1

[South Africa] is a perfect place to cool off, regroup, and plan your finances and operations. The communications 

and infrastructure are excellent, there is a radical Muslim community, and our law enforcement is overstretched.

—Gideon Jones, former head of the Criminal Investigation Unit of the South African Police Service1

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

Playing Ostrich: Lessons Learned from 

South Africa’s Response to Terrorism

BY HUSSEIN SOLOMON

A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

◆ South Africa has come to occupy a central node in global terror networks in recent years.

◆ Despite growing evidence of the risks posed, South Africa has been slow to adopt and implement a more 

robust counterterrorism policy.

◆ Creating the political will to address this threat will require independent oversight of national intelligence efforts and an objective assessment of the terrorism risk in order to make counterterrorism a 

national priority. 

HIGHLIGHTS

NO. 9 / JANUARY 2011

South Africa just days before the attack.2 This resulted in analysts questioning whether there was an 

operational link between Mohammed Saddiq Khan, 

who led the suicide cell in London, and Aswat in 

South Africa. 

The Americans, too, had an interest in Aswat; 

he stood accused of attempting to establish a military training camp in Seattle, Washington,3

 as well 

as in Bly, Oregon, in 1999. Zambian investigators also 

reported that Aswat informed them that he was a 

bodyguard to Osama bin Laden. Aswat himself denies all charges, pointing out that he earns a living 

From terror financing to access to safehouses 

and fraudulently acquired South African passports 

and identity documents to the provision of paramilitary training as well as the use of its territory as an 

operational base to strike at other countries, South 

Africa is emerging as an increasingly attractive terrorist haven. This reality came to the fore with the 

case of Haroon Rashid Aswat in 2005. Aswat was 

detained in Zambia after his phone number appeared 

on all four of London’s July 7, 2005, suicide bombers’ 

cell phones. Indeed, it emerged that he exchanged 

a number of phone calls with each of them while in 
2

from selling Islamic CDs and DVDs at flea markets. 

However, investigators were unconvinced, arguing 

that such an occupation was unlikely to finance the 

amount of traveling Aswat had done.4 Further research revealed that Aswat was the assistant to terrorist ideologue Abu Hamza al Masri of the notorious 

Finsbury mosque in London, where a number of terrorists had received training, including the infamous 

“shoe bomber” Richard Reid. Abu Hamza al Masri, 

in turn, was also linked to al Qaeda groupings in both 

Yemen and Algeria.5

The issue of South Africa as an operational base 

and a transit and conduit for international terrorists 

to their target country also emerged in the case of 

Tunisian al Qaeda suspect Ihsan Garnaoui in 2004. 

Garnaoui was an explosives expert who trained in Afghanistan and was “promoted” to an al Qaeda trainer. 

He held several South African passports in different names (including Abram Shoman and Mallick 

Shoman) and traveled via South Africa to Europe 

where he was accused of planning bombings of American and Jewish targets.6

 Most of Garnaoui’s preparation for these attacks took place in South Africa where 

he purchased sophisticated military-grade binoculars 

with an integrated digital camera, diagrams, and instructions for the assembly of detonators, as well as setting up networks in Berlin while still in South Africa.7

The use of South Africa as an operational base 

and transit point was further revealed in the case of 

Mohammed Gulzer in July 2006. He and seven other 

men were accused of attempting to down at least 

seven passenger jets flying from London across the 

Atlantic by assembling bombs made of hydrogen peroxide–based explosives smuggled aboard the planes in 

soft drink bottles. Gulzer was the leader of the group 

and flew to London via South Africa.8

Despite these increasingly clear indications of 

its expanding role in global Islamist terror networks, 

why has South Africa been slow to adopt and implement a more robust counterterrorism policy? Lessons 

from South Africa’s experience are relevant to other 

African countries that have long downplayed the terrorist threat only to see al Qaeda affiliates take root 

in recent years.

IT ALL STARTED OUT SO WELL . . .

In the aftermath of 9/11, Pretoria immediately 

denounced the terror attacks on the United States 

and offered Washington both humanitarian assistance and the full cooperation of its security agencies. 

The terrorist atrocity in the United States was also 

one of the catalysts for South Africa to reexamine its 

own domestic terror laws.9 

The need for this kind of legislation emanated 

from not only such seminal events as 9/11, but also 

the urban terror campaign conducted by local Islamists 

that ravaged Western Cape Province in the 1990s. 

