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i 

85–331 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–67] 

REPORT FROM SIGAR: CHALLENGES TO 

SECURING AFGHAN WOMEN’S GAINS IN 

A POST–2014 ENVIRONMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 29, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

CHRISTOPHER BRIGHT, Professional Staff Member 

PAUL LEWIS, Counsel 

ARTHUR MILIKH, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, October 29, 2013, Report from SIGAR: Challenges to Securing Afghan Women’s Gains in a Post-2014 Environment ........................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, October 29, 2013 ...................................................................................... 27 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2013 

REPORT FROM SIGAR: CHALLENGES TO SECURING AFGHAN 

WOMEN’S GAINS IN A POST–2014 ENVIRONMENT 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Roby, Hon. Martha, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ...................................................... 1 

Tsongas, Hon. Niki, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Barsa, Michelle, Senior Manager for Policy, Inclusive Security Action .............. 5 

Katzman, Dr. Kenneth, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional 

Research Service .................................................................................................. 7 

Sopko, John F., Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 

Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction ........ 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Barsa, Michelle ................................................................................................. 50 

Katzman, Dr. Kenneth ..................................................................................... 60 

Roby, Hon. Martha ........................................................................................... 31 

Sopko, John F. .................................................................................................. 35 

Tsongas, Hon. Niki ........................................................................................... 33 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

SIGAR ‘‘Afghanistan Oversight Access’’ maps ............................................... 71 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 77 

(1) 

REPORT FROM SIGAR: CHALLENGES TO SECURING AFGHAN WOMEN’S GAINS IN A POST–2014 ENVIRONMENT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, Washington, DC, Tuesday, October 29, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:00 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Martha Roby (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARTHA ROBY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Mrs. ROBY. Welcome to this afternoon’s oversight hearing. Before 

we begin, I would like to take a moment to note the passing of our 

former Chairman, Representative Ike Skelton. Although I have 

never served with Mr. Skelton, I know he represented the best of 

this committee and never forgot the importance of putting the 

needs of our men and women in uniform first. Our thoughts are 

with his family and his friends and his colleagues. 

Today we will convene a hearing with the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction and two outside experts. We 

will receive testimony on the challenges of ensuring the important 

security, educational, and economic gains that Afghan women have 

made in the recent years are not lost as the United States transitions its force posture in 2014. 

This subcommittee convened a related hearing in April. At that 

time we received testimony emphasizing that it is essential that Afghanistan develop a lasting and functioning government with capable police and military forces. A safe and secure Afghanistan is a 

necessary predicate to ensuring that all are protected, men and 

women. 

Members of this subcommittee are deeply committed to this 

topic. In May, I traveled to Afghanistan for the third time. It was 

my second CODEL [congressional delegation] that I led, and I was 

joined by Ms. Tsongas, Ms. Duckworth, and several others. And our 

agenda focused on not only visiting with our men and women in 

uniform to thank them for their service in theater, but also to focus 

on women’s issues. 

We saw firsthand women and girls who were attending schools 

and universities, holding elected office, joining the military and police forces, and pursuing new opportunities previously denied to 

them. These are important gains that must not disappear once the 

U.S. reduces forces in Afghanistan, and we must closely monitor 

conditions during this critical transition. 
2 

The safety and security of Afghan women remains an important 

barometer. You have heard me say it many times. It is a litmus 

test for the success of our efforts. Before proceeding, let me note 

that members of other subcommittees may intend to join us, and 

therefore I ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members be allowed to participate in today’s hearing after all Oversight 

and Investigations Subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. Is there objection? Without objection, nonsubcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time 

for 5 minutes. 

Now I turn to my distinguished Ranking Member for her introductory remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Roby can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. NIKI TSONGAS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Chairwoman Roby. I, too, also would 

like to acknowledge the passing of Chairman Skelton. I did have 

the good fortune to serve under him for a number of years, and I 

found him to be a remarkably decent and honorable man, always 

of great integrity. He served our country, his district, and this committee, I think, with great distinction and we are grateful for his 

service to our country, but we miss—we are sorry he passed away. 

I would also like to thank you, Chairwoman Roby, for working to 

arrange this hearing today. I believe, as do you, that this is a vital 

opportunity to build on the important and bipartisan discussions on 

those issues which our subcommittee—those issues which our subcommittee had a chance to visit in an April hearing on Afghan 

women in the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces], and in our 

July closed briefing with Mr. Sopko. 

As you noted, our Mother’s Day CODELs to Afghanistan—as a 

result of them, we have witnessed firsthand the significant gains 

that Afghan women have made over the past decade in areas such 

as health, governance, and education. Both of us saw what was at 

stake as our forces continue to draw down, and so I would also like 

to thank all of our witnesses for being here today, each with your 

own valuable perspective. I would also particularly like to thank 

you, Mr. Sopko, for the long-term commitment you have made to 

prioritize oversight over Afghan’s women’s issues. Your office faces 

an enormous array of challenges in Afghanistan, and is responsible, as we know, for monitoring every aspect of our reconstruction 

efforts under logistically frustrating circumstances. 

I was very encouraged by your recently announced comprehensive audit of our programs for Afghan women and girls due out 

early next year. And from the written testimonies of all our guests 

today, it is apparent that each of you is fundamentally in agreement that while there have been precious gains made for Afghan 

women and girls over the past decade, these gains are already 

threatened and will face significant challenges after the bulk of our 

armed forces have withdrawn at the end of 2014. 

Your testimony, Mr. Sopko, also notes the significant obstacles 

SIGAR [Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction] 
3 

and other Federal agencies will face in performing oversight on the 

ground, due to security challenges. As much as 80 percent of the 

country may simply be inaccessible. After 2014, not only may the 

gains which have been made for women be eroded in these areas, 

it is also likely that we may not even know the full extent of the 

setbacks. 

I also look forward to hearing from each of your thoughts on how 

we can improve recruiting and retention of Afghan women in the 

ANSF and Afghan national police. The issue is increasingly timely 

due to a number of second-order effects of low recruitment, such as 

the approaching presidential elections in April, and the inability of 

Afghan women wishing to cast ballots to do so, unless there are 

adequate women in uniform available to search them. The ANSF 

is not meeting its recruiting objectives, and the obstacles are varied 

and significant. 

So thank you all again for being here this afternoon, and I look 

forward to your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tsongas can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, Ms. Tsongas. Our panel today includes 

Mr. John Sopko, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction; Ms. Michelle Barsa, senior manager for policy at Inclusive Security Action; and Dr. Kenneth Katzman, a specialist in 

Middle Eastern Affairs at the Congressional Research Service. Mr. 

Sopko, please begin. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN F. SOPKO, SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION, OFFICE OF 

THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION 

Mr. SOPKO. Thank you, very much. Chairman Roby, Ranking 

Member Tsongas, members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be 

here today to discuss SIGAR’s oversight work and the challenges 

facing Afghan women and girls. Since 2002, Congress has appropriated nearly $100 billion to rebuild Afghanistan, making it the 

most expensive effort to rebuild a single nation in U.S. history. 

Improving the lives of Afghan women and girls has been an integral component of that effort. From 2003 through 2010, Congress 

dedicated $630 million to address the needs of Afghan women and 

girls, and it appears this investment may have paid off. Over the 

last decade, Afghanistan has made significant progress in advancing the rights of Afghan women and girls, providing them with critical services and protecting them from violence. 

However, despite these initial gains, Afghan women still remain 

largely marginalized. The United Nations Gender Inequality Index 

puts Afghanistan near the bottom, ranking 175 of 186. The United 

Nations also reports that 50 percent of all marriages that take 

place in Afghanistan are still child marriages. 

And while the goal is for the women to make up 10 percent of 

the Afghan National Army and Air Force, as you know, they currently make up .3 percent of those forces. And, unfortunately, the 

results for recruiting women into the Afghan National Police are 

equally abysmal, less than 1 percent. 
4 

Due to interest from Congress, including members of this committee, SIGAR initiated the new audit referenced by Ranking 

Member Tsongas. We will try to identify the challenges and evaluate the U.S. efforts to confront them. SIGAR is also concerned 

about the impact of the coalition troop drawdown on our government’s ability to oversee Afghan National Security Forces which, 

for the most part, will be solely responsible for preserving these 

hard-fought gains for Afghan women and girls after 2014. 

Now although it is difficult to predict the future U.S. presence 

in Afghanistan, it is likely that less than a quarter of the country, 

mostly the areas around the major cities, will be accessible to U.S. 

civilian personnel by the end of the transition, and a significant decrease from 2009. 

The maps which we are showing up on the TV illustrate that 

fact. They also clearly show the trend of a limited future oversight 

access after 2014. In the coming year, SIGAR will continue to focus 

attention on how the military drawdown, the decline in donor resources, and the transition to Afghan governance and responsibility 

for the ANSF will affect reconstruction and the rights of women 

and girls. 

[The maps referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning 

on page 71.] 

