alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### DAVIDSON v STATE OF FLORIDA

Case No. 90-4258 (Lower Court Case No. 89-18997)

Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County

January 25, 1991

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Dan Kirkwood, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Office of the State Attorney, for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SUSAN C. BUCKLEW, Circuit Judge.

Appellant/Defendant raises two issues on appeal. Did the trial court err in not allowing the Appellant/Defendant to testify in his own behalf and did the trial court err in finding the Appellant/Defendant guilty of the offense of carrying a concealed weapon?

As to the first issue, the trial counsel did not properly preserve this *23issue for appeal. There was no objection made to the trial judge’s failure to allow the Appellant/Defendant to testify and the trial counsel never specifically requested to call the Appellant/Defendant as a witness. At most, the trial counsel only commented, “I’m sure the Defendant has something to say about how he was carrying the knife and what he used it for. . .” An Appellate Court, however, has the inherent power to correct a fundamental error even in the absence of a timely objection in the lower court. Failure to allow the Defendant to testify, if he wishes, if he “has something to say” is a fundamental error. The Constitution of the State of Florida provides that the accused shall have the right to be heard. The Appellant/Defendant was not afforded that right in the lower court and therefore reversible error was committed.

From the evidence heard by the lower court where the Defendant/ Appellant was not afforded the opportunity to testify, the reviewing court does not find as a matter of law that the lower court erred in denying the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and finding the Appellant/Defendant guilty of carrying a concealed weapon. The fact that the lower court granted a Judgment of Acquittal as to the disorderly conduct does not automatically mean the evidence was not sufficient for the court to conclude the officer had probable cause to arrest the Defendant for disorderly conduct and thus conduct the search incident to arrest which thus produced the weapon.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial on the charge of carrying a concealed weapon in accordance with this opinion.

DONE and ORDERED in Hillsborough County, Florida, this 25th day of January, 1991.
#### Edmund Whipple *versus*Lincoln Newton, 2d.

The holder of a promissory note commenced actions thereon against the maker, and against the indorser, and the maker brought into court the full amount of the note with interest. It was *held,*that the holder was not bound to accept it, unless the costs of both actions should be paid.

Assumpsit on a promissory note made by the defendant, payable to Sumner Newton or his order, and indorsed by him to the plaintiff.

At the first term of the Court of Common Pleas, the defendant brought into court, on the common rule, the ful. amount of the note with interest, and offered, in the usual form, to pay the costs of the action to that time. There was another action pending in that court, in favor of the plaintiff, against Sumner Newton as the indorser of the same note. The plaintiff objected in writing to such offer, on the ground that it did not extend to the payment of the costs of both actions.

The Court, *Strong*J. presiding, tuled that the plaintiff was not bound to accept the money brought into court, unless the costs of both actions should be paid. To this ruling the defendant excepted.

Peters, for the defendant.

*Josiah Mams*and Keith, for the plaintiff.

*Per Curiam.*

Allowing a defendant to pay money into

court and thereupon staying all further proceedings, is a summary proceeding, in its nature equitable, and provided for the ease of the defendant ; it cannot therefore be allowed to the injury of the plaintiff. Had the defendant been allowed *169thus to pay money into court, and thus to cancel and discharge the security, it would not only deprive the plaintiff of his costs in a suit rightly brought on a good cause of action, but leave him exposed to pay costs to the defendant. We think the decision of the Court of Common Pleas was right.

*Exceptions overruled and the cause remitted to the Court of Common*Pleas, *for further*proceedings.
Exhibit 10.22


Exhibit 10.22




[Letterhead of Penthouse Media Group, Inc.]

November 9, 2007

VIA FACSIMILE AND E-MAIL

URGENT REPLY REQUESTED

Mr. Barry W. Florescue

Florescue Family Corporation

50 E. Sample Road, Suite 400

Pompano Beach, FL  33064

Dear Mr. Florescue:

Re:

Penthouse Media Group Inc. (“PMGI”) Series B Offering

I write to update you concerning the PMGI Series B Convertible Preferred Offering (the “Offering”). You will recall that in connection with the Offering, you deposited your purchase money funds with Moses & Singer LLP, as escrow agent, pursuant to that certain Securities Purchase Agreement and Escrow Agreement, PMGI now intends to complete the Offering by drawing funds from the escrow, causing the Series B shares to be issued to you, and causing any overpayment remaining from your purchase money funds to be refunded to you.

