### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03- 07 -00 381 -CV
Santos Cervantes, Esther Cer vantes, David Cervante s and Mart ha Cervante s , Appellan ts
v. Rosie Ce rvantes , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B ASTROP COUNTY , 21ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 26,4 84 , HO NORAB LE H. R. TOWSLEE , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ap pe lle e , Ro sie Ce rv ante s, ob ta ine d a de fa ult jud g me nt o rd e ri nga

pp e lla nts Santo s, Esther, Da

vid, and Martha

Cervante s to specifica lly perf orm their promis e to convey proper ty and to pa y a t t o r

n e y ’ s f e e s an d c o s t s i nh e r

s u i tf o r f r a u d , f r a u d i nt h e i n d

u c e m e n t , b r e a c h o f

c o n t r a c t,
rea l estate fr aud under

section 27.01 of the busine ss and commer ce c ode, an d k n o wing and intentional misre prese ntation. Appellants filed a motion for new tria l, which the trial c ourt denied. I n this appeal, a

ppellants argue that the tria l court er red in de ny ing the ir motion for new tria l beca use: (1) the r eturn of service was defe ctive, (2) a ppellants established a ll elements to obtain a newtrialB e c a us e the pa rt ie s sh are a

c omm on surn ame , w e wi ll re fe r to the m by the ir fi rs t na me s to 1 avoid conf

usion.

2 under Craddock v. Sun s h i n e B u s L i nes, Inc

. , 1 33 S.W. 2d 12 4 ( Te x. 19 39 ), and

(3 ) R os ie is not

1
e nti tle d to re c ov e r f

ro m a pp e lla nts a s a ma tte r o f l aw. We w ill re ve rs e the tr ial court ’s jud g me nt.
F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND This case arises out of a

dispute betwee n members of the Cerva

ntes family

over three acr es of land loc ated in B astrop County
. The p ar t i es dispute the circ umstances unde r which Rosie and he r late husba nd, Sam, moved onto the proper ty . Appellants alleg e that Santos and Esther invited their son, Sam, and Rosi e t o move to the prope rty to help them throug h financ ial difficulties ca

used by Sam’s terminal illness and the “ criminal troubles” of some of Rosie and Sam’s g ra nd c hil dr e n. Ap pe lla

nts a sse rt that the y ma de no pr omi se to g ive the pr op e rt y to Ros ie and

Sa m. Ros ie a lle g e s th a t Santo s p ro mis e d to g ive he r a nd Sa m th e de e d t o th e pr op e rt y if the y wo uld move there from Houston, which the y did after purcha sing a

mobi l e h o m e, s etting up w ater and
e le c tr ic se rv ic e , a

nd ins ta lli ng a se pti c sy ste m and wate r we ll. Ros ie and Sa m hir e d a n atto rn e y in October 2006 afte r appe llants continued to ref use their r equests for

a dee d to t h e p ro p erty . On November

2, 2006, Rosie and S am filed a r equest to take Sam’s deposition before suit; however, Sa m di e d o n N ov e mbe r 1 5, on e da y be fo re the c ourt

sig ne d th e a g reed ord er a uth or izin g his deposition. On April 5, 2007, S antos filed a c omplaint for eviction ag ainst Rosie in a prec inct justice court of

Ba strop County . Rosie filed a plea to the jurisdiction a sserting that Santos’sAp pe lla nts ’ c ouns e l te sti fi e d that he did no t re me mbe r wh ic h of the ind ivi du a l a pp e lla nts 2 de liv e re d the pe tit ion : “ on e of the de fe nd ants —I

do n’ t r e c a ll w hic h o ne —c a me int o th e of fi c e wi th a petition in his hand.” 3 claim was ne cessa

rily depende nt upon the deter mination of titl e to re al prope rty , an issue within the district court’s ex clusive jurisdiction. The justice court dismissed the ca se for lack of jurisdiction. On April 24, Rosie su ed ap p ellants in the Ba strop County District Court for fr aud, fr aud in the inducement, brea ch of contra ct, re al estate fra ud under se ction 27.01 of the business and c ommerce code, a nd knowing and intentional misrepre sentation. On J une 4, afte r a hear ing, Rosie obtained a de fa ult jud g ment ord eri ng a

pp e lla nts to s pe c if

ic a lly pe rf or m th e ir pr omi se to c on ve y

the pr op e rt

y and to pay

Rosie’s attorney ’s fe es and costs. The defa ult judg ment was filed w ith the clerk on the morning of June 11. L ater that day , appellants filed a motion for new trial asserting that: (1) the return of service was de fec tive; (2) the c i t at i o n wa s d efe ctive; and ( 3) counse l’s failure to file a timely answe r wa s due to mistake or acc ident, appellants have a me ritorious defe nse, and g ranting
a new trial would not result in delay or pre judice to Rosie. I n the mot ion fo r ne w tr ia l and a t the he ari ng on the mot ion fo r ne w t ri a l, a pp e lla nts ’ counsel e x plained that his failure to file a timely answe r wa s due to “a

n honest administrative er ror” within his office. Ac c or din g to a pp e lla nts ’ c ouns e l, w he n h e wa s r e ta ine d b y a pp e lla nts in “ la te April 2007” t o i n itiate a ca use of a ction to evict Rosie, he wa s unawa re that Rosie had filed a
cause of ac tion ag ainst appellants. Some time in Ap ri l o r M ay , one of the appellants de livered a copy of Rosie’s orig inal petition to appellants’ counse l’s office
. Appellants’ c ounsel contends that 2 this appellant obtained the petit ion from the cour thouse. At the hear ing on appellants’ motion for new tria l, appellants’ c ounsel testified:4