Mr. SOPKO. Now in addition to our work on Afghan women and 

girls, SIGAR has a large body of work focused on the Afghan National Security Forces which is relevant to today’s hearing. This 

quarter, SIGAR issued a number of new audits and inspections related to the ANSF. These reports underscore some key problems 

that SIGAR has identified before, including providing direct assistance to the Afghan government without fully assessing and or monitoring and or fixing financial management weaknesses; the lack of 

an ANSF basing plan that takes into account future ANSF numbers; ignoring the Afghan’s inability to sustain programs and infrastructure; the absence of strong accountability measures over supplies provided to the ANSF; and the failure to consistently exercise 

strong contract oversight and management. 

In conclusion, the reconstruction effort is undergoing a massive 

transition. This includes a growing reliance on direct or on-budget 

assistance to the Afghan ministries. Now I just returned from 

Brussels where I met with officials of the European Union [EU] 

and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. These meetings 

confirmed our concerns. As you may know, as it was recently reported, that NATO was planning to focus less on training of Afghan troops and more on overseeing how the funding will be spent, 

due to fears of corruption and misuse of NATO funds. I also 

learned that the European Union does not give direct bilateral assistance to specific Afghan ministries because of the risk of threat 

and abuse. 

This comports with concerns expressed to me by DFID [Department for International Development], the EU—I mean, excuse me, 

the U.K. aid agency early in the year. 

In addition, we were told in Brussels that the EU has serious 

misgivings that the Law and Order Trust Fund [for Afghanistan] 

or LOTFA, has inadequate controls to ensure payments are not 

made to ghost Afghan employees. 
5 

Therefore, I conclude by saying the United States and other donors must establish mechanisms to protect direct assistance from 

corruption. And the U.S. and its allies must have the courage to 

condition assistance on the Afghans meeting their commitments, 

whether on oversight or protecting the rights of women and girls. 

Thank you very much. And I look forward to your questioning. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sopko can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you. 

Ms. Barsa. 

STATEMENT OF MICHELLE BARSA, SENIOR MANAGER FOR 

POLICY, INCLUSIVE SECURITY ACTION 

Ms. BARSA. Chairman Roby, Ranking Member Tsongas, members 

of the subcommittee, allow me to thank you for your consistent 

support for Afghan women and for inviting me here to testify today 

on the issue of recruitment and retention of women in the Afghan 

National Security Forces. 

I work with an organization called Inclusive Security, that is 

dedicated to increasing the inclusion of women in peace and security processes. 

We have been in Afghanistan for over a decade, and I travel to 

the country frequently. Informing this testimony are consultations 

I have led with men and women in the Afghan National Security 

Forces, officials of the Afghan Ministries of Interior and Defense, 

and representatives of ISAF [International Security Assistance 

Force], among others. 

Let me start by acknowledging that the gains Afghan women 

have made since 2001 are many. But, as U.S. and coalition forces 

draw down, progress is beginning to erode. 

As we consider how to maintain progress for women, we must 

evaluate women’s direct participation in the Afghan institutions 

mandated to protect those gains. 

In total, the U.S. has appropriated about $52.8 billion for the Afghan security forces funds for supporting the Afghan national 

forces. Prior to 2013, there had never been authorizing or appropriating language in law that specifically addressed recruitment 

and retention of women in those forces. 

The presence or absence of women in the ANSF has implications 

in the areas the U.S. has deemed top priorities, including, but not 

limited to, democracy promotion, countering terrorism, and providing security to the Afghan people. 

And I will elaborate briefly on those three points. 

On the issue of democracy promotion, female security officers are 

required to staff the women-only voter registration and polling stations. In the absence of sufficient numbers of female security personnel, these voter registration and polling stations will remain 

closed. 

In other words, Afghan women will not be allowed to vote. 

On countering terrorism, last year in Afghanistan, you can trace 

at least 13 recorded accounts of male insurgents dressed as women 

infiltrating restricted areas from which they launched attacks. 

There were no female body searchers to stop them. 
6 

Due to cultural norms, male security officers cannot conduct body 

searches of women, security checks of homes that have a female 

present, nor effectively gather information from or conduct interrogations of women. 

On the issue of providing security to the Afghan people, of 

course, understanding people to refer equally to men, women, boys 

and girls, sexual and gender-based violence is endemic in Afghanistan, with as many as 87 percent of women experiencing some form 

of domestic abuse or forced marriage in their lifetime. 

In cases where women report these crimes to male police, they 

are often blamed for the abuse or, worse, abused by the officer. 

With female police officers, these crimes are more likely to be 

properly registered, investigated and prosecuted. 

Of the myriad institutional and social impediments to recruitment and retention in the Afghan security forces, I will highlight 

six of priority concern to women. 

First, the recruitment process. Women have reported recruitment 

officers turning them away, heckling them as bad women and asking for sexual favors in exchange for enrollment. 

Second, assignment and rank promotion. Women have often reported being assigned to positions below their ranks, including soldiers relegated to carrying out menial tasks, such as cleaning the 

office or serving tea. 

Equipment and transportation is an issue. Women have reported 

not being assigned weapons, never receiving uniforms or being 

issued uniforms made for men, and having rare access to vehicles, 

which limits their ability to investigate crimes, respond to ongoing 

incidents, and conduct outreach to communities. 

Three is the issue of sexual harassment. Complaints of sexual 

harassment, abuse and coercion are widespread throughout the 

forces. The existing complaints response mechanism has proven ineffective in addressing abuse and holding perpetrators accountable. 

Then, there is the public perceptions issue. While surveys do actually show that communities are increasingly supportive of police 

women, families are still reluctant to encourage or allow female 

members to serve. This is partially attributable to conservative cultural norms, but also to the rampant sexual harassment and assault within the forces and lack of female-only facilities, which lead 

to rumors of prostitution and un-Islamic behavior. 

Highlighting the point of inadequate facilities, as one example, 

29 of the 30 police training centers do not have dormitories for 

women. Without appropriate facilities, women trainees need to 

travel home each night, which effectively limits enrollment to 

women in the immediate vicinity of the training center. 

The Afghan government has set ambitious targets for recruiting 

and retaining women in the forces, but we are not on track to meet 

them. 

This is, in part, attributable to the environment, but also to an 

under-resourced effort. We are grateful Congress has taken steps 

to address this. The 2013 NDAA [National Defense Authorization 

Act] emphasizes the importance of recruitment and retention of 

women in the forces. The House version of the 2014 NDAA as well 

as the 2014 defense approps [appropriations] bill specifically au-
7 

thorize and appropriate, respectively, $47.3 million for this purpose. 

Efforts to support women in the Afghan forces will be sidelined 

if money is not explicitly reserved, which, to clarify, doesn’t imply 

adding another line of effort to the train and assist mission. 

To effectively integrate women into the forces, interventions designed to recruit and retain women must be integrated into current 

U.S. efforts under the existing funding categories. 

I want to stress the point that right now the focus needs to be 

on cultivating a safe environment for women within the forces, 

which can only be done by taking on the challenges outlined earlier. 

Additionally, financial resources must be complemented by 

human resources. Right now, we have gender advisers in place at 

ISAF HQ [International Security Assistance Force Headquarters], 

ISAF Joint Command and the NATO training mission. A number 

of these positions will be cut by the start of 2014, which will curtail 

our ability to meaningfully make progress toward the goals set. 

Without question, Afghan women have experienced improvements in access to health care, education, economic opportunity 

and political power since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. 

But it is important to remember, they weren’t handed progress; 

they fought for it. They established social services organizations, 

ran for political office, advocated to official actors, and did the impossible work of holding communities together in the midst of war. 

As we question how to maintain gains post-2014, our answers 

must include enabling women themselves to protect what they 

have fought so hard to achieve. We must acknowledge Afghan 

women’s interest in serving their communities and their country. 

And, for those who want to serve in the armed forces, it is our 

obligation to ensure they can. 

Thank you, and I welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Barsa can be found in the Appendix on page 50.] 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Katzman. 

STATEMENT OF DR. KENNETH KATZMAN, SPECIALIST IN MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Dr. KATZMAN. Thank you very much, Chairman Roby and Ranking Member Tsongas for—— 

Mrs. ROBY. Dr. Katzman, sorry. 

Dr. KATZMAN. Thank you very much for asking the Congressional 

Research Service for my testimony. I will summarize it and ask the 

full text be included in the record. 

My work on Afghanistan for the Congressional Research Service 

focuses extensively on Afghan politics, culture and the human 

rights situation, having studied Afghanistan since the Soviet era. 

My testimony lays out some of the gains and some of the setbacks, actually, that women have made in Afghanistan since 2001. 

There have been dramatic gains, as outlined, but also, since the 

Taliban insurgency gained or regained some strength, toward 2006, 
8 

2007, before President Obama’s surge in Afghanistan, there have 

been setbacks. 

As the Taliban make gains, they tend to enforce their way of 

thinking in the areas under their control. 

What I want to do in my summary is just lay out four scenarios 

for post-2014 and how that would affect women’s rights in Afghanistan. 

The first scenario is relative stability. In other words, postulating 

that it appears that, roughly, the United States might keep about 

10,000 troops in Afghanistan after 2014, with about another 5,000 

partner country forces. 

