alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 102.130 Communications not prohibited. *Ex parte* communications prohibited by § 102.126 do not include oral or written communications or requests: ( a ) Which relate solely to matters which the Hearing Officer, Regional Director, Administrative Law Judge, or Board Member is authorized by law or Board Rules to entertain or dispose of on an *ex parte* basis.
( b ) For information solely with respect to the status of a proceeding.
( c ) Which all the parties to the proceeding agree, or which the responsible official formally rules, may be made on an *ex parte* basis.
( d ) Proposing settlement or an agreement for disposition of any or all issues in the proceeding.
( e ) Which concern matters of general significance to the field of labor-management relations or administrative practice and which are not specifically related to pending on-the-record proceedings.
( f ) From the General Counsel to the Board when the General Counsel is acting as counsel for the Board.
[82 FR 11778, Feb. 24, 2017]
Statement Pursuant to
Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002






The
undersigned, Daniel Dror, CEO, President and Chairman of American International
Industries Inc., a Nevada corporation, hereby makes the following certification
as required by Section 906(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, with respect to
the following of this report filed pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: Quarterly Report of Form 10-Q/A for the period ended March
31, 2007.






The
undersigned certifies that the above quarterly report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
information contained in the above annual report fairly presents, in all
respects, the financial condition of American International Industries Inc. and
results of its operations.






Date:
March 18,
2008


Daniel
Dror


Chairman


/s/ Daniel
Dror
§ 1206.4 Time limits on applications. Except in unusual or extraordinary circumstances, the National Mediation Board will not accept an application for investigation of a representation dispute among employees of a carrier: ( a ) For a period of two (2) years from the date of a certification or decertification covering the same craft or class of employees on the same carrier, and
( b ) For a period of one (1) year from the date on which: ( 1 ) The Board dismissed a docketed application after having conducted an election among the same craft or class of employees on the same carrier and less than a majority of valid ballots cast were for representation; or
( 2 ) The Board dismissed a docketed application covering the same craft or class of employees on the same carrier because no dispute existed as defined in § 1206.2 of these rules; or
( 3 ) The Board dismissed a docketed application after the applicant withdrew an application covering the same craft or class of employees on the same carrier after the application was docketed by the Board.
[44 FR 10602, Feb. 22, 1979, as amended at 75 FR 26088, May 11, 2010; 84 FR 35989, July 26, 2019]
#### STATE ex PULSKAMP v. MERCER CO. COMRS. et.

Ohio Supreme Court.

No. 21291.

Decided Dec. 19, 1928.

DAY, J,

TAXES.

(560 R2) Where a taxpayer has paid an assessment for road improvement under protest and thereafter, believing such assessment to have been made without jurisdiction by the county commissioners and therefore void, seeks to recover back the money so paid, the proper remedy to test such question is by an action to recover back as provided in Section 12075, General Code.

Under such circumstances, a petition in mandamus against the county commissioners, county auditor and treasurer, asking that they be required to correct the tax list and duplicate as provided in Sections 2588, 2588-1 and 2589, General Code, should not be granted, such sections applying to errors clerical in character rather than those referring to the fundamental one of jurisdiction.

Where one claims to have paid an illegal assessment, he can not recover the amount so paid unless the payment was an involuntary one. A simple protest against the validity of the assessment is, even coupled with notice to the treasurer that the taxpayer will institute legal proceedings to recover back, not sufficient, but it must appear that payment was necessary in order to avoid the legal steps incident to tax collection. (Whitbeck v. Minch, 43 Ohio St., 210, approved and followed).

Marshall, C. J., Allen, Kinkade, Robinson, Jones and Matthias, JJ., concur.
Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:24306-4 Filed:05/19/23 Entered:05/

Envelope Page 1 of 1
#### J. R. Bowman, *Appellant,*v. E. S. Arey, *Appellee.*

Upon appeal, from a temporary restraining order granted on notice, the equities of the bill not being finally passed upon, when the contract breached prima facie justifies the order, the appellate court need not go into minute critical examination to see if some portion of the contract be invalid.

This case was decided by Division A.

Appealed from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County.

The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

*Wall*& *McKay,*for Appellant;

*H. G. Gordon*and *V. H. Knight,*for Appellee.

Cockrell, J.

— This is an appeal from an order granting a temporary injunction, after full notice and conditioned upon the giving of a bond.

