alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Order filed, October 08, 2014

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 14

- 00738

- CV

____________ DAVID CASH MOORE , Appellant

V.
SHARON D. ALLEN, ET AL , Appellee

On Appeal from the 412th District Court Brazoria County, Texa s Trial Court Cause No. 73303I



### ORDER
The reporter’s record in this case was due September 19, 2014

. See Tex. R. App. P. 35.1. The court has not received a request to extend time for filing the
record. The record has not been filed with the court. Be cause the reporter’s record has not been filed timely, we issue the following order.

We order Jill Friedrichs , the official court reporter, to file the record in this appeal within 30 days of the date of this order

. PER CURIAM
#### Burhans vs. Sanford & Brown.

NEW-YORK,

May, 1838.

An action' on the cause of malicious prosecution, is prima facie sustained by proof that the suit complained of as maliciously prosecuted, was voluntarily discontinued; such proof throws upon the defendant the onus of showing probable cause.

Suffering a judgment of non pros, or as in case of nonsuit, to be entered by the defendant, has not the same effect; the mere omission to prosecute a suit, does not of itself furnish sufficient ground for the action of malicious pro. secution.

Malice may be, and usually is inferred in these actions, from the want of pro. bable cause; it is not necessary to show that the act complained of, was dictated by angry feeling, or a vindictive motive.

This was an action on the cause for a *malicious prosecution,*tried at the Albany circuit in October, 1836, before the Hon. James Vanderpoel, then one of the circuit judges.

The plaintiff proved that in January, 1830, he was arrested and held to bail on a capias issued out of the mayor’s court of the city of Albany, at the suit of the defendants, in an action of slander, without a judge’s order to hold to bail. 2 R. S. 348, § 8. Sanford & Brown declared in that action' the defendant pleaded not guilty and gave, , notice of special matter in justification. In July, 1831, Sanford & Brown voluntarily *discontinued their action,*and paid the costs. A judgment of discontinuance was perfected. On proof of these and some other facts, the plaintiff rested. The defendants moved for a nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff had neither proved malice nor want of probable cause. The judge decided that there was not sufficient evidence to carry the cause to the jury, and nonsuited the plaintiff. The plaintiff excepted, and now moves for a new-trial.

*418*H, Burhans,*in pro. per.

*M. T. Reynolds,*for defendants.

*By the Court,*

Bronson, J.

When this case was before the court on a former occasion, the case stated that the plaintiffs in the action of slander suffered a judgment *as in case of nonsuit to be*taken against them ; and we held that this fact alone did not furnish sufficient evidence of a want of probable cause, to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict. The mere omission to prosecute an action, by reason of which the defendant obtains a judgment of *non pros,*or *as in case of nonsuit*does not of itself furnish a sufficient foundation for this action. *Sinclair*v. *Eldred,*4 Taunt. 7. See also *Purcell*v. *Macnamara,*9 East, 361. But it now appears that the former action was voluntarily discontinued by the plaintiffs. That was sufficient to change the onus, and throw upon the defendants the necessity of showing probable cause for arrest. *Nicholson*v. *Coghill,*6 Dow. & Ry. 12. *Webb*v. *Hill,*3 Car. & Payne, 495. 1 M. & M. 253, S. C.

Malice may be, and usually is inferred in these actions from the want of probable cause. It is not necessary to show that the act complained of was dictated by angry feeling, or a vindictive motive. *Jones*v. *Nicholls,*3 Car. & Payne, 12. The evidence was sufficient, prima facie, to carry the cause to the jury, and the nonsuit must therefore be set aside.