Most of my peers in this business, we agree that that probably 

is reasonably enough to preserve a status quo. The government in 

Kabul will not collapse under that scenario and will continue to 

even accomplish some economic development. 

Most of these forces will be training and mentoring the 350,000 

member ANSF. 

So if the security situation—if, indeed, the security gains hold, 

roughly, then women’s rights will relatively remain as they are— 

steps forward, steps backward; gains, some setbacks, but not a dramatic decline. 

The second scenario is what I call a worst-case scenario, which 

would be a collapse of the government in Kabul. If, for example, 

there is no agreement to keep U.S. troops or if the international 

troops prove insufficient, and the Afghan security forces collapse 

under Taliban pressure, and the Taliban were, perhaps, to recapture control of Afghanistan or much of Afghanistan, that clearly I 

think would represent a worst-case scenario. 

We could expect that even though some Taliban leaders, including Mullah Omar, have suggested that they may be more open to 

a different type of regime, should they come back to power, not necessarily expelling girls from school, not necessarily preventing 

women working outside the home. I think we have to assume that 

if the Taliban were to come back to power, they would enforce some 

of those restrictions, many of those restrictions that they practiced 

when they were in power from 1996 to 2001, which included using 

the soccer stadium as an arena to stone women to death and conduct public executions. And women in the streets who were not 

completely covered were routinely hit. And it was—well, we don’t 

need to go—it was awful. You know, there is no other way to describe it. 

The most likely scenario I see is this third scenario, where I say 

the influence of what I call faction leaders is going to increase after 

2014. The U.S. and partners will have not that many forces in Afghanistan. These faction leaders probably will reassert themselves. 

They already are starting to call some of their former militia men 

back into service. 

Most of them are Islamic—very, very conservative Islamists. 

Ismail Khan, for example, who used to run western Afghanistan; 

there was a faction leader in Helmand, Sher Mohammad 

Akhunzadeh, very, very repressive, conservative on women. 

Some of them, such as Mr. Dostum [Abdul Rashid Dostum] in 

the north, the Uzbek area, he is actually somewhat more progressive. He is a former communist. 
9 

But the bottom line is, the faction leaders would have increased 

influence in post-2014, and they tend to enforce arbitrary rule. 

Rule of law will basically dissolve. They rule by the barrel of the 

gun, the, what I call in the testimony, the mujahideen culture, the 

culture of we fought the Soviets, we fought the Taliban, therefore, 

we are in charge, and you do what we say. 

Again, not a good scenario for women; but, you know, not as bad 

as the Taliban coming back. 

A middle-ground scenario would be, as I say in the last one, a 

settlement with the Taliban, if there is a political settlement. 

Karzai or his successor has a settlement with the Taliban. The 

Taliban come back into the government peacefully, perhaps as ministers, perhaps controlling provinces or having seats in Parliament. 

Again, these Talibs who come back would be looking to impose Islamic restrictions, and that would not be a good scenario for 

women. However, they would not be controlling the government, 

they would be in partnership with existing progressive forces, and 

so it is sort of a middle-ground scenario. 

So in conclusion, under almost any post-2014 Afghanistan scenario, it is likely that some of the gains we have seen since 2001 

will likely be eroded. Some of these gains threaten more than other 

scenarios, but likely it will not be a positive after 2014. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Katzman can be found in the Appendix on page 60.] 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you very much, and again thank you all for 

your input and insight into these issues that are so very important 

to this committee. I am going to start with you, Mr. Sopko. This 

weekend, there was a Washington Post article that I am sure most 

everybody here has read, where your organization discussed the 

difficulty that your auditors are going to have monitoring the U.S.- 

funded construction projects as the U.S. troop levels reduce over 

the next 12 months and after 2014. 

As you conduct your ongoing work, looking at women’s programs 

specifically over the next year, what sort of approach are you going 

to take to gather information and provide us better visibility as it 

relates to women’s issues there? 

Mr. SOPKO. Chairman Roby, that is a good question, and I will 

be honest with you, we don’t have as good an answer I would like 

to give you. One of the reasons we sent that letter to the Secretary 

of State, Secretary of Defense, and AID [Agency for International 

Development] administrator was to try to glean best practices. We 

in particular are trying to understand how you can monitor these 

far-reaching programs and if you look at the bubble map, we have 

actually put some specific construction projects on, but that doesn’t 

include, and if we did include all of the places where the ANP [Afghan National Police] is working, or the Afghan military are working, that whole map would be red, and remember, we are paying 

money for their salaries, we are trying to ensure there is recruitment of women in all of those areas. And the difficulty is how do 

we monitor when U.S. citizens, U.S. citizens working for the government cannot get there? 

Mrs. ROBY. Well, right. And so I wanted to bring up at this point 

and ask you, when we were, our last trip, on Mother’s Day, we had 
10 

opportunity, and these ladies here as well were all with us when 

we sat down with the Minister of Defense and had a frank conversation with him about the monies that are supposed to be used 

for that very purpose. And we had a—I mean, it was a very frank 

discussion about whether or not he was committed to ensuring that 

those monies would go to the right place. 

He stated verbally, that he was. So, you know, we do have this 

language that Mrs. Davis proposed that is in the current—the 2014 

NDAA that makes sure that that money is used, but I am curious, 

in your role, have you had an opportunity to interact with the Minister of Defense and had these conversations to make sure that 

that money is going where it is supposed to go? 

Mr. SOPKO. Madam Chairman, I have not had any conversation 

with the Minister of Defense, and in particular, I have avoided conversations at that level because of the political overtones, especially 

since many of the ministers are now running for president, so I 

don’t want to be shown showing favorites, or not showing favorites. 

But we have reached out to officials in the ministries at a lower 

level to try to make a determination. And again, I think the thing 

you have to keep in mind is, and I use President Reagan’s oft-used 

statement, ‘‘trust but verify,’’ and I know my colleague, Dr. 

Katzman, who has looked at this since the Soviet Union, will remember that in the Soviet Union, they had a better Constitution 

than we did, so on paper it looked great in the Soviet Union, and 

these promises are one thing. I think what we need to do is we 

have to go out and verify, and that is why—— 

Mrs. ROBY. Sure. 

Mr. SOPKO [continuing]. We are concerned about our ability to go 

out and see those sites and actually kick the tires. 

Mrs. ROBY. Well that is the—these maps are very, very telling, 

so I can appreciate that. And so when you talk about reaching 

these rural areas and, can you just expand on, you know, I mean, 

I know what I have read in the news articles, but expand on what 

your plan is to reach these rural areas as we move to 2014 and beyond. 

Mr. SOPKO. Like everything in Afghanistan, there is no silver 

bullet, and what we are going to have to do is use multiple approaches to this. You can use geospatial, which are satellite photos 

that you are well aware of, but they have limitations. You can use 

third-party monitors, and we have actually had experience auditing 

third-party monitors. And some have been very good. Others have 

been very bad, and actually we did an audit of a USAID [United 

States Agency for International Development] program and the 

third-party monitors couldn’t get out and do the monitoring. 

Mrs. ROBY. Because they would be—the attention would be 

drawn to them. 

Mr. SOPKO. Absolutely. 

Mrs. ROBY. I mean, I think the Washington Post article alluded 

to this, saying if there is some, you know, Afghan individual out 

with a notepad and a camera, then clearly they are tied to Western 

money and they would be threatened themselves. 

Mr. SOPKO. Absolutely. How long is he or she going to last out 

in the countryside? And again, 70 percent of the population is in 

rural areas. 
11 

Mrs. ROBY. Right. 

Mr. SOPKO. Which means it is probably going to be outside those 

bubbles. 

Mrs. ROBY. Right, and we—real quick, and then I will yield to 

Ms. Tsongas, but when we experienced that in our last trip, compared to 2, 3—our first trip 2 years ago, 21⁄2 years ago, where we 

couldn’t move around the country either, and you and I have talked 

about that. So it is very, very evident that these challenges exist. 

My time has expired. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, and thank you all. I think as you can 

see, our focus and our concern is real, both as a result of all of your 

testimonies, and understanding how important it is to the longterm stability of the country, that these gains are not bargained 

away, and that women continue to have ways to meaningfully participate in their country. 

And hearing, in an earlier hearing, our April hearing, there was 

testimony that the ANSF is primarily responsible for recruiting 

women. And Mr. Sopko, you said in your written testimony that 

12,000 women police officers who can conduct body searches on 

women will be necessary at polling stations so that women are, you 

know, are allowed to vote in the upcoming elections. But unfortunately, there are currently only about 1,600 women police officers. 

And from your testimony, and Ms. Barsa said, this participation 

is a near-term problem and a long-term problem. In the near term 

is bulking up the police force so that women can fully participate. 

The long-term problem is that by participating, they have a stake 

in governance and the security situation in the country reflects 

their input. 

So the question I have is, what are the levers we can use, if the 

ANSF is primarily responsible, we are quickly drawing down, how 

do we incentivize the ANSF to take seriously the need to have 

women participating to a necessary extent one, so women can participate in the elections in the short-term, and two, for the longterm security of the country, so I will start with you, Ms. Barsa, 

and then Mr. Sopko, if you would answer. 

