alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
N O T F O RP U B L IC A T IO NIN W E S T ' S H AWA I # I RE P O R T S A N D P A C IF IC RE P O R T E R



### NO. CAAP-19-0000655

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

O F THE STATE OF HAWAI # I

MICHAEL L. CARTER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE OF HAWAI # I, Respondent-Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT (CASE NO. 1PR181000005 (CR. NO. 1PC131001615))

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL (By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Leonard and Hiraoka, JJ.) Upon review of the record, it appears that:(1) On September 24, 2019, self-represented PetitionerAppellant Michael L. Carter (Carter) filed the notice of appeal without the fees required by Hawai # i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 3(a);

(2) On October 11, 2019, the appellate clerk filed a notice of non-payment, instructing Carter to pay the filing fee or seek a fee waiver on or before October 21, 2019;

(3) The record on appeal was due on or before November 25, 2019. See HRAP Rules 11(b)(1) & 26(a);

(4) On December 3, 2019, the appellate clerk entered a default of the record on appeal, informing Carter that the time to docket the appeal had expired, he had not paid the filing fee or obtained an order allowing him to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis , the matter would be brought to the court's attention on December 13, 2019, for action that may include dismissal of the appeal, and he could seek relief from default by motion; Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-19-0000655 23-JUN-2021 09:53 AM Dkt. 13 ODDPN O T F O RP U B L IC A T IO NIN W E S T ' S H AWA I # I RE P O R T S A N D P A C IF IC RE P O R T E R 

### (5) The appellate clerk mailed copies of the notice of non-payment and the default notice to Carter at his address indicated on the notice of appeal, and both documents were returned; (6) Carter has not filed a notice of change of address, consistent with HRAP Rule 25(f), or taken any other action in this appeal; and

(7) An appeal may be dismissed where the record on appeal has not been prepared because the appellant failed to pay the required fees or obtain an order allowing the appellant to proceed in forma pauperis . HRAP Rule 11(b)(2), (c)(2).

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai # i, June 23, 2021.
/s/ Lisa M. Ginoza Chief Judge
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard Associate Judge
/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka Associate Judge

2
§ 450.147 Agreements. ( a ) *General.* An operator must establish a written agreement with any entity that provides a service or property that meets a requirement in this part, including: ( 1 ) *Launch and reentry site use agreements.* A Federal launch or reentry site operator, a licensed launch or reentry site operator, or any other person that provides services or access to or use of property required to support the safe launch or reentry under this part;
( 2 ) *Agreements for notices to mariners.* Unless otherwise addressed in agreements with the site operator, for overflight of navigable water, the U.S. Coast Guard or other applicable maritime authority to establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice to Mariners prior to a launch or reentry and other measures necessary to protect public health and safety;
( 3 ) *Agreements for notices to airmen.* Unless otherwise addressed in agreements with the site operator, the FAA Air Traffic Organization or other applicable air navigation authority to establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice to Airmen prior to a launch or reentry, for closing of air routes during the respective launch and reentry windows, and for other measures necessary to protect public health and safety; and
( 4 ) *Mishap response.* Emergency response providers, including local government authorities, to satisfy the requirements of § 450.173.
( b ) *Roles and responsibilities.* The agreements required in this section must clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of each party to support the safe launch or reentry under this part.
( c ) *Effective date.* The agreements required in this section must be in effect before a license can be issued, unless otherwise agreed to by the Administrator.
( d ) *Application requirements.* An applicant must— ( 1 ) Describe each agreement in this section; and
( 2 ) Provide a copy of any agreement, or portion thereof, to the FAA upon request.
Exhibit
32.1

CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. § 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the
Quarterly Report of iQ Power Technology Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for
the period ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Peter E. Braun, Chief Executive
Officer and acting Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

| | (1)       
      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | (2)       
      The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.
| | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | /s/
      Peter E. BraunPeter E. Braun, Chief Executive Officer
      and acting Principal Financial Officer
| | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

August 13, 2003

A signed original of this
written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to iQ Power
Technology Inc. and will be retained by iQ Power Technology Inc. and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---
#### OAK BLDG & ROOFING CO v SUSOR

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist, Lucas County

No 2134,

Decided Jan 7, 1929

J. W. Starritt, Toledo, for Oak Co.

Dan H. McCullough, Toledo, for Susor.