Because the Securities Purchase Agreement and Escrow Agreement originally contemplated that the escrow account would liquidate and close by September 30, 2007, the escrow agent has asked for your written confirmation that you consent to the escrow agent releasing to PMGI the entire amount of funds or portion thereof to be applied to your purchase of Series B Convertible Preferred shares.

Please also confirm that you consent to PMGI amending the Securities Purchase Agreement and the Escrow Agreement as reasonably necessary to permit PMGI to complete, and you to participate, in the Offering, including without limitation

·

extending the September 30, 2007 deadline set forth in the Securities Purchase Agreement (Sections 2.2 and 2.3) and the Escrow Agreement (the first WHEREAS clause, and Section 3.1(b)) to November 30, 2007; and

·

extending the October 1, 2007 date set forth in the Escrow Agreement (Section 3.1(d)) to December 1, 2007.

Finally, please confirm that you hereby waive the Securities Purchase Agreement Section 5.1(e) closing condition (i.e., that “the Company shall have delivered the stock certificates to the Escrow Agent in accordance with Section 2.2”), and acknowledge that PMGI will issue the stock certificates in due course, but not later than December 15, 2007.

Please indicate your consent to all of the foregoing points by signing and dating a copy of this letter and returning it to me via facsimile or e-mail.

Please call me if you have any questions.

Cordially,

PENTHOUSE MEDIA GROUP INC.

/s/ Joshua R. Bressler

Joshua R. Bressler

General Counsel

ACKNOWLEDGED AND AGREED

FLORESCUE FAMILY CORPORATION

By  /s/ Barry Florescue                    

Barry Florescue

Its: President
p. 1 

# OAR Box 

# 1828 Prepped by Ollie Stewart



### Document

Number: 

# 13 ) ll-K - (B ) - 1 Docket Number: 

# A-83-2 7

Printed 11/12/2008 11:12:48 AM Sheet 13 of 325P. 2



# hS
II-K-CB)- !

SUMMAR YO F ISSUE S RELATE D T O COAL CLEANINGDISCUSSE D A T IER L MEETINGO

N APRI L 6 , 1979 . Lette r fro

m E . Medine , EE

A t o Dr . A . Wehe , EPArSASD . Apri l 11 , 1979 , THI S INFORMATIO

N CA N B E FOUND I

N DOCKE T A-79-02 , ITE

M II-K-(B)- 1
Table 1. Estimating Veolia's Operating Parameter Limits (OPLs) 

Unit # Metal

Metal 

Feed 

Rates 

During 

2008 

Testing 

(lb/hr)

a

Highest 12-

hr Rolling 

Average 

Metal Feed 

Rate 7/1/04-

1/1/08 

(lb/hr)

Highest 12-hr 

Rolling 

Average Metal 

Feedrate 

(lbs/hr), from 

June 7, 2012

Test Feed 

Rate As a % 

of the 

Highest 12-

hr Rolling Average of Historical 

Values

Was Testing 

Done at ≥ 

Highest 12-

hr 

Historical 

Rates?

b

Was Testing 

Done at ≥ 

Median 12-

hr 

Historical 

Rates?

b

Veolia’s 

3/2/10 

Proposed 

Extrapolated 

Feedrate 

(lb/hr)

c

EPA’s 

Proposed 

OPLs (lb/hr)

d

Est

Stac

Conc. 

VeoliaPropo

OPL

(μg/dsc

7% O2

Hg 0.00165 0.0054 0.0064 31% No Yes 0.0057 0.00165 183 

LVM 47.2 84.5 68.5 56% No Yes 140 68.5 20 SVM 63.6 50.6 91.0 126% No Yes 189 91.0 65 

Hg 0.0018 0.00545 0.0059 33% No Yes 0.0057 0.0018 181 

LVM 47.7 77.3 77.8 62% No Yes 143 77.8 70 SVM 64.3 72.1 81.6 89% No Yes 193 81.6 173 

Hg 0.0214 0.05981 0.060 36% No Yes 0.078 0.021 89 LVM 50.3 69.9 77.3 72% No Yes 151 77.3 30 SVM 63.6 58.4 98.1 109% No Yes 191 98.1 81 

Notes

a. Feed rate calculated by EPA in March 2010 using calculated Hg spike composition & offsite waste feed concentrations.b. In general, feed rates that fall within the top 10-25% of historical 12-hour rolling average rates may be considered 

for extrapolation.

c. Calculated by escalating the metal feed rate during testing by a factor of 3.d. No extrapolation is recommended for Hg because the test feed rates were too low (< 50% of the highest historical rat

For Unit 4, EPA needs an acceptable analysis of the corresponding activated carbon injection rate at higher feed ratIf the test feed rate is higher than the highest historical 12-hour feed rate (e.g., SVM from Units 2 & 4), use the feed rate. For LVM (Units 2, 3, 4) and SVM (Unit 3), extrapolate up to the highest historical feed rate.

e. Stack concentrations are estimated from exhaust parameters and "removal efficiencies" reported by Veolia in the 

March 2010 application, except that Hg removal efficiencies were re-calculated by EPA. (Todd Ramaly Memo, March 26, 

234
#### § 1471.975 Notice.

*Notice* means a written communication served in person, sent by certified mail or its equivalent, or sent electronically by e-mail or facsimile. (See § 1471.615.)
EXHIBIT 31.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Anthony Servidio, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this Annual
Report on Form 10-K of ITXC Corp.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does
not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure
that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of this period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and;



5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants
board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and



b) Any fraud, whether or
not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



Date: March 15, 2004



|                               |  | 
|------------------------------ |  | 
|/s/ Anthony Servidio          
|Name: Anthony Servidio        
|Title: Chief Financial Officer
Update Fields 

I Costs: 

Action Costs per Product (e.g., 

(e.g., Inspection, Total Cost replacement) Labor Parts Cost 

Do not include on- (include cost (l<ibor + u.s. for U.S. Fleet 

condition costs here access, testing, (®.~~!h parts) Registered and 

5 .. . 

c 

. 

' 

. 

•. 

' 

•• 

. . .. 

·• •. 

. 

. . 

·. . 

• 

• 

. 

The known number OI in 

Total Costs of •for r.s. fleet: $2,97: 

Costs I (i 

oCosts~ 

Action Labor cost Parts Cost 

(e.g., Inspection, (include access, (@$85/hour) testing, and close- replacement) uol 

8 
YES* 0 NO 0 *Explanation: 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures: 

Is the AD significant? ~,. 

YES* 0 NO 181 *Explanation: This AD is not considered to be "significant" 

Regulatory Flexibility Act: 

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? Explain for either a Yes or No 

answer.·~ 

YESO N00 Explanation: 

Intrastate Aviation in Alaska: 

This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. Is it appropriate to include specific requirements for aircraft operated in Alaska where aviation might be the only mode of transportation? • 

YES* 0 NO 0 *Explanation: 

9
#### § 1471.500 What is the purpose of the Excluded Parties List System (EPLS)?

The *EPLS* is a widely available source of the most current information about persons who are excluded or disqualified from covered transactions.
§ 1614.103 Complaints of discrimination covered by this part. ( a ) Individual and class complaints of employment discrimination and retaliation prohibited by title VII (discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex and national origin), the ADEA (discrimination on the basis of age when the aggrieved individual is at least 40 years of age), the Rehabilitation Act (discrimination on the basis of disability), the Equal Pay Act (sex-based wage discrimination), GINA (discrimination on the basis of genetic information), or the PWFA (discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions) shall be processed in accordance with this part. Complaints alleging retaliation prohibited by these statutes are considered to be complaints of discrimination for purposes of this part.
( b ) This part applies to: ( 1 ) Military departments as defined in 5 U.S.C. 102;
( 2 ) Executive agencies as defined in 5 U.S.C. 105;
( 3 ) The United States Postal Service, Postal Rate Commission and Tennessee Valley Authority;
( 4 ) All units of the judicial branch of the Federal government having positions in the competitive service, except for complaints under the Rehabilitation Act;
( 5 ) The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Commissioned Corps;
( 6 ) The Government Printing Office except for complaints under the Rehabilitation Act; and
( 7 ) The Smithsonian Institution.
( c ) Within the covered departments, agencies and units, this part applies to all employees and applicants for employment, and to all employment policies or practices affecting employees or applicants for employment including employees and applicants who are paid from nonappropriated funds, unless otherwise excluded.
( d ) This part does not apply to: ( 1 ) Uniformed members of the military departments referred to in paragraph (b)(1) of this section:
( 2 ) Employees of the General Accounting Office;
( 3 ) Employees of the Library of Congress;
( 4 ) Aliens employed in positions, or who apply for positions, located outside the limits of the United States; or
( 5 ) Equal Pay Act complaints of employees whose services are performed within a foreign country or certain United States territories as provided in 29 U.S.C. 213(f).
[57 FR 12646, Apr. 10, 1992, as amended at 64 FR 37655, July 12, 1999; 74 FR 63984, Dec. 7, 2009; 77 FR 43504, July 25, 2012; 89 FR 11171, Feb. 14, 2024]
§ 89.210 Requests for establishment of an FAA-recognized identification area. ( a ) *Application.* An eligible person requesting the establishment of an FAA-recognized identification area under this subpart may submit an application in a form and manner acceptable to the Administrator.
( b ) *Required documentation.* A request under this subpart must contain all of the following information: ( 1 ) The name of the eligible person under § 89.205.
( 2 ) The name of the individual making the request on behalf of the eligible person.
( 3 ) A declaration that the individual making the request has the authority to act on behalf of the community-based organization or educational institution.
( 4 ) The name and contact information of the primary point of contact for communications with the FAA.
( 5 ) The physical address of the proposed FAA-recognized identification area.
( 6 ) The location of the proposed FAA-recognized identification area in a form and manner prescribed by the Administrator.
( 7 ) If applicable, a copy of any existing letter of agreement regarding the flying site.
( 8 ) Description of the intended purpose of the FAA-recognized identification area and why the proposed FAA-recognized identification area is necessary for that purpose.
( 9 ) Any other information required by the Administrator.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

FERNANDO HUERTA RICO,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 06-50700

D.C. No. CR-06-00583-RGK

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 13, 2010** 

Before: SILVERMAN, CALLAHAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Fernando Huerta Rico appeals from the 84-month sentence imposed

following his guilty-plea conviction for being a deported alien found in the United

States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we affirm.

FILED

OCT 04 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 06-50700

Rico contends that the district court erred by applying a drug trafficking

enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) because two prior felony

convictions allegedly occurred when Rico was a juvenile. This contention fails

because Rico admitted to having been convicted for the offenses as an adult. See

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n. 1(A)(iv); see also United States v. Flores, 172 F.3d 695,

700–01 (9th Cir. 1999) (defendant waived challenge by expressly agreeing to

enhancement). Even if it was true that the offenses occurred when he was a

juvenile, it is undisputed that he agreed that he was prosecuted as an adult. 

Rico also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The

record reflects that there was no procedural error and that, in light of the totality of

the circumstances, the sentence within the Guidelines range is substantively

reasonable. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en

banc). 

AFFIRMED.
#### Frederick Reck, App’lt, *v.*The Phœnix Insurance Company, Resp’t.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,*

*Filed May 24, 1889.)*

Costs—When order | requiring additional security not interfered with.

An order of the trial court requiring plaintiff to give additonal security for costs will not be interfered with where a plaintiff has recovered a verdict for a large amount, no judgment having been entered, and the trial court having ordered the defendant’s exceptions heard at the first instance at the general term.

Appeal from ail order of the general term, requiring the plaintiff to give additional security for costs, and staying his proceedings in the meantime.

*J. A. Shoudy,*[for app’lt; *George A. Blade,*for resp’t.

Macomber, J.

Should the case finally go against the plaintiff, it is clear, from the appeal book, that the amount of security heretofore filed, would not be sufficient to indemnify the defendant against costs. It is true, that the plaintiff has, at the end of the fourth trial, obtained a verdict for upwardsjof $10,000. No judgment, however, has been entered thereon, but the learned trial judge directed the exceptions td be heard at the general term, in the first instance. There is, therefore, no determination by the court that the plaintiff is right in his contention. It is true, that the vqrdict , carries with it every intendment in favor of the plaintiff’s ultimate success, so far as the facts are involved, bu| there was doubtless in the mind of the learned judge a doubt as to some important questions of law involved, and hence it appeared that the case was not so clearly in favor of the plaintiff as to warrant a judgment in his favor until thje general term had so adjudicated.

Under these circumstances, we are not disposed to interfere with the exercise of the discretion of the special term, in requiring additional security to be given.

It follows that the order appealed from should be affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disburements.

Van Brunt, Ch. J., and Bartlett, J., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-2000
<CASH>                                          26,928
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   35,886
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,895
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                62,549
<PP&E>                                          13,229
<DEPRECIATION>                                   3,039
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  98,322
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           39,312
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            58
<OTHER-SE>                                      56,919
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    98,322
<SALES>                                         72,286
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               107,264
<CGS>                                            1,959
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   22,934
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                77,233
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,638
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   4
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  7,988
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,589
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              5,399
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     5,399
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.10
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.08


</TABLE>