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WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: BOLSTERING 

DHS TO COMBAT PERSISTENT THREATS TO 

AMERICA 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, 

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, 

AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES 

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY 

PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, 

AND COMMUNICATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 14, 2015 

Serial No. 114–26 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, 

AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas, Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

BRETT DEWITT, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DENNIS TERRY, Subcommittee Clerk 

CHRISTOPHER SCHEPIS, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND 

COMMUNICATIONS 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona, Chairman 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

KERRY A. KINIRONS, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DEBORAH JORDAN, Subcommittee Clerk 

MOIRA BERGIN, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable John Ratcliffe, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure 

Protection, and Security Technologies: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, 

Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 18 

The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Arizona, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress From 

the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications ...................................... 4 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Dr. Reginald Brothers, Under Secretary for Science and Technology, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 9 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 11 

Dr. Kathryn H. Brinsfield, Assistant Secretary, Office of Health Affairs, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 14 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 11 

Dr. Huban A. Gowadia, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 16 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 11 

PANEL II 

Mr. Alan D. Cohn, Counsel, Steptoe & Johnson LLP: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 30 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 31 

Mr. Rick ‘‘Ozzie’’ Nelson, Senior Associate, Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 34 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 36 
Page

IV 

Mr. Warren Stern, Former Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 39 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 41 

APPENDIX 

Questions From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for the Department of 

Homeland Security ............................................................................................... 51 

Question From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Kathryn H. Brinsfield ......... 54 

Question From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Reginald Brothers ............ 55 

Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Reginald Brothers .............. 56 

Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Huban A. Gowadia ............. 57 

Questions From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Alan D. Cohn .................. 57 

Questions From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Warren Stern .................. 59 

Questions From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Rick ‘‘Ozzie’’ Nelson ........ 59 
(1) 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: BOLSTERING DHS TO COMBAT PERSISTENT 

THREATS TO AMERICA 

Tuesday, July 14, 2015 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND SECURITY

TECHNOLOGIES, AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:09 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John Ratcliffe [Chairman 

of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, 

and Security Technologies] presiding. 

Present from Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies: Representatives Ratcliffe, Perry, 

Donovan, Richmond, Jackson Lee, and Langevin. 

Present from Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications: McSally, Walker, Loudermilk, Payne, 

Watson Coleman, and Rice. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. The Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies and the Subcommittee 

on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications will 

come to order. 

Both subcommittees are meeting jointly to consider the Department of Homeland Security’s proposal to reorganize its chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive activities into a consolidated CBRNE office. 

During the Cold War years, the threat of nuclear annihilation 

was universally recognized. Today, there is an equally terrifying 

but persistent WMD threat. But the forms that such weapons could 

take and the bad actors seeking to obtain them have vastly expanded. Today’s threat comes from Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear 

weapon, as well as the rise of ISIS and other terrorist organizations that are seeking to acquire chemicals, biological agents, radiological or nuclear material to use it to set off a bomb in one of our 

major cities. 

While such an attack may not result in total annihilation, it 

would be a major public health and safety catastrophe, as well as 

an economic and psychological blow to the entire country. 

Today’s threat is illustrated by several evolving situations unfolding across the globe. The current nuclear deal just announced 
2 

today with Iran, if approved, could increase the amount of nuclear 

material throughout the volatile Middle East if Iran is in fact allowed to retain a certain amount of enriched uranium. 

Separately, Russia has recently announced it’s pulling out of a 

decades-old Reagan administration INF Treaty which limited the 

number of nuclear weapons between the two countries. Russia has 

since moved to modernize and increase its stockpile, thereby making the availability of nuclear and radiological material that much 

greater. 

Simultaneously, Middle Eastern countries, like Saudi Arabia, are 

building 16 new nuclear plants even as they struggle to battle radical Islamists within their own borders. 

While these are greater geopolitical issues, the implications of 

the WMD threat to the U.S. homeland are immense. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has struggled to keep tabs on its 

radiological and nuclear material across Eastern Europe. The current nuclear negotiations with Iran and the proliferation of nuclear 

material across the Middle East raises similar concerns of operational control of these sensitive materials. 

This is all happening at a time when ISIS is propagating a call 

for terrorist plots here in the United States and is taking control 

of large pieces of territory across Iraq, Syria, and North Africa. 

Terrorists and militant groups have long had an interest in using 

a WMD to attack U.S. interests, especially those including chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials. ISIS has made its 

ambition known that it wishes to obtain WMD material and use it 

in an attack. 

Underscoring the very real possibility of this threat, Australian 

intelligence officials have publicly stated their belief that ISIS has 

already seized enough material from government facilities, hospitals, and universities in Iraq and Syria to build a dirty bomb. 

Currently, the Department of Homeland Security is organized to 

address the WMD threat through several different offices and directorates: The Office of Health Affairs, or OHA, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO, and elements of the Science and 

Technology, or S&T, Directorate. 

This fragmentation is in contrast to other departments and Federal agencies across the U.S. Government that have centralized 

WMD defense programs and have clear focal points for interagency 

collaboration. One of the major concerns we’ve heard with the current structure is that DHS doesn’t have the stature and voice that 

it should among all of the agencies that are working to address 

these threats. 

In September 2013, DHS was directed by Congress to undertake 

an in-depth review of its WMD programs. The review also required 

recommendations to improve its organizational structure to be 

more effective. Unfortunately, the committee only received this report less than a month prior to this hearing, meaning that it’s 

nearly 2 years late. 

I’ve had the opportunity to sit down with Dr. Gowadia, the director of DNDO, numerous times during my short tenure as Chairman 

and as part of my oversight responsibilities to learn how DNDO operates and works with its stakeholders, both domestically and 

internationally. One thing that I have concluded and have heard 
3 

repeatedly from others is that the current DNDO model works, 

something which, unfortunately, can’t be said right now about 

every DHS office. 

In support of the opinion that DNDO is one of the most effective 

offices within the Department, the most recent 2014 edition of ‘‘The 

Best Places to Work in the Federal Government’’ ranked DNDO 

11th out of 314 agency subcomponents. This success is built on 

leadership, a clear mission, and a well-functioning organizational 

structure. While DNDO hasn’t always been a benchmark of success, the organization has certainly matured, and it’s matured into 

a model that I think should be replicated throughout the Department. 

Now, Chairman McSally and I have convened our subcommittees 

here today to examine whether the DHS proposal to reorganize will 

support the shared opinion of most that the Department of Homeland Security should be doing more to guard against WMD threats. 

While the proposal to Congress lays out several different options 

and a proposed recommendation for how the Department would reorganize, we hope to hear more today about this proposed reorganization and how it will address gaps and strengthen the Department’s posture towards WMD threats, and we, frankly, hope to 

hear some specifics. 

I want to thank Chairman McSally for joining me in this effort, 

and I thank the witnesses for being here today. 

[The statement of Chairman Ratcliffe follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHN RATCLIFFE

JULY 14, 2015 

During the Cold War years, the threat of nuclear annihilation was universally recognized. Today, there is an equally terrifying and persistent WMD threat, but the 

forms such weapons could take and the bad actors seeking to obtain them have 

vastly expanded. Today’s threat comes from Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon, as 

well as the rise of ISIS and other terrorist organizations that are seeking to acquire 

chemicals, biological agents, radiological, or nuclear material to use it to set off a 

weapon in one of our major cities. While such an attack may not result in total annihilation, it would be a major public health and safety catastrophe, as well as an economic and psychological blow to the entire country. 

Today’s threat is illustrated by several evolving situations unfolding across the 

globe. The current nuclear deal being negotiated with Iran could increase the 

amount of nuclear material throughout the volatile Middle East if Iran is allowed 

to retain a certain amount of enriched uranium. Separately, Russia has recently announced it is pulling out of a decades-old Reagan Administration INF treaty, which 

limited the number of nuclear weapons between the two countries. Russia has since 

moved to modernize and increase its stockpile, thereby making the availability of 

nuclear and radiological material that much greater. Simultaneously, Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia are building 16 new nuclear plants even as they 

struggle to battle radical Islamists within their own borders. 

While these are greater geopolitical issues, the implications for the WMD threat 

to the U.S. homeland are immense. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia 

has struggled to keep tabs on its radiological and nuclear material across Eastern 

Europe. The current nuclear negotiations deal with Iran and the proliferation of nuclear material across the Middle East raises similar concerns of operational control 

of these sensitive materials. 

This is all happening at a time when ISIS is propagating a call for terrorist plots 

in the United States and taking control of large pieces of territory across Iraq, 

Syria, and North Africa. Terrorists and militant groups have long had an interest 

in using a WMD to attack U.S. interests, especially those including chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials. ISIS has made its ambition known that 

it wishes to obtain WMD material and use it in an attack. Underscoring the real 

possibility of this threat, Australian intelligence officials have publicly stated their 
4 

belief that ISIS has already seized enough material from Government facilities, hospitals, and universities in Iraq and Syria to build a dirty bomb. 

Currently, the Department of Homeland Security is organized to address the 

WMD threat through several different offices and directorates, the Office of Health 

Affairs (OHA), the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and elements of the 

Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate. This fragmentation is in contrast to 

other Departments and Federal agencies across the U.S. Government that have centralized WMD defense programs and have clear focal points for interagency collaboration. One of the major concerns we have heard with the current structure is that 

DHS does not have the stature and voice that it should among all of the agencies 

working to address all of these threats. 

In September of 2013, DHS was directed by Congress to undertake an in-depth 

review of its WMD programs. The review also required recommendations to improve 

its organizational structure to be more effective. Unfortunately, the committee only 

received this report less than a month prior to this hearing, meaning that it’s nearly 

2 years late. 

I’ve had the opportunity to sit down with Dr. Gowadia, director of DNDO numerous times during my short tenure as Chairman as part of my oversight responsibilities to learn how DNDO operates and works with its stakeholders, both domestically and internationally. One thing that I have concluded, and have heard repeatedly from others, is that the current DNDO model works; something which unfortunately can’t be said about every DHS office. In support of the opinion that DNDO 

is one of the most effective offices within the Department, the most recent 2014 edition of the Best Places to Work in the Federal Government ranked DNDO 11th out 

of 314 agency subcomponents. This success is built on leadership, a clear mission, 

and a well-functioning organizational structure. And while DNDO hasn’t always 

been a benchmark of success, the organization has certainly matured into a model 

that I think should be replicated throughout the Department. 

Chairman McSally and I convened our subcommittees here today to examine 

whether the DHS proposal to reorganize will support the shared opinion of most 

that the Department of Homeland Security should be doing more to guard against 

WMD threats. While the proposal to Congress lays out several different options and 

a proposed recommendation for how the Department should reorganize, we hope to 

hear more today about how this proposed reorganization will address gaps and 

strengthen the Department’s posture towards WMD threats and we hope to hear 

some specifics. I thank Chairman McSally for joining me in this effort, and I thank 

the witnesses for being here today. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member 

of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and 

Communications, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for 

his opening statement. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good afternoon. I also want to thank Chairman McSally, along 

with you, for holding today’s hearing to evaluate the Department 

of Homeland Security’s proposal to reorganize certain chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, and explosive counterterrorism programs. I understand that the committee may consider a Department of Homeland Security authorization bill later in this Congress, potentially as early as this fall, and that pending reorganization plan may be included in that. 

I caution against acting too swiftly. Experience tells me that the 

reorganizations can be distracting, disruptive, and demoralizing to 

a workforce. Indeed, the Department itself continues to struggle 

with the morale challenges that date back to its inception. Before 

acting, it is imperative that this committee have an understanding 

of the full implications and can ensure that the benefits outweigh 

the costs. 

As Ranking Member on the Subcommittee for Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, I have particular concerns about how the proposed reorganization will affect legacy offices’ relationships with the State and local response partners. My 
5 

subcommittee has devoted a significant amount of time to assessing 

what DHS does well and what it needs to do better with respect 

to helping State and local governments bolster their ability to respond to biochemical threats. 

Although local first responders and the public health officials 

have noted that the Office of Health Affairs has improved its engagement activities in the recent years, they urge better coordination and more timely information sharing related to chemical biothreats. I’d be interested to hear what safeguards would be in place 

to prevent disruption of these important relationships and whether 

this reorganization is necessary to deliver the improved coordination information sharing that State and local responders have been 

seeking for quite some time. 

Additionally, I am interested to learn how DHS will ensure that 

there will not be winners and losers with respect to resources for 

the various CBRNE threats. For example, for the past several 

years, the Office of Health Affairs’ Chemical Defense Program has 

been operating on a shoestring budget of about $800,000 out of an 

overall $125 million budget, whereas NBIC and BioWatch collectively eat up over $90 million. 

Meanwhile, DNDO’s budget is more than double OHA’s budget. 

DNDO does its own research and development and OHA does not. 

Regardless, I’ll be interested to understand how the reorganization will affect the distribution of resources among the various 

CBRNE threat-related activities. Moreover, I’d like to note the proposed reorganization appears to be a bit lopsided. While the new 

CBRNE office would have R&D responsibilities and radiological 

and nuclear activities, the Science and Technology Directorate 

would retain R&D for chemical and biological activities. 

Accordingly, I’m interested to know whether it indicates that the 

future reorganizations may need to be down the road; specifically, 

we can expect the Department to come back in a year or 2 and ask 

for CBRNE and R&D be fully realigned in their S&T or CBRNE 

office. 

Finally, I would like to express my concern regarding the impact 

of the proposed reorganization on the activities of the chief medical 

officer. I am particularly concerned about the risk that CMO would 

lose a direct line to the Secretary and that the CMO’s DHS workforce health responsibilities would get lost in a larger CBRNE office. 

In closing, there are four fundamental questions that we need 

answered as we consider the Department’s proposal: How will the 

proposed reorganization advance CBRNE missions while preserving existing relationships? What savings or additional costs 

will be incurred with the proposed reorganization yield? What improvements to oversight and management of the activities within 

this new office are expected to be realized? Finally, what steps will 

be taken to contain the negative impacts of such a reorganization 

on employee morale? 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the witnesses for 

being here today, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I thank the gentleman. 
6 

The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the Subcommittee on 

Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, the 

gentlelady from Arizona, Ms. McSally, for her opening statement. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m pleased our subcommittees are meeting today to consider the optimal organization 

of the Department of Homeland Security to meet the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive threats that face our 

Nation. 

We know terrorist groups have long strived to employ chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear, or CBRNE materials in their 

attacks. The director of national intelligence testified in February 

that weapons of mass destruction continue to be a major threat to 

the security of the United States. He noted that biological and 

chemical materials and technologies, as well as personnel with 

their expertise to use and design them, move easily in the economy. 

The DNI also stated that infectious disease continues to threaten 

our security and that a more crowded and interconnected world is 

increasing the opportunities for human and animal diseases to 

emerge and spread globally. 

Experts suggest the terrorists’ interests in utilizing chemical 

agents has also increased. In fact, reports indicate ISIS may be 

currently conducting attacks using chemical agents in Syria and 

Iraq. Last summer, the laptop reportedly retrieved from an ISIS 

hideout in Syria contained plans for weaponizing bubonic plague 

and a document discussing the advantages of using biological 

weapons. 

Earlier this year, the Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee 

held hearings on chemical and biological threats. In addition to the 

severity of the threat, these hearings highlighted a number of 

crosscutting themes. Witnesses testified about the need for more 

robust information sharing among all levels of government, and I 

introduced a bill to address this aimed at enhancing CBRNE intelligence and information sharing, which recently passed the House. 

We also repeatedly heard about the importance of strong coordinated leadership to counter these threats, which brings us to the 

purpose of our hearing today. DHS must play a leading role in defending our homeland from these CBRNE threats. In my first 6 

months in office, I’ve gained an appreciation of the work of the Office of Health Affairs in this particular space. As the coordinator 

for chemical defense at DHS, OHA works with Federal, State, and 

local partners to enhance preparedness and response capabilities 

for an attack or an incident involving chemical agents, as we recently saw in a chemical defense pilot with the city of Baltimore 

mass transit system. 

In addition to managing biological surveillance and detection systems for the Nation, OHA coordinates the Department’s efforts related to biological threats, such as anthrax or Ebola. OHA also 

completed an interagency effort to develop guidance for emergency 

response providers to increase survivability of victims, as well as 

safety of responders after an attack using an improvised explosive 

device. 

Despite this good work, the Department’s chemical and biological 

efforts have not been without their challenges. These are serious 

threats, and I really look forward to hearing from our witnesses 
7 

today from DHS on how the Department is proposing to address 

them. I’m also interested in hearing from both panels how the proposed reorganization will elevate the CBRNE mission and provide 

the strong leadership to ensure the Department is able to meet 

these threats. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The statement of Chairman McSally follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MARTHA MCSALLY

JULY 14, 2015 

We know that terrorist groups have long strived to employ chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear, or CBRNE, materials in their attacks. The director of national intelligence testified in February that weapons of mass destruction continue 

to be a major threat to the security of the United States. He noted that biological 

and chemical materials and technologies, as well as personnel with the expertise to 

use and design them, move easily in the economy. The DNI also stated that infectious disease continues to threaten our security and that a more crowded and interconnected world is increasing the opportunities for human and animal diseases to 

emerge and spread globally. 

Experts suggest that terrorist interest in utilizing chemical agents has increased. 

In fact, reports indicate that ISIS may currently be conducting attacks using chemical agents in Syria and Iraq. Last summer, a laptop reportedly retrieved from an 

ISIS hideout in Syria contained plans for weaponizing bubonic plague and a document discussing the advantages of using biological weapons. 

Earlier this year, the Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee held hearings on 

chemical and biological threats. In addition to the severity of the threat, these hearings highlighted a number of cross-cutting themes. Witnesses testified about the 

need for robust information sharing among all levels of Government, and I have introduced a bill to address this aimed at enhancing CBRNE intelligence and information sharing, which recently passed the House. We also repeatedly heard about the 

importance of strong, coordinated leadership on these threats. 

Which brings us to the purpose of our hearing today: DHS must play a leading 

role in defending our homeland from CBRNE threats. In my first 6 months in office, 

I’ve gained an appreciation of the work of the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) in this 

space. 

As the coordinator for chemical defense at DHS, OHA works with Federal, State, 

and local partners to enhance preparedness and response capabilities for an attack 

or incident involving chemical agents, as we recently saw in a chemical defense pilot 

with the city of Baltimore mass transit system. 

In addition to managing biological surveillance and detection systems for the Nation, OHA coordinates the Department’s efforts related to biological threats, such as 

anthrax and Ebola. 

OHA also recently completed an interagency effort to develop guidance for emergency response providers to increase survivability of victims as well as safety of responders after an attack using an improvised explosive device. 

Despite this good work, the Department’s chemical and biological efforts have not 

been without their challenges. 

These are serious threats and I look forward to hearing from our DHS witnesses 

on how the Department is addressing them. I am also interested to hear from both 

panels how the proposed reorganization will elevate the CBRNE mission and provide strong leadership to ensure the Department is able to meet these threats. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I thank the gentlelady. 

Other Members of the subcommittees are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JULY 14, 2015 

Good afternoon. I thank the Chairmen and Ranking Members of these two subcommittees for holding this important hearing. 

I welcome today’s witnesses, and look forward to their detailed testimony. 
8 

The Department of Homeland Security has approached this committee with a reorganization proposal to establish a central headquarters office responsible for assessing and responding to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives 

threats (CBRNE) to the Nation. 

The Department’s proposal recommends merging the Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office (DNDO) and the Office of Health Affairs, which is currently headed by the 

Department’s chief medical officer. 

The threat from a weapon of mass destruction is complex and the potential harm 

that could affect our citizens is unimaginable. 

First responders need a Federal partner who can help them address these threats. 

I believe the Department of Homeland Security can be that Federal partner and 

throughout my tenure on this committee, I have supported bipartisan legislation to 

assist in these efforts. 

However, I still have concerns about the consequences of this realignment structure. 

For instance, after Hurricane Katrina, it became apparent that the Secretary of 

Homeland Security needed the counsel of a doctor who would be able to provide advice on threats with public health consequences, provide necessary medical guidance 

on workforce health, and serve as a resource to components. 

As Congress worked to draft the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Performance Act, I worked closely with the Department of Homeland Security’s first chief 

medical officer to ensure that the role of the Chief Medical Office was appropriately 

defined. 

In the past, I have expressed concern that the CMO’s mission as primary medical 

advisor to the Secretary and her workforce health and component support responsibilities have been overshadowed by challenges posed by managing BioWatch and 

the National Biosurveillance Integration Center. 

The Department’s proposal to move the chief medical officer to the new CBRNE 

office does not relieve my concerns. 

In fact, I am concerned that if moved to a new CBRNE office, the chief medical 

officer may lose her direct line to the Secretary, which would be a step backward. 

The chief medical officer’s role as the Secretary’s doctor is vital and must be preserved. 

Additionally, I would note that while the Office of Health Affairs struggled with 

the now defunct BioWatch Gen–3 acquisition, it is unclear whether and how this 

reorganization would address the acquisition challenges experiences by not only 

OHA but also DNDO. 

