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VERIFYING IRAN’S NUCLEAR COMPLIANCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 10, 2014

Serial No. 113–173

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker, National Security Advisor, Bipartisan 

Policy Center (former Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control & Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of 

State) ..................................................................................................................... 6

Mr. John A. Lauder, senior advisor, 20twenty Strategic Consulting, Inc. 

(former Director, Nonproliferation Center, Intelligence Community) ............. 16

Mr. Olli Heinonen, senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International 

Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 

(former Deputy Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency) ....... 34

The Honorable Joseph R. DeTrani, president, Intelligence and National Security Alliance (former Director, National Counter Proliferation Center, Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence) ............................................................. 45

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker: Prepared statement .............................. 10

Mr. John A. Lauder: Prepared statement .............................................................. 18

Mr. Olli Heinonen: Prepared statement ................................................................ 36

The Honorable Joseph R. DeTrani: Prepared statement ..................................... 47

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 84

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 85

The Honorable Randy K. Weber Sr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Texas: Material submitted for the record ............................................ 87

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 89

(1)

VERIFYING IRAN’S NUCLEAR COMPLIANCE 

TUESDAY, JUNE 10, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. This morning 

we are focused on Iran’s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, and how to stop it. 

International negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program are coming down to the wire. Indeed, an urgent push is going on as we 

speak. Senior administration officials are sitting with the Iranians 

today in Geneva. Some critical differences remain, including the 

status of Iran’s enrichment capability, which is technology key to 

developing a nuclear weapon. Iran’s stated desire is to increase 

from its roughly 19,000 centrifuges today to over 50,000. The future of Iran’s ‘‘plutonium bomb factory’’ at Arak remains unclear. 

Iran continues to stonewall international inspectors on its past 

bomb-making work. And just the other week, the country’s Supreme Leader characterized the requirement that, as part of the 

final agreement, Iran limit its ballistic missile program as in his 

words ‘‘stupid, idiotic expectations.’’ I think we can presume that 

this is going to be a hard climb here. Meanwhile, Iran continues 

its support for terrorism abroad. It continues its quest for regional 

domination, and the abysmal human rights record at home continues where those who are not of the right belief system, according 

to the theocratic state, are executed. A nuclear-capable Iran would 

be a national security disaster. 

While the sides might sound far apart, the Obama administration will push very hard to reach a deal before the July 20th negotiating deadline, and this committee may soon be asked to judge 

a ‘‘comprehensive agreement.’’ Central to this would be evaluating 

the verification measures needed to ensure that Iran cannot cheat. 

So what types of conditions should U.S. negotiators be demanding? 

What are the limits of verification? How does the IAEA’s reliance 

on Iran’s cooperation impact its work? Some cite the adage ‘‘trust, 

but verify.’’ In this case, there certainly can’t be any trust. The 

question today is, can there be verification? 

These questions are sharpened by the fact that Iran’s leaders 

have invested massive resources and decades of effort into their 

own nuclear program there. Enrichment facilities were built in seVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:44 Aug 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\061014\88286 SHIRL
2

cret, a violation of its agreement with the IAEA. One was even dug 

into a mountainside on a military base, another violation. As one 

witness will testify, ‘‘when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program, they 

have a history of deception, a history of covert procurement, and 

construction of clandestine facilities that are acknowledged only 

when revealed by the government’s adversaries.’’

This dangerous regime has tied its prestige to its nuclear ambitions, and they are not peaceful. Given Iran’s record of clandestine 

activity and intransigence, clear consequences for violating transparency and cooperation requirements must be spelled out with 

zero tolerance for cheating. 

An immediate test of Iran’s willingness to cooperate rests with 

the IAEA’s attempts to clarify evidence the international observer 

group has on the ‘‘potential military dimensions’’ of Iran’s programs. For several years, Iran has refused to provide explanations 

or information to the IAEA on past bomb efforts. This includes the 

Parchin military base, where Iran has gone to great lengths to 

eliminate all traces of any clandestine activity, including demolishing buildings and removing large areas of soil from the site. 

Iran’s willingness to come clean on its past weapons program 

should be an acid test for Western negotiators. We must ask: What 

good is striking an agreement and removing sanctions, our only leverage, if Iran keeps a capacity to secretly build nuclear bombs? 

Unfortunately, U.S. negotiators have already made a key concession that will complicate the task of verifying Iran’s nuclear commitments. The Interim Agreement of last year would allow Iran to 

maintain a mutually defined enrichment program. This program 

could give Iran cover to develop a covert weapons program, as technically speaking, the ability to produce low-enriched uranium is 

perilously close to that needed for a nuclear weapon. 

If Iran is left with the capacity to enrich, a break-out race to a 

weapon will be a permanent threat, a threat that undoubtedly 

would increase as sanctions are eased and the world turns its attention elsewhere. That is especially troubling, given how Iranian 

leaders have spoken of Israel as in their words, a ‘‘one-bomb country.’’

Many on the committee are very troubled that the Obama administration has us on track to an agreement that leaves Iran as 

a permanent nuclear threat to the region and to us. Today’s hearing will be this committee’s latest warning against this ill-considered course of action. 

And I will now turn to the ranking member for his opening statement, Mr. Eliot Engel of New York. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You 

know, you and I have made a great deal, as have other members 

of our committee, about the bipartisan nature of our committee and 

how you and I have worked hard to make this the most bipartisan 

committee in the Congress. 

I must say after listening to your opening statement, I agree 

with it fully. I share your concerns and I think these are concerns 

of many, many members of this committee on both sides of the 

aisle. So I want to thank you for calling this timely and important 

hearing. And as the P5+1 in Iran continue to negotiate, a potential 

agreement on Iran’s nuclear weapons program, we need to carefully 

3

examine how such a deal could be fully verified. What are the requirements for a final deal? What safeguards are needed to give us 

confidence that Iran has truly ceased its drive to develop a nuclear 

weapons capability? 

According to the IAEA, the Joint Plan of Action Interim Agreement has paused many of Iran’s advancements toward a nuclear 

weapon. However, if this temporary agreement became permanent, 

it would certainly be inadequate. The status quo would leave us 

with too many unanswered questions and an Iran that is too close 

to a nuclear breakout point. A comprehensive agreement is necessary to end the permanent threat of a nuclear Iran. 

With just weeks away from the July 20th deadline that the Joint 

Plan of Action set for a comprehensive deal, there have already 

been rumblings that an extension will be needed. Just last week, 

the head of the IAEA made clear that his agency would not be able 

to finish its ongoing investigation of Iran’s nuclear program before 

July 20th. That actually might work in our interests if negotiations 

are continuing, but there is no deal and we need an extension. 

The negotiations between the P5+1 in Iran have taken place behind closed doors so we cannot evaluate the specific details of the 

potential deal that is being discussed. I hope that we will have an 

opportunity to hear from the administration in open session when 

appropriate. 

Whatever its final form, it is safe to say that this deal will not 

be based, as you said, Mr. Chairman, on Ronald Reagan’s old 

axiom ‘‘trust, but verify.’’ On the contrary, there is a tremendous 

amount of mistrust between the parties and the Iranians deserve 

every ounce of suspicion. Tehran has spent years developing a covert nuclear program and has brazenly violated its obligations under 

the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Under this cloud of mistrust, we 

must carefully examine one of the most important parts of the deal, 

how do we verify Iran’s compliance? Iran may not make a mad 

dash for the bomb, but everything I have seen and know about the 

Iranian regime tells me that they will try to push the boundaries 

of any comprehensive agreement and test the will of the international community to respond. 

One of my primary concerns is that even if negotiators are able 

to reach a deal, we still don’t what we don’t know. Building covert 

facilities, illicitly procuring equipment, outsourcing its program 

elsewhere; these steps could put Iran back on the path to a nuclear 

weapon. 

Mr. Chairman, today’s hearing is important because Congress 

has an important role to play in this deal. I want to reiterate that. 

Congress has an important role to play in this deal. Any long-term 

sanctions relief must, and I say must, be approved by Congress. 

And to pass such relief, we will have to be convinced that the deal 

on the table is a good one which brings us back to the key questions facing our panel today. 

What are the minimum requirements for a good deal? I know 

that Secretary Kerry has said ‘‘no deal is better than a bad deal.’’ 

Well, I agree. The question is, will we agree on what is a good 

deal? What sort of verification measures will be needed to give us 

full confidence that Iran isn’t cheating, or worse, attempting to 

4

break out? And finally, if we can’t reach a deal with strong 

verification measures, what is the alternative? 

You know, I have been troubled by the negotiations with Iran. 

I hope we do have a comprehensive agreement. I hope it is 

verifiable and I hope that we are pleased with it. But you know 

what troubles me is while we are negotiating with Iran, they still 

continue to enrich. And it seemed to me that we could have and 

should have made a deal saying to the Iranians, ‘‘If you want to 

talk with us for 6 months, you stop enriching while we are talking.’’ I don’t think that was so much to ask. And the fact that it 

wasn’t done troubles me. I am told that it wasn’t done because Iran 

wouldn’t agree to it. Well, if they didn’t agree to something as simple as that, what does that tell us, I fear, about their acquiescence 

to any kind of comprehensive agreement? 

So I welcome the testimony of our panel of expert witnesses to 

help answer these critical questions. But as far as I am concerned, 

I want to see a dismantling of Iran’s program, not just a point 

where they are at nuclear break-out capacity, not at the point 

where we perhaps push them back a few months. I want to see 

them dismantle their program. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. We go now to Ileana 

Ros-Lehtinen of Florida, chairman of the Subcommittee on the 

Middle East and North Africa, who has been focused on Iran for 

a very long time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce, and 

Ranking Member Engel for holding this vitally important hearing. 

While the administration continues to negotiate a bad and weak 

deal with Iran, while keeping Congress in the dark, it is important 

for us to continue to highlight the menacing nature of the Iranian 

regime and the flaws in the administration’s approach to this deception. We are almost at the end of the 6-month agreement, yet 

the administration has failed to properly consult with Congress 

about important parts of this deal. Where are the details? 

Congress has been steadfast in our mission to prevent Iran from 

acquiring nuclear weapons and it was only because of our efforts 

on implementing Iran’s sanctions that Iran has even agreed to negotiate. I authored, with the support of so many members of this 

committee, the strictest sanctions against Iran, and now we are 

seeing all of that work undone by the administration that misguidedly and dangerously trusts Iran despite decades of evidence 

that tells us that the mullahs are untrustworthy. Time to wake up. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We go now to 

Representative Ted Deutch of Florida, the ranking member on the 

Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This morning’s hearing 

is on verifying compliance. I fear that the hearing topic might be 

a bit premature. We are now coming up on the July 20th date, the 

end of the 6-month period. And before talking about compliance, we 

find ourselves asking what meaningful discussions have taken 

place on reducing the number of centrifuges? How close are we to 

a resolution on Fordow? What is the plan to mothball Arak? Has 

there been any access to Parchin, at all? And finally, and I think 

5

most importantly, when will Iran come clean on the military dimensions of its program? 

These were the fundamental points that we had to deal with during the 6-month period and as we approach the end of the 6-month 

period, the notion that we can simply extend for another 6 months 

because we don’t have a deal yet is not an acceptable one. We need 

to have some sense that there is movement on the part of the Iranians toward a resolution rather than only delay. And I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how we might do 

that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. Now we go to Mr. Ted 

Poe, chair of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade. 

Mr. POE. Since the Joint Plan of Action was signed by Iran and 

the P5+1 in November, the administration has been negotiating 

with the Iranians for a big final deal. I hope our negotiators are 

not the same ones that worked in the big deal to trade in the 

Taliban 5 for Bergdahl. The administration seems to be giving 

away the courthouse and the mineral rights as well. It seems the 

White House would rather have any agreement, even a bad one, 

than no agreement at all. 

Iran is insisting on the right to enrich, which will allow them to 

cheat and come up with a bomb. This could take a few months or 

maybe a few years. They could develop a bomb so fast that we will 

not be able to detect it or stop it and then Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 

and Egypt will want to develop nuclear weapons. We must insist 

on absolute dismantling of nuclear weapon capability in any agreement. We are not dealing with nice people and cannot believe they 

will be honest about nuclear development. We must remember the 

Ayatollah still insists on the destruction of Israel and the United 

States and we must remember the Iranians are still developing 

intercontinental ballistic missiles, which could be used against the 

United States. So I have a lot of questions to ask. Thank you Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Judge. We go now to Mr. Brad 

Sherman of California, the ranking member on the Subcommittee 

on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I strongly agree with the statements of the chair 

and the ranking member and reflect that this committee was pushing for strong sanctions on Iran over the objection of three administrations. Iran was brought to the table only because Congress imposed sanctions, they were resisted by the executive branch. In 

these negotiations, a lot of the focus is on whether Iran will enrich. 

Of equal importance is whether they will stockpile. Iran’s resistance to enforcement mechanisms betrays an interest in evasion. It 

is easier to reactivate a centrifuge cascade than it is to reassemble 

international sanctions. 

Accordingly, we not only need to negotiate with Iran what mechanisms there will be to detect evasion, but we need to negotiate 

with our European and Asian partners what automatic sanctions 

reapplication will apply if any violation is detected. 

And finally, our experience with the Soviet Union illustrates that 

you can negotiate a deal and enforce a deal, even with an 

untrustworthy partner and even if that partner has greater capacVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:44 Aug 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\061014\88286 SHIRL
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ity for evasion than Iran. So I think a deal is physically possible. 

The question is whether we will reach one. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. We are joined to 

help us think through these critical issues, we are joined by a distinguished group of experts here. Mr. John Lauder is a senior advisor at 2020 Strategic Consulting. He previously served as deputy 

director of the National Reconnaissance Office for National Support 

and was director of the DCI Non-Proliferation Center. 

We have Mr. Olli Heinonen. He is a Senior Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government’s Belfer Center for Science 

and International Affairs. Previously, he served 27 years at the 

International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, where he was Deputy Director and head of its Department of Safeguards. 

We have Ambassador DeTrani. Prior to assuming his role as 

President of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance, Ambassador Joseph DeTrani served as the senior advisor to the Director of National Intelligence and he was Director of the National 

Counter-Proliferation Center. 

And we have Mr. Stephen Rademaker. Prior to joining the Bipartisan Policy Center as a National Security Project Advisor, Mr. 

Rademaker served as Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau 

of Arms Control and the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. Prior to that, he served as Deputy Staff Director and 

Chief Counsel of this committee and we welcome him back. 

So let me say that without objection, the witnesses’ full prepared 

statement will be made part of the record. That is to encourage you 

to synthesize this into 5 minutes and the members here are going 

to have 5 calendar days to submit statements and questions and 

any extraneous material for the record. 

