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iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

RUSSIA’S CONTRIBUTION AS A PARTNER 

IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM

Henry Plater-Zyberk

July 2014

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ISBN 1-58487-632-8
v

FOREWORD

Russia’s seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in March 

2014 underscored the vast differences between the 

world views of Russia and the United States. Yet these 

differences notwithstanding, Russia and the United 

States do share key security challenges. One of these is 

terrorism. The 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia, 

saw the attendance of a significant number of highprofile U.S. citizens at an event explicitly threatened 

by Islamic insurgents. This was seen to provide a 

prime opportunity for the two nations to foster meaningful cooperation against a common threat. Yet, the 

extent of joint work in counterterrorism with Russia 

remains insignificant. 

Written before the Sochi Games, this monograph 

by Henry Plater-Zyberk explores the Russian approach to counterterrorism, and draws significant 

conclusions on the prospects for common cause with 

Russia in fighting terror. Cooperation with Russia in 

this field is possible and would provide significant 

benefits, but requires deep understanding of unique 

Russian concepts and constraints, and the specific 

nature of the terror threat perceived by Russia. 

Mr. Plater-Zyberk provides these insights. This 

monograph is therefore recommended for policymakers considering all aspects of security cooperation 

with Russia.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

HENRY PLATER-ZYBERK retired from full-time research in 2011, and now serves as a Senior Research 

Fellow at the Prague Security Studies Institute. His 

previous assignment was with the United Kingdom 

(UK) Ministry of Defence’s Conflict Studies Research 

Centre (CSRC) as a senior lecturer/analyst. During 

his career with CSRC, Mr. Plater-Zyberk wrote and 

briefed prolifically on political and internal security 

issues of Russia and other former Soviet states, regularly lecturing to the staff colleges and defense establishments of the UK and other North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization nations. Mr. Plater-Zyberk’s service 

with the Royal Air Force Reserve was in a variety of 

roles that made use of his extensive language skills. 

Between assignments, he maintained his language 

skills and close contact with the targets of his research 

by assisting bilateral negotiations and direct militaryto-military exchanges as a facilitator and multilingual 

interpreter. When writing on particularly sensitive 

topics, Mr. Plater-Zyberk also published under the 

pseudonym “Gordon Bennett.” He is currently working on a comprehensive history of the Soviet and postSoviet security and intelligence services. Mr. PlaterZyberk graduated with a degree in Russian from the 

University of London.

ix

SUMMARY

Key points resulting from this analysis include:

• Until the end of the Cold War, terrorism was

a phenomenon practically unknown in the Soviet Union. The chaotic disappearance of the 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 

resulted, among other developments, in two 

wars in North Caucasus and subsequent waves 

of terrorism in the region and terrorist attacks 

in Moscow. The demise of the USSR also weakened the organizations responsible for the security and law and order of Russia—a phenomenon rarely understood in the West.

• Russia and the United States are the priority

targets for many radical Islamic groups. The 

two countries should be able, in theory at least, 

to cooperate closely against many terrorist 

groups. However, several issues, which each 

country sees as important, make this cooperation very difficult and occasionally impossible.

• In the post-communist, unipolar world, the

United States was the dominant power, which 

paid little attention to the views and opinions 

of other countries. This attitude was particularly strongly resented in Russia, accustomed 

to its status of an equal security and military 

power. The United States failed to appreciate 

the changes in the Russian Federation and still 

does not always accept that repetitive public 

criticism of Russia’s democratic deficit can be 

counterproductive.

• Political orphans of the Soviet Union, who regret the disappearance of the country they were 

born in, brought up in, and worked for, run 
Russia. Twenty-three years after the collapse of 

communism, they may not want to see a return 

of communism, but they want the new Russia 

to be as respected or feared as was the USSR.

• Many Russians see the United States as the

principal culprit of the USSR collapse and the 

present U.S. foreign policy as a continuing attempt to dominate the world. They also blame 

the United States and other Western countries for profiting from the chaos of their own 

making in the 1990s.

• The United States has a clear choice between 

imperfect cooperation with an imperfect Russia, or in-your-face lecturing of Moscow about 

its deficiencies. The lecturing achieved nothing 

positive so far and provoked Russian counterarguments about Washington’s double 

standards.

• Anti-terrorist cooperation with Russia can be

very productive if it is well planned and executed. This requires a detailed knowledge of 

those with whom to work, and with specific 

lists of operational do’s and don’ts.

• For the last 12 years, the Russian security apparatus has benefitted from increased funding. 

While it has become more effective, this brings 

a duality, creating more problems not only for 

those against whom it operates, but also for potential partners. Russia has become, once again, 

a security superpower.

Successful anti-terrorist cooperation with Russia requires, above all, an understanding of Russia. 

(NOTE: This monograph was written before the 2014 

Winter Games at Sochi, Russia.)

x
1

RUSSIA’S CONTRIBUTION AS A PARTNER 

IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM

INTRODUCTION 

Terrorism is a blight that has affected Russia for 

almost 2 decades. Since the early-1990s, the North 

Caucasus has been ravaged by small-scale attacks 

such as pinpoint assassinations and kidnappings, 

up to large scale attacks on communities—most vividly illustrated by the attack on Beslan in 2004, which 

killed hundreds, the majority of whom were children. 

Attacks have emphasized both casualties and the disruption of authority by attacking not just prominent 

civic leaders, religious leaders, and military personnel in both blunt and sophisticated ways, but also the 

civilian population. Although the Chechen Republic 

was the center of this problem for many years, it has 

spread into neighboring regions and beyond. Outside 

of Chechen, terrorists have attacked Russian transport 

networks—including bombing aircraft and airports, 

such as the Domodedovo attack in 2011, and also attacking trains. Attacks have also been conducted in 

Moscow itself, again vividly illustrated by the attacks 

on the Nord-Ost theatre in 2002.

Although they are not the only source of terrorist 

activity in Russia, radical Islamic cells based in the 

Caucasus are seen by the Russian authorities to be the 

main source of such activity. Furthermore, Russian officials point to the succor given to these cells (in the 

form of financial support, equipment, and fighters) by 

international terrorist groups and networks. For Moscow, this poses a dual dilemma: It is both a domestic 

problem and yet simultaneously an international one. 
2

Such characteristics will be familiar to U.S. and 

European authorities, who have also faced attacks by 

terrorists, and, on the face of it, suggest that the West 

and Russia have a common cause in fighting “international terrorism.” Some senior Western officials have 

advanced the idea of developing practical cooperation in the fight against international terrorists. It is a 

feature, for instance, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-Russia agenda—and one which 

has yielded some practical results. The Winter Olympics, held in the Caucasus in Sochi in 2014, offered an 

obvious point of focus for such cooperation.

Yet, if the agenda appears to coincide and offers a 

potential platform for developing a more practically 

cooperative relationship, the situation is complex. On 

the one hand, U.S.-Russian relations are riven with 

wide problems, practical and conceptual. The Russian leadership is critical of many U.S. foreign policy 

and military initiatives on the international stage, and 

skeptical about the sincerity of U.S. rhetoric about cooperation. Any cooperation against terrorism must 

also be seen in the light of a wider political and security context marred by recurring scandals most recently 

illustrated by Edward Snowden’s asylum in Russia.

On the other hand, there are more specific questions relating directly to a counterterrorism agenda. 

This relates to the “domestic and yet international” 

duality of the question. As a result, there are important questions of mutual understanding and evaluation of counterterrorist operations. Coordination of 

definitions of the problem, as well as preferred solutions, may prove difficult. 

This monograph explores these questions. First, 

it lays out detailed Russian definitions of terrorism, 

illustrating the important point that Russian under-
3

standings of this blight draw on a fundamentally different history from Western definitions. It then turns 

to look at the Russian security “pyramid,” which sets 

out the relevant authority structure. The monograph 

first examines the roles of coordinating bodies such as 

the Security Council (SC) and the National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAC), before looking in more depth 

at the individual organs involved in counterterrorism 

operations, particularly the Federal Security Service 

(FSB) and Ministry of the Internal Affairs (MVD). The 

monograph then explores the most important question 

for Russia in terms of terrorism: the North Caucasus, 

illustrating the extent of the problem, before sketching 

out the security situation regarding the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi. The monograph finally looks at 

the wider context of the relationship between Russia 

and the West, particularly the United States, and looks 

at the lengthy list of tensions. These problems have an 

important negative impact on the wider relationship 

between Russia and the West, one that reduces the 

possibility for real cooperation in counterterrorism.

DEFINING TERRORISM FROM THE

COLD WAR TO TODAY

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was 

largely terrorism free, in part because of the oppressive, but on the whole effective, security system and in 

part because the KGB (the State Security Committee) 

and its predecessors, which were the central organs 

for counterterrorism operations, defined terrorism as 

an anti-Western propaganda slogan, Thus:

Terroristicheskiy akt—terrorist act. One of the most 

extreme forms of subversive activity carried out by 
4

capitalist intelligence services, their agents and antiSoviet elements within the country, consisting of the 

assassination of a state or public personality or representative of authority, or the infliction of grievous 

bodily harm on them, on the grounds of their state or 

public office, with the aim of disrupting or weakening 

Soviet authority.1

This official Soviet definition of a terrorist act was 

therefore a political and linguistic by-product of the 

Soviet struggle with armed independence movements after World War II. Once the armed groups 

fighting for the independence of their countries and/

or against Soviet invaders were subdued, Moscow 

could not accept that any sane Soviet citizen would 

attempt to subvert their communist paradise without 

outside support.

The situation changed dramatically on January 

8, 1977, when a group of Armenian radicals planted 

three bombs in Moscow, the first in a carriage of the 

Metro, the second in one of the capital’s food shops, 

and the third near the main shopping complex in Moscow. The three attacks killed and wounded 37 people.2

Soviet leaders were shocked. Yuri Andropov, the head 

of the KGB, described the attacks as the crime of the 

century.3 The investigation of the attack was given 

absolute priority and no resources were spared—

for a whole year, the KGB attached about 800 of its 

own students to assist the investigation because the 

original Soviet investigating team had only 30 people. 

