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88–271 PDF 2014

S. Hrg. 113–323 

MANAGEMENT OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER 

TRAINING CONTRACTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND CONTRACTING 

OVERSIGHT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 14, 2014 

Available via http://www.fdsys.gov 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

KEITH B. ASHDOWN, Minority Staff Director 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

LAUREN M. CORCORAN, Hearing Clerk 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

MARGARET DAUM, Staff Director 

RACHEL WEAVER, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD, Chief Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statement: Page 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 1 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 2014 

Mary Kay Langan-Feirson, Assistant Inspector General, Acquisition and Procurement Audits, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of 

Transporation ....................................................................................................... 4 

Patricia McNall, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Acquisitions and Business 

Services, Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation ..................................................................................................................... 6 

Lynn Dugle, President, Intelligence, Information, and Services, Raytheon 

Company ............................................................................................................... 7 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Dugle, Lynn: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 49 

Langan-Feirson, Mary Kay: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 31 

McNall, Patricia: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41 

APPENDIX 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record: 

Ms. McNall ........................................................................................................ 55 

Ms. Dugle .......................................................................................................... 69 

(1) 

MANAGEMENT OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER 

TRAINING CONTRACTS 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claire McCaskill, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators McCaskill and Johnson 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL 

Senator MCCASKILL. Good afternoon. I apologize for being a few 

minutes late. We just finished our weekly caucus, and as usual, it 

was rainbows and unicorns. Just kidding. It was contentious and 

difficult today, so we went over a little bit. 

This hearing will now come to order. We are here today to review 

the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) management of the 

Air Traffic Control Optimum Training Solution (ATCOTS). 

ATCOTS is an important contract because it supports the training of this Nation’s air traffic controllers, who, in turn, manage the 

Nation’s air traffic, a critical service. In the next few years, we expect to see more and more retirements from the generation of air 

traffic controllers that were hired after the 1981 strike. At the time 

this contract was awarded in 2008, the FAA had a goal to hire and 

train 17,000 controllers by 2015 in order to meet the expected demand. The FAA also wanted to improve training to meet the needs 

of the new NextGen air traffic control system. 

In order to achieve this goal, the FAA awarded a contract to 

Raytheon to provide training to facilities across the Unied States 

in 2008. In 2010, 2 years into the contract, the Department of 

Transportation Office of Inspector General (DOT OIG) audited this 

contract and found significant problems. The contract was premised 

on certain parameters, that there were going to be 4,000 recruits 

to train and 159 sites to support. But within just a few months, 

those numbers had increased dramatically, to 5,620 recruits at 195 

sites. The cost of the contract had skyrocketed, and FAA was in 

danger of running out of money under the contract. 

The Inspector General (IG) had several recommendations for the 

FAA. The most important one was that FAA needed to figure out 

what training it needed and how much it was going to cost. Unfortunately, FAA failed to take the IG’s recommendation to heart. In-
2 

stead, FAA let the contract continue unchanged, racking up at 

least $89 million in additional costs to the taxpayer. Finally, as 

warned by the Inspector General, FAA ran out of money a year 

early. 

Again, FAA had the opportunity to follow the IG’s common sense 

recommendation to figure out what training it needed. Instead, 

FAA decided the best course of action was to exercise the contract’s 

option period early. 

I wrote to the then-Acting Administrator Huerta in 2012, asking 

FAA to consider its plan carefully and to implement the Inspector 

General’s recommendations by updating cost estimates, defining 

training requirements, and developing performance measures for 

the contractor as opposed to the inappropriate notion that the contractor provided their own performance measures, all basic elements of good contracting. But, FAA did not do this. 

In 2013, the Inspector General released a second report about 

the ATCOTS contract. The Inspector General found that while 

there has been some improvement, FAA still has not figured out 

its training needs. In addition, it appears that FAA has managed 

to bring the costs of the contract under control only by cutting the 

amount of training provided by the contractor and instead relying 

on Certified Professional Controllers to fill the gaps. FAA has been 

unable to tell the Inspector General or this Subcommittee how 

much using these highly paid government employees had added to 

the costs of training new air traffic controllers. In addition, more than 5 years and $512 million later, the FAA 

has not achieved any of the three critical goals of the original 

ATCOTS contract: Reduce training costs, reduce training times, 

and bringing training innovations. 