He sa id t hat he ha d g on e to t

he c ourt be c a us e he wanted to —h e co uld n’ t g e t in contac t with my

office or he c ouldn’t g et in contac t with me personally , and he wanted to see what had bee n done on the c ase. So he c ame down to the c ourt and picked up a

petition and broug ht the petition back to my office
. Appellants’ c ounsel then explained:
At that time it was, I think, may be two or three months a fter I had hire d a par aleg al who was not re ally

familiar with how these things work. And s he did not understand that when a

petition is filed, even though we’ re hired to initiate the proce eding s, we wer e hire d for the pur

pose of be ing the plaintiff. So that’s wher e the c onfusion and the mistake ca

me in; we we re hire d for the pur pose of e victing the plaintiff . . . . So that cause d some confusion in the mind of the para leg al beca us e w h en s he rec eived the pe tition, s he did not rea lly understand e ven thoug h we we re r etained f or the purpose of

evicting the petitioner, we still have to r espond to that petition. So that in fo rm a tio n w a s n ot p ut i nto our a uto ma te d d oc ke tin g s y st em, wh ic h is Amicus Attorney

7 , wh i ch i n turn would prompt me to meet the de adline for re sp on din g to i t.
I n appellants’ motion for ne w trial, appe llants ’ co unsel stated that he disc overe d Rosie’s orig inal petition “ during a monthly inspection of the phy sical files” and “c ontacted the court.” On July 3, the tr ia l c ourt

de nie d a pp e lla nts ’ m oti on

fo r n e w tri a l. A

pp e lla nts pe rf e c te d th is a

pp e a l. On appe al, appe llants arg ue that the tria l court er red in de ny ing thei r m otion for new tria l beca

use: (1) the return of

service was de fec tive; (2) appe llants met the Craddock fac tors fo r s e tti nga side a defa ult jud g me nt; and

(3 ) R os ie is n ot e nti tle d to re c ov e r f ro m a pp e lla nts a s a matter of la

w.5 STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW Tr ia l c ourt s have br oa d dis c re tio n in ru lin g on mot ion s fo r new tr ia l. Limestone Constr., Inc. v. Summit Commercial Indus. Props., Inc. , 14 3 S.W. 3d 53 8, 54 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 2004, no pet.). W e review a trial court’s denial of a motion for ne w trial for abuse of discretion. Id
. at 542. The te st for abuse of discre tion is whe ther the trial court acte d arbitra rily or without ref

ere nce to guiding leg al principles. Cire v. Cummings , 134 S.W .3d 835, 839 (Tex. 2004). Althoug h we a re g ener ally defe rential to the trial c ourt’s dete rmination of fa cts, see, e .g. , Flores v. Fourth Court of Ap pe als , 777 S.W .2d 38, 41-42 (Tex. 1989) , we do not de fer to a trial court’s a pplication of the law , McD aniel v. Y

arbrough , 898 S.W .2d 251, 253 (Tex. 1995)
. A failure by a trial c ourt to analy

ze or apply the law c orre ctly

is an abuse of

discretion. Id
. A t rial court abuses its discretion if it ref uses t o set aside a defa

ult judgment and g rant
a new trial wher e: (1) the failure of the def endant to answ er be fore judgme nt was not intentional or th e result of c onscious indiffer ence , but due to a mistake or a n acc ident; (2) the motion for a new tria l sets up a meritorious def ense; a nd (3) g ranting a new trial will occa sion no undue delay or otherwise injure the par

ty taking the def

ault judgme nt. Craddock , 133 S.W .2d at 126.
DI SCU SSIO N Return of Service

Appellants first contend that the def ault judgme nt cannot stand be cause the re turn of service was defec tive for failing to state t he name of t he person serve d and the plac e of se rvice . TheThe re turns of ser vice f or Santos, Esther, Da

vid, and Martha

are identical wi t h the 3 exception of the times. 6 return of servic e consists of a f orm with blanks filled in by the servingoffice r. We set forth the 3 return of service in its entirety

(italicized portions are ha ndwritten in the re turn):
Offic er’ s Return Ca me to h and the 2 6 day

of Ap r. , 20 07 , at 4:40o’cloc k P .M., and executed the 30 day of Ap r. , 20 07 , at 9 : 15 o’cloc k A. M., by deliveringto the within named ______________ in Bastrop County , T e xas , in person, a tr ue c op y of thi s I NSTRUMENT and tende ring said witness the sum of $ ______. FEES: $ ______ R. He rn an de z—S he rif f Offic er or Authorized Person Bastrop County , Texas B y : Jack Sparkman
The attached c itations include appellants’ na mes. Appellants do not contend t h at the citations
are defe ctive. Se rv ic e of c itatio n must be in str ic t com pli anc e wi th the ru le s o f c ivi l pr oc e dure to establish jurisdiction over a de fenda nt and support a de fault judg ment. W ilson v. Dunn , 800 S.W .2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990). I f strict complianc e is not shown, the servic e of pr ocess is invalid and of no eff ect. Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co. , 6 9 0 S. W. 2 d 8 8 4 , 8 8 5 ( T e x. 1 9 8 5 )
. We
make no pr e su mpt ion s o f v a lid iss ua nc e , s e rv ic e , o r r e tur

n o f c itatio n whe n e xami nin g a de fa ult judgme nt. Id . Howeve r, “stric t compl i an ce wi t h t he rule s does not require ‘obeisanc e to the minutest detail.’” W

illiams v. W

illiams , 150 S.W .3d 436, 443-44 (Te x . App.—Austin 2004, p et
. d e n i e d ) (q u o t i n g Ortiz v. Avante Villa at Corpus Chr isti, Inc. , 926 S.W .2d 608, 6137

