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AFTER SAN BERNARDINO: THE FUTURE OF

ISIS–INSPIRED ATTACKS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 10, 2016

Serial No. 114–137

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

General Jack Keane, USA, Retired, chairman of the board, Institute for 

the Study of War .................................................................................................. 5

The Honorable Alberto M. Fernandez, vice president, Middle East Media 

Research Institute ................................................................................................ 16

Christopher Swift, Ph.D., adjunct professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of 

Foreign Service, Georgetown University ............................................................ 30

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

General Jack Keane, USA, Retired: Prepared statement .................................... 8

The Honorable Alberto M. Fernandez: Prepared statement ................................ 18

Christopher Swift, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ..................................................... 33

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 50

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

(1)

AFTER SAN BERNARDINO: THE FUTURE OF 

ISIS–INSPIRED ATTACKS 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, 

subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

On December 3, 2015, husband and wife, Syed Farook, 28, and 

Tashfeen Malik, 29, carried out the worst terror attack in the 

United States since 9/11. They killed 14 people, seriously injured 

at least 22 others in San Bernardino, California. This was not the 

first ISIS inspired attack in the United States, nor would it be the 

last. 

On October 23, 2014, a man believed to be self-radicalized attacked four police officers in New York City with a hatchet. On 

May 3, 2015, two men opened fire outside of a Prophet Muhammad 

cartoon contest in a Dallas suburb, at least one of the gunmen appeared to have contact with ISIS operative via social media. Last 

month, a man was arrested in Philadelphia after shooting and 

wounding a police officer. The attacker claimed to have committed 

the attack on behalf of ISIS. 

In all, ISIS has conducted over 60 attacks in 20 countries. The 

map that is to the General’s right, and I think all of you have a 

copy of that map—I don’t know if you can see this or not. The map 

shows where these attacks have taken place, and they stretch from 

California to Australia and many places in between. The fact is the 

death toll from terrorism is on the rise. The chart shows global 

deaths from terrorism since 2001. Global deaths from terrorism are 

three times higher than when the President took office, and it is 

hard to say that the world is a safer place because it is not. 

One of the main questions of this hearing is can these kinds of 

ISIS inspired attacks be stopped? If they can’t be eliminated entirely, is there more that we can be doing to make sure that there 

are less of these ISIS attacks? ISIS feeds on a narrative of 

strength. If we can puncture the narrative and show that ISIS is 

on the run and collapsing, that could significantly impact ISIS’ 

ability to inspire attacks in the United States and the world. 

2

Our current strategy is not doing that, in my opinion. In a national televised address in September of ’14, the President stated 

that the United States would degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS. 

Today, 17 months later, we have not accomplished that goal. It 

took a year from the President’s speech before he finally allowed 

air strikes to target the oil infrastructure that ISIS is using to rake 

in millions of dollars a day. 

The number of strike sorties flown per day against ISIS are a 

quarter of what we flew in Libya in 2011, and only 2 percent of 

what we flew in Iraq in 2003. Of the sorties that did fly out, 76 

percent returned to base without dropping any munitions. While 

we all know air strikes alone can’t defeat ISIS, we have yet to corral a ground force in Syria that will fight against ISIS. And the 

$500 million train and equip program was a failure, and the President even admits that it was a failure. 

The President has been unsuccessfully getting the Sunnis in Iraq 

to fight against ISIS mostly because he has been equally unsuccessful in getting the Iranian Government in Baghdad to stop its 

sectarian ways. The latest round of peace talks were seen as so dismal that they were delayed until later this month, but the war 

rages on. 

Part of ISIS’ strength comes from its ability to disseminate its 

propaganda online. Following the San Bernardino attack, it was revealed that the attackers had been communicating online where 

they bonded over their commitment to jihad before Malik was 

granted a visa to come into the United States. 

Malik had also advocated jihad and her desire to join the fight 

in several private messages on social media to her friends in Pakistan. It was later discovered that at roughly the same time of the 

shooting, Malik declared allegiance to ISIS on Facebook. 

The other main question of this hearing is what role social media 

is playing in the fight against ISIS. In October, ISIS issued a new 

instruction manual on how terrorists can use social media. Are private companies doing enough to stop this? Facebook and Twitter 

both have policies prohibiting the promotion of terrorism on their 

platforms. While we have seen a dramatic drop of terrorist content 

on Facebook, there are still over 40,000 Twitter accounts used by 

ISIS supporters. 

What is the role the U.S. Government has in all of this? The administration promised a strategy to counter online radicalization 5 

years ago, but we don’t have that strategy yet. I have introduced 

legislation requiring the strategy that passed the House unanimously in December and is currently pending in the U.S. Senate. 

The administration’s strategy leaves us with little confidence that 

it would be enough to defeat ISIS. 

The amendment to the Omnibus that was signed into law in December required the President to come up with a strategy that 

would actually defeat ISIS, and that strategy must be given to the 

American people and Congress in the summer of this year. ISIS 

has American blood on its hands. What are we going to do about 

it? 

I will now yield to the ranking member, Mr. Keating from Massachusetts, for his opening statement. 

3

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting the 

hearing today. I would also like to thank our witnesses, General 

Keane, Ambassador Fernandez, and Dr. Swift, for being here to 

discuss this very important topic, and for their flexibility in rescheduling for today’s panel. 

As details emerged of the December 2, 2015, cold-blooded attack 

in San Bernardino, we were left shocked and horrified by the calculation and the savagery. Fourteen innocent Americans died and 

dozens more wounded at the hands of two self-radicalized assailants. Let us keep in mind those that lost their lives, their family 

members and their loved ones again here today as we conduct this 

hearing. 

While the severity of the attack caused it to resonate so strongly, 

we are reminded that San Bernardino is not the first attack inspired by ISIL in the United States. In fact, there have been three 

attacks in the U.S. dating back to 2014, which were carried out by 

individuals inspired by ISIL. 