South Africa’s adoption of the Anti-Terrorism Act 

in 2002 also sought to integrate the country’s numerous pieces of antiterrorism legislation into one coherent and comprehensive law as well as to align these 

with international instruments of terrorism,10 such as 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, 

which affirms that any act of international terrorism 

constitutes a threat to global peace and security. 

South Africa also brought the issue of terrorism to the fore in its bilateral relations. In October 

2006, during a meeting with Indian Prime Minister 

Manmohan Singh, former President Thabo Mbeki 

declared that the two countries would share intelligence to help prevent terrorist attacks.11 This 

underscored the notion that terrorism constitutes 

a global threat and that only by acting in partnership can the international community eradicate 

this scourge. 

Yet, despite the initial positive steps and rhetoric 

emanating from Pretoria, a gap between promise and 

performance has emerged, resulting in South Africa 

Hussein Solomon is Senior Professor in the Department 

of Political Science at the University of the Free State, 

South Africa, and a Visiting Professor at the Global Collaboration Centre at Osaka University, Japan.

“lessons from South Africa’s 

experience are relevant to other 

African countries that have long 

downplayed the terrorist threat 

only to see al Qaeda affiliates 

take root”
3

suffering from a credibility gap in the area of terrorism. What explains this deemphasis on terrorism?

One factor is the seeming naiveté exhibited by 

some senior South African policymakers on the issue 

of terrorism. In July 2004, two South Africans were 

caught in an al Qaeda safehouse in Pakistan with a senior al Qaeda commander. Responding to reports from 

Pakistani authorities that they were planning to attack 

targets in South Africa, the Deputy Foreign Minister 

at the time stated, “anybody who has any sense would 

know that South Africa had taken consistently correct 

positions on issues like the Middle East and the war 

on Iraq, and there was no reason why anyone would 

want to attack it.”12 The reasoning behind this position would seem to be that we are safe from terrorism 

because of our “consistently correct” foreign policy 

positions vis-à-vis the Middle East.

But there are other reasons to question the rationale for such dismissiveness. The urban terror campaign conducted by local Islamists in the 1990s in the 

Western Cape as well as various attempts to commit 

terror attacks since indicate that something more sinister was going on. The 1990s bombing campaign not 

only targeted the U.S. Consulate in Cape Town and 

Western-associated restaurants such as Planet Hollywood but also synagogues, moderate Muslims, gay 

nightclubs, and very importantly the organs of the 

South African state itself. In August 1998, there was 

an explosion outside the offices of the police special 

investigation task team, and in September 1998, the 

judge presiding over a case involving a member of the 

People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) 

was assassinated.13

POLITICAL CORRECTNESS

Political correctness, shaped by South Africa’s 

unique history, continues to characterize the perspective of many in the country’s political establishment 

and undermines the fight against the scourge of terrorism. Former Minister of Intelligence Ronnie Kasrils stated, “we guard against a rising international 

hysteria which serves to portray all Muslims as potential targets. The cry of ‘a terrorist in every Madrassah’ echoes the ‘red under the bed’ and ‘swart gevaar’ 

[black danger] phobia of the Cold War and the apartheid era. We must never repeat such witch hunts in 

our country.”14 This ideological reasoning refuses to 

recognize the qualitative difference between the armed 

struggle against apartheid and the current global jihadist scourge. Indeed, it besmirches the noble struggle 

against the apartheid regime. While there was the 

infamous Magoos Bar bombing, attacks on soft targets were not countenanced by the African National 

Congress (ANC) leadership.15 The idea that one targets innocent diners in a restaurant or passengers on a 

bus was anathema to the ANC. In this way, the ANC 

was able to maintain the moral high ground. Even 

more important is the limited goals of the ANC—a 

democratic, nonracial South Africa—compared to the 

global ambitions of radical Islamists who seek to establish a global Muslim caliphate.16

POLITICIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE

Another problem keeping South Africa’s intelligence services from focusing on counterterrorism 

is their politicization. Indeed, since at least 2005, 

agencies such as the National Intelligence Agency 

(NIA) have been at the forefront of claims that the 

executive branch was using state structures to further 

its political goals.17 Small wonder that a 2008 Intelligence Ministerial Review Commission found that 