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied)). “ As long as the rec o rd as a whole, inc luding the pe tit ion , c itatio n, a nd re tur n, sh ow s th a t th e c itatio n w a s se rv e d o n th e de fend ant in th e su it, service of proc ess will not be invalidated.” Id . at 444.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 107, which se ts o u t the re quirements for the re turn of ser vice, r ea d s in pertinent par t: “The re turn of the of fice r or a uthorized person executing the citation shall be e ndorsed on or attache d to the same; i t shall state when the citation was
serve d and the manne r of se rvice and be sig ned by the offic er of

ficially or by the authorized per son.” Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 07 . Ru le 10 7 d oe s n ot e xpre ssl y re qu ir e the re tur

n o f s e rv ic e to inc lud e the name of the pe rs on se rv e d. Ho we ve r, a pp e lla nts c on te nd

that Ru le 10 7’ s r e qu ir e me nt t hat th e re tur

n s ta te the “manne r of se rvice ” includes showingthe method by which the c itation was serve d (e.g ., hand delivery or mail) and that th e c itatio n wa s se rv e d o n a pe rs on c a pa ble of a c c e pti ngse rv ic e . F or

thi s contention, appe llants cite Faggett v. Hargrove , 921 S.W .2d 274, 277 (Tex. App.—Houston [ 1 s t Di s t .] 1999, no pet.), o v e r r u le d , in p a r t, o n o th e r

gr o u n d s b yB a r k e r CA TV Co n s tr
. , I

n c.
v. Ampro, Inc

. , 989 S.W .2d 789, 793 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (e n banc)
. I n Fa gg e tt , th e c ourt

he ld t hat th e re tur

n f or a citatio n f

or wh ic h th e c ourt

ha d o rd e re d s ub sti tut e service did not state the “manne r of se rvice ” whe n it did not s how that the per son on whom citation
was ser ved wa s capa

ble of acc epting service under Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 106. 921 S.W .2d at 278 (holding rec ord failed to show “manne r of se rvice ” whe n “nothing in the rec ord indicate d that ‘F ong , Tran’ was a

person ove r six teen y ear s of ag e” or that proper

substitut e ser

vice a ccomplished). Her e, substitute service was not or dere d. Appellants, the named de fenda nts, are the people to whom the B astrop C ounty sheriff ’s deputy delivere d the citation and pe tition. Unli ke the f actua l situation8

in Fa gg e tt , th e re wa s n o ne e d to a ff ir ma tiv e ly sh owthat a ll a sp e c ts o f s ub sti tut e d s e rv ic e we re me t. Thus, the citation nee d not include this recitation. Se e Tav ar e z v. Sm ith , No. 03-02-00118- CV, 2002 Tex. App. L EXI S 8093, at *10-12 (Te x . App.—Austin Nov. 15, 2002, no pet.) (not de signated for publication).

Fur ther, Fa gg e tt is a restric ted appe al, while this is an appea l from the denia l of a motion for new tria l. T h e T ex as Supreme Court has e x plained that bec ause of “the diff ere nces in these proc edure s . . . case s conce rning one do not nece ssarily apply to the other.” Fi de lit

y& Gu ar . Ins. Co. v. Drewe ry Constr. Co. , 186 S.W .3d 571, 573 (Tex. 2006 ) (per curiam). A restric ted appe al is filed direc tly in the appellate court, and as in any other a ppeal, the a

ppellate c ourt does not take testimony or re ceive evidenc e, and its re view is limit ed to er rors a ppare nt on the fac e of the rec ord. Id . I n restric ted appe als, “ther e ar e no presumptions in favor of valid i ssuance , service , and re turn of citation” be cause the appellate court can neither confirm nor rebut presumptions with evidence
. Id . (quot i n g P r i mate Constr., Inc. v. Silve r , 884 S.W .2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam)). The Court expl ained:
T h u s , f o r e xa mp le , if th e c it a tion sa y s an amende d petition was attac hed (w hich n am ed the de faulted pa

rty ) and the return sa

y s the or igi na l p e ti ti o n w as served (which did not), an a

ppellate c ourt ca

nnot tell from the re cord w hich is true. Pr im ate Con str
. , 884 S.W .2d at 152. Simi larly , if the petition sa y s the reg istered ag ent f

or service is “Henr

y Bunting , J r.” but the citation and return re flec t service on “He nry Bunting ,” an a

ppellate c ourt ca n not tell whether those pe rsons are differ ent or the same. See U

