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i

iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE 

EVOLVING SHANGHAI COOPERATION 

ORGANIZATION

Henry Plater-Zyberk 

with 

Andrew Monaghan

August 2014

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public release; distribution is unlimited.

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Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
iv

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ISBN 1-58487-633-6
v

FOREWORD

The role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

(SCO) in regional politics, and the significance of the 

organization for U.S. interests, is widely misunderstood. The organization is emphatically not a military 

bloc, and yet engages in joint activities which resemble 

military cooperation to U.S. eyes. It is, in theory, open 

to new members; but at present is highly unlikely to 

accept any. Its rhetoric firmly opposes U.S. presence 

and activity on the territory of member states, and yet 

individual member states leverage basing agreements 

with the United States to their advantage. 

This monograph by Mr. Henry Plater-Zyberk 

seeks to explain the SCO through reviewing its history 

and stated aspirations, and measuring these against 

actual achievements. It concludes that with the notable exception of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure 

(RATS), the great majority of SCO accomplishments 

are of little significance other than to provide an additional multinational vehicle through which China, 

and in particular Russia, can seek to counter U.S. and 

Western activity in Central Asia. 

Specific policy aims of the SCO, (or of Russia or 

China through the medium of the SCO), should not 

be analyzed according to U.S. policy criteria. It is not 

necessary for an event to take place that would be 

considered by the United States as a substantial policy 

achievement, in order for Russia to believe that the 

SCO has contributed to countering U.S. aims as part 

of an overall strategy. The Strategic Studies Institute 

therefore recommends this monograph as a key to understanding the real implications of development of 
vi

the SCO for U.S. interests, and where and how these 

should be resisted.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

HENRY PLATER-ZYBERK joined the United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defence’s Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC) as a senior lecturer/analyst. His 

previous service with the Royal Air Force Reserve was 

in a variety of roles making use of his extensive language skills. During his career with CSRC, Mr. Plater-Zyberk wrote and briefed prolifically on political 

and internal security issues of Russia and other former Soviet states, regularly lecturing to the staff colleges and defense establishments of the UK and other 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations. 

Between assignments, he maintained his language 

skills and close contact with the targets of his research 

by assisting bilateral negotiations and direct militaryto-military exchanges as a facilitator and multilingual 

interpreter. When writing on particularly sensitive 

topics, Mr. Plater-Zyberk also published under the 

pseudonym Gordon Bennett. He retired from fulltime research in 2011, and now serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Prague Security Studies Institute, 

while working on a comprehensive history of the Soviet and post-Soviet security and intelligence services. 

Mr. Plater-Zyberk holds a degree in Russian from the 

University of London.

ANDREW MONAGHAN is a Research Fellow in the 

Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House 

and Academic Visitor at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, 

UK. Additionally, he is the Founder and Director of 

the Russia Research Network, an independent organization for the generation of information and expertise on Russian politics, security, and economic issues 

based in London. In this capacity, he has served as an 
viii

expert witness to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee. Until late-2012, Dr. Monaghan 

directed Russia related research in the Research Division of the NATO Defense College (NDC) in Rome. 

In this role, he was also the NDC’s senior researcher 

on energy security matters. Prior to that, he held positions as a Senior Research Associate at the Advanced 

Research and Assessment Group (ARAG), part of the 

Defence Academy of the UK, and a Visiting Lecturer 

in the Defence Studies Department of King’s College, 

London, the civilian academic arm of the Joint Services 

Command and Staff College at the Defence Academy. 

Dr. Monaghan holds an M.A. in war studies and a 

Ph.D. in Russian foreign policy (Russian perspectives 

of Russia-European Union security relations) from the 

Department of War Studies, King’s College, UK.
ix

SUMMARY

Key points from this analysis include:

• The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 

is an enduring association which was originally 

brought together by the short-term border security interests of its first five members.

• Russia believes it plays a leading role in the SCO; 

in fact, however, the organization is and always 

has been driven by China, and Moscow’s role is 

vital but secondary. The other member states, 

former Central Asian Soviet republics with no 

history of modern statehood or governance, are 

not equal partners—but their geostrategic location and, in some cases, natural resources make 

them potentially valuable allies for the United 

States and other major powers.

• The SCO is unlikely to enlarge further. Since 

its inception, the SCO has received several applications for membership. However, any enlargement of the organization could be fraught 

with difficulties, mainly because of conflicts of 

interest between China and Russia and the fear 

by member states that some new candidates are 

potential international liabilities and may create further conflict within the organization.

• SCO’s most important and best-functioning 

component structure to date has been its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS).1

 Following the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization drawdown in Afghanistan in 2014, 

the RATS will certainly be reinforced, but there 

is no indication to date that the organization 

as a whole will move any closer to becoming a 

military alliance.
x

• Recent announcements that the SCO will improve its multidirectional cooperation do not 

seem to be supported by specific planning or 

political determination. Only unforeseen and 

extraordinary world events could make the 

SCO member states move closer towards real 

political, economic, or military integration, 

with all the long-term strategic implications 

that would entail.

• While the SCO as an organization does not 

mount any direct challenge to U.S. interests, 

its political role as a coalition of anti-U.S. sentiment is likely to develop further in the future.

• Bilateral security cooperation with the Central 

Asian members of the SCO is ripe for development, but this will require careful and tactful 

management of their balance of interests between the United States, China, and Russia.

ENDNOTES - SUMMARY

1. The SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure is sometimes 

translated, especially by Chinese sources, as the Regional Counter-Terrorist Structure (RCTS).
1

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE 

EVOLVING SHANGHAI COOPERATION 

ORGANIZATION

AN ACCIDENTAL ALLIANCE

Looking closely at the early development of the 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) shows us 

two things: first, the consistent leading role taken by 

China from the earliest stages; and second, the manner in which the organization in its current form developed almost by accident from a series of short-term 

measures intended to resolve border security issues. 

China reacted almost instantly to the dissolution of 

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) at the 

end of 1991. While the political situation in Russia was 

still close to chaos with a consequent near paralysis 

of foreign policy, China did not suffer from the same 

problems and moved rapidly to investigate the opportunities presented by the newly independent states in 

its vicinity. At the very beginning of January 1992, a 

Chinese government delegation led by Minister of 

Foreign Trade Li Lanqing was already on a whistlestop political reconnaissance tour of all five former 

Soviet Central Asian republics.1 This started an intensive round of bilateral visits and agreement signing 

between Central Asian states and China during the 

rest of 1992,2 which laid the groundwork for a new 

order of cooperative relations in the region. 

The main initial driver for security cooperation 

between the current members of the SCO was resolving border demarcation issues. This was significant 

when considering Chinese relations with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, all of which 

had disputed borders with China as a consequence 
2

of the Soviet period. China’s borders with the new 

states were about 3,700 kilometers long, and as well 

as demarcation, Beijing was also concerned about the 

freedom of movement across the old Soviet borders 

of increasingly aggressive Islamic groups, and their 

potential influence on China’s own Uighur minority 

in Xinjiang. 

On September 8, 1992, at a meeting in Minsk, the 

countries of Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

and Tajikistan agreed on a common border policy 

with China. The four former republics of the Soviet 

Union also agreed to send a joint delegation to have 

border talks with Beijing, China. When the talks began, the three Central Asian countries had a total of 19 

disputed border areas with China (11 between China 

and Kazakhstan, five between Kyrgyzstan and China, 

and three between Tajikistan and China).3 China’s 

border differences with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 

were solved with a mutually acceptable agreement at 

the end of 1999, and with Tajikistan in May 2002,4 and 

China and Russia signed the final border agreement 

on October 14, 2004.5 An additional agreement—finalizing the completion of the 4,300-km border demarcation—was signed by the foreign ministers of both 

countries on July 21, 2008.6

Yet even at an early stage of the long negotiations 

on border issues, shared security concerns were leading to additional closer cooperation over and above 

demarcation. Recognition of the unique challenges of 

the time led to unprecedented multilateral cooperative 

security initiatives. Five countries (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and China) started parallel, independent talks on reduction of their armed 

forces and confidence building measures in the border 

areas of the countries concerned. The “Shanghai Five” 
3

group was officially established on April 26, 1996, 

with the signing in Shanghai of the “Agreement on 

Strengthening of Confidence Building Measures in the 

Military Sphere in Border Regions.” The second meeting of the new organization took place in Moscow, 

where on April 24, 1997, the “four plus one” countries 

agreed to reduce military forces in these border areas.7

Meanwhile, cultivation by China of Central Asian 

states on a bilateral basis continued. In April 1994, 

Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng visited Uzbekistan, 

Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.8 During 

his visit, Li stated four principles of the developing 

relationship between China and Central Asia. All of 

these principles contain phrases which are familiar 

from habitual Chinese discourse, with underlying 

meanings which are strikingly different from general principles of foreign relations followed by the 

United States:

1. Maintaining good neighborly, friendly, peaceful 

coexistence.

2. Developing mutually beneficial cooperation 

which would contribute to the overall prosperity of 

the region. 

3. Respecting the decisions taken by each nation, 

and noninterference with the policies of other states. 

4. Respect for the independence and sovereignty 

of each country and a promotion of regional stability.9

Jiang Zemin, China’s then President and General 

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, was next to visit in July 1996 and 

also visited Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. 

In his speech in Almaty, Kazakhstan, on July 5, 1996, 

Jiang stressed the importance of long-term, stable 

relations between China and its neighbors.10
4

The next meeting of the Shanghai Five in Almaty 

on July 3-4, 1998, saw for the first time five separate 

delegations representing their national interests. The 

Shanghai Five issued “The Almaty Declaration,” in 

which they expressed a desire to continue security 

cooperation and an intention to widen their activities in Central Asia and across the whole continent.11

The signatories of the declaration criticized any form 

of nationalist separatism and religious extremism. 

They agreed to cooperate on combating terrorism, 

organized crime, weapons and drugs trafficking, and 

other illegal activities in the region, and declared 

their willingness to widen cooperation to energy, 

transport, and other economic issues. Finally, the five 

states expressed their concern about the situation 

in Afghanistan. 

The Almaty meeting was the turning point when 

the Shanghai Five changed from a confidence-building organization primarily preoccupied with border 

issues and hard security, into a multidirectional organization with considerably broader potential. At this 

point, Russia, then led by Boris Yeltsin, was still economically weak, indecisive, and unstable, and served 

as a warning for the former Soviet republics rather 

than an example to emulate. Had Moscow been more 

determined, able, and willing to invest money and 

political effort to build up the Shanghai Five, the organization would probably now be called the Almaty 

Cooperation Organization and dominated by Russia. 

However, with their booming economy, effective centralized decisionmaking and clear foreign policy objectives, China gradually took the initiative to lead the 

group into a new alliance. The Shanghai Five met next 

in August 1999 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, at the height 

of the Kyrgyz–Uzbek conflict in the Batken area. At 
5

this meeting, the Kyrgyz delegation proposed establishing a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) 

based in Bishkek. In December 1999, also in Bishkek, 

the Shanghai Five held their first joint meeting of state 

security and law enforcement officials.12

Uzbekistan was seen by all five countries as an 

important partner, conducting a consistent campaign 

against Islamic radicals on its own territory and also 

bordering all four remaining Central Asian countries 

and Afghanistan. Yet, it was not until the Shanghai 

Five Summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in the summer 

of 2000, that a meeting of the Five was attended by 

President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan. Karimov also 

attended the following meeting of the Shanghai Five 

in June of 2001, in Shanghai, at which the Five accepted Uzbekistan as a full member and became—very 

briefly—the Shanghai Six. On June 15, 2001, the six 

countries signed the Shanghai Convention on combating terrorism, extremism, and separatism—occasionally referred to as “the three evils”—and finally signed 

the declaration establishing the SCO and announcing 

their determination to work on close multilevel cooperation.13 So from an ad hoc group convened to resolve 

security consequences from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the organization evolved into a permanent 

structure with significant roles over a broad range of 

economic and security cooperation. 

FOLLOWING CHINA AND RUSSIA

The future of the SCO depends largely on the relationship between China and Russia and on where 

these two major players wish to take the organization. 

Some future decisions taken by the SCO may be important for the region, but those taken bilaterally by 
6

Beijing and Moscow will be vital. At the same time, 

the SCO provides a vehicle for Russia and China to 

cooperate with each other and to observe each other’s 

activity in their area of shared interest in Central Asia. 

For Russia in particular, the SCO provides an additional multinational group through which it can seek 

to counter U.S. and Western activity in the region. 

