Sandia would have to halt its current 

work and initiate a 6.2/6.2A design definition and cost study which is a lengthy 

process required for work such as LEPs. 

Second, NNSA has not conducted a comprehensive WDCR on a different scope 

program so I cannot assess the fiscal impact of a different program. However, any 

scope changes must be jointly agreed to by NNSA and DOD; specifically 

STRATCOM which must review the strategic deterrence needs of the U.S. and how 

a reduced scope would affect that capability. While DOD and the U.S. Air Force can 

provide further information, based on our work sustaining the legacy B61 stockpile, 

the U.S. Air Force would have to maintain the current variants of the B61 stockpile 

and lose the benefit of consolidation. Furthermore, there may higher costs because 

the Triple Alt does not forestall the need for a B61–12 Life Extension Program in 

the near future to address drivers not accounted for in the limited program. 

Lastly, any scope reduction has the potential to require Sandia to jettison the previously completed design and qualification work underway for the current LEP. 

Sandia will have to start its work all over because of the change in design. There 

will also be concurrent impacts to the W88 ALT and Mk 21 fuze which currently 

utilize several B61–12 LEP components. Schedule slips to the B61–12 due to 

rescoping will ripple to these programs as well and could increase their costs. 

Although it is possible to complete a life extension without a tailkit, to do so 

would result in a weapon system that either fails to meet the mod consolidation or 

military effectiveness requirements sought by the Nuclear Weapons Council and 

STRATCOM. The limitations of this approach would need to be reviewed with the 

DOD (particularly STRATCOM) to consider implications on long range strategic 

planning and extended deterrence. DOD experts would better be able to speak to 

these implications. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How does the nuclear long-range strike stand-off (LRSO) missile 

contribute to extended deterrence? Do we need both the B61 bomb and the nuclear 

LRSO if the LRSO contributes to extended deterrence? 

Secretary CREEDON. Both the LRSO and the B61 will contribute to extended deterrence in support of our Allies. The LRSO, once fielded, will be a significant contributor to the U.S. strategic and regional deterrence missions. The LRSO will be 

able to provide enhanced standoff capability against adversaries with more ad-
135 

vanced air defense, anti-access, or area denial capabilities. The B61 is the visible, 

tangible, forward deployed weapon for extended deterrence; while the LRSO provides a reinforcing strategic bomber alternative that further enhances our support 

to Allies and Partners. 

Given the spectrum of modern day threats and the growing problem of nuclear 

proliferation in the 21st century, the President has directed that the U.S. will maintain both a strategic nuclear triad and non-strategic nuclear force capabilities to 

deter adversaries and assure allies and partners. By developing and deploying an 

LRSO capability, and retaining the B61, the U.S. will enhance the credibility and 

effectiveness of strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces even as we transition to 

lower numbers in the stockpile. These systems coupled with the land-based and seabased legs of the triad, and U.S conventional capabilities will ensure the President 

has a wide-range of options, at his disposal, in times of crisis. Retaining the B61 

and deploying an LRSO capability reinforces the U.S. commitment to defend vital 

national interests and those of our allies and partners. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How many B61–12 nuclear weapons will be produced, and how 

many rebuilt B61–12 bombs does the U.S. need for deterrence? How many are required for tactical use and how many are required for strategic use? How many nuclear weapons will be eliminated as a result of the B61–12 mod? 

Secretary CREEDON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Can the B83 yield be increased and decreased (dialed up or 

down)? Please provide yield options (in classified format if necessary). If so, could 

it serve as the deterrent in place of the B61–12? 

Secretary CREEDON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Could the B83 or B61–7 be carried by fighter aircraft? 

Secretary CREEDON. The B61–7 and the B83 warhead could be carried on fighter 

aircraft although there may be some compatibility issues to be resolved. However, 

they could not be used by fighter aircraft in forward-deployed operations because 

they lack a required security feature. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Could the B61–7 only serve as a deterrent in place of the B61– 

12? 