DNDO also has a history of flawed acquisitions programs that have wasted taxpayer dollars. 

For instance, the Advanced Spectroscopic Portals were intended to detect illicit 

nuclear materials and devices that could be shipped in cargo entering the United 

States. 

The Government Accountability Office determined that DNDO underestimated 

the cost of this acquisition, overstated its benefits, and provided misleading information to Congress. 

Although I am not rejecting the DHS proposal, it would be irresponsible for this 

committee to act on it in a hasty manner, without giving due consideration to why 

the reorganization is happening, how it will affect the missions currently carried by 

the existing offices, whether and the degree to which it will improve DHS’s CBRNE 

mission, and how it will affect workforce morale. 

To legislate without careful consideration of these important issues could undo a 

decade’s worth of this committee’s work in that mission space. 

Thank you, and I yield the balance of my time. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. We’re pleased to have a very distinguished panel 

before us today on this important topic. Dr. Reginald Brothers is 

the under secretary for science and technology at the United States 

Homeland Security. 

Dr. Brothers, good to see you again. Thank you for being here. 

Dr. Kathryn Brinsfield is the assistant secretary and chief medical officer with the Office of Health Affairs at the U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security. 

Good to have you, Doctor. 

Dr. Huban Gowadia is the director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
9 

Welcome back, Dr. Gowadia. 

I’d now ask the witnesses to stand and raise your right hand so 

I can swear you in to testify. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. You may be seated. 

Let the record reflect that the witnesses all answered in the affirmative. 

The witnesses’ entire written statements will appear for the 

record. The Chair now recognizes Dr. Brothers for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF REGINALD BROTHERS, UNDER SECRETARY 

FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BROTHERS. Chairman Ratcliffe, Chairman McSally, Ranking 

Member Payne, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s approach to weapons of mass destruction and formation of a potential CBRNE office within the Department. I 

would also like to thank the Members of the subcommittees for 

their longstanding interest in and support of the Department and 

the Science and Technology Directorate and our work to combat 

CBRNE threats. 

On April 22 last year, Secretary Johnson announced the 

Strengthening Departmental Unity of Effort Initiative. Through 

this initiative, the Secretary has directed the Department to improve internal processes, increase joint operational planning in 

DHS operations, and better coordinate and align departmental capabilities. 

Consistent with the Unity of Effort Initiative, the Secretary directed the Department to revisit recommendations from 2013 regarding the Department’s posture toward chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. The purpose was to see if there existed an opportunity for the Department to define roles and responsibilities to maximize CBRNE visibility and focus. 

The ultimate recommendation to Congress signed by Deputy Secretary Mayorkas last month was to form a new CBRNE office in 

DHS headquarters led by an assistant secretary. The proposed office would focus specifically on coordinating CBRNE strategy and 

planning within the Department, reborn largely from integration of 

DHS’s Office of Health Affairs and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, along with specific elements of the Science and Technology Directorate, the National Protection and Programs Directorate, Office 

of Policy, and Office of Operations Coordination and Planning. 

The intent of the proposed structure is to form a center of gravity 

for CBRNE functions within DHS headquarters in order to drive 

greater awareness, alignment, and joint action in the Department. 

For almost any homeland security challenge in the Department, 

CBRNE or otherwise, the innovative technical solutions growing 

out of research and development will be essential to our continued 

success. R&D has changed a great deal over the last several decades. Before, experts in diverse fields could work independently 

from one another and create stand-alone products of great value, 

like a pair of reading glasses. 
10 

In the complex world we live in now, filled with advanced and 

rapidly-evolving technology, successful R&D requires a convergence 

of a once-fragmented field and dispersed knowledge. For example, 

a team bringing together electrical engineering, human biochemistry, neurosurgery, nano materials, and advanced manufacturing can create a hybrid bionic eye that uses a digital camera to 

help blind patients see. In fact, the FDA approved the first bionic 

eye for use in February 2013. 

At S&T, one of the challenges we face is ensuring that our operators and end-users have steady access to innovation regardless of 

how the overall landscape transforms. In the Department, S&T is 

one of the few organizations that works with multiple operational 

components and across a full range of DHS missions. In support of 

the CBRNE mission area, for example, we work not only with OHA 

and DNDO, but also with multiple operational components in the 

Department and interagency, including the Secret Service, FBI, 

and State and local responders and hazardous material teams. 

The range of expertise at S&T, combined with our reach across 

the Department, provides a unique opportunity to contribute to the 

unity of effort through numerous projects across organizational and 

technical areas. 

To begin with, we have a stable portfolio of R&D projects to address long-term enduring focus areas for the Department, such as 

border aviation security. The portfolio also meets statutory responsibilities, such as to transition technology to State, local, Tribal, 

and territorial first responders. In this capacity, we act as a Federal sponsor and voice in mission areas from wildfires to CBRNE 

events. 

As a complement to our longer-term R&D portfolio, S&T also 

plays an important role in helping the Department address immediate needs and pop-up issues. In the last year, we have been a goto asset and source for on-demand science-based assessment on a 

range of urgent homeland security issues the Secretary and components have faced. That has included contributions to important 

Unity of Effort activities ranging from analytical support to the Department’s Joint Requirements Council to independent assessments 

in critical Departmental mission areas. 

To fulfill our immediate and long-term obligations to the Department, we must have strong relationships across the innovation ecosystem. The concept of a homeland security industrial base, a 

greater business community around homeland security missions is 

one we’ve work hard to advance over the last year-and-a-half. 

Wider use of prize challenges, innovation, integration of technology accelerators that focus on small business innovation research enables us to target small businesses, start-ups, and other 

innovators that before may not have imagined Government as a 

customer for their business. 

I can personally attest to the interest in this community in providing public safety and homeland security solutions that will 

make their children and children’s children safer, and S&T will 

continue engaging them. 

Our success in all the areas and initiatives I describe today is 

fueled by S&T’s ability to maintain a workforce with diverse skill 

sets and expertise that is capable of serving as technical experts for 
11 

the Department, and when needed, quickly interfacing with and 

tapping into the S&T ecosystem. 

On almost any Homeland Security issue that emerges, S&T has 

become a reliable resource for independent, scientifically sound 

technical assistance. We work every day to ensure our value to our 

customers and end-users. We’ll bring the same enthusiasm to supporting a CBRNE office when and if it becomes an entity in the Department. 

Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Brothers, Dr. Brinsfield, 

and Ms. Gowadia follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF REGINALD BROTHERS, KATHRYN H. BRINSFIELD, AND

HUBAN A. GOWADIA

JULY 14, 2015 

Chairmen McSally and Ratcliffe, Ranking Members Payne and Richmond; and 

distinguished Members of the Subcommittees on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, and Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, thank you for inviting us to speak with you today. We appreciate the opportunity to testify on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 

work to strengthen Departmental Unity of Effort with regard to chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) threats to our Nation. As the leaders 

of three of the organizations involved in the consolidation of CBRNE functions into 

one office within DHS, we appreciate your interest in this matter. We also appreciate the attention Secretary Johnson and Deputy Secretary Mayorkas have given 

to the issue of aligning the CBRNE mission within their vision of a streamlined Department, and we have worked closely with them to put forward a proposal that enhances coordination and Unity of Effort. 

BACKGROUND

The Senate Explanatory Statement accompanying the fiscal year 2013 DHS Appropriations Act directed that DHS review its chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear (CBRNE) programs and functions. The Secretary of DHS at the time, Janet 

Napolitano, directed the DHS Office of Policy (PLCY) to lead a review team in conducting an impartial, collaborative assessment of potential alignment options. The 

review team identified realignment criteria and desired outcomes, conducted an 

independent analysis, and consulted with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

(DNDO), Office of Health Affairs (OHA), Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), 

leadership of other DHS components and select interagency partners. 

The review team analyzed organizational models ranging from informal coordination to mission integration and identified several alignment options for DHS leadership to consider, each with its own benefits and drawbacks. The then-existing organizational structure was deemed by review participants to be insufficiently robust 

to achieve future goals and outcomes in the CBRNE area. The results of the review, 

including the recommendation to establish a consolidated mission support organization, were presented to Secretary Napolitano in August 2013. No decision was implemented at that time due to the limited remaining duration of Secretary 

Napolitano’s tenure. 

UNITY OF EFFORT

On April 22, 2014, Secretary Johnson directed the ‘‘Strengthening Departmental 

Unity of Effort Initiative’’ to improve the planning, programming, budgeting, and 

execution processes and the DHS joint operational planning and joint operations 

through strengthened Departmental structures, increased capability, and smart 

DHS headquarters realignment. As part of the initiative, DHS established a new 

DHS Joint Requirements Council and strengthened the existing DHS budget and 

acquisition processes. 

In addition, the Department indicated, in briefings to select DHS appropriations 

and authorizing committee staff, the Secretary’s intent to realign DHS PLCY and 

the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS) based on their core functions and consolidate certain DHS headquarters external affairs functions. These 

changes are intended to focus headquarters offices on the principal objectives of the 

Unity of Effort initiative, including to integrate the broad and complex DHS mission 
12 

space and empower DHS components to effectively execute their operations. The Department’s commitment to the Secretary’s Unity of Effort initiative drove the Department to re-visit the recommendations from the 2013 CBRNE review. 

PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF CBRNE ORGANIZATION

The ‘‘DHS Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Functions Review Report’’ was signed by Deputy Secretary Mayorkas on June 17, 2015, pursuant to the 

Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the fiscal year 2013 DHS Appropriations. The report is based on the initial 2013 review, and is further informed by the 

Secretary’s Unity of Effort initiative and DHS’s recent review of the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). If agreed to by Congress, the recommended structure for a CBRNE office is as follows: 

(1) The DHS CBRNE office would be led at the assistant secretary level, as a 

direct report to the Secretary. The assistant secretary position (A/S CBRNE) 

would be empowered to coalesce and elevate CBRNE issues to the Secretary in 

support of the DHS operating components and represent DHS on these matters 

within the Federal interagency as well as with external stakeholders at the 

State and local levels and with private-sector partners. The A/S CBRNE would 

be the Department-wide lead representative at appropriate internal, interagency, and international venues related to DHS CBRNE strategy, policy, planning, programming, budgeting, investment, and joint operational planning and 

joint operational matters. The DHS CBRNE office shall not conflict with other 

DHS component legislative mandates to conduct appropriate internal, interagency, and international engagements related to CBRNE. 

(2) The A/S CBRNE would be responsible for coordinating and maintaining Department-wide CBRNE-related strategy, policy, situational awareness, threat 

and risk assessments, contingency planning, operational requirements, acquisition formulation and oversight, and preparedness across all elements of Presidential Policy Directive 8, ‘‘National Preparedness’’ (i.e., prevention, protection, 

mitigation, response and recovery), consistent with relevant statutory authorities and extant Presidential directives, including but not limited to Presidential 

Policy Directive 2 and Homeland Security Presidential Directives 10, 18, 21, 

and 22. This work will complement the capability-building and sustainment efforts managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 

(3) The new office would be primarily comprised of the consolidation of DNDO 

and OHA, including the BioWatch Program. The director of DNDO and the 

DHS chief medical officer (CMO), as well as other relevant supervisory positions 

depending on the final organizational construct, would report to the A/S 

CBRNE on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosives, and emerging 

infectious diseases and workforce health issues within their cognizance. Under 

this reorganization, the director of DNDO and the CMO would have necessary 

access to the Secretary and deputy secretary as representatives in DHS Senior 

Leader Forums, when their leadership and technical expertise on CBRNE or 

other workforce health issues are needed. However, these leaders would no 

longer be formal direct reports to the Secretary. 

(4) Specialty CBRNE personnel from DHS PLCY and DHS OPS would permanently transfer along with the DHS policy and operations support functions 

they perform, to the CBRNE office to further strengthen the center of gravity 

of the new office. 

(5) Chemical, biological, and integrated risk assessment, functional responsibilities from S&T would be permanently transferred to the CBRNE Office. 

(6) NPPD’s Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP), which builds capabilities to 

counter the use of explosives in the homeland, would also be permanently transferred. 

Under the recommended structure, DHS is creating a coherent nexus for DHS 

CBRNE functions within the DHS HQ. The structure will foster greater harmony 

of effort for priority CBRNE issues and greater awareness by external and internal 

organizations regarding the appropriate CBRNE DHS focal point for most CBRNE 

issues. In addition to better aligned support programs and activities, the new structure will strengthen DHS CBRNE-related operational activities in DHS’s operating 

components. FEMA specifically has indicated the establishment of the A/S CBRNE 

role will support their efforts to leverage CBRNE analytic and technical capabilities 

to enhance component operations related to CBRNE. Additional benefits will likely 

be realized as the Department matures its planning, programming, budgeting and 

execution system, joint operational planning, and joint operations over time. 
13 

ANTICIPATED IMPACTS

The new Departmental structure will have demonstrable impacts across the 

CBRNE spectrum of activities for prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and 

recovery. This will be accomplished in two ways: (1) The inclusion of CBRNE policy 

and operational support personnel within the CBRNE Office, and (2) establishing 

strong linkages between the CBRNE office and the new DHS Joint Requirements 

and Joint Operational Plans processes. DHS OHA, DNDO, S&T, and the Office for 

Bombing Prevention will be realigned in sum or part to ensure the CBRNE office 

has all tools available for a cohesive, competent, and functional organization. 

OHA.—The CBRNE office will subsume OHA in total, and will expand beyond the 

historic OHA purview to additionally encompass the broader impact of chemical and 

biological threats. Under the current structure, OHA’s experts advise and support 

DHS leadership, its workforce, and public and medical health officials Nation-wide 

to prepare for, respond to, and recover from threats to the Nation’s health security. 

This role will continue in the CBRNE Office. In addition, the CMO will be able to 

add the capability to leverage existing highly-skilled experts that had previously 

been in other parts of DHS to further the Department’s end-to-end planning for 

CBRNE threats. Existing health and medical expertise will be leveraged to build 

connections between current and emerging health and medical issues and contribute 

to CBRNE decision analysis. Further, OHA’s current mission of medical advice and 

support, workforce health protection, support for the first responder community, 

medical quality management, and interagency coordination on health/medical issues 

will be further enhanced as the medical expertise will be better informed of CBRNErelated policy decisions, planning, and programs that may impact the Department’s—and Nation’s—medical needs. 

DNDO.—The CBRNE office will subsume DNDO in total with all current functions remaining intact. DNDO was chartered, in law and Presidential directive, 

using an interagency construct to coordinate efforts across the U.S. Government 

(USG) to detect and protect against radiological and nuclear threats. Similarly, the 

National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center was established within DNDO to provide centralized stewardship, planning, assessment, exercises, improvement, and integration for all Federal technical nuclear forensics activities. The U.S. interagency 

and DHS operational components detail staff to DNDO to ensure priorities of their 

home agencies are accounted for and their activities are integrated in all aspects 

(architecture, risk analysis, research and development (R&D), acquisition, training, 

exercises, etc.) to improve coordination across the USG. DNDO conducts a holistic 

program of end-to-end efforts in nuclear detection and nuclear forensics, including 

planning, research and technology development, technology acquisition, and support 

for Federal, State, and local operators. 

OBP.—The CBRNE office will subsume OBP in total with all current functions 

remaining intact. OBP accomplishes its mission to protect life and critical infrastructure by coordinating counter-improvised explosive device efforts, performing capabilities analysis, planning and decision support, and providing training and 

awareness. Moving the bombing prevention activities into the office will allow better 

coordination with State and local outreach without disrupting the capabilities the 

Department provides to critical infrastructure owners and operators and the private 

sector across the CBRNE space. 

S&T.—S&T will transfer to the CBRNE office the chemical, biological, and integrated risk assessment and material threat functions. This will allow appropriate 

consolidation between risk determination and strategy and policy development, enhancing cohesion between these functions. The chemical and biological R&D functions within S&T and the facilities at which the work is conducted will not transfer 

to the CBRNE Office. However, as the center of gravity for the Department on matters related to CBRNE, robust and consistent coordination between DHS S&T and 

the CBRNE office will be required to ensure accountability and transparency of 

R&D efforts in alignment with the Secretarial strategic guidance to achieve operational results, a principal tenet of Departmental Unity of Effort. 

CONCLUSION

The Department’s proposed CBRNE reorganization will foster Unity of Effort 

across the Department by integrating and strengthening DHS CBRNE coordination, 

roles, and responsibilities for improving outcomes and accomplishing goals. We look 

forward to working with Congress in turning the Department’s intent into reality. 

Thank you for your time and interest in this issue. We look forward to answering 

your questions. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Dr. Brothers. 
14 

Dr. Brinsfield, you’ve got 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF KATHRYN H. BRINSFIELD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF HEALTH AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Dr. BRINSFIELD. Thank you, sir. 

Chairmen Ratcliffe and McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and 

distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for your attention to this matter. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you 

alongside my colleagues about CBRNE threats and the health 

needs of our agency and Nation. My remarks today will focus on 

the importance of the DHS focus on CBRNE and health threats 

and how a unified office can support and amplify the work we do 

at the Office of Health Affairs. 

OHA has an important mission space. Led by an assistant secretary and chief medical officer, OHA is a headquarters office built 

to fill the need of the Secretary and component leadership for expert advice and guidance on biological, chemical, and health issues 

that affect our workforce and security. 

Our programs encompass biological detection and surveillance, 

chemical defense, and health and medical-related guidance on 

workforce mission effectiveness and risk mitigation. We also provide guidance for State and local preparedness and response efforts 

related to chemical, biological, or medical threats. Our staff of doctors, nurses, scientists, veterinarians, and first responders have 

years of real-world experience and are uniquely capable of providing expert advice to senior decision makers and front-line employees. 

There are threats and risks to our Nation related to CBRNE and 

health, and those that wish to do us harm continue to try new 

methods and approaches. Chemical agents can kill, incapacitate, 

cause long-term harm, and contaminate critical infrastructure. 

OHA has received directed funds for chemical defense demonstration projects in subways, ports, and large venues. When completed, 

these projects will provide critical analysis of emergency response 

systems, identify community-relevant solutions, and develop best 

practices. We appreciate Congress’ attention on chemical threats 

and hope to work collaboratively in the future with you on this 

issue. 

A catastrophic biological event, whether natural or intentional, 

could cause thousands or in some cases hundreds of thousands of 

casualties, weaken the economy, and threaten National security. 

Radiological, nuclear, and explosive threats are similarly dangerous, and all of these together present a risk of both mass destruction and mass disruption. 

Our mission to prepare for weapons of mass destruction is critical. Threats that are low probability with high consequence require daily preparation and planning. 

Similarly, the mission to prepare for threats of mass disruption 

is critical. Recent events in the United States and the world have 

shown us that these incidents can wreak havoc on economies, impact public trust and infrastructure, and cost human lives. The 

near-daily rhythm of these threats strengthens our response as we 

learn by practice and reinforce our working relationships. 
15 

Our partners in the Office for Bombing Prevention do important 

and complementing work to that of OHA and DNDO. They focus 

on capability and capacity building for State, local, and private-sector stakeholders so they may counter improvised explosive devices. 

They are a small office with a big impact, and in partnership with 

our DOJ counterparts are helping to keep us safer. 

The first response to any incident is local. From big chemical attacks to major disasters, local communities need help to ensure 

that they have the right systems in place to act when a threat occurs. The CBRNE office will create an environment that can foster 

stronger coordination between OHA’s chemical, biological, and 

health programs, DNDO’s radiologic- and nuclear-focused programs, and the Office for Bombing Prevention’s work. By bringing 

together our offices into this new organization, we’ll be able to leverage our existing detection capabilities, protocols, and expertise 

to help facilitate coordinated Federal, State, and local detection, response, and recovery. 

The chemical, biological, and integrative risk assessment and 

material threat functions currently performed in S&T will also be 

an important element within the CBRNE office. The risk assessments inform the work done by our chemical and biological programs and are critical to the decisions and priorities made by us 

and our partners at all levels of Government. 

OHA currently addresses all incidents, whether a major hurricane or disease outbreak, from an integrative perspective using 

both technical threat-based expertise and health knowledge. OHA 

supports front-line responders as they protect communities and 

helps incorporate health considerations into the National response 

to a threat. 

For example, OHA led DHS’s coordinated Ebola response efforts 

and worked closely with Customs and Border Protection to set up 

screening protocols that helped keep our officers and traveling public safer. 

OHA manages the DHS medical countermeasure stockpile so it 

is best able to protect our workforce. We have embedded physicians 

in more than half of the operational components supporting their 

work. For example, they teach front-line personnel how to mitigate 

the spread of disease among detainees at the border, they train our 

paramedics on how to provide care in remote locations, and they 

support best practice development for the safe monitoring of internal drug smugglers. We look forward to taking this integrated capability and further applying it to radiological, nuclear, and explosive mission spaces. 

