alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Editorial Note on Part 1
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 1 appear at 61 FR 19984, May 3, 1996.

§ 1.7 Scope of consideration. ( a ) In making a wage determination, the “area” from which wage data will be drawn will normally be the county unless sufficient current wage data (data on wages paid on current projects or, where necessary, projects under construction no more than 1 year prior to the beginning of the survey or the request for a wage determination, as appropriate) is unavailable to make a wage determination.
( b ) If sufficient current wage data is not available from projects within the county to make a wage determination, wages paid on similar construction in surrounding counties may be considered.
( c ) If sufficient current wage data is not available in surrounding counties, the Administrator may consider wage data from similar construction in comparable counties or groups of counties in the State, and, if necessary, overall statewide data.
( d ) If sufficient current statewide wage data is not available, wages paid on projects completed more than 1 year prior to the beginning of the survey or the request for a wage determination, as appropriate, may be considered.
( e ) The use of “helpers and apprentices” is permitted in accordance with part 5 of this subtitle.
[88 FR 57728, Aug. 23, 2023]
§ 91.187 Operation under IFR in controlled airspace: Malfunction reports. ( a ) The pilot in command of each aircraft operated in controlled airspace under IFR shall report as soon as practical to ATC any malfunctions of navigational, approach, or communication equipment occurring in flight.
( b ) In each report required by paragraph (a) of this section, the pilot in command shall include the— ( 1 ) Aircraft identification;
( 2 ) Equipment affected;
( 3 ) Degree to which the capability of the pilot to operate under IFR in the ATC system is impaired; and
( 4 ) Nature and extent of assistance desired from ATC.
§ 73.3 Special use airspace. ( a ) Special use airspace consists of airspace of defined dimensions identified by an area on the surface of the earth wherein activities must be confined because of their nature, or wherein limitations are imposed upon aircraft operations that are not a part of those activities, or both.
( b ) The vertical limits of special use airspace are measured by designated altitude floors and ceilings expressed as flight levels or as feet above mean sea level. Unless otherwise specified, the word “to” (an altitude or flight level) means “to and including” (that altitude or flight level).
( c ) The horizontal limits of special use airspace are measured by boundaries described by geographic coordinates or other appropriate references that clearly define their perimeter.
( d ) The period of time during which a designation of special use airspace is in effect is stated in the designation.
II 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4310 

To prohibit in-person instructional requirements during the COVID–19 

emergency. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 23, 2020 

Mr. WARNER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

A BILL 

To prohibit in-person instructional requirements during the 

COVID–19 emergency. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Don’t Punish Schools 

5 for Uncontrolled Pandemics Act of 2020’’. 

6 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION OF IN-PERSON INSTRUCTIONAL RE7 QUIREMENTS DURING COVID–19 EMER8 GENCY. 

9 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no rule, 

10 regulation, guidance, or policy regarding an applicable 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 4310 IS

1 program (as defined in section 400 of the General Edu2 cation Provisions Act (20 U.S.C. 1221)) shall require a 

3 local program to conduct in-person instruction during an 

4 emergency, as declared by a Federal, State, or local au5 thority, with respect to COVID–19. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
#### YARBROUGH v. THE STATE.

(Decided December 14, 1915.)

Appeal from Jefferson Criminal Court.

Heard before Hon. Wm. E. Fort.

No counsel marked for appellant. W. L. MARTIN, Attorney General, for the State.

Brown, J.

No bill of exceptions, no errors of record. Affirmed.
#### PEOPLES v COLUMBUS, DELAWARE & MARION ELECT CO

Ohio Appeals, 3rd Dist, Marion Co

No 701.

Decided Jan 22, 1929

Young & Mouser, Marion and Knepper & Wilcox, Columbus, for Peoples.

William P Maloney, Marion, for Elect Co.

*230JUSTICE, J.

Do these facts show a cause of action upon negligence? That was the sole question in the court below and is the sole one here.

Negligence, constituting a cause of civil action, has been thus defined:

> “It is such an omission, by a responsible person, to use that degree of care, diligence and skill which it w,as his legal duty to use for the protection of another person from injury as, in a natural and continuous sequence, causes unintended damage to the latter.”

> Shearman & Redfield on the Law of Negligence, Sixth Edition, Volume 1, page 10, Section 3.

In the instant case, the defendant, by its motion, admits as true, all the material facts well pleaded in the petition and, as we see it, these facts clearly warrant the conclusion that defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff to use ordinary care in the operation of its interurban car to the end that it would not unintentionally injure him while he w,as upon said streets; that it did not use such care, in other words, breached that duty, and that as a direct and proximate consequence and result thereof, plaintiff was injured to his damage.

There are four separate and distinct grounds of negligence alleged in the petition. Of these, only one is referable to the ordinance. Even if the ordinance is not applicable to electric railways, and as to that we express no opinion, it being unnecessary for us to do so in disposing of the case, still the remaining facts, as averred in the petition, clearly show actionable negligence.

