alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1



Section 1350 Certifications



In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Actuate Corporation (the Company) for the period ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, the Chief Executive Officer of the Company and the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge on the date hereof, the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained
in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                                                                                                                             
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Dated March 11, 2004                                                                                                                         
|                                                                                                                                             
|/s/    PETER I. CITTADINI                                                                                                                    
|                                                                                                                                             
|Peter I. Cittadini President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)                                                       
|                                                                                                                                             
|/s/    DANIEL A. GAUDREAU                                                                                                                    
|                                                                                                                                             
|Daniel A. Gaudreau Senior Vice President, Finance and Administration and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
Statement Pursuant to Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002   The undersigned, Charles R. Zeller, Interim CFO of American International Industries, Inc., a Nevada corporation, hereby makes the following certification as required by Section 906(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, with respect to the following of this report filed pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Annual Report of Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2013.  The undersigned certifies that the above annual report fully complies with the requirements of Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and information contained in the above quarterly report fairly presents, in all respects, the financial condition of American International Holdings Corp. and results of its operations.  Date: August 19, 2014 Charles R. Zeller Interim CFO /s/ Charles R. Zeller
Dismissed and Opinion Filed May 13, 2021

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 20

- 00748

- CV

RHONDA FISHER , Appellant

V. DALLAS HOUSING AUTHORITY CITY OF DALLAS

- BARBARA

JORDAN APARTMENTS , Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC

- 20

- 01419

- B

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Myers, Partida

- Kipness, and Garcia

Opinion by Justice Garcia Appellant ’s brief in this case is overdue. By postcard dated April 20, 2021,

we notified appellant the time for filing her brief had expired. We directed appellant

to file a brief and an extension motion within ten days. We cautioned appellant that

failure to file her brief by that time might result in the dismissal of this appeal without

further notice. To date, appellant has not filed a brief, filed an extension motion, nor

otherwise corresponded with the Court regarding the status of this appeal.

Accordingly, w e dismiss this appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.8(a)(1); 42.3(b),

(c).– 2

–

200748f.p05 /Dennise Garcia/ DENNISE GARCIA JUSTICE– 3

– 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

RHONDA FISHER, Appellant

No. 05

- 20

- 00748

- CV V.

DALLAS HOUSING AUTHORITY CITY OF DALLAS

- BARBARA JORDAN APARTMENTS, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC

- 20

- 01419

- B. Opinion delivered by Justice Ga rcia. Justices Myers and Partida

- Kipness participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED

.

Judgment entered this 13 th day of May, 2021.
Exhibit 32

                    CERTIFICATION OF CEO AND CFO PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with the Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q of Playboy  Enterprises,
Inc. (the "Company") for the quarterly  period ended June 30, 2005 as filed with
the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof  (the  "Report"),
Christie Hefner, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Linda G. Havard,
as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  ss. 1350, as adopted  pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that, to the best of her knowledge:

      (1) The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.


/s/ Christie Hefner
-------------------
Name:  Christie Hefner
Title: Chief Executive Officer
Date:  August 5, 2005


/s/ Linda Havard
----------------
Name:  Linda G. Havard
Title: Chief Financial Officer
Date:  August 5, 2005

This   certification   accompanies  the  Report  pursuant  to  ss.  906  of  the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not,  except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of ss.18
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A  signed  original  of this  written  statement  required  by ss.  906 has been
provided  to  Playboy  Enterprises,   Inc.  and  will  be  retained  by  Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.
#### § 1606.2 Scope of title VII protection.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, protects individuals against employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. The title VII principles of disparate treatment and adverse impact equally apply to national origin discrimination. These Guidelines apply to all entities covered by title VII (collectively referred to as “employer”).
#### § 1601.91 Request for title VII interpretation or opinion.

Any interested person desiring a written title VII interpretation or opinion from the Commission may make such a request. However, issuance of title VII interpretations or opinions is discretionary.