“We are concerned that NIA’s mandate may have 

politicized the agency, drawn it into the realm of 

party politics, requiring it to monitor and investigate 

legal political activity.”18 The combination of weak 

checks and balances and a broad mandate gave the 

intelligence bureaucracy the room to spy on those 

opposed to the president. The outgoing Minister of 

Intelligence who had commissioned the intelligence 

review also urged the ruling ANC to replace him 

with someone of the highest integrity owing to the 

sensitivity of the post. As the Minister noted, “The 

possibility of abuse of power by a rogue Minister or 

Director-General is immense.”19

“political correctness, shaped by 

South Africa’s unique history, 

continues to characterize the 

perspective of many in 

South Africa”
4

Accordingly, a factor in being unable to focus on 

terrorists operating inside South Africa is that the nation’s intelligence agencies are preoccupied with domestic political targets. For example, in 2009, funds were 

cut off to the Deputy Director General for Operations of 

the NIA in an attempt to marginalize him. This meant 

that the individual who controlled the top-secret source 

register could not pay about 100 high-level sources. 

These sources included key intelligence relating to possible threats to the 2010 World Cup. 

DOMESTIC SECURITY

In terms of South Africa’s Anti-Terrorism Act, it 

is the South African Police Service that is the country’s primary counterterrorism instrument. However, 

the state of the South African Police Service hardly 

inspires confidence. A 2008 report by 14 retired police 

commissioners found that the police suffered from inadequate planning and training, which impact the quality 

of investigations and result in low conviction rates. It 

also found that command and control was practically 

nonexistent.20 Other notable findings were that:

◆ There is a shortage of detectives—3,343 

nationally

◆ Many detectives are inexperienced and overextended, investigating 150 dockets or more

◆ The majority of detectives are not trained 

adequately, with 24 percent not having undergone a basic detective course.21

Meanwhile, the Department of Home Affairs, 

which is responsible for issuing passports and identity 

documents, has been frequently exploited by international terrorists both in South Africa and abroad.22

GROWING CRIMINALIZATION

There is increasing evidence to suggest that we 

are witnessing the growing criminalization of the 

state security apparatus. In August 2008, the National Prosecuting Authority handed Parliament 

a confidential document, which documented how 

former members of the security forces from both the 

apartheid regime and the ANC are involved in the 

training of paramilitary forces, arms smuggling, and 

organized crime.23

The infiltration of organized crime affects not only 

the political mandarins of state but also its security 

structure—notably the police. During 2008, 538 police officers were found guilty in internal hearings of 

crimes ranging from murder, rape, assault, theft, and 

corruption to alcohol and drug abuse.24 In June 2010, 

for instance, media reports indicated that policemen 

from the Sharpeville and Sebokeng police stations 

were involved in cash-in-transit heists.25 More telling 

than numbers, however, is the seniority of the police 

officials involved. In 2009, the head of Organized 

Crime in the West Rand, Senior Superintendent Dumisani Jwara, and two of his captains were arrested 

and accused of intercepting drugs en route to forensic 

laboratories and channeling them to the criminal underworld.26 More importantly, there is every indication 

that this may be just the tip of the iceberg. According 

to a 2007 Institute for Security Studies survey of the 

police, “92% agreed that police corruption is a serious challenge, and 54% believed that corruption had 

increased in the previous four years. Over 70% stated 

that most members were aware of other members’ involvement in criminal activity, while 68% believed 

that most officers would not report a member they 

knew to be corrupt.”27

This holds serious implications for security since 

it opens a path for the infiltration and penetration 

of the state security apparatus by criminal elements. 

Such penetration, in turn, has knock-on consequences. For instance, why would foreign intelligence agencies fully share information with their South African 

counterparts when it could be passed on to organized 

crime syndicates? Moreover, given the growing nexus 

between organized crime and Islamist networks, such 

information might well find its way into the hands of 

radical Islamists.

EFFECTIVENESS

The nature and extent of the terrorist threat 

raise important questions as to the state of readiness 

of the South African security services.

In August 2009, the prosecution of two PAGAD 

members—Faizel Waggie and Shahied Davids—

for the attempted bombing of the Keg and Swan 
5

restaurant in November 2000 was quietly abandoned. 

