Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-2882 | July 17, 2019 Page 1 of 20

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Andrew J. Sickmann

Boston Bever Klinge Cross & Chidester

Richmond, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Katherine A. Cornelius

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana 

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship

of L.F.,1 Father, and L.S., Minor 

Child,

L.F.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

July 17, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JT-2882

Appeal from the 

Union Circuit Court 

The Honorable 

Matthew R. Cox, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

81C01-1802-JT-13

1 We note that, while the parental rights of Mother, A.S., and Father were terminated during the same 

juvenile court hearing, the parties elected to file separate appeals. The termination of Mother’s parental 

rights was affirmed by this court in L.S. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, No. 18A-JT-2881, 2019 WL 

2181225 (Ind. Ct. App. May 21, 2019). Because the two appeals arise from the same facts and the same 

order, and raise some of the same issues, much of our analysis mirrors analysis in that opinion. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-2882 | July 17, 2019 Page 2 of 20

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

Kirsch, Judge.

[1] L.F. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parent-child 

relationship with his minor child, L.S. (“Child”), raising the following 

consolidated and restated issue: whether the juvenile court’s order terminating 

his parental rights was supported by sufficient evidence.

[2] We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Child was born on October 28, 2015, with cocaine and benzodiazepines in her 

system, and she was experiencing withdrawal symptoms. Appellant’s App. Vol. 

II at 7. The following day, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) 

filed a petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). 

Id. On October 30, 2015, the CHINS court conducted an Initial/Detention 

Hearing, during which Mother admitted the allegations in the CHINS petition, 

including that she used illicit substances resulting in Child experiencing 

withdrawal symptoms at birth. Mother was uncertain about the identity of 
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Child’s father. Id. at 10. Child was in the hospital at the time of the hearing, 

and the juvenile court ordered relative placement upon Child’s discharge. Id. at 

11. Following the hearing, the CHINS court found sufficient evidence that 

Child was a CHINS and, citing the best interests of Child, removed Child from 

Mother’s care. Id. at 10-11.

CHINS Proceedings

[4] At the December 15, 2015 Dispositional Hearing, the CHINS court ordered 

Mother to participate in various services and comply with all recommendations 

with the goal of reunification with Child. Id. at 13-15. In March 2016, the 

CHINS court held a hearing for Periodic Case Review. Id. at 17-18. In its 

order issued after the hearing, the CHINS court described the services DCS had 

offered Mother and the ways in which Mother had failed to comply with those 

services. Id. The CHINS court also noted that although Mother had given DCS 

the name of a possible father, Mother provided no other identifying 

information. Id. at 18. It was not until October 19, 2016 that DCS received the 

results of a paternity test, showing that Father was Child’s biological father. Tr. 

Vol. 3 at 11. 

[5] On April 11, 2017, Father participated in an Initial Hearing regarding Child 

being a CHINS. Father admitted Child was a CHINS based upon, inter alia, 

Mother’s use of illicit substances and Child experiencing withdrawal symptoms 

from that drug use. Father conceded that he was Child’s biological father and 

admitted he had not maintained contact with Child during the CHINS 

proceedings. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 20, 32. 
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[6] On May 3, 2017, following an April 25 hearing, the CHINS court entered a

Dispositional Order as to Father, requiring him to complete certain services and 

comply with certain conditions, with the goal of reunification with Child. 

Those services and conditions, in pertinent part, required Father to: contact the 

family case manager (“FCM”) weekly; allow DCS to make unannounced visits 

to Father’s home; enroll in recommended programs within thirty days and 

participate without missing appointments; if required, complete assessments 

within thirty days; keep all appointments with service providers; maintain

suitable, safe, and stable housing; secure and maintain a stable source of 

income; refrain from using, manufacturing, trading, or selling illegal, controlled

substances; obey the law; complete and follow the recommendations of a 

parenting assessment and substance abuse assessment; submit to random drug 

screens; attend scheduled visitations with Child; and participate in the Father 

Engagement program as recommended by service providers. Id. at 23-24. The 

Dispositional Order also stated, “Any request for drug screen that is not 

completed in a timely manner will result in a positive result indication.” Id. at

24. 

