J-S23024-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KEENAN COLEMAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2326 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 26, 2022,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002793-2011.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KEENAN COLEMAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2328 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 26, 2022,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002794-2011.
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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KEENAN COLEMAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2329 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 26, 2022,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-0002820-2011.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 10, 2023

Keenan Coleman appeals from the order denying his first petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546. This appeal follows this Court’s previous remand for the PCRA court to 

hold an evidentiary hearing to address certain claims of ineffectiveness 

identified by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Coleman, 230 A.2d 

1042 (Pa. 2020). We affirm.

In Coleman, our Supreme Court summarized the pertinent facts and 

procedural history as follows:

. . . In the early morning hours of April 12, 2010, Tobias Berry 

(‘Victim”) was shot and killed on the streets of West Philadelphia. 

During the investigation of Victim’s murder, police, including 

Detective John Keen, took statements from Wakeeyah Powell and 

Hanif Hall, both of whom identified [Coleman] as the person that 

shot Victim. [Coleman] eventually was arrested and charged with 

first-degree murder and related offenses.

At [Coleman’s] trial, the Commonwealth called several 

witnesses, including Powell and Hall, but they recanted their 
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previous statements identifying [Coleman] as the shooter. More 

specifically, Powell claimed that police coerced her into giving her 

initial statement by contending that the officers said they had 

statements from other persons but lost their “original witness.” 

Powell also denied witnessing the shooting, stating instead that 

she heard about it from a friend. Because Powell’s trial testimony 

was inconsistent with her statement to police, the Commonwealth 

utilized her previous statement to examine her. That statement 

included a reference to [Coleman] as a drug dealer. 

During Hall’s trial testimony, he indicated that he felt 

induced by the police to give a statement implicating [Coleman], 

as detectives informed him that they knew that [Coleman] and his 

codefendant committed the killing. In addition, he denied having 

any direct knowledge of the shooting, asserting that he only 

learned about it from “word on the street.” The prosecutor 

examined Hall by utilizing his previous statement to police, 

wherein Hall asserted that [Coleman] “liked to shoot people” and 

that [Coleman] carried “all kinds” of guns. Of further note, 

Detective Keen later read to the jury Hall’s previous statement to 

police. That statement, inter alia, referenced a person named 

Tanisha, who allegedly told Hall that [Coleman] shot Victim.

***

The jury ultimately found [Coleman] guilty of the charged 

offenses. For [his] first-degree murder conviction, the trial court 

sentenced [Coleman] to life in prison without the possibility of 

parole. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal of his judgment 

of sentence, [Coleman] filed [a counseled] PCRA petition[.]

Coleman, 230 A.3d at 1044-45 (footnotes and citation to record omitted).

In his PCRA petition, Coleman asserted that trial counsel was ineffective 

in five specific instances, when counsel failed: 1) to object to the trial court’s 

exclusion of the public during voir dire; 2) to offer a defense to the witness 

intimidation charge; 3) to object to extensive inadmissible hearsay at trial; 4)

to object to admissible bad acts/character evidence; and 5) to object to errors 

in the prosecutor’s closing argument. PCRA Petition, 9/30/15, 2-4.
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Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss Coleman’s 

petition, and Coleman filed a reply. On September 29, 2017, the PCRA court 

issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Coleman’s petition 

without a hearing. Coleman did not file a response. By order entered 

December 1, 2017, the PCRA Court dismissed Coleman’s petition. 

Coleman appealed to this Court, and we affirmed the denial of postconviction relief on March 11, 2019. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 215 A.3d 

631 (Pa. Super. 2019)(non-precedential decision). Thereafter, our Supreme 

Court granted Coleman’s petition for allowance of appeal.

On May 19, 2020, the high court affirmed this Court’s judgment in part, 

vacated in part, and remanded to this Court for further consideration of 

Coleman’s claims regarding the ineffectiveness of counsel. Specifically, as to 

the admission of hearsay testimony, our Supreme Court reasoned:

[I]n his PCRA petition, [Coleman] averred that trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to object to several statements made by 

Powell and Hall on the ground that the statements constituted 

inadmissible hearsay. The lower courts concluded that these 

claims lack arguable merit because the complained-of testimony 

was not hearsay, as it was not admitted for the truth of the 

matters asserted. Instead, the courts concluded, these 

statements were admitted to explain why Powell and Hall were 

recanting their previous statements to police and to allow the jury 

to better assess their credibility. [Coleman] contends that this 

conclusion is erroneous because the trial court did not instruct the 

jury to consider the testimony of Powell and Hall for the limited 

purposes of understanding the witnesses’ reasons for recanting 

their previous statements and assessing their credibility.