Both countries share concern about the continuing 

U.S. military presence in Central Asia, and both are 

determined to build a new international order but not 

(at present) through a force of arms. On July 1, 2005, 

in Moscow, Presidents Hu Jintao and Vladimir Putin 

signed the “Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of 

China and the Russian Federation Regarding the International Order of the 21st Century” [sic].14 To date, 

this remains the most important joint step taken by 

the two countries since the signing of the “Treaty of 

Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian 

Federation,” on July 16, 2001, a month after the signing of the SCO founding agreement. 

The Joint Statement signed by Moscow and Beijing 

can be taken as a road map for principles of foreign 

policy for the entire SCO. The first point of the statement warns that “the process of building a new international order will be complicated and lengthy.”15

It continues by declaring that both countries strive to 

safeguard peace, stability, and security for all of mankind and it vaguely addresses all challenges facing 

the world, including international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized 

transnational crime, infectious diseases, and drug 

trafficking. The statement stresses the importance of 

the right of the individual countries to choose their 

own destiny, and noninterference in each other’s in-
7

ternal affairs “without resorting to the threat of force 

or the use of force.” The signatories support the United Nations (UN) in a leading role as the creator and 

executor of the basic norms of international law, and 

call for strict observation of resolutions of the UN Security Council. They suggest that the UN should be 

reformed, and should have its “potential for dealing 

with new challenges and threats enhanced” (Point 3). 

The statement speaks about human rights “enshrined 

in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” but expects individual countries to safeguard them “in [the] 

light of their own conditions and traditions.” It stresses that countries should not interfere in each other’s 

internal affairs and “that the history and traditions of 

multi-ethnic countries must be respected. Any action 

aimed at dividing sovereign countries and inciting hatred among ethnic groups is unacceptable” (Points 6 

and 7). Russia and China see their new relationship as 

“a major contribution to building a new international 

order” and promise to build a new and harmonious 

world, calling on all countries to engage in extensive 

dialogue on the issue of the international order of the 

21st century (Point 12).16

This statement by the two SCO’s “senior” members was followed 5 days later by the Declaration of 

Heads of Member States of SCO, calling on the antiterrorist coalition in Afghanistan to set a final timeline 

for their temporary use of the bases and other facilities in the SCO countries.17 The SCO thereby represents a means through which Russia and China are 

overcoming their differences in order to work pragmatically toward common interests in a region of 

shared concern. 

As far as the four poorer, landlocked members of 

the SCO are concerned, this quest by Beijing and Moscow to limit outside influence can be beneficial, as it 
8

would tend to preclude external interference in the 

management of their autocracies (except, of course, by 

Beijing and Moscow) and promote the kind of stability 

favored by the local regimes. In pursuing their foreign 

trade and economic development aims, however, Russia and China cannot always count on the support of 

other members of the SCO in the same way, since the 

smaller member states see bilateral economic relations 

with the United States and other countries outside the 

organization as beneficial for them and a good bargaining chip in interaction with Beijing and Moscow. 

Basing agreements with the United States are a specific example of how the interests of the smaller SCO 

members, and the interests of the United States, may 

be in direct opposition to the stated priorities of the 

SCO overall. 

SCOPE FOR ENLARGEMENT

A key element of the strategic impact of the emerging SCO, and its implications for U.S. interests, must 

be the organization’s willingness to expand by accepting new applicants for membership—and who those 

applicants might be. The SCO was not initially prepared to accept any new members. In January 2004, 

then Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov 

said that the SCO “has to stand on its own feet before 

it is ready to accept new members.”18 His statement 

was supported by Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister 

Li Hui who repeated in June 2004 that the SCO was 

not ready to accept new members.19 In October 2005, 

Zhang Deguang, the SCO’s first Executive Secretary—

the title of his position was later changed to Secretary 

General—said that the reason for this was legal since 

“the appropriate laws were not ready yet.”20 But by 

May 2006, Zhang Deguang said that the SCO was not 
9

a closed organization,21 and the following month, at 

the SCO summit, he added that enlargement was possible—but with the continuing rider that appropriate 

legal work would have to be finalized.22

Seven years later, the legal foundation for enlarging the SCO is still not ready. A meeting of Ministries 

of Foreign Affairs of member states organized by 

the SCO secretariat in Beijing on April 11-12, 2013, 

discussed expansion again, as well as work with the 

observer states and dialogue partners. Once again, 

the participants “discussed the legal aspects of 

these issues.”23

“Observer states” and “dialogue partners” form 

two distinct groups of states external to the SCO but 

maintaining relations with it. Both of these statuses 

were created by Article 14 of the SCO Charter of June 

7, 2002, which allows the organization to “interact 

and maintain dialogue, in certain [unspecified] areas 

of cooperation, with other states and international organizations” and to “grant a state or international organization concerned the status of a dialogue partner 

or observer.”24 Belarus and Sri Lanka were granted 

dialogue partner status at the SCO Summit in 2009, 

in Yekaterinburg, Russia.25 Turkey became a dialogue 

partner at the SCO’s 2012 summit in Beijing and apparently wants to upgrade its status to an observer.26

Observer status is in theory the shortest (although 

not necessarily short) route to full membership. Mongolia applied for and received SCO observer status at 

the SCO Tashkent Summit in 2004.27 India, Pakistan, 

and Iran obtained SCO observer status at the Astana 

Summit in July 2005.28 The latest observer applicant 

was Afghanistan, accepted in June 2012 at the Summit 

in Beijing.29 According to Chinese and Russian sources, a U.S. application for similar status was rejected 

in 2005.30
10

Extending membership is likely to continue to 

prove complex, and prospective members face a range 

of hurdles. Iranian full membership of the SCO is officially out of the question at the present time because 

of UN and European Union (EU) sanctions, but also 

because of Iran’s violent international image and its 

sponsorship of terrorism in many countries. China 

may be happy to import large quantities of oil from 

Iran, but accepting Tehran as a full SCO member 

would seriously dent the organization’s international 

image. While China traditionally has been relatively 

unrestrained in regard to actions which risk reputational damage for itself, it is more sensitive to the public image of an organization which it is championing 

as a bastion of regional stability and international cooperation. To introduce a member known to support 

at least two of the dreaded “three evils” would 

be problematic. 

Iran’s self-inflicted precarious situation, in turn, 

does not help Pakistan toward SCO membership. 

Pakistan could become an energy and trade corridor 

to China if the government in Islamabad was able to 

stabilize the country and to control some of its radical 

tribes and politicians. Yet, even if Pakistan achieved 

these seemingly impossible goals, the support of 

China, its traditional ally, would not be enough: Russia would not accept Islamabad’s SCO membership 

without its own ally, India, being accepted at the same 

time. India, on the other hand, has major territorial 

disputes with Pakistan and unresolved border problems with China. In April 2013, the Chinese army had 

moved into the Depsang Valley in the Ladakh region 

of eastern Kashmir, 10-km into Indian territory. China 

claims around 90,000-square-km of land in India’s 

northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, while India 
11

says China is already occupying 38,000-square-km of 

territory in the Aksai Chin plateau in the western Himalayas.31 The two sides have so far held 15 rounds 

of talks since 1990 to resolve their border dispute,32

without making much progress, even though China 

has settled 11 land-based territorial disputes with six 

other neighbors since 1998.33

Belarus’s membership of SCO is also unlikely; 

partly because of Moscow’s recurrent confrontations 

with the mercurial Belarusian President Alyaksandr 

Lukashenka, and partly because Belarus is clearly a 

European country whose links with Central Asia and 

the Far East, despite strenuous efforts by Belarus to 

pursue a multivector foreign policy, remain extremely 

modest. Turkey’s full membership of the SCO has 

been discussed mainly because the Turkish Prime 

Minister Recep Erdogan introduced the subject as an 

attention-seeking maneuver linked to Turkey’s fading campaign to join the EU. Russia is a key energy 

supplier to Turkey, and there are good trade relations 

between the two countries. But in June 2009, with Erdogan comparing the plight of the Uighurs—a Turkicspeaking Muslim minority in Xinjiang—to “a kind of 

genocide,” and Turkey’s rejection of a dialogue with 

the Syrian regime—Moscow’s close ally—Ankara’s 

SCO candidature looks like a remote prospect.34 Furthermore, Turkey’s SCO membership would also be 

likely to end its already weak chance of joining the 

EU, and could potentially complicate its position 

in NATO.35

One of the major problems facing any SCO enlargement process is the incorporation of the new members into the organization’s anti-terrorist cooperation 

structure, and especially its intelligence sharing: every 

candidate member other than Mongolia brings its own 
12

challenges in terms of trust with one or more existing member states. Intelligence integration and access 

in particular would not only be a technical challenge 

but also a political one, especially with Iran, Pakistan, 

and Afghanistan being granted access to shared intelligence on terrorist organizations. 

Of the four countries willing to join the SCO, Mongolia would be the least controversial new member. 

However, Mongolia is not confronted by the SCO’s 

“three evils” (terrorism, extremism, and separatism), 

does not need the SCO’s help, and has good relations 

with both Russia and China, as well as with many 

other regional countries. Its present status in the organization may give it sufficient benefits without any 

adverse impact on its independence and sovereignty. 

For the moment, therefore, any enlargement of 

the SCO seems unlikely, since there are obstacles to 

the membership of any of the current candidates, and 

some (for example, Iran) would instead have a destabilizing effect on the alliance. This, however, does not 

prevent the SCO seeking closer links with both observers and partners. After the April 2013 Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs (MFA) meeting in Beijing, the SCO has 

stated an intention to focus on closer cooperation with 

the UN and other international organizations and 

with what it describes as “authoritative institutions.”36

NO THREAT?

Some commentators and analysts see the SCO 

as a potential threat and an anti-U.S. coalition.37 The 

latter is to some extent true—the voices from Beijing 

and Moscow criticizing the post-Cold War unipolar 

world are loud and persistent. The United States and 

its democratic allies should expect continuing robust 
13

opposition to some of their policies and initiatives in 

the UN and other international organizations, especially as Russian foreign policy continues to refine its 

assertiveness. In addition, the intent toward intensified work with international organizations noted previously may be an indication that the SCO, in a similar 

manner to the Collective Security Treaty Organization 

(CSTO), can be used to claim parity or equivalence 

with U.S.-friendly organizations such as NATO, in an 

attempt to gain leverage for Russia. 

As described later, the uncertain future of Afghanistan will spur SCO member states to even closer cooperation in the field of hard security. In other areas, for 

example in economic and technical fields, cooperation 

may be more difficult, in particular because the two 

“senior members,” China and Russia, have widely 

varying agendas and their world view has little in 

common except for dislike of U.S. domination. Distrust between these two senior partners is centuries 

old, and the brief period of communist friendship of 

the USSR and China between 1949 and the early-1960s 

cooled quickly and almost immediately turned into 

hostility during the Cultural Revolution. Even then, 

the intensity of the friendship was artificially exaggerated by the propaganda machinery of both countries 

and many Western commentators. 

