alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William Soto, Appellant.

[697 NYS2d 653]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Barasch, J.), rendered May 26, 1994, convicting him of manslaughter in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant fired a shotgun twice on a city street during an argument with his girlfriend, causing the death of a bystander. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, there is no reasonable view of the evidence that warranted a charge of criminally negligent homicide as a lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the second degree *(see, People v Randolph,*81 NY2d 868; *People v Cameron,*244 AD2d 350).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Bracken, J. P., O’Brien, Santucci and Altman, JJ., concur.
# EUR-Lex - 31997D0553 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 31997D0553

**97/553/EC: Commission Decision of 13 August 1997 amending Decisions 97/515/EC, 97/513/EC, 97/516/EC and 97/517/EC concerning protective measures with regard to certain products of animal origin originating in India, Bangladesh and Madagascar (Text with EEA relevance) **

*
Official Journal L 228 , 19/08/1997 P. 0031 - 0031 *

COMMISSION DECISION of 13 August 1997 amending Decisions 97/515/EC, 97/513/EC, 97/516/EC and 97/517/EC concerning protective measures with regard to certain products of animal origin originating in India, Bangladesh and Madagascar (Text with EEA relevance) (97/553/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 90/675/EEC of 10 December 1990 laying down the principles governing the organisation of veterinary checks on products entering the Community from third countries (1), as last amended by Directive 96/43/EC (2), and in particular Article 19 (7) thereof,

Whereas the Commission, in adopting Decisions 97/515/EC (3), 97/513/EC (4), 97/516/EC (5) and 97/517/EC (6), has established measures in order to ensure that possibly hazardous products of animal origin cannot enter the Community; whereas these measures tend to suspend all imports of fishery products from India, Bangladesh and Madagascar, as well as of other products of animal origin from Madagascar;

Whereas these measures include an opportunity for products which have been despatched to the Community before the entry into force of these requirements and presented for importation into the Community before 15 August 1997, to gain entry to the Community on condition that they are systematically submitted to a microbiological examination upon arrival;

Whereas it is necessary to extend this delay, whilst ensuring a high level of consumer protection;

Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in conformity with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

In Article 2 of Decisions 97/515/EC, 97/513/EC, 97/516/EC and 97/517/EC, the words 'before 15 August 1997` are replaced by the words 'before 15 September 1997`.

Article 2

The Member States shall alter the measures they apply in trade in order to bring them into line with this Decision. They shall immediately inform the Commission thereof.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 13 August 1997.

For the Commission

Franz FISCHLER

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ No L 373, 31. 12. 1990, p. 1.

(2) OJ No L 162, 1. 7. 1996, p. 1.

(3) OJ No L 214, 6. 8. 1997, p. 52.

(4) OJ No L 214, 6. 8. 1997, p. 46.

(5) OJ No L 214, 6. 8. 1997, p. 53.

(6) OJ No L 214, 6. 8. 1997, p. 54.
§ 1406.3 Virtual services—additional terms of service. The following Terms of Service additionally apply when the FMCS service is provided virtually. ( a ) Parties may not provide meeting access information to non-parties without permission from the neutral unless the session is open to the public.
( b ) The neutral and all parties must be provided notice of all attendees before or at the time of attendance unless the session is open to the public.
( c ) Parties must ensure the integrity of technology used in virtual meetings. If an attendee is aware of any security breach, that attendee will inform the neutral immediately.
§ 10.57 Administrative Review Board proceedings. ( a ) *Authority* — ( 1 ) *General.* The Administrative Review Board has jurisdiction to hear and decide in its discretion appeals concerning questions of law and fact from investigative findings letters of the Administrator issued under § 10.51(c)(1) or (2), Administrator's rulings issued under § 10.58, and decisions of Administrative Law Judges issued under § 10.55.
( 2 ) *Limit on scope of review.* ( i ) The Board shall not have jurisdiction to pass on the validity of any provision of this part. The Board is an appellate body and shall decide cases properly before it on the basis of substantial evidence contained in the entire record before it. The Board shall not receive new evidence into the record.
( ii ) The Equal Access to Justice Act, as amended, does not apply to proceedings under this part. Accordingly, the Administrative Review Board shall have no authority to award attorney's fees and/or other litigation expenses pursuant to the provisions of the Equal Access to Justice Act for any proceeding under this part.
( b ) *Decisions.* The Board's decision shall be issued within a reasonable period of time following receipt of the petition for review and shall be served upon all parties by mail to the last known address and on the Chief Administrative Law Judge (in cases involving an appeal from an Administrative Law Judge's decision).
( c ) *Orders.* If the Board concludes a violation occurred, an order shall be issued mandating action to remedy the violation, including, but not limited to, monetary relief for unpaid wages. Where the Administrator has sought imposition of debarment, the Board shall determine whether an order imposing debarment is appropriate. The ARB's order is subject to discretionary review by the Secretary as provided in Secretary's Order 01-2020 (or any successor to that order).
[85 FR 30617, May 20, 2020]
#### PALM BEACH COUNTY v TOWN OF JUPITER

Case No. AP 90-1789 AY (Consolidated)

Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County

June 3, 1991

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Robert P. Banks, Assistant County Attorney for petitioner, Palm Beach County.

John C. Randolph, Jones, Foster, Johnston & Stubbs, P.A., for petitioner, The Village of Tequesta.

Jerome F. Skrandel, Esquire, for respondent.

Before RODGERS, RAPP, OFTEDAL, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.

The Town of Jupiter enacted Ordinance Nos. 59-89, 60-89, and 61-89 annexing certain lands of unincorporated Palm Beach County. *65Petitioners contend Jupiter failed to meet the requirements for annexation set forth in Chapter 171, Florida Statutes, as to compactness and contiguity.

The annexation here is a classic example of point-to-point or comer-to-comer abutment. “Contiguous,” when used in the context of municipal annexation has been defined as “touching or adjoining in a reasonably substantial sense.” *See City of Sanford v Seminole County,*538 So.2d 113, 115 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); *May v Lee,*483 So.2d 481, 482 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).

We find the annexation is not substantially coterminous with a part of the boundary of the Town of Jupiter. Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is GRANTED and Ordinance Nos. 59-89, 60-89, and 61-89 are hereby quashed. RODGERS, RAPP and OFTEDAL, JJ., concur.
ex106.htm


    
      	
              Exhibit
      10.6

            	
              Subordination
      Letter of James Speros dated as of October 30, 2009 in favor of Silicon
      Valley Bank

            


    

     

    October
__, 2009

    


    Silicon
Valley Bank

    8020
Tower Crescent Drive

    Suite
475

    Vienna,
Virginia 22182

    Attn:  Ms.
Heather Parker

    


    Dear Ms.
Parker,

    


    I
provided a letter of credit (“LC”) to support the loan (“RBC Loan”) of the Royal
Bank of Canada (“RBC”) to Braintech, Inc. (“Braintech”).  Funds from
my LC in the amount of $89,612.40 (“LC Payment Amount”) were used to pay off the
RBC Loan.  As a result, Braintech owes me the LC Payment
Amount.

    


    In order
to assist Braintech in closing its new loan with Silicon Valley Bank (“SVB”), I
am willing to subordinate:  (a) the LC Payment Amount and any other
indebtedness of Braintech to me (including, without limitation, the interest and
fees described below), whether presently existing or arising in the future
(collectively, the “Creditor Debt”) to all of Braintech’s indebtedness and
obligations to SVB; and (ii) all of my security interests to all of SVB’s
security interests in Braintech’s property.

    


    Notwithstanding
the respective dates of attachment or perfection of my security interest and the
security interest of SVB, the security interest of SVB in the property of
Braintech shall at all times be senior to my security interest.

    


    I will
not demand or receive from Braintech all or any part of the Creditor Debt, by
way of payment, prepayment, setoff, lawsuit or otherwise, nor will I exercise
any remedy with respect to the property of Braintech, nor will I accelerate any
of the Creditor Debt, nor will I commence, or cause to commence, prosecute or
participate in any administrative, legal or equitable action against
Braintech.  The foregoing notwithstanding, Braintech shall be
permitted to make, and I shall be permitted to receive, a payment (the “Payoff
Amount”) in the amount of the LC Payment Amount plus interest at a rate of 10%
per annum until paid in full plus any unreimbursed fees charged to me by my
issuing bank or by RBC in connection with the LC in full satisfaction of the
Creditor Debt.  Upon my receipt of the Payoff Amount, I authorize SVB
to file an amendment to UCC financing statement number 2009015456-2 (filed on
June 22, 2009 with the Secretary of State of Nevada) removing myself as a
secured party thereon.

    


    By
execution, I hereby authorize SVB to amend UCC financing statement number
2009015456-2 (filed on June 22, 2009 with the Secretary of State of Nevada) to
state that I have subordinated any security interest or lien that I may have in
any property of Braintech to the security interest of SVB in all assets of
Braintech, notwithstanding the respective dates of attachment or perfection of
my security interest and the security interest of SVB.

    


    This
letter only becomes effective once SVB makes the first credit extension to
Braintech.

    


    Sincerely,

    


    


    James
Speros

    Speros
Ventures LLC
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADDED BY

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of SunCoast Bancorp, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report), I, John T. Stafford, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350, as added by § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | To my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for
the period covered by the Report.
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|      |  |                  |  |     |  |                                                        
|----- |  | ---------------- |  | --- |  | -------------------------------------------------------
|Date: |  | November 9, 2005 |  | By: |  | /s/ John T. Stafford                                   
|      |  |                  |  |     |  | John T. Stafford, President and Chief Executive Officer
#### GLAZZARD v BERNSTEIN

Ohio Appeals, 7th Dist, Mahoning Co

Decided Oct 26, 1928

W F Hesson, Youngstown, for Glazzard.

Kennedy, Manchester, Conroy & Ford, Youngstown, for Bernstein.

*104POLLOCK, J

This was a straight street, somewhat rising grade as the plaintiff was traveling, paved, street car track on it, and no other travel on the street from the time the plaintiff entered upon it until after- this collision except as we have stated. We think that for some reason or other the plaintiff was’ interested in the car that was traveling on the street ahead of him and paid no attention to the objects within the ray of his light. ■ There can be no question but what if he had been looking he could have seen defendant’s truck before he struck it, and we think that if he had been using ordinary care to see where his car was going, or what was in the line of his travel, he would have seen the defendant’s truck in time to turn to the left sufficiently to have avoided it. Really the forward car turning to the left and then making a turn to the right, making an S turn, was an act that should have called his attention to the reason for this turn. He knew that that car was not going to turn out Pike Street long enough to have seen the defendant’s truck had he been looking where his car was going.

The Supreme Court in a very recent case has said:

> “When the proof of the essential facts put in issue and the reasonable inferences deducible therefrom are such that the jury, as fair minded men, should reasonably arrive at but one conclusion, it is the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the party which such proof sustains.” Jacob Laub Baking Co., v. Middleton, 160 N. E., 629.

This case will appear in the 118 O. S., but as we do not have access to that volume we are using the Northwestern Reporter.

From the facts in this case we think that under the: rules above announced there was no error in the court directing a verdict. We think that from the facts in this ca.se no other reasonable inference can be drawn except that the plaintiff, was not using, ordinary care in operating his automobile prior to the time of this accident, and the judgment is affirmed.

Farr and Roberts, JJ, concur.
§ 103.22 Proof of majority-based bargaining relationship between employer and labor organization in the construction industry. Cross Reference
Link to an amendment published at 89 FR 63027 , Aug. 1, 2024.
( a ) A voluntary recognition or collective-bargaining agreement between an employer primarily engaged in the building and construction industry and a labor organization will not bar any election petition filed pursuant to section 9(c) or 9(e) of the Act absent positive evidence that the union unequivocally demanded recognition as the section 9(a) exclusive bargaining representative of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, and that the employer unequivocally accepted it as such, based on a contemporaneous showing of support from a majority of employees in an appropriate unit. Collective-bargaining agreement language, standing alone, will not be sufficient to provide the showing of majority support.
( b ) This section shall be applicable to an employer's voluntary recognition extended on or after the effective date of this rule and to any collective-bargaining agreement entered into on or after the date of voluntary recognition extended on or after the effective date of this rule.
[85 FR 18400, Apr. 1, 2020]
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### National Aeronautics and Space Administration

          - [Notice (00-050)] 

# AGENCY:

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 

# ACTION:

Notice of prospective patent license. 

# SUMMARY:

                        NASA hereby gives notice that Cognitive Technologies, LLC, of Purcellville, VA, has applied for an exclusive license to practice the inventions described and claimed in U.S. Patent Number 5,377,100, entitled “A METHOD OF ENCOURAGING ATTENTION BY CORRELATING VIDEO GAME DIFFICULTY WITH ATTENTION LEVEL,” and NASA Case                               ( print page 30641)                            No. LAR 15817-1, entitled “A METHOD OF ENCOURAGING PHYSIOLOGICAL SELF-REGULATION THROUGH MODULATION OF AN OPERATOR'S CONTROL INPUT TO A VIDEO GAME OR TRAINING SIMULATOR,” both of which are assigned to the United States of America as represented by the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Written objections to the prospective grant of a license should be sent to Langley Research Center.                     

# DATES:

Responses to this notice must be received by July 11, 2000. 

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Helen M. Galus, Patent Attorney, Langley Research Center, Mail Code 212, Hampton, VA 23681-2199; telephone 757-864-3227; facsimile 757-864-9190. 

Dated: May 1, 2000. 

Edward A. Frankle, 

General Counsel. 

[FR Doc. 00-11984 Filed 5-11-00; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7510-01-P
#### James H. Stanley and His Wife Rayme B. Stanley, *Appellants,*v. Sumpter Thompson, *Appellee.*

Appellate Practice — Presumtion in Favor of Correctness of Decree Rendered on Facts.

In equity, as well as at law, every presumption is' in favor of the correctness of the rulings of the trial judge, and a final-decree *577rendered by him, based largely or solely upon questions of fact, will not be reversed, unless the evidence clearly shows it to be erroneous. Evidence examined and found to greatly preponderate in favor of the correctness of the decree.

This case was decided by Division B.

Appealed from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

I. *L. Purcell,*for Appellants;

*Stephens E. Foster,*for Appellee.

Taylor, J.

— The appellee filed his bill in the Circuit Court of Duval County in chancery against the appellants for the foreclosure of a mortgage. The appellants as defendants below answered the bill alleging usury in the note to secure which the mortgage was given. The case was referred to master to take and report the evidence. Upon the coming in of the master’s report finding that the defense of usury had not been sustained the defendants excepted to such report. These exceptions were overruled by the chancellor, and a final decree of foreclosure was rendered for the full amount claimed by the complainant. This decree the defendants below bring here for review by appeal.

The sole question presented here is does the evidence sustain the findings of the master and the decree of the chancellor? In the case of Brannon v. Blume, 61 Fla. 505, 55 South. Rep. 549, it was held that in equity, as well as at law, every presumption is in favor of the correctness of the rulings of the trial judge, and a final decree ren*578dered by him, based largely or solely upon questions of fact, will not be reversed, unless the evidence clearly shows it to be erroneous. Guided by this rule we are of the opinion that the evidence in the record before us, so far from showing clearly that the chancellor’s decree is erroneous, greatly preponderates in favor of the correctness of the decree. And so finding the decree of the court below in said cause is hereby affirmed at the cost of the appellants.

Hocker and Parki-iill, J. J., concur;

Whitfield, C. J., and Shackleford and Cockrell, J. J., concur in the opinion.
§ 0.737-10 Administrative sanctions. The Examiner (or the Under Secretary in any matter in which exceptions are filed or which is decided in accordance with § 0.737-4(b)) may take appropriate action in the case of any individual found in violation of 18 U.S.C. 207(a), (b) or (c) or of the regulations at 5 CFR part 737 upon final administrative decisions by: ( a ) Prohibiting the individual from making, on behalf of any other person (except the United States), any formal or informal appearance before, or, with the intent to influence, any oral or written communication to the Department of Labor on any matter of business for a period not to exceed five years, which may be accomplished by directing agency employees to refuse to participate in any such appearance or to accept any such communications; or
( b ) Taking other appropriate disciplinary action.
#### § 1607.12 Retesting of applicants.

Users should provide a reasonable opportunity for retesting and reconsideration. Where examinations are administered periodically with public notice, such reasonable opportunity exists, unless persons who have previously been tested are precluded from retesting. The user may however take reasonable steps to preserve the security of its procedures.
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CEO CERTIFICATION**

 

Pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 USC §1350, as adopted), Joel A. Ronning, the Chief ExecutiveOfficer of Digital River, Inc. (the“Company”), hereby certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:

 

**1.    **TheCompany’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2003,and to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the “AnnualReport”) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d)of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and

 

**2.    **Theinformation contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company forthe periods presented therein.

 

**IN WITNESS WHEREOF**,the undersigned has set his hand hereto as of the 12th day of March2004.

 
|   | /s/ Joel A.  Ronning    |   |
|--------|-------------------------|--------|
|   |                    |
|   | Joel A. Ronning         |
|   | Chief Executive Officer |

 

 

A signedoriginal of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided toDigital River, Inc. and will be retained by Digital River, Inc. and furnishedto the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

----