alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### American Tie & Timber Company, *a Corporation, Plaintiff in Error,*v. Sherman Washington, *Defendant in Error.*

Where pleas have been filed in an action at law, and at a term of the court thereafter issue is joined on the pleas and the case is tried in the absence of defendant’s counsel, the judgment will not be reversed on that ground, in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion in the court' below in proceeding to a trial under the circumstances stated.

This case was decided by Division A.

*118Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Suwannee County.

The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

*A. E. Leslie,*for Plintifl: in Error;

*L. E. Roberson,*for Defendant in Error.

Whitfield, C. J.

— The declaration filed December 5, 1910, by Sherman Washington in the Circuit Court for Suwannee County, was in the common counts for $248.00. On February 6, 1911, the defendant corporation filed two pleas, one of never was indebted, and the other a special pleas of set off with a bill of particulars attached. On May 9,1911, during a term of the court the plaintiff joined issue on the two pleas. Sec. 1447, Gen. Stats. A trial was had the same day in the absence of defendant’s counsel, and judgment for the plaintiff in $259.20, was rendered, to which the defendant took writ of error. The defendant in error is not represented in this court, -but as the writ of error was duly recorded under the statutes this court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the defendant in error for the purposes of this case.

It is contended that the joinder of issue on the pleas during the term of the court and the trial of the cause on the same day in the absence of counsel for the defendant, was such a surprise to counsel as to make the judgment erroneous and subject to reversal on writ of error.

This may be a hard case, but no such abuse of discretion is shown in the conduct of the trial as requires a reversal of the judgment. The pleas were filed February 6th, 1911, and it was the duty of the plaintiff to reply *119thereto or join issue thereon, at least by the ensuing term of the court, and it was the duty of the defendant’s counsel to be present in the court at the time the issues could have been joined and the trial of the action proceeded with under the law. See Flournoy v. Munson Bros., 51 Fla. 198, 41 South. Rep. 398.

It is stated in the brief that counsel for the defendant below was absent in Tallahassee as an attache of the Florida Legislature when the issues were joined and the trial had. Whether this was, or was not, a good reason for a continuance of the cause was for the determination of the trial court. Only the record proper is here, and there is nothing to indicate such an abuse of discretion by the trial court as calls for a reversal of the judgment, therefore the judgment is affirmed.

Shackleford and Cockrell, J. J., concur;

Taylor, Hocker and Parkhill, J. J., concur in the opinion.
EXHIBIT
10.40
  PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
 
   Base Salary
  Management Stipend
  Annual Incentive Award




---



##### 



Equity
 nd rd
 Employee Benefits




---



##### 








---



##### 



Executive Benefits




---



##### 



Professional Requirements
  or and




---



##### 



Business Information and Non-Competition
    Acceptance of Employment




---



##### 




    
    Personnel Information Form (Section A)
    
    Employment and Education History Form
    
    I-9 Form
    
    W-4 Form
    
    Employee Authorization for Automatic Deposits Form (optional)
    
    Diners Club Corporate Card Application
    
    Agreement To Protect Confidential Information
    
    Non-Harassment/Non-Discrimination...: Acknowledgement Form
    
    Code of Business Conduct: Acknowledgment Form
    
    Code of Business Conduct and Ethics: Acknowledgement Form
    
    Insider Trading Policy: Acknowledgment Form
    
    Policy Statement Prohibiting ...: Acknowledgment Form
    
    IT Security Policies and Procedures: Acknowledgment Form
    
    Business Travel and Expense Reporting: Acknowledgement Form
  Sincerely,
Gary D. Burnison
Chief Executive Officer   /s/ Byrne Mulrooney
Byrne Mulrooney
    
    /s/ Gary D. Burnison
Date
#### § 1602.10 Employer's exemption from reporting requirements.

If an employer claims that the preparation or filing of the report would create undue hardship, the employer may apply to the Commission for an exemption from the requirements set forth in this part, according to instruction 5. If an employer is engaged in activities for which the reporting unit criteria described in section 5 of the instructions are not readily adaptable, special reporting procedures may be required. If an employer seeks to change the date for filing its Standard Form 100 or seeks to change the period for which data are reported, an alternative reporting date or period may be permitted. In such instances, the employer should so advise the Commission by submitting to the Commission or its delegate a specific written proposal for an alternative reporting system prior to the date on which the report is due.

[56 FR 35755, July 26, 1991]
#### STATE ex CITY ICE CO v STEGNER etc

Ohio Supreme Court

No 21502.

Decided April 17, 1929

Syllabus by

MATTHIAS, J.

REAL ESTATE

.(510 Z) The provision of a zoning ordinance, limiting the subsequent addition, extension or substitution of business buildings or the use thereof, existing, in a residence district at the time of the enactment of such ordinance, where it does not appear that such restrictions have no real or substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare, is a valid exercise of the police power and is not violative of either the state or federal constitution.

