alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-7332

LARRY M. STEELE,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

PATRICIA R. STANSBERRY, Warden,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,

District Judge. (CA-05-381-5)

Submitted: December 16, 2005 Decided: December 28, 2005

Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry M. Steele, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Larry M. Steele, a federal prisoner, appeals the district

court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241 (2000). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible

error because the claim is foreclosed by our decision in Yi v.

Federal Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526 (4th Cir. 2005).

Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and affirm

the order of the district court. See Steele v. Stansberry, No.

CA-05-381-5 (E.D.N.C. July 27, 2005). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

___________________________

No. 23-2540

___________________________ 

Gabriela Ansurez-Chavez

 Petitioner

v.

Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States

 Respondent

____________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

____________ 

Submitted: February 7, 2024

Filed: February 12, 2024

[Unpublished] 

____________ 

Before SHEPHERD, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Gabriela Ansurez-Chavez missed her immigration hearing and was ordered 

removed in absentia in 2003. Although she challenges the decision not to reopen 

the case 18 years later, we deny the petition for review.
-2- 

Despite her arguments to the contrary, the Board did not abuse its discretion 

in concluding that she received notice of her hearing back in 2003. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii); Diaz v. Lynch, 824 F.3d 758, 760 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) 

(reviewing the denial of a motion to reopen under an abuse-of-discretion standard). 

The agency sent a notice to appear by certified mail and follow-up notices by regular 

mail to the address she provided. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (authorizing service by 

mail). An “unsupported denial of receipt” does not rebut the presumption that they 

were delivered. Patel v. Holder, 652 F.3d 962, 969 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted)

(addressing certified mail); see also Diaz, 824 F.3d at 760 (addressing regular mail); 

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(B) (stating that an alien who fails to provide a current 

address is not entitled to written notice). 

As for the other issues she raises, they are harmless, see Aguilar v. Garland, 

60 F.4th 401, 407 (8th Cir. 2023); waived, see Chay-Velasquez v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 

751, 756 (8th Cir. 2004); unexhausted, see Essel v. Garland, 89 F.4th 686, 691 (8th 

Cir. 2023); or unreviewable, see Vue v. Barr, 953 F.3d 1054, 1057–58 (8th Cir. 

2020). We accordingly deny the petition for review. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________
#### YENSEL v. DAYTON RUBBER MFG. CO

Ohio Appeals, 2nd Dist, Montgomery Co

No 922.

Decided July 2, 1929

I. L. Jacobson, Dayton, for Yensel.

Burkhart, Heald & Pickrel, Dayton, for Rubber Co.

ALLREAD, J.

It appears from the admissions of counsel for the defendant in error that Earl Weaver was a regular truck driver of the defendant in error, and was employed upon and in engaged in driving said truck in the business of the company until twelve o’clock noon of that day. There were no admissions covering the subsequent period. This accident took place in the afternoon, shortly after two-thirty o’clock of said day. The only evidence in addition to the admissions is that of Reuben-stein, who testifies that after the collision he found evidence on the truck of liquor, and also that the driver of said truck was drunk.

Reubenstein also testifies that the truck carried boards in such a manner as to indicate its use in carrying, passengers. The record is silent, however, as to any mission or errand of Earl Weaver at this particular time for the business of his principal. We think the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff, and this fact should have been established or at least there should have been some evidence tending to establish the same.

The fact that he was in the employ of the company and was driving the truck on the business of the company until twelve o’clock noon of that day, is no evidence that he was driving the truck in the business of the company at the time of the accident.

We have carefully considered the authorities upon this subject. In our judgment the case of the White Oak Coal Company vs. Rivoux, 88 OS. 18 and the case of Braun vs. Overdack, 113 OS. 613 are to the effect that evidence at least tending to support this proposition must be offered by the plaintiff.

Counsel for plaintiff in error relies upon the case of Rosenberg vs. Reynolds, 11 Ohio Appeals, page 70. We have carefully examined that case and while there are many points similar in that case and the case at bar, the cases cited by the defendant in error are subsequent thereto and in our judgment are controlling.

We are, therefore, of opinion that the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas must be affirmed.