valde , 690 S.W .2d at 885.9

Id . at 573. I n contra st, “when a defa ult judgme nt is attacke d by a mot ion for new trial . . . the re cord i s n o t s o l i m i t e d
. In t h o s e p r o c e e d i n g s , t h e p art i e s m ay i n t r o d u c e a f f i d a v i t s , d e p o s i t i o n s , t e s t i m o n y, and exhibits to expl ain what ha ppened.” Id . at 573-74. Appellants provide no ad d itional authority for their contention that the re turn of service is require d to include the def endant’ s name, or that if it is, the phra se “w ithin named” whe n the def endant is name d in t h e citation does not suffice . Be cause the citation, re turn, and pe tition toge ther show that service was made on appellants, see W illiams , 150 S.W. 3d

a t 44 4, and

a pp e lla nts have pr ovided no evidenc e showing otherwise, w e will not invalidate serv i ce o f proce ss on this ground. App ell ants a lso c on te nd that th e re tur

n’ s st a te me nt t

hat c itatio n w a s d e liv e re d “ in Ba strop County , Texas” failed to meet the require ment that the re turn state the plac e whe re se rvice was made . To support this contention, appellants cite Texas Rules of Civil Procedur e 16 and 107,
a s w e ll a s Jack

sboro Nati onal Bank v. Signal Oil & Gas Company , 4 8 2 S.W .2d 339, 341-42 (T e x. Ap p. —T y le r 1 97 2, no wr it) . Ru le 16 pr ov ides th at an o ff ic e r m us t in c lud e “ on

a ll p ro c e ss and pre cepts c oming to his hand .
. . the t ime and place the proce ss was served.” Tex. R. C iv. P. 16. Appellants provide no a uthority for their contention that “B as t ro p County is not a sufficient desig nation o f

p la c e u n d e r

Ru le 1 6
. ” Ru le 1 0 7 in c lu d e s n o r e qu ir e me n t t h a t a r e tu r no f s e rvice include the plac e whe re se rvice was made . And in J ac k sb or o , the re turn of service at issue included

no de sig natio n o f p la c e . 48 2 S.W. 2d a t 34 2 (“ I t w ou ld s e e m th a t to have a ff ir ma tiv e ly sh ow n a va lid
se rv ic e , th e sh e ri ff

’s re tur n sho uld re c ite a t lea st that the wr it wa s ser ve d w ith in t

he State of

Te xas.On appe al appe llants’ arguments with respec t to service of proce ss are focuse d on the 4 return of service . Howeve r, bec ause a ppellants’ brie f re fer s to appellants’ aff idavits stating that they wer e not serve d, we a ddress this issue. 10 T h e r e tu r nin qu e s ti o ns tate s n e it

h e r th e c it y , to w n , s tate , n o r c o u n tr

y in w h ic h it w a s s e r v e d
. ” )
. We will not invalidate service of proc ess on this gr ound.

I n addition to their argument that the return of service was defe ctive, it ap pear s
a p p e ll an ts a ls o c o n te n d th a t th e y w e r e not serve d. I f a de fe nd ant d id n ot r e c e ive su it p a pe rs , 4 g ener ally a def ault judgme nt must be s et as ide. Fi de lit y , 1 8 6 S
. W
. 3 d

at 5 7 4 (c i t i n g Pe ra lta v. He i g h t s Med. Ctr., Inc. , 4 85 U. S. 8 0, 84 (1 98 8) ). Ho we ve r, an e xce pti on to t his ru le e xists when the r eturn of se rvice includes the prope r re citations an d n o nrec eipt is uncorrobor ated. Id .; Pr im ateCon str
. , 884 S.W .2d at 152. The r eturn of service is not a trivial, for mulaic document a

nd is considere d prima fa cie e vidence of the fa cts it recites. Id . “The rec itations in t he re turn of ser vice
car ry so much weig ht that they

cannot be rebutted by the uncorr oborate d proof of the moving pa

rty .” Id . Thus, we turn to a

ppellants’ proof

. Appel l an t s prese nted an a ffidavit fr om eac h defe ndant stating, “ Iwas not ser

ved a c opy

of the pe t i t i o n wi t h a citation in this case.” I n addition, at the he ari ngon

the mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l, a

pp e lla nts ’ c ouns e l argue d a s f

oll ow s:

COUNSEL : I think the most important comment that cannot be re iterate d

enoug h is that they

actua lly did not rece ive s er v i ce ; they actua lly wer e not serve d. They wer e not handed a ny thing by a she ri ff . T hat—a

nd that’ s— and

the ir ve ri fi c a tio n in

the ir a ff ida vit s— the y we re no t se rv e d. On e of the m c a me do wn

to this c o u rt an d p ic k e d u

p th a t d o c u me n t— I me an , p ic k e d up the or igi nal p e tit ion . A nd the n th e y c a me to my

of fi c e wi th that orig inal p et i t i o n and said, he y , did y ou do this? Where did this come from? Or that’s what’s been r epre sented to me.11 An d th a t’ s h ow

—th a t’ s w hat wa s e xpla ine d to the pa ra le g a l. They didn’t—t h ey

wer e not hande d any

thing; they

wer en’t serve d.
TH E CO UR T: I t wo ul d be , I be lie ve , hig hly unus ua l fo r a de pu ty sh e ri ff to just invent or fabric ate, if you will, a return of service
. COUNSEL : They may have g iven it to someone—I mean, ther e is no—the trailer f or the pe titioner is on the same proper ty as the tra iler for the respondent. The re a re no—to my

understanding , there are no numbe rs on

the tr a ile rs . An d the pe tit ion e r’ s tr a ile r i s a c tua lly c los est to the str e e t, a

nd the re sp on de nt’ s tr a ile r i s a c tua lly fu rt he st a wa y fr om t he str e e t.
TH E CO UR T: So your a lle g a tio n is he may hav e se rv e d s ome on e bu t it

wa sn ’t y our c lie nt?
CO UN SEL : Ex act ly . O n th a t sa me pie c e of

pr op e rt y and the same addre ss. So I ’m not saying h e didn’t serve anyone; all I ’m saying is he didn’t serve my clients. And it’s very