Marshall, CJ, Kinkade, Jones, Day and Allen, JJ, concur.
#### § 93.1 Applicability.

This part prescribes special air traffic rules for operating aircraft in certain areas described in this part, unless otherwise authorized by air traffic control.

[Doc. No. FAA-2002-13235, 68 FR 9795, Feb. 28, 2003]
§ 1602.21 Preservation of records made or kept. ( a ) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1602.14, every person subject to § 1602.20 (b) or (c) shall preserve the list of applicants or application forms, as the case may be, for a period of 2 years from the date the application was received, except that in those instances where an annual report is required by the Commission calling for statistics as to the sex, and the race, color, or national origin of apprentices, the person required to file the report shall preserve the list and forms for a period of 2 years or the period of a successful applicant's apprenticeship, whichever is longer. Persons required to file Report EEO-2, or other reports calling for information about the operation of an apprenticeship program similar to that required on Report EEO-2, shall preserve any other record made solely for the purpose of completing such reports for a period of 1 year from the due date thereof.
( b ) Other records: Except to the extent inconsistent with the law or regulation of any State or local fair employment practices agency, or of any other Federal or State agency involved in the enforcement of an antidiscrimination program in apprenticeship, other records relating to apprenticeship made or kept by a person required to file Report EEO-2, including but not necessarily limited to requests for reasonable accommodation, test papers completed by applicants for apprenticeship and records of interviews with applicants, shall be kept for a period of 2 years from the date of the making of the record. Where a charge of discrimination has been filed, or an action brought by the Attorney General under title VII, the ADA, or GINA the respondent shall preserve all records relevant to the charge or action until final disposion of the charge or the action. The term “records relevant to the charge,” for example, would include applications, forms or test papers completed by an unsuccessful applicant and by all other candidates for the same position as that for which the charging party applied and was rejected. The date of “final disposition of the charge or the action” means the date of expiration of the statutory period within which a charging party may bring an action in a U.S. District Court or, where an action is brought either by a charging party or by the Attorney General, the date on which such litigation is terminated.
[32 FR 10660, July 20, 1967, as amended at 56 FR 35755, July 26, 1991; 77 FR 5398, Feb. 3, 2012; 89 FR 11170, Feb. 14, 2024; 89 FR 46021, May 28, 2024]
#### EAST OHIO GAS CO v DANIEL

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No. 10279.

Decided October 21, 1929

Messrs. Tolies, Hogsett & Ginn, Cleveland, for Gas Co.

Mr. Irwin Greene, Esq., Cleveland, for Daniel.

VICKERY, PJ.

Here are two men in a common enterprise, with the odor of gas so prevalent that it could be smelled everywhere, searching for. the leak and striking, a match, and the usual thing resulted that happens when one is searching for a gas leak with a lighted match. We think the record shows, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in that both he and his brother were engaged in a common enterprise, and it is not necessary to invoke the doctrine of imputed negligence because, as already stated, they joined in a common enterprise, and it shows that they were guilty of contributory negligence.

Personally, the writer of this opinion thinks that there is no evidence that is competent in the record to show that the Gas Company was to blame in any way. The plumber testified that he later found a leak under the porch of the house on the premises owned by the landlord and that the Gas Company was responsible for that leak, none of which is competent evidence. Ordinarily, the equipment from the gas mains into and through the house belongs to the owner of the property and it may be put in not by the Gas Company but by some other plumber.. Of course, it may be put in by the Gas Company, but in such event it gets paid f_Qr it and the equipment on the premises still belongs to‘ the property owner; and there is nothing in this record to show, except the incompetent testimony of the plumber, who knew nothing about it, how this equipment was installed or to who mit belonged.

Of course, if the Gas Company has assumed the duty of inspection, and if through a faulty inspection this explosion occurred, it might be responsible if the other question of contributory negligence had not intervened. There is nothing in this record to show that the gas escaped from the mains owned and operated and controlled by the Gas Company. Of course, it is claimed and the. claim is probably true, that none but the Gas Company could turn the gas into the meter. Usually the meter is detached and the gas is turned off when the house is unoccupied and in order to charge a new tenant with gas, it is necessary to have the gas turned on at the meter and that, of course, is the duty of the Gas Company, and no one *692else has that right. But that alone would not make it responsible for the condition of the pipes over which it has no control from the main into the house up the meter. This part of this opinion voices the sentiments only of this particular member of the court, but the reversal is made upon the ground that the evidence shows that the two men were joined in a common enterprise and that they were guilty of contributory negligence in striking. the match when the room was filled and permeated with g.as as the evidence shows it was in this case.

Sullivan, J. concur in judgment.

