[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 22-13892

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SEAN CHRISTOPHER FINNELL, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 9:20-cr-80086-RS-1

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13892

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No. 23-10358

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SEAN CHRISTOPHER FINNELL, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 9:20-cr-80086-RS-1

____________________

Before WILSON, LUCK, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Sean Finnell was convicted of possession of child pornography and sentenced to 160 months in prison, lifetime supervised release, and ordered to pay restitution, fines, and a special assessment 

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under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act. He raises three 

challenges to his sentence on appeal. First, he argues that the conditions placed on his lifetime supervised release are overbroad and 

violate his First Amendment rights. Second, he argues that the restitution award should be vacated because the amount of restitution 

was not determined by a jury and because the district court did not 

disaggregate the victims’ losses. Third, he challenges the imposition of a $5,000 special assessment under the JVTA because he says 

he is indigent. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the district 

court’s imposition of the conditions on his supervised release and 

restitution award, and we vacate the JVTA special assessment and 

remand the case for further determination by the district court.

I.

A jury convicted Sean Finnell of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). The district court sentenced 

him to 160 months in prison and supervised release for life. As a 

condition of his supervised release, the district court prohibited 

Finnell from possessing or using a computer without prior court 

approval and from accessing any sexually explicit materials involving adults or children. The district court also ordered him to pay a 

$5,000 special assessment under the JVTA and $106,500 in restitution. Finnell objected to the conditions of his supervised release, 

the JVTA assessment, and the restitution award at sentencing. The 

district court rejected each of his arguments. Finnell timely appealed. 

II.

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We review the imposition of special conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 

1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003). But if a defendant “fails to clearly state 

the grounds for an objection in the district court . . . he waives the 

objection on appeal” and we review for plain error. Id.

We review the amount of a district court’s restitution award 

for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309, 

1327 (11th Cir. 2019). We review the legality of a restitution order 

de novo and the underlying factual findings for clear error. United 

States v. Osman, 853 F.3d 1184, 1188 (11th Cir. 2017). And we “review the district court’s decision that a defendant can afford a special assessment for clear error.” United States v. Doak, 47 F.4th 1340, 

1361 (11th Cir. 2022).

III.

A.

Finnell first asks us to vacate two conditions the district 

court imposed on his lifetime supervised release: the condition that 

he not use a computer apart from work and the condition that he 

not possess any pornography, including adult pornography.

When imposing special conditions on supervised release, a 

district court should consider whether each condition: “(1) is reasonably related to the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors; (2) involves no 

greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to serve 

the purposes of punishment specified in § 3553(a)(2); and (3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the 

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Sentencing Commission.” United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224, 

1238 (11th Cir. 2015); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). The section 3553 

factors include the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence 

to deter future criminal conduct, and the need to protect the public 

from further crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2).

The weight given to each factor is “a matter committed to the 

sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Williams, 526 

F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008). Conditions imposed need not be 

based on the offense of conviction as long as they reasonably relate 

to the section 3553 factors. See United States v. Moran, 573 F.3d 1132, 

1139 (11th Cir. 2009).

Finnell argues that the first special condition of his supervised release—that he cannot possess or use a computer except for 

employment purposes approved by the district court—is improper 

under the Supreme Court’s decision in Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98 (2017), because it involves a greater deprivation of 

his liberty than is reasonably necessary. In Packingham, the Supreme Court held that a law that prohibits registered sex offenders 

from accessing social networking websites violates the First 

Amendment. Id. at 108. The government argues that our precedent 

establishes that Packingham does not apply to this type of supervised release condition. We agree with the government.