Kunkle and Hornbeck, JJ, concur.
Sincerely 

CBIC Control Number 

p. 1 

363102 

RECEIVED 

OPPT CEIC 

2014 DEC 23 Ail II: 16 

DuPont Chemicals and Fluoroproducts 

Chambers Works 

Deepwater, NJ 08023 

December 17, 2014 

Director, Chemical Control Division 

US Environmental Protection Agency 

Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics 

EPA East 

Room 4146 

1201 Constitution Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20004 

Re: EPA — HQ — OPPT — 2003 - 0012 

DuPont Chambers Works NJPDES Permit No. NJ0005100 

PFOA Data Submittal — Outfall DSN662 Weekly Grab Samples 

November 2014 Sample Data 

Dear Chemical Control Division: 

Attached please find summaries of PFOA analytical results for the DuPont Chambers Works 

weekly grab samples taken at internal outfall DSN662A in November 2014. In accordance with 

the current site NJPDES permit (NJ0005100, effective September 2011), these results are 

provided to NJDEP on a monthly basis via electronic discharge monitoring reports. The 

enclosures include two paper and two electronic copies of the analytical results from this 

monitoring period. 

Am ha Jeyarajasingam 

Area Manager-Secure Environmental Treatment 

DuPont Chambers Works 

AJ/cic 

Enclosures 

iaii9114 
Copy to: 

Document Control Office 

US Environmental Protection Agency 

Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics 

EPA East 

Room 6428 

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20460 

Ms. Susan Rosenwinkel (cover letter only) 

Principal Environmental Engineer 

NJDEP Division of Water Quality 

Bureau of Water Surfacing 

Mail Code 401-02B 

401 E. State Street 

P.O. Box 420 

Trenton, NJ 08625-0420 

p. 2 
P. 3 

Ploy01 

ug/L =micrograms perLiter 

I representasingle analysis,exceptforthesamplecollectedon11 /2/1 4 

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#### Ward *v.*The State.

Violating Animal Quarantine.

(Decided March 23, 1917.

74 South. 727.)

1. Animals; Quarantine; Affidavit. — Where the affidavit follows the form prescribed by the Code for proceedings in the county court, without undertaking to set out the constituents of the offense, it was sufficient to sustain the judgment.

2. Appeal and Error; Review; Demurrers. — Where the record does not show the judgment of the court on the demurrers to the complaint, or on demurrers to defendant’s plea of misnomer, the entries of the clerk in the transcript “that said demurrers were sustained by the court” will not authorize a review.

3. Same; Special Charges; Bills of Exceptions. — In the absence of a bill of exceptions, the refusal of charges to defendant cannot be reviewed.

Appeal from Wilcox County Court.

Heard before Hon. J. N. Stanford.

*599Isaac S. Ward, alias, was convicted of violating the quarantine laws of the State Live Stock Sanitary Board, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

The affidavit charges that the offense of driving, moving, carrying, or transporting, or causing to be driven, moved, or transported in violation of the quarantine laws of the State Live Stock Sanitary Board cattle from Monroe county, Ala., a tick-infested area, into Wilcox county, Ala., has been committed in said county by Irvin S. Ward, alias I. S. Ward, on or about May 23, 1916. Defendant first interposed plea of misnomer that his true name was Isaac S. Ward, and not Irvin S. Ward as alleged, and that he had never been known or called by the name of Irvin S. Ward, etc. Demurrers were interposed, and in the transcript, but not in the judgment of the court, it is noted that said demurrers were sustained by the court, and defendant duly and legally excepted. Demurrers were also interposed to the complaint, but are not necessary to be here set out. The record contains the charges, but none of the evidence on which the trial was had.

Godbold & Godbold, for appellant.

W. L. Martin, Attorney General, for the State.

BROWN, P. J.

(1) The affidavit on which the defendant was tried and convicted follows the form prescribed by the statute for proceedings in the county court, without undertaking to set out the constituents of the offense, and is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the court. — Code 1907, § 6703; *Malloy v. State,*165 Ala. 117, 50 South. 1027; *Miles v. State,*94 Ala. 106, 11 South. 403; *Wilson v. State,*115 Ala. 129, 22 South. 567.

(2) The record does not show a judgment of the court on the demurrers to the complaint, nor on the demurrers to the defendant’s plea of misnomer; and the entries of the clerk in the transcript that “said demurrers were sustained by the court,” etc., will not authorize a *review.*— Alabama *Co. v. Brown,*129 Ala. 286, 29 South. 548; 5 Mayf. Dig. 566, § 51.

(3) The appeal is on the record without- a bill of exceptions; and the refusal of special charges to the defendant, as has been repeatedly held, cannot be reviewed without such bill.