Today, as before, cooperation between the two 

countries is not as close as official statements from 

both sides would have us believe. For the time being, China does not appear concerned by what Russia perceives as its slow return toward the center of 

the international stage, but some officials and experts 

in Moscow see China’s multidirectional growth and 

Russia’s own weaknesses in the Far East as a serious concern. According to Dmitry Rogozin, Russian 
14

Deputy Prime Minister and former Russian ambassador to NATO, between 1993 and 2005 the number of 

inhabitants in the Russian Far East decreased by 3.7 

million and during the same period, the population 

of Russia decreased by 11 million. He predicts that 

this trend will continue until 2050 when the population of Russia will drop, in his estimation, to 92-112 

million people.38

Even without Dr. Rogozin’s drastic statistical projections, the situation in the Russian Far East is striking. There are fewer than 7 million inhabitants living 

in Russia’s Far East Federal District,39 while the other 

side of the border is inhabited by 100 million Chinese;40 the population of the three Chinese provinces 

adjacent to the Russian Far East is more than 20 times 

the population of the Russian Far East itself, and the 

entire Russian population east of the Urals is only one 

and a half times as many as that of “Greater Beijing.”41

Moscow is particularly worried by a potential flood 

of Chinese immigrants, and its own powerlessness to 

address the issue. The more alarmist of Russian commentators have long pointed out that, after a general 

mobilization, the Chinese armed forces would equal 

Russia’s total population.42 Although it remains unstated in Russian doctrinal documents such as the 

National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine, which 

instead focus on politically acceptable commentary on 

the supposed threat from NATO,43 Russia treats the 

rapid growth of the Chinese armed forces as a potential challenge rather than an immediate threat—while 

also being annoyed and grudgingly impressed by 

how quickly the Chinese copied many of the Soviet/

Russian weapons exported to China after the collapse 

of the Soviet Union. Moscow is not worried by an unlikely Chinese military invasion, as it regards its own 
15

nuclear force as a sufficient deterrent.44 However, in 

spite of the positive noises emanating from both capitals, the two countries still do not trust each other.45

Rather than building a militarily strong SCO, Russia is interested in strengthening military aspects of 

the CSTO, set up on October 7, 2002, which also includes four members of the SCO (Russia, Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan).46

The fundamental lack of trust between Moscow 

and Beijing is not the only internal confidence problem within the SCO, which suffers from a complex 

web of mutual mistrust between member states. There 

are still serious border disagreements and ethnic tensions between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are also not 

friendly, and strained by the proposed completion of 

a controversial dam built in a seismically dangerous 

area and exacerbating issues of water politics. Periodic gas cut-offs from Uzbekistan render Tajikistan vulnerable and are also not conducive to improvement in 

bilateral relations. In 2012, Uzbekistan introduced exit 

visas for Uzbek passport holders who want to visit Tajikistan, in an attempt to limit links between the two 

countries.47

Furthermore, there are increasingly visible frictions between Moscow and Dushanbe. Tajikistan, the 

poorest of the Central Asian countries, is trying to 

capitalize on the changing situation in Afghanistan by 

improving its relations with the United States,48 and 

Moscow is unhappy with Dushanbe’s diplomatic efforts to improve its relations with Washington. Igor 

Shuvalov, Russia’s First Deputy Prime Minister, and 

Colonel General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, both recently postponed visits to 

Dushanbe.49 Both countries agreed that Russia would 

modernize the Tajik armed forces without Russia pay-
16

ing for their “201st Base” (the former 201st Motor-Rifle Division, stationed on the Tajik-Afghan border) in 

Tajikistan. Dushanbe requested more than the offered 

$200 million plus an additional $200 million worth 

of fuel, perhaps encouraged by the knowledge that 

neighboring Kyrgyzstan is expecting $1.1 billion from 

Moscow for the modernization of its forces.50 Anecdotal evidence suggests that Central Asian states are 

more impressed with the quality, efficiency, and efficacy of U.S. military training and equipment assistance 

than its Russian equivalent; but Russian offers come 

without the troublesome overhead of external interest 

in domestic human rights issues, and consequences 

such as the withholding of aid following mass deaths 

of civilians during unrest in Andijan, Uzbekistan, in 

May 2005.51

Tajikistan is therefore trying to improve its relations with Washington, in part in the hope of keeping some of the military hardware left behind by the 

drawdown from Afghanistan. This may be a very 

risky strategy because Russia is in a position to destabilize Tajikistan by influencing, or even removing, 

the large number of Tajik migrant laborers working 

in Russia who provide remittances that shore up the 

Tajik economy.52 The implications for U.S. bilateral 

relations, and for potential basing arrangements in 

particular, are clear: the willingness by Tajikistan’s 

leadership to engage in balancing between the major 

powers continues to present the United States with 

opportunities to exploit, as it has done since the early 

days of the current intervention in Afghanistan.53 At 

the same time, the example of Ayni airbase in Tajikistan, still unused almost a decade after India began its 

redevelopment and announced plans for basing there, 

shows how successful intervention can be mounted to 

prevent a foreign military presence in the country.54
17

In the coming years, Russia and China plan to 

continue substantially strengthening their armed 

forces, and both countries are likely to continue to 

make statements separately, jointly, or with the SCO 

which directly and indirectly criticize aspects of U.S. 

and NATO policies. The SCO Summit in June 2012 

in Beijing gives an example of the tone. The heads of 

member states declared that the: 

unilateral and unlimited build-up of anti-missile defence, by one state or group of states, without taking 

into account the legitimate interests of other countries may damage international security and strategic 

stability in the world,

and called to resolve this destabilizing process by political and diplomatic effort.55 The subject is clearly of 

immediate concern to Moscow, some interest to Beijing, and no relevance whatsoever to the other SCO 

members. Despite the strong wording of the statement, it will have no impact on the organization’s 

defense planning or military capability. 

Occasional speculation in its early days that the 

SCO could become a military bloc was addressed in 

June 2005 by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. 

He rejected the idea, adding that the organization does 

not even plan to form a rapid deployment force.56 One 

year later, Executive Secretary Zhang Deguang denied that the organization was the eastern equivalent 

of NATO, adding that “the SCO will never become a 

military bloc.”57 Nothing since has indicated that the 

SCO’s plans or attitude have changed in this respect. 

Russia and China will build up their armed forces for 

years to come, but they will do so separately.
18

FUTURE PLANS AND CONTEMPORARY 

REALITIES

In common with other international bodies, the 

SCO can on occasion produce a great deal more rhetoric than action. At a meeting of SCO heads of states on 

October 14, 2009, in Beijing, member states agreed on 

15 principal points, including: 

• The need to ensure the economic stability of the 

member states and improving their economic 

cooperation, to overcome the global financial 

and economic crisis.

• The necessity to strengthen the financial cooperation within the organization.

• Improving the role of the SCO Business Council 

and to focus on the preparation of proposals for 

the implementation of joint regional projects.

• Instructing the appropriate ministries and agencies to take the necessary measures for more 

effective use of existing transit potential of the 

SCO member states, further improvement of 

the transport infrastructure, and strengthening 

the legal framework for transport cooperation.

• Calling for early launch of pilot projects such 

as the “SCO information superhighway” (of 

which no details have yet been publicly released) and to establish secure electronic crossborder links.

• The need to stress the importance of agricultural cooperation.

• Reaffirming the importance of scientific and 

technical cooperation within the SCO, especially in the priority areas of scientific and technological innovations.
19

• The active promotion of practical cooperation 

between the SCO member states and observer 

states of the SCO.

• The determination to improve the medical 

and cultural cooperation between the member 

states.58

And yet, the participants did not offer any specific 

policies or propose any actual undertakings. 

In addition to meetings of political, administrative, 

foreign policymaking, security organs, and law enforcement bodies, the SCO Secretariat organizes and 

coordinates meetings of an impressive array of interstate groups, covering a range of activities, some of 

which are far removed from the organization’s original focus on hard security issues. These include meetings of unspecified “financial organs” (most recently 

April 23-24, 2012, in Shanghai), the SCO Economic Forums/Fora (April 23-24, 2012, in Almaty and April 18, 

2013, in Beijing), meetings of the Chairmen of the National Supreme Courts (April 23-25, 2012, in Beijing), 

meetings of the SCO Ministers of Defence (April 24, 

2012, in Beijing), Ministers of Finances and Heads of 

the National Banks (May 16-17, 2012, in Beijing), Ministers of Culture (June 4-7, 2012), Attorneys-General 

(June 5-6, 2012, in Dushanbe), and the “5th SCO Discussion Club,” which included participants from the 

United Kingdom (UK) and Germany (March 14, 2013, 

in Beijing). 

Many of these meetings are no more than diplomatic familiarization tours and public relations exercises with little actual substance, and it remains 

unclear whether any of them, in fact, have the bureaucratic capacity to achieve any actual deliverables. The 
20

9th meeting of the SCO Culture Ministers, in Beijing 

in early June 2012, provides a good example. Participants praised the mechanism of these annual meetings, and expressed their satisfaction with its friendly 

and constructive spirit, mutual understanding, and 

trust. They “exchanged opinions on the implementation of the Plan of Activities for 2009-2011” and discussed “further strengthening cultural cooperation 

in the SCO framework in the coming decade.” They 

agreed to “deepen cooperation in the field of protection of historic cultural heritage” and to “stimulate 

cooperation in the field of culture and maintain cultural exchanges with the SCO observer and dialogue 

partner countries.”59 Yet, in common with many other 

SCO meetings on topics other than security and law 

enforcement, the SCO Culture Ministers have been 

engaging in these meetings since 2002 with no visible 

achievement as a result. 

RATS

A Complicated Birth . . .

By contrast, antiterrorism cooperation by SCO 

states shows distinct signs of productive activity. The 

first meeting of the Shanghai Five security and law enforcement officials in Bishkek in December 1999 was 

Moscow’s first serious attempt to set up an anti-terrorist substructure for the organization, the “Regional 

Anti-Terrorist Structure” (RATS). Three years later, at 

the SCO foreign ministers’ extraordinary meeting in 

Beijing on January 7, 2002, the candidature of Bishkek as a location for this structure was accepted,60

and Article 10 of the Shanghai Charter, signed in St. 

Petersburg on June 7, 2002, confirmed that “the Re-
21

gional Counter-Terrorist Structure established by the 

member States of the Shanghai Convention” would be 

located in Bishkek in the Kyrgyz Republic.61

This, however, did not come about, causing considerable private embarrassment within the SCO at the 

time.62 Strong support for Russia’s initiative from Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev was not enough to bring 

the project to life. China and Uzbekistan, opponents 

of the project, argued that the world had changed after the September 11, 2001, attacks, Kyrgyzstan was 

in turmoil, and there was concern that a Kyrgyzstanbased RATS HQ would be dominated by Russia. China and Uzbekistan were also ambivalent about Moscow’s efforts to strengthen the CSTO, as evidenced by 

the fact that Uzbekistan left the organization in April 

1999, and China never joined it; in fact, in the form of 

the CSTO, Russia was attempting to build up a parallel anti-terrorist structure and militarize it, while the 

negotiations to set up the RATS went on. Tashkent 

was especially discontented with Moscow’s attempts 

to dominate the RATS, and because Russia was seen 

as siding with Bishkek in the ongoing conflict between 

Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnic groups. The internal conflict 

in Kyrgyzstan was a powerful argument to move the 

RATS HQ to another country, and the SCO’s Prime 

Ministers, with the approval of their Heads of States, 

signed off on a new anti-terrorist center in Tashkent 

on September 23, 2003.63 The RATS began to operate 

on January 1, 2004, and the official launch of its Executive Committee took place on June 17, 2004, also 

in Tashkent,64 under its first Executive Director, Major 

General Vyacheslav Temirovich Kasymov, Deputy 

Chairman of the Uzbek National Security Service.65

The birth complications of the RATS continued, 

deepening the apprehension of some of SCO mem-
22

bers as Major General Suhrob Kasymov used a conference in Beijing in the summer of 2004 to criticize the 

CSTO.66 In February 2005, Suhrob Kasymov publicly 

criticized Kazakhstan’s insufficient determination to 

combat terrorism on its own soil67—an accusation naturally rejected by the Kazakh MFA. Yet, this was the 

last time when a disagreement among members of the 

RATS came into public view. The artificial cordiality 

that has been observed since may not have been difficult to maintain in public: the SCO is a nontransparent organization, of which Russia, with its muscular 

democracy, is by far the most democratic—or least 

undemocratic—member, so concealing any disagreements or shortcomings from public view should not 

prove difficult. 

The original stated function of the RATS was to 

maintain working contacts and coordinate the activities of the relevant organs of the SCO member states 

in combating terrorism, extremism, and separatism.

At the outset, the RATS employed 30 people—seven 

from Russia, seven from China, six from Kazakhstan, 

five from Uzbekistan, three from Kyrgyzstan, and 

three from Tajikistan. The original budget of the organization was about $2 million, of which 24 percent 

each came from China and Russia, 21 percent paid 

by Kazakhstan, 15 percent by Uzbekistan, 10 percent 

by Kyrgyzstan, and 6 percent by Tajikistan.68 Information about its present budget and the number of 

employees is classified. 

. . . and a bright future?

The RATS claims a consistent record of success in 

combating terrorism, but it is not always clear how 

much of this is thanks to the RATS itself rather than to 
23

the individual and uncoordinated efforts of its member countries. For instance, according to Vyacheslav 

Kasymov, in 2005 the special services of the SCOs 

countries “prevented 263 terrorist acts, killing or arresting 15 leaders of extremist organizations” including extremist groups planning suicide attacks against 

the U.S. embassy and other targets—claimed as a success for the RATS less than a year after its formation.69

By early-2006 the RATS investigative register 

contained about 800 names of members of terrorist 

groups, which were to be added to its new database.70

Five years later, in 2011, the RATS reportedly contributed to more than 400 arrests of terrorist suspects in 

the SCO countries, and prevented 10 terrorist acts and 

about 200 other unspecified actions. More than 400 terrorists were killed; more than 480 individuals belonging to forbidden organizations were detained; and six 

terrorist groups, eight religious extremists groups, 

and two unspecified gangs “were eliminated.”71

Despite building operational capabilities and conducting several anti-terrorist exercises since the early 

days of its existence, the RATS has never attempted 

to build its own anti-terrorist force or coordinate the 

armed forces of member states in formations or units 

capable of operating against terrorist groups. Turning 

RATS into a joint military organization, or establishing an entirely new SCO military structure, would 

require political will, large-scale defense investment, 

and a level of coordination which Beijing and Moscow 

would have difficulty in sustaining, due to political 

rather than technical reasons.