***
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We have no hesitation in agreeing with [Coleman’s] 

assignment of error regarding the manner in which the lower 

courts addressed the alleged hearsay testimony of Powell and 

Hall. Indeed, it is well-settled that evidence which is admitted for 

a limited purpose must be accompanied by a limiting instruction 

to focus the jury’s consideration of the evidence to its appropriate 

purpose. Here, the trial court did not instruct the jury to consider 

the alleged hearsay testimony of Powell and Hall for the limited 

purposes articulated by the lower courts. Thus, contrary to the 

conclusions of those courts, the jury’s consideration of the 

testimony of Powell and Hall was unrestricted.

Coleman, 230 A.3d at 1047-48 (citations omitted).

Given this analysis the high court reached the following conclusion and 

disposition:

For these reasons, we find that the Superior Court erred in 

the manner in which it disposed of the arguable merit prong of 

[Coleman’s] claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to object to the following alleged hearsay testimony presented at 

his trial: (1) Powell’s account that police told her that they had 

statements from other persons but lost their original witness; (2) 

Powell’s testimony that a friend told her that [Coleman] and his 

codefendant committed the murder in question; (3) Hall’s 

declaration that detectives informed him that they knew “them 

two did it;” and (4) Hall’s testimony that he knew [Coleman] and 

his codefendant and that the rumor on the street was that they 

committed the murder at issue in this case. Accordingly, we 

vacate in part the Superior Court’s judgment and remand to that 

court to reconsider, in a manner consistent with this Opinion, 

[Coleman’s] contention that the PCRA court erroneously rejected 

these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Coleman, 230 A.3d at 1048-49. 

Our Supreme Court agreed with Coleman that this Court did not directly 

address one of his ineffectiveness claims, and further vacated our judgment:

[Coleman] presented the PCRA court with, inter alia, a claim 

that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Powell’s 
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statement that [he] was involved in dealing drugs and a claim that 

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Hall’s statements 

regarding [Coleman] carrying guns and his desire to use them. 

The PCRA court rejected both claims. In his Superior Court brief, 

[Coleman] challenged the PCRA court’s ruling as to both of these 

claims, albeit in a singular sub-issue. 

Understandably, in its memorandum, the Superior Court 

mentioned these two claims in tandem. Further, the court 

definitively rejected [Coleman’s] claim that counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance by failing to object to Powell’s drug-dealing 

statement. However, the court did not directly resolve 

[Coleman’s] contention that the PCRA court improperly rejected 

his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 

Hall’s statement that [Coleman] carries guns and likes to shoot 

people. Consequently, we respectfully further vacate the Superior 

Court’s judgment, and on remand, we instruct the Superior Court 

to address [Coleman’s] claim of PCRA court error in the first 

instance.

Coleman, 230 A.3d at 1049 (citations omitted).

Upon returning to this Court, we noted that the PCRA court had not held 

an evidentiary hearing regarding these claims, and the fact that it did not, 

prevented us from reaching the merits of Coleman’s claims. Therefore, we 

vacated the denial of Coleman’s PCRA petition and “remanded the matter for 

an evidentiary hearing on the remaining claims.” Commonwealth v. 

Coleman, 242 A.3d 401 (Pa. Super. 2020), non-precedential decision at 3-4.

The PCRA court first listed the matter on March 12, 2021. However, the 

matter was continued to May 7, 2021, due to the ongoing issues related to 

the Covid-19 pandemic. On May 7, 2021, counsel indicated that they were 

working to prepare a joint stipulation in lieu of an evidentiary hearing 

regarding the testimony of trial counsel. After four continuances, on January 

12, 2022, the parties submitted a proposed stipulation to the PCRA court for 
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review. Two months later, both sides presented arguments and on May 19, 

2022, following a review of the record, the PCRA court sent Coleman notice

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). The court did not receive any response to 

the 907 Notice. Ultimately, on August 26, 2022, the PCRA court formally 

dismissed [Coleman’s] PCRA petition.