So Mr. Rademaker, if you would please summarize your remarks, 

we will begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER, 

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF ARMS 

CONTROL & BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND 

NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE) 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Congressman 

Engel. It is a real pleasure for me to appear here before the committee. It is always nice to come home to the Rayburn Office Building. 

You know I joined the committee staff in 1993 and one of the 

foremost issues of concern to the members of the committee in 1993 

was the risk that Iran might acquire a nuclear weapon. And to me, 

it is really astonishing that here we are more than 20 years later 

and this remains one of the foremost threats to U.S. national security. I just want to observe at the outset that I think this committee has consistently paid attention to this problem for more 

than two decades. You have provided extraordinary leadership to 

our nation and I think the American people are very well served 

by the leadership this committee has provided under a number of 

chairmen over the last 20-plus years. And I am glad to see that you 

are continuing to pay attention to the problem as demonstrated by 

today’s hearing. 

7

I have submitted a prepared statement, so perhaps I will just 

summarize the key points that I make. The first point I make in 

my prepared statement is that Iran is not like other countries that 

say they want to develop civil nuclear energy. They have a track 

record of deception, of covert procurement. The totality of the evidence strongly suggests that Iran is interested in developing a nuclear weapon. So they can’t be treated like a normal country. And 

that is why the question of verification of any agreement that is 

reached with Iran is critically important and that is why this is a 

very timely hearing that you are having today. 

The second point I make and I say if you only take away one 

point from my testimony today I want it to be this. Today, we are 

very much focused on verification of the Joint Plan of Action and 

the so-called Comprehensive Solution that is being negotiated now 

between the two sides in Vienna. A lot of the focus, most of the 

focus in verification discussions is valid. How do we verify their 

compliance with the JPA? How do we verify their compliance with 

the Comprehensive Solution? And I think that is important, given 

Iran’s track record and I am joined by experts today that are going 

to have deep insights into how we should go about trying to detect 

any cheating by Iran on those agreements. 

But my critical point to you is the focus of verification has to be 

broader than just compliance with the current agreement and the 

one that is being negotiated right now. Verification has to look at 

what has happened in the past because there are a lot of unanswered questions about the past. It also has to be—this is even 

more important. I think we need to be worried about permanent 

verification because, as I explained in my testimony, the framework 

of the Joint Plan of Action and my Comprehensive Solution is that 

there is to be a long-term agreement here. But it is not a permanent agreement. It is to be, by its terms, it is to be time limited. 

That has been agreed to by the Obama administration and the 

P5+1. 

So what is being negotiated, it will be an agreement that applies 

for some period of time. I think the Iranians, my understanding is 

the Iranians only want it to be in effect for 5 years. Other experts 

are saying it needs to run 20 years. I don’t know what the P5+1 

is asking, but I think the duration of this Comprehensive Solution 

is going to be somewhere between 5 years and 20 years. That remains to be negotiated. 

So all of these discussions you are hearing now about limits on 

the number of centrifuges and the amount of enriched material 

that they can have, those limitations will apply while the Comprehensive Solution is in effect. But the JPA is crystal clear that 

when that term expires, when the agreed duration of the Comprehensive Solution is reached, all of these limitations end and 

then Iran becomes like any other country. Everything goes away. 

And let me just read the language from the JPA. It says, ‘‘Following successful implementation of the final step of the Comprehensive Solution for its full duration’’—that is the period that 

they agreed to—‘‘the Iranian nuclear program will be treated in the 

same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapons state party to 

the NPT.’’ And what that means is after 5 years or after 20 years 

or whatever the period is, nuclear sanctions on Iran go away. That 

8

is the U.N. sanctions on Iran have to go away. Our sanctions on 

Iran have to go away. All of that is to end at that point. Restrictions on nuclear commerce with Iran end. So Iran can’t be singled 

out and treated differently than other countries. We can’t have export controls that treat Iran differently than other countries. Nor 

can the rest of the international community. Iran becomes a legitimate partner. 

So the idea of the Comprehensive Solution is that for a period 

of time if Iran behaves, if they are not caught cheating, and they 

uphold their commitments under the Comprehensive Solution, at 

the end of the Comprehensive Solution, they go from being nuclear 

pariah to nuclear partner. And at that point they are subject to the 

same verification that Germany or Japan or any other country is 

subject to. That basically consists of two things. That consists of 

IAEA verification under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement 

that applies to all countries. And then secondly, the additional protocol is enhanced verification that Iran has committed to ratifying 

and implementing under the JPA. But that is it. There will be 

more robust verification agreed to under the Comprehensive Solution and I think the parties are talking about. But that more robust verification will end when the Comprehensive Solution ends. 

And then we revert back to the additional protocol and comprehensive safeguards, the same verification that every other country in 

the world is subject to. 

I think it is a critical question for the committee to ask whether 

you are prepared today to agree that if Iran behaves for a set period of time, then we are prepared to end their sanctions. We are 

prepared to end special scrutiny of Iran and treat them as if they 

were Japan. 

I point out in my testimony, there are other examples of countries that have abandoned nuclear weapons programs and we have 

accepted that. And once they abandon their nuclear weapons program, we then treat them like a normal country. South Africa is 

an example. Brazil and Argentina are examples. But what was different in those cases was not only did they say they were abandoning nuclear weapons programs, and not only did they take steps 

in that direction, but in those cases there was also a fundamental 

change in government. In South Africa, the apartheid regime ended 

and Nelson Mandela took power. In Brazil and Argentina, military 

governments gave up power to civilian elected governments. And so 

it was logical in those cases to accept that there had been a fundamental change, that the government perhaps was no longer interested in nuclear weapons. 

In the case of Iran, the vision of the JPA is there doesn’t need 

to be a fundamental change in government. Ahmadinejad can be 

the leader of Iran when the Comprehensive Solution lapses and 

Ahmadinejad will be treated as if he were Japan, his country will 

be treated as if it was Japan. That is what is spelled out. And so 

when we talk about verification, I think yes, absolutely, we need 

to focus on verification of the JPA and the Comprehensive Solution 

because for a country with Iran’s record we have to be suspicious 

that there will be cheating. But we need to get to the bottom of 

what happened in the past. 

9

There are lots of unanswered questions and the JPA does not 

compel Iran to answer those questions. It says if a mechanism 

where there is to be a discussion, but there are no consequences 

attached if Iran fails to cooperate. If the questions remain unanswered, the JPA goes forward nonetheless. And I think something 

needs to be done about that to make sure we get answers about 

the degree to which they pursued a military nuclear program in 

the past. Even more importantly, in the future, after the Comprehensive Solution, I think the committee needs to consider: Are 

you satisfied with the standard safeguards and the additional protocol as the only verification that will apply to Iran’s nuclear program upon the expiration of the Comprehensive Solution? 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rademaker follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Rademaker. Mr. Lauder. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN A. LAUDER, SENIOR ADVISOR, 

20TWENTY STRATEGIC CONSULTING, INC. (FORMER DIRECTOR, NONPROLIFERATION CENTER, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY) 

Mr. LAUDER. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce, Ranking 

Member Engel, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to help address this vital national security topic, monitoring Iranian compliance with a potential nuclear 

agreement. 

I appear before you today in my private capacity as someone who 

has labored on monitoring and verification over several decades. 

The views that I will be presenting are my own and are not intended to represent the views of organizations with whom I have 

been affiliated, such as the intelligence community, the Department of Defense, and the Defense Science Board Task Force on the 

Assessment of Nuclear Treaty Monitoring and Verification. My 

statement draws in part on those experiences and on the Defense 

Science Board Task Force Report, as well as some work on a nongovernmental Task Force on Verification Requirements for a Nuclear Agreement with Iran. 

Neither of the two task forces makes a judgment as to whether 

compliance with any particular nuclear agreement is verifiable. Indeed, we do not yet know of the details of the monitoring provisions 

that will emerge in the Iranian agreement now under negotiation 

or if such an agreement will be concluded. The Defense Science 

Board Task Force Report underscores that monitoring nuclear programs is very challenging and that the technical capabilities to do 

so are limited. But the report suggests a number of steps that can 

be taken to make monitoring more effective, to develop additional 

tools and approaches and to mitigate, but not entirely eliminate the 

risks. 

Mr. Chairman, I submitted a statement for the record that outlines key elements to facilitate compliance monitoring, elements 

that I would respectfully suggest to be part of the agreement with 

Iran and core to the way in which the United States and the international community approaches monitoring and implementation of 

the agreement. 

The implementation of a monitoring regime should be sufficiently 

rigorous to determine whether Iran has made a fundamental strategic decision to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and toward a culture of compliance with international agreements and 

norms. I believe that the monitoring provisions to be included in 

the agreement will be the main determinant of the agreement’s 

success and establish the essential foundation for all of the other 

provisions. Effective monitoring needs to be able to detect both a 

rapid breakout from some facilities known to us and a slow sneakout from covert facilities. 

An agreement with Iran should hence provide one, a full explanation of past Iranian nuclear activities with possible military dimensions; and two, Iran answers previous questions from the 

International Atomic Energy Agency about such activities, explains 

who was involved, what actions were taken and where they took 

17

place. There can be no international confidence that the development of nuclear weapons capabilities has ceased. 

Second, a complete data declaration and robust inspection of 

Iran’s nuclear activities, material, and equipment. Critical parts of 

Iran’s nuclear programs are still not well understood by the international community. A final agreement must allow access to sites, 

persons, and records sufficient to make Iran’s nuclear programs 

transparent. 

Third, an effective means of monitoring all of Iran’s procurement 

activities with possible nuclear applications. A final agreement 

must prevent Iran from continuing to import illicitly materials for 

its nuclear enterprise. The best way to accomplish this is to set up 

an agreed channel for ending nuclear imports that might be allowed by the agreement. No import outside the channel should be 

permitted which will reduce ambiguities in the information detected by the monitoring process. 

Successful monitoring regimes in the past have achieved effective 

verification of compliance through a combination of measures, 

which may be held out as a standard by which to judge the adequacy of the monitoring regime to be applied in Iran. Based on past 

experience, an Iranian monitoring regime should include a combination of negotiated data declarations, inspection measures, and 

national and international monitoring to break tough challenges 

into manageable pieces, as well as a consultative body for an anomaly in dispute resolution. 

The key to all of these measures working effectively is the synergy created among data declarations tell us where to look, routine 

inspections, audited declarations, national and international unilateral monitoring and intelligence means to detect anomalies and 

challenge inspections, and the consultative body seek to gather 

more information relevant to the resolution of those anomalies. I 

recognize that not all of the measures that I recommend in my 

statement will be easily negotiable or ready for rapid implementation, but our goal should be to bring Iran from its prior pursuits 

of nuclear weapons capabilities into what I called earlier a culture 

of compliance with international agreements and norms. 

We should seek the newness in negotiations with Iran by seeking 

agreement and a security agreement to effective monitoring measures. We can also reinforce a culture of compliance by vigorous implementing the monitoring regime. Some of that implementation 

will fall to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Others will 

need to be carried out by the P5+1 itself including by U.S. Government agencies. 

Congress can play a positive and strong role in insisting on effective verification, providing the resources necessary for monitoring 

tasks, and being attentive to compliance issues that may emerge. 

Thank you again to the committee for the opportunity to present 

some of my ideas on this vital topic. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lauder follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. Mr. Heinonen. 

STATEMENT OF MR. OLLI HEINONEN, SENIOR FELLOW, 

BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY (FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL, 

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY) 

Mr. HEINONEN. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to 

talk here today. 

In my testimony today, I am focusing on the verification aspects 

of a comprehensive deal. I am basing my remarks on the implementation of safeguards agreement and available and relevant Security Council resolutions in Iran, and complementing them with 

experiences drawn, in particular from the IAEA verification activities and monitoring activities in South Africa after its dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program, and some experience drawn 

also from safeguards implementation in Syria and North Korea. 

Timely detection and prevention of the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons or a state’s capability to produce them is 

a complex task. Development of weapons of mass destruction is one 

of the closest kept secrets of a state. There are things, which we 

know, and there are aspects of such programs which we can perhaps to a certain degree deduce, but also features which we do not 

know. 

Due to the fact that Iran has been running parts of its program 

first clandestinely and then without satisfactorily fulfilling its reporting obligations to the IAEA and disregarding Security Council 

resolutions. The onus of proof bears heavily on Iran to show that 

its nuclear program is entirely peaceful. 

David Albright, Andrea Stricker and I have recently made an 

analysis on compromises which the negotiators crafting the comprehensive final agreement should avoid. I will now highlight some 

additional details which should be included in a final agreement. 

The strength of the IAEA verification system is access to material, nuclear material, facilities, equipment, and people. However, 

the safeguards are not the magic pill that once taken, cures everything. No verification system can provide absolute assurances that 

a treaty partner fully complies with its undertakings. This is especially the case when applied to problematic states that are noncompliant like Iran. 

Throughout the history of discussions on the nuclear program of 

Iran, Iran has always brought transparency, transparency to build 

the confidence of the international community to the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. President Rouhani has recently offered 

again transparency as one of the tools. Such transparency should 

be understood and implemented in a meaningful and systematic 

way. Even in the name of ‘‘transparency’’ where Iran decides to 

‘‘show’’ a place previously off limits, such inspection visits can bear 

substance only if substantially new information and discussions 

take place, explanations are provided and those are verified. Hence, 

openness should be clearly defined and become a legally binding 

undertaking, and not treated as good will visits to be granted when 

problems arise. 

35

Going further, according to the provisions of the safeguards 

agreement, a state has to declare all nuclear material in its territory. Thus, military sites do not form sanctuaries, but the IAEA 

has the right to conduct inspections under safeguards agreement 

and complementary access under additional protocol when appropriate. 

The purpose of the verification is to reestablish Iran’s nonproliferation records. In order to achieve that, Iran has to fully 

comply with its safeguards obligations. Under the safeguards 

agreement, IAEA statutes, IAEA protocol, and fully implement the 

verification and clarification requirements made by the IAEA 

Board of Governors and U.N. Security Council. But in addition to 

that, additional measures are needed. Iran has to provide complete 

declaration on all aspects of its past and current nuclear program 

including the military dimensions. Iran has to provide information 

on the production of source material, like yellowcake, including imports of those materials. It also goes beyond the requirements of 

the safeguards agreement. 

In addition to that, Iran has to provide information on all imports and domestic production of single-use and dual-use nuclear 

items as specified in the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. 

And in addition to that, Iran has to provide IAEA unconditional 

and unrestricted access, including short notice inspections to all 

areas, facilities, equipment, records, people, and material as required by the IAEA. 

