J-A23042-16

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JAMES T. CARNEY,

 Appellant

 v.

VINIT KATHARDEKAR AND 

USHA RISHI,

 Appellees

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 67 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered December 17, 2015 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Civil Division at No(s): GD-12-021292 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 02, 2016

James T. Carney (Carney) appeals from order entered December 17, 

2015, granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Vinit Kathardekar 

and Usha Rishi (collectively, Appellees). After careful review, we affirm.

The pertinent factual and procedural history of this case has been 

summarized by the trial court as follows.

From July of 2007 through May of 2011, [Carney], in his 

capacity as an attorney, provided various estate planning 

services to the late Dr. Drupadi Bhagwanani [Dr. Bhagwanani] 

and her husband. In January of 2011, during the course of 

[Carney’s] services, [Carney], Dr. Bhagwanani, and her husband 

reached an oral agreement that [Carney] would waive his estate 

planning fees in exchange for Dr. Bhagwanani naming him in her 

will as the contingent executor (her husband would be the first 

executor) or a contingent co-executor. And likewise, Dr. 

Bhagwanani’s husband would name [Carney] as same in his will. 

[Carney’s] estimation is that the 5% of the gross estate he 

would have received as executor/co-executor would have 
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amounted to $375,000. In May of 2011, [Carney] mailed Dr. 

Bhagwanani an updated will naming [Carney] as co-executor of 

her estate. As late as August of 2011, [Carney] was unsure 

whether Dr. Bhagwanani had executed the May 2011 will, and 

[Carney] has not averred that it was ever executed. 

In July 2011[,] Dr. Bhagwanani was diagnosed with 

cancer. Shortly after the diagnosis, Dr. Bhagwanani’s friend 

[Appellee] Usha Rishi moved in to care for both Dr. Bhagwanani 

and her husband, who was bed ridden at the time. In July of 

2011, when Rishi’s son-in-law, [Appellee] Vinit Kathardekar, was 

visiting Dr. Bhagwanani, she asked Kathardekar, an attorney, to 

draft a will for her. Kathardekar declined on the basis that 

estate planning was not his area of practice. Ultimately, 

attorney Lloyd Welling was retained to draft a will for Dr. 

Bhagwanani. On August 1, 2011, Dr. Bhagwanani executed a 

will that named Kathardekar as the executor of her estate. On 

September 30, 2011, Dr. Bhagwanani sent [Carney] a letter 

terminating his services. On this basis, [Carney] initiated this 

action alleging that [Appellees] conspired to displace him in the 

will, and stating a claim for Tortious Inference with Contractual 

Relations. On October 15, 2015, [Appellees] filed a Motion for 

Summary Judgment, which [the trial court] granted on 

December 17, 2015. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/2016, at 1-2.

This timely-filed appeal followed.1 Carney raises the following issues 

on appeal, which we have reordered for ease of disposition. 

I. Did the [trial court] err in finding that Carney presented no 

evidence to show purposeful action on behalf of 

[Appellees] specifically intended to harm the existing 

relationship between Carney and his client?

II. Did the [trial court] deny Carney due process of law by 

deciding the motion for summary judgment on the grounds 

other than those raised by [Appellees]?

 

1 Both Carney and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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III. Did the [trial court] err in granting summary judgment on 

the ground that Carney could not prove actual damage 

resulting from the interference?

IV. Did the [trial court] err in granting summary judgment on 

the ground that [Appellees] were privileged to interfere 

with the contractual attorney[-]client relationship between 

Carney and his client?

Carney’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization and emphasis omitted). 

We consider Carney’s issues mindful of the following.

Our standard of review on an appeal from the grant of a motion 

for summary judgment is well-settled. A reviewing court may 

disturb the order of the trial court only where it is established 

that the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. 

As with all questions of law, our review is plenary.

In evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter summary 

judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the 

summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. The rule states that 

where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment 

may be entered. Where the nonmoving party bears the burden 

of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or 

answers in order to survive summary judgment. Failure of a 

non-moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue 

essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof 

establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a 

matter of law. Lastly, we will review the record in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved 

against the moving party.

Krauss v. Trane U.S. Inc., 104 A.3d 556, 562-63 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(quoting Shepard v. Temple University, 948 A.2d 852, 856 (Pa. Super. 

2008)).

The following principles guide our review if this matter.
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In order to successfully advance a cause of action for intentional 

interference with contractual relations, appellant must 

demonstrate the following: (1) the existence of a contractual 

relationship; (2) an intent on the part of the defendant to harm 

the plaintiff by interfering with that contractual relationship; (3) 

the absence of a privilege or justification for such interference; 

and (4) damages resulting from the defendant’s conduct.

Small v. Juniata College, 682 A.2d 350, 354 (Pa. Super. 1996).