Coleman filed timely notices of appeal. By order entered October 17, 

2022, we consolidated them. Both Coleman and the PCRA court have 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Coleman raises the following two issues on appeal:

1. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing [Coleman’s] PCRA Petition 

because trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 

inadmissible hearsay and highly prejudicial alleged statements 

of [Powell] and [Hall] that stated that, inter alia, [Coleman] 

“carried guns and liked to shoot people . . .” and the 

ineffectiveness/prejudice/admissibility component was never 

fully explored at a purported evidentiary hearing when no 

witnesses were called thereby rendering the Supreme Court’s 

reasons for remand unexplored and allowing the trial/PCRA 

court to effectively infringe upon the province of the jury to too 

[sic] a large degree by essentially adopting a guilty anyway 

theory of the case?

2. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing [Coleman’s] PCRA Petition 

because trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the 

jury [sic] being excluded from access to the courtroom during 

jury voir dire, a vital juncture of [Coleman’s] trial, and PCRA 

counsel was ineffective and [Coleman] suffered prejudice and 

structural error as a result of trial counsel and PCRA counsel’s 

ineffectiveness and layered ineffectiveness respectively?

Coleman’s Brief at 4.

This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a petition 

under the PCRA is to ascertain whether “the determination of the PCRA court 
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is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA 

court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings 

in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 

(Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).

In his first issue, Coleman raises a claim of trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness,

1 and in his second claim he raises a layered claim of 

ineffectiveness. To obtain relief under the PCRA premised on a claim that 

counsel was ineffective, a petitioner must establish, by a preponderance of 

the evidence, that counsel's ineffectiveness so undermined the truthdetermining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could 

have taken place. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 

2009). “Generally, counsel’s performance is presumed to be constitutionally 

adequate, and counsel will only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient 

showing by the petitioner.” Id. This requires the petitioner to demonstrate 

that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no 

reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) counsel’s 

act or omission prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 533.

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1

In his supporting argument for his first issue, Coleman also challenges the 

effectiveness of PCRA counsel. As this distinct claim was not raised in his 

statement of the issue, we will not consider it further. See generally, 

Pa.R.A.P. 2116. Nevertheless, because we affirm the PCRA court’s rejection 

of Coleman’s claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, any layered claim of 

ineffectiveness would likewise fail. See infra.
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In making a layered claim of ineffectiveness, a PCRA petitioner “must 

properly argue each prong of the three-prong ineffectiveness test for each 

separate attorney.” Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1190 (Pa. 

Super. 2012). “In determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical 

inquiry is whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts was ineffective 

did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of counsel.” Commonwealth v. 

Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2010). “If that attorney was 

effective, then subsequent counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to 

raise the underlying issue.” Id. 

In support of his first issue, Coleman contends that the PCRA court erred 

in concluding that his claim regarding trial counsel’s failure to object to 

inadmissible hearsay evidence did not warrant relief.

The PCRA court considered each instance of alleged hearsay that our 

Supreme Court identified in its 2020 opinion, cited in detail a portion of 

Powell’s testimony, and concluded that a proper assessment of trial counsel’s 

effectiveness in failing to object to alleged hearsay statements presented by 

both Powell and Hall required a consideration of all of the evidence introduced 

by the Commonwealth. The court then concluded that trial counsel had a 

reasonable basis for not objecting to any of the statements because they were 

made during the witnesses’ recantation:

To simply refer to [Powell] as a witness who had “gone 

south” or qualify her as “hostile” does not even begin to describe 

the presentation that the jury experienced at trial. Her frustration 

with the prosecutor and detectives was explosive, often crude, 

and unrelenting. Accordingly, the record supports trial counsel’s 
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testimony[2]that it was in Coleman’s best interest that the jury 

believe [Powell’s] recantation and assertions of police coercion of 

her written statement and identification of Coleman. In 

furtherance of this strategy, trial counsel did not raise a hearsay 

objection to[:] a) [Powell’s] account that police told her that they 

had statements from other persons but lost their original witness 

or b) her testimony that a friend told her that Coleman and his 

codefendant committed the murder in question, because 

[counsel] did not want corrective elements being inserted into an 

otherwise unabashed and powerful recantation by the witness. 

Instead, [counsel] harnessed the vigor of [Powell’s] recantation 

and highlighted precise elements of such recantation on crossexamination. In closing, trial counsel argued to the jury that 

[Powell’s written] statement was merely a piece of paper that 

should not be considered, as its veracity was clouded by her drug 

use and own pending criminal charges at the time it was made 

and he urged the jury to accept her vehement contentions that 

she didn’t see anything and was coerced by detectives. This court 

has determined that [trial] counsel’s performance had a 

reasonable basis and, thus, no relief is do.

