COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Fitzpatrick and Senior Judge Duff 

Argued by Teleconference 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1280-97-3 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 OCTOBER 21, 1997 

JAMES ANTHONY YOUNGER 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

William N. Alexander, II, Judge 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 No brief or argument for appellee. 

 The Commonwealth appeals a pretrial order of the trial 

court suppressing evidence obtained during a stop of a car driven 

by James Anthony Younger (defendant). It contends that the trial 

court erred when it concluded that the officer who executed the 

stop did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal 

activity. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand. 

 On January 25, 1997, between 6:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m., Floyd 

Hille, Chief of the Gretna Police Department, received a phone 

call from a person who identified herself as Terri Younger, wife 

of the defendant. Chief Hille believed that the caller was Mrs. 

Younger because he had spoken with Mrs. Younger two or three 

times before, and the caller's voice sounded like Mrs. Younger's 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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voice. The caller asked Chief Hille to be on the lookout for a 

dark blue, four-door, 1985 Oldsmobile with license plate number 

ZJH-9972. The caller said that the vehicle was registered in her 

(Mrs. Younger's) name and that she had "dropped the insurance on 

the vehicle." Chief Hille told the caller that he would look for 

the vehicle. The caller did not mention defendant at any time 

during the phone call. 

 Chief Hille was familiar with the Oldsmobile identified by 

the caller because Mrs. Younger had called him on prior occasions 

to inform him that defendant was driving it. In response to 

these calls, Chief Hille attempted to "find and locate" 

defendant. In addition, the chief had stopped defendant in the 

Oldsmobile about a month earlier on December 25, 1996. After he 

received the phone call, Chief Hille "ran" the license plate 

number given to him by the caller in a computer data base, which 

informed him that the Oldsmobile was registered in Mrs. Younger's 

name. Chief Hille resumed his patrol and made efforts to find 

the Oldsmobile. Around 11:15 p.m., Chief Hille spotted the 

vehicle about to pull away from a gas station. Chief Hille could 

not see who was driving the Oldsmobile because it had tinted 

windows. Although Chief Hille did not observe the driver of the 

car commit any traffic infractions, he decided to stop the 

vehicle "to advise the driver that [he] had information that it 

was uninsured [and] . . . to take it off the road." The chief 

activated the blue lights on his vehicle and stopped the 
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Oldsmobile, which was being driven by defendant. On February 18, 

1997 a grand jury indicted defendant for a second or subsequent 

offense of operating a motor vehicle after being adjudged an 

habitual offender in violation of Code § 46.2-357. Defendant 

filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained by Chief Hille 

during the stop. Two days before the hearing on defendant's 

motion, Mrs. Younger told Chief Hille that she did not call him 

on January 25. According to Chief Hille, Mrs. Younger said that 

she was working at the time he received the call on that date. 

 Following a hearing, at which the testimony of Chief Hille 

was the only evidence offered, the trial court granted 

defendant's motion to suppress. The trial court concluded that 

Chief Hille's stop of defendant was a "bad stop" because a "naked 

telephone call is not enough to authorize a stop of this 

vehicle." 

 "A police officer may stop the driver or occupants of an 

automobile for investigatory purposes if the officer has 'a 

reasonable articulable suspicion, based upon objective facts, 

that the individual is involved in criminal activity.'" Freeman 

v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 658, 660-61, 460 S.E.2d 261, 262 

(1995) (quoting Jacques v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 591, 593, 

405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991)). To determine whether there was a 

reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop, we must 

examine the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of 

a "reasonable police officer with the knowledge, training, and 
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experience of the investigating officer." Murphy v. 

Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 139, 144, 384 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1989). 

 Information provided by an anonymous or known informant may 

establish an articulable, reasonable suspicion for a police 

officer to execute a Terry stop if the information possesses 

"sufficient 'indicia of reliability.'" See Alabama v. White, 496 

U.S. 325, 328-31, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2415-16, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 

(1990); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 

1923-24, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Bulatko v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. 

App. 135, 137, 428 S.E.2d 306, 307 (1993); Beckner v. 

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 533, 535, 425 S.E.2d 530, 531 (1993). 

Specifically, the officer must have some objective basis for 

assessing both the informant's personal reliability and "the 

reliability of the informant's knowledge of the information 

contained in the report." Beckner, 15 Va. App. at 535-36, 425 

S.E.2d at 532. 

 When determining whether an informant's tip possessed 

sufficient indicia of reliability to establish articulable 

reasonable suspicion, a court must consider the totality of the 

circumstances "taking into account the facts known to the 

officers from personal observation, and giving the . . . tip the 

weight it deserved in light of its indicia of reliability 

. . . ." White, 496 U.S. at 330-31, 110 S. Ct. at 2416. If a 

tip has a relatively low degree of reliability because it is from 

an anonymous informer, more information will be required to 
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establish the "requisite quantum of suspicion," such as 

"independent corroboration of significant aspects of the tip." 

