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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

MICHIGAN INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant, UNPUBLISHED February 23, 2017

v No. 330176 Presque Isle Circuit Court
POSEN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE and JASON ROBERT RISTEAU, LC No. 14-003109-CK

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: H OEKSTRA , P.J., and S AAD and R IORDAN , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

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In this declaratory action involving the coverage of a general liability insurance policy, plaintiff, Michigan Insurance Co mpany, appeals the trial court’ s order that granted summary disposition in favor of defendants. The trial court concluded that summary disposition was proper because the vehicle in question did not fall into the in surance policy’s definition of “mobile equipment,” and was therefore not excluded from coverag e. We reverse and remand for the entry of summary disposit ion in favor of plaintiff.

I. FACTS

This case arises out of an accident that occurred on September7, 2014, at a “Bump-nRun” race held as part of the Pos en Potato Festival. During th e final race, Daniel Stewart’s vehicle was pushed off the track by at least one other vehicle into a large tire filled with dirt, which was then propelled into a f ence and caused serious injury to defendant Jason Risteau.

Risteau brought suit for negligence against, among others, def endant Posen Chamber of Commerce, which carried general liability insurance issued by p laintiff. Plaintiff then filed the instant suit and asserted that it was not required to provide c overage because the vehicle driven by Stewart was “mobile equipment” and the policy excluded cover age for injuries “arising out of the use of ‘mobile equipment’ in pre-arranged racing, speed, de molition, or stunt activity.” The parties do not dispute that the Bump-n-Run was a “pre-arranged racing, speed, demolition, or stunt activity.”

Plaintiff moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and argued that either Stewart’s vehicle was designed principally for use off public r oads or, alternatively, because the-2- vehicle was maintained for entertainment purposes and not for t ransportation. The circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of defendant, citing the d efinition of “mobile equipment” in the policy and reasoning that it described vehicles for indu strial or agricultural uses, which did
not describe Stewart’s vehicle.

II. ANALYSIS

This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motio n for summary disposition. Hampton v Waste Mgmt of Mich, Inc , 236 Mich App 598, 602; 601 NW2d 172 (1999). The trial court may grant a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if the “affidav its or other documentary
evidence show that there is no genuine issue in respect to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Quinto v Cross & Peters Co , 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). The trial court considers this evidence in th e light most favorable to the opposing party. Id . “If it appears to the court that the opposing party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment, the court may render judgment i n favor of the opposing party.” MCR 2.116(I)(2).

Plaintiff argues that, under the definition of “mobile equipme nt,” Stewart’s vehicle qualified because it was a “vehic le designed for use principall y off public roads.” We agree.

Contracts for insurance “are subject to the same contract cons truction principles that apply to any other species of contract.” Rory v Continental Ins Co , 473 Mich 457, 461; 703 NW2d 23 (2005). When interpreting or construing a contract, th e goal is “to honor the intent of the parties.” Farm Bureau Gen Ins v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich , 314 Mich App 12, 19; 884 NW2d 853 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts “look to the plain language of the insurance policy in determi ning the scope of coverage.” Busch v Holmes , 256 Mich App 4, 9; 662 NW2d 64 (2003). Additionally, courts must construe cont racts “to give effect to every word or phrase as far as practicable.” Klapp v United Ins Group Agency, Inc , 468 Mich 459, 467; 663 NW2d 447 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted)

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The general liability policy sp ecifically excludes coverage fo r injury arising out of “[t]he use of ‘mobile equipment’ in, or while in practice for, or whil e being prepared for, any prearranged racing, speed, demolition, or stunting activity.” The policy defines “mobile equipment,” in relevant part as follows:

“Mobile equipment” means any of the following types of land veh icles, including any attached machinery or equipment:

a. Bulldozers, farm machinery, forklifts and other vehicles design ed for use principally off public roads[.]

Here, we hold that Stewart’s vehicle clearly falls under the d efinition of “mobile equipment” under subparagraph (a). There is no question that t he vehicle was a “land vehicle,” as it traversed across the land (and not over water or in the a ir). Further, there is no question that the vehicle was “designed for use principally off public roads. ” “Principally” is defined under “principal” as “most important, consequential.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed). The most important or consequential use for Stewart’s veh icle is racing in a Bump-n-Run,-3- which is done off public roads. There is no dispute that Stewa rt’s vehicle had been modified to remove all lights, many windows, and its mirrors, all of which would be necessary for use on a public highway. Therefore, under the plain terms of the policy , Stewart’s vehicle is designed “principally” for use off public roads and qualifies as mobile equipment. Accordingly, the general liability policy excluded coverage for the accident, an d the trial court erred when it failed to grant summary disposition in favor of plaintiff.

The trial court’s and defendants’ reliance on the doctrine ejusdem generis is misplaced. Ejusdem generis is defined as a rule of construction where, “when a general wo rd or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of
the same class as those listed.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed). The trial court found that, because the general term in the definition “other vehicles desi gned for use principally off public roads” followed a list of specific vehicles “bulldozers,” “farm machinery,” and “forklifts,” that this general term must be of the same character as bulldozers, farm machinery, and forklifts. We disagree.

First, the term is not purely general. The term was limited t o “vehicles designed for use principally off public roads .” (Emphasis added.) If this term were more general, such tha t it had little or no limitations at all, then application of the doctri ne arguably would be appropriate. Second, the three listed items have little in common. Bulldoze rs are typically found on construction sites, farm machinery is typically found on a farm setting, and forklifts typically are found in an industrial or commercial setting (although they cer tainly could appear on a construction site). Thus, tryi ng to ascertain any obvious comm on ground from these items (aside from requiring that the vehicles must be either construction-, farm-, or industrial-related) to be able to import into the following general term would be a diffi cult proposition. Third, courts are precluded from engaging in such construction unless the plain m eaning of the text is not apparent. See Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc , 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998) (“‘Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, judicia l construction is precluded.’”) (citation omitted). Indeed, ejusdem generis “should never be applied where the plain purpose and intent of the [parties] would thereby be hindered or defeat ed. . . . If the language used is plain, the rule of ejusdem generis cannot be applied.” Utica State Savings Bank v Village of Oak
Park , 279 Mich 568, 573; 273 NW2d 271 (1937). Here, there is nothi ng in the language of the policy that indicates that the parties did not intend for “mobi le equipment” to include, as the plain text indicates, all “vehi cles designed for use principall y off public roads.”

Reversed. We remand to the trial court to enter summary dispo sition in favor of plaintiff. We do not retain jurisdiction. Plaintiff, as the prevailing pa rty, may tax costs pursuant to MCR
7.219.

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra /s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Michael J. Riordan