1887483.1/SPSA/26517/0102/070115

NO. 04–14–00751–CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 

 

JOSEFINA ALEXANDER GONZALEZ, ET AL, 

 Appellants, 

v.

RAYMOND S. DE LEON II, ET AL, 

 Appellees. 

__________________________________________________________________ 

APPELLEE RAYMOND S. DE LEON’S RESPONSE TO 

APPELLANTS’ POST–SUBMISSION BRIEF 

 

JUDITH R. BLAKEWAY

State Bar No. 02434400

Judith.Blakeway@strasburger.com

JAMES MAVERICK MCNEEL

State Bar No. 24035491

James.McNeel@strasburger.com

LAURA C. MASON

State Bar No. 24028227

Laura.Mason@strasburger.com

2301 Broadway

San Antonio, Texas 78215

Telephone: (210) 250-6000

Facsimile: (210) 250-6100

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

RAYMOND S. DE LEON II, TRUSTEE 

ACCEPTED

04-14-00751-CV

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

7/1/2015 2:41:33 PM

KEITH HOTTLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 07/1/2015 2:41:33 PM KEITH E. HOTTLE Clerk
1887483.1/SPSA/26517/0102/070115 2

Argument

There are two independent reasons supporting the trial court's dismissal of 

Appellants’ trust administration claims. First, Appellants have no standing to assert 

trust administration claims because they are not “affected by the administration” of 

the Family Trust. Second, the trial court correctly dismissed the trust administration 

claims because Webb County Court at Law No. 2 had acquired dominant 

jurisdiction. Appellants never address the second basis. Thus, even if they had 

standing to bring trust administration claims––which is not conceded––the trial 

court correctly dismissed those claims because of the prior pending action in County 

Court at Law No. 2. Because either reason is a sufficient basis to affirm the trial 

court’s dismissal of the trust administration claims, it is not necessary for this Court 

to reach the issue of standing. 

If the Court nevertheless decides to address the trust administration standing 

issue, Appellants had no standing to assert trust administration claims. Appellants 

were not affected by De Leon’s status as a limited partner in limited partnerships

which they control by virtue of their control over the limited liability company that 

is the general partner of the partnerships. And they had no standing under the 

statute attached to their post submission brief, Texas Property Code Section 

112.054. Under Section 112.054, standing is limited to a trustee or beneficiary (“on 

the petition of a trustee or beneficiary a court may order that the trustee be changed, 
1887483.1/SPSA/26517/0102/070115 3

that the terms of the trust be modified. . . .”) TEX. PROP. CODE §112.054(a). So the 

trial court correctly ruled that Appellants lacked standing.

Management v. appointment. Appellants disclaim any intent to control the 

successor trustee, but they want to control who can become their partner because 

they want to maintain control of the partnerships. They want to assure that whoever 

is appointed will not interfere with their management of the partnerships.

Voting interest. Appellants claim that they are affected by the trustee’s 

appointment because the trust has enough votes to prevent the other partners from 

amending or terminating the partnership agreements. This is a spurious argument. 

Because they are in control, they have no desire to amend or terminate the 

partnerships. This is like saying, “the rich as well as the poor have the right to sleep 

under bridges.” True, but why would they want to? 

Moreover, that the trust has a vote as a limited partner is insufficient to confer 

standing on other partners to challenge appointment of the trustee. Appellants have 

an interest in the partnership; they have no interest––pecuniary or otherwise––in the 

trust. Their purported interest in the trust is even more attenuated than the interests 

found insufficient in the cases cited at Appellee’s Brief pp. 13–14. If those parties 

do not have standing to sue, then neither do Appellants.

Standing v. merits. It is ironic that Appellants base their claim to standing on 

their duty to see that the trust’s intent and partnership purposes are fulfilled. The 

very reason that Appellees sued is because Rocio Guerra and her children, the only 
1887483.1/SPSA/26517/0102/070115 4

descendants of settlors Delfina and Josefina, and the intended beneficiaries of their 

bounty, have not received pro rata distributions from partnerships, of which they 

own 90 percent. 