At present, the RATS is still developing what may 

potentially be its most powerful tool, an international 

terrorism intelligence sharing database. As well as 

collection from online, electronic, and print media, the 

database receives information from the RATS mem-
24

ber states and other SCO agencies. In return, the RATS 

Executive Committee transmits a quarterly report on 

information acquired by the database to the security 

and law enforcement organizations of the member 

states. The agreement on the database stipulates that 

only authorized officials of the RATS member states 

will have access to it, with access granted by order 

of the RATS Executive Committee. Significantly, the 

working languages of the database project are Russian 

and Chinese:72 a Russian company was responsible 

for initial database development and information security, and additional software was developed by a 

Chinese firm.73

The database’s content supposedly includes information about terrorist, separatist, and extremist organizations, their structures, their operational methods, their leaders and other individuals involved in 

these organizations, as well as sources and channels 

of funding, including the trafficking of illicit drugs 

and their ingredients. It also stores information about 

organizations and individuals which support terrorism, extremism, and separatism, potential measures to 

counter them, and information on legislation affecting 

individual member states and international organizations. Analysis of terrorist acts includes information on the equipment and materials used, including 

explosives and components. 

Gradual improvement of anti-terrorist cooperation 

within the RATS can be considered a success, not only 

because (considering the lack of trust among certain 

member states) the decision to share some elements 

of anti-terrorist information must have been preceded 

by lengthy, complex, and secret talks, but also because 

it represents an entirely new technological and security network which the member states had to cooperate 
25

to set up. The extent of technological and security coordination required in managing the RATS database, 

and indeed in granting and controlling access, may 

have presented a steep learning curve for some of the 

smaller member states. 

Relative to other SCO activities, internal cooperation within the RATS appears unusually productive, 

and since cooperation is clearly in the best interests 

of the ruling regimes of the contributing states, it is 

very probable that the member states will continue 

working on its improvement. Furthermore, the RATS 

is highly likely to be a beneficiary of the intense concern shared by SCO member states over the aftermath 

of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

drawdown in Afghanistan. 

SCO countries are critical of the ISAF presence in 

Afghanistan, saying that it achieves more harm than 

good, and yet simultaneously is deeply apprehensive 

of the consequences of the ISAF drawdown for the 

region after 2014. Russia claims that heroin production in Afghanistan has increased 40 times since 2001, 

and quotes UN statistics from 2012 indicating that 

Afghanistan produces about 90 percent of the world’s 

opium. Russia also maintains that about 15 percent 

of Afghanistan’s gross national product depends on 

drug-related exports, which amounts to a business 

worth U.S.$2.4 billion a year. Qayum Samir, spokesman for Afghanistan’s Counternarcotics Ministry, announced at the beginning of April 2013 that 157,000 

hectares of poppies are being planted in Afghanistan 

this year—3,000 hectares more than in 2012.74

All the SCO states expect to be targeted by new 

and resurrected terrorist groups, and subjected to an 

increased flow of narcotics, post-2014. Each of them 

can therefore be expected to invest in their counter-
26

terrorist organizations, special services, organizations 

combating drug trafficking, and border guards, and to 

develop international cooperation, including through 

the means of the RATS. A meeting of the organizations 

responsible for combating drug trafficking and other 

“competent organs” of the SCO took place in Bishkek 

on April 30, 2013. As expected, the participants of the 

meeting discussed the problems of combating the illicit trafficking of drugs and their precursors, focusing 

on how to counter the production and trafficking of 

opium from Afghanistan. The meeting approved an 

Action Plan for 2013-14 in accordance with the AntiDrug Strategy of the SCO member states for the years 

2011-16.75 No details of the Plan or the Strategy were 

made public.

Key Facts.

The RATS is directed by two principal bodies: the 

Executive Committee and the Council. The RATS Executive Committee deals with three principal tasks: 

1. Information and analytical support of security 

and law enforcement bodies of the member states, 

consisting mainly of the creation and maintenance of a 

joint database on international terrorist organizations 

and their members. In 2009, the SCO considered setting up a special information file within the RATS’s 

anti-terrorist database which would hold information 

about illegal arms, ammunition, and explosives.76

2. Coordinating the fight against terrorism, 

extremism, and separatism.

3. International legal work relevant to the RATS’s 

activities. 
27

The Council meets twice a year to provide strategic 

directions and plans for the Committee. The Council is 

the transmission belt between national decisionmakers, national security organizations, and the RATS Executive Committee. Its Chairmen are usually hidden 

from the public eye, as they are serving as high ranking security officials in their own countries. During its 

March 29, 2013, meeting in Tashkent, the Council approved a draft protocol between the SCO RATS and 

the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) AntiTerrorism Centre, on the organization of cooperation 

on the security of major international events held on 

the territories of the SCO and the CIS. The participants 

agreed also to hold an international conference on 

strengthening cooperation in the field of information 

security.77

The RATS main functions are: 

• To maintain working contacts with the relevant 

organs of member states and international organizations dealing with terrorism, extremism, 

and separatism.

• To promote interaction among member states 

in organizing and conducting exercises at the 

request of the member states concerned, preparations and conduct of operational-search and 

other activities to fight terrorism, extremism, 

and separatism.

• Participating in the drafting of international 

legal documents affecting the fight against terrorism, extremism, and separatism.

• Collection and analysis of information received 

by the RATS from member states and forming 

and updating the RATS’s database.

• Participation in the formation of an effective 

system to address global challenges and threats.
28

• Preparing and conducting scientific conferences and seminars, and promoting the exchange 

of experience in the fight against terrorism, extremism, and separatism.78

OUTLOOK 

Both China and Russia may have misgivings about 

U.S. policies and U.S. military presence in Asia, but 

it would take extraordinary and unexpected events 

to convince them of the need to militarize the SCO. 

Both countries work consistently on strengthening 

SCO anti-terrorist cooperation, and they will continue 

to do so because of the uncertain future of Afghanistan and the possible rebirth of radical Islamic groups 

across the whole region. At the SCO Bishkek meeting 

of Security Councils of the member states of the SCO 

at the end of April 2013, Chinese representative State 

Councilor Guo Shengkun announced that the new 

Chinese leadership will fully support law enforcement 

and security body cooperation within the SCO.79 This 

statement from the SCO’s principal and most dynamic 

stakeholder does not necessarily mean that cooperation in other areas will improve correspondingly. 

Ambitious statements by the SCO are rarely followed up with specific plans. This may be because 

the organization itself has very limited capacity. The 

SCO is reluctant to discuss the financial aspects of its 

plans or even its budget, but if older figures quoted 

by some, usually Russian, commentators are to be believed, the budget of the organization is very small. 

According to one source, in 2006 the SCO budget was 

$3.5 million, increasing to $3.7 million in 2007, with 

funding contributions divided between member states 

in the same proportions as for funding the RATS as 
29

described previously—Russia and China providing 

24 percent each; Kazakhstan, 21 percent; Uzbekistan, 

15 percent; Kyrgyzstan, 10 percent; and Tajikistan, 6 

percent. The same source said that the SCO’s budget 

for 2008, approved by the heads of the member states 

on November 2, 2007, was to be $3.5 million.80 Other 

sources give figures which are similarly small for such 

a large organization.81 These modest sums are in stark 

contrast to the projected budget for the preparation 

of the SCO summit in Ufa, Russia, in 2015, set by the 

local authorities at 60 billion rubles (approximately 

$1.8 billion).82

Any closer economic cooperation within the SCO 

is likely to encounter serious difficulty. Although all 

the leaders of the SCO member states are in a position to influence just about every economic decision 

taken at the national level in their countries—without 

paying attention to their parliaments, the judiciary, 

the media, or their internal opponents—even they 

would have problems if they were to return to the 

old communist model of large-scale money-losing 

“investments” in the SCO’s poorer members, without dramatic and visible political or social benefits. 

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan 

must also be concerned that closer economic cooperation within the framework of the SCO will attach them 

too strongly to the two larger members, especially 

China, and could thereby limit their potential political 

and economic contacts with the United States, the EU, 

Japan, and other countries. At the same time, this does 

not rule out continued significant investment in Central Asian states by China, as keen to acquire influence 

there through economic means as Russia is to retain it 

through military cooperation and basing. 
30

Long-term mutual economic investment by SCO 

states in Central Asia may also encounter political 

problems. Kyrgyzstan, the most democratic and the 

least stable of the four countries, has already experienced two coups this century, in March 2005 and April 

2010. In 2012, Kyrgyzstan ranked 154th on the Transparency International corruption list among 176 listed 

countries.83 The three remaining Central Asian states 

are run by fiercely independent dictators, not ready to 

relinquish their power or prepare their countries for 

less dictatorial systems. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and 

Tajikistan have no visible generation of new leaders 

being groomed to replace their current leaders. The 

gradual, eventual departure of these three leaders 

from politics, or from this world, may result in dangerous local political vacuums and internal conflicts 

with the potential to destabilize the whole region. All 

four countries are geostrategically very important 

but, at this stage of their development, have little else 

to offer, including their natural resources and their 

markets. All four current Central Asian leaders may 

be attracted by some aspect of the Chinese dynamic 

economy, but they and their countries’ links with Russia are much stronger than with China. Russia, however, with the exception of oil and weapons, also has 

little to offer in comparison with the United States, the 

West, the Far East, and, increasingly, Brazil. 

At the 8th SCO Bishkek forum on April 18, 2013, 

the organization’s experts recommended stronger 

cooperation programs in areas such as medical care, 

modernization of the railway system, and public service. Experts taking part in the forum suggested also 

that some aspects of the SCO cooperation should be 

devolved from the governmental level to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This change could con-
31

siderably complicate economic cooperation inside the 

SCO, because all SCO member states fight ongoing, 

but largely unsuccessful, battles against corruption. 

Yet, the decision to set up a SCO banking system and 

the SCO Development Fund were of political rather 

than financial importance,84 and the Fund itself was 

originally opposed by Russia.85 When and how the 

new banking system and the Fund are to operate is as 

yet unspecified. 

There is a precedent for this kind of activity in the 

form of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa 

(BRICS) financial cooperation, which, of course, also 

involves both China and Russia; one key difference, 

however, is the considerable economic power wielded 

by each of the individual BRICS members in their own 

right, very dissimilar to the unbalanced nature of the 

SCO where the economies of the smaller members are 

almost invisible by comparison with Russia and China. 

Intimidating sounding statistics about the SCO’s land 

area, total population, or geostrategy do not reflect the 

organization’s imperfect cohesion, or the real capabilities, intentions, and ambitions of the individual member states or their future plans. Economically, the SCO 

as a whole is of very little significance compared to the 

individual weight of its two senior members.

Nevertheless, the SCO will remain a major security 

player in Central Asia in large part simply because its 

individual members are determined to protect their 

interests in this volatile region. The organization does 

not intend, at least for the time being, to build military 

power because there is no perceived need for it; the 

smaller members would depend entirely on Russia 

and/or China, and these two larger members are capable of addressing their immediate defense challenges without outside help and do not trust each other 

sufficiently to build a functional military bloc. 
32

The departure of ISAF forces from Afghanistan 

will not change the SCO’s attitude towards the United States and its allies—all the more so if the United States or its allies retain any military facilities on 

Afghan soil. Moscow is deeply concerned about any 

continuing U.S. military presence in greater Central 

Asia. Nikolay Patrushev, Russian Security Council 

Secretary, said that Russia opposes any foreign presence in Afghanistan which may be used against other 

countries.86 Withdrawal of equipment from Afghanistan post-2014 through SCO member countries will 

remain a fragile option. A less critical attitude toward 

the political imperfections of the Central Asian leaders and their lack of democratic credentials, supported 

by large-scale financial and long-term political initiatives, would not only continue to safeguard this process, but could potentially reduce the psychological 

dependence of the four smaller members of the SCO 

on China and Russia. 

The United States, NATO, Japan, South Korea, and 

India should have long-term and well planned security, economic, and cultural cooperation policies in 

place for individual countries of Central Asia. At the 

same time, criticism of any level of engagement in the 

region should be expected from the media and from 

single-issue NGOs. The scope of direct cooperation on 

counterterrorism may be limited by the very different local definitions of terrorism, and approaches to 

counterterror operations and collateral damage, from 

the U.S. and Western norms. In an interview in 2006, 

RATS Executive Director Kasymov noted that during 

meetings with Western partners, SCO members “hear 

a lot about threats and challenges, but as soon as it 

comes to practical measures against terrorists, they 

begin to talk about ‘excessive force’.”87
33

Moscow and Beijing will continue to work jointly 

to limit U.S. influence in the UN and international 

organizations. They may be supported in international 

fora by individual members of the SCO, paying their 

“club membership” political fee, but no joint actions, 

diplomatic or other, should be expected from the 

organization. At the same time, Russia may support 

China but would not get involved in any of Beijing’s 

conflicts, and vice versa. SCO smaller member states, 

with enough of their own economic and security challenges to address, can be expected to attempt to avoid 

involvement in faraway international disputes. 

