J-S56030-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WILBUR CYRUS BROWN

Appellant No. 787 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0002421-2005

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 15, 2015

Appellant Wilbur Cyrus Brown appeals pro se from an order entered in 

the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas denying his “Petition for 

Termination of Court Costs and Fines, Act 84[1] Collection” (“Act 84 

petition”). For the reasons that follow, we vacate the order.

Appellant pleaded guilty to rape2on June 8, 2006. On December 26, 

2006, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 5-10 years’ incarceration in 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728, commonly referred to as Act 84, authorizes the county 

correctional facility or the Department of Corrections to deduct monies from 

inmate prison accounts as payment towards outstanding court costs and 

restitution. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 858 A.2d 627, 628 n.1 

(Pa.Super.2004).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121.
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state prison. Additionally, Appellant’s sentence included $3,590.82 in court 

costs. Appellant filed neither post-sentence motions nor a direct appeal. 

On November 19, 2014, Appellant filed the Act 84 petition. The trial 

court conducted a hearing via video conference on February 20, 2015, and 

denied the Act 84 petition on March 18, 2015. Appellant filed a motion for 

reconsideration on April 8, 2015, which the court denied on April 10, 2015. 

On April 23, 2015, Appellant filed a notice of appeal.3 The trial court did not 

order Appellant to file a statement of matters complained of on appeal, but 

filed an opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925 

on May 15, 2015.

Appellant raises the following two issues for our review:

1.) Was the Defendants rights violated by not having a hearing 

pryor to imposing sentence to determine his Ability to pay court 

cost? Was Due Process violated?

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3 The trial court’s order denying the Act 84 petition is dated March 18, 2015. 

The docket reveals, however, that the trial court did not mail the order to 

Appellant until the following day, March 19, 2015, such that the 30th day fell 

on April 18, 2015, a Saturday. Consequently, Appellant had until the 

following Monday, April 20, 2015, to timely appeal. His notice of appeal is 

dated April 17, 2015. Therefore, although the notice of appeal was not 

docketed until April 23, 2015, per the prisoner mailbox rule, we deem the 

instant petition to have been timely filed. See Commonwealth v. 

Patterson, 931 A.2d 710, 714 (Pa.Super.2007) (noting that, even without a 

postmark definitively noting the date of mailing, this Court may avoid

quashal where the date of receipt indicates appellant likely placed the notice 

of appeal in the hands of prison authorities before the expiration of 30 

days).
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2.) Was the Defendants Rights Violated Under Equal Protection 

not by having him work 1000s of more hours to Pay off said cost 

than a person with Financial means?

Appellant’s Brief, p. 5 (verbatim).

Initially, because it bears directly on the validity of the underlying 

order, we must determine whether the court of common pleas had subject 

matter over this Act 84 petition before proceeding to the merits of 

Appellant’s claims.4 See Commonwealth v. Danysh, 833 A.2d 151, 152 

(Pa.Super.2003) (raising, sua sponte, the question of subject matter 

jurisdiction of an Act 84 claim ruled upon by the court of common pleas). 

Generally, unless a challenge to Act 84 deductions questions the validity or 

modification of the underlying sentence, petitions seeking the cessation of 

Act 84 deductions from state prison accounts fall within the original 

jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court.5 Commonwealth v. Jackson, 

858 A.2d 627, 629-30 (Pa.Super.2004); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 761.6 

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4 Despite the conclusion discussed infra that the trial court lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction, our own appellate jurisdiction in this matter is not in 

question. See Danysh, 833 A.2d at 152 n.1 (noting that, even though a 

trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain an Act 84 claim, its order thereon 

was final and appealable to this Court because it disposed of all claims and 

of all parties). 

5 We note that, when confined in county prisons, defendants’ Act 84 

petitions fall within the original jurisdiction of the Commonwealth’s courts of 

common pleas. See Danysh, 833 A.2d at 154.

6 The Judiciary Code provides:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Therefore, courts of common pleas lack subject matter jurisdiction over Act 

84 petitions, and their orders thereon are void. See Danysh, 833 A.2d at 

154. 

Instantly, the Act 84 petition requests cessation of Act 84 deductions 

from Appellant’s prison account. Accordingly, the Act 84 petition falls within 

the original jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court, and the trial court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Act 84 petition.7 Therefore, the 

trial court’s order is void, and must be vacated. See Danysh, supra.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

(a) General rule.--The Commonwealth Court shall have original 

jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:

(1) Against the Commonwealth government, including any 

officer thereof, acting in his official capacity[.]

42 Pa.C.S. § 761.

7 To the extent Appellant argues his underlying sentence is illegal based on 

the difference between jailhouse wages and the wages that non-incarcerated 

persons might earn for similar work, which inequity Appellant perceives as 

injustice amounting to a violation of Equal Protection, his petition should be 

considered a PCRA petition. Although petitioners cannot waive illegal 

sentence claims, petitioners must still raise such claims in a timely PCRA 

petition. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465 

(Pa.Super.2013) (“although illegal sentencing issues cannot be waived, they 

still must be presented in a timely PCRA petition.”). Appellant filed the 

termination petition nearly 8 years after his judgment of sentence became 

final. The termination petition failed to plead any the PCRA time-bar 

exceptions. Thus, if we consider the termination petition as a PCRA petition, 

it remains untimely, and we lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See

Commonwealth v. Reed, 107 A.3d 137, 140 (Pa.Super.2014) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 519 (Pa.Super.2011), appeal 

denied, 616 Pa. 634, 47 A.3d 845 (2012)) (“[T]he time limitations pursuant 

to ... the PCRA are jurisdictional. [Jurisdictional time] limitations are 

mandatory and interpreted literally; thus, a court has no authority to extend 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Accordingly, we vacate the order of the trial court without prejudice to 

Appellant’s right to seek relief in the Commonwealth Court.

Order vacated.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/15/2015

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

filing periods except as the statute permits. If the petition is determined to 

be untimely, and no exception has been pled and proven, the petition must 

be dismissed without a hearing because Pennsylvania courts are without

jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition.”).