I am proud of what OHA and our talented staff have already accomplished and look forward to elevating the CBRNE mission, continuing health support to our components, and working across the 

enterprise to create efficiency of action. When an agency such as 

FBI or DOD reaches out to DHS, we will be coordinated and ready 

to work with their equivalent offices. When State, local, non-Governmental, and private partners reach to us for help, we can assist 

them regardless of the incident or the changing nature of the 

threat they face. 
16 

As our world grows more complex, we need to leverage our capabilities and expertise to work together seamlessly. I thank you for 

your time and look forward to answering any questions. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Dr. Brinsfield. 

Dr. Gowadia, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF HUBAN A. GOWADIA, DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC 

NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. GOWADIA. Good afternoon Chairman Ratcliffe, Chairman 

McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished Members of 

the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting my colleagues and me to 

discuss the proposed reorganization of the Department of Homeland Security’s CBRNE programs. Through this merger, and in 

concert with the Secretary’s Unity of Effort Initiative, the Department seeks greater coordination across its CBRNE missions, enabling the articulation of its priorities. 

As evident in the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 

nuclear and bioterrorism remain high priorities for the Department. I would like to emphasize that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s structure, mission, and functions will continue intact 

in the new CBRNE office. 

DNDO was established in 2005 as an interagency office and has 

two missions, nuclear forensics and nuclear detection. DNDO’s holistic end-to-end approach includes developing strategies, conducting research and development, and deploying its supporting capabilities for our operational partners. 

To maximize the ability to detect and interdict threats, and to attribute threat materials to their sources, we are rely on a critical 

triad of intelligence, law enforcement, and technology. We work 

with our Federal, State, and local partners, as well as those in the 

National laboratories, industry, and academia to make that triad 

a reality. 

For technical nuclear forensics, DNDO leads centralized planning 

and integrates interagency efforts. In response to an in extremis 

National capability, we are investing in the next generation of U.S. 

nuclear forensic scientists. In fact, we have already exceeded our 

goal at 35 new Ph.D.s into the workforce by 2018. 

For nuclear detection, DNDO coordinates the U.S. Government’s 

interagency efforts to develop a global nuclear detection architecture and assess its current and planned capabilities against evolving threats. To develop breakthrough technologies and provide significant operational improvements, we conduct transformational research. 

Determined to learn from and never repeat prior missteps, 

DNDO has implemented a disciplined approach to acquisition and 

deployment that involves our end-users at every step of the way. 

Today, we have provided thousands of radiation detectors to the 

Department’s operational components so they can perform their nuclear detection missions at ports of entry, along our land and maritime borders, and in the interior of the United States. 

Importantly, all systems under consideration are subjected to rigorous testing and evaluation before deployment. Critical to mission 

success is supporting partners with more than technology. DNDO 
17 

works with Federal, State, and local stakeholders to build and enhance their detection capabilities through pilots, training, exercises, and cross-jurisdictional protocols. 

Additionally, our Red Team assists operational agencies in evaluating their systems and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures. Through these operations, law enforcement and public safety 

officials gain critical experience with uncommon nuclear sources 

leading to improve readiness and performance. Hence, DNDO’s 

unique end-to-end approach ensures critical functions are integrated and synchronized from gap identification to concept development to use in the field. 

This approach has yielded great dividends for the Nation and the 

Department. For instance, through our Securing the Cities program, we have established a robust nuclear detection capability in 

the New York City, Jersey City, and Newark region. Over time, the 

region’s operational familiarity with the mission has grown, and we 

are now positioned to collaborate on the demonstration of an advanced concept whereby radiation detection systems will be integrated with other sensors to provide an early warning system for 

nuclear threats. 

Another example is our technical contribution to reduce the operational burden to CBP Officers in responding to nuisance alarms 

from benign radioactive sources without the loss of sensitivity to 

threats. Collaborating closely with CBP, we have reduced radiation 

portal monitor nuisance alarms by approximately 75 percent on average, thereby facilitating the flow of legitimate commerce and 

freeing up CBP Officers to support other National security efforts. 

My teamed, ranked No. 11 overall out of more than 300 agency 

subcomponents in the 2014 ‘‘Best Places to Work in the Federal 

Government’’ and ranked No. 2 in the innovation category, looks 

forward to the merger, expecting that new opportunities will arise 

as we seek creative synergies with our partners across the Department. For instance, we would collaborate more closely with the Office of Bombing Prevention on the detection of dirty bombs. 

DNDO’s comprehensive approach ensures a range of effective solutions to meet our Congressionally-mandated responsibilities to 

prevent nuclear terrorism. The very real and evolving threat demands an informed, agile, and networked Federal, State, and local 

capability. We will continue to advance the nuclear detection and 

forensics mission as we share best practices along with our colleagues addressing other threats. 

A consolidated CBRNE office allows us to build on our strengths, 

combine expertise, and learn from one another. We look forward to 

working with the subcommittees on this effort. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Dr. Gowadia. 

The Chair now welcomes and recognizes the Ranking Member of 

the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and 

Security Technologies, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just submit my 

opening for the record. I’d ask unanimous consent to do that. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Without objection. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Richmond follows:] 
18 

1Title III of H.R. 5005, as introduced, in the 107th Congress. 

2Pub. L. 107–296, Title III. 

3Government Accountability Office, Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Opportunities for 

Improvement and Considerations for Restructuring, GAO–12–454T, March 21, 2012. 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER CEDRIC L. RICHMOND

JULY 14, 2015 

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, and Chairwoman McSally, and I want to welcome 

my fellow Ranking Member, Mr. Payne to this joint subcommittee hearing. 

I also want to thank our witnesses today, the Department officials on our first 

panel, and the practitioners on the second panel who have specialized knowledge of 

how our nuclear and biological detection programs work. 

As the Chairman noted, today’s hearing will focus on the administration’s plans 

to merge the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, or DNDO, with the Office of Health 

Affairs, or OHA, to form a ‘‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’’ office in headquarters. 

This merged office, as proposed, would focus on the challenges we face from an 

array of chemical, biological, nuclear, and explosives threats, commonly referred to 

as CBRNE. 

I applaud Secretary Johnson’s pledge to elevate CBRNE focus and visibility within DHS. These are serious threats, and our efforts to combat them must be equally 

serious. 

The history of this proposal shows how important careful consideration is. Even 

though the original proposal for the creation of DHS in 2002 included a specific office and Under Secretary for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures,1 Congress chose to direct many of those functions to the Under Secretary for Science and Technology (S&T).2

And, over the past few years, the Committees on Appropriations have instructed 

the Department to take a ‘‘holistic approach toward realignment,’’ suggesting that 

simply merging offices may not fully address CBRNE deficiencies, or might create 

new inefficiencies. 

As we examine the proposal today, I hope we will focus on the heart of the issue: 

How can we best protect the American people from chemical, biological, radiological, 

nuclear, and explosive threats. 

We should not simply approve changes to an organizational flow chart and call 

it a day. We must make sure that those changes are made with proper planning 

and fully thought-out so that we strengthen and improve the Department. As GAO 

puts it, ‘‘... the end result of a government reorganization should not simply be 

a collection of component units, but the transformation to an integrated, high-performance organization.’’3

As we are going to hear today in testimony, the scale of the reorganization may 

itself pose a challenge. The results of both policy and operational choices made during this reorganization may affect its eventual short- and long-term success. 

The key factors for the Department, and for our subcommittees to consider include: Identifying the optimal structure for an office focusing on weapons of mass 

destruction and the mission, scope, and appropriate leadership of that new office. 

Additionally, we should keep in mind the message this committee delivered in 

2010, under then-Chairman Thompson, when it offered a combined S&T and DNDO 

authorization in the belief that there can be conflicts of interest between research 

& development and procurement, so those are best left to separate organizations. 

While not all goals of that legislation were achieved, the message was clearly delivered. 

What I hope we are going to hear today is, ‘‘How can the Department’s overall 

mission be better defined’’? 

Let me finish with this thought. On the ground, and every day, our nuclear deterrence and biodefense effort as a Nation depends on motivated and vigilant officers 

across the globe, supplied with the best equipment and intelligence we can give 

them. 

Officers working at our Nation’s ports of entry have an especially complex and difficult job. Thousands of decisions are made every day all across our borders, ports, 

and airports, to clear a container or a vehicle for transit into the United States. 

These are vital components in the flow of commerce in the world’s premier and largest trading market, the United States. 

Other cargo requires further inspection, or even denial of entry or and interdiction 

action taken on a vehicle or person. That is the hard, cold, repetitive, and everyday 

reality of our mission to prevent a violent nuclear or chemical attack, or biological 

event or outbreak. 
19 

We are grateful for all of our dedicated men and women in the field who protect 

us from weapons of mass destruction. I yield back. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Dr. Gowadia, I’m going to start with you—well, 

actually, first of all, I’ll recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Dr. Gowadia, I’m very much a believer in not fixing what isn’t 

broken, and based on the testimony that we’ve already heard 

today, I think everyone here today would agree that we don’t want 

to provide a solution that creates a problem, particularly with respect to DNDO and the good work that’s being done there. So now 

that I’ve got you under oath, I’d like to ask you the impact that 

you think this proposed reorganization and the effect that it would 

have on DNDO, and would it affect the current high operations and 

morale that you’re enjoying right now? 

Ms. GOWADIA. Thank you, Chairman. 

I have strongly supported and continue to believe very much in 

the Secretary’s Unity of Effort Initiative. In fact, I would posit that 

DNDO is the very instantiation of that Unity of Effort concept. To 

that end, I think bringing DNDO over to the new office intact also 

adheres to one of the principles for the reorganization on preserving a program that is working. 

With our singular focus—and I am truly blessed to work with an 

incredible team who gets their reward in serving the front-line operator—we will not be interrupting their ability to do that based 

on the concept we have for the new organization, and so I think 

we will be able to manage their morale. That will also be up to us 

in leadership to make sure that we allow them to do that which 

they do best and enjoy the most while we take care of the reorganization at our end. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. So in follow-up to that, Dr. Gowadia, I assume 

that having research and development within your office, you see 

that as a critical function when you talk about keeping things intact? 

Ms. GOWADIA. Yes. Yes, Chairman, we do. The end-to-end focus 

is important for a technically challenging mission like radiation 

and nuclear detection. Every piece along the way needs strong 

technical input. In this day of hard fiscal times, we can little afford 

the redundancy of recreating technical expertise in multiple parts 

of the Department. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you. 

So following up on that, I want to ask both Dr. Brothers and Dr. 

Brinsfield about that very issue. It was a concern that was also 

voiced by Ranking Member Payne in his opening. 

Because, as you both know, when DNDO was created, in order 

to focus the organization and give the director all of those end-toend tools needed, radiological and nuclear research and development was moved from S&T to DNDO. In fact DNDO is statutorily 

authorized to conduct that R&D. 

But in this proposed reorganization, the chemical, biological, and 

explosives office, the R&D functions there were not moved from 

S&T. So I would like your perspectives on that. 

I’ll start with you, Dr. Brothers. 

Mr. BROTHERS. Absolutely. Thanks for the question. 

So I think there are different models and that’s come up in some 

of the opening testimony. I think both models can coexist and both 
20 

models have shown themselves to be effective. Both models being 

the end-to-end model that Dr. Gowadia has and the interdisciplinary model that S&T has right now. 

I think if you look historically, a number of years ago, science 

and technology, research and development was really based on disciplines being in different silos, physical science in one silo, life 

science in another silo, engineering in another silo. 

What you’re finding right now in both industry and academia 

laboratories throughout, what you find is the focus now on interdisciplinary research. In fact, you find a convergence, actually, of 

the life sciences, physical sciences, and engineering. Why is this? 

It’s really because when you get people of different types of backgrounds together, they might make insights that wouldn’t have 

been previously possible. 

But, again, we can talk about different types of models. So in 

S&T, because we have such a wide range of stakeholders, from 

Transportation Security Administration, Customs and Border Protection, Secret Service, et cetera, we go across the gamut, it’s important that we’re able to cross-fertilize our innovative ideas with 

disciplines from across the entire range of disciplines that we have. 

So from a perspective of an organization that can look across a 

broad area, it’s fundamental, it’s essential that we have interdisciplinary type of staff. However, that said, for a very specialized 

area, and particularly when we start considering trying to minimize disruption, other models can work as well. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Dr. Brothers. 

Dr. Brinsfield, I want to give you an opportunity to respond on 

that as well, about not having the R&D functions for chem and bio 

in the new office and the effect that that might have. 

Dr. BRINSFIELD. Thank you, sir. 

We have been of an opinion since the beginning of these discussions that there are many correct ways to do this, and that we see 

our role in the chem and bio space as setting the requirements and 

working with the interagency, State, and local partners to set those 

requirements and let the R&D be done in a component such as 

S&T. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. My time has expired. I’d now like to recognize 

the gentleman from Louisiana for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m going to yield my 

time to the gentleman from—my co-Ranking Member on another 

subcommittee and the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. I would like to thank the gentleman from Louisiana 

for yielding. 

I would like to start off, Dr. Brinsfield, I understand that DHS 

plans to expand the scope of its biodefense capabilities. Later this 

summer, the post-9/11 Commission Blue Ribbon Study Panel on 

Biodefense will release a report finding, among other things, there 

is a lack of National leadership in biodefense. 

Do you envision this reorganization as a means to bolster DHS’s 

role as a National leader in biodefense? 

Dr. BRINSFIELD. Certainly we hope that this reorganization will 

elevate the mission space of CBRNE in whole, and with that we 

need to make sure that we are doing our requirements in the bio 

space. As you look through the QHSR report, you’ll see that we’ve 
21 

spent a great deal of time working with our partners in DHS and 

other parts of the interagency to define DHS’ role and to make sure 

that we adequately and completely fulfill that role in support of the 

work that goes on in the inter-Government space. 

So, yes, sir, we hope to continue to advance and promote that 

work. 

Mr. PAYNE. Past history in some of these areas that we’ve discussed, the ability or the lack of the ability for some of these different departments to work together, but what I’m hearing now, 

there’s a new spirit of cooperation that is permeating the work 

that’s being done in some of your departments. 

In my opening statement I observed that proposed reorganization 

is not a complete realignment of CBRNE activities at DHS. There 

are CBRNE functions from across the Department, from FEMA to 

NPPD, that are not included in the realignment. 

How did the Department decide to include certain activities but 

not others in the reorganization proposal? 

Dr. BRINSFIELD. I think the decision was made after careful consultation across the different groups within DHS that the new organization should be a mission support office. To that end, it will 

be our job to enable the operational components to succeed at their 

mission spaces. 

We view ourselves as subject-matter experts who can help components such as FEMA, CBP, the chemical program, and NPPD 

continue to do their jobs and do them well. In fact, we have provided subject-matter experts doing real-world events to help support those programs. 

Mr. PAYNE. There’s always a concern when you have these realignments what the outcome is going to be and how it impacts the 

morale of people that have been at the Department for years, that 

have worked diligently on their projects, and then to have it kindof reorganized and lost in the shuffle does not tend to lead to great 

morale. 

I have some questions about the practical implications of the proposed CBRNE reorganization. I understand that the Department 

does not anticipate any cost savings, but I am wondering if there 

might be some new costs incurred. For example, would the over 

200 employees of the new CBRNE defense office be collocated? If 

so, where? What effect would this have on the existing leases? 

Dr. BRINSFIELD. So, sir, we believe that as we continue to elevate 

this mission space and define this mission space clearly and settle 

this question, our experts that work in these areas will be able to 

continue to function, do their job, and we’re looking forward to 

being able to support them doing that. We also note that no programs have been cut from this. As a matter of fact, one of the 

things that we feel most comfortable about is that the offices are 

moving in toto, and as Dr. Gowadia has stated, we’ll be able completely combine all that work. 

Dr. Gowadia and I operate our offices within a very short distance apart. In fact, our buildings are very close together. We have 

no plans for the future on movement until our current leases are 

up. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. Thank you for that. 

Mr. Chairman, I’ll yield back. 
22 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Arizona, Colonel 

McSally, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Dr. Brinsfield, as you know, the Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee held a hearing earlier this year on chemical threats. Dr. 

Kirk testified. The Chemical Defense Program accounts for only 

$800,000 of OHA’s $125 million budget. So will the reorganization 

bolster chemical defense activities? Do you think the Secretary intends to then have resources more equitably allocated towards 

chemical defense as the reorganization happens? Or how do you see 

that moving? 

Dr. BRINSFIELD. So, certainly we share your concern and the 

knowledge that the chemical threat has become more prominent, 

and we watch that closely. We also note and thank you for all the 

additional funding that Congress has provided to the chemical program. 

We think that it’s very important to make these kind of decisions 

on a risk basis, and so we look forward to working with our colleagues across the area so that we can do our best job to use the 

funding that we’re provided. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. 

For Dr. Brinsfield and Dr. Gowadia. So a common theme in our 

subcommittee’s hearings earlier this year on both chemical and biological terrorism was a need for robust information sharing. This 

is always a challenge both horizontally and vertically, as you know. 

I recently visited our Arizona’s counterterrorism fusion center 

and to learn more about the vital work that they are doing there 

to support, obviously, any counterterrorism activities in the State 

of Arizona. 

Can you share your perspective on how you think this new office 

will coordinate with the Department’s Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis and others in the intelligence community to ensure that 

the threat information is shared with fusion centers, emergency responders, other relevant State and local stakeholders? This is a 

challenge whether you’re reorganizing or not, as you know. But 

how do you see it getting better with the reorganization? 

Ms. GOWADIA. Thank you, ma’am, for that question. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, we rely significantly on 

that fusion of intelligence, law enforcement, and technology. So our 

ties to the intelligence community are strong and must continue. 

We have close and collaborating ties not just with the intelligence 

and analysis function, but across the board. In fact, we exchange 

detailees back and forth. We have Coast Guard intelligence officers 

at DNDO, and we have placed some detailees out into the intelligence community as well. 

Working through I&A, we inform our State and local partners 

through the fusion center, as well as through publications, weekly 

and monthly publications on the state of affairs, lost and stolen 

sources, and very similarly with the counterterrorism community. 

So I only see it as continuing. I do not envision any change thereby. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Great. 
23 

Dr. BRINSFIELD. We consider it an important part of our mission 

space as well. As you know, we staff various positions as details 

within I&A to both support the State and local program office and 

the CBRNE health space. We hope to continue that coordination. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. I know there has been some concerns talked about as far as managing the change and how that 

impacts morale, the management of human capital, keeping talent. 

Having been in the military 26 years, I’ve been through a lot of reorganizations, and I’ve seen them go well and seen them go poorly. 

It seems like some of the best ones are done with the collaboration at the beginning of coming up with the better organization, if 

that makes sense, that there’s collaboration as part of the process 

instead of a top-down one that you could then potentially have people resisting that change. 

It sounds like, just from reading the documents, hearing your 

testimony today, that there’s been a lot of collaboration to identify 

what are the best courses of action that will help you all do your 

jobs better, that won’t lead to change resistance or competition between the specialties. 

So I just want your perspectives on how that, how this has come 

about, because that can have the mission succeed or fail, if people 

are resisting the change. Do you see any challenges in managing 

people and cultures as you’re meshing your different subparts together? 

Dr. BRINSFIELD. So I think one of the things that we’ve always 

strived in our office for is to understand the many different and important cultures within DHS and to be able to provide coordination 

and support across those different subcultures of the organization. 

We’ve been coordinating and speaking to our staff about the discussions on-going, getting their input and feedback in different leadership meetings, and we believe they’re engaged and will continue to 

be engaged as this process goes forward. 

Ms. GOWADIA. Chairman, I have been at the Department from 

the very start, and I can tell you I have seen mergers and standups and all of it all come together. Yes, there are very different cultures from legacy organizations as opposed to stand-up organizations. 

With Secretary Johnson coming to the Department, I think we 

have struck a good balance, allowing legacy organizations to maintain some of their culture while ascribing to a unified mission at 

the Department level. I imagine we will reflect that exactly as we 

move forward with the new CBRNE office. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Great. 

My time has expired. Thank you. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I thank the gentlelady. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New Jersey, Mrs. 

Watson Coleman, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you very much for being here today and sharing your information with us. I have a few questions, kind-of all over the 

place, but a couple of times you mentioned those who have expertise that made a decision about this reorganization. What was the 

entity, or who are the ‘‘they’’ that determine what this reorganization would look like? 
24 

Ms. GOWADIA. The Department undertook a review led by the Office of Policy in response to Congress’ direction for us to take a look 

at this potential reorganization. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Is that Mr. Mayorkas? 

Ms. GOWADIA. No ma’am. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Who is that? 

Ms. GOWADIA. Back then it was under Assistant Secretary 

Heyman. But ultimately the decision was made by a deputy secretary and Secretary. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Okay. I’m a member of—actually, I’m 

the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency, and we’ve heard a lot about the struggle that 

we’ve had in certain of the components with regard to acquisition 

management. So what protections will be in place in this new organizational configuration that will ensure that we have improved acquisition management and accountability? 

