UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

________________________________ 

 ) 

LEONARD EDWARDS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

v. ) Civil Action No. 13-236 (EGS) 

 ) 

VINCENT GRAY, et al., ) 

 ) 

Defendants. ) 

________________________________) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Leonard Edwards brings this pro se action alleging 

that his former employer, the District of Columbia Fire and 

Emergency Medical Services Department (“Department”), refused 

his request for a reasonable accommodation of his disability in 

violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 

29 U.S.C. § 794; discriminated against him based on his race in 

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 

VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; and retaliated against him in 

violation of the ADA and Title VII. Pending before the Court is 

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate 

and race-discrimination claims. Upon consideration of the 

motion, the responses and replies thereto, the applicable law, 

and the entire record, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN 

PART defendants’ motion. 
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I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff is an African-American male who has type-2 diabetes. 

See Fifth Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 9 ¶ 2. He was employed by the 

Department until being terminated from employment on October 13, 

2007. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. His complaint alleges a series of events in 

which he feels the Department discriminated and retaliated 

against him, leading to his termination. 

The first such event occurred in early 2007, after Mr. Edwards 

filed a complaint, the contents of which are unclear, with the 

Department’s Equal Employment Office. Id. ¶ 11. Shortly after 

Mr. Edwards filed the complaint, a Department officer ordered 

him to take a fitness-for-duty physical. Id. ¶ 12. 

The second event occurred in March 2007, when Mr. Edwards was 

placed on personal sick leave after being injured on the job. On 

March 13, 2007, Mr. Edwards sustained a back injury during a 

Department training event. Id. ¶ 14. He was ordered to report to 

the Department’s clinic on March 23, 2007 for evaluation. See 

id. ¶¶ 15, 18. Upon arriving at the clinic, Mr. Edwards was 

“ordered to sign a prewritten letter,” the contents of which are 

unclear. Id. ¶ 19. For some reason, this letter prompted 

plaintiff to file a complaint with the Department’s Office of 

Risk Management, asserting that “his right to choose a physician 

of his choice had been violated.” Id. ¶ 20. Four days after Mr. 

Edwards filed this complaint, the defendants removed him from 
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performance-of-duty sick leave and placed him on personal sick 

leave, even though he had no accrued personal sick leave. See 

id. ¶¶ 21-22. Mr. Edwards views his placement on personal sick 

leave “as retaliation . . . for filing a complaint with Risk 

Management,” id. ¶ 23, and appears to allege that he stopped 

receiving his salary afterwards. See id. ¶ 41. 

The third event occurred two months later, in May 2007. For 

reasons that are not explained in the complaint, Mr. Edwards 

appears to have returned to work by May 16, 2007, when he was 

involved in a car accident while driving a Department vehicle. 

See id. ¶ 25. After the accident, Mr. Edwards went to the 

Department’s clinic, where he was asked to sign a “Disclosure 

and Release” form and to take a psychological examination. Id. 

¶¶ 28-31. He never took the examination because he “repeatedly 

verbally asked to visit a private psychologist” rather than a 

Department psychologist, but his requests were denied. Id. ¶¶ 

34(a), 34(b). 

The final allegedly discriminatory and retaliatory event 

occurred on October 13, 2007, when plaintiff was terminated from 

employment. Id. ¶ 42. Although he does not explain the 

circumstances of his termination, Mr. Edwards alleges that the 

events described in the complaint “were committed by white 

officers” whose “actions . . . were racially motivated” and that 
4 

“he was treated differently from other firefighters in the same 

predicament.” Id. ¶¶ 39, 50-51. 

On November 5, 2007, Mr. Edwards filed a formal complaint of 

discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”), alleging that the Department discriminated against him 

based on his race, age, and disability, and that the Department 

retaliated against him for engaging in protected activity. Id. 

¶ 7. On November 20, 2012, the EEOC determined that it could not 

substantiate the charges. See Ex. A to Pl.’s Supplemental Opp. 

to Mot. to Dismiss (“Suppl. Opp.”), Dkt. No. 28. 

Mr. Edwards received notice of the EEOC’s determination on 

December 14, 2012. Fifth Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 9 ¶ 8. On February 

25, 2013, he filed this pro se lawsuit, alleging that the 

defendants denied him a reasonable accommodation of his 

disability, discriminated against him because of his race, and 

retaliated against him. Compl., Dkt. No. 1. Soon after bringing 

this case, Mr. Edwards filed a series of amended complaints, 

culminating in his Fifth Amended Complaint. 

On March 28, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss Mr. 

Edwards’s failure-to-accommodate and race-discrimination claims. 