Today’s hearing is about learning from the past mistakes, fixing 

problems, and moving forward. I want to spend some time having 

a discussion with the Office of Inspector General, the FAA, and 

Raytheon in order to understand how these problems came about 

and why they have not been addressed earlier. I want to learn 

what both the FAA and Raytheon are doing right now to get this 

contract back on track and what is being done to try and achieve 

some of the initial goals of the contract. 

I also want to understand what the FAA is doing to better manage and oversee its contracts. This is especially important because 

I understand that the FAA may start the acquisition process on a 

new training contract later this year. I want this Subcommittee to 

be satisfied that FAA has learned its lesson and will not make 

these mistakes again. I want to know that the FAA is taking concrete steps to address deficiencies, is committing to making smart 

contracting decisions, and will ensure that its own acquisition policies are actually followed. I do not want to be here in a year’s time 

having the exact same hearing again. 

Congress and the American public have entrusted the FAA with 

taxpayer dollars and trust them to maintain the safety of our airspace. Just this weekend in my State, a plane mistakenly landed 

on the wrong airport in Missouri, coming dangerously close to the 

end of a runway that was too short for the aircraft in question. 

While there is no evidence of a connection of what we are exploring 

here today and what happened in Missouri, it is hard to under-
3 

stand how the air traffic controllers allowed a Southwest Airline— 

and we are not talking about a small general aviation aircraft, we 

are talking about a domestic carrier of American citizens—how 

they allowed them to land at the wrong airstrip, at the wrong airport, on the wrong runway. 

It is a timely reminder of the need to ensure that the resources 

we spend on air traffic safety are spent effectively, and that if we 

do not have enough in the contract to adequately train our controllers, that we confront that rather than continuing to renew contracts that have not been working or have not had the oversight 

that common sense dictates. 

I thank the witnesses for being here and I look forward to their 

testimony. 

Senator Johnson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. You are correct. This is a very timely hearing. I appreciate you calling it. 

I did read the Inspector General’s report. It raised probably more 

questions than it answered, so I will certainly second your opening 

comment in terms of all the questions that you would like to have 

answered during the hearing. 

One of the things I certainly did in reviewing this and getting 

ready for this hearing is just take a look at the reasonableness of 

the cost per training. Since 2009, the average cost—this is per the 

Raytheon contract—was about a little under $20,000 per air traffic 

control trainee. It rose to as high as $29,000, and in 2013 was 

about $26,000. That is relatively high training costs. You can compare that to college education. So, based on that information, I do 

not know if that is appropriate or inappropriate in terms of the 

total expense. I want to understand exactly how the training occurs, who is doing it, how much is done by the FAA, how much is 

done by Raytheon, what the breakdown is, how intensive this 

training is. So, I just really want to understand the complete training process. 

I am certainly looking forward to the testimony. I am hoping that 

is the kind of information I certainly get out of this hearing. But, 

again, I certainly thank the witnesses for coming here and being 

willing to testify and look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me introduce the witnesses today. 

First, we have Mary Kay Langan-Feirson, who is the Assistant 

Inspector General for Acquisition and Procurement Audits at the 

U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General. In 

this capacity, she oversees audits relating to the Department of 

Transportation acquisition and procurements, including direct contracts and contracts awarded by grantees. Prior to joining the Office of Inspector General, Ms. Langan-Feirson worked in the Department of Transportation’s Office of General Counsel for 30 

years. 

Patricia McNall is the Chief Acquisition Officer and Deputy Assistant Administrator for Finance and Management at the Federal 

Aviation Administration, and I will say with a sense of a humor, 

obviously the person who got the short straw at the FAA. I will say 
4 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Langan-Feirson appears in the Appendix on page 31. 

on the record, I am disappointed—not that I am not thrilled to 

have you, Ms. McNall, but I think the person who should be sitting 

there should be the person who has oversight of this program. They 

declined to attend this and sent you, and that—I will give you a 

chance to address that when you testify, but I do not think you are 

in a position to know as much about this as we need to know and 

it is disappointing, but I will tell you candidly in this particular 

area, I was not shocked when I heard that you were being sent in 

terms of getting the short straw. 

In your outstanding 30-year FAA Career, you have served in various positions, including Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator for 

Policy, Planning, and International Aviation, and Deputy Assistant 

Chief Counsel for FAA’s Technical Center. Prior to assuming your 

current position, you were the FAA’s Assistant Chief Counsel for 

Acquisition and Commercial Law. 

Lynn Dugle is a Vice President at Raytheon Company, and President of Raytheon Intelligence, Information, and Services, a position 

she has held since 2009. Before joining Raytheon in 2004, Ms. 

Dugle held officer-level positions with ADC Telecommunications 

and began her career at Texas Instruments. 