The USSR was simply not prepared for these types 

of attacks.4

The roots of terrorism in modern Russia can be 

found in the later stages of the decline of the USSR 

and immediately after its demise. The collapse of the 

USSR resulted in a concatenation of circumstances 
5

that allowed terrorism to flourish not just across the 

Soviet republics but also within Russia itself.5 The collapse of authority had a dual impact. As the power 

of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union slowly 

faded away and, with it, all the state organizations it 

controlled, especially the law enforcement and security organs, the economy became a free-for-all rather 

than a free market system. This weakening of state organizations and the emergence of the new, powerful, 

and rich individuals operating in untested economic 

waters resulted in a rapid growth of crime.6

At the same time, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, by far the largest and the most dominant component of the USSR, was the only republic 

without its own security organization. Just before the 

collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia set up its own version of the KGB very late, on May 5, 1991.7

 The setting 

up of the new security organizations, especially in the 

various regions of Russia, was exceptionally difficult 

in the post-Soviet chaos. There was no legal framework to deal with “new” crimes and transgressions, 

which in the Soviet period were simply regarded as 

anti-Soviet activities and treated accordingly.

The strict control of firearms and other weapons of the Soviet era deteriorated rapidly. Weapons 

dumps were only inadequately guarded, or even not 

at all, and military units in some areas—especially in 

North Caucasus—were attacked and their weapons 

stolen. The armed forces and law enforcement organs were not able to control some parts of the Russian Federation because the decisionmaking system 

within the power structures practically collapsed, as 

did the military conscription system and the central 

funding system. 
6

The legal vacuum left by the Soviet Union was 

matched by the situation in the security and law enforcement organizations. The sword and shield of 

the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union was 

gradually dismantled and weakened by the defection of its personnel to the private sector. The failed 

October 1993 coup against Boris Yeltsin made him 

weaken the whole security apparatus even further, 

transferring some personnel and functions to the inefficient and corrupt, but representing no threat to him, 

Ministry of Internal Affairs.8

Subsequent (endless) reforms of the security apparatus in post-Soviet Russia and the rolling reallocation 

of the anti-terrorist units and resources in the earlyand mid-1990s, resulted in a further weakening of the 

situation. Many officers retired or were removed by local authorities hostile to Moscow.9

 As a result, the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Security Ministry, responsible for the police who briefly replaced the KGB 

and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were desperately 

short-staffed and underequipped.10 When President 

Yeltsin decided to transfer the elite unit “Vympel”—

originally set up by the First Directorate (Intelligence) 

of the KGB—from the Presidential Security Service to 

the MVD, all members of the unit objected. On February 11, 1994, they met their new boss, Minister of 

Internal Affairs, Viktor Yerin. Although General Yerin 

offered to increase their salaries by 40 percent, none 

of the 500 experts accepted the offer—most of them 

resigned, 50 moved to the Main Protection Directorate 

or reapplied for the jobs in the Presidential Security 

Service, 30 moved to the Intelligence Service, and 30 

moved to the Federal Counterintelligence Service.11

During this time, Islam filled this ideological and 

political vacuum in some parts of the former Soviet 
7

Union. In the North Caucasus in 1999, there were 

about 110 registered Islamic educational establishments with teachers from Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and 

Saudi Arabia. Some of the Russian Islamic scholars 

were taught in the Middle East or North Africa.12 By 

1999, in Dagestan alone, there were 1,670 mosques, 25 

madrassas, nine Islamic establishments of higher education, and 1,230 inhabitants of Dagestan studied in 

10 Islamic countries.13 The recruitment of Russian citizens by the Islamic organizations was well-organized 

and well-funded. In mid-1998, Saudi Arabia began to 

pay more attention regarding who its funds were going to in Russia. The most popular form of transferring money to Islamic groups in Russia were couriers who arrived carrying substantial sums of money 

legally and left the county without it.14

In this post-Soviet chaos, legislative changes were 

made to the definition of terrorism. A new article 

(213.3) was introduced to the old Penal Code of the 

Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. The new 

article described terrorism as: 

an explosion, arson, or other activities aiming to violate public security or to influence decisions of the 

authorities creating a danger of the loss of life, significant property damage, as well as other serious 

consequences.15

The new article envisaged—in the most extreme 

cases—the death penalty and the confiscation of property. Article 205 of the new Criminal Code introduced 

in 1996 and updated several times describes a terrorist 

act as:

1. An explosion, arson or other acts, frightening people 

and endangering the lives of people, causing significant property damage or other serious consequences, 
8

in order to influence decision-making authorities or 

international organizations, as well as the threat to 

commit such acts for the same purposes—punishable by imprisonment for a term of 8 to 12 years. (Part 

One, as amended by the Federal Law of 27.07.2006 

N 153-FZ.)

2. The same acts: a) committed by a group of persons, 

by prior collusion or by an organized group; b) resulting, inadvertently, in death of a person, and c) resulting in significant property damage or other grave consequences, shall be imprisoned for a term of 10 to 20 

years. (Part Two, as amended by the Federal law from 

30.12.2008 N 321-FZ.)

3. Acts stipulated in the first or second paragraph of 

this Article, if they: a) involve an attack on nuclear 

facilities or using nuclear materials, radioactive substances, sources of radiation or toxic, poisonous, hazardous chemical or biological agents, and b) caused 

intentionally death of a man—shall be imprisoned for 

a term of 15 to 20 years or life imprisonment. (Federal 

law of 30.12.2008 N 321-FZ.)16

Later, Vladimir Putin further amended the legislation, the Federal Law N 35-ФЗ (Nr 35-F3), “On Countering Terrorism,” signed by President Putin on March 

6, 2006, after it was ratified by both chambers of the 

Russian Parliament. Point 1 of Article 3 Describes terrorism as an ideology of violence and the practice of 

influencing decisions of public authorities, local governments or international organizations by terrorizing 

the population, and/or other forms of unlawful acts 

of violence.17 The law specifies, among other things, 

what constitutes a terrorist act (Article 3); outlines 

the basis of the combat against terrorism (Article 5); 

describes the rules governing the use of the Armed 

Forces of the Russian Federation in the fight against 

terrorism permitting them to operate outside the 
9

Russian territory (Articles 6 and 10); and gives them 

the power to shoot down aircrafts, in extreme situations (Article 7); the role and functions of those leading an anti-terrorist operation (Article 13); the competences and powers of the operational headquarters 

(HQs); and lawful infliction of harm in anti-terrorist 

operations (Article 22).18

THE RUSSIAN SECURITY PYRAMID

The Russian president, in accordance with Article 

5 of Nr 35-F3, defines the main directions of the counterterrorist state policy and determines the composition of the operational HQ in anti-terrorist operations 

(Article 14).19 He is the pinnacle of the law enforcement pyramid, dominating all the relevant core structures. These include the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SC) and the National Anti-Terrorist 

Committee (NAC). 

The president forms and leads the SC. In the earlyand mid-1990s, anti-terrorist operations were coordinated by the SC. President Boris Yeltsin established 

the Council in the summer of 1992. The main tasks of 

the Council were and remain:

• Preparation of the annual report of the President to the SC about Russia’s security, as the 

key policy document for the organs of the executive power concerning the internal, external, 

and military policies, as well as drafting legal 

acts to protect vital interest of individuals, society, and the state from external and internal 

threats.

• Organizing the work of temporary and permanent interdepartmental commissions formed 

by the SC, on a functional and regional basis, 
10

as the main instrument of developing the draft 

decisions of the President of the Russian Federation.

• Developing proposals to protect the constitutional sovereignty and territorial integrity of 

Russia. The SC also implements presidential 

strategic security programs.

The attack on the school in Beslan, Russia, in earlySeptember 2004, provoked a deep reassessment of the 

Russian security strategy and showed the need for a 

new organization focusing only on the suppression of 

terrorism. In the wake of this, the role of the SC has 

grown considerably: The latest status, approved by the 

Russian President—the Chairman of the Council—on 

May 6, 2011, and updated on July 8, 2013, describes 

precisely the roles of President (Chairman) and the 

Secretary of the Council and gives both specific and 

wide powers.20 The SC’s responsibilities now cover all 

aspects of national security. 

The SC brings together the heads of the main organs responsible for combating terrorism. These are 

the Federal Security Service the Ministry of Internal 

Affairs (MVD), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), 

the Federal Protection Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba 

Okhrany or FSO), and the Ministry of Defence (MO).21

Article 6 of the Law “On Countering Terrorism” of 

March 6, 2006, describes the role of the armed forces 

in combating terrorism, but the SC and the five organizations mentioned earlier represent the backbone of 

the Russian anti-terrorist machinery.
11

The National Anti-Terrorist Committee.

As President, Putin has restored the pre-eminence 

of the FSB and gradually reformed the whole security 

and law enforcement system. The Presidential Decree 

of February 15, 2006, Nr 116, set up the National Antiterrorist Committee (NAC), with the head of the FSB as 

its statutory chairman. In accordance with the decree, 

the NAC has its own operational HQ and operational 

HQs are also established in the regions. The leadership of the Federal HQ is nominated by the Chairman 

of the NAC, i.e., the President of Russia, and the heads 

of the local HQs are the regional heads of the FSB, unless decided otherwise by the President. The decree 

specifically mentions Chechnya (Point 4.1.) as an area 

of particular attention.

The decisions made by the Federal HQ have to be 

obeyed on Russian territory, and the relevant decisions of the local HQs, in accordance with their competence, have to be obeyed by all regional state organs. 

The person in command of the joint group of forces at 

the federal level is the Minister of Internal Affairs. The 

decree addresses also the process of the withdrawal of 

troops from Chechnya. The apparatus of the NAC is 

in the FSB system (Point 11a). The staff size of the FSB 

is to be increased by 300 places and that of the FSO by 

seven places. (Point 13). The regional HQs were to be 

organized very quickly.22

The decree was updated on August 3, 2006, and 

November 4, 2007, giving the NAC the power to cooperate with other countries in combatting terrorism, 

and involving it in planning of the protective measures for people fighting terrorism and victims of terrorism. Further updates, concerning the personnel of 

the Federal HQ and the regional HQs, appeared on 

August 8, 2008, April 22, 2010, and October 8, 2010.23
12

The main body coordinating the everyday operations and other organs is the FSB, a much depleted 

successor of the Soviet KGB.24 This role was originally based on the law “On Combating Terrorism” of 

July 25, 1998, Nr 130-F3, amended several times and 

later replaced by the law “On Countering Terrorism” 

of March 10, 2006, Nr 35-F3.25 Much maligned by its 

enemies and opponents in Russia and abroad, the 

FSB, helped by Putin’s patronage, is the best trained, 

best equipped, and the most efficient security organ 

in Russia. 