Secretary CREEDON. No. The B61–7 is facing significant aging issues and would 

require an extensive Life Extension Program (LEP) to remain in the stockpile. Its 

LEP scope would be the same as the B61–12 unless the tail kit was eliminated. In 

addition, the yields on the B61–7 would not meet military needs as effectively as 

those on the B61–12. 

Not having a tail kit would prevent stockpile reductions because it would prevent 

modification consolidation. 

The B61–12 is more than a single weapon modernization. It is part of a plan to 

maintain an effective deterrent, provide an acceptable extended deterrent solution 

our Allies, and enable significant stockpile reductions. We cannot achieve those objectives with any single bomb in our current arsenal or with a cruise missile. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Can the B61–12 be used on any existing cruise missiles and future cruise missiles? 

Secretary CREEDON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What is plan B if the currently planned B61–12 LEP does not 

get full funding or is delayed, in either FY14 or in the following years? Is a contingency plan being considered? What are the contingency plans for refurbishing the 

B61 and to maintain our commitments to NATO if the delay for the first production 

unit slips past 2020? 

Secretary CREEDON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Ms. Creedon, you noted that, ‘‘The B61–12 LEP will consolidate 

multiple variants into a single design, which offers opportunities for significance 

stockpile reductions while maintaining national security objectives and extended deterrence commitments.’’ When will these reductions occur? Is consolidation a military requirement? 

Secretary CREEDON. We would begin consolidating B61 warhead variants as soon 

as production begins in Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 and complete the consolidation of the 

four B61 variants at the completion of B61–12 production, currently scheduled in 

FY 2024. As soon as we achieve confidence in the B61–12 LEP, at this time estimated to occur around FY 2029 we would retire the B83 and the last remaining 

B61 variant. The consolidation is a military requirement that offers prudent stewardship of tax payer dollars. 
136 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Secretary Creedon, are you confident that NNSA can manage the 

4–5 concurrent LEP workload? 

Secretary CREEDON. We are confident that NNSA can manage the current scope 

of work required to meet long-term requirements. Concurrency of work remains a 

concern, and therefore our plan is structured not to exceed the capacity of NNSA 

facilities by sequencing programs and by utilizing reuse of components where possible to minimize both costs and infrastructure utilization. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is the plan still for a first production unit of the W78/88 in 2025? 

Are there considerations of delaying or canceling the W78/88 in the near-medium 

term? 

Secretary CREEDON. The current plan still has the W78/88–1 first production unit 

(FPU) in 2025. Given the expected budget during the next five years, there are ongoing discussions about delaying this program. Delaying the W78/88–1 would be a 

difficult decision. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How many B61–12 nuclear weapons will be produced, and how 

many rebuilt B61–12 bombs does the U.S. need for deterrence? How many are required for tactical use and how many are required for strategic use? How many nuclear weapons will be eliminated as a result of the B61–12 mod? 

Dr. COOK. That information is available and can be provided in a classified format 

or through a classified presentation. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Can the B83 yield be increased and decreased (dialed up or 

down)? Please provide yield options (in classified format if necessary). If so, could 

it serve as the deterrent in place of the B61–12? 

Dr. COOK. Table 2–1 in Chapter 2 of the classified annex to the FY 2014 Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Plan has yields for all current U.S. nuclear warheads. Roles and missions for our nuclear warheads are determined by the Department of Defense. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. a. What is plan B if the currently planned B61–12 LEP does not 

get full funding or is delayed, in either FY14 or in the following years? 

Dr. COOK. a. To the extent possible, NNSA is committed to providing the funding 

necessary to complete the B61–12 by FY 2020. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. b. Is a contingency plan being considered? 

Dr. COOK. b. Contingency is always part of our planning process and any further 

delays will require close coordination with the DOD in order to maintain the necessary deterrent. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. c. What are the contingency plans for refurbishing the B61 and 

to maintain our commitments to NATO if the delay for the first production unit 

slips past 2020? 