RICHARDS, J

The contract contains no provision as to who should bear the loss in case anv building on either of the properties should be destroyed before the deeds were executed. *71Neither does it contain any provision requiring either of the parties to deliver the land with the buildings thereon in the same condition as when the contract was executed by the parties. The bungalow was destroyed by fire without any fault on the part of the defendants. The contract of sale being unconditional in form, we must regard the purchaser as the equitable owner of the property and the vendor as holding the title for the benefit of the purchaser, and it would therefore result, under such a contract, that the loss by fire must fall on the purchaser.

A quite similar question was involved in the case of Gilbert & Ives vs Port, 28 Oh St., 276, although that case was complicated with an option to purchase. ,The Supreme Court, in delivering the opinion, cite with approval Sugden on Vendors, 8 Am. Ed 291, to the effect that the vendee of the property being the equitable owner from the time of contract of sale, must pay the consideration for it, even though the property be destroyed between the agreement and conveyance. The rule thus indicated appears to have been adopted by a great majority of the authorities.

Maudru vs Humphreys, Admr., 83 W. Va., 307;

McGinley vs. Forrest, 22 A. L. R., 567. The authorities are collected in a note to the last case cited, beginning on page 575.

For the reasons given judgement and decree will be entered for the defendants.

WILLIAMS and LLOYD, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.2

                              CERTIFICATION OF THE

              EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

                             PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



     In  connection  with the  Annual  Report  on Form  10-K for the year  ended
December 31, 2005 of KeySpan Corporation (the "Corporation"),  as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  I, Gerald
Luterman,   Executive  Vice  President  and  Chief  Financial   Officer  of  the
Corporation, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations
          of the Company.



Date:    February 28, 2006


                                                  /s/ Gerald Luterman
                                                  -------------------
                                                  Gerald Luterman
                                                  Executive Vice President
                                                  and Chief Financial Officer
#### EBEL v CLEVELAND (City)

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No. 10106.

Decided October 7, 1929

Messrs. Krueger & Pelton, Cleveland, for Ebel.

Mr. S. O. Hirstius, Cleveland, for City.

SULLIVAN, J.

It is a well settled principle that a reviewing court cannot go outside the record upon a question which is vital and necessary in the determination of the material issue. The purpose of the bill of exceptions is to bring before the reviewing court the matters and things upon which the court acts in order to determine whether the judgment of the lower court was good or b,ad. In this case, in order to determine the validity of the ordinance or whether its provisions have been complied with, it would be necessary to go outside the record and make up the deficiency of the bill of exceptions by bringing the ordinance by main. strength into the case. We think under the authorities that this cannot be done.

Evans vs City of Wooster, 28 O. C. A.

The Evans case supra cites 21 Cir. Ct. 761 which was afterwards affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio without opinion in the 92 OS. 504 which undoubtedly makes the doctrine here laid down the law in Ohio.

Grossner vs State, 18 C. C. (NS) 46.

Esch vs City of Elyria, 7 C. C. (NS) 9.

It is our judgment that the bill of exceptions should show what the ordinance is and that the mayor should certify the same so as to bring the matter before this court by way of the bill of exceptions, and we think that in no other way can it properly be brought before a reviéwing court.

Peter Nelson vs Village of Berea, 21 O. C. C. 781.

Affirmed in 66 OS. 668.

Turning to Jones on Evidence upon this point we find that he uses language which bears out the authorities cited:

Vol. 1. Sec. 401.

Holding, these views it is our unanimous judgment that the motion to dismiss the petition in error and strike the bill of exceptions from the record should be granted and the same is hereby done and an entry may be made on the motion docket and the general docket in accordance with these views.

