### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00401- CR NO. 03-03-00402- CR NO. 03-03-00403- CR

Saul Hur ta do, App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 299TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NOS . 30209 67, 902 0998 & 9020 999, HO NORAB LE JON N. WIS SER, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
F oll ow ing a se ri ou s car ac c ide nt in whi c h a chi ld wa s kille d an d sev e ra l ot he r p e op le
wer e injured, appellant Saul H urtado was indicted for manslaug hter and three counts of ag g ravated assault with a dea dly

wea pon. The case s wer e consolidated for trial, and a jury convicted a

ppellant of the le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e of c ri min a lly ne g lig e nt ho mic ide and tw o o f t he a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult s. The trial c ourt sentenc ed appe llant to f ive y ear s’ imprisonment for ea ch off ense, w ith the sentence s running concur

re n t l y , and made aff

irmative finding s of use of a deadly wea pon in eac h offe nse. Appellant ra ises four points of er ror, arg uing that the trial court e rre d in admitting scientific e vidence without requiring the State to establish its reliability , the evidence is leg ally and fa ctually insufficient to support the convictions, and the e vidence is leg ally insufficient to prove the dea dly wea pon fi nd ing s. We a ff

ir m th e c on vic tio ns .A p e r s o nis le g a ll y in to xic a te d

if h e h a s ana lc o h o l c o n c e n trati o no f 0
. 0 8 o r mo r e . T e x. 1 Pen. Code Ann. § 49.01(2) (B ) (West 2003). Rule 702 provides for

the admission of expert testimony . Tex. R. Evi d. 702. 2 2 Adm ission of E vidence I n his first point of error , ap pellant contends that the trial court e rre d in admitting scientific e vidence that he ar g ues wa s not shown to be reliable. The e vidence of which he complains is the result of a g as chromatogr aphy test perf ormed on a

blood sample taken f

rom appe llant after the ac cident, which show ed his blood had a 0.04 alcohol conce ntration. Appellant complains that 1 the cour t erre d by admitting the e vidence “without requiring the [S tate] to establish its reliability .” Ex pert testimony

may be admitted under

rule 702 of the rules of e vidence if the trial 2 court de termines the e vidence is reliable. Ke lly v . S tat e , 824 S.W .2d 568, 572-73 (Te x . Crim. App. 1992). To be considere d reliable , scientific evidenc e must satisfy three criter ia: “(a ) the unde rlying scientific theor

y must be valid; (b) the tec hnique applying the theory must b e v al i d ; an d (c) the technique must have been pr operly applied on t h e o cc as i o n in question.” Id . at 573. Howe ver, “[t] rial cour

ts are not r equire d to re-inve nt the scientific whee l in ever y trial.” He rn an de

z v . S tat e , 116 S.W .3d 26, 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Once a scie ntific principle, theor y , or methodolog y

has b ee n acc epted by

the profe ssional community and the tria l courts, other c ourts may take judicial notice of the validity

of that theory
. Id
. The transportation code provides t hat in a prose cution such as this, evidence of a person’ s alcohol concentration is admissibl e if shown by the ana ly sis of blood take n at th e re qu e st of a peace of fi c e r a nd in a sanit ary pla c e by a qu a lif ie d me dic a l pr of

e ssi on a l. Ga rc ia v . S

tat e , 1 1 2 S. W. 3 d

8 3 9 , 8 4 8 ( T e x. A p p . — H o u s to n[1 4 th D is t. ] 2 0 0 3 , n o p e t. ) ( c it in g T e x. Transp. Code A nn. §§ 724.017(a) , .064 (West 1999)).509 U.S. 579 (1993). 3 824 S.W .2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). 4 3 A tri a l c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n o n th e a dmi ssi bil ity of e v ide nc e is r e vie we d f

or an a bu se of discre tion. Mo ntgom e ry v . S tat e , 810 S.W .2d 372, 378-79 (Te x . Crim. App. 1990). When there
are mul tip le po ssi ble g ro un ds that c an be su mm ari zed un de r o ne g e ne ra l ob

je c tio n a nd “ it s e e ms from conte x t that [ the objecting ] party failed e ffe ctively to c ommunicate his de sire, then r eviewing courts should not hesitate to hold that a ppellate c omplaints arising f rom the eve nt have be en lost.” Me y e rs v . S tat e , 8 65 S.W. 2d