Counsel for defendant in error, however, insist that the motion was properly sustained because of - plaintiff’s failure to allege in the petition that he, prior to entering upon Center Street, which was concededly a main thoroughfare, had looked both to the right and left and had waited until he believed he could cross the tracks in safety. With this contention we are not in accord.

Manifestly the gist of the action was negligence. Negligence is never presumed. The presumption is that plaintiff exercised ordinary care when he entered upon Center Street. There is nothing in the petition to remove that presumption.

Our attention has been invited to the case of Buell v New York Central Railroad Company, 114 OS. 40, and the case of Heidle v. Baldwin, 8 Ohio Bar 375. We are acquainted with the rules of law enounced in these cases. They are not at variance with the pronouncement here.

Holding these views, it follows that the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas should be reversed and the cause remanded.

Before Judges Crow, Hughes and Justice.
Exhibit
10.16

    


    First Amendment to
Employment Agreement

    


    This First Amendment (“First
Amendment”), to the Employment Agreement (the "Agreement") dated February 27,
2007 between Payment Data Systems, Inc. ("PDS") and Louis A. Hoch (“Executive")
is entered into this 12th day of November, 2009 and is made part of the Agreement which is
hereby amended as follows:

    


    1.           Definitions.  All
capitalized terms used herein and not expressly defined herein shall have the
respective meanings given to such terms in the Agreement.

    


    2.           Entire
Agreement.  Except as expressly modified by this First
Amendment, the Agreement shall be and remain in full force and effect in
accordance with its terms and shall constitute the legal, valid, binding and
enforceable obligations of PDS and Executive.

    


    3.           Successors and
Assigns.  This First Amendment shall be binding upon and inure
to the benefit of the successors and permitted assigns of the parties
hereto.

    


    4.           Section
References.  Section titles and references used in this First
Amendment shall be without substantive meaning or content of any kind whatsoever
and are not a part of the agreements among the parties hereto evidenced
hereby.

    


    5.           Now,
therefore, in consideration of the mutual covenants set forth herein and for
other good and valuable consideration, the adequacy, receipt and sufficiency of
which are hereby acknowledged:

    


    a. The Base Salary as set forth in
Schedule 4(a)(i) of Schedule 1 to the Agreement is hereby amended to be $175,000
per annum in year 2009.

    


    This
First Amendment amends the Agreement as set forth herein. All previously
existing obligations under the Agreement are hereby reaffirmed in all
respects.

    


    In
witness thereof, the parties
hereto have caused this First Amendment to the Agreement to be executed on the day and
year first above written.


    


    
      	 
      	
              Payment Data Systems, Inc.

            	
              Executive

            	 
      
	 
      	 
      	 
      	 
      
	 
      	
              By:

            	
              /s/ Michael R. Long

            	 
      	
              By:

            	
              /s/ Louis A. Hoch

            	 
      	 
      
	 
      	
              Name: Michael R. Long

            	
              Name: Louis A. Hoch

            	 
      
	 
      	
              Title: CEO & CFO
[Nos. 49253-5-I; 50152-6-I.

Division One.

October 28, 2002.]

#### Gilbert Scherer, et al., *Respondents,*v. Byron D. Coney, *Appellant.*

Appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 01-2-03931-8, Mary Yu, J., entered September 17, 2001. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Becker, C.J., concurred in by Appelwick and Schindler, JJ.
§ 61.115 Balloon rating: Limitations. ( a ) If a person who applies for a private pilot certificate with a balloon rating takes a practical test in a balloon with an airborne heater: ( 1 ) The pilot certificate will contain a limitation restricting the exercise of the privileges of that certificate to a balloon with an airborne heater; and
( 2 ) The limitation may be removed when the person obtains the required aeronautical experience in a gas balloon and receives a logbook endorsement from an authorized instructor who attests to the person's accomplishment of the required aeronautical experience and ability to satisfactorily operate a gas balloon.
( b ) If a person who applies for a private pilot certificate with a balloon rating takes a practical test in a gas balloon: ( 1 ) The pilot certificate will contain a limitation restricting the exercise of the privilege of that certificate to a gas balloon; and
( 2 ) The limitation may be removed when the person obtains the required aeronautical experience in a balloon with an airborne heater and receives a logbook endorsement from an authorized instructor who attests to the person's accomplishment of the required aeronautical experience and ability to satisfactorily operate a balloon with an airborne heater.
Appendix I 

Proposed EMEC Transmission Line and Substation 
Proposed EMEC

Transmission Line

Origin

Figure I-1

Downeast LNG Project

Proposed EMEC Transmission Line and Substation: Sheet 1 of 4

EMEC Transmission Line

LNG Pipeline Row

0 1,200 2,400

Feet

LEGEND

P:\Downeast-3253\Team Information\GIS\Spatial\MXD\Sendout_Pipeline_Reroute_Figures_082608\FigureI.mxd
Figure I-2 

Downeast LNG Project 

Proposed EMEC Transmission Line and Substation: Sheet 2 of 4 
Figure I-3 

Downeast LNG Project 

Proposed EMEC Transmission Line and Substation: Sheet 3 of 4 
Figure I-4 

Downeast LNG Project 

Proposed EMEC Transmission Line and Substation: Sheet 4 of 4 
Figure I-5 

Downeast LNG Project 

EMEC Proposed Electric Substation
#### FRENCH v HUSTON

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist, Lucas Co.

