alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of
Marshall Holdings International, Inc. for the fiscal year ending December 31,
2006, I, W. Jamie Plante, Chief Financial Officer of Marshall Holdings
International, Inc., hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best
of my knowledge and belief, that:

     1.     Such Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ending
December 31, 2006, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.     The information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for
the fiscal year ending December 31, 2006, fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Marshall Holdings
International, Inc.

     Dated: April 16, 2007.

                              /s/  W. Jamie Plante
                              --------------------------------------------------
                              W. Jamie Plante, Chief Financial Officer of
                              Marshall Holdings International, Inc.
**Exhibit32.2**

 

**Certification of the Chief Financial Officer Pursuant toSection 906 of the**

**Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

I,Herbert Lindo, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report ofKenilworth Systems Corporation on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31,2003 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such AnnualReport on Form 10-K fairly presents in all material respects the financialcondition and results of operations of Kenilworth Systems Corporation.

 
| By:    | /s/  Herbert Lindo       |   |
|--------|--------------------------|--------|
| Name:  | Herbert  Lindo           |
| Title: | Chief  Financial Officer |
| Date:  | May  10, 2004            |

 

----
§ 1403.2 Policies of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. It is the policy of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service: ( a ) To facilitate and promote the settlement of labor-management disputes through collective bargaining by encouraging labor and management to resolve differences through their own resources.
( b ) To encourage the States to provide facilities for fostering better labor-management relations and for resolving disputes.
( c ) To proffer its services in labor-management disputes in any industry affecting commerce, except as to any matter which is subject to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, either upon its own motion or upon the request of one or more of the parties to the dispute, whenever in its judgment such dispute threatens to cause a substantial interruption to commerce.
( d ) To refrain from proffering its services: ( 1 ) In labor-management disputes affecting intrastate commerce exclusively,
( 2 ) In labor-management disputes having a minor effect on interstate commerce, if State or other conciliation services are available to the parties, or
( 3 ) In a labor-management dispute when a substantial question of representation has been raised, or to continue to make its facilities available when a substantial question of representation is raised during the negotiations.
( e ) To proffer its services in any labor-management dispute directly involving Government procurement contracts necessary to the national defense, or in disputes which imperil or threaten to imperil the national health or safety.
( f ) To proffer its services to the parties in grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement only as a last resort and in exceptional cases.
# Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed January 31, 2024

. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

No. 3D22

- 1385

Lower Tribunal No. 19

- 106

- P



### Monte Kennedy

, Appellant,

vs.



### Homeowners Choice Property & Casualty Insurance Company , Inc

. , Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Timothy J. Koenig, Judge.

Boyle, Leonard & Anderson, P.A., Alexander Brockmeyer, and Stephen M. Smith (Fort My ers), for appellan t

.

Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP and Mihaela Cabulea (Tampa); Kubicki Draper and Nicole L. Wulwick, for appellee.

Before EMAS, FERNANDEZ and SCALES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.Affirmed. See Perez v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. , 343 So. 3d 140, 142

(Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“The question of whether an insured’s untimely

reporting of loss is sufficient too result in the denial of recovery under the

p olicy implicates a two

- step analysis. If the insured breaches the notice

provision, prejudice to the insurer will be presumed, but may be rebutted by

a showing that the insurer has not been prejudiced by the lack of notice.”

(internal citations omitted)); LoBello v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. , 152 So. 3d

595, 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (“[I]f the undisputed evidence will not support a

finding that the insured gave notice to the insurer as soon as practicable,

then a finding that notice was timely given is unsuppo rtable.”); Hope v.

Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp.

, 114 So. 3d 457, 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (finding

the record did not set forth evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of

prejudice to the insurer resulting from the homeowners delayed

notice of loss; the evidence was “merely conclusory and fails to rebut the

presumption of prejudice to [the in surer] where the passage of time has

rendered [the insurer] unable to determine exactly what current damage is

directly attributable to Hurricane Wilma, and thus a covered loss.”).

2
§ 91.515 Flight altitude rules. ( a ) Notwithstanding § 91.119, and except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, no person may operate an airplane under VFR at less than— ( 1 ) One thousand feet above the surface, or 1,000 feet from any mountain, hill, or other obstruction to flight, for day operations; and
( 2 ) The altitudes prescribed in § 91.177, for night operations.
( b ) This section does not apply— ( 1 ) During takeoff or landing;
( 2 ) When a different altitude is authorized by a waiver to this section under subpart J of this part; or
( 3 ) When a flight is conducted under the special VFR weather minimums of § 91.157 with an appropriate clearance from ATC.
#### Daniel F. Appleton, App’lt, *v.*James S. Speer *et al.,*Resp’ts.

*(New York Superior Court,*

*General Term,*

*Filed June 29, 1889.)*

Attachment—Affidavit—Sufficiency. <

Where the papers upon which an attachment was issued disclose that some facts, the existence of which it was necessary to prove, were sworn to on information and belief, and the source of the information not disclosed, the order should be vacated; nor can the defect be supplied by other affidavits produced upon the motion to vacate.

Appeal from an order vacating an attachment.

*Abbett & Fuller*and *Henry Schmitt,*for app’lt; *Morse & Haynes,*for resp’ts.

Truax, J.

The order should be affirmed for the reasons assigned by the chief judges. See *Cribben*v. *Schillinger**963(30 Hun, 248), *Marine Nat. Bk.*v. *Ward*(35 id., 395), *Buhl*v. *Ball*(41 id., 61), *Lee*v. *Co-operative, etc.*(19 N. Y. State Rep., 879).

Sedgwick, J.

From the original papers, taken together, on which the order of attachment was issued, it appeared that some facts, the existence of which it was necessary to prove, were sworn to upon information and belief, and the source of the information not disclosed. For this reason the court below was correct in granting the motion to vacate the order. The original defect could not be remedied by proving by other affidavits produced upon the motion to vacate, that the facts referred to really existed; and the more is this true, because the motion to vacate was made upon the original papers, when the plaintiff has no right to present additional papers. 75 N. Y., 179.

The order should be affirmed, with ten dollars costs.

Freedman, J., concurs.
#### STATE ex POPOVICI v. AGLER, et

Ohio Supreme Court

No. 21357.

Decided Dec. 26, 1928.

MARSHALL, C. J..

DIVORCE & ALIMONY.

(230 Dc) Inasmuch as the federal courts have disclaimed altogether any jurisdiction upon the subject of divorce or for the allowance of alimony either as an original proceeding in chancery or as an incident to a divorce, prohibition will not lie to prevent tb,e courts of this state -which have jurisdiction of the subject-matter of divorce and alimony, from hearing and determining a suit for divorce or alimony or both against a consular representative accredited by a foreign government of the United States and recognized and accepted by the government of the United States, who is stationed in the state of Ohio.

Day, Allen, Kinkade, Robinson, Jones, and Matthias, JJ.., concur.
No. 17,335.

#### Wagner et al. *v.*Citizens’ Building, Loan and Savings Association.

Filed April 26, 1895.

From the Huntington Circuit Court.

*J. M. Hatheld, M. L. Spencer*and *W. A. Branyan,*for appellants.

*J. B. Kenner*and *U. S. Lesh,*for appellee.

Jordan, J.

— The questions involved and presented by appellant in this case are identical with those decided by this court in *Wohlford*v. *Citizens’ Building, Loan and Savings’ Asso.,*140 Ind. 662.

For the reasons given in that case, and upon the authority thereof the judgment herein is affirmed at appellants’ cost.
**Exhibit 3.2**

CERTIFICATE OFAMENDMENT

OF THE

CERTIFICATE OFINCORPORATION

OF

KENILWORTH SYSTEMSCORPORATION

UnderSection 805 of the Business Corporation Law

Meltzer, Lippe,Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP190 Willis AvenueMineola, New York 11501516-747-0300

CERTIFICATE OFAMENDMENT

OF THE

CERTIFICATE OFINCORPORATION

OF

KENILWORTH SYSTEMSCORPORATION

UnderSection 805 of the Business Corporation Law

IT IS HEREBYCERTIFIED THAT:

(1)                                  Thename of the Corporation is:

KENILWORTH SYSTEMSCORPORATION

(2)           The Certificate of Incorporation wasfiled by the Department of State on the 25th day of April, 1968 under theoriginal name of School For Computer Studies, Inc.

(3)           To increase the number of shareswhich the Corporation shall have the authority to issue and to authorize twoclasses of stock.  The fourth Article (paragraph) of the Certificateof Incorporation shall now read as follows:

“FOURTH: The Corporation is authorized to issue twoclasses of stock to be designated respectively “Common Stock” and “PreferredStock.”  The total number of shares of stock which the Corporation shallhave authority to issue is 202,000,000.  The total number of shares ofCommon Stock which the Corporation shall have authority to issue is Two HundredMillion (200,000,000), $.01 par value per shares.

The total number of shares of Preferred Stock whichthe Corporation shall have the authority to issue is Two Million (2,000,000),$.01 par value per share. The shares of Preferred Stock may be issued fromtime to time in one or more series.  The Board of Directors of theCorporation is authorized to determine or alter any or all of the designations,powers, preferences and rights and the qualifications, limitations orrestrictions thereof, in respect of the wholly

 

----

 

unissued class of Preferred Stock or any whollyunissued series of Preferred Stock, and to fix or alter the number of sharescomprising any series of Preferred Stock (but not below the number of shares ofany such series then outstanding).”

(4)          The above amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation was authorized by voteof the Board of Directors followed by a vote of the holders of a majority ofall outstanding shares entitled to vote thereon at a meting of the shareholderson August 13, 2001.

IN WITNESSWHEREOF, this certificate has been subscribed by the undersigned who affirm(s)that the statements made herein are true under the penalties of perjury.

DATED: May 25, 2004
| /s/ Herbert Lindo |   |   |
|-------------------|--------|--------|
| Herbert Lindo     |   |   |
| President         |   |   |

 

----
Exhibit 99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Advanstar Communications Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Robert L. Krakoff, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge, based upon a review of the Report, and as of the end of the
period covered by the Report:

|By: |  | /s/ROBERT L. KRAKOFFRobert L. Krakoff
Chief Executive Officer |  | 
|--- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------- |  | 

March
28, 2003

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

This
certification is being submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission solely for the purpose of complying with Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United
States Code. This certification shall not to be deemed "filed" for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), or otherwise subject to the
liability of that section. This certification does not constitute a part of Registrant's Annual Report on Form 10-K accompanying this certification and to which it is an exhibit.

---

QuickLinks
# L_2005140EN.01001301.xml

| 3.6.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 140/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.6.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 140/13

---

Corrigendum to Commission Decision 97/447/EC of 16 July 1997 exempting imports of certain bicycle parts originating in the People's Republic of China from the extension by Council Regulation (EC) No 71/97 of the anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 2474/93 and maintained by Regulation (EC) No 1524/2000

(
  Official Journal of the European Communities L 193 of 22 July 1997
  )

On page 35, in Annex A, in the penultimate line of the first column:

for:

‘Quantum Cycles’,

read:

‘Quantum International SA’.

---
#### § 1905.51 Finality for purposes of judicial review.

Only a decision by the Assistant Secretary shall be deemed final agency action for purposes of judicial review. A decision by a hearing examiner which becomes final for lack of appeal is not deemed final agency action for purposes of 5 U.S.C. 704.
#### Wm. W. Flournoy, *Plaintiff in*Error, v. Interstate Electric Company, a Corporation, *Defendant in Error.*

1. Where a writ of error purports to be taken to a final judgment, and no final judgment appears in the transcript of the record proper, the court shall not proceed to consider the errors assigned, but should dismiss the writ of error, whether a motion be made for that purpose or not.

2. The rules contemplate that in making up a transcript of the record to be transmitted to the appellate court in response to a writ of error, the judgment to which the writ of error is addressed should be included in the transcript.

This case was decided by Division B.

Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Walton County.

*215The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was reinstated.

*Wm. W.*Flournoy, *in pro per ■*

*W. 0.*Butler, for Defendant in Error.

Per Curiam.

The writ of error herein is addressed to a judgment entered in the cause, but no judgment appears in the transcript of the record on file here.

Where a writ of error purports to be taken to a final judgment, and no final judgment appears in the transcript of the record proper, the court should not proceed to consider the errors assigned, but should dismiss the writ of error, whether a motion be made for that purpose or not. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Bennett, 47 Fla. 215, 36 South. Rep. 86; Goldring v. Reed, 61 Fla. 250, 53 South. Rep. 503; Graves v. Harris, 61 Fla. 254, 54 South. Rep. 390.

The rules contemplate that in making up a transcript of the record to be transmitted to the appellate court in response to a writ of error, the judgment to which the writ of error is addressed should be included in the transcript.

In this case counsel directed the clerk to include in the transcript certain specified “papers,” but did not mention or include the judgment, and directed the clerk to “omit from the transcript all other papers.”

The writ of error is dismissed.

Taylor, Hocker and Parkhill, J. J., concur;

*216Whitfield, C. J., and Shackleford and Cockrell, J. J., concur in the opinion.
#### § 1601.29 Referral to the Attorney General.

If the Commission is unable to obtain voluntary compliance in a charge involving a government, governmental agency or political subdivision, it shall inform the Attorney General of the appropriate facts in the case with recommendations for the institution of a civil action by him or her against such respondent or for intervention by him or her in a civil action previously instituted by the person claiming to be aggrieved.
§ 1603.109 Investigations. ( a ) Before referring a complaint to an administrative law judge under section 201 of this part, the Commission may conduct an investigation using an exchange of letters, interrogatories, fact-finding conferences, interviews, on-site visits, or other fact-finding methods that address the matters at issue.
( b ) During an investigation of a complaint under this part, the Commission shall have the authority to sign and issue a subpoena requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses, the production of evidence, and access to evidence for the purposes of examination and the right to copy. The subpoena procedures contained in 29 CFR 1601.16 shall apply to subpoenas issued pursuant to this section.
[62 FR 17543, Apr. 10, 1997, as amended at 89 FR 47852, June 4, 2024]
§ 1471.315 May I use the services of an excluded person as a principal under a covered transaction? ( a ) You as a participant may continue to use the services of an excluded person as a principal under a covered transaction if you were using the services of that person in the transaction before the person was excluded. However, you are not required to continue using that person's services as a principal. You should make a decision about whether to discontinue that person's services only after a thorough review to ensure that the action is proper and appropriate.
( b ) You may not begin to use the services of an excluded person as a principal under a covered transaction unless the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service grants an exception under § 1471.120.
**Exhibit99.2**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of MEEMIC Holdings, Inc. (the“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2002 as filed withthe Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,Victor T. Adamo, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that:

 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operationsof the Company.

 

 
| /s/ Victor T. Adamo        |   |
|----------------------------|--------|
| Victor T. Adamo            |
| Chief Executive****Officer |
|                       |
| November 14, 2002          |

 

----
#### § 1471.900 Adequate evidence.

*Adequate evidence* means information sufficient to support the reasonable belief that a particular act or omission has occurred.
§ 15.205 What types of claims for property damage are allowed under the MPCECA? ( a ) Claims for property damage are allowed under the MPCECA only if the property involved was being used incident to service with the Department and: (l) The damage or loss was not caused wholly or partly by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of the claimant, his or her agent, the members of his or her family, or his or her private employee (the standard to be applied is that of reasonable care under the circumstances); and ( 2 ) The possession of the property lost or damaged and the quantity and the quality possessed is determined by the claimant's supervisor to have been reasonable, useful or proper under the circumstances; and
( 3 ) The claim is substantiated by proper and convincing evidence.
( b ) Claims otherwise allowable under this subpart shall not be disallowed solely because the claimant was not the legal owner of the property for which the claim is made.
#### MULLEN v PELLAR

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 10115.

Decided June 17, 1929

C. M. Heil, Esq., Cleveland, for Mullen.

J. L. Spits, Cleveland, for Pellar.

VICKERY, PJ.’

There ,are two theories on which this case could be reversed, if it is reversible and if the evidence warranted sustaining either of those theories: .One is that the note was given to compound a felony; and the other is that there was duress.

The first could not be true, for there was no felony committed, nor does the record show anything like a felony or any promises not to prosecute if the note was given; so the note was not given to compound a felony and there is no evidence which would warrant a reversal upon the theory that this noté was given to compound a felony.

The other theory is that' it was given under duress. Now it must be remembered that there is no relationship between Mullen and Livingston. They were nothing but friends and when Livingston sent over to Mullen to come over to the Police Headquarters, Mullen was under no physical restraint nor was he related in any way where the subject of duress might be invoked in order to release him from *439liability on the note. He w,as a free agent and his friend was in difficulty.

The law is well settled that taking a note of a third person is a payment pro tanto to the amount of the note unless it is expressly agreed that the note shall be taken only as conditional payment; and there is no such agreement in this record and, therefore, Livingston’s debt to Pellar was paid by the acceptance of this note to the extent of $100. So there was a valid and valuable consideration for the note, and there being no duress nor the compounding of a felony, we can see no reason why this note should not have been paid, nor do we see any error in the court’s finding for the plaintiff below.

There being no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.

Sullivan, J, concurs. Levine, J, dissents.