—Imean, that would be a f

org ivable mistake if you have two tr ailers on the same pie ce of

proper ty and at the gate y ou see the number fo r t hat pi e c e of

pr op e rt y and the fi rs t ho us e y ou

e nc ounte r i s ri g ht t he re , th a t w ou ld be ve ry fo rg iva ble fo r t he sh e ri ff to stop r ight he re a

nd assume that the f

irst house—that this is t he house that corresponds to that addr ess. And that’s a very re a so na ble mis take fo r him to m a ke . B ut t he ult imate re su lt of i t was—whatever

mistake was made , my

clients wer en’t serve d.
Be cause appellants’ pr oof is uncorr oborate d, it i s i n s u fficient to rebut the re citation in the return that th e sh e ri ff

’s de pu ty de liv e re d it

to t he “ wi th in nam e d. ” Thus , th e tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

de nyinga

pp e lla nts ’ m oti on

fo r n e w tri a l on

thi s b a sis . We ov e rr

ule a ppell ants’ first issue.12

Cr addo c k Fac tor

s B e c a us e we ho ld t

hat th e tr ia l c ourt did no t abu se its dis c re tio n in deny inga pp e lla nts ’ motion for new tria l on the basis of def ective se rvice of citation, we turn to Craddock
. A trial cour t abuses its discre tion if it refuses to set aside a default judgme nt and gra nt a new tr ial wher e: (1) the failure of the de fenda

nt to answer be fore judgme nt was not intentional or the re sult of conscious indiffer ence , but due to a mistake or a n acc ident; (2) the motion for ne w trial sets up a me ritorious de fe ns e ; and

(3 ) g ra nti ng a ne w tri a l w ill oc c a sio n n o und ue de lay or oth e rw ise inj ur e the pa

rt y taking the def

ault judgme nt. Craddock , 133 S.W .2d at 126. I f the plaintiff doe s not controver t the defe ndant’s affi d av i t s i n support of a ne w trial motion, the trial court must acc ept as true the aff idavits’ fac tual asser

tions reg ardingthe Craddock elements. Di re c tor , Sta te Em plo y e es W or k e rs’ Comp. Div. v. Ev ans , 889 S.W .2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1994).
(A ) M ist ake or Ac c ide nt Appellants asse rt that their ev i d ence established that their failure to file an a

nswer
wa s d ue to m ist a ke , n ot c on sc iou s i ndif fe re nc e . T o s up po rt

the ir mot ion fo r n e w t ri a l, a pp e lla nts pr e se nte d the ir ow n a ff

ida vit s, a s we ll a s the a ff

ida vit s of a pp e lla nts ’ c ounsel and app e lla nts ’ counsel’s pa

rale g al, which do not conta in any fac tual asser

tions reg ardingappellants’ f ailure to a ns we r, bu t in ste a d s ta te : “ I have re a d the F ir st A me nd e d M oti on fo r a Ne w T ri a l and

state me nts contained the rein p er taining the reto a re w ithin my

persona l knowledg e and a re true and cor

rec t.” S an t o s ’ s a f

f i d a v i tf u rt h e r a s s e rt s t h a th e d i d

n o tp r o m i s e t o g i v e R o s i e o r S a m an y p r o p e rt y.Appellants initially asser ted in their motion for newtr i al t hat this delivery occur red 5 “on ar ound April 26, 2007.” Appellants’ f irst amended motion for ne w trial states that it occ urre d “on ar ound May 26, 2007.” At the hear ing on the motion for new tria l, appellants’ c ounsel testified that it occurr ed “sometime around May , late May .” Ap pe lla nts ’ a ns we r w a s d

ue May 21 , th us , it is unclea r on this re cord whether the orig inal petition was in appellants’ c ounsel’s possession befor e the answe r wa s due. 13

I n a ppe lla nts ’ f ir st a me nd e d mo tio n f

or ne w tri a l, t

he y a sse rt that so me tim e in M ay, one of the m—they do not s p ecif

y which, and a

ppellants’ counse l testified that he does not 5
re me mber— ob taine d a

c op y of Ros ie ’s or ig ina l pe tit ion fr om t he c ourt ho us e and

br ou g ht i t to appellants’ c ounsel’s off

ice. Appe llants’ counsel testified that this appellant obtained the petition from the c ourthouse bec ause “ he wanted to—he couldn’t g et in contac t with my office or he c ouldn’t g e t in c on ta c t wi th me pe rs on a lly , and he wa nte d to se e wh a t ha d be e n do ne on the c a se .” Ap pe lla

nts
c on te nd that a lth ough th e pe tit ion ha d b e e n d e liv e re d to a

pp e lla nts ’ c ouns e l’ s o ff

ic e , a pp e lla nts ’
c ouns e l w a s una

wa re of it b e c a us e his pa ra le g a l f a ile d to e nte r it int o th e int e rn a l do c ke tin g sy ste m. Appellants asse rt that during a monthly inspection of his files, ap p el l an t s ’ counsel discove red the petition and “conta cted the c ourt.” Appe llants have pre sented no e vidence of the manne r in which counsel c ontacted the court or when this contac t occur red. Presumably , it was be fore J une 11, whe n appellants filed the ir motion for new tria l. At the hear ing on t h e motion for new tria l, Rosie’s counsel argu ed that a def endant is bound by

his attorney ’s ac tions and that an interna l docketing mistake is not sufficient to set aside a defa ult judgment. He further

argued:

