United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

____________________________

No. 97-6060

____________________________

In re: *

*

John E. Land, Mary Connie Land, *

*

Debtors *

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Dan Bryan; Sharon Bryan; Bryan *

Broadcasting, Inc., *

*

Creditors - Appellants, * Appeal from the United

States

v. * Bankruptcy Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa

John E. Land, Mary Connie Land, *

*

Debtors - Appellees *

____________________________

Submitted: October 22, 1997

Filed: December 19, 1997

____________________________

Before KOGER, WILLIAM A. HILL, and SCHERMER, Bankruptcy Judges

KOGER, Chief Bankruptcy Judge

Dan Bryan, Sharon Bryan and Bryan Broadcasting, Inc. appeal

from the bankruptcy court’s order entered on June 24, 1997, in

which the court denied the appellants’ Motion to Dismiss or to

Change Venue and their Motion to Set Aside and to Vacate Judgment

and Order of Confirmation, for Extension of Time to Appeal, and for

Other Relief.
2

FACTS

On April 7, 1997, John and Mary Land, husband and wife, filed

a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy

Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern

District of Iowa. Despite declaring under penalty of perjury that

they had been domiciled or had a residence, principal place of

business, or principal assets in the Northern District of Iowa for

180 days immediately preceding the date of the bankruptcy petition

or for a longer part of such 180 days than in any other district,

counsel for the Lands admitted at a hearing held on June 3, 1997,

that venue was proper only in the Southern District of Iowa and

that the Lands had filed in the Northern District of Iowa for their

convenience. In their bankruptcy schedules, the Lands listed Dan

Bryan as a creditor holding an unsecured nonpriority claim based

upon his role as a co-signor for a loan from State Central Bank.

The amount of the claim was shown as zero, and as contingent,

unliquidated and disputed. In the mailing matrix, the Lands listed

Dan Bryan’s address as Sherwood Oaks, Carthage, Illinois 62321.

Although Dan Bryan’s spouse, Sharon Bryan, was also a creditor of

the Lands as a result of a mortgage executed by the Lands in favor

of Dan Bryan and Sharon Bryan, the Lands did not list Sharon Bryan

as a creditor in their schedules filed on April 7, 1997. In the

mortgage, the address of the Bryans was shown as Sherwood Oaks,

Carthage, Illinois 62321. Bryan Broadcasting, Inc. is the Bryans’

wholly-owned business and is a defendant, along with the Bryans, in

a state court lawsuit filed by the Lands arising out the sale of a

radio station by Bryan Broadcasting, Inc., Dan Bryan and Sharon

Bryan to the Lands’ business, Landmark Broadcasting, Inc. Bryan

Broadcasting, Inc. and the Bryans may be creditors of the Lands

based upon claims or counterclaims they may file in the pending

state court action. On or about May 25, 1997, the Lands did amend
3

their bankruptcy schedules to include Bryan Broadcasting, Inc. and

Dan and Sharon Bryan, each with an address of P.O. Box 485,

Carthage, Illinois 62321.

 A notice of the Lands’ bankruptcy filing; the date, time and

location of the meeting of creditors; the deadline to file a proof

of claim; the bar date for filing objections to confirmation of the

plan; and the date, time and place of the hearing on confirmation

was mailed to each creditor at the address shown on the mailing

matrix. The section 341 meeting of creditors and the confirmation
4

hearing were both held on May 6, 1997, at 12:00 p.m. and 1:30 p.m.,

respectively. The bankruptcy court confirmed the Lands’ Chapter 13

plan, without objection. The order confirming the plan was filed

on May 12, 1997.

On May 6, 1997, after the 1:30 p.m. confirmation hearing, Dan

Bryan, Sharon Bryan and Bryan Broadcasting, Inc. filed a Motion to

Dismiss or to Change Venue. On May 14, 1997, Dan Bryan, Sharon

Bryan and Bryan Broadcasting, Inc. filed a Motion to Set Aside and

to Vacate Judgment and Order of Confirmation, for Extension of Time

to Appeal, and for Other Relief. Subsequently, on May 19, 1997,

the appellants filed an amendment to the May 14 motion in which

they stated that the address for Dan Bryan was incomplete, and

asserted that neither Dan Bryan, Sharon Bryan nor Bryan

Broadcasting, Inc. received notice of the Lands’ bankruptcy filing.