Levine, J, dissents.
Exhibit
13.1







PRINCIPAL
EXECUTIVE OFFICER CERTIFICATION


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350





In
connection with this Annual Report of Ultrapetrol (Bahamas) Limited (the
"Company") on Form 20-F/A for the year ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") on or about the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Felipe
Menendez Ross, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)  The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




This
certification is made solely for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, and not
for any other purpose.  A signed original of this written statement
has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and
furnished to the SEC or its staff upon request.





Date:
November 25, 2009





/s/ Felipe Menendez
Ross


Felipe
Menendez Ross


Principal
Executive Officer
#### INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION v POLCEN

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No. 9383.

Decided March 4, 1929

Messrs. Gilbert Bettman, Cincinnati, Arthur Kr,auss and R. D. Metzner, Cleveland, for Industrial Commission.

Messrs. Locher. Green & Woods, Cleveland, for Polcen,

EPITOMIZED OPINION

Where plaintiff had been employed for upwards of ten years in a chemical plant and at the time complained of and for a considerable period theretofore had been working in the chemical department, and *719it appeared that employes in this department were subjected to sulphuric fumes and vapors which caused them to cough and sneeze, a violent coughing spell 'which seized plaintiff while so employed, resulting in an inguinal hernia causing disablement, entitles him to compensation for an injury arising out of his employment; nor can such condition be attributed to an occupational disease.

Opinion by

ROBERTS, J.

MIDDLETON & MAUCK, J. J., concur.
§ 77.3 Definitions. For the purpose of this part: *Non-precision instrument runway* means a runway having an existing instrument approach procedure utilizing air navigation facilities with only horizontal guidance, or area type navigation equipment, for which a straight-in non-precision instrument approach procedure has been approved, or planned, and for which no precision approach facilities are planned, or indicated on an FAA planning document or military service military airport planning document.
*Planned or proposed airport* is an airport that is the subject of at least one of the following documents received by the FAA: ( 1 ) Airport proposals submitted under 14 CFR part 157.
( 2 ) Airport Improvement Program requests for aid.
( 3 ) Notices of existing airports where prior notice of the airport construction or alteration was not provided as required by 14 CFR part 157.
( 4 ) Airport layout plans.
( 5 ) DOD proposals for airports used only by the U.S. Armed Forces.
( 6 ) DOD proposals on joint-use (civil-military) airports.
( 7 ) Completed airport site selection feasibility study.
*Precision instrument runway* means a runway having an existing instrument approach procedure utilizing an Instrument Landing System (ILS), or a Precision Approach Radar (PAR). It also means a runway for which a precision approach system is planned and is so indicated by an FAA-approved airport layout plan; a military service approved military airport layout plan; any other FAA planning document, or military service military airport planning document.
*Public use airport* is an airport available for use by the general public without a requirement for prior approval of the airport owner or operator.
*Seaplane base* is considered to be an airport only if its sea lanes are outlined by visual markers.
*Utility runway* means a runway that is constructed for and intended to be used by propeller driven aircraft of 12,500 pounds maximum gross weight and less.
*Visual runway* means a runway intended solely for the operation of aircraft using visual approach procedures, with no straight-in instrument approach procedure and no instrument designation indicated on an FAA-approved airport layout plan, a military service approved military airport layout plan, or by any planning document submitted to the FAA by competent authority.
[No. 49377-9-I.

Division One.

January 6, 2003.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Rachnna Chanrat Ly, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 01-8-03008-8, Julie Spector, J., entered September 28, 2001. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Coleman, J., concurred in by Cox, A.C.J., and Grosse, J.
#### BRANNON v WILMINGTON (city)

Ohio Appeals, 1st Dist, Clinton Co

No. 77.

Decided July 16, 1928

Jos M Brant for Brannon.

R H Hildebrant, City Sol., Wilmington, for city.

PER CURIAM

We are aware of the line of cases holding that “when the penalty prescribed in the ordiance is in excess of that authorized by the charter, the ordinance is not void, and the penalty may be enforced to the extent that it does not exceed the lawful limit.” 19 R. C. L. page 812, title “Municipal Corporations,” section 17. But we are of the *137opinion that the ordinance in question, which provides for a penalty as high as $1000. is so in conflict with the express provisions of section 3628 of the General Code as to be void. Petersburg v. Metzger, 21 Ill. 205. New Orleans v. Costello, 14 La. Ann. 37. Schreveport vs. Draiss, Ill La. 511. State vs. Babcock, 112 Iowa, 250. Merkee v Rochester, 13 Hun (20 N. Y. Sup. Court) 157, Assaria v. Wells, 68 Kans. 787. In Re Van Teyl, 71 Kans. 659. People v. Quayle, 204 N. Y. Supp. 641. Commonwealth v. Meletsky, 203 Mass. 241. Green v. Fitchburg, 219 Mass. 121. Leland v. Commissioners, 42 N. J. L. 375.