Vickery, PJ., and Levine, J, concur.
GARY M. RIDLEY

Secretary ofTrunsportation STATE OF OKLAHOMA MARY FALLIN Governor 

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July 22, 2013
Brooke chapman, Associate Director Small Community Air Service Development Program U. S. Department ofTransportation 1200New Jersey Ave. SE W86-310 Washington, DC 20590 Dear Ms. Chapman. 'r'j

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The Air Travelers form the greater Stillwater area and Oklahoma State University have to drive up to 90 miles to getlo Oklahoma City orTulsa iIiorder to access the National Transportation System via an air carrier. This places significant time and cost onthe members ofthe community who wish to travel. This added costcan impede potential businesses who want to relocate or expand to the community ofStillwater. Aswe allknow, air service is vitally important to the economic wellbeing ofbusinesses inthe local community and aswell as throughout the state ofOklahoma. Regional business growth and sustainment depends, in part, onthe ability to meet the airtravel needs ofexisting local businesses and institutions as well as companies considering Stillwater as alocation fortheir operations. There are inherent financial risks and significant costs associated with starting schedule airline service atacommunity that does not currently have service, and that airlines are looking for financial support to help reduce thatrisk. The funds requested will be matched with significant local dollars, including funds at the stale levelthat willbe used for airline incentives to attract new service at Stillwater Regional Airport. The large amount OffWlds already dedicated to this project, over $3.5 million, shows the level ofsupport within the community from both public and private entities. Again, itis my hope that you will give the Stillwater Regional Airport proposal full consideration and award the funds requested to help Stillwater re-establish access to the National Transportation System by attracting new service to Dallas/Ft Worth with American Airlines. Sincerely, 

# a:;:4A' ' ~~e~:~f Transportatio

3500 MARTIN LUTHER KINGAVENUE. P.O. BOX 11357. OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73136.0357.405-425.3601
###### Editorial Note on Part 302

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 302 appear at 84 FR 15935, Apr. 16, 2019.

#### § 302.418 Motions for immediate suspension of operating authority pendente lite.

All motions for the suspension of the economic operating authority of an air carrier during the pendency of proceedings to revoke such authority shall be filed with, and decided by, the DOT decisionmaker. Proceedings on the motion shall be in accordance with § 302.11. In addition, the DOT decisionmaker shall afford the parties an opportunity for oral argument on such motion.
#### § 101.2 Initiation of unfair labor practice cases.

The investigation of an alleged violation of the National Labor Relations Act is initiated by the filing of a charge, which must be in writing and signed, and must either be notarized or must contain a declaration by the person signing it, under the penalties of the Criminal Code, that its contents are true and correct to the best of the persons' knowledge and belief. The charge is filed with the Regional Director for the Region in which the alleged violations have occurred or are occurring. A blank form for filing such charge is supplied by the Regional Office upon request. The charge contains the name and address of the person against whom the charge is made and a statement of the facts constituting the alleged unfair labor practices.
Materials Not Included in

Airworthiness Directive (AD) Docket

Docket Number: FAA- 2014-0146

Directorate Identifier: 2013NM243AD

84-28-12 --- 7/23/12

Name/Description of Item(s) Not Included in FDMS Docket and Maintained in the 

Supplemental AD Docket

MAY BE VIEWED AT: Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate

Rules Docket

1601 Lind Ave. SW.,

Renton, WA 98057

425.227.1221

DURING THE HOURS OF: 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday,

except Federal holidays.

Form Date: 03/05/2008
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                             727
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    5,736
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      2,009
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 9,337
<PP&E>                                          13,837
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (8,241)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  18,666
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,989
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             6
<OTHER-SE>                                       3,577
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    18,666
<SALES>                                          6,648
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 6,648
<CGS>                                            5,773
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    6,418
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  (48)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  42
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    236
<INCOME-TAX>                                        88
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                148
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       148
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .26
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .26


</TABLE>
#### Prewett *v.*Caruthers *et al.*

A final judgment as to part of the defendants, and a continuance as to others, is error.

Judgment by default was taken against some of the defendants, on whom service had been perfected, and the cause continued as to those not served, who being afterwards notified, appeared and plead, and on their motion the court entered a discontinuance of the cause as to them: held to be error.