It is clear that ISIL poses a threat to the United States through 

its ability to appeal to a vulnerable demographic predominately of 

young adults. As of last October, FBI Director Comey reported that 

his agency is pursuing over 900 active investigations against homegrown violent extremists, the majority of which are linked to ISIL. 

Separately, over 20,000 foreign fighters have traveled to join 

rebel or terrorist groups in Iraq, Syria, including ISIL. These movements are increasingly difficult to track in our globalized world, 

and the risk of their return to the U.S. is a great challenge to agencies overseeing foreign fighter travel. As the title of this hearing 

suggests, it is critical that we understand the nature of the threat 

posed by ISIL, be it an evolving threat, and in order to degrade and 

ultimately defeat a foreign terrorist organization like ISIL, we need 

to bring together various stakeholders such as federal, state, and 

local first responders and investigatory agencies, and equip them 

with the best resources necessary to respond. 

To this end, I have been proud to partner with my colleagues 

both on this committee and Homeland Security to study the threat 

posed by foreign fighter travel and authorize the Department of 

Homeland Security to develop a strategy in response while bolstering the arsenal of fusion centers and intelligence agencies. Coordination and support from the private sector is also necessary, 

since many ISIL members use technology and social media platforms for communication, fundraising and recruitment. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about the 

threat posed by ISIL, and how the United States and its partners 

can work together to overcome it. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. The Chair 

will yield a minute to General—not General, excuse me—Colonel 

Cook for his opening statement. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. The promotional system was 

seriously flawed when I made colonel. Didn’t make it any higher. 

Anyway, this is a very, very important hearing. Many years ago, 

I was part of the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, 1983. I left that and 

they went afloat and went into a place called Lebanon. There was 

a group called Hezbollah that went in there, blew up the barracks, 

and over 260 Marine-Army-Navy personnel were killed that day. 

4

And then it always stayed in my head, and then recently in my 

home county that I represent, San Bernardino County, had almost 

deja vu all over again with, once again, Islamic terrorism. 

The one thing I did want to comment on, and I will talk more 

about knowing your enemy and everything else, was just the tremendous job that the local police department, the sheriff’s office, 

the state, the county, everybody worked together. It was like we 

have a terrorist incident and they knew right away and instead of 

14 killed, and I don’t know how many wounded, it changes. We 

could have had even more. 

So this is an extremely important hearing. Obviously it is right 

in my backyard, and I want to thank you very much for calling 

such an important hearing. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. The Chair will yield a minute to Mr. Higgins from New 

York for his opening statement. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think 

when we are talking about terrorism in the United States, I think 

it is very important to distinguish between fact and fiction. The 

fearmongering that goes on this country is extraordinary, and public polling indicates that it is very, very effective. 

But I think when you look at the most recent book by Peter Bergen, ‘‘The United States of Jihad,’’ who is a CNN national security 

analyst, wrote four other books on terrorism, you see that there is 

a real distinction between Islamic terrorists and how many people 

have been killed in the United States since 9/11. It is 45. The neoNazi and anti-government terrorists have killed over 48 people. 

The profile that we presume about terrorists, I think, has been 

shattered at least in terms of perception, and not enough credit is 

given also to our counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts, be 

it at the fusion level, at the local level. On 9/11 there were 16 people on the no-fly list, today there is 47,000. One-point-five million 

people, if they tried to get on a plane bound for the United States, 

would be set aside for secondary screening. So I think it is also important to recognize the effectiveness of our counterterrorism activities. 

And, unfortunately, in counterterrorism you never get credit for 

what didn’t happen, and in counterterrorism it is all about what 

didn’t happen. So I think we should give recognition to those facts 

as well as we move forward with this discussion. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from New York. I will introduce 

each witness and let them give their opening statements. General 

Jack Keane is a retired four-star general, former vice chief of staff 

of the U.S. Army, and currently serves as chairman of the Institute 

for the Study of War. 

Ambassador Alberto Fernandez is vice president of the Middle 

East Media Research Institute. Ambassador Fernandez served as a 

U.S. Foreign Service officer and as the State Department’s coordinator for the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. 

And then we also have Dr. Christopher Swift. He is an adjunct 

professor of National Security Studies at Georgetown University 

School of Foreign Service. Dr. Swift has conducted extensive research on terrorism, armed conflict, and the intersection between 

international law and national security. 

5

General Keane, we will start with you for your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JACK KEANE, USA, RETIRED, 

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF 

WAR 

General KEANE. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member 

Keating, distinguished members of the committee, for inviting me 

back today to talk about such an important subject. I am honored 

to be here on the panel with my distinguished colleagues. Please 

refer to the map that we provided by the Institute of the Study of 

War, which I will reference in my remarks. 

The primary objective of the United States Government remains 

protecting the homeland and the American people, including safeguarding American values both in the homeland and abroad. The 

San Bernardino attack following the Paris attacks, the downing of 

the Russian airliner, and multiple attacks by ISIS in Lebanon and 

Turkey, all once again dramatically emphasize the danger and vulnerability of civilian population to terrorism. 

The Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in his recent 

report to the Congress stated that homegrown extremists pose the 

most significant threat to the United States homeland in 2016. 

While I believe this is a daunting task to prevent all such attacks, 

I am confident in the United States law enforcement and intelligence capabilities to rise to the challenge. Having the best defensive security system in America is not sufficient. We must have as 

good an offense to stop and defeat ISIS, which is where I will concentrate my remarks. 

While the United States’ offensive capability is there, the strategy is not. Indeed, without an effective strategy we are destined to 

prolong the barbarism and the killing in the region while driving 

up the risk at home. Radical Islam is morphing into a global jihad 

with the expansion of al-Qaeda and the extraordinary success of 

ISIS which has rapidly become the most successful terrorist organization in modern history. 

ISIS has three major goals. The first is to defend Syria and Iraq. 