And in the af

fidavits of defendants’ counsel—and they ’re a li ttle unclea r, as I pointed ou t in my re sp on se , b ut f

ir st o f a ll he sai d th at he w a s g ive n p a pe rw or k in Ap ri l. That’s the f

irst motion fo r n ew t ri al. Now the second motion for ne w trial he acknow ledg es he g ot the paper work in May . Now, I ’m not sure which one is the truth, but i n any

event he had suff

icient information in his hands to deter mine that14

there was something that neede d to be done. He had all the data he ne eded to f ile an answe r, and he had two we eks to do it and he did not respond in that fa shion.
Ithink that that in and o f itself ca n be construe d as consc ious indiffere nce. A nd cer tainly he intentionally did not file an answe r; he intentionally did not look more cl osely at the pape rwork f

rom which he could have conclude d that an answ er w as due. There was more than sufficie nt inf ormation for Counsel to conclude that there was something that he nee ded to do to file an a nswer.

Fa iling to fi le an a

nswer intentionally

or due to c onscious indiffer ence means “ the de fe nd ant knew it was sued but did not care .” Levine v. Shack elford, Melton & McKinley, L.L.P. , 2 4 8 S
. W
. 3 d

1 6 6 , 1 6 8 (T ex . 2 0 0 8 ) ( p er cu ri am ) ( qu o t i n g Fi de lit y , 186 S.W .3d at 576). When deter mining whe ther the de fenda nt’s failure to file an answe r was not due to intentional disreg ard
or co n s ci o u s indiffere nce, a court looks to the knowledg e and a cts of the de fenda nt. Evans , 889 S.W .2d at 269. Gene rally , when the de fenda nt relies on an at t o rn ey t o file an a nswer, the defe ndant must establish that the failure to answer was not intentional or the re sult of the conscious indiffer ence of either

himself or his attorney
. See, e .g. , Levine , 248 S.W. 3d at 16 9; Estate of Pollack v. Mc Murrey , 858 S.W .2d 388, 391 (Tex. 1993)
. The de fenda nt’s burden a s to the first prong of the Craddock test is satisfied when the de fenda nt’s fac tual as s er t i ons, if true, ne g ate intentional or consciously

indiffer ent conduct and are not c ontroverte d by the plaintiff. Evans , 889 S.W .2d at 268. I n deter mining if the de fenda

nt’s fac tual asser

tions have been controve rted, the court looks t o all the evidenc e in the re cord. Id . at 269.15 The trial c ourt’s ruling indicates that it found tha t al though a ppellants may

have neg ated conscious indiffer ence on their part by providing evidenc e that they delivere d a copy

of the p e t i t i o nt o t h e i r

a t t o r n e y, t h e y d i d

n o tn e g a t e c o n s c i o u s i n d i f f e r e n c e o nt h e p arto f

t h e i r a t t o r n e y:

Ibelieve w hen a pe tition, an origina l petition, is delivere d to a lawy er’ s office , that should be enoug h diligenc e, if y o u wi l l , on the par t of the client to g et an a nswer filed. And I ’m not satisfied with y our cla im that your para leg al made a mistake and didn’t put it on t he ca lendar or docke t or g ive it to y ou.
We ag ree that by

deliveringa copy

of the pe tition t o their attorne y , appellants took suffic ient action to n e g a te c on sc iou s in dif

fe re nc e on the ir

pa rt . H ow e ve r, we ho ld t

hat a pp e lla nts ’ c ouns e l’ s a c tio ns , while per haps neg lige nt, do not reac h the level of conscious indiffe renc e. Rosie argues that conscious indiffer ence means “ a fa ilure to take some a ction which would see m indicated to a pe rson of reasona ble s ensibiliti es under the same c ircumstance s.” Howeve r, the Te x as Supreme Court r ece ntly clar ified that the first prongof the Craddock test is not a neg lige nce sta

ndard. Levine , 248 S
. W .3d at 168. I n Levine , the attorne y knew of the dea dline to file an a

nswer a nd ag ree d to file one by

that date, but fa iled to do so. Id . at 169. He a g ain fa iled to me e t an e xte n d e d

deadline. Id
. He e ventually emailed a

draf t answer to the parties, but neve r attempted to conf

irm that it was filed “de spite repe ated disc u s s i o n s , em ails, and conta ct with the opposing pa

rty war ning him that if he did not file an answe r, [the opposing part y ] wo u l d take a defa ult judgment.” Id . The Court held t hat “[ t] his pattern of ignor ing deadlines and war nings f rom the opposing party

amounts to conscious indiffer ence .” Id
.The c ases Rosie cites in whic h the movant’s erro r or inaction amounted to conscious 6 i n d i ff erence predate the Te x as Supreme Court’ s clarif ication of c onscious indiffer ence in Levine and appe ar to a