The bankruptcy court held a hearing on the motions on June 3, 1997.

The bankruptcy court denied both motions. In its order the

bankruptcy court found and concluded in relevant part that:

Evidence was presented that the Bryans’ attorney

contacted the Lands’ attorney on April 16, 1997 regarding

the bankruptcy of the Lands. This was six days after the

notices were mailed by the Clerk. Mr. Bryan testified

that upon learning of the bankruptcy he had to “find Mr.

Lam as an attorney”, as he had no bankruptcy attorney.

Mr. Bryan contacted Mr. Lam, who now represents all three

Bryan parties, sometime prior to the April 16, 1997 phone

call by Mr. Lam to the Lands’ attorney. Mr. Bryan also

testified that he is sure he contacted Mr. Lam prior to

that date.

There was testimony that Mr. Bryan may have heard of

the Lands’ bankruptcy through one of his other attorneys

during depositions in a collateral case. Whether

coincidental or not, he became aware of the Lands’

Chapter 13 petition and began to act on that information

at the same time the notices from the court were

delivered.
5

. . . .

Mr. Bryan had notice of the bankruptcy proceeding in

question and began to act on that information exactly as

if he had received notice by mail. Mr. Bryan contacted

an attorney to deal with bankruptcy issues at Mr. Bryan’s

request at least 20 days prior to the objection bar and

confirmation hearing date. The Court concludes that Mr.

Bryan had adequate notice of the Lands’ bankruptcy.
6

It is notable that the appellants do not appeal from the

bankruptcy court’s determination that Dan Bryan had actual notice

of the Lands’ bankruptcy filing at least 20 days prior to the date

set for the confirmation hearing, nor do they appeal from the

bankruptcy court’s factual findings supporting its ruling.

Regarding Sharon Bryan’s notice of the Lands’ bankruptcy

filing, the bankruptcy court found and concluded that:

Sharon Bryan and Dan Bryan live together as husband

and wife. Mr. Bryan testified that they see each other

every day and that he would discuss with Mrs. Bryan

matters of an important nature of which he became aware.

The bankruptcy of individuals who presumably owe them a

substantial debt would qualify as a matter of importance.

Mrs. Bryan has retained the same attorney as Mr. Bryan to

represent her in relation to the Lands’ bankruptcy. That

attorney received notice of the Lands’ bankruptcy from

Mr. Bryan at least 20 days prior to the hearing date.

This Court has concluded that Mr. Bryan received

timely notice of the Lands’ bankruptcy proceeding.

“[T]he normal relationship between spouses being close,

Congress could well consider that receipt of the notice

by either spouse would be well calculated to give actual

notice to both, even though one spouse may be temporarily

absent.” Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d 760, 773 (9th

Cir. 1962). In Cohen, a prosecution for income tax

evasion, Mr. Cohen was temporarily away, in prison. He

nevertheless was deemed to have received notice when his

wife was served at their permanent address. Neither of

the Bryans have claimed absence from the family home.

Mr. Bryan’s testimony, the advisory language of Congress,

and Cohen, when considered together, convince this Court

that notice to Mr. Bryan [sic] was adequate.