Dr. BRINSFIELD. So, ma’am, I think as we look forward to working with the Department on the Joint Requirements Council, having decisions made in a coordinated fashion across the Department, 

that will help to inform the process. Also, Dr. Gowadia and I both 

intend to do responsible acquisition, and in fact, we are looking forward to working closely with Dr. Gowadia’s staff, who have developed a certain amount of expertise in the acquisition area. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. A quick question. Dr. Gowadia referred 

to her staff, as her place of work, as the 11th best place to work 

and the second-best something. 

Ms. GOWADIA. Second-best in innovation, ma’am. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. So you all neglected to mention your ranking. Do you know what your ranking is with regard 

to whether or not it’s one of the best or one of the least in terms 

of morale of that nature places to work? 

Dr. BRINSFIELD. Ours is embedded somewhere within headquarters and it is somewhere around the middle of the area. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Dr. Brothers. 

Mr. BROTHERS. We know. We were rated 314, so we were on 

the—we’re near the bottom, yes. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Okay. Are there any additional costs associated with this reorganization? Will there be a request for additional funds? If so, how much? 

Ms. GOWADIA. We do not envision that at this time, ma’am. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Alrighty. Thank you. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I thank the gentlelady, and recognize the newest 

Member of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, gentleman from New York, Mr. 

Donovan, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope no one recognizes my newness to the committee by my question. 

I’d like to thank you all, Dr. Brothers, Dr. Brinsfield, for coming. 

Dr. Gowadia, thank you so much for coming to my office and 

briefing me. 

As you know, I represent the 11th Congressional District of New 

York, which encompasses New York City, and we face a persistent 

terrorist threat in our city. In fact, Commissioner Bratton of the 
25 

New York City Police Department stated that he believes that this 

time period is one of the most significantly dangerous periods since 

September 11, 2001. 

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has worked closely with 

New York City in improving the ability for local law enforcement 

and public safety agencies to detect the transmission of nuclear 

and radiological materials through the Securing the Cities program. This program is viewed as one of the most successful and it 

allowed New York to dramatically improve its capabilities to secure 

existing radiological materials and increase its detection capabilities. 

My question, because I know, Chairman, we might be called for 

votes any time now, I just have one question. With that in mind, 

how is the new office going to impact Securing the Cities program, 

and do you anticipate any changes or disruptions in that program? 

Ms. GOWADIA. No, sir. Insofar as we are moving to the new office 

intact, we will continue our support for the Securing the Cities program, which has yielded tremendous results, as you know, not just 

in the New York City, Jersey City, and Newark region, but also in 

Los Angeles, right here in the National capital region, and very 

soon we will select our fourth implementation. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes my friend and colleague from Rhode 

Island, Congressman Langevin, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and your testimony. 

One of the criteria that the CBRNE functions review measured 

against was to define clear roles and responsibilities for DHS HQ 

and operational components. However, listening to your testimony 

and reading the report, I’m not sure it’s completely clear to me. So 

can you help me to understand what’s unclear about the current 

roles and responsibilities and what would be different under the restructuring? 

Ms. GOWADIA. Sir, under the new office, a lot of the authorities, 

in fact all the authorities off the various offices that are moving together would come together in the new office. Certainly, we have 

clear delineation for the work that operational components do and 

the work that we do within the headquarters function. 

We envision the new office to be a mission support office. So we 

would get requirements from our operators in rad, nuke line and 

provide them capability. Dr. Brinsfield and her team would certainly give requirements to Dr. Brothers so that they could develop 

capabilities in support of the bio and chem mission. 

So we do actually have fairly well-defined roles and responsibilities, and it should not see a disruption moving forward. 

Dr. BRINSFIELD. It’s our hope that it will be a one-stop shop, 

whether it be for an operational component of DHS or for State and 

locals looking for assistance in any of these areas. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. We’re confident that we’re not going to be duplicating efforts? My question in follow-up would be, are there other 
26 

offices in DHS or in other agencies that operate in a similar fashion to the proposed CBRNE office? 

Dr. BRINSFIELD. So there are other offices. We are specifically 

looking at this office encompassing the DHS mission and the DHS 

roles and responsibilities in the CBRNE space. 

But I think it’s also important to note when we work with the 

first responder communities, it behooves us, as Members of the 

Federal Government, to make sure we are coordinated well across 

the interagency. Therefore one of the things our offices strive to do 

is actually work towards common guidance and common information for first responders and State and locals in these areas. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I certainly hope when it moves forward that it is 

comprehensive, inclusive, and not duplicative. 

The DHS Office of Policy serves as a central resource for DHS 

policy development and review. It’s responsible for developing 

DHS-wide policies, programs, and planning. In the proposed reorganization, CBRNE-related policy positions would be transferred 

from the Office of Policy to the new office. 

So what benefits does DHS expect to achieve from moving policy 

staff out of the Department-wide Policy Office and into a more narrowly-focused office? 

Dr. BRINSFIELD. So I think the Policy staff that are currently on 

detail to OHA right now provide expertise in coordinating CBRNE 

policies across the Department. They have provided that expertise. 

We continue to coordinate well with them and make sure that they 

are well-coordinated with the subject-matter experts in both OHA 

and DNDO, and we hope to continue that. 

It is also a critical need for us to make sure that their work in 

the CBRNE policy space continues to coordinate with big DHS Policy and that we as leaders in these areas continue to work across 

that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How would policy staff in the new CBRNE office 

coordinate and integrate their decisions with those in the Department-wide Office of Policy? Also what factors make CBRNE policy 

different from the other topics that remain in the Office of Policy? 

Should policy positions in other topic areas also be decentralized 

throughout the Department? 

Ms. GOWADIA. So the policy aspects, we have always worked very 

closely with our partners from Policy, whether they are detailed to 

OHA or resident up at the Office of Policy. We have enjoyed very 

good collaborations with them. They have provided for us Department-wide perspectives and allowed us to speak with a unified 

voice in the interagency and policy fora. 

The CBRNE missions have a technical element to them. So 

sometimes it does help to have closer proximity for the policy people to the subject-matter experts. That is one advantage of having 

our policy partners sit closer to us. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. All right. Thank you very much. 

I’ll yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Perry, for 5 minutes. 
27 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank the panelists for 

taking the time to be here today. I think I’ll turn to Dr. Brothers 

for the first question. 

In addition to managing operational detection and surveillance 

programs for CBRNE threats, the role of DHS headquarters is to 

enable the operational components to achieve their missions. Can 

you tell us how your offices are engaging components such as CBP 

and TSA on these threats currently? 

Mr. BROTHERS. Yes, I can. In fact, we’re developing a structure, 

you may have heard. So under the Secretary’s Unity of Effort initiative, we’ve developed a Joint Requirements Council, and under 

this Joint Requirements Council, we have a membership of cross 

principals of all the components that discuss issues around 

acquisitional requirements, et cetera. As part of that council, S&T 

plays a fundamental role in terms of looking at and evaluating 

technical issues, system engineering as well. 

So I think with the Joint Requirements Council that that’s a big 

picture on how we’re developing requirements across the organization, but we’re also about to set up IPTs, which are teams that are 

made up of the different components for us to get down go into 

what kind of research and development should be done across the 

Department. 

So under the Secretary’s Unity of Effort initiative, we are really 

pulling the Department together to, we want one organization to 

develop requirements and acquisition policies going forward. 

Mr. PERRY. So from an operational standpoint for a layman or 

somebody that’s, you know, not working there every day, can you 

kind-of describe—I understand the Joint Requirements Council and 

the IPTs, but operationally, like, what happens on a regular basis? 

How often do you get together once you determine actions and potential threats, and then who exactly is in charge? 

Who do you report to, how often, and then how do you adjudicate 

the actions in the past through an after-action review process and 

then make modifications, if you know any of the answers? That 

was a few questions at one time, but—— 

Mr. BROTHERS. It’s a few questions—right. I think from my perspective, the research and development perspective, our interaction 

with the operational components really is through the Joint Requirements Council, and we then are setting up structures where 

we actually interact on a daily basis with those operational components. That’s a work in progress. 

Mr. PERRY. But it’s just from a research—— 

Mr. BROTHERS. From my perspective——— 

Mr. PERRY [continuing]. From your perspective. 

Mr. BROTHERS. It’s a research and development exercise, that’s 

right. Now, S&T is also involved in the—we’re getting more involved in the acquisition process in order to make sure the Department has a system engineering look at acquisitions going forward. 

So we’re moving in there as well. I think perhaps Dr. Gowadia—— 

Mr. PERRY. Yeah, can you, if you can, and if you can answer 

those questions from a kind of a tactical standpoint, you know, 

event management. 

How does it work? How does the current system work? Because 

I think the purpose—one of the purposes for the hearing is it seems 
28 

like it’s—there’s no point—there’s no point to the spear. It’s—there 

are many points to the spear, but who’s coordinating the effort? 

How does that occur? 

Ms. GOWADIA. All right. So I can speak to what we have done 

on the Rad and Nuke threat. First and foremost, we are an interagency office and we exchange detailees. So the operators sit with 

us and help shape our plans, help shape everything we do. Help 

even in the design of systems. We leave detail people out into the 

field so that scientists, technical personnel can get out and appreciate the operational world. It establishes a healthy tech pull, tech 

push. 

In concert with Dr. Brother’s office, we certainly try to build systems that are as multifunctional as possible, but we involve our 

end-users from start to finish. So whether it’s analyzing the risk, 

understanding the threat, receiving their operational requirements, 

turning it into strategies testing the equipment out into the real 

world, once we buy and deploy these systems for them, we support 

them with alarm adjudication help if they need, training and exercises, et cetera. 

So this whole loop does play through over and over again, and 

I can promise you I don’t make a single investment decision without my operational components sitting right there at the table with 

the catcher’s mitt ready to catch what we are building for them. 

Mr. PERRY. But from a time frame, how often do you reevaluate 

your process? 

Ms. GOWADIA. Annually, sir. We annually re-elicit the intelligence community. It forms a basis of our terrorism risk assessment. From that we are able to analyze what the blue team has, 

what the red team capabilities are likely to be, what our gaps and 

vulnerabilities are, and what our portfolio mix needs to be. 

Much of our investment is based on this risk assessment. It is 

also coupled with technology maturity, what the operators really 

want and need, and how they will choose to use the systems in the 

field. So annually we sit down to go through our portfolio and every 

acquisition decision milestone we follow a very deliberate process 

that’s reflective of the departments and the management directive 

102–01 every milestone along the way. They sit with us as necessary, test with us constantly, sit with us to develop the strategies. So it’s pretty much constant. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes 

the Ranking Member, gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond. 

Mr. RICHMOND. In an effort to finish before we have votes, and 

to keep you all for waiting for us to vote and come back, I will really just make a statement and hope that it’s something we can all 

agree on. 

To an answer to an earlier question, you mentioned that there 

really—this was a top-level decision and that the top-level people 

came together, and, you know, I just want to make sure this is not 

something that is a great idea in theory but in reality, for the people who have to implement it, it’s not so manageable. So in recognizing that on the ground every day our nuclear deterrence and 

biodefense effort as a Nation depends on motivated and vigilant of-
29 

ficers across the globe supplied with the best equipment and intelligence we can give them. 

Officers working at our Nation’s ports of entry have an especially 

complex and difficult job. Thousands of decisions are made every 

day all across our borders, ports, and airports to clear a container 

or a vehicle for transit into the United States. These are vital components in the flow of commerce in the world’s premiere and largest trading market, the United States. 

Other cargo requires further inspection or even denial of entry 

or interdiction action taken on a vehicle or person. That is the 

hard, cold, repetitive, and every-day reality of our mission to prevent a violent nuclear or chemical attack or a biological event or 

outbreak. 

So I want to make it clear that we are very grateful to all of our 

dedicated men and women in the field who protect us from weapons of mass destruction on a daily basis and to make sure that they 

are involved in this process, to make sure that it’s not just in theory that it’s a great idea, but all the way to the bottom where our 

officers serve that they’re also included and they make sure that 

they can do their goal and their tasks. 

So with that, thank you all for coming, and, Mr. Chairman, I will 

yield back. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank the gentleman. I thank all of you for 

being here for giving your testimony today. It’s greatly appreciated. 

You all as a panel are dismissed. 

The committee is going to recess for votes, and we’ll reconvene 

immediately after the votes with apologies to the second panel for 

the inconvenience, but with appreciation for your indulgence. So we 

will recess to be back here in about 30 minutes. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. The Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, Security Technologies and Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications will now reconvene and come to order. 

At this time I would like to welcome our second panel to today’s 

hearing. I very much appreciate your participation today and I, 

again, I appreciate your indulgence with the vote schedule, and we 

will have additional Members hopefully coming back here, but I’ve 

been given the green light to go ahead and start receiving your testimony. 

So with that I would like to welcome the panel. With us today 

we have Mr. Alan Cohn, who’s a principal at Steptoe & Johnson 

LLP. He is the former assistant secretary for strategy, planning, 

analysis, and risk at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 

Mr. Ozzie Nelson is a senior associate for Homeland Security and 

Counterterrorism at the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies. 

Mr. Warren Stern is a former director of the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. Thank you 

all for being here today. Again, at this time I’d ask all of you to 

stand and raise your right hands, and I will swear you in. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 
30 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the affirmative, and the witnesses’ full written statements will appear in the record. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Cohn for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ALAN D. COHN, COUNSEL, STEPTOE & 

JOHNSON LLP 

Mr. COHN. Thank you. Chairman Ratcliffe, Ranking Member 

Richmond, distinguished Members of the subcommittees, thank you 

very much for the opportunity to present testimony today. 

As you noted, you have my written testimony, so I’ll just shortly 

summarize that briefly here. 

As you noted, I served at the Department of Homeland Security 

for 9 years. Seven of that as the head of strategy. The last year 

dual-hatted as the Deputy Head of Policy. In that time I was privileged to work with several leadership teams, including multiple 

leaders of each of the organizations that you saw before. 

I commend these subcommittees for ensuring continued focus on 

the question of the best approach to defending against weapons of 

mass destruction. As has been noted, biological threats and hazards and the use of an improvised nuclear device and the terrorist’s 

use of explosives against transportation targets and mass gatherings remain among the threats, hazards, and persistent challenges that pose the most strategically significant risks to the Nation. 

Having been at the Department for over 9 years before I left, I 

can say definitively that organizational changes are rarely the first 

solution or the most effective solution to any problem. That said, 

in this case, DHS is faced with the problem that its weapons of 

mass destruction leadership, its expertise, and its personnel, and 

resources are dispersed across numerous organizations just in its 

headquarters, let alone its operational components. That dispersal 

has resulted, as this committee has rightfully recognized, in unclear assignment of responsibilities and suboptimal engagement 

with Federal interagency partners, and with external partners. It 

has also contributed to less-than-effective oversight and execution 

of major acquisitions aimed at combatting weapons of mass destruction. 

Three principles should guide any consideration of DHS functions—any consolidation of DHS functions and organizations. No. 1, 

there should be a single center of gravity within the Department’s 

headquarters for any major function. 

No. 2, headquarter’s entities should perform the integrating functions necessary for the Department as a whole to be effective. 

Third, operating entities should carry out operating responsibilities. For these reasons, I support the reorganization of the Department’s headquarter’s weapons of mass destruction’s functions as 

the Department has proposed, but I would highlight two points. 

First, the Department must go beyond placing the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the Office of Health Affairs, and the Office 

of Bombing Prevention into the same organization. Instead, it must 

fully integrate all of those functions to be transferred into the new 

offices. Each of these offices will perform certain functions well, but 

the Department will benefit most by taking the best practices of 
31 

each and adopting them across the CBRNE functions. So for that 

reason, I believe Congress should set the overall responsibilities 

and authorities for the new CBRNE office, but empower the Secretary to integrate the functions of the new office in the most effective manner possible. 

Second, Congress must ensure that the Department effectively 

assesses its current models for CBRNE research and development 

and determines the best manner in which to pursue CBRNE programs and major acquisitions. 

As you heard, DNDO, OHA use different models for their programmatic execution and for acquisition. Both of these models have 

achieved successes and both of these models have resulted in failure and termination of major acquisitions over time. It’s difficult to 

say with certainty which of these models or a third model, is best 

suited to ensuring effective mission execution and guarding against 

the failure of major system acquisitions. However, that is an answerable question, and Congress and the Department should partner to actively seek that answer. 

DHS has been traumatized in its short life-span by a series of 

reorganizations. However, that does not mean that the Department 

cannot benefit from a thoroughly-examined, well-considered reorganization and consolidation, particularly of its headquarters functions. In this case, the time has come for Congress and the Department to reorganize and consolidate its CBRNE headquarters functions to better effectuate the Department’s CBRNE responsibilities. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to provide this testimony, 

and I’m happy to answer any questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohn follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALAN D. COHN

JULY 14, 2015 

Chairs McSally and Ratcliffe, Ranking Members Payne and Richmond, distinguished Members, thank you very much for the opportunity to present testimony 

today regarding how the Department of Homeland Security can best organize itself 

to meet the challenge of weapons of mass destruction. 

I commend these subcommittees for ensuring continued focus on the question of 

the best approach to defending against weapons of mass destruction. As a former 

first responder and official at the Department of Homeland Security, I know the 

challenges we face as a Nation in confronting this threat. While organizational 

change is rarely the first solution to a problem, in this case, the Department is 

rightfully examining the effectiveness of its organization with respect to this challenge. The Department’s headquarters needs to be consolidated in many aspects, ensuring consolidation of similar headquarters functions and integration by the headquarters with respect to the Department’s National responsibilities, while ensuring 

that the Department’s operational components and its external operational partners—rather than the Department’s headquarters—are entrusted with operations. 

To that end, I support the consolidation of DHS’s headquarters weapons of mass destruction functions into a single office reporting to the Secretary of Homeland Security. A fuller explanation of these points follows. 

While cyber threats, geopolitical conflicts, and instability and terrorism overseas 

have rightfully captured the interest and imagination of the American public and 

the media at this time, this committee has correctly ensured that we remain focused 

on the range of security challenges facing the United States. As stated in the report 

on the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, biological threats and hazards, 

the use of an improvised nuclear device, and the terrorist use of explosives against 

transportation targets and mass gatherings remain among threats, hazards, and 

persistent challenges that pose the most strategically significant risks to the Nation. 

In addition, chemical weapons and accidents involving chemical facilities and chemi-
32 

cals in transit, and radiological dispersal devices or ‘‘RDDs,’’ are risks that must 

continually be assessed and addressed. 

I am currently of counsel with Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, the principal of my own 

consulting firm, and a non-resident senior fellow with the Brent Scowcroft Center 

for International Security at the Atlantic Council, focusing on issues at the intersection of security, technology, innovation, and government. I am proud to have served 

with the dedicated men and women of the Department of Homeland Security in the 

Department’s Office of Policy for 9 years, from 2006 to 2015, 7 of those as the head 

of strategy and strategic planning, the last 3 as assistant secretary for strategy, 

planning, analysis & risk, and the last year dual-hatted as the deputy head of policy 

for the Department. Before that, I practiced law, was a member of the Fairfax County Urban Search & Rescue Task Force and a disaster assistance employee for the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency’s urban search and rescue program, and 

served as an emergency medical technician for the 9–1–1 emergency ambulance system in New York City. I recognize the deep need for Congress and the Department 

to get its job done efficiently and effectively. This is important for the Nation, but 

also for the first responders across the country who rely on the Department for effective risk assessment, National strategy and policy, grants and grant guidance, 

scientific information, and protection, detection, and response and recovery equipment to supplement their own efforts and that of their departments and jurisdictions. 

As noted above, organizational changes are rarely the first solution to any problem. However, in this case, the Department of Homeland Security does not lack for 

leadership, expertise, or dedicated personnel and resources focused on these challenges. Rather, the Department is faced with the problem of dispersing that leadership, expertise, and personnel and resources across numerous organizations just in 

its headquarters, let alone its operational components. That dispersal has resulted, 

as this committee has rightfully recognized, in unclear assignment of responsibilities 

and suboptimal engagement with Federal interagency partners and external stakeholders on weapons of mass destruction issues, and has contributed to less-than-effective oversight and execution of major acquisitions involving programs aimed at 

combatting weapons of mass destruction. This is not unique to weapons of mass destruction; the Department’s headquarters is in need of overall consolidation, and an 

overall sharpening of roles and lines of authority. 

For that reason, Congress should be commended for directing, and the Department should be commended for conducting, a study of the Department’s organization with respect to its weapons of mass destruction functions, and for making difficult decisions that will require organizational transition and consolidation within 

the Department. During my time as an assistant secretary at the Department, I led 

portions of this review process, and helped facilitate discussions that resulted in the 

report that was provided to Congress by the Department. However, the views expressed today are my own, and are not intended to represent the Department of 

Homeland Security or the organizations with which I am currently associated. 

I believe that there are three principles that should guide any organizational 

changes at the Department of Homeland Security, given the Department’s structure 

as a multi-divisional organization, a corporate form of organization in which semiautonomous component entities perform interconnected functions and responsibilities, and where a headquarters exists to support the organization’s senior leadership in effectively integrate and optimize cross-Departmental activities and decision 

making in order to best meet the organizations overall goals and responsibilities. 