On appeal, Carney argues the trial court erred in finding that Carney 

did not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the second element of 

the aforementioned tort. Carney’s Brief at 22. First, Carney avers “it is 

undisputed that [on August 1, 2011, Appellees were] aware that [Dr. 

Bhagwanani] had an ongoing relationship with an attorney.” Id. at 23. 

Carney argues that this alone is sufficient to show Appellees knowingly 

interfered with a contractual relationship. Id. at 23-26. Furthermore, 

Carney contends the trial court erred in failing to consider all factors set 

forth in Restatement (Second) Torts, section 767, and ignoring “critical 

pieces of evidence.”2 Id. at 26-28. 

In response, the trial court offered the following analysis:

To satisfy the second element of a claim for intentional 

interference of contractual relations, [a plaintiff] must prove that 

a defendant “acted for the specific purpose of causing harm to [a 

plaintiff.]” [Carney] has pled that [Appellees] acted with the 

intent of “furthering their own interests.” [Carney] has not 

 

2

In his brief, Carney sets forth three critical pieces of evidence: (1) an 

excerpt of the deposition of David Groetsch, Dr. Bhagwanani’s financial 

advisor; (2) evidence that Appellee Kathardekar had seen the will drafted by 

Carney, with Carney’s name on it; and (3) an affidavit from Carney that 

avers he received a call from Kathardekar demanding he turn over all files 

relative to Dr. Bhagwanani. Carney’s Brief at 27-28.
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averred or offered any proof that [Appellees] had knowledge of 

[Carney’s] arrangement to waive his fees and that displacing 

him as an executor of Dr. Bhagwanani’s estate would lead to 

[Carney] effectively having performed his estate planning 

services for free. Therefore, [Carney] has not averred or offered 

proof that [Appellees] acted with the intent of harming him, and 

therefore has failed to satisfy the second element of his claim.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/2016, at 3 (citations removed). 

The trial court’s findings are supported by the record. While Carney 

impassionedly argues that Appellees were aware of the attorney-client 

relationship between himself and Dr. Bhagwanani, he has failed to provide 

evidence that would demonstrate Appellees were aware that Carney had an 

agreement to provide free legal services in exchange for being named as an 

executor of Dr. Bhagwanani’s estate. Not only has Carney failed to produce 

such evidence, he admitted he did not have any facts or information to 

suggest that Appellees were aware of such an arrangement.

[Appellees’ Counsel]: Do you have any facts or information that 

Usha Rishi was aware of the oral agreement that you allegedly 

entered into with [Dr, Bhagwanani] in January of 2011.

[Carney]: No.

[Appellees’ Counsel]: Do you have any information that Vinit 

Kathardekar was aware of the oral agreement that you had, 

allegedly, with [Dr. Bhagwanani] in January of 2011?

[Carney]: No.

[Appellees’ Counsel]: Do you have any reason to dispute that 

the first time Usha Rishi and Vinit Kathardekar became aware of 

this alleged oral agreement that you had with [Dr. Bhagwanani] 

in January of 2011 is when you filed your complaint against 

them?
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[Carney]: I have no evidence to the contrary. They were 

certainly aware, however, of my relationship with Dr. 

[Bhagwanani], an attorney[-]client relationship.

Deposition of James Carney, 4/17/2015, 103-104.

Here, merely knowing that there is an existing attorney-client 

relationship is not enough to prove that Carney and Dr. Bhagwanani’s 

unorthodox arrangement was known by Appellees. As such, Carney is 

unable to demonstrate that Appellees’ had the specific intent to harm Carney 

by depriving him of the benefit of the oral agreement he entered into with 

Dr. Bhagwanani.3 Thus, Carney’s claim fails. See Glenn v. Point Park 

College, 272 A.2d at 899 (“It must be emphasized that the tort we are 

considering is an intentional one: the actor is acting as he does [for] the 

purpose of causing harm to the plaintiff.”). 

Because we find the trial court did not err in concluding that Carney 

failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that Appellees had a specific intent 

to cause Carney harm, we find the remainder of his issues raised on appeal 

moot. See, e.g., Pappas v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 856 A.2d 183, 

186 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted, emphasis added) (“[A] defendant 

may establish a right to summary judgment by demonstrating the plaintiff’s 

 

3 We further note that all three “critical pieces of evidence,” cited supra, 

involve interactions that occurred in mid to late August, 2011. Dr. 

Bhagwanani signed the will displacing Carney as executor on August 1, 

2011. Therefore, the “critical evidence” provided by Carney does not 

provide any proof that Appellees were aware of the existing will or 

agreement when they assisted Dr. Bhagwanani in drafting and signing a new 

one. 
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inability to show an element essential to his claim. If the plaintiff fails to 

contravene the defendant’s claim with evidence raising a factual dispute as 

to that element, the defendant is entitled to entry of judgment as a matter 

of law.”).

Having concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting 

Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, Carney is entitled to no relief from 

this Court. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/2/2016