Ms. BARSA. Sure. It is not the easiest task, but there are a couple 

things I think you can do. I think one, and Congress has already 

taken this step, is to dedicate financial resources explicitly to recruitment and retention. And looking beyond just female-targeted 

recruitment campaigns, but really to the infrastructure and facility 

refurbishment that the reformist system policies and processes that 

needs to happen to create a safe environment for women in the 

forces. 

That money needs strong safeguards, so that it is not used for 

any other purpose, particularly if it is transferred to the Afghan 

ministries. And we also need to be creative in thinking about how 

we use this funding as potentially positive incentives, so that the 

Afghan ministries in theory could get a plus-up in their budget 

when they meet certain benchmarks related to recruitment and retention, or when we look to money that is dedicated for higher education, secondary or tertiary education for girls, and looking at 

working out a system like our U.S. program of ROTC [Reserve Officers’ Training Corps] such that women exchange scholarships to at-
12 

tend these higher institutions in exchange for a service, either the 

police or army, right? 

I think another piece of it is human resources. I mentioned the 

issue of the advisors. We need these advisors embedded within the 

ministry. They really force and drive action as well as sitting close 

to the commanders of ISF HQ, IGC [Inter Governmental Council] 

and NATO training command, as well as trainers. 

So the training capacity doesn’t exist internal of the ANA [Afghan National Army] and it is quite weak within the ANP, or the 

Afghan National Police, and so they are looking externally to international trainers, so they do trainings of trainers for the Afghans 

to build up that capacity. Diplomatic pressure is really important 

to bring it up in every key leader engagement, just as you all did 

in your Mother’s Day CODEL. Those gestures carry a lot of weight 

within the Afghan ministry. 

I think as we look to professionalizing the force of reform and revision of the performance evaluation process, such that Afghan officers, particularly those in leadership positions, are evaluated not 

just on their tactical and operational performance, but on their 

demonstrated ability to uphold the values of the force. And for 

leaders, their unit’s adherence to a code of conduct that includes 

zero tolerance for sexual abuse and harassment. 

And then finally, I think there is the support for ongoing efforts 

led by Afghan and international NGOs [non-governmental organizations]. There is a lot of really incredible work happening right 

now. Consortiums of Afghan women’s NGOs that have set up a police mentoring project in the provinces, women are working one on 

one with police to build their capacity and help them advance complaints when they have them. There are policewomen’s associations 

being formed, and the Afghan Women’s Network, a local NGO, is 

training them in advocacy, bringing them for direct exchanges with 

chiefs of police. There is work with male commanders, there is community-based democratic policing projects, legal advisors embedded 

within the ministries who go through accelerated training led by 

NGOs. 

And that money is all currently coming through LOFTA, through 

the Law and Order Trust Fund, and it is unclear whether those 

funding levels will be sustained post-2014, so that is another clear 

avenue. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Mr. Sopko, if you have, we have a little time. 

Mr. SOPKO. I am usually not into policy. I do process, as I have 

explained to you before. But I think all of the points raised by my 

colleague here at the table are accurate. I think we have to look 

at our own experience, and our own experience with how we integrated our military, how we have promoted women in the ranks, 

how we did it in the police forces. And there is no silver bullet. I 

think what my colleague has said has given you a list of about 10 

or 15 issues, and I think those are things you have to look at almost every one of them. But the one thing you do have, you have 

the purse strings. 

You have the money that is going to Afghanistan, and it is a lot 

of money. And I think you have to design a program that 

incentivizes doing what we, and that means you, and the taxpayer 

behind you, wants to see done. So there is no silver bullet. But I 
13 

will say the one thing which will destroy any of your plans will be 

if security goes south on the Afghan country, and we don’t have effective oversight. 

Mrs. ROBY. Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr. Sopko, I have 

heard you numerous times, and here I am again. I am like any 

human being. I want to see women and children treated fairly, 

whether it be America or Afghanistan. My biggest concern is, and 

I am sure everybody in town will read your report, but you, and 

maybe those at the table, you have set up metrics of what you 

think should show that Afghanistan is moving forward. Obviously, 

they are not making great advances, and there are cultural reasons 

for that going back 2000 years. It doesn’t mean that we still 

shouldn’t try, but in the debt ceiling increase a week ago, $240 billion for 21⁄2 months, $30 billion of that goes to Afghanistan. 

When do we get to a point as a Congress, and I am talking about 

both parties, that we set the metrics, but we fall short of the 

metrics. The American people are sick and tired of the money that 

we continue to spend and you and other inspector generals testify 

that you can’t account for a large percentage of the American 

money going to Afghanistan. I don’t know, I hope every one of my 

colleagues knows that we had seven Americans killed during the 

shutdown. I don’t know? That is something I am concerned about. 

But when do you get to a point, I have been listening for 12 years. 

I am on the Armed Services Committee as everybody else up here. 

I have heard, not from you today, I have heard the word, ‘‘fragile.’’ 

We are making progress, but things are fragile. Situations are fragile. I hope that you will continue, those of you at the table, and 

many people like yourself, to continue to try to put pressure on 

Congress to look at what we expect, what is reasonable to expect, 

and what is not reasonable. 

Because I cannot explain back to people in my district how we 

continue to spend $30 billion in Afghanistan as we raise the debt 

ceiling, and we are cutting programs left and right across the Third 

District of North Carolina, even some of the military down in my 

district. I hope that at some point in time, whether it be you or 

someone else, would be honest with the Congress and say that just 

putting money in a black hole and there is no end to the black hole. 

I assume that the metrics are in here regarding this issue of the 

women in Afghanistan. I assume you have got recommendations in 

here, is that correct? I haven’t had a chance to look at it. 

Mr. SOPKO. Congressman, that is our quarterly report that you 

held up. You got an advance copy, the committee did. We do discuss some of the metrics. We do not come up with the metrics, we 

use the metrics as provided by the U.S. government and try to 

apply them. Again, you are putting me into that scary zone for inspector generals and that is enunciating policy. I again will refer 

to another President: I feel your pain. I am a taxpayer, too, but policy issues have to be decided by somebody else. We do process. As 

I told you before, I think at one of our other meetings, I am the 

eternal optimist. I think we can accomplish something in Afghanistan, but that is my personal opinion. As an auditor, I know my 

auditors behind me are saying, ‘‘Oh, well you have got to follow 
14 

GAGAS [generally accepted government auditing standards] on 

your personal opinion.’’ But my personal opinion, I think we can do. 

But I do also want to keep in—let us keep in mind that we have 

lost a good many troops, and a lot of our treasury there, and we 

don’t want to lose it all, and have wasted all of it now that we are 

coming into the transition. This is probably the most important period, now, with the drawdown in the troops, we have got to get it 

right. And that is what we are trying to emphasize with the maps, 

we are trying to emphasize with all the reports, and I personally 

think that hearings like this are very important, because you are 

getting the message out to your colleagues, we are making a record 

of the concerns you have, the concerns we have, and the points and 

concerns that every witness has. So I am again, I believe in the 

process and I think the process is working having this type of conversation. 

Mr. JONES. Well in closing, I just would like to say to whomever 

is watching this to hold Congress responsible, to have benchmarks, 

whether it be talking about helping the women of Afghanistan or 

whatever the project might be, and if we are not making those 

benchmarks, then stop spending the money and stop sending young 

men and women to die in Afghanistan. So anyway, Madam Chairman, thank you for the time. 

Mrs. ROBY. Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. Madam Chair, I would like to thank 

you and the other members of the committee for being so diligent 

about this issue, traveling to that country on multiple occasions, 

and I think you are doing some of the most meaningful work in 

this Congress by your diligence here, and I am proud to be associated with it in a very minor way after the work you have done. 

This, what we hear is overwhelming, just overwhelming that in 

a country of 31 million people, apparently there are only 120,000 

women have a high school diploma. Eighty-seven percent of Afghan 

women report being victimized by some sort of physical violence or 

coerced sexual activity. It is appalling. But, you know, when all 

seems lost, there are some metrics, as my friend from North Carolina just said, that make you feel a little more optimistic. If I read 

this correctly, that around the time of the U.S. invasion or shortly 

before, the life expectancy for Afghan women was 44 years. It is 

now 62 years. That is an unbelievable achievement for which the 

Afghan women themselves deserve the most credit, but this country and its taxpayers, its troops, its civilians, public servants deserve credit, including each of you. 

I was sobered, however, Dr. Katzman, when I heard your four 

scenarios. It is really sobering when you think about all of the investment of life and blood and money for a dozen years, that the 

best scenario of the four is the status quo, which is grim. The other 

three compete in terms of their grimness. I am not sure that I 

would disagree with your assessment, so let me ask anyone on the 

panel, or each of you, this question. Given the probability that 

there will be very rough times for Afghan women and girls when 

troops are withdrawn, given the high probability that is the case, 

in which institution in Afghanistan is there the strongest measure 

of progress for women and girls? In which institution have we had 

the greatest positive impact? And I ask that question so that we 
15 

can have some guidance on where to focus our future resources. I 

am kind of looking for an oasis here, a place that is most likely to 

be a success story in the years ahead. Dr. Katzman, would you 

want to answer first? 