In addition, Moscow and possibly Beijing may 

seek to leverage SCO support in order to claim parity 

or equivalence with U.S.-friendly organizations such 

as NATO, in a similar pattern to that currently seen 

with the CSTO. 

Implications and Policy Recommendations.

China’s immediate approaches to Central Asian 

states directly after the fall of the Soviet Union testify 

to Beijing’s long-standing commitment to expanding 

economic and natural resource harvesting opportunities in the region. At the same time, Moscow traditionally views Central Asia as its own sphere of interest, 

and has a strong desire to maintain political influence 

including keeping the U.S. out of the region. As the 

United States continues to develop interests and policies for the region, these two opposing forces will be 

the main challenge. However, mutual mistrust not 

only between Russia and China but also between the 

smaller SCO members presents the U.S. with opportunities to exploit the Central Asian states’ differences in 

policy and interest from Moscow and Beijing. 
34

Current U.S. policy objectives in Central Asia include stability for Afghanistan, combating terrorism, 

stemming drug flow, and non-proliferation. These 

policy goals are closely aligned with the stated SCO 

goals, which bring an opportunity to pursue these 

policies on a bilateral basis with each country without public resistance. Most Central Asian states value 

their bilateral relationships with the U.S. simply because of the financial incentives it provides. However, 

any financial assistance with strings attached to human rights, democratization, or combating corruption 

will be met with resistance, and will likely hinder the 

development of close political ties and alliances within 

Central Asia. It should be remembered that attempts 

to link aid, assistance or cooperation with domestic 

governance issues, and in particular human rights, 

will immediately increase the relative attractiveness 

of Russian and Chinese offerings. 

There are direct implications for the future of basing arrangements and broader bilateral security cooperation with the Central Asian states. According to the 

U.S. Department of State, it was bilateral exchanges 

with the five Central Asian states that resulted in the 

establishment of the Northern Distribution Network 

(NDN), the network of roads, railroads, rivers, and 

ports in use by the U.S. military to move equipment 

from Afghanistan. The U.S. Army alone is scheduled 

to move 80,000 containers and 20,000 vehicles out of 

Afghanistan by December 2014, much of which will 

rely on the NDN. The political will of these countries to continue to support the NDN through 2014 is 

strong, but any U.S. extended presence beyond 2014 

is likely to encounter stronger resistance, as Moscow 

steps in to ensure the U.S. departs the area on time.

Risks to U.S. interests in Central Asia arise from 

Russian influence as opposed to SCO policies. Russia 
35

has a vested interest in removing a U.S. presence from 

Central Asia, and will use all tools at its disposal toward this aim, including the SCO. This is in addition to 

bilateral leverage, which Russia possesses to different 

extents against different states. This is demonstrated 

by the example of Uzbekistan, which enjoys close relations with the United States and blows hot and cold 

on security cooperation with Russia and Russia-dominated supranational entities like the SCO, CSTO and 

Eurasian Union. Bilaterally, the benefits of security cooperation with Russia can be immediate and tangible 

for Central Asian regimes, as with the example of Russian support for President Rahmonov of Tajikistan in 

his election campaign in exchange for continued Tajik 

facilitation of the Russian “201st Base” there.

Consequently, decisionmakers considering future options for basing arrangements in Central Asia 

should observe closely the instance of Manas, a U.S. 

military logistics hub located near the Kyrgyz capital, 

Bishkek. The history of confrontation over Manas provides a valuable case study of the range of public, private, and clandestine influences which can be brought 

to bear on host nations by Russia. In addition to direct 

financial competition, over a number of years Moscow 

increased pressure on the Kyrgyz government to close 

the base, including several security and economic bilateral accords designed to project exclusive Russian 

influence in Kyrgyzstan. Most recently, at the time of 

this writing, the Kyrgyz parliament voted to terminate the lease just a few days after Russian President 

Vladimir Putin visited Bishkek.

If the U.S. Army wishes to maintain a presence in 

Central Asia post-2014, strong opposition from Russia can be expected unless a deal is brokered whereby 

that presence can be portrayed as meeting Russian in-
36

terests. For example, Russia wishes to arrive at a situation where the United States is explicitly bound by 

international agreements, since this is one of the few 

areas where Russia can exert leverage. This leads to a 

desire to tie any U.S. presence in Afghanistan, and by 

extension in its Central Asian supply route, to a UN 

Security Council resolution—in other words, to have 

the UN regulate and govern the U.S. presence post2014. Under these circumstances, Russia would accept the enhanced security and assistance with counterterrorism and counternarcotics programs which a 

U.S. presence in the Central Asian SCO states 

could provide.

As noted previously, the prospects for SCO expansion are limited, despite a number of countries expressing interest in joining. Although SCO accession 

by either Iran or Turkey is not an immediate prospect, 

both these potential developments should be watched 

closely. In particular, Turkey’s NATO membership 

brings immediate complications and a potential conflict of interest if security cooperation with the SCO 

states is increased.

Large-scale joint anti-terrorist exercises by the 

armed forces of SCO states are likely to become more 

frequent. Because of the very different definitions of 

terrorism and counterterror operations noted earlier, 

some of these may resemble the beginning of SCO 

military cooperation, especially if there is a resurgence of radical, armed Islamic groups in the region. 

In particular, a “bloc law enforcement and security 

apparatus” intended to counter terrorism and narcotics may strongly resemble military cooperation, and 

will certainly have direct implications for security 

cooperation with the United States. But this should 

not be treated by the United States as the creation of a 
37

military bloc, unless specific evidence and intentions 

to the contrary appear. 

When considering the SCO, U.S. policymakers 

should view it primarily as a vehicle to further Russian interests in Central Asian states and beyond. To 

Russia, the SCO is one tool for the overall purpose of 

countering U.S. policy. Other, similar tools include the 

CSTO, CIS, BRICS, and the Eurasian Union. 

Russia gains political support from these supranational organizations to rally for Russian interests. Forum shopping and influence peddling is a key tactic 

for Russia in its current weakened state; the goal is to 

use political leverage to influence international norms 

to reflect Russian interests, change the course of how 

the world thinks, and reflect what Russia wants from 

the world. Russian, as well as Chinese, initiatives in 

fora such as the UN can rely on support from other 

SCO members. 

At the same time, specific policy aims of the SCO, 

or Russia through the SCO, should not be analyzed 

according to U.S. policy criteria. It is not necessary for 

an event to take place that would be considered by the 

United States as a substantial policy achievement, in 

order for Russia to believe that the SCO has contributed to countering U.S. aims as part of an overall strategy. There may well be no single reason for specific 

SCO actions: the tradition in the region of planning 

the “kombinatsiya,” or cascade effect with multiple 

possible objectives, is strong.88

This allowance for multiple possible outcomes can 

make it challenging for U.S. policymakers to discern 

the longer-term, patient strategy employed by Russia through implements such as the SCO. Instead of 

thinking in terms of direct linkages, where action X 

leads to consequence Y, many of the aims of establish-
38

ing and developing the SCO are less well-defined and 

consist more of building long-term policy momentum 

for long-term aims, including eroding the U.S. nearmonopoly on moral support and on the ability to marshal backers in international fora. Thus, the apparent 

lack of concrete achievements by the SCO as an international organization should not lead U.S. policymakers to discount it as a tool, or facilitator, for longerterm objectives by its two key members. 

ENDNOTES

1. January 2, Uzbekistan; January 3, Kazakhstan; January 4, 

Tajikistan; January 5, Kyrgyzstan; and January 6, Turkmenistan. 

K. S. Anufriyev, Politika Rossii i Kitaya v Tsentralnoy Aziy (Politics of 

Russia and China in Central Asia), Tomsk, Russia: Izdatelstvo Tomskogo Universiteta, 2011, p. 121.

2. In February 1992, Kazakh Prime Minister Sergey Tereshchenko visited China. Uzbek President Karimov visited Beijing 

in March 1992; his Kyrgyz counterpart, Akayev, went to China 

in May, and Turkmen president Niyazov in November 1992. All 

the Central Asian visitors signed several agreements with China.

3. Yuriy Mikhaylovich Galenovich, Istoriya Otnosheniy Rossii 

i Kitaya (History of Relations Between Russia and China), Moscow, 

Russia: Russkaya Panorama, 2011, pp. 51-67.

4. Anufriyev, pp. 124-125.

5. The agreement was ratified by China’s Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in April 2005 and by 

the Russian State Duma in May 2005. On June 2, 2005, the Russian and Chinese Foreign Ministers exchanged the ratification 

documents.

6. “China, Russia Complete Border Survey, Determination,” Xinhua, July 21, 2008, available from news.xinhuanet.com/

english/2008-07/21/content_8739941.htm; “China, Russia Solve All 

Border Disputes,” Xinhua, June 2, 2005, available from news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-06/02/content_3037975.htm.
39

7. Anufriyev, p. 125.

8. Ibid., p. 122.

9. Yu. S. Peskov, “Problemy i Perspektyvy Sotrudnichestva 

Rossii i Kitaya so Stranami Tsentralnoy Azii – Chlenami SNG” 

(“Problems and Prospects of Cooperation of China and Russia 

with the Central Asian States which are Members of the CIS”), 

Problemy Dalnego Vostoka, 1997, No. 3, p. 53.

10. Yu.S. Peskov, “Problemy i Perspektyvy Sotrudnichestva 

Rossii i Kitaya so Stranami Tsentralnoy Azii – Chlenami SNG” 

(“Problems and Prospects of Cooperation of China and Russia 

with the Central Asian States which are Members of the CIS”), 

Problemy Dalnego Vostoka, 1997, No. 4, p. 22.

11. Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik (A Multilateral Meeting in Almaty), August 1998, available from www.mid.ru/

bdomp/dip_vest.nsf/19c2fdee616f12e54325688e00486a45/c603b

3915829207dc32568890029bb34.

12. Gill Bates and Mathew Oreseman, “China’s New Journey 

to the West: China’s Emergence in Central Asia and Implications 

for US Interests,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2003, p. 7.

13. For the original goals of the SCO, see: “Brief introduction 

to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” SCO website, available from www.sectsco.org/EN123/brief.asp.

14. Asia Adam Wofe, “Cool-headed diplomacy,” Asia Times 

Online, August 6, 2005, available from www.atimes.com/atimes/

Central_Asia/GH06Ag02.html

15. “China, Russia Call for Multilateralism in World Affairs,” Xinhua, July 1, 2005, available from news.xinhuanet.com/

english/2005-07/01/content_3164071.htm.

16. “China, Russia Issue Joint Statement on New World Order,” Xinhua, July 1, 2005, available from news.xinhuanet.com/

english/2005-07/01/content_3164427.htm.
40

17. “SCO Leaders Vow to Boost Group’s Internal Construction,” People.com, July 6, 2005, available from english.people.com.

cn/200507/06/eng20050706_194332.html.

18. “Interview of Secretary of the Russian Security Council 

Igor Ivanov with the Russian News & Information Agency RIA 

Novosti,” RIA Novosti, May 22, 2007, available from en.ria.ru/

analysis/20070522/65587920.html.

19. “Chinese Official Says SCO Not Ready To Accept New 

Member,” Xinhua, June 1, 2004. 

20. “SCO Not To Admit New Members Presently: Executive 

Secretary,” Xinhua, October 27, 2005.

21. “SCO Remains Open Organisation—Secretary-General,” 

UzReport Information Agency, June 6, 2006, available from mir.

uzreport.uz/news_e_13423.html.

22. “Joint Communiqué of Meeting of the Council of the 

Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” June 15, 2006, SCO official website for SCO Summit of 

2013, available from www.scosummit2013.org/en/documents/english-joint-communique-of-meeting-of-the-council-of-the-heads-of-themember-states-of-the-shanghai-cooperation-organisation/.

23. “O mezhmidovskikh konsultatsiyakh po voprosam rasshireniya 

Organizatsii” (“On Inter-Foreign-Ministries Consultations on the 

Expansion of the Organisation”), SCO website, April 12, 2013, 

available from www.sectsco.org/RU123/show.asp?id=597.

24. “Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” SCO 

official website for SCO Summit of 2013, June 7, 2002, available 

from www.scosummit2013.org/en/documents/hartiya-shanhaykoy-organizatsii-sotrudnichestva/.