52 3, 52 4- 25 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 19 93 , p e t. r e f’ d) (t o prese rve error , defe ndant m ust make tim ely and specific objec tion, which “allow[s] the trial cour t the opportuni ty to make a de termination on the objec tion and then to proce ed with the trial unde r the pr op e r p ro c e dura l and su

bs tanti ve mann e rs , as ap pr op ri a te ly c or re c te d by the tr ia l c ourt ” ; a

pp e llate complaint “that does not c omport with the trial objection pre sents nothing f or re view”)
. Glenn Ha rbi son, chemist with the Austin Pol ice De partment, testified that he perf ormed a g as chr omatog raphy

test and that the test “has been around since the 40’s and 50’s. I t’s been a pretty standardized wor

khorse in the c hemistry

field.” Appellant objecte d that the State’s p ro s ec u t o r h ad“n o tl ai d

t h e p ro p er

p re d i ca t e” fo r t h e t es t i m o n y , s t at i n g:
She [t he prosecutor] needs to show under a 702 standard—702, Rules of Evidence , the re liability

—besides the r eleva

nce she needs to show also it’s reliable e vidence , and she h as n ’t g one throug h any of the fa ctors under

[ Daubert v. M

errell Dow Pharmace uticals, Inc. , ] . . . or Ke lly v . S tat e [ ]. . . . Ther e are cer

tain standards that 3 4 she has to e s t ab l i s h scientifica lly to show reliability

of this evidence befor e it’s admissible.The trial court was corr ect in its ruling that the g as chr omatog raphy test has bee n proven 5 reliable
. Se e Com bs v . S

tat e , 6 S.W .3d 319, 322 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (discussing reliability

of g as chr omatog raphy

test in identify ing substanc es). Cf. He rn an de z v . S tat e , 116 S.W .3d 26, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (no evide nce to show ma chine’ s scientific re liability ). Ap pe lla nt’ s c omp la int

is s ome wh a t ambi g uo us even on a pp e a l—h e state s th a t hi s 6 complaint is not about the underlying sc ientific theory but the “re liability of the testing perf ormed on appellant’ s blood,” but g oes on to say that the trial cour

t did not require the State “to establish the 4 The trial c ourt responde d that “evide nce on this piec e of instrumentation has been a cce pted for e ons and is so firmly established that there ’s no need to e ng ag e in f urther time e x penditure” and over ruled the objection. On c ross-examination, appellant aske d whet h er appellant’s blood alc ohol level
rea ched the st an d ar d o f l eg al intox ication. Har bison answer ed that it did not, and appellant
co n cl u d edh i s qu es t i o n i n g.

Appellant is corr ect t h at the State did not present e vidence of the c onditions under which appe llant’s blood sample was teste d. Howeve r, in his objection, appella n t re fe rr ed to t he Daubert/Kelly fac tors, whi ch ad d re ss the reliability of a the ory , and rule 702, arguing that the scientific r eliability

of the test had not be en esta blished. Appellan t ’s o b j ec tion attacked the under ly in g me th o d o lo gy

o f the g as chr omatog raphy

test, rather

than questioning the conditions under wh ic h th e te st w a s per fo rm e d. Whe n the tr ia l court ov e rr ule d the ob

je c tio n, makin g it c le ar t

hat it understood appe llant to be objecting to the t heory underly ing the test as opposed to this particular te st, a pp e lla nt did no t cla

ri fy his ob je c tio n o r o bje c t f

ur the r. On c ro ss- e xami natio n, a

pp e lla nt d id 5 not raise a

ny questions or conc erns a bout the test conditions, Harbison’s experienc e with or knowledg e about the t est, or t he mac hine’s per formanc e. Se e Ke lly , 824 S.W .2d at 573. B y failing to clarify or objec t further , appellant waived his spe cific objection to the reliability of this particular te st. Se e Me

y e rs , 865 S.W .2d at 525. We overr ule appe llant’s first point of err or. 6reliability of the scientific testing at issue,” c iting to Da ub e rt , Ke lly , and Hernande z , w hic h a dd

re ss how an unde rlying sc ientific theory or piec e of sc ientific testing equipment i s to be shown re liable.