No. 2091.

Decided Dec. 31, 1928.

O. W. Nelson and Lawton & Saalfield, Toledo, for French.

Fraser, Hiett, Wall & Effler, for Huston.

*56LLOYD J

The only ,act of negligence of which complaint is made is that above indicated, to-wit: that plaintiff in error had violated the ordinance in permitting this stove to be used without a flue or vent pipe attached thereto as required thereby, but the evidence discloses that long before the occasion in question Mrs. Huston knew that the stove was constructed to have attached thereto such pipe, and in spite of that knowledge she continued to use "t, so that, if plaintiff in error violated this ordinance, defendant in error also violated it. There is no evidence in the record to show what the conditions of the lease-were, what control or supervision, if any, Mrs. French retained over this apartment. Mrs. Huston and her husband were privileged to lease this apartment, if they saw fit, with such furnishings as there might be therein, and there was no violation of law or any negligence in the leasing of this apartment by Mrs. French to Mr. and Mrs. Huston with the' stove in the condition in which it was. The ordinance places upon the one having control and possession of the stove the duty of seeing that it is not used unless the conditions of the ordinance are complied with, The stove was in the possession and control of Mr. and Mrs. Huston and they could use it or not, as they saw fit, and if Mrs. Huston chose to use it, knowing as she did that no flue or vent pipe W'as connected therewith, then, if as claimed by her, plaintiff in error was chargeable with negligence, certainly she was guilty of such contributory negligence as would preclude a recovery for the injuries alleged to have been sustained by her because of its use on the occasion in question.

Miller, Admx vs McLeary, 21 Court of Appeals Reports, 6th District, unreported, p. 311.

The evidence not being in dispute in this regard, the judgment of the court of common pleas should be and is reversed and final judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff in error.

Richards and Williams, JJ, concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4019 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4019

To amend title 5, United States Code, to designate Juneteenth National 
              Independence Day as a legal public holiday.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 22, 2020

Mr. Markey (for himself, Ms. Smith, Mr. Booker, Ms. Harris, Mr. Cornyn, 
  Mr. Casey, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Hawley, Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Gardner, Mr. 
 Sanders, Mrs. Capito, Mr. King, Mr. Young, Ms. Hirono, Mr. Burr, Mr. 
Kaine, Ms. Collins, Ms. Warren, Ms. Ernst, Mrs. Shaheen, Ms. Duckworth, 
   Mr. Brown, Mr. Van Hollen, Ms. Baldwin, Ms. Rosen, Mr. Coons, Mr. 
Wyden, Ms. Klobuchar, Ms. Cortez Masto, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Durbin, Ms. 
   Cantwell, Mr. Bennet, Mr. Menendez, Mrs. Murray, Ms. Hassan, Mrs. 
Gillibrand, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Crapo, Mr. Risch, Mrs. Fischer, Mr. Cramer, 
 Mr. Udall, Mr. Scott of South Carolina, Mr. Heinrich, and Mr. Peters) 
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 5, United States Code, to designate Juneteenth National 
              Independence Day as a legal public holiday.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Juneteenth National Independence Day 
Act''.

SEC. 2. JUNETEENTH NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE DAY AS A LEGAL PUBLIC HOLIDAY.

    Section 6103(a) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
inserting after the item relating to Memorial Day the following:
            ``Juneteenth National Independence Day, June 19.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### § 1206.5 Decertification of representatives.

Employees who no longer wish to be represented may seek to decertify the current representative of a craft or class in a direct election. The employees must follow the procedure outlines in § 1203.2.

