CLD-363 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 13-2009

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AKHI RAHEEM MUHAMMAD,

Appellant

v.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA; 

COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA;

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA;

PENNSYLVANIA SUPERIOR COURT

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-01255)

District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab

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Submitted for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

August 1, 2013

Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 16, 2013)

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OPINION

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PER CURIAM

Akhi Muhammad appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania, which dismissed his complaint for failure to 
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obey discovery orders and failure to prosecute. For the following reasons, we will affirm 

the District Court’s judgment.

Muhammad filed a pro se complaint in the District Court alleging that his civil 

rights were violated by some 200 defendants. Among those defendants were the 

Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, the 

Pennsylvania Superior Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (“the State Court 

Defendants”). Muhammad alleged, among other things, that the State Court Defendants 

violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) 

by repeatedly failing to provide reasonable accommodations for his impaired vision 

throughout unrelated lawsuits he initiated in Allegheny County between 2004 and 2008.1

The State Court Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the 

District Court granted on the basis that Muhammad’s claims were time-barred. We 

vacated and remanded in part, concluding that the District Court erred by dismissing 

some of Muhammad’s ADA and RA claims. See Muhammad v. Court of Common

Pleas, 483 F. App’x 759 (3d Cir. 2012). On remand, the District Court conducted a case 

management conference attended by Muhammad and counsel for the State Court 

Defendants. The Court ordered discovery to be completed within 90 days and directed 

 1 Muhammad originally filed his complaint in the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania. After finding that the complaint sufficiently stated 

ADA and RA claims against the State Court Defendants upon which relief could be 

granted, the District Court transferred Muhammad’s action to the Western District of 

Pennsylvania, where venue was proper. Muhammad subsequently filed several 

unsuccessful motions to change venue back to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania or to 

the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.
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the parties to thereafter attend a post-discovery status conference. Approximately two 

months after the expiration of the discovery period, Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly 

issued a report that recommended dismissing Muhammad’s compliant for his repeated 

failure to comply with the District Court’s discovery orders, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), 

and his failure to prosecute, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), guided by the six factors we set 

forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867-68 (3d Cir. 1984). On 

March 12, 2013, the District Court entered an order adopting Magistrate Judge Kelly’s 

report and dismissing Muhammad’s complaint. This appeal followed.

We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s 

order of dismissal for an abuse of discretion, recognizing that dismissals for discovery 

violations and failure to prosecute are appropriate in limited circumstances, and that 

doubts should be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the merits. See LiggonRedding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 260 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011); Bowers v. NCAA, 

475 F.3d 524, 538 (3d Cir. 2007). To determine if the District Court abused its 

discretion, “we will be guided by the manner in which [it] balanced the following factors 

. . . and whether the record supports its findings: (1) the extent of the party’s personal 

responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling 

orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of 

the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions 

other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the 

meritoriousness of the claim or defense.” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.
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We agree with the District Court that the first Poulis factor, which focuses on the 

extent of Muhammad’s personal responsibility, weighs against Muhammad because as a 

pro se litigant he is “solely responsible for the progress of his case.” Briscoe v. Klaus, 

538 F.3d 252, 258-59 (3d Cir. 2008). The second factor, which focuses on prejudice to 

the adversary, also weighs against Muhammad because the State Court Defendants have 

now been parties to this litigation for 5 years and Muhammad’s actions have 

continuously frustrated the completion of discovery and the Defendants’ ability to 

prepare a defense. See Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003). 

The third and fourth factors weigh against Muhammad because the record reflects that he 

consistently and willfully refused to participate in discovery with the State Court 

Defendants, comply with the District Court’s numerous discovery-related orders, appear 

at mandatory status conferences, or otherwise move his case forward. The fifth factor 

also weighs in favor of dismissing Muhammad’s action because his history of 

unresponsiveness to the District Court’s orders suggests that alternative sanctions would 

not be effective, and he was previously warned that his failure to abide by the Court’s 

orders could result in sanctions up to and including the dismissal of his case.

We recognize that no single Poulis factor is determinative and not all must be 

satisfied in order to justify dismissal. Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1988). 

We are also mindful that dismissal is an extreme sanction. See Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867-

68. Under the circumstances of this case, however, we conclude that the District Court’s 

analysis and weighing of the Poulis factors was not an abuse of discretion. We find no 
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support in the record for Muhammad’s contention that the District Court’s handling of 

this case was influenced by a corrupt or biased motive, or that the Court refused to 

respond to his request for accommodations for his visual impairment.2

Accordingly, the District Court’s order of dismissal will be affirmed.

 2 The record reflects that during a September 2010 case management conference, 

Muhammad stated that he suffers from diabetes which impacts his vision and that he 

needed accommodation in the form of a desktop magnifier. The District Court requested 

that Muhammad file a request for accommodation, identifying the specific visual 

impairment and requested accommodation, which Muhammad failed to do. Nonetheless, 

the District Court entered an order advising Muhammad that a desktop video magnifier 

located in the Clerk’s office was available for his use during business hours. Because 

Muhammad has already filed a lengthy response in opposition to resolving this appeal 

through summary action, which we now do pursuant to LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, we 

will deny as moot his request for this Court to provide unspecified accommodations.