*

The Honorable David G. Larimer, District Judge of the

United States District Court for the Western District of New

York, sitting by designation.

09-4186-pr

Colliton v. Donnelly et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE

OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A

SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE

FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A

PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY

COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United

3 States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on

the 2nd 4 day of November, two thousand ten.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

8 DENNY CHIN,

9 Circuit Judges,

DAVID G. LARIMER,* 10

11 District Judge.

12 __________________________________________

13

14 James P. Colliton,

15

16 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

17

18 v. 09-4186-pr

19

20 Ann Marie Donnelly, Rachel Lauren

21 Hochhauser, and Robert M. Morgenthau,

22

23 Defendants-Appellees.

24 __________________________________________

25 
2

1 FOR APPELLANT: James P. Colliton, pro se, Poughkeepsie, NY.

2

3 FOR APPELLEES: Susan C. Roque, Assistant District Attorney,

4 Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New

5 York County, New York, NY.

6

7 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court

8 for the Southern District of New York (Kaplan, J.)

9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

10 DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.

11 Plaintiff-Appellant James P. Colliton, pro se, appeals the

12 judgment of the district court granting the Defendants-Appellees’

13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss his 42 U.S.C. § 1983

14 complaint alleging various constitutional claims arising from his

15 arrest, prosecution, and state court conviction in 2006 and 2007

16 for various charges of sexual misconduct. Colliton argues that

17 the district court erred by finding his claims barred by Heck v.

18 Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and by collateral estoppel (issue

19 preclusion). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

20 underlying facts and procedural history.

21 “We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a

22 complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint

23 liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as

24 true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s

25 favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d

26 Cir. 2002); see also Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321

27 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). To survive a motion to dismiss
3

1 under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must plead “enough facts to

2 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

3 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although all

4 allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true,

5 this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v.

6 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A claim will have “facial

7 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

8 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

9 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

10 After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the

11 majority of Colliton’s claims are precluded by his prior state

12 court conviction, while his remaining claims are either

13 insufficiently pleaded or barred by absolute immunity. See

14 ACEquip Ltd. v. Am. Eng’g Corp., 315 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2003)

15 (finding that the Court of Appeals may “affirm the district

16 court’s judgment on any ground appearing in the record, even if

17 the ground is different from the one relied on by the district

18 court”). 

19 “The fundamental notion of the doctrine of collateral

20 estoppel, or issue preclusion, is that an issue of law or fact

21 actually litigated and decided by a court of competent

22 jurisdiction in a prior action may not be relitigated in a

23 subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies.” Ali

24 v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 489 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations

25 omitted)(emphasis added). This principle applies to a judgment
4

1 from a New York state court, to which a federal court must give

2 “the same preclusive effect as would be given to the judgment

3 under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.” 

4 Johnson v. Watkins, 101 F.3d 792, 794 (2d Cir. 1996). Under New

5 York law, because a criminal conviction is considered a valid

6 final judgment for purposes of issue preclusion, it bars

7 relitigation of all of the factual issues upon which that

8 conviction was based. See Singleton v. City of New York, 632

9 F.2d 185, 205 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing S.T. Grand, Inc. v. City of

10 New York, 32 N.Y.2d 300, 304-05 (1973)).

11 The majority of Colliton’s claims rely on the presumption

12 that, as a factual matter, he was not guilty of the offenses to

13 which he entered a guilty plea in state court. But Colliton, who

14 neither appealed his state court conviction nor sought to

15 withdraw his plea, is collaterally estopped from challenging the

16 facts supporting his conviction. Colliton argues that collateral

17 estoppel is inapplicable to a § 1983 claim where the plaintiff

18 was denied a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate his claims

19 in the earlier action. Colliton contends that he was denied such

20 an opportunity due to incompetent counsel at his state court

21 proceedings. This is unavailing. Colliton, who practiced law at

22 Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP prior to his disbarment, entered a

23 plea under oath and stated that he understood and knowingly

24 admitted that he committed the offenses charged in the state
5

1 indictments, and that he voluntarily entered a plea free from any

2 coercion. Neither his complaint in this case nor his brief on

3 appeal alleges facts sufficient to render facially plausible his

4 claim that he was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to

5 litigate his factual innocence in that proceeding.

6 In addition, we find Colliton’s remaining claims to be

7 insufficiently pleaded or barred by absolute prosecutorial

8 immunity. See Ciambello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324-

9 25 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that complaints containing conclusory

10 or general allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to sustain

11 a § 1983 action); see also Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d

12 Cir. 2010) (“Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity. . .

13 because their prosecutorial activities are intimately associated

14 with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”) (internal

15 quotations omitted).

16 We have considered Colliton’s other arguments on appeal and

17 find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the

18 judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.

19

20 FOR THE COURT:

21 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

22