It appears that in January, 1911, Bowman sold out to Arey his “Tailoring and Gents’ Furnishings” business in the City of Tampa for one thousand dollars, together with the good will of the business and in the contract of sale stipulated that he would not at any time within five years engage directly or indirectly, either as agent, principal, servant or otherwise, in carrying on, conducting or *441being interested in the said business of ‘Tailoring and Gents’ Furnishings’ in Tampa, and further included in the sale the exclusive right to use his name; notwithstanding this contract within a few months thereafter the said Bowman opened business in said city under the name of “Bowman, the Tailor.” Bowman answered among other things that his present business was not strictly speaking tailoring, but that he had samples to show customers, that he did the measuring, sending the orders to the large cities in the north to be made up, and upon receipt, delivering them to his customer.

The temporary restraining order goes only to conducting directly or indirectly' a tailoring or gents’ furnishing business in Tampa, or advertising a place of business so conducted until the further order of the court, and from entering into further contract, directly or indirectly, or as the agent of another person to furnish clothing manufactured by him or made by him as a tailor or under his direction. The injunction, however, permits him to complete the orders on hand.

We think the contract *prima facie*justifies the restraining order, and that we need not now go into a minute critical examination to see if there be not some possible invalidity in some portion of the contract. The court Avas not required to pass finally upon the equities of the bill nor to rule upon the demurrer incorporated in the answer. A final hearing has not been reached nor has the demurrer been set doAvn for hearing.

The order is affirmed.

Whitfield, O. J., and Shackleford, J., concur;

Taylor, Hooker and Parkhill, J. J., concur in the opinion.
§ 18.13 Settlement judge procedure. ( a ) *How initiated.* The Office of Administrative Law Judges provides settlement judges to aid the parties in resolving the matter that is the subject of the controversy. Upon a joint request by the parties or upon referral by the judge when no party objects, the Chief Judge may appoint a settlement judge. A settlement judge will not be appointed when settlement proceedings would be inconsistent with a statute, regulation, or executive order.
( b ) *Appointment.* The Chief Judge has discretion to appoint a settlement judge, who must be an active or retired judge. The settlement judge will not be appointed to hear and decide the case or approve the settlement without the parties' consent and the approval of the Chief Judge.
( c ) *Duration of settlement proceeding.* Unless the Chief Judge directs otherwise, settlement negotiations under this section must be completed within 60 days from the date of the settlement judge's appointment. The settlement judge may request that the Chief Judge extend the appointment. The negotiations will be terminated if a party withdraws from participation, or if the settlement judge determines that further negotiations would be unproductive or inappropriate.
( d ) *Powers of the settlement judge.* The settlement judge may convene settlement conferences; require the parties or their representatives to attend with full authority to settle any disputes; and impose other reasonable requirements to expedite an amicable resolution of the case.
( e ) *Stay of proceedings before presiding judge.* The appointment of a settlement judge does not stay any aspect of the proceeding before the presiding judge. Any motion to stay must be directed to the presiding judge.
( f ) *Settlement conferences.* Settlement conferences may be conducted by telephone, videoconference or in person at the discretion of the settlement judge after considering the nature of the case, location of the participants, availability of technology, and efficiency of administration.
( g ) *Confidentiality.* All discussions with the settlement judge are confidential; none may be recorded or transcribed. The settlement judge must not disclose any confidential communications made during settlement proceedings, except as required by statute, executive order, or court order. The settlement judge may not be subpoenaed or called as a witness in any hearing of the case or any subsequent administrative proceedings before the Department to testify to statements made or conduct during the settlement discussions.
( h ) *Report.* The parties must promptly inform the presiding judge of the outcome of the settlement negotiations. If a settlement is reached, the parties must submit the required documents to the presiding judge within 14 days of the conclusion of settlement discussions unless the presiding judge orders otherwise.
( i ) *Non-reviewable decisions.* Whether a settlement judge should be appointed, the selection of a particular settlement judge, and the termination of proceedings under this section are matters not subject to review by Department officials.
1 The Honorable Thomas M. Shanahan, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 99-1149

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Nebraska. Jeffrey Allan Harrison, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: December 3, 1999 Filed: December 9, 1999

___________ Before BOWMAN, FAGG, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Jeffrey Allan Harrison appeals the judgment entered by the District Court 1 following his guilty plea to drug offenses. For reversal, he argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Because there is no indication in the record before us that Harrison entered into a conditional guilty plea, preserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion, we conclude Harrison has waived his right to appeal the issue. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); UnitedStates v.-2-

Jennings , 12 F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 1994); UnitedStates v. Stewart , 972 F.2d 216, 217-18 (8th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Searched for **http://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/data/reportcard.htm**

 

19961997199819992000200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024

*Note:* This calendar view maps the number of captures of **http://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/data/reportcard.htm**, *not* how many times the site was actually updated.