It is also ironic that Appellants now make a distinction between standing and 

merits, when their whole argument is premised on the assumption that De Leon’s 

appointment was void, which addresses the merits, which the trial court never 

reached because it found Appellants did not have standing.

Appellants also claim that they had standing because they were ordered to 

produce books and records, which their partner indisputedly had a right to examine. 

If their theory of standing were correct, any entity subpoenaed to produce records 

pertaining to a trust––for example, financial institutions or accounting firms––would 

have standing to challenge a trustee’s appointment. Standing is not that broad.

Effect of appointment. Finally, Appellants claim that they have standing 

because of the relief sought in the trustee’s derivative action. It is apparent that 

Appellants’ real interest is not only in controlling the process by which the trustee is 

selected, but also controlling the trustee himself, so that they can continue to use the 

partnerships for their own benefit, depriving the intended beneficiaries of their 

inheritance. 

None of this is to say that Appellants are without recourse. But their recourse 

is not to challenge the process by which the trustee was appointed but to bring their 

trust administration claims in Webb County Court at Law No. 2, where the district 
1887483.1/SPSA/26517/0102/070115 5

court properly ordered that these claims be pursued. Allowing Appellants to bypass 

that court would circumvent the rulings of the county court, interfering with the 

jurisdiction of the court having dominant jurisdiction.

Conclusion

The trial court correctly sustained the plea to the jurisdiction that Appellants 

lacked standing, ordered that trust administration claims must be brought in the 

pending actions in Webb County Court No. 2 and dismissed the remaining claims. 

Those orders should be affirmed. 
1887483.1/SPSA/26517/0102/070115 6

Respectfully submitted,

STRASBURGER & PRICE, LLP

By: /s/ Judith R. Blakeway

JUDITH R. BLAKEWAY

State Bar No. 12434400

JAMES MAVERICK MCNEEL

State Bar No. 24035491

LAURA C. MASON

State Bar No. 24028227

2301 Broadway

San Antonio, Texas 78215

Telephone: (210) 250-6000

Facsimile: (210) 250-6100

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 

RAYMOND S. DE LEON, II, 

TRUSTEE OF THE DELFINA & 

JOSEFINA ALEXANDER FAMILY 

TRUST

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

In accordance with Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1), I hereby certify that this 

Response to Appellants’ Post–Submission Brief contains no more than 827 words.

 /s/ Judith R. Blakeway

Judith R. Blakeway
1887483.1/SPSA/26517/0102/070115 7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to E-Filing Standing Order, I certify that on July 1, 2015, I 

electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the 

EFile.TXCourts.gov electronic filing system which will send notification of such 

filing to the following:

Robinson C. Ramsey

State Bar No. 16523700

rramsey@langleybanack.com

Joyce W. Moore

State Bar No. 14357400

jwmoore@langleybanack.com

Paula C. Boston

State Bar No. 24089661

pboston@langleybanack.com

Langley & Banack, Inc.

745 E. Mulberry, Ste. 900

San Antonio, Texas 78212–3166

Telephone: (210) 736–6600

Facsimile: (210) 735–6889

Attorneys for Appellants

Jeffrey T. Knebel

State Bar No. 11589000

Osborne, Helman, Knebel & Scott, LLP

301 Congress Ave., Suite 1910

Austin, TX 78701

Telephone: (512) 542–2015

Facsimile: (512) 541–2011

jtknebel@ohkslaw.com

Tom Bassler

State Bar No. 01894300

Thomas G. Bassler, P.C.

306 W. Sunset, Suite 119

San Antonio, Texas 78209

Telephone: (210) 836–8885

Facsimile: (210) 826–2236

thomas@basslerlaw.com

Jesus “Jesse” Guillen

State Bar No. 24011090

1308 San Augustin

Laredo, TX 78040

Telephone: (956) 725–5899

Facsimile: (877) 874–6560

jguillen@guillenlawoffice.com

Attorneys for Appellee 

Rocio Guerra

 /s/ Judith R. Blakeway

Judith R. Blakeway