I thank all three of you for being here. It is the custom of this 

Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses that appear before us, so 

if you do not mind, I would ask you to stand and take the following 

oath. 

Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to give before this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and 

nothing but the truth, so help you, God? 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON. I do. 

Ms. MCNALL. I do. 

Ms. DUGLE. I do. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you all very much. 

We will be using a timing system today. We are not sticklers 

about that, but we will ask you to try to keep your testimony to 

5 minutes. Obviously, you are welcome to supplant your oral testimony today with any other information you would like to have us 

put in the record concerning our hearing topic. 

And we will begin with you, Ms. Langan-Feirson. 

TESTIMONY OF MARY KAY LANGAN-FEIRSON,1 ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL, ACQUISITION AND PROCUREMENT AUDITS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON. Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member 

Johnson, thank you for inviting me here today to testify on FAA’s 

Air Traffic Control Optimum Training Solution contract. The $859 

million contract was intended to provide up to 10 years of support 

to train approximately 17,000 air traffic controllers, most of whom 

FAA planned to hire over the next decade. 

In September 2010, we reported several contract weaknesses 

that challenged FAA’s efforts to effectively manage the ATCOTS 

program. FAA has made progress in addressing many of the weaknesses we identified. However, more than 3 years after that report, 
5 

FAA has yet to address our most important recommendation, 

which is to clearly define controller training requirements and determine whether they can be achieved within the existing cost 

baseline of $859 million. 

Specifically, we recommended that FAA update its training requirements and develop criteria for determining whether the agency should exercise contract options beyond the 5-year base contract. 

Despite our recommendation, the ATCOTS program experienced 

four consecutive years of cost overruns, totaling about $89 million, 

due largely to FAA’s lack of clearly defined requirements. In the 

first 2 years alone, contract costs exceeded negotiated values by 

$46 million, and the contractor was required to provide far more 

training than FAA originally estimated. 

As a result, FAA ran out of money in the fourth year of the base 

contract and was not prepared to make an informed decision on 

how to best meet its controller training program needs. Ultimately, 

FAA chose to exercise the contract’s first option period a year earlier than planned without first clearly defining its training requirements or determining whether to exercise the option or take a different acquisition approach. 

In our most recent report, released last month, we know that 

FAA has taken some steps to better assess its training needs. For 

example, FAA reestablished its use of an annual workplan to better 

identify training requirements. However, the plan still does not 

capture all of FAA’s training needs, including training on new air 

traffic controller systems, such as the En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM). If FAA does not clarify and update its training 

requirements, the ATCOTS program remains at risk of cost overruns in the future. 

During our recent audit of ATCOTS, we also identified contract 

management weaknesses that undermine FAA’s ability to achieve 

its training goals. For example, FAA has not used its award fees 

or incentive fees to manage the contract effectively. One of the 

FAA’s key training goals is to reduce training times, but the award 

fee performance measures have not been adequately linked to this 

goal, an issue we first reported in 2010. Between fiscal years 2009 

and 2012, controller training times actually increased by an average of 41 percent, taking 9 months longer, on average, to certify 

each controller. Over the life of the contract, FAA paid the contractor over $17 million in award fees for performance measures 

that did not effectively motivate the contractor. FAA also paid $14 

million in incentive fees despite 4 years of cost overruns. This is 

counterintuitive to the concept in use of award fees. 

In its response to our 2013 report, FAA announced that its goal 

is to award a new contract to replace ATCOTS as early as fall of 

2014. To avoid repeating the problems with ATCOTS, it is crucial 

that FAA address our recommendation to clearly define its training 

requirements and decide whether it needs to rebaseline before 

awarding a new contract. We will continue to monitor FAA’s 

progress in implementing our recommendations and provide this 

Committee, the Secretary, and FAA with future updates on the 

program. 

This concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have. 
6 

1The prepared statement of Ms. McNall appears in the Appendix on page 41. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much. 

Ms. McNall. 

TESTIMONY OF PATRICIA MCNALL,1 DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, ACQUISITIONS AND BUSINESS SERVICES, 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF TRANSPORTATION 

Ms. MCNALL. Good afternoon, Chairman McCaskill and Ranking 

Member Johnson. I am Pat McNall, the FAA’s Acquisition Executive, and I am responsible for the agency’s acquisitions. I appreciate this opportunity to speak with you today about the FAA’s Air 

Traffic Controller Training Contract. 

