Appendix B 

U.S. Coast Guard LOR and Waterway Suitability Report 
20090302-0306 FERC PDF (Unofficial) 02/23/2009 

u.s. oepartm. of 

Homeland $ecurity/~ 

United States #,aL.=~j 

Coast Guard I~ 

Commander 

United S~tN Coast Guard 

Sect" No~lem New England 

259 H~II St. 

South Po~aml. ME 04106 

Staff Symbol: PREV 

Phone: (207) Z87-0333 

Fax: (207) 7'67-0308 

16600 

Federal Energy Rgulatory Commission 

Attn: K. Bose 

Secrm 

888 First Street NE, Room IA 

Washington, DC 20426 

/ 

Dear Ms. Bose: 

This letter is in follow-up to communication with Ms. Shannon Jones of the Federal Ene='gy Regulatory 

Commission (FERC) staffand advises of a typographical error found in the Downenst LNG (DELNG) 

waterway suitability report (WSR). 

On January 7, 2009 the Coast Guard provided the (FERC) with a Letter of Recommendation (LOR) and 

redacted and un-redacted versions of the associated WSR for the Downcast LNG project proposed for 

Robbinston, Maine. It has come to our attention that the WSR requir~ an edit be made; speci~cally, on 

page 46 of the red.ted WSR; page 48 of the un-redacted WSR; and page il of Appendix A. the acronym 

for The Sodety oflnternatiom21 Gas Tanker and Term~l Operators, LTD should read SIGTTO vice 

SIGTO. 

Accordingly, it is requested that a notice to this effect be posted in the DELNG docket to enable better 

'word search' capability. 

Should you have any questions in this regard please feel to contact Mr. Alan Moore, of my staff, at (207) 

767-0338 or by c-mailing Alan.H.Moore2~2.mil. 

Sincerely, 

M.K. SAMS 

Commander, U. S. Coast Guard 

By direction of the Captain of the Port 

Sector Northern New England 

I 

t.~ 

"~ 7::_ .~.. 

oo [., 
~0090325-0134 FERC PDF (Unofficial) 03/24/2009 

U.S. Oepamamt of 

Homeland Security 

United States 

Coast Guard 

Unt~cl Smtu C,~ ~J~d 

Sec~r Nodham New Englimd 

• ~.~ 

259 H~ 5C 

Soub't Po~md, ME 04100 

S~nl~: PREV 

Pho~: (2o7) 767-o333 

Fax: (207) 787-03~ 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 

At'm: IC Bose " 

Secretary 

888 First Street NE, Room 1A 

Washington, DC 20426 

Dear Ms. Bose: 

This letter is in follow-up to communication with Ms. Shannon Jones of the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (FERC) staff and advises of a typographical error found in the 

Downeast LNG (DELNG) waterway suitability report (WSR); reference docket number PF06- 

|3-000. 

On January 7, 2009 the Coast Guard provided the (FERC) with a Letter of Reenmmandation 

(LOR) and redacted and un-redaeted versions of the associated WSR for the Downeast LNG 

project proposed for Robbinston, Maine. It has come to our attention that the WSR requires an 

edit be made; specifically, on page 46 of the redacted WSR and page 48 of the un-redacted 

WSR. Accordingly, it is requested that the 2 "d bullet be changed to read "During the LNG 

carrier's transit, a Zone 1 impact may well occur at Dog Island Light, affecting a small portion of 

Moose Island on the Maine side and the tip of Deer Island on the New Brunswick side." vice 

"During the LNG carrier's mmsit, a Zone 2 impact may very well occur at Dog Island Light, 

affecting pot'dons of Moose Island on the Maine side and Deer Island on the New Brunswick 

side." 

Should you have any questions in this regard please feel to contact Mr. Alan Moore, of my staff; 

at (207) 767-0338 or by e-mailing Alan.H.Moore2(a.~.nsc~.mil. 

Sincerely, 

M.IC SAMS 

Commander, U. S. Coast Guard 

By direction of the Captain of the Port 

Sector Northern New England 


REDACTED VERSION Section 5.0 of this document contains Sensitive Security Information controlled under 49 

CFR Part 1520. No part of that Section may be disclosed to persons without a “need to 

know,” as defined in 49 CFR 1520.11, except with the written permission of the Secretary 

of homeland Security. Section 5.0 has been redacted from this document. 

U. S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port 

Sector Northern New England 

Liquefied Natural Gas Facility 

Waterway Suitability Report 

for the proposed 

Downeast LNG Facility 

Robbinston, ME 

 January 6, 2009 

 Sector Northern New England 

REDACTED VERSION 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 

1.0 INTRODUCTION 1 

1.1 Background 2 

1.1.1 Marine Terminal and Storage Facility General Arrangement 3 

1.2 COTP Role 4 

1.3 Public Input and Interaction 5 

1.4 Safety Work Group 6 

1.5 Security Work Group 8 

2.0 PORT AND LNG VESSEL ROUTE 8 

 2.1 General Features 9 

 2.2 Transit Route Overview 9 

 2.3 Transit Route Alternatives 12 

 2.4 Port Area Characterization 12 

 2.4.1 Maritime Commerce 12 

 2.4.2 Port Level Impacts 13 

 2.4.3 Iconic Value 16 

 2.5 Areas of Environmental Significance 16 

3.0 SAFETY AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT 18 

3.1 Port and Waterway Security Assessment 19 

3.2 Thermal Radiation Analysis 19 

3.2.1 Hazard Zone Characteristics and Considerations 20 

3.2.2 Consequence Zone Analysis 32 

3.2.3 Hazard Zone Impacts 32 

3.3 International and Sovereignty Considerations 47 

3.4 Marine Traffic Control 51 

3.5 LNG Carrier Simulation Tests 53 

3.5.1 General Results of the Simulations 55 

3.6 Transit Analysis and Traffic Study 56 

3.7 Safety/Security Zones and Operational Parameters 58 

3.7.1 Safety and Security Zone Considerations 58 

3.7.1.1 Safety Zones 60 

3.7.1.2 Security Zones 62 

3.7.1.3 Combined Safety and Security Zones for Vessel Transits 62 

3.7.1.4 Safety and Security Zones for Moored LNG Carriers 63 

3.7.2 Assist/Escort Tugs 64 

3.7.3 Marine Firefighting Capability 64 

i
REDACTED VERSION 

ii

3.7.4 Marine Traffic, Anchorages and Boarding Areas 65 

3.7.5 Environmental Controls 67 

3.7.6 Communications, Radar, and Aids to Navigation 68 

4.0 RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 68 

4.1 Risk Assessment Scenarios 69 

4.2 Environmental Protection and Response 72 

4.3 Consequence Management 73 

4.4 Resource Identification and Needs 74 

4.4.1 U.S. Federal Resources 74 

4.4.2 State, County. Local Resources 74 

4.4.3 Canadian Resources 75 

4.5 Emergency Responses Plan Process 76 

4.6 Risk Mitigation Measures 78 

5.0 SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION SUPPLEMENT 82 

This section has been redacted from this version 

6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 83 

APPENDICIES 84 

A. List of Acronyms i 

B. Ports and Waterways Safety Assessment Workshop Report iii 

 Passamaquoddy Bay, ME 
REDACTED VERSION 

1

DOWNEAST LNG 

WATERWAY SUITABILITY REPORT 

Executive Summary 

The data and information regarding the proposed facility detailed in this Waterway 

Suitability Report (WSR) was derived from Downeast LNG’s Application and supporting 

Resource Reports filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), as well 

as information provided directly to the COTP Sector Northern New England (COTP) in 

the Downeast LNG’s Letter of Intent (LOI) and Waterway Suitability Assessment 

(WSA). Downeast LNG is proposing to build a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) import, 

storage, and regasification facility within an 80-acre tract of land on the south side of Mill 

Cove, Robbinston, Maine, near the confluence of Passamaquoddy Bay and the St. Croix 

River. 

This report was developed using U.S. Coast Guard Navigation and Vessel Inspection 

Circulars (NVIC or Circular) 05-05, Guidance on Assessing the Suitability of a Waterway 

for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Marine Traffic and NVIC 05-08, Guidance Related to 

Waterfront Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Facilities which replaced 05-05. NVIC 05-08 

eliminated the term WSR and replaced it with “Letter of Recommendation Analysis”. 

For the purpose of clarity, the WSR is equivalent to the LOR Analysis. As this report 

was originated under NVIC 05-05, we have elected to keep “Water Suitability Report” as 

the title of this document. 

 

The project is intended to have the capability to receive, store, and vaporize LNG at a 

baseload sendout rate of 500 million standard cubic feet per day (mmscfd), with a 

peaking capacity of approximately 625 mmscfd, and an expansion potential for a total 

capacity of 1 billion standard cubic feet per day (bscfd). The proposed facility includes a 

3,862-foot single-berth pier and vessel mooring system, LNG unloading pipeline, 

onshore storage tanks, regasification equipment, and ancillary, supporting infrastructure. 

An approximate 30-mile sendout pipeline will connect the facility to the existing 

interstate Maritimes and Northeast Pipeline. It is anticipated that an LNG carrier would 

be arriving from a foreign port and offloading to the terminal once every 5 to 7 days in 

the winter and once every 8 to10 days during the summer period. The proposed LNG 

vessel transit route passes through both United States and Canadian waters. This requires 

that Downeast LNG adequately address and resolve several transboundary safety and 

security risks, requirements, and impacts. 

1.0 Introduction 

This document constitutes the U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP) Sector 

Northern New England’s Waterway Suitability Report (WSR) for the proposed Downeast 

LNG, Inc. (Downeast LNG) Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Facility. This Waterway 

Suitability Report (WSR) meets the intent of paragraph 6.a. of U.S. Coast Guard 

Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC or Circular) 05-05, entitled Guidance 

on Assessing the Suitability of a Waterway for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Marine 
REDACTED VERSION 

2

Traffic, and NVIC 05-08 Guidance Related to Waterfront Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 

Facilities. NVIC 05-08 and it predecessor 05-05 establishes U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) 

policy for assessing the suitability of a waterway to support LNG carrier traffic. 

This Report was compiled from several resources, some of which have been provided by 

the applicant, including the Application filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission (FERC or Commission) and associated Resource Reports, Waterway 

Suitability Assessment (WSA), and amplifying information Downeast LNG provided 

directly to the COTP Sector Northern New England. 

1.1 Background 

The COTP Sector Northern New England received a Letter of Intent (LOI) in accordance 

with Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), §127.007 from Downeast LNG, dated 

December 20, 2005. That LOI notified the COTP Sector Northern New England that 

Downeast LNG, Inc.; a Delaware based corporation, intended to construct a liquefied 

natural gas (LNG) import terminal and facility at a site located in Washington County on 

Mill Cove, Robbinston, ME. 

The small town of Robbinston (population 525 in the 2000 census) lies at the 

northeastern edge of Washington County, with the small cities of Eastport (pop. 1640) 

lying to the south, and Calais (pop. 3447) to the north. The facility is to be sited within 

an 80-acre tract of land that abuts U.S. Route 1 on one end, and the southern half of Mill 

Cove, near the confluence of Passamaquoddy Bay and the St. Croix River, on the other. 

The marine portion of the project will be located entirely within U.S. waters. 

The project is intended to have the capability to receive, store, and regasify (vaporize) 

LNG at a baseload sendout rate of 500 million standard cubic feet per day (mmscfd), with 

peaking capacity of approximately 625 mmscfd, and an expansion potential capacity of 1 

billion standard cubic feet per day (bscfd). The marine terminal and single berth pier is 

intended to handle LNG vessels ranging from 70,000 to 165,000 m3

 in capacity. It will 

have the capability to support future vessels of up to 220,000 m3 and corresponding 

lengths approximating 1,033 feet and drafts of nearly 40 feet (natural water depth at berth 

will be 50 feet at mean low, low water). It is anticipated that a carrier would be arriving 

and offloading once every five to seven days in the winter, and once every eight to ten 

days during the summer period. Figure 1 is an artist’s rendering of the proposed project. 
REDACTED VERSION 

3

Figure 1 

1.1.1 Marine Terminal and Storage Facility General Arrangement 

The proposed import facility will consist of five major components: (1) Marine Terminal; 

(2) Storage Facility; (3) Pipeline Facilities; (4) Utilities, Infrastructure, and Support 

Systems; and (5) the natural gas pipeline. The following is an overview of these 

components of the project: 

1. The Marine Terminal is comprised of a single berth pier arrangement with the trestle 

portion approximating 3,862 feet in length. The pier will be affixed with mooring 

systems to accommodate LNG carriers ranging from 70,000 to 165,000 m3

 in cargo 

carrying capacity, with future expansion capabilities to handle vessels approaching 

220,000 m3

 in cargo carrying capacity. Three 16-inch manifold liquid unloading 

arms, equipped with emergency quick release couplings, are mounted mid-way along 

the vessel berth, as well as a 16-inch vapor return line and 36-inch cargo transfer 

pipeline. 

2. The LNG Storage Facility will contain two storage tanks, with each having the 

capacity to store 160,000 m3 of LNG. Only one tank will be initially built, with the 

second dependent on operational, permitting, and marketing conditions. The storage 

facility will also house two fully submerged, low pressure transfer pumps, boil-off 

gas recovery system, a submerged combustion vaporizer system, and high pressure 

natural gas pumps. 
REDACTED VERSION 

4

3. Pipeline Facility: The LNG will be offloaded from the carriers and pumped to the 

landside storage tank(s) using shipboard pumps. From the storage tank, the LNG will 

be regasified (natural gas) and ultimately fed into the M&NP pipeline via an 

approximate 30-inch diameter, 31-mile sendout pipeline and metering arrangement 

which serves the downstream States of Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. 

The entire capacity of the Downeast LNG facility is intended for the pipeline; no 

retail distribution is planned. 

4. The Utilities, Infrastructure, and Support Systems contain the ancillary control, 

hazard detection and emergency shutdowns, vent system, fire detection and fire 

fighting, supply and control pneumatics, electrical control and transmission, and a 

host of administrative, utility, maintenance, and service facilities that are necessary to 

operationally support the facility. 

Figure 2 – Proposed LNG Facility 

1.2 COTP Role 

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) conducts environmental, safety, 

and security reviews of LNG plants and related pipeline facilities, and as the lead federal 

agency for the process of authorizing the siting, construction, and operation of such 

facilities, prepares the overall National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 

documentation. In accordance with an Interagency Agreement between FERC and the 

Coast Guard, the Coast Guard is a cooperating agency with FERC under the NEPA 
REDACTED VERSION 

5

process, and will be providing input to FERC throughout the siting process. The Coast 

Guard exercises regulatory authority over LNG facilities which affect the safety and 

security of port areas and navigable waters under Executive Order 10173, the Magnuson 

Act, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, as amended, and the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act of 2002. The Coast Guard is responsible for matters related 

to navigation safety and security, vessel engineering and safety standards, and all matters 

pertaining to security of facilities or equipment located in or adjacent to navigable waters. 

The Coast Guard also has authority for LNG facility security plan review, approval, and 

compliance verification as provided in 33 CFR subchapter H (parts 101-106) 

1.3 Public Input and Interaction

The public had significant input into this Report. COTP Sector Northern New England 

representatives participated in five public meetings (of which two were joint scoping 

sessions) in concert with FERC: three in Washington County, ME, one on the 

Passamaquoddy Tribal Reservation at Pleasant Point, ME, and one on Campobello 

Island, New Brunswick (although premised on the safe and secure transportation of LNG 

in general, the Pleasant Point and Campobello sessions were conducted in conjunction 

with a competing project proposal). COTP Sector Northern New England attended a 

number of public outreach and informational sessions that were hosted by the applicant 

and/or their contracted consultants; meetings/sessions organized by the State of Maine 

Office of Energy Independence and Security; and a forum hosted by a tri-nation 

alliance/concerned citizens’ group. 

COTP Sector Northern New England has also considered numerous letters and electronic 

correspondence received from U.S., Canadian, and Tribal members of the public sector; 

local, county, state, provincial, and federal elected officials; non-profit organizations; 

environmental groups; and local, county, and state agencies commenting on the proposal. 

Many comments, both written and verbal, questioned the safe navigation of the intended 

waterway and expressed serious concerns for the maritime security and security of the 

vessels and port area. 

Several articulated apprehension about LNG vessels being able to safely navigate through 

the approaches to Passamaquoddy Bay, especially within constrained portions of the 

channel where extreme currents and divergent eddies exist due to the extraordinary tides 

in the area. Comments also referenced local meteorological conditions, such as the 

prolonged periods of heavy fog and extreme winds common to the region. Several 

questioned the impact of these conditions on the safe movement of deep draft LNG 

carriers. In addition, numerous comments expressed grave concern regarding the 

perceived health hazards and property risks associated with the transportation of LNG to 

the coastal residents in the event of an intentional or unintentional release of LNG 

consequent to an act of terrorism or major marine casualty. These comments were 

carefully considered during the USCG’s evaluation of this proposal. 

Comments were also received that were not specifically relevant to the USCG’s 

evaluation of the actual navigation safety and maritime security aspects of the proposed 

project. For example, comments included concern and opposition to potential 
REDACTED VERSION 

6

industrialization of the Passamaquoddy Bay area and the resultant impact it would have 

on ecotourism. Such comments reflected concern for the many environmentally sensitive 

areas and regional estuaries that the area is renowned for, some of which are outside of 

the immediate waterway. Others stressed potential adverse impacts on local aquaculture, 

marine life and fish, as well as the shellfish and lobster harvesting industries, claiming 

there would be crippling effects to the commercial fishermen. Some expressed concern 

about limiting public access to, and on, Passamaquoddy Bay and its tributaries. Several 

expressed general, overall opposition to the proposal, without further indicating specific 

areas of concern. 

While all comments were not exclusively related to navigational safety and/or maritime 

security, which is the premise of this report, the USCG felt many of these issues and 

concerns have an overlapping effect on shipping, whether directly or indirectly, and 

consequently were taken into consideration where deemed germane. All documentary 

comments were placed in the public docket, and can be accessed via the FERC website. 

In addition, COTP Sector Northern New England proactively conducted a number of 

outreach campaigns to solicit input from, among others, the regional citizenry, local and 

state agencies, Canadian officials, the Passamaquoddy Tribe, and advocacy groups such 

as the “Save Passamaquoddy Bay 3-Nation Alliance.” 

1.4 Safety Working Group 

Regional waterway users and stakeholders contributed to the information contained in 

this Report. As part of its assessment of the safety and security aspects of this project, 

the COTP Sector Northern New England convened safety and security working groups 

under the umbrella of the Passamaquoddy Bay/Down East Sub-Committee of the Area 

Maritime Security Committee (LNG Working Group) and Maine and New Hampshire 

Port Safety Forum, and participated in ad hoc meetings with the regional U.S. and 

Canadian response and law enforcement communities. For each of these working groups 

and sub-committees, a balanced group of representatives were invited to participate to 

ensure concerns on both sides of the international boundary were considered. None of 

the participants were asked to ‘vote’ or otherwise indicate whether the Downeast LNG 

proposal should be approved. Rather, participants were relied upon to provide valid input 

based on their expertise and regional familiarity in order to conduct a thorough 

assessment of potential risks to navigational safety and port security associated with the 

proposed project, and as well assist in the identification of possible mitigation measures. 

The LNG Working Group, as a whole, convened initially in Ellsworth, ME, in March, 

2006, and subsequent meetings were held in Ellsworth and Eastport, ME, in April and 

December, 2006, respectively. The consultation process has included subsequent 

collaboration with members throughout the WSA review and validation process. 

Additionally, LNG sub-committee sessions and related issues were regular agenda topics 

at quarterly Maine and New Hampshire Port Safety meetings held in Portsmouth, NH, 

Augusta, Bangor, and Eastport, ME. In addition to the Eastport Port Safety Forum 

venue, a tour through the waters of the intended LNG transit route was conducted for the 

benefit of the membership. In addition to the USCG sponsored LNG Working Group, 

COTP Sector Northern New England participated in LNG technical working group 
REDACTED VERSION 

7

sessions hosted by the State of Maine, which met periodically to collaborate on safety 

and emergency response aspects of the proposed project. 

The LNG Working Group, Port Safety Forum, State assemblage, and project-related ad 

hoc safety and response meetings included representatives from the following: 

• U.S. Coast Guard 

• Maine Maritime Academy 

• Moran Towing 

• Portland Tugboat 

• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

• National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration 

• National Marine Fisheries 

• NI2 Center for Infrastructure 

• Maine State Fire Marshall 

• Maine Department of Environmental Protection 

• Maine Department of Marine Resources 

• Eastport City Manager 

• Eastport Port Authority 

• Maine Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) 

• Washington County EMA 

• Clean Harbors Response Corp 

• Town of Calais, ME 

• Maine Port Authority 

• Harbor Master, Town of Bar Harbor 

• Maine Bureau of Parks and Lands 

• U.S. Department of Justice 

• Royal Canadian Mounted Police 

• Integrated Border Enforcement Team 

• U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

• Maine Marine Patrol 

• Maine Energy and Policy 

• Maine State Police 

• Save Passamaquoddy Bay 

• Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commission 

• Passamaquoddy Tribe, Pleasant Point Reservation 

• Town of Perry, ME 

• Town of Robbinston, ME 

• Federal Marine Terminal 

• Eastport Pilots 

• Quoddy Pilots 

• Maine Ferry Service 

• Pollution and Safety Advisor/LNG Consultant 

• National Response Corp 

• Penobscot Bay Pilots 
REDACTED VERSION 

8

This LNG Working Group was formed to review the safety risks outlined in Downeast 

LNG’s WSA and those identified and compiled by the COTP, and to help evaluate 

proposed risk mitigation measures and vessel transit operational parameters. 

1.5 Security Working Group 

The USCG conducted its security assessment in conjunction with Law Enforcement (LE) 

elements of its LNG Working Group, the Passamaquoddy Bay/Down East SubCommittee of the Area Maritime Security Committee, and ad hoc sessions involving the 

regional law enforcement community. Representation included: 

• Maine State Fire Marshall 

• Maine Department of Marine Resources 

• City of Calais, ME 

• Maine Pilotage Commission 

• U.S. Coast Guard 

• Maine State Police 

• U.S. Department of Justice 

• Royal Canadian Mounted Police 

• Interagency Border Enforcement Team 

• U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

• Maine Marine Patrol 

• Maine State Police 

• Passamaquoddy Tribe, Pleasant Point Reservation 

• Town of Perry, ME 

• Town of Robbinston, ME 

• City of Eastport, ME 

This Report will not identify specific security mitigation measures, nor divulge any other 

information that could compromise security measures for the proposed facility. Such 

information is considered Sensitive Security Information (SSI) under 49 U.S.C. § 114(s) 

and 49 CFR, Part 1520. Because it discusses potential vulnerabilities or operational 

security measures for the proposed facility; this specific information has been provided to 

FERC as part of the Supplementary Record to this WSR. Members of the LNG Working 

Group were considered to have the “need to know” as defined by 49 C.F.R. §1520.11. 

Accordingly, each signed appropriate Non-Disclosure Statements, which gave them 

access to SSI material related to the safety and security assessment. 

2.0 Port and LNG Route Characterization 

The assessment of the projected route included the examination of waterway attributes, 

weather, port characterization, density and character of marine traffic, zones of concern 

as defined in the Sandia Study, sensitive environmental areas, and population density. 

Applicable navigation charts are NOAA 13394 (approach) and NOAA 13396 (inward 

passage). 
REDACTED VERSION 

9

2.1 General Features 

The natural features in the area along the transit route are rolling hills meeting the waters 

of the passages. The channel is naturally deep and is not required to be maintained by 

dredging. Currents in the area run up to 5-6 knots due to the extreme tides in the area. 

The mean range of tide in the region is 18 feet, with a tidal range from 11-26 feet being 

common, and 28 feet under extraordinary circumstances. The shoreline quickly 

disappears into deep water very close to the shore at high tide. At low tide there is a 

considerable expanse of exposed sand and mud intermixed with a substantially rocky 

shoreline containing shoals and land points that jut out into the waterway. The waterway 

is dotted with large and small islands. The largest islands are located in Canadian waters 

and inhabited with year-round residents. The intended LNG carrier route skirts the 

shoreline of the three Fundy Isles - Deer Island, Campobello Island, and Grand Manan 

Island. 

There are no known physical hazards, such as shipwrecks, reefs, shoals, etc., in this area. 

In addition, there are no man-made obstructions such as bridges, dams, or locks along the 

intended waterway. The only major chokepoint measures approximately 1,000 yards 

wide and is located between Dog Island and Deer Island Point. This area is subject to 

whirlpools on the ebb and flood tides where currents from Western Passage and 

Passamaquoddy Bay converge. Of interest, the so-named “Old Sow” whirlpool has 

garnered significant interest as a tourist attraction and has been blamed for small 

recreational vessels losing control when unknowingly caught in its vortex. Due to the 

extreme and divergent currents in this area, pilots favor the Maine coast off Dog Island 

when making this bend and primarily move ships only during periods of slack tide. 

Transit times are planned to ensure vessels pass through this area as close to slack water 

as possible. The second narrowest point between land masses occurs in Canadian waters, 

within Head Harbor Passage between Casco Bay Island and Head Harbor, and measures 

approximately 1,200 yards in width. 

2.2 Transit Route Overview 

The proposed Downeast LNG facility is to be constructed on the down slope of Mill 

Cove on the west side of the mouth of the St. Croix River. An LNG carrier’s transit from 

sea to the Downeast LNG terminal would follow a circuitous route through Canadian 

waters. This is virtually the same route as currently used by all deep-draft vessels 

servicing the Passamaquoddy Bay port area. Deep-draft vessels bound for the ports of 

Bayside, New Brunswick, or Eastport, ME, either enter the area via the Gulf of Maine 

and into Grand Manan Channel, or by transiting Grand Manan Basin into the Bay of 

Fundy. 

A major issue of concern and routing factor for mariners is the protection of the North 

Atlantic Right Whale, which is known to aggregate in large numbers to the east of Grand 

Manan Island near the Roseway Basin off the coast of Nova Scotia. The North Atlantic 

right whale has been listed as “endangered” under the Endangered Species Act since 

1973. Consequently, the right whale has been the subject of major concern throughout 
REDACTED VERSION 

10

the WSA-review process. The potential increase in vessel traffic, especially if other 

regional LNG facility proposals come to fruition, could result in increases in vessel 

strikes of whales. Additionally, potential vessel traffic increases could also raise the risk 

for a significant pollution incident that could result in habitat degradation. The plight of 

the right whale is obviously a trans-boundary issue. The topic is of significant research 

interest by both nations in that the Bay of Fundy and Gulf of Maine are both critical 

habitat for the right whale and represent the whale’s primary foraging ground. In 

addition, the east-west ship traffic to port(s) bisects the north-south movements of 

reproducing female whales that congregate in this area. Therefore, protecting whales 

against ship strikes and other interference is a critical environmental management issue. 

In July of 2003, the routing scheme through the Bay of Fundy was modified to reduce the 

likelihood of mortality or serious injury to these marine mammals as a result of ship 

collisions. Specifically, the northern segment of the shipping lanes was moved eastward 

approximately four miles at the maximum point and a designated turn-out lane for ships 

turning west towards Eastport, ME, was established. It was determined that this approach 

would be at least 80% effective in reducing strikes and yet afford safe and economical 

commercial marine operations. 

While no mandatory deep draft vessel routing is currently prescribed for the proposed 

transit area, Downeast LNG proposes that LNG carriers en route to their Mill Cove 

terminal enter the area via the Grand Manan Channel only, thereby: 

(1) avoiding the designated right whale conservation zones altogether, and 

 

(2) providing a potential site for a USCG boarding in U.S. waters south of Quoddy 

Narrows in the vicinity of West Quoddy Head. 

Figure 3 depicts the proposed route. Specifically, LNG vessels would approach the U.S. 

coast from the Atlantic Ocean to a point about five miles southeast of Cutler, ME, and ten 

miles northwest of the southern end of Grand Manan Island. From this point the ship 

would turn northeast and roughly parallel the coast of Maine between Cutler, ME, and 

Quoddy Head State Park at a distance of about two to three miles. Along this same 

segment, the ship’s route would also parallel the northwest coast of Grand Manan Island 

at a distance of five to nine miles. The ship would continue on its northeasterly course 

into Canadian waters, roughly paralleling the east and northeast coasts of Campobello 

Island, New Brunswick, to the entrance of Head Harbor Passage. 

The ship’s transit would then enter Head Harbor Passage where it would pass 

Campobello Island along the island’s north shore, to Friar Roads south of Indian Island 

and Cherry Isle, into U.S. waters as it neared Eastport, ME. It would pass along that 

city’s eastern shore, up Western Passage, passing Quoddy, ME, to the west and Deer 

Island, New Brunswick to the east. The ship’s transit would continue north through 

Western Passage along the international boundary between Canada and the United States, 

keeping Deer Island to the right and the Maine coast on the left until turning 

northwesterly back into U.S. waters opposite Lewis Cove to reach the intended project 

site near the mouth of the St. Croix River. A typical transit, from the time an LNG 
REDACTED VERSION 

11

carrier would enter Head Harbor Passage to the time it reaches the proposed Downeast 

LNG Terminal, would take approximately two and one half to three and one half hours. 