In the case of In re Texaco Inc., 182 B.R. 937

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995), a Chapter 11 case, adjacent

landowners were found to have received actual “Notice by

mail of the Bar Date” for the filing of proofs of claim,

by reason of their relationships to five other landowners

to whom notice was actually mailed. The parties in

question in Texaco were related to some lesser degrees

(sister-in-law, e.g.) to parties to whom notice had
7

actually been mailed. Id. at 954. This provides further

support that the Lands’ position that Mr. Bryan’s notice

provided either actual or imputed notice to Mrs. Bryan by

virtue of their marital relationship, living arrangement,

and the testimony of Mr. Bryan.
8

The bankruptcy court also observed and found that Sharon Bryan

“was a party to the Motion to Dismiss or to Change Venue which was

filed late on the date of the confirmation hearing.” It is

important to note that the appellants do not appeal from the

bankruptcy court’s factual findings supporting its legal conclusion

that Dan Bryan’s actual notice of the Lands’ bankruptcy filing

could be imputed to Sharon Bryan.

The bankruptcy court did not spend much time on the venue

issue. In relevant part, the bankruptcy court stated that no

objections to venue were made prior to the confirmation hearing and

found that the motion filed subsequent to confirmation was not

timely filed.

JURISDICTION

We must address the issue of whether the bankruptcy appellate

panel has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this case. The

appellants timely filed a notice of appeal on July 1, 1997. See

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a). The bankruptcy court’s denial of the

appellants’ motion to set aside the order confirming the debtors’

plan is a final order over which the bankruptcy appellate panel

unquestionably has appellate jurisdiction. See KCC-Leawood

Corporate Manor I v. Travelers Ins. Co., 117 B.R. 969, 972 (W.D.

Mo. 1989) (“Confirmation of a plan is a final order for purposes of

an appeal.”).

The inquiry over whether we may exercise jurisdiction in this

case arises in the context of the bankruptcy court’s order denying

the motion to change venue. Although the denial of a motion to

change venue is interlocutory in nature, it has been held to be

appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). See ICMR, Inc. v. Tri-City
9

Foods, Inc., 100 B.R. 51, 53 (D. Kan. 1989). In ICMR, Inc. the

district court, quoting 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.02[4][f] (L.

King 15th ed. 1988), opined:

The discretion of the district court or appellate

panel [to permit interlocutory appeals of orders changing

venue] should be more readily obtained when an order

regarding the venue of the title 11 case is concerned

than in an appeal from a venue order in a civil

proceeding. Unlike a civil proceeding in which the order

regarding
10

venue can be appealed at the conclusion of the proceeding, there is

a very small chance of success on an appeal which is taken after

the title 11 case has been administered and closed, which may be

the only time when the order regarding venue becomes a final order.

The appellate panel or district court should recognize this, and be

more inclined to grant the interlocutory appeal when a motion

regarding venue of the case is involved.

ICMR, Inc., 100 B.R. at 53. We choose to follow the guidance

provided by the district court in ICMR, Inc. and determine that we

have jurisdiction to rule on the bankruptcy court’s order denying

the motion to change venue.

For practical reasons it is appropriate for us to exercise

appellate jurisdiction now over the denial of the motion to change

venue. If we fail to do so, the Lands’ Chapter 13 case will run

its course, the bankruptcy court may issue rulings during the

pendency of the case, dividends will be paid to the creditors, and

the Chapter 13 trustee will be paid the percentage fee. After the

case has been administered and closed, the appellants could bring

an appeal from the bankruptcy court’s order denying the motion to

change venue. If they are successful at that time in their

assertion that venue was improper from the inception of the case,

the bankruptcy court will be required to order and oversee the

recovery of the dividends paid to the creditors and the fee paid to

the Chapter 13 trustee, vacate any orders entered in the case, then

transfer the case to the Southern District of Iowa for the entire

process to begin anew. This would certainly defeat the promotion

of the efficient use of judicial resources, and frustrate the

expectations of the debtors, their creditors and the Chapter 13

trustee.

Further, exercising jurisdiction over the denial of the motion

to change venue also comports with the three-part test for
11

determining whether a bankruptcy decision is final that is set

forth in Lewis v. U.S., Farmers Home Admin., 992 F.2d 767, 772 (8th

Cir. 1993). Here, the order leaves the bankruptcy court with

nothing to do but to execute the order; delay in obtaining review

would prevent the appellants from obtaining effective relief; and

a later reversal on the issue of venue would possibly require

recommencement of the entire bankruptcy case. See Lewis, 992 F.2d

at 772.
12

See also Moix-McNutt v. Coop, 212 B.R. 953, 954 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.