The FSB also plays a major role countering terrorism in the regions. The FSB’s anti-terrorist Special 

Purpose Centre was established on October 8, 1998, 

and includes Russia’s two best anti-terrorist units 

known today as Directorate “A” (Alfa group) and 

Directorate “V” (Vympel group). On July 16, 1999, 

the center acquired the Special Operation Service 

(changed later to “Directorate”). The center serves as 

Russia’s main anti-terrorist establishment and the FSB 

operational unit.26

The heads of the FSB’s operational HQs, in accordance with the Presidential Decree Nr 116 of February 

15, 2006 (as amended), are the heads of the regional 

FSB directorates, with the exception of Chechnya, 

where the priority has been given to the Ministry of 

Internal Affairs where its police force and the Internal 

Troops provide the frequently used firepower.27

The Law Nr 40-F3 of April 3, 1995, allows the FSB 

to have official contacts with foreign special services—implying both intelligence and security organizations—and law enforcement agencies. The law gave 

the FSB the right to cooperate with foreign partners 

within the framework of the established rules and international agreements. The service has 142 such con-
13

tacts from 86 countries and has its own official representatives in 45 countries.28

Powerful politically, reasonably well equipped, 

better trained and disciplined than other organizations 

combating terrorism in Russia, the FSB nevertheless is 

an awkward partner for all foreign potential security 

organizations, especially those in NATO countries. 

All eight directors and one minister responsible for 

the FSB and its two predecessors, in the short history 

of the Russian Federation, were educated in the Soviet educational system belonging to one of its power 

structures. The last four heads of the FSB started their 

careers in the KGB, as did all six commandants of the 

highly regarded FSB academy. They may not see the 

United States as the enemy, but the new generations 

of the security personnel formed by them trusts the 

United States no more than did their predecessors. 

Equally, cooperation with the FSB is also difficult because it operates against real and imaginary spies and 

enemies of the state in Russia and does it usually effectively but without much finesse. It is therefore very 

often criticized by the Western media and human 

rights organizations. 

The Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The Russian MVD is seen by some countries as the 

alternative Russian partner when it comes to fighting 

terrorism. The May 2013 visit to the United States of 

the Russian Minister of Internal Affairs was a moderate success. During the meeting with the head of the 

Homeland Security Department, Janet Napolitano, 

Minister General Vladimir Kolokoltsev called for 

the creation of a joint U.S.-Russian working group to 

counter crime and terrorist threats, and praised the ex-
14

isting, but insufficient according to him, cooperation. 

“Since the beginning of this year, we have exchanged 

827 documents with U.S. law enforcement agencies,” 

Kolokoltsev told reporters, adding that the United 

States is one of the top five countries with which 

Russia cooperates within Interpol.29

Additionally, the MVD wants to improve cooperation with the United States in tackling cyber crime, 

especially searching for the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of attackers threatening the cyber security of 

the two countries.30 This may be the only—and limited—opportunity for both sides, as the FSO, the Russian principal cyber and electronic security operator, 

and the FSB would be unlikely to join. The agreement 

on cooperation in cyberspace was close to final approval at the beginning of this year. The United States 

and Russia were to cooperate in combating attacks on 

computer networks of state agencies. In case of detection of any activity that can potentially damage the 

national security, Russian and American specialists 

would be able to contact each other using a special 

communication line to deal with the threat together.31

Cooperation with the MVD is politically and operationally less risky than working with the FSB, but 

there are serious drawbacks. First, the MVD has been 

very corrupt in its Soviet period and the post-Soviet 

era. During the failed October 1993 coup, the MVD 

supported Boris Yeltsin, saving his career and possibly his life. It was rewarded with full presidential 

support and better funding—but not with the quality 

control which it badly needed. Russia was economically weak and flooded by a crime wave. The sweeping reforms of the ministry’s 1.2 million-strong police 

force, notorious for its corruption, came only in 2011. 

Some 200,000 officers were dismissed, salaries were 
15

raised and the force changed its name from “militia” 

to “police.”32

Second, the MVD’s capacities are limited. The 

MVD’s own anti-terrorist structure, the Main Directorate for Combating Extremism of the MVD, was established by Presidential Decree Nr 1316 on September 6, 

2008, and was updated twice in 2011. The Directorate 

is the main operational unit of the ministry responsible for combating extremism and terrorism. It takes 

part in formulating policies countering extremism 

and terrorism, and organizes and coordinates within 

it competent MVD structures and executive powers 

in the regions.33 The MVD is also in charge of the Internal Troops and their seven regional commands.34

They are a relic of the old Soviet era, and their robust 

presence, sadly necessary, is a testimonial of Russia’s 

terrorist and criminal problems. Internal Troops sustained heavy losses in North Caucasus since the beginning of the first Chechen war and will continue to 

be deployed in the region irrespective of the level of 

tension there. The Internal Troops are responsible for:

• Maintaining public order, together with the

MVD police.

• Combatting terrorism and handling the legal

aspects of the anti-terrorist activities.

• Protection of important public facilities and

special cargo.

• Taking part in the territorial defense of the

country.

• Assisting the FSB border guards.35

The ministry’s information acquisition capabilities 

are limited, and its listening and electronic surveillance capacities are modest, in comparison with the 

FSO, the MO, or the FSB. It has limited experience 
16

dealing with foreign security related issues and its 

counterintelligence activities, including monitoring 

foreign contacts, are handled by the FSB. Cooperation 

with the MVD is the safest but also the second best 

choice. All this machinery is enforcing law and security on the territory of the Russian Federation, but its 

main effort is focused on terrorist centers in the North 

Caucasus and Volga regions.

If an awareness of these different elements of the 

Russian security pyramid is important, at the same 

time, we cannot escape the central role of the president. Putin is uncompromising. In September 1999, as 

newly appointed Prime Minister, Putin said publically 

that terrorists will be pursued and killed, even if they 

are in the toilet.36 On November 12, 2002, following 

a summit meeting between Russia and the European 

Union (EU), when challenged by a journalist about the 

war in Chechnya, Putin said: 

If you want to become a complete Islamic radical and 

are ready to undergo circumcision, then I invite you to 

Moscow. We are a multi-denominational country. We 

have specialists in this question as well. I will recommend that he carry out the operation in such a way 

that after it nothing else will grow.37

In July 2003, after a suicide bombing at a rock festival, Putin said: “They must be dug up out of their 

basements and caves, where they are still hiding, and 

destroyed.”38 At the end of March 2010, after the terrorist attacks in the Moscow metro, he declared:

. . . in this case, we know that they [terrorists] are lying 

low. This is a matter of honor of the law enforcement 

organs—to dig them out from the bottom of the sewers into the daylight.39
17

The Russian President reacts strongly to minor 

foreign criticism of Russia, of what he considers the 

country’s internal affairs, even on insignificant issues. For example, he responded to a criticism of The 

New York Times and many bloggers of “stacking” the 

World University Games in July 2013 with 18 London 

Olympic gold-medal winners, with a suggestion that 

the critics should take Viagra, which would “improve 

their lives and unfold some of its bright sides.”40

THE NORTH CAUCASUS: NO ROOM 

FOR COMPROMISE

There is no room for compromise in the North 

Caucasus conflict. The Russian Empire and later the 

USSR subjugated the region with extreme brutality, 

and the local populace resisted with the same ferocity. 

Today’s fighters for the freedom of North Caucasus 

battle for sovereignty and radical Islam. The region 

has long suffered from attacks. Colonel General Sergei 

Chenchik, Chief of the Main Directorate of the MVD 

of the Caucasus Federal Region, announced in January 2013 that in 2012, terrorists killed 211 members of 

the law enforcement organs and injured 405; 78 civilians were killed, and 179 were injured. The terrorists 

operate in smaller groups than previously and target 

members of security structures, public figures, religious leaders, and opposing extremists and terrorists. 

They also demand extortion money from local businessmen. In 2012, the Russian power structures killed 

391 terrorists.41
18

During his visit to the HQ of the FSB in February 

2013, President Putin announced that 99 crimes of a 

terrorist nature, including six specific terrorist acts, 

were prevented in 2012 but acknowledged the general “tense operational situation.”42 The unquestionable successes are overshadowed by the unchanging 

number of terrorist attacks. According to the MVD 

and General Prosecutor’s Office, 295 terrorist crimes 

were committed in 2012 in Dagestan alone—more 

than in 2011. The number of crimes committed by 

armed groups in the first several months of 2013 was 

more than 100, and one-fifth of the 180 victims were 

civilians.43

The attacks on the Russian military decreased dramatically, as there were fewer of them and they were 

less involved in anti-terrorist operations. In 2012, attacks on the military and military bases represented 

up to 4 percent of all terrorist incidents. The local government institutions and law enforcement bodies became the priority target for the militants.44 The official 

or semi-official upbeat announcements about terrorism in North Caucasus do not reflect the real situation. In August 2013, Ramzan Kadyrov, the Chechen 

leader, announced that there were 35 to 40 terrorists 

in Chechnya. He claimed that they recruit now weakwilled and mentally retarded young people.45 No one 

believes him.

The FSB and the MVD forces in North Caucasus 

are quite clearly not sufficient to subdue the terrorists 

without major losses. Magomed Shamilov, Chairman 

of the Dagestani Independent Trade Union of Police 

Officers, wrote a letter to the national leadership reporting “steady and methodical extermination of police officers in the republic.” According to Shamilov, in 

the recent years, more than 800 members of the MVD 
19

died, and thousands were injured. In 2011, 188 policemen were killed in Dagestan, representing 50 percent 

of the national police killings for that year.46

The conscription system has practically been abolished in the region. Only 179 young Dagestanis were 

drafted in 2012, and only 42 of them were to serve in 

the Russian MO. The rest serve in the Emergency Situations Ministry. Until 2010, every year 15,000-20,000 

young men were drafted in the republic, but only 

2,009 were drafted in 2011. Conscription in Dagestan 

was stopped, because the draftees from that region 

are usually undisciplined and intolerant of other ethnic groups. The Russian authorities worry also that 

the conscripts serve as an information source for the 

terrorists, and that their military training is used by 

criminals and terrorists.47

The second biggest problem after terrorism in 

North Caucasus is unemployment. At the beginning 

of July 2010 at a meeting in Kislovodsk, Russia, Putin 

announced new economic plans to improve the situation, but admitted at the same time how much room 

for improvement there is in the region. In Ingushetia, 

Russia, 50 percent of the working population was 

unemployed; in Chechnya, the number is 30 percent. 