1. Consolidation.—There should be a single center of gravity within the Department’s headquarters for any major function, whether in an integrated policy, 

management, or other directorate, or in a specialized office, recognizing that 

most if not all of the Department’s operating components will likely have a role 

in carrying out that function. 

2. Integration.—Headquarters entities should perform the integrating functions 

necessary for a multi-divisional organization to be effective: Conducting risk assessments and associated analysis, leading to the development of integrated 

strategy and policy, against which research and development, programmatic activity, major acquisitions, joint operational planning, and joint operations can 

be conducted. 

3. Operations.—Operating entities should carry out operational responsibilities, 

whether the Department’s own operating components or the myriad State, local, 

territorial, Tribal, private sector, non-governmental, and other partners with 

operational roles. 

It goes without saying that any entity’s organization should be as lean as possible, 

with clearly delineated mission responsibility and authority, a clear leadership 

structure, effective recruiting, training, and retention programs, progressive oppor-
33 

tunities for advancement into either leadership or senior technical positions, and a 

robust interchange of personnel and information between headquarters entities, the 

Department’s operating components, and the Department’s external stakeholders. 

This testimony assumes those steps will follow any reorganization of the Department’s weapons of mass destruction functions. 

With those elements as the backdrop, I believe that the time has come for the 

Department to undertake a reorganization of its weapons of mass destruction activities, with Congress’s direction and authorization, to best serve its constituents and 

help safeguard the Nation. Specifically: • Congress should authorize the consolidation of the functions currently performed by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the Office of Health Affairs, 

and certain functions performed by the Science & Technology Directorate, the 

Office of Policy, the Office of Operations Coordination, and the National Protection and Programs Directorate to create a single office in the Department’s 

headquarters, headed by an assistant secretary and reporting directly to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, to best support the Department’s responsibilities to combat chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive 

(CBRNE) threats and hazards. • Congress should ensure that this new office is clearly authorized and empowered to perform the range of headquarters functions associated with the Department’s CBRNE responsibilities, to include effectively assessing CBRNE risk, 

formulating and communicating consistent and integrated Departmental 

CBRNE strategy and policy, ensuring effective oversight and execution of major 

CBRNE-related programs and acquisitions, communicating effectively with the 

Department’s partners and stakeholders concerning CBRNE risks and the most 

effective ways to manage those risks, and enabling the Department’s operational components to effectively carry out their CBRNE-related responsibilities. • Congress should direct the Department to study, and should also direct an independent study, to determine the best model for integration of CBRNE-related 

research and development functions conducted by the Science & Technology Directorate with the functions to be performed by the new CBRNE office, and 

should revisit that issue once those studies have been completed. 

The Department has now proposed many of these steps to Congress, so I will 

elaborate on two points: (1) The integration of CBNRE functions within a new 

CBRNE headquarters office; and (2) the process for determining the best model for 

integration of CBNRE-related research and development functions within the Department’s headquarters. 

First, the Department must go beyond placing the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the Office of Health Affairs, and the Office of Bombing Prevention into the 

same organization, and must fully integrate the functions to be transferred into the 

new office. Both the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the Office of Health Affairs perform certain functions well, but both could benefit from taking the best 

practices of each and adopting them across CBRNE functions. Moreover, the functions to be transferred from the Office of Policy and the Office of Operations Coordination, as well as the Office of Bombing Prevention, should be integrated in full into 

the new organization. Congress should set the overall responsibilities and authorities of the new CBRNE office, and empower the Secretary to integrate the functions 

to be incorporated into the new office to achieve the best effect across CBRNE functions, and not simply place the offices whole into what might be nothing more than 

a new shell organization. 

Second, Congress must ensure that the Department effectively assesses its current models for CBRNE research and development, and determines the best manner 

in which to pursue CBRNE programs and major acquisitions. Currently, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office uses a ‘‘systems command’’ approach, similar to Naval 

Sea Systems Command, performing ‘‘end-to-end’’ systems development including research and development. The Office of Health Affairs uses a model that separates 

research and development from programmatic execution and acquisition, with research and development functions performed by the Science & Technology Directorate. Both models have achieved successes, and both models have resulted in the 

failure and termination of major acquisitions. It is difficult to say with certainty 

which of these models, or a third model, is best suited to ensuring effective mission 

execution and guarding against the failure of major systems acquisitions. However, 

there is an answer to this question, and Congress and the Department should actively seek that answer. 

For that reason, Congress should mandate that the Department assess the effectiveness of each of these models under the new organizational structure, perhaps 

on a yearly basis, until a specific date in the future, say 3 years from the creation 
34 

of the office. In addition, Congress should mandate than an independent study be 

conducted by an organization with familiarity with the different research and development models currently in use by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the 

Office of Health Affairs, as well as those of other Federal departments and agencies 

and corporate entities, and make a recommendation to Congress and the Secretary 

as to the best model for the new CBRNE organization to employ. Congress can then 

revisit this last CBRNE-related organizational piece once both the Department and 

an independent organization have completed their review. 

DHS has been traumatized in its short lifespan by a series of reorganizations. 

However, this does not mean that the Department cannot benefit from thoroughlyexamined, well-considered reorganizations and consolidations, particularly of its 

headquarters functions. In this case, the time has come for Congress and the Department to reorganize and consolidate its CBRNE headquarters functions to better 

effectuate the Department’s CBRNE responsibilities. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to provide this testimony. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Mr. Cohn. 

The Chair will now recognize Mr. Nelson for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF RICK ‘‘OZZIE’’ NELSON, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL 

STUDIES 

Mr. NELSON. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Ratcliffe, 

McSally, Ranking Members Richmond and Payne, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

As we’ve noted today, terrorist groups continue to pursue 

CBRNE weapons. For almost 20 years we have seen al-Qaeda and 

its affiliates pursue unconventional weapons. Most recently I’ve 

seen reports of ISIL seizing chemical weapons facilities and radioactive material in Iraq. Domestic efforts designed to detect and respond to a CBRNE incident are a critical component of our Nation’s 

security, representing the last and perhaps the most vital line of 

defense against these weapons. No department has a greater role 

in this effort than the Department of Homeland Security. 

While the Department has succeeded in building a number of offices, programs, and capabilities designed to detect and respond to 

CBRNE events, its effectiveness continues to be hampered by a variety of challenges. Primarily its fragmented organization and approach through which the Department executes its efforts. 

Responsibility for CBRNE within the Department is spread 

across no fewer than six separate offices. This fragmented architecture demands unachievable levels of coordination and makes the 

implementation of common Department-wide policies and activities 

unnecessarily difficult. 

Most U.S. Government departments and agencies, with the exception of DHS, have a streamlined approach to CBRNE with a 

central office that oversees WMD policy and programs. Not only 

does DHS continue to be the outlier with this fractured approach, 

but it has also resisted efforts to address this issue. The benefits 

of the Department for maintaining its current structure seem elusive. DNDO was created in 2005 as a stand-alone entity to focus 

Government efforts on the nuclear threat. While the office has succeeded in remaining focused, it has struggled to develop a strategic 

guidance and to manage large acquisition programs. 

Recently DNDO has seen significant improvements efforts such 

as the Securing the Cities initiatives have flourished, and the orga-
35 

nization’s morale is the highest in the Department. However, 

issues still remain, many of which are beyond the control of the director. For example, the director of the science and technology 

maintains its own portfolio of nuclear radiological R&D programs 

which should fall under the purview of DNDO. 

The other primary CBRNE entity within DHS is the Office of 

Health Affairs probably has suffered the most from DHS’s fragmented approach. The Department’s chemical and biological defense programs are tucked in the office whose primary responsibility is health and medical expertise. The relationship between 

chemical and biological threats in public health is clear, but they 

are by no means the same. This arrangement fails to recognize the 

nature of the treat and the organizational efforts required to address it. 

The office’s flagship program, BioWatch has been shrouded in 

controversy since its inception. In total, the Department has spent 

over $1 billion on BioWatch, and it at best has provided questionable results. The Department’s chemical defense efforts are similarly lackluster. They are severely fragmented and generally ineffective at least in part because the issues worked in various small 

offices spread throughout the Department. 

While OHA retains the overarching responsibility, these other offices own key aspects of the chemical defense portfolio, making 

OHA’s charter seemingly unmanageable. The Department and Congress must act now to address these shortcomings by unifying and 

elevating DHS CBRNE capabilities into one departmental entity. 

Specifically, DNDO and OHA should be merged along with the Department’s CBRNE policy and operations capabilities. This new office should be headed by an assistant secretary who reports directly 

to the Secretary of Homeland Security. 

The decentralized nature of CBRNE efforts within DHS has lead 

to an equally decentralized system to develop associated technologies, which has contributed to many of the deficiencies in 

CBRNE and R&D and acquisition programs. As such, CBRNE, 

R&D efforts within DHS also should be unified under the centralized office. With responsibility for the Department’s entire range of 

CBRNE efforts, the new entity would have the clear charter for establishing the Department’s priorities. 

Perhaps most importantly, the assistant secretary would solely 

be accountable for all CBRNE acquisition programs allowing for a 

more streamlined and agile approach that is directly connected to 

both policymakers and operators. It also would enhance external 

coordination issues by providing a primary entry point for outside 

entities seeking to coordinate with the Department on CBRNE 

issues. 

The idea of consolidating DHS WMD efforts has long be discussed, and now is the time for action. We as a Nation have no excuse for not making this change as it will only improve the Department’s ability to defend against the threat while eliminating 

redundancies. Through integration there exists an opportunity to 

forge more efficient and effective CBRNE enterprise and strengthen our Nation’s security against these devastating weapons. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson follows:] 
36 

1For the purposes of this testimony CBRNE and WMD are used interchangeably. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICK ‘‘OZZIE’’ NELSON

JULY 14, 2015 

Good afternoon Chairmen McSally and Ratcliff, Ranking Members Richmond and 

Payne, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I will be discussing how the Department of Homeland Security can be better organized to defend the United States against chemical, biological, 

radiological, or nuclear (CBRNE) weapons. I am here today under my CSIS affiliation however I am also employed by Crossmatch Technologies, an identity management company, as well as Georgetown University where I teach classes on Homeland Security and Counterterrorism as part of the Biohazardous Threat Agents and 

Emerging Infectious Disease Program within the Microbiology and Immunology Department. 

THE THREAT

In the midst of a seemingly perpetual terrorism threat and a time of constrained 

fiscal resources, the United States Government faces difficult questions regarding 

how to best prepare for National security threats that may be viewed as relatively 

unlikely or low probability yet could have potentially devastating consequences, specifically the use CBRNE weapons on American soil. Though they may require comparatively more time and skill to build or acquire than conventional weapons, the 

proportional effects of CBRNE weapons are significantly greater. The ‘‘Amerithrax’’ 

attacks of 2001, for example, involved only a small amount of anthrax yet succeeded 

in paralyzing portions of the U.S. Government. And the consequences of a terrorist 

group detonating a low-yield nuclear weapon in a major U.S. city would change 

America forever. Although the probability of terrorists using simpler means—such 

as mass shootings—to strike the United States appears much higher, the impact of 

a successful CBRNE attack demands that the Nation prioritize and resource this 

threat. 

Terrorist groups continue to pursue CBRNE weapons, despite the challenges they 

face developing these capabilities, at least in part because they can provide these 

terrorists with a disproportionate level of power, and even prestige, relative to their 

actual capabilities or standing. For almost 20 years, we have seen al-Qaeda and its 

affiliates pursue unconventional weapons. Osama bin Laden in 1998 declared that 

acquiring and using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD)1 was his Islamic duty. 

More recently we have seen reports of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL) seizing chemical weapons facilities and radioactive material in Iraq. Deterrence strategies have no effect against these enemies—If they acquire a WMD then 

we should expect them to use it. 

These types of weapons are game-changers for a terrorist group, and we should 

expect such groups to pursue these capabilities with continued vigor. While 30 years 

ago, state-level WMD programs were far and away our primary concern, the rapid 

spread of technology and increasing availability of information on the internet has 

made the development of such weapons simpler for terrorist groups by further lowering the barriers to development of CBRNE capabilities. Further, instability in nations that possess CBRNE weapons, such as Syria and Pakistan, raises the risk of 

existing stockpiles falling into dangerous hands. Faced with these threats, the 

United States has little choice but to work to defend itself against CBRNE weapons. 

THE CHALLENGE

Since 9/11 the United States has developed a robust series of measures intended 

to counter CBRNE weapons at multiple points before they reach U.S. shores. Yet 

these efforts continue to fall short. The Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center 

in its 2011 Bio Response Report Card gave the Federal Government failing grades 

in its assessment of the Nation’s ability to respond to a large-scale bioterrorism 

event. This report is only one of many that indicates the Federal Government writ 

large has failed to posture itself to adequately detect and disrupt CBRNE threats 

or incidents. And ultimately, regardless of Governmental efforts at any level, the 

possibility always will remain that a device or agent could evade detection or even 

be manufactured within the United States itself. As such domestic efforts designed 

to detect and respond to a CBRNE incident are a critical component of the Nation’s 

security, representing the last and perhaps most vital line of defense against these 

weapons. 
37 

2http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/rankings/overall/sub. 

No department has a greater role in this effort than the Department of Homeland 

Security. While the Department has succeeded in building a number of individual 

offices, programs, and capabilities designed to detect and respond to CBRNE events, 

its effectiveness continues to be hampered by a variety of challenges. First among 

these is simple but critical—the fragmented organization and approach through 

which the Department executes its CBRNE efforts. Currently responsibility for various elements of CBRNE detection and response within the Department is spread 

across no fewer than six separate offices including the Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office (DNDO), the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), the Office of Policy, the Office 

of Operations Coordination, the Science and Technology Directorate, and the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). This fragmented architecture 

demands unachievable levels of coordination and cooperation, and makes the implementation of common, Department-wide policy and activities unwieldy and difficult. 

Moreover it runs contrary to the Department’s program to improve Departmentwide unity of effort. 

While organizational dynamics may seem trivial they are critically important 

when countering such complex threats as terrorism and CBRNE. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States—the 9/11 Commission—presents a scathing critique of U.S. Government inter-departmental coordination. More 

recently the 2008 Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Proliferation and Terrorism, cited inefficient Government organization as a serious 

problem—with dozens of overlapping offices and officials responsible for addressing 

CBRNE issues. 

The challenge of coordinating CBRNE detection and response is significant. Not 

only must Federal agencies coordinate across the Government but also with State 

and local governments, who likely will be the first responders in such an event, and 

with industry and academia, who provide valuable research and development (R&D) 

and other technical support. Such coordination requires that department and agencies be unified and well-coordinated internally. Without effective internal coordination, departments and agencies cannot expect to succeed with external coordination. 

Most departments and agencies, with the exception of DHS, have a streamlined 

approach to CBRNE with a central office that oversees WMD policy and programs. 

These entities, among others, include the Department of Defense’s Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, the Department of State’s Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate. The unity and strength of these elements with their clear assignment of responsibilities and clean lines of communication has enabled these organizations to effectively coordinate internally within their agencies and external with 

the interagency. 

Not only does DHS continue to be the outlier with its fractured approach to 

CBRNE but it also, for unknown reasons, has resisted—or just simply failed to 

prioritize—efforts to correct the issue. In the fiscal year 2013 Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act the Secretary of Homeland Security was tasked by the Congress 

to review the Department’s WMD coordinating mechanisms and provide recommendations by September 1, 2013. Yet the Department failed to respond to this 

request until June 2015—almost 2 years later. 

The benefits to the Department for maintaining its current structure seem elusive. DNDO was created in 2005 as a separate, stand-alone entity to focus Government and DHS efforts on the nuclear threat. While the office has succeeded in remaining focused it has struggled to develop strategic guidance and direction and to 

manage large acquisition programs. The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture—a 

framework for detecting, analyzing, and reporting on nuclear and other radioactive 

materials—has floundered, and hundreds of millions of dollars have been wasted on 

radiation detection programs that have fallen well short of expectations, such as the 

Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) and the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography Systems (CAARS). 

Recently under the leadership of Director Huban Gowadia DNDO has seen significant improvement. Efforts such as the Securing the Cities initiative—a program to 

assist States in establishing capabilities to detect radiological and nuclear materials 

in major cities—have flourished, and the organization’s morale is the highest in the 

Department.2 However, issues still remain, many of which are beyond the control 

of the director. For example the Directorate of Science and Technology, with a lackluster record of coordinating effectively within the Department, maintains its own 

portfolio of nuclear and radiological R&D programs that arguably should fall under 

the purview of DNDO. Additionally key nuclear/radiological policy and operations 
38 

elements reside within other DHS directorates detached from DNDO. While Dr. 

Gowadia’s strong leadership and vision have improved DNDO, the organization’s efficacy cannot be dependent upon personality or leadership alone. It must be strong 

enough not only to stand on its own merit but also to execute its charter both inside 

and outside of the Department. 

The other primary CBRNE entity within DHS, the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), 

probably has suffered most from DHS’s fragmented approach. The Department’s 

chemical and biological defense programs are tucked into the office whose primary 

responsibility is ‘‘health and medical expertise.’’ The relationship between chemical 

and biological threats and public health is clear—but they are by no means the 

same. Having chemical and biological programs as a subset of public health fails to 

recognize the nature of the threat and the organizational efforts required to address 

it, which can be seen in OHA’s execution of its programs. 

The office’s flagship program, BioWatch, which aims to detect the presence of 

high-risk biological agents, has been shrouded in controversy since its inception. In 

2011 the National Academy of Sciences questioned the effectiveness of the currently 

deployed Generation Two (Gen–2) system. Last year the Department cancelled the 

acquisition of the next generation biosurveillance technology (Gen–3), which was to 

replace the fielded Gen–2 systems. The program was moved from OHA back to S&T 

for further development. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified a 

number of deficiencies with the Department’s management of the Gen–3 program 

noting that the Department failed to conduct sound mission needs analysis and to 

follow good acquisition processes. In total, the Department has spent over $1 billion 

on BioWatch and has at best provided questionable results. Over $150 million was 

spent on the Gen–3 technology alone before it was cancelled. 

The Department’s chemical defense efforts are similarly lackluster. They are severely fragmented and generally ineffective at least in part because the issue is 

worked in various, small offices spread throughout the Department. While OHA retains the overarching responsibility, these other offices own key aspects of the chemical defense portfolio. The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program, 

which regulates high-risk chemical facilities, is managed by NPPD. And the Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC), which assesses chemical threats and 

vulnerabilities, is led by the S&T office. With a variety of disparate chemical programs spread throughout component agencies, OHA’s chemical defense charter is 

seemingly unmanageable. 

DHS’ fractured approach to CBRNE has resulted in inefficient operations, insufficient accountability, and wasted taxpayer dollars, ultimately increasing the risk to 

the American homeland. Fortunately, many of these shortcomings can be addressed 

simply by reorganizing and elevating the Department’s CBRNE efforts into single, 

consolidated entity. Such an approach will make it possible for the Department to 

have a focused CBRNE detection and response capability with clear roles and responsibilities in order to improve reaction times and accountability, and eliminate 

redundancy and inefficiencies. 

THE SOLUTION

The Department and Congress must act now to address these shortcomings by 

unifying and elevating DHS’s CBRNE capabilities into one Departmental entity. 

Specifically DNDO and OHA should be merged along with the CBRNE policy and 

operations capabilities and the NPPD Office of Bombing Prevention. The new office 

should be headed by an assistant secretary who reports directly to the Secretary of 

Homeland Security. The Department also should align R&D programs under this 

new office. Given that CBRNE detection and response is inherently a technologyintensive venture, there are numerous challenges associated developing and acquiring the needed technologies. The decentralized nature of CBRNE efforts within DHS 

has led to an equally decentralized system to develop associated technologies, which 

has contributed to many of the deficiencies in DHS CBRNE R&D and acquisition 

programs. To increase both the tactical and strategic integration of the CBRNE detection and response, the new consolidated enterprise must focus on both policy and 

technology. As such, CBRNE R&D efforts within DHS also should be unified under 

this centralized office. 

The consolidated office also would be able to provide a holistic approach to the 

Department’s WMD programs and eliminate duplication of efforts. With responsibility and visibility into the Department’s entire range of CBRNE efforts from policy 

to technology to operations the merged entity would ensure continuity and effective 

prioritization of this highly complex threat. Moreover the experiences of the Department’s entire WMD expertise could be leverage on a routine and daily basis. The 

new entity would have the clear charter for establishing and articulating the De-
39 

partment’s CBRNE priorities and strategies to both internal and external audiences. 

Perhaps most importantly the assistant secretary would be solely responsible and 

accountable for all CBRNE acquisition programs allowing for a more streamlined 

and agile approach that is directly connected to both policy-makers and operators. 