IN ERROR from the circuit court of the county of Monroe.

Cocke for plaintiff in error.

Hubbard, *contra.*

Opinion by

Turner, Justice.

This was an action on the case, founded on a promissory note, made by the defendants, payable to the plaintiff. Judgment by default final was taken as to two of the defendants, who filed no plea; and at a subsequent term, the cause having been continued, and the other defendants having been served, pleaded issuable pleas. They moved the court to discontinue the cause as to them, inasmuch as the plaintiff had previously taken judgment by default final against the other two, and the court sustained the motion. The plaintiff moved the court to set aside the order of discontinuance; but the court overruled the motion, and for this error the plaintiff seeks to reverse the judgment.

It was irregular to enter a final judgment against part of the defendants, without disposing of the cause against the others. See 2 Howard, 805. It seems that the plaintiff did not intend to take a final judgment, as he continued the cause; and it was equally irregular to discontinue as to the other two defendants on their *305motion. For these irregularities the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. It was regular to take judgment by default, against those who did not plead; but the judgment should not have been finally entered, until the cause was ready for final disposition as to all.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings.
#### § 1471.100 What does this part do?

This part adopts a governmentwide system of debarment and suspension for FMCS nonprocurement activities. It also provides for reciprocal exclusion of persons who have been excluded under the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and provides for the consolidated listing of all persons who are excluded, or disqualified by statute, executive order, or other legal authority. This part satisfies the requirements in section 3 of Executive Order 12549, “Debarment and Suspension” (3 CFR 1986 Comp., p. 189), Executive Order 12689, “Debarment and Suspension” (3 CFR 1989 Comp., p. 235) and 31 U.S.C. 6101 note (Section 2455, Public Law 103-355, 108 Stat. 3327).
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman, Chief Justice

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 March 22, 2017

t0315

Order 

Clerk

March 22, 2017

154353 & (44)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee,

v SC: 154353

COA: 329686 

Wayne CC: 14-008080-FH

STEVEN COLLINS,

Defendant-Appellee/

Cross-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 5, 2016 

judgment of the Court of Appeals and the application for leave to appeal as crossappellant are considered, and they are DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the 

questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
#### § 102.26 Motions; rulings and orders part of the record; rulings not to be appealed directly to the Board without special permission; requests for special permission to appeal.

All motions, rulings, and orders will become a part of the record, except that rulings on motions to revoke subpoenas will become a part of the record only upon the request of the party aggrieved thereby as provided in § 102.31. Unless expressly authorized by the Rules and Regulations, rulings by the Regional Director or by the Administrative Law Judge on motions and/or by the Administrative Law Judge on objections, and related orders, may not be appealed directly to the Board except by special permission of the Board, but will be considered by the Board in reviewing the record if exception to the ruling or order is included in the statement of exceptions filed with the Board pursuant to § 102.46. Requests to the Board for special permission to appeal from a ruling of the Regional Director or of the Administrative Law Judge, together with the appeal from such ruling, must be filed in writing promptly and within such time as not to delay the proceeding, and must briefly state the reasons special permission may be granted and the grounds relied on for the appeal. The moving party must simultaneously serve a copy of the request for special permission and of the appeal on the other parties and, if the request involves a ruling by an Administrative Law Judge, on the Administrative Law Judge. Any statement in opposition or other response to the request and/or to the appeal must be filed within 7 days of receipt of the appeal, in writing, and must be served simultaneously on the other parties and on the Administrative Law Judge, if any. If the Board grants the request for special permission to appeal, it may proceed immediately to rule on the appeal.
§ 1471.925 Conviction. *Conviction* means— ( a ) A judgment or any other determination of guilt of a criminal offense by any court of competent jurisdiction, whether entered upon a verdict or plea, including a plea of nolo contendere; or
( b ) Any other resolution that is the functional equivalent of a judgment, including probation before judgment and deferred prosecution. A disposition without the participation of the court is the functional equivalent of a judgment only if it includes an admission of guilt.