1997). “[T]he test for finality in the bankruptcy area is more

liberal than in nonbankruptcy proceedings.” Lewis, 992 F.2d at

772. “‘[F]inality for bankruptcy purposes is a complex subject .

. . [and courts deciding appealability questions] must take into

account the peculiar needs of the bankruptcy process.’” In re Koch,

109 F.3d 1285, 1287 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Huebner, 986

F.2d 1222, 1223 (8th Cir. 1993)).

ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL

The appellants raise two points on appeal. First, whether a

motion to change venue filed within twenty-nine days of the

petition is timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1408 and Fed. R. Bankr.

P. 1014(a)(2). Second, whether notice of the bankruptcy filing may

be imputed to Sharon Bryan.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL

Whether the appellants’ motion to change venue was timely

filed under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1014(a)(2) involves a question of

fact and the bankruptcy court’s ruling on this matter shall not be

set aside unless clearly erroneous. See First Nat’l Bank v. Allen,

118 F.3d 1289, 1294 (8th Cir. 1997); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013. A

bankruptcy court’s finding of fact is clearly erroneous when the

reviewing court is left with a “‘definite and firm conviction that

a mistake has been committed.’” In re Waugh, 95 F.3d 706, 711 (8th

Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S.

564, 573, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985)). The

appellant bears the burden of proving that the bankruptcy court’s

determination was clearly erroneous. U.S. Machinery Movers v.
13

Beller, 280 F.2d 91, 95 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 903, 81

S. Ct. 236, 5 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1960).

Whether notice of the Lands’ bankruptcy filing may be imputed

to Sharon Bryan involves a question of law over which the

bankruptcy appellate panel exercises de novo review. See First

Nat’l Bank, 118 F.3d at 1294.
14

DISCUSSION

I. Whether the motion to change venue was timely filed.

The proper venue in which to file a bankruptcy case is set out

in section 1408 of the Judicial Code, which states in relevant part

that:

[A] case under title 11 may be commenced in the district

court for the district--

(1) in which the domicile, residence, principal

place of business in the United States, or

principal assets in the United States, of the

person or entity that is the subject of such case

have been located for the one hundred and eighty

days immediately preceding such commencement, or

for a longer portion of such one-hundred-andeighty-day period than the domicile, residence, or

principal place of business, in the United States,

or principal assets in the United States, of such

person were located in any other district.

28 U.S.C. § 1408(1).

Federal R. Bankr. P. 1014(a)(2) provides that:

If a petition is filed in an improper district, on

timely motion of a party in interest and after hearing on

notice to the petitioners, the United States trustee, and

other entities as directed by the court, the case may be

dismissed or transferred to any other district if the

court determines that transfer is in the interest of

justice or for the convenience of the parties.

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1014(a)(2).

If venue is not proper in a district, upon the filing of a

timely motion to change venue a bankruptcy court is without

authority to retain the bankruptcy case. McCall, 194 B.R. at 593.

See also ICMR, Inc., 100 B.R. at 54. However, “[i]f a timely
15

motion to dismiss for improper venue is not filed, the right to

object to venue is waived.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1014, Advisory

Committee Note (1987), reprinted in Norton Bankruptcy Rules

Pamphlet 1996-1997 Edition, p.50. “What constitutes a timely

filing of such a motion is not governed by a statutory or rule

definition.” McCall, 194 B.R.
16

at 592. Whether a motion to change venue has been timely filed

depends on the facts and circumstances presented in the particular

case. See McCall, 194 B.R. at 593.

There is no question that venue is improper in this case.