It would seem prosecutors dropped the case since 

conversations of the accused were bugged illegally 

and the police had lied under oath. More importantly, the two alleged accomplices of Waggie and 

Davids—Yusuf and Fahiema Enous, who had turned 

state witness—were assassinated while in witness protection. Neither was this the first time that witnesses 

were killed. Ebrahim Gallie, who was to testify in 

another PAGAD-related trial in 2009, was abducted 

and later shot dead. Needless to say, this case, too, 

had to be dropped.28 Here lies the rub: If witnesses 

are aware how unsafe witness protection is, will they 

come forward to testify? And if such witnesses do not 

come forward, can cases be successfully tried?

A structural problem may also exist within the 

intelligence community. Mid- and lower-level operatives who often risk their lives gathering information on these various Islamist groups often complain 

that their tip-offs and warnings are either ignored or 

not relayed to the higher echelons of policymakers.29

Why is this so? Are there barriers that prevent certain kinds of actionable intelligence from getting to 

policymakers? Or does it actually get to policymakers but then is simply not acted upon? Whatever the 

reason, this is an issue that needs to be corrected as a 

matter of grave urgency.

A M B I G U I T Y I N T H E C O U N T E R T E R R O R 

RESPONSE

Ambiguity also characterizes South Africa’s 

counterterrorism “policy.” For example, in October 

2004 the National Intelligence Agency denied media 

reports that South Africa was being used as a base for 

al Qaeda operations. Yet in August 2005, the NIA 

warned that al Qaeda was possibly trying to set up 

networks in southern Africa and that it would be easy 

for them to attack harbors.30 Independent experts attribute the mixed messages to Pretoria’s reluctance to 

investigate its own Muslim community out of concern of alienating it.31

The mixed signals continue today. Following the 

closure of the U.S. Embassy and consulates as well 

as the offices of the U.S. Agency for International 

Development in September 2009 after a threat from 

al Shabaab’s Cape Town–based cell, South Africa’s 

National Police Commissioner stated that police 

were investigating the threat and that there would 

be arrests. But he added the police had not ruled out 

the possibility of a hoax.32 In fact, this episode did 

later lead to a joint operation involving senior police officers, members of NIA, and American agents, 

which resulted in the arrest of militants linked to 

extremists in Somalia and Mozambique who were, in 

turn, linked to al Qaeda lieutenants in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan.33

STEPS FOR MOVING FORWARD

There can be no effective counterterror strategy 

without a professional intelligence service. The first 

step to achieving a strategy would be to depoliticize 

the intelligence community. Steps to do so are clearly 

outlined in the 2009 Ministerial Intelligence Review Commission. This Commission, among others, 

pointed out the incredibly wide mandate given to NIA 

to gather political intelligence and urged that NIA’s 

mandate be narrowed to focus on “terrorism, sabotage, 

subversion, espionage, proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction, organized crime and corruption and largescale violence and drug-trafficking.”34 Focusing on a 

narrower mandate has the added advantage of not allowing the intelligence community to disperse their 

resources over too wide a scope. Moreover, through 

partnering with foreign intelligence agencies, training 

and the requisite transferring of skills may also assist 

in the creation of a professional intelligence service.

Another key element of a successful counterterrorism strategy is to redress the problems of ambiguity over the seriousness of the threat and seeming 

lack of political will. One means of doing this is to 

compile an objective assessment of the threat (that 

is, to generate a white paper on the threat of terrorism). Here, various government departments would 

“[corruption] holds serious 

implications for security since it 

opens a path for the infiltration 

and penetration of the state 

security apparatus by 

criminal elements”
6

have to provide answers to strategic and operational 

questions involving:

◆ evaluating the actual threat level

◆ mapping the types of threats and relevant 

targets

◆ exploring new technological counterterrorism possibilities

◆ finding an equilibrium between liberties 

and security

◆ enhancing international counterterrorism 

cooperation

◆ informing society adequately without creating unnecessary fear.35

Such an evidence-based white paper might well 

be the answer for the discourse on the terror threat 

posed to South Africa (and other African countries 

that must overcome limited political will). In compiling the threat assessment objectively, policies 

that flow from the effort are relatively less likely to 

be tinged by personal biases and ideologies. Such a 

white paper may also help clearly signal that countering terrorism is a priority and provide the basis 

for synchronized efforts across the spectrum of government departments.