pply a neg lige nce sta

ndard. See, e .g. , Ad

v an c e d A esth e tics, In c . v . Cr e ati v e Be au ty 16 Our surve y

reve als that in case s holding that the acts of attorney s rea ched the level of consc ious indiffere nce, the nonmovant prese nted evidenc e th at the movant’s attorney was
awa re of the impending defa ult judg ment or that the movant’s attorney had repe at ed l y i gnored deadlines or

co m munications. See, e .g. , Padilla v. Hollerman Dev ., L.P. , No. 04-08-00739- CV, 2009 Tex. App. L EXI S 2917, at *10 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 29, 2009, no pet.) ( mem. op.) (holding it was not abuse of discretion for

trial court to deny

motion for new t ri al when attorney looked at pe t i t i o n and instructed c lient no answer was ne eded be cause service was improper , but testified he did no re sear ch re g arding whether answe r wa s due and if he had, he w ould have fi le d a ns we r) ; Ker n v. Spenc er , No. 2-06-199- CV, 2008 Tex. App. L EXI S 5582, at *15-17 (Tex. A pp.—For t Worth J uly 24, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding it was not abuse of discretion for tria l court to deny

motion for new tria l when evidence included: six cer tified mailings notifying attorney o f submission date; uncontrover ted statements re g ardingattorney ’s re curr ing pa ttern of failure to prosecute case , show up for de positions, a n d respond to dis cover y ; and testimony

that at t o rney often used e x cuse of

not having been notifie d); 21st Century Home M ortgage v. City of El Pa so , 281 S.W .3d 83, 86-87 (Te x . App.—El Paso 2008, no p et.) (holdingit was not abuse of discretion for

trial court to deny

motion for new trial when attorney testified that he thoug ht client was not par

ty to lawsuit and was c onfused a s to why cl i ent was se rved, but nonmovant pre sented citation stating that client had been sued in se cond amende d petition and that defa ult would be taken if client did not answer ). 6Innovations, Inc

. , No. 2- 04 -0 78 -C V, 20 05 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 11 42 , at *1 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th Fe b. 10, 2005, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ( holding that “a pe rson of rea sonable sensibiliti es under the same c ircumstance s would have taken ac tion to file an answe r . . . pri o r t o t he date the trial cour t sig ne d th e de fa

ult jud g me nt” ); Prince v . Prince , 912 S.W .2 d 367, 370 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1995, no writ) (holding t hat court “interpr et[s] conscious indi ffe renc e to mean a failure to take some a ction which would see m indicated to a pe rson of re asonable sen s i b i l i t i es under the same c ircumstance s”).
17

He re , a pp e lla nts have pr e se nte d e vid e nc e that the y de liv e re d the or ig ina l pe tit ion to their attorney ’s office , but that be cause of his pa rale g al’s administrative err or, he was not aw are of it and thus did not know t hat an answe r wa s due. Appe llants provided the af fidavits of their attorney and his para leg al at t es t i n g t o the explanation of the administrative e rror provided in the motion fo r n e w t r i a l
. A l t h o u g h i t s h o u l d h a v e b e e n n o s u r p r i s e t o a p p e l l an t s t h a t R o s i e f

i l e d a la ws uitin district court since she had filed a request to take Sam’s deposition prior to suit five months earlier, by de liv e ri ng a c op y of the pe tit ion to the ir atto rn e y , a pp e lla nts too k su ff

ic ie nt a c tio n t o n eg a te conscious indiffe renc e. Appe llants retained the ir curr ent attorne y in April 2007, five mont hs afte r the reque st to take Sam’s deposition pr ior to suit, and Rosie ha s prese n t ed n o ev i d en ce that appellants’ c ounsel was a war e of this re quest. Rosie has pre sented no evidenc e to controve rt appellants’ c ontention that their attorney was una war e that a pe tition was filed and an a nswer w as due. Nor has she pr esente d evidenc e that she w arne d appellants or their attorney that she would take a def ault or that appellants or t heir attorney had enga g ed in a pattern of disre g ardingdeadlines. She likewise has not presente d evidenc e contr overting appellants’ pr oof of the pa rale g al’s er

ror in fa iling to enter the petition into t he interna l docket i n g s y s t em . Se e Fi de lit y , 186 S.W .3d at 576 (“ The
a ff ida vit s he re sh ow ne ith e r int e nt no r ind if fe re nc e . I ns te a d, the y de ta il F ide lity ’s e ff or ts t o e sta bli sh18

a sy stem that would avoid pre cisely what happe ned. As Dr ewe ry did not controvert this proof, the trial court wa s not at liberty to disreg ard it.”)
. B e c a us e a pp e lla nts have pr e se nte d ev ide nc e that the ir fa ilure to an sw e r wa s due to the ir a tto rn e y ’s mis take and

