alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# EUR-Lex - 31998D0163 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 31998D0163

**98/163/EC: Commission Decision of 10 February 1998 amending Decision 97/569/EC on drawing up provisional lists of third country establishments from which the Member States authorise imports of meat products (Text with EEA relevance) **

*
Official Journal L 053 , 24/02/1998 P. 0023 - 0025 *

COMMISSION DECISION of 10 February 1998 amending Decision 97/569/EC on drawing up provisional lists of third country establishments from which the Member States authorise imports of meat products (Text with EEA relevance) (98/163/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Decision 95/408/EC of 22 June 1995 on the conditions for drawing up, for an interim period, provisional lists of third-country establishments from which Member States are authorised to import certain products of animal origin, fishery products or live bivalve molluscs (1), as amended by Decision 97/34/EC (2), and in particular Article 2(4) thereof,

Whereas provisional lists of establishments in third countries producing meat products have been drawn up by Commission Decision 97/569/EC (3), as last amended by Decision 98/9/EC (4);

Whereas Singapore, Slovenia and Switzerland have sent a list of establishments producing poultry meat products and for which the responsible authorities certify that the establishment is in accordance with the Community rules;

Whereas a provisional list of establishments producing poultry meat products can thus be drawn up for Singapore, Slovenia and Switzerland; whereas Decision 97/569/EC should therefore be amended accordingly;

Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The Annex to this Decision is added to the Annex to Decision 97/569/EC.

Article 2

This Decision shall apply from 1 February 1998.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 10 February 1998.

For the Commission

Franz FISCHLER

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ L 243, 11. 10. 1995, p. 17.

(2) OJ L 13, 16. 1. 1997, p. 33.

(3) OJ L 234, 26. 8. 1997, p. 16.

(4) OJ L 3, 7. 1. 1998, p. 12.

ANEXO - BILAG - ANHANG - ÐÁÑÁÑÔÇÌÁ - ANNEX - ANNEXE - ALLEGATO - BIJLAGE - ANEXO - LIITE - BILAGA

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§ 0.737-6 Time, date and place of hearing. ( a ) Any hearing shall be conducted at a reasonable time, date and place as determined by the Examiner.
( b ) In setting a hearing date the Examiner shall give due regard to the former employee's need for: ( 1 ) Adequate time to prepare a defense properly, and
( 2 ) An expeditious resolution of allegations that may be damaging to his or her reputation.
§ 29.683 Operation tests. It must be shown by operation tests that, when the controls are operated from the pilot compartment with the control system loaded to correspond with loads specified for the system, the system is free from— ( a ) Jamming;
( b ) Excessive friction; and
( c ) Excessive deflection.
#### § 102.17 Amendment.

A complaint may be amended upon such terms as may be deemed just, prior to the hearing, by the Regional Director issuing the complaint; at the hearing and until the case has been transferred to the Board pursuant to § 102.45, upon motion, by the Administrative Law Judge designated to conduct the hearing; and after the case has been transferred to the Board pursuant to § 102.45, at any time prior to the issuance of an order based thereon, upon motion, by the Board.
----- Forwarded by Nicole Law/R9/USEPA/US on 11/25/2009 02:27 PM

-----

From: "Joven Nazareno" <joven.nazareno@valleyair.org>

To: Nicole Law/R9/USEPA/US@EPA

Cc: "George Heinen" <george.heinen@valleyair.org>, "Errol Villegas" <errol.villegas@valleyair.org>

Date: 07/23/2009 02:35 PM Subject: RE: Rule 4603 AND 4612

Hi Nicole,

Based on our permit database there are about 300 permitted sources subject to R 4603. I reviewed the latest annual inspection reports and found that only one facility out of 300 is using extreme performance coating. The facility ( Guntert & Zimmerman: P ermit No. N

- 380) uses 884.76 gallons per year of Sherwin Williams topcoat which is an extreme performance coating and the facility is Air

- dried operation . Its VOC limit is 3.38 lb/gal which is below the 3.5 lb/gal limit for air

- dried extreme performance c oating. Please note that the 2008 CTG for miscellaneous metal and plastic parts and products recommended

limit for air

- dried is also 3.5 lb/gal. We do not have any baked extreme performance coating operation that would be subject to the CTG limit of 3.0 lb/gal limit. Nonetheless, our current rulemaking to incorporate the 2008 CTG will lower the existing baked extreme performance coating limit from 3.5 to 3.0 lb/gal. In addition, we are also proposing to remove the existing exemption for touch and repair coating and set the same limit as the CTG at 3.0 for baked and 3.5 for air dried. Hope this helps in answering the comments submitted to EPA by EarthJustice.