Dr. KATZMAN. Thank you very much, Congressman. You know, in 

my testimony, what I tried to do is put in some specific names of 

some very inspiring and very powerful and successful women in Afghanistan, because they don’t get a lot of press. We talk about statistics, and infant mortality is way down, which adds to, what you 

pointed out, but in government, you know, just in governance, we 

have a very successful woman governor, Habiba Sarobi, she is now 

a vice presidential candidate. We have had, in my testimony, one 

woman who is an Afghan, Malala. We hear about Malala 

Yousafzai, Malalai Joya in Afghanistan. She stood up at a big loya 

jirga, which is a traditional Afghan assembly, and was shouting 

down these commanders who I was mentioning, for past abuses 

during the various civil wars. 

And then, you know, obviously they retaliated and basically 

drove her out of Afghanistan, but there are a lot of powerful 

women, so I would say in the governance structure, in the Parliament, at the district, you know, at the mainly in the central government, in the ministries, the Ministry of Education, there is a 

Ministry of Women’s Affairs. The core of the Kabul government is 

where you are seeing, and in the Parliament is where you see a lot 

of success. And in the ANSF too, although I am a little skeptical 

that that is going to continue. 

Mr. ANDREWS. But how about outside the government, because 

if one of your scenarios comes true and the government implodes, 

or has no functioning control, are there any non-governmental institutions out provincially that are stronger or working? 

Dr. KATZMAN. There are. I mean, many civil societies, you know, 

we have the Afghan Women’s Networks, a lot of civil society groups 

that advocate for women have come up. However, if these scenarios 

come to pass, the dire scenarios, those groups are likely going to 

be somewhat suppressed, unfortunately. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Anybody else have a suggestion? 

Mr. SOPKO. I think that what the doctor said, the last point is 

the one I would focus on. If security goes south, all the scenarios 

are extremely negative, and there is no organization that will protect the women, so we have to focus on making certain that the 

ANSF and the rule of law, as fragile as it is, exists. And I can just 

add, Congressman, I don’t know, and we haven’t done that audit 

yet, but hopefully when that audit gets done that we reference, we 

will find out what has succeeded the best and what hasn’t. As you 

probably know, I sent that letter to all the major agencies asking 

for your top 10 successes, and DOD [Department of Defense], State, 

and AID refused to answer it, saying they couldn’t rack and stack. 

Now personally I find that troubling and I think you and Congress 

should, because that is a requirement of OMB [Office of Management and Budget] that you are able to rack and stack your programs on what succeeds. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I am sure that that sounds like a good project for 

us. 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes. 
16 

Mr. ANDREWS. I yield back. Thank you. 

Mrs. ROBY. Dr. Katzman, I want to talk to you about the scenarios that you presented and really get you to elaborate because 

obviously, your worst-case scenario is, as Mr. Jones pointed out, 

that is where the fragile part comes in, that it is very fragile. And 

when you talk to women in Afghanistan, there is a real recognition 

that getting back to that place would completely gut every—you 

know, and these are women who have put their lives on the line, 

and do it every single day. 

But I really want you to, if you could, elaborate and about the 

importance of the participation, and you, as well, the importance 

of the participation of women in this election, and how important— 

and we can’t emphasize this enough—a peaceful transfer of power 

is going to dictate what the likely outcome will be, based on your 

analysis. 

Dr. KATZMAN. Thank you. I would say, let’s look at the reports, 

and I believe them to be true, that Mr. Karzai favors his former 

foreign minister, Zalmai Rassoul, who I have met on a number of 

occasions. He is very progressive. Was educated in the West, in Europe. He is a modernizer. 

One of his key opponents in the election is Abdul Rab Rasul 

Sayyaf. He is a Saudi-backed mujahideen commander, who was 

very successful against the Soviet Union, and then went into parliament, where he has fought to basically block the law on eliminating violence against women from becoming law. 

It basically is a Karzai decree. Karzai issued the EVAW [Elimination of Violence Against Women] by decree. The parliament has 

been talking about passing it into law. Sayyaf has blocked it— 

along with his allies. He is not the only one. 

So, depending on who wins, you can get very different results. 

Karzai’s brother is running, Quayum. He used to have a restaurant in Baltimore. He used to come all the time, when the 

Taliban were in power. And no one ever met with him, but, it was 

a sad time. 

But he is also, like his brother, somewhat progressive. 

So, Dr. Abdullah is running. He ran last time. He is from the 

northern area. Again, very progressive. Very pro-West. 

So, depending on who wins, you can have different outcomes. 

Mrs. ROBY. And under the scenario that you talked about, with 

the factions, I guess—— 

Dr. KATZMAN. Faction leaders. 

Mrs. ROBY. Yes. Do you think that they—I mean, I know that 

this is all kind of trying to predict the future stuff, but do you honestly believe under that scenario that those individuals would be 

able to keep the Taliban at bay? I mean, wouldn’t it be worst-case 

scenario plus something worse? 

Does that make sense? 

Dr. KATZMAN. Yes. Some postulate civil war. Basically, these faction leaders are mostly from the north and west. They are mostly 

non-Pashtuns. The Taliban are Pashtun. So the hypothesis is these 

faction leaders are gonna re-arm and fight against the Pashtun 

Taliban. And there will be a civil war. 

I am not sure I am where that is as far as that being that dire 

of a civil war. I do think the Taliban will be kept roughly at bay. 
17 

But the faction leaders will simply re-assert themselves, because 

rule of law is going to deteriorate, because the international community is not there watching the Afghans as closely anymore. 

A lot of the gains we have seen is because we have been riding 

them. You know, we are on them. We are threatening to withhold 

money, or we are, you know, enacting provisions like we have 

talked about today. 

And they do respond. Once we are not there, as much, it going 

to become—revert back to the way it was before we were there. 

Mrs. ROBY. Sure. 

Ms. Barsa, do you know, we spent some time at Herat University 

on our last trip. Forty percent of their student population are 

women. Very encouraged by that. 

One of the things, as we even look at the map that Mr. Sopko 

put on the board, you know, there are kind of the four corners that 

are—where there will be a presence. Then you have all these rural 

areas that we are really worried about. 

In your opinion, do you think that women have gained enough 

that they can’t be stopped at this point? Like they have had a taste 

and they will continue to seek out. Or do you think that they—I 

mean, we talk about being fragile. How fragile is it? I mean, how 

easily would they be forced back into the corner and darkness? 

Ms. BARSA. Well, there is not a single answer to that, because 

it varies quite dramatically from region to region. In the west, I 

think—in the west and north, in particular, I think that you will 

see women maintain a lot of the gains. 

The experience and quality of life for women in those two regions 

is quite different from what you will see in the east and the south. 

Right? 

And so, I think—you also have to take into consideration the political negotiations that are ongoing in those regions already, right, 

but also acknowledge the role that women are playing in those political negotiations, which is something that I think we miss. 

As we look at the dysfunction of the national level peace process, 

I think we are missing some of what is happening at a provincial 

level in terms of reintegration efforts and local reconciliation efforts 

that are being integrated into that. 

So you have provincial peace committees overseeing those efforts. 

There are three women on each of the committees, a minimum of 

three women. And they are negotiating directly with commanders. 

They are mediating intertribal disputes that are leading to destabilization at a district level. And, really, demonstrating their value 

and leadership in a tangible and concrete way to the extent that 

it is being recognized by men in official authority positions. 

Mrs. ROBY. Right. 

Ms. BARSA. In Kandahar, for example, one of the women on the 

provincial peace committee was nominated to be deputy head of the 

council, based on her work in mediating intertribal disputes. 

Mrs. ROBY. And that is real. 

Ms. BARSA. That is real. Yes. 

Mrs. ROBY. Okay. Thanks. 

My time has expired. I want to hear more. 

But, Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Madam Chair. 
18 

And, Mr. Sopko, it is good to see you again. 

I want to return back to something that you had actually said 

in Oversight and Government Reform looking at the diversity of 

projects that are ongoing and applying it to Afghanistan. 

You know, as you said, DOD, USAID, State Department can’t 

rack and stack for you. And then, in looking at what we do postpullout of the U.S. troops, is there any way forward in terms of coordinating what is happening? 

Or do you have any recommendations on how we would be able 

to have oversight of all of the different departments, you know, 

that are trying to do these projects in Afghanistan, at least from 

our end, with the U.S. money that is going over there, so that we 

know that, for example, USAID is here, trying to do this project for 

women and girls, but then, again, so is the State Department Office of Ambassador for Women and Girls, and the like? 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, you actually highlighted one of the problems 

that one of our prior audits had dealing with women’s issues. And 

we issued the one, I believe it was in 2010 or 2011, looking at coordination, and we noticed there was a lack of coordination. 

I supposed if there is somebody who can try to coordinate it, to 

some extent, our looking at all of these programs tries to, using the 

bully pulpit to get people to coordinate. 