The FAA’s mission is to ensure the safest, most efficient airspace 

system in the world, but we are also committed to cost effectiveness. The taxpayer expects and deserves nothing less. 

In 2005, the FAA projected the need to hire 17,000 controllers by 

2015. This unprecedented level of hiring and training was necessary to replace the large number of expected retiring controllers 

and meet projected increases in air travel demand. To manage this 

large training effort, the FAA proposed replacing two existing level 

of effort contracts with a single centrally managed performancebased contract. Simply put, this means we were removing and 

transitioning from existing contracts where we specified the number of instructors and the method of providing the training to a 

new contract that would specify the number controllers to be 

trained, plus or minus 10 percent, allow the contractor to determine the best means of training these controllers, while we measure its effectiveness and ability to do so according to pre-set 

metrics. 

In September 2008, after running a full and open competition, 

the FAA awarded the contracted titled the Air Traffic Control Optimum Training Solution contract, to Raytheon Technical Services 

Corporation with a ceiling value of $859 million. In the early years 

of the contract, however, we encountered significant challenges and 

costs. We underestimated the difficulty in transitioning from level 

of effort contracts in place for over 20 years to the new performance-based ATCOTS contract. We reverted to the methods we knew 

had been working in the past. Our training needs, both in the number of students and the technology for which we needed to provide 

the training, accelerated faster than we anticipated. We incurred a 

substantial cost, accordingly. 

We have taken significant steps to improve our management of 

the ATCOTS contract. I would like to highlight a few of these 

steps. The FAA provided increased management attention and requirements control by consolidating all training under the FAA’s 

Air Traffic Organization Vice President for Safety and Technical 

Training. Additionally, we imposed an award fee structure that motivates the contractor to control costs. We implemented a new 

training planning tool to better define and control our dynamic 

training needs. We developed guidelines to monitor required performance standards and expected outcomes for the contractor, and 

we hold our oversight staff accountable for overseeing these stand-
7 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Dugle appears in the Appendix on page 49. 

ards. These changes are improving our oversight, management, 

and administration of the ATCOTS contract. 

We appreciate the Office of Inspector General’s audit of the contract. We are confident that the measures we have taken, which 

fall in line with their recommendations, will allow us to stay on 

track for the remainder of this contract. 

The FAA recently issued a market survey and request for information as the first step to a possible replacement of the ATCOTS 

contract. If we proceed with this procurement, we will replace the 

contract before the end of this calendar year. Whether we replace 

it or not, I am confident that we will continue to provide quality 

air traffic control training. 

The training of air traffic controllers will continue to be a critical 

need for the agency. We estimate that we will need to hire 11,700 

controllers by the year 2022. In order to maintain safety and handle the high volume of air traffic, we need to maintain a steady hiring and training rate through this time. Our ability to do that, 

however, has been challenged by decreased funding, including the 

sequestration. All training courses at the FAA Academy were canceled since sequestration was implemented and have only resumed 

this month. 

The FAA was also unable to hire any new air traffic controllers 

and will have to now accelerate hiring, budget permitting, to ensure that we have a sufficient number of controllers. This increased 

rate of hiring will bring with it increased training requirements beyond what we predicted for this coming year. 

Whenever we face uncertainty about hiring and funding, we face 

uncertainty about our training requirements. This makes it very 

difficult to predict, cost, and plan for the best and most effective 

cost effective contract we can have, but we remain committed to ensuring the safety of the National Airspace System and will not ever 

compromise safety, even in these uncertain times. 

Ms. Chairman, this concludes my statement and I would be 

happy to take questions at this time. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Dugle. 

TESTIMONY OF LYNN DUGLE,1 PRESIDENT, INTELLIGENCE, 

INFORMATION, AND SERVICES, RAYTHEON COMPANY 

Ms. DUGLE. Good afternoon, Chairman McCaskill and Ranking 

Member Johnson. I am Lynn Dugle, President of the Intelligence, 

Information and Services business of the Raytheon Company, the 

business which is the prime contractor for the ATCOTS program. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address the Subcommittee on 

Raytheon’s management of the program, our ongoing efforts to reduce cost, and the new training innovations we can bring to the 

program. 

Before I do so, let me provide some relevant context on Raytheon 

and our training. We are one of the world’s leading providers of 

mission critical training solutions. We train more than two million 

people a year whose missions include national defense, U.S. intelligence operations, cybersecurity, and, of course, national airspace 
8 

management. In addition, our training solutions extend to critical 

needs in the commercial sector. 

