alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### GIBIDES v STATE OF FLORIDA

Case No. 88-352 AC

Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Dade County

August 14, 1989

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Robert Burke, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Richard L. Polín, Assistant Attorney General and Mary Jane Feanny, Certified Legal Intern, for appellee.

Before HENDERSON, MARGOLIUS, ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBINSON, STEVEN D.

This case requires us to test whether the record was sufficient to sustain a prima facie case that Section 810.09, Florida Statute (1987), trespass after warning was violated.

The only witness, Officer Marco Valazquez of the Metro Dade Police Department, testified that on August 13, 1988, he observed the defendant in the parking lot of a car wash flagging down vehicles. Officer Velazquez had previously warned the defendant not to enter the car wash property.

*2There are four elements which must be proved.

1) That the defendant willfully entered the property alleged;

2) the property was owned by or lawfully in possession of the person alleged;

3) notice not to enter had been given by ordered communication to the defendant; and

4) that defendant’s entering the property was without permission. *R.C.W. v State,*507 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). First, there was no proof of the fourth element that the defendant’s entry was without permission. We may only speculate whether or not the defendant had been given permission to enter. Second, hearsay alone proved that the police had authority to give warning. Officer Velazquez had testified over a defense hearsay objection, “We have [written] authorization by the owner to arrest anybody inside the property.” The written authorization was not produced. Officer Velazquez’s testimony constituted hearsay and should have been excluded.

As all the necessary elements of the crime were not proven, the court should have granted the motion for judgment of acquittal. Reversed and remanded to enter a judgment for the defendant.

HENDERSON and MARGOLIUS, JJ. concur.
**EXHIBIT 21.1**

 

**Significant Subsidiaries of the Registrant**

 

The following are significant subsidiaries of Buffalo Wild Wings, Inc. as of December 26, 2010 and the states or jurisdictions in which they are organized.  Buffalo Wild Wings, Inc. owns, directly or indirectly, at least 99% of the voting stock of each subsidiary. The names of particular subsidiaries have been omitted because, considered in the aggregate as a single subsidiary, they would not constitute, as of the end of the year covered by this report, a “significant subsidiary” as that term is defined in Rule 1-02(w) of Regulation S-X under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

 
| ** **                               | ** ** | **State or Jurisdiction** |
|------------------------------------------|------------|-------------------------------------|
| **Name**                                 | ** ** | **of Entity**                  |
| Buffalo   Wings International, Inc. |       | Ohio                                |
| Blazin   Wings, Inc.                |       | Minnesota                           |
| Real   Wing, Inc.                   |       | Kansas                              |
| BWW   New Jersey, Inc.              |       | New Jersey                          |
| Tender   Wings, Inc.                |       | Minnesota                           |
| Texas   Big Wings, Inc.             |       | Texas                               |
| BWLD   Global I, Inc.               |       | Minnesota                           |
| BWLD   Global II, Inc.              |       | Minnesota                           |
| BWLD   Canada, LP                        |       | Canada                              |
| BDUBS   UK, Limited                      |       | United Kingdom                      |

 

----
§ 1611.11 Fees. ( a ) No fee shall be charged for searches necessary to locate records. No charge shall be made if the total fees authorized are less than $1.00. Fees shall be charged for services rendered under this part as follows: ( 1 ) For copies made by photocopy—$0.15 per page (maximum of 10 copies). For copies prepared by computer, such as tapes or printouts, EEOC will charge the direct cost incurred by the agency, including operator time. For other forms of duplication, EEOC will charge the actual costs of that duplication.
( 2 ) For attestation of documents—$25.00 per authenticating affidavit or declaration.
( 3 ) For certification of documents—$50.00 per authenticating affidavit or declaration.
( b ) All required fees shall be paid in full prior to issuance of requested copies of records. Fees are payable to “Treasurer of the United States.”
[71 FR 11309, Mar. 7, 2006]
**Exhibit
      32.2**











