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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

JOHN SYKES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

October 25, 2018

v No. 338476

Wayne Circuit Court

PHOENIX PROMOTIONS, LLC, doing business 

as BLACKBERRY BAR & GRILL, and CORTEZ 

SMITH,

LC No. 16-006474-NO

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: MURRAY, C.J., and BORRELLO and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ. 

MURRAY, C.J. (concurring).

I agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion to reverse the trial court’s order granting 

defendants’ motion for summary disposition, but write separately to briefly explain why a 

genuine issue of material fact exists despite the limited circumstances under which the 

merchant’s duty can arise.

It is a general rule that merchants do not have a duty to protect invitees from an 

unreasonable risk that is unforeseeable. MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 322, 332; 628 NW2d 

33 (2001). Instead, a duty arises only on behalf of those specifically identifiable invitees that are 

“ ‘readily identifiable as [being] foreseeably endangered.’ ” Id. (quotation marks and citations 

omitted; alteration in original).

When it comes to criminal acts committed on the premises, it is likewise well-settled that 

a “merchant can assume that patrons will obey the criminal law.” Id. at 335. According to the 

MacDonald Court: “This assumption should continue until a specific situation occurs on the 

premises that would cause a reasonable person to recognize a risk of imminent harm to an 

identifiable invitee. It is only a present situation on the premises, not any past incidents, that 

creates a duty to respond.” Id. (emphasis added). It is important to recognize that the duty 

imposed upon merchants “is not based upon the general question whether a criminal act was 

foreseeable, but, rather, once a disturbance occurs on the premises, whether a reasonable person 

would recognize a risk of imminent harm to an identifiable invitee.” Id. at 339 (emphasis 

added). And it bears repeating that “a merchant has no obligation to anticipate the criminal acts

of third parties.” Id.
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The trial court concluded that no genuine issue of fact existed, and that no duty could be 

imposed upon defendants, because there was not an ongoing situation that a reasonable person 

would recognize as a risk of imminent harm to plaintiff. This conclusion was based upon 

plaintiff’s testimony that after the altercation ended, he and the unidentified shooter remained on

the premises for approximately 30 minutes, and plaintiff felt the situation had ended. 

Additionally, plaintiff admittedly remained on the premises for an additional 30 minutes or so 

until leaving, which was when he was shot. 

But the risk of imminent harm did exist at the time defendants’ employee1 was informed 

that there was an altercation, and that the unidentified individual had a gun. At that point, when 

defendants were informed of the situation, a reasonable juror could conclude that there was an 

ongoing situation that one would recognize as creating a reasonable risk of harm to plaintiff, and 

that defendants should have acted upon this duty. The criminal act arose from a situation that 

occurred on the premises, and there is at least some evidence defendants were made aware of the 

situation and the potential for imminent harm, i.e., that there was an altercation and one of the 

participants possessed a gun. Caselaw supports this conclusion, see MacDonald, 464 Mich at 

334, and evidence that the situation had temporarily calmed does not sufficiently detract from the 

fact that there was an ongoing situation at the time defendants were notified of the altercation and 

the gun. For this reason, the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary 

disposition on this issue.

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

 1 Defendants makes much out of the fact that their employees testified that no bouncers were 

employed or utilized by the bar that evening. However, the use of the term “bouncers” came 

from defense counsel’s question, not plaintiff. In other words, plaintiff did not independently 

testify that a bouncer was informed about the gun, but defense counsel asked whether a bouncer 

was informed.