While ISIS has lost some territory, it views operations in Syria and 

Iraq as largely successful because it still controls large swaths of 

territory, it is recruiting well—1,500 to 2,000 per month—it is 

maintaining initiative, and it is able to logistically sustain its 

forces. 

The second goal is to use its headquarters in Syria to expand in 

what ISIS terms the near abroad—it is in orange on your map with 

black or blue stars—by establishing affiliate organizations with a 

formal relationship in nine countries and regions, with three in the 

blue about to be formed. ISIS provides guidance and resources to 

most of these affiliates. 

The third major goal is to influence the far abroad—on your map 

see areas in yellow—which are Muslim lands and countries that 

are supporting the coalition against ISIS, the United States, Europe, and Australia to name some. ISIS does so by inspiring, motivating or directing followers to kill their fellow citizens, by averaging thousands of social media posts per day, and by returning 

fighters from Syria who are trained and motivated to attack their 

6

own citizens at home. ISIS attempts to divide and polarize these 

societies by weakening the people’s resolve to support their government’s effort and to fragment and polarize the non-Muslim and 

Muslim populations. 

What can be done? First, defeat the idea. National leaders and 

Muslim clerics must undermine the political and religious ideology 

with not just what is wrong, but what is right. The battle is within 

Islam itself, where in the Arab world this battle is intersecting 

with authoritarian regimes and family monarchy’s failure to politically reform and to adjust to the needs of their societies. Therefore, 

we are fighting a political and religious ideology which draws its 

origin from the very strict interpretation of the Quran and Hadith 

as well as the intolerance of Wahhabism and Salafism. 

Political leaders such as el-Sisi and King Abdullah have referred 

to it as a religious revolution, yet U.S. policy fails to define radical 

Islam or explain it nor understand it. How can we possibly defeat 

radical Islam if we don’t understand it? Knowing the kind of war 

you are fighting is the first priority of a national or military leader. 

We must challenge ISIS not simply in mosques and schools and 

other gathering places, op-eds and the like, but also, certainly, on 

the Internet. 

Second, destroy the safe havens. No insurgency was ever defeated where a safe haven existed. The major lesson of 9/11 was 

that the al-Qaeda safe haven was allowed to exist in Afghanistan 

for many years even after the al-Qaeda successfully attacked the 

U.S. Embassy in Africa and the USS Cole. The longer terrorists are 

allowed safe haven, history advises that terrorists become more experienced, more lethal and more ambitious. Iraq and particularly 

Syria are ISIS safe havens. 

Recognize that the current strategy of relying on local defense 

forces without sufficient numbers, arms, training, and not maximizing effective air power, protracts the war against ISIS for years 

unnecessarily. In my judgment, throw out strategic patience and 

replace it with strategic urgency to defeat ISIS. While the military 

effort in Iraq and Syria is significantly under-resourced, the political effort which is so necessary to achieve a military victory is also 

flawed. I would be willing to take that on in Q&A. 

Third, marginalize the affiliates. The 9–11 Commission recommended a global alliance to defeat radical Islam. In parallel 

with destroying ISIS safe havens in Iraq and Syria, partnering 

with allies to marginalize and, where possible, defeat affiliates is 

critical. Otherwise, ISIS will reemerge at an affiliate location, now 

likely, Libya. The U.S. is beginning an effort in Libya against ISIS. 

Sharing intelligence, technology, equipment and training is a proven winner in harnessing the collective resources of an alliance in 

defeating a common enemy. 

In conclusion, ISIS and al-Qaeda pose the most imminent threat 

to the security and values of the United States and Europe. The 

success of these radical Islamist military organizations comes only 

partly from their own strength and will. It results also from a general collapse of the international order driven partly by the withdrawal of the United States from supporting that order, partly by 

the irresponsible passivity and free-riding of most European states, 

partly by the unrealized expectations of the people of the Middle 

7

East, and partly from the active attempts of Iran, China, and Russia to dismantle all or part of a global order designed to favor our 

values and interests and to replace it with one that favors theirs. 

Understanding what is happening and why is the basic ingredient to developing achievable strategies. The United States is facing global security challenges on a scale not seen since the rise of 

the Soviet Union post World War II. While complex and difficult, 

it is certainly not hopeless and the world has never needed American leadership more than it does today. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, General Keane. 

Ambassador Fernandez. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALBERTO M. FERNANDEZ, 

VICE PRESIDENT, MIDDLE EAST MEDIA RESEARCH INSTITUTE 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you, members of the committee for having me today. It is great to 

be back again. 

Measured in comparison with most other terrorist groups and insurgent movements, the ISIS brand is a major success. The fact 

that it has mobilized tens of thousands to flee their countries, thousands of them leaving very comfortable circumstances in the West, 

is testimony to the enduring power of its message. It most certainly 

does represent a revolutionary, contemporary appeal. This is not 

going back to the Middle Ages. 

But despite being so new, its success now is that it is not a specific video or statement or act that mobilizes, but rather the concept, the image of the organization. This is an idea and a symbol 

which has matured and has been internalized by those people that 

support it. That is one of the lessons of San Bernardino and other 

places. 

One result of these attacks is to make the Islamic State look 

even more ubiquitous, powerful and conquering than it actually is. 

It is something that we see in the West, including in the government and media, sometimes unwittingly helping to suggest that 

they are actually more powerful than they are. They are actually 

quite extraordinary, but we make them look even more than they 

are. 

While the actual state in its Syrian-Iraqi heartland is slowly, all 

too slowly weakening, the virtual caliphate, the idea of the state, 

its image, its sense, remains relatively intact and powerful. The 

ISIS victory narrative has been sustained to this day by two elements, the actions and growth of the ISIS franchises and these continued attacks in the West such as Paris, which mimic and, in a 

way, replace the preferred image of ISIS of military victory on the 

ground. They would rather be marching into Baghdad and Damascus, but in lieu of that they will take what they can get, whether 

in San Bernardino or Paris or Sinai or wherever. 