Regards

Joe

Joven R. Nazareno Senior Air Quality Engineer San Joaquin Valley Air Pollutio n Control District 1990 E. Gettysburg Ave., Fresno, CA 93726 Phone: (559) 230

- 6100

From: Law.Nicole@epamail.epa.gov [mailto:Law.Nicole@epamail.epa.gov]

Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2009 1:29 PM

To: Joven Nazareno Subject: Rule 4603 AND 4612

Hello Joe,

As you know, I am responding to comments from EarthJustice regarding my recent proposed approval on rules 4603, 4604, and 4612. I wanted to see if you could provide me with a little bit more information on

the c ategory of extreme performance coatings. I know you told me that inspection reports indicated only one facility uses these coatings. Do those reports also give you an idea of how much of this coating is used? I know you said you'd check this, and can re call doing actual emission calculations. Those would be great as well.

Moving onto rule 4612, I would like to get some information regarding the usage of precoat category and the topcoat

- metallic/iridescent category. I am not sure if you are the con tact person for this rule, but if you are, I would be interested in getting an idea of how large these categories are compared to the othercategories in the rule. Thank you very much Joe!

- Nicole

Nicole Law Rulemaking Office, Air Division

U.S. Environ mental Protection Agency

75 Hawthorne Street San Francisco, 94105 Office: (415) 947

- 4126 Fax: (415) 947

- 3579
#### PATERAS v STANDARD ACCIDENT INS CO.

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 9288.

Decided March 4, 1929

W J Lamb, Esq., for Pateras.

Dustin, McKeehan, Merrick, Arter & Stewart, Cleveland, for Coach Co.

Judges RICHARDS and WILLIAMS of the 6th Dist, sitting

*333WILLIAMS, J.

There is nothing in the written contract ■ heretofore referred to by which Goodman was employed as agent, which gave him authority to do anything more than solicit and write insurance.

Plaintiff relies upon 9586 GC, but we think a proper construction of it is simply that the person who solicits insurance and procures the application is the agent of the inurance company for the purpose of ■ such solicitation and procuration.

> Mechanic’s and Traders’ Insurance Co. vs. Himmelstein, et al, 155 N. E. 806;

> 24 Ohio App. 29;

> Royal Insurance Co. vs. Silberman, 24 C. C. N. S. 511.

Notice to an agent is not binding upon his principal unless such agent had authority, to deal with those matters which the notice affected or had a duty to communicate the same to his principal. Myers vs. Insurance Co., 108 Ohio St. 175.

In other words, an insurance agent, authorized to .procure and deliver a policy of insurance, has no authority to receive notice of an accident under such a policy of insurance, unless such authority is given to him by the insurance company, either expressly or impliedly. It is contended, however, that the evidence that Goodman' had reported some accidents to the defendant company would warrant the jury in drawing the inference that he had authority to receive the notice in question on behalf of the company. The testimony of Goodman, however, fails to show that he had made such reports prior to the time of receiving the report from plaintiff and fails to show that if he sent in such reports he did it as agent of the defendant company, and fails to show that the defendant company had any knowledge that he was assuming to act as its agent in reporting accidents.

It is conceded that Goodman had no express authority to receive notice of an accident on behalf of the defendant com_ pany, and there is no evidence tending to show any such implied authority. The verdict was, therefore, properly directed for defendant.

For the reasons given the judgment of the court of common pleas will be affirmed.

Richards, J, concurs; Lloyd J, not participating.
EXHIBIT
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Centracan Incorporated, a Florida
corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2009,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), Jerome Goubeaux, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certifies to
the best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
      Company.





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company, and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.








