The Honor able Richa rd K. Eaton, of the United States Court of International Trade , * sitti ng by desig nation. 1 07-1013 -cr Un i t edSt a t es v. M a rt e R ob les 

### UN ITED STA TES C OUR T OF AP PE ALS F OR TH E S EC ON D C IR C U IT

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ A ugus t T er

m , 200 8 (A rg ue d: January

13, 200 9 D ec ide d: Apr il 9, 200 9) Doc ke t No . 07 -1 01 3- cr (L)

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ U NI T E D 

### S TATES OF 

### A MERI CA 

### , Appellee , v. F RANCI S CO 

### M AR TE 

### R OB L ES 

### , al so know n a s C HI CO 

### , also kno wn as J UL I O 

### A PONTE 

### , J OSE 

### S AL DANA 

### , also kno wn as E L 

### P UE RCO 

### , H E CT OR 

### P E NARANDA 

### ,

D ef en dant s- A ppe lla nts .

________________________________ BEF ORE: HON. CHESTER J . STRAUB, HO N. PETER W. HAL L , Circuit Judges , and HON
. RI CHARD K. EATON , Judge. *

________________________________ Def endant- Appellant F ranc isco Marte Robles (“Mar te”) appea ls from a judg ment of conviction of c onspiracy

to commit Hobbs Act robber y , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, entered in the United States District Court for the Southern D istrict of NewYork (Patter son, J
. )
. We2

revie w her e Mar

te’s cla im that the district court err ed in ca lculating his SentencingGuidelines
ra ng e wh e n it

e nh anc e d h is s e nte nc e ba se d o n it s f ind ingbe y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t th a t Ma

rt e had conspire d to commit offenses not spec ifically identified in the conspira cy count of the indictment as objects of the conspirac y . We also review Marte’ s claim that the district court improperly

enhanc ed his sentenc e in re liance on “ the same c onduct” a s that of which he had bee n acquitted. The Court finds no error . For the re asons stated he rein a nd in an ac company

ing summary order , the judg ment of convic tion and the sentenc e ar e AF FI RMED.

________________________________ For Appellee : M A RC U S A. A S NER , Assistant United States Attorney ( J o n a th anS
. K o l o dn e r , A s s i s t an tU n i t e d S t a t e s A t t o r

n e y, on the brief

), for L ev L . Dassin, ActingUnited States Attorney for the Souther

n District of Ne w York, N ew Yor k, New Y ork. F or De fe nd ants -A

pp e lla nts : L L OYD E P ST E IN , Epstein & Weil, New York, Ne w York. P ET ER J. G UADAGN I NO , E l i z a b e th , N e wJ e r s e y. L AWRENC E K. F EIT ELL , New Y ork, Ne w York.

________________________________ PER CU RIAM : Def endant- Appellant F ranc isco Marte Robles (“Mar te”) appea ls from a Mar ch 8, 2007, judgme nt by

the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w York ( Patterson, J .) convic ting him of c onspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robber y , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

se nte nc e d M art e pr inc ipa lly to a 78 -m on th t e rm

of imp ri so nme nt. On

a pp e a l, Marte c laims: (1) the district court e rre d in admitting evidenc e of a n unchar g ed bad a ct without3

eng ag ing in ba lancingunder F ed. R. Evid. 403 and 404(b) and without providing a limiting ins tr uc tio n; ( 2) the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s Ho bb s A c t jury ins tr uc tio n d e pr ive d h im o f h is Si xth Amendment rig ht to have the jury decide the “inter state commer ce” element of his crimes and; (3 ) t he dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d in c a lc ulatin g his Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s r ang e wh e n it e nh anc e d h is
se nte nc e ba se d o n ( a ) i ts f ind ingbe y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t th at Ma

rt e ha d c on sp ir e d to c omm it offe nses not specific ally

identified in the conspira cy count of the indictment a s objects of the conspirac y

and (b) “the same conduc t” as that of which he ha d been a cquitted. We revie w her e M arte ’ s c h a ll e n g e s to th e d is tr ic t c o urt’ s d e te r mi n a ti o no f

h is s e n te n c e an d

f in d n o e r r o r . We addre ss in a separ ate summary order Marte’ s challeng es to the cour t’s evidentiar

y ruling and jury instructions. For the r easons state d here in and in the ac company ing summar

y order , the judgme nt of conviction and the sentenc e ar e AF FI RMED.