[56 FR 9625, Mar. 7, 1991]
§ 1691.12 Interagency consultation. ( a ) Before investigating whether the employment practices of a recipient of Federal financial assistance constitute a pattern or practice of unlawful discrimination or initiating formal administrative enforcement procedures on that basis, an agency shall, to the extent practical, consult with the Chairman of the EEOC and the Assistant Attorney General to assure that duplication of effort will be minimized.
( b ) Prior to the initiation of any legal action against a recipient of Federal financial assistance alleging unlawful employment practices, the Department of Justice and/or EEOC shall, to the extent practical, notify the appropriate agency or agencies of the proposed action and the substance of the allegations.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>         5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE 12/31/98
FORM 10-KSB AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FORM
10-KSB.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>             0001062663
<NAME>            FULL TILT SPORTS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>      1
       
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
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<CASH>                                         101,716
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   10,303
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      8,573
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               122,639
<PP&E>                                           6,845
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (2,311)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 127,173
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           26,907
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                        500
<COMMON>                                         3,136
<OTHER-SE>                                      96,630
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   127,173
<SALES>                                         19,006
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                19,006
<CGS>                                           15,622
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   15,622
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               189,372
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 163
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (182,866)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (182,866)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                       (3,589)     
<NET-INCOME>                                  (186,455)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     (.05)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     (.05)
        

</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-2083

JENNIFER MAZZARELLO,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES, INCORPORATED, a New

Jersey corporation,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge.

(CA-02-3576-AMD)

Submitted: February 19, 2004 Decided: February 24, 2004

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jennifer Mazzarello, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Ross Niccolini,

MCGUIREWOODS, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Jennifer Mazzarello appeals the district court’s order

dismissing her civil action alleging employment discrimination. We

have reviewed the record and find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons as stated by the district

court in its order granting the employer’s motion for summary

judgment. See Mazzarello v. Lucent Tech., Inc., No. CA-02-3576-AMD

(D. Md. July 24, 2003). We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION

I,
David L. Hauser, certify that:

1.     I
have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of FairPoint Communications, Inc. (the "Company");

2.     Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.     The
Company's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act") Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the Company and have:



5.     The
Company's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Company's auditors
and the audit committee of the Company's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



Date:
May 27, 2010

/s/ DAVID L. HAUSERDavid L. Hauser Chief Executive Officer


---



QuickLinks
#### DOMBROSKI v RANKIN

Ohio Appeals, 9th Dist, Lorain Co

No 464.

Decided Dec 11, 1928

C F Adams and D H Aiken, both of Lo-rain, for Dombroski.

Fauver & Fauver, Elyria, for Rankin.

WASHBURN, PJ.

These facts warranted the conclusion that Rankin caused the arrest of Dombroski, and it then became a question for the jury to determine as to whether or not, under all the circumstances, there was probable cause for having Dombroski arrested.

Melanowski v. Judy, 102 O.S. 153, at p. 156.

In this case the determination of the question of probable cause required a consideration of the care taken by Rankin to ascertain who the proprietor of said business place was and where he 'lived, the source of Rankin’s information, and all the facts and circumstances; and in determining it the jury was authorized to draw all reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances proven.

The trial judge was without power to weigh the evidence or determine what reasonbale inferences should be drawn from the facts proven.

Painesville Utopia Theater Co. v Lautermilch, 118 O.S. 167.

*183Ellis & Morton v. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co., 4 O. S. 628.

The suggestion that the trial judge indicated that the ruling on the motion was partially based upon the fact that there was no evidence that Dombroski was damaged, is of no avail, because there was some evidence of damage. Dombroski was publicly arrested and confined for an hour or more in the jail, and then taken before the court and arraigned and discharged; he was entirely innocent and had no connection whatever with said business place or the crime committed therein, and had done nothing to even excite a suspicion of his being guilty of an offense; under such circumstances he had a right to have the jury pass upon the question of damage and the trial judge was not authorized to take that question from the jury.

The record! discloses that the trial judge invaded the province of the jury in the case at bar, and for that reason the judgment must be revérsed.

The merits of this controversy are not before us; in this proceeding we determine only a question of law; neither is there involved any question as to the power of the trial judge to set aside the finding of the jury: all that we determine is that under the record in this case the trial judge was not justified in preventing a finding by the jury.

For error in directing a verdict for Rankin, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

Funk, J, and Pardee, J, concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND RELATED NOTES CONTAINED IN THIS FILING AND IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                          21,808
<SECURITIES>                                    10,922
<RECEIVABLES>                                    5,844
<ALLOWANCES>                                       794
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                38,180
<PP&E>                                           2,410
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,005
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  39,798
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           13,764
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            14
<OTHER-SE>                                      26,020
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    39,798
<SALES>                                         17,750
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                21,872
<CGS>                                            1,012
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    4,183
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                21,594
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   548
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  22
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (3,166)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (3,166)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (3,166)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.41)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.41)
        

</TABLE>
#### STANLEY v. KEITT.