**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Tower Financial Corporation (the
      "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2005 as filed with
      the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
      Michael D. Cahill, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of the Company,
      certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to
§ 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1) The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








/s/
                Michael D. CahillMichael
                D. CahillChief
                Financial Officer and SecretaryNovember
                7, 2005
##### 



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT TO SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT RULE 13a-14,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB/A of ProLink Holdings Corp.2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with
respect to the period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods
presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing
and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 (a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made
known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which
this report is being prepared;(b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report
based on such evaluation; and(c)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter
reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrants internal control over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on out most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants
auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):
 (a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of the internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely
to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; and(b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or the other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting.
  /s/ Lawrence D. BainLawrence D. BainPresident and Chief Executive Officer
§ 1603.302 Filing an appeal. ( a ) An appeal shall be filed within 30 days after the date of the appealable decision or certification for interlocutory review, unless the Commission, upon a showing of good cause, extends the time for filing an appeal for a period not to exceed an additional 30 days.
( b ) An appeal shall be filed with the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, by mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, by personal delivery or commercial delivery service, by digital transmission, or by facsimile to (202) 663-7022.
( c ) The appellant shall furnish a copy of the appeal to the opposing party at the same time it is filed with the Commission. In or attached to the appeal to the Commission, the appellant must certify the date and method by which service was made on the opposing party.
[62 FR 17543, Apr. 10, 1997, as amended at 74 FR 3430, Jan. 21, 2009; 89 FR 47853, June 4, 2024]
#### § 1611.12 Penalties.

The criminal penalties which have been established for violations of the Privacy Act of 1974 are set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(i). Penalties are applicable to any officer or employee of the Commission; to contractors and employees of such contractors who enter into contracts with the Commission on or after September 27, 1975, and who are considered to be employees of the Commission within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 552a(m); and to any person who knowingly and willfully requests or obtains any record concerning an individual from the Commission under false pretenses.
#### INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION v McDANIEL

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co.

No 9810.

Decided June 10, 1929

Gilbert Bettman, Columbus, and Arthur Krause, Cleveland, for Indust. Comm.

Snyder & Mayoh, Cleveland, for McDaniel.

LEVINE, J.

Was the common pleas court empowered at a subsequent term to correct the previous journal entry heretofore filed and entered in this case, after the judgment has been paid and satisfied of record in accordance with the order contained in the first journal entry?

Counsel for plaintiff in error does not dispute the power of the court to enter a nunc pro tunc order to correct mistakes or irregularities in a previous entry but it is contended that the function of a nunc pro tunc order is limited to the correcting of mistakes and irregularities and can go no further. If the court rendered ■ an erroneous judgment it has no power to remedy such error by the instrumentality of a nunc pro tunc order.- In addition it is urged , that the mistake which was made in the first journal entry as to the amount of weekly compensation, was caused by the inadvertence of counsel for. the claimant and that therefore he is not in position to ask for a correction.

In the case of Ewing vs McNairy, 20 OS. 315, the court held:

> “Where a party by his own mistake, and not by any fault of his adversary party, takes judgment by default for a less sum than the amount due on his claim, he cannot maintain a second action to recover the remainder.”

We are of the opinion that the entering of a judgment after a verdict by a jury and the overruling of a motion for new trial, to correspond to such verdict, is a mandatory duty and that no discretion is lodged in the trial court with reference thereto. If the court for some reason failed to perform this mandatory duty it is enabled at any subsequent term to perform that duty. Sec. 16631 GC empowers the common pleas court to vacate or to modify its judgment after term for mistake, neglect or omission of the clerk. Sec. 1164 provides that this may be done by the court on motion within three years after judgment was rendered.

In Nye vs Stillwell, 12 O. C. C. 40 it was held:

> “If one judgment as entered fails by mistake of the clerk to conform to that rendered, the error may be corrected on motion within three years.”