In Leland v. Commissioners, supra, the statute authorizes a municipality to assess a penalty “not exceeding $100.00 or imprisonment in jail not exceeding 10 days.” The ordinance stipulated a fine “not exceeding $50. or imprisonment not exceeding 10 days, or both.” The ordinance was held void.

In Commonwealth v. Maletsky, supra, the statute authorizes a fine of $20, and the ordinance provided for a fine of not less than $20 nor more than $100. The ordinance was held void.

In Assaria v. Wells, supra, the statute authorized a municipality to prescribe a penalty of not exceeding $100.00 The ordinance prescribed a penalty of $100, or 30 days imprisonment, or both. The court, in holding the ordinance void, said:

> “An ordinance x x x failing to prescribe penalties within the limits fixed by the legislature is void and cannot be enforced.”

Where, as in the instant case, the ordinance prohibits the doing, of an act, and attaches thereto a single provision as to penalty, the invalidity of the penal section invalidates the entire ordinance, inasmuch as the severing of the sanction renders the ordinance futile and ineffective.

To hold this ordinance valid would be to hold that when an ordinance is, on its face, contrary to a statute, prosecution can be had under the ordinance and judgment pronounced under the statute. The ordinance would thus not be the basis of the proceedings, since the sentence would be imposed under the statute.

It is within the power of the City to enact a valid ordinance in conformity with the statute.

Inasmuch as we find the ordinance invalid, it is not necessary to pass on the other alleged errors.

The judgment of the court of common pleas and the judgment of the municipal court will be reversed and set aside, and the cause will be remanded to the court of common pleas with instructions to issue a mandate to the trial court ordering the discharge of Brannon.

Hamilton, PJ, Mills and Cushing, JJ, concur.
O rder filed June 7 , 202 1



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________ 

### No. 11

- 2 1

- 00 107

- C V

__________


### IN RE SENTRY INSURANCE A MUTUAL COMPANY

O riginal Mandamus Proceeding

O R D E R In conjunction with an original mandamus proceeding, Relator
, Sentry Insurance a Mutual Company
, has filed in this court an opposed emergency motion to stay the trial court proceedings. This matter stems from Cause No. DO

- 92

- 17 , 178
in the 32nd District Co urt of Nolan County, Texas

— a dispute relating to the recovery of benefits pursuant to the Worker s ’ Compensation Statute that was in
effect in 1990

. See Act of Dec. 11 , 1989, 71st Leg., 2d C .S., ch. 1, § 17.18 , 19 89
Tex. Gen. Laws 1 , 122 . The petition for writ of mandamus specifically relates to a June 1, 2021 order in which the Honorable Glen Harrison denied Relator’s May 26, 2021 plea to the jurisdiction as to certain claims contained in the seventh amended2

answer and counterclaim filed by Re al Party in Interest, Donald Bristow, on April 8,
2021. We have requested that Real Party in Interest file a response to the petition
for writ of mandamus. In the opposed motion for emergency relief, Relator requests that we stay all proceedings in the t rial court, including the trial that is currently set for June 15, 2021, so that this court may consider the merits of the petition for writ of mandamus. We grant the opposed motion for emergency relief and hereby stay all proceedings in the trial court, including the June 15 trial, pending further order of this court or final disposition of this mandamus proceeding. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 52.10(b).

PER CURIAM

June 7, 2021
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter , J. , and Williams , J.
#### AUSTIN C SAYLER & ASSOCIATES INC STANDARD SAND & MACHINE CO

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 9939.

Decided May 6, 1929

*332J W Bergeron, Cleveland, for Sayler etc.

Schaefer & Lawrence, Cleveland, for Machine Co.

SULLIVAN, J.

From a reading of the record it is quite clear that as to the question of competency of the or,al proof, the evidence was based upon the. theory of inducement instead of fraud, and it is well settled that an inducement which resulted in a contract, if it contained elements of misrepresentation and fraud, is competent by way of evidence where it is sought to set the contract aside. Such a status is not an attempt- to invalidate the written terms of a contract by oral proof, because the terms of the contract itself are not in question. The issue, instead of being whether it is an oral or a written contract, is whether the contract was induced by fraud or misrepresentation and evidence concerning this issue is always competent.

Parol evidence is often times admissible to show the surrounding circumstances under which a contract is made, and in the instant case these surrounding circumstances under the record in the case constitute the inducement which is set up in the allegations of the answer, and it then becomes a question not what the terms of the contract are, but whether a false inducement was the procuring cause of the execution of the contract.

We unanimously view the question in the light of an inducement as shown by the record, and thus we have come to the conclusion that there is no error of a prejudicial nature which would warrant a reversal of the judgment and hence the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed.

Vickery, PJ, and Levine, J, concur.