Look Up URL in general Internet Archive web collection.
§ 1640.1 Purpose and application. ( a ) This part establishes the procedures to be followed by the Federal agencies responsible for processing and resolving complaints or charges of employment discrimination filed against recipients of Federal financial assistance when jurisdiction exists under both section 504 and title I.
( b ) This part also repeats the provisions established by 28 CFR 35.171 for determining which Federal agency shall process and resolve complaints or charges of employment discrimination: ( 1 ) That fall within the overlapping jurisdiction of titles I and II (but are not covered by section 504); and
( 2 ) That are covered by title II, but not title I (whether or not they are also covered by section 504).
( c ) This part also describes the procedures to be followed when a complaint or charge arising solely under section 504 or title I is filed with a section 504 agency or the EEOC.
( d ) This part does not apply to complaints or charges against Federal contractors under section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act.
( e ) This part does not create rights in any person or confer agency jurisdiction not created or conferred by the ADA or section 504 over any complaint or charge.
[No. 48493-1-I.

Division One.

December 23, 2002.]

#### Thomas Jones, et al., *Appellants,*v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., et al., *Respondents.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 98-2-03960-4, Mary Yu, J., entered April 13, 2001. *Affirmed*by unpublished per curiam opinion.
# EUR-Lex - 31996D0137 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 31996D0137

**96/137/EC: Commission Decision of 29 January 1996 amending Decision 94/86/EC drawing up a provisional list of third countries from which Member States authorize imports of wild game meat (Text with EEA relevance) **

*
Official Journal L 031 , 09/02/1996 P. 0031 - 0031 *

COMMISSION DECISION of 29 January 1996 amending Decision 94/86/EC drawing up a provisional list of third countries from which Member States authorize imports of wild game meat (Text with EEA relevance) (96/137/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 92/45/EEC of 16 June 1992 on public health and animal health problems relating to the killing of wild game and the placing on the market of wild game meat (1), as last amended by the Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, and in particular Article 16 (2) and (3) thereof,

Whereas Commission Decision 94/86/EC (2) established a provisional list of third countries from which importation of wild game meat is authorized;

Whereas it is necessary to adapt Decision 94/86/EC to take into account amendments in Community legislation referred to by it;

Whereas further written assurances have been received from Tunisia; whereas examination of these assurances has shown that this country satisfies the requirements of the Community;

Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Part I of the Annex to Decision 94/86/EC is replaced by the following:

'PART I

List of countries from which Member States shall authorize imports of wild feathered game meat:

- the list of third countries from which Member States authorize imports of fresh poultry meat appearing in Commission Decision 94/85/EC (*),

- Greenland,

- Tunisia.

(*) OJ No L 44, 17. 2. 1994, p. 31.`

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 29 January 1996.

For the Commission

Franz FISCHLER

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ No L 268, 14. 9. 1992, p. 35.

(2) OJ No L 44, 17. 2. 1994, p. 33.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. CESAR COUTINO

- LOPEZ,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 16

- 50178 D.C. No. 3:15

- cr - 02657

- LAB

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 11 , 2017 ** Before: GOULD , CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Ce sar Coutino

- Lopez appeals from the district court’ s judgment and challenges the 24

- month sentence and one

- year term of supervised release imposed following his guilty

- plea conviction for being a removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S. C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

APR 24 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 16

- 50178

§ 1291, and we affirm. Coutino

- Lopez contends that the government breached the parties’ plea agreement at the sen tencing hearing by implicitly suggesting that it did not support the stipulated low

- end Guidelines sentence or the four

- level fast

- track departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1. We reject this argument because the record reflects that, in its sentencing summary chart and at the sentencing hearing, the government stood by its recommendation that Cou tino

- Lopez receive the stipulated fast

- track departure and a low

- end Guidelines sentence . Accordingly, Coutino

- Lopez received the benefit of his bargain and “the presentation of a united front to the court.” See United States v. Alcala

- Sanchez, 666 F.3d 571, 575 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). Coutino

- Lopez next contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Coutino

- Lopez’s
sentence
. See Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The custodial
sentence and term of supervised release are substantively reasonable in light of the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Coutino

- Lopez’s immigration history. See Gall , 552 U.S. at 51.
AFFIRMED.
#### George J. Hubbard, Resp’t, *v.*William H. Nearpass *et al.,*as Adm’rs, etc., App’lts.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department,*

*Filed May 13, 1889.)*

Examination before trial—Condition.

It is within the power of the court to impose as a condition to the granting of an order for the examination of a plaintiff as a witness, before trial, that such deposition may be read by plaintiff on the trial, should defendants fail to read the same.

Appeal from an order made by Justice Bartlett, at. special term, on the 4th day of December, 1888.