But that is one of the most serious problems we have. People just 

don’t talk to each other. 

And, if you recall when I spoke at the Oversight and Government 

Reform Committee hearing, I talked about those seven questions. 

And one of them was coordinate with the Afghans, but it was also 

coordinate internally. 

And we are not coordinating with our allies. I just came back 

from NATO and was a bit surprised to find out that the NATO allies didn’t know about some of the things that DOD and the EU 

was even doing, so—and AID. 

So that is a major problem we have, on coordination. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Ms. Barsa, do you have any information on the 

type of work that is being done by some of the U.S. allies for 

women and girls in Afghanistan right now? 

Ms. BARSA. I have information that is focused on the peace and 

security intervention. Not more broadly. 

So there is quite a bit of work that is being done. Most of the 

work that is being done to fund police mentorship work and the 

formation of policewomen’s associations and the lobbying that those 

associations are doing to police commanders is being facilitated by 

Afghan women’s NGOs but with funding from European nations, 

from the Dutch in particular. They are really coming out ahead on 

that. 

In the peace and security realm, you know, that varies. The Norwegians are really doing quite a bit of work to train women in 

skills related to community mobilization and the value of women’s 

inclusion in the peace process and are funding quite a bit of work 

to forge bridges and links between women in official authority positions and women in civil society, so women on the provincial peace 

committees and provincial counsels together with women’s, what 

you might call NGOs or voluntary associations, women who are 

doing really productive work in service to their communities at a 
19 

provincial level, which I think is doing quite a bit in service of expanding women’s political power and a space for them in the political discussion and debate. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Can you—just off the top of my head, I am 

thinking of other nations, I mean, yes, the U.S. is going to take a 

leading role, and we certainly hold a big chunk of the purse strings. 

But looking at some of the other nations around the world that 

also have a history or a tradition of strong democracy, of women 

participating in the democratic process, especially those like— 

places like Malaysia, Indonesia, that are Muslim nations, is there 

any potential there for us to reach out to those nations for help in 

Afghanistan? 

Ms. BARSA. Huge potential. And particularly as it relates to security force development. So this is something we have looked at a 

lot. It is funding professional development opportunities and exchanges between not just Afghan women in the forces, but also 

their male commanders, with Islamic nations that have a strong 

presence of women in their forces, and to look at how that has 

functioned, the value that has been added, and the systems that 

have been put in place to support that. So 100 percent. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Great to hear. 

Dr. Katzman, can you add to something like that? 

Dr. KATZMAN. Well, I just wanted to mention Turkey. Because, 

you know, Turkey does basically command Kabul city in partnership with the Afghans. And, I am not a Turkey expert, but, you 

know, it has a somewhat Islamic government right now, but still 

a tradition of progressivity and secularism, particularly in its military. 

And it is a big force contributor in Afghanistan. 

I think Malaysia has a few, not many. I don’t think Indonesia 

even has any forces in Afghanistan. 

But I think the Turks, as a Muslim nation and a lot of the Afghans, particularly in the north, speak a Turkic dialect, Uzbek is 

a Turkic dialect. That might be something to look at. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Dr. Katzman. 

I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Mrs. ROBY. We are gonna run, go vote, really quickly. 

So if you will be patient, there are only two votes, and we are 

15 minutes into the first one, so we got to go, but we will come 

right back, if you guys don’t mind waiting. 

And for the members that are here, if you can come back, I 

would appreciate it as well. Thanks. 

[Recess.] 

Mrs. ROBY. Okay, thank you for your patience and letting us exercise our constitutional duty. I want to pick up on behalf of my 

colleague, Mrs. Davis. She, I don’t think, can return, but I think 

something that in repeated conversations about our concerns about 

Afghan women one of the things that she has concentrated a lot 

of her efforts on is the election, the upcoming election. 

And how can we make sure that they—the Afghan government— 

does not use the lack of women in the ANP as an excuse for women 

to not have the opportunity to exercise their right to vote. 

One of the things that has come up a lot of times in our conversations, you know, both traveling back and forth to Afghanistan, 
20 

but also just even down on the floor is between Mrs. Davis and Ms. 

Tsongas and myself and others, is what creative ideas can we come 

up with and help facilitate to get women to the polls but ensure 

that their vote counts. 

And so I am sure each of you have some ideas, maybe outside 

of your wheelhouse, but I am sure you each have an opinion of 

sorts. And so, again, on behalf of Mrs. Davis—and I know this is 

important to all of us, but this is of particular importance to her, 

and if she were here I am quite confident this is what she would 

probably ask you about. 

Mr. SOPKO. If I can start, chairman. Actually we did an audit on 

the barriers to greater participation in women in the last Afghan 

election, and we found serious problems, similar to the problems I 

think you are seeing right now, and similar concerns, and we 

issued a number of recommendations, and that was an audit we 

did back in October of 2009. 

And we recommended then to the ambassador, in conjunction 

with the United Nations, to urge the Independent Election Commission [IEC] to address those challenges of female candidates and 

voters, by taking a number of corrective actions, including 

proactively recruiting and training female IEC staff, and integrating women in the IEC planning process, communicating to all 

IEC staff the importance of following electoral law, increasing supervision over staff and publicly reporting violators, ensuring registration centers and polling places are secure, accessible locations, 

and raising awareness of the right of women to participate fully in 

electoral process. 

And I think those recommendations are still valid today. The embassy agreed fully with those. So we hope they are being implemented or trying to implement them now. 

Mrs. ROBY. And I am interested in hearing the other two, remarks, but one of the other things that we had talked about, you 

know, similar to what we do here in the United States as it relates 

to get-out-the-vote efforts. 

I know that sounds very simplistic, but it is what makes the differences in elections is you have to get people to the polls. 

And—oh, I am asking your question. I didn’t think you were coming back. 

[Laughter.] 

Mrs. ROBY. But anyway, Susan and others, we have talked 

about, you know, using the women or helping to motivate the 

women that are—have had the privilege of education and are in a 

position to be leaders within their communities, particularly in the 

rural areas, to help guide women through this process. 

So, if the other two want to make comments. 

Ms. BARSA. Sure. I think, you know, there are a couple of pieces 

to look at. One is security. Another is monitoring and engagement. 

And the third is civic education. 

So on the security piece, the plan in place right now is to contract temporary female security personnel for the election on the 

order of about 13,000. And the hope is that they can look to existing female teachers, train them up in 2 to 3 days, and secure contracts just to staff maybe a last-ditch voter registration effort and 

then certainly the polling stations on the day of the election. 
21 

All of that is a bit behind schedule because of resourcing issues. 

And so we will see how effective that is, but that is a key component. 

Then there is the monitoring piece. So some of what we have 

been doing is training women in how to monitor political transition 

processes and helping them develop their own tools for what they 

want to prioritize as key indicators for a transparent, legitimate 

process, and one that has adequate attention to women and gender, 

right? 

And so they are collecting that information and feeding it back 

up. And then we do additional training on how you communicate 

findings to decisionmakers and people with official authority over 

those issues. 

The last piece, like you mentioned, the get out the vote or civic 

education piece. One of the flaws with the ways we have approached civic education in Afghanistan thus far is that we treat 

it much more like a training on how to vote. So the actual physical 

logistics of what you do when you arrive at the voting station and 

helping women be aware that nobody is watching them. No one 

will know who they voted for and there will be no repercussions for 

who they vote for because they receive quite a number of intimidating threats in advance of the election. 

But we don’t do civic education that is oriented towards understanding how you choose a candidate of your preference, right; how 

you understand each individual’s political platform and whether or 

not it services your needs, and how you can engage candidates in 

discussions about what needs need to be met and their approach 

to addressing those. 

So I think that will be a big piece in looking towards the success 

not only of the presidential election, but certainly the parliamentary elections to follow, and whether or not we can oversee, fund 

and support a robust civic education effort. 

Mrs. ROBY. I want to ask Dr. Katzman, you stated in your response to one of my other questions, is that, you know, the outcome 

of the election, of course, you have candidates that represent very 

differing interests when it comes to the rights of women, is what 

I understood you to say. And that being the case, that civic component as it relates to helping these women understand how to 

choose the candidate and what that person represents to them is 

going to be so crucial. 

My time is expired, and Mrs. Davis, it is your turn. And I will 

just tell you that I apologize. I didn’t know you were coming back, 

but I am sure you can expound on those in your 5 minutes. 

Mrs. DAVIS. That is fine, Madam Chair. I wasn’t sure—I didn’t 

think I could, but I wanted to come back because I was a little concerned. 

I think, Ms. Barsa, I guess everybody really mentioned that the 

needs to have women at the polls to assist with other women as 

their confidence level and comfort level that they are actually going 

to be able to vote is really critical. 

And we certainly heard that on our last trip to Afghanistan. And 

it concerned me that maybe we had kind of written that off in some 

way, that we, you know, realized that we cannot do it really the 
22 

way we wanted to, and therefore, you know, maybe it wasn’t going 

to come out so well. 