In addition to raising the profile and priority of CBRNE in the Department, and 

consolidating capabilities and eliminating overlap, the new entity would enhance external coordination by providing a primary entry point for outside agencies and entities seeking to coordinate on CBRNE issues with DHS. In today’s security environment there are very few single agency threats and there are even fewer single agency solutions. This is especially true with CBRNE where coordination between Federal, State/local, academia, and the private sector is an absolute necessity. Under 

the current DHS structure it is uncertain as to who in the Department has the lead 

for CBRNE efforts and at what moment in the process. 

Interagency or inter-departmental coordination is critical when dealing with complex transnational threats such as CBRNE. In interagency meetings, including at 

the National Security Council level, each Department normally gets a single seat 

at the table. Individuals that are knowledgeable in a broad range of topics, yet still 

technically conversant, often prove to be the most effective participants in these policy discussions. Regarding CBRNE, departments must have a cadre of individuals 

who can speak with one voice on the whole of the issues. With DHS’s expertise currently stove-piped into disparate parts of the organization, they lack a robust group 

of individuals that has the responsibility and authority to speak to the whole of 

their efforts against CBRNE threats. 

The consolidated entity also would serve as the home base for all DHS CBRNE 

personnel allowing them to benefit from each other’s background and experience not 

only in technology but also in management and acquisition programs. A larger, consolidated cadre of talent also would provide DHS CBRNE professionals with greater 

career opportunities and positions for growth. By raising the profile of CBRNE within the Department and the interagency, and leveraging the recent leadership efforts 

in DNDO that have resulted in such high morale, DHS CBRNE could become one 

of the most sought-after places to work for WMD professionals. Instead of internal 

components competing against one another for prioritization and resources they 

could be working together for mutual and greater benefit. 

CONCLUSION

DNDO and OHA have struggled with effectively communicating and facilitating 

a common understanding of the Department’s CBRNE efforts and have ineffectively 

managed major CBRNE acquisitions. The idea of consolidating DHS WMD efforts 

has long been discussed, and now is the time for action. We as a Nation have no 

excuse for not making this change as it will only improve the Department’s ability 

to defend against the WMD threat while eliminating redundancies and inefficiencies. The current model is also inconsistent with the Department’s Unity of Effort 

initiatives. There is simply no reason to maintain the current structure. Ultimately, 

there is no consolidated, single architecture that would perfectly address the multitude of challenges associated with CBRNE detection and response. However, the 

various offices, programs, and capabilities currently spread across the Department 

can and should be integrated. Through integration, there exists an opportunity to 

forge a more efficient and effective CBRNE detection and response enterprise and 

strengthen our Nation’s security against these devastating weapons. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Mr. Nelson. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Stern for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF WARREN STERN, FORMER DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. STERN. Good afternoon, Chairman Ratcliffe, Chairman 

McSally, Ranking Member Richmond, Ranking Member Payne, and 

distinguished Members of the subcommittee. 

I’m pleased to testify today about the Department of Homeland 

Security plan to establish an office responsible for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive threats. I am currently the 

R&D manager at Brookhaven National Laboratory. However, I’m 
40 

not here today as a Brookhaven employee. I am here as an individual to provide testimony based on my experience in this field. 

From 2010 through 2012, I was the director of DNDO. I have 

also worked in related U.S. Government positions over 25 years, 

and have been part of several Government reorganizations. I draw 

my insights from these experiences. 

In general, I favor the creation of a weapons of mass destruction 

organization within DHS. Weapons of mass destruction threats, 

which are exceedingly infrequent, can be easily forgotten in the 

day-to-day work of Government agencies. A strong organization focused on the work necessary to prevent and respond to events of 

low frequency but very high consequence is necessary to prevent a 

terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction in the United 

States. However, I also believe that a reorganization of the scale 

and scope being considered by the subcommittee would be a significant—would be significantly disruptive to the work of the those involved. This does not mean that a reorganization should not be 

pursued. It simply means that such reorganization should only be 

pursued if the benefits significantly outweigh the costs. If there is 

a clear objective, and if Congress and the administration have the 

willingness and the ability to devote the resources needed to ensure 

the objectives will be met. 

If a reorganization is to be done, it should be done to make a 

substantially stronger organization. Reorganization should not be 

pursued simply to make a cleaner organizational chart. While 

DNDO has had difficult periods in its relationship with Congress, 

I believe that when I left DNDO, Congress was generally pleased 

with and supportive of its work. I also believe that under the current leadership this is still true, and I’ve heard that today also. 

As such, as Congress considers any reorganization plan, it should 

consider which specific problems with respect to DNDO it is trying 

to fix, as DNDO will be the largest part of the new CBRNE unit. 

Within the context of these cautions, I’d like to highlight three specific points regarding the specific reorganization plan presented by 

the administration. 

The first is at the bureaucratic level. The proposed structure 

would place each of the functional units, nuclear, chemical, biological, explosive, below an assistant secretary. This would mean that 

the head of all nuclear functions would no longer have a direct link 

to the Secretary and would become the equivalent of a deputy assistant secretary or an office head. This structure has the potential 

to diminish rather than to strengthen the role of DNDO. 

For example, when I started at DNDO, one of the main Congressional criticisms was that the organization had not been able to 

create a Government-wide strategic plan for the global nuclear detection architecture. Within 3 months we were able to create such 

a plan. The plan reflected the hard work, insights, dedication, and 

diplomatic skills of the DNDO’s many employees. However, it is 

clear to me that this could not have been done if it had not been 

for my ability to reach out to assistant secretaries in other agencies 

as an equal partner and to have a direct line to the Secretary to 

call upon when there were problems. 

My second specific comment relates to the functions of the new 

office. DNDO has a narrowly-defined function, nuclear detection 
41 

and nuclear forensics. This allows the office to do what it does well. 

The DHS plan suggests that the new office would address a much 

broader span of nuclear topics. The subcommittee should recognize 

that this would have a fundamental and transformative effect on 

DNDO. 

My final point relates to this change in scope. The DHS plan 

notes that the expansion in DNDO’s mission would be accomplished by the inclusion of CBRNE policy and operational support 

personnel within the new CBRNE unit. The shift in personnel into 

the new nuclear organization appears quite small, perhaps a few 

people. It in no way reflects a fundamental shift in the scope of the 

organization. I urge that the actual scope of the new office be clear, 

carefully considered, and related to the manpower it needs for each 

of the new areas to be included in DNDO’s mandate. 

In conclusion, I would once again like to thank the subcommittee 

for the opportunity to testify today, and to emphasize that if a 

CBRNE organization is going to be created in DHS, it should be 

created in a way that makes its constituent parts stronger than 

they are today. I appreciate your consideration of this issue, and 

am happy to answer any questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stern follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WARREN STERN

JUNE 14, 2015 

Good afternoon Chairman Ratcliffe, Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Richmond, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I 

am pleased to testify today about the Department of Homeland Security’s plan to 

establish a central headquarters office responsible for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) threats. 

I am currently senior advisor and R&D manager at Brookhaven National Laboratory. However, I am not here today as a Brookhaven employee or representative of 

Brookhaven or the Department of Energy. Rather, I am here as an individual, to 

provide testimony based on my experience in this field. The views I express today 

are my own. Furthermore, I am not being reimbursed by my employer for the time 

or expense incurred by this testimony. 

From 2010 through 2012, I was the director of DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office. This is the office that would comprise the largest part of the new CBRNE 

office being considered by the subcommittees. I have worked in other related U.S. 

Government positions over a 25-year career and have been part of several Government reorganizations. I draw my insights from these experiences. 

At the outset, I would like to be clear that, in general, I favor the creation of a 

strong WMD organization within DHS. DHS focuses its efforts on threats that manifest themselves frequently. WMD threats, which are exceedingly infrequent, can 

easily be forgotten in the day-to-day work of Government agencies. A strong organization focused on the work necessary to prevent and respond to events of very low 

frequency but very high consequence is necessary to prevent a terrorist attack using 

WMD. 

I believe that a reorganization of the scale and scope being considered by the subcommittees would be significantly disruptive to the work of those involved. This is 

not unique to DHS. It is simply what happens during any large-scale reorganization. 

There are winners and losers; civil servants and others will spend time wondering 

what will happen to them and debating the details of the new structure. A reorganization such as this will set the organization back for a time as the new structure 

transitions. 

This does not mean that reorganizations should not be pursued; it simply means 

that such reorganizations should only be pursued if the benefits outweigh the costs, 

if there is a clear objective, and if Congress and the administration have the willingness and ability to devote the resources needed to ensure the objective will be met. 

DNDO and OHA are two of the smallest components in DHS, and some have argued that the two should be consolidated to make a more streamlined structure at 

DHS. In my opinion, the Secretary’s office does have too many direct reports. How-
42 

ever, because of the costs involved in reorganization, reorganization should not be 

pursued simply to make a cleaner organization chart. 

Some assert that reorganization should be pursued to reduce costs. However, 

while DNDO and OHA work cooperatively when there is a common issue, the missions of DNDO and OHA are very different. Nuclear detection and monitoring and 

response to biological threats are distinct disciplines. While there may be small administrative savings in combining the two, it is hard for me to imagine that the benefits would be significant enough to justify the costs of reorganization. If reorganization is going to be done, it should be done well and done for the right reason: To 

make a substantially stronger organization. 

DNDO is a unique interagency organization, as it is focused on two main areas 

of nuclear terrorism prevention: Nuclear detection and nuclear forensics. DNDO 

works with Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, international, and private-sector 

partners to fulfill its mission. It works in coordination with partners from across the 

U.S. Government (USG), including DHS components, the Departments of Energy 

(DOE), State (DOS), Defense (DOD), Justice (DOJ), the intelligence community, and 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

DNDO develops the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) and implements the domestic component of the architecture. DNDO also works with its partners to coordinate interagency efforts to develop technical nuclear detection capabilities, measure detector system performance, ensure effective response to detection 

alarms, integrate USG nuclear forensics efforts, and conduct transformational research and development for advanced detection and forensics technologies. DNDO 

is charged with being the primary Government entity to develop, acquire, and support the deployment of an enhanced domestic system to detect and report on attempts to import, possess, store, transport, or use a nuclear explosive device or unauthorized radiological material in the United States. 

While DNDO has had difficult periods in its relationship with Congress, primarily 

surrounding the work related to the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) and its 

lack of a strategic plan, I believe that when I left DNDO, Congress was generally 

pleased with and supportive of its work. I also believe that, under its current leadership, this is still true. As such, as Congress considers any reorganization plan, it 

should consider what specific problem with respect to DNDO it is trying to fix, as 

DNDO will be the largest part of the new CBRNE unit. 

Within the context of the above cautions, I would like to highlight three specific 

issues on the reorganization plan presented in the ‘‘DHS Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Functions Report.’’ 

The first is the bureaucratic level of the CBRNE office and its units. The proposed 

structure would place each of the functional units (nuclear, chemical, biological) 

below an assistant secretary who would be responsible for all of the units and overall CBRNE policy. This would mean that the head of all nuclear functions would 

no longer have a direct link to the Secretary and deputy secretary and would become the equivalent of a deputy assistant secretary. Presumably, managers below 

the new nuclear head would become the equivalent of office directors or team leaders. 

This structure has the potential to diminish rather than strengthen the function 

of DNDO. Interagency relationships are at the heart of DNDO’s work. Stepping 

down the level of the director and those below her could impact the effectiveness 

and efficiency of DNDO. 

For example, when I started at DNDO, one of the main Congressional criticisms 

of DNDO was that the organization had not been able to create a Government-wide 

strategic plan for the GNDA, despite a strong recommendation from Congress to do 

so. I agreed with Congress that such a plan was necessary and was determined to 

create such a plan. Creating any plan across the five or six relevant Departments 

with overlapping responsibilities is an extremely complex task, and my first step 

was to appeal to my counterparts in the other agencies to personally ask for their 

help in creating this strategic plan. I asked each of my counterparts at the assistant 

secretary to show flexibility and consider overriding obstruction by lower-level officials in their organizations if necessary. My next step was to explain to the Secretary and deputy secretary that I needed their help managing the interagency and, 

more importantly, in managing the larger components within DHS. 

Within 3 months, we were able to create the first GNDA strategic plan and deliver it to Congress with concurrence and input from the White House and all relevant agencies. To be clear, the plan reflected the hard work, insights, dedication 

and diplomatic skills of DNDO’s many talented employees. However, it is also clear 

to me that this could not have been done if I had not been able to reach directly 

out to my interagency counterparts at the assistant secretary level to resolve problems and directly leverage the Secretary’s office. 
43 

My second specific comment relates to the function of the new office. As I mentioned earlier, DNDO has a narrowly-defined function—nuclear detection and 

forensics—and that limitedness has both positive and negative elements. On the 

positive side, it allows the office to do what it does well. There are several places 

in the Government that work on nuclear detection, but no other agency or department covers the detection field so comprehensively or competently, from R&D and 

testing to acquisition and architecture. 

On the other hand, detection and forensics is only a slice of U.S. efforts to prevent 

a nuclear or radiological terrorism. The DHS plan suggests that the new structure 

offers the opportunity for the nuclear office to more robustly address the span of 

nuclear topics, to include prevention, protection, response, mitigation, or recovery. 

The subcommittee should recognize this relatively small part of DHS’s plan could 

have a fundamental and transformative effect on the work of DNDO. 

My final point is related to the change in scope. The DHS plan notes that the 

expansion in DNDO’s mission would be accomplished in two ways: By inclusion of 

CBRNE policy and operational support personnel within the new CBRNE office and 

by establishing strong linkages between the CBRNE office and a new DHS Joint Requirements Joint Operational Plans Process. To me, this seems wholly inadequate 

given the potential scope of the new organization. The shift in personnel into the 

new nuclear organization appears quite small, perhaps a few people, and it in no 

way reflects the fundamental shift in scope of the organization. 

Indeed, even with the shift, important elements of the CBRNE mission will remain in other parts of DHS. For example, the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) and National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) will retain key nuclear missions and personnel that appear to be within the new scope of 

the nuclear part of the new CBRNE office. I urge that the actual scope of the new 

office be clear, carefully considered, and related to manpower needs for each of the 

new areas to be included in DNDO’s new mandate, which could be substantial. 

In conclusion, I would once again like to thank the subcommittees for the opportunity to testify today and to emphasize that if a CBRN organization is going to 

be created in DHS, it should be created in a way that makes its constituents—in 

particular DNDO—stronger than they are today. I appreciate your careful consideration of this issue and am happy to answer any questions. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Mr. Stern. 

I’d now like to recognize the gentlelady from Arizona, Congresswoman McSally for 5 minutes. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, gentlemen. I really appreciate your 

testimony today and your experience as outsiders but also former 

insiders, in some cases, on what’s the best way for us to be combatting these threats. I agree with you, I spent 26 years in the military, I said this to the last panel, I’ve reorganized for reorganizing 

sake or been a part of those in the past. Managing change is something that is, you know, sometimes doesn’t end up with a better result. So, I mean, I appreciate your perspectives on that, Mr. Cohn, 

and, Mr. Stern, especially your comments on that. 

So can we talk a little bit more about that? Just elaborate a little 

bit on your perspectives of how you think this change would be 

managed. I hear you say it needs to happen, and so how do you 

think it would be managed so it is for the good and it isn’t like a 

bureaucracy that then resists the change and ends up less capable 

to actually address the issue that we were trying to do because bureaucracies have an ability to resist change. 

So just wondering about your perspectives, and also, Mr. Stern, 

having been there on if this is, you know, the right thing to do, how 

that should be managed so that we don’t have a dip. Because sometimes there’s a dipping capability as you’re moving to a new order, 

and what you think we can learn from your insights on how to do 

it well if it goes into force? 

Mr. COHN. So I think the most important thing in any organization, whether you’re leading as it is or reorganizing it is a clear 
44 

sense of mission, strong leadership who are empowered to carry out 

that mission, and a workforce that clearly understands what is expected of it in that new organization. 

So I think that the most important pieces—and so in this way 

I agree with Warren that the reorganization should not be undertaken for reorganization’s sakes. But the Department has set out 

some key reasons why the reorganization needs to take place. People within the Department and outside the Department need to 

know where they go for this source of expertise, people within and 

outside of the Department, and that may be its operating components down to the individual CBP Officers or others, as Ranking 

Member Richmond has mentioned. Whether that is State and local 

officials from Texas or Arizona or Louisiana or wherever they are, 

or from the Federal interagency to be able to have one place to go. 

As was pointed out, that there is one official who is accountable for 

making decisions based on risk across these entities. 

So I think that it’s imperative in this reorganization, and Congress has the opportunity to clearly set the mission, clearly set the 

authorities, and clearly direct the new office in a task to carry out 

the Department’s National and overall responsibilities in an integrated way. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Mr. Stern, you got any perspective? 

Mr. STERN. Yeah. So I think the most important thing, assuming 

a transition is going to occur, is to ensure that the objectives which 

Mr. Cohn mentioned are linked to the means. That it’s clear to the 

individuals involved how this change relates to those objectives. 

So, for example, if the objective is to strengthen the organization, 

then presumably there should be an elaboration of how this 

strengthens the organization and how the individuals in the existing units fit into that strengthened organization, and although the 

administration or the DHS plan is not very detailed, understandably at this point, I think at some point before Congress approves 

of this it should be well explained and it should be explained to the 

staff. 

The other thing that I would suggest in order to ensure that it’s 

not too disruptive is to ensure that in DNDO’s case that it moves 

as a unit. For example, I think there’s been discussion of moving 

the R&D part of DNDO, and that was in play when I was director 

also, and I fought strongly against it. DNDO acts as a unit and 

acts together and is structured that way, and the objective would 

be to minimize that transition in the creation of this new organization. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. I heard you talking about, and I 

totally agree, if people don’t know who to call, if there’s not one 

place or somebody who’s responsible at the right level, then that 

can be confusing both within the Department and the interagency 

and then with us. But having an assistant secretary as an answer, 

we’re marking up a bill later this week to create potentially another assistant secretary about countering violent extremism. 

So how many direct reports—or how many assistant secretaries 

will there be when we’re done with this, and is there a down side 

as we try and elevate those many different missions that it—you 

know, that we have too many chiefs and not enough Indians, so to 

speak, you know, just to use that example. 
45 

Mr. COHN. My experience in the Department is that when an office like this is created, it’s not at the diminution of the sub offices 

that are incorporated, but rather when you have heads of individual offices all reporting to the Secretary, it diminishes the impact that any one of them has. So in this case you are taking two 

direct reports and pieces of other entities and combining them into 

a single organization with a single leader at a level of stature who 

can then have the level of impact directly with the Secretary, the 

deputy secretary, and the Department’s leadership that you would 

want for this function. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. My time’s expired. Thanks, Mr. 

Chairman, for yielding to me so I can go to the floor and talk about 

National security. Another important issue. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I thank the gentlelady for yielding back, and the 

Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on 

Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond. 

Mr. RICHMOND. I guess I’ll start with Mr. Stern, because I think 

you touched on it a little bit, and then as Mr. Nelson and Mr. Cohn 

want to chime in, you’re more than welcome. 

I’m trying to get a feel for what extent you think the proposed 

consolidation represents a departure from existing technologies acquisition review processes for each office or component. Let me give 

you an example. Would you recommend that the newly-minted assistant secretary scrutinize current activities and re-assess or reprioritize their relevance or need? Second, how would you form a 

CBRNE office? Feel free to take a minute to expand on a your 

thoughts too. 

Mr. STERN. Yeah, thank you. Following in answering this question and following on the last answer, the consolidation within 

DHS and removing direct reports from the Secretary doesn’t necessarily require the diminution of the directors below the assistant 

secretary level. So now you’ll have an assistant secretary and/or 

some perhaps under secretary with several independent yet cooperative elements below it. 

It doesn’t fundamentally affect the way acquisition is done, although it provides the opportunity for joint acquisitions between 

the different components within this new CBRNE unit. So it has 

the potential to improve acquisition processes, but that can’t be 

taken as a foregone conclusion. 

Mr. NELSON. To the earlier point as well, we could make it an 

under secretary as well. I think the Department’s probably short 

two under secretaries to begin with, and raise them up. Again, not 

all departments are going to be equal either. All assistant secretaries wherever we are regarding Government aren’t weighed. 

But as far as the acquisition, I think having that one individual 

that is responsible for these complex—technically complex acquisition programs, having that charter is critically important. Right 

now, as I said in my comments, the acquisition in the R&D is so 

fragmented throughout the Department and agency, and with these 

programs moving through the system and exchanging hands, 

there’s really no one to go to and say: Okay. Who is ultimately responsible for X, Y, and Z, and who’s following it through? That’s 

what that under secretary—assistant secretary is going to give you, 
46 

the single belly button that is oversight inside the Department and 

oversight to you here in Congress. 

Mr. COHN. I think that this is a departure from the way that the 

Department is currently operating, and that is for the better. I 

think it is an opportunity to combine the best of what you heard 

from each of the three panelists on the first panel. 

No reorganization, as Mr. Nelson said, change—or Mr. Stern 

said—changes acquisition oversight or other things automatically. 