See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”), Dkt. No. 20. Plaintiff 

filed an opposition on April 2, 2013, in which he asserted that 

he had successfully pled a claim under the ADA and the 

Rehabilitation Act, and did not defend his Title VII claim. See 
5 

Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 24. Defendants noted in 

their reply that Mr. Edwards did not respond to the substance of 

any of their arguments. See Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 

(“Reply”), Dkt. No. 25. 

On April 22, 2013, the Court issued an order advising 

plaintiff of his obligation to respond to the defendants’ 

arguments and the consequences of failing to do so. See Order, 

Dkt. No. 27 at 1. Mr. Edwards filed a supplemental response, 

Suppl. Opp., to which defendants responded on June 7, 2013, 

asserting that plaintiff still had not opposed any of their 

arguments. See Defs.’ Suppl. Reply, Dkt. No. 29. Four days 

later, Mr. Edwards filed yet another brief, which asserted that 

“the legal standards imposed on a licensed attorney should not 

totally apply to a Pro Se party,” but did not otherwise address 

defendants’ arguments. Pl.’s Third Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 

No. 30 at 1. On June 14, 2013, defendants reiterated that 

plaintiff had not responded to their arguments. See Defs.’ 

Second Supplemental Reply, Dkt. No. 31. Defendants’ motion is 

now ripe for the Court’s decision. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning 

v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A complaint must 

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
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the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds 

upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007) (quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). 

While detailed factual allegations are not necessary, a 

plaintiff must plead enough facts “to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level.” Id. 

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider 

“the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as 

exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and 

matters about which the Court may take judicial notice.” 

Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002). 

The Court must construe the complaint liberally in plaintiff’s 

favor and grant plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences deriving from the complaint. Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns 

Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Court must not 

accept inferences that are “unsupported by the facts set out in 

the complaint.” Id. “Nor must the court accept legal conclusions 

cast in the form of factual allegations.” Id. “[O]nly a 

complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a 

motion to dismiss.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

“‘[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be 

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted 

by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 
7 

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Even a pro 

se complainant, however, must plead “‘factual matter’ that 

permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of 

misconduct.’” Atherton v. D.C. Office of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 

681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950). 

III. ANALYSIS 

Defendants argue that: (1) plaintiff failed to state a claim 

for denial of a reasonable accommodation because he did not 

demonstrate any connection between his alleged disability and 

the accommodation he sought, and (2) he failed to state a claim 

for racial discrimination because he alleged no facts to support 

an inference that he was mistreated because of his race.1

A. Plaintiff Failed to State a Claim for Denial of a 

Reasonable Accommodation. 

Mr. Edwards asserts that the defendants’ denial of his request 

to take a psychological examination with a private psychologist 

was a failure to accommodate his disability, type-2 diabetes. It 

is well settled that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act “do[] not 

cover every individual with an impairment who suffers an adverse 

employment action.” Flemmings v. Howard Univ., 198 F.3d 857, 860 

(D.C. Cir. 1999). Rather, they prohibit employers from 

 

1

 Defendants assert that plaintiff did not address the substance 

of their arguments and ask that the Court treat their motion as 

conceded. See Reply at 1-2. The Court need not treat unopposed 

arguments as conceded, however, and declines to do so here given 

Mr. Edwards’s repeated opposition to defendants’ motion. 
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discriminating “against a qualified individual on the basis of 

disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) 

(prohibiting discrimination “by reason of [an individual’s] 

disability”). Accordingly, while a plaintiff may prove 

discrimination by showing that his employer failed to provide a 

“reasonable accommodation[]” of his disability, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112(b)(5)(A), an employer need only provide an accommodation 

that is “responsive to and tailored to a specific disability.” 

Coleman-Adebayo v. Leavitt, 326 F. Supp. 2d 132, 143 (D.D.C. 

2004); see also, e.g., Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936, 944 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008) (“When an employee seeks a workplace accommodation, 

the accommodation must be related to the limitation that 

rendered the person disabled.”) (quotation marks omitted); Jones 

v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2012). 

Neither Mr. Edwards’s complaint nor any of his oppositions to 

the defendants’ motion explain how his type-2 diabetes is 

connected to his request to visit a private psychologist for a 

Department-ordered examination. Mr. Edwards alleges that he 

suffers from degenerative-disc disease and hypertension, Fifth 

Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 9 ¶ 9, but does not connect these 

conditions to his request either. Mr. Edwards’s assertions that 

he “reserved his rights because of his medical condition 

(Diabetes),” and that “[t]here is a causal connection between 

the termination and the reserved rights,” Suppl. Opp. at 4, do 
9 

not answer the relevant question: how is diabetes related to Mr. 