New trial granted.
§ 1425.1 Definitions. As used in this part: ( a ) *The Service* means Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
( b ) Party or Parties means ( 1 ) any appropriate activity, facility, geographical subdivision, or combination thereof, of an agency as that term is defined in 5 U.S.C. 7103(3), or
( 2 ) a labor organization as that term is defined in 5 U.S.C. 7103(4).
( c ) *Third-party mediation assistance* means mediation by persons other than FMCS commissioners.
( d ) *Provide its services* means to make the services and facilities of the Service available either on its own motion or upon the special request of one or both of the parties.
Fifth amendment to the Restated and Amended Zions Bancorporation Pension Plan



 EXHIBIT 10.1 
 FIFTH AMENDMENT 
 TO THE 
 RESTATED AND AMENDED 
 ZIONS BANCORPORATION 
 PENSION PLAN 
 This Fifth Amendment to the restated and amended Zions Bancorporation Pension Plan (the “Plan”) is made and
entered into this 29th day of September, 2008, by Zions
Bancorporation, hereinafter referred to as the “Employer.” 
 W I T N E S S E T H: 
 WHEREAS, the Employer has heretofore entered into the Plan, which Plan has been restated and amended in its entirety effective
January 1, 2001, and 
 WHEREAS, the Employer has reserved the right to amend the Plan in whole or in part, and 

WHEREAS, the Employer now desires to amend the Plan for the purpose of maintaining the Plan’s qualification under Internal Revenue
Code §417(e)(3) (providing for the determination of the present value of certain benefit distribution options) and complying with the requirements of the determination letter issued by the Internal Revenue Service on Aug. 25, 2008, 

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises and mutual covenants herein contained, the Employer adopts the following
amendments to the Plan (amended language is marked in bold italics): 
 1. Section 1.4(a) is amended by
adding the following at the end thereof: 
 Unless specifically provided otherwise in this Plan, the value
of a benefit payable in any other non-annuity form shall be determined by applying the Actuarial Equivalence factors specified for lump sums in (ii) above. 







 2. The last sentence in Section 5.7(f)(2) is amended to read as follows: 
 The amount of the adjustment to the Sumitomo Participant’s benefit shall be calculated using the factors in Appendix III
of the Sumitomo Plan, provided that in no event shall value of the benefit payable under this sub-section ever be less than that determined by applying the Actuarial Equivalence factors for lumps sum payments described in Section
1.4(a)(ii). 
 3. This Fifth Amendment shall be effective January 1, 2001, and for Plan Years commencing after that
date. 
 4. In all other respects the Plan is ratified and approved. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Employer has caused this Fifth Amendment to the Plan to be duly executed as of the date and year first above
written. 
  

			
	“EMPLOYER”
	
	ZIONS BANCORPORATION
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Diana M. Andersen

	Its:	 	 SVP & Director of Corporate Benefits



  

 2
Exhibit 21.1



Actuate Corporation Subsidiaries



|                                  |  |                                            
|--------------------------------- |  | -------------------------------------------
|Subsidiary Name                   |  | Jurisdiction of Incorporation              
|Actuate Australia Limited         |  | Australia                                  
|Actuate Canada Corporation        |  | Canada                                     
|Actuate Cayman Limited            |  | Cayman Islands                             
|Actuate Corporation PTE Limited   |  | Singapore                                  
|Actuate France, S.A.              |  | France                                     
|Actuate Germany GmbH              |  | Germany                                    
|Actuate International SARL        |  | Switzerland                                
|Actuate International Corporation |  | State of Delaware, United States of America
|Actuate Japan Co., Ltd.           |  | Japan                                      
|Actuate Limited                   |  | Hong Kong                                  
|Actuate Software Company Ltd.     |  | Peoples Republic of China                  
|Actuate UK Ltd.                   |  | United Kingdom                             
|Nimble Technology, Inc.           |  | State of Delaware, United States of America
----

|               | /s/ TERRY G. ROUSSEL                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date: May 12, 2009 | Terry G. RousselChief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) ofCornerstone Ventures, Inc., Managing Member ofCornerstone Industrial Properties, LLC, the Managing Member ofCornerstone Realty Fund, LLC |
|               |                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|               |                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|               | /s/ SHARON C. KAISER                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Date: May 12, 2009 | Sharon C. KaiserChief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer) ofCornerstone Ventures, Inc., Managing Member ofCornerstone Industrial Properties, LLC, the Managing Member ofCornerstone Realty Fund, LLC |

----
§ 1420.8 FMCS deferral to parties' own private factfinding procedures. ( a ) The Service will defer to the parties' own privately agreed to factfinding procedure and decline to appoint a Board of Inquiry (BoI) as long as the parties' own procedure meets certain conditions so as to satisfy the Service's responsibilities under the Act. The Service will decline to appoint a BoI and leave the selection and appointment of a factfinder to the parties to a dispute if both the parties have agreed in writing to their own factfinding procedure which meets the following conditions: ( 1 ) The factfinding procedure must be invoked automatically at a specified time (for example, at contract expiration if no agreement is reached).
( 2 ) It must provide a fixed and determinate method for selecting the impartial factfinder(s).
( 3 ) It must provide that there can be no strike or lockout and no changes in conditions of employment (except by mutual agreement) prior to or during the factfinding procedure and for a period of at least seven days after the factfinding is completed.
( 4 ) It must provide that the factfinder(s) will make a written report to the parties, containing the findings of fact and the recommendations of the factfinder(s) for settling the dispute, a copy of which is sent to the Service. The parties to a dispute who have agreed to such a factfinding procedure should jointly submit a copy of such agreed upon procedure to the appropriate regional office of the Service at as early a date as possible, but in any event prior to the appointment of a BoI by the Service. See § 1420.5(f) for the addresses of the regional offices.
( b ) Since the Service does not appoint the factfinder under paragraph (a) of this section, the Service cannot pay for such factfinder. In this respect, such deferral by the Service to the parties' own factfinding procedure is different from the use of stipulation agreements between the parties which give to the Service the authority to select and appoint a factfinder at a later date than the date by which a BoI would have to be appointed under the Act. Under such stipulation agreements by which the parties give the Service authority to appoint a factfinder at a later date, the Service can pay for the factfinder. However, in the deferral to the parties' own factfinding procedure, the parties choose their own factfinder and they pay for the factfinder.
§ 102.148 When an application may be filed; place of filing; service; referral to Administrative Law Judge; stay of proceeding. ( a ) An application may be filed after entry of the final order establishing that the applicant has prevailed in an adversary adjudication proceeding or in a significant and discrete substantive portion of that proceeding, but in no case later than 30 days after the entry of the Board's final order in that proceeding. The application for an award must be filed with the Board in Washington, DC, together with a certificate of service. The application must be served on the Regional Director and on all parties to the adversary adjudication in the same manner as other pleadings in that proceeding, except as provided in § 102.147(g)(1) for financial information alleged to be confidential.
( b ) Upon filing, the application will be referred by the Board to the Administrative Law Judge who heard the adversary adjudication upon which the application is based, or, in the event that proceeding had not previously been heard by an Administrative Law Judge, it will be referred to the Chief Administrative Law Judge for designation of an Administrative Law Judge, in accordance with § 102.34, to consider the application. When the Administrative Law Judge to whom the application has been referred is or becomes unavailable, the provisions of §§ 102.34 and 102.36 will apply.
( c ) Proceedings for the award of fees, but not the time limit of this section for filing an application for an award, will be stayed pending final disposition of the adversary adjudication in the event any person seeks reconsideration or review of the decision in that proceeding.
( d ) For purposes of this section the withdrawal of a complaint by a Regional Director under § 102.18 will be treated as a final order, and an appeal under § 102.19 will be treated as a request for reconsideration of that final order.
[82 FR 11783, Feb. 24, 2017]
State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: September 11, 2014 517845 

________________________________

In the Matter of DAVID 

MORRISHILL,

Petitioner,

v MEMORANDUM AND JUDGMENT

ALBERT PRACK, as Director of 

Special Housing and Inmate 

Disciplinary Programs,

Respondent.

________________________________

Calendar Date: August 4, 2014

Before: Stein, J.P., Rose, Egan Jr., Devine and Clark, JJ.

__________

David Morrishill, Marcy, petitioner pro se.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Peter H.

Schiff of counsel), for respondent.

__________

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this

Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to

review a determination of the Commissioner of Corrections and

Community Supervision which found petitioner guilty of violating

a prison disciplinary rule.

After petitioner's urine twice tested positive for

marihuana, he was charged in a misbehavior report with drug use. 

He was found guilty following a tier III disciplinary hearing,

and that determination was affirmed on administrative appeal. 
-2- 517845 

This CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued.1

We confirm. Petitioner signed a document waiving his right

to employee assistance and, when he requested assistance at the

hearing, the Hearing Officer appropriately acted "by offering to

provide him with whatever he would have requested from an

assistant" (Matter of Truman v Fischer, 75 AD3d 1019, 1020

[2010]; see Matter of Alvarez v Fischer, 94 AD3d 1404, 1405

[2012], lv denied 96 AD3d 1703 [2012]). The Hearing Officer

properly denied petitioner's ensuing request for the testimony of

a correction officer as irrelevant (see Matter of Henderson v

Fischer, 98 AD3d 1162, 1163 [2012]). Likewise, petitioner was

not entitled to a copy of the operator's manual for the testing

equipment (see Matter of Anderson v Prack, 111 AD3d 1214, 1214

[2013]; Matter of Kussius v Walker, 247 AD2d 911, 912 [1998]; but

see Matter of Marshall v Fischer, 103 AD3d 726, 728 [2013]). The

Hearing Officer also appropriately denied petitioner's request

for unredacted log book entries that would have identified other

inmates who had been tested on the day in question (see Matter of

Lindo v Fischer, 72 AD3d 1295, 1296 [2010]). Petitioner's

remaining claims have been examined and found to be meritless.

Stein, J.P., Rose, Egan Jr., Devine and Clark, JJ., concur.

1 While we agree with petitioner that the petition appears

to raise only procedural issues and should not have been

transferred to this Court, we will retain jurisdiction in the

interest of judicial economy (see Matter of Hernandez v Fischer,

111 AD3d 1042, 1043 n [2013]).
-3- 517845 

ADJUDGED that the determination is confirmed, without

costs, and petition dismissed.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court
II 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4828 

To amend section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 (commonly referred 

to as the ‘‘Communications Decency Act’’) to stop censorship, and for 

other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 21 (legislative day, OCTOBER 19), 2020 

Mrs. LOEFFLER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

A BILL 

To amend section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 

(commonly referred to as the ‘‘Communications Decency 

Act’’) to stop censorship, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stop Suppressing 

5 Speech Act of 2020’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REVOCATION OF IMMUNITIES. 

7 Section 230(c) of the Communications Act of 1934 

8 (47 U.S.C. 230(c)) is amended— 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 4828 IS

1 (1) in the heading, by striking ‘‘AND SCREEN2 ING OF OFFENSIVE MATERIAL’’ and inserting ‘‘OF

3 UNLAWFUL OR OBJECTIONABLE MATERIAL’’; and 

4 (2) in paragraph (2)— 

5 (A) in subparagraph (A)— 

6 (i) by striking ‘‘harassing, or other7 wise objectionable’’ and inserting ‘‘or 

8 harassing, that the provider or user deter9 mines to be unlawful, or that promotes vio10 lence or terrorism’’; and 

11 (ii) by striking ‘‘; or’’ and inserting a 

12 semicolon; 

13 (B) in subparagraph (B), by striking 

14 ‘‘paragraph (1).’’ and inserting ‘‘subparagraph 

15 (A); or’’; and 

16 (C) by adding at the end the following new 

17 subparagraph: 

18 ‘‘(C) any action taken to provide users 

19 with the option to restrict access to any other 

20 material, whether or not such material is con21 stitutionally protected.’’. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
EXHIBIT  32.1  --  CERTIFICATION  OF  CHIEF  EXECUTIVE  OFFICER OF FIRST CAPITAL
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INTERNATIONAL,  INC.,  PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AND  SECTION  1350  OF  18  U.S.C.  63.
---------------------------------------


I,  Alex Genin, the Chief Executive Officer of First Capital International, Inc.
hereby  certify that First Capital International, Inc.'s periodic report on Form
10QSB  and  the  financial  statements contained therein fully complies with the
requirements  of  Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15  U.S.C.  78m or 78o(d) and that information contained in the periodic report
on  Form 10QSB and the financial statements contained therein fairly represents,
in  all material respects, the financial condition and results of the operations
of  First  Capital  International,  Inc

Date:  November 14, 2003              /s/ Alex Genin
                                      Chief Executive Officer of
                                      First Capital International, Inc.


<PAGE>
#### Rose D. April et al., Appellants and Respondents, *v.*Philip April, Defendant, and Joseph G. Abramson, as Trustee, Respondent and Appellant.

Submitted March 1, 1937;

decided March 16, 1937.

Motion for a reargument or to amend the remittitur denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. Without plaintiff’s knowledge payments were made both from principal and income while the trust fund was not sufficient security. Under the rules stated in the opinion the result of such payments was to deprive the plaintiff of the security to which she was entitled. This is true even though the payment was made in part from income. (See 272 N. Y, 331.)
#### YONTZ et v McCUTCHIN

Ohio Supreme Court

No. 21584.

Decided June 12, 1929

Syllabus by

DAY, J.

AUTOMOBILES — Courts (180 Jj)

(50 A2f) Jurisdiction is not conferred on the Municipal Court of the City of Columbus by 6308 GC, in an action for damages for injury due to the negligent operation of a motor vehicle in Franklin County, Ohio, where defendants reside outside “the city limits, by the sheriff of Franklin County leaving a summons at the residence of such defendants, all parties to such action being residents of Franklin County.

Marshall, CJ, Kinkade, Robinson, Jones, Matthias and Allen, JJ, concur.
§ 102.84 Contents of petition to rescind authority. ( a ) The name of the employer.
( b ) The address of the establishments involved.
( c ) The general nature of the employer's business.
( d ) A description of the bargaining unit involved.
( e ) The name and address of the labor organization whose authority it is desired to rescind.
( f ) The number of employees in the unit.
( g ) Whether there is a strike or picketing in progress at the establishment involved and, if so, the approximate number of employees participating, and the date such strike or picketing commenced.
( h ) The date of execution and of expiration of any contract in effect covering the unit involved.
( i ) The name and address of the petitioner, and the name, title, address, telephone number, facsimile number, and email address of the individual who will serve as the representative of the petitioner and accept service of all papers for purposes of the proceeding.
( j ) A statement that 30 percent or more of the bargaining unit employees covered by an agreement between their employer and a labor organization made pursuant to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, desire that the authority to make such an agreement be rescinded.
( k ) Any other relevant facts.
( l ) Evidence supporting the statement that 30 percent or more of the bargaining unit employees desire to rescind the authority of their employer and labor organization to enter into an agreement made pursuant to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Such evidence must be filed together with the petition, but must not be served on any other party.
( m ) Evidence filed pursuant to paragraph (l) of this section together with a petition that is filed by facsimile or electronically, which includes original signatures that cannot be transmitted in their original form by the method of filing of the petition, may be filed by facsimile or in electronic form provided that the original documents are received by the regional director no later than 2 days after the facsimile or electronic filing.
( n ) The type, date(s), time(s) and location(s) of the election sought.
[24 FR 9102, Nov. 7, 1959, as amended at 79 FR 74489, Dec. 15, 2014; 82 FR 11765, Feb. 24, 2017]
#### § 1405.2 Policy.

It is the policy of FMCS to provide career part-time employment opportunities in positions through GS-16 (or equivalent) subject to agency resources and mission requirements.