However, the factual findings of the bankruptcy court support its

conclusion that Dan Bryan did not timely file the motion to change

venue. The findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. The

uncontested evidence shows that Dan Bryan contacted an attorney at

least 20 days prior to the date set for the confirmation hearing

and the date set for filing objections to confirmation. The

attorney contacted the Lands’ attorney on April 16, 1997, regarding

the Lands’ bankruptcy filing. Dan Bryan became aware of the Lands’

bankruptcy about the same time the notice from the clerk’s office

was delivered to creditors. Dan Bryan had actual notice of the

Lands’ bankruptcy filing and began to act on that information by

contacting an attorney who then contacted the Lands’ attorney 21

days before the confirmation hearing. Although he had actual

notice of the Lands’ bankruptcy filing and plenty of time in which

to act, Dan Bryan failed to file the motion to change venue and

failed to file objections to confirmation of the Lands’ Chapter 13

plan prior to the confirmation hearing. After confirmation Dan

Bryan sought to undo all that had been done by filing his tardy

motion to change venue and subsequently filing a motion to vacate

the order of confirmation in which he likewise tardily raised

objections to confirmation of the plan. The evidence shows that

Dan Bryan failed to timely file the motion to change venue, and

that Dan Bryan untimely filed objections to confirmation of the

Lands’ Chapter 13 plan.

Whether Sharon Bryan timely filed the motion to change venue

and timely raised objections to confirmation in the motion to set
17

aside the confirmation order depends upon whether notice of the

bankruptcy filing may be imputed to her.

II. Whether notice of the Lands’ bankruptcy filing may be imputed

to Sharon Bryan.

Sharon Bryan did not testify at the hearing on the motion to

change venue and motion to set aside the confirmation order, and

Dan Bryan did not testify that he told his wife about the Lands’
18

bankruptcy filing. Although the bankruptcy court imputed notice of

the Lands’ bankruptcy filing to Sharon Bryan based upon Dan Bryan’s

actual notice, we determine that the bankruptcy court’s ruling must

be affirmed because notice or knowledge of the Lands’ bankruptcy

filing clearly is imputable to Sharon Bryan as a matter of law

based upon the attorney-client/agent-principal relationship with

her attorney, Eric W. Lam.

The bankruptcy court found that the attorney whom Dan Bryan

contacted prior to April 16, 1997, Eric W. Lam, now represents

all three Bryan parties; that Sharon Bryan has retained the same

attorney as Dan Bryan to represent her in relation to the Lands’

bankruptcy; that the attorney received notice of the Lands’

bankruptcy from Dan Bryan at least 20 days prior to the date set

for the hearing on confirmation; and that Sharon Bryan was a party

to the motion to change venue that was filed late on the date of

the confirmation hearing. Although the bankruptcy court did not

impute notice of the Lands’ bankruptcy filing to Sharon Bryan based

upon her attorney-client relationship with Lam, the factual

findings of the bankruptcy court support such a legal conclusion.

Specifically, the bankruptcy court found that Sharon Bryan had

retained Lam to represent her in relation to the Lands’ bankruptcy.

An attorney is considered to be an agent for his or her client.

See Cheriogotis, 188 B.R. at 999; Dillon v. City of Davenport, 366

N.W.2d 918, 923 (Iowa 1985). The attorney-agent’s knowledge is

imputable to the client-principal. See In re Felberman, 196 B.R.

678, 684-85 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995). Further:

The rule in Iowa is that knowledge acquired by an agent

before the commencement of the relationship of principal

and agent is imputable to the principal if the knowledge

is present in the mind of the agent while acting for the

principal in a transaction to which the information is
19

material.

Curran Hydraulic Corp. v. National-Ben Franklin Ins. Co. Of

Illinois, 261 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Iowa 1978). “‘Except for knowledge

acquired confidentially, the time, place, or manner in which

knowledge is acquired by a servant or other agent is immaterial in

determining the liability of his principal because of it.’” Id.

(quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 276).
20

“The relationship of principal and agent is not dependent upon

express agreement between the parties. It may be implied from

either words or conduct of the parties, depending on the

circumstances of the case.” Wyckoff v. A & J Home Benevolent Ass’n

of Creston, Iowa, 119 N.W.2d 126, 128 (Iowa 1962). In Kurtenbach v.