*410The power of the court to correct its journal entry in furtherance of justice and to make it conform to the verdict is in our opinion fundamental. See Jacks v. Adamson, 56 OS. 397; Charles v. Fawley, 71 OS. 50.

In Reinboldt vs Reinboldt, 112 OS. 526 the court held:

> “Power of the trial court to make an entry nunc pro tunc after term does not extend beyond the power to make the journal entry speak the truth.”

When the attention of the trial court is called to the fact that its mandatory duty to enter judgment upon the verdict has not been performed it is empowered to perform that duty even after term.

Holding as we do the judgment of the common pleas court is hereby affirmed.

Vickery, PJ and Sullivan, J, concur.
### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN
NO. 03-05-00811- CR NO. 03-05-00812- CR NO. 03-05-00813- CR

The St at e of Te xa s, App e lla nt

v. John Dominick Colyand ro, Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 331ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT

NOS. D -1-DC -05-90 4150 , D -1-DC -05-90 4156 & D -1-DC -05-90 4159 HO NORAB LE WAY NE PATRI CK P RIEST, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E MO R

A N D UM O P I N I O N Th e State a

pp e a ls the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r qu a sh ing tho se po rt ion s of the ind ic tme nts ag ainst J ohn Dominick Coly andro a ccusinghim of conspiringto violate the elec tion c ode. SeeT e x. Pen. Code Ann. § 15.02 (West 2003); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §§ 253.003,
. 0 9 4 , . 1 0 4 (West 2003). These cause s are companions to those befor e us in State v. De Lay , Nos. 03-05-00817- CR and 03-05- 00818-CR, decided this day , and ra ise the same issue: whe ther the p enal c ode’s c onspiracy provision
a ppli ed to the e le c tio n c od e at th e tim e of the a lle g e d c ri min a l c on du c t. F or the re a so ns state d in DeLay , w e ho ld t

hat it did no t.2 The district cour

t’s order is affirme d.

__________________________________________ Be a Ann Smith, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P uryear and Waldrop Affir med Filed: Apr il 19, 2006 Do No t Pu

bli sh
§ 100.615 Authorities other than offset. ( a ) *Administrative Wage Garnishment.* The NLRB is authorized to collect debts from a debtor's wages by means of administrative wage garnishment in accordance with the requirements of 31 U.S.C. 3720D and 31 CFR 285.11. This section adopts and incorporates all of the provisions of 31 CFR 285.11 concerning administrative wage garnishment, including the hearing procedures described in 31 CFR 285.11(f). The NLRB may use administrative wage garnishment to collect a delinquent debt unless the debtor is making timely payments under an agreement to pay the debt in installments.
( b ) This section does not apply to Federal salary offset, the process by which the NLRB collects debts from the salaries of Federal employees.
Opinion issued November 15 , 2016

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 16
- 00539
- CV

——————————— RAMESH KAPUR , Appella nt

V. FONDREN SOUTHWEST TE MPOS ASSOCIATION, IN C. , Appell e e

On Appeal from the 189th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 2010
- 13051

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Ramesh Kapur , has neither paid the required fees nor established indigence for purposes of appellate costs. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 5, 20.1; see also T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . §§ 51.207, 51.941(a) (West 2013), 101.041 (West Supp. 2015); Fees Charged in the Supreme Court, in Civil Cases in the Courts of Appeals, and2

Before the Judicial Panel on Multi

- District Litigation, Misc. Docket No. 15

- 9158 (Tex. Aug. 28, 2015). Further, a ppellant has not paid or made arrangements to pay the fee for preparing the clerk’s record. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 37.3(b). After being notified that this appeal was subject to dismissal, appellant did not adequately respond. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 5, 42.3(b), (c). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for nonpayment of all required fees and for want of prosecution. We dismiss any pending motions as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Bland, Massengale, and Lloyd.
#### Charles Pfeil, Appellant, *v.*August C. Hasselbush et al., Respondents.

