alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 100.570 Compliance procedures. ( a ) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, this section applies to all allegations of discrimination on the basis of handicap in programs and activities conducted by the agency.
( b ) The agency shall process complaints alleging violations of section 504 with respect to employment according to the procedures established by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 29 CFR part 1613 pursuant to section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791).
( c ) The Director of Administration shall be responsible for coordinating implementation of this section. Complaints may be sent to Director of Administration, National Labor Relations Board, 1099 Fourteenth Street NW., Washington, DC 20570.
( d ) The agency shall accept and investigate all complete complaints for which it has jurisdiction. All complete complaints must be filed within 180 days of the alleged act of discrimination. The agency may extend this time period for good cause.
( e ) If the agency receives a complaint over which it does not have jurisdiction, it shall promptly notify the complainant and shall make reasonable efforts to refer the complaint to the appropriate Government entity.
( f ) The agency shall notify the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board upon receipt of any complaint alleging that a building or facility that is subject to the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4151-4157), is not readily accessible to and usable by individuals with handicaps.
( g ) Within 180 days of the receipt of a complete complaint for which it has jurisdiction, the agency shall notify the complainant of the results of the investigation in a letter containing— ( 1 ) Findings of fact and conclusions of law;
( 2 ) A description of a remedy for each violation found; and
( 3 ) A notice of the right to appeal.
( h ) Appeals of the findings of fact and conclusions of law or remedies must be filed by the complainant within 90 days of receipt from the agency of the letter required by § 100.170(g). The agency may extend this time for good cause.
( i ) Timely appeals shall be accepted and processed by the head of the agency.
( j ) The head of the agency shall notify the complainant of the results of the appeal within 60 days of the receipt of the request. If the head of the agency determines that additional information is needed from the complainant, he or she shall have 60 days from the date of receipt of the additional information to make his or her determination on the appeal.
( k ) The time limits cited in paragraphs (g) and (j) of this section may be extended with the permission of the Assistant Attorney General.
( l ) The agency may delegate its authority for conducting complaint investigations to other Federal agencies, except that the authority for making the final determination may not be delegated to another agency.
[53 FR 25884, 25885, July 8, 1988, as amended at 53 FR 25884, July 8, 1988. Redesignated and amended at 59 FR 37159, July 21, 1994]
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### NOV 26 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

GARRY A. ULLAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST. JOSEPH MEDICAL CENTER, INC.; DAVE TUCKER; JAMES D. RATZLAFF; DON S. SEERY; LEONARD A. KLAFTA; JOE MEYER; CAROLINE DETBARN-FERGUSON; COLLEEN TYSER-VOTH; D. MATTHEW; M. MICHAEL; DERBY POLICE DEPARTMENT; THOMAS PRUNIER; FRANCIS KNIPFER; DERBY POLICE OFFICERS; SEDGWICK COUNTY MEDICAL STAFF; DERBY E.M.S.; SEDGWICK COUNTY CORONER; CORRIE L. MAY; BILL DIETZ, Medical Investigator, Defendants-Appellees. No. 97-3132 (D.C. No.96-3604-GTV) (District of Kansas)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, PORFILIO and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.2

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. **See** Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. We hold the district court did not err in dismissing this action for lack of jurisdiction. We AFFIRM for the reasons stated by the district court in its order of April 22, 1997.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

John C. Porfilio Circuit Judge
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exhibit_4-2.htm

 




EXHIBIT 4.2

 


September 22, 2009









CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM









U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Washington, DC 20549









Ladies and Gentlemen:





We hereby consent to the incorporation and use in this Registration Statement of Alkane, Inc. on Form 10 of our audit report, dated September 22, 2009, relating to the accompanying audited financial statements (and related statements included there in) as of June 30, 2009 which appears in such Registration Statement.