Raytheon is also one of the world’s largest providers of air traffic 

management systems. Our systems control more than two-thirds of 

the world’s airspace and our company is an active participant in 

the FAA’s Next Generation program. 

By way of starting, let me say that Raytheon agrees with the 

general conclusion of the IG report that progress has been made, 

yet much more work remains. Raytheon and the FAA have built a 

partnership that has addressed the agency’s very dynamic training 

needs for more than 5 years. During the last year, we have accelerated those improvements, and now, we have a solid foundation to 

get future gains. 

Let me now share my thoughts on the three topics that the Committee requested Raytheon to cover, management of the contract, 

cost reductions, and new training innovations or transformation. 

The management of this contract was challenged from the start 

by those unexpected increases in cost and scope that were identified after the contract began. This included a hiring surge that resulted in a 40 percent increase in year one. There were also new 

training requirements for 700 of these new trainees. There were 

new air traffic control system modernization requirements, the 

ERAM that you mentioned, and new tower simulation needs. 

Nevertheless, Raytheon responded to those challenges by training 20 percent more individuals over the 4-year period. We lowered 

the cost per student on Raytheon-delivered training by 6 percent, 

lowered the cost—decreased the controller failure rate by 12 percent. We shortened class durations at the Academy by 10 percent. 

And we achieved a 23 percent increase in the utilization of the 

complex and expensive tower simulators. 

On the topic of cost reduction, Raytheon and the FAA are working together to maximize the training that can be delivered, can be 

accomplished, within the budget given. Let me cover some of the 

changes we have already made. 

For the first time, FAA’s field managers, onsite managers, are involved in deciding local training priorities, which will lead to more 

effective and more efficient training across the system. Their involvement was enabled by a new planning and execution tool developed by Raytheon at our own expense to assist with that planning. 

In partnership with the FAA, we have also implemented new workforce practices and scheduling efficiencies at the Academy that will 

reduce the fiscal year (FY) 2014 costs by an additional 5 percent. 

We have also reduced our Program Management Office by 20 percent, after working with the FAA to streamline contractual reporting requirements. This reduction will result in $2 million of annual 

savings. 

Let us shift to the topic of new training innovations. I, again, 

agree with the IG report that significant opportunities exist to further modernize training and reduce our cost. With support and approval from the FAA, we can implement innovations that will allow 

us to deliver high-quality training at a much lower cost. 

Raytheon has provided numerous proposals and white papers 

outlining potential areas for important innovations. The biggest opportunity now before us is the implementation of the ATCOTS Cur-
9 

riculum Architecture Project. This project created a blueprint for 

the systematic modernization and transformation of air traffic controller training by identifying the best training mechanisms, methodologies, and then how to best sequence the training to avoid any 

duplication. We have also presented and shared other opportunities 

with the FAA, such as Virtual Classroom Training and the implementation of remote training for the Air Traffic Basics Course, both 

of which I discussed in more detail in my written testimony. 

I would like to conclude by emphasizing that significant progress 

has been made over the past year in a very complex, challenging, 

and critically important program. Raytheon and the FAA have established a solid foundation for future performance gains and future cost reductions. I believe Raytheon has the program knowledge, the transformational training capabilities, and the larger air 

traffic management domain experience to continue to collectively 

support the FAA and meet the training needs of our air traffic control professionals. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, and once again, I appreciate all 

of you being here. 

I would ask each of you before we begin questioning, if you 

would, to try to assign a grade to the management and oversight 

of the ATCOTS contract. Ms. Langan-Feirson, what grade would 

you give it? 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON. An incomplete. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Ms. McNall. That was kind. Ms. McNall. 

Ms. MCNALL. I am inclined to agree. Actually, I would also point 

out, I think the grade has changed over time, all right, so I would 

say we started off with a C, at best, and then it progressed to a 

B. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. And Ms. Dugle. 

Ms. DUGLE. I think on the management of the program and 

meeting our budget constraints, none of us would be pleased with 

our grade. I think on the quality of the training delivered, I would 

give us a much higher grade. I also would warmly embrace the 

idea that we have improved through time, improving more and 

more as each year has progressed. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I know that the FAA has implemented some 

of the recommendations from the initial audit, though. I think the 

thing that is hardest for me is, as was mentioned in Ms. LanganFeirson’s testimony, it did not implement the most critical recommendation, which is to assess your training needs and figure out 

what you want. That is the most important thing in contracting in 

government, is to know what you want. You cannot get a bargain 

if you do not know what you want. You cannot, frankly, adequately 

oversee a contract unless you know what it is you are actually acquiring, what you want, and how much it is going to cost. And it 

is still unresolved. Can you address that, Ms. McNall? Why is this 

so hard to figure out what you want and what it is going to cost? 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes, ma’am. Actually, let me explain a little bit 

about the training process. It is a very dynamic situation. The piece 

that is actually in many ways the easiest, and if I do a new contract it is easy enough that I am even thinking maybe we can fix 
10 

price to work, is when we hire controllers, we bring them to the 

Academy and they provide a very basic FAA air traffic controller 

training, all right. That is the first step of the training process. 