With regard to [Hall], the ineffectiveness claims before this 

court are counsel’s failure to make hearsay objections to [Hall’s] 

declaration that detectives informed him that they knew “them 

two did it” and to [Hall’s] testimony that he knew Coleman and 

his codefendant and that the rumor on the street was that they 

committed the murder at issue. As with the claims concerning 

[Powell], these claims too must be examined in the context of all 

evidence and testimony presented at trial as well as [Hall’s] own 

presentation on the stand. Further, like [Powell], trial counsel was 

faced with a written statement to police—which corroborated 

Coleman’s bragging about killing [the victim]—that Coleman 

needed to have discredited and disbelieved by the jury.

At trial, [Hall] testified on the heels of [Powell], wherein he 

denied ever giving a written statement to police, denied that the 

signature on the proffered statement was his, and recanted the 

entire substance of the proffered statement. The at-issue 

____________________________________________

2 At the March 23, 2022, argument following our remand, the PCRA court 

likened the parties’ joint stipulation regarding trial counsel’s purported 

testimony to a deposition in a civil matter, and further noted that a PCRA 

proceeding is civil in nature. N.T., 3/23/22, at 5.
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testimony regarding the detective saying that they knew “them 

two did it” and Hall’s indication that it was the rumor on the street 

that Coleman and his [codefendant] had committed the murder 

was presented amidst Hall’s complete rejection of the substance 

of the [written] statement and complete rejection that any 

statement was ever given or signed by him. As with [Powell], trial 

counsel’s objective was to have the jury be persuaded to discredit 

the content of the respective statements to police, as the 

statements corroborated the identification of Coleman as the 

person who shot [the victim] multiple times and corroborated 

Coleman’s bragging about having killed [the victim].[3] 

Accordingly, trial counsel did not elect to interject corrections into 

otherwise recanted testimony. On cross-examination, trial 

counsel reaffirmed Hall’s testimony that he wasn’t present when 

[the victim] was shot, he didn’t know who killed him, and that 

when he was brought to the police station he was brought in on a 

detainer for his own open drug charges. This court has 

determined that [trial] counsel’s performance had a reasonable 

basis, and, thus, no relief is due.

PCRA Court Opinion, 2/14/23, at 11-13 (unnumbered).

Our review of the record, including Coleman’s trial transcript and the 

joint stipulation, amply supports the PCRA court’s conclusions that trial 

counsel had a reasonable basis for not objecting to any hearsay testimony 

made by either Powell or Hall during their recantations of their written 

statements to police.

Coleman’s claims to the contrary are unavailing. He presents no 

substantive argument regarding any of the alleged hearsay statements 

identified by our Supreme Court in its 2020 opinion and addressed by the 

____________________________________________

3 At trial, another Commonwealth witness, Rashe Bellmon, testified that 

Coleman bragged about the killing. See N.T., 8/29/12, at 60.
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PCRA court above.4 Instead, Coleman asserts that the manner in which the 

court received trial counsel’s stipulated “testimony” prejudiced him and that 

we should remand for a substantive evidentiary hearing. He cites no authority 

to support his claim that the use of a joint stipulation in lieu of an evidentiary 

hearing prejudiced him to a degree that a new hearing is required.

Further, Coleman makes the bare assertion that he “suffered prejudice 

because there was no reasonable basis for allowing the hearsay testimony of 

[Powell] and [Hall] to be admitted at trial.” Coleman’s Brief at 15. Coleman 

makes this claim without acknowledging the PCRA court’s analysis cited 

above. Claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness are not self-proving and 

therefore cannot be raised in a vacuum. See generally, Commonwealth v. 

Pettus, 424 A.2d 1332 (Pa. 1981). 

“When evaluating ineffectiveness claims, judicial scrutiny of counsel’s 

performance must be highly deferential.” Commonwealth v. Perry, 128

A.3d 1285, 1290 (Pa. Super. 2015). “Counsel will not be deemed ineffective 

where the strategy employed has some reasonable basis designed to 

effectuate his or her client’s interests.” Id. A finding that a chosen strategy 

lacked a reasonable basis is not warranted unless it can be concluded that an 

alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater 

____________________________________________

4 We note that the statement to which he refers in his first issue, that “he 

carried guns and liked to shoot people” was remanded by our Supreme Court 

to be considered as an improper reference to prior bad acts, not hearsay. See 

Coleman, supra. 
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than the course actually pursued. Commonwealth v. Howard, 719 A.2d 

233, 237 (Pa. 1998). Counsel's approach must be "so unreasonable that no 

competent lawyer would have chosen it." Commonwealth v. Ervin, 766 

A.2d 859, 862-63 (Pa. Super. 2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Miller, 431 

A.2d 233, 234 (Pa. 1981). Finally, a PCRA petitioner is not entitled to 

appellate relief simply because a chosen strategy is unsuccessful. 