[84 FR 35989, July 26, 2019]
§ 91.1443 CAMP: Airworthiness release or aircraft maintenance log entry. ( a ) No program aircraft maintained under a CAMP may be operated after maintenance, preventive maintenance, or alterations are performed unless qualified, certificated personnel employed by the program manager prepare, or cause the person with whom the program manager arranges for the performance of the maintenance, preventive maintenance, or alterations, to prepare— ( 1 ) An airworthiness release; or
( 2 ) An appropriate entry in the aircraft maintenance log.
( b ) The airworthiness release or log entry required by paragraph (a) of this section must— ( 1 ) Be prepared in accordance with the procedure in the program manager's manual;
( 2 ) Include a certification that— ( i ) The work was performed in accordance with the requirements of the program manager's manual;
( ii ) All items required to be inspected were inspected by an authorized person who determined that the work was satisfactorily completed;
( iii ) No known condition exists that would make the aircraft unairworthy;
( iv ) So far as the work performed is concerned, the aircraft is in condition for safe operation; and
( 3 ) Be signed by an authorized certificated mechanic.
( c ) Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(3) of this section, after maintenance, preventive maintenance, or alterations performed by a repair station certificated under the provisions of part 145 of this chapter, the approval for return to service or log entry required by paragraph (a) of this section may be signed by a person authorized by that repair station.
( d ) Instead of restating each of the conditions of the certification required by paragraph (b) of this section, the program manager may state in its manual that the signature of an authorized certificated mechanic or repairman constitutes that certification.
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pane l unani m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T E MI L I A H E RNA ND E Z DE QU E VE DO , P et i t i on er , v. E R I C H . H O L D E R , J r ., A tto rn e yG e n e r a l, R e s p o n d e n t. N o. 08- 70055 A ge nc yN o. A 029- 253- 553 ME MOR AN DU M *

O n P e t i t i on f

orR e vi e w of

an O r de rof

the B o ar do f I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls S ubm i tt e d June 29, 2010 ** B e f o r e : A L A R C Ó N , L E A V Y , an dG R A B E R , C ir c u it Ju d g e s . Em i l i aHe rn an d e z De Qu e v e d o , an a t i v e o f ElSa l v a d o ran dac i t i z e n o f El S a l va dorand G ua t e m a l a , pe t i t i ons f orr e vi e w of

the B oar d of

I m m i gr a t i on A ppe a l s ’ or de rdi s m i s s i ng he rappe a l f r om an i m m i gr a t i on j udge ’ s de c i s i on



# FI LED JU L 13 2010 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS08- 70055 2 denyi ng her app l i cat i on for r el i ef un der the N i cara gu an A dj ustm entand C entra l A m e r ic an R e lie f

A c t o f 1 9 9 7 ( “N A C A R A ” ) . W e d is m is s th e p e titio n f o rr e v ie w . W e l ac k j uri sdi ct i on t o revi ew the agency’ s det erm i nat i on thatH ernand ez D e Q u e v e d o f

a ile dto e s tab lis h e lig ib ilityf o rr e lie f u n d e rN A C A R A . See N A C A R A , P ub. L . N o. 105- 100, § 203( a ) ( 1) , 111 S t a t . 2160, 2196- 97 ( N ov. 19, 1 9 9 7 ) ; se e al

so L an uza v. H

older , 5 9 7 F .3 d9 7 0 , 9 7 2 ( 9 th C ir . 2 0 1 0 ) ( p e rc u r ia m ) . P E T I T I O N F O R R E V I E W D I S M I S S E D .
###### Editorial Note on Part 45

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 45 appear at 74 FR 53394, Oct. 16, 2009.

#### § 45.16 Marking of life-limited parts.

When requested by a person required to comply with § 43.10 of this chapter, the holder of a type certificate or design approval for a life-limited part must provide marking instructions, or must state that the part cannot be practicably marked without compromising its integrity.

[Doc. No. FAA-200-8017, 67 FR 2110, Jan. 15, 2002, as amended by Amdt. 45-26, 74 FR 53395, Oct. 16, 2009]
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 44482

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JASON ANTHONY EDWARDS,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2017 Unpublished Opinion No. 404

Filed: March 17, 2017

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. Lansing L. Haynes, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and consecutive unified sentences of fifteen years 

indeterminate for attempted first degree kidnapping; twenty years determinate for 

battery with intent to commit a serious felony; and twenty years, with ten years 

determinate, for aggravated assault with an enhancement for use of a deadly 

weapon, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Brian R. Dickson, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;

and MELANSON, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM

Jason Anthony Edwards pled guilty to attempted first degree kidnapping (Count I), Idaho 

Code §§ 18-306, 18-4501(1), 18-4502; battery with intent to commit a serious felony (Count II), 

I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-911; and aggravated assault with an enhancement for use of a deadly weapon

(Count III), I.C. §§ 18-901, 18-905. The district court imposed consecutive unified sentences of 

fifteen years indeterminate on Count I; twenty years determinate on Count II; and twenty years, 
2

with ten years determinate, on Count III. Edwards appeals, contending that his sentences are

excessive.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Edwards’ judgment of conviction and sentences are affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K of UC Hub Group, Inc. for the Quarter ending October31, 2008, I, Larry Wilcox, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:



1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ Larry D. WilcoxLarry D. WilcoxPrincipal Executive Officer & Principal Financial OfficerDecember 26, 2008