Figure 3 - Proposed Route 
REDACTED VERSION 

12

2.3 Transit Route Alternatives 

As discussed above, vessels bound for the Passamaquoddy Bay port area can take one of 

two routes; effectively transit Grand Manan Channel to the west of Grand Manan Island, 

or enter the traffic lanes in the Grand Manan basin and follow the traffic scheme on the 

easterly side of Grand Manan Island towards the port of St. John, New Brunswick, 

turning west at the established turn-out sector discussed above. Both routes converge 

offshore in the general vicinity of the entrance to Head Harbor Passage, north-northeast 

of Campobello Island. For the purposes of the Waterway Suitability Assessment (WSA) 

process, the transit starting point for the westerly route was deemed West Quoddy Head 

and for the north-easterly route the center of the designated Eastport turn-out lane in the 

St. John Fairway, at 66 degrees 12 minutes North latitude, by 44 degrees 47.5 minutes 

West longitude. 

The only other entrance to the Passamaquoddy Bay port area, aside from Head Harbor 

Passage, is the Quoddy Narrows located between Lubec, ME, and the southern tip of 

Campobello Island. This passage, which is bisected by the international boundary along 

its course, has very strong currents and a relatively shallow depth (28 feet mid channel) 

making it impassable by deep-draft vessels. Moreover, in 1962 the Franklin D. Roosevelt 

Memorial Highway Bridge, an essential link connecting Campobello Island to the 

mainland and having a documented vertical fixed span of 47 feet, was built over the 

Lubec Narrows (10 feet at mid channel), further restricting the size of ship traffic. 

As discussed previously, Downeast LNG has proposed that all prospective LNG carriers 

serving its facility enter the system via the Grand Manan Channel, which is relatively free 

of shoals and would be the most direct passage for those bound for the Bay of Fundy 

from the Gulf of Maine. The Company states that this would serve to avoid the rightwhale-conservation area altogether and better situate the vessel for USCG safety and 

security boardings while still in U.S. waters. 

2.4 Port Area Characterization 

2.4.1 Maritime Commerce 

The major commercial ports in the area are Eastport, ME, on the U.S. side, and Bayside, 

New Brunswick, on the Canadian side of the waterway. 

The port of Eastport is operated by the Eastport Port Authority. The Eastport Breakwater 

Terminal has berthing for a vessel up to 700 feet in length with approach depths being 

over 100 feet and the mean low water depth averaging 42 feet. The downtown Fish Pier 

berths two tug boats on the north side, and has slips for transient boats on the south side. 

The Breakwater Terminal is also used by the aquaculture industry, commercial 

fishermen, and recreational boaters. Also located in Eastport is the Estes Head Cargo 

Terminal, which can accommodate a ship of 900 feet in length in Berth A and one up to 
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13

550 feet in Berth B. The 43 acre terminal contains several large warehouses and open 

storage areas. Office space for the Federal Marine Terminals is located just above the 

Estes Head Pier. 

The Bayside Port Corporation in New Brunswick, Canada, is located south of the St. 

Croix River across from Calais, Maine. The facility has three berths with lengths of 330, 

264, and 462 feet, and corresponding depths of 26.7, 21.5, and 32 feet, respectively. The 

approach channel has a depth of 70 feet, and the terminal is affixed with a ship loader 

used for quarried aggregate material. The terminal’s main source of traffic consists of 

gypsum, potatoes, and sensitive cold food storage. A review of waterborne commodities 

being delivered to, and/or shipped from, the regional Passamaquoddy Bay ports was 

conducted. It was determined that: 

• No bulk petroleum products are actually transported by vessel or barge through 

the Passamaquoddy Bay area; however, crude oil traffic traverses the Bay of 

Fundy itself in order to reach the port of St. John, New Brunswick. 

• Ammonium nitrate, shipped in bags as low-grade agriculture fertilizer in support 

of potato farming in Maine and New Brunswick, has been transported by vessel 

to Bayside, New Brunswick, on the average of 1-3 times in any given year. The 

non-regular commodity is offloaded from vessels and transferred directly into 

awaiting trucks for immediate over-the-road delivery. 

• No bulk chemical carriers call on either Eastport or Bayside. 

There was some conjecture that dynamite was being routinely shipped by vessel to the 

port of Bayside in support of regional construction, mining, and quarry/aggregate 

operations. No documentary evidence was discovered that sustained this speculation, and 

the Bayside Port Corporation reported that there had been no dynamite shipped through, 

or to, their port since it has been in operation. 

2.4.2 Port Level Impacts 

Commerce in the area consists almost entirely of aquaculture, farming, ecotourism, and 

commercial fishing. Some of those who commented during this review process described 

commercial fishing and fisheries, occurring on both sides of the international border, as 

the “economic engine” of the region. Aquaculture and fishing related industries 

reportedly employ over 6,000 persons in Charlotte County, New Brunswick, and 

Washington County, ME. 

The area also supports a good deal of lobster fishing, fish weirs, and aquaculture. Due to 

the strong currents, commercial fishing within the channel is relatively light. Most of the 

lobster fishing is conducted in the Grand Manan Channel and along the coast south of 

Lubec Narrows. Aquaculture has been a mainstay industry in the area, with salmon being 

the principal fish grown and harvested. Research is ongoing regarding the potential of 

cod farming as well. The state-controlled leases for these facilities are generally along 

the waterway in shallower water than that transited by deep-draft vessels. Reportedly, on 
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any given day there are approximately twenty small commercial draggers and lobster 

boats working in the inlets and coves. The regional pilots have estimated that about 

twenty fishing vessels operate out of the U.S. side, and fifteen to twenty from the 

Canadian side seasonally, but not necessarily all at the same time. 

Primarily, the fish catch is lobster and herring, with limited amounts of scallops and other 

species. There are some shellfish (soft-shell clam) nurseries along the transit route; 

however, these areas are well inshore where manual harvesting of the clams is 

accomplished using hand rakes. The shorelines along most of Head Harbor Passage, 

Friar Roads, and Western Passage are steep and rocky, offering little habitat for the softshelled clam. The majority of the remaining area that would provide the necessary 

habitat is adversely affected by the “red tide,” a “bloom” of damaging marine 

microorganisms; only a few of the coves/mud flats are actually open to shellfish 

harvesting. Scallops are harvested commercially by draggers, primarily in Cobscook Bay 

and South Bay, which are south and west of the transit route and proposed facility site. 

Due in large part to the strong tidal currents, the bulk of lobsters landed is caught along, 

and offshore, the outer Maine coast. Few traps are actually set inside Cobscook Bay, 

Western Passage, or Passamaquoddy Bay; the extreme currents make it difficult for 

fishermen to set and haul them. Although not formally documented, local fishermen 

contend that Mill Cove (the proposed Downeast LNG site) is a rich breeding, hatching, 

and nursery ground for lobsters, and that any major disturbance to the underwater bottom 

in connection with the proposed project trestle construction could significantly impact 

future lobster catches. 

Members of the Fundy North Fishermen’s Association, Cobscook Bay Fishermen’s 

Association, Grand Manan Fishermen’s Association, and others expressed anxiety about 

increased deep-draft vessel traffic, and more specifically LNG carriers, adversely 

affecting their industry. There was considerable apprehension that USCG established 

safety and/or security zones would adversely hamper their ability to freely fish and move 

about during LNG carrier transits, with the assumption being that the entire waterway 

would be closed to boaters. As denoted in Section 3, the USCG anticipates setting and 

enforcing safety/security zones in U.S. waters during carrier transits to ensure the safety 

of the surrounding communities, the boating public, and the carrier itself. However, there 

are specific boundary parameters applied to any such zones, and in most cases there will 

be ample room for boaters to still freely navigate the waterway along the outer periphery 

of the channel and ahead and astern of any LNG carrier present. As well, the zones will 

move with the vessel, with the average time for the zone to pass any given point 

corresponding to approximately eighteen minutes. While the zones could cause slight 

delays and/or interferences, proper voyage planning and attention to advance Broadcasts 

to Mariners should help alleviate potential impositions and conflicts. 

The land and islands along the transit route and in the vicinity of the proposed facility site 

are relatively remote, rural, and sparsely-populated, especially during the wintertime. 

During the late spring, summer, and early fall seasons, however, the population density 

swells. Tourism along the entire Maine coast also increases significantly at that time, and 

contributes greatly to the regional economy. The tourism industry in the area is estimated 

at $300-400 million, with much of the attraction to the area centered on its natural beauty, 
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fish, whales, and other wildlife. Although the “down east corridor” does not presently 

experience the same tourist “pull” in comparison to communities further south in Maine, 

the region, nonetheless, depends on eco-tourism dollars to supplement its fishing, 

lobstering, agricultural, and wood harvesting industries. In addition, the City of Eastport 

and other municipalities along the regional shoreline are exploring a number of touristrelated ventures to increase local employment opportunities in the future. 

St. Andrews, New Brunswick, a Canadian resort community located on the western shore 

of the St. Croix River geographically opposite of the proposed Downeast LNG site, relies 

almost exclusively on eco-tourism for its economic well-being. Other attractions and 

sources of eco-tourism related income include kayaking, recreational fishing, canoeing, 

and sightseeing by boat, including whale-watching. 

As identified by USCG records and confirmed during a Ports and Waterways Safety 

Assessment (PAWSA), the number of maritime-related events that could potentially 

impact or impede deep draft vessel traffic flow for the region is relatively small. 

Historically, Fourth of July festivities in Eastport involve recreational boating events and 

usually include a U.S. Navy vessel port visit. A “Sailabration Parade,” sponsored by the 

Save the Bay organization, also transits Head Harbor Passage during that festival. There 

are other annual events and festivals held in the immediate port area which attract a 

number of visitors, but do not significantly affect boating traffic. These include the 

Memorial Day weekend Down East Spring Bird Watching Festival, Fourth of July Old 

Home Week, Maine Salmon Festival in September, and the Eastport Festival of Lights 

held in December. 

The entire Passamaquoddy Bay area is characterized by its pristine environment, many 

natural attractions, and abundant wildlife. The waters of the Bay of Fundy leading up the 

existing facilities and proposed Downeast terminal are known habitats for whales and 

other marine mammals, including, as discussed above, the North Atlantic right whale. 

Whale-watching is a major tourist attraction in the area, particularly for tours out of St. 

Andrews, New Brunswick. Consequently, significant efforts have been undertaken, 

including the shifting of the traffic scheme in the vicinity of Grand Manan Island, to 

protect this endangered species’ breeding and feeding grounds. Other whales, such as 

minke, finback, and humpback, are also common. In addition, porpoises, seals, bald 

eagles, osprey, ducks, and many types of sea birds make their home in the waters of Head 

Harbor Passage and Friar Roads. 

Obviously, a major concern to the regional boaters and residents in the area is the 

heightened risk of a maritime accident due to the potentially three-fold (pending multiple 

LNG proposals) increase in deep-draft vessel traffic along the transit route. Although a 

significant number of whale-watching and sight seeing tour boats operate out of the St. 

Andrew vicinity, they normally transit Letite Passage in order to get to the Bay of Fundy 

whale viewing and wildlife habitat areas. This effectively reduces the vessel traffic in 

Western Passage and Head Harbor Passage and would minimize any conflicts. 
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2.4.3 Iconic Value 

The Roosevelt Campobello International Park is located on the southern end of 

Campobello Island, which directly abuts Head Harbor Passage and Friar Roads. The 

Park and its Commission were established in 1964 by a treaty between the U.S. and 

Canada as a symbol of friendship. As a result, the Park holds iconic value for both U.S. 

and Canadian citizens alike. One of the Park’s main attractions is the historic summer 

home of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, which receives approximately 150,000 visitors 

annually. The Park is well known for its unspoiled natural beauty and offers spectacular, 

unbroken views of rugged coastline, estuarine bays, and the open ocean. Tourism dollars 

have a significant and positive ripple-effect on the economic health of the area. 

The Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commissioners have voiced grave concern 

regarding the proposed development of the Downeast LNG terminal and resultant tanker 

traffic, citing safety and security concerns due to its extreme closeness to the transit route. 

They fear that a large-scale movement of LNG cargo in an area unsuited to such traffic 

poses an unacceptable risk. A release of fuel oil, lube oil, or LNG product as a result of 

an accidental grounding or intentional act of terrorism would result in unacceptable 

ecological harm to the unique environment and present an even greater health hazard to 

the surrounding population. 

Some persons who commented on this proposal opined that an accidental or intentional 

release of LNG would not only be catastrophic to the Park and Island, but would be 

devastatingly compounded by the absence of trained personnel and proper response 

equipment needed to effectively combat a fire of such magnitude and proportion due to 

the remoteness of the area. In general, the law enforcement, public safety, and 

emergency response assets and capabilities in the U.S. and Canada are in keeping with 

the rural nature of the area – minimally staffed, minimally equipped and trained, and 

limited in their ability to expand due to their small tax base. 

2.5 Areas of Environmental Significance 

The Passamaquoddy Bay port area is characterized by its pristine environment, natural 

attractions and abundant wildlife. The Bay of Fundy, Passamaquoddy Bay, and 

Cobscook Bay (and all approaches) are areas of unusual biodiversity and are home to a 

number of species listed as endangered, threatened, or of special concern. A number of 

marine research and biological studies have been conducted by such institutions as 

Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and the New England Aquarium, 

with focus on protecting and preserving endangered aquatic life, and integrated marine 

management strategies within and for the Bay of Fundy, Passamaquoddy Bay, and 

Cobscook Bay, including adjacent estuaries. Subjects of study included the aquaculture 

industry, commercial fisheries and hatcheries, protection of seabirds, marine mammals 

and exploited species, among others. Collectively, the area has been reported as being 

the most diverse aquatic ecosystem on the eastern seaboard of North America. 

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review process is designed to evaluate 

each project independently and ensure any and all potential impacts to the environment 
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have been carefully considered. The assessment includes an analysis of potential 

pollutants and the ability to reduce or eliminate such pollution. 

Part and parcel to the NEPA assessment is the individual state permitting/application 

review process. Project applicants must demonstrate compliance with applicable federal 

and state laws and regulations regarding environmental protection to receive the 

necessary approvals needed to construct their respective project. Detailed information 

and data concerning environmentally sensitive areas, endangered species, wildlife 

refuges, estuaries, aquaculture, and general areas of environmental significance, which 

could be impacted in one way or another by the Downeast LNG project, are contained in 

Resource Report 3, filed with FERC. 

The following is a sampling of some of the area’s ecological and environmental concerns, 

followed by a “snapshot” of regional resource centers, sensitive sites, estuaries and 

refuges. It should be noted that not all identified environmentally-significant areas would 

be directly impacted by the Downeast LNG proposal due to their geographical location 

and/or distance; however, these sites are considered “common” to the region and often 

referred to collectively. 

The waters of the Bay of Fundy leading up to the existing regional facilities and proposed 

LNG terminals are known habitats for whales, including the North Atlantic right whale, 

which is a federally endangered species. Along the entire Eastern seaboard, significant 

efforts are being taken to protect this marine mammal. Canada, through its Fisheries and 

Oceans Department, created two Right Whale Conservation Zones in the area. Zone 1, 

where right whales have been most frequently observed, includes Grand Manan Basin 

within the Bay of Fundy, and Zone 2 includes the Roseway Basin, located between 

Browns and Baccaro Banks on the southern Scotia shelf. Ships are asked to avoid this 

area, if possible. If they do transit the area, they are required to decrease speed without 

sacrificing maneuverability, post lookouts, avoid maneuvering around marine mammal 

activity, and report any marine mammal sightings or collisions with same. 

Other whales such as minke, finback, and humpback are common to the waters of Head 

Harbor Passage and Friar Roads, as well as porpoises and seals. Bald eagles, Peregrine 

Falcons, Osprey, ducks, and a variety of sea birds, such as the Atlantic Puffin and 

Common Tern, make their home along the bay and waterway as well. 

According to the referenced research studies, open ocean aquaculture must avoid areas of 

known deep draft vessel traffic and anchorages in order to be successful. For that reason, 

the safety of other craft, and the protection of the right whale, designated traffic lanes 

now exist for large ships traveling between the southeastern entrance to the Bay of Fundy 

and the port of St. John, New Brunswick. These sea lanes are used by approximately 840 

vessels annually, most of them petroleum tankers bound for, or departing, St. John. 

Environmentally sensitive areas include: 

• The U.S. St. Croix Island is a designated heritage site. Access to the island is by 

boat only, from either the U.S. or Canadian shores of the St. Croix River. 
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• The Huntsman Marine Science Center is located adjacent to the DFO Biological 

Station in Brandy Cove, St. Andrews, New Brunswick. The Center houses an 

aquarium and is in the process of expanding to the shorefront to further encourage 

tourism and public access to the waterfront. 

• Within Canadian boundaries, other environmentally sensitive areas include the 

coasts of Grand Manan Island and Deer Island (Clark Gregory Preserve and the 

Robert Stewart Preserve), and the West Isles area. As well, Campobello Island, 

with its coastline along the Bay of Fundy, houses numerous environmentally 

sensitive areas including the Roosevelt International Park.

• Other significant areas include the St. Croix Estuary, located along the coastal 

region of Charlotte and neighboring areas surrounding St. Andrews, and the 

Cobscook Bay region – a unique ecosystem and estuary of significance renowned 

for its eagle habitat. 

• The Moosehorn National Wildlife Refuge, located immediately south of Calais, 

ME, consists of two divisions: the Baring Division, which covers 20,016 acres 

and is located southeast of Calais; and the Edmunds Division, which is comprised 

of 8,735 acres and borders the tidal waters of Cobscook Bay. The Refuge was 

established in 1937 and is first in the chain of migratory refuges extending from 

Maine to Florida. 

3.0 Safety and Security Assessment 

Downeast LNG contracted Det Norske Veritas, (USA), Inc. (DNV), to conduct the 

Follow-On Waterway Suitability Assessment, in accordance with the guidance contained 

in NVIC 05-05 on its behalf. A Preliminary WSA, providing the outline of the proposed 

project and projected impacts to the port community, had been prepared by TRC Security 

LP (TRC). The safety assessment evaluated the risks of an accidental release of LNG 

consequent to such incidents as collisions, allisions, and groundings. Potential problems 

that could lead to an accidental release were considered and the likelihood and 

consequences of those events evaluated. The consequence analysis evaluation was based 

on accidental release scenarios as outlined in the Sandia National Laboratories Report 

SAND2004-6258 (Sandia Report), a study commissioned by the Department of Energy 

(DOE), entitled Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large Liquefied 

Natural Gas (LNG) Spill Over Water, dated December 2004. The corresponding Zones 

of Concern parameters related to an accidental release of LNG, as determined by DNV in 

conjunction with the Sandia Report, are depicted in Figures 6 through 10. The security 

assessment evaluated the risks of intentional releases of LNG and explored threat, 

vulnerability, and consequence. The probability of an incident was evaluated in terms of 

threat and vulnerability, where threat was considered as the likelihood of an attack and 

vulnerability being the likelihood that such an attack could succeed. As was done with 

the safety risk assessment, potential consequences relating to an intentional release of 

LNG were considered based on release scenarios outlined in the Sandia Report. The 

corresponding Zones of Concern for an intentional release are shown in Figures 11 
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through 15. This Report also contains a discussion of strategies aimed at managing the 

potential risks associated with the proposed project. 

3.1 Ports and Waterways Safety Assessment 

A Ports and Waterways Safety Assessment (PAWSA), conducted in October 2006, 

provided a baseline for analyses of navigational safety concerns for the Passamaquoddy 

Bay port area. The PAWSA is a systematic assessment process designed to identify 

major waterway safety hazards, estimate risk levels, and evaluate potential measures to 

reduce risk. 

Participation in the PAWSA was through invitation and was designed to include a broad 

cross-section of waterway users, port stakeholders, and maritime professionals. 

Participants included representatives of the marine industry, pilots, tug operators, 

passenger/ferry operators, commercial fishing and aquaculture industry, environmental 

groups, state and local officials, local and regional law enforcement, and federal and 

provincial governments. Canadian government officials, members of the LNG industry, 

and concerned citizens’ groups were on hand to observe the process. 

The PAWSA covered existing navigation concerns for the Passamaquoddy Bay port area; 

including those anticipated should the proposed Downeast LNG terminal be approved. In 

consideration of an alternate LNG proposal, the potential for cumulative impacts relative 

to other LNG terminals that may be operating simultaneously was factored into the 

assessment process as well. As a baseline, the participants informally defined the 

geographic bounds of the waterway area under consideration as the contiguous waters of 

Passamaquoddy Bay and its tributaries, from the International Bridge at Calais, ME, 

seaward to the eastern shore of Campobello Island and West Quoddy Head, 

encompassing both the U.S. and Canadian waters, and including Head Harbor Passage. 

The participants examined all risk factors along the waterway, including those 

presumptive risks associated with the proposed LNG traffic. Participants then crosschecked the identified risks against mitigation measures and practices that are currently in 

place. Further discussion of identified risk areas and potential mitigation factors for the 

port area are contained in the PAWSA. The PAWSA results are being used as part of the 

USCG’s continued assessment of related waterway safety issues associated with this 

LNG proposal. A copy of the PAWSA Report is contained in Appendix B. 

3.2 Thermal Radiation Analysis 

An important consideration in assessing the suitability of the proposed transit route and 

its approaches to support LNG traffic along the intended transit route, as well as the 

suitability of the proposed terminal site, is establishing the size of the hazard zones, or 

Zones of Concern associated with a large release of LNG. The criteria used by Sandia 

National Labs to define the outer limits of the three hazard zones discussed in their 

report, (SAND2004-6285), "Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a 
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Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Spill Over Water", were used/applied in assessing 

potential risks associated with the proposed Downeast LNG project. 

The criterion used to define the outer limits of Zone 1 and Zone 2 is incident heat flux, 

i.e., thermal radiation that would be expected from an intense LNG vapor fire over a 

specified time. Within Zone 1, the thermal radiation can cause serious injuries and/or 

significant damage to structures. Within Zone 2, thermal radiation can cause injuries or 

some damage to structures. The outer limit of Zone 3 is defined based on the lower 

flammability limit of LNG vapor, i.e., the lowest concentration of fuel by volume mixed 

with air that is flammable. Within all three zones, the level of risk of injury or property 

damage is reduced as the distance from the source increases and the thermal radiation 

decreases, as indicated in Figure 4. 

Figure 4 - Hazard Zone Criterion 

Zone 

Distance 

from 

Release (in 

meters) 

Criteria (10 

minute 

exposure time) 

Consequence 

Zone 1 0-500 37.5 kW/m2*

High potential for major injuries or 

significant structural damage consequent 

a pool fire and/or vapor cloud 

Zone 2 500-1600 5 kW/m2

Potential for injuries and limited property 

damage consequent a pool fire and/or 

vapor cloud 

Zone 3 1600-3500 

Lower 

flammability limit 

(5%) 

Reduced potential for injury or damage if 

appropriately clothed or protected 

consequent a vapor cloud only 

Source: Extrapolated data from Sandia Report and NVIC 05-05 

Notes: (1) Zone distance from spill based on an intentional release; the zone criteria for accidental spill scenarios is 

 significantly less. 

*(2) kW/m2 = Kilowatts per square meter 

Therefore, the most significant impacts to public safety and property exist within 

approximately 500 meters of an LNG spill/release, due to the thermal radiation hazards 

from fire, with lower public health and safety impacts at distances approaching 1600 

meters and beyond. 

3.2.1 Hazard Zone Characteristics and Considerations 

The intensity and linear size of the three hazard zones calculated in the Sandia Report for 

accidental and intentional spills/releases of LNG were determined only after extensive 

modeling and testing. However, the potential for an LNG cargo tank breach, the 

dynamics and dispersion rates, and the resultant hazards of such a spill are only generally 

understood and, as such, are only postulated estimates at best. The combination of LNG 

vessel double hull design and current safety management practices throughout the marine 

transportation industry have reduced LNG accidents to a point where there is little 

historical or empirical information from which to arrive at finite conclusions. This lack 

of information forces assumptions to be made when the size, dispersion rate, and thermal 
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hazards of a spill are calculated. Therefore, it should be understood that a level of 

variability exists with the many current models and techniques being used to provide 

adequate guidance on the hazards of an LNG spill. Some of the variables that affect the 

modeling techniques, assumptions, and simplifications include: the size, mass, speed, and 

loaded condition of the carrier; size, mass, collision velocities, and angle of impact if 

collided with another vessel; amount of penetration and whether or not the inner hull and 

primary tank boundary was compromised; size and number of breaches; whether or not 

there were multiple, cascading tank failures; climatic conditions (wind velocity and sea 

state); and reference of the breach to the waterline. 

The Sandia Report, published in December 2004 (SAND2004-6258), based its findings 

on the capacities of LNG carriers in operation at the time. The vessels studied had an 

average upper cargo carrying capacity of 148,000 cubic meters (m3 ), with individual tank 

capacities of approximately 25,000 m3 of LNG, depending on number and type of design. 

The emerging generation of LNG carriers has cargo carrying capacities of as much as 

265,000 m3. In May of 2008, Sandia National Labs published an additional report 

(SAND2008-3153), "Breach and Safety Analysis of Spills Over Water from Large 

Liquefied Natural Gas Carriers" which analyzed impact of LNG spills associated with 

breaches from the emerging larger class of LNG tankers. Overall, the results obtained 

from the more detailed analyses conducted and presented by Sandia were found to be 

similar to the previous conclusions, recommendations, and guidance presented in the 

2004 Sandia LNG report concerning the general scale of hazards to the public and 

property from a large LNG spill over water and approaches to reduce those risks and 

consequences.

For the purposes of this Report, the hazard zones used to assess the possible impacts of 

potential LNG releases resulting from either navigation safety accidents or terrorist 

attacks against the proposed LNG carriers transiting the waters of the Passamaquoddy 

Bay port area and its approaches are based on the computations conducted by Sandia 

National Laboratories in their December 2004 Report. Based on the conclusions 

presented in the Sandia Report of May 2008, the sizes of the hazard zones applied in 

association with the Downeast LNG site are considered applicable to vessels up to a 

maximum of 265,000 m3 cargo capacity.

Figure 5 - Downeast LNG Project Hazard Zones 

Zone 1 

(37.5 kW/m2

) 

Zone 2 

(5 kW/m2) 

Zone 3 

(Lower Flammability 

Limit) 

Intentional Breaches 500 m 546 yds 1600 m 1750 yds 3500 m 2.2 miles 

Accidental Breaches 250 m 273 yds 700 m 765 yds 1700 m 1.06 miles 

Ref: Sandia Report 

As discussed in the December 2004 Sandia Report, Hazard Zone 3 is based on the 

simultaneous release of LNG from three tanks without being ignited. The size of the 

zone is established by calculating the distance the vapor cloud could travel before the 

lower flammability limit (LFL) is reached. Based on the modeling conducted, Sandia 
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National Laboratories established the size of Zone 3 to be 3,500 m from the source of the 

LNG release. 

Figures 6-15 feature the projected zones of concern for LNG vessel traffic transiting from 

sea to the proposed Downeast facility site. Specifically, Figures 6-10 highlight the zones 

of concern through the proposed transit route based on an accidental cargo release. 

Figures 11-15 highlight the zones of concern through the proposed transit route based on 

an intentional cargo release. 

 

Figure 6 

 (Accidental Release) 
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Figure 7 

 

(Accidental Release) 

 
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Figure 8 

 (Accidental Release) 
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Figure 9 

 (Accidental Release) 
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Figure 10 

 

(Accidental Release) 
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 Figure 11 

 

(Intentional Release) 
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Figure 12 

 (Intentional Release) 
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Figure 13 

 (Intentional Release) 
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 Figure 14 

 (Intentional Release) 
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 Figure 15 

 (Intentional Release) 
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3.2.2 Consequence-Zone Analysis 

Consistent with the guidance contained in NVICs 05-05 and 05-08, the WSA submitted 

by Downeast LNG used the Sandia Report to describe the expected consequences of a 

large release of LNG from a carrier onto the water and into the surrounding atmosphere. 

The hazard zones, as discussed earlier, were applied along the intended carrier route to 

geographically depict where the zones may intersect with the population areas and major 

infrastructure elements in and adjacent to the transit waterway. As well, two different risk 

assessments, commensurate with the zones of concern, were conducted and incorporated 

into the Downeast WSA; one for accidental releases and one for intentional breaches. 

3.2.3 Hazard-Zone Impacts 

Preceding Figures 6-10 provide a graphic view of the hazard zones (accidental release) 

applied along the inland portion of the prospective LNG carrier’s transit route. Preceding 

Figures 11-15 detail the same graphic depictions for an intentional release. 1

Complementing the inland portion of the transit route, Figures 16 through 25 are 

provided to graphically depict the zones of concern for an intentional release along the 

LNG carrier approach route from sea. Of note, vessels may proceed up the Grand Manan 

Channel or take an alternate route via the port of St. John, New Brunswick. traffic 

separation zone, turning westerly at the turnout to Head Harbor Passage. Figure 16 

shows a broad view of both possible routes from the sea. Figure 17 shows the zones 

applied to the traffic separation scheme. Figures 18 through 25 show the transit route and 

corresponding zones along the northeast coastline of Maine and Grand Manan Channel 

leading to the proposed facility site. Because these two offshore routes are relatively 

distant from land masses, intentional zones of concern were depicted, as they represent 

the worst-case scenario and corresponding zone size.2 

1

 Figures reprinted courtesy of DNV (USA), Inc. with permission by Downeast LNG.