Commonwealth v. Buksa, 655 A.2d 576, 582 (Pa. Super. 1995).

Because Coleman provides no argument to challenge the PCRA court’s 

conclusion that trial counsel had a reasonable basis for not objecting to the 

hearsay statements, and the record supports the trial court’s conclusions that 

trial counsel acted reasonably, Coleman’s first ineffectiveness claim fails.5

In his second issue, Coleman presents a layered claim of ineffectiveness 

in which he asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

exclusion of the public6 during jury selection, and that PCRA counsel was 

ineffective for failing to “raise and preserve the issue of [Coleman] being 

denied his right to a public trial.” Coleman’s Brief at 19. 

____________________________________________

5 Because the PCRA court concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective for 

failing to object to the hearsay testimony, we further note that there was no 

need for a jury instruction as discussed in Coleman, supra. 

6 Although in his issue cited above, Coleman refers to the jury being excluded 

from access to the courtroom during voir dire, given his supporting argument 

it is clear that he means exclusion of the public. See Coleman’s Brief at 19. 
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Initially, given the limited scope of this Court’s remand, we question 

whether PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness can be challenged at this time. 

Compare Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021) (holding 

that a PCRA petitioner may challenge the effectiveness of PCRA counsel at his 

or her first opportunity to do so, even if it is on appeal). Nevertheless, we 

note that, in his 2015 PCRA petition, Coleman did raise a claim of trial counsel 

ineffectiveness for failing to object to the exclusion of the public from jury 

selection, which the PCRA court denied, and Coleman did not challenge the 

PCRA court’s conclusion in his original appeal to this Court.

In its original opinion supporting its initial denial of Coleman’s 2015 

PCRA petition, the PCRA court explained:

Coleman set forth a claim of ineffectiveness for counsel’s 

failure to object to this court’s decision to close the courtroom to 

the public during voir dire due to the large panel of jurors 

requested and the limited space in the courtroom. Coleman’s 

claim was presented in advance of the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Weaver v. Massachusetts, [137 S.Ct. 1899 (2017)], wherein 

the Court granted certiorari on the limited issue of “whether a 

defendant must demonstrate prejudice in a case [. . .] in which a

structural error is neither preserved nor raised on direct review 

but is raised later via a claim alleging ineffective assistance of 

counsel, [. . .] specifically and only in the context of trial counsel’s 

failure to object to the closure of the courtroom during jury 

selection. On June 22, 2017, the Court ruled in the affirmative, 

holding that a petition must show prejudice in a claim of 

ineffectiveness based upon the trial counsel’s failure to object to 

the closure of the courtroom during jury selection.

As such, this court relies on our longstanding Superior Court 

precedent in Commonwealth v. Brandt, [509 A.2d 872 (Pa. 

Super. 1986)], wherein the Court rejected Brandt’s 

ineffectiveness claim based upon trial counsel’s failure to object 

to voir dire being conducted in chambers rather than in open court 
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due to space limitations. The Court reasoned that Brandt had not 

demonstrated that “public voir dire would have offered a potential 

for success greater than the selection process actually utilized or 

that he was prejudiced in any way because his trial counsel failed 

to request an alternate procedure.” In applying Brandt, as well 

as Weaver, this court has determined that Coleman has failed to 

establish a reasonable probability that, had jury selection been 

open to the public, the verdict returned would have been different. 

Accordingly, Coleman has not satisfied the requisite prejudice

prong [of the ineffectiveness test] and, thus, his claim does not 

warrant relief.

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/19/17, at 4-5, (paragraph break added; footnotes 

and excess capitalization omitted). Within his brief, Coleman offers nothing 

to disturb the original PCRA court’s determination regarding trial counsel’s 

alleged ineffectiveness. Thus, because trial counsel was not ineffective, 

Coleman’s present claim of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness likewise fails. 

Burkett, supra.

Order affirmed.

Date: 10/10/2023