At the very end of his speech, the Russian President 

asked, “What must be done to stop corruption in the 

region? He suggested hanging, but then added, “but 

this is not our method.”48 Acting President of Dagestan Ramazan Abdulatipov said in May 2013 that terrorism is the result of long-term lawlessness and corruption of the local authorities. He argued that there 

is nothing new in these attacks—this is a continuation 

of age-old policies and fanaticism, and the failure 

to implement promised social and economic plans. 

Abdulatipov claims that: 
20

even as an amateur, I am convinced that there is a clear 

operational, spying, and intelligence work, a lot of 

random people got jobs in the law enforcement organs 

of Dagestan through connections, not on merit.49

In July, Abdulatipov said that the new wave of terrorist attacks was the answer to the purge of the municipal bad apples ordered by the federal authorities.50

Aleksey Alekseevich Grishin, a former security officer and a present member of the Russian Duma, argues that the ineffective work of the special services in 

the region is a problem of unqualified and untrained 

personnel—only about 10 percent of those operating 

against radical Islamic groups are properly trained. A 

former security service officer and a member of the 

Public Council of the FSB, Lieutenant General (Rs) 

Andrey Stanislavovich Przhzdomskiy added that the 

local authorities in Dagestan do not conduct a sufficiently robust information and propaganda campaign 

in the republic.51 In Spring 2013, the terrorists began to 

target the personnel of the Russian power structures 

and teachers. The campaign covers Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Chechnya.52 In July 2013, Timur Aliev of the 

Rossiskaya Gazeta, the government official daily, wrote, 

“The July 2013 killings, in Dagestan, of police officers, 

journalists, businessmen, and civilians happened one 

after the other.”53 On December 5, 2012, an employee 

of the TV & Radio Company was killed in Kabardino 

Balkaria, Russia. In February, several broadcasters of 

the station were threatened by militants. Various unspecified militant websites began to threaten journalists working in the region, and on December 1, 2012, 

one of the Dagestani extremists published “a warning 

to journalists” that they, together with the members of 
21

special forces, the military, and government officials 

became the priority target. The message made it clear 

that a list of potential victims was already being compiled.54 The most successful terrorist killing campaign 

is against “disobedient” imams in the whole of Russia. Indeed, the elimination of “disobedient” imams 

across Russia shows clearly a long-term strategy of the 

militants and the inability of the Russian state to take 

appropriate action.

In October 2012, Russian military units began to return to North Caucasus to participate in anti-terrorist 

operations. They closely cooperate with the FSB and 

MVD organs. This is partly to help suppress the unrelenting terrorist campaign and partly to gain experience before the Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia, and 

to learn how to synchronize their actions with other 

security actors in the region. The communications networks of the power structures in North Caucasus are 

still not compatible, although special communications 

links were introduced recently.55

The Russian General Staff officials and the Military 

Intelligence Directorate (GRU) have asked Russian 

Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu to create a Special 

Operations Command, with the Special Forces center—which would be answerable only to the Defence 

Minister. It would include a Special Forces brigade 

“borrowed” from one of the military districts, a helicopter squadron, and a squadron of transport Il-76s. 

The command would undertake special missions such 

as freeing hostages on enemy territory, evacuating citizens from local conflict zones, and liquidating terrorist formations. During a war, the command would be 

responsible for eliminating enemy leadership, strategic sites, communication hubs, nuclear missile launch 

facilities, and so on. A similar project was rejected by 

Shoigu’s predecessor.56
22

The Russian federal and local security and law enforcement organs appear to concentrate their efforts in 

three principal directions:

1. Killing or arresting of terrorists. In a shootout 

with the federal forces, the terrorists practically never 

surrender.

2. Combating corruption—a particularly difficult 

task considering the old customs, clan and family 

links at every level, economic poverty and high unemployment, the high level of corruption everywhere 

in Russia, and terrorist intimidations.

3. Eliminating terrorist “tax collectors.” The “collectors” are less visible than the terrorist fighters organizing explosions and killings but equally deadly 

when surrounded.

Although they occasionally lose their officers and 

troops in shootouts, the federal forces are not unsuccessful in eliminating terrorists. Never very subtle, 

they blow up the houses of terrorists when they find 

explosives in them, arguing that it is done for security 

reasons. The residents of these houses argue in return 

that the explosive are planted by the Russian forces. Six 

houses which belonged to the militants were blown up 

in April 2013 in Gimry village in Dagestan. According 

to the National Anti-terrorist Committee, improvised 

explosive devices (IEDs) were found in each of them, 

and sappers managed to neutralize them only with 

assistance of special charges.57

Russian anti-terrorist units are increasingly better 

trained and better equipped for their missions. During 16 anti-terrorist operations in July/August 2013, 

they killed 43 terrorists—according to the information 

released by the NAC, the terrorists refused to surrender—and arrested two terrorists.
23

At the same time, the Russian authorities are conducting a countercorruption campaign. In April 2013, 

the head of the government of the Republic of Ingushetia, Musa Chiliev, was investigated for paying $1 

million of “protection” money to terrorists. The investigation was conducted by General Prosecutor Yury 

Chaika.58 This is a particularly demanding campaign, 

as both sides in this type of corruption deal have very 

little interest in cooperating with the federal authorities, since losing, in many cases, means death for both 

those who cooperate—who are killed by terrorists—

and for terrorists, who are killed by the Russian special forces. A group of the terrorist “tax collectors” 

was eliminated in March 2013. The leader of the “collectors,” Ibragim Gadzhidadaev, was credited with 

forcing almost half of the businessmen in Dagestan 

to pay “taxes.” The gang killed about 30 people. One 

of the five killed militants was the chairman of the 

Assembly of Untsukulsky Distric, Magomedkhabib 

Magomedaliev.59

Anti-terrorist operations are not made easier by a 

territorial dispute between Chechnya and Ingushetia, 

after the Chechen parliament passed a bill in March 

2013 on the inclusion of the Ingush Sunzha District in 

Chechnya. When a group of armed Chechens crossed 

the administrative border between Chechnya and Ingushetia, they were stopped by the local police. The 

Ingush claimed that the Chechens wanted to organize 

a political meeting in support of their territorial claim. 

The Chechen leader argued that the Ingush policemen ruined a special operation to catch Russia’s most 

wanted terrorist, Doku Umarov.60
24

SOCHI: THE TOP PRIORITY

The Winter Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014 will 

be a vital test for the Russian security and law enforcement organizations. The North Caucasian militants and their allies will do everything they can to 

disrupt it. Doku Umarov, the leader of the Chechen 

radicals appealed in July 2013 to his supporters to use 

“any methods” to disrupt the games, which he called 

the “satanic dances on the bones of our ancestors,” in 

reference to the many Circassians killed by Russian 

troops in the Sochi area in the 19th century.61

The recent deadly terrorist attacks in North Caucasus indicate that the Russian security forces are not in 

control of the region, and that time is not on their side. 

During the games, security is bound to be extremely 

tight, bordering on oppressive, which will guarantee 

instant criticism from some sections of the foreign 

media and politicians. If the Russian security system 

succeeds in keeping the security lid on and preventing 

explosions and attacks, the strict security measures 

will be forgiven, remembered, and learned. If they 

fail, the consequences can be very serious, depending 

on the scale of the failure and possible foreign connections of the perpetrators. Russia would pursue them 

at home and abroad with the same determination the 

United States pursues their “most wanted,” and with 

even less subtlety, and the relations with the countries which are seen in Moscow as protectors of terrorists could become very complicated irrespective of 

Russia’s economic and political interests. 

During the games, there will be a defense perimeter along the state borders of Abkhazia and the administrative borders with Kabardino Balkaria. Army special forces are going to cover the southern part of the 
25

Krasnodar region and Karachevo-Cherkessiya. This 

is an order given to the Operational Group “Sochi” 

set up in August 2012. Army special forces will also 

patrol the mountainous regions close to Sochi. On the 

border with Georgia, they will be supported by units 

of the 58th Army. The group “Sochi” includes the 

22nd Special Forces Brigade, located in the Stepnoye 

Pole village, and the 10th Brigade relocated to Goryachi Klyuch village in the Krasnodar region. These 

are the two best mountain units in the Russian Army. 

The aviation of the operational group will be based in 

Korenovsk (Kuban), Budeyonnovsk, and Stavropol. If 

it is true that a third Special Forces Brigade is to be 

formed in Yessentukhi, the total number of special 

forces soldiers and officers will be more than 10,000.62

According to a paper produced for the Commercial Real Estate Broker, Cushman and Wakefield, by 

their Moscow office, Sochi can expect between 200,000 

and 300,000 visitors during the games.63 The games 

are expected to be attended by more than 15,000 U.S. 

fans—not counting the customers of the sponsoring 

companies.64 One of the Russian commentators remarked that the Kremlin “returned” to Dagestan for 

the sake of the security of the Olympics, and his description of the problems in the area indicates that it 

left much too soon.65

THE TEPID PEACE: THE CONTEXT OF THE 

U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP

Irrespective of the security requirements of the 

United States and Russia, close anti-terrorist cooperation between the two countries is going to be troubled 

by political disputes. Moscow rejects any sense of 

what it sees as U.S. interference in Russian domestic 
26

affairs. The list of U.S. concerns about Russian domestic policies, however, is lengthy, and includes the curtailed freedom of public rallies and nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs), criminal punishment for libel, 

the “black list” of Internet sites, and the prohibition 

of “propaganda” relating to homosexuality. Nothing 

damages the relationship between the United States 

and Russia as much as Washington’s criticism of what 

Moscow considers to be its internal affairs. Similarly, 

the Russian leadership regards the U.S. public support given to the controversial opposition activist, 

Aleksey Navalny, by the U.S. ambassador in Moscow, 

after Navalny was sentenced to 5 years in a penal 

colony for embezzling 16 million rubles (£330,000) 

from a state-owned timber company, as a further 

instance of U.S. interference in Russian domestic 

affairs.66

Another point of contention is the Magnitsky Act, 

passed by the U.S. Congress at the end of 2012 named 

after Sergey Magnitsky, a lawyer who died in a Moscow prison in 2009. Although the U.S. interest in the 

case was understandable because Sergey Magnitsky 

investigated an alleged crime for London-based Capital Heritage Management, set up by a U.S. national, the 

Act named after him was bound to provoke a tit-for-tat 

reaction. It allows the United States to withhold visas 

and freeze financial assets of Russian officials thought 

to have been involved with human rights violations.67

The list of 18 people made public by U.S. authorities 

includes at least two individuals not involved in the 

Magnitsky case.68 Russia retaliated with a similar list 

known in Russia as the Dmitri Yakovlev bill. On April 

13, 2013, Russia released the list naming 18 Americans 

banned from entering the Russian Federation over 

their alleged human rights violations.69
27

However, the event which may have most significantly damaged U.S.-Russia anti-terrorist cooperation 

was the case of Ryan Fogle, an alleged Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer who was arrested by 

the FSB when he tried to recruit an FSB officer. The 

Russians were particularly annoyed because a request 

in October 2011 to the CIA station chief in Moscow 

to stop recruiting attempts of Russian intelligence 

agents went apparently unheeded.70 The FSB showed 

the Americans not only the names of the alleged recruiters but also their Russian “targets.” On January 

11, 2013, the FSB detained an alleged CIA agent who 

attempted to recruit a member of the Russian NAC.

