IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,

v. MICHAEL THOMAS THRASHER, Appellant. No. 70613-6-1 DIVISION ONE r-3 c5

UNPUBLISHED OPINION *"
FILED: August4, 2014 Appelwick, J. — Thrasher appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition for relief from the duty to register as a sex offender. He argues that trial court improperly denied his petition and failed to hold a hearing on the petition. We affirm. FACTS 

### In May 1992, Michael Thrasherentered anAlford1 plea ofguiltyto second degree assault with sexual motivation. He was sentenced to a nine month standard range 

### sentence and was notified of his statutory duty to register as a sex offender. Between 1993 and 2006, Thrasher was found or pleaded guilty to 9 felonies and 31 misdemeanors. This included a 2006 conviction for felony failure to register as a sex 

### offender. In 2009, Thrasher was again convicted of felony failure to register as a sex offender. 

### OnApril 26, 2013, Thrasherpetitioned pro sefor relief from the duty to register as
a sex offender under RCW 9A.44.142. He stated in his petition: 

### I have served 167 months past my release date of probation, fines, sentences that far [exceed] the standard sentencing for a second degree 1 North Carolina v. Alford. 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). In 

### an Alford plea, the accused technicallydoes not acknowledge guilt, butconcedes there is sufficientevidence to support a conviction. In re Pers. Restraint of Cross, 178 Wn.2d 519, 521, 309 P.3d 1186(2013).No. 70613-6-1 

### assault w/ a finding of sexual motivation on May 18th 1992. Iserved my whole sentence of my sentencing range of0-12 months inthe King County Jail work release program. Sucessfull [sic] was able to volenteer [sic] for the King County Park Services. Doing janitorial type work. I was also employed fulltime as a dish washer and waiter atthe pancake house, and Cafe Minnie's, working for merchantDickWright, business man and mentor. Iwas released from my incarceration with excellent reviews and thanks for all my help and volenteer [sic] work atthe King County court house waxing floors on my days off. Ialso completed my 12 months ofprobation thatwas a requirement of my [judgment and sentence] on an [Alford] plea agreement. 

### The superior court denied Thrasher's petition without a hearing, but without prejudice. The court concluded that Thrasher "failed to provide sufficient information so that the Court can make a determination as to whetherthe defendant should be relieved 

### from his obligation to register and the Defendant has not filedthe appropriate forms with the court." Thrasher appeals. DISCUSSION I. Relieffrom Sex Offender Registration 

### Thrasher argues thatthe trial court erred in denying his petition for relief fromsex 

### offender registration, because he provided sufficient facts to show he was rehabilitated. Hefurther asserts thatthe courterred indenying him a hearing atwhich he could present evidence in support of his petition. 

### We review a trial court's decision to deny a petition for relief from the duty to 

### register as a sex offenderfor abuse ofdiscretion. State v. Gossage, 138Wn. App. 298, 306, 156 P.3d 951 (2007), rev'd in part on other grounds, 165 Wn.2d 1, 195 P.3d 525 

### (2008). Determiningwhetherto conduct anevidentiaryhearing is alsowithinthe superior court's discretion, ]g\ at 305-06. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is 

### manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.No. 70613-6-1 State v. Powell. 126Wn.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. State v. Norlin, 134 Wn.2d 570, 582, 951 P.2d 1131 (1998). Thrasher's 1992 conviction for second degree assault with sexual motivation is a 

### felonysexoffensethat requires him to registeras a sexoffender.2 RCW 9A.36.021(2)(b); RCW 9A.44.128(10)(a); RCW 9.94A.030(46)(c); RCW 9A.44.130(1)(a). Sex offenders may petition a superiorcourtfor relief from the duty to register if, among otherconditions, 

### they have "spent ten consecutive years in the community without being convicted of a disqualifying offense during that time period." RCW 9A.44.142(1)(b). A disqualifying offense includes "a conviction for: Any offense that is a felony." RCW 9A.44.128(3). The record before us shows thatThrasherwas convicted offelonies in 1996,1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2006, and 2009. He has not been felony-free for any 

### consecutive 10 year period since his 1992 sex offense. The superior court had no 

### discretion to grant Thrasher's petition. Doing so would have been an error of law. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Thrasher's petition for relief 

### from the duty to register as a sex offender. For the same reason, the court did not err in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on Thrasher's petition.



### 2Thrasher's judgment and sentence listed the crime charged as former RCW 9A.36.020(1) (1975) and the date of the crime as September30, 1991. However, former RCW9A.36.020(1) was repealed in 1986. Lawsof 1986, ch. 257, § 9. In 1991, second 

### degree assault was codified at former RCW 9A.36.021 (1988). At that time, second degree assault was a class Bfelony, whichrequiredThrasher to registeras a sexoffender for 15 years after release from confinement. FormerRCW9A.36.021 (1988). However, a "sex offense" also includes felony failure to register as a sex offender ifthe person has been convicted of failure to register on at least one prior occasion. RCW 

### 9.94A.030(46)(a)(v). Thrasher was convicted offailure to registerin 2006 and againin 2009, extending his sex offender registration period.No. 70613-6-1
II. Statement ofAdditional Grounds 

### Thrasher makes several arguments in his statement of additional grounds. He 

### reiterates hiscounsel's argument that the superior courtabused its discretionin denying his petition for relief from sex offender registration. This does not raise a new issue for

our review. 

### Thrasher also contests the length of his sentence and asserts his innocence for 

### the 1992 sex offense. These arguments are not supported by credible evidence in the 

### limited record before us, so we cannotreview them. See RAP 10.10(c). Ifmaterial facts exist that have not been previously presented or heard, then Thrasher's recourse is to bring a properly supported personal restraintpetition. See RAP 16.4; Statev. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 339, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). Lastly, Thrasher argues at length about the injustice of sex offender registration. We are likewise unable to review this issue, because Thrasher fails to inform us of the nature and occurrence ofthe alleged error. RAP 10.10(c); see also State v. Ward, 123 Wn.2d 488, 492, 869 P.2d 1062 (1994) (holding thatthe sex offender registration statute does notviolate due process orequal protection). We affirm.

WE CONCUR: 

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