1

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

Majed Abdullah Maliki,

Defendant Below, Petitioner

vs.) No. 19-0118 (Wood County 18-C-AP-14)

City of Parkersburg,

Plaintiff Below, Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Majed Abdullah Maliki, self-represented litigant, appeals the February 4, 2019, 

order of the Circuit Court of Wood County entering judgment in favor of Respondent City of 

Parkersburg (“the City”) in the amount of $2,200, plus costs and interest, after petitioner failed to 

pay the monthly fee for his real estate registered on the vacant property registry pursuant to article 

1765 of the City’s Code of Ordinances. The City, by counsel Robert K. Tebay, III, filed a summary 

response. 

The Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, 

a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

On May 1, 2016, petitioner bought property located at 1231 20th Street in Parkersburg, 

West Virginia. At that time, it is undisputed that the seller informed petitioner that the property 

was registered on the vacant property registry pursuant to article 1765 of the City’s Code of 

Ordinances. 

Section 1765.02(a)(6) defines “vacant,” in pertinent part, as follows:

A building or structure shall be deemed vacant and subject to the registration and 

possible penalty provisions provided herein if the exterior maintenance and major 

systems of the building and the surrounding real property thereof, as defined in this 

FILED

March 13, 2020

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
2

section, are in violation of the building codes or health and sanitation codes and if 

there is no proof of continual utility service evidencing actual use of electric, gas 

(i.e., applicable heating sources), water service, etc. Continued is meant to be 

without more than one (1) thirty (30) day interruption in any given three-hundred 

sixty (360) day period. In order for such continual utility service to be considered 

as being actually in use as described in this section, it must be more than merely 

registered to the owner for purposes of billing and must be utilized, at a minimum, 

in order to keep the property and the major systems of the building in compliance 

with building and safety codes. The person or entity asserting that there has been 

continued utility service has the burden to produce actual bills evidencing utility 

service for the relevant period.[

1

]

(Footnote added.). Section 1765.05(b)(1) and (2) further provide, in pertinent part: “(1) [n]o fee

[is assessed] for properties that are vacant for less than one (1) year; [and] (2) [o]ne-hundred dollars 

($100.00) per month [is assessed] for properties that are vacant for one (1) year or more.” 

On September 9, 2018, the City filed a civil action against petitioner in the Magistrate 

Court of Wood County for the purpose of collecting unpaid vacant property fees pursuant to § 

1765.05(b)(2) for the period of September 2016 through July 2018. Following a bench trial, by 

order entered on December 20, 2018, the magistrate court entered judgment in the City’s favor in 

the amount of $2,203.50, plus costs and interest at 4.5% per year. On that same date, petitioner 

appealed the judgment to the Circuit Court of Wood County. 

The circuit court held a trial de novo on January 25, 2019. At trial, the City’s accounts 

receivable supervisor testified that water had not been used at the property since 2008 and offered 

the billing statement for the vacant property fee for September 2016 through July 2018.2 Petitioner 

did not object to the billing statement’s admission into evidence. Next, the City’s code director 

testified that he had a time-stamped photo of petitioner’s property from 2014 showing, among 

other defects, “the soffit falling down off the house.” When the City offered the 2014 photo into 

evidence, petitioner did not object. The City’s code director further testified that the most recent 

photo he had of petitioner’s property was taken on January 15, 2019, ten days before the trial 

before the circuit court. The code director stated that the January 15, 2019, photo showed that “the 

fascia has totally collapsed on that far side [of the house],” that “it’s not been painted,” and that 

“there’s no power at the residence[.]” Petitioner did not object to the January 15, 2019, photo’s 

admission into evidence.

During petitioner’s testimony, he stated that he lived at the property and denied the City’s 

 

1Article 1765 of the City’s Code of Ordinances and the vacant property registry are 

authorized by West Virginia Code § 8-12-16.

2The City notes that the vacant property fee was not assessed for the period from May 2017 

to October 2017, while the City installed a new HVAC unit on petitioner’s property as a part of an 

assistance program. 
3

assertion that he resided in nearby Vienna, West Virginia. The circuit court ruled that whether 

petitioner lives at the property was not relevant given § 1765.02(a)(6)’s definition for “vacant.”

Petitioner admitted that the water, electricity, and gas to the house were turned off at time of trial

and that “the main problem . . . is the deficiencies [cited by the City,] . . . [w]hich I’m not 

disputing.” Petitioner specifically stated that the deficiencies exist, “and I’m not objecting that they 

[exist]—or saying that [the City is] lying.” After trial, by order entered on February 4, 2019, the 

circuit court awarded judgment in the City’s favor in the amount of $2,200, plus costs and interest, 

due to petitioner’s failure to pay the monthly vacant property fee for September 2016 through July 

2018.3

Petitioner now appeals the circuit court’s February 4, 2019, order. We apply the standard 

for reviewing a judgment entered following a bench trial:

In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court 

made after a bench trial, a two-pronged deferential standard of review is applied. 

The final order and the ultimate disposition are reviewed under an abuse of 

discretion standard, and the circuit court’s underlying factual findings are reviewed 

under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo

review.

Syl. Pt. 1, Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank in Fairmont, 198 W. Va. 329, 480 S.E.2d 538 

(1996).

On appeal, petitioner argues that the City failed to comply with § 1765.05(b)(1), which 

provides an exemption for properties vacant for less than one year. We find that petitioner’s 

argument is belied by the record. The testimony and evidence at the trial before the circuit court 

showed that the water has been off at the property since 2008 and that the exterior deficiencies 

cited by the City were present as early as 2014.4 Given that the City sought unpaid vacant property 

fees for September 2016 through July 2018, we conclude that § 1765.05(b)(1) does not apply to 

this case.

The remainder of petitioner’s arguments are difficult to decipher. However, petitioner

generally argues that the circuit court erred in awarding judgment to the City. The City counters 

that the circuit court properly awarded it judgment in the amount of $2,200, plus costs and interest, 

due to petitioner’s failure to pay the monthly vacant property fee for the relevant period. We agree 

with the City. Based on our review of the record, we find that the testimony of petitioner, the City’s 

accounts receivable supervisor, and the City’s code director, as well as the exhibits admitted at 

trial, all established that the City was entitled to judgment. Therefore, we conclude that the circuit 

 

3The amount awarded to the City by the circuit court is $3.50 less than the amount 

awarded by the magistrate court. The City does not raise this discrepancy as a cross-assignment 

of error.

4As noted above, it is undisputed that when petitioner purchased the property in May 2016, 

the seller informed him that the property was registered on the vacant property registry. 
4

court did not err in awarding judgment to the City in the amount of $2,200, plus costs and interest. 

 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s February 4, 2019, order awarding 

judgment in the City’s favor. 

 Affirmed.

ISSUED: March 13, 2020

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead

Justice Margaret L. Workman

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Evan H. Jenkins

Justice John A. Hutchison