It simply sets the conditions for that. But this type of integration 

allows you to take that focus that Dr. Gowadia spoke of and expand it across the CBRNE space. 

It allows you to take the risk-oriented approach that Dr. 

Brinsfield noted, invest the assistant secretary with the ability to 

look across this portfolio and make decisions based on risk in consultation with and in service to, the Department and its external 

stakeholders. It gives the assistant secretary in the office the opportunity to take that integrated view that Dr. Brothers said was 

so important, especially when you’re dealing with technical subjects. 

Mr. RICHMOND. As they embark on this creation and, really, the 

goal of getting unity of effort, and you talk about focus, what would 

your advice be in terms of the maybe not so obvious but pitfalls 

that may be in there or unintended consequences that you would 

want to give just a heads-up that they should look for? We can 

start in same order. Fine with me. 

Mr. NELSON. Sorry. I apologize for interrupting. I would say, 

somebody’s mentioned it, but this is critical, again, having spent 20 

years in Government, you have to merge them. It can’t just be reorganization on a piece of paper. It has to be a full integration, and, 

as Alan pointed out, a very clear charter, that there can’t have 

been DNDO inside this organization and OHA inside this organization. It has to be a blending, a full blending, of the organization. 

That’s probably the biggest pitfall. 

Mr. STERN. I would say the biggest pitfall is not adequately defining the function of the new organization that is—in the administration plan, it suggests that this new nuclear unit will be doing 

a lot more than DNDO currently is doing. The nuclear security 

field is vast, and nuclear detection and nuclear forensics, which are 

narrowly what DNDO does, are a small part of that, and they do 

it well. But if that’s going to be broadened, then that should be 

done intentionally with the resources devoted to the new areas of 

consideration. 

Mr. COHN. I think the other point I would add to those points, 

and it’s as you pointed out, there are dedicated employees across 

the Department of Homeland Security. Whenever there’s a reorganization, clear direction should be given and the leaders have to 

lead. Leaders have to lead in the direction of the mission as it is 

set forth because that is what’s owed to the employees of the Department. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

Thank you to the witnesses. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank the gentleman. I yield myself as much 

time as I may consume. 
47 

I’d like to start with an issue that we discussed with the prior 

panel. You all were present in the room and were able to hear the 

testimony talking about DNDO functioning well, and one of the 

reasons given for that success was the ability of DNDO to achieve 

end-to-end solutions in part because the research and development 

component was contained therein. 

I asked a question of Dr. Brothers about the reorganization and 

the fact that, as it’s proposed, the chem/bio research and development would not transfer. His response to that question was essentially different models work well. I want to start with your perspective on that, whether or not you agree with that? 

Mr. COHN. I’ll start with that. I do think that, as I said in my 

testimony, there are different models at play here. They have succeeded in some ways. They have failed in others. I think actually 

that both Mr. Stern and Dr. Gowadia underplay their own role in 

the success of DNDO. DNDO has been very well led in the past 

several years, and that has contributed substantially to its success. 

Because DNDO was organized in the same way since its inception 

and had significant failures at that point as well. 

I think in this instance I wish there was an answer to give to 

this committee where the work had been done and to be able to say 

model A is correct or model B is correct. I don’t believe that it is 

right to have multiple models running simultaneously. I do not 

know which of those models is the best for the Department. But 

I do believe—and I believe that this opportunity gives Congress the 

chance to mandate and the Department to carry out an examination, both itself and with an outside independent entity that knows 

how these different models work in the Department, in other Federal agencies, in private-sector organizations and determine which 

is the best model for the Department. 

Because mixed multiple models in different areas I think is more 

of a reflection of the desires of the individuals now than what is 

the most durable solution over time. 

Mr. NELSON. I agree with what Alan is saying. I don’t think you 

can have this mixed model. I also think that one of the reasons 

why you’ve had such success at DNDO is because you have that 

tail to nose entire system in process, in place. Alan and I were talking earlier. You know, the original intention of the Department was 

to have a WMD office that has S&T focus when it was originally 

thought of, and instead we ended up with an S&T department with 

a WMD sub-focus. 

So we now find ourselves trending back to the original model 

that was conceived by the people that thought about this originally. 

So I would like to see those R&D efforts moved over into this entity. I think it is such a critical issue, and the understanding of the 

topic is so technical that it has to be placed under the experts to 

understand its information. 

Mr. STERN. Thank you. Well, nuclear detection and, for example, 

biological response, are very different beasts, even in concept. For 

example, in the area of nuclear detection, we’re trying to detect 

things before they’re released. Most of what in the bio world they 

consider prevention they’re actually calling prevention for things in 

the nuclear world we would call response. 
48 

So they’re already different concepts. In that context, I guess I 

really wouldn’t have a problem with two different approaches to development existing in the same organization. I do know, however, 

that for DNDO the integrated model is the right one. When I first 

started 5 years ago, there was, in fact, a push in legislation to take 

the R&D portion out of DNDO. I felt then and I feel now it’s the 

wrong approach because it’s very, very difficult to separate R&D 

from testing to acquisition in the overall—in the global architecture 

that DNDO is in charge of. 

So I know that the existing approach is the right one for DNDO. 

I don’t necessarily know if it’s right or wrong for the bio and chem 

world, but I don’t know that they necessarily have to have the 

right—the same approach just to be a little bit—make a slightly 

separate concept. 

One way to resolve this is to put this all including R&D under 

one big under secretary, the under secretary of science and technology, and turn that into a weapons of mass destruction unit. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Terrific. Thank you. Mr. Cohn, as you know and 

as you just mentioned, both DNDO and OHA have had major acquisition failures in the past, and those acquisition failures have, 

frankly, cost taxpayers millions of dollars. I assume that you think 

that the current structure of the CBRNE components contributed 

to that problem. 

But do you think—is it your opinion that this new CBRN or 

CBRNE office will address those types of failures in the future? 

Mr. COHN. I think that office as proposed poses a better chance 

of preventing those failures than the current model. As Dr. Brothers and others mentioned during the first panel, Secretary Johnson 

has embarked on the strengthening the departmental Unity of Effort Initiative which includes implementing a virtual management 

system within the Department and empowering the Department’s 

leadership. It’s a more closely-examined major program execution 

and major acquisitions through strategy, joint requirements, programming, and budgeting, and major acquisition oversight. 

Creating an assistant secretary who has full scope responsibilities across CBRNE issues, placing that individual into the leadership and really empowering that individual to speak definitively, 

on the one hand, in those fora, and to engage with the heads of the 

operational components and with the external stakeholders who, as 

was mentioned, are the source of the requirements, and who will 

be the end-users of what is developed, I think gives a better chance 

of creating success in acquisition oversight and not wasting—not 

leading to the same program cancellations and terminations that 

we’ve seen than the current model. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Terrific. Thank you, Mr. Cohn. 

Mr. Nelson, given your experience in the field and in the interagency, I just want to make sure I have your testimony very clearly 

on how the current CBRNE structure negatively affects DHS’s role 

and stature within the interagency. 

To that point, I’d like you to speak to the importance of DHS 

having a strong focal point for interagency collaboration. 

Mr. NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s critically important. 

You know, as I said in my written testimony, today there are very 

few single agency problems, in there are even fewer single agency 
49 

solutions. So interagency coordination with Federal, and with State 

and local, is critically important. On the very basic end, you have 

to be able to—if I have a question who do I call, who do I pick up 

the phone and call at what point in that process? Right now it’s so 

fragmented in the industry, in DHS, you don’t know where it is on 

the S&T side, or whether it’s with DNDO or with OHA. That 

makes it extraordinarily difficult. 

Moreover, when you’re talking about interagency coordination, 

whether it’s a meeting at the White House or any other interagency meeting, you usually get one seat at the table per department. Those individuals need to be able to speak for the whole of 

the issue. It’s not convenient and useful to inject subject-matter experts for every single policy meeting. You have to have people that 

can go into those meetings that are aware of the full breadth of 

what is going on inside the Department. 

Right now there isn’t a cadre of individuals inside DHS that can 

represent the Department in meetings regarding WMD issues at 

large. They have to determine what the subject is and then pull 

those individuals in. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Okay. Thank you. So, Mr. Stern, let me follow up 

with you in that regard. Because in your testimony, one of the 

things you—to quote you, you said that the proposed structure, 

‘‘has the potential to diminish rather than strengthen the function 

of DNDO.’’ 

I’m wondering whether you think that the way this creating an 

office with the assistant secretary sort-of better evaluates the importance of the mission and gives DHS CBRNE programs a better 

stature and voice within the interagency? 

Mr. STERN. Yeah. So after 25 years of working, actually more, in 

the interagency, most WMD-related important meetings aren’t 

WMD at large. They’re nuclear, biological, chemical, separate. So 

if the nuclear part of DHS is what would in the new structure be 

a deputy assistant secretary or an office director, that individual 

might not even be invited to some of these meetings. 

So, yeah, I believe that in order to maintain, if not strengthen 

the role of nuclear in the DHS’s structure, in fact, the individual 

in charge needs to be elevated, not diminished, in his or her role. 

It may sound overly bureaucratic, but having, again, worked for 

many years in interagency, there’s a big difference between an office director and an assistant secretary and what that individual 

can get done. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Gentlemen, thank you all for being here. I know 

I speak on behalf of everyone that your testimony’s been very valuable. Obviously a number of the subcommittee Members weren’t 

able to return after votes, but Members of the subcommittee will 

likely have some additional questions for you since they weren’t 

able to return, that we would ask you to respond to those in writing. 

Pursuant to committee rule 7E, the hearing record will remain 

open for a period of 10 days. Without objection, the subcommittees 

now stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:46 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

(51) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, JR. FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. It has been observed that there are CBRNE functions from across the 

Department—from FEMA to NPPD—that are not included in the proposed realignment. How did the Department decide to include certain activities but not others 

in the reorganization proposal? 

Answer. The proposed reorganization of the Department’s chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) functions is intended to focus headquarters offices on the principal objectives of the Unity of Effort initiative, including 

integrating the broad and complex Department of Homeland Security (DHS) mission 

space and empowering DHS components to effectively execute their operations. 

Other CBRNE functions exist within the Department, including those at the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

Alignment of the Department’s headquarters CBRNE-related support programs and 

activities will strengthen DHS operational activities. Since this was a reorganization 

of headquarters’ functions to create a mission support office and to minimize disruption of operations, we did not consider programs and efforts currently executed by 

the above-mentioned operational components. 

Question 2a. The Department does not anticipate any cost savings from reorganization, but there is potential for new costs to be incurred. 

For example, would the over 200 employees of the new CBRNE Defense Office be 

co-located at some point in the future? 

Question 2b. What other costs could result from the proposed CBRNE Defense Office? 

Answer. The Department intends to undertake major movements of personnel associated with the proposed CBRNE reorganization in concert with the expiration of 

current office leases. Physical consolidation of the new CBRNE office may occur as 

early as 2018, pending approval of requested funding for DHS Headquarters moves 

to the St. Elizabeths Complex. 

The Department is committed to responsibly identifying ways to reduce its overhead costs, as exemplified by the new facilities consolidation pilots being undertaken 

in the Seattle and Boston areas, in order to ensure we make every dollar available 

to directly enable operations in the field. DHS will consider the new CBRNE Office, 

along with other DHS headquarters offices, as we explore other efficiencies proposals. 

Question 3. Dr. Brinsfield, as DHS plans to expand the scope of its biosurveillance 

capability, what impact will this have on prioritization and investment decisions 

across the biosurveillance enterprise for the core biosurveillance functions called for 

in the National Strategy for Biosurveillance? 

Answer. DHS is committed to countering biological threats and hazards and implementing the National Strategy for Biosurveillance. The 2014 DHS Quadrennial 

Homeland Security Review included biological threats and hazards as a top homeland security risk. Since the Department’s biosurveillance activities are performed 

by the OHA, which is being brought into the new CBRNE entity in its entirety, the 

reorganization will not have an immediate effect on biosurveillance. In the longer 

run, bringing the Department’s biological risk assessment activities within the 

CBRNE entity should improve our ability to ensure that our biosurveillance efforts 

are optimally informed about the evolving nature of biological risks and hazards. 

However, these efforts will also be informed by CBRNE-related projects and expertise remaining in the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate and other parts of 

DHS, and maintaining the close working relationships between the CBRNE entity 

and the rest of the Department will be necessary to optimally inform biosurveillance 

and other activities. 
52 

This CBRNE reorganization is focused on making smart choices in consolidating 

DHS headquarters functions to address threats. The goal is not to change the scope 

of our biosurveillance capability but rather to be better able to adapt and adjust to 

threats as they evolve. Further, the reorganization will help amplify existing efforts 

by looking across the entire space to find the gaps and work together to address 

them. 

Question 4. Dr. Brinsfield, this year, the Office of Health Affairs Chemical Defense Program conducted a Chemical Demonstration Project in Baltimore, Maryland. Within the next year, the Demonstration Project will be expanded to four new 

cities. 

How will the Department ensure that on-going activities, such as the Chemical 

Demonstration Project, are not interrupted? 

Answer. Since the Chemical Demonstration Project is conducted by the OHA, 

which is being brought into the new CBRNE entity in its entirety, the reorganization will not have an immediate effect on this program. Rather, this reorganization 

is intended to integrate the broad and complex DHS mission space and empower 

DHS components to more effectively execute their operations. The Chemical Defense 

Program will continue to pursue its projects and provide invaluable insight and expertise to DHS senior leaders, the Federal Government, and State and local communities. OHA chemical demonstration projects are currently underway in four cities: 

Houston, TX; Boise, ID; New Orleans, LA, and Nassau County, NY. These four cities were chosen through a competitive selection process evaluating their chemical 

threat risk (city and venue) and community interest and goals to improve chemical 

incident preparedness. I can assure you that, as a critical portion of our chemical 

defense portfolio, the demonstration projects will not be interrupted due to the forming of the new CBRNE office. It is our intent through the consolidation of the 

CBRNE missions to increase awareness of the Chemical Defense Program. 

The demonstration projects focus on improving information flow, enhancing decision making and aligning resources to optimize emergency response. At the completion of all the demonstration projects, OHA will have examined in detail where the 

leverage points within the emergency response system exist and will have identified 

where specific solutions can address the greatest challenges, limitations, and gaps 

each community faces. Our analysis is intended to lead to the delivery of a set of 

preparedness tools, shared best practices, and guidance for comprehensive community preparedness to a large-scale chemical incident. 

Question 5. Dr. Brinsfield, does the Department anticipate that the consolidation 

would have an effect on the mission of the National Biosurveillance Integration Center? 

Answer. Since the National Biosurveillance Integration Center is located within 

the OHA, which is being brought into the new CBRNE entity in its entirety, the 

reorganization will not have an immediate effect on its operations or mission. Rather, this reorganization is intended to integrate the broad and complex DHS mission 

space and empower DHS components to effectively execute their operations. OHA’s 

programs, including the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC), will 

continue within the new CBRNE organization. In meeting its mission to integrate 

information about threats to human, animal, plant, and environmental health, 

NBIC already shares information with its partners regarding a variety of CBRNE 

and emerging infectious disease threat sources which will continue and complement 

the activities of the new organization. For example, past reporting has occurred during nuclear power plant disasters, chemical spills, natural disasters, and novel disease outbreaks such as Ebola. NBIC frequently taps into the subject-matter expertise resident within OHA to field a range of requests from its stakeholders. This 

reach-back capability will only be strengthened within the new structure as NBIC 

will have more ready access to the considerable radiological, nuclear, and explosive 

SMEs consolidated in the new organization. The Department sees the reorganization as an opportunity to capitalize on the concentration of CBRNE expertise to enhance the mission of NBIC. 

Question 6. Dr. Brinsfield, the current BioWatch system has been in the field for 

over a decade and the National Academies and the GAO have raised questions on 

the value this type of biosurveillance adds across the broader threat arena. What 

impact will expanding the scope of DHS’s traditional biosurveillance efforts have on 

the BioWatch program? 

Answer. DHS is committed to countering biological threats and hazards. The 2014 

DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review included biological threats and hazards as a top homeland security risk. The BioWatch Program is the only early warning system for aerosolized biological threats and is a key element of DHS’s strategy 

to manage biological risk, per the 2014 QHSR. BioWatch helps build the preparedness of local jurisdictions in case of a biological attack, informing and equipping de-
53 

cision makers at the local, State, and Federal levels with the information they need 

to make decisions that can save lives and mitigate damage. The goal of this CBRNE 

reorganization is not to change the scope of our biosurveillance efforts or the role 

for BioWatch, per se, but rather to be better able to adapt and adjust to threats 

as they evolve. BioWatch will benefit from the enhanced coordination, as will all of 

OHA’s programs. In addition, the Secretary identified BioWatch as the DHS Program of Record for biosurveillance and directed that the technology used in the 

BioWatch Program be updated. Consistent with the Secretary’s decision, the OHA 

BioWatch Program is actively working with DHS S&T, our Federal partners and 

partners at the State and local level to identify new and better technologies and 

field them as soon as possible. 

The use of biodetection, while complementary with surveillance, provides certain 

advantages over medical surveillance alone. Medical surveillance detects the presence of disease in the population after people become symptomatic. Biodetection detects the presence of a potential attack prior to the population becoming symptomatic and allows for the dispensing of antibiotics before symptoms appear, making 

for a more efficient response. These benefits of biodetection were reinforced by an 

independent analysis conducted by both the Institute for Defense Analyses in 2013 

and Sandia National Laboratory in 2012. In addition, the environmental surveillance provided by BioWatch provides more precise information on timing, specific 

location and the type of agent used in an attack. 

Question 7. If Congress were to approve the reorganization proposal, what specific 

steps would the Department take to limit the negative impact on employee morale? 

Answer. The morale of our employees is a priority for the Department. The deputy 

secretary is undertaking a number of initiatives to find innovative ways to engage 

employees, share employee ideas, and address concerns regarding transparency in 

hiring, promotion, and training opportunities. These principles will be practiced 

within the new CBRNE office. Specifically, the Department will engage employees 

and provide avenues for information sharing and feedback between leadership and 

staff throughout the reorganization process. The Department will develop a change 

management and communications plan to help make the process as smooth as possible for all employees. 

Open communication throughout the included organizations and two-way information forums will reduce the negative impact on morale. Effective change management will be important as this reorganization takes place, and we have been keeping our employees apprised and engaged in the process. We are committed to helping our employees achieve our mission through this new organization, and we will 

continue to support them and help them in moving the mission forward. 

Question 8. Two years into the realignment, what should this committee be looking for, in the way of metrics, to know whether it was a success? 

Answer. The new CBRNE office should be judged on how well the Department’s 

CBRNE policies, strategies, plans, budgets, acquisitions, and other activities are 

synchronized across the breadth of DHS stakeholders and how they are driving improved operational results. We will not be judging the new organization solely by 

the publication of new guidance documents. Rather, we will assess the effectiveness 

of the new CBRNE Office, as we do with other elements of DHS, on the success of: 

CBRNE capability requirements development; sustainable investment in CBRNE-related capabilities; CBRNE acquisition program health; CBRNE operational plan development and exercises; and ultimately, our response effectiveness to CBRNE 

threats and incidents, whether naturally-occurring or man-made. 

Question 9. The proposed consolidation for the CBRNE office appears a bit lopsided. The CBRNE office will do R&D for radiological and nuclear activities, but 

S&T will keep researching chemical and biological technologies. 

Does the Department anticipate requesting future reorganizations to further align 

CBRNE R&D functions? 

Answer. The Department does not have future plans to further align chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives Research and Development (R&D) 

functions. One of the driving principles for this reorganization has been to ‘‘preserve 

programs and activities that are currently working.’’ Therefore, the proposed structure for R&D seeks to minimize the disruption to CBRNE R&D activities. Due to 

the current synergies between chemical and biological R&D within S&T and the facilities at which the work is conducted, the R&D function will not transfer to the 

CBRNE Office. The CBRNE office would provide requirements and work closely 

with S&T for the needed chemical and biological R&D for the office. Radiological 

and nuclear R&D, which is currently performed extremely effectively in DNDO, 

would move to the new CBRNE office and continue to receive R&D requirements 

from the DHS operating components. 
54 

Question 10a. There are concerns about how the CBRNE reorganization would affect the existing relationships that OHA, S&T, and DNDO have with stakeholder 

groups. 

Under the reorganization, how does the Department envision sustaining relations 

with stakeholder groups? 

Question 10b. For example, if the assistant secretary determined that the 

BioWatch program no longer aligned with the current threat picture and decide to 

nix the program, how would the Department go about sustaining its partnerships 

with the State and local public health officials who participated in BioWatch? 

Question 10c. Similarly, how does the Department expect Federal interagency relationships to be affected by the reorganization? 

Answer. OHA, S&T, and DNDO, and the other offices included in this reorganization, will continue to provide the same level of support to their Federal, State, and 

local stakeholders and will work to ensure minimal disruption to their partners. 