The detained man was expelled from Russia the following month. The Russians were particularly angry 

because the NAC works closely with U.S. law enforcement agencies, and both Russian officers appear to 

have been known to the Americans as anti-terrorist 

operators after Moscow assisted the United States in 

the investigation of the Boston bombers.71 If that is indeed the case, the anti-terrorist cooperation between 

the countries will be quite complicated and the effects 

of the alleged recruitment attempt—understandable 

operationally but imprudent politically—could last 

for years. 

The relations between the two countries deteriorated still further on July 31, 2013, when U.S. National 

Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden 

was granted temporary asylum in Russia.72 Arrogant, 

badly organized, and in pursuit of the lime-light, 

Snowden painted himself into a corner reserved for 

traitors and defectors. He was preoccupied with his 

mission and his own importance just like Bernon F. 

Mitchell and William H. Martin, two NSA employees 

who defected to the USSR 53 years earlier.73 The U.S. 
28

anger at the Russian government was understandable; its surprise is not. No Soviet or Russian defectors 

were ever sent back to Moscow, although one or two 

returned voluntarily. There is also no doubt that the 

United States would not have sent back any Russian 

security defectors, if requested to do so by Moscow. 

The Russians asked the United States to extradite Ilyas Akhmadov, a former public affairs officer to Aslan 

Maskhadov, who was granted asylum in the United 

States in 2004, in spite of objections from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (He was, however, 

supported by some members of the U.S. Congress.) 

He is currently a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at 

the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, DC.74 The Russians argue that between 2011 and 

2012, the United States did not answer five Russian 

extradition requests. Deputy Russian Prosecutor General Alexander Zvyagintsev, said that “since 2008, the 

United States has refused 16 times to extradite people 

to us, citing the absence of a relevant treaty.”75

Referring to the Snowden case, President Barack 

Obama was reported as saying: 

I think the latest episode is just one more in a number 

of emerging differences that we’ve seen over the last 

several months around Syria, around human rights issues where, you know, it is probably appropriate for 

us to take a pause, reassess where it is that Russia is 

going, what our core interests are, and calibrate the 

relationship so that we’re doing things that are good 

for the United States and, hopefully, good for Russia.76

The Snowden case has served as a catalyst for 

U.S. reaction. Due to the issue, President Obama cancelled his meeting with President Putin in Moscow.77
29

Yuriy Ushakov, Putin’s top foreign policy adviser, announced that Moscow was disappointed, adding that: 

It is clear that this decision has been prompted by the 

situation regarding former U.S. spy agency employee, 

Edward Snowden, [a situation] which was not created 

by us.78

He also commented that the Snowden case shows 

the United States does not see Russia as an equal partner.79 Vladimir Batyuk—the head of the Military-Political Research Centre of the U.S.-Canada Institute—

remarked that if Obama did not plan to meet the 

Russian leader, that would be evidence that there is 

nothing special to be signed. Alexei Pushkov, the head 

of the International Committee of the State Duma, suggested that the reaction to Obama’s decision should 

be calm, and that a meeting of the two leaders would 

be appropriate just now, so the old problems could 

be resolved, and a new agenda determined. His first 

deputy, Leonid Kalashnikov—a member of the Communist Party—added “Obama has done so under duress, as he did when he signed the Magnitsky law. . 

. . Americans in this situation are losing much more 

than the Russians.” Sergey Neverov, Secretary of the 

General Council of “United Russia,” added that the 

United States is the main loser because of Obama’s 

decision.80 By refusing to meet with Putin, Obama 

has not achieved anything. Washington may pick and 

choose when it wants to talk to Moscow, but in return, 

Moscow will choose when it wants to listen and cooperate. It is difficult to imagine that anyone in Washington could expect that this decision, announced publicly, would change any Russian policy. An unnamed 

Russian diplomatic source said: 
30

Obama turned to personalities, which was absolutely 

unacceptable. He said that it was necessary to watch 

development of the situation in Russia. What is there 

to watch? He would better come and talk to us.81

The Russians are also convinced that President 

Obama is “specially pre-prepared” on Russian issues.82 President Obama’s decision not to go to Moscow not only looks like double standards—the United 

States would have done exactly the same with a Russian national claiming, for the same reason, asylum in 

the United States—but achieved nothing. 

The decision not to go to Moscow before the G-20 

summit stopped also an initiative taken by President 

Obama when, on April 15, 2013, he sent a message to 

his Russian counterpart, delivered by Tom Donilon, 

the U.S. national security adviser, arguing that the 

United States and Russia are two great powers with a 

special historical mission and must work together to 

solve global problems, and not to quarrel over trifles.83

President Obama offered economic and political cooperation, including issues of strategic stability, terrorism, missile defense, and Syria.84 It was well received 

in Moscow, although Ushakov remarked that Obama 

has not done anything to reduce the “Russophobia” 

in unspecified parts of the American government, by 

which he probably meant Congress.85

Putin’s answer was delivered to the White House 

on May 22, 2013, by Nikolay Patrushev, the Secretary 

of the Russian Security Council, and one of Putin’s 

closest and oldest colleagues and subordinates. Patrushev met Donilon and the U.S. President briefly joined 

in the discussion.86 Patrushev found his trip very 

productive and, according to him, his meeting with 

Obama was of a profound nature and content, and he 
31

expressed hope that the talks on the subjects dividing 

the two sides would continue.87

But with Edward Snowden landing in Moscow, on 

June 23, 2013, the dialogue between the two countries 

practically stopped. The visit to Washington, DC, by 

Foreign Minister Lavrov and Defence Minister Sergey 

Shoigu at the beginning of August was low key and 

has not achieved anything, although Lavrov stated 

that Russia and the United States agree on several 

points. Both ministers wanted to show that there was 

no crisis in relations between the countries. Lavrov 

stated that Russia and the United States had similar 

positions on several issues, such as Afghanistan (preserving of stability in the country after the withdrawal 

of the International Security Assistance Force, Syria 

(the postponed Geneva-2 conference), the Iranian 

nuclear program (the need to organize the postponed 

meeting of the “Iranian six” which would address the 

Iranian nuclear challenges), combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and cooperation 

on the outer space program, among others. However, 

with Snowden loitering in Russia, the United States 

downplayed the visit of the two ministers as much as 

it was diplomatically possible, missing an opportunity to continue several parallel dialogs on the issues 

dividing the two countries.88

SYRIA, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN AND NATO 

MISSILE DEFENSE—PROBLEMS OR 

CHALLENGES?

The disagreements between the two countries in 

the international arena appear to be based on two 

fundamental preconceptions: the U.S. conviction that 

Russia would become a “proper” democracy if only 
32

Putin and people close to him either accepted criticism 

coming from Washington and some European capitals 

(or disappeared altogether), and the Russian annoyance and surprise that Washington still does what it 

has been doing for the last 2 decades, criticizing publicly Russia’s internal affairs. The issues dividing the 

United States and Russia reflect two simple realities: 

1. The United States can do whatever it wishes to 

do, but should expect Russia to be very awkward, unless such help serves Moscow’s interests as well.

2. If U.S. actions are seen to damage Russia’s interests, Moscow will do everything, short of military 

intervention, to stop or disrupt them, irrespective 

how unethical the Russian response may look in 

Washington.

Syria. 

Russia is unlikely to change its position on Syria 

as long as it believes that Bashar Assad may win the 

conflict. If the opposition wins, Moscow will lose its 

only ally in the region and will suffer serious financial loses. As long as there is a glimmer of hope that 

Assad could survive, Moscow will do everything 

to help him. If Assad loses, Russia’s position in the 

Middle East will be similar to that of the USSR in the 

mid-1950s. 

Iran.

Putin’s visit to Teheran in October 2007 was the 

first visit of a Soviet/Russian leader since 1943. Russia has no major problems with the rulers in Teheran 

and much to gain from a good relationship with them.

If Assad falls, Moscow may even try to strengthen its 
33

ties with Iran and sponsor robustly Iran’s membership 

in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Afghanistan.

Nikolay Patrushev, Secretary of the Russian Security Council, said after his visit to Washington that the 

Taliban’s top leadership is not interested in serious 

peace talks because they aim to control most of Afghanistan after 2014.89 On the one hand, Moscow has 

watched with some degree of satisfaction as NATO 

has failed to democratize Afghanistan. On the other, 

if the Taliban take over Afghanistan and implement 

their previous policies, Tajikistan and other Central 

Asian countries would be the first targets of radicalism originating in Kabul. The cooperation between 

the United States, Russia, and the regional countries 

could become a success, providing that Washington 

does not attempt to dominate the region and publicly 

lecture its potential partners. 

NATO Missile Defense.

The NATO anti-missile defense program is probably the most straightforward issue dividing the two 

countries. As long as Moscow feels that the new system undermines its nuclear forces and damages the 

nuclear parity with the United States, it will do everything to keep this balance intact, deploying its missiles 

when it deems necessary. Washington’s attempts to 

convince Moscow that the new system is supposed to 

protect the West from attacks from Iran and/or North 

Korea failed to convince anyone in Russia. 

Numerous foreign policy differences between Russia and the West are something Moscow is prepared 

for and deals with calmly and diplomatically. During 
34

his almost annual TV appearance on “Direct Line” at 

the end of April 2013, Putin said that: 

some cooling in our relations began with events in Iraq. 

It began not yesterday, not last year and not this year. 

Then events in Libya and other parts of the world began. . . . We observe chaos everywhere. And we do not 

think that our partners’ position is absolutely right.90

CONCLUSIONS

The principal, if not the only, strategic decisionmaker in the Russian Federation is President Putin. 