Affirmed.
#### § 1606.1 Definition of national origin discrimination.

The Commission defines national origin discrimination broadly as including, but not limited to, the denial of equal employment opportunity because of an individual's, or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group. The Commission will examine with particular concern charges alleging that individuals within the jurisdiction of the Commission have been denied equal employment opportunity for reasons which are grounded in national origin considerations, such as (a) marriage to or association with persons of a national origin group; (b) membership in, or association with an organization identified with or seeking to promote the interests of national origin groups; (c) attendance or participation in schools, churches, temples or mosques, generally used by persons of a national origin group; and (d) because an individual's name or spouse's name is associated with a national origin group. In examining these charges for unlawful national origin discrimination, the Commission will apply general title VII principles, such as disparate treatment and adverse impact.
§ 101.39 Initiation of advisory opinion case. ( a ) The question of whether the Board will assert jurisdiction over a labor dispute which is the subject of a proceeding in an agency or court of a State or territory is initiated by the filing of a petition with the Board. This petition may be filed only if: ( 1 ) A proceeding is currently pending before such agency or court;
( 2 ) The petitioner is the agency or court itself; and
( 3 ) The relevant facts are undisputed or the agency or court has already made the relevant factual findings.
( b ) The petition must be in writing and signed. It is filed with the Executive Secretary of the Board in Washington, DC. No particular form is required, but the petition must be properly captioned and must contain the allegations required by section 102.99 of the Board's Rules and Regulations. None of the information sought may relate to the merits of the dispute. The petition may be withdrawn at any time before the Board issues its advisory opinion determining whether it would or would not assert jurisdiction on the basis of the facts before it.
[61 FR 65182, Dec. 11, 1996; 62 FR 52381, Oct. 7, 1997]
[No. 27410-8-II.

Division Two.

November 8, 2002.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Jo Ann Malone, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Grays Harbor County, No. 00-1-00429-2, F. Mark McCauley, J., entered April 19, *2001.Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Morgan, J., concurred in by Hunt, C.J., and Houghton, J.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**Certificationof the Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

I, Herbert Lindo,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of Kenilworth SystemsCorporation on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003 fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such AnnualReport on Form 10-K fairly presents in all material respects the financialcondition and results of operations of Kenilworth Systems Corporation.

 
| By:    | /s/ Herbert Lindo       |   |
|--------|-------------------------|--------|
| Name:  | Herbert Lindo           |   |
| Title: | Chief Executive Officer |   |
| Date:  | March 19, 2008     |   |

 

 

***Remainder of page intentionally left blank***

 

 

 

 

 

 

----
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.21

                                                 [SERVICEWARE TECHNOLOGIES LOGO]

2004 Executive Compensation Plan

Kent Heyman CEO

Components of Compensation:
Base Salary
Executive Bonus Incentive paid annually
Stock Options
Severance Agreement

2004 Plan
Base Salary:                                       $ 225,000
Target Executive Incentive:                        $ 125,000
                                                   ---------
Total Cash Compensation                            $ 350,000

Current Equity (stock options you hold now)        1,300,000
Stock Options to be Granted in 2004*:                800,000

*Special vesting schedule 25% after 1 year, 50% after 2 years, 25% after 3 years

2004 Executive Cash Incentive Model:

Paid annually
Key Metric: EBIDTA
Minimum threshold to begin earning incentive $700,000
Bonus caps at 150% of your target incentive at $3,000,000 EBIDTA.

You will earn 8.152% of every dollar EBIDTA between $700,000 and capping at
$3,000,000. Your cash incentive caps at 150% of your target executive incentive
stated above.

Stock Options:

As part of your long term compensation for ServiceWare, you will receive a new
grant of 800,000 options of ServiceWare stock that will vest over three years.

<PAGE>

Severance Agreement

Your severance agreement will remain as stated in your employment agreement.

In consideration for the foregoing severance agreement and incentive plan, and
as a condition precedent to the granting thereof, you must sign a current
ServiceWare Technologies, Inc. Confidentiality, Non-Competition and Assignment
of Inventions Agreement, in the form attached hereto, and have it in our files.

Please sign and return this agreement to Human Resources.