(Decided November 22, 1916.)

Appeal from Chilton Circuit Court.

Heard before Hon. W. W. Pearson.

No counsel marked for either party.

Per curiam.

Appeal dismissed for want of prosecution.
#### HIGGINS v CLEVELAND (City)

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 10101.

Decided June 17, 1929

Squire, Sanders '& Dempsey, Cleveland, for Higgins.

Carl Shuler and Ben Levin, Cleveland, for city.

SULLIVAN, J.

It is urged by counsel for plaintiff in error that the section of the ordinance upon which conviction was had is unconstitutional because it violates Sec. 28 of Article II of the Constitution, of Ohio which provision relates to the impairment of the *438obligations of contracts, and it is also urged that the ordinance is in contravention of Sec. 1, 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States which provides that there should be no abridgement of the privileges or immunities of citizens and no denial of equal protection of all citizens. We sustain this contention.

It is clear that throughout the ordinance there is an unlawful encroachment upon civil rights. The very essence of the ordinance deals with contractual relations which canot be impaired. Every provision appears to be an interference with those business relations that of necessity must exist among citizens transacting the ordinary affa-irs of life with each other. The ordinance in its provisions makes the municipal government a party to transactions involving those civil rights which all men have the inalienable right to enjoy. Each provision is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power and therefore unlawful. The very nature of the provisions of the ordinance is at war with all those principles upon which the citizen has a right to rely without molestation for the conduct of the ordinary affairs of life. The provisions are regulations which attempt to limit freedom in the right to contract. Its provisions are discrimnatory inasmuch as it seeks to favor one class of citizen and ignore all others. There is no uniformity therefore in the operation of its provisions. All these conclusions it seems to us are patent from a mere reading of the ordinance and our conclusion is, for the reasons herein noted, that the arrest and conviction of plaintiff in error had no foundation in law because of the inherent violations of the state and federal constitutions appearing in the provisions of the ordinance, and the passage of the ordinance by the city council-was an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power and therefore we hold the enactment invalid and of no force and effect in law.

Holding those views the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the plaintiff in error is discharged.

Vickery, PJ, and Levine, J, concur.
§ 27.1121 General. For each exhaust system— ( a ) There must be means for thermal expansion of manifolds and pipes;
( b ) There must be means to prevent local hot spots;
( c ) Exhaust gases must discharge clear of the engine air intake, fuel system components, and drains;
( d ) Each exhaust system part with a surface hot enough to ignite flammable fluids or vapors must be located or shielded so that leakage from any system carrying flammable fluids or vapors will not result in a fire caused by impingement of the fluids or vapors on any part of the exhaust system including shields for the exhaust system;
( e ) Exhaust gases may not impair pilot vision at night due to glare;
( f ) If significant traps exist, each turbine engine exhaust system must have drains discharging clear of the rotorcraft, in any normal ground and flight attitudes, to prevent fuel accumulation after the failure of an attempted engine start;
( g ) Each exhaust heat exchanger must incorporate means to prevent blockage of the exhaust port after any internal heat exchanger failure.
(Secs. 313(a), 601, and 603, 72 Stat. 752, 775, 49 U.S.C. 1354(a), 1421, and 1423; sec. 6(c), 49 U.S.C. 1655(c))
[Doc. No. 5074, 29 FR 15695, Nov. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 27-12, 42 FR 15045, Mar. 17, 1977]
|   | 1.  | Lexicon’s      Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2009, and to      which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the “Periodic      Report”), fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or section      15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and  |
|--------|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | 2.  | The      information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of      Lexicon.                                                                                                                                                  |

| By:    | /s/      Arthur T. Sands                   |
|--------|--------------------------------------------|
|   | Arthur      T. Sands, M.D., Ph.D.          |
|   | President      and Chief Executive Officer |

| By:    | /s/      James F. Tessmer                   |
|--------|---------------------------------------------|
|   | James      F. Tessmer                       |
|   | Vice      President, Finance and Accounting |