This image can still be sustained for awhile, especially if a continued progress against ISIS on the ground remains slow and gradual. As long as the idea of the ISIS caliphate remains plausible, it 

will continue to attract recruits, spawn terrorist operations focusing on targets of opportunity worldwide, and spin off copy cat operations. You cannot contain the ISIS brand if the ISIS caliphate is 

merely contained. 

So you see this seeming paradox. The best way to weaken the 

ISIS brand is to crush it in the field militarily, but the more you 

push the greater the incentive they will have to lash out in both 

planned operations and encourage zealous, young devotees to act. 

That is the price we are going to have to pay. Success in planned 

operations will no doubt lead to attempts by lone wolves in the future. 

So obviously ISIS needs to lose and even more importantly to be 

seen to lose. In addition to military progress powerfully and graphiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Feb 25, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\021016\98601 SHIRL
17

cally portrayed, technical means used by both social media companies and government need to shrink the size of the online state. 

But while those two things are important, the core message of the 

ISIS brand also needs to be answered. Some of this work is beginning, albeit all too slowly and weakly. 

Given the importance of Iraq and especially Syria in the ISIS 

discourse and how it is sold to Westerners and even to people in 

the Middle East distant from the front, there is real value in empowering Syrian and Iraqi Sunni Muslim voices who can speak directly to wavering individuals outside the Middle East. This hasn’t 

been done yet. The voices of recanters and defectors need to be 

raised much higher than they have been. 

Governments receiving returnees from ISIS ranks should find 

creative ways to incentivize counter-radicalization media outreach 

as much as integration and law enforcement. And we actually have 

a great template because we have ISIS’ own way of producing these 

personal testimony videos. There should also be room for a wellfunded effort promoting tolerant, liberal Arab Muslim values in 

contradistinction to the vision of Salafi jihadism. ISIS is a really 

important phenomenon, but it is part of a much wider phenomenon 

occurring. 

Governments should also look to empower and expand the scope 

of nongovernmental messaging platforms and organizations within 

the Middle East with the goal toward building sustainable messaging efforts against Salafi jihadism. It is not something that only 

the U.S. Government or friendly governments can do. So the ISIS 

brand or way of doing things has now metastasized and been internalized. But it can at least be chipped away by a combination of 

military, technical and counter-messaging efforts. 

I am concerned that steps have been too little and too late so far, 

but I see that we are slowly beginning to move in the right direction, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Fernandez follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, Ambassador Fernandez. 

Dr. Swift. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER SWIFT, PH.D., ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, 

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Mr. SWIFT. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, honorable 

members, it is a pleasure to be here before you today and to be 

with my esteemed colleagues. I agree with General Keane that the 

first step in any war is to know your adversary and to know the 

nature of the war you are embarking upon, not changing it to or 

turning it into something alien to its own nature. 

And I agree with Ambassador Fernandez that ISIS has a remarkable tendency to amplify its own importance and influence 

through messaging and narrative. But at the same time, we have 

to see the messaging as a symptom of the disease and understand 

the disease in its own context. And so what I would like to do with 

my statement today is provide you with a framework for understanding how individualized action contributes to and aggregates 

global jihad. 

And so what I would like to do is start with a discussion of two 

major shifts in the global Salafi jihadi movement, and then put 

them into a practical context in terms of what we are seeing with 

ISIS-inspired attacks not just in the United States but also in 

western Europe. 

There are two major trends in the Salafi jihadi movement today. 

The first is the localization of global jihad, and the second is the 

atomization of global jihad. These two things are distinct but complementary. This is how they work. Localization is a product of a 

generational shift in leadership from the individuals who started 

al-Qaeda and fought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to the deputies that survived al-Qaeda’s failures and fought against the United 

States in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

We see this generational shift and we see with it a geographic 

shift in this focus of the Salafi jihadi movement from the cultural 

and geographic periphery of the Islamic world to the Sunni Arab 

core. In fact, if you look at the map provided by the Institute for 

the Study of War, you can see the drawing in to the Sunni Arab 

core as a fundamental part of this localization strategy. 

Now what does localization do? Well, for the first time in nearly 

two decades, Salafi jihadi groups are fighting in Arab countries 

with a Sunni majority, where they speak the language, recognize 

the local tribal structure and can build roots, something that alQaeda was never able to do. This is why al-Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula, initially, in Yemen, and now ISIS in Syria and Iraq has 

become the true base that al-Qaeda was never able to become. It 

has a population, it has a way of generating resources, it has a way 

of deploying and organizing manpower, money and materiel. 

At the same time, we see the atomization of global jihad, and 

that is to say, violence undertaken by individuals who have a desire to become part of a broader imagined community. We see this 

in the attacks that we have experienced in the United States over 

the space of the last two decades, we see it in the messaging that 

31

Ambassador Fernandez was discussing earlier, and we see it in the 

tragic events of San Bernardino. 

How is this different? Well, unlike the localization of global jihad 

it doesn’t build on organizations, it builds on ideas. And so while 

the localization of global jihad creates a political caliphate, a political community that provides a foundation, as Ambassador 

Fernandez noted the atomization of global jihad thrives on an 

imagined caliphate, an imagined community. 

If you look at the thing that distinguishes ISIS from every single 

transnational terrorist syndicate in the world today it is the combination of this political community that has a foundation in real 

places and real people and this imagined community that exists online. What are the consequences strategically? Well, they are twofold. The first is, ISIS can organize, recruit and direct violent force 

to serve its ends. It uses direct action in the places where it has 

direct access. But ISIS can also recruit, inspire and direct indirect 

action through social media, through print media and through 

broadcast media. And that allows them to operate in our strategic 

depth without the need to commit their regular forces. 

There are three implications for that, honorable members, and 

they are as follows. The first is we need to understand that ISIS 

is opportunistic. It uses different tools in different theaters depending on what its capabilities are in those places. Chairman Poe, if 

you look at the map you presented earlier, the number of direct 

ISIS attacks in Europe is substantially higher while the number of 

ISIS inspired attacks in the United States is substantially higher. 

That breakdown is not surprising at all. Europe has closer proximity to the Syrian civil war, it is in the middle of a major refugee 

crisis, and they have large, alienated, domestic Muslim populations 

that are not well integrated into European society. Contrast that 

with the United States where we have a much more diffuse Muslim 

population, we are not proximate to a major conflict, and we are 

not experiencing a major refugee crisis. 

The tools that ISIS uses here to influence, disrupt and intimidate 

are much more tools of facilitation and resonant effects, inspiring 

people online or engaging in recruiting them through online chat 

rooms, through Skype and through other sorts of mediated or facilitated dialogues. 

So for the United States, the risk of terrorist infiltration is somewhat lower than it is compared to our European allies, but the risk 

of the homegrown radical, of the individual we are not able to identify early on is much, much higher, in part because that is the 

strategy ISIS is using here versus the strategy of infiltration that 

we have seen them use in Paris and elsewhere. This is why the 

trends we are seeing look so different, even though the underlying 

motives and ideology and psychology are the same. 

Honorable members, I would like to conclude with one last 

thought before we get to question and answer, and that is that success in one theater does not necessarily create security in another. 

And here is what I mean by that. Terrorism is a low risk, high return strategy that weaker organizations use to reach beyond their 

grasp and punch above their weight. Organizations use terrorism 

when they are not able to confront and defeat their adversary directly. 

32

So the more we contain, degrade, isolate ISIS in the Middle East, 

the more effective our strategy becomes in places like Iraq and 

Syria—and I agree with General Keane that we do need a more effective approach—the more likely it is that ISIS will lash out using 

indirect effects, using unconventional means in western Europe 

and the United States. Success in one area does not necessarily 

yield security in the other, and if we are going to turn up the temperature on ISIS in the Middle East we should anticipate, plan, 

and prepare for, on a whole of government basis, more terrorism 

here at home. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Swift follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. It was excellent. I will yield 5 minutes to myself for some questions and get 

your answers. 

I agree with you, Dr. Swift, that this is a multifaceted issue. We 

need a strategy to combat ISIS, but not just in the United States 

or not just in Syria, not just in North Africa, but online and all of 

the other avenues where we see ISIS creeping its ugly head up. We 

need strategy for all of the above, not just for one area. 

General Keane, there has been some talk about—and I see your 

map and it is very disturbing, got all of North Africa under some 

part of an influence in areas of ISIS. What is the situation with 

ISIS’ rumored movement toward Libya and moving their headquarters, if I can use that word, to Libya? Explain to us what is 

taking place here. 

General KEANE. Well, first of all, it is much more than a rumor. 

It is a fact they have been putting fighters and resources into Libya 

for over a year now. And certainly, the social and political upheaval 

that is taking place in the Middle East is known to the committee 

members and certainly everybody at this table that radical Islamist 

groups take advantage of those events. 

And Libya is by definition a failed state, and don’t want to revisit 

why that happened but it is, and they are there taking huge advantage of that. I mean, conservative estimates are somewhere around 

3,000 to 4,000 are now there and other estimates are as high as 

10. I am skeptical about the higher number, but I don’t have access 

to top secret information. But they have several thousand in there 

and they intend to expand it. They have put their own leaders on 

the ground there to assist with training and also with equipping, 

and I am confident they will be providing guidance to them. 

Certainly they can be predators in terms of what is taking place 

in Africa itself. They have a movement already in the Sinai challenging Egypt and el-Sisi, and certainly they can influence that 

from Libya. They can also influence Tunisia. But most significantly, I think the thing that concerns most of us is the access it 

would give them to Europe, because they are a small body of water 

away from influencing Europe and bringing terrorism there. 

So it is a potentially dangerous situation. I think the United 

States, here, is doing absolutely the right thing by recognizing that 

we just cannot take away the safe havens, which we are doing as 

I indicated not with the sense of urgency I think it needs; that we 

have to look at these affiliates as well, prioritize them in what are 

the most dangerous and work with partners as much as we can to 

deal with this. This should not be the burden of the United States 

military exclusively when we have so many people in the region 

who are concerned about this threat as much as we are. And that 

is why I believe that partnering is essential to do this. 

But I do believe our special operations are on this. I think the 

CIA has been collecting on this for some time, and there is also alQaeda groups in Libya that are dangerous as well. So that is, I 

think, where we are. We will make some progress against some of 

these groups. But I think until we partner with others in the region to take a more holistic approach to it, it won’t be nearly effective as we can be. 

41

Mr. POE. Two more questions. I would like for you to define the 

enemy more than just the name. I mean, they have been called 

ISIL, ISIS, Daesh, and all types of different names. But how would 

you define the enemy? 

General KEANE. I mean, they are clearly a radical Islamist organization that is grounded in a political and theological ideology. 

They base it on a very strict interpretation of the Quran and 

Hadith, and they have huge geopolitical objectives in terms of not 

only dominating Muslim lands, but also in terms of ISIS stimulating an apocalyptic event in Europe which would carve out a 

rather large caliphate for them with also eventually seeking world 

domination. 

They are somewhat similar to the al-Qaeda in that respect, but 

the methodology that they go about achieving it are somewhat different. And so I think ISIS in that terms is the best way to describe it, and I would agree with the Ambassador of how they have 

been able to achieve success in what they are doing as well. 

Mr. POE. My time has expired. I will yield to the ranking member, Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One thought I had 

when we talk about our coalition. We can all get up and sign on 

together, take pictures together, issue statements together, but one 

of the things that really doesn’t line up and I think it is critical, 

is the hierarchy of interests in terms of ISIL with our coalition. 

Now let us set Europe aside as a separate example. I am going 

around the Mideast region and Northern African region, and who 

among our coalition has ISIL ranked number one as their concern? 

Turkey, I think, it is number three or four. Saudi Arabia, it is not 

number one, in my opinion. So we are lining up with this coalition, 

but that is primary concern right now in terms of our own. Name 

another country and the other region outside of our European allies 

that ranks at number one. Can you? 

General KEANE. I think in the Middle East, the country, I believe, that puts ISIS ahead of the Iranian influence in the Middle 

East, most all these other countries consider, Sunni Arab countries 

consider Iran the greatest threat, and I agree with that assessment. But Egypt would put it number one. 

Mr. KEATING. Any other thoughts on that, the imperfect coalition? 

Mr. SWIFT. Ranking Member Keating, I would say that Russia 

probably puts ISIS number one for the purposes of propaganda, but 

not for the purposes of operations. And to the extent that ISIS is 

a threat, it is a threat to a proxy rather than a threat to Russia’s 

own interests. 

Mr. KEATING. Ambassador? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. I would just add, sir, that obviously 

Iraq would put it as number one. Not out of any special devotion 

to eliminate ISIS, but because it obviously represents an immediate national security threat. The problem with Iraq seeing it that 

way is it sees it within the lens of the problem of sectarianism 

within Iraq. The only problems of the Iraqi Government itself it 

has with its own Sunni Arab population. 

Mr. KEATING. Just to make another observation when I look at 

the map, General. King Abdullah met with a group of us not long 

42

ago, and he said here is the battlefront, and he had 17 points but 

they almost juxtapose over your regions as well. I mean, it is important to defeat ISIL, to take away their territory obviously, but 

we can’t lose that perspective that this map presents and what 

King Abdullah said as well. I mean, that is also our front line and 

it is spread all over the place. Isn’t that an important perspective? 

General KEANE. Well, I agree. I mean, I have another map that 

shows the influence of Iran and put it in red, the countries they 

are dominating in green, essentially Sunni Arab countries. Most of 

the Middle East countries look at that map and take that as their 

largest threat. 

I mean, what I was trying to say at the end of my remarks, is 

that certainly ISIS exists and is succeeding, but it is part of a larger story that is taking place in the Middle East with the collapse 

of the order that is there, and also a much larger geopolitical story 

where Iran, Russia, and China are also pushing back on international order which has some impact. I don’t think you can look 

at these threats in isolation that I believe is what you are suggesting. 

Mr. KEATING. Yes. 

General KEANE. And I would agree with that, Congressman 

Keating. But nonetheless, as you are working with these threats it 

does take some intellectual muscle to determine how best to meet 

these challenges. 

Mr. KEATING. This is a great topic and so expansive, but let me 

just jump to something more recent. The siege in Aleppo, how is 

that going to change the landscape going forward? Some of the people, they are pretty much—pretty tough choices for people in that 

area. There is the Assad government, and then the Syrian rebels 

are now taking a very important hit here. And what about the influence of al-Nusra in this? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Sir, if I could add, I think that is a 

really important question and it goes to what General Keane just 

said. ISIS is the most prominent part of a larger phenomenon of 

radical Sunni Arab revivalism. But ISIS’ success has also done 

something else. It has ignited a political, ideological, military arms 

race among the al-Qaeda franchises. 

When al-Qaeda, when ISIS rose in al-Qaeda, it was kind of 

dumbfounded. Al-Qaeda central was these old men in Waziristan. 

But the franchises have learned, they have adapted, some better 

and some worse. The Nusra Front has been in the forefront of 

being smart, creative, and planning really, really well. 

Obviously, and by the way, the fall of Aleppo, one thing that of 

course it does is it discredits the West, it discredits the United 

States, and it simplifies both for the two best worst actors’ remaining standing, the Assad regime on the one hand and ISIS on the 

other. That is actually good for them and it is bad for us. 

Mr. KEATING. That is a terrible choice. 

Just quickly, Dr. Swift. 

Mr. SWIFT. Ranking Member Keating, I wanted to go back and 

ask, point out a broader issue about the map. I think when we look 

at this particular map we have to distinguish between ISIS’ ambitions and their operations, and then we need to distinguish between their operations and their traction. 

43

Traction requires building roots in a society, knowing where the 

bodies are buried, how to raise money, who the stakeholders are, 

who the political players are, what tribes to interface with. And if 

you look at what some of the most successful al-Qaeda successor 

organizations have done, they have really built themselves into 

whatever the local political, social and economic framework was in 

a particular place. That is the localization of global jihad that 

makes it possible for these organizations to do things that al-Qaeda 

and other transnational terrorist syndicates were never able to do. 

When we are looking at where ISIS is going and what it can do, 

we really need to be looking at how far it has dug into the societies 

where it is operating versus the light touch or the ambition we see 

in their messaging, and break that down very consistently. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. I am going to yield back. My time is 

over. But I hope that threat can be picked up by other members’ 

questions because that is very important. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, 

Mr. Cook. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am going to switch gears a 

little bit. And I understand, by the way, it is a great hearing and 

everything, but why San Bernardino? I mean, in terms of the impact on it, it just seems—I could understand a military base. I can 

understand a hospital. But going into a county building and killing 

14 people, they are certainly going to have all of San Bernardino 

County and the city, probably 99 percent of them, they might have 

been neutral on some of these issues but now to do that and particularly in an area where we have had some success where the different agencies have worked together as opposed to other states, 

cities, where it was very disjointed. 

And as I said, I thought the police response was good. Even 

though 14 died, I think it could have been in the hundreds if it was 

a different objective. And could you just comment on that? 

General KEANE. Well, I think all the three of us can do is speculate, but yes, there are certainly more vulnerable targets, greater 

targets for them to access. There has to be some relationship with 

the fact that Farook was an employee there, and I would suspect 

the relationship there was in the equation in making the decision. 

Familiarity is another. 

But certainly there are other targets that would have had a significantly greater impact—thank God. And also, I think we all 

know also, because the police and the FBI reported it, they did intend to kill more people with the bombs that they had, but fortunately they did not go off. 

Mr. COOK. General, I agree with you. And you had made a comment about intelligence, and I am not sure if I have a warm and 

fuzzy feeling. I understand national intelligence and everything 

else, but some of these things, getting down to local agencies in 

terms of—and any threat assessment is real, real iffy, but if I am 

somebody down there in the San Bernardino Police Department or 

the sheriff’s department, I am interested if there is a threat on a 

terrorist activity, whether it is radical Islam, neo-Nazi, you name 

it, whether we can take action. Do you have any recommendations 

or suggestions on that? 

44

General KEANE. Well, you are moving out of my expertise, but 

in dealing with law enforcement leaders, I mean, clearly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as many of our major cities 

have very good intelligence systems. I think when you get beyond 

some of that and I believe that is what you are talking about, then 

there are issues there certainly. 

And every time I have had a problem like this in the United 

States military, what I have always thrown at that problem is 

training and education and it usually has a payoff. So we have the 

expertise and we have got to get that expertise out to others, and 

certainly there is no lack of motivation and how you build effective 

intelligence systems and what the cues are, et cetera, and I think 

we can do that. But there is a problem. 

Mr. COOK. Do you think it gets down to that level or do we need 

to do that? Because my experience, sometimes it is classified, we 

can’t talk to you about this or it is too compartmentalized. And I 

don’t know whether that would solve the problem or at least give 

them a warning, because it is going to happen again someplace. We 

have had it in Boston and some other place, and I am just wondering whether we have got to do that. 

General KEANE. Well, I mean, it shouldn’t surprise us when you 

get beyond major urban centers where they have the resources to 

be able to put together, actually, intelligence systems—obviously 

New York is the most notable—that smaller sheriff’s departments 

are not going to have that resource. But also what they have is 

human intelligence because they are on the ground out there. 

And I think the awareness that we are trying to build in this 

country, when you see something say something and work through 

the issues that the FBI has reported out that 80 percent of the 

school shootings and terrorist activities that have taken place in 

our country, the shooters have spoken to somebody about what 

they were going to do before they executed the act. So that means 

there is intelligence out there. Now whether we can educate the 

public enough so that peers, family members, those in the circle of 

relationships are willing to come forward is another issue. 

Mr. COOK. Dr. Swift, you were going to comment real quick. 

Mr. SWIFT. Representative Cook, I have had the pleasure working in fusion centers when I was doing financial intelligence at the 

Treasury Department and also the pleasure of advising joint terrorism task forces on some of these issues. There were two questions you asked, sir. The first, why San Bernardino, and the second, what can we do about it? 

So the answer to the first question is the adversary picks the 

fight. They pick the weapon and the pick the terrain. And when 

you are dealing with inspired violence as opposed to directed violence, the terrain is going to be where the person who is inspired 

and self-motivated happens to find themselves. The weapon is 

going to be what they can acquire in that place, and the target is 

going to be whoever they think is the most appropriate target given 

those circumstances. 

So when we are dealing with the self-radicalization phenomenon 

as opposed to something that is directed, it could be anywhere because what matters is not the direction that a command and conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:33 Feb 25, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\021016\98601 SHIRL
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trol system is providing, but what exists in the mind of the person 

who is creating the act. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. I have got to yield back. They are giving 

me that evil eye. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, 

Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There was a hearing 

earlier today in Foreign Affairs where it was disclosed that in the 

past year ISIS has had their footprint reduced in both Iraq and 

Syria. Iraq it was 40 percent, Syria it was 10 percent, with excessive air strikes led by the United States. 

But what is, I think, most disturbing, and I think, General 

Keane, you had alluded to it is, is ISIS’ introduction to the African 

continent. And there is a lot of instability to exploit in the African 

continent. There are 55 countries, the newest of which is South 

Sudan. There are more failed states in that continent than anywhere else, and as you also made reference to, its close proximity 

to Europe. 

And when you look at the United States, I think we have done, 

again law enforcement and others have done a good job in integrating the Arab Muslim community. It is not the case in most European countries. In fact, Muslims make up about 10 percent of the 

French population, but they represent about 70 percent of the prison population. That is a disaffected group. That is a group that is 

ripe for radicalization. 

So just if you could elaborate a little bit further on your concerns 

about the African continent and the ISIS presence in Libya, I think 

that would be very helpful to us. 

General KEANE. Thank you. Well, clearly—by the way, ISW produces this map but this is ISIS’ map. This is their graphics not 

ours. And clearly they are interested in North Africa and they are 

putting resources into it. I believe part of that is Egypt and part 

of that is also Europe. I believe they are going to continue to put 

those resources in there unless we counter them. 

And remember, when they go into Europe they are very sensitive 

to what you just suggested; that there are Muslim communities in 

Europe that are not assimilated and they really want to foment the 

Muslim and non-Muslim divide. They want to take advantage of it. 

That is the apocalyptic event that they are describing. They bring 

Europe—in their minds; this is their goal—to a calamitous war 

based on that divide. 

And one of the things that we must do in our own country and 

also in Europe is not overreact to this threat. What I mean by that 

is over-policing, taking away people’s civil liberties, creating the 

sense of alienation in communities. We have got to be careful about 

how we deal with this. 

So when the French President stands up and he is proud of the 

fact that he has conducted 800, 800 raids into Muslim communities, well, on the surface of that that sounds like a good thing. 

But I am willing to speculate that most of those raids did not yield 

much of anything, and yet he is busting down doors where kids are 

living and families are living and the rest of it. 

I mean, we have the scars of this ourselves in the United States 

military because we were doing that in the beginning when we 

46

were dealing with al-Qaeda and the Sunni insurgency in Iraq and 

we learned quickly from our mistakes. But that is exactly what 

ISIS wants. They want this overreaction. They want over-policing. 

They want them to take civil liberties away. They want that sense 

of alienation in Muslim communities to grow and fester to the 

point where more people are willing to take up arms. 

So they are very interested in Europe because they want to take 

advantage of what is taking place there in those Muslim communities that do feel a sense of isolation. That is what they are about 

in going to Europe. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from New York. The gentleman 

from California, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. This hearing’s title focuses us on ISIS. There is 

also the Shiite alliance headed by Tehran including Hezbollah, 

Assad and many of the forces in the Baghdad government. And I 

believe that that Shiite alliance is more dangerous. I think, General Keane, you agreed with that. They have killed more Americans starting with our Marines in Beirut, and including those they 

killed with IEDs given to the Taliban and given to forces fighting 

against us in Iraq. And just the Assad wing of that alliance—and 

I should mention the alliance also includes the Houthi in Yemen—

but just the Assad wing has killed perhaps 200,000 innocent 

Sunnis. So they have killed more Arab civilians, they have killed 

more Americans. 

But I think the chief difference is when ISIS kills 50 people they 

put it on YouTube. When Assad, he murders 1,000 civilians, he has 

the good taste to deny it. And so of course we are focused on ISIS 

as being the enemy and the great evil. 

Twitter has announced that they are going after sites that are 

being used to recruit. They used to do a much worse job than 

Facebook; they are now apparently getting better. Gentlemen, I 

don’t know if you have had enough time, because it has been a recent announcement, but do any of you have an opinion on whether 

Facebook and especially Twitter is going a good job in interrupting 

terrorist recruitment? 

Ambassador? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Yes, sir. This is something that both 

when I was in the government and now at the Middle East Media 

Research Institute we study very closely. Facebook has actually led 

in efforts to clean up those platforms that it has, so it has really 

been a leader. We have seen that over the past year in kind of policing itself rather well. 

Twitter was the happy hunting ground of ISIS a year ago. I remember in government it was basically a completely unpoliced 

state. They have taken these steps very recently. It is not the solution, but it is a very large step in the right direction and they are 

to be applauded for that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So if Facebook has done a——

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. Great job. 

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. Great job, what phrase should today’s 

Twitter deserves? 

Ambassador FERNANDEZ. I would give them a C+. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Ah, okay. I am going to move to the topic we dealt 

with at the full committee and that is defeating ISIS where it is, 

47

because the existence of a caliphate, even if one that is shrunk, is 

an inspiration to demented minds in Paris, San Bernardino and 

elsewhere. 

General, in World War II we carried out a serious strategic 

bombing campaign. And I was told by the French Ambassador we 

killed 90,000 French civilians in occupied Europe and yet we were 

greeted as liberators when we arrived. Yet our approach to strategic efforts against ISIS’ economics and war building capacity is 

very different. For example, in the testimony today the administration did not disagree with the decision of the Iraqi Government to 

provide free electricity to Mosul and other areas controlled by ISIS. 

I don’t remember us trying to provide free electricity, fuel or food 

to occupied Europe during World War II. 

There is also, up until recently, ISIS has been paying persons 

who live in ISIS area and are subject to their taxation. I don’t remember Charles de Gaulle parachuting bank notes into occupied 

France in order to pay people working for the government there. 

And then of course we have had the zero—that we heard the testimony today that when it comes to hitting their tanker trucks, 

which allow them to sell petroleum, we are only willing to bomb 

the tanker trucks if we find them parked with the drivers away. 

We are not willing to hit the tanker trucks while they are moving 

because that would kill the driver or might endanger the driver. 

What language would we be speaking here today if during World 

War II we had not hit any Nazi train or truck unless it was 

parked? 

General KEANE. Well, I know. I mean, you are frustrated with 

that, the absurdity of all of it. Look at it. We live in literally different times and our values have shifted. Roosevelt and Churchill 

made a decision as you well know that it was not enough to defeat 

the German army and the Nazi military force. They believed they 

had to defeat the German people so it would not give rise to this 

kind of behavior for a third time in Europe. So we ran continuous 

bombing campaigns against major German cities that had no military value. 

Mr. SHERMAN. If I can that is no——

General KEANE. We have to put that aside. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I am talking about our bombing of occupied Europe where we were hitting strategically useful economic targets in 

occupied France. 

General KEANE. When we bombed targets in Europe certainly we 

went after their war industry, and certainly most of the people who 

were working in their war industry were in fact civilians. And it 

is an absurdity that we would not take down ISIS’ economic infrastructure even though civilians are working in it. That is number 

one. 

Number two, and you alluded to it, the bombing campaign is different. I mean, even though I am very critical of this campaign because the rules of engagement is what you just described, in military terms are overly restrictive, the President made a policy decision he wanted zero civilian casualties. He was told that is very unrealistic. 

Even though we have the most sophisticated precision guiding 

munitions and the most sophisticated system to protect the loss of 

48

civilian life, when you are fighting a war in and amongst civilians, 

civilian deaths are not avoidable. 

All that said, we go out of our way to avoid civilian casualties, 

but the bombing campaign still is not what it should be. Now when 

people tell you that in the Gulf War in ’91 or in the Gulf War in 

2003 or in Afghanistan we did thousands and thousands of attacks 

a day, remember what we were doing. We are going after a nation 

state’s infrastructure which is largely a physical based system that 

supports a nation state. 

In going after ISIS, most of those structures that they are using 

they have civilians in those structures with us and we know that 

so we have been unwilling to go after that. That is why I have been 

a proponent for a long time of conducting large scale, special operation forces raids, probably using rangers to do it, surprise attacks 

that take down these physical plants that ISIS is occupying in 

doing its business, all of the things that we have described that a 

safe haven does. 

Some risk involved in that. That is direct combat. We have got 

the skill sets to do this and we could truly start to handicap this 

organization in a way that air power cannot. 

Mr. POE. I thank all three of you for being here. Very informative, very fascinating. And the committee members may have 

some more questions for you and they will put those in writing and 

send them to you and then would expect some answers quickly. So 

the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 3:59 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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