BACK GR OUND Def endant- Appellant Mar

te par ticipated in a violent police- impersonation robbe ry cre w duringthe summer and f

all of 2000. The r obbery

cre w totaled appr ox imately ten member s, and inc lud e d M art e and

De fe nd ants -A

pp e lla nts He c tor

Pe na ra nd a and Jose Sa lda

na , w ho se
c ha lle ng e s o n a

pp e a l are a dd

re sse d in the a c c omp a

nyingsumma

ry or de r. Th e c re w p ri mari ly targ eted pe ople whom they believed w ere involved in narc otics traff icking beca

use they supposed that dr ugde a le rs wo uld

be mor e lik e ly

to h ave signif

ic ant a mou nts of mon e y and le ss l ike ly

to repor t to the police. The super sedingindictment filed on J uly 19, 2005, char g ed seve n counts. Those re lating to Marte a

re a s follows: (1) Count One cha rg ed Mar te, Saldana, Pena

randa , and thre e other4

defe ndants with conspirac y to “commit [ Hobbs Act] robberie s of drugdeale rs in Manhattan a nd the B ronx, New York . . . ,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; (2) Count Two cha rg ed Mar te and Saldana with committing Hobbs A ct robbe ry at 92 Pinehurst Avenue in Manhattan on July 25, 2000 (the “ Pinehurst robbery”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2; (3) Count Thre e
c h ar g e d M arte , Sa ld an a , an d

tw o o th e r

d e f e n d an ts w it

hc o mm itti n g H o b b s A c t r o b b e r y a t 6 5 4 W. 16 1s t Str e e t in

Manh a tta

n o n July 27 , 2 00 0 ( the “ 16 1s t Str e e t r ob be ry” ), in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § § 1 9 5 1 an d

2 ; (4 ) C o un tFi v e c h ar gedM art e a n d S al d an a w i thu s i n g, ca rryi n g, an d p o s s es s i n g a firea rm duringand in re lation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924 (c) (1)( A)(ii) a

nd (2); and ( 5) Count Six char g ed Mar te, Saldana, a

nd two other de fenda

nts with
us ing , c arr

ying , a nd po sse ssi nga

fi re arm duri ngand

in r e latio n to a

c ri me of vio le nc e , in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924 (c)(1) (A)( ii) and (2) . [R ed 2, JA 18] The trial e nded on June 26, 2006, when the jur

y found all four

defe ndants g uilty

on Count One of the indictment. The jury
a c qu itt e d th e de fe nd ants of the re ma ini ngsu

bs tanti ve c ounts of

the ind ic tme nt. Notwithstanding the jury ’s ac quittal on the substantive char g es, the district cour t found for pur poses of c alculatingMarte’ s sentence for the c onspiracy conviction that the Gove rnment ha d p ro ve n b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t th a t he ha d c on sp ir e d to c omm it the Pin e hurs t and 16 1s t Street robbe ries. The court, ther efor e, conside red those r obberie s as offe nses that wer e the objec t of the Hobbs Ac t conspirac y and took them into acc ount when dete rmining Ma rte’s se ntence . Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

se nte nc e d M art e pr inc ipa lly to a 78 -m on th t e rm

of imp ri so nme nt, wi thi n h is calc ulated Guidelines r ang e.Mart e no min a lly c la ims that th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c on sid e ra tio n o f t he ro bb e ri e s a s o bje c ts 1 of the c onspiracy

cre ate F ifth Amendment problems a s well. His arguments in this reg ard essentially

lie under the Six th Amendment, howeve r. 5 DI SCU SSIO N As rele vant to this opini on, Marte r aises seve ral objec tions to hi s sentence . Marte’ s objections ce nter on his claim that the district cour t erre d when, in orde r to enha nce his sente nce, it found beyond a re asonable doubt that the Pinehurst and 161st Street robbe ries we re obje cts of the conspira cy . First, Mar te ar g ues that the c ourt err ed in consider ing the robber ies as objec ts of the conspira cy

beca use these r obberie s were not specifica lly identified as objec ts of the conspirac y

in the conspirac y

count of the indictment. Mar te contends that in consideringthe robber ies neve rtheless, the c ourt (1) misapplied the United States SentencingGuidelines (the