Dr. COOK. c. These contingency plans consider both the B61–12 production and 

the sustainment of the B61–3, -4, -7, and -10s to gap any additional delays to the 

B61 12 program. A classified report was provided as part of an addendum to the 

FY 2013 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), dated May 2013. The classified addendum outlines the mitigation strategies and timelines and can be provided if requested. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Dr. Cook, you noted that ‘‘Other strategies to extend the life of 

the many current variants of the B61 and the B83 would likely be double the cost 

compared to continuing progress on the B61–12.’’ Please provide a detailed cost assessment comparing the costs for the current path (including the currently planned 

B–61 LEP (3B option) and the planned 2033 B61–12 LEP) to (1) the costs for less 

ambitious B61 LEP (1E option) and any required follow-on LEP in the 2020s (that 

might take the place of the planned 2033 LEP), and (2) to the cost of a B83 LEP. 

Dr. COOK. A detailed cost assessment is not available and would require additional time, resources and engagement with the DOD to assess requirements and 

possible alternatives. However, the NNSA’s Defense Programs, Office of Program Integration recently completed a B61 Alternatives Analysis in FY 2013 using rough 

order of magnitude estimates. The analysis considered the current mod consolidation strategy versus an alternative that would maintain the current family of B61s 

and the B83 without the B61–12 LEP. While the analysis did not specifically call 

out option 1E, sufficient similarities exist to make this comparison applicable. The 

analysis compared the costs to maintain the B61–12 versus the existing gravity 

bombs stockpile (B61 family and B83) over 25-year and 50-year planning windows. 

For the B61–12 LEP the analysis assumed a 20 year stockpile life, and that a second LEP would be required in the 50 year planning window. For the existing bombs 

stockpile the analysis assumed non-nuclear alterations on the B61–3, -4, -7 and 

B83–1 would be initially performed prior to 2030, and full LEPs on both bomb families before 2040. This analysis demonstrated that the costs of the B61–12 LEP approach are approximately half as much than to maintain the existing bombs stockpile. The B61–12 LEP, as currently authorized by the Nuclear Weapons Council and 
137 

requested in the Administration’s FY 2014 budget request, is the lowest cost option 

that meets military requirements. Any other alternative would not meet military requirements and would drive-up lifecycle costs for these modernization activities necessary to realize the President’s vision. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Dr. Cook, please provide details on how much has NNSA spent 

to date on engineering work for the option 3B option (costed versus obligated funds). 

Dr. COOK. As reported in the September 2013 Selected Acquisition Report, NNSA 

has expended $385M of direct program funding for Engineering Development. In the 

B61–12 Report to Congress dated July 2012, NNSA reported a total of $634M in 

study and technology maturation cost prior to the start of Engineering Development. 

Including $90M of Other Program Money, the total as of September 2013 is $1.1B. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Dr. Cook, how does NNSA plan to manage 4–5 concurrent LEPs 

without cost increase and schedule delays? 

Dr. COOK. The 4–5 concurrent LEPs referred to are in different phases that place 

different demands on the nuclear security enterprise Phase 6.2/2A (Feasibility and 

Cost Study) activities tend to be focused on technology maturation and 

computationally supported analysis and mostly involves the weapons laboratories. 

Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering) is focused on the design and testing of components and subsystems that make use of design and computational capabilities along 

with testing facilities at the laboratories and preliminary production engineering at 

the potential production facilities. Phase 6.3 continues as Phase 6.4 ramps up as decisions on specific technologies and designs are decided upon and the production facilities perform process prove-in to ensure war reserves (WR) quality parts can be 

reliably produced. Laboratory involvement in the LEPs tends to peak just prior to 

FPU after which their support is required to resolve production issues. Production 

facilities carry most of the workload/effort following Phase 6.5 (FPU) and into Phase 

6.6 Full rate production. The W76 LEP is currently in full rate production to be 

completed by FY 2019. The B61 LEP will reach FPU in FY 2020 with Phase 6.3 

activities currently underway. The cruise missile and IW–1 LEPs have FPUs in 

FY24 and FY25, respectively so most of their Phase 6.3/6.4 activities will occur after 