Id. at 331, 332, 110 S. Ct. at 2416, 2417. Less verification of 

a tip is necessary when the police are more familiar with the 

informant. See id.; Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47, 92 S. Ct. at 

1923-24 (holding that in-person discussion with known informant 

who had provided information in the past was sufficient indicia 

of informant's reliability); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 

49, 54, 455 S.E.2d 261, 264 (1995) (stating that the fact that 

informants had previously provided information that resulted in 

arrests and successful prosecutions was an indicia of their 

reliability); Beckner, 15 Va. App. at 535, 425 S.E.2d at 531-32 

(stating that face-to-face confrontation with previously unknown 

informant provided indicia of informant's personal reliability). 

 Upon appeal from an order granting a defendant's motion to 

suppress, the Commonwealth has the burden to show that the trial 

court's decision was erroneous. See Stanley v. Commonwealth, 16 

Va. App. 873, 874, 433 S.E.2d 512, 513 (1993). We must review 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, the 

prevailing party below, granting him "all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible therefrom." See Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 

Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991); Reynolds v. 

Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 436, 388 S.E.2d 659, 663 (1990). 

We review the trial court's findings of historical fact only for 

"clear error" and "give due weight to inferences drawn from those 
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facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." 

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. , , 116 S. Ct. 1657, 

1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). We review the trial court's 

determination of reasonable suspicion de novo. See id. at , 

116 S. Ct. at 1659. 

 We hold that Chief Hille's stop of defendant was a valid 

Terry stop. The information provided to him by the caller 

possessed sufficient indicia of reliability from the perspective 

of a reasonable police officer with Chief Hille's knowledge and 

experience to provide an articulable basis for the chief to 

suspect that the driver of the Oldsmobile was committing a crime. 

 First, the caller's tip that the Oldsmobile was uninsured 

was sufficiently reliable from the perspective of a reasonable 

police officer in Chief Hille's position to warrant the chief's 

subsequent response. Because we view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to defendant, we must accept as fact that the 

person who called Chief Hille was not Mrs. Younger. However, we 

conclude that Chief Hille's reliance on the tip was justified 

because he reasonably believed that he was speaking with Mrs. 

Younger, who was both known to him and the car's owner. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, the chief's belief 

that the caller was Mrs. Younger was reasonable. When 

determining reasonable suspicion, 

 reasonableness is judged from the perspective 

of a reasonable officer on the scene allowing 

for the need of split-second decisions and 

without regard to the officer's intent or 

motivation. 
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Scott v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 725, 727, 460 S.E.2d 610, 612 

(1995) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97, 109 S. Ct. 

1865, 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1985)). In addition, we give 

deference to the inferences the police officer draws from the 

historical facts with which he or she is faced. See Ornelas, 517 

U.S. at , 116 S. Ct. at 1663; Murphy, 9 Va. App. at 144, 384 

S.E.2d at 128. 

 Based on Chief Hille's reasonable belief that he was 

speaking with Mrs. Younger, the caller's information about the 

Oldsmobile possessed sufficient indicia of reliability to justify 

Chief Hille's response. Cf. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 

804-05, 91 S. Ct. 1106, 1111, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971) (holding that 

arrest of person not named in warrant due to an understandable 

mistake of identity and the subsequent search did not violate the 

Fourth Amendment because the arrest and search were "reasonable 

response[s] to the situation facing [the officers] at the time"). 

 First, Chief Hille could reasonably conclude that the caller was 

personally reliable because he knew Mrs. Younger and had received 

information from her in the past about defendant. Chief Hille's 

determination that the caller's statement was reliable was 

likewise reasonable under the circumstances. Chief Hille had an 

objective basis to assess the reliability of the caller's 

knowledge that the Oldsmobile was uninsured because Mrs. Younger, 

as the car's owner, was likely to know the status of the car's 

insurance. 
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 Finally, Chief Hille's knowledge that the insurance on the 

Oldsmobile had been canceled justified his decision to conduct an 

investigative stop of the driver of the vehicle. Under Code 

§ 46.2-707, it is a Class 3 misdemeanor for the non-owner of an 

uninsured vehicle to drive the vehicle knowing that the uninsured 

motor vehicle fee was unpaid. From "Mrs. Younger's" statement 

that she had "dropped" the insurance on the Oldsmobile and the 

fact that she was calling the police to report that someone might 

be driving the car, Chief Hille could reasonably infer that she 

had yet to pay the uninsured motor vehicle fee. Because Chief 

Hille harbored an articulable, reasonable suspicion that the 

driver of the Oldsmobile was engaged in criminal activity, his 

investigative stop of the Oldsmobile did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand the order 

of the trial court granting defendant's motion to suppress and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 Reversed and remanded.