“ Gu ide lin e s” ) a

nd (2 ) v iol a te d h is Si xth A me ndme nt r ig ht t o a jur y tr ia l. Se c on d, Ma

rt e c la ims 1 that the district court violated his Six th Amendment rig ht to a jury trial when it consider ed the robber ies as objec ts of the conspira cy rele vant to sentenc ing be cause —Marte a sserts—the jury had ac quitted him “as to the same c onduct.” Ma rte’s c halleng es pre sent questions of law, whic h thi s Co ur t c on sid e rs de novo
. See U nited States v. Sanche

z , 517 F.3d 651, 662 ( 2d Cir. 2008). A. M ar te ’s c lai m th atth e c our t m aynotc ons ide r th e r obbe r ie s a s o bj e c ts of t he c ons pir ac y be c aus e th e r obbe r ie s we r e notide nt ifie d as obj e c ts of t he c ons pir ac y in th e c ons pir ac y c ountof t he indic tm e nt

1. W hether such c onsideration is a misappl ication of the Sentencing Guide lines Marte c ontends that the Guidelines pr ohibit sentencingenhanc ements base d on the objects of a

conspirac y

unless those objects ar e spec ifically identified in the conspira cy count of the indictment. He a

rgues that althoug h the Pinehurst and 161st Street robbe ries we re c harg ed as6

substantive offe nses in the indictment, they wer e not spec ifically

desig nated a s the objects of the
c o n s p i r a c y “ in the conspiracy c ount ” of the ind ic tme nt. F or

that r e a so n, the argume nt g oe s, Application Note 4 of

the Guidelines provision cove ringconspirac y convictions prec ludes the judge from conside ringthe undesig nated r obberie s as objects of the conspirac y when c alculating the def endant’ s offe nse leve l under § 1B 1.2(d) of the United States Sentenc ing Guidelines. See United States SentencingGuidelines (“ U.S.S.G.”) § 1B 1.2(d) c mt. n. 4 (emphasis adde d). As we state d in Un ite d S

tates v . Ca v e ra : A d istri c t c ourt

sh ou ld n o r m a l l y b e g in a ll s e nte nc ingpr oc e e din g s b y c a lc ulatin g , w ith the assis tance of the Prese ntence Report, the applica ble [S entenc ing] Guidelines rang e. Ga ll [ v. United States ], 128 S. Ct. [586,] 596 [(2007).] . . . [ T]he Guidelines provide the “starting point a nd the initial benchmar

k” for sentenc ing, Ga ll , 128 S. Ct
. at 596, and dis trict courts mus t “re main cog nizant of t hem t hroug hout the sentenc ing proce ss,” id. at 596 n. 6. 550 F.3d 180, 189 ( 2d Cir. 2008) ( en banc ) (c itation omit ted). The Guidelines Application Ins tr uc tio ns dic tate that th e pr ov isi on s o f t he Gu ide lin e s Ma

nu a l are to b e a

pp lie d in a sp e c if ic order . U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1. A sente ncingcourt must first “[d] eter mine, pursuant to § 1B 1.2 (Applica ble Guidelines), the offe nse guideline sec tion . . . applicable to the of fense of conviction.” Id. § 1B1.1( a). Guidelines § 1B1.2 pr ovides, inte r a lia , that the cour t must “(a) [d] eter mine the offe nse guideline sec tion in C hapter Two (Of fense Conduct) . . .” a

nd “(b) [a] fter deter mining the a

ppropriate offe nse guideline sec tion . . . determine the a pplicable guideline rang e in ac corda

nce w ith § 1B1.3 (Rele vant Conduct).” Id. § 1B1.2( a)- (b). Significa nt to the appea l we dec ide her e, § 1B 1.2(d) state s: “A convic tion on a count char g ing a

conspirac y

to commit more than one off ense sha ll be treated as if the de fenda nt had7

be e n c onvic te d o n a

se pa rate c ount o f c on sp ir a c y

fo r e a c h o ff

e ns e that th e de fe nd ant c on sp ir e d to commit.” Id. § 1 B 1. 2( d) . App lic a tio n N ote 4 to U. S.S. G. § 1 B 1. 2 c omm e nts that: Particular c are must be taken in applying subse ction (d) be cause there are case s in which the verdic t or plea does not establish which offe nse(s) w as the objec t of the conspira cy . In such ca ses, subsection (d) should only be applied w ith respec t to an object of