/s/ Jerome GoubeauxJerome
      GoubeauxChief
      Executive OfficerMay
      14, 2009
§ 1450.9 Demand for payment. Prior to making an administrative offset, demand for payment will be made as stated below: ( a ) Written demands shall be made promptly upon a debtor in terms which inform the debtor of the consequences of failure to cooperate. A total of three progressively stronger written demands at not more than 30-day intervals will normally be made unless a response to the first or second demand indicates that a further demand would be futile and the debtor's response does not require rebuttal. In determining the timing of demand letters, FMCS will give due regard to the need to act promptly so that, as a general rule, if necessary to refer the debt to the Department of Justice for litigation, such referral can be made within one year of the agency's final determination of the fact and the amount of the debt. When necessary to protect the Government's interest (for example, to prevent the statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2415, from expiring), written demand may be preceded by other appropriate actions under this subpart including immediate referral for litigation.
( b ) The initial demand letter will inform the debtor of: ( 1 ) The basis for the indebtedness and the right of the debtor to request review within the agency;
( 2 ) The applicable standards for assessing interest, penalties, and administrative costs (subpart D of this regulation) and
( 3 ) The date by which payment is to be made, which normally should be not more than 30 days from the date that the initial demand letter was mailed or hand-delivered. FMCS will exercise care to insure that demand letters are mailed or hand-delivered on the same day that they are actually dated. Apart from this, there is no prescribed format for the demand letters.
( c ) As appropriate to the circumstances, FMCS may include either in the initial demand letter or in subsequent letters, matters relating to alternative methods of payment, policies with respect to use of consumer reporting agencies and collection services, the agency's intentions with respect to referral of the debt to the Department of Justice for litigation, and, depending on applicable statutory authority, the debtor's entitlement to consideration of waiver.
( d ) FMCS will respond promptly to communications from the debtor, within 30 days whenever feasible, and will advise debtor who dispute the debt that they must furnish available evidence to support their contentions.
( e ) If, either prior to the initiations of, at any time during, or after completion of the demand cycle, FMCS determines to pursue administrative offset, then the requirements specified in §§ 1450.10 and 1450.11, as applicable, will be met. The availability of funds for offset and the agency determination to purse it release the agency from the necessity of further compliance with paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this section. If the agency has not already sent the first demand letter, the agency's written notification of its intent to offset must give the debtor the opportunity to make voluntary payment, a requirement which will be satisfied by compliance with the notice requirements of §§ 1450.10 and 1450.11 as applicable.
###### Editorial Note on Part 399

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 399 appear at 84 FR 15947, Apr. 16, 2019.

#### § 399.3 Statements in other Department documents.

No statement contained in any Department opinion, decision, order, certificate, permit, exemption, or waiver shall be considered a statement of policy within the meaning of this part, even though such statements may constitute a precedent in future cases or declare future policy to be followed in like cases. Similarly, a denial by the Department or relief sought, or statements of the Department's reasons for failure to issue a rule upon which rulemaking proceedings have been commenced shall not be considered statements of policy, except to the extent that it is specifically stated that such denial or failure is based upon a policy thereafter to be followed.
1 The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 05-2756

___________ Craig Allen Smith, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Minnesota. United States of America, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: May 30, 2006 Filed: June 13, 2006

___________ Before MELLOY, FAGG, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Craig Allen Smith appeal s the district court’s 1 order denying his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) for appointed counsel in his Federal Tort Claims Act suit. We hold that the order Smith challenges is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (courts of appeals shall have jurisdic tion of appeals from all final decisions) or § 1292 (granting appellate jurisdiction over specified interlocutory orders), or under the collateral order doctrine, seeKassuelke v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc. , 223 F.3d 929, 931 (8th Cir. 2000) (to qualify for immedi ate appeal under collateral order doctrine,-2- order must conclusively decide disputed que stion that is important and distinct from case’s merits, and decision must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment); cf. Marler v. Adonis Health Prods. , 997 F.2d 1141, 1142-43 (5th Cir. 1993) (declining to extend collateral order doctrine to immediate appeals of orders denying appointed counsel in products liability cases; in support stating, inter alia, that appellate court can effectiv ely remedy effects of erroneous denial of counsel by vacating judgment and remanding for ne w trial with appointed counsel). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

______________________________
#### NEIGHBORS v STATE

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist, Lucas Co

No 2217.

Decided July 8, 1929

Christensen & Christensen, Toledo, for Neighbors.

Leroy W. Hunt, Prosecuting Attorney, and Clarence A. Irwin, both of Toledo, for State.

WILLIAMS, J.

Several questions are presented, but we think none of them calls for discussion except the admissibility in evidence of two letters addressed to hinj., one written by the brother Henry Neighbors and another written by another brother, named Horace, not previously referred to, who resided in Cleveland. Each of these letters called upon the plaintiff in error to confess and asked him not to fight extradition.

James O’Reilley, a police officer of Toledo, took these letters with him to Memphis, Tennessee, when he went there to bring the plaintiff in error back. It appears O’Reilley read to plaintiff in error the letter of Henry while they were in Tennessee and on the return trip to Toledo plaintiff in error read both letters, and after reading the letter purporting to be written by Henry he said that the signature was Henry’s but that he did not think the body of the letter was in his writing, and as to the other letter he stated that he was satisfied that the whole letter was in the writing of Horace. After that he discussed the case generally with O’Reilly and asked O’Reilley what he thought he ought to do with the situation. Plaintiff in error then said to O’Reilley that he would have to consult Horace before he could determine whether he would plead or stand trial, and stated that he ought not to get any more than Henry got anyhow.

The court admitted the letters in evidence over the objection and exception, of defendant below. The case does not present a question where the reading of a letter is met by silence, nor, on the other hand, one where such reading is met by a denial of the truth of the statements contained therein. The plaintiff in error commented on the letters after he read them, not only by admitting by word of mouth their genuineness but discussed the request to confess by saying that he did not know whether he would plead guilty or not. When an accused person is presented with a letter written to him, and reads it and admits that it is from the person whose signature is attached, and discusses the question whether he will comply with a request contained in the letter, the letter is admissible in evidence against him. Dutton vs. Woodman, 9 Cushing, 255.

The ruling of the trial court on the admissibility of the letters in question was in accordance with established principles of the law of evidence.

We find no error apparent upon the face of the record and the judgment will therefore be affirmed.

Lloyd and Richards, JJ, concur.
#### § 437.15 Transfer of an experimental permit.

An experimental permit is not transferable.
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

U. S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY

TEXAS

ADJOINING 7.5' QUADRANGLES

QUADRANGLE LOCATION

TX 2798-213

MCCAMPBELL RANCH, TX

2010

Interstate Route State Route

ROAD CLASSIFICATION

Interstate Route US Route State Route

Ramp 4WD

US Route Local Road

MCCAMPBELL RANCH QUADRANGLE

TEXAS

7.5-MINUTE SERIES

Zone 14R

Imagery......................................................NAIP, April 2008

Roads.....................................US Census Bureau TIGER data

with limited USGS updates, 2008

Names...............................................................GNIS, 2008

Hydrography.................National Hydrography Dataset, 1995

Contours............................National Elevation Dataset, 2008

North American Datum of 1983 (NAD83)

World Geodetic System of 1984 (WGS84). Projection and

1 000-meter grid: Universal Transverse Mercator,

Produced by the United States Geological Survey

10 000-foot ticks: Texas Coordinate System of 1983

(south zone)

1000 500 0 METERS 1000 2000

1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000

FEET

This map was produced to conform with version 0.5.10 of the

draft USGS Standards for 7.5-Minute Quadrangle Maps.

A metadata file associated with this product is also draft version 0.5.10

SCALE 1:24 000

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MN

1 0.5 0 KILOMETERS 1 2

GN

UTM GRID AND 2010 MAGNETIC NORTH DECLINATION AT CENTER OF SHEET

0° 9 ́

3 MILS

5° 16 ́

94 MILS

U.S. National Grid

100,000-m Square ID

Grid Zone Designation

14R

NR

CONTOUR INTERVAL 10 FEET
#### Onondaga County Bank *vs.*Shepherd and others.

Requisites of an affidavit in support or opposition of a motion to change *venue.*

This was a motion to change venue, in the decision whereof the Chief Justice laid down the following rule : .

“ On a motion to change venue or on opposing such motion, the party making an affidavit is bound to allege that he has fully and fairly stated his case to his counsel, and disclosed to him the facts which he expects to prove by each, and every of his witnesses.”
[Nos. 47843-5-I; 48941-1-I.

Division One.

November 12, 2002.]

#### *In the Matter of the Parentage of*Dominick Emil May-Douglass. Desiree Luanna Douglass, *Petitioner,*v. Robert Joseph May, *Respondent.*

Appeals from judgments of the Superior Court for King County, No. 94-5-03704-9, Suzanne M. Barnett and Steven G. Scott, JJ., and Nancy Bradburn-Johnson, J. Pro Tern., entered November 14, 2000, February 23, 27 and June 21, 2001. *Affirmed*by unpublished per curiam opinion.
#### § 15.213 Are there limits to representatives' fees for claims under this subpart?

Yes. No more than 10 percent of the amount in settlement of each individual claim submitted and settled under this subpart shall be paid or delivered to or received by any agent or attorney on account of services rendered in connection with that claim. 31 U.S.C. 3721(i).
§ 29.999 Fuel system drains. ( a ) There must be at least one accessible drain at the lowest point in each fuel system to completely drain the system with the rotorcraft in any ground attitude to be expected in service.
( b ) Each drain required by paragraph (a) of this section including the drains prescribed in § 29.971 must— ( 1 ) Discharge clear of all parts of the rotorcraft;
( 2 ) Have manual or automatic means to ensure positive closure in the off position; and
( 3 ) Have a drain valve— ( i ) That is readily accessible and which can be easily opened and closed; and
( ii ) That is either located or protected to prevent fuel spillage in the event of a landing with landing gear retracted.
[Doc. No. 5084, 29 FR 16150, Dec. 3, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 29-12, 41 FR 55473, Dec. 20, 1976; Amdt. 29-26, 53 FR 34218, Sept. 2, 1988]