We have held that Packingham did not undermine a condition of supervised release that prohibits a convicted sex offender 

from using a computer except for work and with the prior 

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permission of the district court. In United States v. Bobal, 981 F.3d 

971 (11th Cir. 2020), we distinguished Packingham from that condition of supervised release for three reasons. First, we reasoned that, 

although the law in Packingham restricted sex offenders beyond the 

completion of their sentence, Bobal’s restriction did not extend beyond his supervised release term. Id. at 977. Second, we noted that 

the law in Packingham applied to all registered sex offenders, not 

just those who used a computer or other electronic means to commit their offenses, and thus the law was not sufficiently narrowly 

tailored. But because Bobal’s use of an electronic device was at the 

core of his offense—communicating with a minor via text message—the prohibition on his use of a computer prevented him 

from repeating that offense. Id. Finally, unlike the law in Packingham, Bobal’s restriction allowed him to obtain court permission to 

use a computer for his employment, and Bobal could seek a modification of his release for other reasons. Id. Thus, we held that 

Bobal’s conditions on his supervised release were distinguishable 

from Packingham and did not violate the First Amendment. 

Finnell argues that his sentence is distinguishable from Bobal

for three reasons: (1) we reviewed Bobal’s sentence for plain error, 

(2) Finnell never communicated with minors, and (3) Bobal was 

permitted to later move to modify the conditions of his supervised 

release, while Finnell claims our decision in United States v. Cordero, 

7 F.4th 1058, 1070 (11th Cir. 2021) does not allow him to seek a 

modification. We address each argument in turn.

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We ordinarily review conditions of supervised release for 

abuse of discretion, but we review for plain error when the defendant fails to properly state his objection in the district court. See 

United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1087. The parties disagree about 

whether Finnell properly stated his objection to the conditions of 

his supervised release in the district court, and therefore about 

what standard of review should apply. But we do not think it matters because his challenge fails either way. 

If we review the district court’s imposition of the conditions 

on Finnell’s supervised release for plain error, our holding in Bobal

directly applies and forecloses his arguments. And if we review the 

issue for abuse of discretion, our precedent after Bobal also forecloses his arguments. Indeed, after we decided Bobal, we reviewed 

a similar computer restriction imposed on a 30-year term of supervised release for abuse of discretion and upheld that condition. See 

United States v. Coglianese, 34 F.4th 1002, 1010 (11th Cir. 2022). We 

noted that “[w]e have uniformly upheld similar restrictions, so long 

as the defendant . . . has the ability to seek permission from the 

probation office to use a computer and/or access the internet for 

specified purposes.” Id. Finnell may seek permission from the district court to use a computer for employment purposes, and as the 

district court noted at sentencing, may move to modify the conditions of his supervised release when he is released from prison. 

Thus, we reject Finnell’s argument that Bobal is inapposite because 

we applied the plain error standard of review.

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We also reject Finnell’s attempt to distinguish Bobal on the 

grounds that he accessed and saved thousands of images of child 

pornography on the internet and did not communicate with the 

minors directly like the defendant in Bobal. The district court found 

that Finnell was “a clear and present danger to children all across 

the world.” It found that Finnell lacked both remorse for his crimes 

and recognition of the seriousness of his offense. Indeed, Finnell 

stated at sentencing that he believed minors have the right to express themselves through child pornography and that the images 

he possessed were of minors freely expressing themselves. He also 

stated that he failed to see the criminality in his actions and the 

need for any punishment. 

The sentencing guidelines recommend a condition limiting 

the use of a computer when a defendant used a computer to commit a sex offense like Finnell did here. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(7)(B).

The district court considered the section 3553 factors and all the 

evidence before it and concluded that the sentence was appropriate. Based on all the evidence, we do not believe the district court 

abused its discretion or committed plain error by imposing this 

condition of supervised release on Finnell. 

We also reject Finnell’s argument that our decision in 

Cordero holds that he is not allowed to seek a modification of his 

supervised release. 7 F.4th 1058. We agree with the government 

that Cordero only held that a defendant cannot contest the legality 

or constitutionality of his supervised release via a motion to modify. Id. at 1070. We did not hold that a defendant may no longer 

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move to modify the restrictions on his supervised release. Rather, 

the district court made clear at sentencing that Finnell may do just 

that when he gets out of prison. Thus, we reject this argument as 

well. 