Ros ie ha s p re se nte d n o c on tr ov e rt inge vid e nc e , we ho ld t hat a pp e lla nts met the first prongof the Craddock te st.
(B ) M e r it or iou s D e fens e The sec ond prong of the Craddock test require s appellants to “set up” a meritorious d ef ense in their motion for new trial. Dolgencorp of Tex ., Inc. v . Lerma , 2 8 8 S. W. 3 d 9 2 2 , 927 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam). “Setting up a meritorious defe nse does not re quire proof ‘in the ac cepte d sense.’ ” Id
. at 9 2 7 -2 8 (q u o t i n g Iv y v . Ca rre ll , 407 S.W .2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966)). Rather , a motion fo r n e w tri a l se ts up a me ri tor iou s de fe ns e if it a lle g e s fa c ts wh ic h in law wo uld c on sti tut e a de fe ns e to the plaintiff’s ca

use of a ction and is suppo rt ed by aff idavits or other e vidence providing prima fac ie proof that the def endant ha s such a de fense
. Id . at 92 8. On c e su c h r e qu ir e me nts are me t, controve rting evidenc e off ere d by the nonmovant should not be consider ed. Id
. Appellants’ f

irst amended motion for ne w trial asse rted “ [d] efe ndants deny that Plaintiff was g iven permission to move onto property by Mr. David Cer

vantes, the r ightf

ul owner of the prope rty

and that Plaintiff was pr omised ownership of the proper ty in exchang e for

Plaintiff’s moving onto the pr operty .” Appe llants submit ted af fidavits from each appellant s tating “I have r ead the Fir st Amended Motion for a New T rial and state ments contained therein per taining the reto a

re within my

persona l knowledg e and a re true and cor

rec t.” Santos’s aff

idavit further

stated:19

My so n Sa nto s Ce rv ante s, Jr. [Sam] as ke d to move on to t he pr op e rt

y be c a us e of his financ ial probl em s he wa s having due to his terminal illness and the cr iminal pr ob le ms h is s on s and

g ra nd so ns we re havin g in Ho us ton , Te xas. I ma de no pr omi se to give my

son Santos Cervante s any proper ty
. He was allowed them [si c] to move onto the proper

ty only beca use of the ha

rdship he then suff

ere d.

At the hea

ring on the moti o n for ne w trial, in addition to asserting that Santos and Esther ne ver promised to g ive the prope rty to Rosie or Sam, appellants’ c ounsel also asser ted: Primarily the meritorious def

ense is that the de fenda

nts, Mr. Santos Cervantes a nd Ms. Es the r C e rv ante s, numbe r o ne , th e y do n’ t ow n th e pr op e rt

y that th e pla int if

f i s say in g the y

g a ve to t he pla int if

f. Yo u c ann ot c on ve y

mor e tha n y ou ow n; t hat’ s a fundame ntal rule of pr operty . You ca n’t conve y t h at which you do not own. The proper ty belong s to David .
. . t h e p eti tion its elf say s, Santos and Esther made the pr omi se s. Th e y

do n’ t im pli c a te Da

vid in m a kin g any

pr omi se s.

T h e fa ct s al l ege d i n ap p el l an t s ’ m o t i o n , i f t ru e, wo u l d co n s t i tu t e ad ef

en s e t o R o s i e's
cause of ac tion. Fu rt h er , the af fidavits appellants submitted and appe llants’ counsel’s te stimony
a t th e he ari ngon

the mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l pr ov ide d p ri ma fa c ie su pp or t for the de fe ns e . App e lla nts have satisfied the sec ond prong of the Craddock te st.
(C) No Undue Delay The third prongof the Craddock te st i s th a t th e mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l be fi le d at a time w hen the g ranting there of will occasion no undue delay or otherw ise injure the plaintiff. Evans , 889 S.W .2d at 270. “Onc e a de fenda nt has alleg ed that gra n t i n g a new trial will not inj ure th e p la in ti f

f , th e b u r d e n o f g o in g f

o r w ar d w it h p r o o f o f in

ju r y s h if ts to th e p la in tif

f.” Id
. The purpose of

the third prongof the Craddock test is to protec t a plaintiff ag ainst the sort of undue de layA par ty ’s willingne ss to go to trial immediately an d p ay fo r t h e ex penses of the 7 de fa ult jud g me nt a

re imp or tant f a c tor s f or the c ourt to l oo k at in

de te rm ini ng whe th e r i t sh ou ld g rant a new tria l, but are not dispositive. Director, State Employe es W orkers’ Comp. Div. v. Ev ans , 889 S.W .2d 266, 270 n.3 (Tex. 1994). 20 or inj ur y that w ou ld r e su lt i n a

dis a dv anta g e wh e n p re se nti ngthe me ri ts o f t he c a se a t a

ne w tri a l, “such a s a loss of witnesses or othe r valua ble evidenc e.” Id
. I n their motion for new

trial, appellants asserted that g ranting a new trial would not result in delay

or pre judice and of

fered t o go to trial immediately and to re imburse Rosie for the
e xpe ns e s in c ur

re d in ob ta ini ngthe de fa

ult jud g me nt. Rosie’s response to the motion for new tria l

7 does not asser

t that granting a new trial would cause her a ny injury , nor did she pre sent any evidenc e of i n j u ry at t he hea

ring on the motion for new tr ial. Thus, Rosie has failed to show a n injury that neg ates a ppellants’ alleg ation of no undue delay or injury
. Appellants have satisfied the third prong of the Craddock te st.

Be cause appellants have satisfied all three prong s of the Craddock test, we ne ed not
rea ch appe llants’ rema ining issue.

CO NC LU SION

Be cause appellants satisfied all three prong s of the Craddock test, we hold that the tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s d iscreti on in r e fu sin g to s e t a sid e the de fa ult jud g me nt a g a ins t a

pp e lla nts
. Ac co rd i n gl y , we re v er s e t h e t ri al c o u r t ’s j u d gm en tan d re m an d t h e c as e f

o r f u rt h er p ro ce ed i n gs consistent with this opi nion.21 __________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Reverse d and Remande d Filed: Nove mber 5, 2009