It is also important that the South African government move from reactive to more proactive (ultimately preemptive) measures to counter the threat 

of terrorism. It is, after all, less useful to apprehend 

and incarcerate terrorists after civilians have already 

been killed and maimed (as happened in the Planet 

Hollywood bombing).

On this point, it might be useful to look at the 

lessons in counterterrorism from selected European 

countries.36 Key elements include a special relationship between the intelligence services and dedicated 

magistrates. In this way, cases do not have to crumble 

when suspected terrorists are hauled before court. As 

these magistrates are focused on issues of counterterrorism, they understand the limitations of the criminal justice system when dealing with acts of terror. 

Moreover, they understand the constraints under 

which counterterror officials labor and the need for 

quick responses to avert a terrorist atrocity. Second, 

acts of terrorism are seen as an autonomous offense 

attracting higher penalties. In this way, the law itself 

serves as a powerful deterrent. Third, the proactive 

nature of counterterrorism strategy is seen in the 

preemptive judicial approach being followed by the 

Europeans in the legal designation “conspiring to terrorism.”37 This proactiveness has been accompanied 

by nationwide security alert plans and preplanned 

extra security measures for public places and public 

transport. This was informed by the terrorists’ penchant to strike European nations’ transport systems, 

as was seen so graphically in the attack on London’s 

subway system and the Madrid train bombings.

Understanding that the nature of the threat is 

constantly mutating, necessitating constant monitoring and engagement by all government institutions, 

the French, for instance, elevated the fight against 

terror to a national priority. As Ludo Block noted, 

all “government institutions actively searched for 

indications and information pointing to processes of 

radicalism in society.”38

This objective may be further advanced by creating one central institution that is responsible for receiving all relevant terrorism-related information and 

developing a strategy for the country as a whole. This 

may minimize the mixed signals on terrorism emanating from different government bodies in South 

Africa. Importantly, members of this structure must 

be appointed on the basis of competence, not party 

loyalty. They must also be well-paid and well-vetted 

to prevent criminal or other elements from penetrating a sensitive security agency.

Although Africa could do well to learn from the 

European experience, it should be noted that proactive measures need to be seen on a continuum. 

While attempting to identify and disrupt processes of 

radicalism may suffice at the outset of proactive measures, what happens if one faces an already radicalized 

jihadist? Other proactive measures should then be 

taken. These could include disrupting terror finances, 

destroying weapons caches and information for training, and destroying training camps. Failing this, if a 
7

trained, armed terrorist already exists with the financial resources to initiate the attack, then proactive 

measures further down the continuum would include 

isolating the target from the terrorist or the terrorist 

from the target or sabotaging the terror plan.39 This, 

of course, would assume that through good intelligence one would know what the targets are, who the 

terrorists are, and what the plan is. For this reason, 

South African and other African states need to think 

long-term and have in place long-term human intelligence assets within jihadi structures. 

CONCLUSION

Terrorism constitutes a ubiquitous global threat. 

Getting squeezed elsewhere, Islamist militants are 

increasingly finding the African continent an attractive place to operate. South Africa, with its 

relatively developed transport, telecommunications, 

and commercial infrastructure, is a particular favorite. The poor state of the country’s security services 

coupled with the ideological approach of some of its 

political mandarins further emasculates any robust 

counterterrorism initiative. Yet international practice indicates that if Pretoria does manage to find its 

political will, it will be able to turn back the tide of 

the terrorist scourge.

NOTES

1

 “Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism,” 

U.S. Library of Congress, October 2003, 23.

2

 Jonathan Schanzer, “Pretoria Unguarded,” The Weekly Standard 12, no. 35 (May 28, 2007).

3

 Alameen Templeton, “Uncovering the SA life of London 

bomb suspect,” Cape Times, August 2, 2005.

4

 “SA a growing terrorist hideout,” South African Press Association (SAPA), September 6, 2005.

5

 Schanzer.

6

 “Terrorist obtained South African passports,” USA Today, 

July 27, 2004.