[7] Around that time, DCS FCM Sherry McClain (“FCM McClain”) gave Father 

referrals for substance abuse assessment, random drug screens, Father 

Engagement Program, and visitation. Tr. Vol. 3 at 15. One referral, which was 

made to Meridian Services for both parents, was cancelled by Meridian due to 

the parents missing appointments and because Father lived in Oxford, Ohio. 

Id. For that reason, a referral for substance abuse assessment was made to the 
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Community Mental Health Center (“CMHC”), which was located within a 

half-hour’s drive of Oxford. Id. at 62.

[8] On June 13, 2017, Father was present at a CHINS Periodic Case Review 

hearing. As to Father, the CHINS court found the following facts and made 

the following orders: (1) Father did not comply with Child’s case plan; (2) 

Father had referrals for substance abuse assessment and treatment, random 

drug screens, case management, and supervised visitation but had not begun 

any treatment as of the date of the hearing; (3) Father submitted to three drug 

screens in April and May of 2017, two of which were positive for cocaine; (4) 

Father did not cooperate with DCS; (5) Father was not forthcoming with DCS 

about where he lived, saying he lived in Hamilton, Ohio, when he actually lived 

with Mother in Oxford, Ohio; and (6) the reason for the out-of-home placement 

or supervision had not been alleviated. DCS Ex. 12; Appellant’s App. Vol. II at

34-35. The CHINS court also recognized that visits with Child had been 

“suspended at the hearing on April 25, 2017 for both parents. However, neither 

parent had been visiting with [C]hild prior to the suspension of visits during the 

reporting period.” DCS Ex. 12. 

[9] On October 10, 2017, the CHINS court held a hearing on the permanency plan. 

DCS Ex. 13. Although Father did not appear, the CHINS court found: (1) 

Child was “progressing well” in relative placement; (2) Father had been offered 

a substance abuse assessment through the CMHC in Brookville, Indiana, 

located within a half-hour’s drive of Oxford, Ohio, but had not appeared at the 

facility to complete an assessment; (3) Father had not complied with Child’s 
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case plan; (4) Father submitted to three drug screens and tested positive for 

cocaine once in May and once in June 2017; and (5) Father refused to submit to 

drug screens in July and September 2017. Father’s two refusals to submit to 

drug screens were, under the terms of his Dispositional Order, deemed to be 

positive screens. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 24. The CHINS court ordered 

Child’s permanency plan to be changed to reunification with a concurrent plan 

of termination of the parent-child relationship and adoption for Child. Id. at 35. 

[10] On March 13, 2018, ten months after entering its Dispositional Order for 

Father, the CHINS court held a Review and Modification of Disposition 

hearing. The CHINS court found: (1) Father had not complied with Child’s 

case plan; (2) Father had been offered substance abuse treatment but had not 

complied with that treatment; (3) Redwood Toxicology suspended its random 

drug screens due to Father’s non-compliance; (4) Father submitted to a drug 

screen on June 16, 2017 that was positive for cocaine; (5) Father had not 

fulfilled his parental obligations to Child; (6) Father had not complied with 

DCS instructions; and (7) the cause for Child’s out of home placement had not 

been alleviated. DCS Ex. 14. The CHINS court ordered, “Mother and Father 

are not to have visitation until the parents have engaged in substance abuse 

treatment and produce random drug screen results that are free from illicit 

substances.” Id. DCS asked the CHINS court for permission to stop offering 

Mother and Father reunification services, but the CHINS court required DCS 

to continue to provide services to both parents. Id. 
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Termination Proceedings

[11] Meanwhile, on February 15, 2018, DCS had filed a petition to terminate 

Father’s parent-child relationship with Child. On May 2 and June 5, 2018, the 

juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing on the termination petition, and FCM 

McClain and Court Appointed Special Advocate Linda Taylor (“CASA 

Taylor”), among others, testified. FCM McClain testified that, once Child was 

adjudicated a CHINS as to Father, the CHINS court ordered Father to 

participate in services, including drug screens and substance abuse assessment,

and, thereafter, the CHINS court held review hearings and a permanency 

hearing to monitor Father’s progress. Tr. Vol. 3 at 7. DCS introduced into 

evidence the CHINS court’s orders from those hearings as DCS Exhibits 2

through 14. 

[12] Over Father’s objection, DCS offered into evidence DCS Exhibit 15, which was

the affidavit of Bridget Lemberg (“Lemberg”), the laboratory director of 

Forensic Fluids Laboratories, Inc. DCS Ex. 15. In the affidavit, Lemberg

detailed the laboratory’s procedures and stated that those procedures were 

followed when Father submitted to drug screens on April 11, 2017 and May 3, 

2017. Id. Both lab reports were attached to Lemberg’s affidavit and showed 

that Father had tested positive for the presence of cocaine. Id. Father objected 

to the admission of Exhibit 15, arguing that the test results were unreliable and 

that the forensic lab technician was not present to testify. Id. DCS countered 

that the lab reports could be admitted because they met the requirements of the 
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business records exception to the rule against hearsay. Tr. Vol. 3 at 28-30. The 

juvenile court ruled:

Uh, on the issue of the, uh, drug screens being admitted into

evidence. The Court will take the matter under advisement but 

will proceed as if they are admitted into evidence. So any 

subsequent testimony regarding drug screens will be allowed. If I 

determine that they are not admissible, then that . . . testimony 

will be stricken from the record. If I determine they are 

admissible, then the evidence submitted, uh, for their testimony 

will be admitted.

Id. at 34. 

[13] FCM McClain explained that DCS referred Father to the following services: 

substance abuse assessment; random drug screens; and participation in the 

Father Engagement program. Id. at 52. Although Father was initially allowed 

visitation with Child, FCM McClain stated that Father had minimal visits with 

Child. Id. at 39. During one of the visits, FCM McClain observed that Child 

was very uncomfortable; she engaged with Father a little but then retreated to 

FCM McClain’s lap. Id. at 51. When Father picked up Child to kiss her 

goodbye, Child cried and pushed Father away. Id. 

[14] For Father’s convenience, DCS moved Father’s mental health referral to 

CMHC, which was in Indiana but less than a half-hour’s drive from Oxford. 

Id. at 62. In September 2017, Father attended a supervised visit with Child at 

CMHC. Id. at 59. After the meeting, FCM McClain asked Father to submit to 

a drug screen. Father refused, saying CMHC had screened him just the day 
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before. Id. FCM McClain spoke with CMHC and learned that, contrary to 

Father’s assertion, he had not submitted to a screen the previous day. Id. 

Although Father went to CMHC for visitation, he never went there to 

participate in his required mental health assessment. Id. at 81-82. Father’s 

visits were suspended based on non-compliance with the substance abuse 

assessment, and the CHINS court required that Father have two months of 

clean drug screens before visitation would be reinstated. Id. at 56, 59. Father 

never complied. Id. at 61. 

[15] FCM McClain said that DCS had communicated with Redwood, a service 

provider in Oxford, who had agreed to meet Father at a location of his choice 

so that he could participate in the Father Engagement program; FCM McClain 

stated that Father did not contact Redwood or complete Father Engagement. 

Id. at 60, 61. FCM McClain was unsure about Mother’s and Father’s housing 

but stated that they had lived together “for a good while” at a motel in Oxford, 

Ohio. Id. at 39, 57. 

[16] FCM McClain testified that Child was two-and-a-half years old at the time of 

the hearing, did not know her parents, and “ha[d] been basically raised by the 

maternal grandmother and the maternal aunt.” Id. at 39. FCM McClain also 

testified that Child “is very bonded to her maternal aunt and her family” and

“needs stability and permanency, and they are who she knows.” Id. at 37. 

FCM McClain also observed, “The parents have not completed any of the 

treatment, [the] referrals that they were asked to complete.” Id. She also stated 

that the case started in October 2015 and, as of the date of the hearing, almost 
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three years later, nothing had been completed successfully. Id. She maintained 

that, after Father’s rights were terminated, the permanency plan was to have 

Child adopted by her “current placement.” Id. at 37-38. FCM McClain

concluded that it was in the best interest of Child to have her parent-child 

relationship with Father terminated and remain with her maternal aunt. Id. at 

37. 

[17] CASA Taylor testified that she represented Child’s best interests. When asked 

if she had any concern about the parents, CASA Taylor questioned parents’ 

ability to provide appropriate care and supervision for Child. Id. at 65. CASA 

Taylor testified that, from her interaction with parents, she knows “they’ve not 

been [in] compliance with Court orders.” Id. Furthermore, it was her 

observation that “Child doesn’t even know these parents as parents.” Id. 

When asked about specific concerns concerning Father, CASA Taylor said she 

worried about Father’s cocaine use. Tr. Vol. III at 67. CASA Taylor also 

expressed the following concern:

[Father and Mother] have always been together, as far as I can 

determine during this two-and-a-half years of, uh, placement for 

[Child], and yet he didn’t come forward until . . . October [2016]

when mother named him as the father. There was a whole year 

he went without acknowledging his child. And so I’m 

wondering now why is he coming forward?

Id. CASA Taylor shared her concern about Mother’s and Father’s ability to 

meet Child’s needs. Id. CASA Taylor, like FCM McClain, believed that for 

the two-and-a-half years that Child has been in relative care, she has developed 
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a bond with her caregivers. Id. The CASA concluded that it was not in Child’s 

best interests to remove her from the family she has known and put her into a 

“risky situation” that may or may not work. Id. CASA Taylor concluded, “It’s 

my belief that it’s in the best interests of [Child] to have . . . the parents’ rights 

terminated.” Id. 

[18] Father testified that he was present when Child was born. Tr. Vol. 4 at 5. In 

fact, Father claimed that he helped deliver Child in Mother’s home when she 

was unable to make it to the hospital in time. Id. Father testified that when 

Mother and Child were transferred to the hospital, he followed the ambulance. 

Id. at 6. Once released from the hospital, Child was placed “in the relative’s 

home, which was down the road from where [Mother] was living at the time.” 

Id. at 7. Even though paternity had not been established, Father said he visited 

Child two or three times a week. Id. Father testified that he was visiting Child 

because he thought she might be his child. Id. In June 2017, four months 

before the paternity test established Father’s paternity, Father thought Child 

was his. Id. at 8. Mother was concerned that Father was going to get custody 

of Child and prevent Mother from visiting. Explaining he was able to see Child 

in relative placement, Father said he and Mother had “an understanding” that 

he would not pursue his rights as a father. Id. at 7-8. Following the fact-finding 

hearing, the juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights to Child. Father 

now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision

[19] As our Supreme Court has observed, “Decisions to terminate parental rights are 

among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also 

among the most fact-sensitive - so we review them with great deference to the 

trial courts[.]” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). While the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of a 

parent to establish a home and raise his child, and parental rights are of a 

constitutional dimension, we may terminate those rights when a parent is 

unable or unwilling to meet his responsibilities as a parent. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t 

of Child Servs., Dearborn Cty. Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). 

[20] Parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s best 

interests in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate 

the parent-child relationship. Id.; In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2013). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent 

but to protect the child. Z.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 108 N.E.3d 895, 902 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. The juvenile court need not wait until the 

child is irreversibly harmed, such that her physical, mental, and social 

development is permanently impaired, before terminating the parent-child 

relationship. Id. at 903. 

[21] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 900. Instead, we 

consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-2882 | July 17, 2019 Page 13 of 20

the judgment. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Where, 

like here, the juvenile court entered specific findings and conclusions, we apply 

a two-tiered standard of review. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008), trans. denied. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the 

findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. 

Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the

evidence, we will not set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child 

relationship unless it is clearly erroneous. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d at 148-49. A 

finding is clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts or inferences 

that support the finding. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d at 14. If the evidence and 

inferences support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t 

of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[22] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State is 

required to allege and prove, among other things:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least 

six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

. . . . 

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 
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placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services; 

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by 

clear and convincing evidence. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d at 149. If the juvenile

court finds that the allegations in a petition are true, it shall terminate the 

parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

[23] Here, Father does not contest the juvenile court’s conclusions that: (1) Child 

has been removed from Father’s care for at least six months under a 

dispositional order; (2) the termination is in the best interests of Child; and (3) 

adoption is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child. Instead, 

Father argues that there is not clear and convincing evidence that there is a 

reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child’s removal will not 

be remedied. Father challenges the juvenile court’s following findings of fact as 

being unsupported by the evidence: 
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19. On or about August 31, 2016, October 12, 2016, and May 3, 

2017, Mother submitted to drug screens, and the results were 

positive for cocaine.

20. On or about April 11, 2017 and May 3, 2017, Father 

submitted to drug screens, and the results were positive for 

cocaine.

21. Mother did not complete services through Meridian, and 

around January 2017 Meridian ended services for Mother due to 

non-compliance.

22. Father’s referral for substance abuse treatment through 

Meridian ended due to noncompliance.

23. DCS made a referral for services for the parents through 

CMHC around June or July 2017, but the parents did not 

complete services.

. . . . 

27. Mother and Father have a history of using illicit substances, 

but the parents have not completed the recommended services in 

order to address their illicit substance use.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 36. 

Findings 19, 20, and 21

[24] Father first challenges Findings 19 and 21. However, we need not determine 

whether Findings 19 and 21 are supported by the evidence because those two 

findings pertain to Mother only; the juvenile court could not have relied on 
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those findings to terminate Father’s parental rights. In Finding 20, the juvenile 

court found that Father participated in one drug screen in April and one in May 

2017, and the results of each test was positive for cocaine. Id. at 36. Finding 20 

was supported by evidence of the drug screen reports that were attached to 

Lemberg’s affidavit in Exhibit 15. Father argues that these reports should not 

have been admitted under the business records exception to the rule against 

hearsay. Assuming without deciding that the juvenile court erred in admitting 

Exhibit 15 and in using that evidence to support Finding 20, the error was 

harmless. As we explain in our analysis of Finding 27 below, even without 

Finding 20, there was clear and convincing evidence of Father’s drug use to 

establish that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in 

Child’s removal from Father and Mother will not be remedied. 

Findings 22 and 23

[25] Father next contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile 

court’s findings that he failed to complete services through Meridian and 

CMHC. Appellant’s Br. at 15. Regarding Finding 22, Father maintains that it 

was not non-compliance that closed the Meridian services; instead, Meridian 

closed its services for Father because he lived out of state. FCM McClain 

testified that she referred Father to Meridian for a “new substance abuse 

assessment and outpatient treatment” in the early part of May 2017. Tr. Vol. 3

at 15, 16. FCM McClain testified that Mother and Meridian went back and 

forth trying to get an appointment that both she and Father could attend. Id. 

After a couple of months had passed without an appointment being made, 
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Meridian closed the referral around June or July 2017, citing “two reasons”: 

(1) “they missed appointments”; and (2) Mother and Father “were living in 

Ohio.” Id. Here, while we agree that living out of state played a large part in 

Meridian’s decision to close Father’s referral, based on FCM McClain’s 

testimony, we find there was sufficient evidence for the juvenile court to find 

that non-compliance was also a factor in the closure of Father’s Meridian 

referral. 

[26] In July 2017, FCM McClain, in consultation with parents, referred Father to 

CMHC. That referral was to ensure that Father had a substance abuse

assessment. Id. The parents agreed “that CMHC would be better for them, 

um, that it was a little bit closer and would be easier for them.” Id.at 16. That 

referral for Father was still in place at the time of the May 2, 2018 termination 

hearing. Tr. Vol. 3 at 16. 

[27] Father contends that there was insufficient evidence to support Finding 23, 

which stated that Father did not complete services with CMHC. As support for 

his claim, Father argues that he lived in Ohio throughout the underlying 

CHINS proceedings, sought services in Ohio, yet never received any support in 

securing such services. Id. He contends that, notwithstanding DCS’s ability to 

offer services in Ohio, he was never provided services there. Id. Finally, Father 

asserts that he had transportation issues that prevented him from traveling from 

Ohio to CMHC in Indiana. Id. Father made these same arguments to the 

juvenile court, and the court found them unpersuasive. Father’s arguments are 

invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, 
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which we cannot do. See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), 

trans. denied. Furthermore, Father’s arguments do not undermine the juvenile 

court’s finding that he did not complete services at CMHC. Instead, they are 

excuses as to why he did not complete services and tacit admissions that Father, 

in fact, did not complete the required mental health services. This evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s finding of fact regarding Father’s non-compliance 

with services.

Finding 27

[28] Finally, Father contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a 

finding that (1) he has a history of using illicit substances; and (2) did not 

complete the recommended services in order to address that issue. Appellant’s 

Br. at 16. In support of his argument, Father directs our attention, in part, to 

DCS Exhibit 15’s drug screen results, which were admitted into evidence over 

his hearsay objection. Father contends that the juvenile court erred in 

admitting the drug screen and that, without Exhibit 15, the juvenile court 

lacked a factual basis for Finding 27. Assuming, without deciding, that it was 

error for the juvenile court to introduce DCS Exhibit 15 under the business 

records exception to the rule against hearsay, we conclude that it was harmless 

error.2 An error will be found harmless if its probable impact, in light of all of 

 

2 During the same hearing on the termination of Mother’s parental rights, DCS offered into evidence two 

substantially identical affidavits with attached drug screens reflecting that Mother tested positive for cocaine. 

L.S., No. 18A-JT-2881, at *2. Mother objected, but DCS argued that the evidence, while arguably hearsay, 

was admissible under the business records exception to the rule excluding hearsay. Id. The juvenile court did 

not rule on Mother’s objection, and her parental rights were terminated. On appeal, a panel of this court 
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the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial 

rights of the parties. In re C.G., 933 N.E.2d 494, 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 

954 N.E.2d 910 (Ind. 2011).

[29] As discussed above, Father did not complete his drug assessment at CMHC. 

Father’s claims that transportation was unavailable and that DCS failed to 

provide services in Ohio are mere excuses; they do not undermine the juvenile 

court’s finding that Father did not complete his required drug assessment. 

Furthermore, even without the admission of DCS Exhibit 15’s drug screens, we 

find sufficient evidence that Father had a history of drug abuse. The orders of 

the CHINS court, which were admitted into evidence without Father’s 

objection, reveal that the CHINS court included in the terms of his Disposition 

Order that Father refrain from substance abuse. The CHINS court also 

required Father to submit to a drug abuse assessment and participate in random 

drug screens. Under the terms of the Dispositional Order, Father’s two refusals 

to submit to a drug screen constituted positive drug screens. 

[30] Father’s visitation with Child was suspended because of Father’s drug use and 

his failure to submit to drug screens. The CHINS court required Father to have 

two clean drug screens before it would reinstate visitation. The ball was in 

Father’s court; Father could have stopped taking drugs, tested negative for 

drugs on his drug screens, and again had visitation with Child. Father had the 

 

found that the evidence did not fall within the business records hearsay exception. Id. at *4. Accordingly, 

our court found that the juvenile court erred in admitting this evidence but that the error was harmless. Id.
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power to restart the visitation; however, he did not submit to future drug 

screens. We find this was sufficient evidence for the juvenile court to find that 

Father had a history of substance abuse.

[31] In sum, sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings and its 

conclusions that there is a reasonable probability that Father will not remedy 

the conditions resulting in Child’s removal. The juvenile court’s termination of 

Father’s parent-child relationship with Child was not clearly erroneous. 

[32] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.