2

 Reprinted courtesy of WOODLOT ALTERNATIVES, Inc. with permission of Downeast LNG. 
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Figure 16
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Figure 17 
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35

Figure 18 
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36

Figure 19 
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Figure 20 
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38

Figure 21 
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39

Figure 22 
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40

Figure 23 
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41

Figure 24 

 
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42

 Figure 25

LNG burns at extremely high temperatures. Once started, a natural gas fire is quite 

difficult to extinguish. As indicated in the Sandia Report, scientists determined that 

should a large LNG spill on water be ignited, it could burn at 3,000 degrees F for 30 

minutes to an hour, throwing off extreme, potentially damaging radiant heat for the first 

four-tenths of a mile from the vessel. Beyond that range, the degree of heat flux 
REDACTED VERSION 

43

decreases appreciably depending on surrounding climatic conditions (wave height, wind 

speed, ambient temperature, etc.) and geographical impediments such as man-made 

buildings or structures, and natural obstructions such as tree lines and hills. The affected 

distances and hazard parameters related to Sandia zones of concern for an intentional

(i.e., terrorism related) release are: 

 

• Zone 1 - 500 meter radius with resultant fire and severe thermal radiation hazards. 

By definition these are areas in which LNG shipments occur in relatively narrow 

harbors or channels, or ships pass under major bridges or over tunnels, or come in 

within 500 meters of major infrastructure such as military installations, 

commercial/business centers, or national icons. 

• Zone 2 - from 500 to 1600 meters with less severe thermal radiation hazards to 

public safety and property. These are areas of broader channel widths, larger 

open harbors, or over 500 meters from major critical infrastructure elements. 

• Zone 3 – from 1600 to 3500 meters with potential pockets of flammable vapor. 

These are areas where LNG traffic and deliveries occur approximately 1.6 

kilometers from major infrastructure or in large bays or open water. The thermal 

radiation risks to public safety and property are significantly reduced. 

As shown in the Figures on pages 25-34, zones of varying significance impinge on 

communities along both sides of the shared waterway. It should be noted, however, that 

the centerline from which the Zones of Concern are calculated follow the LNG carrier’s 

anticipated course or track line. An LNG carrier “drifting” from the plotted route within 

the channel would, therefore, carry the zones of concern proportionately, where greater 

public safety and environmental effects could be experienced, if a worst case accidental 

or intentional release scenario were realized. 

The other factor used to judge the potential impact of an LNG release is the concentration 

of populace threatened. The three levels of population density, as defined by NVICs 05-

05 and 05-08, are: 

• High population areas – residential areas with a population density of 9,000 

persons or more per square mile; 

• Medium population areas – residential areas with 1,000 to 9,000 persons per 

square mile; and 

• Low population areas – residential areas with less than 1,000 persons per square 

mile. 

Using the above criteria, Downeast LNG concluded in their WSA that the transit route 

passes through relatively low population areas, i.e., predominantly fewer than 1,000 

persons per square mile. By definition, the Pleasant Point Passamaquoddy Tribal 

Reservation, having a population density of 1,376 persons per square mile and located 

about 7 nautical miles downstream of the proposed terminal site and approximately 3⁄4 

nautical miles from the centerline of the transit route, is considered a borderline medium 

population area (other sources report the population density as being 984 persons per 

square mile). By contrast, the popular tourist area of St. Andrews, New Brunswick, is 

located geographically opposite from the proposed Downeast LNG site, and is home to 
REDACTED VERSION 

44

approximately 2500 residents with a population density of 88 persons per square mile. 

The next highest population area affected by a transiting LNG carrier is the City of 

Eastport, ME, with a population density of 448 persons per square mile. Comparatively, 

Campobello Island, New Brunswick, Deer Island, and Robbinston, ME, have population 

densities of 78, 58, and 19 persons per square mile, respectively. Obviously, the 

demographics of the Passamaquoddy Bay port area do not meet the NVIC criterion for 

high population density, both with regard to the vessel’s transit route or surrounding the 

proposed facility site. This statement is not meant to minimize the significance and/or 

importance of the surrounding communities, environment, and population living, working 

or using the waterway. Rather, it simply concludes that the risk of LNG movement 

through the waterway has been evaluated against pre-determined criteria in order to 

measure and prioritize those areas that would be most severely impacted. 

Due to the relative remoteness of the shared waterway and comparatively low 

concentration of defined critical infrastructure and population densities, the following 

generalities, by zone consequence, are provided regarding an intentional release of LNG 

vice a detailed breakdown of the entire transit route by segments: 

Zone 1 

• Zone 1, the measure with the most severe impact, does not affect any high 

population area, public or government centers such as schools, hospitals or 

transportation infrastructure as LNG carriers proceed along the intended track 

line. However, any commercial vessel intended for the port of Bayside may well 

fall into Zone 1 as it passes docked LNG carriers (cumulative consideration if 

other proposed LNG facilities are also built), and similarly, recreational and 

fishing vessels may fall within the zone depending on their course. As well, the 

seasonal ferry crossings connecting Deer Island, New Brunswick and Eastport, 

Maine and Campobello Island, New Brunswick could possibly be within Zone 1 

as an LNG carrier passes. Transit of such vessels through a Zone 1 area of 

concern can be avoided by timing and course changes, if conditions permit. 

• During the LNG carrier’s transit, a Zone 2 impact may very well occur at Dog 

Island Light, affecting portions of Moose Island on the Maine side and Deer 

Island on the New Brunswick side. This area presents the narrowest point in the 

entire transit route and the pilots tend to hug the U.S. side of the dogleg, rather 

than stay in the middle of the channel, in order to avoid the divergent currents 

common to this portion of the waterway. 

• Although no major military post or camp is situated along the waterway, USCG 

Station Eastport, a Search and Rescue (SAR) and Law Enforcement (LE) 

installation, is located on the shore of Eastport and would fall within Zone 1 

and/or 2, depending on the actual course taken by the pilots when navigating the 

bend off Dog Island. 

• When the carriers transit Head Harbor Passage, the northern most edge of Head 

Harbor and shore side neighboring areas on Campobello Island would fall within 
REDACTED VERSION 

45

Zone 1. When the carriers transit Friar Roads and Western Passage, the western 

edge of Deer Island Point, New Brunswick, would also fall into this zone. 

Zone 2 

• Elements within the U.S. which would fall within Zone 2 while vessels transited 

Friar Roads and Western Passage include most of Eastport, Kendall Head, and 

Pleasant Point, ME. While not necessarily classified as “critical infrastructure”, 

i.e. bridges, tunnels, etc., Route 190 provides the only vehicle access to and from 

the City of Eastport. A portion of Route 190 is within the zone of concern. 

• During LNG vessel transits of Head Harbor Passage all Canadian areas and 

communities along the northern and westerly edges of Campobello Island such as 

Brown Head, Wilson’s Beach, Windmill Point, and Bald Head would fall within 

Zone 2. Also within this zone would be the islands off the coast of New 

Brunswick to include Spruce Island, Sandy Island, Casco Bay Island, Green 

Island, Pope Island and Indian Island. Zone 2 would also impact land masses 

along Friar Roads and Western Passage such as West Deer Isle, New Brunswick 

communities west of Highway 772, Doctors Cove, Cummings Cove, and Mink 

Point. 

Zone 3 

• In addition to the localities identified in the above zones, areas impacted by Zone 

3 in the U.S. include all of Moose Island, Pleasant Point, Perry, and Robbinston. 

• On the Canadian side, in addition to all locales previously identified along Head 

Harbor Passage impacted by Zones 1 and 2, Welshpool and all of Northern 

Campobello Island would fall into Zone 3, as would the communities on the 

alternate side of Head Harbor Passage which would encompass areas such as 

Leonardville, Bar Island, and a portion of Southern Deer Island. And, when 

carriers navigate Friar Roads and Western Passage, a major portion of western 

Deer Island falls within this zone as well. 

Within the context of the defined criteria contained in the Sandia Report and the guidance 

contained in the NVICs, Downeast LNG identified the following as not being contained 

within the Zones of Concern, as plotted from the centerline of their intended transit route: 

• any wild and scenic rivers; 

• any shellfish nurseries; 

• any coral reefs; or 

• any marine protected areas (assuming vessels used the Grand Manan Channel, 

which may be their preferred transit route as the North Atlantic right whale and 

Bay of Fundy conservation areas are located to the east of Grand Manan Island). 
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46

A number of comments were received regarding the site selection and proposed LNG 

operations in contrast to the guidelines and recommended industry best practices outlined 

in The Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators Ltd. (SIGTO) 

publications. As emphasized by SIGTO, each port environment presents a unique set of 

risk exposures for LNG operations and, as such, each requires a specific, detailed study 

of the operating environment in every case. The waterway suitability assessment process 

and the FERC site analysis closely parallels SIGTO’s Quantitative Risk Assessment 

(QRA) methodology and, in fact, utilized many similar decision-making tools. 

Of specific comment and concern was SIGTO’s pronouncement that an LNG site 

location should be suitably distant from centers of population; and the associated mooring 

piers should not be situated in heavily trafficked areas or within constricting channels 

where other ships pose collision risks. There was expressed concern that Downeast 

LNG’s proposed site did not follow SIGTO’s site selection criteria in these regards. It 

must be understood that SIGTO’s publications are meant as general guidance only. 

While based on industry “best practices,” the recommended procedures and 

precautionary measures provided in their Information Papers are not regulatory standards. 

Rather, they are intended as transit/site-specific measures to reduce risk and to be applied 

where practical and within realistic limits. The USCG recognizes the significance of 

SIGTO and referred to their documents throughout the WSA process as a risk 

management measure. 

As described above, Zones of Concern were applied along the carrier transit route to 

graphically identify and depict areas where an accidental release of LNG may cause the 

most severe consequences. Unique to the Passamaquoddy Bay port area, three separate 

and distinct LNG proposals are being evaluated for FERC approval. Although each 

proposal is being assessed on its own merits, there are cumulative impacts that should be 

taken into account on the event that each ultimately receives approval. There is one case 

of particular note: A competing LNG project proposal involves the construction and 

operation of a facility about 6.8 nautical miles downstream of the Downeast LNG site. 

The alternate proposal includes a marine terminal designed with two staggered berths 

near to affiliated regasification facilities. As part of that proposed operation, two LNG 

carriers will most likely be at the facility simultaneously; one will be actively offloading 

product into the sendout line via the regasification system, while the other stands by, 

ready to offload. According to the developer’s stated plans, this event will be typical 

during its first phase of operation while storage tanks are being constructed in the 

neighboring town of Perry, but are expected to be rare thereafter. Although only one 

carrier will actually be transferring cargo at any given time, the gross amount of LNG 

attributable to two berthed carriers having a midpoint separation distance of about 575 

yards, becomes an accumulative factor affecting the overall dimensional range of 

overlapping zones of concern – compounded by the likelihood of an LNG carrier passing 

relatively close aboard (approximately 1,100 yards to the centerline of the established 

vessel track line) when en route the Downeast LNG proposed site. (Note: Effective 

October 17, 2008, the FERC formally dismissed the application of this alternate proposal 

without prejudice. The applicant has stated intentions to re-apply in the future once the 

facility design plans are finalized.) Also of significance, a third prospective developer 
REDACTED VERSION 

47

 

has entered the pre-filing process with the FERC and filed a LOI with the Coast Guard to 

build and operate an LNG facility near the City of Calais on the St Croix River, also 

necessitating the need for cumulative impact assessments. 

The above scenario is presented only to highlight the fact that there may be a need to recalculate the hazard zone parameters in order to qualify the cumulative effects of double 

cargo loads being present at the opposing terminal site for the safety of the surrounding 

populous and infrastructure. Apart from any mitigating strategies and measures that may 

become apparent as a result of an impending analysis, the USCG will require, at a 

minimum, a tractor tug of minimum 60 ton bollard pull and equipped with American 

Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Class 1 (Fi Fi 1) equivalent firefighting capabilities to be 

moored outboard of all berthed LNG carriers at all times to assist with emergency 

departure maneuvers and/or assist in the fending off of uncontrollable craft. 

3.3 International and Sovereignty Considerations 

As denoted in the Transit Route Overview, LNG carriers bound for the proposed LNG 

facility site must travel through Canadian territorial waters, specifically Head Harbor 

Passage, before entering U.S. waters at the confluence of Friar Road. The vessels then 

straddle the international boundary before turning into exclusive U.S. waters to reach the 

intended terminal site, to be located on the Maine side of Passamaquoddy Bay near its 

confluence with the St. Croix River. Based on the sovereignty over their portions of 

these waters, the Canadian and provincial governments have publicly expressed strong 

opposition to any and LNG carriers traversing their waters, citing potential security, 

environmental, navigational, and safety risks. Also of expressed concern are the public 

health of its local residents, economic viability of the fishing and tourism industries, and 

the pristine environment of the region. Jurisdictional issues have been at the forefront as 

well. The Canadian government has indicated that it considers all of Head Harbor 

Passage to be the internal waters of Canada and that the international right of “innocent 

passage” does not apply. This has been a matter of extensive discussions and legal 

review ever since the Downeast LNG proposal was first announced. In contrast to 

Canada’s assertion, it is the formal position of the United States that vessels departing to 

and from U.S. ports on the waters of the Passamaquoddy Bay port area enjoy the nonsuspendable right of innocent passage under customary international law as reflected in 

the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).3

 Canada became a 

party to UNCLOS in December 2003; the United States is not party to the Convention in 

that the U.S. Senate has not yet provided the necessary approval.4

 One important 

consequence of the U.S.’s current non-party status is that the United States is not subject 

to, nor can the U.S. make use of, the compulsory dispute settlement provisions of 

3

 United States, Message of President Clinton transmitting the United Nations Convention on the Law of 

the Sea to the U.S. Senate for Ratification in 1994, “Commentary -The 1982 united Nations Convention on 

the Law of the Sea and the Agreement on Implementation of Part XI,” 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, Treaty 

Document 103-39, at p.19. 

4

 Marjorie Ann Brown, “The U.N. Law of the Sea Convention and the United States: Development Since 

October 2003,” (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Order Code RS21890, updated 27 

January 2006). 
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48

 

UNCLOS, since this is clearly a right/obligation that arises from being a party and is not 

a right/obligation that arises from customary international law.5 

The Province of New Brunswick has filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and Comment

with FERC, in addition to, a Motion to Suspend Proceedings. These documents, along 

with other official correspondence relating to the subject emanating from the offices of 

the Canadian Ambassador, Premier of New Brunswick, Chairman of FERC, U.S. State 

Department, and U.S. Senate, are maintained in the public docket by FERC and 

accessible on their website. 

There has been ongoing correspondence and a continued dialogue between COTP Sector 

Northern New England and its counterpart Canadian agencies. Early on, the COTP 

initiated meetings with colleagues in Transport Canada, the Departments of Foreign 

Affairs, Fisheries and Oceans, Environment, and Public Safety and Security during trips 

to Halifax/Dartmouth, Moncton, and Fredericton, New Brunswick, to build on the 

existing professional rapport and discuss issues of the mutual concern regarding the 

project proposal and need for joint cooperation and a unified response capability. 

Additionally, the COTP met with the Mayor of St. Andrews and members of his council 

to discuss local safety, economic, and environmental concerns in relation to the proposed 

operation. 

During the initial assessment proceedings, pertinent branches within the Canadian 

government, such as Transport Canada, were granted permission by the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs to engage in “technical” discussions with COTP Sector Northern New 

England in an effort to identify mutual issues of concern, potential risks, and address 

possible mitigating factors surrounding the proposed LNG ventures. However, 

consequent to the official stance taken by the government in regards to “innocent 

passage” and the formal filing of the documents discussed above, Canadian officials 

curtailed further participation in the review process and subsequent joint interrogatories 

have since stalled. This action caused the assessment process to slow and ostensibly 

inhibited Downeast LNG’s ability to assimilate resource information and fully assess 

environmental impacts to Canadian waters and property; requisites that were 

communicated via follow-on agency data requests. Developing bilateral arrangements 

and protocols is necessary on a number of fronts to ensure that adequate safety, security, 

and environmental response mechanisms are in place to ensure safe and efficient transits 

and for the protection and welfare of the surrounding marine communities. The eventual 

involvement and cooperation of Canada’s maritime, environmental, and public safety 

authorities are paramount to ensure the safety and security of the waterway. 

In addition to examining Canadian sovereignty issues, the inherent rights and concerns of 

the Passamaquoddy Tribal Nation, whose Sipayik members reside in the vicinity of the 

proposed project site, have been issues of significant concern and consideration by COTP 

Sector Northern New England. The Pleasant Point Reservation, which is located at the 

edge of the transit route on the banks of Western Passage, is approximately eight nautical 

miles downstream from the planned Downeast LNG site. The Indian Township 

5

 Ted L. McDorman, “The International Legal Status of Head Harbor Passage,” Research Memorandum, 

January 2007, p. 8. 
REDACTED VERSION 

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Reservation, situated further upstream on the edge of the St. Croix River near Calais, ME, 

is beyond the transit route. However, that Reservation could be directly or indirectly 

impacted by an LNG terminal or vessel mishap. Additionally, some Passamaquoddy 

Tribal members live in Canada just across the St. Croix River. 

Sovereignty, a critical feature of federal Indian law, has been an exceedingly complex 

and sensitive issue for the Wabanaki People (Coalition of Abenaki, Penobscot, Maliseet, 

Passamaquoddy and Mi’kaq Tribes) within the State of Maine for hundreds of years. In 

order to appreciate the complexity surrounding Passamaquoddy Tribal sovereignty issues 

the following historical overview is provided. 

In 1790, the First Congress of the United States enacted the Nonintercourse Act, 

declaring that any transfer of land from Indians to non-Indians had to be approved by 

Congress. The law was designed to protect Indians from unscrupulous and unfair 

property transactions. However, during the 19th Century and much of the 20th Century, 

the Wabanaki People of Maine were considered “state” Indians, because they had never 

signed any treaties with the federal government. Thus, Indians in Maine were considered 

to have no inherent sovereignty, no right to self-government, and were excluded from 

land trust relationships; i.e., they were not protected under the Non-intercourse Act. 

Purportedly, the Maine State Legislature assumed the authority to make whatever 

decisions it thought necessary at any given time, and it was during this time period that 

most of the land of the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot People was transferred, through a 

variety of transactions, to the State of Maine. These land transfers were never approved 

by Congress. 

In 1972, the Passamaquoddy Tribe filed suit in federal court seeking to force the federal 

government to return their lands; an area encompassing 60% of the State of Maine. The 

suit also sought to establish that the Passamaquoddy tribe and Penobscot Indian Nation 

were entitled to the special services that the federal government makes available to 

Indians in other parts of the country, that they still possess their inherent sovereignty, and 

that the State of Maine had no power to interfere with their self-government. The 

Passamaquoddy Tribe won this suit in U.S. District Court in 1975, and the U.S. Court of 

Appeals affirmed that decision. Neither the federal government nor the State of Maine 

sought to appeal that decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. Within months of this 

landmark decision, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it would sue the State 

of Maine and its largest land holders on behalf of the Tribes for the return of the land if 

an out-of-court settlement could not be reached. At the same time, the federal 

government also announced that from then on the tribes would be eligible for the special 

services that the federal government provides to other tribes. 

In a memorandum the Justice Department described the case as “potentially the most 

complex litigation ever brought before the federal courts with social costs and economic 

impacts without precedent ....” This conclusion was based on the size of the claim (12.5 

million acres, or 60% of the State of Maine, with an assessed value of $25 billion), and 

the fact that 350,000 people lived, worked, and often owned property within the disputed 

area. In 1979, the Maine Supreme Court determined and ruled that the inherent 
REDACTED VERSION 

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sovereignty of the Passamaquoddy People survives and that the State of Maine had no 

power to interfere in their self-government. 

Over the next few years negotiations were intense. The Governor of Maine persuaded 

the congressional delegation from Maine to ask Congress to pass legislation that would 

bar the Passamaquoddy Tribe and Penobscot Indian Nation from continuing in court by 

retroactively approving the treaties that their claims were based on. The tribes 

maintained that such a move would be illegal and unjust. 

The situation was extremely tense until President Carter called for a resolution. Through 

the actions of an appointed work group, an agreement was ultimately reached. The 

Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act (MICSA), signed by President Carter in 1980, is the 

Federal codification for this agreement. In the end, the Passamaquoddy Tribe and 

Penobscot Nation received a total of $81.5 million, and 150,000 acres for each tribe. 

The State of Maine enacted companion legislation to MICSA, known as the Maine 

Implementation Act (MIA). It attempted to define the relationship between the three 

Tribes and the State of Maine. Its interpretation has proven controversial, and many 

issues are still in dispute, including concerns of aboriginal rights. One unresolved issue is 

that the Passamaquoddy Tribe claims the waters from the head of the St. Croix River to 

Pemaquid Point as their own. There continues to be spirited debates about state versus 

tribal jurisdiction in many areas, including land-use regulation, tribal courts, and fish and 

wildlife enforcement.6

COTP Sector Northern New England is sensitive to the issues pertaining to 

Passamaquoddy Nation sovereignty and has reached out to the Pleasant Point Sipayik 

Tribal Council to seek clarification on the Tribe’s perception of its authority with regard 

to the territorial waters of the Passamaquoddy Bay area. Additionally, Pleasant Point law 

enforcement, fire and emergency response, and environmental management personnel 

have been active participants in the LNG Working Group proceedings to assist in the 

evaluation of the Downeast LNG WSA process. In response to the COTP’s focused 

outreach efforts, the Sipayik’s, in consultation with the Joint Tribal Council, have 

retained legal council to address his concerns. While no formal response has yet been 

received, the COTP anticipates receiving helpful input and ongoing cooperation. 

 

In response to a USCG-initiated FERC data request regarding the sovereignty issues 

discussed above, Downeast LNG submitted a legal précis rebuffing the Passamaquoddy 

Tribe’s claims. Based on legal research the company stated: “The Passamaquoddy tribal 

fishermen lack sovereignty or any other special fishing or sustenance rights over the 

waters through which LNG carriers will transit to and from the Downeast LNG facility. 

Accordingly, Downeast LNG does not anticipate material legal issues regarding this 

matter.” The legal argument included the following points: 

 

• The rights of the Passamaquoddy Tribe in Maine are collectively governed by the 

MICSA MIA, and, accordingly, the Passamaquoddy Tribe does not maintain an 

6

 Diana Scully, Executive Director Maine Indian Tribal-State Commission; summary/excerpts from Maine 

Indian Claims Settlement: Concepts, Context, and Perspectives, February 14, 1995. 
REDACTED VERSION 

51

 

interest as a sovereign in the waters in and surrounding Passamaquoddy Bay, 

though it does have some level of sovereignty in Passamaquoddy Indian Territory, 

which is limited to the Passamaquoddy Indian Reservation and certain lands 

acquired by he U.S. government in trust for the Tribe.7

 

• The Tribe does not have sovereign authority in any other lands or waters, and 

aboriginal title in other lands has been extinguished.8

• The Tribes retained “sovereignty in Passamaquoddy Indian territory exempts the 

Tribe from the laws of the State of Maine with respect to “internal tribal 

matters.”9

 The scope of the internal tribal matters exception to State sovereignty, 

however, is narrow and “does not displace general Maine law on most substantive 

subjects, including environmental regulation.”10 

The intricacy of, and overall sensitivity to the sovereignty issues within the region have 

complicated the WSA process. Of significant concern is the COTP’s jurisdictional 

authority to enforce risk reduction measures, such as safety/security zone enforcement, 

and/or how to quantify environmental risks and related potential impacts to hallowed 

hunting and fishing grounds and sacred ceremonial sites, if in fact Passamaquoddy 

sovereign rights prevail. 

3.4 Marine Traffic Control 

As previously indicated, all deep-draft vessel traffic entering the Passamaquoddy Bay 

port area initially traverses Canadian waters, and then straddle the international boundary 

throughout their respective transits. The existing scheme for ensuring traffic control 

involves the full cooperation of the U.S. and Canada, with vessel movements reported to 

and controlled by “Fundy Traffic,” a Canadian Vessel Traffic System (VTS) in St. John, 

New Brunswick. Canadian authorities require vessels destined for Canadian waters to 

provide a 96-hour notice of arrival. In addition, 24-hour advance notification to Fundy 

Traffic is required for all vessels transiting this area. Similarly, the National Vessel 

Movement Center in the U.S. requires a 96-hour advance notice of arrival for those deep 

draft vessels calling on U.S. ports. Once inside the VTS Fundy Zone, all vessels are 

required to both maintain voice contact with controllers and check in on designated 

frequencies at established way points. Fundy Traffic has radar coverage of the entire Bay 

of Fundy, but does not have visual or radar coverage inside Head Harbor Passage. Voice 

communication (VHF-FM), however, is maintained with vessels transiting to Eastport 

and/or the port of Bayside, New Brunswick. Insufficient radar coverage for this port area 

was an issue of major concern and debate during the PAWSA workshop and the 

recommendation was made that a radar repeater be installed on either Campobello Island, 

Deer Island, or in Eastport, ME, in order to provide full coverage. 

Both Transport Canada and the U.S. Coast Guard administer Port State Control 

procedures. If a U.S. Port State Control boarding is required prior to a vessel entering a 

7

 Maine Revised Statutes Annotated (M.R.S.A.) § 6205(1). 

8 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1723(b), 1725(a), 1725(h). 9

 30 M.R.S.A. § 6206(1). 

10 See Maine v. Johnson, 498F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir., 2007). 
REDACTED VERSION 

52

U.S. port, the boarding would need to take place in U.S. waters, most likely at a point 

south of West Quoddy Head. 

Deep-draft vessels bound for ports within the Passamaquoddy Bay port area transit a 

shared waterway system that includes Head Harbor Passage, Friar Roads, Western 

Passage, Passamaquoddy Bay, and the St. Croix River. Head Harbor Passage is 

exclusively Canadian waters, while Friar Roads, Western Passage, Passamaquoddy Bay, 

and the St. Croix River incorporate the international boundary between Canada (Province 

of New Brunswick) and the U.S. (State of Maine). 

Those vessels currently bound for the Port of Eastport, ME, access U.S. waters through 

Head Harbor Passage and Friar Roads. Potential Downeast LNG carriers would continue 

on through Friar Roads and transit Western Passage before turning northwesterly near the 

mouth of the St. Croix River to arrive at the proposed terminal site. 

Vessels bound for the Bayside Marine Terminal in New Brunswick follow the same basic 

route. They continue on through Western Passage, pass through the westerly part of 

Passamaquoddy Bay, and then transit about 6 miles up the St. Croix River. 

Pilotage is compulsory for foreign vessels and U.S. vessels under registry in the foreign 

trade when in U.S. waters. All deep draft ships currently entering the shared waterway 

via Head Harbor Passage and thence transiting Maine waters to Eastport must employ a 

U.S. pilot. In contrast, there is currently no requirement under Canada’s Pilotage Act or 

Atlantic Pilotage Regulations mandating compulsory pilotage for vessels transiting these 

same waters bound for Canadian ports. In practice, however, unlicensed Canadian pilots 

are employed on 90-95% of all vessels bound for the Bayside Marine Terminal in St. 

Stephen, New Brunswick. Of note, pilotage is compulsory for all deep-draft vessels 

bound for the port of Saint John, New Brunswick, which is accessed via the Bay of 

Fundy. 

In May, 2006, a risk-based review was conducted of the St. Croix River and its 

approaches to determine if the current practice of non-compulsory pilotage should remain 

in place. The assessment was conducted under the auspices of the Atlantic Pilotage 

Authority (APA), the Federal Crown Corporation charged with pilotage services, to 

ensure the waters meet the standards of safety of Transport Canada and the Minister of 

Transport. Six recommendations resulted from the study: 

• The waters and approaches to the St. Croix River to the port of Bayside should be 

designated as a Compulsory Pilotage Area. 

• The APA should adopt as much of the existing pilotage infrastructure as possible. 

• A review of existing “Fundy North” monitoring capabilities should be conducted 

with a focus on improving VHF radio coverage, radar, and Automated 

Information Systems (AIS). 
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53

• The establishment of “designated” anchorages in concert with the commercial 

fishing industry and in coordination with U.S. authorities. 

• Review the location and adequacy of the navigational aids currently in use and 

add/upgrade aids as necessary to mark all areas posing a hazard to navigation. 

Update charts of the area, to include the conjoining waters of Head Harbor 

Passage and Western Passage, to reflect current stationing of all aids and location 

of any unmarked hazards to navigation. 

• Recommend that the U.S. Coast Guard include consultation with the local U.S. 

pilots when conducting the next Waterways Analysis and Management System 

(WAMS) review. 

Complementing the risk management study, the APA also conducted a review of its 

pilotage regulations in cross-comparison to those existing, informal procedures currently 

in practice. After close collaboration with the USCG, joint consensus was tentatively 

reached on jurisdictional concerns in order that APA’s proposal for compulsory pilotage 

move forward. A proposed amendment to the Atlantic Pilotage Authority regulations has 

been drafted and is pending further Canadian regulatory review and public comment. 

The draft regulation respects U.S. sovereignty over its own waters, and the right of U.S. 

authorities to imposed pilotage requirements on vessels bound for U.S. ports. 

At present, there are no designated “anchorage grounds” (anchorage areas subject to 

pertinent rules and regulations) directly within the Passamaquoddy Bay area. However, 

deep-draft vessels routinely anchor in the Bay of Fundy (outside of the transit corridor 

and to the north of Head Harbor Passage – dictated by water depth), inside the waterway 

south of Eastport in the vicinity of Friars Bay, and within Passamaquoddy Bay itself 

while waiting for dock availability, to avert traffic, or wait out adverse weather and/or 

unfavorable tide/current conditions. Along Head Harbor Passage and portions of Friar 

Roads, there are submarine pipeline and cable crossings that would also preclude vessel 

anchoring – these are adequately charted. 

Specific anchorage criteria were developed by the LNG working group and are contained 

in Section 3.7. 

3.5 LNG Carrier Simulation Tests 

During the period July 27-31, 2006, a proof of concept evaluation was performed by 

Marine Safety International (MSI) at their facility in Newport, RI. The evaluation was 

conducted on full mission simulators with fifteen trial runs based on inbound vessel 

transits, ten outbound trips, and eight simulations dedicated solely to docking and 

undocking maneuvers. For the purpose of the tests, a full transit run was considered to 

start at the pilot boarding area in the vicinity of East Quoddy Head and conclude at the 

proposed single-berth terminal site in Mill Cove, Robbinston. All simulations were 

conducted in ‘real time,’ with a 34-mile round trip taking about 5 to 6 hours in duration. 
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54

In attendance were MSI personnel, Downeast LNG principals and associated 

engineers/consultants, Canadian and U.S. pilots, U.S. Coast Guard, Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission, Transport Canada, Maine Port Authority, and maritime 

professionals (master mariners). 

The objectives of the maneuvering studies were: 

• Prove the feasibility of navigating a variety of LNG carriers up to 165,000 

cubic meters for Downeast LNG on the planned transit route to its respective 

terminal site (East Quoddy Head to Mill Cove). 

• Identify wind and current windows for transits and dockings. 

• Evaluate arrival and departure maneuvers in the vicinity of the berths. 

• Ascertain the adequacy of existing aids to navigation for day and night 

transits. 

• Determine the number, size, and bollard pull of tractor tugs needed. 

• Define tethering locations, speeds, and arrangements for the tractor tugs. 

• Define wind and tidal current limitations for transits and docking operations. 

• Determine the need for additional ATON and strategic locations for tidal 

current meters. 

The full mission bridge simulations were conducted “real time” and focused on both 

basic normal operating conditions and more complex, challenging considerations, such 

as: 

• Various mechanical failures (i.e., loss of rudder/steering, loss of propulsion). 

• Emergency departures from the dock with limited tug assistance. 

• Extreme/severe climatic conditions (tides/current/winds/fog). 

Simulation runs were made using LNG carriers in the 125,000 to 165,000 cubic meter 

cargo carrying capacity range, and incorporated varying rudder and propulsion 

configurations. Downeast LNG has preliminarily designed its marine terminal pier to 

handle vessels approaching 220,000 cubic meter capacity with corresponding drafts of up 

to 39.4 feet and maximum length overall of 1,033 feet for potential, future expansion. 

MSI employed a three dimensional analysis for these tests, which included the use of the 

actual U.S. and Canadian pilots employed in the Passamaquoddy Bay port area. The fullmission bridge simulation provided the pilot(s) with visual cues of the surrounding areas 

as well as the handling/maneuvering characteristics of each size vessel undergoing 

testing. The pilots were able to anticipate changing waterway characteristics and varying 
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55

traffic conditions commencing at the pilot pickup area to the proposed berth, based on 

their experience and astute familiarity with the area. This “hands on” simulation strategy 

provided the pilots with exposure to the proposed LNG carriers, and correspondingly 

identified potential areas of concern, without compromising real-life safety. 

 

Due to the strength of currents in the area, adequate tug/escort power was determined to 

be critical, especially during berthing and departure maneuvers. Up to four 60 ton 

bollard-pull tractor tugs were used to assist with transit, docking, and undocking 

operations throughout the simulations. The tugs were modeled with fully azimuthing 

propulsion units, allowing them to quickly change propulsion direction and manage the 

speed and steering of the LNG carriers, even under “dead-ship” conditions. For the 

vessel maneuvering analyses a variety of climatic settings were introduced to simulate 

predominate, seasonal conditions common to the Passamaquoddy Bay region. The 

simulator interjected varying weather and hydrodynamic conditions, to include current 

directions and speed, stages of ebb and flood tides, wind velocities and changing 

directions, wind gusts, and low-visibility factors. The injected variables ranged from 

normal/routine to extreme conditions. Simulations were also conducted based on worstcase scenarios in order to ascertain breakaway limitations and confirm tug capabilities. 

Each pilot was advised of the prevailing environmental factors at the beginning of each 

computer/simulation run, and he then made up the tugs in whichever fashion best suited 

him to meet the existing and/or expectant, emergent conditions. 

3.5.1 General results of the simulations: 

• LNG carriers in the projected design ranges (125-165K cubic meter capacity) can 

be successfully navigated through the channels and passages, and safely 

maneuvered into and out of the proposed terminal berth. This assessment is 

largely attributable to the area’s naturally deep waters, relatively wide channels, 

and calculated employment of tugs. 

• Four 60 ton bollard pull tractor tugs of 5,000 horsepower each are sufficient for 

assisting and escorting the design range of LNG carriers to the terminal. Tethered 

escorting from the pilot boarding area to the terminal is recommended. 

• Tests proved that real-time measurements of current velocities and directions are 

needed and this data be made available to the pilots on a 24-hour basis. The pilots 

should designate where the current meters will be placed for maximum 

effectiveness. 

• Transits are not recommended when there are sustained winds of more than 25 

knots. 

• Prior to any LNG carrier nighttime transits, further simulation tests need to be 

accomplished to further ascertain the suitability of the current ATON system to 

support non-daylight/restricted visibility operations. 
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56

• Additional tractor tug training is needed to ensure the pilots are fully familiar with 

the tugs’ capabilities. 

• Transiting the Cherry Islet to Dog Island area should be avoided on a flood tide 

and during those times when ebb tide currents exceed three knots. 

• ATON placement and optimum operability were evaluated by the pilots. 

Recommended ATON changes included: 

1. Establishing a lighted buoy at Stovers Ledge to mark the shoal area. 

2. Adding a light to the Clark Ledge day beacon. 

3. Intensifying the luminosity of the Dog Island and Deer Island fixed aids. 

4. Relocating and lighting the UH4 buoy at Popes Island. 

5. Establishing a lighted aid on Kendalls Head. 

The above is an abridged summary of the MSI simulation results and observations made 

by the pilots and observers. Within the parameters of those tests conducted, the 

simulated passages were relatively uneventful, even during virtual mechanical 

breakdowns and other simulated crises, as long as escort tugs were utilized effectively 

and the environmental window limits adhered to. 

3.6 Transit Analysis and Traffic Study 

Quoddy Bay LNG, an alternate firm proposing to build and operate an LNG facility 

approximately eight nautical miles downstream of the proposed Downeast LNG facility, 

retained Moffatt & Nichols International (MNI) to evaluate the impact of LNG carriers 

on the existing marine traffic within the passages and approaches to Passamaquoddy Bay. 

While specific to the Quoddy Bay planned operation, there were, nonetheless, several 

conclusions made in that study that lend themselves to both proposals and, therefore, 

considered relevant to this Report. (Note: Although the FERC formally dismissed 

Quoddy Bay LNG's application effective October 17, 2008, the results of the MNI traffic 

study are still relevant, although perhaps to a lesser degree, in light of a third proposal 

now under consideration (Calais LNG). 

A computer simulation model was developed and a number of scenarios were run in 

order to estimate potential delays that could be encountered by other waterway users and 

to judge the distinct and cumulative impacts of LNG carriers on existing traffic. 

Scenarios and corresponding data more specific to the Quoddy Bay proposal have not 

been included for proprietary reasons. 

For the purposes of this study the LNG vessel traffic pattern was determined based on the 

anticipated number of carrier arrivals at the terminal(s) per year. The traffic pattern for 

all other vessels was based on historical statistics. Climatic information and data was 

based on weather conditions prevalent for the region and season. The existing scheme 

for ensuring traffic control involves vessel movements reported to and controlled by the 

CCG (i.e., “Fundy Traffic”). As well, locally conceived cooperative agreements and 

transiting practices that exist between the U.S. and Canadian pilots were factors 
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57

considered, including an informal one-way vessel traffic scheme. It should be noted that 

specific operational parameters under consideration by COTP Sector Northern New 

England were not available at the time the analysis was conducted. Consequently, the 

simulation was carried out using a number of assumed risks and operating conditions 

based on input from the local pilots and rules and procedures germane to existing LNG 

operations. As well, fishing vessels and recreational craft were not factored into the 

study. The authors reasoned that there would be minimal impact to deep draft traffic due 

to the seasonal nature of recreational craft and the relatively limited numbers of 

commercial fishing vessels in operation. 

General results of the study concluded that: 

• Based on delays computed at key locations along the waterway, vessels transiting 

to Estes Head and Bayside would be slightly impacted. This would result in a 

small number of vessels experiencing longer delays in their in-bound transit 

through Head Harbor Passage and Western Passage. 

• Vessels waiting to sail outbound would experience the largest impact. Statistics 

show that at the existing traffic level (no LNG carriers) 64% of the vessels 

experience a weather delay of up to 5 hours; 2% between 5 and 10 hours; and 1% 

experience even longer delays. With the introduction of about 62 LNG carriers, 

an additional 4% of vessel traffic will experience some form of delay; with the 

proportion of longer delays increasing, with an additional 6-7% experiencing 

delays exceeding 5 hours. 

• When ferry traffic was incorporated into the simulation runs, using a factor of 

four crossings every hour throughout the day during the period of mid-June 

through mid-September, the calculations ultimately showed a ferry-crossing 

coinciding closely in time with an inbound or outbound LNG carrier transit 

approximately once every 1.5 days. 

Quoddy Bay LNG recognized that, if both operations were to materialize, the cumulative 

consequences of LNG traffic serving the pair of facilities would have a further impact on 

regional marine traffic. Consequently, aside from its site-specific scenarios, a further 

simulation was run by MNI to consider the effect of both terminals operating 

simultaneously. For the purposes of this particular study, 63 Downeast LNG carriers, 

serving the proposed Mill Cove facility, were factored into the analysis. Results of this 

simulation run indicated: 

• With both, the Downeast LNG terminal and Quoddy Bay LNG terminal 

operating, an additional 6% of vessels (as compared to existing traffic conditions) 

could experience some type of delay when outbound in the waterway. An 

additional 9% of vessels could experience delays that exceed 5 hours. 

• With both facilities operating, an LNG carrier could conceivably cross a ferry 

route, in the proximity of an underway ferry, approximately once a day. 
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• The actual impact that LNG carriers will have on ferry traffic is dependent, to a 

certain degree, on the stand-off distances specified in any safety/security zone 

established by COTP Sector Northern New England. 

The aforementioned simulation results are abridged and only provide a snapshot of the 

overall study. The full Transit Analysis and Marine Traffic Study, prepared by MNI, is 

contained in Appendix N to the Quoddy Bay LNG WSA. 

3.7 Safety/Security Zones and Operational Parameters 

Throughout the Waterway Suitability Assessment process the LNG workgroup identified 

a significant number of issues, concerns, and risks (ICR’s) relating to the proposed 

project. The ICR’s were categorized and distributed to ad hoc subcommittees for further 

consideration and recommended resolution. The subcommittees were comprised of 

USCG personnel, local officials, stakeholders, and members of the marine community 

having subject expertise in each of the respective areas. After considerable deliberation 

the subcommittees developed an inventory of perceived risks and corresponding 

mitigating measures for the USCG’s review. “Operational Parameters” were then 

developed based on the ICR’s and working group input. It was collectively agreed that 

these measures, once implemented by the COTP, would have a moderate to significant 

impact on reducing the potential for safety related accidents. Of note, a substantial 

number of the recommended measures paralleled the findings and conclusions of the 

Ports and Waterways Safety Assessment (PAWSA) that was conducted independent of 

the WSA review process. The following is a synopsis of the working group’s efforts. 

3.7.1 Safety and Security Zone Considerations 

Early on in the assessment process, the COTP recognized that a considerable amount of 

confusion and misconception existed regarding the terms safety and security zones, and 

the respective enforcement action of each. In an effort to qualify the terms, COTP Sector 

Northern New England developed an overview and distributed it to the LNG working 

group membership to assist in the formulation of tenable operating parameters. 

Overview: Interested parties have inquired as to the nature of potential USCG 

safety/security zones relative to the LNG facility siting proposals in Downeast Maine, 

and if imposed, the extent of the restrictions and who would have authority to enforce 

these limitations. This discussion below explains this authority. 

The USCG has the responsibility of safeguarding the nation’s ports, waterways, port 

facilities, vessels, persons, and property in the vicinity of the port, from accidental 

destruction, damage, loss, or injury. In order to protect the navigable waters and adjacent 

shore areas of the U.S., minimize death, personal injury and property loss, and prevent 

pollution of the marine environment, the COTP administers multi-mission Marine Safety 

and Security and Marine Environmental Protection Programs by enforcing federal laws 

and regulations. 
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The statutory authority to enforce these laws and regulations is derived from a number of 

sources, but primarily the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA) of 1972, 33 USC 

1221 et. seq. Using this authority, the COTP may, when safety, security, or other 

national interests dictate, establish certain access areas to control the movement of any 

vessel, vehicle, or person in, or on, the navigable waterways and adjacent shorelines. A 

control mechanism commonly used to safeguard navigation, vessels and facilities, and to 

protect the marine environment includes the setting and enforcement of safety zones. 

Regulations applicable to safety zones are codified in 33 Code of Federal Regulations 

(CFR) Part 165. 

A safety zone is a water area, shore area, or combination of water and shore areas to 

which, for safety and/or environmental protection purposes, access is limited to persons, 

vehicles, or objects specifically authorized by the COTP or U.S. Coast Guard District 

Commander. No person may enter a safety zone, remain in a safety zone, or allow any 

vehicle, vessel, or object to remain in a safety zone, unless authorized by the COTP or the 

District Commander. Additionally, each person in a safety zone, who has notice of a 

lawful order or direction, must obey that order or direction, under penalty of law. A 

safety zone may be described by fixed limits, or it may be a specified zone around a 

vessel in motion. Safety zones may be established as temporary measures, such as in 

response to an emergency situation, or they may be established for indefinite periods, 

such as along the waterfront and shore area of a high-risk waterfront terminal or facility. 

Security zones are another control mechanism available to the COTP. Security zones are 

designated areas of land, water, or combination of land and water, established for such 

time as necessary to prevent damage or injury to any vessel or waterfront facility; to 

safeguard ports, harbors, or waters of the United States; or to secure the obligations of the 

U.S. Security zones are established under the authority of the Ports and Waterways 

Safety Act, see 33 CFR Part 165, Subpart D; the Magnuson Act, as reflected in 50 USC § 

191 and 33 CFR § 6.04-6; or both. Security zones are primarily used for national security 

interests rather than strictly for safety considerations. To achieve heightened security 

postures, combinations of safety and security zones are often being employed when the 

need dictates. 

The establishment and enforcement of controlled access areas, such as safety and security 

zones, are not arbitrary measures. They are established through the federal rulemaking 

process and must be published in the Federal Register. Rulemaking of a non-emergency 

nature, as in the case of long term LNG siting proposals, requires the opportunity for 

public comment. This process provides “constructive legal notice” to the general public 

and the maritime community as to the rulemaking’s existence and legal enforceability 

and provides an opportunity to shape the rule in such a way that makes sense for the local 

area. 
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Historically, safety and security zones have been control mechanisms employed by 

COTPs to ensure the safe navigation of vessels transiting U.S. waters carrying bulk 

products such as liquefied petroleum gas, liquefied natural gas, explosives, and other 

dangerous articles. Safety/security zones serve important dual purposes. A level of 

safety is provided to the transiting vessel by minimizing waterway congestion, and a 

layer of protection is afforded to the surrounding port community through the reduction 

in casualty risk. 

It should be noted that all safety and security zones are site specific and the conditions 

and parameters of each are solely dependent on the surrounding and/or extenuating 

conditions. For example, the stand-off distances cited in a safety zone may vary 

significantly from one waterway to another, depending on local circumstances, cargoes 

carried, and other needs identified. What does not change, for U.S. safety/security zones, 

is that only the USCG COTP has authority to determine who may enter a zone, and under 

what conditions. The COTP may delegate that authority to lawful designated on-scene 

representatives, who are usually USCG personnel. In Maine and New Hampshire 

however, under a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with each respective state, the 

Maine and New Hampshire Marine Patrols may also enforce U.S. Coast Guard 

safety/security zones. 

The USCG’s jurisdiction is limited to U.S. navigable waters and its territorial seas (for 

the purposes of this part of the regulations). Obviously then, COTP Sector Northern New 

England does not have the authority to establish and/or enforce a safety and/or security 

zone in Canada’s, or any other country’s, waters. In the case of the Passamaquoddy Bay 

proposals, a significant portion of the transit route intended for use by transiting LNG 

carriers to reach proposed LNG terminals in Maine is contained entirely in Canadian 

waters. As well, much of the proposed transit route straddles the international boundary. 

Due to the international maritime boundary and distinct jurisdictional authorities of the 

U.S. and Canada, bilateral discussions, coordination, and procedures will be necessary 

relative to the setting and enforcement of complementing safety and security regimens.

3.7.1.1 Safety Zone 

Taking the above factors into consideration, coupled with regional concerns, the 

collective group formulated a recommended safety zone. In arriving at its 

recommendation, a number of factors, assumptions, and expectations were deliberated. 

These included: 

 

1. The USCG should establish and enforce a safety zone around LNG carriers 

while they are underway in U.S. navigable waters within the intended transit 

route for the safety of transiting and moored deep-draft vessels, excursion 

boats and ferries, commercial fishing craft, recreational boats, and the 

surrounding maritime communities. 
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2. A safety zone around an LNG carrier would result in a moderate reduction in 

risk in the event a navigation safety accident did occur and resulted in a 

breach of the LNG containment. 

 

3. The size of the safety zone should not be smaller than the Sandia calculated 

Zone 1, which for 250,000 cubic meter range LNG carriers is approximately 

0.43 miles (750 yards) and for 148,000 cubic meter range carriers about 0.31 

miles (547 yards). This is consistent with the Sandia Report’s findings and 

guidance provided in NVIC 5-05. 

4. The narrowest portion of the transit route, which is approximately 1000 yards 

in width, is at the confluence of Head Harbor Passage, Friar Road, and 

Western Passage, between Dog Island and Deer Island. The second 

narrowest point between land masses occurs in Head Harbor Passage between 

Casco Bay Island and Head Harbor and measures approximately 1,200 yards 

wide; however, this is entirely within Canadian territorial waters. 

5. The safety zone should extend sufficiently far ahead of the LNG carrier to 

reduce the potential for a close-quarters situation between the carrier and 

small craft, e.g., kayaks, sail boats, other small recreational craft, and 

commercial/fishing vessels. It should also be sufficiently large to reduce the 

risk of collision with other vessels, such as ferries, crossing ahead of the 

carrier. For example, a small craft moving at 2 knots would require 

approximately 7 1⁄2 minutes to transit from the center of the channel to the 

outer edge of a 1000 yard diameter safety zone. During this same period an 

LNG carrier moving at 10 knots (which was the upper speed assumption 

employed during the simulation trials) would travel approximately 1 1⁄4 

nautical miles, depending on current direction and velocity. At these rates, the 

small craft would arrive at the outer edge of the safety zone concurrent with 

the LNG carrier’s passing. Therefore, a safety zone extending 2 nautical 

miles ahead of the carrier would provide a small craft moving at 2 knots 

adequate time to move out of the channel well in advance of the LNG carrier’s 

passing. Likewise, this distance also provides adequate separation space for 

vessels that cross the transit path. 

6. The distance the safety zone extends astern of the carrier should be sufficient 

to prevent vessels from crossing too close astern, as well as to ensure that tugs 

following and/or tethered astern have room to maneuver in the event that the 

LNG carrier loses steering or propulsion. 

7. Examples of safety zones currently in place around LNG carriers while they 

are underway in other U.S. ports are: 

• Boston Harbor, MA: 2 nautical miles (NM) [4,000 yards] ahead, 1 NM 

(2,000 yards) astern and 1⁄4 NM (500 yards) abeam (on each side). 

• Chesapeake Bay, MD: 1⁄4 NM (500 yard) radii around the LNG carrier. 
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62

• Savannah River, GA: 2 NM (4,000 yards) ahead and astern for all vessels 

greater than 1600 gross tons. Vessels less than 1600 gross tons may be 

allowed in the safety zone provided they maintain a safe distance 

(minimum 70 yard approach limit), as determined by the COTP. 

• Lake Charles, LA: 2 NM (4,000 yards) ahead, 1 NM (2,000 yards) astern, 

and the width of the shipping channel on either side. 

• Long Island Sound, NY/CT (proposed facility): 2NM (4,000 yards) ahead, 

1 NM (2,000 yards) astern, and 0.37 NM (750 yards) on each side of the 

carriers. 

• Piscataqua River (Portsmouth/Newington, NH – Liquefied Petroleum Gas 

(LPG) cargo carried within COTP Sector Northern New England zone): 1 

NM (2000 yards) ahead, 1⁄4 NM (500 yards) astern, and 1⁄2 NM (1000 

yards) abeam each side of the carrier. 

Therefore, taking all factors into consideration the recommended moving Safety Zone for 

Passamaquoddy Bay would be: 2 NM (4,000 yards) ahead, 1 NM (2,000 yards) astern, 

and 1⁄4 NM (500 yards) abeam (each side) of the carrier, assuming a maximum LNG 

carrier transit speed of 10 knots. 

3.7.1.2 Security Zone 

As with the safety zone, a number of factors were deliberated by the LNG Working 

Group during the formulation of a recommend security zone. These included: 

1. The USCG should establish and enforce a security zone around LNG carriers 

while they are underway in U.S. navigable waters within the intended transit 

route. It should be noted that the purpose of the security zone is to protect the 

LNG carrier from external threats. Public safety and navigation concerns are 

addressed through the use of a safety zone, as aforementioned above. 

2. Based on the assessment of potential risks to the LNG carrier the minimum 

size of the security zone should be a 500 yard radius around the moving 

vessel. This distance is based, in part, on existing DoD set-back requirements 

for U.S. naval vessels. 

3.7.1.3. Combined Safety and Security Zone for Vessel Transits 

Although the terms safety and security zones are often used interchangeably, safety and 

security zones are established using different statutory authorities and are intended to 

accomplish different purposes. Simply stated – safety zones are intended to protect what 

is outside of the zone from what is inside; whereas, security zones are intended to protect 

what is inside from what is outside. 
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63

In contrast to the purpose of a security zone, the purpose of the safety zone is to protect 

the public and marine transportation system from the hazards associated with a breach of 

the LNG carrier’s tanks. Therefore, to ensure both the security of the LNG carrier and 

the general safety of the public, the necessary security zone should have dimensions of 

the greater of the two – in this case, the safety zone. In other words, the moving zone 

would be considered to be a combined safety and security zone, and would have the 

dimensional boundaries of the above recommended safety zone. 

The burden of having to adjust traffic patterns/schedules on ferries and other non-LNG 

related traffic, both commercial and recreational, should be minimized as much as 

possible. To put the recommended combined safety & security zone into prospective, the 

time it would take for the total zone of an LNG carrier traveling at an estimated speed of 

10 knots to pass any given point would correspond to about 18 minutes. 

For efficiency, LNG vessels always maintain a small percentage of cargo in their tanks, 

termed heel, in order to keep the cargo tanks and lines in a refrigerated/liquefied state and 

ready for the next loading. (No cargo refrigeration system is employed on LNG vessels). 

Consequently, as they are not in an inert or gas-free condition, escort requirements and 

safety/security zones would continue to apply as determined by the COTP. 

3.7.1.4. Safety and Security Zone around Moored LNG Carriers 

Assuming the same DoD setback parameters as applied to U.S. Navy Protection Zones, 

the minimum security zone surrounding an LNG carrier while berthed should be no less 

than 500 yards. Although the LNG carrier is no longer moving and is moored at a 

terminal pier/berth, there are still inherent fire risks involved during the transfer of cargo 

that could substantially impact the surrounding population and infrastructure; therefore, a 

safety zone needs to be set and enforced to mitigate the overall risk factor. In addition, a 

security zone is needed to protect against subversive acts. 

Examples of fixed safety/security zones currently in place around liquefied gas carriers 

while they are moored pier side in other U.S. ports include: 

• Boston Harbor, MA: 400-yard radius while at the dock (increased from a previous 

150 feet requirement). 

• Chesapeake Bay, MD: 500-yard radius around the berthed vessel. 

• Savannah River, GA: 70-yard radius around the vessel while transferring cargo. 

• Lake Charles, LA: 50 feet beyond the carrier. 

• Long Island Sound, NY/CT (proposed): 1,210 yards around the floating LNG storage 

and regasification unit (FSRU). 

• Piscataqua River, NH: 500-yard radius while the (LPG) carrier is moored at the 

receiving terminal. 

Taking all factors into consideration, the recommended size of the fixed safety/security 

zone for an LNG carrier berthed at the Downeast LNG terminal would be a 500-yard 

radius around the moored vessel. Of significance, the distance from the proposed pierend to the center of the typical commercial vessel track line is approximately 1,200 yards. 
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64

This distance figure does not take into account the average beam of a berthed LNG 

carrier or attending, standby tug. 

3.7.2 Assist/Escort Tugs 

Preliminary transit runs and docking maneuvers were simulated at Marine Safety 

International. The simulation tests validated specific tug operating characteristics needed 

to ensure maximum maneuverability during transits under varying hydrodynamic 

conditions, adverse weather, and emergency/casualty situations (such as steering/rudder 

failure and/or loss of propulsion aboard the carrier). Based on these simulations and 

expertise of the attending pilots, the following escort tug criteria were determined: 

• Three to four tractor tugs (depending on carrier size), having azimuthing propulsion 

units (ASD) rated at a minimum of 5,000 HP, with 60-70 metric ton bollard pull 

ahead, and 65 metric ton astern, are required to satisfy the entire range of LNG 

carriers being considered. LNG carriers ranging from 125,000 to 165,000 cubic meter 

capacity were used in the simulations. For vessels at or below 125,000 cubic 

capacities, 60 ton bollard pull ASDs were deemed adequate. 

• One tug should be made up (tethered) at all times during the transit to berth in the 

event of a sudden loss of steering or propulsion in order to prevent a collision, 

allision, or grounding. Tug stationing/arrangements will be as per the attending pilot. 

Bulk carriers and break-bulk freighters proceeding to the Bayside Terminal in New 

Brunswick could potentially pass three moored LNG carriers (two at the proposed 

Quoddy Bay LNG facility and one at Downeast LNG) at relatively close quarters (less 

than 1,000 yards separation distance). Historically, vessels currently plying the region 

and carrying aggregate and other less-valued cargo per ton, by the very nature of their 

services, may be older and less than optimally maintained. These vessels currently transit 

the waters without tug assistance and/or escort. A mechanical breakdown, such as 

sudden loss of steering and/or propulsion, could potentially result in an allision with one 

of the berthed LNG tankers during cargo offload, resulting in a serious casualty. In order 

to afford an additional margin of safety, it is therefore deemed prudent to require a 

standby tug be moored outboard, and at the ready, of all berthed LNG vessels. 

• One tug must be on immediate stand-by and moored outboard of the berthed LNG 

carrier at all times the vessel is at the receiving terminal for emergencies. 

• In addition to the determined assist/escort tugs, LNG carriers should also be escorted 

into and out of “port” by USCG and/or USCG authorized assets, as determined by the 

COTP. 

3.7.3 Marine Firefighting Capability 

In addition to the onboard firefighting capabilities of the LNG carriers, which must 

comply with the requirements established by the International Gas Carrier Code, the 
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65

assist tugs are to be equipped with firefighting equipment that meets the International 

Association of Classification Societies (IACS) “Fi-Fi 1” notation. 

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) also requires similar criteria for towing 

vessels in order that they are Class 1 certified. This requirement is outlined in its 

publication NFPA 1915 – Standard on Marine Fire-Fighting Vessels, which addresses 

the construction of marine fire-fighting vessels and contains criteria on a wide-range of 

specific standards including outfitting, stability, propulsion, auxiliary machinery, 

electrical systems, fire pumps and fire-fighting equipment. 

It is logical to expect shore-based fire departments to also have appropriate training and 

equipment to respond to a LNG fire/emergency. Among the local fire departments that 

would be responsible to respond, none have any LNG capability or significant marine 

firefighting resources. 

3.7.4 Marine Traffic, Anchorages, and Boarding Areas 

An LNG carrier transiting to the proposed Downeast LNG terminal site requires an 

indirect route through Canadian waters, and then follows the international boundary 

throughout the Passamaquoddy Bay approaches. The transit time would approximate two 

and one half to three and one-half hours in duration. The existing scheme for ensuring 

traffic control involves the full cooperation of the U.S. and Canada, with vessels over 20 

meters in length and/or over 500 gross tons falling under the operational control of Saint 

John, New Brunswick Traffic Control (Fundy Traffic). All deep draft vessel movements 

are reported to and controlled by Fundy Traffic, and are subject to Canadian Shipping 

Act traffic services, zones, regulations, and requirements. Vessel movements are 

coordinated though local cooperative agreements among the U.S. and Canadian pilots, 

Fundy Traffic, and an informal, one-way traffic scheme. 

There are distinct differences in how the U.S. perceives and addresses the risks of LNG 

safety and security as compared to Canada. Under the Canadian Shipping Act and other 

authorities LNG carriers frequenting Canadian ports are usually subject to routine Port 

State Control procedures only. For LNG vessels destined for U.S. ports though, standing 

USCG policy and pertinent federal regulations require specific safety and security 

functions be performed to responsibly manage and reduce the risk to public safety. 

Downeast LNG is anticipating approximately 53 carriers per year, in the 70,000 to 

165,000 cubic meter range, to meet their anticipated maximum throughput of 500 million 

standard cubic feet per day (mmscfd). This number is an average figure, as the actual 

amount will vary depending on the vessel sizes and cargo carrying capacities of each. 

Although this WSR is Downeast LNG specific, for comparison sake, Quoddy Bay LNG 

anticipates approximately 180 LNG carrier arrivals per year (for its first year of 

operation) in order to maintain its maximum anticipated throughput of 2 Bcfd and Calais 

LNG estimates approximately 54 vessel transits. When combined with current numbers 

of deep draft arrivals, the prospective total for the port area climbs from 125 to about 380, 

equating to a three-fold, or tripling, of the current deep-draft traffic flow. To put this 
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anticipated change into perspective, on the average the port area currently experiences 

arrivals at the rate of one vessel every 3 days. With the addition of LNG carriers 

(assuming the Downeast and Quoddy Bay proposed facilities receive approval), the 

average number of arrivals would potentially increase to over one vessel arriving per day. 

Although the FERC formally dismissed Quoddy Bay LNG's application, Quoddy Bay 

LNG has indicated that it intends to re-file at a later date; therefore these figures are 

considered relevant for cumulative considerations. Should the Quoddy Bay LNG facility 

not materialize and the Downeast LNG and Calais LNG go into operation the average 

annual vessel arrivals for the port area would equate to about one vessel per day. 

Current practice employs informal one-way traffic patterns for deep-draft transits. This 

would be strictly enforced whenever LNG carriers are moving; i.e., there would be no 

meeting or passing situations authorized. 

At the discretion of the attending pilots and in consultation with vessel masters and 

Fundy Traffic, all vessel transits will be on a first-come, first-served basis. Inbound 

vessels should have priority over outbound. 

Loaded, inbound LNG carriers transiting Head Harbor Passage and Western Passage 

must maintain ample separation distance and uphold, at a minimum, the safety and 

security zone parameters. The intent of this limitation is to preclude the possibility of 

incurring overtaking situations or causing the need for non-LNG vessels to hold at, or 

anchor in, Friar Roads. 

There are presently no designated anchorages; however, three routine anchorages exist 

for the area: one located in the Bay of Fundy (controlled by Fundy Traffic) outside of the 

transit corridor and to the north of Head Harbor Passage; one inside the waterway in the 

vicinity of Friars Bay southeast of Eastport; and one inside Passamaquoddy Bay. LNG 

vessels will not be allowed to anchor in Friar Roads while waiting for a berth – anchoring 

or holding under this circumstance must occur offshore. Non-LNG vessels may anchor 

in, or hold at, Friar Roads while waiting for a vessel proceeding in the opposite direction 

to transit Head Harbor Passage or Western Passage. 

With the exception of temporary boarding areas established by and for USCG authorized 

resources, the anchoring or holding of LNG vessels within Friar Roads is limited to 

emergency situations only, such as major mechanical malfunctions and reduced visibility 

consequent to non-forecasted, abrupt weather changes (fog, squalls, etc.), and/or as 

directed by, and in consult with, the COTP. 

Presently, through locally conceived, informal agreement, U.S. pilots board the majority 

of deep-draft vessels bound for Eastport in Canadian waters, in the vicinity East Quoddy 

Head. LNG vessels are designated Certain Dangerous Cargo (CDC) carriers and as such, 

specific safety inspections and security precautions must be undertaken prior to entering 

port. These USCG boardings would need to take place in U.S. waters. 
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3.7.5 Environmental Controls 

Loaded or partially loaded LNG carriers (inbound) would only be allowed to transit U.S. 

waters during daylight hours. Daylight is interpreted as “Civil Twilight” in which the sun 

may be below the horizon but the “Horizon is clear and larger stars visible”. (Dutton’s 

Navigation and Plotting). In practical terms, the horizon, shoreline, and receiving berths 

must be clearly seen with natural light. 

Inbound fully or partially laden LNG transits can only begin if there is sufficient time to 

arrive in the Cherry Islet to Dog Island area near slack tide due to the unpredictability of 

tide and current patterns in that vicinity. As a general policy and as per the pilots’ 

recommendations and prevailing practice, all transits should be conducted at high slack 

water or on an early ebbing tide. Transits through the Cherry Islet and Dog Island area 

should always be avoided on a flood tide and as well, on an ebb tide when currents are in 

excess of three knots. 

Likewise, outbound “empty” LNG transits can only begin if cast-off is within a period of 

time that permits the carrier to be in the vicinity of the Cherry Islet to Dog Island area 

during slack tide and there is no vessel departing the port of Bayside and/or deep draft 

vessels inbound Head Harbor Passage or transiting Western Passage that could possibly 

result in a meeting or overtaking situation. 

Prior to conducting nighttime transits of the area, nighttime conditions should be 

simulated to best appreciate the suitability of current aids to navigation for nighttime 

operations. 

Depending on the outcome of the simulation tests, outbound, or “empty” (with “heel” 

allowance) LNG carriers may (in the future) be allowed to transit after sunset during 

periods of fair weather and clear periods of unrestricted visibility (actual and forecasted) 

upon concurrent agreement between the attending pilot(s) and the COTP. The minimum 

visibility limits must be commensurate with combined safety and security zone distance 

parameters. 

A minimum of two nautical miles of visibility is required for the movement of LNG 

vessels in U.S. waters. In marginal weather conditions visibility can vary significantly 

along the route. The decision as to whether sufficient visibility exists, and is likely to 

continue for the duration of the transit, is a judgment call to be made jointly by the 

attending pilot(s) and Fundy Traffic in consultation with, and concurrence by, the COTP. 

Wind: 25 knots is the maximum sustained wind speed (ascertained during the simulation 

tests), as measured on the vessel, in which an inbound or outbound transit shall 

commence. As with visibility, significant variation in wind conditions can exist along the 

route, and the decision as to whether wind conditions permit a safe transit will be made 

by the pilots in consultation with, and concurrence by, the COTP. 
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3.7.6 Communications, Radar, and Aids to Navigation 

As identified during the PAWSA process, the existing communications network (and 

associated interoperability) is marginal for the port area. As well, regional radar 

coverage is very limited. Fundy Traffic has radar coverage in the Bay of Fundy, but does 

not have visual or radar coverage once inside Head Harbor Passage. Upgrades to the 

current navigation systems and/or acquisition of new technology, such as Physical 

Oceanographic Real-Time System (PORTS), Differential Global Positioning System 

(DGPS), and closed circuit television (CCTV), that are cross-border compatible and 

jointly supported, are needed to ensure safe transits of the carriers and for the safeguard 

of all water-way users and abutting shore-side communities along the intended route. 

Without navigation safety system expansion and/or increased coverage, additional 

operational parameters may need to be considered and implemented accordingly. 

The PAWSA and MSI simulation trials also identified several locations within the port 

area waterway that require the placement of additional navigational aids and/or 

modification to existing ones in order to better mark obstructions and enhance the pilots’ 

capabilities. These include establishing a lighted buoy to mark Stovers Ledge; adding a 

light to the Clark Ledge day beacon; intensifying the power of the Dog Island and Deer 

Island fixed aids; placing a lighted aid at Clam Cove Head; relocating and lighting the 

HU4 buoy at Popes Island; and establishing a lighted aid on Kendall Head. With the 

exceptions of the Dog Island aid, Clark Ledge beacon and Kendall Head marker, the 

manufacture, placement, and servicing of the remaining aids fall under the authority of 

the Canadian government. It would be helpful if the applicant could establish that the 

CCG would undertake to make the recommended modifications to its waterway 

infrastructure in support of LNG and other deep-draft traffic 

4.0 Risk Assessment and Management Strategies 

Based on a review of the risk factors identified during this assessment and the PAWSA 

Report, it was concluded that it will be necessary to implement mitigation measures to 

effectively manage potential risks to navigation safety, security, and environmental 

impact if FERC does approve the proposed Downeast LNG project and it is subsequently 

constructed and operated. Mitigation measures generally fall into one of two categories: 

prevention and consequence management. Whereas prevention seeks to avoid an 

accident, consequence management seeks to reduce the negative impacts should an 

accident or incident occur. 

As part of the WSA process, a safety and security risk assessment was performed. The 

analyses were based, in part, on data collected during site and location visits, interviews 

conducted with area stakeholders, and information gleaned from, and in support of, the 

FERC Resource Reports. Safety and security measures that are currently in place that 

help mitigate the associated risks were identified and quantified. Where the identified 

risk appeared to not have sufficient resource capability to adequately offset or diminish 

the consequences, a gap was identified and alternate mitigation strategies explored. 
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The focus of the risk assessment was on the identification of potential measures for 

mitigating risks associated with either a navigation safety accident or a terrorist attack 

against the LNG carrier. Downeast LNG performed and documented its safety risk 

assessment and analyzed security risks utilizing the USCG Risk-Based Decision-Making 

(RBDM) Guidelines. These assessments used the thermal hazards associated with the 

respective accidental and intentional zones of concern contained in the Sandia 

Laboratories Report to describe the expected consequences of large releases of LNG from 

a carrier onto the water. 

In addition to the plotting of Zones of Concern, NVICs 05-05 and 05-08 also require the 

development of risk assessment scenarios and management strategies to correspond with 

the calculated zones. Downeast LNG’s WSA contained a comprehensive inventory of 

potentially strategic scenarios and corresponding, well-conceived risk reduction 

measures. These scenarios took into consideration a number of assumptions on which the 

overall mitigation strategies were based. Included in the study were parameters and 

assumptions such as waterway boundaries, carrier size and capacity for the defined 

hazard zones, potential for vessel groundings, collisions and allisions, hazards 

consequential to spill/release scenarios, potential vulnerabilities, security risks, existing 

safeguards, and terrorist-related attacks and activities, among others. 

For the purpose of the safety and security assessments, Downeast LNG made the 

favorable assumption that Canada and the United States would reach joint agreement and 

bilateral consensus regarding the employment of safety, security, and response 

capabilities for the protection of the vessel, its crew, and communities and other interests 

along both sides of the transit route. However, Downeast LNG has not been able to 

demonstrate that it will be feasible to achieve this level of cooperation. Consequently, in 

response to Coast Guard initiated data requests disseminated by FERC, alternate safety, 

security, and mitigation strategies were submitted for further consideration and 

validation. 

Downeast LNG’s risk-based assessment methodology suggests that the likelihood of 

accidental releases and/or threats of intentional interference are relatively low. Its 

assessment was based on the relative remoteness of the area, virtual width and depth of 

the transit route, comparative absence of national iconic and/or critical infrastructure, and 

reduced population densities more common to heavier industrialized and strategically 

located urban port areas. Nonetheless, potential consequences, albeit proportionately less 

for the Passamaquoddy Bay port area, do exist. Consequently, COTP Sector Northern 

New England, in coordination with FERC, will require specific risk reduction measures 

as outlined throughout this Report. 

4.1 Risk Assessment Scenarios 

Following the guidelines contained in NVIC 05-05, Downeast LNG applied the Risk 

Management Quick-Reference Tool in conjunction with the Sandia Report to develop an 

inventory of safety and security scenarios. After overlaying the calculated Zones of 

Concern along the proposed transit route, the scenarios were then analyzed to determine 

the likelihood and severity of risk. Based on the potential impact, resource needs were 
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then considered to identify and recommend scalable prevention, mitigation, and response 

strategies necessary to support the proposed operation. A summary of identified 

concerns, needed resources, and recommended actions was then provided in the WSA. 

Scenarios were categorized under the headings Prevention, Mitigation, Potential 

Prevention, and Potential Mitigation, with applicability assigned to Safety and/or 

Security. A brief discussion of each risk-reduction measure/strategy (existing and/or 

proposed) was provided, along with corresponding recommendations for each. An 

abstract of the specific security-related findings is contained in the separate, sensitive 

Security Supplement of this Report; an overview of the safety-related recommendations 

is as follows: 

• 33 Prevention measures were considered, with 21 being related to safety, 30 to 

security, and 15 applying to both. Examples include the application of or requirement 

for: 

1. Safety and Security Zones, Notice of Arrivals, Port State Control Programs, 

pre-arrival safety and security boardings, Broadcast Notice to Mariners, and 

standards prescribed by international classification societies. 

2. International conventions and protocols such as Standards of Training, 

Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW), International Safety Management 

(ISM) Code, Vessel Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), and standards for 

the design, construction, and operation of LNG carriers under the International 

Maritime Organization (IMO). 

3. Vessel escorts, vessel traffic management, enhanced Aids to Navigation, 

mandated pilotage, formalizing one-way traffic, and the development of bilateral 

safety regimens. 

• 15 Mitigation measures were considered, with all of them related to combined 

safety and security. Examples include: 

1. Utilization of escort vessels in numbers and capabilities as determined in the 

simulation testing. 

2. Application and enforcement of Safety and Security Zones, or their 

equivalent, in both U.S. and Canadian waters. 

3. Development of emergency response plans; national, regional, and local 

emergency contingency plans; regional and local incident management plans; and 

creation of a regional crisis alarm/notification system. 

4. Regional and local emergency preparedness and response training, drills and 

exercises, and marine firefighting training. 

• 11 Potential Prevention measures were considered; 6 applied to safety, 11 to 

security, and 6 applied to both. Examples included: 

1. Establishment of a USCG Regulated Navigation Area (RNA). 

2. Use/establishment of a regional harbormaster and/or port traffic controllers. 

3. Development of a remote maritime surveillance system; increased harbor 

patrols by Federal, State, and private assets; utilization of aerial surveillance; and 
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employment of law enforcement personnel (armed with either lethal or non-lethal 

weaponry depending on jurisdictional authority) aboard LNG carriers. 

• Six Potential Mitigation measures were considered; five applied to safety, six to 

security and five to both. Examples included: 

1. Development of an interoperable communications system. 

2. Periodic incident management training and exercises for local, state, and 

provincial officials. 

3. Development and implementation of an LNG gas cloud ignition system 

commensurate with applicable procedures and acceptable parameters. 

4. Implementation of a rapid civil emergency advisory system (audible alarm, 

radio, TV, etc., as well as a community awareness protection program in the event 

of an LNG release (i.e., shelter in place procedures). 

• In summary, findings and/or Recommendations drawn directly from the risk 

management and resource needs identification processes employed by Downeast 

LNG and listed in Part D of their respective WSA include: 

1. The safety and security scenario inventory revealed that there are riskreduction measures currently in place that promote the safe transit of LNG 

carriers along the proposed route. 

2. The development and implementation of many of the proposed mitigation 

measures would reduce the risks associated with the marine transportation of 

LNG. 

3. Due to the relative remoteness of the projected site and associated waterway, 

current law enforcement, fire fighting, medical and emergency response 

capabilities are inadequate to capably respond to a shipboard casualty involving a 

cargo of LNG. 

4. A form of bilateral agreement with Canada is necessary in order to promote 

and implement: 

• A mechanism for the setting and enforcing of safety and security zones (or 

equivalent) in Canadian waters. 

• The development of Safety and Security Communications Plans. 

• Formalized vessel traffic management throughout the transit route. 

• Community programs for safety/security awareness along both sides of the shared 

waterway. 

• Joint training and exercising programs to enhance safety, security, and response 

capabilities. 

• The establishment of general marine and LNG-specific firefighting and incident 

management training for shoreside firefighters; and revision of local contingency 

plans to address joint response strategies. 

• The establishment of vessel positive control procedures. 
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• The implementation or acknowledgement of established Maritime Security 

(MARSEC) Levels and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Advisories. 

• The recognition of USCG established Regulated Navigation Areas. 

• The possible utilization of private security force assets. 

• Emergency communications compatible with Canadian emergency response 

agencies. 

• The implementation of natural gas cloud ignition systems and procedures for New 

Brunswick communities. 

• The implementation of rapid civil emergency advisory systems to cover the New 

Brunswick populace. 

4.2 Environmental Protection and Response 

An accidental spill or release of LNG consequent to a marine casualty or intentional act 

could pose potential hazards to the public, waterway, and surrounding environment. The 

nature and severity of the spill, climatic and sea conditions, and whether or not oil 

pollutants were also spilled are all factors that must be taken into consideration in order 

to mount a rapid and effective response. 

An environmental response protocol is in place between the U.S. and Canada for spills of 

oil and other noxious substances. The original Canada-United States Joint Marine 

Pollution Contingency Plan (JCP) was developed to cover the Great Lakes; subsequent 

geographic annexes have since been added to cover all waters of U.S/Canadian mutual 

interest where the use of combined resources would improve the response posture and 

capability of each nation. The Atlantic Geographic Annex to the JCP applicable to the 

Passamaquoddy Bay region is known as CANUSLANT. CANUSLANT is tested 

regularly and improved by way of biennial exercises, under coordination of the U.S. 

USCG, District 1, and CCG, Atlantic Maritimes Region. CANUSLANT also recognizes 

the rights of U.S. Tribes and Canadian Aboriginal people, and even applies when only 

one country is affected, if the incident is of significant magnitude to require assistance 

from the other country. 

The primary objectives of CANUSLANT are to: 

• provide a joint cross-border mechanism for a coordinated and integrated response 

by both nations; 

• establish a Canada-United States Joint Response Team (JRT) for the Atlantic 

region under co-leadership of the CCG and the USCG; 

• if needed, establish and set up a Joint Command Post (JCP); 
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• ensure timely notification of cross-border incidents and the accurate transmission 

of information between responders, and the general public and media; 

• facilitate the safe and timely flow of personnel, equipment, and supplies across 

the international border; and 

• complement the Canada-U.S. Joint Inland Pollution Contingency Plan, and its 

CANUSEAST operational supplement, if needed. 

It should be noted that the JCP provides for a coordinated response to “Harmful 

Substance Incidents,” a broadly defined term that encompasses much of the domestic 

pollution response authority held by the two Coast Guards. CANUSLANT may be 

invoked when a harmful substance incident presents an imminent and substantial risk to 

public health and welfare, and/or poses potential danger to the environment on either side 

of the maritime international boundary. The definition of “harmful substance” is 

relatively wide-ranging and subject to both Canadian and U.S. laws and regulations. 

Harmful substance includes, but is not limited to, substances subject to control by a 

number of both national and international conventions and protocols such as the 

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (more commonly 

known as MARPOL 78), Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, and the Oil 

Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990, just to name a few. Conceptually, CANUSLANT provides 

for a strong and coordinated response regime to combat a noxious substance and/or 

petroleum-based spill. 

There have only been a few vessel-related accidents or allisions reported in the 

Passamaquoddy Bay area. The only commercial shipping accident in recent memory was 

on January 12, 2008, when the empty bulk carrier ALEXANDERGRACHT suffered a 

temporary loss of propulsion in Head Harbor Passage (Canadian waters). The ship was 

safely anchored in Head Harbor Passage, where the engine failure was quickly diagnosed 

and temporarily repaired. The vessel was able to continue to its berth at Estes Head, 

where final repairs and regulatory verification were conducted. The case did not impact 

navigation or result in any pollution. Additionally, PAWSA workshop participants were 

aware of only a couple of commercial fishing vessel groundings in the recent past, and a 

review of USCG records did not reveal any significant marine casualties involving deep 

draft vessels. According to the local pilots, over 2,400 deep draft vessels have safely 

transited the waterway during the past 25-year period without major incident or pollution. 

As typical for an area lacking a large industrial base and metropolitan setting, the region 

is currently not currently prepared to accept LNG carriers. The extent and nature of the 

resources, training, and equipment necessary to address emergency response, safety, and 

security, have yet to be fully determined. 

4.3 Consequence Management 

Concerns related to emergency response and marine firefighting have been consistently 

raised by the general public, representatives of emergency response organizations, and 

elected officials on both sides of the international border throughout the process of 

identifying and assessing potential risks associated with the Downeast LNG proposal. As 
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noted during the PAWSA, there are currently very limited resources immediately 

available to respond to a large marine fire along the current transit route. The consensus 

of the LNG Working Goup and AMSC subcommittee was that, if the Downeast LNG 

proposal is approved by FERC, it is imperative that issues relating to emergency response 

and marine firefighting be addressed during the development of the emergency response 

plan required by Section 311 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Additionally, bilateral 

arrangements to ensure appropriate cross-boundary emergency response capabilities 

under the existing CANUSLANT agreement would be required. 

4.4 Resource Identification and Needs 

The area along the proposed transit route presents a number of significant response 

challenges due to the relative remoteness of the area (equating to limited resources), 

jurisdictional implications surrounding the U.S. and Canadian border, and potentiality for 

high consequences in the event of an LNG spill/release. Downeast LNG was required to 

categorize safety, security, and response resources that are available to manage the risks 

associated with LNG carriers along the shared waterway, and concurrently, identify 

potential prevention/mitigation measures or short falls posed by the proposed operation in 

their WSA. The following is an abstract of the major public and private assets as 

provided, as well as a number of recommended prevention and mitigations measures as 

proposed. The listings are not all inclusive; they are intended solely as a comparative 

overview. 

4.4.1 U.S. Federal Resources 

All USCG Marine Safety related activities (Marine Inspection, Port State Control, 

International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) and Maritime Transportation Security 

Act (MTSA) compliance exams and vessel boardings, and Pollution Prevention and 

Response) are handled by the Marine Safety Detachment located in Belfast, ME (under 

Commander, Sector Northern New England). The following is a representative listing of 

federal units/resources located in the vicinity of the Downeast LNG proposed route. 

• USCG Station Eastport: equipped with a 41’ Utility Boat (UTB), and 25’ Response 

Boat Small (RBS). 

• USCG Station Jonesport: equipped with a 47’ Utility Motor Life Boat (MLB), 25’ 

RBS, and 27’ Response Boat Homeland Security (RBHS).

• USCGC Moray (WPB 87331): an 87' Coastal Patrol Boat, also home ported in 

Jonesport, ME.

• U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for the Eastport area is equipped with 25' 

RBS and 22' Sea-Ark watercrafts. 

4.4.2 State, County, and Local Resources 

Along with federal assets, there are a number of trained emergency management, fire, 

law enforcement, and environmental response agencies available to provide assistance 

throughout the region. These resources include: 
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• Maine State Police 

• State Fire Marshall’s Office 

• Maine Emergency Management Agency 

• Washington County Regional Communications Office 

• Washington County Sheriffs Office 

• Washington County Emergency Management Agency 

• Calais Fire and Emergency Management Service Dispatch 

• Local city and town fire and rescue departments 

• Oil Spill Response Organizations (OSRO) for Down East Region 4 

The majority of local, on-site public and private emergency response services within the 

immediate area are predicated on ‘everyday’ emergent situations based on a largely rural 

population and risk model. In the event of a large-scale crisis or catastrophe, the 

acquisition of enhanced response capabilities, such as bomb squads, hazardous materials 

response, marine firefighting/salvage operations, and major medical assistance, etc., 

would require significant coordination through the major Federal, State, and County 

agencies. Due to the relative geographic remoteness of the area, this could be a timeconsuming, problematic, and complex evolution. 

4.4.3 Canadian Resources 

Canada has also developed national prevention, preparedness, and response mechanisms 

to manage environmental emergencies. Federal policy exists to effectively manage all 

types of emergencies, including natural ones, such as hurricanes and tornadoes, and 

human-caused events, such as fire and hazardous materials spills. It should be 

emphasized, however, that the physical response to emergencies is almost exclusively 

carried out by the private sector, with monitoring conducted by the government. Within 

the federal Canadian government, emergency preparedness and response falls under 

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC). The mandate of the 

PSEPC is to lead the national effort to protect the Canadian citizenry from natural 

disasters, crime, and terrorism. 

In addition to the federal PSEPC, each province has an Emergency Management Office 

or Emergency Measures Organization (EMO). The EMO works at both provincial and 

municipal levels, and administers disaster financial assistance programs. 

The Canadian emergency response system is premised upon the following: 

• Initial response action lies with the responsible party (RP). 

• If the incident is beyond the scope and capacity of the RP, then municipal 

services, as directed by the respective mayor respond. 

• If the municipality cannot effectively manage the emergency, provincial services 

are expected to come to the aid of the local authorities. 

• If the response capacity of the province or territory is exceeded, then the federal 

government intervenes and provides emergency assistance. 
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In Canada, the federal government normally only intervenes upon request, or when the 

emergency clearly lies within federal jurisdiction. In the event of intervention, a lead 

Minister heads the Department whose normal responsibilities closely relate to the 

circumstances of the incident (e.g., Environmental Canada in the case of an 

environmental emergency on federal land; or the CCG for spills originating from a 

vessel). 

In Atlantic Canada, the key groups which would respond to an LNG spill/release at sea or 

during docking evolutions are the CCG, the Habitat Management Division of the 

Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Environment Canada, the Regional Environmental 

Emergency Team (REET), and Regional Response Organizations (ROs).11 

Canadian resources identified in the Downeast LNG WSA depend on risk management 

measures being implemented in agreement with the federal and provincial governments. 

Identified resources include: 

• Transport Canada – Provides experience and expertise in vessel design, 

construction, stability, and salvage. 

• Canadian Coast Guard – Lead federal agency for all spills originating from a ship 

in Canadian waters. Responds with spill response equipment to all ship source 

spills either as the primary responder or as a monitor. 

• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), an agency of the Ministry of 

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Directorate, provides policing and 

constable service for national, federal, provincial, and local municipalities. 

• Regional volunteer fire/rescue departments. 

Due to the relative remoteness of the communities along the Canadian shoreline, low 

population densities, and lack of critical infrastructure, emergency response inventories 

and capabilities are limited for the Passamaquoddy Bay region. 

4.5 Emergency Response Plan Process 

In accordance with Section 311 of the Federal Energy Policy Act of 2005, Downeast 

LNG is required to develop an Emergency Response Plan in consultation with the USCG 

and State and local agencies. This plan must be examined by the USCG and approved by 

FERC before the developer receives an approval to begin construction of its facilities. 

During the typical 3-year construction period, the requirement to annually review and 

update Downeast LNG’s WSA may identify changes to the project and/or port area that 

require the USCG to review and validate the updated WSA. 

At least 30 days before transferring LNG, the actual terminal operator must submit copies 

of its emergency manual to the USCG COTP for examination and approval. 

11 “A Study of the Anticipated Impacts on Canada from the Development of Liquefied Natural Gas 

terminals on Passamaquoddy Bay by SENES Consultants Ltd 
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The Community Assistance & Technical Services (CATS) Managers in each Department 

of Transportation (DOT) region are the primary contacts for state and local governments 

concerning the Commission’s process for approving Emergency Response Plans. 

After an LNG terminal is commissioned, LNG inspectors from the DOT Pipeline and 

Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) regional Office will examine the 

emergency response and preparedness plan for compliance with applicable regulations as 

part of their standard facility inspections. 

The Plan must incorporate response sections to include: 

1. Organization and Contacts 

• Incident management structure, identification of primary contacts, team 

responsibilities and functions. 

2. Responses to emergency incidents such as fires, release of vapors, hurricanes 

emergency vessel departures, bomb threats etc. 

• Procedures for communications 

• Procedures for responses, shelter and evacuation 

• Description of detection and shutdown systems 

• Hazard control equipment and local agency response 

3. Training and exercises 

4. Documentation 

5. Cost sharing: The Energy Policy Act and Commission orders require a cost 

sharing plan identifying the mechanisms for funding all project-specific security 

costs and safety/emergency management costs that would be imposed on state and 

local agencies. The cost sharing plan must specify what the LNG terminal 

operator will provide to cover the cost of state and local resources required to 

manage the security of the terminal and vessel to include: 

• Direct reimbursement (overtime for police and fire etc.). 

• Capital costs associated with emergency management equipment (patrol 

boats, fire fighting equipment etc.) 

• Annual costs associated with specialized training for fire departments, 

mutual aid, etc. 

The emergency response plan is developed through a transparent, public process that 

actively involves the USCG, appropriate agencies, and key officials of state and local 

governments. How this process applies to Canada and whether Canadian officials will 

wish to be involved are issues as yet to be determined. 
REDACTED VERSION 

78

4.6 Risk Mitigation Measures 

Based on the comprehensive assessment of the waterway, the COTP Northeast New 

England recommends that the following Risk Mitigation Measures should be 

implemented prior to allowing Downeast LNG’s Passamaquoddy Bay facility to begin 

operation. 

• The development, by the applicant, of standard operating parameters approved by the 

U.S. Coast Guard and coordinated with the Government of Canada to enable the safe 

and secure movement of LNG tankers through Canadian and U.S. waters, taking into 

account the need for: 

1. Number and performance capabilities of assist tugs and escort vessels as well as 

determining appropriate staging areas. The minimum specified number of 

escort/assist tugs must be employed at all times to escort LNG carriers throughout 

their transit and during berthing and unberthing. It should be noted that additional 

requirements for escort tugs may be identified during the emergency response 

planning process. 

2. Safe operating parameters and environmental constraints, to include but not 

limited to: visibility, wind, sea state, currents, and tides. 

3. Identification and implementation of navigation safety upgrades and 

enhancements, as identified in the applicant’s WSA, to include but not limited to: 

radar, communications interoperability, data buoys, and critical Aids to 

Navigation. 

4. These parameters must include the following: 

 Daylight Transits - Loaded or partially loaded LNG carriers may only transit 

the waterway during daylight hours. “Daylight” is interpreted as “civil 

twilight” in which the sun may be below the horizon, but the “horizon is clear 

and larger stars visible (Dutton’s Navigation and Plotting). In practical terms, 

the horizon, shoreline and receiving berths must be clearly seen under 

conditions of natural light. 

 Visibility - A minimum of two miles of visibility is required for the movement 

of LNG vessels in U.S. waters. Since in marginal weather conditions 

visibility can vary significantly along the route, the decision as to whether 

sufficient visibility exists, and is likely to continue to exist for the transit, is a 

judgment call that will be made jointly between the attending pilot(s) and 

Fundy Traffic, in consultation with and the concurrence of the COTP. The 

minimum visibility limits must be commensurate with the combined safety 

and security parameters. 

 Wind – 25 knots is the maximum sustained wind speed (determined during 

simulation tests), as measured on the vessel, in which an inbound or outbound 

transit will be allowed to commence. As with visibility, significant variation 

in wind conditions can exist along the route, and the decision as to whether 
REDACTED VERSION 

79

wind conditions permit a safe transit will be made by the attending pilot(s) in 

consultation with, and concurrence by, the COTP. 

 Traffic Control – One-way traffic patterns for deep-draft transits will be 

required and strictly enforced whenever LNG carriers are moving to avoid 

meeting or passing situations. At the discretion of the attending pilots and in 

consultation with vessel masters and Fundy Traffic, all vessel transits will be 

on a first-come, first-served basis, with inbound vessels having priority over 

outbound. 

 Anchoring - There are presently no designated (i.e., anchorages specified in 

regulation) for the area. However, three locations are routinely used: one 

located in the Bay of Fundy (controlled by Fundy Traffic) just outside of the 

transit corridor and to the north of Head Harbor Passage; one in the vicinity of 

Friars Bay southeast of Eastport; and one inside of Passamaquoddy Bay. 

LNG vessels will not be allowed to anchor, or hold, in Friar Roads while 

waiting for a berth – anchoring or holding under this circumstance must occur 

offshore. 

 Loaded, inbound LNG carriers transiting Head Harbor Passage and Western 

Passage must maintain ample separation distance and uphold, at a minimum, 

the safety and security zone parameters. The intent of this limitation is to 

preclude the possibility of incurring overtaking situations and/or the need for 

holding at, or anchoring in Friar Roads. Non-LNG vessels may anchor in, or 

hold at Friar Roads while waiting for a vessel proceeding in the opposite 

direction to transit Head Harbor Passage or Western Passage. 

 With the exception of temporary boarding areas established by and for USCG 

authorized assets, the anchoring or holding of LNG vessels within Friar Roads 

is limited to confirmed emergency situations only, such as major mechanical 

malfunctions and reduced visibility situations following non-forecasted, 

abrupt weather changes (fog, squalls, etc.) and/or as directed by, and in 

consultation with, the COTP. 

• The development by the applicant, of an Emergency Response Plan required by 

Section 311 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 15 U.S.C § 717b-1(e), that is approved 

by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and accepted by the U.S. Coast Guard 

to enable a comprehensive and coordinated response to an LNG emergency, taking 

into account the need for: 

1. In-transit and dockside emergency procedures in the event of fire, mechanical 

malfunction, allision, grounding, and/or need of safe anchorage or refuge. 

2. The potential environmental impact of an LNG release and the identification and 

acquisition of joint resource needs to respond to the potential release. 

3. A contingency response plan specific to LNG and focusing on a layered response 

approach. 

4. Coordinated marine firefighting training and emergency response, with an 

emphasis on containing and extinguishing LNG fires. 

5. An incident management training and collaborative exercise program. 
REDACTED VERSION 

80

• Collaborate with all appropriate jurisdictions on joint, complementary rulemaking to 

formalize vessel traffic management practices and the establishment and enforcement 

of comprehensive safety and security zones for the protection of the LNG carrier, 

alternate waterway users, and area residents, taking into account the need for: 

1. A one-way vessel traffic scheme during transit operations 

2. Deep-draft vessel tug escorts and assistance services. 

3. Mandatory pilotage throughout the transit route and during docking and 

undocking evolutions at all ports along the waterway. 

4. Implementation of an Automatic Identification System for all vessels involved in 

the transport of LNG on this waterway. 

5. Implementation of appropriate vessel speed restrictions. 

6. Implementation of appropriate environmental operating parameters (e.g. currents, 

tides, visibility, wind velocity, ect.) 

• The applicant must develop and successfully conduct full mission bridge simulator 

training for all pilots providing services to LNG carriers. The training must take into 

account the full spectrum of vessel design and length, cargo carrying capacity, 

method of propulsion, steering and rudder configuration, thruster arrangements, and 

maneuvering characteristics for those carriers being considered for charter. In 

addition, expanded simulator training incorporating the number and design of tug 

boats having the minimum performance and operating criteria previously outlined, 

will be required. 

• The applicant must develop a Transit Management Plan or other document, in 

consultation with the USCG and other cognizant agencies, that clearly outlines the 

roles, responsibilities, and specific procedures for the LNG carrier, the LNG terminal, 

and all federal, state/provincial, and local stakeholders with responsibilities related to 

the proposed project and/or whose jurisdiction may reasonably be expected to be 

impacted by a potential navigation safety accident or terrorist attack. 

• The applicant must prepare and submit an Operations Manual, as required by 33 

C.F.R. § 127.305, an Emergency Manual, as required by 33 C.F.R. § 127.307, and a 

Facility Security Plan as required by 33 C.F.R. § 105.120 to the COTP Sector 

Northern New England for review and approval at least 6 months but no more than 12 

months before the facility would begin operations. 

 

• The applicant must provide written verification of collaboration with and acceptance 

from the Passamaquoddy Nation, ensuring its jurisdictional interests and public safety 

and security needs associated with this project are adequately met. 

Downeast LNG must determine and comply with all applicable Canadian laws and 

regulations applicable to the safe and secure navigation and the regulation of maritime 

traffic that comply with customary international law. Such laws and regulations shall not 

discriminate among foreign ships or in their application have the practical effect of 
REDACTED VERSION 

81

denying, hampering, or impairing the right of non-suspendable innocent passage through 

an international strait. Moreover, consistent with international law, the Coast Guard will 

not require compliance with such laws and regulations that apply to the design, 

construction, manning, or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to 

generally accepted international rules or standards 
REDACTED VERSION 

5.0 Sensitive Security Supplement 

 

This section contains Sensitive Security Information controlled under 49 CFR Part 1520 

and has been redacted. This information may not be disclosed to persons without a “need 

to know”, as defined in 49 CFR 1520.11, except with written permission of the Secretary 

of Homeland Security. 

82
REDACTED VERSION 

6.0 Conclusions and Recommendations 

Based on the results of the assessment of potential risks to navigation safety and maritime 

security associated with the Downeast LNG proposal, the USCG has determined that the 

waterway along the intended transit route, which takes in waters of the Gulf of Maine, 

Bay of Fundy, Grand Manan Channel, Head Harbor Passage, Friar Roads, Western 

Passage, and Passamaquoddy Bay, is suitable for the type and frequency of marine traffic 

associated with this proposed project, provided that the Risk Mitigation Measures 

outlined in Section 4.6 of this report are fully implemented. The hydrographic 

characteristics of the waterway are suitable to sustain deep draft vessel movement and the 

simulation tests and traffic studies conducted confirm that the transit and maneuvers are 

feasible for the design range of LNG carriers anticipated. 

If the conditions of the waterway change and or the applicant is unable to implement the 

recommended mitigation measures, the COTP, Sector Northern New England, may 

reconsider this determination. 

Whether or not the Downeast LNG proposal is approved by FERC, the USCG will 

continue to systematically analyze the waters of Passamaquoddy Bay and its approaches 

to effectively manage the potential risks to navigation safety and maritime security 

associated with the project. 

If FERC approves the project and the facility begins operations, additional resources 

would be needed to mitigate safety and security risks identified during the suitability 

assessment. The required security resources, in particular law enforcement personnel and 

associated security craft, and associated operational procedures are based on existing 

USCG policies. These policies take into account a changing threat environment and the 

potential for unknown threats. The most probable security regime should consist of a 

mix of U.S. and Canadian federal, state/provincial, and local law enforcement, which 

may require cost-sharing arrangements, as outlined in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. As 

mentioned previously, a major portion of the vessels’ route is initially through Canadian 

waters. Downeast LNG must be able to adequately demonstrate that an effective security 

regime has been established during the Canadian portion of the vessels’ planned route 

prior to a loaded LNG vessel being allowed to transit to the facility. 

83

REDACTED VERSION 

Appendices 

A. List of Acronyms 

B. Ports and Waterways Safety Assessment for the Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 

 

84

REDACTED VERSION 

Appendix A: List of Acronyms 

ABS American Bureau of Shipping 

AIS Automated Information System 

AMSC Area Maritime Security Committee 

APA Atlantic Pilotage Association 

ASD Azimuthing Propulsion Unit 

ATON Aid to Navigation 

BCFD Billion Standard Cubic Feet per day 

BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion 

CANUSLANT Canada, United States, Atlantic 

CATS Community Assistance & Technical Services 

CCG Canadian Coast Guard 

CCTV Closed Circuit Television 

CDC Certain Dangerous Cargo 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

COLREGS International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 

COTP Captain of the Port 

CVTS Cooperative Vessel Traffic Services 

DGPS Differential Global Positioning System 

DOT Department of Transportation 

DNV Det Norske Veritas 

EIS Environmental Impact Statement 

ERP Emergency Response Plan 

EMO Emergency Measures Organization 

FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

FSRU Floating LNG Storage and Regasification Unit 

IACS International Association of Classification Societies 

ICR Issues, Concerns and Risks 

IMO International Maritime Organization 

ISM International Safety Management 

LE Law Enforcement 

LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 

LOI Letter of Intent 

LOR Letter of Recommendation 

LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas 

MARPOL Convention to Prevention Pollution from Ships 

MARRSEC Maritime Security 

M & NP Maritimes and Northeast Pipeline, L.L.C. 

MEMA Maine Emergency Management Agency 

MNI Moffatt & Nichols International 

MMBCF Million Standard Cubic Feet per day 

MSI Marine Safety International 

MTSA Maritime Transportation Security Act 

i
REDACTED VERSION 

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act 

NOAA National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration 

NVIC Navigation Vessel Inspection Circular 

OPA Oil Pollution Act of 1990 

PAWSA Ports and Waterway Safety Assessment 

PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 

PORTS Physical Oceanographic Real-Time System 

PSEPC Public Safety a Preparedness and Emergency Canada 

PWSA Ports and Waterway Safety Act 

QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment 

RBDM Risk-Based Decision-Making 

REET Regional Environmental Emergency Team 

RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police 

SAR Search and Rescue 

SIGTO Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators 

SSI Security Sensitive Information 

VHF-FM Very High Frequency-Medium Frequency 

VTS Vessel traffic Service 

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

USC United States Code 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

WAMS Waterways Analysis and Management System 

WSA Waterway Suitability Assessment 

WSR Waterway Suitability Report 

ii
Appendix B: Ports and Waterways Safety 

Assessment Workshop Report, Passamaquoddy Bay, 

ME

PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

1

Ports and Waterways Safety Assessment 

Workshop Report 

Passamaquoddy Bay, ME 

UIntroduction

Risk identification and mitigation are and have been ongoing activities within the 

Passamaquoddy Bay area. As a step toward standardizing methodology, a formal Ports and 

Waterways Safety Assessment (PAWSA) for Passamaquoddy Bay was conducted in Bangor, 

ME, on 3-4 October 2006. A group of experts examined the waterway using the risk model 

pictured here. 

The results of that workshop are provided in this report and include the following information: 

• Geographical Area 

• Numerical results for the factors listed above as derived from the following activities: 

− Team Expertise 

− Risk Factor Rating Scales 

− Absolute Risk Levels 

− Present Risk Levels 

− Intervention Effectiveness 

• Brief description of the process used for the assessment 

• List of participants 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

2

• Planned Actions: Summary of risk(s) and mitigation(s) dialogue 

• Survey results presented in tabular format 

UGeographic Area

The participants defined the geographic bounds of the waterway area to be discussed as: 

The contiguous waters of Passamaquoddy Bay and its tributaries, from the International 

Bridge at Calais, ME seaward to the eastern shore of Campobello Island and West Quoddy 

Head. 

What follows is a diagram of the geographic area (courtesy of Old Sow Publishing)

of the geographic area, not drawn to scale: 

Approximate Vessel

Transit Route

BAYSIDE

EASTPORT

Existing 

Proposed 

Approximate Vessel

Transit Route

BAYSIDE BAYSIDE

EASTPORTEASTPORT

Existing 

Proposed 

UNumerical Results

Book 1 – Team Expertise 

In Book 1, the participants were asked to assess their level of expertise, in comparison to the 

other workshop participants, for each of the six categories in the Waterway Risk Model. Overall, 

41% of the participant teams placed themselves in the upper third, 34% in the middle third, and 

25% in the lower third of all teams. This distribution is fairly typical because the participants 

were chosen for their acknowledged expertise. 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

Book 2 – Risk Factor Rating Scales 

The purpose of Book 2 is to produce the risk scale numbers that are used in Book 3. Participants 

calibrated intermediate points on the risk assessment scale for each risk factor.

On average, participants from this waterway calculated the intermediate risk points as 2.9 and 

5.4, which are close to the national values (2.9 and 5.5) established by the prior PAWSA 

workshop participants from around the country. 

A tabular display of the results of Book 2 is found at the end of this report. 

Book 3 – Absolute Risk Levels with no mitigations 

The participants evaluated the absolute risk level in the waterway by selecting a qualitative 

descriptor for each risk factor that best described conditions in the Passamaquoddy Bay area. 

Those qualitative descriptors were converted to numerical values using the scales from the Book 

2 results. 

On those scales, 

1.0 represents low risk (best case) and 

9.0 represents high risk (worst case), with 

5.0 being the mid-risk value. 

In the Passamaquoddy Bay area, 9 of the 24 risk factors were scored at or above the mid-risk 

value. They were (in descending order): 

Risk Category Score Risk Category Score 

Visibility Restrictions 7.9 Configuration 7.7 

Environmental 7.5 Aquatic Resources 7.5 

Small Craft Quality 6.9 Commercial Fishing Vessel 

Quality 

6.4 

Water Movement 6.4 Economic 5.9 

Hazardous Materials Release 5.3 

Specific hazardous locations identified 

Only one location along the transit route was identified as being “hazardous.” It was at the 

approximate confluence of Head Harbor Passage, Friars Road, and Western Passage, which is 

off the southern tip of Deer Island and opposite Dog Island, where the turn north exceeds 45 

degrees.

Book 4 – Present Risk Levels after applying existing mitigations 

The participants examined all risk factors along the waterway, including those presumptive risks 

associated with proposed LNG traffic and cross-checked these risks against mitigation measures 

and practices currently in place. Group consensus, which is defined as 2/3 majority, indicated that 

3
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

4

only one risk factor was fully offset by existing mitigation measures, while 21 other risk factors 

were NOT adequately balanced. Consensus could not be reached on two of the factors regarding 

the adequacy of existing measures to nullify the identified risks. 

Book 5 – Intervention Effectiveness 

The participants selected those specific actions, or interventions, that would be most effective in 

reducing the identified risks. The Risk Improvement is the perceived reduction in risk when 

taking the actions specified by the participants. A green “Balanced” indicates that no 

intervention is needed and risk is balanced in the waterway. 

For five of the 21 risk factors identified as needing additional risk reduction action, the 

intervention categories listed below were judged as being most effective. 

Risk Category Selected Intervention Category Specific Actions 

Vessel Conditions Active Traffic Mgmt • Develop joint USCG / CCG requirements to control 

vessel movements 

• Make radar, AIS, and VTS compliance mandatory 

• Improve VHS radio coverage 

• Update previous WAMS to reflect critical port status 

(pending LNG approval) 

• Conduct Port State inspections (U.S. and Canada 

respectively) 

• Enhance communications (radio repeaters) 

• Develop designated traffic lanes 

• Expand radar coverage 

Traffic Conditions Active Traffic Mgmt • Specify traffic lanes; develop non-meeting traffic 

procedures 

• Formalize designated one-way traffic schemes 

• Provide designated holding zones 

• Provide VTS with enhanced radar coverage 

• Enhance radar and communications capabilities 

• Improve / upgrade ATON; provide NDBC buoy 

Waterway Conditions Active Traffic Mgmt • Formalize one-way traffic zones; establish designated 

no passing zones 

• Update current WAMS 

• Establish lighted navigation aids at Stovers and Clarks 

Ledges; intensify the power of the Dog Island and 

Deer Island lighted buoys; establish a lighted aid on 

Kendall Head; install a lighted aid on Clam Cover 

Head, relocate and light the current HU4 buoy 

• Provide z-drive tugs having sufficient bollard pull, 

HP, and fire fighting capabilities 

• Provide updated hydrographic survey 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

5

Intervention Category Definitions

• Coordination / Planning – Improve long-range and/or contingency planning and better 

coordinate activities / improve dialogue between waterway stakeholders 

• Voluntary Training – Establish / use voluntary programs to educate mariners / boaters in 

topics related to waterway safety (Rules of the Road, ship/boat handling, etc.) 

• Rules & Procedures – Establish / refine rules, regulations, policies, or procedures (nav 

rules, pilot rules, standard operating procedures, licensing, UrequireU training and education, 

etc.) 

• Enforcement – More actively enforce existing rules / policies (navigation rules, vessel 

inspection regulations, standards of care, etc.) 

• Nav / Hydro Info – Improve navigation and hydrographic information (NTM, charts, 

coast pilots, AIS, tides and currents tables, etc.) 

• Radio Communication – Improve the ability to communicate bridge-to-bridge or ship-toshore (radio reception coverage, signal strength, reduce interference & congestion, 

monitoring, etc.) 

• Active Traffic Management – Establish / improve a Vessel Traffic Service: information / 

navigation / traffic organization 

• Waterway Changes – Widen / deepen / straighten the channel and/or improve the aids to 

navigation (buoys, ranges, lights, DGPS, etc.) 

• Other Actions – Risk mitigation measures needed that do NOT fall under any of the 

above strategy categories

Intervention categories providing the highest mitigation factor for subsequent consequent risk 

categories focused on coordination, planning, and training. 

Risk Category Selected Intervention Category Specific Actions 

Immediate Consequences Coordination / Planning Coordinate with Provincial, State, and local response 

agencies to formulate joint emergency response plan; 

identify / assess response assets and capabilities 

Subsequent Consequences Coordination / Planning 

(for three risk factors) 

Coordinate with Canadian, State, and local governments 

on response plan development and associated training 

and exercising criteria 

Two “consensus alerts” occurred. Consensus alerts can be triggered by a less than strong / 

majority agreement on risk factor interventions, and/or no real consensus being reached at all. 

The two alerts, by Risk Factor and associated Intervention, were: 

• Volume of Small Craft Traffic (Traffic Conditions) – mitigated by implementing and 

enforcing rules & procedures. 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

6

• Bottom Type (Waterway Conditions) – mitigated by navigation / hydrographic 

information. 

UAssessment Process

The PAWSA process is a structured approach for obtaining expert judgments on the level of 

waterway risk. The process also addresses the effectiveness of possible intervention actions for 

reducing risk in the waterway. A select group of waterway users / stakeholders evaluate risk 

factors and the effectiveness of various intervention actions. Thus the process is a joint effort 

involving waterway users, both professional and recreational, and the agencies / entities 

responsible for implementing selected risk mitigation measures. 

The PAWSA methodology employs a generic model of waterway risk that was conceptually 

developed by a National Dialog Group on National Needs for Vessel Traffic Services and then 

translated into computer algorithms by Potomac Management Group, Inc. In that model, risk is 

defined as the product of the probability of a casualty and its consequences. Consequently, the 

model includes variables associated with both the causes and the effects of waterway casualties. 

The first step in the process is for the participants to assess their expertise with respect to the six 

risk categories in the model. Those self assessments are used to weight inputs during all 

subsequent steps. The second step is for the participants to provide input for the rating scales 

used to assess risk. The third step is to discuss and then numerically evaluate the absolute risk 

levels in the waterway using pre-defined qualitative risk descriptors. In the fourth step, the 

participants discuss and then evaluate the effectiveness of existing mitigation strategies in 

reducing risk. Next, the participants are asked to offer new ideas for further reducing risk, for 

those factors where risk is not well balanced with existing mitigations. Finally, the effectiveness 

of various intervention actions in reducing unmitigated risk is evaluated. 

The process produces the group’s consensus of risks in this waterway and is an excellent tool for 

focusing risk mitigation efforts. However, risk factors evaluated as being adequately balanced 

may still be worthy of additional risk mitigation actions. Any reasonable steps for minimizing or 

preventing the impacts of marine accidents should be encouraged for the benefit of the waterway 

community. 

UParticipants

The following is the list of waterway users and stakeholders who participated in the process: 

Participants Organization Phone Email 

Mr. Harold Bailey Roosevelt Campobello 

International Park 

506-752-2922 bailey@fdr.net 

BMC Mark Corbishley OIC, USCG Station Eastport 207-497-3404 Mark.R.Corbishley@uscg.mil 

CDR Brian Downey USCG Sector Northern New 

England 

207-741-5464 Brian.J.Downey@uscg.mil 

Capt. John J. Egan LNG Consultant / Marine Advisor 860-608-2986 CAPTAINLIB@aol.com 

Mr. George Bud Finch City of Eastport 207-853-2300 eastport_mgr@ptc-me.net 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

Participants Organization Phone Email 

Mr. Robert S. Gardner Maine Emergency Management 

Agency 

207-624-4400 robert.s.gardner@maine.gov 

CAPT Stephen Garrity COTP, USCG Sector Northern 

New England 

207-767-0320 Stephen.P.Garrity@uscg.mil 

Mr. Clifford A. Goudey Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology 

617-253-7079 cgoudey@mit.edu 

Mr. Michael F. 

Hinerman 

Washington County EMA 207-255-3931 

207-263-5990 

wnema@ptc-me.net 

Ms. Kristen Koyama NOAA / NMFS 978-281-9300 

ext. 6531 

Kristen.Koyama@noaa.gov 

Mr. Steve Lehmann NOAA / SSC 617-223-8016 Steve.Lehmann@noaa.gov 

Mr. Tim Leitzell Athenian Energy Inc. 713-654-0067 tim.leitzell@sbcglobal.net 

Mr. Stan Lord F/V Fundy Trails 744-2486 info@eastcoastferries.nb.ca 

Capt. Brendan McAvoy Maine Maritime Academy 207-326-2423 bmcavoy@mma.edu 

LT Daniel McLean USCG MSD Belfast 207-338-8395 Daniel.W.McLean@uscg.mil 

Mr. Kareem Monib FERC / OEP / LNGE Branch 202-502-6265 kareem.monib@ferc.gov 

Mr. Alan Moore USCG Sector Northern New 

England 

207-767-0338 Alan.H.Moore2@uscg.mil 

Mr. Gerry Moores F/V Examiner 207-338-8905 fvexaminer@earthlink.net 

Capt. Gerald Morrison Eastport Pilots USA 207-853-6020 gmorrison5@prexar.com 

Mr. Brian Nutter Maine Port Authority and Maine 

Pilotage Commission 

207-624-3564 Brian.Nutter@maine.gov 

Capt. Bob Peacock Quoddy Pilots USA 207-263-6403 qpilot@maineline.net 

Mr. Michael Power Bayside Port Corporation 902-863-8368 mrpower@eastlink.ca 

Mr. Roland Skip Rogers Federal Marine Terminals 207-853-6096 srogers@fedmar.com 

BMCM Kurt Rugenius OIC, USCGC Moray 207-497-2340 Kurt.A.Rugenius@uscg.mil 

Mr. Robert N. Stewart Moran Towing Corp. bstewart@morantug.com 

Mr. David Turner Town of Perry, ME, Selectman 

Chair & Weir Fishermen’s 

Association 

207-853-9404 turnerdd@wwsisp.com 

Mr. Thomas W. Varney Maine DEP 207-941-4573 Thomas.W.Varney@maine.gov 

Capt. Laurence V. Wade Maine Maritime Academy 207-326-2425 wcah@mma.edu 

lwade@mma.edu 

Sgt. John Welcher RCMP New Brunswick, CA 506-452-3482 John.Welcher@rcmp-grc.gc.ca 

7
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

Observers Organization Phone Email 

Mr. Mihai Balaban Transport Canada 902-426-3477 balabam@tc.gc.ca 

Cst. John Beck RCMP – IBET 506-465-2803 

506-467-7889 

john.beck@rcmp-grc.gc.ca 

Mr. Paul B. Skip Cole Roosevelt Campobello 

International Park 

506-752-2922 skipcole@fdr.net 

Mr. Sinclair Dewis Environment Canada Sinclair.Dewis@ec.gc.ca 

Ms. Marcia Gartley District Representative for 

Congressman Mike Michaud 

202-225-4502 Marcia.Gartley@mail.house.gov 

Capt. Patrick Gates Atlantic Pilotage Authority 902-426-6389 pgates@atlanticpilotage.com 

Mr. Robert Godfrey Save Passamaquoddy Bay 207-853-2922 info@savepassamaquoddybay.org 

Mr. Gavin Insley Transport Canada, Marine Safety 

Saint John 

506-636-4748 insleyg@tc.gc.ca 

Mr. Robert Jette Bayside Port Corporation 506-633-3824 mrj@clarkdrummie.ca 

Mr. George Lindsay Environment Canada 506-452-3286 George.Lindsay@ec.gc.ca 

Capt. Lars Lund Retired Master Mariner 506-755-1889 larbetty@nb.sympatico.ca 

Mr. Al McLarty Canadian Coast Guard 902-426-9022 mclartya@mar.dfo-mpo.gc.ca 

Mr. Earle Stanhope Jr. Stanhopes Trucking 207-454-3341 stanhopestrucking@wwsisp.com 

CWO2 Kurt D. Strauch USCG Sector Northern New 

England 

207-244-4234 Kurt.D.Strauch@uscg.mil

Mr. Adam Wilson Quoddy Bay LNG 207-853-6631 

405-625-6185 

awilson@smithcogen.com 

awilson@quoddylng.com 

Ms. Carol Woodcock State Office Representative (U.S. 

Senator S. Collins) 

207-945-0417 Carol_Woodcock@collins.senate. 

gov 

Mr. Rob Wyatt Downeast LNG 207-214-5926 rwyatt@downeastlng.com 

Facilitation Team Organization Phone Email 

LT Keith Pierre USCG COMDT (G-PWN) 202-372-1554 Keith.J.Pierre@uscg.mil 

Mr. Ward Fisher Potomac Management Group, Inc. 703-836-1037 wfisher@potomacmgmt.com 

Mr. Chuck Klingler Potomac Management Group, Inc. 703-836-1037 cklingler@potomacmgmt.com 

Ms. Stephanie Muska Potomac Management Group, Inc. 703-836-1037 smuska@potomacmgmt.com 

Participation in the PAWSA was through invitation and was designed to include a broad crosssection of waterway users, port stakeholders, and maritime professionals, with the greatest 

emphasis placed on deep-draft vessel interests. As indicative of the above list, a large segment of 

the regional marine industry, emergency response and law enforcement community, 

environmentalists, state, provincial, and local governments, and the fishing and aquaculture 

industry were well represented by participants from both sides of the border. A number of 

academia were on hand as well, and contributed to the workgroup discussions. In addition, 

8
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

representatives of state agencies and elected officials, Canadian governmental officials, members 

of the LNG industry, and concerned citizens’ groups were on hand to observe the assessment 

process. Other central interests invited, but unfortunately unable to attend, included 

representation for the Pleasant Point Passamaquoddy Tribe, Canadian commercial fishing 

industry, and the regional estuaries. 

Planned Actions

The catalog of risks and possible mitigation strategies derived from the Passamaquoddy Bay port 

area PAWSA workshop is set forth on the following pages. This provides an excellent 

foundation from which the local maritime communities in both, the U.S. and Canada, respective 

harbor safety organizations, and representative government, state, and provincial authorities can 

further examine and take appropriate risk mitigation actions for both near-term action and for 

future risk mitigation planning. 

The section has been annotated to include those initial actions that appear appropriate in 

response to the participants’ expressed concerns. Identification of initial actions will help focus 

subsequent discussions with the local maritime community, waterway users, and stakeholders 

regarding each risk, permitting the testing of each proposed action for validity and 

appropriateness prior to implementation. The listing of initial possible actions should be viewed 

as a starting point for continuing dialogue within the local maritime communities, leading to 

clear identification of risks and well conceived mitigation measures. 

Each new idea is listed along with how many times it was suggested by the participant teams in 

Book 5. 

9
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

10

Vessel Conditions: Deep Draft Vessel Quality 

Today: 

• The majority of the vessels using the 

waterway are bulk, refrigerated, and general 

cargo carriers. Problems experienced ten 

years ago with the bulker fleet have 

diminished significantly. 

• Overall risk is considered relatively minimal. 

• Communication and navigation concerns 

exist due to the lack of full radio and radar 

coverage by Fundy Traffic. 

• Although the bulkers calling on the 

FEDMAR and Bayside terminals are 

relatively older than other classes of vessels, 

there have been no reported casualties in the 

port area. Deep drafts approximate 130 in 

number annually, with 60% to Bayside; 40% 

to Eastport. 

• Engineering is usually good; however, 

shipboard crane maintenance is a concern. 

• The U.S. completed a WAMS study in 2005; 

an ATON study by Canada has not yet been 

conducted. 

Trends: 

• Deep draft vessel quality is improving 

• LNG cargo and deep draft ships may be 

coming into the area. Will require additional 

fire fighting. 

• Number of service vessels needed to support 

LNG traffic will increase. 

• Hazardous materials introduced into area will 

increase. Currently, one ship per year transits 

area with hazmat. 

Existing Mitigations:

• International and domestic safety and 

construction standards have been improved. 

• Crew training standards must be met as per 

STCW. 

• Deep draft vessels must be in full compliance 

with MARPOL requirements. Both, the U.S. and 

Canada administer Port State Control procedures 

and inspections to ensure compliance with 

STCW, SOLAS, and ISM. 

• Risk-based decision making methodologies now 

exist and emergent systems and procedures are 

being implemented. 

• Deep draft vessels fall under the operational 

control of Fundy Traffic. 

• U.S. has compulsory pilotage requirement. 

Canadian pilotage is not compulsory; however, 

90% take on pilots. A recent Canadian study 

recommends mandatory pilotage. 

• Ferry operators are very competent and well 

accustomed to the mix of high currents and tides. 

• The majority of deep draft operators are fluent in 

English. 

• The pilots have their own stand-alone navigation 

system. 

• Vessels feature safety, machinery, and navigation 

redundancy to reduce operating risks, downtime, 

and insurance costs. 

• U.S. and Canada has a vessel clearance system 

that includes an advanced notice of arrival. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• Additional security issues will be addressed. 

• Enhanced / improved communications, radar, 

and AIS. 

• LNG carriers are quality constructed with double 

hulls. 

• Tug / escort vessels with increased HP, bollard 

pull, and increased fire fighting capabilities. 

• USCG safety / security zones will be 

implemented. 

• Proficiency and training standards are higher on 

LNG vessels than ships carrying low-value 

cargo. 

• Simulator training obtained by pilots. 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

11

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Provide regulations that rule vessel movement 

(includes VTS, designated traffic lanes, and radar 

requirements) or formalize existing practices and 

policies under joint U.S. and Canada effort. 

10 Active Traffic Mgmt 

• Compulsory radar, AIS, and VTS. 7 Active Traffic Mgmt 

• Enhance VHF radio coverage. 6 Radio Communications 

• Have design in place to make vessels and the 

environment safe as soon as possible after a 

casualty. 

5 Rules & Procedures 

• Conduct / update WAMS (pending LNG). 5 Waterway Changes 

• Expand safety inspection program and oversight 

of commercial fishing fleet. 

4 Enforcement 

• Provide appropriate (number, size) assist / support 

tugs, escorts, and service vessels. 

4 Other Actions 

• Promote vessel vetting. 4 Coordination / Planning 

• W.R.T. international agreements, consider the 

arrangements with Canada in Puget Sound and 

along the Detroit River as a possible best practice. 

Include pilots in the process. 

3 Coordination / Planning 

• Compulsory pilotage for Canada. 2 Rules & Procedures 

• Required mandatory training for pilots on 

navigation (simulator). 

2 Rules & Procedures 

• Possibly restrict all “hazardous” cargo. 1 Rules & Procedures 

• Restrict vessel size and tonnage. 1 Other Actions 

• Provide education and training for pilots on a 

voluntary basis. 

1 Voluntary Training 

• Use technology in ship control, spill detection, and 

for first responders. 

1 Other Actions 

• Increased liability (for spills). 1 Enforcement 

• Provide terminal specific equipment (for first 

responders). 

1 Other Actions 

• Build vessel to meet the unique environmental 

conditions. 

1 Other Actions 

• Provide safety management system for shore side 

facilities. 

1 Other Actions 

• Provide infrastructure improvements for first 

responders. 

1 Other Actions 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

12

Vessel Conditions: Shallow Draft Vessel Quality

Today: 

• Tug boat captains are licensed, most crews 

carry MMDs; however, these vessels are 

uninspected (and thus operate under less 

authority and oversight). 

• Subchapter T and K vessels have licensed 

captains but crews are undocumented and 

may be seasonally employed with high 

turnover rate. 

• On the whole, commercial tug fleet crews are 

knowledgeable and experienced. 

Trends: 

• Stricter safety requirements for tugs / tow 

vessels forthcoming. 

• STCW and Responsible Carrier Program 

have improved the tug / barge fleet and crew 

competency. 

• Regional tourism is slowly increasing and 

the number of tour / whale watching boats is 

rising. 

• Increased construction shore side 

• Need greater public relations to deal with 

additional LNG ships. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Tug and tow crews are STCW qualified. 

• Additional / enhanced aids to navigation being 

employed. 

• Bridge Resource Management training. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• More responder vessels. Additional, highly 

sophisticated emergency response vessels are 

needed. 

• Consistent coordination and communication 

needed between LNG ships and ferries / 

passenger vessels due to the three-fold increase 

in traffic and moving safety / security zones. 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

13

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Require vessel inspections (U.S. and Canada). 9 Enforcement 

• Enhance communication capabilities (AIS, radio 

repeaters). 

7 Radio Communications 

• Provide / formalize designated traffic lane scheme. 4 Active Traffic Mgmt 

• Compulsory VTS and AIS 3 Other Actions 

• Mandate additional crew size. 3 Rules & Procedures 

• Provide better instrumentation for ship control and 

communication. 

2 Other Actions 

• Examine multipurpose use of support craft. 2 Coordination / Planning 

• Increase education and training. 2 Voluntary Training 

• Require mandatory training. 1 Rules & Procedures 

• Provide federal safety and/or security zone 

enforcement. 

1 Active Traffic Mgmt 

• Develop contingency plans. 1 Rules & Procedures 

• Develop updated WAMS. 1 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Provide infrastructure improvements to first 

responders and for community communication. 

1 Other Actions 

• Provide public service safety announcements in 

the event of a spill (similar to those provided to 

communities surrounding nuclear power plants). 

1 Other Actions 

• Crossing vessels to set and follow schedules. 1 Other Actions 

• Mandatory training to pilots for ship control and 

navigation. 

1 Enforcement 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

14

Vessel Conditions: Commercial Fishing Vessel Quality 

Today: 

• Overall professionalism of operators is 

relatively low to moderate. 

• Fishing vessel maintenance is sensitive to 

economic conditions; overall material 

condition is marginal. 

• There have been recent deaths on fishing 

boats. 

• Boats used for inland fisheries are marginally 

maintained. 

• Area knowledge is high; few fishing vessels 

are from outside of the area. 

• Lack of required certification, navigation 

equipment, and cold water immersion gear. 

• Trouble with communications to other 

commercial vessels; some operators don’t 

respond to VHF calls or are unintelligible. 

Trends: 

• Adapting vessels to other fisheries has 

sometimes led to stability and structural 

issues. 

• More violations of Rules of the Road. 

• Casualty investigations reveal about two 

vessel groundings per year; fatigue and autopilot are significant factors. 

• USCG and Canada are considering licensing 

requirements. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• F/V traffic is minimal. Most boats only go out 

during good weather; usually just day trips. 

• Canadian fishing boats are well maintained. 

• The increased market value of product is 

parlaying into boat improvement. 

• Voluntary USCG fishing vessel inspection 

program inspections gradually improving 

maintenance and quality of boats. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• Need greater education / training to deal with 

additional LNG traffic. 

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Consider citizenship requirements; require 

licensing. 

1 Not Defined 

• More enforcement of existing regulations; conduct 

more at sea boardings. 

1 Not Defined 

• Require mandatory standardized equipment and 

associated training. 

1 Not Defined 

• Increase enforcement staff; provide more ME 

State and provincial LE presence. 

1 Not Defined 

• Provide for a grant for vessel modification. 

Consider an excise tax break. 

1 Not Defined 

• Require stability criteria. 1 Not Defined 

• Develop better safety procedures within the 

recreational boating community. 

1 Not Defined 

• Provide tariffs on imports. 1 Not Defined 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

15

Vessel Conditions: Small Craft Quality 

Today: 

• Number of small craft increasing; recorded 

the highest number this year. Risk is still 

considered minimal. 

• Increased from 3 marine event permits to 12; 

ranged from kayak races to regattas. 

• The number of USCG boardings escalated 

from 50 to 170 in three years. 

Trends: 

• Number of kayaks increasing (maybe 

involving operation with inebriation). 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Very few jet skis. 

• Guides take out first time kayakers. 

• Coast Guard conducts boating education classes. 

• Locals know the area and what to expect and 

how to dress for the weather in their small craft. 

• Newer boats being purchased are usually safer 

and better equipped. 

• Relatively small community – pilots share 

commercial vessel information with the public. 

• USCG Station centrally located. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• No trends in this area were discussed. 

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Conduct boardings / inspections (Canada and 

U.S.). 

9 Enforcement 

• Provide information at the boat ramps... signage. 

Include public service announcements. 

6 Rules & Procedures 

• Provide appropriate training. 5 Voluntary Training 

• Provide for more voluntary dockside inspections. 4 Rules & Procedures 

• Provide weather information at the boat ramps. 

Include public service announcements. 

2 Other Actions 

• Require mandatory safety / navigation training. 2 Rules & Procedures 

• Mandate licensing. 2 Voluntary Training 

• Enforce Rules of the Road with monetary fines. 1 Enforcement 

• Better communications with international 

agencies. 

1 Radio Communications 

• Provide Canadian assets for possible SAR 

response to the small craft. 

 

• Need appropriate education / training to deal with 

additional LNG traffic. 

1 Other Actions 

• Provide small craft with auxiliary channel. 1 Waterway Changes 

• LNG Safety Zone Escort. 1 Waterway Changes 

• Conduct a WAMS. 1 Waterway Changes 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

16

Traffic Conditions: Volume of Commercial Traffic

Today: 

• Volume is relatively light – approx 130 

arrivals per year. 

• Volume has decreased in the last 30 years. 

• Sometimes have 4-5 ships queuing up. 

• U.S. and Canada both require a 96-hour prearrival notification. 

• U.S. Navy vessels make port calls at least 

once annually. 

Trends: 

• If LNG is approved, vessel traffic will 

increase from 1 ship every 3.5 days to 1.3 

ships every day. 

• Possibly increased tourism. 

• Two new dock areas will be added; to be 

built well into the waterway. Pier lengths and 

security zones may restrict the movement of 

small vessels. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Light volume of ships spreads out the traffic. 

• Fundy Traffic controls vessel movements and 

coordinates same with U.S. and Canadian pilots. 

• Well defined transit pattern along the waterway. 

• Seasonality of the ferry transits. 

• Fishery stocks are down, so there is less fishing 

vessel traffic. 

• Deep draft ships transit only on the slack tide. 

• Pilots check in with Fundy Traffic at established 

way points along the transit routes. 

• One-way traffic for deep draft vessels. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• The effect on traffic volume will depend on how 

transits are handled in relation to imposed 

operating parameters (security and safety zones 

size, limitation and duration, day / night transits, 

wind and visibility restrictions, etc.). Ships may 

queue up, waiting to come in. This will increase 

during the winter and heavy periods of fog. 

• Additional tug boats will escort the LNG vessel – 

requirements to be determined. 

• More education and training will be provided. 

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Specify traffic lanes. Develop non meeting traffic 

situations. Require / formalize designated one-way 

traffic zones. Provide designated holding zones. 

12 Active Traffic Mgmt 

• Provide VTS coverage with enhanced radar 

coverage for entire transit route. 

8 Active Traffic Mgmt 

• Boost radar coverage and communications 

capabilities. 

7 Radio Communications 

• Improve / upgrade ATON. Provide NDBC buoy. 7 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Facilitate better scheduling. 5 Active Traffic Mgmt 

• More utilization of tugs. Require compulsory 

Canadian pilotage. 

3 Rules & Procedures 

• Provide enhanced training for the pilots. 1 Rules & Procedures 

• More U.S. / Canadian law enforcement presence. 1 Enforcement 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

17

Traffic Conditions: Volume of Small Craft Traffic

Today: 

• Three-month seasonal activity, primary 

volume occurs only in the summertime. 

• Volume increases significantly during 

marine events and major holidays. 

Trends: 

• Rapidly growing numbers, especially 

trailered boats. 

• Kayak use exploding. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Major small boating activity is seasonally related. 

Foul weather curbs the bulk of small craft activity. 

• Safe boating courses and related education is 

regionally available. 

• Fair to good on-the-water enforcement presence. 

• Recent, higher fuel prices deterred some boaters. 

• Oversight of major marine events (4P

thP

 of July). 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• No trends in this area were discussed. 

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Establish / enforce small vessel traffic lanes, safety 

and security zones. Publish for local 

dissemination. 

5 Rules & Procedures 

• Enhance radar and communications capabilities. 

Monitor N to M information. Require radio 

reporting / check-in. 

5 Radio Communications 

• Enhance VTS; provide traffic lanes. 4 Active Traffic Mgmt 

• Provide training, workshops, and navigation safety 

education. Provide public service announcement 

(awareness campaigns). 

3 Voluntary Training 

• Mandatory education / training. 3 Rules & Procedures 

• Require licensing. 2 Rules & Procedures 

• Enhanced State, Canadian, and USCG presence. 2 Enforcement 

• Provide weather, current buoy (NDBC). 1 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Mandatory AIS. 1 Active Traffic Mgmt 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

18

Traffic Conditions: Traffic Mix

Today: 

• Waterway is multiple use. 

• Canadian and U.S. traffic mixes and mingles. 

• Aquaculture farms exist. 

Trends: 

• Aquaculture business is currently flat but is 

cyclical and speculated to return to the bay; 

including farming for sea urchins and 

mussels. 

• Additional escort vessels and service vessels 

will arrive. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Well-marked channels show boaters where ships 

must transit. 

• Foul weather deters recreational boaters. 

• Permitted marine events published in BNM. 

• Extensive local knowledge by pilots, ferry 

operators, and the majority of commercial 

fishermen and neighboring recreational boaters. 

• Small craft activity tends to be closer to shore on 

both sides of the Boundary. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• Highly trained / quality vessels as the new escort 

vessels are added. 

• Safety zones will alleviate potential close quarter 

crossings. 

• Compulsory pilotage may be required in Canadian 

waters. 

• Dual pilots (1-U.S., 1-Canadian) being considered 

for all LNG carriers. 

• Number in pilot pool will increase. 

• LNG may transit Grand Manan Channel to avoid 

Right Whale activity. 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

19

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Establish traffic patterns (formally establish a oneway traffic scheme) and publish same. 

10 Active Traffic Mgmt 

• Provide better routing and transit scheduling. 6 Coordination / Planning 

• Enhance VTS, AIS. 4 Active Traffic Mgmt 

• Establish better communications between boats, 

associations, and community. Provide public 

service announcements. 

4 Radio Communications 

• Conduct / update WAMS, update Coast Pilot, and 

consider NDBC buoy. 

4 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Provide a training / informational symposium / 

seminar. 

4 Voluntary Training 

• Provide an auxiliary traffic lane, VTS, and day / 

night rules. 

3 Rules & Procedures 

• Step up enforcement presence (USCG and 

Canada) and related training. 

2 Enforcement 

• Require VHF monitoring of security channels; 

require radio reporting / check-ins. 

2 Radio Communications 

• Provide recommended routes around fixed fishing 

gear. 

1 Not Defined 

• Maintain the Fundy Traffic system; maybe add 

radar atop the USCG Eastport station for more 

coverage; also add communication repeaters. 

1 Not Defined 

• Make agreed upon mitigations a condition of LNG 

construction. 

1 Not Defined 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

20

Traffic Conditions: Congestion

Today: 

• There are seasonal ferry crossings 

connecting Deer Island, Eastport, and 

Campobello, and St. Andrews, NB operating 

on frequent schedules. 

• Presence of kayaks in the shipping lanes is 

becoming a major problem. 

Trends: 

• Number of head boats (whale boats) is pretty 

steady. 

• Number of recreation boats increasing. 

• Small cruise liners may be entering the 

waterway. 

• LNG vessels may queue up – consequent 

weather delay. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Federal, State, and Provincial LE presence and 

patrols. 

• With current traffic numbers, there is minimal 

risk. 

• Waterway is moderately expansive; due to overall 

depth channel is relatively broad. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• Mandatory VTS may result. 

• AIS will be improved. 

• Increase in the number of pilots. 

• Greater USCG asset / resource presence. 

• Added escort and supply craft and tugs. 

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Establish recommended routes for deep draft 

vessels. Formalize anchorage policies. 

16 Active Traffic Mgmt 

• Require AIS on all commercial vessels. Enhance 

VTS and radar coverage. 

8 Active Traffic Mgmt 

• Mandatory monitoring of security channels. 

Enhanced VHF communications capabilities. 

6 Radio Communications 

• Provide and publish traffic scheduling. 4 Coordination / Planning 

• Conduct a WAMS, update Coast Pilot, and 

consider NDBC. 

4 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Provide navigation instruments, equipment, and 

publications. 

2 Other Actions 

• Limit hazardous cargoes. 1 Rules & Procedures 

• Update Coast Pilot – possibly add information on 

types of vessel transiting. 

1 Not Defined 

• Upgrade USCG resources. 1 Not Defined 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

21

Navigational Conditions: Winds

Today: 

• Most high winds occur in the winter. 

• Sustained winds oppose tides from Bay of 

Fundy and cause high, rough seas – problem 

for the pilot boat, not for large ships. 

• Prevailing winds are from the NE and NW 

during September through May, and 

predominately SW from June through August. 

Wind speeds average 15-20 km per hour in 

winter and 12-15 km during summer. 

• University of Maine R&D is planning to 

remove one of their weather buoys which 

gives real time data from the internet. It was 

claimed to be redundant. Pilots agree there is 

no accurate reading on the beach and the buoy 

is important. 

• The buoy also has temperature, sea state, and 

current sensors that aids in fish farming, 

especially feeding cycles. 

• Islands act as a wind block, sometimes giving 

erroneous readings at the existing wind 

sensors. 

• Funnel effect at Western Passage. Causes 

wind to swirl / change direction at various 

locations around the island – challenging 

traffic transits. 

• Approximately every 20 years, a storm comes 

up that brings strong winds; funnels through 

the harbor and damages the shorefront of 

Eastport (from the storm surge). 

• 30 kts is the maximum limiting wind speed 

for effective thruster use on deep draft 

vessels. 

• Maneuvering and docking operations are 

severely impacted by wind direction, speed, 

and dock alignment. 

Trends: 

• USCG is developing vessel operating 

parameters. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Weather avoidance practices are in place. 

• Seasonal high winds are strongest during the 

winter, when recreational boaters are less 

prevalent. 

• Weather buoy maintained by the University of 

Maine effectively monitors wind speed, direction, 

current, and wave height data that is available 

online, in real time. 

• Wind trends are historically tracked and reported. 

• Buoys off Jonesport are critical in providing real 

time weather information. 

• The Matinicus, Mt. Desert Rock, and Jonesport 

buoys are relied upon extensively by pilots. 

• Tugs stabilize the vessel and provide a large 

berthing window in terms of weather and design 

of the pier. 

• NOAA broadcasts accurate weather data via 

radio. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• Strict vessel operating parameters will be 

established. 

• Extensive simulator training has been provided to 

the pilots in the navigating and docking of the 

LNG carriers under varying weather and 

hydrographic conditions to include emergency 

maneuvers consequent to machinery failures. 

• Downeast meteorological tower to provide 

extensive weather data information. 

• LNG ship berthing parameters will be established. 

• LNG ships will have sophisticated mooring 

monitoring systems. 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

22

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Provide Physical Oceanographic Real-Time System 

(PORTS), GoMOOS (University of Maine weather 

buoy), and down east meteorological tower. 

10 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Utilize z-drive tugs. 7 Other Actions 

• Require specific vessel berthing parameters. 4 Rules & Procedures 

• Maintain and/or provide weather buoys. 3 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Provide more accurate weather forecasting. 2 Coordination / Planning 

• Provide warning signs for small craft. 1 Other Actions 

• Establish and enforce freeboard limitations. 1 Rules & Procedures 

• Establish vessel operating parameters. 1 Rules & Procedures 

• Provide better communications capabilities for 

weather forecasting. 

1 Radio Communications 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

23

Navigational Conditions: Water Movement

Today: 

• Currents in the area run up to 5-6 kts due to 

extreme tides. 

• Transit times are figured in reverse to ensure 

vessels enter Western Passage off Dog Island 

as close to slack water as possible. 

• Area off Deer Island is subject to whirlpools 

consequent to currents converging from 

Western Passage and Passamaquoddy Bay. 

• Tide and current tables are good predictors 

except when there are high-wind conditions 

that alter water levels. Study shows that 

predictions of slack water are less reliable. 

• Small vessels (mostly recreational craft) are 

unfamiliar with the unusually high currents 

and tides common to the region. 

Trends: 

• No trends discussed. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Tide and current meters generate relatively 

accurate information. 

• Voyage planning / established way point reporting 

via Fundy Traffic by pilots to avert strong 

currents. 

• Pilot boat precedes ship and provides sea-level 

traffic report and redundant radar. 

• Specific transit timing and docking maneuvers 

based on slack water. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• No trends discussed. 

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Formalize slack water transit practice. 9 Coordination / Planning 

• Provide PORTS. 8 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Provide highly maneuverable / powerful tractor 

tugs. 

6 Other Actions 

• Establish additional weather buoys. 2 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Formalize berthing / docking parameters and 

procedures. 

2 Rules & Procedures 

• Consider limiting transits during strong ebb / flood 

tide conditions. 

1 Rules & Procedures 

• Establish vessel operational parameters. 1 Rules & Procedures 

• Follow / enforce required Rules of the Road. 1 Active Traffic Mgmt 

• Place a current meter at down east location 1 Other Actions 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

24

Navigational Conditions: Visibility Restrictions

Today: 

• Fog occurs more than 25% of the days of the 

year, and has been reported to be as high as 

36% of the days during July, often for 24 hrs 

straight. There have been occasions of no 

fog... no real predictability. 

• Sea fog is much more prevalent at night and 

during early morning hours. Local 

knowledge of fog patterns allows pilots to 

generally work around the winter sea fog. 

• Occasionally snow storms can cause vessels 

to be weather bound for days. Perilous to 

navigate in snow squalls / white-out 

conditions. 

• Fog is generally localized in the bay. 

• Comparatively, less fog at Bayside. 

Trends: 

• Appears to be less fog over the past 20 years. 

• Difficult and dangerous to respond to a 

casualty in the fog. 

• In the event of a release, one cannot see an 

LNG plume in fog. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Radar (increasing number of boaters have it but 

may not be able to use it well). 

• GPS gives precise position. 

• Automatic fog signals on electronic equipment. 

• Commercial vessels: 

− Are using chart plotting software programs 

(ECDIS), but may over rely upon it. 

− Radar interpretation instruction / license 

endorsement. 

• NOAA electronic navigation charts are free (S57 

standard vector charts). See 

http://chartmaker.ncd.noaa.gov. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• Tug / barge will soon be required to carry AIS. 

• Establish vessel operating parameters / 

procedures; vessel movement may be restricted 

due to reduced visibility. 

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Improve Fundy Traffic radar coverage. 9 Active Traffic Mgmt 

• Enhance VHF radio communication capabilities. 7 Radio Communications 

• Decrease the WAMS review cycle – address 

potential LNG operations. Provide RACONS. 

Provide better ATON. 

7 Waterway Changes 

• Regulate all deep draft vessel movements; publish 

recommended transit routes. 

6 Rules & Procedures 

• Limit deep draft vessel movement by initiating 

visibility standards. 

4 Rules & Procedures 

• Provide weather buoys. 2 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Provide PORTS. 2 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Mandate ferries and fishing vessels carry AIS. 2 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Establish operational parameters. 2 Rules & Procedures 

• Reinforce need to monitor VHF security calls. 1 Radio Communications 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

25

Navigational Conditions: Obstructions

Today: 

• Mean range of tide is 18 ft.; however, 28 ft. 

tides occur under extraordinary conditions. 

• Ice seldom obstructs navigation due to swift 

currents downstream of Passamaquoddy Bay 

(St. Croix Island). One-in-twenty year cycle. 

• On the average heavy, floating debris and 

deadheads surface due to the extreme tidal 

action. 

• Commercial fish pens are prevalent, 

especially off-shore near many of the islands. 

• Waters of Fundy Bay and Passamaquoddy 

Bay approaches are known habitats for 

whales. Northern Atlantic Right Whales are 

predominant along the Eastern seaboard, 

especially north of Grand Manan. 

Trends: 

• New piers are being built; if approved, LNG 

facility piers will significantly extend into 

the waterway. 

• LNG ships may have to anchor in Canadian 

anchorages, or slowly steam in the Bay of 

Fundy if weather conditions cause delays. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Significant efforts are being taken to protect the 

right whales to include ship traffic zones, speed 

limits, and whale sighting / reporting procedures. 

• Pilot boat listens for whales in the fog and advises 

the deep draft pilot accordingly. 

• Whale Conservation Zones have been established. 

• If LNG proposals come to fruition, the carriers 

will not be allowed to anchor once they’ve 

entered Head Harbor Passage, except for 

emergent, extenuating circumstances. 

• Pilots report dangers to Fundy Traffic for further 

public distribution. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• No new ideas discussed. 

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Update current WAMS. Install lighted buoy to 

mark Stover’s Ledge. 

15 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Initiate NOAA hydrographical survey; consolidate 

current charts (three needed for navigating the area) 

into one. 

7 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Limit pier length. 1 Coordination / Planning 

• Provide enhanced VTS. 1 Active Traffic Mgmt 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

26

Waterway Conditions: Visibility Impediments

Today: 

• Channel visibility is obscured when making 

the turn off Cherry Island. 

• Back scatter from lights on the reservation 

obscures view of navigational aids and 

shoreline. 

Trends: 

• Potential for increased LNG traffic and 

associated escort boats. 

• LNG ships may be moored at new, extended 

length piers. 

• Small boats will have to venture out around 

the piers and deep draft berths. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Intensity of Cherry Island Light increased to take 

care of backscatter from Eastport. 

• Once inside the VTS Fundy Zone, all vessels 

maintain voice contact with controllers and checkin at designated way points. 

• AIS aids in situational awareness and assists in 

tracking vessels. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• Due to the relatively constant draft and vessel 

design height LNG carriers have a higher field of 

vision. 

• The channel is naturally deep and relatively wide; 

the narrowest points occur in Head Harbor 

Passage and off Dog Island in the Western 

Passage approach – width provides sufficient 

room to navigate. Vessel simulation testing that 

involved machinery breakdowns (i.e., loss of 

rudder, propulsion failure, etc.) were conducted at 

these narrowest points and in the direct vicinity of 

the alternate LNG site proved successful – tug 

assistance prevented follow-on collisions or 

allisions. 

• Moored ships will block out lights along the 

shoreline. 

• Education aimed at the small boat operator. 

• Provide navigational aids around piers extending 

out into the waterway or close to the navigating 

channel. 

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Update WAMS; consider placing a lighted aid to 

delineate Stover’s Ledge. 

15 Nav / Hydro Info 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

27

Waterway Conditions: Dimensions

Today: 

• Head Harbor Passage narrows to 1,200 yds. 

between Casco Bay Island and Head Harbor, 

and the confluence of Head Harbor Passage, 

Friars Road, and Western Passage narrows to 

approximately 850 yds. between Dog Island 

and Deer Island – the two narrowest points 

between land masses within the waterway. 

Trends: 

• No trends discussed. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Although the channel width potentially permits 

opposing traffic flow of smaller vessels, the policy 

is for one-way traffic only to reduce the risk of 

casualty. 

• Pilots time transits to coincide with slack water – 

way points are pre-established and communicated 

with Fundy Traffic. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• No trends discussed. 

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Formalize one-way traffic zones. Establish 

designated no passing areas. 

10 Active Traffic Mgmt 

• Update WAMS. Mark Stover’s Ledge. 7 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Provide highly maneuverable tractor tugs. 5 Other Actions 

• Invoke speed restrictions. 4 Other Actions 

• Establish operational parameters. 3 Rules & Procedures 

• Provide recommended transit routes and expand 

VTS coverage. 

3 Active Traffic Mgmt 

• Limit vessel length. 1 Rules & Procedures 

• Provide navigational aids such as GoMOOS and 

PORTS. 

1 Nav / Hydro Info 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

28

Waterway Conditions: Bottom Type

Today: 

• Bottom composition is hard, gravel / rocky 

ground with rock ledge prevalent in shoal 

areas. 

• Casualty statistics indicate periodic 

commercial fishing vessel groundings. 

• There have been reported sailing vessel 

groundings. 

Trends: 

• No trends discussed. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Most shoaling well marked with buoys. 

• Charting, Coast Pilot, and hydrologic publications 

well serve the area. 

• Channel is naturally deep, no dredging required. 

• More double-hulled vessels being used vice 

“single-skin.” 

• Transits are timed with slack water. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• No trends discussed. 

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Provide updated hydrographic survey 13 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Update WAMS. Establish lighted buoy at Stovers 

Ledge; add light to buoy at Clark Ledge; intensify 

power of the Dog Island and Deer Island fixed aids; 

establish lighted aid at Clam Cove Head; relocate 

and light the HU4 buoy (Popes Island); and 

establish a lighted aid on Kendall Head. 

2 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Enact / enforce reduced speed limitations. 2 Rules & Procedures 

• Develop and set operational parameters. Formalize 

policy of vessel movements based on slack tide 

conditions. 

2 Rules & Procedures 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

29

Waterway Conditions: Configuration

Today: 

• Sharp course change in vicinity of Dog 

Island approximating a 45-degree turn. In 

addition, vessels must hug the U.S. side of 

the channel due to strong currents during the 

ebb and flood. 

• Seasonal risk of crossing traffic. Two small 

car / passenger ferry services connect Deer 

Island, Eastport, and Campobello; scheduled 

runs are hourly. A small ferry has operated 

between St. Andrews and Campobello Island 

in the recent past. 

Trends: 

• No trends discussed. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Ferry service is seasonal (mainly during the 

summer months) and scheduled service is 

primarily during daylight hours. 

• VHF communications and security calls among 

operators. 

• Deep draft vessel transits are spread out; roughly 

130 ships call on the two ports annually. 

• Pilots are acutely familiar with the waterway. 

• Fundy Traffic maintains traffic control and 

commercial vessels adhere to the Rules of the 

Road. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• No trends discussed. 

New Ideas: 

• Risks and mitigations were balanced. There were no ideas captured.
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

30

Immediate Consequences: Personal Injuries

Today: 

• In the past, small cruise ships have made 

seasonal port calls to St. Andrews. 

• Ferries are relatively small; passenger 

capacity approximates 45 persons. 

• Extremely limited emergency response 

capabilities. 

• A number of whale watching and excursion 

boats operate seasonally. 

Trends: 

• Small cruise vessels carrying 110-120 

passengers had previously called on the port 

area; regional commerce / tourist bureaus are 

trying to attract 300-400 passenger capacity 

vessels. 

• Evacuation and emergency response routes 

are limited. Only one road serves the 

communities surrounding Eastport. Route 1 

is the primary road utilized for area travel 

and direct access to regional hospitals. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Presently, no cruise ships. 

• Joint Marine Contingency Plan (U.S. & Canada) 

and CANUSLANT annex is in place for spill 

response; however, it exempts LNG. 

• USCG Station Eastport is centrally located and 

SAR capabilities provide framework for other 

emergency responses. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• LNG terminals to provide response procedures, 

resources, and associated training for responding 

to emergencies at the terminals, communities 

surrounding the terminal, and along the transit 

route. 

• Joint LNG emergency response training to LNG 

release / fire is needed and must involve local, 

state, and provincial responders and LE personnel. 

• Regulatory process will ensure safety and 

emergency response assets / resources are 

provided via cost sharing in accordance with the 

ERP process before the process can move 

forward. 

• Potential exposure of crews on board commercial 

and recreational vessels in the direct vicinity if 

cargo breach occurs. 

• Incident Command System training needed. 

• Zones of Concern, as specified in the Sandia Lab 

Report, establish concentric risk levels for death, 

injury, and property damage in the event of an 

LNG release. 

• At present, there are less than minimal response / 

emergency capabilities along the shared waterway 

and within the surrounding maritime communities 

to effectively deal with a sizeable LNG release. 

• The paper mill, located 25 miles away, maintains 

the only available hazmat response capability. 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

31

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Revisit interagency and international plans – update 

as necessary and provide associated training with 

respect to mass casualty response. 

11 Voluntary Training 

• Improve radio communication interoperability 

among all agencies and bi-national infrastructure. 

Make available an additional radio tower. Identify / 

publish emergency radio channels. 

10 Radio Communications 

• Develop / update local contingency / emergency 

management plans. Identify egress routes. 

10 Rules & Procedures 

• Enhance cell phone coverage. 6 Other Actions 

• Develop mass-casualty plan; identify available 

emergency medical personnel, medical hospital and 

clinics, and life flight capabilities. Provide 

shortfalls where needed. 

4 Coordination / Planning 

• Provide a warning system and procedures to 

implement emergency broadcasts. 

3 Other Actions 

• Develop better coordination / planning for a 

catastrophic event; conduct interagency / 

international training / simulations / exercises. 

2 Voluntary Training 

• Limit hazardous cargoes. 1 Rules & Procedures 

• Conduct safety audit inspection. 1 Enforcement 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

32

Immediate Consequences: Petroleum Discharge

Today: 

• 130 annual ship transits by deep draft 

vessels... 2,000 tons (500,000 gallons) of 

bunkers per ship. Two vessels are present in 

the waterway at any one time. 

• Petroleum products: 

− Eastport and Bayside terminals do not 

handle petroleum cargo in bulk nor 

bunker vessels via fuel barge or ship. 

Trends: 

• Will need plan to fuel all the support vessels. 

• A petroleum based fire will burn longer than 

an LNG fire; however, with much less 

intensity and at a lower temperature. 

• Waterside / floating fire mitigation 

capabilities are extremely limited. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Joint bi-national agreement exists 

(CANUSLANT) between U.S. and Canada for oil 

spill response. 

• Canadian spill response equipment is prepositioned in St. John; USCG response equipment 

maintained in Portland, ME. 

• Minimum of six hours to respond by commercial 

spill response entities such as NRC, Clean 

Harbors, etc. 

• Mandatory double hull compliance under 

MARPOL; aggressive phase out dates for single 

hull tankers. 

• ME DEP has hazardous materials response team 

and limited resources to assist in oil spill 

mitigation and recovery. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• No trends discussed. 

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Provide more response / preposition teams and 

equipment; include OSROs. 

10 Coordination / Planning 

• Provide more response training; hold annual joint 

spill response drills. 

6 Voluntary Training 

• Provide improved cell coverage and tower. 6 Radio Communications 

• Designate response vessels as multipurpose escorts 

and spill response vessels. 

4 Rules & Procedures 

• Re-establish Quoddy Oil Spill Coop. 4 Coordination / Planning 

• Establish speed controls. 1 Rules & Procedures 

• Improve bilateral agreements; update all 

contingency plans; install PORTS for spill tracking. 

1 Coordination / Planning 

• Provide multiple tug escorts; ensure tugs have FiFi 

1 fire fighting capability. 

1 Other Actions 

• Consider ship / cargo owner liability. 1 Other Actions 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

33

Immediate Consequences: Hazardous Materials Release

Today: 

• Bulk ammonium nitrate is shipped to 

Bayside, NB on the average of one ship / 

2,000 tons annually. 

Trends: 

• Hazardous materials entering the area would 

dramatically increase if LNG is approved. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• NOAA has a Scientific Support Coordinator to 

assist with response planning / mitigation. 

• Federal, State, and local agency training in ICS. 

• Pre-identified / designated incident command post 

and associated response structure in place. 

• Response software (such as CHRIS) exists. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• No trends discussed. 

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Conduct training / drills / exercises (consider 

CANUSLANT). Obtain additional fire fighting and 

response assets; improve coordination efforts 

among state, provincial, and local. 

10 Coordination / Planning 

• Follow prescribed regulations regarding facility 

inspections; incorporate local enforcement where 

available. Bolster local USCG assets and resources 

to meet regional demands and requirements. 

5 Enforcement 

• Provide better education / outreach; certify training. 4 Voluntary Training 

• Improve radio communications and 

interoperability. 

3 Radio Communications 

• Incorporate evacuation planning / routing into 

current contingency plans. 

2 Coordination / Planning 

• Conduct extensive LNG carrier oversight. 2 Enforcement 

• Designate response vessels and tugs as 

multipurpose escort and spill response vessels. 

2 Other Actions 

• Improve first responder training focusing on fire 

fighting and hazmat release; recognize increased 

possibility of significant personnel casualties. 

1 Other Actions 

• Establish speed limits. 1 Rules & Regulations 

• Develop and exercise joint response management 

procedures. 

1 Coordination / Planning 

• Provide floating barriers and/or booms for docked 

vessels. 

1 Other Actions 

• Improve cell coverage. 1 Other Actions 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

34

Immediate Consequences: Mobility

Today: 

• There is only one main channel / transit route 

into the port area. A casualty occurring in 

one of the bottlenecks along Head Harbor 

Passage or at the entrance to Western 

Passage would effectively shut down both 

port facilities and/or the shared international 

waterway. 

• Route 1, which basically runs along the 

entire Maine coastline, is vital to regional 

traffic flow; closures and/or temporary 

interruptions will significantly impact the 

area. 

• Residents of Deer Island, Campobello Island, 

and other island communities are particularly 

dependent on ferry service for supplies / 

deliveries. 

• Route 190 is the main and only source of 

road access to / from Eastport and the 

communities along the way. A major 

casualty resulting in the blocking of this 

roadway would significantly impact 

evacuation efforts by land. 

Trends: 

• If approved, LNG and natural gas will be 

piped under the only access road to the 

peninsula. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Small vessels have access to the coast via an 

alternate channel (i.e., Lubec Narrows). Vessel 

size / height is restricted by the International 

Bridge to Campobello. 

• Fundy Traffic and the associated VTS procedures 

provide a significant margin of safety while in 

Canadian waters; however, there is no formal 

vessel traffic system for vessels transiting on the 

U.S. side of the international boundary. 

Trends: 

• Two LNG facilities have been approved by 

Canada and are under construction – Canaport in 

St. John, NB, and Bear Head at Cape Breton 

Island. Can Maritimes Northeast Pipeline capacity 

accommodate two additional U.S. terminals 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• No trends discussed. 

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Develop alternate means of transportation to 

supplement the local highway to move response 

equipment. 

6 Other Actions 

• Explore local and regional (U.S and Canada) 

salvage capabilities. 

4 Other Actions 

• Provide enhanced communications. 1 Radio Communications 

• Conduct air patrols. 1 Enforcement 

• Install and use mooring system arrangements that 

meet the demands of the extreme tidal range, winds, 

and high currents of the region. 

1 Coordination / Planning 

• Provide tug escort of sufficient number, HP, and 

bollard pull. 

1 Other Actions 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

35

Subsequent Consequences: Health and Safety

Today: 

• Relatively speaking, the Passamaquoddy Bay 

port area is considered “rural” with 

population figures for the U.S. side 

approximating 3,450 persons. 

• Eastport is the largest populated town on the 

U.S. side of the port area with an 

approximate total of 2,000 persons, equating 

to 540 persons per sq. mi. 

• Population density criteria for the WSA, as 

set forth in NVIV 05-05, is: High – 9,000 

persons per sq. mi.; Medium – 1,000 persons 

per sq. mi; and low – <1000 persons per sq. 

mi. 

• A significant petroleum discharge could 

seriously affect fish farms and other forms of 

aquaculture. 

• Bulk ammonium nitrate in sizeable quantity 

poses potential health, safety, and hazard 

risks. 

• No site specific evacuation plans have been 

generated. Maine Emergency Management 

Agency (MEMA) has developed general 

egress plans. No formal evacuation plans. 

• Majority of regional fire fighting capability 

rests on all-volunteer forces with dated, 

limited equipment. There is little to no 

waterside fire fighting capability. 

Trends: 

• LNG ships entering the area will increase 

health and safety risks. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Strong prevailing winds help disperse spills. 

• Calais is the nearest hospital. It has a bed 

capacity of 25 and is located approximately 20 

miles from Eastport. Eastern Maine Medical 

Center, located in Bangor, is the nearest large 

medical facility and trauma center; life flight 

helicopter transports utilized. 

• “Mass casualty” numbers potentially lowered 

due to current population densities. 

• Joint federal, state, county, and provincial 

planning and exercising for nuclear power 

stations has laid the framework for other types of 

energy programs and emergency procedures. 

• Multiple local, county, and state agencies have 

trained and worked together to combat forest 

fires. 

• MEMA very proactive in and health / safety 

arena. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• Washington County Emergency Preparedness is 

updating regional response and evacuation plans. 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

36

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Develop / update local, county, and regional 

(including joint Canadian) contingency plans. 

Provide egress routes. 

9 Rules & Procedures 

• Provide warning system and emergency broadcast. 7 Other Actions 

• Coordinate emergency preparedness, fire fighting, 

and training plans with Canadian resources. 

5 Voluntary Training 

• Pre-position equipment. 4 Coordination / Planning 

• Provide enhanced fire fighting capability; land and 

water. 

4 Other Actions 

• Formalize U.S. / Canadian agreements. 3 Coordination / Planning 

• Provide additional emergency medical personnel, 

medical clinics, and life flight capabilities. 

2 Coordination / Planning 

• Enhance cell phone coverage. 1 Other Actions 

• Limit hazardous cargoes. 1 Rules & Procedures 

• Conduct interagency / international training / 

simulations / exercises. 

1 Voluntary Training 

• Conduct predictive modeling and plume 

trajectories. 

1 Coordination / Planning 

• Develop emergency response web page. 1 Other Actions 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

37

Subsequent Consequences: Environmental

Today: 

• 250 feet around the shoreline of Eastport... 

development setback 

• The area is characterized by its pristine 

environment and natural attractions. 

• The waters of Fundy Bay are known habitats 

for right whales. Minke, finback, and other 

whales have been sighted in the approaches 

to Passamaquoddy Bay. 

• Cobscook Bay, St. Croix Estuary, 

Campobello International Park, and 

Moosehorn Refuge are extremely 

environmentally sensitive areas containing a 

myriad of endangered species. 

• Cultural resources and archeological-based 

studies need to be conducted on tribal land. 

• Some ships carry different grades of fuel oil 

in their bunker tanks as they shift from heavy 

bunker (no. 2) oil to lighter diesel fuel during 

maneuvering operations. A spill of either 

could be devastating to the regional 

environment. 

• Stressed ecosystem; aquaculture farming, 

ecotourism, sea urchin farming, shellfish, 

lobsters, and oysters would be affected by 

pollution. 

Trends: 

• Vessel strike risk to the federally protected 

Northern Right Whale. 

• New ships... bunker tanks are double 

hulled... may not be used here. 

• LNG ships will enter the waterway, resulting 

in more traffic, and the potential for 

increased air pollution, noise, and the 

introduction of invasive species (Note: LNG 

carriers do not deballast). 

• LNG is odorless, colorless, non-corrosive, 

and non-toxic; environmentally benign until 

flammability range is reached and source of 

ignition provided. 

• Some LNG ships use boil off from cargo 

tanks; others burn IFO fuel, which could 

taint fish if spill involved. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Ballast water program required. 

• Right whale sighting / reporting program, speed 

limits, and traffic schemes to route ships away 

from breeding / feeding areas. 

• Fundy Traffic notifies ships of whale sightings. 

• Extensive knowledge / studies of species and 

locations that might be impacted. 

• Spill notification infrastructure is well 

established. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• LNG ships do not deballast. 

• Some ships use a blend of diesel fuel and heavy 

fuel oil vice boil off. 

• Scientific resources are available to assist with 

monitoring and mitigating effects of pollution 

discharges. 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

38

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Conduct training / drills / exercises (consider 

CANUSLANT) and develop priorities. 

7 Coordination / Planning 

• Improve real-time hydrographic / navigation 

information (PORTS). 

7 Nav / Hydro Info 

• Conduct response / equipment training. 4 Voluntary Training 

• Conduct predictive modeling. 3 Other Actions 

• Develop evacuation contingency planning and spill 

response. 

2 Coordination / Planning 

• Develop routing methodology for environmentally 

sensitive areas. 

2 Active Traffic Mgmt 

• Develop and formalize an environmental / whale 

informational system. 

2 Other Actions 

• Implement pre-positioned spill response resources. 2 Coordination / Planning 

• Establish contracts with spill contractors such as 

NRC, Clean Harbors, MSRC, etc. 

1 Other Actions 

• Have vessels provide bunker fuel oil specifics for 

spill pre-planning. 

1 Rules & Procedures 

• Develop joint response management plans, OSROs. 1 Coordination / Planning 

• Provide better education / outreach, training, and 

proficiency certifications. 

1 Voluntary Training 

• Improve radio communications. 1 Radio Communications 

• Develop web page. 1 Other Actions 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

39

Subsequent Consequences: Aquatic Resources

Today: 

• Marine commerce in the area consists almost 

entirely of aquaculture, fish farming, 

ecotourism, and commercial fishing. 

• The area is populated with lobster fishing, 

fish weirs, and aquaculture. 

• Due to strong currents in the approaches to 

Passamaquoddy Bay commercial fishing 

inside the Bay of Fundy is relatively light to 

moderate; most of the lobster fishing is done 

in the Grand Manan Channel and along the 

coast south of Lubec Narrows. 

• Aquaculture is one of the largest industries, 

with salmon and cod being the primary 

marine commodity. 

• State issued leases are generally closer to the 

channel edge in shallower water vice the 

deep draft transit route. 

• A variety of marine life and shellfish (e.g., 

sea cucumbers, herring, clams, quahog, 

scallops, etc.) are commercially harvested 

throughout the geographic area. A spill 

would be devastating to the industry. 

• Recreational fishing is very active during the 

summer season. 

Trends: 

• Commercial and recreational fishing and 

ecotourism is increasing. 

• If both LNG facilities are approved the 

resultant three-fold increase in deep draft 

traffic will negatively affect fishing reducing 

the number of spaces to fish. 

Existing Mitigations: 

• Existing authorities close shellfish beds during 

periods of red tide and probable pollution. 

• NOAA has a sensory analysis lab available to test 

and chemically analyze the fitness of fish product. 

− Active State and local fisheries enforcement 

capabilities. 

• Depending on the season, some fisheries are less 

impacted by a pollution event. 

• Whale alerts are provided by Fundy Traffic. 

• Maine DEP, St. Croix Estuary, Passamaquoddy 

Tribe, and other U.S. and Canadian organizations 

map and record sensitive aquatic resources. 

Trends (if LNG ships begin to call): 

• No trends discussed. 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

40

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Establish definitive post spill fisheries opening and 

closing protocols in concert with Canada. 

6 Rules & Regulations 

• Improve communications; develop joint U.S. / 

Canadian call-down list. 

6 Radio Communications 

• Develop and formalize an environmental / whale 

information system. 

2 Other Actions 

• Develop web page dedicated to aquatic resource 

management. 

2 Other Actions 

• Conduct baseline assessment of water quality and 

aquatic resources; update sensitivity maps. 

1 Coordination / Planning 

• Provide better education / outreach; certify training. 

Improve spill response / coordination planning / 

preparedness. 

1 Voluntary Training 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

41

Subsequent Consequences: Economic

Today: 

• Fish contamination consequent to a hazmat 

spill would be economically devastating to 

the industry. 

• Closure of the waterway due to a spill would 

significantly impact fisheries in both 

countries. The industry contributes more than 

$2M annually into the economy. 

• Severe economic disruption would be felt 

within two weeks of a port closure. 

• The salmon market is strong along the entire 

East Coast; lobster and sea urchins are 

marketed internationally as well. 

• Potential income derived from tourism and 

fishing would be negatively affected, even if 

there is just a perception that the area has 

been “tainted” by spills, etc. 

• Reimbursement through claim process 

possible for loss of income attributable to an 

oil spill. 

• May not be able to get product to market... 

may affect the regional and national 

economy. 

• A major casualty would affect tourism, 

especially in St Andrews, NB, a major resort 

community. Likewise, whale watching tours 

would be significantly impacted. 

• Regional paper mills depend on waterborne 

commerce; approximately 350,000 tons of 

product are exported from the region 

annually. 

• In the event the waterway was closed due to 

a casualty / spill, Bayside Terminal could 

lose revenues at the rate of one ship per 

week. 

• OPA 90 framework for oil spill response and 

mitigation. 

Trends: 

• No trends discussed for this section.

Existing Mitigations: 

• No existing mitigations were discussed. 

Trends (If LNG ships begin to call): 

• People like to watch deep draft traffic. 

• May add $250M to the regional tax base. 

• Young people may remain in the area. 

• Will provide site specific compensation package 

to local fishermen. 

• Will provide a fish / gear trap replacement 

program for U.S. and Canadian fishermen. 

• LNG industry will increase local job market, spinoff; additional support vessels / chandlery, agents, 

etc. will boost local economy and job potential. 

• People may stop coming to tourist area in Canada 

(St. Andrews, Campobello Island, etc.); 

environmentally pristine areas. 

• Additional traffic may push the whales elsewhere, 

hurting the whale-watching / tourist industry. 

• Energy Policy Act (U.S. only): 

− Provides extensive emergency response plan 

for communities along the waterway and 

surrounding the proposed terminal sites. 

− Provides cost sharing plan to provide 

additional emergency response, medical, and 

enforcement assets and resources. 

• Potential for international concessions. 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

42

New Ideas: 

Idea Times Risk Mitigation Categories 

• Pre-positioned spill response recovery / mitigation. 10 Coordination / Planning 

• Joint Canada / U.S. MOU for hazmat response. 7 Other Actions 

• Fishermen compensation plan. 5 Other Actions 

• Trap / fish gear replacement program. 2 Other Actions 

• LNG via offshore terminal vice on-shore. 1 Coordination / Planning 

• Develop web page devoted to ideas and activities 

about economic issues and development. 

1 Other Actions 
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

Book 2 Tabular Results: 

Risk Factor A Value B Value C Value D Value

Deep Draft Vessel Quality 1.0 3.0 5.6 9.0

Shallow Draft Vessel Quality 1.0 3.0 5.6 9.0

Commercial Fishing Vessel Quality 1.0 3.0 5.6 9.0

Small Craft Quality 1.0 3.0 5.6 9.0

Volume of Commercial Traffic 1.0 3.0 5.3 9.0

Volume of Small Craft Traffic 1.0 2.8 5.7 9.0

Traffic Mix 1.0 2.3 4.7 9.0

Congestion 1.0 2.7 5.0 9.0

Winds 1.0 2.5 5.2 9.0

Water Movement 1.0 2.9 5.0 9.0

Visibility Restrictions 1.0 2.9 5.7 9.0

Obstructions 1.0 2.0 4.5 9.0

Visibility Impediments 1.0 3.1 5.5 9.0

Dimensions 1.0 3.1 5.5 9.0

Bottom Type 1.0 2.4 5.1 9.0

Configuration 1.0 2.8 5.3 9.0

Personnel Injuries 1.0 3.1 5.7 9.0

Petroleum Discharge 1.0 3.8 6.2 9.0

Hazardous Materials Release 1.0 3.7 6.2 9.0

Mobility 1.0 3.0 5.3 9.0

Health and Safety 1.0 3.1 5.6 9.0

Environmental 1.0 3.2 5.9 9.0

Aquatic Resources 1.0 2.8 5.5 9.0

Economic 1.0 3.1 5.7 9.0

43
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

Book 3 Tabular Results: 

Vessel 

Conditions

Traffic 

Conditions

Navigational 

Conditions

Waterway 

Conditions

Immediate 

Consequences

Subsequent 

Consequences

Deep Draft

Vessel Quality

Volume of 

Commercial 

Traffic

Winds Visibility 

Impediments

Personnel

Injuries

Health and

Safety

1.3 1.3 4.5 3.9 3.0 2.5

Shallow Draft 

Vessel Quality

Volume of

Small Craft 

Traffic

Water

Movement Dimensions Petroleum Discharge Environmental

1.7 1.6 6.4 3.3 2.1 7.5

Commercial 

Fishing

Vessel Quality

Traffic

Mix

Visibility 

Restrictions

Bottom

Type

Hazardous 

Materials

Release

Aquatic 

Resources

6.4 3.1 7.9 7.0 5.3 7.5

Small Craft 

Quality Congestion Obstructions Configuration Mobility Economic

6.9 2.1 3.5 7.7 3.2 5.9

44
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

Book 4 Tabular Results: 

1.3 2.4 1.3 4.6 4.5 6.0 3.9 3.9 3.0 6.5 2.5 6.2

1.7 2.9 1.6 4.1 6.4 7.1 3.3 3.4 2.1 4.2 7.5 8.1

6.4 6.3 3.1 5.2 7.9 7.8 7.0 7.3 5.3 7.3 7.5 8.1

6.9 6.8 2.1 4.7 3.5 5.1 7.7 6.8 3.2 4.9 5.9 6.3

Immediate 

Consequences

Subsequent 

Consequences

Vessel 

Conditions

Traffic 

Conditions

Navigational 

Conditions

Waterway 

Conditions

Deep Draft

Vessel Quality

Volume of 

Commercial 

Traffic

Winds Visibility 

Impediments

Personnel

Injuries

Health and

Safety

Shallow Draft 

Vessel Quality

Volume of

Small Craft

Traffic

Water

Movement Dimensions Petroleum Discharge Environmental

RISING RISING

Mobility Economic

Commercial 

Fishing

Vessel Quality

Traffic

Mix

Visibility 

Restrictions

Bottom

Type

Small Craft 

Quality Congestion Obstructions Configuration

Hazardous 

Materials

Release

Aquatic 

Resources

RISING RISING

RISING Balanced RISING RISING

RISING RISING

RISING RISING

Maybe RISING NO RISING

RISING RISING

NO RISING RISING Maybe RISING RISING

KEY Book 3 Absolute level of risk 

Book 4 Level of risk taking into account existing mitigations Risk 

Factor Balanced Consensus that risks are well balanced by 

 existing mitigations 

Book 3 Book 4 Maybe No consensus that risks are adequately balanced by existing 

 mitigations 

Consensus NO Consensus that existing mitigations do NOT adequately 

 balance risk 

45
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

Book 5 Tabular Results: 

1.8 4.1 5.9 6.4 5.9

2.7 3.9 Caution 6.4 2.8 3.7 6.9

4.7 7.2 6.7 Caution 7.2 8.0

6.5 4.0 4.8 4.8 6.2

Mobility Economic Small Craft

Quality Congestion Obstructions Configuration

Commercial 

Fishing

Vessel Quality

Traffic

Mix

Visibility 

Restrictions

Bottom

Type

Shallow Draft 

Vessel Quality

Volume of

Small Craft

Traffic

Water

Movement Dimensions

Personnel

Injuries

Health and

Safety

Deep Draft

Vessel Quality

Volume of 

Commercial 

Traffic

Winds Visibility 

Impediments

Vessel 

Conditions

Traffic 

Conditions

Navigational 

Conditions

Waterway 

Conditions

Immediate 

Consequences

Subsequent 

Consequences

Active Traffic Mgmt Active Traffic Mgmt Nav / Hydro Info Balanced

Enforcement Rules & Procedures Rules & Procedures Active Traffic Mgmt

Rules & Procedures Nav / Hydro Info

Radio Communications Other Actions

Other Actions Coordination / Planning

Petroleum 

Discharge Environmental

Hazardous 

Materials

Release

Aquatic 

Resources

Coordination / Planning Coordination / Planning

Voluntary Training Active Traffic Mgmt Nav / Hydro Info Balanced Other Actions Coordination / Planning

Balanced Active Traffic Mgmt

KEY 

 Risk 

Factor Intervention category that was judged most effective 

 in further mitigating risk 

Intervention Expected improvement in risk level if new mitigation 

 measures were implemented 

Risk 

Improvement Caution No consensus alert 

46
PAWSA Workshop Report for Passamaquoddy Bay Port Area 3-4 October 2006 

Legend:

The intervention category listed is the one category that most participant teams selected for 

further reducing risks. The Risk Improvement is the perceived reduction in risk when taking the 

actions specified by the participants. A green Balanced indicates that no intervention is needed 

and risk is balanced in the waterway, and a yellow Caution indicates that there was a difference 

between the most effective category and the category most selected by the participants for 

action. Intervention category definitions are:

Coordination / Planning Improve long-range and/or contingency planning and better 

coordinate activities / improve dialogue between waterway 

stakeholders 

Voluntary Training Establish / use voluntary programs to educate mariners / boaters in 

topics related to waterway safety (Rules of the Road, ship/boat 

handling, etc.) 

Rules & Procedures Establish / refine rules, regulations, policies, or procedures (nav 

rules, pilot rules, standard operating procedures, licensing, require

training and education, etc.) 

Enforcement More actively enforce existing rules / policies (navigation rules, 

vessel inspection regulations, standards of care, etc.) 

Nav / Hydro Info Improve navigation and hydrographic information (NTM, charts, 

coast pilots, AIS, tides and current tables, etc.) 

Radio Communications Improve the ability to communicate bridge-to-bridge or ship-toshore (radio reception coverage, signal strength, reduce interference 

& congestion, monitoring, etc.) 

Active Traffic Mgmt Establish / improve a Vessel Traffic Service: information / 

navigation / traffic organization 

Waterway Changes Widen / deepen / straighten the channel and/or improve the aids to 

navigation (buoys, ranges, lights, LORAN C, DGPS, etc.) 

Other Actions Risk mitigation measures needed that do NOT fall under any of the 

above strategy categories 

47