Signature: _________________________________________________
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

Nos. 97-20433 c/w 97-20434

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

KENNETH WAYNE CLEMMENS,

also known as Kenneth Wayne Clemens,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-97-CV-1362

- - - - - - - - - -

June 17, 1998

Before DAVIS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Kenneth Wayne Clemmens appeals from the district court’s

order denying his motion made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He

argues that the district court erred in dismissing his motion

without requiring the Government to file a pleading in response

or order an evidentiary hearing. We have reviewed the record and

the district court’s opinion and determine that Clemmens’

allegations fail to surmount the “formidable barrier” presented

by his open-court assertions at the sentencing hearing and his

plea agreement. An evidentiary hearing was not required. See
No. 97-20433, 97-20434 

-2-

United States v. Smith, 915 F.2d 959, 964 (5th Cir. 1990). 

AFFIRMED.
From: Fitzgerald, Kristin

To: Fitzgerald, Kristin

Subject: FW: Walmart data - Coumadin

Date: Wednesday, May 20, 2015 3:47:52 PM

Attachments: warfarin Summary with weights.xls

From: Lisa Lauer/DC/USEPA/US

To: Charlotte Mooney/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Kristin Fitzgerald/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Jessica Young/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, 

Date: 01/14/2011 03:50 PM

Subject: Fw: Walmart data - Coumadin

-----Forwarded by Lisa Lauer/DC/USEPA/US on 01/14/2011 03:52PM -----

To: Lisa Lauer/DC/USEPA/US@EPA

From: Richard Leahy - Legal <Richard.Leahy@walmartlegal.com>

Date: 01/14/2011 03:41PM

Subject: Walmart data - Coumadin

(See attached file: warfarin Summary with weights.xls)

Lisa: Pursuant to our recent conference call attached please find the data we gathered

 regarding the issue of whether "empty" plastic pill bottles should be considered P-waste when

 discarded. We did the sampling following the Florida protocol that you are familiar with. The

 results clearly show that less than .3% Coumadin is "present" in the container when compared to

 the original amount of Coumadin in the bottle when full. That is our understanding of how

 Florida did the analysis. However, the data also indicates how much Coumadin is "present"

 compared to the total weight of the waste, i.e., the discarded or recycled plastic bottle itself.

Those results are also clearly below the .3% standard that defines whether a Coumadin waste

 is a P or U listed waste. Based on these results, the bottles should be RCRA empty - U 248

 containers. 

As we discussed during our call there a number of other viable alternative rationales why the

 bottles should not be considered P waste but if EPA agrees that this data indicates the bottles

 are RCA empty - U 248 containers, then those other rationales may become moot. We are

 eager to have further discussions regarding this issue (and also would welcome further

 discussion about the Universal Waste Pharmaceutical Rule). Feel free to contact me any time.

If you have any questions regarding the data please let me know. 

Ps: one key point regarding the data is that each "result" is based on a composite from 3-4

 bottles. So the amounts indicated need to be divided by 3 or 4 to get individual bottle results. 

 The attachment explains this point but if you miss it the results will seem high in terms of residue

 amounts, pill weights, and bottle weights. 

Richard Leahy Associate General Counsel

Phone 479-277-8262, Fax 479-277-5991 

richard.leahy@walmartlegal.com
Walmart 

508 Southwest 8th Street

Bentonville, AR 72716-0505

Save money. Live better.

(See attached file: warfarin Summary with weights.xls)
Exhibit 32
                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                         18 U.S.C. 1350,
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In  connection with the Quarterly Report of AEI Income  &  Growth
Fund  23 LLC (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period  ended
March  31,  2007,  as  filed  with the  Securities  and  Exchange
Commission  on  the date hereof (the "Report"), the  undersigned,
Robert  P.  Johnson, President of AEI Fund Management XXI,  Inc.,
the  Managing Member of the Company, and Patrick W. Keene,  Chief
Financial Officer of AEI Fund Management XXI, Inc., each certify,
pursuant  to  18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section  906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     1.   The  Report  fully  complies with the  requirements  of
          Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange  Act
          of 1934; and

     2.   The   information  contained  in  the   Report   fairly
          presents,  in  all  material  respects,  the  financial
          condition and results of operations of the Company.


                          /s/ Robert P Johnson
                              Robert P. Johnson, President
                              AEI Fund Management XXI, Inc.
                              Managing Member
                              May 8, 2007



                          /s/ Patrick W Keene
                              Patrick W. Keene, Chief Financial Officer
                              AEI Fund Management XXI, Inc.
                              Managing Member
                              May 8, 2007