We now turn to Finnell’s challenge to the condition of his 

supervised release that he may not access sexually explicit material 

depicting minors or adults. He argues that this condition is overbroad and unjustified as it pertains to adult pornography and therefore violates his First Amendment rights. The parties again dispute 

whether we should review this condition for plain error or abuse 

of discretion. We again conclude that the district court did not err 

under either standard of review. 

The government says this condition was appropriate because Finnell’s lack of remorse shows that he cannot distinguish 

between legal and illegal pornography—i.e., that all pornography 

should be legal and that he saw nothing wrong with what he did. 

We agree. Although Finnell’s conviction was for child pornography, Finnell demonstrated that he could not or would not distinguish between child pornography and adult pornography and 

showed a complete lack of remorse for his crimes. For these reasons and the reasons stated above, we hold that the district court 

was well within its discretion to order a total prohibition on all sexually explicit material to defer Finnell’s future criminal conduct and 

to protect the public. 

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B.

Finnell next argues that we should vacate the district court’s 

restitution award because (1) the jury made no findings about the 

victims’ losses or the number of victims, and (2) the district court 

did not disaggregate the victims’ losses. We reject both arguments. 

The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 requires district 

courts to order restitution for covered offenses, including Finnell’s 

conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259. The district court may not decline 

to award restitution because a defendant is indigent. Id. § 

2259(b)(4)(B)(i). The district court must “determine the full 

amount of the victim’s losses that were incurred or are reasonably 

projected to be incurred by the victim” and “order restitution in an 

amount that reflects the defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s losses, but which is no less than 

$3,000.” Id. § 2259(b)(2)(A)-(B). 

Finnell first argues that Apprendi v. New Jersey and its progeny

establish that a court may not award restitution absent a jury finding without violating the Sixth Amendment. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, 

any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). We 

then held that Apprendi does not apply to restitution orders. 

Dohrmann v. United States, 442 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2006). Finnell argues that the Supreme Court abrogated Dohrmann in Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343 (2012), which applied 

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Apprendi to criminal fines. The Court held that it has “never distinguished one form of punishment from another” in stating Apprendi’s rule, and that “our decisions broadly prohibit judicial factfinding that increases maximum criminal ‘sentences,’ ‘penalties,’ or 

‘punishments.’” Id. at 350. Finnell argues this holding extends to 

criminal restitution. 

We disagree. Nothing in Southern Union leads us to conclude 

that it abrogated our holding in Dohrmann such that Apprendi and 

its progeny apply to restitution orders. The Court in Southern Union

specifically explained that there could not “be an Apprendi violation 

where no maximum is prescribed.” 567 U.S. at 353. Our analysis in 

Dohrmann turned on the absence of a maximum award in the restitution statute, and there is similarly no maximum here. 44 F.3d at 

1281. And since Southern Union, several of our sister circuits have 

declined to extend Apprendi to restitution. See United States v. VegaMartinez, 949 F.3d 43, 54 (1st Cir. 2020); United States v. Sawyer, 825 

F.3d 287, 297 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Thunderhawk, 799 F.3d 

1203, 1209 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Bengis, 783 F.3d 407, 412–

13 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Rosbottom, 763 F.3d 408, 420 (5th 

Cir. 2014); United States v. Green, 722 F.3d 1146, 1148–51 (9th Cir. 

2013); United States v. Wolfe, 701 F.3d 1206, 1216–18 (7th Cir. 

2012); United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 732 (4th Cir. 2012). We 

thus conclude that the district court was not required to submit the 

question about the victims’ losses to the jury. 

Finnell separately argues that the restitution award violates 

the Sixth Amendment under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 

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(2013) because a jury did not determine the number of victims of 

Finnell’s crimes. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court extended Apprendi

to mandatory minimums so that facts triggering mandatory minimums must be found by a jury. Id. at 103. Finnell argues the district 

court violated his Sixth Amendment right because a jury did not 

identify each victim of his crimes and therefore did not determine 

the statutory mandatory minimum he would owe in restitution. 