TeKippe, 260 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1977), the Supreme Court of Iowa

stated that an attorney-client relationship is created when:

(1) a person seeks advice or assistance from an attorney,

(2) the advice or assistance sought pertains to matters

within the attorney’s professional competence, and (3)

the attorney expressly or impliedly agrees to give or

actually gives the desired advice or assistance.

In this case, an attorney-client/agent-principal relationship

was created between Lam and Sharon Bryan upon which notice of the

Lands’ bankruptcy may be imputed as a matter of law to Sharon

Bryan. Accordingly, Sharon Bryan failed to timely file the motion

to change venue, and failed to timely raise objections to

confirmation of the Lands’ Chapter 13 plan.

CONCLUSION

We determine that it is appropriate to exercise appellate

jurisdiction over both the bankruptcy court’s denial of the motion

to change venue and motion to set aside the confirmation order.

The evidence supports the bankruptcy court’s factual finding that

Dan Bryan failed to timely file the motion to change venue, and

failed to timely file objections to confirmation of the Lands’

Chapter 13 plan. Notice or knowledge of the Lands’ bankruptcy

filing clearly is imputable to Sharon Bryan as a matter of law

based upon the attorney-client/agent-principal relationship with

Lam. As a result, Sharon Bryan likewise failed to timely file the

motion to change venue and failed to timely object to confirmation
21

of the Lands’ Chapter 13 plan. Accordingly, the decision of the

bankruptcy court is affirmed.
22

SCHERMER, Bankruptcy Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Because there is no final order of

the bankruptcy court, we lack jurisdiction to address the merits of

this appeal.

This court must first decide whether the bankruptcy court’s

order is final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). This circuit

has “traditionally considered three factors in determining when an

order in a bankruptcy case is final: the extent to which (1) the

order leaves the bankruptcy court nothing to do but execute the

order; (2) the extent to which delay in obtaining review would

prevent the aggrieved party from obtaining effective relief: (3)

the extent to which a later reversal on that issue would require

recommencement of the entire proceeding.” In re Koch, 109 F.3d

1285, 1287 (8th Cir. 1997). As the majority noted, the order of

the bankruptcy court denying a change of venue is interlocutory.

Only the third factor weighs in favor of appealability in this

case.

Although our circuit has not yet determined whether an order

denying a change of venue is an appealable order, other circuits

have held it is not. See Blankenship v. Am. Sav. & Loan Assoc.,

871 F.2d 1087, No. 89-5075, 1989 WL 27812 (6th Cir. (Ky.) March 24,

1989) (stating this court has no jurisdiction over an interlocutory

appeal from an order denying leave to appeal or, from orders

transferring venue (citations omitted); Dalton v. United States,

733 F.2d 710, 714 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding it is “[a]lso wellestablished . . . that an order transferring venue of an action,

even if the transfer is to a district in another circuit, is an

interlocutory order and unappealable, except by certification under

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)”). Section 1292(b) allows for immediate appeal
23

when an order of the district court “involves a controlling

question of law as to which there is substantial ground for

difference of opinion and . . . an immediate appeal from the order

may materially advance the ultimate determination of the

litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Authority for the majority opinion is based upon Collier on

Bankruptcy ¶ 3.02 [4][f] (L. King 15th ed. 1988). This treatise

suggests that courts should be more lenient granting interlocutory

appeals than the standard followed under § 1292(b) when a request

for change of venue has been
24

made. Venue decisions are usually fact specific to the case at

hand. “Thus they are generally not ‘controlling questions of law’

as that term is used in § 1292(b), but rather are discretionary

determinations. Such discretionary orders are not of the type from

which interlocutory appeals are generally taken.” K-Mart Corp. v.

Swann Ltd. Partnership, 128 B.R. 138, 140 (D. Md. 1991) (citations

omitted).

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL FOR THE

EIGHTH

CIRCUIT