7

 Ronald Sandee, “Target South Africa,” Presentation to 

the U.S. Congresssional Caucaus on Counter Terrorism, May 

26, 2010. See also Stephan Hoffstatter, Suthentira Govender, 

and Teneshia Naidoo, “SA Accused of Being Slow to Respond 

to Warnings,” Times Live, May 30, 2010, available at <www.

timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/article477466.ece/World-Cupterror-alert>.

8

 “UK bomb plotter flew via SA,” News24.com, April 7, 

2008.

9

 “Terrorism Profile-South Africa,” Privacy International, June 

17, 2004, available at <www.privacyinternational.org/article,shtm

l?%cmd%SD=x-347-66677>. 

10 Henri Boshoff and Martin Schonteich, “South Africa’s 

Operational and Legislative Responses to Terrorism,” in Africa and 

Terrorism, Joining the Global Campaign, ed. Jakkie Cilliers and Kathryn Sturman (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2002), 67.

11 Ibid., 2.

12 “Pahad: The heat is on,” News24.com, August 5, 2004.

13 Sandee, 2.

14 Kurt Shillinger, “al-Qaida in Southern Africa,” Armed 

Forces Journal, February 2006, available at <www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/02/1813653/>.

15 “Holding the ANC Accountable,” in The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (Pretoria: Government 

of the Republic of South Africa, 2003), 649, available at <www.

info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/5_3.pdf>. 

16 Hussein Solomon, Pakistan and the Legacy of Maulana 

Maududi, International Institute for Islamic Studies, 2009, 2.

17 Jackie Mapoloko, “Top cop scuttled Zuma case,” Mail & 

Guardian, May 21, 2010.

18 Sam Sole and Nic Dawes, “Kasrils shields his legacy,” Mail 

& Guardian Online, September 26, 2008, available at <www.mg.co.

za/article/2008-09-26-kasrils-shields-his-legacy>. 

19 Ibid.

20 Adriaan Basson, “Shocking state of the SAPS,” Mail 

& Guardian Online, May 1, 2008, available at <www.mg.co.za/

article/2008-0501-shocking-state-of-the-saps>.

21 Ibid.

22 Sean O’Neil, “SA face visa curb to shut terrorist route to 

Britain,” The Times, February 4, 2008.

23 Liezel Steenkamp, “Suide Afrika ‘n veilige hawe vir Moslem terroriste,” Rapport, August 9, 2008. 

24 C. Du Plessis, “Hundreds of cops found guilty of crimes in 

one year,” Pretoria News, September 8, 2009.

25 Sonja van Buul and Daniella du Plooy, “Cops involved in 

deadly heist,” News24.com, June 7, 2010.

26 Alex Eliseev and Bonile Ngqiyaza, “Drugs: top cop arrested,” Pretoria News, March 24, 2009.

27 “Zille warns of rising tide of police corruption,” Mail & 

Guardian Online, January 18, 2008, available at <www.mg.co.za/

article/2008-01018-zille-warns-of-rising-tide-police-corruption>.

28 Stefaans Brummer and Sam Sole, “Did top cops rig 

PAGAD case?” Mail & Guardian, August 21, 2009.
8

29 Stephan Hofstatter, Suthentira Govender, and Teneshia Naidoo, “World Cup terror alert: South Africa accused of being slow 

to respond to warnings,” The Sunday Times, May 30, 2010.

30 Ibid.

31 “South Africa’s growing terrorist hideout,” SAPA, September 6, 2005.

32 Peter Fabricius, Shaun Smillie, and Gillian Gifford, “US still on terror threat in SA as buildings close,” Pretoria News, September 

23, 2009.

33 “Al Qaeda plot to attack 2010 football World Cup foiled in South Africa,” October 14, 2009, available at <www.newstrackindia.

com/newsdetails/128098>.

34 Sole and Dawes.

35 Ibid.

36 Ludo Block, “Evaluating the Effectiveness of French Counter-Terrorism,” Jamestown Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 15 (July 2005), 

available at <www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=560>.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Boshoff and Schonteich.

AFRICA CENTER FOR 

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National Defense University

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REGIONAL OFFICE 

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REGIONAL OFFICE 

IN ADDIS ABABA

Regional Manager:

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AFRICA SECURITY BRIEFS

Editor: Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Phone: + 1 202-685-6808

Email: Sieglej@ndu.edu

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

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and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

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AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

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