He is a popular leader, and even those critical of him 

have difficulty finding a credible political personality, in the eyes of the Russian voter, who could challenge him. Strong criticism of Putin by a segment of 

Moscow and St. Petersburg intellectuals and middle 

classes, supported by many respected and vocal individuals and journalist in the United States and Europe, 

helped to create an illusion that Russia is full of potentially competent liberal democrats. But this is not the 

case, and barring an unexpected incident or illness, 

Putin is going to be in charge for many years. How 

well Western leaders will be able to cooperate with 

Russia depends partly on whether they will be willing 

to tone-down their public criticism of Russian internal 

policies, and Putin in particular. Moscow rightly accuses the West of double standards as its criticism is 

never directed at some of the far more deserving and 

much less transparent countries. Russia complained 

vociferously about these double standards on several 

occasions in the recent past.91

President Putin sees the international issues as 

things which can be discussed, but Russia’s internal 

affairs are not. Anything seen in Moscow as a public 
35

attempt to “democratize” Russia will be instantly and 

uncompromisingly rejected by Russian leaders. This 

kind of public criticism may win some support on the 

domestic political arena in the West and please a large 

section of the media but will achieve nothing, except 

further damaging relations with Moscow. The decision of President Obama not to meet Putin before the 

G-20 summit met with little comprehension in Russia, especially because it was made a day after he expressed his disappointment about the Russians giving 

Edward Snowden a temporary refuge.92

At another level, there is a gap between Russia and 

the United States in terms of priorities regarding terrorism. The theory that the United States needs Russia 

more than Russia needs the United States may have 

been the case before the Winter Olympic Games in 

Sochi. The uncompromising Islamic radicals in Russia will do everything they can to disrupt the Games 

either by attacking the event directly, or conducting a 

bloody and spectacular attack in Russia which would 

overshadow the games. For Moscow, this is the primary terrorist challenge. Russian forces may win the 

war against the radicals at Sochi, but they are not 

anywhere near winning the continuing anti-terrorist 

campaigns. The slow, partially successful anti-terrorist campaign in the North Caucasus, the oppressive 

regime in Chechnya, and the comparatively generous 

benefits offered to all refugees in Europe, especially 

in Germany, may bring another danger if the terrorist attacks in Russia continue. Europe, especially Germany, faces a wave of Chechen refugees. In the first 7 

months of 2013, more than 10,000 Chechens applied 

for asylum in Germany, almost three times as many 

as in all of 2012.93 The generous German package for 

refugees—if they are accepted—attracted asylum 
36

claimers, including Chechens, from other countries. 

For example, between 2008 and 2009, Poland accepted 

more than 3,000 Chechens for either asylum status 

or “subsidiary protection.” However, since then, the 

number of Chechens offered protected status in Poland dropped to fewer than 600 between 2010 and 

2013.94 The integration of that group, irrespective of 

how many claimants will be accepted, will not be easy. 

The case of the Tsarnayev brothers (the Boston Marathon bombers) and the arrest of the three Chechens in 

France in March 2013 shows that a small minority of 

the Chechen diaspora in democratic countries are vulnerable targets for radical recruiters and will continue 

waging their battles from the countries which offered 

them asylum.95 Any terrorist attacks in Russia, or Russian interests abroad organized in Western democracies, are bound to create tension between Russia and 

these countries. As the political and legal constraints 

exclude sending the alleged terrorist suspects back to 

Russia, especially from Europe, the less than easy relationship between Moscow and most of the Western 

capitals may become very tense if the Sochi games are 

disrupted by terrorist attacks planned in democratic 

countries. 

In a world addicted to media appearances and instant sound bites, it is very difficult to convince our 

democratically elected leaders that a quiet, long-term 

diplomacy built on in-depth knowledge of the subject, 

the countries they deal with, and patience is an attractive option which could achieve the successes which 

may happened in a distant future when they are not 

in charge. Toning down the top level criticism of Russia and replacing it with quiet diplomacy would be a 

very important and positive step towards improving 

relations between Russian and its Western partners, 

especially the United States. 
37

The issues dividing the United States and Russia 

should not be fused and presented as a set of problems which have to be addressed together. Everything 

or nothing—large package deals will not achieve 

much, simply because mutual trust must be restored 

gradually. Large strategic issues can be repacked 

into individual issues and then addressed separately. 

The failure to reach agreement should not provoke a 

chain reaction of public criticism and recriminations. 

The economic, cultural, or educational cooperation 

between Russia and the liberal democracies will be 

driven largely by the supply and demand factor. No 

amount of successful economic or cultural cooperation 

will improve security cooperation between the two 

countries if the present political tension between the 

United States and Russia continues. Counterterrorism 

cooperation requires a thoughtful, well planned, stepby-step approach, not media-pleasing performances 

aimed exclusively at Western audiences.96 Anyone expecting to share with Russia common democratic values in the near future will have to wait for a long time. 

ENDNOTES

1. Vasiliy Mitrokhin, KGB Lexicon, London, UK: Frank Cass, 

2002, p. 393. 

2. Major General (KGB) Vadim Nikolayevich Udilov, Terakty 

i Diversiy v SSSR. Stoprotsentnaya Raskryvaemost (Terrorist Acts and 

Sabotage in the USSR. A Hundred Percent Clear-up Rate), Moscow, 

Russia: Eksmo Algoritm, 2011, p. 126. 

3. Ibid., p. 222.

4. Ibid., pp. 222-223.
38

5. Dhokhar Dudayev, the Chechen leader, announced the independence of Chechnya on November 1, 1991. “Chechenskaya 

Tragedya. Kto Vinovat” (“The Chechen Tragedy. Who is to be 

blamed?”), RIA Novosti, 1995, p. 20.

6. In 1991, 4,500 crimes involving the use of firearms, ammunition, and explosives were committed in Russia. The following year, this number almost doubled, and in 1993, the number 

reached 19,100. In 1992, there were about 100 contract killings 

in Russia, which doubled the following year. V. E. Petrishchev, 

Zametki o terrorizme (Notes on Terrorism), Moscow, Russia: URSS, 

2001, p. 26. Leonid Shebarshin, the former head of the KGB Intelligence Directorate, observed in one of his books that July 25, 1991, 

was an important date because for the first time in recent Soviet 

history, the F-1 hand grenade was used against the police. Leonid 

Shebarshin, Khronika Bezvremenya. Zametki Byvshego Nachalnika 

Razvedki (Chronicles of Stagnation. Notes of the Former Head of the 

Intelligence Service), Gagarina, Russia: Russkiy Biograficheskiy Institut, 1998, p. 24.

7. Gordon Bennett, The Federal Security Service of the Russian 

Federation, C102, Sandhurst, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, March 2000, p. 2, available from www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/

document-listings/russian/C106.

8. For the reforms of and the power struggle within the Russian security sector and the law enforcement organs in the 1990s, 

see Ibid.; and also www.agentura.ru/library/csrc/fsb.pdf.

9. Petrishchev, p. 35.

10. A Soviet motor rifle division located in Chechnya in 1991 

was staffed by less than 10 percent of the required personnel. The 

Chechen Tragedy, p. 20. 

11. Bratishka, in Russian, January 2011, p. 79.

12. A.V. Vozhennikov, ed., Mezhdunarodniy Terrorism (International Terrorism), RAGS, 2005, p. 309, quoting Musulmanskye dukhovye organizatsiy i obyedinenya, in Russian, March 1999, p. 54; and 

Tatarskye kraya, in Russian, July 1997.
39

13. Vozhennikov, p. 310, quoting Yu. Anchabadze, “Kavkaz 

posle Novoy Chechenskoy Voiny” (“The Caucasus After The 

New Chechen War”), Tsentr Strategicheskikh i Politicheskich Isledovaniy, Byuleten Nr 1, p. 35. 

14. Vozhennikov, pp. 301-340.

15. “О внесении изменений и дополнений в Уголовный кодекс 

РСФСР и Уголовно-процессуальный кодекс РСФСР” (“On introduction of amendments and supplements to the Criminal Code 

of the Russian Federation and the Criminal Procedure Code of 

the RSFSR”), available from docs.cntd.ru/document/9006528; and V. 

Ye. Petrushev, Zametki o Terrorizme (Notes on Terrorism), Moscow, 

Russia: URSS, 2001, p. 213. The old Criminal Code was superseded by the Criminal Code of 1996 and its supplements. 

16. Уголовный кодекс Российской Федерации от 13.06.1996 N 

63-ФЗ (ред. от 23.07.2013) (The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation), June 13, 1996, No. 63-FZ, (version as of July 23, 2013), Moscow, Russia, available from www.ug-kodeks.ru/ug/ug-kodeks.ru/ugolovnij_kodeks_-_glava_24.html.

17. Федеральный закон от 6 марта 2006 г. N 35-ФЗ “О 

противодействии терроризму” (The Federal Law N 35-ФЗ, “On 

Countering Terrorism”), available from the official website of the 

National Anti-terrorist Council, nac.gov.ru/content/3888.html. 

18. Ibid.

19. Федеральный закон Российской Федерации от 6 марта 2006 

г. N 35-ФЗ О противодействии терроризму (The Federal Law of 

the Russian Federation “On Countering Terrorism” Nr 35-F3), Moscow, Russia: March 6, 2006, available from www.rg.ru/2006/03/10/

borba-terrorizm.html.

20. Положение о Совете Безопасности Российской Федерации 

N 590 (On the Security Council of the Russian Federation N 590), The 

official site of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, 

Moscow, Russia: May 6, 2011, available from www.scrf.gov.ru/

documents/11/3.html. 
40

21. Федеральный закон от 25 июля 1998 г. No 130-ФЗ (Federal 

law Nr 130-F3 of 25 July 1998 “On Combatting Terrorism”), Moscow, 

Russia, available from www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/17/30.html. 

22. The official site of the Russian Intelligence Service (SVR), 

available from svr.gov.ru/svr_today/doc12.htm. 

23. Ibid.

24. The FSB, responsible for the internal security of Russia, 

“lost” its control over the intelligence operations, communications, cryptography, communications interception, and SIGINT. 

25. Федеральный закон Российской Федерации от 6 марта 2006 

г. N 35-ФЗ О противодействии терроризму (The Federal Law of the 

Russian Federation of 6 March 2006, Nr 35-F3 On Countering Terrorism), Rossiskaya Gazeta, March 10, 2006, available from www.

rg.ru/2006/03/10/borba-terrorizm.html. 

