www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 280 1 

Russia’s institution of a ban on American adoptions of Russian orphans, 

an appalling response by the Duma to U.S. sanctions against officials 

involved in the Sergei Magnitsky case,1 was a clear indicator that bilateral relations will assume a lower priority in the next 4 years for both capitals. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the measure despite open misgivings 

by some of his own key aides and against the opposition of most of Russia’s civil 

society. The Russian Internet response was scathing, producing an instant winner 

for best sick joke of 2012: “An educated American family has decided to adopt a 

developmentally disabled Duma deputy.”2

Despite Putin’s calculated pandering to anti-American sentiment, however, there are important areas of the bilateral relationship where cooperation 

and improvement are possible. At his last face-to-face meeting with President 

Barack Obama at the Los Cabos G20 summit in June 2012, for example, Putin 

suggested both a desire and basis for real cooperation, particularly in expanding 

the economic aspect of the relationship. Putin’s public signals are mixed, but 

America remains the most important actor in the world for Russia, and Moscow 

by no means wishes to put the brakes on its relationship with Washington either 

in this or in half a dozen other key areas.

Looking beyond the low point in bilateral relations, reached at the beginning of February 2013, Russia will not cease to be important to U.S. policymakers and American geopolitical interests for a number of reasons. The 

country retains its Soviet-era inheritance of permanent membership and veto 

power in the United Nations (UN) Security Council, where its cooperation or 

opposition can prove decisive. The Russian Federation is still the only country 

in the world that can obliterate the United States with a nuclear strike. This 

Russia Still Matters: Strategic 

Challenges and Opportunities 

for the Obama Administration

By John W. Parker and Michael Kofman

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

About the Authors

Dr. John W. Parker is an Adjunct 

Fellow in the Center for Strategic 

Research (CSR), Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, at the National 

Defense University. Michael Kofman 

is a Program Manager and Researcher 

in CSR.

Key Points

◆ Bilateral relations will assume a 

lower priority for Washington and 

Moscow in the next 4 years, but 

there are important areas where 

cooperation is possible, and may 

prove necessary, despite the growing “values gap.”

◆ Pressing developments, interests, 

and disagreements will necessitate 

U.S.-Russian coordination on Syria, 

Afghanistan, the Iranian nuclear 

file, and missile defense in Europe 

in the near term.

◆ Each country’s “pivot” toward 

the Asia-Pacific region, interests 

in security and development of 

the Arctic, and desire to stimulate 

bilateral trade and investment will 

be on a longer fuse.

◆ Allaying Russian concerns over 

the European Phased Adaptive 

Approach through transparency 

measures and technical cooperation will influence any future 

negotiations on strategic weapons 

reductions.

March 2013

Cen

ter

f

o

r Strat

e

gic R

eSEARCH
2 SF No. 280 www.ndu.edu/inss

is not a fading, obsolescent capability. Instead, Russia’s 

new rearmament program is beginning to resuscitate 

military challenges dormant since the collapse of the 

Soviet Union and to upgrade the nuclear arsenal. Finally, cooperation with Russia on nuclear issues of all 

sorts is crucial to U.S. nonproliferation goals, many of 

which Russia shares.

Regional developments are altering the security architecture of the world and America’s place in it. In addition, Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) may slowly change the investment climate 

in Russia and, with passage of permanent normal trade 

relations, has already opened the door to expanded U.S. 

access to the Russian market, the sixth (by gross domestic product [GDP] measured by purchasing power 

parity) or ninth (by nominal market GDP) largest in 

the world.3

 Despite numerous governance shortcomings, Russia’s remaining great power attributes give it 

the ability to influence events in a number of key regions around the globe:

◆ In South Asia, Russia will be important to the 

modalities of the International Security Assistance Force troop drawdown in Afghanistan, to 

the maintenance of any long-term U.S. presence 

there post-2014, and to the context of U.S. relations with adjoining countries, especially those in 

Central Asia.

◆ In the Middle East, Russia is maneuvering to 

play a key role in the Syrian endgame and will 

be an important player as the P5+14 engage in 

the next and possibly decisive set of negotiations 

with Iran over its troublesome nuclear enrichment program.