5 Suf fi ciency of the Evidence I n his se c on d an d thir d poin ts of e rr or , ap pe lla nt ar g ue s tha t th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly and factual ly

in s u f f ic ie n t t o s u

p p o rt h is c o n v ic ti o n . I nh is s e c o n d p o in t, h e c o n te n d s th a t t

h e jur y char g e did not require the j ury to find that his vehicle struc k the vehicle in which the victims were passeng ers a

nd that the “manne r and me ans of c ommitt ing the offe nse as f ound by the jury wer e not shown t o have c aused” the victims’ injuries. I n his third point, appellant argues that the other dr ive r’ s c on du c t w a s a

c on c ur re nt c a us e of the a c c ide nt t

hat “w a s su ff

ic ie nt t o p ro du c e the vic tim s’
re su lti nginj ur ie s” and

that a pp e lla nt’ s c on du c t w a s in su ff

ic ie nt t o c a

us e the a c c ide nt.
Fa c tua l Su mm ar

y On the evening of May

12, 2002, Pedro Jaimes (“J aimes”) left his sister’s house, dr ivi nghis c hil dr e n, Ne lsi , w ho wa s a lmo st t wo y e ars ’ old , a

nd Pe dr ito , a no the r s ist e r n a me d M ari a J aimes, who wa s three months preg nant, her husband, and the ir son. J aimes testified that he had driven a long the same two-la ne roa d many times in the past; the lanes a re divided by

double y ellow lines, indicating a no-pa ssing zone. There is ve ry littl e shoulder a nd a stee p g rade to a dra inag e ditch on either side. Ma

ria a nd J aimes testified that Jaimes stopped to wa i t t o m ak e a left turn, and appellant, who w as driving the ca r behind them, star

ted honking and acting as if he was g oing to try to pa ss. J aimes decide d not to turn beca use of onc oming tra ffic a

nd instead dec ided to drive a head to a point where the roa d widens into four lane s. He a cce lerated from a stop, try ing to g et bac k up to the s peed

li mi t. A p p e ll an t t

h e np u ll e d

in to th e le f

t l an e to p a s s Ja im e s ; Ja im e s s a id th a t at tha t6

point, he was no long er acc eler ating , but was proba bly driving about thirty -five miles pe r hour. As appellant trie d to pass, a van a pproac hed from the opposite direc tion, a nd in a n attempt to avoid a head- on collision, appellant moved ba ck i n t o t h e rig ht lane, trying to g et ahe ad of Jaimes’s truck. A p p e l l an t ’ s c ar

s t r u c k Ja i m e s ’ s t r

u c k , an d b o t h v e h i c l e s r ano f

f t h e r o a d an d i n t o a d i t c h
. M a ri a miscarr ied her

baby and suff ere d inju ri es t o her he ad, hea rt, ribs, and ba ck; her

husband suffe red head a nd back injurie s; and J aimes suffe red a broken shoulder . Nelsi, who wa s not in a child seat or otherw ise restra ined in the truck, died as a result of her injuries. The medic al examiner testified that Nelsi might have survived the acc ident if she had be en prope rly restra ined. Mari a c ou ld n ot r e me mbe r w he the r Ja ime s w a s a c c e le ratin g a s a p p e l l ant t ri e d to pa ss. J aimes did not rec all that he slowed or brake d when he noticed appellant trying to pass just before the a c c ide nt, no r d id h e kn owho w fas t appel lant w a s g oin g , b ut h e sa id a pp e lla nt p a sse d h im qu ic kly . Jai me s w a s n ot fam ili ar w iththe tr ans po rt a tio n c od e pr ov isi on tha t r e qu ir e s a

dr ive r t o maintain or re duce spe ed whe n being passed by another car . S e e T ex . T ra n sp. Code Ann. § 54 5. 053( b) (2 ) ( Wes t 19 99 ). As ke d w he the r h e c ou ld h a ve mov e d o ve r t o a llo w the c ar t o p a ss, he sa id, “ Ido n’ t kn ow . M ay be . I do n’ t kn ow . Ev e ry

thi ng we nt so fa st. I do n’ t know
. I wa s ju st trying to stay

in my lane.” He testified that he usually had a ba by seat for Nelsi, but he had r emoved it s o a ll o f h is p a sse ng e rs c ou ld f it. Jaim e s d e nie d b e ingang ry , r a c ing , o r p lay ingg a me s w ith
a pp e lla nt and sa id he wa s no t a c c e le ratin g to s top a pp e lla nt f ro m pa ssi ng , b ut w a s si mpl y tr y ingto
ma int a in h is l ane . A sk e d w he the r Ja ime s cou ld h a ve slo we d a nd a llo we d a

pp e lla nt t o p a ss, Mari a said, “B ut he wouldn’t g o past. . . . I t’s almos t like he wa s playing at like, and that’s what we t h o u g h ta b o u ta f t e r w ar d s . H o w c o m e h e d i dn ’ tj u s tg o ?”7 A p o l i ce office r testified that a witness to the acc ident said it looked like the two vehicles ha d been dr agrac ing. D etec tive Mark B rec kenridg e did a p ar t i al rec onstruction of the
acc ident and dete rmined that Jaimes hit his brakes shor tly befor e the c ollisi on. He conclude d that
a p p e l l an t ’ s c ar

w a s t r a v e l i n g a l m o s ts i x t y m i l e s p e r h o u r an d t h a t J a i m e s w a s dr i v i n g b e t w e e nf o rt yfive a nd six ty miles per hour; the s peed limi t is thirty -five miles per hour. Br ecke nridg e testified, “Speed mig ht have play ed a minor r ole in this one, but the major role w as the ve hicle beingin the
no passing zone a

nd coming back to the r ight a nd trying to g et bac k into the lane.” H e also testified that he sme lle d a lc oh ol o n a pp e lla nt’ s b re a th a ft e r t

he a c c ide nt. Ricky Richardson witnessed the accident and testified t hat hi s attention was dra wn to the vehicles when he hear d “a loud revving of engine s like car s coming at a high rate of spee d”; he def initely hear d two eng ines revving . He testified that t h e t wo v eh i cles we re “ jockey ing f or po sit ion ” an d

t h a tt h e r e w a s a

h i l l t h a tw o u l d

h a v e b l o c k e d

a p p e l l an t ’ s v i e w o f

o n c o m i n g c ar s. Richardson e stimated the vehicle s were g oing f orty or for ty -five miles pe r hour a

nd testified that as appellant trie d to pass, J aimes, rather than pulling over s l i gh t l y o r slowing down, sped up to stop appellant f

rom passing . The two ve hicles “touc hed and c ollided a little bit,” continued for a short distance, collided ag ain, and lef t the roadw ay . Two of a

ppellant’s fr iends wer e following appellant’ s
car and witnessed the acc ident. They testified that J aimes wa s driving slowly until appellant tried to pass, at which point J aimes ac cele rate d. They did not see J aimes si g nal a turn or come to a stop
and sa id h e wa s d

ri vin g slo wl y

and ha d tr a ff ic ba c ke d u

p b e hin d h im. David L y sek did a full acc ident rec onstruction for this ca se and be lieved the ve hicles
wer e g oing a

bout six ty miles per hour. H e said he had never see n a for ty mile per hour c ollisi on8

cause this kind of damag e. B ased on ma rks left on the r oad and da mag e to the vehic les, L y sek concluded that J aimes’s truc k was g oing f aster tha n appellant’ s car

at the time of impac t and disag ree d with Bre ckenr idge ’s conc lusion that J aimes’s truc k had bra ked bef ore the collision. Standard of Review Whe n re vie wi ng the le g a l su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , w e vie w a ll o f t he e vid e nc e in the light most favor able to the verdict and ask whe ther a rational finde r of f

act c ould have f

ound the essential ele ments of the offe nse beyond a re asonable doubt. J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 2 3 S. W. 3 d

1 , 7 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); W

ink le yv . S tate , 123 S.W .3d 707, 710 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). I n a fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w, we vie w the e vid e nc e in a ne utr a l lig ht an d will se t asi de the ve rd ic t on ly if it i s so c on tr ary

to t he ov e rw he lmi ngwe ig ht o f t he e vid e nce as to be clearl y wr on g and

un jus t. Cle wis v . S

tate , 9 2 2 S
. W
. 2 d

1 2 6 , 1 2 9 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 6 ); W inkley , 123 S. W. 3 d

a t 7 1 1
. We should ex erc ise our fa ct jurisdiction “only to preve nt a manife stly

unjust result.” W

i nkley , 123 S
. W
. 3 d at 7 1 1 (c i t i n g Cle wis , 922 S.W .2d at 135). I t is for the fa ct-finde r to resolve any evidentiar

y conflicts, eva luate witness cr edibility , and dete rmine the weig ht to be g iven the evidenc e. Id . “Any inconsistencies i n the evidenc e should be re solved in favor of the ve rdict.” Id
. (c i t i n g Moreno v

. Sta te , 755 S.W .2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)).
An aly sis The jury convicted a

ppel l an t o f cr iminally

neg lige nt homicide, which is a lesse ri n cl u d edo ff

en s e o f t h e c h ar gedo ff

en s e o f m an s l au gh t er , an d aggr av at edas s au l t
. T h e c h ar ge instructed the jury

that it could convict appe llant if it found he ca used the victims’ injuries by9

“oper ating a motor vehic le af ter c onsuming a

n alcoholic be vera g e [ or]
. . . at an unsafe speed unde r the then existi ng conditions, and/or by passing or attempting to pa ss . . . in a no passing zone, and/or by failing to maintain assured c lear distance, a

nd/or by failing to maintain control” of his ve hicl e. Appellant ar g ues that bec ause the char g e did not require a finding that his car struc k J aimes’s truc k, the manner

in which he wa s found to have c ommitt ed the offe nse was not shown to have ca used the
v i ct i m s ’ i n

j u ri es . Ho we v er , we m ea s u re t h e s u ff i ci en cy o f t h e e v i d en ce n o t aga i n s t t h e j u ry ch ar ge actua lly g iven but ag ainst the eleme nts of the offe nse as de fined by a “hy pothetically

corr ect” char g e. Ma lik v . S tat e , 953 S.W .2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (“S u ch a cha rg e would be one that
acc urate ly

sets out the law, is auth o rized by the indictment, does not unnec essar ily incre ase the State’s bu rden of

pr oo f o r u

nn e c e ssa ri ly re str ic t th e State ’s the or ie s o f l ia bil ity , a nd a de qu a te ly descr ibes the par

ticular off ense f or which the defe ndant was trie d.”). The ref ore, w e will consider the suffic iency

of the e vidence as if the c harg e had r equire d a f i n ding that appellant ca

used the victims’ injuries by

striking the tr

uck with his car
. A per son commits criminally neg lige nt homicide if he c auses a nother’ s d eath by
cr im in a l n e g li g e n c e . T e x. Pe n . Co d e A n n . § 1 9
. 0 5 ( a ) ( We s t 2 0 0 3 )
. “ A p e r s o na c ts w it h c r im in al neg lige nce, or

is criminally

neg lige nt, with r espec t to the circ umstances surr ounding his c onduct or the re sult of his con d u ct when he oug ht to be awa re of a substantial and unjustifiable r isk that the circ umstances e x ist or the result will oc cur” ; the risk must be “of a nature and deg ree that the fa ilure to p e rc e ive it co ns tit

ute s a gr os s dev ia tio n fr om the sta nd ard of c are that an o rd ina ry pe rs on wo uld exercise under all the circ umstances.” Id
. § 6.03(d) ( West 2003). A person c ommits ag g ravated assault if he c auses se rious bodily injury to another pe rson or uses a deadly wea pon during the10

assault. Id . § 22.02(a) (West Supp. 2004-05). A dea dly wea pon is “any

thing that in the manne r of its us e or intended use is capa ble of c ausing death or

serious bodily

injury .” Id
. § 1
. 0 7 ( a ) ( 17 )(B) (West Supp. 2004-05) (empha sis added).

Appellant ar g ues that Jaimes’s conduct was a concur rent cause of the ac cident such that the evidenc e is insufficient to support his convictions. We disag ree .

J aimes and Ma

ria testified that J aimes wa s not trying to stop appellant f rom passing and that the a ccide nt occur red in a matter of se conds from the t ime they saw appellant’s car pull out from behind the truck. A lthough Richa rdson and a

ppellant’s fr iends testified that Jaimes sped up wh e n a pp e lla nt a tte mpt e d to p a ss a

nd L y se k te sti fi e d th a t Jai me s w a s d ri vin g fa ste r t

ha n a pp e lla nt, it was for the jury to de termine what weig ht to g ive to the various witnesses’ testimony and we a re bound to resolve e videntiary conflicts in favor of the jur y ’s ver dict. See W

inkley , 123 S.W .3d at 711. F ur the r, e ve n if

Jaim e s’ s beh a vio r co ntr ibute d to the a c c ide nt, a pp e lla nt atte mpt e d to pa ss i lle g a lly and instead of

slowing to g et bac k behind J aimes whe n he saw the onc oming ve hicle, pulled in front of Ja i m es wi t h insufficient room to do so saf ely . Although the evidenc e wa s that J aimes wa s probably driving somewher e betwe en for ty -five an d s i x t y

miles per hour in a

thirty -five mile pe r hour z one, the evidenc e shows that appellant hims elf was driving six ty miles per hour w hen his ca r collided with the truck, a nd Br ecke nridg e testified that the a ccide nt was not pri m arily cause d by speed, but by

appellant’ s attempt to pass on a nar row two-la

ne roa d marke d as a no-passing zone and
near a hill that would have blocke d his view of oncomingtraff ic. T h e j u ry co uld have f ound that
a p p e ll an t’ s a g g r e s s iv e dr iv in g , e v e n if in p art tr ig g e r e d b y Ja im e s ’ s b e h a v io r , c a u s e d the ac cident that killed Nelsi and inj ured se vera l others. We hold the evidenc e is leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt11

to s up po rt a fi nd ing tha t a pp e lla nt w a s o r s ho uld

have be e n aw are that atte mpt ing to pa ss g a ve ri se to a substantial a

nd unjustifiable risk and that his f ailure to perc eive the r isk or to act to avoid it was a g ross deviation fr om the standard of car e an or dinary

p er son would have e x erc ised under the circ umstances. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 6.03(d). We overrule his second and third points of e rror . Deadly Weapon Findin gs I n his fourth point of error, appellant arg ues t hat t he evidence is leg ally insufficient to show that he used his ca r as a deadly wea

pon. He contends that the evidenc e shows the c ollisi on
was c aused by

J aimes’s truc k, which wa s traveling“at a n excessive rate of spee d.” Th e qu est io n to be ans we re d is wh e the r, vie wi nga ll the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t favor able to the ve rdict, a r ational trier of fac t could have fo u n d b ey o n d a re asonable doubt that appellant’s ca r wa s used as a deadly wea pon. Se e Ga rc ia v . S

tat e , 9 2 S. W. 3 d

5 7 4 , 5 7 5 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). A deadly wea pon is “any

thing that in the manne r of its use or intende d
us e is c a pa ble of c a us ingde a th o r s e ri ou s b od ily inj ur y .” Te x. Pe n. Cod e Ann. § 1 .0 7( a )( 17 )( B ); see Ad am e v . S tate , 69 S.W .3d 5 8 1 , 5 8 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (Mey ers, J., concurr ing) (objec t not usually considere d dang erous may become so throug h manner in which it is used in offense ). As discussed above , althoug h appellant attempts t o char acte rize the ac cident as
cause d by J aimes’s truck “traveling at an e x cessive spe ed” a nd striking a

ppellant’s ca

r, the e vidence supports a finding that the accident was cause d by appellant’ s attempt to pass in a no-passingzone
an d u n d e r u n s a f

e c o n d it io n s . E v e n if w e a s s u me Ja im e s w a s tr a v e li n g a t an e xcessive spe ed, appellant must have been driving at least t hat fast to have pulled out from behind, passed along side, and pulled in front of

the truck. Whether

J aim es ’s t ru ck struck appe llant’s car or appe llant’s car12

struck Jaimes’s truck is of no import. The ve hicles collided whe n appel l ant performed a n unsafe pa ssi ngmane uv e r a

nd the n p ull e d in

fr on t of the tr uc k w ith ou t e no ug h s pa c e to d o s o s a fe ly
. A c hil d
wa s k ill e d a

nd se ve ra l othe r pe op le we re inj ur e d, inc lud ing Jaim e s and his fr on t- se a t pa sse ng e r, bo th of whom were wear ing their seatbe lts. We cannot say what would have happene d had Jaimes reac ted differ ently ; the accident was cause d by appellant’ s conduct a nd the use of his automobile. An intent to achieve a specific purpose is not require d to suppor t a finding that an objec t was a de adly wea pon in its use. Ga rc ia , 92 S.W .3d at 575. The e vidence is leg ally sufficie nt to support a finding that appellant dr ove his ca

r in such a manner that it wa s capa ble of ca using de ath and se rious injury and there fore is sufficie nt to support the dea dly wea pon finding s. Se e Ma nn v . S tat e , 13 S.W .3d 89, 91- 92 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000), aff’d , 5 8 S. W.3 d 1 32 (T e x. Cr im
. App . 200 1) . We ov e rr ule appellant’ s fourth and f

inal point of err or.
Conclusion Havingoverr

uled appe llant’s points of error , we a ffirm the trial court’s judg ments of conviction.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: Jul y

7, 2005 Do No t Pu

bli sh