26. Bratishka, October 2011, p. 78; and July 2011, p. 78.

27. Указ Президента Российской Федераций О мерах по 

протививодействию терроризму (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on Measures Countering Terrorism, Nr 832s), August 

2, 2006, (with amendments), Moscow, Russia, available from 

www.fsb.ru/fsb/npd/more.htm%21id%3D10342802%40fsbNpa.html. 

28. Международное сотрудничество (The International Cooperation), The FSB official website, available from www.fsb.ru/fsb/

international.html. 

29. Ivan Nechepurenko, “Russians to Get Access to FBI Data,” 

The Moscow Times, May 27, 2013, available from www.themoscowtimes.com/mobile/article/480497.html. 

30. Alexander Grigoriev, “ФБР заинтересовалось опытом 

борьбы России с терроризмом на Кавказе” (“The FBI Interested in the Experience of Combatting Terrorism in the Russian 

Caucasus”), Izvestia, May 27, 2013, available from izvestia.ru/

news/550957.
41

31. Yury Paniev, “США и РФ поладят в киберпространстве” 

(“The US and the RF Will Get Along in Cyberspace”), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 16, 2013, available from www.ng.ru/

world/2013-05-16/1_rus_usa.html. 

32. “Moscow Safer Than New York—Minister,” RIA Novosti, 

May 21, 2013, available from en.rian.ru/world/20130521/181268611.

html. 

33. The MVD official website, available from mvd.ru/mvd/

structure1/Glavnie_upravlenija/Glavnoe_upravlenie_po_

protivodejstviju_j.

34. The official site of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of 

Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, available from www.

vvmvd.ru/menu2/structure/okruga/. 

35. The official site of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of 

Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, available from www.

vvmvd.ru/menu2/structure/obishie/.

36. BBC News, July 7, 2003, available from news.bbc.co.uk/2/

hi/europe/3050806.stm; and RT Russiapedia, available from 

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37. Thomas Fuller, “Hint of Castrating Islamic Radicals Gets 

Lost in Translation: Putin’s Words Spark Confusion at EU,” The 

New York Times, November 13, 2002, available from www.nytimes.

com/2002/11/13/news/13iht-putin_ed3_.html. 

38. BBC News, July 7, 2003. 

39. Archives of the site of Prime Minister V. V. Putin (in Russian), The Government of the Russian Federation official website, 

March 31, 2010, available from archive.premier.gov.ru/premier/press/

ru/4894/; and Zhivoi Russkiy Yazyk, April 4, 2011, available from 

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40. Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Stacked Team with Stars for 

World University Games,” The New York Times, July 17, 2013, available from www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/world/europe/russia-stackedteam-with-stars-for-world-university-games.html?_r=1&; and Forbes 

(in Russian) Путин посоветовал «Виагру”критикам спортсменов 
42

Универсиады (Putin Advised His Critics to Take Viagra), July 19, 

2013, available from www.forbes.ru/news/242410-putin-posovetovalviagru-kritikam-sportsmenov-universiady. 

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42. Kira Latukhina, “Экстремизм не пройдет” (“Extremism 

Will Not Pass”), Rossiyskaya Gazeta, February 15, 2013, available 

from www.rg.ru/2013/02/14/zadachi-site.html. 

43. Vladimir Mukhin, “Армия боевиков пополняется 

“черными вдовами” (“Army Militants Reinforced By ‘Black 

Widows’”), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 27, 2013, available from 

www.ng.ru/regions/2013-05-27/1_boeviki.html.

44. “Kirill Belyaninov, “Россию оставили под угрозой 

терроризма“ (“Russia Was Left Under the Threat of Terrorism“), 

Kommersant, December 11, 2012, available from www.Kommersant.

ru/doc/2087374.

45. Argumenty I Fakty, No. 43, October 24-30, 2012, available 

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46. Vladimit Mukhin, “Третья чеченская война” (“The Third 

Chechen War”), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 10, 2012, available 

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47. Denis Telmanov, “Вармию перестали брать дагестанцев” 

(“The Army Stopped Drafting Dagestanis”), Izvestia, October 11, 

2012, available from izvestia.ru/news/537309.

48. Pierre Sidibe, “Вешать—не метод. Владимир Путин 

уверен, что побороть коррупцию сложнее, чем терроризм”

(“Hanging is to the method. Vladimir Putin convinced that to 

fight corruption is more difficult than terrorism”), Rossiskaya

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html. 
43

49. Vladimir Mukhin, “Армия боевиков пополняется 

‚черными вдовами‘” (“Army militants reinforced by‚ ‘black widows‘”), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 27, 2013, available from www.

ng.ru/regions/2013-05-27/1_boeviki.html.

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51. Mukhin, “Army militants reinforced by ‘black widows’.” 

52. Vladimir Mukhin, “Боевики развернули минную 

войну” (“Militants Started a Mine Warfare”), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 5, 2013, available from www.ng.ru/regions/2013-04-05/1_

mines.html; and Aliev, “Bullets For No Reason.”

53. Aliev, “Bullets For No Reason.”

54. Irina Gordyenko, “Боевики составили ‘расстрельные 

списки’журналистов” (“Militants Composed ‘hit lists’ of Journalists”), Novaya Gazeta, December 6, 2012, available from www.

novayagazeta.ru/politics/55766.html?print=1. 

55. Elena Sidorenko, “Военное усиление” (“Military reinforcement”), Vzglyad, October 8, 2012, available from vz.ru/

society/2012/10/8/601538.html. 

56. Aleksey Mikhailov, “Генштаб просит Шойгу создать 

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ru/news/540120#ixzz2DPoez8Vj. 

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Up Together with Bombs”), Kommersant, May 8, 2013, available 

from www.Kommersant.ru/doc/2185376. 

58. Anastasya Kashevarova, “Генпрокуратура проверит 

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Office Will Check the Ingush Authorities If They Have Contacts 

with Militants”), Izvestia, April 3, 2013, available from izvestia.ru/

news/547826. 
44

59. Sergey Mashkin and Nikolay Sergeev, “В Дагестане 

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61. Tom Parfitt, “Doku Umarov Calls for Islamists to Disrupt 

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63. Sergey Riabokonylko and Co, Sochi: The Impact of the 2014 

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Caucasus”), Izvestia, May 27, 2013, available from izvestia.ru/

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of Olympics”), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, available from www.ng.ru/

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45

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71. Perviy Kanal TV, in Russian, May 17, 2013. The Russians 

were somewhat selective in their outrage as their own spying activities have not diminished since the collapse of the USSR. 

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46

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82. Ibid.

83. Yelena Chernenko and Ivan Safronov, “Доверительные 

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Обаме” (“Putin’s Answer Has Been Delivered to Obama”), 
47

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 24, 2013, available from www.ng.ru/

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86. Eugenia Novikova, “Ответ Путина доставлен 

Обаме” (“Putin’s Answer Has Been Delivered to Obama”), 

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87. Pavel Koryashkin, “Предложения Барака Обамы идут 

в правильном направлении, но этого мало” (“Barack Obama’s 

proposals go in the right direction, but this is not enough”), 

Kommersant, May 25, 2013, available from www.Kommersant.ru/

doc/2197826. 

88. Pavel Tarasenko, Ivan Safonov, and Yelena Chernenko, “’Перезагрузку’ поставили на паузу” (“The ‘Reset’ was 

Paused”), Kommersant, August 12, 2013, available from www.

Kommersant.ru/doc/2253581. 

89. Pavel Koryashkin, “Предложения Барака Обамы идут 

в правильном направлении, но этого мало” (“Barack Obama’s 

proposals go in the right direction, but this is not enough”), 

Kommersant, May 25, 2013, available from www.Kommersant.ru/

doc/2197826. 

90. Caitlin Dewey, “Putin’s 9 most notable quotes from in his 

five-hour Q&A,” The Washington Post, April 25, 2013, available 

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91. Luke Harding, “Georgia: Moscow accuses west of double 

standards,” The Guardian, August 30, 2008, available from www.

theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/30/russia.georgia; “Moscow slams 

West’s ‘double standards’-based Syria policy,” Johnson’s Russia, 

July 9, 2013, quoting Interfax, July 8, 2013, available from russialist.org/moscow-slams-wests-double-standards-based-syria-policy/; 
48

“Russian Minister Condemns West’s ‘Double Standards’ on 

Syria,” RIA Novosti, June 11, 2013, available from en.rian.ru/russia/20130611/181611613.html; Andrei Zolotov, “Moscow’s Patriarch Accuses West of Double Standards Over Chechnya,” Christianity Today, January 4, 2000, available from www.christianitytoday.

com/ct/2000/aprilweb-only/44.0a.html; Jill Dohery, “Putin still sees 

double standard with West on terrorism,” CNN, April 26, 2013, 

available from security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/26/putin-still-seesdouble-standard-with-west-on-terrorism/. 

92. Jay Leno’s interview with President Obama (transcript, 

video), POLITICO, August 7, 2013, available from www.politico.

com/story/2013/08/jay-leno-obama-interview-transcript-video-95279.

html#ixzz2dXgrl7B7.

93. Benjamin Bidder and Maximilian Popp, “Third Wave: 

Thousands of Chechens Seek Refuge in Germany,” Der Spiegel 

Online, in English, August 28, 2013, available from www.spiegel.

de/international/europe/refugees-from-chechnya-seek-new-life-ingermany-a-918720.html.

94. Glenn Kates, “In Poland, Chechen Asylum Seekers 

Languish In Limbo,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 14, 

2013, available from www.rferl.org/content/poland-chechnya-asylumseekers-germany-limo/25075082.html. 

95. Al Goodman and Paul Cruickshank, CNN, March 1, 2013, 

available from edition.cnn.com/2013/03/01/world/europe/franceterrorism-arrests. 

96. The “peregruzka” box that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave her Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, on March 6, 

2009, in Geneva, Switzerland, was not only badly translated but 

had no Russian (Cyrillic) writings. 
49

APPENDIX I

THE RUSSIAN SECURITY PYRAMID

The Security Council.