25. China Daily, June 16, 2009, available from www.chinadaily.

com.cn/china/2009sco/200906/16/content_8289713.htm.

26. “Turkey Seeks Observer Member Status in SCO,” Hurriyet 

Daily News, February 1, 2013, available from www.hurriyetdaily-
41

news.com/turkey-seeks-observer-member-status-in-sco.aspx?pageID=2

38&nID=40267&NewsCatID=338.

27. “Tashkent Summit Marks New Phase for SCO,” China 

Daily, June 18, 2004, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/

doc/2004-06/18/content_340361.htm. 

28. “Fifth Summit in Astana 2005,” People’s Daily Online, July 26, 2007, available from english.people.com.

cn/90002/91620/91644/6224952.html. 

29. “Press Communiqué of the Meeting of the Council of The 

Heads of the Member States of The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 

China website, June 6-7, 2012, available from www.fmprc.gov.cn/

eng/wjdt/2649/t939161.shtml.

30. Yang Hongxi, “The Evolution of the U.S. Attitude towards 

the SCO,” Beijing, China: China Center For Contemporary World 

Studies, March 14, 2013, available from www.cccws.org.cn/en/NewsInfo.aspx?NId=2311. See also Ariel Cohen, “What to Do About the 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Rising Influence,” Eurasianet, September 20, 2006, available from www.eurasianet.org/

departments/insight/articles/eav092106.shtml; and Vladimir Fedoruk, 

“Russia, China don’t see US in SCO,” Voice of Russia, November 1, 

2011, available from voiceofrussia.com/2011/11/01/59706557/.

31. Arti Bali, “China’s New Twist to the Border Issue,” Samay 

Live, May 12, 2013, available from english.samaylive.com/nationnews/articles/676529525/china-s-new-twist-to-the-border-issue.html.

32. Rama Lakshami, “India-China Border Dispute: Both Sides 

Step Warily with High-Level Visits Due,” The Guardian, May 7, 

2013, available from www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/07/indiachina-border-dispute.

33. “India-China Border Tensions Remain: Pentagon,” NDTV, 

May 7, 2013, available from www.ndtv.com/article/india/india-chinaborder-tensions-remain-pentagon-363521; The Times of India, May 6, 

2013, available from articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-05-06/

india/39063666_1_defence-capabilities-daulat-beg-oldi-actual-control.
42

34. France 24, July 10, 2009, available from www.france24.

com/en/20090710-turkish-pm-erdogan-xinjiang-violence-genocideturkey-uighurs-han-trade-beijing-china; and Today’s Zaman, April 17, 

2013, available from www.todayszaman.com/news-312876-lavrovslams-friends-of-syria-lays-bare-differences-with-turkey.html.

35. “Turtsiya namerena vstupit v ShOS” (“Turkey Intends to 

Join the SCO”), Regnum.ru, January 26, 2013, available from www.

regnum.ru/news/1617665.html#ixzz2Sdltmnx1.

36. “O mezhmidovskikh konsultatsiyakh po dalneyshemu razvitiyu 

svyazey ShOS s mezhdunarodnymi organizatsiyami” (“On Inter-MFA 

Consultations about Further Development of SCO Links with 

International Organizations”), SCO website, April 10 2013, available from www.sectsco.org/RU123/show.asp?id=594.

37. “Is the SCO a threat to Japan?” Japan Reference, December 

22, 2008, available from www.jref.com/forum/japanese-news-hot-topics-4/sco-threat-japan-40754/#.UeWF7oxIupo; Gene Germanovich, 

“The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Threat to American Interest in Central Asia,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 

Vol. 6, No. 1, 2008, pp. 19-38, available from www.scribd.com/

doc/26087287/A-Threat-to-American-Interest-in-Central-Asia.

38. D. Rogozin, Yastreby Mira. Dnevnik Russkogo Posla (Hawks 

of Peace: Diary of a Russian Ambassador), London, UK: Glagoslav 

Publications Ltd., 2010, pp. 241, 243.

39. According to the Russian state statistics service, the population of the Far Eastern Federal District of the Russian Federation 

was 6,251,496 people at the beginning of January 2013. 

40. Aleksandr Babakin, “На Дальнем Востоке пока все 

спокойно” (“So Far Everything is Calm in the Far East”), Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, June 10, 2005, available from nvo.

ng.ru/wars/2005-06-10/2_fareast.html.

41. Sergey Kazennov and Vladimir Kumachev, “Не надо 

абсолютизировать “угрозу с Востока” (“The Threat from the 

East Should Not be Taken in Absolute Terms”), Nezavisimoye 

Voyennoye Obozreniye, August 13, 2010, available from nvo.ng.ru/

concepts/2010-08-13/12_menace.html.
43

42. Aleksandr Sharavin, “Третья угроза” (“The Third 

Threat”), Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, September 28, 2001, 

available from nvo.ng.ru/wars/2001-09-28/5_danger.html.

43. Keir Giles, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010,” Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, February 2010, 

available from www.academia.edu/343489/The_Military_Doctrine_

of_the_Russian_Federation_2010; Keir Giles, “Russia’s National 

Security Strategy to 2020,” Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, 

June 2009, available from www.academia.edu/343512/Russias_

National_Security_Strategy_to_2020.

44. Russian military doctrine accepts the use of nuclear weapons when the enemy uses weapons of mass destruction or threatens the very existence of the state. 

45. Igor Korotchenko, “Военный экспорт Поднебесной как 

вызов для отечественного ОПК” (“China’s Military Exports as 

a Challenge to the Domestic Defense Industry”), Nezavisimoye 

Voyennoye Obozreniye, October 29, 2010, available from nvo.ng.ru/

armament/2010-10-29/10_china.html.

46. The organization evolved into an intergovernmental military alliance after the signing of the Collective Security Treaty 

(CST) in May 1992 by Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined as a full member 

in 2006, but suspended its membership as it was unhappy with 

Moscow’s dominance of the organization.

47. Konstantin Parshin, “Uzbekistan and Tajikistan: Souring Political Relations Damaging Human Ties,” Eurasianet.org, 

October 3, 2012, available from www.eurasianet.org/node/65994;

Shavkat Kasymov, “Dammed or Damned: Tajikistan and Uzbekistan Wrestle Over Water-Energy Nexus,” World Policy Blog, 

April 2, 2013, available from www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/04/02/

dammed-or-damned-tajikistan-and-uzbekistan-wrestle-over-waterenergy-nexus; “Uzbekistan ‘cuts off gas’ to Tajikistan,” The Australian, January 1, 2013, available from www.theaustralian.com.au/

news/breaking-news/uzbekistan-cuts-off-gas-to-tajikistan/story-fn3dxix6-1226545967186.
44

48. See “U.S. Relations With Tajikistan,” Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of State, November 16, 2012, available from 

www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5775.htm. 

49. Viktoriya Panfilova, “Душанбе заигрывает с Вашингтоном” (“Dushanbe Flirts With Washington”), Nezavisimaya 

Gazeta, February 20, 2013, available from www.ng.ru/cis/2013-02-

20/7_tadjikistan.html.

50. Vladimir Mukhin, “Tsentral’noaziatskii mirotvorcheskii 

vopros,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 20, 2013, p. 7. 

51. “Backgrounder: U.S. Military Bases in Central Asia,” New 

York: Council for Foreign Relations, available from www.cfr.org/

russia-and-central-asia/asia-us-military-bases-central-asia/p8440. See 

also “How the Andijan killings unfolded,” BBC News, May 17, 

2005, available from news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4550845.stm.

52. Panfilova. 

53. See, for example, Raffi Khatchadourian, “US Eyes Bases 

in Tajikistan,” Eurasianet, November 4, 2001, available from www.

eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav110501a.shtml.

54. Joshua Kucera, “Why is Tajikistan’s Ayni Air Base Idle?” 

Eurasianet, July 9, 2010, available from www.eurasianet.org/

node/61503?quicktabs_11=2.

55. “Informatsionnoye soobshcheniye po itogam zasedaniya Soveta 

glav gosudarstv-chlenov ShOS” (“Information issued after the meeting of the Council of Heads of States which are Members of the 

SCO”), Russian presidential website, June 7, 2012, available from

xn--d1abbgf6aiiy.xn--p1ai/%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%

D0%B2%D0%BA%D0%B8/1233.

56. Russian MFA website, in English, June 6, 2005, as reported 

by BBC Monitoring Service; item subsequently removed from 

Russian MFA website.

57. “Shanghai to Host Sixth SCO Summit this June,” UzReport Information Agency, January 17, 2006, available from mir.

uzreport.uz/news_e_6721.html.
45

58. Website of Russian Embassy in Beijing, available from www.russia.org.cn/rus/2887/31292107. Also see “О 

ратификации Соглашения о банке данных Региональной 

антитеррористической структуры Шанхайской организации 

сотрудничества.” Закон Республики Казахстан от 22 мая 2006 

года N 142. (“On the Ratification of the Agreement on the Data 

Bank of the Regional Antiterrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.” Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of May 

22, 2006, N 142), available from agentura.ru/infrastructure/sharing/

rats/bd/; and Ведомости Парламента Республики Казахстан, 

2006 г., N 9, ст. 50; “Казахстанская правда” от 25 мая 2006 года 

N 127-128 (25098-25099) (Bulletin of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2006, N 9, Art. 50”; “Kazakhstan Pravda” on 

May 25, 2006, N 127-128 (25098-25099).

59. “SCO Culture Ministers gather in Beijing,” SCO website, June 7, 2012, available from www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.

asp?id=335.

60. “Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” June 

7, 2002, as published in China Daily, June 12, 2006, available from 

www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_6020341.htm.

61. Ibid.

62. Confidential interviews with author, 2006. 

63. “History of development of SCO,” Window of China, 

August 21, 2008, available from news.xinhuanet.com/english/

2008-08/21/content_9572869.htm.

64. Istoriya RATS (The History of the RATS), RATS website, 

June 17, 2006, available from ecrats.org/en/about/history/.

65. “Regionalnaya antiterroristicheskaya struktura (RATS) 

ShOS” (“The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) of the 

SCO”), Agentura.ru, available from www.agentura.ru/infrastructure/sharing/rats/. 

66. Novoye Pokoleniye, in Russian, September 3, 2004. Kasymov’s criticism of the CSTO was subsequently confirmed to the 
46

author by several officials from SCO countries. The heads of the 

SCO member states issued a declaration on August 28, 2008, calling for strengthening of SCO cooperation with the CIS and the 

CSTO, and follow-up memoranda signed in March 2009 facilitated working meetings of the SCO with members of the secretariat 

of the CSTO and the anti-terrorist centre of the CIS. Infoshosru,

April 29, 2009, available from www.infoshos.ru/ru/?idn=4120. 

67. Viktoriya Panfilova, “Bednost kak osnova terrorizma” 

(“Poverty as the Root of terrorism”), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 7, 2005, available from www.ng.ru/dipkurer/2005-02-07/11_

poverty.html.

68. The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) of the SCO.

69. Panfilova.

With the help of the RATS, the Kazakhstan security service dismantled the ‘Dzhamoat’ organization which trained its members 

for suicide actions against the embassies of the USA, Israel, and 

the office of the Uzbek general prosecutor. The Uzbek branch 

of the same organisation was eliminated when it tried to set up 

a bomb factory near Bukhara. The sect ‘Akramya’ in the Uzbek 

Andijan was also dismantled as was another group, ‘Bayat’ in 

Tajikistan. 

70. Vyacheslav Kasymov, “S ‘chernym internatsinalom’ v belykk perchatkakh ne boryutsya” (“The Black International Cannot be Fought in White Gloves”), Vesti.uz, June 20, 2006, available 

from www.vesti.uz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&

id=22802:2006-06-20+00:00:00&catid=19:politics&Itemid=39.

71. “Antiterroristicheskaya struktura ShOS sodeystvovala 

arestu bole 400 terroristov” (“The Anti-Terrorist Structure of the 

SCO Facilitated the arrest of More than 400 Terrorists”), Avesta.tj, 

June 21, 2012, available from www.avesta.tj/security/12813-antiterroristicheskaya-struktura-shos-sodeystvovala-arestu-bolee-400-terroristov.html.

72. O podpisanii soglasheniya o banke dannykh RATS SCO (On 

the Signing of an Agreement on the SCO RATS Database), Alyans Media, available from www.allmedia.ru/laws/DocumShow.
47

asp?DocumID=91179; “Decree of 24 July 2004 #310 On Signing the 

Agreement on the Database of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” available from 

www.hrichina.org/content/5224. 