Phase 6.5/6.6 activities have commenced for the B61. The scheduling of these LEPs 

has been subject to enterprise modeling to establish the feasibility of their concurrent execution and to identify and resolve potential ‘‘choke points’’ in capability. Additionally, the recent workforce prioritization study conducted by NNSA determined 

that the NNSA sites were capable of staffing these activities in addition to staffing 

other ongoing critical activities such as surveillance and assessment (contingent on 

the provision of sufficient funding. Critical to planning and integrating all these activities will be federal leadership. Defense Programs recently reorganized to establish NA–19 (Office of Major Modernization Programs) to focus management of LEPs 

and major construction projects in support of modernization of key capabilities separate from the day to day maintenance of the stockpile. Defense Programs also established NA–18 (Systems Engineering and Integration) to put systems engineering 

and integration tools in place to better apply these tools to the LEPs, major construction efforts, and the overall program. 

In addition, the Office of Infrastructure and Operations was established to focus 

on maintaining, operating, and modernizing the National Security Enterprise. It is 

critical to remember that funding for NNSA infrastructure investments is also limited. Funding for NNSA infrastructure investments is also limited. This could cause 

system- or facility-level failures in the enterprise that would preclude safe and secure operations, causing unplanned delays in the B61 LEP and other programs. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. a. Is the plan still for a first production unit of the W78/88 in 

2025? 

Dr. COOK. a. Yes, the current estimated FPU for the W78/88–1 is FY 2025. The 

W78/88–1 LEP is the first interoperable warhead concept supporting the ‘‘3+2’’ nuclear strategy of three ballistic missile warheads and two air-launched warheads to 

reduce the numbers and types of nuclear weapons, consistent with the Nuclear Posture Review. The military requirements, cost and schedule promulgated by the Nuclear Weapons Council include requirements derived from both Air Force and Navy 

applications and improve the safety and security of the resulting warhead. The feasibility study has been developing options to meet these requirements. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. b. Are there considerations of delaying or canceling the W78/88 

in the near-medium term? 

Dr. COOK. b. NNSA is working on contingency planning which ranges from maintaining the current scope and schedule of the W78/88–1 to extending the FPU. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What is plan B if the currently planned B61–12 LEP does not 

get full funding or is delayed, in either FY14 or in the following years? Is a contingency plan being considered? What are the contingency plans for refurbishing the 
138 

B61 and to maintain our commitments to NATO if the delay for the first production 

unit slips past 2020? 

Dr. HOMMERT. To reiterate, my annual assessment letters have documented concerns related to technology obsolescence and aging. While the B61 is currently safe 

and secure, these concerns continue to increase. For example, in the past three 

years, we have observed time-dependent degradation not seen before in electronic, 

polymer, and high-explosive components. This observation is not surprising given 

the age of the B61 weapon system, the oldest units of which were manufactured and 

fielded in the late 1970s with some components dating back to the 1960s. As 

planned, the B61 LEP we are currently executing addresses all known aging-related 

issues and meets the minimum threshold requirements 

Regarding extended deterrence, officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

are suited to provide a reply to the question. Sandia can provide additional information related contingency plans in a closed briefing for Representative Garamendi 

and the Subcommittee staff. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARSON 

Mr. CARSON. There has been significant investigations conducted by my colleagues 

in the SASC on counterfeit microelectronics. I was pleased to see the significant 

work done in my home state at Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center to ensure trust 

in strategic weapon systems. As you know, one of the difficulties we face is in identifying manufacturing facilities or foundries that produce the counterfeit parts and 

put them into the DOD and DOE supply chain. Could you explain the DOE and 

DOD efforts currently under way to ensure trust in our microelectronics for the nuclear weapon modernization program? 