But that argument must fail for the same reason his first argument 

does: Apprendi does not apply to restitution orders, and nothing in 

our precedent or the Supreme Court’s precedent has abrogated our 

holdings. See Dohrmann, 442 F.3d 1279. 

Finnell’s second argument regarding the district court’s restitution order is that the district court erred in the amount of restitution it awarded because it did not disaggregate the losses. That 

is, Finnell says the district court was required to separate the victims’ losses caused by Finnell’s possession of the images and the 

losses caused by the initial abuse. But we have held that “a district 

court is not required to determine, calculate, or disaggregate the

specific amount of loss caused by the original abuser-creator or distributor of child pornography before it can decide the amount of 

the victim’s losses caused by the later defendant who possesses and 

views the images.” United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309, 1333 

(11th Cir. 2019). The district court made an appropriate finding of 

Finnell’s restitution based on the evidence before it. Thus, we reject this argument.

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C.

Finnell’s last argument is that we should vacate the district 

court’s imposition of a $5,000 special assessment under the JVTA 

because he is indigent. The JVTA provides that the district court 

should impose this assessment “on any non-indigent person” convicted of certain offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 3014(a)(3). Finnell argues that 

there was sufficient evidence that he was indigent because a magistrate judge previously found him indigent, and the probation officer reported he could not pay the JVTA assessment because he 

had $100 in his checking account, no income or assets, and $7,000 

in credit card debt. He notes that the district court determined that 

he could not pay a fine yet still imposed the JVTA assessment. He 

also argues that the district court gave no explanation for finding 

him non-indigent and imposing the JVTA assessment after he objected to it on the grounds of indigency.

The government says the district court did not err because 

indigency can be based on future earnings and because it did not 

know Finnell’s financial status because he declined a presentence 

interview and did not sign the release forms to permit the probation officer to verify his financial information. The government 

also argues that Finnell failed to sufficiently raise the issue at sentencing. 

We agree with Finnell that the district court gave no explanation for its imposition of the JVTA assessment in light of Finnell’s 

objections on the basis of indigency. After the government asked 

the district court to impose the JVTA assessment, the district court 

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determined that Finnell could not pay a fine, but immediately imposed the JVTA assessment. Finnell later asked the district court to 

clarify whether it was imposing the assessment and the court said 

that it was. Finnell cited the statute, pointed out that it only applies 

to non-indigent persons, stated that he is indigent and has no ability 

to pay the assessment, and argued that the court should not order 

the JVTA assessment. The district court provided no other reasoning for imposing the assessment.

It is true that other circuits have held that indigency for purposes of the JVTA assessment can be determined based on future 

potential earnings. See, e.g., United States v. Rosario, 7 F.4th 65, 70 

(2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Norton, 48 F.4th 124, 133–34 (3d Cir. 

2022). It is also true that the record may support a finding that Finnell may be able to pay the JVTA assessment when he gets out of 

prison. But the district court failed to explain its reasoning for imposing the JVTA assessment in light of Finnell’s objection and evidence on the record that Finnell might be indigent. 

In the context of fines imposed under the sentencing guidelines, we have held that “when the record provides no guidance as 

to the court’s reason(s) for imposing a fine, we must remand the 

case so that the necessary factual findings can be made.” United 

States v. Hernandez, 160 F.3d 661, 666 (11th Cir. 1998); see also

U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a). The same is true in the context of the JVTA 

assessment. The district court must provide some reason on the 

record for imposing the JVTA assessment when the defendant has 

presented evidence of indigency and has objected to the 

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assessment. Because the district court failed to do so, we vacate its 

ruling and remand for the district court to make the necessary factual findings.

IV.

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM IN PART AND 

VACATE AND REMAND IN PART.

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