73. Doklad Soveta RATS ShOS Sovetu glav gosudarstv-chlenov 

ShOS o deyatelnosti RATS ShOS v 2004 godu (“Report by the SCO 

RATS Council to the Council of SCO Heads of State on the Activity of the SCO RATS in 2004”), Russian MFA website, July 5, 2005, 

available from www.mid.ru/ns-rasia.nsf/3a0108443c964002432569e7

004199c0/432569d80021985fc32570350039ead2.

74. “‘1mn Died’ from Afghan Heroin, Drug Production ‘40 

Times Higher’ since NATO Op,” Russia Today, April 3, 2013, available from rt.com/news/afghanistan-heroin-production-increased-266/.

75. “Itogi IV Soveshchaniya rukovoditeley kompetentnykh organov 

gosudarstv-chlenov ShOS, nadelennykh polnomochiyami po borbe so 

nezakonnym oborotom narkotikov” (“Results of the IV Meeting of SCO 

Member States’ Heads of Organs Empowered to Combat Drug Trafficking”), April 30, 2013, available from www.sectsco.org/RU123/show.

asp?id=613.

76. “Na perednem kraye borby s ‘tremya salami zla’” (“At the forefront of the fight against the ‘three evil forces’”), Infoshos, April 29, 

2009, available from www.infoshos.ru/ru/?idn=4120/.

77. “Predstaviteli ShOS dogovorilis o protivodeystvii verbovke v terroristicheskiye organizatsii” (“SCO Representatives 

Agree to Counteract Recruitment Into Terrorist Organisations”), 

Mir Islama, April 1, 2013, available from www.mirislama.com/

news/5276-predstaviteli-shos-dogovorilis-o-protivodeystvii-verbovke-vterroristicheskie-organizacii.html; “В Ташкенте прошло очередное 

заседание Совета РАТС ШОС” (“A Regular Meeting of the SCO 

RATS Council Took Place in Tashkent”), Avesta.Tj, April 1, 2013, 

available from www.avesta.tj/security/17588-v-tashkente-proshloocherednoe-zasedanie-soveta-rats-shos.html.

78. “O zasedanii Soveta natsionalnykh koordinatorov ShOS” 

(“On the meeting of the Council of National Coordinators of 

SCO”), April 12, 2013, available from www.sectsco.org/RU123/

show.asp?id=599.
48

79. “China’s New Leadership Supports Security Cooperation 

within SCO: Official,” Xinhuanet, April 29, 2013, available from 

news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/29/c_132349531.htm.

80. “Shankhayskaya organizatsiya sotrudnichestva” (“Shanghai Cooperation Organisation”), Newsruss.ru, available from 

newsruss.ru/doc/index.php/%D0%A8%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%85

%D0%B0%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0%

BE%D1%80%D0%B3%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0

%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F_%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%82%

D1%80%D1%83%D0%B4%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5

%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%B0.

81. Aleksander Lukin, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: What Next?” Russia in Global Affairs, August 8, 2007, available from eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_9132.

82. Artur Fazleev, “Бюджет саммита ШОС в Уфе поделят 

два бюджета и инвесторы” (“The Budget of the SCO Summit in 

Ufa Will be Shared by Two Budgets and Investors”), Kommersant.

ru., February 5, 2013, available from kommersant.ru/doc/2120808. 

The budget for the SCO meeting in Ufa may also cover a meeting 

of BRIC countries also scheduled to take place there.

83. According to Transparency International, Kazakhstan is 133rd on the list, available from www.transparency.org/

country#KAZ; Tajikistan, 157th, available from www.transpar

ency.org/country#TJK; and Uzbekistan 170th, available from www.

transparency.org/country#UZB.

84. “Stronger Economic Cooperation Highlighted at SCO Forum,” Xinhuanet, April 18, 2013, available from news.xinhuanet.

com/english/china/2013-04/18/c_132322780.htm.

85. Lukin.

86. “РФ выступила против длительного иностранного 

присутствия в Афганистане” (“Russia Opposes a Long-term 

Foreign Presence in Afghanistan”), RIA Novosti, December 18, 

2012, available from ria.ru/world/20121218/915200816-print.html.
49

87. Kasymov.

88. For more detail, see “Russia: Future Directions,” Shrivenham, Swindon, Wiltshire, UK: Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the UK, October 1, 2008.
50

APPENDIX I

THE SCO TODAY

The Council of Heads of Government.

The supreme decisionmaking body of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the Council of 

Heads of State (HSC), responsible for defining strategic priorities of the organization and mapping out its 

actions. Each member state presides for 1 year, and 

the year ends with a SCO summit when another country takes over. The annual meetings of the HSC allow 

the heads of states to make decisions and give instructions on all major issues concerning the SCO activities. 

HGC approves the SCO budget and decides the 

main economic issues relevant to the SCO activities. 

The HGC also meets once every year to discuss a strategy for multilateral cooperation, concentrating mainly 

on economic issues and on adopting the SCO budget. 

The Council of Foreign Ministers.

The Council of Foreign Ministers monitors and 

guides the current activities of the SCO, and conducts 

consultations within the SCO foreign relations remits. 

The council is empowered to issue statements on behalf of the SCO. 

Minister and heads of the national agencies of the 

SCO member states occasionally meet to address specific issues concerning the organization. Such meetings are determined by the Council of Heads of State 

and the Council of Heads of Government. The SCO 

has also the Council of National Coordinators which 

coordinates the current activities of the organization 
51

such as meetings of Speakers of Parliament, Secretaries of Security Councils, Foreign Ministers, Ministers 

of Defense, Emergency Relief, Economy, Transportation, Culture, Education, Healthcare, Heads of the 

Law Enforcement Agencies, Supreme Courts, Courts 

of Arbitration, and Prosecutors General. The Council of National Coordinators is staffed by some of the 

most experienced and competent officials representing the member states.

The SCO Secretariat.

The Secretariat is the main permanent executive 

body of the organization. It is based in Beijing, China, 

and provides organizational and technical support for 

activities of the SCO and drafts annual budget proposals. The Secretary General is appointed for 3 years by 

the Heads of State Council.1 The Secretary General is 

also in charge of the SCO Business Council which has 

its secretariat in Moscow, Russia. 

The Secretariat:

1. Coordinates and provides informational, analytical, legal, organizational, and technical support for 

the activities of the organization, in conjunction with 

the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS). It 

formulates the proposals concerning the development 

of cooperation within the SCO framework and external ties of the organization, and oversees the fulfillment of decisions adopted by the SCO bodies.

2. Together with the national Permanent Representatives, composes draft documents based on the proposals of the member states and, with the consent of 

the Council of National Coordinators, circulates them 

among the member states for further consideration by 

the SCO institutions, including draft agendas of the 
52

forthcoming meetings of the SCO institutions, as well 

as necessary materials, and agrees on the dates and 

venues of these meetings. Materials and documents 

mentioned in the given paragraph are forwarded to 

the member states not later than 20 days before the 

start of these meetings.

3. Together with the Council of National Coordinators, arranges consultations of experts of the member 

states and drafts documents submitted to meetings of 

the SCO institutions.

4. Provides the organizational and technical support for meetings of the SCO institutions, in accordance with the relevant regulations, and cooperates 

with states hosting such meetings. 

5. Carries out the duty of a depositary of documents, certifies, and forwards to the member states 

copies of such documents, as well as to the SCO RATS, 

when appropriate. Certified copies of documents adopted by the SCO are handed out to Permanent Representatives within 7 days after the Secretariat has 

received original documents. 

6. Prepares and publishes information catalogues, 

manages the website of the Secretariat, and coordinates its contents with that of the website of the SCO 

RATS and the SCO Regional Economic Cooperation 

website. Holds regular briefings for representatives of 

the media.

7. Carries out preliminary legal and financial assessment of draft treaties and regulations drawn up in 

the SCO framework. 

8. In conjunction with the SCO, RATS composes 

a general plan of the organization’s activities for the 

following 6 months. 

9. Has the right to request the member states to 

provide reference books and other open source materials for working needs of the SCO institutions. 
53

10. Ensures protocol support of the Secretary General’s activity. 

11. Together with the SCO RATS, maintains contacts with states and international organizations and,

with the consent of the member states, prepares appropriate documents for such contacts.

12. With the consent of the Council of National 

Coordinators, and working with the SCO RATS, coordinates the organization’s cooperation with observers 

and dialogue partners, in accordance with the legal 

rules of the SCO. 

13. Works with nongovernmental structures in the 

SCO, in accordance with the SCO’s legal rules and 

regulations.

14. With the consent of the member states and 

within budgetary limits, recruits experts on the basis 

of a single term contract for conducting research on 

issues of specific concern to the SCO. He/she also organizes workshops and conferences. 

15. Arranges and coordinates the activities of the 

SCO Observer Mission, in accordance with the regulations on SCO Observer Mission in presidential and/or 

parliamentary elections, as well as referendums.2

The Secretariat and the RATS are the only two 

permanently functioning bodies of the SCO, but in 

contrast with the RATS, the SCO Secretariat is only 

a supporting administrative organ with very limited 

decisionmaking powers. 
54

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX I

1. “Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus website, available from www.mfa.gov.by/en/

organizations/membership/list/c2ee3a2ec2158899.html. “Brief introduction to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” SCO website, available from www.sectsco.org/EN123/brief.asp.

2. “SCO Secretariat in Brief,” SCO website, available from 

www.sectsco.org/EN123/secretariat.asp.
55

APPENDIX II

KEY IMPLEMENTERS: 

THE GENERAL SECRETARIES 

AND THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS

The two most significant positions in the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are those of the SCO 

Secretary General and the Regional Anti-Terrorist 

Structure (RATS) Executive Director (for this reason, 

biographies of the individuals who have held these 

posts are provided in the succeeding pages.) Until 

recently, the first was expected to be a seasoned diplomat with a good knowledge of his own diplomatic 

service, foreign language abilities, and extensive foreign diplomatic experience, which would allow them 

to interact with the SCO member states, with members 

of international organizations, and with Beijing-based 

foreign ambassadors and other officials. The RATS Executive Directors, meanwhile, had to be experienced 

security managers. In both cases, these are the two 

highest ranking national officials. They are expected 

to run the international organizations, but also monitor events as the representatives of their own states at 

the same time.

The SCO’s first Secretary General, Chinese diplomat Zhang Deguang, had impeccable credentials. A 

graduate in Russian literature from the Beijing Institute of Foreign Languages, he served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and on diplomatic postings in 

Washington and as Chinese ambassador to Russia. 

He took up his post at the SCO on January 1, 2004, 

and was replaced 3 years later by Bolat Nurgaliyev 

who graduated in the 1970s from the Foreign Language Faculty of the Tselinograd State Pedagogical 
56

Institute and later from the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy 

Bezopasnosti (Russian Secret Police, better known as 

the KGB) Intelligence School. Nurgaliyev served as a 

Soviet intelligence officer under diplomatic cover in 

Pakistan between 1981 and 1985, and in India between 

1990 and 1992. In 1992, Nurgaliyev joined the Kazakh 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and between 1994 and 1996 

was Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan. 

In January 2007, before he became the SCO Secretary 

General, he was the Kazakh ambassador to the United 

States, South Korea, and Japan. On January 1, 2010, he 

was replaced by Muratbek Sansyzbayevich Imanaliyev, a qualified historian of the Far East and Chinese 

translator who was previously the Kyrgyz ambassador to China, twice Kyrgyz Minister of Foreign Affairs 

(1991-92 and 1997-2002), a politician, and a Professor 

at the American University of Central Asia. 

The latest incumbent, Dmitry Fedorovich Mezentsev from Russia, is different than his predecessors. 

He has enjoyed an illustrious career, but his arrival 

with the SCO raised eyebrows, when in 2006 he came 

straight from the position of Deputy Chairman of the 

Federation Council of the Russian Federal Assembly 

to the SCO Business Council, which he left in 2009 to 

return to Russian administration as Governor of Irkutsk Region. Since 2008, he also has been the Head of 

the Political Psychology Department of the Saint Petersburg University. In effect, he is the least qualified 

Secretary General to date. 