And then finally, a few words regarding the possible military dimension. Why does it matter? There are records that much of the 

material came to a halt in 2003. On the other hand, IAEA has assessed in its reports that some of this work has continued since 

then. It is important to understand the status of Iran’s military-related efforts, noting that one of the last duties of people and organizations involved was the document work they have done. One plausible reason for such effort would have been to save the information for future use. 

Unless properly addressed, it would be difficult to create a meaningful and robust verification regime for Iran. It would also render 

difficult for the IAEA to determine with confidence that any nuclear weapons activities are not ongoing. Without addressing those 

questions, the IAEA will not be able to come to a conclusion that 

all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful use which is an essential 

element in building confidence of the international community over 

Iran’s nuclear program. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heinonen follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH R. DETRANI, PRESIDENT, INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCE 

(FORMER DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION 

CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE) 

Ambassador DETRANI. Thank you, Chairman Royce, Ranking 

Member Engel, distinguished members of the committee. Thank 

you for inviting me and having this important hearing. 

Let me just say that effective monitoring of an agreement with 

Iran will be exceptionally challenging. Iran has a demonstrated 

record of violating its safeguards agreements with the IAEA. The 

lack of transparency into Iran’s nuclear program was cited and documented by the IAEA in numerous reports from the Director General to the Board of Directors. Iran was negligent certainly in declaring the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz in 2002 and the 

Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in 2009. In fact, Iran acknowledged 

both facilities only after they were exposed by an opposition group 

and reported in the press. So I mean there is a record here that 

one has to be very, very cognizant of as was indicated by the chairman and others this morning. 

The IAEA Director General report of 8 November 2011, I think 

a very important report, provided disturbing details regarding 

Iran’s nuclear warhead development efforts that would allow Iran 

to acquire the expertise necessary to produce nuclear weapons. Although there was previous IAEA reporting on ‘‘weaponization,’’ this 

report was stark in its concern about the military dimension of 

Iran’s nuclear program. This is a very, very central part of the 

issue here. Indeed, it is a covert—having covert facilities, but the 

militarization of their nuclear program. 

Director General Amano on 2 June 2014, just a few days ago, 

said the IAEA needed time before they could provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material in Iran. 

A robust monitoring and verification protocol will be necessary to 

deal with Iran’s nuclear program. This will be very difficult, a difficult program to implement effectively. At a minimum, it will require unfettered and I emphasize unfettered access to people and 

places. Indeed, if Iran were in compliance with the six U.N. Security Council resolutions, all forbidding Iran from enriching uranium, the monitoring and verification process would be easier. And 

indeed, if Iran, as they say, was interested in a peaceful nuclear 

program, it is not only through enrichment of uranium that one 

could achieve and acquire a peaceful nuclear program. 

Since Iran reportedly will now be permitted to enrich uranium 

at some level, the IAEA’s task will be considerably more difficult. 

Some of the monitoring issues are an accurate baseline of Iran’s 

nuclear program is necessary for any meaningful monitoring program that will attempt to verify compliance with a safeguards 

agreement. Iran has declared 15 nuclear facilities at 9 locations. Is 

this the totality of their program? As stated above, the IAEA cannot provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear 

material in Iran. Assurances that there are no covert nuclear facilities in Iran capable of enriching uranium are necessary. TechVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:44 Aug 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\061014\88286 SHIRL
46

nically, locating covert uranium enrichment facilities is difficult, 

since spinning centrifuges are silent, with no signature or signal. 

Our experience with North Korea strongly reinforces this point. 

Iran announced its intent to construct 10 additional uranium enrichment facilities and to build a greater number, approximately 

60,000 additional sophisticated centrifuges. Again, monitoring the 

declared facilities deploying sophisticated centrifuges with greater 

capacity and confirming the non-existence of additional covert facilities will be a real challenge. 

A comprehensive declaration from Iran on their nuclear program 

is a necessary first step for any monitoring and verification program. In addition to all related facilities, a list of the scientists and 

technicians who are working at these facilities is necessary. IAEA 

monitors will require unfettered access to these individuals and to 

their relevant records and notes. 

The right to take samples at every facility is necessary, with said 

sample undergoing testing at 

U.S. or IAEA labs. 

The issue of weaponization must be pursued, with access to 

known and suspected high explosive test sites, and all relevant 

records. Information dealing with miniaturization and the mating 

of a nuclear warhead to an Iranian missile must be pursued, for 

obvious reasons. 

Access to all related nuclear R&D work and sites will be necessary, with and I emphasize this ‘‘any time, any place’’ access to 

the facilities that manufacture, assemble and test centrifuges. 

Technical coverage of Natanz and Fordow, with cameras, sensors 

and inspections, will be necessary, 24/7. 

Technical monitoring of Arak, Iran’s plutonium facility approaching completion, will be required since this facility has one purpose, 

one purpose, using plutonium for nuclear weapons. If Iran is committed to a peaceful nuclear program, Arak should be dismantled, 

not monitored. 

Those are some of the issues that a monitoring and verification 

protocol will have to address. The task will be massive, especially 

if Iran is permitted to construct additional fuel enrichment plans, 

similar to Natanz and Fordow, deploying improved centrifuges with 

greater capacity. Determining that permitted enrichment does not 

exceed the 5 percent, this is so critical, a low enriched uranium 

level will also be a challenge, if Iran is permitted to enrich uranium at numerous facilities. Indeed, determining that there are no 

covert uranium enrichment facilities will be a principal challenge 

for any monitoring and verification protocol. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador DeTrani follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. So you say the issue 

of weaponization must be pursued. 

Ambassador DETRANI. Absolutely. 

Chairman ROYCE. And we have all said Iran has to sit down and 

come clean for all of the reasons enumerated. 

Chairman ROYCE. Yet, the head of the IAEA says we are not getting any cooperation from Iran on this. 

Ambassador DETRANI. That is a fair point, Mr. Chairman, absolutely. And you mentioned in your opening statement Parchin and 

the high explosive test sites. There is no question, they have to 

come clean on all these issues, no question. 

Chairman ROYCE. But what if they are not forced to come clean? 

What are the implications of that? 

Ambassador DETRANI. I think there are sanctions in place. I 

think there are consequences if you are not coming clean. I think 

that is what the monitoring and verification protocols are all about, 

coming clean. 

Chairman ROYCE. This is a signed agreement we are trying to 

come to agreement on in terms of these issues to satisfy this issue 

of a weaponization. Of course, anyway, let us go back one point 

though to Mr. Rademaker’s key focus on his testimony. The last 

line of the Interim Agreement notes that after implementing the 

final step of the Comprehensive Solution for the agreed amount of 

time, then Iran is treated ‘‘the same,’’ the same as any non-nuclear 

weapons state that is a party to the NPT. 

Mr. Rademaker, I think in your written testimony you said this 

is a giant get out of jail free card for Iran because it means at that 

point in time no more sanctions, no more restrictions on procuring 

nuclear items, no more restrictions on the number of centrifuges it 

can spin or the level to which it may enrich uranium, at that point 

in time, under the Interim Agreement, we have already conceded 

that whatever the time frame after that. You treat Iran like you 

treat Japan or Germany, completely legitimate. And what does that 

mean then for verification? What is the consequence? Because it’s 

really just a question of trust, isn’t it? We began with the argument 

referring to trust but verify, but it is completely a question of trust 

if at the end of the agreement everything is lifted and there is no 

more verification. 

Mr. Rademaker? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Mr. Chairman, I think you put your finger on 

what I see as the biggest single verification challenge before us. 

And that is—it is really a conceptual challenge. The concept of the 

Joint Plan of Action is that there is this work out period where 

Iran is to behave. It is to fulfill its obligations and if they are not 

caught cheating during that time, then all the limitations come off 

and they are treated like any other country. Given Iran’s track 

record, the clear evidence for decades, the current government has 

shown a concerted effort to—has pursued a concerted effort to develop a nuclear weapon. If they behave for 5 or 10 or 15 years, are 

we prepared at that point to say, okay, we will let bygones be bygones and going forward you will be treated like any other country? 

That is the promise. 

Now what I suggest in my testimony is logically for the Iranians 

an incredibly good deal. This is a get out of jail free card. All they 

51

have to do is behave and then—so if what they want is a nuclear 

weapon, they have been struggling. They have been under international sanctions. They have been under restrictions on their ability to import components. It has been a slog for them to get to 

where they are and they have been very persistent and they have 

stood up this program really only with help from the A.Q. Khan 

Network, otherwise, they procure things, but it has been covert. 

If they behave for the period of the Comprehensive Solution, they 

will be able to move forward with a civilian nuclear program with 

international cooperation. I mean that is promised to them in the 

JPA. And the logical thing for them would be to take that deal, behave, then once the Comprehensive Solution expires, then very aggressively stand up a far more robust civilian infrastructure than 

they have been able to stand up now. Go to tens of thousands of 

centrifuges, much larger quantities of enriched material. And then 

if they choose to break out, do so with a much larger infrastructure 

in place with a much larger stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched material or even 20 percent enriched material because once the Comprehensive Solution ends, they can go back to producing as much 

20 percent material as they want. 

Chairman ROYCE. One of the arguments made to me by one of 

the ambassadors of one of the Arab states was if this comes to pass 

and Iran, of course, is continuing its effort to destabilize other 

countries in the region and he listed country by country where they 

were—from Yemen, where they are trying to topple a government 

and are very close to doing so, to their efforts throughout the region. When he exhausted all of the examples, he said a regime with 

that intent and also having the intent to obtain nuclear programs 

capability, you are in danger of leaving them with a hegemon in 

the region. And with their ambitions intact, both in terms of their 

capability of this weapon and knowing right now that they can destabilize other regimes and knowing that when you lift sanctions 

on them, that is going to be more hard currency that they will use 

to destabilize their neighbors. The argument he was making I 

think was the veiled threat that other states would then do the 

same thing, attempt to rush to a nuclear weapon in order to try 

to offset the aggressive nature of this regime. 

What do you think this portends for proliferation concerns? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Are you directing that question to me, Mr. 

Chairman? 

Chairman ROYCE. Yes, Mr. Rademaker. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think we already have some history here that 

is instructive. In 1995, Iran announced that they wanted to build 

a civilian nuclear power reactor at Bushehr and Russia signed a 

contract with them to help. And for about 10 years it was the policy of the United States under both the Clinton administration and 

probably the first half of the Bush administration to oppose that 

and say Iran, this oil-rich country, ample energy resources, what 

do they need a nuclear power reactor for? We need to stop this. 

And it was a high priority for the U.S. diplomatically to turn off 

the Bushehr reactor. 

One of the reasons we wanted to turn it off was because we were 

afraid it would provide a justification for setting up an enrichment 

capability to fuel the reactor and in fact, that is exactly what the 

52

Iranians did covertly initially and then when they were caught, 

then the Natanz facility was revealed. And they justified it because 

they said they needed the fuel for their reactor. 

And so then the focus of our diplomatic activity shifted to their 

enrichment program and by about 2005, the Bush administration 

decided to give up in the losing effort to prevent completion of the 

Bushehr civil power reactor. And I was in the Bush administration 

at the time. Our talking points changed. We stopped talking about 

how they shouldn’t have a nuclear power plant. We started focusing on just the enrichment facility. The moment we did that, what 

happened? Suddenly, it turned out a lot of Middle Eastern countries were interested in having civil nuclear plants, too. 

Chairman ROYCE. Yes. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. And the 123 agreement was negotiated with 

UAE and Saudi Arabia, Jordan, other countries started talking 

about how they wanted civil nuclear power. Now I think the 

Obama administration is proceeding on the assumption that we 

can change policy again and we can sign off on enrichment in Iran. 

And so okay, we are prepared to accept an enrichment capability 

in Iran. 

Chairman ROYCE. We should learn from past mistakes. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. And that the other countries in the region 

aren’t going to immediately, when that happens, say well, guess 

what, we need enrichment too. 

Chairman ROYCE. Right. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. And then how do we say, how does the United 

States say to Saudi Arabia well, you know, actually, we only trust 

Iran to have enrichment. We don’t trust you, Saudi Arabia, our 

ally. We only trust Iran. 

Chairman ROYCE. My time has expired. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think it becomes untenable. 

Chairman ROYCE. I am going to go to Mr. Engel. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let us continue that. I 

am troubled, I said in my opening statement, that while we are 

talking with Iran, they continue to enrich. I still don’t understand 

how that happened. I just don’t understand it. 

And you mentioned, Mr. Rademaker, the 123 Agreement with 

the UAE. I had the UAE Ambassador in my office and he mentioned that agreement, which does not allow the UAE to enrich for 

peaceful purposes on their soil. Canada has nuclear weapons for 

peaceful purposes. They are not allowed to enrich on their soil. 

If we sign an agreement with Iran that ostensibly says well, they 

can enrich on their soil, but only for peaceful purposes, how do we 

ever get any of the other countries to not enrich on their soil? 

Aren’t we then opening the door to you name it, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt. Why should any of those countries negotiate a deal 

where they will not be allowed to enrich on their soil for peaceful 

purposes when clearly we are giving it away to Iran? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I agree entirely with your question. In fact, it 

was the point I was just making. I think once the United States 

says we are prepared to accept enrichment in Iran, this whole effort over the past decade to stem the spread of that technology to 

other countries it becomes untenable because how do we explain to 

any country that, especially allies, friends of the United States? 

53

You are our friend, so we are not going to let you have this technology. 

Now Iran, we are prepared to let them have it. I couldn’t write 

the talking points for our diplomat to explain to our allies why we 

don’t trust them to have something that we trust Iran to have. 

So I think what happens when we permanently accept enrichment in Iran is by default, we have to accept it anywhere else that 

wants it. I don’t know how—you can try and make it financially attractive for them to not go in that direction, but for a country that 

is determined to have it, to tell them as a matter of policy it is the 

policy of the United States that only Iran gets to have it and not 

you, I think it is not a case that you can persuasively make. 

Mr. ENGEL. Rouhani has said to CNN that Iran won’t dismantle 

a single centrifuge. The Joint Plan of Action calls for a Comprehensive Solution that says that ‘‘would ensure Iran’s nuclear program 

would be exclusively peaceful.’’

Is there a way to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program would be 

exclusively peaceful without dismantling some centrifuges? Anybody care? 

Ambassador DETRANI. There is no question the number of centrifuges is extremely important, certainly for the monitors. When 

you have a number, and especially if they are even more sophisticated and they are spinning and they are putting out that much 

more capability, absolutely, there is no question about the numbers 

are important. 

Mr. ENGEL. Let me talk about an editorial that was in the Washington Post a few weeks ago, 3 weeks ago, perhaps. The editorial 

argued, and I said this in my opening statement, that we can afford to wait, that perhaps time is on our side if the date comes up 

in July and we don’t have a comprehensive agreement, that it 

might be in the best interest of the United States to put it back 

another month or 2 or 3 or 4, that Iran is still undergoing a lot 

of economic difficulty as a result of the sanctions and that we 

might have more leverage if we let the date lapse beyond the July 

20th date. That was essentially a Washington Post editorial. Anybody have any thoughts on that? 