Submitted March 5, 1937;

decided March 23, 1937.

*620
      *Albert C. Jordan*for appellant.

*John L. Crandell*for respondents.

Order affirmed, with costs. Question certified answered in the affirmative. No opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Loughran, Finch and Rippet, JJ.
The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for 1

the District of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendation

of the Honorable Jonathan G. Lebedoff, United States Magistrate

Judge for the District of Minnesota.

___________

No. 96-2658

___________

Patrick J. Melius, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Minnesota.

Frank W. Wood, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

__________

 Submitted: January 7, 1997

 Filed: January 10, 1997

__________

Before BOWMAN, MAGILL, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Patrick J. Melius appeals the district court's dismissal without

1

prejudice of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties'

briefs, we conclude that the district court's dismissal was correct.

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
-2-

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### FALOR v FALOR

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist, Fulton Co

No 101.

Decided April 22, 1929

F J & J M Ham, Wauseon, for Plaintiff.

Fred B Fowler, Wauseon, for Defendant.

BY THE COURT

This cause comes into this court on appeal and is ,an action upon a judgment for alimony in the sum of $600.00 payable in certain stipulated installments, which judgment the plaintiff claims is a lien on certain premises described in the petition. The petition prays for the determination and adjudication of liens and that such liens may be marshalled and the premises sold.

It appears that the defendant Lawrence Falor was a party to the action in which the judgment w,as rendered. He now seeks to attack that judgment in this cause collaterally. This can not be done. The judgment rendered in the other proceeding is a valid and subsisting, lien on the premises, and the plaintiff' is entitled to the relief prayed for. A decree will therefore be entered in favor of plaintiff. Williams, Lloyd and Richards, JJ, concur.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 95 (Tuesday, May 16, 2000)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 31118]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-12201]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Internal Revenue Service

26 CFR Part 1

[REG-100163-00]
RIN 1545-AX73


Applying Section 197 to Partnerships; Hearing Cancellation

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Cancellation of notice of public hearing on proposed 
rulemaking.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This document provides notice of cancellation of a public 
hearing on proposed regulations relating to the application of section 
197 to partnerships.

DATES: The public hearing originally scheduled for Wednesday, May 24, 
2000, at 10 a.m., is canceled.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Guy R. Traynor of the Regulations 
Unit, Assistant Chief Counsel (Corporate), at (202) 622-7180 (not a 
toll-free number).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A notice of proposed rulemaking and notice 
of public hearing that appeared in the Federal Register on January 25, 
2000, (65 FR 3903), announced that a public hearing was scheduled for 
May 24, 2000, at 10 a.m., in room 2615, Internal Revenue Building, 1111 
Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC. The subject of the public 
hearing is proposed regulations under section 197 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. The deadline for requests to speak and outlines of oral 
comments expired on May 3, 2000.
    The notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of public hearing, 
instructed those interested in testifying at the public hearing to 
submit a request to speak and an outline of the topics to be addressed. 
As of May 9, 2000, no one has requested to speak. Therefore, the public 
hearing scheduled for May 24, 2000, is canceled.

Cynthia E. Grigsby,
Chief, Regulations Unit, Assistant Chief Counsel (Corporate).
[FR Doc. 00-12201 Filed 5-15-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4830-01-P
#### § 93.331 Purpose and applicability of this subpart.

This subpart prescribes special air traffic rules for aircraft operating in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area. Because identification and control of aircraft is required for reasons of national security, the areas described in this subpart constitute national defense airspace. The purpose of establishing this area is to facilitate the tracking of, and communication with, aircraft to deter persons who would use an aircraft as a weapon, or as a means of delivering weapons, to conduct an attack on persons, property, or buildings in the area. This subpart applies to pilots conducting any type of flight operations in the airspace designated as the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area (DC SFRA) (as defined in § 93.335), which includes the airspace designated as the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone (DC FRZ) (as defined in § 93.335).