So I just wondered whether that was a—was I hearing that correctly? And you mentioned just now that you will have some contract, temporary assistance, whether teachers or whatever. I didn’t 

know whether there was an opportunity to also bring women in 

from other Muslim countries as an example or even the U.S., I 

mean, making certain that the women who were still in-country 

were available and if that was going to be helpful. 

Obviously, we are dealing with both the city and the rural areas, 

that we know it is important, and yet it sounded like maybe we 

weren’t going to move forward. I also had asked recently at a hearing, and basically was told the kind of ‘‘Look, we have got it—we 

have it under control.’’ And it doesn’t sound like we do. 

Dr. KATZMAN. One thing I wanted to point out. You know, one 

woman did file to run for president, Fatima Ghaznowi. Okay? And 

October 6th was the registration deadline. She filed. October 23rd, 

the IEC had its first cut. She was nixed. So now there is no female 

running for president. 

In the past presidential elections in 2004 and 2009, there was at 

least one woman candidate. Now, they didn’t do particularly well, 

but they ran. Massouda Jalal, very well known, first minister of 

women’s affairs. Also, the election law for this election cut—there 

is a quota in the elections that 25 percent of each provincial council, each of the 34 provinces has a council, like a little state legislature-type thing; 25 percent must be women. Okay, the election law 

has cut that now to 20 percent. 

Also, the registration. I mean, we have sort of, we are in a way 

behind the curve because registration has already started. What we 

saw in the last election in 2009 is many women did not register. 

Or basically what happened, men registered for them. Men would 

just take their—a lot of it is cultural. I mean, it is not all—it is 

not a policy problem. This is the thinking. So—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. We even run into that occasionally here. 

[Laughter.] 

Mrs. DAVIS. So, yes, I understand. I think part of it is trying to 

understand best where this is in terms of our priorities and moving 

forward. And if, in fact, it is important to the future in a way that 

may be out of proportion to our ability to plan better at this time, 

do we have time to put in additional effort with NGOs and others. 

And I am just trying to get a feel for is this a place for us—you 

know, if there is one place to focus right now before our troops pull 

out, with the exception hopefully of a 10,000 force, is this it? Or 

maybe it is not. 

Mr. SOPKO. Can I just add? I mean, I think we are faced with 

three major transitions. We have referred to the security transition, which is obviously important. The political transition is a key. 

And if the election is bad, we could lose it on that. 

And then, of course, the third transition is we are moving toward 

this direct assistance. So I think you are absolutely correct. Now 

is the time to make the difference. Now is the time to focus on this 

and to get the Afghan government to either hire the police, hire the 

poll watchers, whether they are temporary or otherwise, but you 

have got to do it now. It may be too late if we wait. 
23 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you. And I really appreciate, Madam 

Chair, your having this hearing. And I think that you have all 

mentioned in one way or another, I think one of the reasons that 

we kept going back was we saw the strength of these incredible 

women in the face of unbelievable adversity. And you knew that 

given just a little bit of support, they would be able to make 

changes in their communities that nobody else could do. I mean, 

it really—they are the ones who can do it. 

Thank you so much. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, Mrs. Davis. 

Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I want to thank you all for what has been a really 

very interesting and so important discussion. 

One of the things that I keep coming back to in my mind is, as 

I, like everyone of us here have made these many trips to Afghanistan. In our last visit, one woman said to us, we were in Kabul at 

a meeting, and she said: ‘‘We don’t expect more. We just want the 

space to fight for what we have.’’ 

And so we understand that there is a limit to what we can do, 

and yet we want to be sure that, you know, that we are doing as 

much as we can to allow Afghan women to continue the fight. We 

know it is a long-term effort. It has certainly been one—the United 

States’ effort has been long term. But you have got to have the 

space to do it. 

So whether it is a security space, whether it is a political space, 

or whether it is the economic space, there are a lot of ways in 

which we have to think about it. 

And as we have been listening today, just a couple of things, Mr. 

Sopko, as you do your audit, it is an after-the-fact thing, as opposed 

to prospective, but I think it is so important that you look at what 

has succeeded and why. You know, what about it made it successful? 

If you look at the amount of money that has actually been, you 

know, clearly spent on women issues, related to women and children, it is so small in relationship to the total amount of dollars 

that have gone into Afghanistan. So, and yet we see the successes. 

They may not cover huge numbers, but where they do have an impact, it is very apparent how real it is. So we have gotten a lot of 

money, gotten a lot of bang for our buck, at least in those specific 

dollars. 

Now, a lot of other dollars have gone in in a more generic way 

and I am sure they have also helped promote women and girls. But 

I think to be very thoughtful about it, we have heard that there 

are differences in what has happened at the national level as opposed to the provincial level. I hope you will look at that. 

It would be interesting to know in those parts of the country that 

are more progressive, in which women’s rights continue to be recognized and promoted and there are efforts to secure them. You 

know, are those the areas where the ANSF has had better ability 

to recruit women? I mean, is there a linkage there? I think it would 

be interesting to look at those prospectively. 

I also think it would be interesting to look at, a lot of money has 

come through the provincial reconstruction teams. Has that been 

an effective mechanism? Has that really worked? Or is the money 
24 

that comes through the NGO community a better way to spend our 

dollars? 

So lots of things to look at prospectively, I mean, after the fact. 

Because as we go forward, it will help guide how we continue to 

make investments so that we can be a partner and continue to 

allow women, promote the rights of women to continue to fight for 

what they think is so important for them as individuals and for 

their country. 

Mr. SOPKO. Congressman, if I can just respond briefly. As I mentioned to you I think yesterday, we did not get a satisfactory response from DOD, AID and State on what worked and what didn’t 

work and why. So, I met with a number of smaller NGOs who are 

working in the provinces, working in the community. And actually 

they complained. They said, ‘‘You are doing a great job, but you are 

tarring us with the same brush that these large corporations who 

maybe screwing up out there have.’’ 

And I heard them. I said, ‘‘Okay, what do you think works, the 

smaller charities that are working out there, the smaller NGOs? 

You tell me.’’ So they said, ‘‘That sounds great.’’ So we are going 

to be sending a letter to the smaller NGOs operating just to answer 

that type of question that you have proposed. 

Likewise, we are going to be doing a capping report on the PRTs 

[provincial reconstruction teams], what worked, what didn’t work, 

and why. So, those are two projects that we are going to be doing 

in addition to our looking at how we are handling the funds for 

women and girls in Afghanistan. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And Ms. Barsa, if you want to comment at all? 

Ms. BARSA. Sure. I mean, I couldn’t agree with you more on the 

bang-for-your-buck question particularly. And when we are thinking about how to make our aid more effective, I hope that we think 

about women’s integration as a key to that, particularly when we 

are looking at things like building legitimacy and professionalism 

of a police force, right, when 6 out of 10 Afghans believe that female police are likely to resolve a crime more fairly than a man 

would, right? 

So, I think, you know—— 

Ms. TSONGAS. It sounds like the United States use of women in 

Congress. 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. BARSA. There are now about 400 Afghan women’s NGOs registered in-country. And the work that they are doing is beyond. 

And the conversations that they are having with police commanders and ANA commanders at a provincial level are really 

what is driving change. 

They are having conversations about, you know, what the true 

nature of security threats are at a provincial level, and whether or 

not an all-male force can address those threats. Inevitably, the answer is no, from the male commanders themselves. 

And really, that is the way that you can force this change, both 

from the top down and the bottom up. So I think, you know, I won’t 

comment on the PRT issue. I have maybe some of my own personal 

perspectives on that, but I certainly think that the assisting NGO 

community is a solid pathway forward on this. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Mr. Katzman, quickly. 
25 

Dr. KATZMAN. Well, I mean, I think we have been talking a lot 

about incentives. What does Karzai care about and what is his successor going to care about? Three things: arms, money and Pakistan. To force change on the Afghans, you need to go with those 

core interests if you want to get them to make reforms and keep 

the reforms that have been made on women going, on corruption. 

It could be anything—education, corruption, women. You need to 

work those core interests that they have. 

They want protection against Pakistan. They want F–16 combat 

aircraft, which they are probably not going to get because they 

can’t fly them. And they want a guarantee of U.S. money for the 

Afghan National Security Forces and the economy. So those are 

your levers that you are basically working with. 

The work that the NGOs are doing are great, and the problem 

is prospectively, when we are not there to basically ride them and 

oversee what the Afghans are doing. A lot of that is going to deteriorate. So you have to find ways to make it in their interest to continue that work after there are not 85,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, when there are only 8,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. That 

is the key to consider, I think. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. 

Mrs. ROBY. Okay. Just a few comments, you know, as we close 

here. You know, I just want to say first of all the women that were 

here today, all of us, have spent time, and 36 hours in theater is 

never enough time, in the—you know, only visiting that country 

once a year. But I can tell you all of us as wives and mothers who 

have little experience, if any, overcoming adversity on this level, as 

we watch these women who struggle, this has, you know, become 

a deeply personal issue for all of us here, particularly when you are 

meeting their children and getting to spend time with them in 

their country. 