fense alleg ed in the conspirac y count if the court, wer e it sitti ng as a trier of fa ct, would convict the de fenda nt of conspiring t o commit that object offe nse. Id. § 1B1.2( d) cmt. n. 4. The Gove rnment ar g ues that Mar te’s position—that the above la ng uag e re quires any ob je c t of fe ns e s th e jud g e c on sid e rs a t se nte nc ingto b e sp e c if ic a lly name d a s o bje c t of

fe ns e s in thec on sp ira c

yc ou nt of the indictment—is not mandated by the languag e of A

pplication Note 4. We ag ree . The c onstruction of Application Note 4 place s its emphasis not on the specificity of the conspirac y

char g e but on the standa

rd of pr oof that must be satisfied to per mit a court to find that
a de fe nd ant c on sp ir e d to c omm it p art ic ula r o bje c t of

fe ns e s a nd the n to tr e a t su c h f

ind ing s a s a sentenc ing f

actor in determiningthe def

endant’ s offe nse leve l. This more rig orous standar d of proof is a pr otection for the defe ndant and is imposed bec ause of the impact that the deter mination of object off

enses ha s on a def

endant’ s sentence . We have pr eviously stated as much, albeit in dicta, notingthat: “As the Sentenc ing Commission made clea r in promulg ating this application note . . . it was re quired be cause : ‘A hig her standa rd of pr oof should g overn the
c re a tio n o f what is , in

e ff e c t, a ne w c ount o f c onvic tio n f or the purp os e s o f C ha

pte r T hr e e , Pa

rt D (Multiple Counts).’” Un ite d S tates v . M ac k lin , 927 F.2d 1272, 1280 ( 2d Cir. 1991) (quoting8

U.S.S.G. App. C. ¶ 75, at C. 36) (discussing then-U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2( d) cmt. n. 5, which c ontained the same la

ng uag e as the curr ent Application Note 4)
. Fur thermore , the languag e of A pplication Note 4 appe ars to addr ess itself to just such a situation as the one we encounte r her e, re commending“par ticular c are ,” exerc ised in the form of
a highe r s tand ard

of pr oo f, in “ c a se s in

wh ic h th e ve rd ic t . . . d oe s n ot e sta bli shwh ic h o ff

e ns e (s ) was the obje ct of the c onspiracy .” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2( d) cmt. n. 4. I f Application Note 4 require d that th e ob

je c ts o f a c on sp ir a c y

be sp e c if ic a lly name d in the c on sp ir a c y

c ount o f a

n in dic tme nt, it would be diffic ult to im ag ine the re ason for this comment’s exi stence . A ver dict of guilty on the
c on sp ir a c y

c ount i n s uc h a

sit uatio n w ou ld e sta

bli shwi th p re c isi on

the of fe ns e s a jud g e c ou ld “per missibl y ” conside r at sente ncing , and ther e would be no oc casion wa rra nting the “ particula

r
car e” r ecommende d by

Application Note 4. Additionally , as the g overnme nt points out , limit ing Se c tio n 1 B 1. 2( d) in t

he wa y Mart e su g g e sts wo uld

c on fl ic t w iththe Gu ide lin e s p re c e pt t hat a defe ndant should be liable for the full scope of

his or her c riminal activity , including “ all acts a nd omissions committed . . . by the def endant” as we ll as “all re asonably fore seea ble ac ts and omi ssi on s o f o the rs . . . th a t oc c ur re d d ur ingthe c omm iss ion

of the of fe ns e of c onvic tio n, in prepa ration for that offe nse, or in the c ourse of attempting to avoid detection or r esponsibility for that offe nse.” Id. § 1B1.3 ( a)( 1). The indictment, moreove r, provided suf ficient notice that the Pinehurst and 161st Street robber ies could be c onsidered a s objects of the c onspiracy . The indictment cha rg ed in Count One that Ma

rte a nd others “c onspired to commit robberie s of drugdeale rs in Manhattan a nd the Br onx . . ..” This put Marte on notice of the nature of the objects of the c harg ed conspirac y