Mr. Heinonen? 

Mr. HEINONEN. First of all, we should not forget that this whole 

Plan of Action is very limited. Today, we don’t know how many 

centrifuges Iran has. IAEA has got some declaration about the 

manufacturing of the replacements of the centrifuges, but it has 

not got the total number of centrifuges produced. So what is happening now in the next few months Iran is still likely building additional centrifuges. It is manufacturing components for the Arak 

reactor and it maintains the skills of the labor, in addition producing additional enriched uranium. So in my view, one should put 

a cap to this and not to wait. The problem doesn’t become easier 

by waiting. 

Mr. ENGEL. So you disagree essentially with what the Washington Post editorial was saying about the fact that Iran is still 

being hurt with sanctions and they will continue to be hurt and 

time will not be on their side. You essentially disagree with that? 

Mr. HEINONEN. I think it is a little bit wishful thinking. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

54

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Engel, we will now go to Ileana RosLehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I have 

been on the record disapproving the Interim Agreement and any 

subsequent agreement that does not require Iran to cease all enrichment activities and dismantle its nuclear infrastructure. We 

know that Iran can’t be trusted. We have decades of covert activities related to its nuclear program to back that up. Yet, we are now 

relying on two things, number one, that Iran is honest with us on 

disclosing all of its nuclear activities; and two, that the verification, 

monitoring, and transparency programs that we have in place are 

strong enough to detect when Iran is cheating. But all of the 

verification and monitoring system operate under the framework 

that is presented to us by Iran, only what Iran has declared as part 

of the program. 

In last month’s IAEA Board of Directors report on Iran’s nuclear 

program, the Director General stated that the IAEA cannot provide 

credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the agency. And we are all familiar with 

the Pentagon report that stated that the United States does not 

have the capability to locate undeclared or covert nuclear facilities 

or programs. So it is still very possible that Iran could be continuing its covert activity and neither the IAEA nor the U.S. would 

have any idea. And this Joint Plan of Action did nothing to 

strengthen verification and monitoring programs or force Iran to 

abide the additional protocols. 

Mr. Heinonen, thank you. You testified to our Middle East and 

North Africa Subcommittee in January and you stated that the 

JPOA provide IAEA inspectors access only to surveillance records, 

not anywhere else at the facilities, that the surveillance measures 

are designed to cover only certain activities. How comprehensive 

are these surveillance records? Is it possible that we are only getting access to what Iran wants us to see, not getting the full picture that the cameras perhaps only focus on the door and not what 

is going on in the room? And also, bad state actors that seek to acquire nuclear weapons—and I am thinking of North Korea, Iran, 

obviously, Libya, Syria—do so surreptitiously. So what we now 

have is the administration and the P5+1 negotiating on a basis of 

only what has been declared. 

Doesn’t the success of any IAEA verification and monitoring program depend on access to all sites, all programs, all of the information, and people and equipment in order to get the full picture? 

One other major area of concern that we should all have and 

which goes largely unaddressed many times is the possible military 

dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. The 2010 U.N. Security 

Council resolutions on Iran ordered the regime to fully cooperate 

with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly regarding the 

possible military dimensions of the program. That is not happening 

and the latest Board of Governors report states that not only is 

Iran not complying, but there have been extensive activities that 

may have taken place at Parchin, especially seriously undermine 

the IAEA’s ability to conduct effective verification. 

55

So my last question is, we are nearing the end of the 6-month 

time frame. There has been no access to Parchin. Does this undermine the credibility of the deal and the so-called monitoring and 

verification measures that we have in place? So that question and 

Mr. Heinonen, are we only seeing what Iran wants us to see? How 

comprehensive are the surveillance records? 

Mr. HEINONEN. IAEA has several measures in place and surveillance is only one. IAEA measures the nuclear material that flows 

in Natanz. IAEA has short notice inspections at intervals between 

1 or 2 weeks. So there are additional measures which complement 

each other, so we are not relying entirely on the surveillance. But 

it is important that this surveillance is modified so that it actually 

covers all the centrifuges and not just exit and entrance routes. I 

think more important that it calls for remote monitoring more so 

that we don’t use this valuable IAEA inspection resources sitting 

at the side and reviewing computer screens. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We should modify it to include all of those? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Yes. All this and this is what I say in my written 

testimony. And then one small remark still, whenever we verify the 

correctness and completeness of declarations and look at items 

which may have been declared, we need to remember that this is 

a very consuming process. This doesn’t come in 1 month or even 

1⁄2 year. And I give an example of South Africa. So we started this 

verification in 1993 and task force, the only thing—because South 

Africa nuclear program ran many, many years without any IAEA 

surveillance. So it took until 2010 when the IAEA was finally able 

to say that all nuclear material in South Africa is in peaceful use. 

So it took that long time to come to this conclusion, based on the 

practices and procedures of the Iran. So Iran will face something 

very similar. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Let us go Mr. Brad Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. Mr. Lauder, I am interested in your 

analysis that we have got to look at break out possibility and sneak 

out possibility. I am not sure I understand what you mean by culture of compliance. Let us face it, Nelson Mandela was not taking 

over in Tehran. I think the culture will always be to try to maximize their nuclear capacity. 

Mr. Rademaker, you brought to our attention what we knew and 

that is after some period of time, Iran will be, at least according 

to this agreement just like any other non-nuclear state, except they 

will have signed and presumably ratified the additional protocol. 

Let us say that is the situation. Let us say that everything they 

have now is frozen and de-thawed 10, 15 years from now. And they 

are subject to the additional protocol and that is about it. And they 

want to sneak, not break out. How long before they have a bomb? 

How long before they have a dozen? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think my personal concern is that will be up 

to them because——

Mr. SHERMAN. Assume that they make an all-out sneak out effort, subject only to the additional protocol, how difficult is it to 

sneak out if you are subject to the additional protocol? 

56

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think there are two dimensions to break out 

and usually we talk about how quickly can they do it and that is 

an important thing to——

Mr. SHERMAN. I am talking about how quickly they can do it 

without being detected. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Right, but let me say I think for a country like 

Iran, the notion that they are going to race, they are going to violate an international law, they are going to race to produce one nuclear weapon——

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Rademaker, you don’t seem to be understanding my question. I am not talking about break out. I am talking about sneak out. That is to say undetected efforts to develop 

a nuclear weapon, assuming they don’t want to be detected, but 

they are diligent, hard working, and well financed. What can they 

put together in a few years of being subject only to the additional 

protocol? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Basically, they will be able to put together everything they want. They will be able to stand up a vastly more 

robust infrastructure with tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of centrifuges, tons of——

Mr. SHERMAN. And under the additional protocol, can they then 

divert the low-enriched uranium to a secret facility and put it up 

to weapons grade? Again, assuming they don’t want to be caught. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. The more robust their infrastructure, the more 

quantity of nuclear material they have, the easier it will be. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Why don’t I shift to one of the other witnesses? 

Mr. Lauder, can you answer the same question? If they are subject only to the additional protocol and they don’t want to get 

caught, what can they do? 

Mr. LAUDER. One of the reasons that I use the phrase sneak out 

in my oral remarks is the international community has focused a 

lot about the rapid break out from known facilities. One of our concerns has to be just as you indicated in your question, Mr. Sherman, that if Iran moves at a slower pace, but behind the scenes 

at facilities that we don’t know about, it can continue down that 

path to nuclear weapons in ways that normal IAEA procedures 

would not necessarily be able to detect. That is one of the reasons——

Mr. SHERMAN. Would they be able to put together without being 

detected, subject only to the additional protocol five bombs in the 

5 years after this agreement is eclipsed? 

Mr. LAUDER. I go back to testimony that the Director of National 

Intelligence Clapper gave before the Hill where he said that the 

fundamental constraining element or the fundamental point is 

what decision that Iran will make. If Iran——

Mr. SHERMAN. They already told you the decision. The decision 

would be develop a nuclear capacity and don’t get caught. Work 

hard. Assuming that is the decision, does anybody have an answer 

to the question? 

Mr. LAUDER. In terms of time frame? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. I said could they do five bombs in 5 years 

subject only to the additional protocol? 

Mr. LAUDER. Yes. 

57

Mr. SHERMAN. I just picked that number out. Does anyone on the 

panel have a better estimate of what they can do subject only to 

the additional protocol assuming they don’t want to get caught? 

Mr. Heinonen? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Certainly that is important for the IAEA in 

terms of verification, but we should not forget here that actually 

Iran can do a plan how to do it. They see which are the strengths 

of the IAEA, which are the weaknesses, and they actually can do 

high product routes, do something at particular facilities, do something in undeclared and in a combination you have this what you 

are afraid of. So I think this needs quite a—a kind of analysis, a 

rethinking of how the verification system is set up, and its capabilities. 

And I also want to bring to your attention that actually this 

whole thing will be a step-wise process. Once the——

Mr. SHERMAN. I want an answer to this question. Does anybody 

disagree five bombs in the 5 years after they are subject only to 

the additional protocol? 

Ambassador DETRANI. I don’t disagree. And that is why we need 

more than the additional protocol. 

Mr. SHERMAN. You say you don’t agree or you disagree with five 

bombs in 5 years? 

Ambassador DETRANI. With the additional protocol, that is a possibility, because it is still managed access. You need unfettered access to everything. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I agree with that, but let me just say I have 

a slightly different concern and that is not how quickly could they 

break out or how effectively could they sneak out. But if they 

choose at some point in the future to become a nuclear weapons 

state, not sneaking, but they just say okay, circumstances have 

changed, we need to have nuclear weapons, if they do that today, 

they can make a mad dash and in some period of months they will 

have maybe two or three nuclear weapons. If they have a vastly 

more robust civil nuclear infrastructure after the expiration of the 

Comprehensive Solution and at that point decide okay, now we’re 

abandoning the NPT in a nuclear weapons state, what will they 

have? It won’t be two or three nuclear weapons. It will be dozens. 

So what they will have upon breaking out with the much larger infrastructure that they will be admitting to have——

Mr. SHERMAN. Knowing my time has expired, I think they will 

sneak out and then break out because if they have five nuclear 

weapons, our response to their announcement of break out and our 

response to their test will be considerably more similar to how we 

treated North Korea than how we treated Gaddafi or Saddam Hussein. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, especially 

thank you for calling this extraordinarily timely hearing and for 

the insights provided by our distinguished witnesses. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, last week on June 4th we recognized the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre and 

I raise this because Bill Clinton, on May 26, 1994, delinked human 

rights with trade. Beijing knew that human rights were a superfluous, an adjunct, a talking point. It was not nuclear. They had 

58

no real consequence if they violated them with impunity and I am 

very concerned fast forward to the Joint Plan of Action that when 

Iran looked us in the eyes, they knew that they could get major 

concessions and they already have achieved that with the sanctions 

regime. How are we ever going to put that back together? And this 

could be analogous to ‘‘Peace in our time,’’ the infamous Neville 

Chamberlain quote he said after meeting with the Germans. 

These are game-changing days. And I am very concerned—Secretary Rademaker, your testimony and your service has been extraordinary over the decades—you have reminded us that Iran has 

a deplorable history of deception, covert procurement, and construction of clandestine facilities which are acknowledged only when revealed or exposed, a catch me if you can mentality. It reminds me 

of Hans Blix traveling around Iraq looking for weapons of mass destruction. Iran, as we know, defied six binding resolutions, demanding that they suspend uranium enrichment. That now has 

changed. That is no longer what we have demanded through the 

JPA. And as you pointed out, in the signing of the JPA, Iran persuaded the United States and others to set aside its policy of no 

right to enrichment. 

You also called the biggest concession the idea of the ill-defined 

time period, wait out a certain period of time, it is not defined, and 

at that point you elaborated that a few times in your statement 

just a moment ago. 

My questions would be one, human rights are very often the canary in the coal mine. In meetings and in conversations with the 

Foreign Minister of Iran have said you can do a grand stroke, release the political prisoners, release Saeed Abedini and then we 

will say hey, they may be meaning business here. There may be 

a sense of sincerity. I find it almost laughable in the preamble 

when it says on November 24th Joint Plan of Action, ‘‘Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop 

any nuclear weapons.’’ If you believe that, I will sell you the Brooklyn Bridge. 

So of course, trust and verify, on-site verification are all absolutely required, but I think we are setting up ourselves to fail. And 

now with Russia—what kind of friend or colleague or partner are 

they going to be, given everything that has happened in Kiev and 

certainly in the Ukraine? 

So a couple of questions. The whole idea of the duration, Mr. Secretary. If you could really elaborate that even further. Twenty 

years, 25 years, it ought to be forever and as you said, to think that 

Iran might be construed to be Japan, and I think in your testimony 

you made some very, very good points about the whole idea that 

Argentina and they matriculated from a dictatorship to democracy, 

South Africa. So the examples were very well taken and you also 

said something if you can elaborate quickly on your need to anticipate that the executive branch officials are going to become deeply 

invested in the success of the JPA. Almost like a mission accomplished mentality when the threats to the region and the world are 

so high that that kind of political chicanery should be nowhere on 

the map. So if you could respond? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, I am happy to respond. 

It is certainly a conceptual thing. The concept of the JPA is we are 

59

not going to insist on a change in government. We are not going 

to insist on a change in your guiding philosophy. We are just going 

to look at your behavior for a set period of time. And if you behave 

as you promised, then it is your get out of jail free card. You will 

be able to go forward as a fully accepted, legitimate member of the 

nuclear club. 

And that is being promised to them up front with no—all they 

have to do is comply with whatever is in that agreement and nothing more. 

To me, the Congress, the American people are being asked to buy 

a pig in a poke because we don’t know who is going to be the leader 

of Iran in 5 or 10 or 15 years when this thing expires. We don’t 

know what they are going to be doing with respect to promoting 

terrorism around the world. We don’t know how much they are 

going to be meddling in Syria or Iraq. We just don’t know. And yet 

we are making this commitment up front that you behave and here 

are all the benefits you get. And I guess I would suggest that the 

judgment whether they are to be considered rehabilitated and 

treated like a normal nation is one that is really premature to 

make today. The judgment may be to be made much closer to the 

event and I don’t see that in this framework. I mean we are making the judgment today that if they behave for 10 years or whatever the agreed period is, they will be deemed rehabilitated. 

And Congress will have an important role here, because I believe 

the administration is going to need you to enact legislation permitting them to waive some of the sanctions that are currently in 

place and so legislatively you will address this and I think in that 

context you ought to be thinking about to what extent are we prepared to accept this concept that all verification, all extraordinary 

verification ends and they become treated like—they become subject only to the verification that other countries are subject to. 

The trust, but verify, that is the wrong concept for a country 

with a track record like Iran. For Iran, it can’t be trust. It has to 

be verify, but verify. You know, I don’t know how trust can be part 

of the equation given their track record. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Gregory Meeks of New 

York. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this 

important hearing. I for a long time have been worried about Iran 

getting a nuclear weapon. I think that one thing that everybody on 

this committee says and I heard the President say it also that it 

is unacceptable, that that is a no starter for Iran to have a nuclear 

weapon. 

And I was just thinking, listening to you, Mr. Rademaker, at the 

beginning of your statement, which really concerned me, was that 

on your return here, we are still talking 20 years later or 25 years 

later, we said that the threat was in 1992 about Iran getting a nuclear weapon. And unfortunately, here we are today in 2014 with 

the same concerns which I would believe that various administrations, Democratic and Republican, have had different strategies in 

trying to make sure that we can assure ourselves of Iran not having a nuclear weapon. 

And here we are still at this juncture and this President has proposed trying to see what we can do talking with Iran, not only by 

60

ourselves, but an unprecedented level with some of our allies and 

some folks who may not because I think you have to have everybody there with the P5+1. 

And as I hear the dialogue going back and forth, the question 

that I ask myself sometimes, and I guess the first question that I 

would ask you because it just seems as though when we were successful with sanctions, it was when it became multilateral and not 

just unilateral. And if we want to make sure that we contain Iran 

and make sure they don’t have a nuclear weapon and if they violate any of the—don’t allow the IAEA to get in or anything of that 

nature, then I would think that if we have to ramp up sanctions, 

we would want to be able to do that with other nations because 

that seems as though when it has been successful. 

And so given Iran’s history that—and what I have heard thus far 

which makes sense to me if they don’t follow through and they are 

not going to follow through, then we are going to need to make 

sure that we still have unity among ourselves so that we can make 

sure that those sanctions that we have to put on or implement are 

not sanctions that is just done by the United States, but are sanctions that are also done by P5+1 countries, so they become very important to us I think. 

I am going back and forth and I am thinking so the effort, at 

least the initial effort that is being made to have negotiations 

under the P5+1 and to make sure that the IAEA has access to 

whatever they are doing there, it seems to me tremendously important because we have not been there before. We want to verify 

what they are doing and what they are not doing extremely. I 

guess I am trying to get a sense from you, do you think that the 

effort that is at least being made thus far so in regards to the conversations that are taking place, we don’t know what the end results are going to be because if they are a failure, then we have 

got to make sure that we ramp up these sanctions, etcetera. Do you 

think that we should make the effort that is made currently by the 

administration? To anyone. 

Ambassador DETRANI. I certainly believe we should make the effort, no question. And that is why the monitoring and verification 

protocol is so, so important. All the points you made, Congressman 

Meeks, exactly right. Unfettered access, we are concerned on the 

weaponization. We are concerned on the covert facilities there. 

They have not been forthcoming, absolutely. 

And the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 speaks to this 

issue. Iran should cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding 

issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about military 

dimensions of their nuclear program. So even if you have the U.N. 

Security Council coming forth with a resolution saying this, so we 

go forth. So the key would be a very robust, meaningful, monitoring 

and verification regime. 

Mr. MEEKS. Anybody else? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I guess I have said some critical things about 

the JPA, but you shouldn’t infer from that I oppose the idea of trying to negotiate with Iran an end to their nuclear weapons program 

and an end to the risk of nuclear proliferation to Iran. I think a 

negotiated solution is by far the best outcome as opposed to continuing with sanctions. We continue with sanctions and they conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:44 Aug 07, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\061014\88286 SHIRL
61

tinue with their nuclear development. That is not a good solution. 

Military attack is a temporary solution, but not a permanent solution. So negotiated solution is ideal if you can get it, but it has always been possible to negotiate an agreement with Iran. All we 

have to do is agree to their demands and we have got a deal. That 

is obviously not acceptable. So you want to negotiate and you want 

to get a deal that actually addresses——

Mr. MEEKS. We know it is not easy. If it was easy, it would have 

been done. We know it is hard. This is hard stuff. And that is why 

this hearing is good. That is why listening to you and having this 

dialogue is good and hearing sides and hearing from folks and 

hearing from other countries is good because this is not easy. If it 

was easy, we would be done. This is hard stuff. And thank you for 

your testimony. I am out of time. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Rohrabacher from California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you, Chairman Royce for calling today’s hearing. And all of us 

should agree that one of the great foreign policy challenges we face 

and challenges we face are preventing a nuclear armed mullah dictatorship in Iran. I think that one of the things that has been lacking in this discussion so far today is the fact that we wouldn’t 

care—there is a fundamental difference here is that we wouldn’t 

care if this was Brazil. We wouldn’t care if this was Ireland wanting to have this nuclear facility that could result in a nuclear 

bomb. What we have is one of the world’s worst human rights 

abusers, China being the worst and this mullah dictator has jails 

filled with people that want to get along with the rest of the world. 

So perhaps the only way that we are going to succeed in not permitting the mullah dictatorship from having a nuclear weapon 

from what I am gleaning from what you are saying, frankly, the 

only way we are going to succeed is we get rid of the new mullah 

dictatorship in Iran. The bottom line is if we can’t convince them 

and I am taking it from what I heard today that we are not going 

to be able to—not to take their word for it that they are not going 

to utilize this new capability. I don’t believe that we are going to 

convince them that through a culture of compliance that they are 

going to change their ways because they want to fit into the culture. We either have to get rid of them or they are going to have 

the bomb. And when they have the bomb they may well, as we 

know they are fanatics. 

So the question is, shouldn’t we be supporting—instead of relying 

on negotiations with the mullahs, shouldn’t we be supporting those 

elements in Iran that would like to overthrow the mullahs and establish a real democracy? Does anyone want to go on record as saying that? I guess not. 

Mr. LAUDER. If I could, I used that phrase culture of compliance 

as an aspirational goal in the sense that what we are ultimately 

trying to do through negotiated measures, through sanctions, 

through all the steps that the international community has taken 

is to bring about a more open and moderate Iran and this is one 

set of tools. There is obviously a variety of tools. And the inspection 

process itself, as we found in the Soviet Union——

62

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me just say, I don’t believe that the 

mullahs want to be cool and go along with what the culture is all 

about, when we establish this new culture. I want to—I have got 

2 minutes left or 11⁄2 minutes. Are the Russians still engaged in 

the engineering and the development of the technologies that are 

going on, the centrifuges that will make the weapons possible? Are 

the Russian engineers engaged in this? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Sir, actually the IAEA knows very little about 

the involvement of other countries in Iran’s nuclear power program 

because of the limitations of the inspections. Therefore, the IAEA 

has not been able to fully investigate, for example——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am asking—I have got 1 minute left. Are 

the Russian engineers still engaged in this project? 

Mr. HEINONEN. I think that for the enrichment program, there 

has not been direct Russian engineers directly involved. There are 

some assumptions on the weaponization part of the individual, but 

it appears that no Russians were part of the enrichment program. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So right now, in terms of the actual building 

of this facility was a Russian project, was it not? 

Mr. HEINONEN. No. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It wasn’t? 

Mr. HEINONEN. It was a Bushehr power plant which nuclear 

power plant——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is what I am talking about, the nuclear 

power plant. Was the nuclear power plant built by the Russians? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Yes, that is true. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And the centrifuges wouldn’t make any difference if they didn’t have the nuclear power plant, right? 

Mr. HEINONEN. I don’t think they need the centrifuges for their 

nuclear power plant. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No, no. I understand that. The point is when 

the Russians came on board, I remember going to the Ambassador 

in 1999, our American Ambassador, suggesting we give the Russians an alternative place to build several nuclear power plants because this would lead to this moment. And nothing happened. I 

said the same thing to Condoleezza Rice about a year later and 

nothing happened. 

When the Russians first started building this nuclear power 

plant, we were leading up to this day and I would hope that—I am 

sorry that it looks like our cooperation level with the Russians has 

actually gone down since this moment and perhaps this is something that would show a sign of good faith on their part if they 

would start cooperating with us in dealing specifically with the Iranians. 

Will you indulge me for one more question? Was there an offer, 

do any of you know of an offer by the Russian Government to refrain and to withdraw from this project early on before the nuclear 

power plant was done, before that part of the project was done? Do 

you know of any offer made by the Russians to withdraw from this 

project any time which could have prevented us from coming to 

this point? I have been told there was an offer and that we didn’t 

pay any attention to it and that was under George W. Bush’s administration. Thank you very much. 

63

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. We go now to 

Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. 

Rademaker, you said you referred back to two decades ago when 

we were concerned about Iran’s nuclear program. And I am trying 

to get a sense from the panel going forward, we are talking about 

verifying a comprehensive agreement. And yet, for as long as we 

have worried about the nuclear program in Iran, how confident 

were we that there wasn’t a facility—I don’t recall when Natanz 

was discovered, you can speak to that. But certainly Fordow, how 

confident were we that there weren’t other facilities, nuclear facilities beyond Natanz? Let us start with that, Mr. Rademaker. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. The answer to your question is, we were never 

confident that there is no secret facility. Natanz was a secret facility until it was revealed in 2002. And then for a long period of time 

that was the only enrichment facility that we knew of in Iran. And 

then the Fordow facility was revealed and it was again, an even 

more secretive, underground facility. 

So today, is there yet a third underground enrichment facility 

somewhere in Iran under construction, in operation? I don’t think 

anybody, given that record, that history, I don’t think anybody can 

come to you and say we are confident that there is not. That is why 

the question regarding our patience is critically important, both in 

the near term through the JPA and the Comprehensive Solution, 

but also as I suggested in my testimony, even afterwards, because 

afterwards, when the Comprehensive Solution expires, the level of 

verification is going to go way, way down. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Is there anyone else on the panel that is confident 

that these are the only enrichment facilities in Iran? 

Mr. LAUDER. I think as Mr. Rademaker has said, one of the reasons why I think all of us have been strong proponents of additional monitoring measures that are comprehensive and go beyond 

just certain facilities is to try to reduce the uncertainty about what 

is going on elsewhere in Iran that maybe we don’t fully understand. And that is also why it is very important to get that precise 

and detailed, comprehensive, and complete accounting from Iran 

about its past activities. That needs to be part of the agreement. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And that is what troubles me the most. We are now 

a little more than a month away from the expiration of the 6-

month period and we have been talking for how long have we been 

talking about the military, possible military dimensions, Mr. 

Heinonen? When was the first IAEA report that talked about the 

military dimensions program? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Actually, the first time it was mentioned indirectly was in spring 2004, if I remember correctly. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So we are negotiating during this interim period to 

get to a comprehensive agreement for a decade, for a decade. We 

have worried about possible military dimensions of the program. 

That is what has been driving the congressional action. That is 

why we have been engaged in these deliberations for now some several decades. But for 10 years, we have worried about this. We 

have known about this. And yet, what access have we been given 

thus far during this initial period when the goal is to negotiate a 

comprehensive agreement, what access have we been given to the 

64

other areas that we might be interested in to ensure that Iran has 

come clean on the military dimensions of its program? 

Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador DETRANI. Sir, that is why we want a robust monitoring and verification regime as we go forward, knowing what you 

just said. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate that. The question is, it is a chicken 

and egg situation, right? I mean how do we agree to any sort of 

comprehensive agreement with an adequate level of verification if 

to date on the most concerning issue about Iran’s nuclear program, 

the Iranians haven’t been willing to provide any access at all. 

Ambassador DETRANI. That is a fair point, sir. That is why persistent and continuous access to all the facilities, the ability to take 

samples, the ability to question people, to see documents and everything is very basic to a robust monitoring and verification program. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And certainly before we would ever entertain the 

possibility of extending this interim agreement for another 6-month 

period, certainly we should expect that the Iranians would at least 

be willing to grant us that access in the areas that for more than 

a decade we had these concerns. 

Mr. Rademaker? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I just wanted to interject the point that regrettably, this is another area where the JPA is deficient. The JPA, I 

can read you the sentence. There is one sentence in the JPA that 

talks about the history. It doesn’t use the word military dimension, 

but that is what they are talking about. 

Let me just read you the sentence. This is how this question, this 

critically important question is addressed in the JPA. It says they 

are to create a joint commission of the two sides, the P5+1 and the 

Iranians. There will be this joint commission. And ‘‘it will work 

with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of 

concern.’’ That is all it says. So there is a mechanism that is going 

to work with the IAEA to try and figure this out. Nothing in the 

JPA depends on it actually being worked out. 

In other words, if this mechanism utterly fails to achieve satisfaction for the IAEA, that is unfortunate, but it doesn’t stand in 

the way of the rest of the JPA. So what is going on here? I have 

to say I think regrettably what happened was our negotiators 

found this to be a very hard issue because I think the Iranians 

have a lot to hide. There is a lot of history here they don’t want 

to talk about. So this became a sticking point in the initial discussions and the answer, the negotiators, the P5+1 ultimately settled 

on was we are going to ship this issue to the IAEA. It is going to 

become the IAEA’s problem to get to the bottom. We will have a 

joint commission that will try to work with them, but if we don’t 

get to the bottom, well, that is just too bad. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I am out of time, but Mr. Chairman, I appreciate 

that and I just hope that given that it is now more than a decade 

that we have worried about military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear program per the IAEA, longer for a lot of the rest of us, that 

at a bare minimum Congress should be informed of the very detailed nature of whatever talks have taken place surrounding that 

65

issue before we should be asked to budge an inch on any sanctions 

and in fact, whether to respond beyond 6 months. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Deutch, I think you and I should talk 

after this hearing on that very subject. 

Let us go now to Mr. Steve Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last year, the Asia Subcommittee which I chair and the Middle East Subcommittee 

chaired by Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, held a joint hearing to discuss the 

linkages between covert and illicit activities in Iran, North Korea, 

and Syria. It has been reported for some time that North Korea 

has been assisting and supplying Iran’s missile program. 

Given the history of North Korea and the failure of the U.S. and 

international community to stop Pyongyang from acquiring nuclear 

weapons, what lessons should be applied to the situation with Iran 

moving forward? And what provisions, if any, in the agreement 

prevent Iran from outsourcing their nuclear program to another 

country as was the case with North Korea. 

I see you nodding, Mr. Lauder, so I will go to you first, if you 

like. 

Mr. LAUDER. Well, I will start, but I am sure Ambassador 

DeTrani will have something to add to this point as well. 

One of the reasons why I argued in my statement that it is very 

important to have an effective means of monitoring Iranian procurement particularly if they are going to be allowed to have a 

peaceful nuclear program as part of whatever agreement emerges 

is to make sure that in the noise of those procurement efforts that 

Iran is not able to outsource significant parts of its nuclear weapons development program to other states or to non-state actors, the 

A.Q. Khans in the world, to states like Korea. And also, to get a 

good handle on what procurement that they are obtaining, because 

there has been this long track record of Iran looking for various 

sources throughout the world that could aid in its nuclear developments. 

Mr. CHABOT. Ambassador DeTrani? 

Ambassador DETRANI. Sir, let me just note for North Korea, we 

have a real example here of how important verification and monitoring is. In 2008, when we were proceeding with the dismantlement programs to dismantle Yongbyon, there was a verification 

and monitoring protocol that they agreed to orally. When we asked 

for them to put it in writing because that was a very robust monitoring and verification protocol, it required, if you will, unfettered 

access, anywhere, any time, samples taken out of the country, they 

refused to put it in writing and that was the end. And since then 

they have not come back to the table. 

So to show how important that verification piece of the equation 

is with North Korea, I would think the same with Iran, with a very 

robust meaningful monitoring and verification protocols that insist 

on the unfettered access and samples and so forth. I think that will 

be very, very critical as we move forward. And that is exactly what 

we offered North Korea. 

Mr. CHABOT. Let me just shift gears for just a moment. Where 

does Israel fit in all of this and their views on Iran-compliant 

issues and just what attention is being paid in that area? Mr. 

Rademaker? 

66

Mr. RADEMAKER. Israel is obviously very concerned about the 

Iranian nuclear program and with good reason. Iran—Iranian leaders have on multiple occasions made comments about how Israel 

should be wiped from the face of the earth and wiped off the map 

of the Earth. So for a country like Israel, that is obviously alarming 

that we have those kinds of statements of intention, coupled with 

technological activity that seems aimed at producing a nuclear 

weapon which would actually enable them to do precisely what 

they are saying they would like to see happen. 

So the United States has a lot to be worried about and I think 

Iran’s other neighbors in the Persian Gulf region have a lot to be 

worried about. And Israel has a lot to be worried about. Israel is 

paying a lot of attention to this problem. My understanding is 

there is a great deal of apprehension in Israel about the current 

course of diplomacy. 

As I said earlier, it is always a possibility to negotiate a deal 

with Iran, just agree to what they are asking for, and you have a 

deal. And I think the Israelis are concerned that the deal that was 

struck last year leans too far in the direction of Iran’s negotiating 

objectives, that they are allowed to continue enriching, that they 

get sanctions relief, the momentum in the direction of tightening 

sanctions has all been reversed. 

And then they are promised this get out of jail free card that 

they can continue to enrich at a level that is being negotiated right 

now and then when that period expires, they can do all the enrichment they want. They can do all the reprocessing they want. None 

of that will be limited. So the Israelis, I think, are deeply concerned 

about that and my sense is it has given rise to some tension in the 

bilateral relationship between the United States and Israel. 

Mr. CHABOT. I think my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will go to Karen Bass of California. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. The Obama administration has 

intimated that a final agreement that leaves Iran with a nuclear 

weapons break out time is 6 months to a year may be acceptable. 

I wanted to know from the panelists, whoever chooses to answer, 

what you think of the idea of if a 6-month break out window would 

be a sufficient period of time to detect and counteract an Iranian 

break out? Sure, go ahead. 

Mr. HEINONEN. Well, certainly 6 months is a very short period 

of time in international diplomacy. And it depends how Iran will 

deviate from the agreement or how it may renegade. There are several options available there. And if it goes, for example, in such a 

way that the only evidence that the IAEA has are the environmental sample results which normally take about 3 months to deliver, 6 months is much too short time because you need to take 

evidence, additional samples, you can perhaps analyze them first, 

but it has a lot of vulnerabilities and it is also difficult to estimate 

the unknowns, what kind of parameter you have there, how long 

will it take to find out. You need to prove it, etcetera, so 6 months 

for me is the very, very short end. 

Ms. BASS. Yes, Mr. Lauder. 

Mr. LAUDER. If I could just add, I think some of us feel that there 

may be too much emphasis on a time line because it is very hard 

to say for sure well, Iran is 6 months away from a weapon or it 

67

is 51⁄2 months away from a weapon or even react in that time. And 

I think that is why several of us have been advocating that the 

really important thing to get right in this agreement is to layer on 

sufficient monitoring measures so you really have a sense of what 

is that attack status of Iran’s program to the extent that you can 

get it. Because everything else falls from that. 

Ms. BASS. Yes . 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Forgive me if I sound like a broken record, but 

the 6-month break out time, that is fine. But bear in mind that 6-

month period will only apply during the period of the Comprehensive Solution. When the Comprehensive Solution ends and that is 

going to be 5 years, 10 years, 15 years. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Then all of the things that give us that 6-month 

window go away. They will no longer be limited to the number of 

centrifuges, the amount of the enriched material and so at that moment that solution expires, it won’t be 6 months anymore it will 

be 6 weeks or 6 days. 

Ms. BASS. Right. And I heard you say that earlier, so what do 

you think it should be? So it shouldn’t be 5 years. It should be 10 

years, 15 years, forever? What are your thoughts about that? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. On the Comprehensive Solution? 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think the enhanced verification requirements, 

the restrictions—well, I don’t think given their history I don’t think 

Iran should be ready to enrich at all. I think it should remain the 

U.S. policy that they are not ready to enrich, but the restrictions 

on what they can do and the enhancement verifications that applies to that, I believe, should extend indefinitely until the international community can reach a judgment that it is satisfied that 

Iran is now like South Africa. They turned the corner. They are no 

longer a nuclear proliferation threat. I think it is going to take 

more than just good behavior for a finite period of time. Then I will 

feel comfortable that there is been a genuine change of heart. 

Ms. BASS. You and several of the other panelists mentioned several countries, South Africa, I think was one. Are there any other 

examples internationally where it has been without a specific time 

line? 

Ambassador DETRANI. Libya also declared their program and 

gave that program up. 

Ms. BASS. I am sorry, sir. 

Ambassador DETRANI. Libya also gave up their program. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Karen Bass. Now we go to Adam 

Kinzinger of Illinois. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you all for 

being here and helping educate us and talking about some of these 

important issues. I mean as I look around the world and I look 

around especially the Middle East, I guess I am excited that the 

administration is so giddy about the prospect of negotiations with 

Iran. I think a lot of the pending negotiations we heard yesterday 

from the administration about how they are hopeful that the situation going on with the release of five Taliban will help lead to a 

68

reinvigorated Taliban to come negotiate with the United States. I 

reminded some folks of the administration that, in fact, Pakistan 

is in negotiations with the Taliban right now and about a day or 

two ago, 18 people were killed in an airport in a fight with the 

Taliban. 

Look at the situation in Israel, the Israel-Palestine negotiations 

and all the effort that the administration is putting into that which 

while we would all love that to be solved, it is probably questionably a regional conflict, a smaller conflict on the basis of conflicts 

that surround and envelope the entire Middle East. 

Look at the negotiations with Russia, how well some of those 

have gone and Syria and the situation we find ourselves in there. 

So I don’t have a lot of hope in the future of negotiations from this 

administration. 

And I would ask if anybody, and I am going to ask this rhetorically, and you can feel free to comment later, if you can think of 

any success we have actually had with negotiations with an enemy 

of the United States under this administration. 

We had our boot on the throat of the Iranians at a time when 

we really could have, I think, ended the question of nuclear arms 

in Iran, but we backed away. And it is always interesting to me 

how the Iranians feel like they can be in any position at all to have 

any bargaining power at the table and have any demands from the 

very beginning. We have determined that they should not have the 

right to a nuclear weapons program and I think that pretty much 

says it. 

But that said, I want to go on to an issue that hasn’t been 

touched on yet very briefly. I can ask for your comment to the level 

of your expertise. Can you talk about the Iranian ballistic missile 

program? They are developing the ability to deliver nuclear weapons through a ballistic missile program, yet of course, they claim 

that they have no desire for the weaponization of their nuclear program. So I am curious, whoever wants to go first, if you can talk 

about the situation where Iran finds itself right now with ballistic 

missiles. 

Mr. Lauder? 

Mr. LAUDER. The Iranian ballistic missile program is a capability 

that is of concern, ought to be a concern. And in fact, it would be 

difficult to negotiate at this stage given what has transpired already. But I would think that it would be very important to begin 

to find a way to add additional constrains on that program and to 

add additional monitoring against the program. 

You can recall in the heyday of arms control agreements between 

the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, we chose to 

focus on delivery vehicles because they were easier to monitor in 

some ways that the nuclear weapons themselves and the nuclear 

programs themselves. 

And I think constraints and monitoring on the Iranian ballistic 

missile program would be a very useful complement to the types 

of things that we have been talking about so far in this hearing. 

Mr. KINZINGER. But do we have the ability to do that in the law? 

I mean, look, when you are negotiating with the Russians and you 

have arms limitation agreements, you have two super powers, both 

69

with a vested interest in trying to calm a situation. This is an 

asymmetric situation. I mean Iran is no Soviet Union. 

Do we really believe that we can put in place a way just to monitor, and this is what I am going to ask, are there ways to put in 

place to monitor what they are doing and to do it with assurances 

that they are not hiding anything in the mountains or underground? 

Mr. LAUDER. I think one of the challenges that we face, as you 

quite rightly point out, is this is very much an asymmetric relationship. This is not where the United States is concerning some of its 

capability compared to something that we are asking Iran to do. 

We are asking Iran to stop doing what it has been doing illicitly 

against the international norms and international agreement and 

we are trying to trade off sanctions relief against that. We know 

how to monitor missiles. We certainly have a track record of things 

that we could put in place if we could bring Iran to that position. 

Ambassador DETRANI. But your point is right on though that is 

so central. Because if we are talking about weaponization and miniaturization that is a delivery system. You have to look at the ballistic missile program. And that is one program that they have 

worked with North Korea on and so forth and they continue to develop. So it is a very central piece to any meaningful monitoring 

and verification protocol. The missiles have to be very, very much 

a part of that. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Mr. Chairman, I have a million other things, but 

I will yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. William Keating of Massachusetts. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank 

the panel for their very important discussion this morning. I think 

it underscores to me and many of our members the need for Congress to be informed fully before the agreement is to go forward. 

And many of the issues you brought up are critical ones. 

My role at the committee also is the ranking member on Europe 

Eurasia emerging threats there. So I would like to shift more into 

European perspective of things. 

How do you assess the role of our European partners in the PF+1 

negotiations, especially with Catherine Ashton, stepping down as 

the EU High Representative. Is that going to have an effect at all 

and would you comment on that, our partners and how they are 

viewing the situation and give us your expertise in that area as 

well. 

Ambassador DETRANI. So my only comment on that would be the 

Europeans have to be extremely concerned. The last question about 

the ballistic missiles because if North Korea has the capability and 

they are working on it to touch Europe with their ballistic missile 

system, if there is a nuclear program and—they are needing it. So 

I think the European nations have to be extremely concerned about 

the nuclear program, no question. 

Mr. KEATING. Could any of you comment on the effect of the U.S. 

dealing with our European partners as well, what things could 

raise as potential conflicts, what things could we do to ameliorate 

things going forward? 

70

Mr. RADEMAKER. Sir, on your question about Cathy Ashton, obviously she has been a central player. I think her departure will 

make a difference although we don’t know exactly what difference 

it will be because we don’t know who her replacement will be. And 

everything will depend on personality of her successor. 

More broadly speaking, the observation was made earlier that for 

our sanctions policy to work we need cooperation of our economic 

partners and there have been plenty of hiccups along the way but 

by and large in recent years the cooperation has been pretty good. 

I think Congress has provided incredible leadership in the sanctions area, the short hand that applies to this is the MenendezKirk amendments to the Defense Authorization Bill. There have 

been two of them. But the way, they impose financial sanctions in 

a creative way designed to discourage the importation of Iranian 

oil, but it was done very cleverly and in a calibrated way that has 

actually worked. And there is a lot of conversation about frozen 

Iranian assets in foreign banks. These are not funds that are actually frozen, but they are funds that are being held in those banks 

and they can’t be repatriated in cash form to Iran because of the 

U.S. sanctions policy that Congress mandated and that other countries are cooperating on. 

So the partnership has worked pretty well. I think in terms of 

the actual diplomacy, it is interesting. I was involved to some extent when I served in the Bush administration and I mean there 

are times that some of our European partners take a harder line 

on Iran than the United States does. I think, for example, the current French Government has been pretty firm in its demands of 

the Iranians. So it is gratifying to see, sometimes sobering to see, 

some of our allies take a harder line on the Iranian nuclear program than the U.S. Government. 

Mr. KEATING. If the PF+1 moves forward though and there is 

some kind of long-term agreement and some of the ambiguity or 

the lack of robust verification that you talked about this morning 

isn’t in place, what are the concerns as a group? What, for instance, would happen if the EU would move more ahead or some 

of the countries and lifting those sanctions unilaterally or as a 

group? Do you see that as a real concern going forward, a kind of 

disengagement? 

Ambassador DETRANI. Sanctions is a key. Lifting sanctions like 

that would be, I think, a terrible move and it would move us in the 

wrong direction. I think we have to be united on something like 

this. 

Mr. KEATING. And then lastly, I just want to touch base a little 

bit on Russia. The U.S. and the EU imposed on Russia’s oil and 

gas sectors at any point, what implication if any will increase European demand for gas having our ability to sustain international 

consensus regarding sanctions on Iran? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. That is a pretty complex question having to do 

with the functioning of global energy markets. But Iran and Russia 

are major energy exporters and so I guess they both benefit from 

higher prices and they both benefit from the emergence of shortages. So it is one of the challenges that I believe the United States 

faces in dealing with Russia, the fact that I think something like 

30 percent of European gas consumption is Russian gas. 

71

There is an effort now to build a pipeline across Turkey and into 

southern Europe, ideally to be filled with Azeri gas. The Iranians 

I think would be happy to put their gas in the pipeline if they were 

allowed to do that. I think it is sort of a central tenet of U.S. policy 

we don’t want that to happen. But the energy equation is a complex one and Iran as a government is guilty of gross financial mismanagement and so their energy resources are relatively undeveloped compared to what they could be with better management. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Randy Weber of Texas. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our colleague down on 

the left, Mr. Meeks, said that negotiating with Iran is not easy. 

And I think—is it Rademaker, is that how you say that?—said that 

negotiating would be easy, my words, if we roll them and play 

dead. You said if we give them everything they want. Was it you 

that said that? 

You know, my opinion is if we are not careful in these negotiations, we are going to get what we got in the Guantanamo trade. 

We get to keep one conventional weapon. They get five nuclear 

weapons. So it turns out Adam Kinzinger was exactly correct, negotiations have not been kind to us during this administration if I 

can put it rather glibly. If we don’t realize that there is a danger 

in negotiating with Iran, we are fooling ourselves. Anyone here on 

the panel remember when the first time that Iran referred to the 

United States as the Great Satan? Anybody? 

Ambassador DETRANI. Was it when Khomenei came in ’79? 

Mr. WEBER. November 5, 1979 when Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini called us the Great Satan. So for 35 years they have been 

exporting terrorism, calling us the Great Satan. Soon after that, I 

don’t know what time, it was Israel was the small Satan. So should 

we be saying, when we talk about negotiating with Iran, the terrorists, here we are negotiating with a group of people who will—radical, Islamic, fundamentalist, jihadist terrorist, Khomeini—who the 

jihadist believe in exporting terrorism to the extent that they will 

strap explosives on young boys and girls to kill other boys and girls 

and innocent men and women and we think we can negotiate with 

them? 

I believe it was you, Mr. Lauder, who said that we need a list 

of all of their scientists who are working on their program. And I 

don’t know if you saw the Wall Street Journal article on May 27th 

where there is a group of opposition leaders who have identified 

Mohsen Fakhizadeh, I think is his name, as probably the father of 

their nuclear weapon. Would you agree with that? 

And Mr. Chairman, by the way, Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would 

like to get this letter into the record. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Weber, without objection, we will include 

that. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Would you agree with that? 

Mr. LAUDER. I think it is very important that we have access as 

part of the monitoring machine the key personnel who are part of 

Iran’s nuclear program. 

Mr. WEBER. But do you agree that he is the father of their nuclear program? 

Mr. LAUDER. I don’t know. Most nuclear programs probably have 

multiple fathers. 

72

Mr. WEBER. But do you know this gentleman? 

Mr. LAUDER. I know the name and know the individual, yes, sir. 

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Ambassador, you are shaking your head. 

Ambassador DETRANI. I have heard the name before, sir, yes, absolutely. 

Mr. WEBER. Turn you mike on, please, sir. 

Ambassador DETRANI. Sorry? 

Mr. WEBER. Turn your mike on? 

Ambassador DETRANI. Yes, I have heard the name before, sir. 

Mr. WEBER. You have heard the name. 

Ambassador DETRANI. And affiliated with the nuclear program. 

Mr. WEBER. Would you give this credence then or is it just something you heard in passing? 

Ambassador DETRANI. No, I think there is probably something to 

it. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. You mentioned also, Mr. Lauder, that the facility, first of all, that once we should get that list of those involved, 

those scientists, we should have any time, any place, access for 24/

7. I think that was you that said that in today’s hearing which I 

can’t agree more of. And we keep in context that we have got terrorists who will kill innocent children, men and women, and who 

have been lying and doing such for over 35 years. How long do you 

think we ought to give them a chance to prove themselves? Trust, 

but verify, 24/7, any time, any place access, should it be 35 years? 

Should they stop their exporting of terrorism to Syria or I should 

say supporting in Syria and you can go right down the list, Afghanistan, Iraq, all the terrorism they are supporting. Should it be 35 

years or is 35 months long enough or not long enough? 

We will start with you, Mr. Rademaker. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. The question is——

Mr. WEBER. How long should we expect them to be compliant before we can trust them? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I have a hard time answering that. It is sort 

of the Supreme Court on what is obscenity. I will know it when I 

see it. I don’t think you can measure this by a time line. I think 

the measure of whether you can trust Iran will be the totality——

Mr. WEBER. Okay, I got you. I got you. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. The atmosphere, who is in power there, what 

policies are they pursuing. 

Mr. WEBER. I got you. What do we catch them with, if we are 

diligent? I am almost out of time. Let us go to Mr. Lauder real 

quick. 

Mr. LAUDER. And I agree with some of the comments Mr. 

Rademaker made earlier that we have to be about this monitoring 

and verification regime for the long term. There may be aspects of 

it——

Mr. WEBER. But 6 months. Karen Bass asked the questions, 6 

months to break out. Six months is not long enough, agreed? 

Mr. LAUDER. Oh, for monitoring, oh, it has to be longer, yes. 

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Heinonen, what do you think the length of time 

ought to be? 

Mr. HEINONEN. More than 6 months, but it depends on the compliance, how the compliance is dealt with, what kind of a process 

will we have in place when something comes up when we see that 

73

Iran has not complied. The track record is pretty poor there. We 

have had a number of red lines which have been——

Mr. WEBER. Forgive me. 

Ambassador DETRANI. Sir, I would say this is going to be indefinite. I am going to say the part of the NPT, the IAEA is there. You 

are going to have to have those monitors. The extra protocol and 

the unfettered access is going to have to be there indefinitely. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. We will go to Mr. David Cicilline from Rhode 

Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the 

witnesses for this very useful testimony on a very serious issue. I 

think the hearing underscores the principal challenge we face as a 

country and that is how do we reach agreement with a party with 

very serious consequences that has been deeply untrustworthy and 

deceptive. And I think in part our success depends on our ability 

to monitor effectively and to respond effectively to any failings in 

the agreement. 

So I want to first ask the witnesses, the Joint Plan of Action calls 

for a Comprehensive Solution that, and I quote, ‘‘would ensure 

Iran’s nuclear program would be exclusively peaceful.’’ We have 

also heard President Rouhani say that Iran will not dismantle a 

single centrifuge. 

So my first question is, is there a way to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful without dismantling 

some centrifuges? 

Ambassador DETRANI. Let me just start off by saying they are 

talking about building additional centrifuges, even more sophisticated centrifuges. That flies in the face of where we are going here. 

It should be going the other way around. They need fewer centrifuges. They should not be enhancing and that is where it should 

be going. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Is it even possible to develop or sustain a program 

which is exclusively peaceful that does not require some diminution 

of the production of centrifuges? 

Ambassador DETRANI. Certainly with the number they have now 

and the figure is about 19,000 that people are putting out. We saw 

recently, just a year ago they had enough uranium at the 20 percent purity level which would have given them maybe enough to 

get one nuclear weapon. So yes, what they have now is sufficient 

to get them in the nuclear business. No question about it. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Rademaker, you were about to say something? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Yes, Iran is, of course, telling you today their 

nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. And they will say actually 

we don’t have to do anything because it is an exclusively peaceful 

program. We, of course, don’t accept that. If your question is, how 

many centrifuges can they be operating and we can be confident 

that it is exclusively peaceful? My personal answer is that with the 

current government, with its history, with everything we know 

about where they have been, the answer is they should have for me 

to say I am confident that their program is exclusively peaceful, 

the answer is zero centrifuges. 

74

Unfortunately, we are in a situation where under the JPA, they 

are going to have some number of operating centrifuges and that 

troubles me because I don’t understand why they need any. And I 

think it is something of a logical conundrum because their argument is this is, we are developing infrastructure to produce fuel for 

our civil nuclear program. Well, if you buy that, then they actually 

do need a lot more centrifuges than they have now. 

And so this idea that you are going to negotiate some number 

and it is going to be lower than what they have now and that is 

evidence of a peaceful program, well, some minimal number of centrifuges makes no economic sense in commercial terms. It makes 

a lot of sense in military terms, but that is sort of where we are. 

We are sort of negotiating them down to a centrifuge program that 

the size will only make sense in the context of a military program. 

I think it would have been more logical to go with the requirement 

that they have zero operating centrifuges. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Which actually gets to my next question. I think 

many of us think if there were not sufficient constraints in the 

Joint Plan of Action with respect to research and development and 

sort of the view that the current state of technology, as if it is frozen in time. I am wondering what your thoughts are about what 

should be in the final agreement that would impose responsible 

constraints on research and development such as—I mean to ensure kind of the security of our country and the limitation of any 

final agreement. 

Ambassador DETRANI. Well, certainly access to facilities, access 

to the scientists, the technicians, access to the notes, the data, access to past records. I think it is important to really go way back 

with Iran on this to confirm where they are, to determine what is 

the state of capability. I think that is all necessary. 

Mr. CICILLINE. But in addition to the knowledge of that are there 

any limitations that we should attempt to secure in a final agreement to actually limit research and development in their nuclear 

capability? 

Mr. HEINONEN. First of all, we need keep in our mind that these 

are dual-use technologies. Once you have a centrifuge, you can 

produce uranium for peaceful purposes or nonpeaceful purposes. So 

this is actually the measurement of the intentions. And it is not a 

technical topic. It is the behavior of a state, also economic rationales, as Mr. Rademaker has said. I personally see it is very hard 

to argue that Iran needs enrichment for Bushehr power plant. And 

their concern is that nobody sells to them enriched uranium. But 

Iran doesn’t have uranium in its soil. So if you are not able to buy 

uranium, you are well dressed, but nowhere to go with your enrichment plant. So you need to think about the rationale I suggest is 

the case, and then base your argument to that. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to go to Mr. Ron DeSantis of 

Florida. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been struck by 

watching the Ayatollah’s reaction to how things have unfolded. And 

he spoke the other day in front of a banner that said, ‘‘America 

cannot do a damn thing,’’ I believe. And he basically said that they 

have renounced the idea of any military actions. And so I think I 

75

am trying to understand from their perspective how he sees sanctions being eased, force being ruled out. So what incentive does he 

have to want to change his course of conduct? To me, he is absolutely incentivized to want to continue to enrich and to have a nuclear capability. Does anybody want to quibble with me about from 

the Ayatollah’s perspective, haven’t we provided him, as he sees it, 

a roadmap to continue on? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think your points are well of concern. What 

brought Iran to the negotiating in the first place? It is pressure, 

economic pressure, political pressure. That pressure has been relieved to some extent and certainly on the military side I think 

they probably are a lot less concerned about the threat to a U.S. 

military strike today than they would have been a year or 2 ago. 

We have negotiators who are meeting with the Iranians right 

now. They are meeting today in Geneva. Maybe they are making 

progress. I don’t know, but I guess I am certainly concerned that 

Iran right now, I think they know what they need to agree to get 

a deal. They are refusing to make that deal. They are holding out 

for better terms. Is that because they are under less pressure and 

did they calculate the pressure is going to diminish over time? In 

other words, with the current trajectory is in their favor? Yes, I 

worry a lot. Maybe that our diplomats are, too, because I think 

they are probably frustrated, they can’t get the Iranians to say yes 

to whatever proposal they are making. 

Mr. DESANTIS. We sometimes, I think, my frustration with seeing as how some of this unfolding particularly looking at people in 

the State Department as they will deal with Iran and treat them 

in a way that I think imputes too much of a Western sensibility 

into how Iran conducts themselves. I don’t think they recognize 

enough the extent to which they are motivated by their virulent 

form of the Islamic jihad, the ability to continue to wage war 

against infidels, the United States being the Great Satan. And so 

I just look at it and I think from their perspective, I think they see 

them playing us like a fiddle. 

I understand we have negotiations. I am absolutely not optimistic that that is going to be done and that Iran is going to willingly disarm itself. I hope I am wrong, but I think that is just 

where we are and I will yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Brad Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, echoing what 

has been said today. Thank you for calling this hearing and for allowing us to conduct it in a bipartisan way on an issue of grave 

importance. 

Mr. Rademaker, let me start with you. You touched on in your 

testimony and in subsequent conversations the fact that Iran, the 

concern that the deal being negotiated is a time based agreement, 

that Iran just sits tight for a period of time and then it is free to 

proceed however the country wants to under a term that we treat 

Iran like Japan. I think the sense that we all need to understand 

that Iran is not Japan. Iran is a revolutionary regime. It has got 

hegemonic ambitions and clearly demonstrated nefarious intent 

and deeds. And the idea that such a state can be treated like 

Japan, I would argue it would be the exact opposite. Such a state 

can never be treated like Japan, or treated in the same manner as 

76

the JPOA says, as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to 

the NPT. Iran is different. 

And as we sit here, today is exactly 40 days away from July 20th 

deadline set by the agreement. Again, as was previously mentioned, there was talk about moving Iran back on the pathway to 

a nuclear weapons capability. I think many of us have stated here 

before and again today that moving Iran backwards is not sufficient. The goal should be to move Iran off the path to a nuclear 

weapon. 

By that long way of an introduction, Mr. Rademaker, for the 

whole panel, is there any reason why we should be giving, as you 

stated, the goal of holding Iran to zero enrichment, holding Iran to 

not having an Arak plutonium reactor, holding Iran from fully disclosing their previous potential military dimensions of their nuclear 

program? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. First of all, congressman, I think you and I are 

in violent agreement about our perspectives on this. In answer to 

your question, the rationale for allowing them to enrich, I am really the wrong person to ask to provide such a rationale because 

where I come down is the correct answer is they should not be allowed to enrich given their history. So I think if you want someone 

to give you a reason to permit that——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Does anyone have any case that would justify allowing Iran to enrich? I think the sense is that we are all in agreement that that shouldn’t be. I know before November 24th last 

with the announcement of the agreement was made, the conversation was, my terms, permanently closing any and all pathways for 

Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. It seems the concern is that this 

is not closing those pathways at all. 

Mr. Lauder, in your written testimony, you talked about the 

sense of—well, how to deal with noncompliance. How do we deal 

with noncompliance before we even have an agreement? What 

should we be doing now to make sure Iran has the incentive to go 

forward? 

Mr. LAUDER. Well, I think it is an excellent question and I think 

it comes back again to this theme of to begin to have any confidence that this agreement will be complied with, we have to go 

back to Iran’s past and have to press them to make a full disclosure of what they have done in the past on their nuclear program. 

We still have the leverage of sanctions. We still have the leverage of nothing is agreed to everything is agreed. But that understanding of what Iran has done in the past becomes the foundation, 

then, for the monitoring regime. And we do have to remember that. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Ambassador—I am sorry, Mr. Heinonen. 

Mr. HEINONEN. In 2003 when EU reached an agreement with 

Iran, actually there was a paragraph there which required Iran to 

come with the complete past history of its nuclear program and it 

failed to do so. And I think that we need to look at what was the 

reason for the failure? Were there some other mechanisms which 

we should apply when faced with this? And I think it is the most 

important element of this new agreement to be concluded. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Ambassador DeTrani? 

Ambassador DETRANI. If I could just comment, sir. Sanctions, 

they are biting. We know why the Iranians are back at the table. 

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They made it very clear. They need relief. Sanctions and sanctions, 

going after the financial system, the institutions and so forth, there 

are a list of activities. This is so key. And that is the pressure. 

That is the pressure to keep them on a path. And once we keep 

that pressure on, my personal views, my personal view, you keep 

that pressure on, if they want relief, they are going to have to perform and that is where the verification monitoring comes in and so 

forth. When they are not performing, that pressure continues. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Ambassador, I agree with you. Sanctions are 

what brought Iran brought to the table. My personal belief is that 

we need to make sure Iran understands that the no deal is better—

no deal is better than a bad deal. No deal is not the sanctions we 

had in November 2013, but orders of magnitude greater bite in 

those sanctions if there is not a deal to our terms and thus close 

those gaps. With that, I yield back. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We go now to Mr. Ted Yoho of 

Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, I appreciate you being here. We have sat here several times over the past 

11⁄2 years and I think some of you have been here and I remember 

Ambassador Bolton was here and everybody was pretty much in 

agreement that Iran was going to have fissionable nuclear materials to construct a bomb, five to six bombs by January or February 

of this year. Has Iran accomplished that mission? Do they have 

enough material to do that? 

Ambassador DETRANI. I don’t think we see that. Sir, the sense 

is no, they do not. The concern was when they had 20 percent purity and enough kilograms to have maybe one. 

Mr. YOHO. Yet, we don’t have all the information. So we can’t say 

with certainty they don’t have that, correct? 

Ambassador DETRANI. Because we are just looking at the declared facilities and there may be un-declared as the IAEA is indicating. 

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Lauder and Ambassador DeTrani, you were saying that it is very difficult to monitor and verify Iran’s compliance 

to the Iranian-U.S. JPA agreement. Do you believe these details 

should have been worked out prior to any agreement starting and 

releasing sanctions? I mean if you are going into a negotiation, you 

should have everything on the table. I want to know everything 

you have before you move forward. Would you agree with that? 

Ambassador DETRANI. Sir, I don’t have all the modalities of the 

negotiators and what they were using. I believe they gave them relief on a certain number of sanctions, so they could move forward. 

Mr. YOHO. If we can’t verify now or monitor it, we should have 

had a way to monitor that stuff all those parameters before we 

move forward. I would hope so. 

How about you, Mr. Lauder? 

Mr. LAUDER. I think it is very important before there is further 

loosening of the sanctions which have brought Iran to the table 

that we do get this complete and full accounting of Iranian activities and have the declarations that we need as the basis of our 

monitoring regime. 

Mr. YOHO. In your opinion, does the current situation in Iran’s 

nuclear program or whatever they are doing in our agreement, does 

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it allow Iran to get closer to having a bomb if we stay on the current track, Mr. Rademaker? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think the Obama administration would argue 

that the current arrangement diminishes the risk of nuclear break 

out, because it limits the number of new centrifuges that Iran can 

employ. Actually, it prevents them from continuing to enrich to 20 

percent, at the 20 percent level which they were doing in the past. 

But on the other hand, there has been some recent analysis done 

by the Bipartisan Policy Center. It is on the Web site. They are not 

only producing 20 percent enriched material, but their production 

of lower enriched, 3.5 percent has gone up by about 25 percent. 

Mr. YOHO. And what I have heard on this panel——

Mr. RADEMAKER. The advantages of progress is substantially less 

than the Obama administration advertised. 

Mr. YOHO. Right, but what I have heard on this panel today is 

they have got way more centrifuges than they need to have for nuclear power production. And so I think we are all in agreement 

that they are moving in that direction. They have been moving in 

that direction in the last 25 to 30 years, playing the cat and mouse 

game. 

Do you believe that the U.S.-Iranian Interim Agreement was detrimental to the U.S. security or Israel’s security or the regional security the way it was negotiate and released the sanctions at the 

time they did? Do you think it was detrimental to do that, just kind 

of real quickly because I am running out of time. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think it was detrimental on the sanctions 

side. I also think it was highly detrimental by basically legitimizing 

centrifuge enrichment in Arak which, up until the time of the 

agreement, was something we said was not permitted. 

Mr. YOHO. Ambassador DeTrani, what do you think? 

Ambassador DETRANI. Sir, the reporting is that Iran has down 

blended and converted to uranium oxide their inventory. This is 

coming out of the IAEA. They are talking about framework for cooperation——

Mr. YOHO. Your microphone, please. 

Ambassador DETRANI. I am sorry. The reporting from the IAEA 

indicates that Iran has down blended and converted to uranium 

oxide their inventory, all of their inventory of 20 percent purity enriched uranium. The IAEA report speaks about the framework for 

cooperation. So I think what we have just recently seen from the 

IAEA is that there has been some movement on the part of Iran 

in response to the relief on some of those sanctions. But that is just 

a very interim type of approach to it. 

Certainly, if you are sitting in Israel and you are looking at the 

existential threat, you are looking at something different, so that 

is——

Mr. YOHO. That brings me up to my last question. Since Iran—

do you feel like they have abided by the terms of the agreement? 

Ambassador DETRANI. Sir, I don’t have any particulars on that, 

but according to the IAEA, the IAEA’s most recent report is a much 

more positive report than I have seen in the past with the exception of the weaponization and the militarization. 

79

Mr. YOHO. And if they don’t abide by that, what should we as 

a nation do? More sanctions, preemptive strike, prepare for the day 

that they do get a nuclear bomb? 

Ambassador DETRANI. Sanctions are biting. Sanctions are big. 

Sanctions have had impact. 

Mr. YOHO. I am out of time. I appreciate your time. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Mr. Juan Vargas of California. 

Mr. VARGAS. I, too, want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having 

this meeting and also to the ranking member. As many of you 

know, I have been very critical of the interim deal. I thought it was 

a mistake. I believe that we first should have gotten the final deal. 

Then we should have negotiated the interim deals. In other words, 

we first should have made sure that there was no path to getting 

a nuclear weapon. Then we could have negotiated these interim 

deals because I did think that the sanctions were working and I 

voted here to ratchet up the sanctions because I think you had to 

get that fundamental choice. Do you want your nuclear program 

and do you want to militarize it as you are tempted to do or do you 

want a functioning economy? We would continue to press the sanctions until you didn’t have a functioning economy. I think that that 

would have been the right way to go. 

Now we are here. And we are here and I think it is a very dangerous situation that we are in because I do think that if we are 

going to get to July 20th and for sure they are going to have one 

more time. That is what we feared at the beginning. I think that 

that is going to be the case. Then what do we do? Then do we say 

well, we are not going to negotiate and make ourselves look like 

the bad guys? Then it is harder to put the sanctions back on again. 

So where do we go from here? And I do want to comment, Mr. 

Rademaker, I couldn’t agree with you more wholeheartedly. If it is 

a 5-year deal, if it is 10-year deal, or it is even a 20-year deal, it 

is not a deal. I mean that is a bad deal. This is a situation where 

you have to make sure you can force them to comply all the way 

out because otherwise they will simply play cat and mouse and outlast us 10 years and then they will get on with their nuclear program. So where do we go from here? I mean as we are approaching 

this point, I don’t think we are going to be able to——

Ambassador DETRANI. I agree on the monitoring and verification, 

congressman. There is no question about it and we have talked 

about unfettered access, any time, any place, access to all the facilities, concern about covert facilities, concern about weaponization. 

These are things that need to be drilled down and pursued with 

great vigor indefinitely. 

Mr. VARGAS. Right. I believe we are going to get to the 6th 

month, assume for a second, we get to the 6th month and they 

want more time. What do we do? At that point, what do we do? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think it is pretty clear that if we reach the 

6-month point without having reached agreement on the Comprehensive Solution, I think there will be a 6-month extension. In 

fact, the JPA at one point says it will take up to a year to negotiate 

this, so even a draft of the JPA, they were anticipating potentially 

a 6-month extension. I did want to pick up on one thing you said. 

You said you think the right thing to have done here would have 

been to negotiate the final agreement and then come back and fill 

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in the details. It pains me to say this, but I think in fact that is 

what they did. I mean the JPA does specify the final agreement. 

The final agreement is that—I read it earlier. The final agreement is that upon the expiration of the Comprehensive Solution, 

the Iranian nuclear program will be treated in the same manner 

as that of any non-nuclear weapon state to the NPT. 

So the end state, the final state is no sanctions, no restrictions 

on their ability to do whatever they want in the nuclear area, subject to ordinary safeguards and——

Mr. VARGAS. If I could interrupt just for a second. I mean the 

issue of having any type of enrichment program, any type of way 

for them to be able to reach that ability to, in fact, create the nuclear weapon, having that facility——

Mr. RADEMAKER. But that is——

Mr. VARGAS. I know what you are saying and I actually am not 

disagreeing with you, but I think that in the final agreement, what 

I would say is that if you are going to allow any kind of nuclear 

power program it had to be one so tight there was no way around 

it that you had to have the fuel coming from somewhere else, monitored closely, that you would have to have unfettered access to 

their country where they could potentially be hiding things, that is 

the deal I mean because I agree with you. That is why I think personally and again it is very critical, I think that the people who are 

associated with this deal were very good hearted and attempted to 

negotiate with a Western type of nation and found out that that 

is not who they are negotiating with. I think it was very naive. 

Mr. Lauder, could I have you comment on that? 

Mr. LAUDER. I think to the extent to which the negotiations continue, the opportunity needs to be seized and I agree with Ambassador DeTrani in this respect, is to use that time to push even 

harder to expand the monitoring provisions that Iran will need to 

undertake. Iran is different. They have violating international 

norms over an extended period of time. They have not been compliant with the international agreement. It is reasonable then to expect that Iran should need to undertake additional monitoring provisions to build confidence in the international community that 

they are changing their path. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you. My time has expired. I want to say 

though I think Iran is like North Korea. If they get a nuclear weapon, they will also threaten to bomb Los Angeles or else and I unfortunately think they might have the nerve to do it. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Vargas. We go now to Mr. 

George Holding of North Carolina. 

Mr. HOLDING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we can all 

agree that if the Obama administration is to craft the final agreement with Iran that it would be a huge foreign policy win at least 

in the eyes of the administration, a foreign policy win, a political 

win, truly in an environment of an administration that is somewhat bereft of foreign policy wins or accolades. My concern is that 

if they achieve what they consider a win, that they will lack the 

political will to risk tarnishing that win by calling out a violation 

that we find substantively. 

So my question and I have got just to run down the line and 

have each of you all to respond to this is what internal controls are 

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there, red teams so to speak, that would ensure that the politics 

of trying to salvage this foreign policy win don’t trump good sense 

in the White House as far as calling out a violation. 

Mr. Rademaker? I have got 30 seconds, so let us go down and 

by the time everyone has done that, I will be out of time. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I honestly don’t know what sort of checks there 

might be within the administration. Every President can structure 

decision making on foreign policy in his administration in the way 

he sees fit. I would like to think that there are people at the Defense Department that are vigilant. That there are people in the 

intelligence community drawing attention to problems, but I don’t 

know. I think the ultimate red team is the United States Congress 

and this committee. 

Mr. HOLDING. Perhaps that might have been helpful as the 

President was considering exchanging Bergdahl for five Taliban 

terrorists. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Well, the good news here I think for the Congress is I think one of the things the Iranians are demanding is 

to end all U.S. sanctions. In fact, they are promised that in the 

JPA. I don’t think the President has the authority unilaterally to 

get rid of all of the sanctions. He has waivers. He has the ability 

not to enforce certain laws, but I think at the end of the day there 

are certain things that only the Congress is going to be able to do 

and so for them to fulfill their commitments to the Iranians in this 

negotiation, they are going to need this committee and this Congress to pass legislation. And that will afford you an opportunity 

to pass judgment on the entire arrangement and for that reason I 

would think it would behoove the administration to consult closely 

with you now to make sure that you are prepared to accept——

Mr. HOLDING. Indeed. Mr. Lauder. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I don’t know if that is happening, but ultimately they need to persuade you that they struck a good deal and 

if there are details that you are unhappy about, it is probably better to let them know that now rather than after they promised 

things to the Iranians that they are not going to be able to deliver. 

Mr. HOLDING. Mr. Lauder. 

Mr. LAUDER. I agree that perhaps the most effective red team for 

this will be the U.S. Congress. You will have the opportunity and 

I am presuming to say this as an outsider, but this is not a treaty, 

but you will have the functional equivalent of a resolution to ratification when you deal with the sanctions question. And that is an 

opportunity to express the Congress’ views about the types of capabilities that need to be—for monitoring that need to be nurtured 

in the U.S. Government, that need to be funded in the U.S. Government, and you can ask for a periodic compliance report to the 

extent to which Iran is compliant with the agreement, what types 

of anomalies are being detected, what has been done to resolve 

that, to ask for both a periodic unclassified and classified report. 

That certainly has been a feature of other agreements in the past. 

I think you used to like them when I was in the Executive 

Branch because they were a lot of work and it led to a lot of internal debate, but I think it is something to make sure that the Iranians understand that their compliance is going to be very important to the United States across all the branches. 

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Mr. HOLDING. Thank you. Mr. Heinonen? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Thank you. I agree with Mr. Lauder. And I think 

the red team is actually the public opinion that you make the deal 

open and open compliance reports. There is an automatic assessment. This is important. It is important not only to the security of 

the United States of America, but regional security and we set a 

benchmark of how we are going to deal, for example, in the future 

with North Korea. So this will have a lot of ramifications and they 

don’t end up here. 

Mr. HOLDING. Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador DETRANI. I believe ground truth will be the monitors who are in the field, the IAEA and other countries when they 

deal with them. I believe it is those foreign governments that also 

have access and unique insights into what is going on there. I 

think a strong case can be made that they can speak to compliance 

issues and if Iran has gone on to their own way and if they are 

cheating and so forth I think that will come forth. I don’t think 

anyone is going to be able to conceal that aspect to it. 

Mr. HOLDING. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Holding. We thank all of our 

witnesses for their testimony and I think you have given us a lot 

to consider as the administration continues to negotiate. 

I am particularly troubled that, as Mr. Rademaker put it, this 

agreement puts Iran on the path from nuclear pariah to nuclear 

partner and I don’t think any member of the committee is comfortable with that given the Supreme Leader’s comments in May in 

particular about expectations that we might try to limit their ballistic missile program. As I quoted earlier he said, ‘‘this is a stupid, 

idiotic expectation.’’ But I didn’t give you the rest of his quote 

which to me is very revealing. He said, ‘‘The Revolutionary Guards 

should definitely carry out their program and not be satisfied with 

the present level. They should mass produce ballistic missile.’’ He 

said, ‘‘This is the main duty of all military officials.’’ Now he is not 

referring to a space program here. And when you combine that 

with the call for the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization to 

add 30,000 centrifuges last month to Iran’s existing 19,000, ignoring what the Iranian officials and what their leader is saying on 

this subject as they move forward with their program is very concerning to me and I especially wanted to thank Mr. Engel and the 

other members of this committee and our witnesses for the chance 

today to take a good, hard look at the on-going negotiations. Thank 

you all very much and we stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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