Dr. COOK. DOD and DOE participate in monthly meetings of the Trusted Systems 

Network Roundtable where DOD agencies and commands address issues associated 

with threats to military hardware and software, including information technology 

systems. In addition, the NNSA is coordinating with the DOD on Program Protection Plans for the B61–12 LEP and the bomb tailkit, respectively. Recently, NNSA 

has expanded efforts to address this vulnerability to the W88 Alt 370 fuse replacement. NNSA is coordinating with the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 

to address the any threat to the supply chain perpetrated by nation state or other 

adversaries with intent to subvert the NNSA mission. DOE/NNSA is also mandated 

to participate in the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP). Counterfeit items identified by DOD and, other participating agencies, which are reported to GIDEP, are reviewed within the DOE Office of Health Safety and Security 

(HSS). Any counterfeit item reports deemed to potentially affect Program(s) across 

the DOE, including the NNSA organization, are disseminated to the DOE/NNSA 

Sites and their M&O contractors. DOE/NNSA-identified counterfeit items are also 

required to be reported to HSS and, if substantive, may also be reported to GIDEP 

for information exchange. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. NUGENT 

Mr. NUGENT. Dr. Cook, what impact will a FY14 full year continuing resolution 

have on the B61 LEP? 

Dr. COOK. Under the current CR, the B61–12 is operating at $369M as opposed to the PBR of $537M or the Selected Acquisition Report estimated requirement of 

$561M. If the program remains at the $369M level through FY 2014, it would significantly impact the ability to meet the B61–12 LEP first production unit (FPU) 

date. The reduced funding would require a reduction in the current B61–12 technical staff levels, elimination of development hardware procurements, and cancellation of joint test activities with the USAF. The lack of new hardware would also 

impact component development activities and testing for FY 2015. The FPU in 

March 2020 could not be achieved, and could possibly slip into FY 2021. In addition, 

funding for NNSA infrastructure investments is also limited. This could cause 

system- or facility-level failures in the nuclear security enterprise that would preclude safe and secure operations, causing unplanned delays in the B61 LEP and 

other programs. 

Mr. NUGENT. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review states that the B61 Life Extension Program would deliver a First Production Unit to the Air Force in FY17. Last 

year, the Administration proposed delaying that until FY19. Now it appears that 

sequestration has delayed First Production Unit until FY20. 

Dr. Hommert, in your professional technical judgment at what point does further 

delay result in too much risk? Do you believe the B61 LEP schedule can be slipped 
139 

again without impacts to the safety, security and reliability of the weapon? What 

are the primary drivers that might cause the schedule to slip again? Is it technical 

problems, programmatic problems or budget uncertainty? 

Dr. HOMMERT. As described in my annual classified assessment provided to Congress (and briefed to the Subcommittee earlier this year), known end-of-life component issues and uncertainties in other aging mechanisms significantly increase risk 

with any additional schedule slips beyond an FY2020 FPU consistent with the current Selected Acquisition Report commitments. However, it is my opinion the B61– 

12 needs to remain aligned with the planned first production near the end of 

FY2020 to assure confidence in the ongoing safety, security, and reliability of the 

weapon in the face of continuing degradation of components. 

Regarding schedule drivers, there are two overarching causes for slip: technical 

issues and budgetary changes. With respect to technical risk, I have the highest 

level of confidence that technical issues will NOT cause impact to Sandia’s schedule 

performance. With respect to budgetary changes, I cannot be as sanguine. In FY13, 

sequestration impacts caused some technical activities to be moved into FY14. We 

estimated the schedule impact of those shifts to be relatively small—on the order 

of 2 to 3 months over the life of the program (within overall schedule contingency). 

However, at the time of my testimony, we are operating against a FY14 resource 

allocation that, on an annual basis, is at least 23% below the FY14 requirement, 

as contained in the most recent NNSA-approved Baseline Change Requests to the 

Selected Acquisition Report, approved in October 2013. Until the final FY14 Energy 

and Water Development Appropriations bill is enacted, NNSA does not have the authority to provide a definitive funding level for the program. Obviously, unless addressed, budgetary changes of this magnitude will have significant schedule impact. 

Æ