De Joya Griffith & Company, LLC





/s/ De Joya Griffith & Company, LLC

Henderson, NV

September 22, 2009
EXHIBIT 32.1 AND 32.2 - CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND ACTING CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF FIRST CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL, INC., PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 AND SECTION 1350 OF 18 U.S.C. 63.








I, Alex Genin, the Chief Executive Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer of First Capital International, Inc. hereby certify that First Capital International, Inc.'s periodic report on Form 10Q and the financial statements contained therein fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d) and that information contained in the periodic report on Form 10Q and the financial statements contained therein fairly represents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of the operations of First Capital International, Inc.








Date:  May 14, 2009
/s/ Alex GeninChief Executive Officer andActing Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer)
#### TRAPP v STATE

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 9224.

Decided January 21, 1929

A. R. Edgerton, Esq., Cleveland, for Trapp.

E. C. Stanton, Esq., Cleveland, for State.

EPITOMIZED OPINION

Where defendant was convicted of manslaughter resulting frqm alleged careless driving, of automobile, held not to be error to refuse to introduce in evidence an ordinance describing a closely built up section on the theory that the ordinance did not include the spot where the fatality occurred, it being a question of fact whether or not a place is closely built up.

Nor is it error for the court to fail to instruct as to contributory negligence of the deceased, before argument, *since*contributory negligence is not an element in a criminal prosecution.

Opinion by

VICKERY, J.

SULLIVAN, P. J. concurs.

LEVINE, J. dissents.
#### SCHUMACHER et v OHIO SAV & TR CO

Ohio Supreme Court

No 21648.

Decided Dec. 4, 1929

Syllabus by

JONES, J.

HUSBAND & WIFE — Debtor & Creditor (210 J)

(290 P2) A husband and wife each owned, as tenants in common, individual moieties in certain premises. The husband’s moiety was sold at judicial sale and the proceeds thereof brought into court for distribution. The wife’s undivided interest in the premises was not sold. The husband and wife, living together, continued to occupy the premises as a homestead. Held, that the wife, as a tenant in common, is entitled to claim in such a proceeding a homestead in the premises; but since both husband and wife had a homestead which they were occupying, neither could claim an allowance in lieu thereof out of the proceeds derived from the sale of the husband’s moiety.

Marshall, C. J., Kinkade, Robinson, Matthias, Day and Allen, JJ., concur.
#### § 39.3 Definition of airworthiness directives.

FAA's airworthiness directives are legally enforceable rules that apply to the following products: aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and appliances.
**PHILADELPHIA AREA 2009 banked emission credits**  **includes: Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia counties**

**COUNTY COMPANY NAME**  **DEP PF ID**  **EPA FACILITY ID** **PERMIT**

**# VOC**  **TPY NOX**  **TPY SOX**  **TPY CO**  **TPY PM10**  **TPY PM 2.5** 

**TPY certified**  **(transfer) expire**  Bucks Rohm & Hass 245649 420170009 09-00015 1.47 20022010-11 Bucks Minnesota Mining (3M) 1177 420170056 09-00005 758.00 2002 2011 Bucks Waste Mgt Disposal Services252449 420170408 09-00007 43.00 (2004) 2012 Bucks Waste Mgt Disposal Services252449 420170408 09-00007 70.00 (2004) 2012 Chester Worthington Steel Co 516084 420290127 15-00016 10.00 2005 2013 Chester NVF Company 245076 15-000030 34.05 18.86 28.42 2009 2015 Delaware Foamex, LP 244059 23-00006 84.25 7.67 1.0326.93 2009 2018 Delaware Norcross Safety Products 240824 23-00025 7.62 2009 2017 Delaware Sun Company, Inc/ Sunoco 292970 420450025 23-00001 147.93 2002 none Delaware Congloeum Corp 240876 420450049 23-00021 0.90 5.20 1998 none Delaware Sentry Paint 3476 420450039 3.56 2004 2013 MontgomeryHarvard Industries 482549 420910059 8.70 28.25 2003 2011 MontgomeryGlasgow Inc 294861 420910023 46-00043 0.73 9.26 2003 2010 MontgomeryAllegro Microsystems 481603 420910070 46-00006 42.61 2003 2012 MontgomeryAllegro Microsystems 481603 420910070 46-00006 2.90 1.30 2004 2013 MontgomeryPenco Products 516229 420910005 29.48 3.11 2003 2011

MontgomeryBluegrass Folding Carton

(Smurfit Stone) 239549 420910017 46-00041 60.36 2015 Phila Philadelphia Baking Co 24.20 4.09 0.02 1.33 0.10 2008 2017 Phila Philadelphia Gas Works (PGW) 6.54 47.86 0.1622.48 0.56 0.56 2008 2015 Phila Kurtz Hastings Inc 4210101585 137.45 2001-2002 none Phila Kurtz Hastings Inc 4210101585 64.55 8.01 20042013-14 Phila Avery Dennison 3.13 2003 2012 Phila Sea Gull Lighting Co 4210103294 12.50 2004 2013 Phila Exelon Generating Station 286.50412.2031.70 31.20 22.30 2005 2014 Phila Arbill Safety Products 4210103811 20.32 0.38 0.21 2006 2016

**TOTAL ERCs Banked** 1561.35432.09442.0483.74 31.86 22.86

Saved in Phila SIP files 8/24/09 with updates
#### BOYD v ROYAL INDEMNITY CO

Ohio Supreme Court

No 21470.

Decided May 8, 1929

Syllabus by

MARSHALL, CJ.

ERROR PROCEEDINGS

(260 S) A judgment of the Court of appeals reversing a judgment of the trial court “on the ground that the evidence submitted in this court and in the trial court was insufficient in law to entitle defendant in error to judgment” is not a judgment of reversal “wholly or partly on the ground that such judgment is not sustained by sufficient evidence” within the true intent and meaning of Rule XIX of this court.

INSURANCE — Railroads (500 D2d)

(310 A) Where a person is intending to take passage on a street car and is attempting to enter the ear and has one foot resting on the step of the car, and one hand on the hand rail of the car, and while in this position the car door is closed catching his foot so that he cannot alight from the car and he is carried a short distance in this manner. Held: That he is “riding as a passenger in or upon a public conveyance (including the platform, steps or running board thereof)” within the true intent and meaning of a “double benefit” clause in a policy of accident insurance.

Robinson, Jones, Matthias and Allen, JJ, concur. Kinkade, J, dissents. Day, J, not participating.
[if !vml]>[endif]>

[if !vml]>[endif]>

You have reached the FederalDepository Library Program Electronic Collection (FDLP/EC) Archive. Thisarchive assures ongoing access to publications in the FDLP/EC. Access to publicationsin the archive is available through GPO's suite of cataloging and locatorservices, including the Catalog of U.S. Government Publications (CGP). Archived copies of publications are retrieved in the event that publicationsare no longer available from the original publishing agency site. 
**Title:****Grand Teton: boating**
 
2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016
 
SuDoc Number:I 29.6:G 76/37/
Item Number:0651 (online)
CGP systemNumber:000933863
 
February 21, 2018
#### § 1472.220 By when must I publish my drug-free workplace statement and establish my drug-free awareness program?

If you are a new recipient that does not already have a policy statement as described in § 1472.205 and an ongoing awareness program as described in § 1472.215, you must publish the statement and establish the program by the time given in the following table:

| If . . . | then you . . . |
| --- | --- |
| (a) The performance period of the award is less than 30 days | must have the policy statement and program in place as soon as possible, but before the date on which performance is expected to be completed. |
| (b) The performance period of the award is 30 days or more | must have the policy statement and program in place within 30 days after award. |
| (c) You believe there are extraordinary circumstances that will require more than 30 days for you to publish the policy statement and establish the awareness program | may ask the FMCS awarding official to give you more time to do so. The amount of additional time, if any, to be given is at the discretion of the awarding official. |
[No. 20816-8-III.

Division Three.

November 7, 2002.]

#### Jerry Nunn, *Appellant,*v. The Department of Labor and Industries, *Respondent.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Chelan County, No. 99-2-00160-0, John E. Bridges, J., entered January 11, 2002. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Kurtz, J., concurred in by Brown, C.J., and Schultheis, J.
Exhibit
32.1
  CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
 PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  In
connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K of Marshall Holdings
International, Inc. for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2007, I, Richard A.
Bailey, Chief Executive Officer of Marshall Holdings International, Inc., hereby
certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, that:
  1.           Such
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2007, fully
complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and
  2.           The
information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year
ending December 31, 2007, fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of Marshall Holdings
International, Inc.
  Dated:
April 15, 2008.
  /s/  Richard A.
      BaileyRichard
      A. Bailey, Chief Executive Officer ofMarshall
      Holdings International, Inc.
**REGULATORY EVALUATION**

**Directorate Identifier:** 2011

- NM

- 086

- AD

**Executive Order 12866:** Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”? YES ( ) explain NO (X) **DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:** Is the AD significant? YES ( ) explain NO (X) **Regulatory Flexibility Act:** Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? YES ( ) explain NO (X) **Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:** This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. I s it appropriate t o include specific requirements for aircraft operated in Alaska, where aviation might be the only mode of transportation? YES ( ) explain NO (X)
#### § 65.105 Display of certificate.

Each person who holds a repairman certificate shall keep it within the immediate area where he normally exercises the privileges of the certificate and shall present it for inspection upon the request of the Administrator or an authorized representative of the National Transportation Safety Board, or of any Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer.

[Doc. No. 7258, 31 FR 13524, Oct. 20, 1966, as amended by Doc. No. 8084, 32 FR 5769, Apr. 11, 1967]
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

594 KA 08-00132
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, CARNI, GREEN, AND GORSKI, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JERMAINE T. LESTER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (TIMOTHY S. DAVIS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

MICHAEL C. GREEN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LESLIE E. SWIFT OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (John R. Schwartz, A.J.), rendered November 19, 2007. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of assault in the second degree.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 [2]), defendant contends that County Court erred in limiting his cross-examination of a prosecution witness. Defendant failed to preserve that contention for our review ( see People v George , 67 NY2d 817, 818-819; People v Rookey , 292 AD2d 783, lv denied 98 NY2d 701), and in any event it is without merit. “It is well settled that [t]he scope of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court” ( People v Bryant , 73 AD3d 1442, 1443, lv denied 15 NY3d 850 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, the court did not abuse its discretion because there was no good-faith basis for the question at issue ( see People v Baker , 294 AD2d 888, 889, lv denied 98 NY2d 708) and, moreover, the court’s refusal to allow defendant to ask the prosecution witness that single question cannot be said to have affected the outcome of the trial ( see Bryant , 73 AD3d at 1443).

We further reject defendant’s contention that the court erred inpermitting an investigating officer to testify concerning an out-ofcourt statement made by an unidentified witness. That out-of-court statement was properly admitted because it was offered “not for [its] truth, but for the fact [that it was] made” ( People v Mastin , 261 AD2d 892, 894, lv denied 93 NY2d 1022). As the court properly explained in its limiting instruction to the jury, the testimony of the investigating officer that is challenged by defendant was admitted “for the ‘nonhearsay purpose of completing the narrative of events and-2- 594 KA 08-00132

explaining police actions’ ” ( People v Vazquez , 28 AD3d 1100, 1101, lv denied 9 NY3d 965; see People v Tosca , 98 NY2d 660). In any event, any error with respect to the admission of that testimony is harmless ( see Vazquez , 28 AD3d at 1101).

Entered: April 29, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan Clerk of the Court