The portion of the order complained of by appellant is the condition therein stated, which directs “that plaintiff’s motion to vacate or modify defendant’s order, for the examination of the plaintiff before trial, be granted, unless defendants stipulate that the deposition sought may be read by plaintiff on the trial hereof, in case defendants fail to read the same.” The order for the examination *of*the plaintiff before trial was procured from the county judge of Orange county, on the 27th day of October, 1888, and was procured on affidavit of defendant, Nearpass. At folio 74 of affidavit of defendant, Nearpass, it is stated ; “Deponent further says that he expects to use plaintiff’s deposition on the trial of this action, if he is allowed to take it.” Plaintiff’s affidavit for order to show cause why the order of the county judge, for his examination before trial, should not be vacated or modified, discloses clear reasons for the granting of the order made therein. On the return of that order, plaintiff urged the bad faith of defendants in the examination sought, on the ground stated in plaintiff’s affidavit, and upon the further ground that the defendants did not intend, in good faith, to read or use the depositions on the trial of this action, but would avail themselves of the legal restrictions on plaintiff in using the same against the deceased person, whose estate defendants represent.

The court thereupon granted plaintiff’s motion to vacate the order for plaintiff’s examination, unless defendants stipulated that plaintiff might read deposition in case defendant failed to read.

*C. E. Cuddeback,*for app’lts; *John W. Lyon,*for resp’t.

Pratt, J.

We are of opinion that the condition imposed upon the examination of the plaintiff, at the instance of the adverse party, was within the power of the court, and we are not able to say that the power was indiscreetly exercised.

*461Much may be said in favor of the view that if the administrators require the plaintiff to submit to an examination at their instance, it should be upon terms that such examination may be used in evidence upon the trial, by plaintiff.

Order affirmed with ten dollars costs and disbursements.

All concur.
#### FULLERTON TRANSFER & STORAGE CO v McNEIL

Ohio Appeals, 7th Dist, Mahoning Co

Decided March 22, 1929

E. L. Williams, Akron, for Fullerton Co.

Dahl B. Cooper, Youngstown, for McNeil.

POLLOCK, J.

All that appears in the latter entry is that the motion for rehearing:

> “This day this cause comes on to be heard on motion for rehearing on motion for new trial; upon consideration thereof the court sustains the same and a rehearing is hereby allowed.”

And then there is a judgment entered. There is no finding that this motion was really filed within time; in other words, there is no finding that the date entered which appears on the dockets and journal entry, was a mistake. We do not know what transpired. There is no bill of exceptions filed of evidence that was heard *456on the motion for rehearing, so we presume that the court did not find that there was any mistake made by the date shown on the docket and journal entries.

Now, we have two judgments, the later judgment entered on a rehearing, without any reason given whatever for entering judgment. The former judgment is not stricken out. It is still in full force on the records of the court below. We think that this latter judgment must be said to be- a surplusage or nullity; anyhow, it has no effect on the rights of the defendant in error, but his rights, and the rights of the plaintiff in error, were fixed and established when the first judgment was entered.

It follows that the bill of exceptions must be stricken from the record, and in fact the petition in error was filed out of time. The judgment below will be affirmed.

Roberts, and Farr, JJ, concur.
No. 17,224.

#### Davis et al. *v.*Bayless et al.

Filed Oct. 11, 1894;

From the White Circuit Court.

*B. K. Elliott*and *W. F. Elliott,*for appellants.

*&.*1?. *Eldridge, J. A. Sims*and *S. O. Bayless,*for appellees.

Coffey, J.

— The questions involved in this case are identical with the questions involved in the case of *McKinney*v. *Frankfort, etc.,*R. *W. Co.,*140 Ind. 95, and upon the authority of that case the judgment of the White Circuit Court is reversed.

petition for rehearing overruled Jan. 11, 1895.
Subsidiaries of the Registrant (As of March, 30, 2000)

Best Masonry & Tool Supply,  Inc.  f/k/a J. Marvin Isaac  Interests,  Inc.(Texas
     domestic)

Lewis W. Osborne, Inc. (California domestic)

United Terrazzo Supply Co., Inc. (California domestic)

Magna Wall, Inc. (Texas domestic)

ISG Canada Limited (New Brunswick domestic - Canadian subsidiary)

ISG Manufactured Products, Inc. (Utah domestic)

        Don's Building Supply, L.L.P. (Texas domestic)*

Palestine Concrete Tile Company (Texas domestic)



* This  L.L.P is owned 90% by ISG  Manufactured  Products,  Inc.  and 10% by ISG
Resources, Inc.
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INDEX MAP OF ALASKA SHOWING LOCATION OF SEWARD PENINSULA AIRBORNE GEOPHYSICAL
SURVEYS, 1968. SEE DETAILED INDEX FOR ACTUAL COVERAGE.

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Released to open file and has not been edited
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