And I just want to make one other comment about, you know, 

we say women and little girls, but this is just as much about the 

little boys, too. And, you know, in a country where we have seen 

life expectancy increase in a country that has been at war for 30- 

plus years, you have a generation or more that have never known 

anything but what they see every day. And, you know, I think it 

is very important to educate—not just to worry about the education 

of the little girls, but to educate the little boys, too, and about respecting the little girls in a different way. 

And so, again, I just wanted to express, you know, my—Niki and 

I were talking on the way back. I mean, you just to be there and 

to look these women in the eye and, you know, hear their personal 

stories of their struggle, it makes it very, very real to all of us who 

have participated in this hearing today. 

And I guess the last question I would just ask each of you to 

briefly comment on, because it is something that we struggle with 

as women in Congress, what role do you see for us as women in 

the United States Congress to play as it relates to the furtherance 

of women’s rights in Afghanistan? And I will let you each comment 

on that. 

Mr. SOPKO. I think what you are doing today is the most significant thing you can do. And it is holding people accountable, asking 

the questions, and doing the oversight. 
26 

Ms. BARSA. I think continuing to have the conversations that 

identify this issue as core to our civilian and military mission in 

theater is really key; that it is an effort that is in service of mission 

objectives really for democracy promotion and countering terrorism 

and the provision of security for all Afghan men and women. And 

that women’s participation is the key to ensuring women’s protection in the long run. 

Dr. KATZMAN. Of course, CRS [Congressional Research Services] 

isn’t in a position to suggest any legislation, obviously, but if you 

look at what was done during the Taliban regime, actually the legislation that was passed criticizing the Taliban was actually—on 

their treatment of women—way before anybody mentioned bin 

Laden or terrorism. The criticism of the Taliban, 1996 when they 

took power, was on the basis of their treatment of women. 

There was a Senate resolution by Senator Boxer that was passed. 

There was other legislation, a lot of legislation on that. And that 

was way before September 11 or the Africa embassy bombings or 

anything. And it basically said the Clinton administration should 

not recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan unless 

and until it improves its treatment of women. 

So, there have been legislative models that have been passed 

that you could look at. 

Mrs. ROBY. I appreciate that. And, you know, one of the most 

meaningful conversations that we have had with Afghan women in 

Afghanistan is from their position. You know, we cannot allow for 

the gains that they have made to be bartered away for other 

things. And so, you know, again, that is why we wanted to have 

this hearing. 

That is why we are going to continue to keep a close eye on what 

we are seeing happen politically because we very much think that 

this is, you know, we have our leverage, but, you know, there are 

other political interests at stake as well. And we have got to make 

sure that that is not what they use. 

So, on behalf of Ranking Member Tsongas and myself, thank you 

all for being here. This has been a very, very meaningful hearing 

today. And so thank you for your time, and we look forward to continuing discussions with you in the future. 

[Whereupon, at 2:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. How do you intend to evaluate whether past, current, and future 

funds that were intended to support recruitment and retention of women in the Afghan National Security Forces were actually used for that purpose? Can you evaluate the impact of women-specific funding in cases where the funding was used for 

its intended purpose? 

Mr. SOPKO. In August 2013, we initiated an audit of U.S. efforts to support Afghan women, with a focus on programs, projects, and initiatives the Department of 

Defense (DOD), Department of State, and USAID implemented in fiscal years 2011 

through 2013. The objectives of the audit are to (1) identify U.S. government programs or initiatives to improve the rights and treatment of women in Afghanistan 

since fiscal year 2011; (2) assess the extent to which these programs and initiatives 

have been coordinated across different U.S. government agencies; and (3) identify 

challenges in addressing women’s issues in Afghanistan and evaluate U.S. efforts 

to address these challenges. As part of this audit, we are examining U.S. efforts supporting recruitment and retention of women in the Afghan National Security Forces 

(ANSF). Since 2009, we have tracked the amount of funding the United States has 

appropriated and disbursed to support the ANSF through the Afghanistan Security 

Forces Fund (ASFF)—$52.78 billion appropriated and $43.54 billion disbursed as of 

August 31, 2013—and have been able to identify approximate funding levels for 

such areas as construction, operation and maintenance, fuel, and vehicle spare 

parts. However, we have found it difficult to determine what portion of the ASFF 

has been spent directly on recruitment and retention of women into the ANSF and 

whether funding is used for its intended purpose. As we note in our January 2014 

Quarterly Report, while DOD has reported progress in recruiting women into the 

ANSF, women make up only 1 percent of the Afghan National Police and less than 

1 percent of the Afghan National Army (SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, January 30, 2014, pp. 97, 101.). Furthermore, it is methodologically difficult to link that 

increase directly to U.S. efforts and funding. Although past legislation has emphasized the recruitment and retention of women in the ANSF, and required the Secretaries of Defense and State to report on these efforts, Congress did not authorize 

or appropriate funding specifically for the recruitment and retention of women in 

the ANSF until fiscal year 2014. Specifically, the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2014 authorized no less than $25 million in funding from the 

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund for the ‘‘recruitment, integration, retention, training and treatment’’ of women in the ANSF. In addition, the Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2014 stated that not less than $25 million in appropriated 

funding for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund shall be used for the ‘‘recruitment 

and retention’’ of women in the ANSF. To the extent possible, we will examine the 

Department of Defense’s plans for using these funds during the course of our ongoing audit. In its regular Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, DOD provides details on its efforts to support women in the ANSF, including recruitment numbers, but the department does not include specific data on 

funding for these efforts. However, in response to a request for information submitted during our audit, DOD provided the following examples of funding specifically for women in the ANSF: 

• The Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A) provided 

$100,000 to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) to be used for Women’s Recruiting 

and Advertising. 

• As part of the overall National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA) facilities management budget, CSTC–A provided $13,000 to complete the female 

cadet training field. As of October 1, 2013, the project had not been completed. 

• CSTC–A provided $4,400 of gym equipment for the NMAA female cadets, which 

was delivered on September 29, 2013. We are currently working with DOD to 

verify this information. We will continue to identify other efforts to support the 

recruitment and retention of women in the ANSF and associated funding, if 

possible, as part of our ongoing audit. We anticipate issuing a final report in 

summer 2014. 
78 

Ms. TSONGAS. In December 2011, President Obama issued the first-ever U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, (U.S. NAP) making a firm commitment to empowering women as equal partners in preventing conflict and building sustainable peace around the world in countries threatened and affected by war, 

violence and insecurity. The resulting executive order directed the U.S. Department 

of State, Department of Defense, USAID, and other agencies to develop and implement strategies to ensure women’s participation in preventing conflict and keeping 

peace. In her October 18th speech to the UN Security Council, U.S. Ambassador to 

the United Nations, Samantha Powers affirmed the principle that ‘‘women’s participation in conflict prevention, mitigation, and recovery is vital to the maintenance 

of international security and peace. Not a sideshow, but vital;’’ and further stated 

that we must take ‘‘concrete steps so that women share fully in efforts to avoid and 

contain conflict, just as they inevitably share in the suffering when such efforts are 

poorly designed or when they fail.’’ 

Can you please describe to the Committee to what extent SIGAR applies a gender 

perspective, such as the collection of sex-disaggregated data or analysis of the 

unique impact of U.S. foreign policies and practices on Afghan women, in its oversight activities? Is there a way for you to measure whether Afghan women are fully 

and effectively participating in the peace building and political transition processes 

in Afghanistan? 

Mr. SOPKO. As part of our ongoing audit of U.S. efforts in support of Afghan 

women, we are reviewing the Department of Defense’s (DOD), Department of 

State’s, and USAID’s implementation plans developed in accordance with the United 

States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (NAP), actions taken 

to implement those plans in Afghanistan, and the extent to which these agencies 

assess their progress in implementing the NAP. (The goal of the NAP is to empower 

half the world’s population as equal partners in preventing conflict and building 

peace in countries threatened and affected by war, violence, and insecurity. The 

plan describes the course the United States Government will take to accelerate, institutionalize, and better coordinate our efforts to advance women’s inclusion in 

peace negotiations, peace-building activities, and conflict prevention; to protect 

women from sexual and gender-based violence; and to ensure equal access to relief 

and recovery assistance, in areas of conflict and insecurity.). We are also assessing 

the extent to which DOD, State, and USAID sex-disaggregate their data and/or 

analyses of the impacts the identified programs, projects, and initiatives have had 

on Afghan women. Our assessment will include a high-level review of each agency’s 

monitoring and evaluation efforts. Because this is a sector-wide audit, we do not intend to delve too deeply into each program, project, or initiative, though we might 

highlight specific efforts through case studies. 

In addition to our audit of U.S. efforts in support of Afghan women, we are also 

auditing the U.S. government’s efforts to assist and improve the Afghan education 

sector. This may identify programs focused on education of women and girls. As part 

of our quarterly reports, we collect data and reports from DOD, State, and USAID 

on programs and issues related to Afghan women, such as the Afghan government’s 

progress in recruiting women into the Afghan National Army and Afghan National 

Police and implementing of the Elimination of Violence Against Women law, as well 

as women’s participation in the upcoming elections. 

Æ