◆ In the Asia-Pacific region, Russia has set in motion its own pivot and is eager to be a part of the 

new multipolar security architecture developing as 

China’s rise continues to evoke a regional response.

◆ In Europe, expanding U.S. exchanges with Russia over the European Phased Adaptive Approach 

(EPAA) to missile defense will determine the 

possibilities and shape of any post–New Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and European 

theater arms reductions.

◆ In the Arctic, Russia is at the forefront of exploiting the Northern Sea Route for more efficient 

East-West commerce, has already begun to engage 

major U.S. business partners to exploit the region’s 

resources, and has started to focus more expansively on protecting its security interests in the region.

◆ On trade and investment, Putin has set his cap 

on significantly expanding ties with the United 

States, which will create more jobs for American 

businesses that manufacture goods and sell services 

to the Russian market.

Whether Russia prospers or stagnates politically 

and economically over the next 4 years, it will still matter to U.S. security interests around the world in critical 

ways. It will be impossible to isolate or marginalize Russia. America’s interests will continue to be best served 

by identifying areas of overlapping interests or concerns 

where Russia’s own self-interests will serve to advance 

American goals. Ignoring Russia as an irrelevant power has not proved an effective policy, as the 2007–2008 

downturn in bilateral relations amply illustrated. Putin’s 

Russia cannot tolerate being disregarded and is sure to 

find a way, often a negative one, with which to regain the 

attention of American policymakers.

Pushing Past the Elections

During much of 2011–2012, resistance to Putin’s return to the presidency and the battle down to the wire in 

the American elections put bilateral relations on the back 

burner. The exceptions were forced by intruding crises, especially in Libya and Syria, and by calendar deadlines such as 

Russia’s WTO accession. Even now, the U.S. fiscal cliff and 

maneuvering in Moscow over domestic politics will probably keep the relationship on pause a bit longer. Nevertheless, President Obama and the Russian leadership agreed 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 280 3 

to positive placeholders on missile defense and business ties 

at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in March 2012 

and during the G20 summit in Los Cabos in June 2012.5

Despite his endorsement of the Duma’s anti-U.S. 

adoption bill, Putin has a personal incentive to get back 

to productive relations with Washington sooner rather 

than later. The Russian president will not be able to reproduce the vast increases in wealth and standards of 

living that Russia enjoyed during his first two terms in 

2000–2008. That earlier growth spurt came from the 

sharp increase in the price of oil and a steady restoration of industrial capacity left unused following the 

collapse of the Soviet Union. If the Russian economy 

now underperforms, support for Putin could plunge to 

the single digits in only a few years, the same fate that 

befell Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s and Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s.

The values gap between Russia and the United 

States, exacerbated by Putin’s increasingly repressive 

policies and the continued absence of true democracy 

or rule of law in Russia, cannot be ignored. This gap is 

once more widening after a slight convergence while 

Dmitriy Medvedev was president and will remain an 

obstacle to progress in U.S.-Russian relations. Putin personally is much to blame. During the election campaign, 

he encouraged anti-U.S. sentiment at home to buttress 

his electoral base. Since then, he has presided over the 

rollback of the mildly liberal changes of the Medvedev 

years. Russia is again becoming more rather than less 

authoritarian. In the long term, Putin may not be able 

to control how Russian elites use these repressive and 

poorly defined measures against each other and against 

Russian society.

Nevertheless, Putin’s anti-Americanism is not blind. 

He will still be ready for business on issues of overlapping 

interest. In April 2012, he defended the Ulyanovsk transit point for U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) equipment and personnel from Afghanistan. 

More recently, even after President Obama signed the 

Magnitsky bill,6

 Putin’s foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov 

said the Russian president was looking forward to welcoming Obama to Moscow during the first half of 2013. Putin 

appears to calculate that Washington’s incentives for dealing 

with Moscow on specific issues will outweigh its distaste 

for his domestic politics, which he is not likely to abandon.

Despite obstacles to any U.S.-Russia strategic partnership in the near term, matters of mutual strategic concern will endure. Trust in dealing with Moscow on such 

issues cannot be negotiated or arrived at by discussion. It 

can only emerge from a series of interactions resulting in a 

positive outcome for all parties. At the same time, the lack 

of values and trust associated with the current Russian administration are not deterministic of future relations. Russian civil society will continue to develop in ways divergent 

from Kremlin wishes and will pull the Russian leadership 

along with it—witness the Kremlin twisting back and 

forth over how to implement the highly unpopular adoption ban. As this happens, the following are issues whose 

importance to U.S. interests transcends American objections to Putin’s regressive domestic policy. These issues 

will provide ample opportunities for advancing relations 

between Washington and Moscow over the next 4 years 

and into—eventually—the post-Putin era.

South Asia: Afghanistan

The challenge for U.S.-Russian cooperation on Afghanistan will be calibrating post-2014 arrangements 

such that Russia feels assured the American military 

presence in the region will not be permanent. Moscow 

opposes permanent U.S. bases, yet worries that the International Security Assistance Force is planning to 

withdraw too early, leaving its mission undone as well 

as Russia and its allies vulnerable. Without Moscow’s 

agreement, it is unlikely that the United States will be 

able to sustain counterterrorism or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in the region. But 

if the central government in Kabul heads toward collapse 

as a result, Russia’s and Afghanistan’s other neighbors 

would again have to scramble to reinforce ties and support their historically favorite factions.

On balance, Russian worries over the potential fragmentation and destabilization of Afghanistan will likely 
4 SF No. 280 www.ndu.edu/inss

overshadow concern over the extent of the remaining 

U.S. presence. Russian support will be important for the 

maintenance of any significant U.S. military deployment 

in Afghanistan and future use of the Northern Distribution Network. This network is even more important 

when factoring in the fragile state of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Any desire to deleverage away from Pakistani 

supply routes will inherently involve dealing with Russia. 

Both countries will have to reach an understanding that 

eases Russian suspicions of long-term U.S. intentions in 

Central Asia. There is also great potential for U.S.-Russian cooperation in the counternarcotics sphere, a common long-term interest.

For Russia and the United States, Afghanistan will 

probably be a necessary area of cooperation given longterm mutual security interests. Success would decrease the 

imperative for Russia to preserve the option of cooperation with Iran against future threats in Afghanistan. But 

success might also open the door to developments in Central Asia that Moscow would not welcome. It might result 

in Central Asian leaderships that are open to exploring 

significant regional cooperation ventures across Central 

and South Asia, which would reduce Russian influence in 

the region and call for bilateral relations with individual 

states. Although the track record since the Soviet collapse 

has not been encouraging in this regard, a modicum of 

stability in Afghanistan could have a transformative effect 

on regional economic integration.

Middle East: Syria

The political outcome of the civil war in Syria will 

be a key indicator of the fate of the Arab Spring and the 

regional balance of power. Russia’s maneuvering is likely 

aimed at positioning itself to play a major role in shaping 

that outcome as an international guarantor of a post–

Bashar al-Asad multiconfessional government that is 

still a largely secular state within Syria’s current borders. 

Putin’s apparent gamble is that an Alawite rump faction 

will survive—with or without Asad still around—and 

play a constituent part in a power-sharing government. 

Putin probably calculates that in its weakened state, that 

rump will have to reach out to Russia and will be dependent on Moscow’s good graces in a way that Asad never 

was before the Arab Spring hit Syria.

Despite Russia’s differences with the United 

States over Syria, Moscow shares with Washington a 

deep aversion to extremist Islamist regimes coming to 

power anywhere in the Middle East, to the territorial 

fragmentation of the existing states, and to another 

Libya-like outcome in Syria. Moscow realistically 

knows that Asad could fall—perhaps sooner rather 

than later—but does not want his ouster to appear 

as the result of Russian interference or withdrawal of 

support. Russian leaders are also convinced that Asad’s 

fall would not be the end of the violent struggle over 

control of Syria because his supporters may simply 

trade places with the insurgency.

With the Asad regime weakened by defections and the 

loss of control of territory, Russia will have an increasing 

interest in working with the United States to dampen the 

even greater violence the Kremlin fully expects will ensue 

should the regime totally collapse. Moscow would bring to 

the table its longstanding contacts in Damascus, especially 

with the security remnants of the Alawite regime, and Russia’s desire to preserve influence in the Syrian capital. At the 

same time, those remnants of the Asad regime left standing, 

together with their supporters, will probably reach out to 

Russia as their international protector.

Iran has been much more deeply involved than 

Russia in propping up Damascus during the civil war 

and much more heavily invested than Russia in Asad 

personally. But Moscow would be able to use its UN 

Security Council permanent membership and veto 

power to champion the cause of Asad-regime survivors, 

something that Tehran would not be able to do. Moreover, if there is to be any international presence in Syria 

either to secure or enforce stability post-Asad, Russia’s 

UN Security Council vote will prove necessary.

Middle East: Iran

In this connection, keeping Russia on the same page 

with its P5+1 counterparts in upcoming negotiations over 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 280 5 

capping Tehran’s nuclear enrichment program will be 

critical to their success, and that in turn will be vital to 

the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The P5+1 need 

to keep a united front and not allow Iran to think Russia 

will provide it an escape hatch. This has never been easy 

since Russia’s approach to Iran has never been either/or 

but rather depends on shifting balances. However, Moscow’s overlapping but not identical interests with Tehran 

in both Syria and Afghanistan do not extend to the nuclear enrichment field.

Moscow continues to make clear to Tehran that it is 

opposed to Iran having nuclear weapons, and it has put 

its money where its mouth is. Russia is still paying the 

penalty of lost arms contracts for imposing tough sanctions on Iran in accordance with UN Security Council 

Resolution 1929 (2010), even going beyond it by breaking the contract for the S-300 air defense missile system. 

Russian and American success in persuading Iran to cap 

its nuclear enrichment program could in turn improve 

the chances of agreement in talks on missile defenses in 

Europe against the developing Iranian threat.

Europe: EPAA and Arms Control

Moscow argues that the EPAA to a potential Iranian 

threat will undermine U.S.-Russian strategic stability by 

endangering its own second-strike capability against the 

United States. Its view is that the “true strategic partnership” that Russia and NATO called for at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 is only possible if strategic stability 

is preserved. Although the United States announced that 

it is abandoning Phase 4 (the most controversial phase), 

this will not address Russia’s fundamental fears about the 

missile defense plan—even more so if the change results 

in a gradual expansion of U.S. missile defenses elsewhere, 

such as more interceptors and new radars on Russia’s 

eastern border. Russia is also concerned that the U.S. missile defense program could catalyze China to improve or 

increase its current offensive nuclear forces with security 

consequences for both Russia and the West.

Allaying Russian concerns over EPAA through transparency measures and technical cooperation will be critical 

to future post-New START strategic weapons reduction 

negotiations. Absent agreed understandings on missile defense in Europe, more negotiated strategic cuts are unlikely. 

The current numbers are already low from Moscow’s perspective of its need for an assured second-strike capability, 

and it will have little incentive for new negotiations.

Russia is also unlikely to negotiate on tactical weapons in Europe given its requirement to deter against the 

conventional superiority of NATO in the West as well as 

China in the East. Any cuts would be rather one-sided, 

and the small number of U.S. deployed tactical weapons 

provides Moscow with little motivation for negotiations. 

Even if there were mutual incentives for negotiations on 

reductions of nondeployed or nonstrategic arsenals, these 

are unlikely to be productive until the missile defense issue is resolved. Progress on missile defense could also 

improve the atmospherics for productive exchanges on 

mutual restraint in cyberspace.7

There is still ample time to address Russian concerns 

over EPAA. The official abandonment of Phase 4 changes 

little since it can be reinstated at any time. As now planned, 

EPAA’s technical challenge will not begin to emerge until 

after 2018 with Phase 3 and may never fully materialize. 

Russia’s primary concerns over Phase 3 deployments are 

the numbers of Aegis-equipped ships and their areas of deployment. Russia will insist on scaling back the numbers of 

these Aegis platforms from multiples of 10 to single digits, 

and limiting their operation to the North and Mediterranean seas. Otherwise, Russia fears that ships operating 

close to its borders in the Black, Baltic, White, and Barents 

seas and equipped with advanced SM-3 interceptors will be 

able to intercept Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles 

on transpolar trajectories, degrading Russia’s second-strike 

capability and undermining strategic stability.8

Russia’s security establishment fears that without 

any agreement on transparency and cooperative measures, bureaucratic inertia and technical success could 

lead the United States to expand its missile defense plans 

beyond those currently envisioned in the EPAA. The U.S. 

plan to expand the number of long-range interceptors on 

the Pacific coast, and to explore a third continental site 
6 SF No. 280 www.ndu.edu/inss

for missile defenses, underscores this concern. This fear 

is demonstrative of the lasting distrust in the relationship, and the persistence of capability-based planning, 

but an opportunity exists for cooperation between the 

two countries. This can only be achieved if missile defense is not dismissed as primarily a political problem. 

The domestic political environment in the United States 

and Russia will become less, rather than more, conducive 

to a political resolution. There are, however, a number 

of practical and technical measures of cooperation and 

transparency on missile defense that remain undeveloped but that could address the matter.9

Asia-Pacific: China

The rise of China will increasingly present an opportunity for the United States to discretely engage Russia in 

shaping a new multilateral security architecture, along with 

all the other countries in the region that fear the emergence 

of a more nationalistic Beijing. Putin’s Russian Federation 

has ambitions to regain the status of an Asia-Pacific power, 

which was lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although now frequently overlooked as a potentially significant player in the region, the Russian Empire expanded to 

Pacific shores in the 1600s. In contrast to the United States, 

however, Russia is unable to announce any overt “pivot” that 

could lead to open competition or confrontation with its giant neighbor and will refrain from doing so out of necessity. 

Putin prefers to stress the “unprecedentedly high level of 

trust” between Russian and Chinese leaders and the “colossal potential for business cooperation—a chance to catch 

the Chinese wind in the sails of our economy.”10 These platitudes belie a Russian quest for relevance and strategic independence in the face of its neighbor’s dwarfing economic 

and military development.

Putin used the September 2012 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vladivostok to 

underscore Russia’s presence and role in the region. The 

Russian approach to raising its regional profile, however, 

is plagued by fits and starts. Many observers have judged 

the results of the APEC summit as disappointing. Gross 

venality and criminality led to the squandering and disappearance of billions of rubles allocated to the many 

high-profile investments in infrastructure for the meeting. The same problems of demographic decline, low investment, corruption, and neglect from Moscow persist 

and continue to dog development in Primorskii Krai and 

elsewhere in the Russian Far East.11 All the same, the investment of $20 billion into Vladivostok’s infrastructure 

and surrounding region demonstrated Moscow’s desire 

to signal the return of Russia’s presence in the Far East.

This region will see increased Russian attention and 

activity in coming years, and Moscow could develop into 

a major participant in the emerging multipolar order 

in Asia. In this context, there is a growing convergence 

of concern among Russia, the United States, and other 

Asia-Pacific powers over China’s global ambitions and 

role in the region. While not shouting it from the rooftops, Russia knows that any cooperation with China inherently relegates Moscow to a junior partner role, and 

Russian elites believe that China is liable to treat it far 

more ruthlessly as an inferior partner. “Nothing concentrates minds in Moscow as much as the thought of Russia becoming a raw materials appendage to China,” notes 

Dmitri Trenin, head of Carnegie’s Moscow Center. “That 

specter rattles Russian national pride to no end—and it 

raises very direct concerns about national security.”12

That being the case, the argument is increasingly 

made that Russia has to make some strategic choices, all 

involving significant changes in its current approach to realizing its aspirations in the Far East. While Putin stresses 

the importance of the China connection, others argue that 

Russia needs to supplement those ties with other major 

partners in order to succeed. Some point to Japan as a priority in this regard. They urge that Moscow solve the Kuril 

Islands dispute with Tokyo in order to facilitate Japanese 

trade and investment in the Russian Far East. This would 

in effect transform Japan from a historic adversary to an 

economic partner, as Russia did with Germany. It would 

also strengthen Russia’s position in Asia vis-à-vis China 

while not undermining the Moscow-Beijing relationship.13 Another priority could be a more concerted effort 

to address North Korea’s nuclear weapon and ballistic 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 280 7 

missile tests, which are sources of regional instability and 

could result in further militarization.

Arctic: Trade, Resources, and 

Security

The melting ice cap is already resulting in Arctic sea 

lanes remaining open longer each year. Increasingly, this 

will facilitate Russia’s pivot to Asia, both commercially 

and militarily. In September 2012, the Northern Fleet 

held an unprecedentedly large, week-long exercise to 

practice protecting Russia’s interests in the Arctic, including against expected visits by Aegis-equipped ships 

that Russia fears will pose a threat to its strategic nuclear 

forces.14 In November-December, Gazprom sent its first 

liquid natural gas (LNG) tanker from Norway to Japan 

via the Northern Sea Route.

As competition from LNG and shale oil and gas enables Europe to lessen its dependence on Russian energy, 

Russia will be able to use the Arctic sea lanes to transfer 

increasing volumes of hydrocarbons and other raw materials from Western to Eastern markets. In addition, given 

the right season, Russia will be able to transfer military 

assets from its Western military district and Baltic and 

Northern fleets to the Asia-Pacific region more quickly.

That said, given Russian-held resources and Western extraction technology, the Arctic will be an area of 

expanding opportunities for U.S.-Russian-European cooperation. Russia does not have the technology to map 

and explore its own resources properly, let alone extract 

them. As a consequence, it is turning to Western firms 

for help. The joint venture that the state-controlled Russian oil company Rosneft signed with Exxon Mobil in 

April 2012 at Putin’s country residence underscored this 

dynamic. The two oil giants will spend $3.2 billion in 

exploring for oil in the Russian portion of the Arctic 

Ocean and in the Black Sea, and this seed money could 

grow to $500 billion over the next two decades.

Trade and Investment

American business leaders strongly supported congressional passage of permanent normal trade relations 

with Russia in November following its accession to the 

WTO after 18 years of negotiations. According to some 

estimates, U.S. exports to Russia could double to $19 

billion in 5 years. With a population of 143 million, the 

country represents a huge market. The International Monetary Fund estimated its GDP at around $2.38 trillion in 

2011, outranked in purchasing power parity only by the 

United States, China, Japan, India, and Germany.15

The global fiscal crisis has served to remind Russia that 

it is not impervious to external economic shocks. At the Los 

Cabos G20 summit in June, Putin pushed expanding trade 

with the United States as his priority for bilateral relations. 

The need for Western technical know-how and significant 

investment capital to grow its economy should continue to 

steer Russia away from lingering Soviet-era delusions of autarky and toward greater integration in the world economy 

and global economic governance in coming years. Yet rather 

than evolving or diversifying the economy, Putin’s government appears to be doubling down on Russia’s comparative 

advantage as an exporter of energy and natural resources to 

developed countries, although it simply does not have the 

technology to maximize or make extraction more efficient. 

Looking to the future, Russia is also eager to explore shale 

extraction, energy that can only be acquired with methods 

pioneered by the West.

Continuing Western investment in Russia this past year, 

even as he encouraged anti-Americanism and clamped down 

on his civil opposition, has no doubt persuaded Putin that 

his domestic political stances will not deter profitable foreign 

investment. However, WTO membership with time should 

nudge Moscow toward a more transparent and rule-based 

economy. Were Russia also to make a serious bid for membership in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 

Development, this would give the United States and other 

more transparent advanced economies added leverage to 

nudge the country toward an improved business climate.

In the shorter run, however, WTO membership will 

not be without problems. Russia likes to be part of international institutions but often chafes under their rules. 

Disputes and challenges are already in the works. Nevertheless, while it will be a slow process, WTO’s impact on 
8 SF No. 280 www.ndu.edu/inss

Russia’s corruption-riddled and heavy-hand-of-the-state 

business culture may eventually rival the impact of the 

Commission on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, 

now the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 

Europe) on Soviet politics. Signed in 1975 by Brezhnev, 

the CSCE provided the legal and political justification for 

Soviet domestic opposition and pro-reform movements 

that eventually helped produce Gorbachev’s perestroika 

thaw and set the stage for everything that followed.

Although Russia’s authoritarian turn has highlighted 

the obstacles to a genuine partnership with the United States 

under the current Putin administration, the set of mutual interests and concerns described herein necessitates pragmatic 

engagement with Moscow. The opportunity exists to expand 

the current agenda to emerging issues such as cybersecurity 

and strategic restraint in cyberspace. There is also the potential for technical and defense cooperation with NATO to 

serve a transformative role to the antiquated strategic stability framework for the current security relationship. But it is 

more than likely that this confining framework will persist as 

long as the leadership and system of government in Moscow 

remain unchanged. In the meantime, Russia will continue to 

play an important role for U.S. interests and retain a significant influence over regional events.

Notes 1 Russian attorney and auditor Sergei Magnitsky exposed a large 

fraud and corruption scandal involving Russian officials, the police, and 

the mafia. He was subsequently arrested in 2008, held for 11 months 

without trial, and died in prison from lack of medical treatment.

2 Original Russian “Интеллигентная американская семья 

возьмёт на воспитание умственно отсталого депутата Госдумы.”

3 For side-by-side International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and 

CIA World Factbook comparisons of the size of the Russian economy, see 

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)> and 

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)>.

4 P5+1 refers to the five permanent members of the United 

Nations Security Council plus Germany, namely China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

5 For example, on trade, “One of the key tasks on our shared 

agenda is the expansion of trade and investment relations, which should 

foster mutual economic growth and prosperity.” On missile defense, 

“As a priority, we intend to successfully implement the New [Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty], and to continue our discussions on strategic 

stability. Despite differences in assessments, we have agreed to continue 

a joint search for solutions to challenges in the field of missile defense.” 

See “[Obama-Putin] Joint Statement,” Los Cabos, Mexico, June 18, 

2012, available at <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/English/texttrans/2012/06/201206187628.html#axzz2HVxm18Xk>.

6 Attached to the bill that gives Russia permanent normal trade relations with the United States, the Magnitsky provision punishes a list of 

Russian officials believed to be involved in the death of Sergei Magnitsky, 

denying them travel to the United States and access to U.S. banks.

7 David C. Gompert and Michael Kofman, Raising Our Sights: 

Russian-American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability, Strategic Forum 274 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, January 2012).

8 Sergey Rogov et al., “Compromises for a Solution to the Missile Defense Problem,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, 

September 14, 2012.

9 Steven Pifer, “NATO-Russia Missile Defense: Compromise Is 

Possible,” December 2012, available at <www.brookings.edu/research/

articles/2012/12/us-russia-nato-arms-pifer>.

10 Vladimir Putin, “Russia and the Changing World,” Moscow 

News, February 27, 2012, CEP20120227006001.

11 See, for example, “Sammit ATES ne opravdal ozhidaniy,” 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 29, 2012, available at <www.ng.ru/

regions/2012-12-29/5_ates.html>.

12 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia can pivot to the Pacific, too,” The Globalist (Washington, DC), September 7, 2012, available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/07/russia-can-pivot-to-pacific-too/ds5n>.

13 Dmitri Trenin and Yuval Weber, Russia’s Pacific Future: Solving the South Kuril Islands Dispute, The Carnegie Papers (Moscow: 

Carnegie Moscow Center, December 2012), available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/russia_pacific_future_upd.pdf>.

14 Yaroslav Vyatkin, “It’s Time to Expect ‘Guests’ from NATO 

in the Arctic,” Argumenty Nedeli Online, September 27, 2012, 

CEP20120928358003.

15 See “List of countries by GDP (PPP),” available at <http://

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)>.

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional studies and engages in independent and leading-edge 

research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

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Nicholas Rostow

Director

Center for Strategic Research

William T. Eliason

Director

NDU Press

Institute for National Strategic Studies

COL Timothy A. Vuono, USA 

Director, INSS

Director of Research