The Security Council meets every 2 months, but 

the president meets the permanent members of the 

Council once a week to discuss operational issues or 

as often as the situation demands. The Council has 

the right to show interest in any aspect of the national 

security. The president has to approve the activities 

of every interdepartmental commission as well as its 

membership. The members of the Security Council are 

divided into 12 full voting members and 16 nonvoting members. The permanent (voting) members of the 

Council are usually the heads of the Russian power 

structures and politicians (as of August 2013):

Aleksandr Vasilevich BORTNIKOV Director of the FSB

Boris Vyacheslavovich GRYZLOV Full member of the Council

Sergey Borisovich IVANOV Head of the Presidential Administration 

Vladimir Aleksandorvich KOLOKOLTSEV Minister of Internal Affairs

Sergey Viktorovich LAVROV Minister of Foreign Affairs

Valentina Ivanovna MATEVEENKO Chairperson of the Federation Council of the 

Federal Assembly

Dmitri Anatolyevich MEDVEDEV Prime Minister

Sergey Yevgenevich NARYSHKIN Chairman of the Duma of the Federal 

Assembly

Rashid Gumarovich NURGALIYEV Deputy Secretary of the Security Council

Nikolay Platonovich PATRUSHEV Secretary of the Security Council

Mikhail Yefimovich FRADKOV Director of the Intelligence Service

Sergey Kuzhgetovich SHOIGU Minister of Defence.
50

The National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAC).

The NAC is divided into four principal structures:

1. The Directorate for the Coordination of the Antiterrorist Preventive Actions is responsible for developing preventive measure against terrorism at the national level, including the relevant legal framework, 

protection of the population and the critical infrastructure, countermeasures against terrorist financial 

resources, eliminating and dealing with the effects of a 

terrorist act, and assisting their victims. This directorate is also responsible for the coordination and control 

of the regional anti-terrorist commissions in the Russian Federation and contacts with foreign organizations responsible for combating terrorism.

2. The Directorate for Intelligence and Internal 

Protection is responsible for anti-terrorist combat coordination and for operational matters and planning, 

anti-terrorist exercises and internal security.

3. The Information-Analytical Directorate, in addition to its main analytical work, has to develop and 

maintain its information systems and to implement 

the Federal Program “Anti-Terror 2009-2013.”

4. The Information Center of the NAC deals with 

the media, psyops operations, and the organizational 

and information-analytical support for the operations 

of the Interagency Group responsible for information 

support of the NAC.

The final membership of the NAC was approved 

by Vladimir Putin on September 2, 2012. Members of 

the NAC include:

• Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB)—

Chairman of the NAC. 

• Minister of Internal Affairs (MVD)—Deputy 

Chairman.
51

• Deputy Director of the Russian Federal Security Service. 

• Deputy Chairman—the Head of the Office of 

the NAC. 

• Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation—the Plenipotentiary Representative of 

the President of the Russian Federation in the 

North Caucasus Federal District.

• First Deputy Head of Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation.

• First Deputy Chairman of the Federation

Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian 

Federation.

• First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma of the

Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

• Minister for Civil Defense, Emergencies and

Elimination of Consequences of Natural 

Disasters. 

• Minister of Foreign Affairs.

• Minister of Defence.

• Minister of Justice.

• Minister of Health.

• Minister of Industry and Trade.

• Minister of Communications and Mass Media.

• Minister of Transport.

• Minister of Power Industry.

• Director of the Intelligence Service.

• Director of the Federal Service for Control and

Distribution of Drugs.

• Director of the Federal Guard Service.

• Director of the Financial Monitoring Service.

• Chief of Staff—First Deputy Minister of

Defence. 

• Deputy Secretary of the Security Council.
52

The NAC is divided into eight regional antiterrorist commissions. 

1. The Far Eastern Federal District.

2. The Volga Federal District.

3. The North-West Federal District.

4. The North-Caucasian Federal District.

5. The Siberian Federal District.

6. The Ural Federal District.

7. The Central Federal District.

8. The South Federal District.

The FSB.

The FSB consists of four principal parts supported 

by many supporting entities:

1. The central apparatus divided into services, 

departments, directorates and other subunits responsible for the management and implementation of its 

tasks on the territory of the Russian Federation.

2. The territorial organs (directorates and departments of the FSB in the regions). 

3. Security and counter intelligence organs in the 

armed forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other militarized organizations. 

4. The Border Guards with its own aviation. 

They share the supporting organs of the FSB:

• The aviation units.

• The scientific and research units.

• The educational establishments and centers.

• The expert and legal experts units.

• The special forces units.

• The military-medical units.
53

A CASE STUDY IN RUSSIAN DEALINGS WITH 

INTERNAL TERRORISM: CHECHNYA—

HISTORY AND BLOODSHED

The Chechen population has never accepted Moscow’s domination. To understand the difficulties 

facing the Russian law enforcement organs in North 

Caucasus, it should be remembered that Khasukha 

Magomedov, the most wanted criminal in the history 

of the region, was able to avoid arrest between 1939 

and 1976. Between 1939 and 1951, Magomedov and 

the members of several groups he joined took part 

in 194 attacks, killing 33 Communist Party officials 

and security and police officers and injuring 10. After 

1951, he began to operate on his own, assisted by the 

members of the local population. Magomedov was 

shot dead on March 28, 1976. According to the official 

Soviet sources, he had personally committed 30 murders. Many Chechen websites glorify Magomedov. 

Although those supporting him describe him as “arbek” a mountain fighter in loose translation, in reality 

he was a robber and killer. 

Post-Soviet Chechnya became the hottest of Russia’s potential hot spots. In November 1990, with the 

approval of the regional Communist Party, the National Council of the Chechen People was created. The 

Council became, de facto, a Chechen national party, 

but the Chechen leadership did not challenge the Russian Federation until the end of 1991. On November 

1, 1991, Chechen leader Dzokhar Dudayev announced 

the sovereignty of Chechnya. Between 1991 and 1994, 

Dudayev had to fight his internal opponents—the 

conflict resembling more a war of mafias rather than a 

political struggle—and Moscow made an unsophisti-
54

cated attempt to dislodge him. The first Chechen War 

began on December 11, 1994, when Russian troops, in 

three columns, moved towards the capital, Grozny. 

The first Chechen war ended in August 1996 and restarted 3 years later when Chechen radicals invaded 

Dagestan. The Russians responded with a large-scale 

military campaign. Ten years later, in April 2009, proKremlin President Ramzan Kadyrov, announced that 

he was informed about the end of the anti-terrorist 

operation in Chechnya. 

The militants, however, continued their unrelenting attacks. The Global Terrorism Index 2012, published 

by the Australian and the U.S. Institute of Economics 

and Peace, in 2011 listed Russia as the 9th among 115 

countries affected by terrorism that year. In 2011, there 

were 187 terrorist incidents in Russia, with 159 people 

killed and 431 injured. Attacks on imams included:

• At the beginning of June 2010, a terrorist opened fire on the congregation of the mosque in 

the village of Tarki (Dagestan). Makhomed Kazakhbyev, the imam of the mosque, was killed, 

and several people were injured.

• Magomedvagif Sultanmagomedov, the head of

the Islamic education department of the Islamic 

Religious Board of Dagestan, was killed on August 11, 2010—the first day of Ramadan.

• The imam of the village Mikheevka (Dagestan), 

Ashurulav Kurbanov, was killed on November 

6, 2011.

• Acting imam of the city of Ivanovo, Fuad

Rustamkhodzhayev, was killed on September 

24, 2011.

• Isomutdin Akbarov, an imam in Tyumen, was

killed on October 10, 2011.
55

• Artur Manukyan, the second imam of the Yaroslav region principal mosque, was found dead 

on November 9, 2011. He was shot four times in 

front of his apartment.

• Gitinomagomed Abdulapurov, the imam of

the Buinaksk (Dagestan) city mosque, and his 

bodyguard died on March 23, 2012, as a result 

of the explosion of an IED.

• Valiulla Yakupov, deputy mufti of Tatarstan,

was killed in Kazan on July 19, 2012.

• Kalimulla Ibragimov, one of the imams of the 

town of Derbent, and two of his relatives were 

shot dead on October 30, 2012. The killing surprised the locals as the murdered imam belonged to a mosque supporting wahhabism. 

Ibragimov was not an official imam but his 

supporters regarded him as an imam.

• The imam of the village of Khadzalmakhi 

(Dagestan), Gadzhi Aliev, was shot dead on 

November 13, 2012. He was a known critic of 

the local extremists.

• Magomed Saipudinov, the imam of the Yasnaya Polana village of the Kizlyar region of 

Dagestan, was killed on April 9, 2013.

• On June 23, 2013, the imam of the Untsukul 

region of Dagestan shot dead one of the three 

attackers who tried to break into his house and 

kill him.

• Ilyas Khadzhi Ilyasov, the Imam of Alburikent

(Dagestan), was murdered on August 4, 2013.

Counterterrorist operations in July-August 2013:

— July 6: Three terrorists attacked a patrol car

in Buinaksk. Two of them were killed and 

the third attacker escaped.
56

— July 8: One terrorist was killed after a shootout in Chechnya.

— July 12: Three terrorists died in a shootout in

a village of Truzhennik.

— July 13: Two terrorist were shot dead in the 

village of Nesterovskoye, in Ingushetiya.

— July 13: A member of the Derbent terrorist

group, Umar Musayev, was arrested after 

his house was surrounded by federal forces.

— July 18: Four militants were killed in the Bakinskiy region of Kabardino Balkaria.

— July 23: Two militants were killed after

a shootout with the Federal forces in the 

Makhachkala region in Dagestan.

— July 27: Federal forces apprehended Yusup 

Kasymov in the village of Noviy Kostek of 

the Khasavyurt region. He resisted arrest 

and was killed after a brief firefight.

— July 30: The FSB arrested Ilmudin Kairbekov,

the leader of the “Buynaksk” terrorist group.

— August 7: A team of traffic policemen shot 

and killed four militants in a fire-fight in Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria.

— August 11: Federal forces killed one militant

near the station of Stalskoye in the Kizlyarskiy region of Dagestan. His companion 

escaped.

— August 17: Three militants were killed near 

the village of Manas.

— August 18: Six militants were eliminated in 

Khasavyurt by the FSB and MVD special

forces.

— August 20: The Russian special forces 

killed nine terrorists, including their leader, 

Bammatkhan Sheikhov.
57

— August 28: Two terrorist were killed in 

a shootout near the village of Kvanda in 

Dagestan.

— August 30: Two terrorist were killed in two 

separate fire-fights in Dagestan and Kabardino Balkaria.1

ENDNOTE-APPENDIX I

1. Evidence available from the NAC official website, 

nac.gov/ru.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Mr. Henry Plater-Zyberk

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil