In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-18-00217-CR

TAKYME JAMES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 5th District Court

Bowie County, Texas

Trial Court No. 17F1231-005

Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Burgess
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Following a jury trial, Takyme James was convicted of murder and sentenced to life 

imprisonment. On appeal, James claims that the evidence that he intended to cause serious bodily 

injury to the victim is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Because we find the evidence legally 

sufficient to sustain the conviction, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

I. Standard of Review

In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential 

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Hartsfield 

v. State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d). Our rigorous legal 

sufficiency review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917–

18 (Cochran, J., concurring). We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks

opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury “to fairly resolve conflicts in 

testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate 

facts.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

318–19); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by 

a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 

The “hypothetically correct” jury charge is “one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by 

the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict 
3

the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the 

defendant was tried.” Id. 

II. Analysis

The State’s indictment charged that James committed “an act clearly dangerous to human 

life” that caused Sanders’ death by shooting him with a firearm “with the intent to cause serious 

bodily injury.” “A person commits an offense if he . . . intends to cause serious bodily injury and 

commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.” TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(2). On appeal, James challenges only whether he intended1 to cause 

serious bodily injury2 to Sanders.

“Proof of a culpable mental state is often made by circumstantial evidence.” Rhymes v. 

State, 536 S.W.3d 85, 95 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. ref’d) (quoting Louis v. State, 329 

S.W.3d 260, 268 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010), aff’d, 393 S.W.3d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

“Intent may . . . be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as acts, words, and the conduct of 

the appellant.” Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Patrick v. 

State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). Intent may also be inferred from the extent 

of the victim’s injuries, the manner in which the offense was committed, and the relative size and 

strength of the parties. Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). “In 

homicide prosecutions, although the intent to kill may not be presumed, ‘the jury may . . . infer 

 1

“A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when 

it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a). 

2

“‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious 

permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(46) (Supp.). 
4

intent from any facts in evidence which it determines proves the existence of [an] intent to kill, 

such as the use of a deadly weapon.’” Rhymes, 536 S.W.3d at 95 (quoting Brown v. State, 122 

S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). In considering these circumstances, the jury is entitled 

to rely on its collective common sense “and may apply common knowledge and experience.” 

Atkinson v. State, 517 S.W.3d 902, 906 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2017, no pet.). It is “a 

common-sense inference . . . that a person intends the natural consequences of his acts.” Soliz v. 

State, 432 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (quoting Ex parte Thompson, 179 S.W.3d 

549, 556 n.18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)); see Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2009) (actions are “generally reliable circumstantial evidence” of intent). 

The evidence at trial showed that on the evening of December 3, 2017, James and Sanders 

engaged in a fist fight following a dispute while at a football-watching party. Sanders evidently 

got the upper hand in the fight, as evidenced by James’ bloody, bruised, and swollen face. After 

the fight, James left the party and went to see his friend, LaPrense Willis. James, Willis, and 

Willis’ brother, Clarence, then drove Willis’ car to Sanders’ house, where James and Clarence got 

out of the car. When Sanders and his wife, Dorsanner Butler, saw the car pass in front of their 

house, they went inside the house and locked the doors. The evidence showed that James, who 

gained entry into the house after the dead-bolted front door was kicked off of its hinges, killed 

Sanders with a single shot fired from a .380 semi-automatic handgun. Sanders was found lying 

on his stomach underneath a table, bleeding profusely from a gunshot wound to the pelvic area. 

He was taken by ambulance to the hospital, where he later died. 
5

The bullet that struck Sanders passed through a wall located to the right of the front door. 

A single .380 shell casing was found on the couch, located against a wall on the right side of the 

front door. According to measurements made at the scene, the bullet entered the wall at a height 

of three feet and three inches from the floor and exited the wall at a height of three feet and threequarters of an inch from the floor. Based on this information, crime scene investigator Marc 

Sillivan testified that the bullet passed through the wall at a slight downward angle, which was 

approximately hip-high on Sanders, who was on the other side of the wall when he was struck by 

the bullet. 

Sillivan further explained that a shell casing from a semi-automatic firearm is extracted up 

and to the right.3

 Based on the location of the bullet hole in the wall, its trajectory, and the location 

of the shell casing, Sillivan concluded that the shooter was standing in the living room next to the 

couch facing the kitchen when he fired the gun. Given the pressure required to pull the trigger on 

a .380 semi-automatic handgun,4 Sillivan testified that this was not a situation in which the gun 

accidentally fired. 

When James was arrested the following day for Sanders’ murder, he told officers that he 

was waiting for them and stated, “All the stuff y’all looking for me for, I did.” James also told the 

arresting officer that he did not mean to shoot Sanders, that he had just wanted to scare him, and 

that he never “wanted that man to die that way.” James also told the arresting officers that they 

would never find the gun. When he was interrogated, James admitted that he shot Sanders. 

 3

The weapon in this case was not located.

4

According to Sillivan, who was qualified as an expert witness, it takes anywhere from two to seven pounds of pressure 

to pull the trigger on a .380 semi-automatic weapon. 
6

James argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove that he intended to cause 

serious bodily injury because, although shooting a firearm in the direction of another can be an act 

clearly dangerous to human life, see Forest v. State, 989 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), 

shooting someone does not always result in serious bodily injury, see Williams v. State, 696 

S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (gunshot wound, although caused by deadly weapon, is 

not per se serious bodily injury). And, James maintains, the State did not prove that he intended 

to cause Sanders serious bodily injury. In support of this claim, James attempts to discredit 

Sillivan’s testimony that Sanders was tracked:

Q Okay. And I think you told me, Officer, that your opinion was, 

based upon a shot like that, that there was tracking, that that person was tracked. 

Tell the jury about that.

A If a person’s standing here, that -- the victim could have either been 

in this area once the door’s kicked, running to this area or coming from a bedroom 

going to this area, but our victim was behind this wall at the time of the shot.

. . . . 

Q Okay. And then I think, if you’ll -- I think here at -- this is going to 

be the -- what you’re talking about as the single shot in the house?

A Into the wall, yes, it is. 

Q Okay. So based upon the position of Mr. Sanders’ body, is it your 

opinion that he was running into another part of the house?

A Yes. I believe he was coming into this area here, running into this 

room here. Once he runs, gets by the wall, the bullet travels through the wall and 

then hits him in the hip.

James contrasts this testimony with forensic evidence regarding the location of the gunshot wound. 

Dr. Stephen Lenfest, a medical examiner at the Dallas County Medical Examiner’s Office, testified 
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that Sanders received a gunshot wound to the upper right thigh or the top of the right leg. The 

bullet had perforated and split in the right femoral artery and vein in the upper leg. According to 

the autopsy report, the “direction of the projectile is front to back, right to left, and slightly 

downward.”5

 

Based on this evidence, James argues that it was not possible for Sanders to have been 

running away from James when Sanders was shot. Instead, he contends, Sanders would have had 

to have been standing in the kitchen facing the living room behind the wall and out of James’ sight 

when he was shot. Consequently, James concludes, he could not have been tracking Sanders’

movements when he fired the gun. James concludes that absent the viability of the “tracking”

testimony, there was no evidence before the jury that James intended to cause serious bodily injury 

to Sanders, or that he was even aware that Sanders was in the kitchen at the time he fired the gun.6

 

We disagree. 

Regardless of James’ characterization of the “tracking” testimony, the jury—as the sole 

judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence—was entitled to rely on this evidence if it chose 

to do so. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. And, in this case, the entirety of the evidence is sufficient 

to permit a reasonable jury to infer that James intended to cause serious bodily injury to Sanders. 

Butler testified that they left the party following the altercation between Sanders and James. 

When they arrived home, Butler called her father to let him know that she and Sanders were on 

 5

Lenfest testified that the description of the path of the bullet in the autopsy report “doesn’t mean anything about the 

position of the decedent or the suspect but as -- after the bullet entered the body, it went from his front towards the 

back, from the right to the left and slightly downward.” 

6

James’ argument invites this Court to engage in a factual sufficiency analysis, which we decline to do. See Brooks, 

323 S.W.3d at 895. 
8

their way to pick up their four-year-old daughter from his house. As Butler and Sanders walked 

outside, Butler saw Willis’ car come down the street, make the block, and then pull up next to their 

house. Clarence and James got out of the car as Butler and Sanders walked back to the front door 

to go inside. Butler testified that James was angry and was carrying a gun as he approached them. 

James told Sanders, “No, don’t run in the house now, n-----. Don’t get scared now, n-----. Don’t 

go nowhere now, n-----.” Once inside, Sanders told Butler to go hide in the bedroom and call

9-1-1. Butler testified that Sanders told her to hide so that she would be safe if they “did come in 

shooting.” While Butler was hidden in the bedroom, James forcibly entered Sanders’ house with 

a loaded .380 handgun and shot through the wall in the precise spot where Sanders stood. Butler 

heard the gunshot and then heard stumbling over the front door which had been kicked in. She 

exited the bedroom to find Sanders lying on the den floor bleeding and unresponsive. The entire 

course of events, from the time Clarence and James walked into the yard until Butler discovered 

Sanders had been shot, was less than one minute. James did not remain at the scene and render 

aide. Instead, he fled the scene and discarded the gun. He was arrested at his home the following 

day, at which time he confessed to shooting Sanders.

Based on James’ statements and behavior, the circumstantial evidence, and the location 

and nature of Sanders’ wound, a reasonable jury could infer that James intended to kill or cause 

seriously bodily injury to Sanders. See Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 50; Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61,

64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The jury could also infer intent from James’ use of a deadly weapon. 

Godsey v. State, 719 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (stating that “[i]f a deadly weapon 
9

is used in [a] deadly manner, the inference is almost conclusive that [the appellant] intended to 

kill”) (quoting Hatton v. State, 21 S.W. 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893)).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that 

legally sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of guilt. 

III. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Ralph K. Burgess

Justice

Date Submitted: September 4, 2019

Date Decided: September 19, 2019

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