Edwards’s desire to visit a private psychologist? Because the 

Court cannot answer this question, Mr. Edwards’s failure-toaccommodate claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act must 

be dismissed. 

B. Plaintiff Stated a Claim Under Title VII. 

To bring an actionable discrimination claim under Title VII, 

Mr. Edwards must establish that “(1) [he] is a member of a 

protected class, (2) [he] suffered an adverse employment action, 

and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of 

discrimination.” Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C. Cir. 

2002) (quotation marks omitted); see also Nguyen v. Mabus, 895 

F. Supp. 2d 158, 174 (D.D.C. 2012). Although it is well 

established that “‘an employment discrimination plaintiff is not 

required to plead every fact necessary to establish a prima 

facie case to survive a motion to dismiss,’” Rodriguez v. 

Donovan, 922 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Jones v. 

Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 642 F.3d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2011), a 

plaintiff must nevertheless “plead sufficient facts to show a 

plausible entitlement to relief.” Id. 

It is undisputed that Mr. Edwards alleged the first two 

elements of a prima facie case by asserting that he “is a . . . 

Black American” and that he was “terminated by DCFD.” Fifth Am. 

Compl., Dkt. No. 9 ¶¶ 2, 3. Defendants contend that Mr. Edwards 
10 

failed to support an inference of discrimination because he 

asserted only that the officers who took action against him were 

white and that he was treated differently than other 

firefighters. See Mot. at 9. The Court need not address whether 

that alone raises an inference of discrimination, however, 

because plaintiff made additional allegations which help to 

support such an inference. 

Plaintiff’s complaint describes a series of events that paint 

a plausible picture of Department officers singling him out for 

unfair discipline, culminating in his termination. First, Mr. 

Edwards was ordered to take a fitness-for-duty physical soon 

after he filed an equal-employment-opportunity complaint against 

a supervisor. Fifth Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 9 ¶¶ 11-12. Then, after 

being injured on the job, he was removed from performance-ofduty sick leave and his salary was withheld. Id. ¶¶ 14, 21-22, 

41. Next, his request to see a private psychologist in 

connection with a Department-ordered examination was denied. Id. 

¶¶ 34(a), 34(b). Finally, he was terminated from employment. Id. 

¶ 42. This discipline, Mr. Edwards alleges, deviated from the 

defendants’ treatment of other firefighters. See id. ¶ 50. He 

also alleges that each event was driven by white officers whose 

actions “were racially motivated.” Id. ¶¶ 39, 51. While Mr. 

Edwards does not fully explain the circumstances of each event, 

the Court must accept his allegations as true at this stage. 
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A liberal reading of Mr. Edwards’s pro se complaint inevitably 

leads to the conclusion that he is also asserting that the 

firefighters who received better treatment were members of a 

different race. Indeed, if plaintiff was mistreated by racially 

motivated white officers and other firefighters were treated 

better, it follows that the others were either members of a 

different race or were supervised by different officers. Cf. 

Montgomery v. Omnisec Int’l Sec. Servs., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2013 

WL 4427194, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2013) (in ruling on a motion 

to dismiss a pro se complaint, the court may read separate 

allegations together where doing so “leads to the undeniable 

conclusion that plaintiff believes the two facts were . . . 

linked”). Either way, plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he 

received disparate treatment for racially discriminatory 

reasons, and supports that allegation with sufficient factual 

detail to state a plausible claim. This is sufficient to survive 

a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Jones v. Ottenberg’s Bakers, __ 

F. Supp. 2d __, 2013 WL 6119322, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2013) 

(because “an allegedly racially motivated deviation from 

standard procedure may raise an inference of discrimination at 

the motion-to-dismiss stage,” plaintiff stated a claim by 

alleging that his employer targeted him for racially 

discriminatory discipline that deviated from its standard 

response); Winston v. Clough, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 
12 

2010) (plaintiff stated a claim for racial discrimination by 

alleging that he was subject to discipline that “was motivated 

by [his] race and color” and “that other co-workers outside of 

[his] protected class” engaged in the same behavior for which he 

was disciplined “yet none was suspended or disciplined for it”).

The Court emphasizes that its role at this stage of the 

proceedings is to review Mr. Edwards’s pro se complaint 

liberally to determine whether it contains factual allegations 

sufficient to make out “a plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 679. While the complaint is not the model of 

clarity, it contains sufficient factual content to support an 

inference of discrimination at this stage. Accordingly, 

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Title VII 

discrimination claim is denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is 

hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. An appropriate Order 

accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

 United States District Judge 

 December 20, 2013