—robber ies of drugdeale rs in Manhattan a nd the B ronx—and the fac t that there w ere9

multipl e objec ts, i.e. , robber ies in two differ ent boroug hs. In addition, Counts Two and Three of the indictment char g ed that Mar te par ticipated in spec ific robbe ries of dr ug deale rs in Manhattan, one of which took place on Pinehurst Avenue a nd the other on W. 161st Street. Read a s a whole, the indictment g ave Ma

rte both broa d and spec ific notice a s to offense s that the court mig ht leg itimately

consider a s objects of the c onspiracy if it found beyond a re asonable doubt that Marte ha d conspired to c ommit t hose off enses. B y

its verdict, the jury

found Mar

te guilty of having“conspire d to commit robberies of dr ug deale rs in Manhattan . . ..” The judg e’s f inding beyond a re asonable doubt that Marte ha d specific ally conspired to c ommit t he Pinehurst and 161st St ree t robberie s is not inconsist ent with the jury verdic t finding Ma

rte guilty of having
c o n s p ir e d to c o mm it

mu lt ip le r o b b e r ie s o f

th e v e r y ty p e p la n n e d f o r Pi n e hur s t A v e nu e an d

W. 16 1s t Str e e t. 2. W

hether c onsideration of the robberies violates the Sixth Ame ndment To the extent Marte a

rgues that the Six th Amendment rig ht to a jury trial requir es the ob je c ts o f a c on sp ir a c y

to b e sp e c if

ic a lly name d in the c on sp ir a c y

c ount o f t

he ind ic tme nt i n
or de r f or the jud g e pr op e rl y

to c on sid e r t

ho se ob je c ts a s r e le va

nt at se nte nc ing , h is a

rgume nt i s
un ava ili ng . We have pr e vio us ly ru le d th a t: So long as the facts found by the district court do not incre ase the sentenc e beyond the statutory

maxi mum authori z ed by the ver dict or trig g er a

mandatory

minimum sentenc e not author i z ed by the ver dict that simult aneously raises a corr esponding maxi mum, the district c ourt does not violate a def endant’ s Fifth or Six th Amendment ri g hts by imp os inga

se nte nc e ba se d o n f

a c ts n ot a lle g e d in

the ind ic tme nt. United States v. She ikh , 433 F.3d 905, 906 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (whe re judg e enha nced de fenda

nt’s sentenc e base d on a findingthat defe ndant’s fr aud “c rimes re sulted in a loss of more than $ 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 b u tn o tm o re th an $ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ” t h er e w as n o co n s t i tu t i o n al v i o l at i o nb ec au s e “ al th o u ghU. S.S. G. § 5 G1 .1 pr ov ide s: 2 Se n te n c in g o na

Si n g le Co un t o f

Co n v ic ti o n [: ] (a) Where the statutorily authorized maxi mum sentenc e is less than the minimum of the applica

ble guideline ra

ng e, the statutorily authorized maxi mum sentence shall be the guideline sentenc e. (b) Where a statutorily require d minimum sentenc e is greater than the maxi mum of the applica

ble gu id e li n e rang e, the statutorily require d minimum sentenc e shall be the g uideline sentenc e. (c ) I n a ny oth e r c a se , th e se nte nc e may be imp os e d a t any po int wi thi n th e a pp lic a ble g uideline ra

ng e, provide d that the sentenc e-- (1) is not g reater than the statutorily authorized maxi mum sentence , and (2) is not less than any

statutorily

require d minimum sentenc e. 10 the indictment did not alleg e a spe cific loss amount . . . that fa ct did not enhanc e the maximum sentenc e to which [the defe ndant] was exposed”). In addition, this C ourt has spec ifically stated that a “ sentenc ing c ourt’s dete rminations on the ob je c ts of a mul ti- ob je c t c on sp ir a c y

do no t c on sti tut e c ri min a l ve rd ic ts, su c h th a t a defe ndant’s Six th Amendment rig hts are violate d.” Un ite d S tates v . M alp eso , 115 F.3d 155, 168 (2d Cir. 1997) (e mphasis added) . This principle continues to stand in the c ontext of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2( d) eve n afte r the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2 00 5) . T his is s o b e c a