The reason for this may lie in Mezentsev’s early career. A graduate of the Leningrad Railway Transport 

Engineering Institute, Mezentsev became an activist 

in the Soviet All-Union Leninist Young Communist 

League (Komsomol) and between 1984 and 1990 was 

a Political Officer in the Soviet Army. In 1990, Me-
57

zentsev became a People’s Deputy of Leningrad City 

Council, and between 1991 and 1996 was Chairman 

of the Media Committee of the Saint Petersburg city 

administration, where he worked with both Vladimir 

Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. When their common political boss and mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatoliy Sobchak, lost the 1996 election, both Putin and Mezentsev 

moved to Moscow, where Putin worked in the Presidential Administration and Mezentsev became Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation State Press 

Committee. Three years later, Dmitry Mezentsev was 

President of the Centre of Strategic Research, both, 

one of the principal information providers for Putin’s 

presidential election campaign in 2000, and a strategic 

planning center for Putin’s subsequent agenda such 

as the Strategy for the Socio-Economic Development 

of the Russian Federation to 2010. Here, he worked 

alongside other senior Russian figures such as German 

Gref and Elvira Nabiullina. By proposing Mezentsev 

for Secretary General, Putin installed a loyal associate 

rather than the man most qualified to lead the organization in its own interests. In addition, Putin also has a 

direct representative at the SCO, the experienced and 

knowledgeable diplomat Kirill Barsky, appointed in 

2011 as the Russian national coordinator in the SCO 

and later promoted to Russian presidential envoy. 

If it is desirable for the SCO’s general secretaries to 

have some diplomatic or international experience, then 

professional competence and experience is absolutely 

essential for Executive Secretaries of the RATS. The 

first Executive Secretary, Major General Vyacheslav 

Temirovich Kasymov, started his career in the Soviet 

KGB and, after 1991, continued in the Uzbek National Security Service, becoming Deputy Chairman of 

the organization. His replacement, Colonel General 
58

Myrzakan Usurkanovich Subanov, took over in January 2007. A professional Soviet army officer, Subanov 

was the first Defence Minister of Kyrgyzstan. Before 

joining the SCO, he was the Chairman of the Kyrgyz 

Border Guard Service. He was replaced in 2010 by 

Dzhenisbek Mukhamedkarimovich Dzhumanbekov, 

Deputy Chairman of the Kazakh State Security Committee (KNB), who started his professional career in 

1972 in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 

KGB and, in 1992, moved to the KNB where he held 

several high-level positions, including as the KNB’s 

official representative in Russia and Uzbekistan.

The latest Executive Secretary of RATS, Zhang 

Xinfeng, is a professional security officer. He held 

several important positions in China’s Public Security 

regional departments, and in 2003 was transferred to 

Beijing, to the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). In 

2005, Zhang Xinfeng became Deputy Director of the 

National Narcotics Control Commission, Deputy Director of the People’s Armed Police Force, and Deputy 

Public Security Minister. Without losing any of these 

positions, in 2011, he was appointed Deputy Director of the State Internet Information Office. Zhang 

Xinfeng is expected to work in this position until the 

end of 2015. His nomination shows that Beijing treats 

RATS appointments seriously. 

SCO General Secretaries.

Zhang Deguang

Born in February 1941 in the Shandong province.

1965 - Graduated from the Beijing Institute of 

Foreign Languages, in Russian literature, and joined the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs (MFA).
59

1965 - 1973 Translator in the Chinese MFA.

1973 - 1977 Attaché at the Chinese Embassy in 

 Moscow.

1977 - 1987 Second Secretary, First Secretary, Deputy Director of the Chinese – Russian Negotiations Department of the USSR and 

European Affairs at the Chinese MFA.

1987 - 1992 Counsellor at the Chinese Embassy in 

Washington.

1992 - 1993 Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Kazakhstan.

1993 - 1995 Head of the Department of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, at the Chinese 

MFA.

1995 - 2001 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

2001 - 2003 Ambassador to Russia.

In May 2003, Zhang Deguang was appointed Secretary General of the Secretariat of the 

SCO. He took up his post on January 1, 

2004.1

Bolat Kabdylkhamintuly Nurgaliyev 

Born in Blagodatnoye village, Aqmola District 

(Kazakhstan) in July 1951.

1972 - Graduated from the Foreign Languages 

Faculty of the S. Seifulin Tselinograd 

State Pedagogical Institute and later 

from the Red Banner KGB Institute. (Intelligence) 

1972 - 1973 Lecturer at the Tselinograd Pedagogical 

Institute.

1973 - 1980 Unspecified position in the Soviet Ministry of Defence.

1981 - 1985 Attaché, Third Secretary at the USSR 

Embassy in Pakistan.
60

1985 - 1990 Second and then First Secretary of the 

USSR MFA.

1990 - 1992 First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in 

India.

1992 - 1994 Counsellor, head of the International Security and Armaments Control Directorate of the Kazakh MFA. 

1994 - 1996 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of 

Kazakhstan. 

1996 - 2000 Kazakh Ambassador to the USA, Canada and Mexico.

2000 - 2003 Kazakh Ambassador to South Korea. 

2003 - 2006 Kazakh Ambassador to Japan.

2007 - 2009 Secretary General of the SCO.

2010 - Special Representative of the OSCE 

(January 1) Chairman.

2012 - Kazakh Ambassador to Israel and, since

(April) November 2012, also to Cyprus.2

Muratbek Sansyzbayevich Imanaliyev 

Born: February 1956 in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan).

1978 - Graduated from the Institute of Africa 

and Asia of the Moscow State University, with a degree in history of the Far 

East and as a Chinese translator. 

1982 - Postgraduate studies at the Leningrad 

Eastern Studies Institute of the USSR 

Academy of Science. 

1982 - 1991 Second Secretary, Head of a department 

and acting Deputy Minister at the Kyrgyz SSR MFA. 

1991 - 1992 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic.

1993 - 1996 Kyrgyz Ambassador in China.
61

1996 - 1997 In charge of the Foreign Affairs Department of the president of Kyrgyzstan. 

1997 - 2002 Minister of Foreign Affairs of 

Kyrgyzstan.

2002 - 2007 Professor at the American University of 

Central Asia.

2004 - Became a cofounder of the JanyBagyt 

(New Course) movement.

2005 - 2009 President of the Public Policy Institute.

2009 - Advisor to the President of the 

(January) Kyrgyz Republic.

2010 - Secretary General of the SCO.3

(January 1)

According to unconfirmed information, between 1992 

and 1993, Imanaliyev was Councilor at the Russian 

Embassy in China.

Dmitry Fedorovich Mezentsev 

Born in Leningrad in August 1959.

1981 - Graduated the Leningrad Railway 

Transport Engineering Institute. Foreman at the Leningrad-Baltiysk locomotive depot.

1983 - 1984 Communist Youth Movement activist in 

Leningrad.

1984 - 1990 Officer in the printing media of the Soviet Army.

1990 - 1991 People’s Deputy of the Leningrad City 

Council, in charge of the Press Centre of 

the Leningrad City Council.

1991 - 1996 Chairman of the Media Committee of 

the St. Petersburg Town Hall and Publishing and Media Committee, representative of the Information and Press Ministry of the Russian Federation. 
62

1996 - 1999 Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation State Press Committee.

1999 - 2003 President of the Centre of Strategic Research in Moscow.

2002 - 2009 Representative of the Irkutsk Region Administration at the Council of Federation 

of the Federal Assembly of the Russian 

Federation, Chairman of the Information Policy Committee. 

2004 - 2009 Deputy Chairman of the Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the 

Russian Federation 

2006 - Appointed Special Representative on 

SCO Business Council affairs.

2009 - Re-elected SCO Business Council Chairman. 

2009 - 2012 - Governor, Chairman of the Government 

of Irkutsk Region. 

Since 2008 - Head of the Political Psychology Department of St. Petersburg State University, 

Ph.D. in political psychology, doctoral 

candidate of Moscow State Institute 

(University) of International Relations. 

 Decorations: “Order of Merit to the 

Motherland Fourth Degree,” Order of 

Honour, medals, officer of the National 

Order of the French Legion of Honour, 

medal “For the strengthening of RussoChinese friendship.”4

2013 - Secretary-General of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. On June 7, 2012, 

appointed (January 1, 2013, through December 31, 2015). Ambassador-at-large 

of the Russian Federation Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs
63

RATS Executive Directors.

Vyacheslav Temirovich Kasymov (2004-07)

Major General

Born in 1948 in Bukhara region.

Graduated from the Tashkent Institute of Irrigation 

and Agricultural Mechanisation Engineering 

1980 - 1991 Served in the KGB USSR.

1991 - 1996 Head of a Directorate of the Uzbek National Security Service (SNB).

1996 - Deputy Chairman of the SNB.

2004 - 2007 Appointed as First Executive Director of 

the RATS of the SCO. 

Myrzakan Usurkanovich Subanov (2007-09)

Colonel General

Born in October 1944, in Tash Tube (Kyrgyzstan).

1966 Graduated from the Tashkent Higher 

Combined Arms School.

1977 Graduated from the Frunze Military 

Academy.

1984 Graduated from the USSR General Staff 

Academy. Commanded the 1st Motorised Rifle Division in Kaliningrad.

1987 - 1989 Adviser to the Afghan Ministry of Defence.

1989 - 1991 Commander of an army corps in the 

Leningrad Military District.

1991 - First Deputy Commander and the Chief 

of Staff of the Turkestan Military District. 

1992 - First Deputy Chairman, then Chairman, 

of the Kyrgyz State Defence Committee.

1993 - 1999 Defence Minister of Kyrgyzstan.
64

2005 - 2006 Chairman of the Kyrgyz Border guard 

Service.

2007 - 2009 Executive Director of RATS. 

Dzhenisbek Mukhamedkarimovich 

Dzhumanbekov (2010-13) 

Lieutenant General 

Born in November 1945.

1968 - Graduated from the Moscow Technological Institute of the Food Industry 

and worked in the Kazakh SSR Ministry 

of Bread Production [sic] in Almaty.

1972 - Graduated from an unspecified KGB 

school and worked as a KGB officer in 

Almaty and Karaganda regions.

1986 - Deputy Head of the Kazakh KGB, of the 

KGB USSR, of the Aktyubinsk region.

1992 - Head of the Kazakh KGB/KNB of the 

Dzhambyl region. 

1994 - First Deputy of the Chairman of the 

Kazakh National Security Committee 

(KNB).

1995 - 1997 Chairman of the National Security Committee of Kazakhstan.

1997 - Deputy Director of Barlay/Intelligence 

Service of the Kazakhstan

1999 - 2002 Official KNB Representative in 

Uzbekistan.

1992 - 2004 Official KNB Representative in Russia.

2004 - 2009 Deputy Director of the Executive Committee of the RATS of the SCO.

2009 - Deputy Chairman of the Kazakh KNB.

2010 - 2013 Executive Director of the RATS.
65

Zhang Xinfeng (2013 - )

Born in 1952 in Tieling City in Liaoning Province.

His working career - probably in the state security sector - began in 1968, a year before the official end of the 

Cultural Revolution, and joined the Communist Party 

of China in 1976, the year Mao Zedong died. 

1980 - 1983 Worked for the Public Security Department, Culture Protection Division, Heilongjiang Province.

1983 - 1984 Deputy Director, Public Security Department, Criminal Investigation Division Heilongjiang Province 

1984 -1990 Director of the Public Security Department, Criminal Investigation Division in 

Heilongjiang Province.

1995 - 2003 Deputy Director, then Director of the 

Public Security Department, Heilongjiang Province, Promoted to Director, 

Ministry of Public Security, Criminal Investigation Department. 

2003 - 2005 Assistant Minister, Ministry of Public 

Security.

2005 - Deputy Director, National Narcotics 

Control Commission.

 Deputy Director, Chinese People’s 

Armed Police Force.

 Deputy Director, National Narcotics 

Control Commission.

 Member of the CPC Party committee at 

Ministry of Public Security CPC.

 Deputy Minister of Public Security 

Ministry.

2012 - Deputy Director, State Internet Informa- 

(April) tion Office.
66

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX II

1. Peoples.ru, available from www.peoples.ru/state/

politics/chzhan_deguan/; SCO website at www.sectsco.org/home.

asp?LanguageID=2. 

2. “Kazakh News,” Kazinform, July 4, 2012, available from 

www.knews.kg/ru/people/454/print/; “New Secretary-General of the 

SCO Muratbek Imanaliev Officially Took Office,” Infoshos, undated, available from infoshos.ru/en/?idn=5353; “About the Embassy, 

Ambassador,” Kazakh Embassy in Israel, undated available from 

www.kazakhemb.org.il/?CategoryID=162&ArticleID=734&Page=1.

3. “Imanliev Muratbek Sansyzbayevich,” Knews, July 21, 

2013, available from www.knews.kg/ru/people/454/ and aef.kz/

ru/aef2011/speakers/61019/; “Imanliev Muratbek Sansyzbayevich,” Central Asia.ru, available from www.centrasia.ru/person2.

php?&st=1013869298.

4. “Secretary-General, Dmitry Federovich Mezentsev,” SCO 

website, available from www.sectsco.org/EN123/secretary.asp.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Authors

Mr. Henry Plater-Zyberk

Dr. Andrew Monaghan

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil