NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

APRIL CHRISTINE WEEKS, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

DAVID PAUL WEEKS, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0459 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. P1300DO201400583

The Honorable Patricia A. Trebesch, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Offices of Robert L. Frugé, P.C., Prescott

By Robert L. Frugé

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Miller Shaw, PLLC, Prescott

By Bryan C. Shaw

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
WEEKS v. WEEKS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

B R O W N, Chief Judge:

¶1 April Christine Weeks (“Wife”) appeals from the trial court’s 

decree of dissolution granting the marital community an equitable lien 

against Wife’s sole and separate property in favor of David Paul Weeks 

(“Husband”). Wife argues the court failed to apply the proper formula 

when calculating the amount of the lien. For the following reasons, we 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 The parties were married in March 2004. In June that year, 

Wife purchased vacant land in Prescott Valley, known as the Weekhaven 

property, using a $30,000 gift from her grandparents. Husband signed a 

disclaimer deed acknowledging the Weekhaven property as Wife’s “sole 

and separate property.” In October, Wife borrowed funds to build a home, 

and upon its completion in April 2005 she paid off the construction loan 

with permanent financing of $141,000. The parties then lived in the home 

with their three children until Wife petitioned for dissolution of the 

marriage in July 2014. 

¶3 In her pretrial statement, Wife requested that she be assigned 

the marital home as her sole and separate property, asserting such 

disposition would be “consistent with Arizona law and the facts.” Wife 

made no mention of an equitable lien. In his pretrial statement, Husband

claimed an equitable interest in the marital home and asserted that the court 

would have to determine the value of the interest. 

¶4 At trial, testimony from Wife and Husband revealed that only 

community funds were used to pay the mortgage and all expenses related 

to the marital home from the time Wife incurred the construction loan until 

she filed for dissolution. Husband produced the only documented 

appraisal of the home, indicating a value of $275,000 as of October 2014. 

Husband testified he believed the home was worth $500,000 in 2005, and 

had dropped to $300,000 when Wife refinanced in 2012. However, neither 
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Decision of the Court

3

Husband nor Wife provided any documentary evidence at trial of the 

property’s value other than the October 2014 appraisal. Addressing the 

issue of an equitable lien in favor of the community, Husband testified that 

the amount of the lien should be $123,659, calculated as follows: $275,000

(value at dissolution) minus $121,341 (mortgage balance) minus $30,000 

(funds Wife used to purchase the land).

¶5 After hearing testimony, the trial court invited additional 

briefing addressing the equitable lien. Wife’s post-trial brief acknowledged 

that all the mortgage payments for the marital home were made from 

community funds. She argued that the property had depreciated, based on 

Husband’s testimony that he believed the original value of the home was 

$500,000. Wife cited several cases recognizing that use of community funds 

to pay a mortgage on separate property gives rise to an equitable lien in 

favor of the community, but provided no formula or specific calculation 

other than asserting the community lien should be the amount the 

mortgage was reduced during the marriage ($18,518.48). Husband’s posttrial brief essentially mirrored his trial testimony, contending the 

community lien should be measured by the property’s appreciation, not 

merely the amount contributed by the community.

¶6 In its subsequent ruling, the trial court recognized the marital 

residence was Wife’s sole and separate property, but noted Wife offered no 

testimony that would assist the court in determining the amount of an 

equitable lien. The court rejected Wife’s attempts to show the value of the 

home had depreciated, finding that Husband’s testimony about the original 

value of the home was neither credible nor persuasive. The court then 

determined that Husband had established by a preponderance of the 

evidence an equitable lien in favor of the community, finding that other 

than the $30,000 gift that Wife used to purchase the vacant lot, the parties 

“used only marital income to maintain and improve” the property. The 

court calculated the equitable lien as follows:

Value/appraisal at time of trial $ 275,000.00 

Unpaid mortgage balance when petition served ― 122,481.52

Wife’s initial contribution to purchase land ― 30,000.00

Community Equity $ 122,518.48

The court found that Husband was entitled to half of the lien in the amount 

of $61,259.24. The court then reduced Husband’s share to $33,468.06, “as 

an equalization for a fair and equitable allocation of community assets . . . 
WEEKS v. WEEKS

Decision of the Court

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in recognition of the allocation of property and debt to Wife[.]” This timely 

appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

¶7 Wife does not dispute any of the trial court’s factual findings, 

nor does she challenge the court’s finding that the evidence supported 

imposing an equitable lien in the marital home on behalf of the community. 

Instead, Wife argues the trial court failed to use the formula this court 

applied in Drahos v. Rens, 149 Ariz. 248, 250 (App. 1985), and in subsequent 

cases.

¶8 We will uphold the court’s factual findings unless clearly 

erroneous or unsupported by any credible evidence, Hrudka v. Hrudka, 186 

Ariz. 84, 91 (App. 1995), but we draw our own legal conclusions from the 

facts found or implied by the family court, McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 

30, ¶ 6 (App. 2002). We review the court’s apportionment of community 

property for abuse of discretion and consider the evidence in the light most 

favorable to upholding the decree. Boncoskey v. Boncoskey, 216 Ariz. 448, 

451, ¶ 13 (App. 2007). 

¶9 When mortgage payments have been made using community 

funds, courts typically apply the “value-at-dissolution” formula set forth in 

Drahos to determine the amount of the community’s equitable lien. 149 

Ariz. at 250; Valento v. Valento, 225 Ariz. 477, 481, ¶ 13 (App. 2010)

(explaining the “value-at-dissolution” approach is generally “appropriate 

to value a community lien”). The Drahos formula consists of the following:

C + (C/B x A) , where 

A = appreciation in value during marriage (or since purchase if 

purchased during marriage)

B = purchase price at date of marriage (or at time of purchase if 

purchased during marriage)

C = community contributions to mortgage principal

¶10 Wife, however, did not ask the trial court to employ this 

formula in determining the value of the equitable lien. Notwithstanding 

that the “value-at-dissolution” principle is well-recognized in Arizona, 

Wife essentially ignored it at trial. Instead of acknowledging that the 

marital community paid all expenses associated with the marital home for 

almost ten years, Wife took the position that Husband was entitled to only 

one-half of the mortgage reduction ($9,250). She did not provide the court 
WEEKS v. WEEKS

Decision of the Court

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with any documentation that the property value had decreased since the 

home was constructed, nor did she offer any evidence of relevant values or 

even suggest a formula the court could have used to accurately calculate

the lien. Wife was aware of the equitable lien amount to which Husband 

asserted he was entitled (one-half share of $123,659); she was present at 

trial, represented by counsel, and Husband detailed his calculations in 

arriving at such amount. Yet, Wife provided no additional evidence to 

challenge his calculations, nor did she argue that the court was using the 

wrong formula. 

¶11 On appeal, Wife posits a hypothetical value for the land and 

home when first constructed of $180,000, asserting the trial court “lacked 

any evidence of the value by which Wife’s separate property had by the 

time of trial appreciated” and “did not even conclude that the property 

appreciated or depreciated.” Wife could have presented evidence on these 

issues but did not. She also could have obtained an appraisal of the home 

as of the time construction was completed in April 2005, but she did not.

¶12 The trial court concluded that the community held an 

equitable lien in an amount essentially identical to that urged by Husband, 

and explained how it reached that conclusion. Nonetheless, Wife did not 

file any post-trial motions to bring to the court’s attention its failure to use 

the Drahos formula. Instead, because she raised this issue for the first time

in this court, she has waived the right to assert it on appeal. Trantor v. 

Fredrikson, 179 Ariz. 299, 300 (1994) (holding that absent extraordinary 

circumstances, we will not address issues raised for the first time on 

appeal).1 

¶13 Waiver aside, Wife has not established that the trial court 

abused its discretion in calculating the amount of the equitable lien. Other 

than providing a hypothetical example, she has not explained what figures 

the court should have used in applying the Drahos formula. She points to 

the absence of evidence in the record, but does not identify what evidence 

she would present on remand that would affect the court’s calculation of 

the community lien. Moreover, Wife’s argument fails to account for the fact 

that after calculating the amount of Husband’s share of the community lien, 

the court reduced it by approximately $28,000 to facilitate a “fair and 

 

1 Wife argues that Husband had the burden to establish the amount 

of any equitable lien properly due to the community. The allocation of the 

burden of proof to one party, however, does not relieve the other from the 

duty to raise any appropriate legal argument bearing on that evidence. 
WEEKS v. WEEKS

Decision of the Court

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equitable allocation of community assets.” Because Wife has not 

demonstrated how she was harmed by the court’s overall division of 

property and debts, we decline to remand the matter for further 

proceedings. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 27 (“No cause shall be reversed for 

technical error in pleadings or proceedings when upon the whole case it 

shall appear that substantial justice has been done.”); Phoenix W. Holding 

Corp. v. Gleeson, 18 Ariz. App. 60, 65 (1972) (“In order to justify a reversal 

the error must be prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant.)” 

¶14 Both parties request attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes section 25-324(A), which authorizes 

a court to award attorneys’ fees after considering the parties’ financial 

resources and the reasonableness of their positions during the litigation. In 

our discretion, we decline to award attorneys’ fees to either party. As the 

prevailing party, however, Husband is entitled to costs incurred on appeal 

upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. 

CONCLUSION

¶15 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decree of dissolution.