us e , r e g ard le ss o f a

ny e nh anc e me nts imp os e d in a c c or da nc e wi th U
. S
. S
. G
. § 1 B 1
. 2 ( d ) b a s e d o nth e d i s tr i c tc o urt ’ s f

i n d i n g o f mu l t i p l e o b

j e c t s o f a c o n s p i r a c y, U. S.S. G. § 5 G1 .1 pr oh ibi ts the dis tr ic t c ourt fr om i mpo sin g a

se nte nc e g re a te r t

ha n th e statut or ily authorized maxi mum sentence for the sing le conspira cy count on which the jur

y has found the d e f e n d an tg u i l ty. 2 Whil e Guidelines § 1B 1.2(d) dire cts a c ourt to treat a jury ’s conviction on a c ount char g ing a

multipl e-obje ct conspira cy “as if the defe ndant had be en convic ted on a se parate count11

of conspira cy

for e ach of

fense that the def

endant c onspired to commit,” id. § 1 B 1. 2( d) , th is direc tion ex ists sol ely

for the pur

pose of e nabling the cour t to calculate a def

endant’ s sentence
un de r t he Gu ide lin e s. To put it

ano the r w ay , a

c ourt ’s de te rm inatio ns (b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t) that a

de fe nd ant c on sp ir e d to c omm it a c e rt a in n umb e r o f o bje c t of

fe ns e s r e ma in deter minations of sentencingfac tors. Section 1B1.2( d) is mere ly the imprimatur to treat eac h of th o s e s en t en ci n g fa ct o rs as a s ep ar at e c o n s p i ra cy co n v i ct i o nfo r p urp o s es o f d et erm i n i n g a sentenc e with in the Guidelines fr amewor k. These so- called “ new c ounts of conviction,” see Ma c k lin , 927 F.2d at 1280 (quoting U .S.S.G. App. C. ¶ 75, at C. 36), do not transcend the Guidelines provision in § 5G1.1 such that a de fenda nt could be exposed to a sentenc e above the statutory maxi mum for the one c ount of conspira cy for whic h the jury

found him or her

g uilty
. That beingthe ca se, there is no violation of such defe ndant’s Six th Amendment rig ht to a jury tr ia l. B. M ar te ’s c lai m th atth e c our t’ s c ons ide r at ion of t he r obbe r ie s a s o bj e c ts of t he conspiracy violated his S ixth Am endm ent right to a j ury trial because t he jury had acquitted him “as t o the sam e conduct” Marte a lso argues that the district cour t may not enhanc e a de fenda

nt’s sentenc e base d on conduct the c ourt has found the defe ndant committed when suc h finding is inconsistent with t he jury ’s ac quittal “as to the same c onduct.” Esse ntially , Marte c ontends that bec ause the jury acquitted him of the substantive Pinehurst and 161st Street robbe ry char g es, the district cour t
err ed at se ntencingwhen it consider ed those same robber ies to be ob je c ts of the c onspiracy
. Mart e ’s argume nt m iss e s th e po int be c a us e the su bs tanti ve c omm iss ion

of a ro bb e ry is n ot, in fac t, “the same conduct” as conspiringto commit that very same robbe ry . See Salinas v. U nited States , 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) (“ I t is elementary that a conspira cy

may exis t and be punished12

whether or not the substantive cr ime ensues, f or the c onspiracy

is a distinct evil, dang erous to the pu bli c , a nd so punis ha

ble in i tse lf

.” ); United States v. J

ackson , 335 F.3d 170, 182 ( 2d Cir. 2003) (“A s in all conspirac y

case s, the essenc e of the crime is what the conspirator s ag ree d to do, rather than what they

actua lly did.”). The jury ’s ver dict standing for the f act that Ma

rte fa iled to car

ry out the substantive robber ies, there fore , does not prec lude the district cour t from findingbeyond
a re asonable doubt that he conspired to commit thos e robbe ries. In acc ordanc e with Sentencing Guidelines § 1B 1.2(d), the district c ourt proper ly enhanc ed Mar

te’s sente nce ba sed on its finding that the Pinehurst and 161st Street robbe ries we re ob je c ts of the ove rall conspira cy of which Marte w as convic ted.

CO NC LU SION We have c onsidered a ll of Marte’ s arguments, and for the re asons stated he rein a nd in an
a c c omp anyingsumma

ry or de r, we AF F I RM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt .