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BOKO HARAM: THE GROWING THREAT TO

SCHOOLGIRLS, NIGERIA, AND BEYOND

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 21, 2014

Serial No. 113–172

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Sarah Sewall, Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, U.S. Department of State ........................................ 7

Ms. Amanda J. Dory, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African 

Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................................. 19

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Sarah Sewall: Prepared statement ............................................... 10

Ms. Amanda J. Dory: Prepared statement ............................................................ 21

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 66

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 67

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Material 

submitted for the record ...................................................................................... 69

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 72

(1)

BOKO HARAM: THE GROWING THREAT TO 

SCHOOLGIRLS, NIGERIA, AND BEYOND 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 21, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:53 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (chairman of 

the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. 

Today, as we meet here, we have nearly 300 young girls from 

Chibok, in Northern Nigeria, that remain Boko Haram kidnap victims. 

It has been 5 weeks since they were abducted. Every passing 

minute makes their successful rescue less likely. And we meet 

today to ensure that the United States is doing everything it can 

to assist in their rescue. Just yesterday, the House passed a resolution pressing for more aggressive action. 

Many around the world are just now hearing of Boko Haram. 

Sadly, though, for communities in Northern Nigeria, they know the 

death and destruction that this group brings only too well, and 

they have known it for a number of years. 

They have known it for a number of years because, as Boko 

Haram has spread, they have continued to burn schools. As of 

today, over 500 schools have been destroyed. Over 100 teachers 

have been killed. 

This morning committee members had the chance to meet with 

Deborah Peter. Deborah, a young woman of just 15 years of age, 

is from Chibok, Nigeria, the same town where the recent abductions took place. Ms. Peter is seated in the front row. She is one 

of only three Boko Haram survivors in the United States. She courageously shared her traumatic experience at the hands of Boko 

Haram with us this morning. Her father and her brother—her father was a pastor—were executed in front of her eyes for not renouncing their Christian faith. His church was burned to the 

ground. We thank Deborah for being with us today. We thank her 

and her friends for traveling from rural Virginia to share her traumatic story in the hopes that the world will act. 

We are faced with two challenges in Northern Nigeria; in the 

near term, seeing these girls rescued, and in the long term, rendering Boko Haram unable to threaten the region. This is a group 

that has killed thousands, thousands, of Nigerians to date. And 

their loose title of the translation ‘‘Boko Haram’’ is ‘‘Western eduVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:40 Aug 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\052114\88018 SHIRL
2

cation is a sin.’’ Their mission is to carry out a war against those 

who educate or empower women. And the greatest sin to them is 

not treating women as chattel, which they do, or enslaving women, 

which they purport to justify, or selling women. No. The greatest 

sin to them is to be involved in educating or teaching young women 

how to read and write. 

And over time this group, Boko Haram, has developed a vast arsenal of weapons. They are an al-Qaeda affiliate. They have sworn 

their allegiance to al-Qaeda. They have received training from alQaeda groups. They have built up their resources with that support. And this means greater terror for the people in Northern Nigeria and greater challenges for Nigerian security forces. 

Unfortunately, these forces suffer unprofessional elements with 

poor morale. I have been in Nigeria several times. It is a struggle 

for the Nigerian military to cope with this threat, which has led 

some to say that we should not get involved. But it tells me otherwise. It tells me that U.S. involvement is critical. U.S. forces are 

well positioned to advise and assist. We can advise and assist Nigerian forces in the search and the rescue of these girls. In this role, 

U.S. forces expertly trained to deal with hostage situations, jungle 

environments, and in tracking could help Nigerians with intelligence, planning, and logistics. If some U.S. laws would hinder 

such assistance, the administration should use its waiver authority 

under these extraordinary circumstances. 

Why do we care? We care about Deborah, her friends and family. 

We care about a girl’s right to an education. We care about human 

rights and religious liberty and the future of Africa’s largest country, largest in population, largest economy. 

We have direct security interests. Commanders at the Pentagon 

have stated that Boko Haram is, in their words, a ‘‘threat to Western interests’’ and one of the highest counterterrorism priorities in 

Africa. 

Pressure from this committee was critical in getting the State 

Department to designate Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Indeed, the administration made that announcement in 

this room under pressure from us on this committee. 

As many have noted, it shouldn’t have taken so long. We want 

to hear from the State Department and the Pentagon witnesses on 

the strategy we now have in place. 

Boko Haram, with heavy weapons and grenade attacks, is waging a brutal war against schoolgirls carrying backpacks, books, and 

pencils. We can’t sit on the sidelines. 

And I will now turn to the ranking member for his opening comments, Mr. Eliot Engel of New York. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for holding this very timely hearing on Boko Haram. 

I would like to thank our witnesses, Dr. Sewall and Ms. Dory, 

for being here today. 

And, of course, I would like to welcome Ms. Deborah Peter, a 

brave young survivor of a Boko Haram attack in 2011. She met 

with members of this committee earlier this morning to describe 

her harrowing experience. 

Deborah, we are all grateful for your courage and your commitment to seeing that these horrible abuses are stopped so that no 

3

other family goes through what your family has gone through. 

Thank you for your courage. We are all very, very proud of you. 

And I must also say, since I had the opportunity to meet with 

her privately, how proud any parent would be of having a daughter 

like Deborah. 

So thank you, Deborah. 

Mr. Chairman, Boko Haram is an Islamic extremist group, increasingly active since 2010. It operates mainly in Northern Nigeria. 

As we all know, one of Boko Haram’s most recent atrocities took 

place on April 14 of this year. That day nearly 300 schoolgirls were 

doing what young women and girls all over the world do every day, 

studying for tests, playing with friends, building a future for themselves. 

That day Boko Haram, which roughly translates to ‘‘Western 

education is forbidden,’’ abducted these girls; tore them away from 

their families and their communities. 

Today, more than a month later, we still don’t know where they 

are. Our thoughts are obviously with their families, and we pray 

that they are safely reunited as soon as possible. 

The United States and other international partners have offered 

assistance to bring the schoolgirls home, and we all hope those efforts will prove successful. 

I agree with Chairman Royce that we must do everything in our 

power to bring those girls home and the United States can be very 

helpful in assisting this process. 

But even as we work to address the crisis, we need to focus on 

the larger challenge: Stopping Boko Haram’s reign of terror in Nigeria and beyond. 

Just yesterday Boko Haram set off two bombs in the city of Jos, 

killing over 100 people—100 innocent people. Two weeks ago the 

group attacked a market in the town of Gamboru, killing more 

than 300 people. 

Back in 2011, in one of their most high-profile attacks, the terrorist group bombed the United Nations’ headquarters in Abuja, 

killing at least 21 people and injuring more than 120. You really 

have to be bold to attack a United Nations headquarters. 

So, all told, Boko Haram has murdered more than 5,000 people 

over the last 4 years. Their victims are both Christians and Muslims, men, women, and children, and, of course, teachers. 

Before this brazen kidnapping, Boko Haram was virtually unknown around the world. As more of their violent history has come 

to light, the international community has reacted with shock, horror and disbelief. But the sad reality is that Boko Haram is not 

new and neither are their tactics. 

I think our witnesses can shed more light on the situation for us 

and for everyone following the plight of these young girls. 

How did Boko Haram emerge and grow into an extremist threat? 

What has allowed them to thrive as on organization? And what 

challenges does the U.S. face in working with Nigeria to disrupt 

and dismantle the group? 

Let me just say, contrary to some of the reporting I have seen, 

I know the difficulty in weakening Boko Haram has not been due 

to a lack of effort or an unwillingness to help. 

4

In fact, one of our major challenges is working with the Nigerian 

military itself. Its approach in Northern Nigeria has often alienated the very population that could be providing valuable information about Boko Haram’s activities. 

But instead of forming these relationships, unfortunately, the 

military has too often built a record of indiscriminate destruction 

themselves, theft of personal property, arbitrary arrests, indefinite 

detention, torture, and extrajudicial killing of civilians, much of 

this with impunity. 

In addition, despite a recent intelligence-sharing agreement, 

there are legitimate concerns that intelligence shared with the 

military to assist them in their operations might be leaked. And to 

make matters worse, this corruption is rampant throughout the 

force. Nigerian security forces are the best funded on the African 

continent. Yet, many of the funds are siphoned off by corruption 

and troops often aren’t paid a living wage, generating increased 

frustration in the ranks and fueling low-level corruption. 

So how exactly can the U.S. engage with a military force that 

sometimes lacks professionalism and often seems to fail with respect to human rights? And how do we convince Nigerian leaders 

that they aren’t doing enough and, in fact, may be making the 

problem worse? 

Lastly, while we are very focused on recovering these girls and 

stopping Boko Haram, we need to look at the broader context. 

Years of economic stagnation and neglect have afflicted Northern 

Nigeria and created the sort of environment where terrorist groups 

thrive. 

In places where there is no support or opportunity, extremists 

find it easier to prey on vulnerable populations, preaching false 

ideologies of violence and hatred. 

To push back against this tide, I believe Nigeria’s Government 

must address these issues of corruption by improving the professionalism of its security forces, and providing additional resources 

for education, infrastructure, and economic activity. In short, Nigeria must take a more holistic approach to counterterrorism. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how the U.S. 

can more effectively engage with the Nigerians when addressing 

the scourge of Boko Haram today. 

I regard Nigeria as our partner in this, and the United States 

needs to be helpful to them. We need to build an environment that 

forces development and prosperity in Northern Nigeria for tomorrow. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

And thanks to the witnesses and Deborah for appearing here 

today. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

We go to Mr. Chris Smith, chair of the Africa subcommittee, for 

1 minute. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And, again, 

thank you very much for convening this extremely important hearing. 

Obviously, words are inadequate to express our concern—and I 

say that collectively for all of us—for the welfare and whereabouts 

5

of the abducted girls, as well as the outrage toward Boko Haram 

for this absolutely horrific act of aggression and violence against 

these young women. 

My good friend and colleague, Mr. Engel, just mentioned how 

Boko Haram was largely unknown around the world until this infamous incident, but not to Chairman Royce or Eliot Engel or Ranking Member Bass or me or any other member of this committee. 

We have been raising the concerns of Boko Haram for years. Especially since 2011, when they seemed to transition into a more lethal stage with the bombing of the U.N. mission in Abuja, but, also, 

the very real problem of not being designated a Foreign Terrorist 

Organization. 

I held two hearings on Boko Haram. Emmanuel Ogebe was at 

one of those hearings. As a matter of fact, I went with him. He 

joined us in Jos and in Abuja. We met with people who had been 

victims of fire bombings, and Christians as well as some Muslims, 

who were targeted for killings by these thugs. 

He made it very clear then—he is now accompanying Deborah 

Peter—how this is only going to get worse unless all means are 

used to destroy this terrible threat. 

And it took years to get the designation of the Foreign Terrorist 

Organization (FTO). I am looking forward to what the answer may 

be. It wasn’t until we had another hearing that it was announced 

that, yes, it would be designated a FTO. 

I don’t know—I still can’t understand what the delay was 

when—I asked Ambassador Johnnie Carson repeatedly at one of 

those hearings—and that is the one that Mr. Ogebe testified at—

why? Why the delay? 

I mean, we all need to be on the same page now and work as 

never before to assist the Government of Nigeria. But we lost some 

precious time, in all candor, by not designating Boko Hara as a 

Foreign Terrorist Organization earlier rather than later. 

Yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Congresswoman Karen Bass isn’t with us today as the ranking 

subcommittee member. She is in Africa. 

So we will go to Mr. Brad Sherman, chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Boko Haram is but one of many organizations 

using terror to try to impose a contorted version of 9th Century 

Islam. It touches our hearts to see the victims from North Africa, 

through the Middle East, and through South Asia. 

But it is also a threat to the United States. Whether these 

groups claim to be affiliated with al-Qaeda or don’t claim the alQaeda franchise, whether their chief focus is local and their secondary focus is worldwide Jihad or the reverse, the war against 

violent extremism is not one that we can declare to be over just because we are tired of it. It has been one of our longest conflicts, 

exceeded at this point only by the Cold War, but it has to be won. 

We have to turn off the money to groups like Boko Haram. 

And I hope that we will get some testimony as to the Gulf oil, 

state and other money that is or is not being detected going to 

these groups. 

6

And we have to provide the military aid to the Nigerian Government and other host governments to deal with this extremism. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Lastly, we go for 1 minute to Mr. Ted Poe, a former judge and 

the chair of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade. 

Mr. POE. Boko Haram showed the world its evil ways when it arrogantly kidnapped over 200 innocent schoolgirls, threatened to 

marry them off to their fighters and traffic them out of the country 

as property and as slaves. 

As a judge, I have seen the ills of human trafficking and other 

despicable acts. And this is the ultimate human rights violation, 

but it is not a surprise, given who these outlaws are. 

Unfortunately, the State Department did not want to designate 

Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization until 14 months 

after the FBI and other government organizations made their plea 

to designate the group. 

In fact, the State Department didn’t make the announcement 

until the day before my subcommittee held a joint hearing with Mr. 

Smith’s subcommittee on the threat of Boko Haram in mid-November of 2013. 

Interesting timing, wouldn’t you think? We should have listed 

Boko Haram earlier. Instead, we worried about diplomatic relations. Nonsense rules the day. 

After fighting the FTO designation for so long, I am curious how 

the State Department has implemented the designation and what, 

if anything, we are doing to stop this Foreign Terrorist Organization. Do we have a plan? What is the plan? 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are joined this morning by representatives 

of the Department of State and the Department of Defense. We 

welcome them. 

Prior to being sworn in earlier this year as Under Secretary of 

State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, Dr. 

Sarah Sewall served as a senior lecturer in public policy at the 

John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Dr. 

Sewall also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Peacekeeping 

and Humanitarian Assistance at the Department of Defense from 

1993 to 1996. 

Ms. Amanda Dory is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for African Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. A career member of the Senior Executive Service, Ms. Dory previously 

served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy. She 

is a recipient of the Presidential Rank Award for her work on the 

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. 

And without objection, the witnesses’ full prepared statements 

will be made part of the record. Members will have 5 calendar days 

to submit any statements or questions to the witnesses or to submit any extraneous material for the record here. 

And we will start with Dr. Sewall. If you would summarize your 

remarks and hold it to 5 minutes. And then afterwards we will go 

to questions. Dr. Sewall. 

7

Ms. SEWALL. Thank you very much. Chairman Royce—here we 

go. 

Thank you, Chairman Royce. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. Make sure your microphone is on 

there. 

And, also, without objection, I would like to include for the record 

Ms. Deborah Peter’s testimony, which she recounted and gave us 

this morning, members of this committee who met with her. We 

are going to make that part of the record. And thank you, Deborah, 

for that. 

All right. Dr. Sewall. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SARAH SEWALL, UNDER 

SECRETARY FOR CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND 

HUMAN RIGHTS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. SEWALL. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and 

members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today 

to discuss Nigeria’s struggle against Boko Haram, one of the most 

lethal terrorist groups in Africa today. And thank you, Mr. Chairman and the committee, for your longtime leadership on African 

issues. 

Over a month ago the world was outraged when Boko Haram 

kidnapped some 250 young women from a secondary school in 

Chibok, and the United States swiftly joined the effort to help the 

Government of Nigeria safely recover the hostages. President 

Obama pledged our full support, and President Goodluck Jonathan 

readily accepted Secretary Kerry’s offer of assistance. 

Today in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, a robust multidisciplinary 

team from the United States Government is working hand in hand 

with Nigerian counterparts and teams from half a dozen other 

countries, such as the United Kingdom and France. 

Our military and civilian experts in intelligence, military planning, hostage negotiations, strategic communications, civilian protection, and victim support have been given unprecedented access 

and cooperation to assist Nigeria’s effort to safely recover the kidnapped schoolgirls. 

This effort, one that would be daunting for any government, will 

necessarily entail not just a diplomatic approach, but, also, law enforcement and diplomat—not just a military approach, but, also, a 

law enforcement and diplomatic effort. 

During our trip last week, AFRICOM Commander General David 

Rodriguez and I met with Nigeria’s top security officials to stress 

America’s support for Nigerian efforts and to reiterate the need for 

Nigeria to redouble its efforts to defeat Boko Haram while respecting human rights and ensuring the protection of civilians. 

This past weekend Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 

Wendy Sherman, continued America’s conversation with Nigerian 

President Jonathan, heads of state from neighboring countries, and 

other key partners at a summit in Paris convened by French President Hollande. Coming 1 day after Boko Haram killed and kidnapped Chinese nationals in North Cameroon. The kidnappings 

underscored why Boko Haram is a regional challenge. 

And while the kidnappings have cast a spotlight on this terrorist 

organization, I want to emphasize that, for roughly a decade, the 

8

United States has been working to help the people of Nigeria and 

the Nigerian Government address this terrorist threat. 

Today I would like to highlight some of the kinds of security assistance that we have more recently been providing to help Nigeria 

address Boko Haram. 

Fiscal years 2012, 2013, Department of State planned approximately $35.8 million in security assistance programs that would 

benefit Nigeria, subject to congressional notification and approval. 

We are working with vetted police and civilian security components to build Nigerian law enforcement capacities to investigate 

terrorist cases, effectively deal with explosive devices, and secure 

Nigeria’s borders. We do this because the most effective counterterrorism policies and practices are those which respect human rights 

and are underpinned by the rule of law. 

We are also focusing on enabling various Nigerian security services, including the police, intelligence agencies, and the Ministry of 

Defense, refusing multiple information streams to develop a better 

understanding of Boko Haram. 

We engage in robust dialogue with our Nigerian counterparts on 

these activities, including through the U.S.-Nigeria Binational 

Commission’s Regional Security Working Group. There is also a 

lengthy history of DoD involvement, which I will leave to my Defense Department colleague to describe. 

The Department has also considered other steps to support the 

fight against Boko Haram. As you know, its leaders do not have 

bank accounts and the organization is not structured as many 

other terrorist organizations against whom the United States has 

used particular legal designations. 

After careful deliberation and consultation with the Nigerian 

Government, the United States decided in June 2012 to designate 

Boko Haram’s top commanders as specially designated global terrorists, which allowed us to implement an asset freeze, a travel 

ban, and a prohibition on providing weapons or material support 

to these designated individuals as relevant. 

In June 2013, we decided to add Abubakar—forgive my pronunciation—Shekau, Boko Haram’s official leader, to our Rewards 

for Justice Program with a $7-million reward for information leading to his arrest. 

In November 2013, after implementing and assessing these earlier steps and building on our long record of security cooperation, 

and shortly after Nigeria and the United Kingdom made their own 

designations, we also designated Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. 

Our approach reflected our evolving assessment of Boko Haram’s 

threat potential, the utility of additional sanctions of different 

types, and our close coordination with our partners. 

Significantly, while Nigeria had been reluctant to seek international attention to the Boko Haram crisis, it has now moved forward, in part, at our urging to request that the United Nations Security Council designate Boko Haram under its al-Qaeda regime. 

And while these efforts will make a difference, we continue to 

have concerns that corruption and human rights violations by government forces, particularly those forces that have operated in the 

9

northeast, continue to undermine the government’s attempts to defeat Boko Haram militarily. 

Given these concerns, we continue to press the Government of 

Nigeria to demonstrate that it is working to protect civilians where 

Boko Haram is not, and this means ending impunity for human 

rights violations by security forces. 

Let me be clear that there is no equivalence between the actions 

of the Nigerian military and those of Boko Haram, a terrorist 

group that seeks to murder civilians in large numbers and terrorize 

the civilian population as a matter of policy, killing over 1,200 people in 2014 thus far. 

Yet, we also know the power of popular grievance narratives 

against the government, and it’s incumbent upon Nigeria’s Government to demonstrate through specific steps the will to ensure its 

forces protect human rights for all of its people and end impunity 

for those that use violence indiscriminately. 

Consistent with our council 2 months ago, the Government of Nigeria announced a multifaceted ‘‘soft’’ approach to countering Boko 

Haram, and we are eager to see it implemented. 

And we are also eager to see the Nigerian Government address 

the underlying concerns that impede their ability to address Boko 

Haram. 

In closing, I will say that the State Department, like the American people, hopes very much to see the Nigerian schoolgirls reunited with their families soon. 

But we are also prepared for a long, tough fight to defeat Boko 

Haram and to help the Nigerian people realize the political and 

economic potential of their great country. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sewall follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Ms. Dory. 

STATEMENT OF MS. AMANDA J. DORY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Ms. DORY. Good morning, Chairman Royce, Ranking Member 

Engel, members of the committee. 

Thank you for calling us together to address the deeply disturbing abductions of more than 270 schoolgirls from Northern Nigeria by the terrorist organization Boko Haram some 5 weeks ago. 

The global community has been horrified by this barbarous act. 

Within the context of the U.S. Government response, the Department of Defense is taking action to help the Nigerian authority’s 

efforts to recover the girls safely and address the growing threat 

of Boko Haram. 

Sixteen DoD personnel from multiple locations have joined the 

multidisciplinary team of experts led by the State Department at 

our Embassy in Abuja. 

Their initial efforts have been to work with Nigerian security 

personnel to identify gaps and shortfalls and provide requested expertise and information, including the use of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. 

We are also working closely with the U.K., France, and other 

international partners in Abuja to coordinate multilateral actions. 

Our intent is to support Nigerian-led efforts to safely recover the 

girls and help catalyze greater efforts to secure the population of 

Nigeria from the menace of Boko Haram. 

To be clear, immediate and long-term solutions to Boko Haram 

must be developed and implemented by the sovereign Government 

of Nigeria if sustained security is to be achieved. 

Extant in its current form since 2009, the Boko Haram threat 

has grown over the past several years, extending its geographic 

reach and increasing the sophistication and lethality of its attacks. 

Along with other U.S. departments and agencies, DoD has been 

engaging for some time with the Government of Nigeria to help 

build its capacity to respond. 

Beginning in January 2011, we have used the State Departmentled U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission as our principal forum to 

tackle the challenge of enhancing counterinsurgency efforts while 

developing a civilian-centered approach to security that is comprehensive, engaging law enforcement, border security, as well as 

the underlying contributors to instability, such as governance, education, health, and economic development. 

For its part, DoD is supporting the establishment of counter-IED 

and civil-military operations capacity within the Nigerian Army as 

part of Nigeria’s security doctrine. 

We have also supported the establishment of a national-level intelligence fusion capability to promote better information sharing 

among the various Nigerian national security entities. 

Most recently, in late April of this year, we began working with 

Nigeria’s newly created counterterrorism-focused Ranger Battalion. 

As has been demonstrated recently, Boko Haram uses the lightly 

controlled borders between Nigeria and its neighbors for cross-border operations. 

20

Last week, France hosted a very timely summit at which heads 

of state from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Benin, Niger, along with 

the U.S. and U.K., sought to improve regional collaboration. 

For our part, DoD and the Department of State are working 

closely together on a proposal to enhance border security along Nigeria’s common borders with Chad, Niger, and Cameroon in support of a regional response to counter the threat posed by Boko 

Haram. 

The concept is to build border security capacity and promote better cooperation and communication among the security forces of 

each country with the aim of reducing Boko Haram’s operational 

space and safe havens. 

As committed as the U.S. is to supporting Nigeria and in returning these girls safely, Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram is a very 

challenging case. In the face of a new and more sophisticated 

threat, Nigeria’s security forces have been greatly challenged by 

Boko Haram’s tactics. 

Also troubling have been the heavy-handed approaches by security forces during operations against Boko Haram, approaches that 

risk further alienating local populations. 

Consistent with U.S. law and policy, we review all security units 

nominated for assistance, and we do not provide assistance when 

there is credible information of human rights violations. With this 

important consideration in mind, we have worked to engage where 

we are able. 

No discussion of how to address Boko Haram would be complete 

without addressing some of the political dynamics in Nigeria and 

the underlying security environment. 

In spite of its vast oil wealth, Nigeria continues to face enormous 

development challenges. When these factors are combined with pervasive corruption and Boko Haram’s brutal terrorization of the population, Northern Nigerians lack a reliable source of security. 

The long-term solution to Boko Haram cannot come solely from 

Nigeria’s security forces, but, rather, also requires Nigeria’s political leaders to give serious and sustained attention to addressing 

the systematic problems of corruption, the lack of effective and equitable governance, and the country’s uneven social and economic 

development. 

While continuing to draw attention to these broader factors, we 

will remain sharply focused on the heartwrenching event that triggered this broader awareness of Boko Haram’s depredations. 

DoD is committed to supporting Nigeria’s efforts to locate and recover these girls. This will not be an easy task, as hostage recovery 

is a high-risk undertaking in the best of circumstances. 

If this terrible episode is to resolve with the girls’ safe returns, 

the Government of Nigeria must continue to match its public statements with a serious and focused response that draws on all elements of its government, the influence of key social and religious 

figures, and the resources international partners are making available to assist. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, thank you for that testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dory follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. As you testified, you do not provide assistance 

when human rights violations occur. However, there is a provision 

whereby, in an extraordinary circumstance, we could. 

And here is the argument that I would make about Boko Haram 

and why this is an extraordinary circumstance. You have a situation here where we are focused on the kidnapping of 300 girls some 

weeks ago, but, in the meantime, more have been kidnapped. 

As we talk about it, an additional group of schoolgirls were kidnapped. As we talk about it, additional attacks have occurred, 118 

killed this morning, you know, 300 killed a few weeks ago. 

As we talk about it, 500 schools have been destroyed, and Boko 

Haram—their modus operandi is to destroy the schools and then 

recruit young uneducated men into their ranks and teach them 

Jihad. 

And so, as the Jihad mushrooms out across North Africa and into 

Cameroon and into Chad and into neighboring states, we say, 

‘‘Well, you know, human rights violations have occurred in Nigeria; 

so, we are limited in what we can do.’’

The difficulty is that Boko Haram is in a process of expanding 

their terror and the frequency of these attacks, the attacks on girls, 

that has been an evolution. 

They have intimidated and frightened the Nigerian military, 

they are now to the point where a lot of military units have run 

away. And so they can go in and take girls and then, you know, 

they can turn them into concubines or sell them or, you know, enslave them, because that is what they are actually doing. They are 

enslaving. 

And I would say that is an extraordinary circumstance that 

might necessitate the U.S. We have U.S. forces well positioned to 

advise and assist Nigerian forces in the search for these girls and, 

in this role, U.S. forces are trained to deal with hostage situations. 

Unfortunately, the Nigerian forces are not. They are trained to deal 

and track in jungle environments. 

They can advise and assist right up to the point of an attack. 

They don’t have to be involved in the attack. But they could use 

those unique assets that the U.S. has in terms of our spy satellite 

capabilities and et cetera in order to track and rescue these girls. 

This would be very similar to the mission that we have approved 

with respect to the Lord’s Resistance Army. And for a number of 

years, if you think about it—how many years did it take us to galvanize some support against Joseph Kony? 

I think it was about 15 years of Joseph Kony marauding and kidnapping young boys and making child soldiers out of 12-year-old 

boys and young girls and making them concubines. I think 15,000 

was roughly the number of people he slaughtered before we finally 

put him on defense by authorizing U.S. forces to help track him. 

So now he is the one that is being tracked instead of the one 

tracking others. Right? It used to be he would maraud—he would 

take his band into Congo or Northern Uganda or Southern Sudan 

or Central African Republic and just create mayhem. 

But now at least he is on the run. Somebody said this morning, 

‘‘Well, we haven’t got him yet.’’ No. We haven’t caught him yet, but 

he is on the run. And there is little doubt that they are going to 

28

run him down, and it is a completely different situation than it was 

a couple of years ago when he was on the offensive. 

Now, you have got the same situation here. And, frankly, we 

should do the same thing. For the sake of humanity, we should do 

the same thing. We should not allow this cancer to spread the way 

it has. 

We heard from Deborah this morning—Deborah Peter—about 

the uncompromising position where they tell her father, you know, 

that he has to quit. He was a pastor. 

You know, they burned the church, they killed him, they killed 

her young brother, and now they have kidnapped her schoolmates. 

I think the time is at hand for the United States to help build the 

morale. 

Think about what this would mean to the Nigerian forces if we 

were willing to give them this assistance. You could ensure that 

the strategy for the rescue operation launched by them is very well 

planned. 

You could boost the morale and effectiveness of the Nigerian 

forces, and you could ensure that our intelligence, reconnaissance, 

and surveillance assets are put to best use. 

So I would just ask for your response, if you could, to the observation. Is there any reason why we can’t offer that waiver and 

treat this the same way we have treated going after Joseph Kony? 

Ms. DORY. I think the waiver issue I would defer to my State Department colleague in terms of the specific provisions of Leahy. 

But what I could quickly do is agree in terms of some of the 

diagnostics as you look at the situation with the Lord’s Resistance 

Army and why we are on a successful path collectively at this 

point, and how that pertains to the Boko Haram situation. 

You have identified, Congressman, the elements of success. You 

have neighbors who are working together under a regional task 

force construct to address the LRA challenge. 

You have a Ugandan Government dedicated to addressing the 

governance and the economic concerns of Northern Uganda, which 

helps give rise to the phenomenon of the Lord’s Resistance Army 

in the first place. 

With external support, Uganda and the other forces have been 

able to develop an intelligence and information picture that has 

been very important and then launched a very successful information campaign that reaches the populations in the affected areas 

that are then able to further assist in the tracking operations. 

So I think many of those elements are very relevant to how we 

could productively work with Nigeria and its neighbors going forward vis-a`-vis Boko Haram. 

Chairman ROYCE. And, Ms. Dory, I would just add one other 

thing for your consideration. 

And maybe Dr. Sewall would like to comment on this as well. 

But the one difference is that, with Boko Haram, we have a 

group that is a threat to U.S. interests as well, to quote the State 

Department testimony over on the Senate side, or perhaps it was 

the Defense Department. 

But there is no question that a Jihadist group like this, that directs its efforts and its bombing against those who believe in emVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:40 Aug 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\052114\88018 SHIRL
29

powering women or teaching women, is also a threat to the United 

States and our interests. 

So it would seem to me that, if we are going to authorize this 

with respect to going after Joseph Kony, we certainly should do it 

here. 

Dr. Sewall? 

Ms. SEWALL. Thank you for your observations. And I share your 

sense of urgency about the matter. 

I think, with respect to the specific question concerning sanctions, it is my understanding that there is limited waiver authority 

in the case of national security emergencies and that the decision 

rests at the highest levels of the government with regard to exercising a national security emergency exception. 

Chairman ROYCE. Is it under consideration as an exemption? 

Ms. SEWALL. I can’t speak to what the senior members of this 

government are discussing with regard to Leahy. I think the focus 

right now is very much on the safe rescue of the girls. And so, 

when I——

Chairman ROYCE. Yes. But the Leahy Amendment is what prohibits our active cooperation. In the steps that I just enumerated 

here, you know, in the tracking on the ground and to be able to 

plan that attack on the ground, that is the whole point. 

I mean, we had the testimony by the Defense Department last 

week in the Senate that, ‘‘This vetting is a persistent and very 

troubling limitation on our ability to provide assistance’’—they are 

talking about the Leahy provision here—‘‘particularly training assistance that the Nigerians so badly need.’’ So this is a problem. 

Ms. SEWALL. And so I would like to address it. 

The issue is to disaggregate the immediate crisis and what options are available to deal with supporting the Nigerians in their 

effort to rescue the girls versus longer-term systemic and forcewide engagement. 

And I think it is very important to both disaggregate those and 

then to look at the facts as they pertain to each case. 

In the first case, I spoke yesterday to the deployment team in 

Abuja, and they are very pleased with the growing level of cooperation that exists, both within the Intel Fusion Center and with their 

broader discussions with their Nigerian counterparts. 

They are hopeful that U.S. assistance will be increasingly useful 

to the Nigerians in their effort, and they, nonetheless, rely on 

choices made by the Government of Nigeria in terms of what they 

would like to avail themselves of and how to proceed. 

More broadly, the security systems issue—and, again, I think 

Amanda Dory can speak in great detail about the level of security 

assistance that is occurring right now. 

But we have been able to, pursuant to the Leahy Law, create essentially two new battalions with whom we are working—one is 

specialized counterterrorism force, and the other a Ranger Battalion to create their specialized military capabilities with regard 

to the kind of military challenges that Boko Haram presents. 

Chairman ROYCE. Here would be my suggestion. Thank you. 

Here is my suggestion. Ask for a temporary waiver. If you don’t 

want the permanent waiver, ask for a temporary waiver, designate 

this as an extraordinary circumstance, and get to an answer to the 

30

point that your colleague made from the Department of Defense 

that it is a ‘‘persistent and very troubling limitation on our ability 

to provide assistance, particularly training assistance, that the Nigerians so badly need.’’ That is the statement from the Department 

of Defense. It needs to be addressed. 

But I need to go to Mr. Engel. My time has long since expired. 

Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I was in favor of declaring Boko Haram as a terrorist organization, but I want to address the undercurrent with some of my 

friends on the other side of the aisle that somehow the lack of designating them as a terrorist organization earlier contributed somehow to this kidnapping. I think that is absurd. 

You know, when the State Department didn’t designate Boko 

Haram as an FTO, it wasn’t because anyone was being careless. It 

wasn’t because they weren’t paying attention. It was a policy decision based on facts on the ground. 

Facts changed and the Department issued a designation. It is not 

clear what the designation does—asset freezes and Visa bans and 

prohibition of material support—that that has actually made a difference. 

But, you know, designating Boko Haram as an FTO earlier 

would have helped the organization’s fundraising and recruiting efforts. Organizations like Boko Haram aren’t afraid of being branded terrorists by the U.S. That word is a badge of honor. 

I am also told that the Nigerian Government didn’t want the designation. That is the reason the State Department didn’t issue it. 

And in May 2012, 25 leading experts on Nigeria wrote the State 

Department, saying that an FTO designation for Boko Haram was 

a bad idea. 

And in 2012, the State Department did designate the top three 

leaders of Boko Haram as specially designated nationals, which are 

terrorists, meaning that we could go after them and their network. 

And, in fact, Secretary Clinton visited Nigeria in 2012 to consult 

with the Nigerian Government on how we could work together. 

So while I have been in favor of declaring them as a terrorist organization, I don’t think anyone can seriously think that, if we had 

done it earlier, it would have somehow prevented this kidnapping. 

So I would like either Dr. Sewall or Ms. Dory to comment on 

what I have just said. 

Ms. DORY. Congressman—Ranking Member Engel, I think it is 

fair to say that we work closely with host nation governments regardless of the designation issue. Boko Haram has certainly been 

on the radar screen in terms of the type of security cooperation 

that has been effective with Nigeria since it emerged in the Nigerian context years ago. 

So the point about the formal designation, it brings some additional tools to bear. Principally, in the financial domain, you mentioned the Visa bans as well. So it can be helpful from that perspective. But it does escalate, in a sense, and that can be why, 

when engaging with host nations, they may be reluctant to have 

such an international designation because it draws more attention 

to the problem, potentially, in unproductive ways. 

31

So I think that is making a linkage to at what point did the designation occur and the practical engagement that has been underway with the Nigerians are really separate issues. 

Ms. SEWALL. I think the key point is the extent to which sanctions actually achieve their objectives. 

And I think one of the reasons why the administration decided 

in June 2012 to designate the three top commanders of Boko 

Haram as specially designated terrorists was because most of the 

tools that would be available against Boko Haram, as an organization, were then available to use against those three recognized 

leaders. 

The Rewards for Justice Program was an additional effort to find 

ways to put pressure on the organization. And what fundamentally 

changed in the context of the FTO designation that followed both 

of those actions was the ability to take action against the group as 

opposed to its three top leaders. 

So I think it is in that context that it is very important to look 

at the evolution of U.S. actions, and the primary significance, I 

think, was in the June 2012 designation of the three Boko Haram 

top leaders as specially designated terrorists. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Let me ask you both this: Given the enormous domestic and 

international attention following these kidnappings, has the Nigerian Government—I said some of it in my opening remarks, and, 

Ms. Dory, you mentioned it as well—has the Nigerian Government 

become more receptive to our messages, urging them to change 

their approach to Boko Haram? And what concrete things have 

they done to shift their strategy and their relationship with us? 

Ms. DORY. I believe the quick answer is ‘‘yes.’’ The intensity of 

international public opinion and support is productively contributing to our dialogue with the Government of Nigeria. 

I think their willingness to accept the multidisciplinary team and 

their robust engagement with it since its arrival are the most concrete indicators in the near term. 

Ms. SEWALL. In my recent visit with AFRICOM Commander 

David Rodriguez, we stressed both of the points that you referenced, both the need to take rapid action to rescue the girls and 

the need to fundamentally rethink their approach to 

counterinsurgency. 

We talked a lot about the evolution of the U.S. approach to 

counterinsurgency and the ways in which it is critical to think of 

a holistic approach, the ways in which a careful approach to violence is absolutely vital for attaining the cooperation and, therefore, the intelligence from the local population, one of the main hindrances in the fight against Boko Haram thus far. 

And we also spoke frankly about our concerns about the inability 

of a seemingly very large defense budget to translate into the receipt of bullets and workable trucks at the level of the 7th Division 

in the northeast. 

Mr. ENGEL. Does the State Department have an estimate of how 

many people the Nigerian security forces have killed over the last 

4 years in Northern Nigeria? 

Ms. SEWALL. We do not have an estimate. 

32

But I will tell you that, given my own background as someone 

who urged the United States Government to count civilian casualties during its counterinsurgency campaigns, this was an issue that 

I raised repeatedly with all four of the military officials with whom 

we met. 

And my strong advice to them was that they would be unable to 

evaluate and reform their efforts to protect civilians and to more 

directly avoid killing civilians by mistake unless they very carefully 

tracked those casualties. 

So it is my hope that, going forward, we will be able to see 

progress in that regard. 

Mr. ENGEL. The chairman and I agree on what we in the United 

States must do in order to help bring these girls back in terms of 

working with other countries and forces. 

Could you outline for us what are some of the operational challenges to finding and rescuing these girls. 

Ms. DORY. Thank you. 

The operational challenges are significant. You have seen some 

of the comparisons in terms of the vastness of the terrain in which 

the girls may be located. 

We are working with our Nigerian counterparts and other international partners to develop a better understanding of where they 

may be, but our sense at this point is that they have been dispersed into multiple smaller groups. They may or may not all be 

in Nigeria. 

So the sheer number of individuals involved, the complexity of 

the terrain—jungle for a great part of it—and the movement that 

could be associated over the weeks that have elapsed, creating a 

greater area of operations, make this a very difficult environment 

in which to contemplate what a recovery might look like. 

Just to give an example, if you think back to the hostage incident 

in Amnas, Algeria 2 years ago, where you had 800 hostages who 

were in a single location and the Algerian Government and military took action as the AQIM and Mokhtar Belmokhtar began to 

separate and disperse the hostages, they engaged in an assault 

that left 40 of the hostages dead, and that was in a desert environment and the hostages were all concentrated together. 

So it would be hard to overestimate the complexity, first, of locating the hostages and then in considering how that might be resolved successfully. 

If we had an FBI witness here today, he or she, I imagine, would 

indicate that the vast majority of hostage recovery situations are 

resolved through dialogue and negotiations and not through rescues and assaults. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Anything to add, Dr. Sewall? 

Ms. SEWALL. I think any military experts in hostage recovery 

would also tell you that a dialogue is often very helpful even in the 

event that dialogue fails. 

And so I think we have to be respectful of the ways in which the 

Nigerians may choose to try to achieve the safe return of the girls. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

33

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Chris Smith from New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for your testimony. 

A couple of questions. I know this—and I am cognizant this is 

an open hearing. But do you have reason for optimism that 

progress is being made in ascertaining the whereabouts of these 

abducted young women and any indication at all about their welfare and well-being, their health? 

Ms. SEWALL. I would say that the team, when I spoke to them 

yesterday, was very pleased by the level of cooperation, was very 

pleased by the multiple sources of information flowing into the 

Intel Fusion Center, was encouraged by the professionalism and 

the commitment of the Nigerians in the Intel Fusion Center, and 

was hopeful that the degree of intelligence information would continue to increase over time. 

Given time, I am hopeful that we will make progress. And I 

think that is the extent to which I can respond in this context. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for that. 

Let me ask you with regards to the designation of FTO status, 

which I think is a very serious issue. On July 10, 2012, I chaired 

a hearing. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson 

testified, and I asked him repeatedly at that time why Boko Haram 

was not designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization. And he said, 

while acknowledging it is a very important question, that he believes that the larger element—he goes,

‘‘We believe that the larger element of Boko Haram is not 

interested in doing anything but attempting to discredit, 

disgrace the Nigerian Government.’’

He went on to say—this is Ambassador Carson speaking—

‘‘I would remind people that the phenomena of Boko 

Haram is one of discrediting the central government in 

power for its failure to deliver services to the people.’’

In retrospect, do you believe that was an assessment that had 

validity, I mean, services to the people, that is why they are doing 

this? 

I would also note parenthetically that Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary Robert Jackson acknowledged last week that, ‘‘In retrospect, we might have done the designation earlier.’’ He then added, 

‘‘I think we will be quicker to make designations based on our own 

assessments earlier based on this.’’

I actually went, as you may know, in September of last year to 

Jos and to Abuja and repeatedly raised the question of Foreign Terrorist Organization designations. And, frankly, in government 

meetings on the Nigerian side, in meetings with our own people in 

the Embassy, there was a very strong sense that this could have 

a very valuable effect, particularly in tracking where all the weapons are coming from. 

Maybe they don’t have bank accounts. Maybe they do. I don’t 

know. But if we really look and probe and try to discern who is providing the AK–47s and the IEDs and the like that are killing so 

34

many people, we may be able to put a tourniquet—or at least begin 

putting a tourniquet on this bloodshed. 

So your sense on that statement that this—you know, statement 

that was made by, again, Johnnie Carson, ‘‘The phenomenon of 

Boko Haram is one of discrediting the central government in power 

for its failure to deliver services to the people.’’

Ms. SEWALL. I think it is hard to look at Boko Haram as an insurgency that rests predominantly on the failings of the State, but 

there is no question that the failings of the State create a context 

in which disaffected voices are prey to recruitment. 

And when you look at the specifics of Boko Haram’s tactics in 

terms of forcible recruitment of persons, that is a way to explain 

how it continues to survive, additionally. 

I think, from the perspective of our efforts to counter Boko 

Haram from the outside, from legal mechanisms that exist outside 

of the Nigerian context in which the Nigerian decisions are central, 

the important step, to me, was the June 2012 designation of the 

three leaders as——

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask you—because I am almost out of 

time—should we have done the FTO designation earlier? 

Ms. SEWALL. I wasn’t here; so, I don’t know. I think that the 

most——

Mr. SMITH. You are in a very high position. I look back and forth. 

We all do all the time. 

Ms. SEWALL. Right. 

Mr. SMITH. Should it have been done? 

Ms. SEWALL. Right. Well, I thank you for your leadership on this 

important issue. And it is clear that the committee played a very 

vital role in continuing to press the issue. 

I think the important thing is that the three leaders were designated in 2012, and the organization as a whole——

Mr. SMITH. I understand that. I am almost out of time. I will just 

ask very quickly. 

Have there been attacks by Boko Haram against Americans? Jos 

has the highest number of Americans in Northern Nigeria. Following yesterday’s bombings, have all Americans been accounted 

for? And for the record, when the U.N. compound was bombed, 

were any Americans present? 

Ms. DORY. I am not aware that there were Americans involved 

in the U.N. compound bombing. And I think, in terms of Jos, we 

would have to check with the Embassy to see if there is a full accounting of Americans. I am not——

Chairman ROYCE. You can get back to us, then. 

Mr. Brad Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Dory, perhaps you could give me a one-word answer. Boko 

Haram has got a lot of weapons. Are they mostly captured from the 

Nigerian military, purchased, or we don’t know? 

Ms. DORY. If I could give slightly more than one word, it is a 

mixture, in our understanding. They have resources as a result of 

kidnapping-for-ransom operations. So they are able to purchase, to 

include——

35

Mr. SHERMAN. Are the weapons that we have seen them use or 

captured from their caches or stores the same weapons found in Nigerian military arsenals? 

Ms. DORY. Some of them are also captured from Nigerian security services or in raids against arsenals. So it is a mix. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. 

Dr. Sewall, Mr. Mamman Nur is a high-ranking member of Boko 

Haram. According to open sources, he may be a key link between 

that organization and certain AQ affiliates, like Al-Shabaab. He 

may have been behind the 2011 U.N. bombing. 

Should we be designating this individual as a specially designated global terrorist? 

Ms. SEWALL. I don’t know the answer off the top, and I will have 

to look into that and get back to you. I simply can’t answer that 

right now. I apologize. 

Mr. SHERMAN. There are lots of reports in the press that the Nigerian military knew hours in advance of this attack. 

Do either of you have any information that would either confirm 

or discredit, beyond what we have all read in the newspapers? 

Ms. DORY. I am familiar with the press reports, but don’t have 

additional information either way. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Dr. Sewall, I am trying to understand the attitude 

of the Nigerian Government. It is acting as if it is almost disturbed 

that the whole world is now focused on Boko Haram. 

Can you explain why the Nigerian Government wasn’t pressing 

us to designate Boko Haram as a terrorist organization and wasn’t 

doing more to bring in international support in its efforts against 

this terrorist organization? 

Ms. SEWALL. Well, I am not sure I can really speak for the Nigerian Government, but I can share with you, Congressman, my impressions based on the conversations that we had in our recent 

visit. 

And so I think the Nigerian Government believes that it has 

heard the message about the need to change the way it does its 

business. 

It believes it has taken a more offensive approach in recent 

months, and it has expressed the belief that the more recent 

rounds of bombings have been the efforts by a desperate group to 

gain attention. 

I think that the Nigerian view about international attention was 

misguided in some ways along the same lines that I have heard 

commentary in the U.S. public discourse, which is to say that the 

world ignored Nigeria and is now only now focusing on Nigeria 

with the kidnapping of the schoolgirls. 

And so I found myself reiterating the decade-long security cooperation assistance that we had had and the messages that we 

had been sending them about corruption, about the comportment 

and accountability——

Mr. SHERMAN. And I will point out we would have designated 

Boko Haram earlier had we not, I think correctly, taken into consideration the views of the Nigerian Government. It is just, I am 

confounded as to why the Nigerian Government wasn’t pushing us 

forward, why they were pulling us back. 

36

We have designated certain individuals. We have designated the 

entire organization. The view I have of Boko Haram is that, of all 

of the Islamic extremist organizations, they are the ones that are 

most in the jungle, the least likely to have bank accounts, et cetera. 

Have we successfully frozen any of the individual assets of the 

specially designated global terrorists—frozen any of the assets or 

been successful in going after Boko Haram? 

A lot of discussion here is, ‘‘Why didn’t we do it sooner?’’ But we 

did do it over 6 months ago. And if they are really an in-the-bush 

organization, that would have very little effect on them, a great effect on us psychologically because we like to feel like we have done 

something, like we indict Chinese military officers because they are 

engaged in hacking. 

But other than making us feel better, what have we been able 

to accomplish with all these designations? 

Ms. SEWALL. I would need to refer you to my colleagues in other 

agencies to speak to the specifics of the enforcement actions pursuant to the sanctions designation. And perhaps in the hearing tomorrow——

Mr. SHERMAN. But you are not aware of anything that the designations of certain individuals as specially designated global terrorists or the designation of Boko Haram as a terrorist organization—to your knowledge, there isn’t any particular bank account, 

a particular intercepted or prevented fundraising effort, no tangible 

effect of 6 months—well, more than 6 months of such designations? 

Ms. SEWALL. Unfortunately, I really need to refer you to the colleagues that do the enforcement. I am just not in a position to answer the question. I apologize. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Congressman Sherman, in answer to your first 

question—or further answer to it—there was testimony from the 

FBI, and I will just give you their quick response. 

FBI Director James Comey testified that Boko Haram has communications, training and weapons links with al-Qaeda in the 

Maghreb, as well as Al-Shabaab based in Somalia, and al-Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula based in Yemen. 

And then he also testified that these links, in his words, ‘‘may 

strengthen Boko Haram’s capacity to conduct terrorist attacks 

against U.S. or Western targets in the future.’’

So in terms of the weapons movements, that is the FBI’s testimony. 

Mr. SHERMAN. It is good to have expertise both from there and 

from here. 

Chairman ROYCE. Right. Right. 

We go to Mr. Mike McCaul of Texas. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just say, last night I watched the video again of Boko 

Haram, the leader with these 270 girls, and it is horrific, and it is 

hard to stand back idly and watch that happen, knowing that we 

could do more to help them. 

The chairman raised the issue of the waiver process. And I guess 

my question to Dr. Sewall is: If that waiver was granted, what additional assistance could be given to this situation? 

37

Ms. SEWALL. I think one of the distinctions that I have been trying to articulate is that the waiver really is geared toward the 

training and material support for forces. 

And some 50 percent of the Nigerian military at this point in 

time are not eligible for that form of cooperation with the United 

States because of the Leahy Law. 

So we have been able to engage in security cooperation with 

Leahy-vetted units, which is the remaining 50 percent. 

In terms of the operational pieces, I guess I should turn to my 

colleague, Ms. Dory, to speak about what additionally might happen in a waiver. 

But at this point we are doing everything that the Nigerians 

want us to be doing, and we are there and available to do more, 

completely consistent with the Leahy Law, with our deployment 

teams, and our military planners there in Abuja. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Ms. Dory, if that waiver is granted, what additional assistance militarily could be provided? 

Ms. DORY. Sir, it is predominantly a function of what type of assistance is requested by the Government of Nigeria. We have a 

complete menu of training activities, equipping activities, advising, 

assisting, the usual inventory that the Department can pursue in 

partnership with another country. But it really rests with the host 

nation to identify in what areas it wishes to cooperate. 

Mr. MCCAUL. You mentioned earlier that a military operation 

would be risky and risky to the hostages, and I understand that. 

But has there been any effort to have our FBI’s hostage rescue 

team assist with this? 

Ms. DORY. There are FBI personnel who are part of the multidisciplinary team, and I believe the services of the FBI’s hostage 

recovery experts are on the table. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, I would hope so. I would hope the answer is 

‘‘yes’’ to that question. I think they could be very valuable in this 

situation. 

I chair the Homeland Security Committee. In 2011, we released 

a report, ‘‘Intel: Boko Haram Emerging Threat to the Homeland.’’

We asked that they be designated as an FTO back then because 

it would support U.S. intelligence in their effort to curb financing, 

to isolate it internationally, heighten public awareness, and signal 

to other governments that the threat is serious. 

In September 2013, we issued a follow-up report, ‘‘Boko Haram, 

the Growing Threat to the Homeland,’’ again asking that the designation take place. Members of Congress additionally made that 

request. 

And, finally, the head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division sent a letter to the State Department requesting that 

Boko Haram be put on this list. 

Now, I know, Dr. Sewall, that, eventually, they were put on the 

list. But, you know, it took years to get the Haqqani Network put 

on the list. It took years to get Ansar al-Sharia behind the 

Benghazi attack put on this list. We still can’t get the Quds Force 

to be put on this list. 

Why is it so difficult for the State Department to put what is so 

obvious on the Foreign Terrorist Organization list? 

38

Ms. SEWALL. I can’t speak to the decisions that were made before 

I came to the Department, sir. I am sorry. 

And I know that there are many different considerations that go 

into other decisions. I mean, in the context of the Nigerian case, 

I think I explained that there was a discussion with the government, there was a discussion about the nature of the threat, and 

there was a discussion about the efficacy, the true impact of the 

sanctions. 

I can only speak to that case, and I unfortunately can’t speak to 

the prior cases. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, it is not just Members of Congress. It is not 

just the Justice Department. It is General Hamm. Carter Hamm 

talked about this threat. Director Clapper, the DNI, mentioned this 

threat. General Dave Rodriguez, Commander of AFRICOM. 

This is coming in from multiple points, you know, not just Members of Congress, not my committee, but multiple points in the 

military, the Justice Department. 

I don’t really understand, when you look at that video, when it 

is so obvious that they are terrorists, why they weren’t put on the 

FTO, which just maybe—it may not have stopped this event from 

happening, but at least we could have put some pressure on their 

financial ties and their funding mechanisms. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Gregory Meeks from New 

York. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the way that you 

have been conducting this hearing and the investigations and the 

education that you have done to talk about the waiver, to figure 

out how we resolve this. 

You have done it in a manner—and I think I want the record to 

be clear with me that I concur with you and your opinion on how 

we should be able to assist the Nigerian Government. 

I think that the research that you and your staff have done is 

excellent, and I want the record to reflect that this is clearly something that we all agree upon in that regard. 

I want to say to Ms. Peter, who is sitting in the audience, who 

I had to listen to her tell the horrible story in regards to her family 

that happened before her eyes in 2011. No child, no child, should 

have to see their parents killed and siblings before their eyes. 

None. And it really angers me inside when I hear that. 

And when you hear and see this group, Boko Haram, who now 

has kidnapped these 200 girls, but has killed boys, destroyed 

churches, taken away hope, there is no redeeming factor for individuals like that. 

They are in the same category as al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, and 

I want to make sure that we do everything that we can to free 

those girls. I don’t care whether it is negotiation, whatever it is. 

But let me tell you I don’t want that to be the end of it. You 

know, generally, I am a multilateral guy. And I think all of the 

countries—I haven’t heard any country, anybody, dissent on the 

evil of this group. 

39

So I want somebody—I don’t see why that, once we get these 

girls free—I am going to tell you, for me, I want drones, I want 

something, because they don’t belong on this earth. 

Threatening people and having people living in fear, this is something that I see that this world—not just this Nation, but other nations all across, are coming together to say, ‘‘We are going to stop 

this.’’

And we need to do it. We need to do it in Nigeria. We need to 

do it in Syria, Pakistan and Somalia, wherever Al-Shabaab—wherever these individuals are. 

And then we have got to do more than that, because the attacks 

on these girls—over 200 schoolgirls in Northern Nigeria—we talked 

about it and it is a global outcry to keep children safe in schools 

and protect their right to education. But, unfortunately, we are all 

too aware of these same groups—extremist groups that are doing 

the same thing. 

So I am wondering whether or not there is a plan to ensure that 

children—all children, especially those in conflicted areas, are protected and have access to quality education. 

I know you can’t answer that question, but I am just upset right 

now. I wish I could think rationally, as the chairman does and has 

done. 

That is why I think that it is a good thing that he is doing this 

because you need rational thinkers at a time like this and not having emotions taking over, as it is doing with me. 

But I am. Just listening to Ms. Peter’s story has made me that 

I can’t, you know, do what the chairman has done. So I thank God 

that the chairman is doing what he is doing right now. 

But, you know, it seems to me that I have got, like Ms. Peter, 

the same year—15-, 14-year-old daughter, who is asking me about 

this scenario and what are we doing and what should we do. So 

when I am thinking that, I can’t think rationally. 

Tell me why—Ms. Sewall? 

Ms. SEWALL. First, Congressman Meeks, I want to tell you that 

I can be every bit as irrational as you are on this issue. I don’t 

think there is a single American that doesn’t detest Boko Haram 

from the bottom of their hearts. 

I have four daughters. I have three 17-year-old daughters and I 

have one 12-year-old daughter. And when I left them to go to Nigeria, you can imagine how heavily they weighed on my heart. 

And when I met with the activists that had been protesting the 

government’s response to the crisis, when I called the principal of 

the school to express Americans’ support for her and for bringing 

the girls back safely, I was able to give voice to the emotion that 

I think we all feel in the context of this immediate crisis. 

At the same time, it is abundantly clear that, if we are to move 

to address Boko Haram as an enduring threat beyond the question 

of these 200-plus schoolgirls, that the Nigerian Government itself 

has to make changes. It has to address corruption. It has to address the excessive use of violence. 

There are ways we can support them in those efforts, and there 

are ways that we can do specific things for them. But those are 

fleeting things. Those will not solve the Boko Haram problem. 

40

The Boko Haram problem in Nigeria needs to be addressed by 

Nigerians. The Boko Haram problem, as a regional threat, needs 

to be addressed by the regional actors. 

The value of this crisis is that it has brought together in a conversation all the actors that are seized not just with the schoolgirls, 

but with the enduring threat of Boko Haram. 

And this moment offers the hope that we will coordinate the assistance and focus the efforts to address the underlying problems 

here, which are the scourge of Boko Haram. But any sustained solution requires the Government of Nigeria to show a degree of commitment and to take a set of actions that it has thus far not committed to. 

And so we cannot lose sight of the fact that this is not our problem to solve, and we must seize the moment to bring together all 

of the voices of concern about the schoolgirls and about Boko 

Haram to press and support the Nigerian Government in undertaking its own critical changes and reforms. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. 

We go now to Mr. Jeff Duncan of South Carolina. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank Mr. Meeks for his passion on this issue. It 

is touching. And I share your passion. 

I just hope that that same passion will continue to carry forward 

as we talk about terrorists wherever they are, whoever they are, 

attacking not just interests in Africa, but Americans and folks that 

love liberty anywhere in the world. And so I appreciate that and 

look forward to working with you going forward. 

I listened to Ms. Peter’s story. And thinking about Christians, in 

general, her father was a pastor. Her brother could have grown up 

to be a pastor, is what the terrorists thought. 

So the question I have for you, Ms. Sewall: Do you think Christians are specifically targeted in the Boko Haram attacks? 

Ms. SEWALL. I wish there was such discrimination in Boko 

Haram attacks. Boko Haram attacks everyone who is Nigerian. 

Boko Haram is an equal-opportunity threat for all Nigerian citizens. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you for that. 

I would like to delve into the links with al-Qaeda and the broader al-Qaeda network. 

Boko Haram’s ties to other al-Qaeda-affiliated and associated 

groups, as well as the focus by some of its members on pursuing 

a more transnational agenda, have amplified concerns of the 

group’s threat. 

U.S. officials have suggested that Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in 

the Islamic Maghreb, or the AQIM, were likely sharing funds, 

training, and explosive materials. 

So could you provide some clarity—and I am going to ask both 

of you this question and ask you to be brief—but could you provide 

some clarity to the extent of cooperation and support that AQIM 

has provided to this organization. 

Ms. DORY. Congressman——

Mr. DUNCAN. Financial, material support. All that, please. 

Ms. DORY. In this setting, there are limits on the ability to go 

into detail. But we can absolutely confirm the categories that you 

41

are talking about in terms of the cooperation between Boko Haram 

and AQIM, in particular, where the ties seem to be the strongest, 

that it does include training, facilitation, financing of weapons. 

That is the type of influence and material that is being traded back 

and forth between AQIM and Boko Haram. 

Boko Haram also has sought linkages with some of the other AQ 

affiliates, as was discussed earlier, and the intensity of those linkages is less clear. 

But there is an all-member briefing tomorrow, at which I think—

a classified briefing tomorrow where we could get into some of 

those details. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Ms. Sewall, a question that just came to mind: 

What is the State Department, the FBI, Treasury, doing to track 

the money? 

Do we have folks on the ground working with the financial institutions in and around Nigeria and Africa, in general, to trace this 

money to make sure that we know the sources and whether there 

are any al-Qaeda links? 

Can you tell me what we are doing in that regard, if anything? 

Ms. SEWALL. Congressman, I wish I could. I don’t have the details on that. But I would be happy to go back to the other agencies 

and to the specific elements of the State Department that might be 

involved in this and get you a more fulsome answer. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. I appreciate that. 

The other thing is: Can you answer the question about the extent 

of the cooperation that you know of between Boko Haram and alQaeda affiliates? Material support, financial, anything you might 

be able to add. 

Ms. SEWALL. Our understanding is that there is intermittent 

support as much as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dory 

described. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Are we connecting those dots within the State Department? 

Ms. SEWALL. Sir, the State Department is always working hard 

to connect the dots. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Have any of the Nigerians who have been prosecuted in U.S. courts in recent years for providing material support 

to terrorist groups such as AQAP had any links to the Boko Haram 

group? Do you know of any connections? 

Ms. SEWALL. I don’t. But, again, I am not fully briefed to answer 

that question to 100 percent certainty. And so I would have to take 

it for the record, also. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. Last question before my time runs out: Have 

we identified individuals within Boko Haram and put them on the 

terrorist watch list to make sure that they don’t infiltrate the 

United States of America? 

Do we know who these leaders are, members of this terrorist organization? Have we put them on the list to make sure they are 

not going to infiltrate the United States of America? 

Ms. SEWALL. I would be surprised if we haven’t, given that they 

have been designated as specially designated terrorists themselves. 

But that is a DHS function. And so I can check on that and get 

back to you as well. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you so much. 

42

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go now to Mr. David Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this 

hearing, and thank you for your sensitivity in bringing Deborah 

Peter to us for our conversation earlier before this hearing. 

It has been a tremendous honor to meet with her and to see her 

extraordinary courage and horrifying to hear the story of how she 

and her family were so brutalized by Boko Haram. 

I know that every member of this committee is committed to 

doing everything we can to hold these individuals accountable and 

to rescue these girls. 

So thank you for being with us today, Deborah. 

When you look at the information we have learned about the impact of this terrorist organization, in addition to more than 4,000 

people having been killed in Boko Haram-related violence, U.N. 

and Nigerian officials report that more than 6 million Nigerians 

have been affected and more than 300,000 Nigerians have been displaced. 

So I think it is really important for us to understand and for the 

world to understand the significant impact of this terrorist organization. 

So my first question to either Dr. Sewall or Ms. Dory is: Do we 

have a sense of where Boko Haram gets its resources, its weaponry 

and its financial support? 

Ms. DORY. Congressman, I think I have briefly touched on this 

already. But it is a variety of sources in terms of their access to 

finances and equipment. 

Some of it comes from their activities in Nigeria, whether it is 

stealing resources, food, equipment from local populations, whether 

it is taking them from the military and other security services in 

the course of attacks. 

You may be familiar with an incident where they destroyed aircraft at a Nigerian Air Force base, for example. So that is one 

source. 

They also, through kidnapping for ransom schemes, have financial resources at their disposal. So they are able to purchase weapons and supplies on the open market, and there is a connection into 

the Libyan arms markets in that regard. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And I know that you have said, Ms. Dory, that 

the principal responsibility for defeating Boko Haram has to come 

from the Nigerian people and that requires them to focus on governance issues, reductions of corruption, ending mass arrests and 

disappearances within the government, and their own human 

rights record. 

So what can we do and—what is the U.S. doing or what can we 

do in addition to that to pressure the Nigerians to do that so they 

have the capacity to respond to Boko Haram? 

And what kind of leverage do we really have in this moment to 

really make that case with the Nigerian Government? And do you 

see any signs that they are serious about undertaking whatever 

those recommendations might be? 

Ms. DORY. I will take the question and, also, share it with my 

colleague. 

43

I think the head-of-state-to-head-of-state engagement that we 

have seen over this issue is indicative of both our level of concern 

and our level of support and our willingness to communicate it at 

the highest levels. 

So I think this is a very important time, both in terms of the 

U.S. support and determination and, coupled with that, from colleagues from around the world, all over Europe and beyond, who 

are similarly outraged at the situation and resolved that now is the 

time to provide maximum support and pressure as we engage with 

the Government of Nigeria. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Last issue I just want to mention. 

I have been working on a piece of legislation to address this situation in which there is an emergency necessitating—or that should 

authorize the issuance of a visa. And I am just curious. 

It seems as if—this related, actually, to a mother who was attempting to come back to the United States to retrieve a child who 

had been murdered in the U.S. for burial back in their home country. 

And there was actually not a provision in the existing State Department protocol because she had no—not deep ties in her home 

country, no business, no employment. 

So, obviously, they argued that there was not a sufficient basis 

to give her a visa for fear she would overstay it and remain here. 

But in the example that we heard about this morning, it seems 

as if I am on the right track in trying to develop some exemption, 

some emergency issuance of a visa, for those who have been victims 

of terrorism or—you know, we can set out the criteria. 

But it sounded, at least initially, that Deborah was in a situation 

in which she was not given a visa, which I think everyone agrees 

doesn’t make sense. And I would just like your thoughts on that. 

Ms. SEWALL. I am sorry. I really know very little about the visa 

process. And so I just don’t feel comfortable commenting. Thank 

you. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go to Mr. Mo Brooks of Alabama. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In your judgment, does Nigeria currently have the police or military capability of defeating Boko Haram? 

Ms. DORY. Congressman, from my perspective, Nigeria’s military 

is the force with which I am most familiar. And they have been a 

premier peacekeeping force for many decades, focused external to 

their country, if you think about their long history in that regard. 

And the process of retooling from a peacekeeping orientation to 

focusing on a domestic insurgency is something that takes an entire recalibration in terms of how you engage in your home country. 

I would say——

Mr. BROOKS. Might I infer from your comments that you just 

made that the answer is ‘‘no,’’ that, as of today, they don’t, that 

things have to be done before they have that capability? 

Ms. DORY. Part of it. When we speak of a capability, part of it 

is the strategic approach and the mindset. And, as yet, Nigeria has 

not yet finalized a counterterrorism strategic approach. Which, I 

44

think, leaves gaps in terms of the operational employment of the 

security forces, their training and readiness for those types of missions and then the equipment that is available to them. 

Mr. BROOKS. Dr. Sewall, do you have a judgment on whether the 

Nigerian police or military have the capability of defeating Boko 

Haram as of today? 

Ms. SEWALL. It is a great question, and I want to answer it thoroughly. So I have to step back for just one moment and say that 

the ability of a police force or a military force to effectively defeat 

a virulent insurgency is limited. 

And so that is just the first point to make, that this is why the 

U.S. has been in a dialogue with the Nigerians for the need for a 

holistic approach that includes economic development, social engagement, political empowerment and a host of other things. 

In a narrow sense, the Nigerians have capability that we would 

recognize as strong in the sense that they have a number of forces, 

they have a certain number of equipment. 

I think the challenge for both the police and the military is how 

their assets and resources, human and otherwise, are actually deployed. 

And that is why the questions about corruption and that is why 

the questions about, as DEPSEC Dory just said, the mindset are 

so critical. 

It took us——

Mr. BROOKS. I am not sure if I am getting a response. I am trying to get something simple, a ‘‘yes,’’ ‘‘no’’ or ‘‘I don’t know.’’

Do you have a judgment as to whether the Nigerian police and 

military have the capability as of today to defeat Boko Haram? 

‘‘Yes,’’ ‘‘no’’ or ‘‘I don’t know.’’

Ms. SEWALL. So the United States, when it began its invasion in 

Iraq, was the finest military force in the world——

Mr. BROOKS. I am sorry. 

Ms. SEWALL [continuing]. And it was unable to——

Mr. BROOKS. I am asking for a ‘‘yes,’’ ‘‘no’’ or ‘‘I don’t know’’ because I have limited time here. I can’t go into a monologue. 

Ms. SEWALL. It is complicated. 

Mr. BROOKS. It is complicated. 

So maybe, maybe not? Is that a fair way to assess your opinion. 

Ms. SEWALL. If you wish to describe it that way, that——

Mr. BROOKS. Well, what short answer can you give me that describes your opinion of whether Boko Haram today can be defeated 

by the Nigerian police and/or military? 

Ms. SEWALL. I think that, with the appropriate political redirection, as well as the concerted effort on the part of specific capabilities, that the country of Nigeria, the Government of Nigeria, can 

make significant progress in defeating Boko Haram. 

Completely eliminating, I would hedge on that. The timeframe, 

I would hedge on that. But I don’t think there is any question that 

the Government of Nigeria both can and will——

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you for your response. 

The very first sentence of the Charter of the United States in 

Chapter I, Article I, Paragraph 1, states:

‘‘The Purposes of the United Nations are: To maintain 

international peace and security, and to that end: To take 

45

effective collective measures for the prevention of threats 

to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression 

or other breaches of the peace.’’

If we were to look at the history of Boko Haram in Nigeria: August 26, 2011, a bomb attack on a U.N. building, 21 killed; January 

20, 2012, attacks in Kano State, 12 targets, over 150 people killed. 

We have already talked about the young schoolgirls who were 

kidnapped. May 5, 2014, an attack lasting 12 hours, 300 people 

killed. The list goes on and on and on. You have provided two 

pages of attacks. 

As of today, what has the Obama administration undertaken to 

secure a United Nations force to take on Boko Haram inasmuch as 

that seems to be the primary purpose of the United Nations Charter? 

Ms. SEWALL. So, the United Nations Charter, as you know, is 

based on the concept of sovereignty. And so, typically, when there 

is an insurgency within a government, the government is expected 

to address the security threat and is free to seek assistance. 

Terrorism has typically been treated in a slightly different venue. 

Boko Haram has elements of both. And so I think that it is certainly—that there are a variety of ways in which the international 

community can respond to what is increasingly recognized as——

Mr. BROOKS. Okay. Again, I don’t think you are responding to my 

question. 

My question was: What has the Obama administration done to 

request the kind of support from the United Nations that we would 

need to eliminate Boko Haram’s influence in Nigeria and Central 

Africa inasmuch as that is the primary purpose of the United Nations? 

I don’t know how we can be any clearer when the United Nations 

says in its Charter:

‘‘[T]o take effective collective measures for the prevention 

[and removal] of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression . . .’’

So what has the Obama administration done to invoke the 

United Nation’s charter to get the United Nations to do their job? 

Ms. SEWALL. Right now, the way the Obama administration has 

interacted with the United Nations on the question of Boko Haram 

is to encourage the Nigerian Government to designate Boko Haram 

pursuant to the al-Qaeda list. 

What the United States and the Obama administration has been 

doing since President Obama has been in power is working to 

strengthen Nigeria’s capacity to defeat Boko Haram. So we have 

been very actively engaged in this. This engagement began before 

the Obama administration. 

And, ultimately, the Nigerian Government has great progress 

that it can make to defeat Boko Haram. It needs to decide and 

commit itself to do that in ways that are similar to those learning 

curves that we, the United States, have had to take in defeating——

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go to Gerry Connolly of Virginia. 

46

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Here we go again. So, Dr. Sewall, clearly it is the fault of the 

Obama administration that these young girls were kidnapped. Is 

that true? 

Ms. SEWALL. No. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Someone in the administration embedded with 

Boko Haram? 

Ms. SEWALL. Do you really want me to answer the question? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SEWALL. No, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No. 

Conspiracy to turn a blind eye to the activities of Boko Haram? 

Ms. SEWALL. No, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Changing talking points to make sure that somehow the administration was protected even at the expense of innocent victims of Boko Haram? 

Ms. SEWALL. No, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Dilatory tactics by the administration to prevent 

effective action by the United Nations, well known, I might say to 

my friend from Alabama, for its effective actions. 

So we were engaged in some kind of activity in New York to slow 

it down and not designate them in a timely fashion or coordinate 

international reaction to the unspeakable outrage of the kidnapping of these young women? 

Ms. SEWALL. I would argue that the United States has been 

among the most concerned about Boko Haram for the longest period of time among all the actors within the international community. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Including at the United Nations? 

Ms. SEWALL. It has been a concern of American officials for some 

time, as evidenced by our significant both personnel and financial 

investments in enhancing——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Including at the United Nations? 

Ms. SEWALL. Including at the United Nations insofar as we have 

been supporting Nigeria’s efforts to designate the terrorist organization. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

So, I guess, from your testimony, there is no evidence whatsoever 

of anything other than an administration deeply concerned and 

doing everything in its power to try to assist the international community and the Government of Nigeria and, when necessary, to 

prod the Government of Nigeria to try to take effective action to 

defang Boko Haram and to release these young women. Is that correct? 

Ms. SEWALL. It is a high priority of the United States Government, and we have been consistent in our efforts. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. It just strikes me as something not worthy of the 

Congress, when we actually continue to fall into a false narrative, 

to try to make partisan political points when we are trying to do 

foreign policy. 

There used to be a time—it was actually a Republican who pronounced the philosophy that our partisan differences ended at the 

water’s edge for the sake of the country. 

47

And it just seems to me something deplorable that any of us 

would yield to the temptation—no one here, of course—to try to 

make political points off of this kind of tragedy and to hold the 

President and his administration somehow responsible for every 

event, especially every unsavory or tragic event, that occurs around 

the world is simply nonsensical. It may play well on certain networks with certain pundits, but it is not worthy of a great country 

and it is not worthy of this Congress. 

Why can’t we come together to try to support a cohesive policy 

to effectuate the goal, which is to lessen and dismantle Boko 

Haram and to release safely these young women to their families 

and try to prevent that kind of kidnapping activity from ever recurring again? Isn’t that really the goal of the United States Government, Dr. Sewall? Ms. Dory? 

And I need you to answer on the record. A shaking head 

doesn’t—we can’t record that. 

Ms. SEWALL. I think all Americans share a concern about the 

schoolgirls and the threat from Boko Haram, and I believe that the 

United States will be stronger in supporting the desires of the 

American people, as it speaks with one voice, in that regard. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Ms. Dory? 

Ms. DORY. I agree with the objectives as you laid out, the safe 

recovery of the schoolgirls and the effective addressing of Boko 

Haram as a threat to Nigeria and the broader region. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And those are our goals? Those are the goals of 

this government. Is that correct? 

Ms. DORY. Those are among our many goals when we are relating to Nigeria and in the broader region. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. I am talking specifically, since this hearing 

is focused on that, about the Boko Haram activity. 

And, obviously, it is not only the desire of all Americans, Dr. 

Sewall. It is, in fact, the pronounced policy of the United States 

Government that we want them released. Is that not correct? 

Ms. SEWALL. That is correct. General Rodriguez and I traveled 

to Nigeria to convey that very point. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right. 

And one final question: Can you both reassure us that our Government is doing everything in its power to effectuate that end? 

Ms. SEWALL. The President, the Secretary of State, and the entire government is doing everything it can to effectuate that end. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And from the Defense Department point of view, 

Ms. Dory? 

Ms. DORY. We have brought our maximum effort into the engagement with the Nigerians and hope we can support them in whatever way they will let us. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank you both for your testimony. And I assure you there are many of us up here who will be behind you and 

side by side in trying to make that happen. 

Thank you for your service to your country, and thank you for 

trying to help us achieve a positive end in this tragic set of events. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Scott Perry of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

48

Dr. Sewall, it is my understanding that officials have repeated—

administration officials have repeatedly stated that Boko Haram is 

not motivated by religious causes, but by issues of economic deprivation. 

Is the State Department also led to that conclusion? 

Ms. SEWALL. I am not sure whether there is a piece of paper that 

describes the State Department’s view about the motivations of 

Boko Haram. 

What I can tell you is that we know from watching Boko Haram 

over the years that they are bent on destroying institutions that 

support the people of Nigeria in the northeast and that they have 

no compunction about killing any Nigerian that is in their path. 

Mr. PERRY. I understand that. And I think we, as Americans, understand that. 

But I am trying to focus on how State Department views Boko 

Haram and——

Ms. SEWALL. We view Boko Haram as a terrorist organization. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. And what is their motivation? If you could, describe that. What are they motivated by? Not what are their actions. What are they motivated by? 

Ms. SEWALL. Well, I am not in the head of their leader. I have 

watched the video like you have. And so I——

Mr. PERRY. I understand. 

But you make assessments. You must make assessments. 

Ms. SEWALL. We do make assessments. 

Mr. PERRY. To understand the adversary and the enemy, you 

must make assessments. 

Ms. SEWALL. We do make assessments. As in the case of the 

LRA, sometimes it is easier to discern motivations than others. 

Al-Qaeda is very clear about its motivations. Some other terrorist 

organizations are a combination of criminally motivated, 

egomaniacally motivated, and opportunistic. 

And so I just——

Mr. PERRY. Would you accept that they are motivated by religious fanaticism—extremist Islamic religious fanaticism? 

Ms. SEWALL. I can speak to the elements of religion that——

Mr. PERRY. I know you can speak to it. 

Is that a clear assessment or would you assess it somehow differently than I have just stated? 

Ms. SEWALL. If you are asking for an official State Department 

assessment of the motivations of the leader of Boko Haram, I will 

need to take that question back and return it to you later. 

Mr. PERRY. All right. Well, I just want to give you this information and you can roll that up into your assessment. 

The leader of Boko Haram says that, ‘‘Nobody can stop us and 

live in peace except if you accept Islam and live by sharia law.’’

He also said that they will kill anyone who stands against the 

will of Allah by opposing sharia and that they are fighting a religious war against the Christians and has also said, ‘‘By Allah, we 

will kill whoever practices democracy.’’

When he says things like that and he says that nobody can live 

in peace except if you accept Islam and live by sharia, do you see 

any economic nexus there? 

49

Ms. SEWALL. When he talks about religion as one lens through 

which he defines his enemies, I think that is very revealing. When 

he talks about democracy as being one lens through which he defines his enemies, I think that is very revealing. 

When he decides that killing people who are seeking an education, it constitutes his ideology. I think that is very revealing. 

So I think it is a mix of things, among which clearly, in his rhetoric, religion is very important. 

Mr. PERRY. Well, is there an economic—because I have heard the 

administration—I have got reports of the administration saying——

Ms. SEWALL. Okay, I understand now. Yes. 

So the economic nexus is something that we have learned 

through our own experience with combating both violent extremism 

and counterinsurgency, which is to say, if you have a well-governed, economically vibrant society, you are less likely to have 

disenfranchised persons who can be lured by extremist ideology of 

any type. 

Mr. PERRY. I understand the lure. 

But that has nothing to do with their motivation. That is how 

they recruit. Their motivation is otherwise. And I am concerned 

about——

Ms. SEWALL. Their motivation is economic insofar as DEPSEC 

Dory was talking about kidnap for ransom as being a means of financing themselves. 

Mr. PERRY. I understand that is the way of financing. 

But administration officials say that their motivation, the reason 

they exist, is due to economic deprivation that they don’t have. 

But there are many countries and many people around the world 

that don’t have and that don’t resort to kidnappings, killings, 

bombings, and forced views on extremist religious ideology. But I 

move on. 

Does the administration—does the State Department accept and 

acknowledge that there is a nexus with Boko Haram and at least 

its leadership and the Muslim Brotherhood? 

Ms. SEWALL. Do you want to speak to that? I don’t know. 

Mr. PERRY. Quickly, please, if you could. 

Ms. DORY. Congressman, from the Department of Defense perspective, I am not aware of a linkage. But I would be glad to take 

that back. 

Mr. PERRY. All right. Well, I have got the linkage here which 

shows where the leaders came from—and it goes way back to the 

1980s—the Muslim Brotherhood. 

And here is my concern in my last 15 seconds. It seems to me 

in some ways that the State Department is living in some altered 

state of reality, that most of America, yet most of the world, understands and recognizes and, if you can’t acknowledge your adversary 

and your enemy for who they are, there is going to be no way that 

you can combat them effectively. 

And I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, just your indulgence as I close 

up. 

This holistic approach should include something in the national 

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rity strategy that either of you folks are following. And that is my 

concern, because we can’t fix the problem if we don’t identify it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Juan Vargas of California. 

Mr. VARGAS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to speak. 

I have to say I think you can see the emotions up here, because 

we are very much outraged with what has happened, and I think 

the American people are outraged. 

But I have to ask this question: Where is the Muslim outrage? 

I mean, I have to say that, if this happened and they did it in the 

name of Christ, from the Pope on down to the street preacher, everyone would be yelling and screaming, ‘‘This is not right. This 

does not follow our religion. It is wrong’’ and people would try to 

find these girls and these people. 

So, I mean, I ask: Where is the outrage from the imams? Where 

is the outrage? This is an insult to Islam. It has to be. They are 

a peaceful people. 

I had the opportunity and the privilege of having a Muslim family live with me and my family for 2 years because of what was 

going on in Kosovo. So we adopted this family and they lived with 

us. 

And they are wonderful people and they lived peacefully. And 

they have two girls. I have two girls. And I have to say I love my 

daughters as much as they love their daughters. 

I have to ask: Where is the outrage? Could you answer? 

I mean, again, if this was happening in the name of Christianity, 

every official Christian group from, you know, the Catholics down 

to the unorganized Christians, everyone would think this was the 

biggest scandal in the world. 

Where is the outrage? 

Ms. SEWALL. Well, where I heard the outrage when I was in 

Abuja was from the voices that were demonstrating in the public 

squares, which included community leaders and just community 

members and concerned citizens, many of them from the Borno 

State, who were by and large Muslim, and were outraged at the 

perversion of Islamic tenets in the rhetoric of the Boko Haram 

leadership. 

So I think certainly in the context of Nigeria there is outrage and 

it comes from the community that is most affected by these events. 

Mr. VARGAS. Well, I have to say it doesn’t seem like it. I mean, 

as someone who watches the news all the time and I know that the 

Muslim community in the world has gotten outraged over other 

things, where they protested in the street and, you know, have gotten very angry, understandably so in some instances, I don’t see 

that here. 

I mean, I see us fighting and very frustrated over this issue. I 

see us, you know, fighting over whether the administration is doing 

enough, ‘‘Why aren’t we sending the soldiers?,’’ you know, ‘‘We have 

people there. We ought to go out and find them and shoot them 

and kill them and rescue these girls.’’

I mean, that is basically what we are saying up here. And we are 

frustrated because we don’t seem to be able to do that. It violates 

51

a lot of laws. But I think, as every parent, that is what we want 

to do, go find the bad guys and put them away or shoot them. 

But you don’t see—you don’t feel this outrage in the rest of the 

Muslim world. You don’t see it. It is shocking to me. You would 

think that they would be turning in these people and saying, ‘‘Here 

they are. Come and get them. Here they are.’’

And you don’t seem to—maybe you could tell us. Maybe you will 

tell us in a secured situation, a classified briefing. 

But is there that type of help in the community there? Are they 

helping us find the bad guys? 

Ms. SEWALL. So if the question is whether tactically on the 

ground there is an outpouring of support to identify the Boko 

Haram people, I think the way to characterize the situation in Nigeria is that Boko Haram has so terrorized the local population 

that they are very fearful of being perceived as participants in the 

war by actively cooperating with the government. 

The situation, of course, is greatly complicated by the fact that 

security forces from the 7th Division have often, in their pursuit of 

Boko Haram, killed numerous civilians in addition to Boko Haram. 

So by virtue of trying to draw attention to an area, they could be 

jeopardizing their own children. And so it is very difficult——

Mr. VARGAS. No. That part is understandable. 

I mean, you know, no one is saying that the Nigerian Government has clean hands here. I mean, I think that is the issue. 

They have done some terrible things, and that is why I think the 

population has a lot of issues. I mean, that is the underlying problem you are trying to solve. 

But at the same time, it seems, if there was more outrage in the 

Muslim world, there would be more pressure to try to find these 

guys and rescue these girls, and there doesn’t seem to be. 

I guess that is really my question. 

And I will yield back after that, Mr. Chairman. 

But, again, I find it disturbing that there is not more outrage, 

that the outrage comes from the Western world and the outrage 

should be coming from the Muslim world. We have got to do something here. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Vargas. 

Ms. Dory has to be at the Pentagon for a meeting at noon, and 

we appreciate her being here this morning. 

I will remind members of an all-House closed session on Boko 

Haram, which Eliot Engel and I and the House will be doing tomorrow. 

Dr. Sewall has agreed to finish with our members who remain. 

So we appreciate that very much. 

But, Ms. Dory, we will let you go. Thank you. 

We go now to Ron DeSantis from Florida. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Sewall, I have been a little concerned with what I have heard 

in two of the colloquies. I know that my colleague from South Carolina, Mr. Duncan, had asked whether the Boko Haram attack on 

the schoolgirls was anti-Christian in nature, whether that was one 

of their motivations, and you seemed to suggest that it was not. 

Did I hear you correctly? 

52

Ms. SEWALL. I believe what you heard me say is that the attack 

was against Nigerian schoolgirls. 

Mr. DESANTIS. But you don’t think that it was an attack motivated by being anti-Christian at all? 

Ms. SEWALL. Again, you are asking for—speaking to motivation 

when I am unable to be in the mind of someone and, I hope, never 

to be in the mind of someone like the leader of Boko Haram. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And I don’t expect you to. But I do think that——

Ms. SEWALL. And, of course, in the case of the schoolgirls, I believe it was some 15 percent of them were Muslim. So it was the 

education and the freedom and empowerment and the progress 

that Boko Haram was attacking as it attacked the schoolgirls, as 

much as it was anything to do with religion. 

I am not denying that religion doesn’t appear to be a very important factor for the leadership, but that is—that is different from 

saying it is the sole motivation. It is different from trying to understand the impact of their actions on Muslim civilians throughout 

the northeast. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And I appreciate that. And certainly you can’t get 

into their head. I just—and I don’t necessarily say that it is the 

sole motivation, but I think we have to realize that this is an animating feature. 

I mean, you can’t get into his head, but you can listen to what 

he says. And he said—and this is quoting from his speech—‘‘We 

know what is happening in the world. It is a Jihad war against 

Christians and Christianity. It is a war against Western education, 

democracy, and constitution. This is a war against Christians and 

democracy. In their constitution, Allah says we should finish them 

when we get them.’’

So, clearly he believes that Christianity, constitutionalism, liberal democracy—he is putting those things together and he is saying that his belief and his version of Islam is what is motivating 

him to do that. 

And I think to try to—I mean, there was a colloquy with Mr. 

Perry about—you know, are they an Islamic terrorist group? Would 

you feel confident putting the fact that, yeah, there are terrorist 

groups specifically operating in the name of Islam? 

Ms. SEWALL. Well, again, you know, when they recruit people 

forcibly and make them fight for them, I don’t know what percentage of their force is essentially enslaved and what percentage of 

their force represents the extreme and neolithic views of the leadership. 

I agree with you completely that their rhetoric includes significant religious motivation, but it also includes motivation that reflects westernization more broadly. 

We know that modernization and westernization and education, 

for that matter, is an equal-opportunity, inclusive of all faiths process. And so they are motivated by something that goes beyond just 

Christianity based on what they say and what they do. 

Mr. DESANTIS. But the modernity conflicts with their faith, and 

that is—and when he started his speech, he said, ‘‘My brethren in 

Islam, I am greeting you in the name of Allah, like he instructed 

we should among Muslims. Allah is great and has given us the 

53

privilege and temerity above all people.’’ So the anti-Western posture is flowing from this belief. 

And it is interesting. You read his speech, you know, and he 

starts getting into all kinds of issues. He says that he believes in 

marrying off 9-year-old girls. He thinks that is acceptable, and he 

cited a religious justification, the conduct of Muhammad, for that. 

He defends slavery and criticizes human rights. Again, he cited 

Islam as the reason for that. He threatens to kill the President of 

the United States. 

And so I think what we are dealing with here is—I mean, you 

see the video of those schoolgirls being forced to wear Islamic garb, 

being forced to recite the Koran. He is trying to spread this ideology. 

This group is spreading the ideology by the sword because they 

know that it is fundamentally at odds with human reason and that, 

if these girls are allowed to be educated in that school, they are obviously not going to think that his ideology is something that is 

very attractive. 

So that is what we are dealing with here, and I just hope that 

we can understand the motivation. If we try to put a Western 

frame of reference on how they behave and say, Well, maybe it is 

because they think there is some economic problems or this or that, 

you know, some of those things may be a factor at the margins. 

But at the end of the day, I think that that speech and their conduct make clear what their motivation is. And so I would just hope 

that we would be willing and always have our eyes open and not 

try to blind ourselves to reality. 

And I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Lois Frankel from Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, Dr. Sewall, for being a very calm-sounding board 

here today and, Mr. Chair, for this bipartisanship. I would call it 

a bipartisan show of humanity. 

And I very much enjoyed meeting today also with Deborah Peter, 

who has a lovely sparkle in her eye and a lovely smile, wonderful 

resilience. 

And she told us a very sad story of how she basically fled Nigeria 

2 years ago after she witnessed the murder of her father and her 

brother and—because her father was the pastor of a Christian 

church. 

And then her 14-year-old brother was shot because, as Deborah 

related, her—one of the terrorists said, ‘‘Well, he will grow up to 

be the pastor of the church.’’

I hope, Mr. Chair, that we are going to be able to help her with 

her visa issue and maybe—and to reunite her with her mother. 

And, Deborah, I wish you the best. 

She is studying to be a doctor. 

I know you will be a very fine doctor. 

You know, when I heard about these such children being kidnapped, I am sure I reacted like most people around the world, 

which is I thought of the time when my son was much younger and 

I would drop him off to school every day. 

And I can’t even imagine what it would be like to have learned 

that his entire school had been kidnapped and then maybe sold 

54

into slavery. I know that I would be screaming from the top of my 

lungs and insisting that this government do everything possible to 

get them back. 

And there are some crimes against humanity that, no matter 

where they happen, it requires a response. And I know it is complicated, but I want to add my echo to what the chair and what 

so many of my colleagues said. First of all, I thank the President 

for sending a team, working with Israel, France, and the United 

Kingdom to try to bring these girls back. But as much as we can 

do, I want to add my voice to those who say we must bring these 

girls home. And, you know, this is more than just a crime against 

humanity. 

I wanted to get into this education angle, because ‘‘Boko Haram’’ 

means, I think, ‘‘Western education is a sin.’’ So—because they 

know—they know that, when you educate children, it is a step toward freedom, democracy, and peace in the world—to have educated children, educated with a Western slant. 

And so, when we ignore—when we allow children to be kidnapped because they are partaking in Western education, we are 

failing our own children here. 

So I hope we can do more. And along those lines, I wanted to ask 

you—and I know this is a long-term situation. 

But what are we doing to try to fight the corruption that we are 

finding, which seems to be endemic in so many of these governments that are having such serious problems around the world? 

Ms. SEWALL. Thanks. 

So, first, we don’t shy away from the issue. We raise it as in the 

bilateral conversation because it is ultimately a limiting factor, not 

just in how we interact with the government, but, also, in terms 

of the government’s ability to provide for and protect its citizens. 

We are vocal about our concerns. 

We also work with the—with specific elements within the law enforcement sector to improve both investigatory capacity and, in 

many cases, judicial capacity to identify and prosecute corruption 

cases. 

This has been a hallmark of our assistance in many different 

areas of the world, and it is capacity-building in a rule-bound, values-based, accountable and transparent ethos. 

It is slow work. It is painstaking work. And it does ultimately 

require the commitment of an ever-enlarging circle of leadership 

within whichever country we are seeking to support anti-corruption 

efforts. 

And many countries take different approaches to trying to address widespread and systematic corruption, and there are different degrees of successes, different approaches. So we continue to 

do whatever we are able. 

In the case of Nigeria, it has been very specific training and capacity-building. And we will continue to press this issue because, 

you know, Nigeria is themost populace country in Africa. 

It is, you know, an economic juggernaut, and it is extraordinarily 

diverse and extraordinarily important for a whole host of American 

security interests. 

55

They have elections coming up in 2015. The future of democracy 

is very much an issue in those elections in terms of both the transparency of the elections and the risk of violence afterwards. 

If Nigeria can address its corruption in a meaningful way, there 

is no limit on what that country can become. And it is—it is a huge 

opportunity there for the government to seize; so, it is very much 

in their interest to address it. But the conversation will be ongoing, 

and we will continue to press it. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you. 

Yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go to Mr. Ted Yoho of Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Doc, appreciate you sitting through this. 

And I am looking at your title, Under Secretary of Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights. And you have been there 

since February 2014. Correct? 

Ms. SEWALL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. YOHO. I just find it interesting when I look back over the history of Nigeria the amount of foreign aid that has been given 

there—it is roughly—over $400 billion, which is six times the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after World War II—for one country; 

yet, it is wrought with corruption. 

And the Department Under Secretary of Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights—we have been fighting that campaign 

for, what, 20, 30, 40 years to try to correct that problem over there? 

And without putting blame on any administration, it is a problem with what we are trying to accomplish and how we go about 

it. We give money over and over again. Last year we gave $693 

million. In 2012 we gave $647 million. 

The majority of their legislators make the highest wages in any 

government in the world, more than the British Parliament, yet 

the average wage—over 70 percent of the population lives below 

1.29 pounds a day, which is about—less than $4 a day. 

And we are giving all this foreign aid, and then we have the situation with what we have with the Boko Haram and the situation 

we have with that. We are not getting to the root cause of the problem. 

How do you—what do you see that we do different than what we 

have done in the past to change the dynamics? Because if you don’t 

change the dynamics, nothing is going to change. 

They are going to continue to kidnap people, they are going to 

continue to kill people, and they are going to continue to have a 

corrupt government. And I saw the Obama administration threaten 

to cut off all foreign aid to them, which I applaud. 

How do we go further and change the dynamics over there? And 

I would like to hear what you have to say about that. 

Ms. SEWALL. Sure. Well, I think, you know, again, if we parse 

the question a little bit in the context of what kind of aid do we 

provide and what do we get for it, my understanding is that the 

bulk of our assistance certainly now—I can’t speak to 40 years ago, 

but certainly now—is in the realm of health assistance, significantly HIV/AIDS assistance. 

56

Mr. YOHO. But that is going to continue. I mean, the problem is 

going to continue. If they don’t care for their own people, we can’t 

go in there. 

We can build any school you want, but if they are going to come 

back there and just dismantle it, it is—what do you do to the government to change government without telling them how to live? 

You know, what is that underlying cause or core value that they 

want to see succeed in their country for their people? And if they 

don’t have that, we don’t need to be giving them aid. 

Ms. SEWALL. So the government—the government is not tearing 

down things. It is Boko Haram that is tearing down things. 

The issue of government performance in the northeast is related 

to its failure to defeat Boko Haram, which has many different components, as you are alluding to. 

Mr. YOHO. Boko Haram is just a fruition of government not being 

in check and taking care of what they need to because they are not 

building the infrastructure. 

If they are taking all that wealth—I mean, there is $11 billion 

in oil money that was funneled off that went to the—to the politicians. 

Back in the 1990s, there was a—the President, Sani Abacha, 

died in bed with two Indian prostitutes worth $4 billion. 

They are not taking care of their own country and, if they don’t 

want to take care of their own country, nothing is going to change. 

And I want to know what we are going to do from a foreign policy standpoint to change the dynamics of that. 

Ms. SEWALL. So one of the important changes has been the movement toward democracy. I mean, I think we can all agree that that 

is a significant change in the context of Nigeria’s history. And so 

one of the more important things to do is to support a transparent 

and accountable democratic process. 

And I spent a significant amount of time talking to the government about the upcoming 2015 elections and how it would be run 

and how, hopefully, they won’t be disenfranchising the three states 

in the north by virtue of a state of emergency and how we need 

to be planning now—encourage them to plan now—for violence that 

predictably happens after the elections. So democracy is one big 

theme of change. 

But in terms of where I think you are coming from—and then 

the issue of—if you have a democratic system that is vibrant, you 

have the ability to hold people accountable. 

And so the focus that the United States has had on enhancing 

civil society voices to hold governments accountable and to demand 

greater transparency in budgets, for example, is a long-term process, but I think that is one hopeful mechanism. 

Mr. YOHO. How can you do that when over 70 percent of the population is below poverty? They don’t have a voice. 

Ms. SEWALL. Well, in many countries, including our own, there 

is great income disparity. But if you have a vote, you have a vote. 

And so that is, I think, an important element of democracy. 

I think, in terms of when I—when I look at the State Department’s contributions to things that are occurring in—to capacitybuilding within Nigeria, I think they are in line with efforts to 

57

make the country more accountable and more responsible both as 

an international security actor and as a government. 

So, for example, military training and education, enhancing them 

in their role as regional peacekeepers, antiterrorism assistance, piloting a program on woman, peace, and security, helping them in 

the context of their regional security responsibilities and their West 

African regional security responsibilities, and improving rule of 

law, those are the kinds of programs that the State Department facilitates that I think are necessary elements of progress. 

But I agree completely with your point, and I hope I made it effectively in my opening remarks, that, ultimately, the government 

does need to be accountable, and corruption is an endemic problem. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. I appreciate your response. I am out of time. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. And we are going to Steve Stockman of Texas. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. I am listening to this debate, and it reminds me 

of the 1930s. We had a similar problem where we were trying to 

rationalize irrational behavior, and we didn’t want to call it anything. 

We have a gentleman, if you want to call him a gentleman, who 

is committing genocide in a country. And we can’t say what his motivation is, and we know what his motivation is. You may not be 

able to say it, but it is hatred. And he continues to hate. 

And I really resent one of my colleagues saying that our side is 

asking questions due to political motivation. We have the deepest 

compassion. We want to resolve this. 

But we can’t—our side—we want to—we want to support the 

President, but we cannot gather around a hashtag. We want to see 

real action, and we want to call it—we want to call it what it is. 

This gentleman, or whatever you want to call him, hates. And I 

hear the same words coming from this administration, that they 

called the Speaker of the House. And the Speaker of the House 

they called a terrorist, and I don’t think he is the same as what 

we are seeing in Nigeria. 

And I would like to yield a minute to my colleague from Alabama 

to respond to, I think, unfair criticism and the balance to my friend 

from New Jersey. 

But we have to start calling things what they are, and to equivocate on what they are and who they are is a mistake. 

Ms. SEWALL. Could I just comment on that, sir? 

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection, let’s yield to Mr. Brooks. 

And then we will have the response. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I take a moment to respond to the 

rather partisan mischaracterization and distortion of my remarks 

by Congressman Connolly of Virginia. 

As the record shows and proves, I merely asked the witnesses to 

detail what the Obama administration has done or not done to encourage the United Nations in accord with the first sentence of its 

Charter to engage in ‘‘effective, collective measures for the prevention of threats to the peace.’’

Mr. Chairman, I submit that question is directed at getting the 

United Nations to do its job so that America does not have to once 

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gress of both parties can get behind without the kinds of partisan 

attacks and responses that were recently uttered. 

Thank you for the time. 

Mr. SMITH. I thank my friend for yielding. 

First of all, I want to make something very clear—and this hearing has made me even more concerned than I was when I walked 

in the door—and that is a fundamental misread of the radical nature of Boko Haram as it relates to radical Islamic belief. 

As my colleague, Mr. DeSantis, pointed out so eloquently, we 

have got to be able to call it for what it is. In 2012, 47 churches—

Christian churches were attacked, 2 mosques; 2013, 53 churches 

attacked, 2 mosques. 

I went to Jos. Mr. Emmanuel was there when we went to an IDP 

camp. We met with hundreds of Christians who were targeted for 

one and only one reason, because they were Christians. 

And one man we brought here—and he sat where you sat—Mr. 

Adamu—and said they put an AK–47 to his jaw, right around his 

nose area, and blew his face off after he would not answer the 

question correctly. ‘‘Will you convert to Islam or not?’’ He said, ‘‘No. 

I am ready to see my Lord. I am a Christian.’’ And they blew his 

face away. 

That is the underlying fundamental raison d’etre of Boko Haram. 

Yes. They hate Western education. They hate a lot of things. But 

at the core, as Mr. DeSantis pointed out, I think, so well, just 

watch what they say. It is about radical Islamic belief. 

And I wish you—you know, you said you wished they would differentiate—or discriminate—they were so discriminating. Yes. 

They will hate other Nigerians. They will hate other Westerners. 

But Christians are their main targets. 

Secondly, I want to strongly associate my remarks and concerns 

with—concerns raised by Chairman Royce that the Leahy Amendment is having the unintended consequence of precluding best 

practices military training of well-vetted Nigerian forces. 

You said earlier—and I hope it was out of context—that it is not 

our problem to solve this. Well, maybe not alone, but certainly in 

tandem with the Nigerian Government and the families who have 

lost their daughters and others who may be at risk of losing their 

sons and daughters in the future. 

One of the biggest takeaways I had on that trip was talking to 

our own people who said, ‘‘Leahy is a great thing. We are all for 

Leahy. I voted for Leahy, would always vote for it.’’

But it needs to be looked at in a calibrated fashion. There can 

be stood up forces in the Nigerian military who are well vetted to 

become a strike force and make all the difference in the world. 

And maybe they are about to do that, but it should have been 

done for years—not months, years—and there is nothing whatsoever partisan about this. I have raised this. Members of the other 

side have raised first the FTO concerns. 

And then we get again Johnnie Carson saying that—and I quote 

this because I still am amazed at this: ‘‘The phenomenon of Boko 

Haram is one of discrediting the central government in power for 

its failure to deliver services to the people.’’

That is an insult to the poor. Poor people don’t join the—there 

is a radical Islamic perspective being promoted here and a gangVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:40 Aug 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\052114\88018 SHIRL
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like mentality. And, of course, al-Qaeda and the like—and others 

like it are a part of it. 

So please take back the idea of what Chairman Royce talked 

about because we do think, I think strongly, we have got to be able 

to help the military stand up capably. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Dr. Sewall. 

Ms. SEWALL. Thank you. 

And, Congressman, I appreciate your passion, and I appreciate 

your leadership on this issue for so very long. It is very important 

that Congress be participating in the formation of foreign policy. 

And I want to be very clear because I don’t want to be misunderstood. The question that I was asked was whether there was an official State Department position on the motivations of Boko Haram, 

which I simply don’t have with me. 

If the question is does the leadership of Boko Haram and do the 

actions of Boko Haram target Christianity, absolutely, unequivocally. More fundamentally, they target other things, too, and they 

are a threat to the government and to the region. 

And so I loved the very clear-eyed characterization that was just 

offered, which is that Boko Haram is motivated by hatred. I don’t 

think anybody would disagree with that. I endorse it 100 percent. 

And I think it simplifies the problem because we all recognize that 

Boko Haram is a threat that must be addressed. 

I think, in terms of the Leahy Law, well-vetted units we work 

with—we work with now. We have been working with them for 

years. The problem can arise when units cannot be vetted. 

But where units are vetted—and only 50 percent have not been 

able to be vetted—the United States is engaging in robust security 

cooperation. 

And so I think it is just very important, as we look at the Leahy 

Law and as we remember that the fight in Nigeria is fundamentally about human rights and freedoms, we would wish to honor 

the Leahy Law’s commitment to human rights in that context. 

And it is only if we were to find that we could not do that, be 

both consistent to the Leahy Law’s commitment to human rights 

and work in support of the human rights of Nigerians, that we 

would need to look at alternatives. 

So I just wanted to both be very clear about my endorsement of 

the characterization as the motivation of Boko Haram as being hatred—and I think that is a very powerful and unifying way to think 

about the problem, which is a regional, if not international, problem—and agree with you that, in the context of the Leahy Law 

where units are well vetted, we should—and we are—work closely 

with them to enhance Nigeria’s capacity to address this horrific 

threat. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Doctor. 

I am just going to clarify this point, because this testimony was 

as late as last week by the Defense Department testifying in the 

Senate. 

And I will quote—because this gets back to the point at hand: 

‘‘The Leahy Law is a persistent and very troubling limitation on 

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our ability to provide assistance, particularly training assistance 

that the Nigerians so badly need.’’

With my opening line of questioning, I laid out the difficulty. The 

difficulty is finding a way for our forces to assist with the capabilities that we bring, which are unique, to help track on the ground 

and rescue these girls. 

And so, without that waiver to come down to the bottom line, 

without that waiver to allow them to do that, and direction from 

the administration to have, you know, our Navy SEALs with this 

special capability that they have, you know, the ability to download 

information from satellite technology in the field and from drones 

and the ability to track in the jungle, the ability to sort of stand 

up that Nigerian unit and plan that operation right up to the point 

where Boko Haram is engaged and then allow the Nigerians to 

carry it out. But if we do that, then our likelihood of success is 

many multiples, in the viewpoint of everyone who has looked at 

this—many multiples of what it would be. 

And since we have had the offer from the British and from the 

French to engage and assist, it would be very wise simply to go 

back, get us that waiver. 

Because this is an extraordinary circumstance. I made the point 

before. I just want to reiterate it because I don’t want us to get off 

the subject. 

Ms. SEWALL. I didn’t have a chance to respond before. 

Could I respond now, Mr. Chair? 

Chairman ROYCE. Yes. Absolutely. 

Ms. SEWALL. Thank you so much. 

So there are two different issues, and I am guessing—I am not 

familiar with the DoD comment, but I am guessing that the concern about Leahy as a constraint was a concern in reference to the 

units for whom we were unable to vet, which is some 50 percent 

of the Nigerian military. 

I don’t wish to suggest it is not a problem, but it is 50 percent. 

And so I just want to differentiate that from the question, which, 

Mr. Chairman, you are rightly putting, about the need to be cooperative in a very operational sense with the effort to return the 

schoolgirls. 

And here we are. By virtue of an agreement that I carried with 

me to Abuja, we have now intelligence-sharing arrangements. We 

have planners——

Chairman ROYCE. Dr. Sewall, to get to the point, if you will recall my original testimony, you know what we do with the Lord’s 

Resistance Army. We put our Special Ops in the field, on the 

ground, with Ugandan units and other units in order to track, in 

order to try to suppress Joseph Kony. Okay? 

Ms. SEWALL. It is not a Leahy motivation, is what I am trying 

to——

Chairman ROYCE. So in this particular case, we—we have a situation where we are not doing this. What I am suggesting to you 

is we are not doing it. 

When the issue is raised, the response is, ‘‘Well, we would have 

to have a waiver to do that.’’ Well, if that is the case, get a waiver, 

not from you——

Ms. SEWALL. I don’t believe it is the case. 

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Chairman ROYCE. We are not doing what we need to be doing on 

the ground in order to track and rescue these girls. This is what 

this whole debate is about, not the rhetoric around it. 

Ms. SEWALL. I think——

Chairman ROYCE. We are not doing it. So if you don’t need a 

change to do it, if you don’t need a waiver to do it, go back and 

report——

Ms. SEWALL. Yes. I will. I will take your——

Chairman ROYCE [continuing]. That, in Congress, we feel it 

needs to be done now. 

Because the longer we wait and debate it, the farther removed 

these brigands get with their captives and the harder it is going 

to be to apprehend and rescue these girls. It should have been done 

immediately. 

And in the future, if a situation like this comes up, I would just 

suggest you have the discretion. Use it. Immediately go into the 

field and assist in the rescue. 

Now, without objection, we have a member who is not a member 

of this committee. But Sheila Jackson Lee wanted unanimous consent, if we could, for her to ask a question. So she might ask one 

question now. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the chairman and ranking 

member for their enormous courtesies. 

And thank you, Dr. Sewall and Ms. Dory, for your presence here 

today. 

I started going to Nigeria in the 1970s. I studied at their universities. And I actually stayed in the home of a family. The father 

was an engineer. 

And I feel the consternation in this committee, but I will tell 

them that the enormity of people in Nigeria are not corrupt and 

are looking for opportunities to do what is being said in this committee, to build this country into one of the best and most productive countries for their young people, not only in Africa, but in the 

world. 

I am very grateful for this committee that has focused on Africa 

with its subcommittee, but, more importantly, by its members. And 

I encourage our colleagues to go as you have gone and many others. I hold in my hand the list of kidnapped girls, and I do it and 

carry it with me all the time because these are names and people. 

So I would like to pose a question around your testimony about 

the rescue, but more importantly as well, about the regionalism of 

Boko Haram from Chad to Niger to Cameroon, Togo and beyond. 

Ghana is not far from Nigeria. 

And so the first question is—Members of Congress, women, went 

to the Nigerian Embassy and asked the country to establish a relief 

fund for the families, just announce and put in—put dollars in for 

the pain, the displacement—many of them may be trying to follow 

where the girls are, want to see whether the State Department—

beyond our monies that we are giving for them to establish a relief 

fund. 

Secondarily, in your testimony, you said that you were able to 

work with new battalions, special forces and Rangers. I think you 

were talking about in the Nigerian military, that they were established as that. 

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I am concerned that rescue would generate—that we would not 

endanger the girls. However, I do know that it is very, very concerning that there is not that concerted push using these particular 

battalions and special forces. 

So my question is on the relief fund and how can we collaborate 

with the African Union on the regional aspect. Is there any 

grounds for the U.N. peacekeepers? I know that Ambassador Powers is not here. And is there any way that you can encourage President Jonathan that his voice now, even though it is painful—his 

voice continuing to speak of their concern to the world is crucial? 

He made one point. And I will tell you I take a little credit for 

that because we were calling into Nigeria the day before the World 

Economic Council to indicate that he needed to say something, of 

which he said a little bit when he made his opening remarks. But 

now there is dead silence at least coming this way. 

So I ask: In your engagement, can you explain to them that it 

is important? We know how great Nigeria’s potential is and what 

they have done, and I want to promote it all the time. 

But can we focus on this siege? Because this terrorist group is 

not going away unless we get our hands around it in an appropriate manner. 

Ms. SEWALL. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

I am not aware of any new State Department initiatives to create 

a victims fund, if that is the—I understand——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. No. It is for Nigeria to create a relief fund——

Ms. SEWALL. I see. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. And for the State Department to 

encourage them to do something for all of those families and pronounce it publicly and nationally. 

Ms. SEWALL. So I think it is fair to say that, while I did not specifically emphasize that initiative, in all of our engagements with 

Nigerian officials, from the President throughout the administration, we are communicating very clearly that their leadership and 

their vocal leadership and their expressions of empathy with the 

people of the northeast in the fight—who are the victims of the 

fight against Boko Haram is absolutely critical and that more can 

be done to convey both the attention and the commitment and the 

empathy on that point. 

I think, as you point out—in terms of the regional ramifications, 

I believe this is a very important moment for concerned nations, if 

not the international community as a whole, to convince Nigeria of 

the need to redouble its efforts, to rethink its tactics in this fight, 

to flesh out its commitment to a soft approach and to identify clearly what that means in terms of the nonmilitary elements of a strategy to combat Boko Haram, to strengthen all regional platforms to 

both better understand the nature of the problem and to facilitate 

actions to address the problem concretely. 

So I think this is a very important moment. And while the tragedy of the kidnapping is a heartbreak for us all, I certainly hope 

that we can use this as a way to do as you say, which is to improve 

collective efforts to address the underlying problem of Boko Haram, 

which is not likely to disappear in the next year. 

Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the chairman very much. 

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And I just want to conclude by saying I heard my colleagues, and 

I truly believe that the religious aspect looms very large. Because 

this started many years back and Christians were at the direct hit 

of Boko Haram. It has obviously spread. 

And I will finish by saying that we have tracked—and I know 

you have—millions of dollars that have come from the al-Qaeda 

structure to Boko Haram. It is really an international issue, and 

it really is an issue that will impact the United States maybe at 

some point. 

And I think it is very important that we are in it for that reason 

and the reason for the love and need for these children to be returned to their families and the respect we have for the continent 

and its friendship to us. 

And I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, we appreciate both of our witnesses 

being here this morning. 

Dr. Sewall, we appreciate you finishing out the panel. Thank you 

very much. 

The situation with these girls is critical. Members of the committee want to do all that they can to assist State and Department 

of Defense with any additional authority we may need in order to 

help secure a rescue. 

What I was suggesting, the technical terminology for it, is an upgrade to an advise-and-assist role. So if that could be conveyed, I 

very much appreciate it. 

And, also, we very much appreciate Deborah Peter being with us. 

Thank you so much for your meeting with the members of our 

committee this morning, Deborah. 

With that, we stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS


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