One of the focus areas of the new organization is to ensure strong coordination processes and procedures both internally and with other Departmental and interagency 

partners to advance the DHS CBRNE agenda through a single point of contact on 

CBRNE issues. In this new structure, when an agency reaches out to DHS, we will 

be coordinated and ready to work with their equivalent offices. Similarly, when 

State, local, non-Governmental, and private partners reach to DHS for help, we can 

assist them regardless of the issue, or the changing nature of the threat they face. 

The BioWatch Program is the only early warning system for aerosolized biological 

threats and is a key element of DHS’s strategy to manage biological risk, per the 

2014 QHSR. There are no plans to cancel the BioWatch program. Further, the assistant secretary for CBRNE would use strategic prioritization documents and Departmental review processes when implementing the Department’s priority programs. It should be noted that a major strength of the BioWatch Program is the 

interaction that it has at virtually all levels of Government. The BioWatch Program 

is building preparedness by coordinating and/or participating in 30-plus exercises/ 

drills annually, creating guidance documents, providing essential training and technical assistance to stakeholders Nation-wide, and enabling a forum for Federal, 

State, and local stakeholders to share all types of relevant data and information 

during an act of bioterrorism. Also, the BioWatch Program has forged strong ties 

at the Federal level, expanding cooperation and strengthening ties with a number 

of agencies. This capability will be maintained and further leveraged within the new 

CBRNE office. 

QUESTION FROM HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE FOR KATHRYN H. BRINSFIELD

Question. Biological threats like Ebola can cross our borders without notice. An 

apparently healthy person that enters the United States can become infectious within 21 days. Ebola is not the worst of the highly infectious diseases—only an example 

of one of the challenges of a biological early detection system. We have hoped for 

an automated system that could detect chemical and perhaps biological agents on 

a person through an early detection system. The experience of the last year with 

Ebola raises questions about the role first responders play in early detection and 

containment. 

The focus of much of the work on detection and containment efforts may focus 

on emerging infectious diseases, which can be defined as those infectious diseases 

that have newly appeared in a population or have existed but are rapidly increasing 

in incidence or geographic range, or that are caused by one of the NIAID Category 

A, B, or C priority pathogens. 

Ebola is designated as a Category A infectious disease along with anthrax, botulism, plague, and small pox. It is likely that should a terrorist attack come in this 

form, it would likely be discovered after people start to become ill. 

Should we be more focused on training, equipment, and protocols for first responders on the local and State level to better prepare for biological threats? 

Would a survey conducted by local health departments of hospitals be helpful in 

learning how prepared they may be to address highly infectious diseases that may 

arrive without notice? 

Answer. The training, equipment, and protocols for first responders are of primary 

importance for the Department. For example, in the past year OHA has published 

two guidance documents for first responders in collaboration with our interagency 

partners: Patient Decontamination in a Mass Chemical Exposure Incident: National 

Planning Guidance for Communities; and First Responder Guidance for Improving 

Survivability in Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and/or Active Shooter Incidents. 

Past guidance has focused on protecting responders against the anthrax threat. In 

addition to providing guidance, OHA is also developing a pilot initiative to educate 
55 

first responders about anthrax and offer them voluntary access to the anthrax vaccine. 

OHA collaborates with National emergency medical service (EMS) organizations 

and Federal Government entities to help identify EMS system needs and possible 

solutions and engages EMS stakeholders Nation-wide to improve response coordination between jurisdictions and agencies, across State lines, and with the Federal 

Government. Through these collaborations, OHA contributed to interagency guidance on personal protective equipment for first responders in response to the Ebola 

threat; and worked with FEMA to make sure communities can use their grant dollars to purchase personal protective equipment for non-law enforcement personnel 

responding to Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or active-shooter incidents. OHA 

also participates in the Interagency Board, a group of emergency preparedness and 

response practitioners who assist in the development and implementation of performance criteria, standards, test protocols, and requirements for all-hazards incident response equipment. 

The BioWatch program works with State and local officials and responders in jurisdictions across the country to develop clear and detailed plans to respond to biological agent detection, and the NBIC distributes reports on emerging and current 

biological threats to approximately 1,500 State and local officials. We are also developing a set of preparedness tools, shared best practices, and guidance for comprehensive community preparedness to a large-scale chemical incident through our 

chemical demonstration projects. We will continue to prioritize supporting first responders, in coordination with our DHS and interagency partners, to ensure they 

get the tools, resources, and training they need to act as the Nation’s first line of 

defense. 

In the event of a National health threat/emergency the Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS) Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) 

and HHS’s Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have substantial responsibilities. ASPR is the chief advisor on public health and medical preparedness 

for and response to emergencies. It maintains a database of hospitals and associated 

resources, as well as other facilities capable of providing health care; it also manages a program that can obtain near-real-time counts of available beds under several bed categories. Among CDC’s public health responsibilities, specifically in the 

response to Ebola, were designing the tiered health care system approach (front-line 

facilities, assessment hospitals, and Ebola treatment centers), deploying teams of experts to hospitals at the request of States, and working with States and hospitals 

to identify any operational gaps and recommend improvements. The CDC also 

issued Interim Guidance for Preparing Frontline Healthcare Facilities for Patients 

Under Investigation for Ebola Virus Disease. 

QUESTION FROM HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, JR. FOR REGINALD BROTHERS

Question 1a. Dr. Brothers, historically, the Science and Technology Directorate 

struggled to get its footing in the Department, but seems to have made progress in 

recent years. 

How does the Department plan to address the unavoidable employee morale implications for workers impacted by the stripping of chem-bio risk assessment responsibilities from S&T? 

Answer. As stated previously, the morale of our employees is a priority for the 

Department. The Deputy Secretary is undertaking a number of initiatives to find 

innovative ways to engage employees, share employee ideas, and address concerns 

regarding transparency in hiring, promotion, and training opportunities. These principles will be practiced within the new CBRNE office. 

S&T’s workforce is committed to the Department’s missions and the Secretary’s 

Unity of Effort initiative. We anticipate minimal morale impact, but S&T leadership 

is committed to open and transparent communication with any affected staff to address concerns and mitigate any negative perceptions. Open communication 

throughout the included organizations and two-way information forums will also reduce the risk to negative impact on morale. We are committed to helping our employees achieve our mission through this new organization, and we will continue to 

support them and help them achieve their goals moving forward. 

S&T has initiated several broader morale initiatives which we believe will also 

mitigate any potential negative effects. We have established, for example, an Employee Council with several subcommittees, all comprised of employees from a crosssection of the S&T to develop solutions and improved procedures in key areas of our 

business. 

Question 1b. How will losing the risk assessment component of its work affect 

S&T’s chem-bio R&D responsibilities? 
56 

Answer. The Terrorism Risk Assessments and Biodefense Knowledge Center are 

integrated elements of S&T’s Chemical and Biological Defense R&D portfolio and 

help inform projects dealing with emerging and future threats. With the proposed 

move to a new CBRNE office, certain changes and additional coordination will need 

to be made to ensure the continued operation and success of the R&D portfolio. S&T 

would work closely with the proposed CBRNE office to ensure that S&T’s needs for 

longer-term assessments are still met. 

Question 1c. If DHS expanded its bio-surveillance capability, how would it ensure 

its efforts do not duplicate those performed by other agencies, such as the Departments of Health and Human Services, Agriculture, the Interior, and the Environmental Protection Agency? 

Answer. As stated previously, this CBRNE reorganization is focused on making 

smart choices in consolidating DHS headquarters functions to address threats. The 

goal is not to change the scope of our biosurveillance capability, but rather to be 

better able to adapt and adjust to threats as they evolve. The reorganization should 

not cause any duplication of efforts performed by other agencies, and biosurveillance 

activities will continue to be coordinated with other Federal agencies through established mechanisms like working groups, interagency policy committees, and requirements generation activities. We believe the CBRNE office will help to strengthen 

and streamline interagency relationships and collaboration to advance the DHS 

CBRNE agenda, by creating one place in DHS headquarters where all Federal agencies can go to find the right expertise on CBRNE-related issues. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE FOR REGINALD BROTHERS

Question 1. Dr. Brothers, the Science and Technology Office over the course of its 

existence had difficulty developing a Federal laboratory testing process that certifies 

technology for its ability to perform as needed. You have an exceptional background 

in science and technology which includes extensive experience in the management 

of DOD laboratories. 

What have you been able to do to improve the laboratory accreditation and testing 

process? 

Answer. S&T is responsible for research, development, testing, and evaluation in 

DHS. To assist the under secretary in fulfilling responsibilities for test and evaluation, the Secretary delegated authorities to the director of operational test and evaluation (DOT&E). The DOT&E has well-established procedures for supporting program development of realistic operational tests. However, this type of testing typically occurs late in the acquisition process, after initial production has begun, in 

order to approve proceeding to full rate production. It has been our observation that 

a key determinant of successful acquisition is ensuring the program properly sets 

the conditions to begin initial production. We continue to work with our partners 

in the DHS management directorate and in DHS components to improve early engagement and strengthen acquisition processes by involving S&T in developmental 

testing and evaluation activities, and providing systems engineering support for assessment of technical risks. If you are interested in more information, we would be 

happy to provide you or your staff a more in-depth briefing on the subject. 

Question 2. Has the Office of Science and Technology been able to compete for and 

recruit the top talent you need? If no, why not? 

Answer. Human Resources S&T managers have used a variety of hiring authorities to attract qualified applicants. For example, S&T makes optimal use of Homeland Security Act of 2002 Section 307 to hire eminent experts in science and engineering under the Administratively Determined (AD) hiring authority, with 27 AD 

employees on-board now or in the application pipeline. We also use the Intergovernmental Personnel Act authority to augment our ability to obtain experts in science 

and engineering for temporary appointments. S&T has also utilized a host of shortterm detail assignments, both reimbursable and non-reimbursable, to be able to acquire individuals with specific program-related skills and experience when needed. 

Question 3. Is there something that the committee can do to improve the ability 

of your office to identify technology needs and to inform the committee on what innovations are needed but are not currently available? 

Answer. S&T appreciates that Congress has been supportive of the organization 

and the need in the Department for wider use of better technology. Through Unity 

of Effort-focused bodies like the Deputy’s Management Action Group and Joint Requirements Council, S&T has made great strides to draw closer to the components 

and more effectively identify and address their technology gaps and needs. New 

S&T efforts underway such as the Targeted Innovation Technology Acceleration 

Network (TITAN) along with enduring efforts such as the Centers of Excellence are 

ensuring that S&T connects the Homeland Security Enterprise to innovation com-
57 

1 National Academies and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Radiological Attack: Dirty 

Bombs and Other Devices. Washington, DC (2004), 1. Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/ 

publication/radiological-attack-fact-sheet. 2 Ibid. 

3 Ibid. 

4 Ibid. 

5 International Atomic Energy Agency, Categorization of Radioactive Sources, Safety Guide 

No. RS–G–1.9 (2005). 6 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Agreement State Program, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/ 

state-tribal/agreement-states.html (June 30, 2015). 7 International Atomic Energy Agency, Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Vienna, Austria. (2004) 6. Retrieved from http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/ 

publications/PDF/code-2004lweb.pdf. 

munities in small businesses, at universities, and elsewhere around the country and 

abroad. As S&T continues to implement new and better ways to deliver innovative 

solutions, we will also continue to work with Congress to keep Congress informed 

of the progress we are making. If you, or your staff, are interested in more information on S&T’s vision for the future of the organization, we would be happy to provide a more in-depth briefing on the subject. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE FOR HUBAN A. GOWADIA

Question 1. Dr. Gowadia the 18th Congressional District of Texas is located in the 

city of Houston. Houston is the Nation’s fourth-largest city, and has one of the largest ports in the Nation, an international airport and a complex State and inter-State 

highway system. 

As you know, nuclear threats may involve taking radiological materials that are 

used for beneficial medical or industrial purposes such as fuel or spent fuel for a 

nuclear power plant, radiological material used in diagnosis or treatment of patients, or industrial material. The tracking and management of these materials 

would be of importance to National, State, and local authorities. 

Should the materials come under the control of terrorists could they be combined 

with an explosive device? 

Answer. If stolen or otherwise acquired radiological materials came into the possession of a terrorist, it is possible they could be used in an explosive radiological 

dispersal device, otherwise known as a ‘‘dirty bomb.’’1 Such a bomb uses conventional explosive to disperse radiological material. 

Question 2. Could a weapon like this contaminate a large area while also exposing 

people to immediate and long-term health risks? 

Answer. It is extremely difficult to design a dirty bomb that would deliver radiation doses high enough to cause acute radiation health effects or fatalities in a 

large number of people. Near-term injuries from a dirty bomb would primarily occur 

from the heat, debris and force of the conventional explosion used to disperse the 

radioactive material, affecting only individuals close to the site of the explosion.2 In 

addition, however, a dirty bomb is expected to have economic and behavioral health 

consequences. For example, radioactive contamination from a dirty bomb could deny 

use of the area and necessitate an expensive clean-up, thereby causing a disruption 

to lives and commerce. It would also likely cause anxiety to those in the immediate 

and surrounding areas who believe believed they had been exposed to radiation.3

The long-term health effect of exposure to radiation from a dirty bomb is the elevated risk of developing cancer later in life, commensurate with the level of radiation dose incurred, although the risk is limited.4

Question 3. What can be done to track the use and disposal of radiological materials found in industrial, research, and medical devices that could pose a threat if 

obtained by terrorists? 

Answer. To monitor the use and disposal of radiological materials found in industrial, research, and medical applications, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) uses the National Source Tracking System (NSTS), a secure web-based database that tracks Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources 5 regulated by the NRC and 

the Agreement States.6 NSTS tracks data spanning the life cycle of the source from 

manufacture through shipment receipt, to decay, and burial. This system fulfills the 

U.S. Government’s commitment to implement a National source registry, as described in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, 

which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued in January 2004.7

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, JR. FOR ALAN D. COHN

Question 1. If Congress were to approve the reorganization proposal, what specific 

steps would the Department take to limit the negative impact on employee morale? 
58 

Answer. Reorganization of DHS’s headquarters CBRNE functions is an opportunity to improve morale across the Department’s CBRNE functions. Employee morale is enhanced in any organization when: • Mission responsibility is clearly defined and matched with appropriate authority; • The leadership structure is lean and sensible; • The organization’s leaders are held accountable for excellence and hold their 

subordinates accountable for excellence; • The organization recruits, trains, and focuses on retaining top talent, creates 

progressive opportunities for advancement into either leadership or senior technical positions, and ensures a robust interchange of personnel and information 

between headquarters entities, the Department’s operating components, and the 

Department’s external stakeholders. 

Reorganization gives the Department and the leaders of the Department’s CBRNE 

functions the opportunities to implement or enhance these elements. 

Question 2. Two years into the realignment, what should this committee be looking for, in the way of metrics, to know whether it was a success? 

Answer. The Department has put forward a set of goals for the proposed consolidation of its CBRNE headquarters functions, which provide the foundations for outcomes and metrics such as the following: • Provide Clear Roles and Responsibilities for DHS HQ and Operating Components.—The Secretary has formally delegated CBRNE-related authorities and 

designated CBRNE-related responsibilities, and DHS headquarters offices and 

operating components publicly identify and rely on the DHS CBRNE headquarters office for those responsibilities assigned to the CBRNE office. • Enable DHS to Formulate and Communicate Consistent Departmental Positions 

on CBRNE Issues.—Department offices and operating components, interagency 

partners, external stakeholders, and Congress consistently identify the CBRNE 

office as the source for consolidated, integrated, and sensible CBRNE-related 

Departmental positions on CBRNE issues. • Provide DHS the Ability to Effectively Structure, Oversee, and Execute Major 

CBRNE-Related Acquisitions.—The CBRNE office, working with the relevant 

component Chief Acquisition Executives, the DHS Management Directorate, the 

DHS Joint Requirements Council and Investment Review Board, and the Department’s overall governance bodies (i.e. the Deputy’s Management Action 

Group and the Senior Leadership Council), has ensured that all CBRNE-related 

programs on the DHS Major Acquisition Oversight List are properly aligned to 

mission, have clearly-defined joint requirements responsive to operational 

needs, are funded at the levels specified in their acquisition program baselines, 

and are performing at the level anticipated in their program designs. 

These or similar metrics can serve as effective proxies for the success of the consolidated DHS headquarters CBRNE office. 

Question 3. The proposed consolidation for the CBRNE office appears a bit lopsided. The CBRNE office will do R&D for radiological and nuclear activities, but 

S&T will keep researching chemical and biological technologies. 

Does the Department anticipate requesting future reorganizations to further align 

CBRNE R&D functions? 

Answer. As a private citizen, I do not know and cannot speculate on whether the 

Department anticipates requesting future reorganizations of the Department’s 

CBRNE R&D functions. As discussed at the hearing, it is difficult to say with certainty whether the current R&D model for radiological and nuclear activities, the 

current R&D model for chemical and biological activities, or a third model, is bestsuited to ensuring effective mission execution and guarding against the failure of 

major systems acquisitions. However, this is an answerable question, and Congress 

and the Department should actively seek that answer. For that reason, Congress 

should mandate that the Department assess the effectiveness of each of these models, and should mandate than an independent study be conducted by an organization with familiarity with these models as well as those of other Federal departments and agencies and corporate entities. Congress can then revisit this last 

CBRNE-related organizational question once both the Department and an independent organization have completed their review. 

Question 4a. There are concerns about how the CBRNE reorganization would affect the existing relationships that OHA, S&T, and DNDO have with stakeholder 

groups. 

Under the reorganization, how does the Department envision sustaining relations 

with stakeholder groups? 

Question 4b. For example, if the assistant secretary determined that the BioWatch 

program no longer aligned with the current threat picture and decide to nix the pro-
59 

gram, how would the Department go about sustaining its partnerships with the 

State and local public health officials who participated in BioWatch? 

Question 4c. Similarly, how does the Department expect Federal interagency relationships to be affected by the reorganization? 

Answer. As a private citizen, I do not know and cannot speculate about the Department’s plans for how a consolidated CBRNE organization would interact with 

its partners and stakeholders. However, consolidation of the Department’s headquarters CBRNE functions provides the opportunity to enhance the Department’s 

relationships with those partners and stakeholders. Consolidation of these functions 

allows the Department to make decisions concerning its portfolio of CBRNE programs and activities in a consolidated, integrated, and transparent way. Consolidation also provides a single senior official with true responsibility and authority 

across the Department’s CBRNE headquarters responsibility to serve as the senior 

point of contact for the Department’s partners and stakeholders, and the spokesperson for the Department with respect to external partners and stakeholders. So, 

for example, should the Department decide that a specific program—or approach for 

executing a program—is no longer sound, the Department would need to make such 

a decision and determine the best path forward in conjunction with its interagency 

and non-Federal partners and stakeholders. A single DHS headquarters CBRNE official, working together with the Department’s leadership and the Department operating components that maintain the operational relationships with the relevant 

partners and stakeholders, would better enable the Department to enhance its 

stakeholder engagement in such a situation. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, JR. FOR WARREN STERN

Question 1. If Congress were to approve the reorganization proposal, what specific 

steps would the Department take to limit the negative impact on employee morale? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. Two years into the realignment, what should this committee be looking for, in the way of metrics, to know whether it was a success? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. The proposed consolidation for the CBRNE office appears a bit lopsided. The CBRNE office will do R&D for radiological and nuclear activities, but 

S&T will keep researching chemical and biological technologies. 

Does the Department anticipate requesting future reorganizations to further align 

CBRNE R&D functions? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4a. There are concerns about how the CBRNE reorganization would affect the existing relationships that OHA, S&T, and DNDO have with stakeholder 

groups. 

Under the reorganization, how does the Department envision sustaining relations 

with stakeholder groups? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4b. For example, if the assistant secretary determined that the BioWatch 

program no longer aligned with the current threat picture and decide to nix the program, how would the Department go about sustaining its partnerships with the 

State and local public health officials who participated in BioWatch? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4c. Similarly, how does the Department expect Federal interagency relationships to be affected by the reorganization? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, JR. FOR RICK ‘‘OZZIE’’ NELSON

Question 1. If Congress were to approve the reorganization proposal, what specific 

steps would the Department take to limit the negative impact on employee morale? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. Two years into the realignment, what should this committee be looking for, in the way of metrics, to know whether it was a success? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. The proposed consolidation for the CBRNE office appears a bit lopsided. The CBRNE office will do R&D for radiological and nuclear activities, but 

S&T will keep researching chemical and biological technologies. 

Does the Department anticipate requesting future reorganizations to further align 

CBRNE R&D functions? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 
60 

Question 4a. There are concerns about how the CBRNE reorganization would affect the existing relationships that OHA, S&T, and DNDO have with stakeholder 

groups. 

Under the reorganization, how does the Department envision sustaining relations 

with stakeholder groups? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4b. For example, if the Assistant Secretary determined that the 

BioWatch program no longer aligned with the current threat picture and decide to 

nix the program, how would the Department go about sustaining its partnerships 

with the State and local public health officials who participated in BioWatch? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4c. Similarly, how does the Department expect Federal interagency relationships to be affected by the reorganization? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

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