That, at least I know I am hiring X-number of people. They are 

going to come into a class and the class is going to be conducted 

roughly like this, absent any training innovations. 

From there, they go to an air traffic control facility, all right, and 

they are going to get some additional training at that facility. This 

is where it becomes a very dynamic situation. Although we know 

we have a bow wave of retirements coming, because we have a 

mandatory age cap by which controllers must retire, and as you 

know, we had to hire a great number of controllers all at one particular point in time, which means they are more or less going to 

be retiring at the same time—because of that, we know we need 

to hire a lot. We know we have to train a lot. 

But I do not know ahead of time which specific controller is going 

to retire at which specific facility and what position that controller 

is on. For the FAA air traffic controller training, it has to be, when 

you get to the facility level, unique not only to that facility, but 

unique to that particular position that the controller is on. We predict as best we can, and we have developed a training tool with 

Raytheon that we have implemented with our field that now involves a rolling process that we know with a fairly good place, at 

least 30 days ahead, 60 days ahead, and 90 days ahead, what we 

think that training will be that we can then pinpoint and identify. 

Once the controller candidate, so to speak, graduates and 

changes that applies not only to new trainees, that applies to existing controllers who may need to be trained. If they are going to 

change positions, they need to be trained for the new position to 

which they are going to move. If they are going to change facilities, 

they need training for that new facility as well as the new position 

on which they are going to be. 

At that point, the FAA takes over the training and we use our 

professional air traffic controllers to provide on-the-job training. 

On-the-job training accounts for about 75 percent of the total 

amount of training that our controllers go through. In fact, that is 

the majority of the cost of our training program. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And how much is that training costing you? 

Ms. MCNALL. We provided some figures for the Committee and I can look it up again, but total cost is around $250,000 per controller, approximately. That is total cost of both our contractor 

training and our own employee training. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, 75 percent of that is your employees? 

Ms. MCNALL. Or more, yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So, you are saying that 75 percent of 

$250,000 is being done by your folks. 

Ms. MCNALL. In fact, I can provide that for the record, if you 

like. I do have some figures with me I can go through with you, 

if you like, on what our labor costs are for our employees to train 

you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. I will come back to this on the second 

round because I need to talk to my staff, because we discussed this 

and this is the first I have heard this number and I want to go 

through it with them while Mr. Johnson is questioning you. 
11 

Ms. MCNALL. Mm-hmm. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Why in the world would you go from 4,000 

to 5,620 in the first year? How could the contract be that far off 

that soon, that close to the beginning of the contract? 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes, ma’am. Actually, we do not agree with that 

5,600 number. I understand exactly where the number came from, 

or at least we think we do, but we cannot match it with our own 

records. The contract provided that the controller would, for each 

year, need to train about 4,000 controllers, and it said, plus or 

minus 10 percent. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Ms. MCNALL. We do agree the number was higher, and by our 

calculations was around 4,500 to 4,600. I think, and doing it wrong. 

It is different data systems that collect the data that I think is 

helping lead to why there is a bit of a difference—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Wait. Let us back up here. 

Ms. MCNALL. Mm-hmm. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, you are telling me that you are paying 

for training for these people and you are not even sure and cannot 

articulate why the IG would say there was 5,620 and you are saying there was 4,500? 

Ms. MCNALL. No, I can definitely articulate that. The 5,600 was 

Raytheon’s number, which we believe includes all people initially 

put into the class, whether or not they graduated from the class or 

washed out. It includes training that we would otherwise not necessarily have counted, all right. So—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, why did you pay them for it, then? 

Ms. MCNALL. Oh, one thing, it is a cost reimbursement contract 

and we treated it like a level of effort contract, and the way we 

should have is basically a performance-based contract. But they 

were successful in training this number of personnel, and we do 

agree—they did put in a request for equitable adjustment and at 

the end, we agreed they did train more than we expected. So, if you 

take the plus 10 or minus 10 percent, that makes 4,400 at the op 

side. We do agree they trained at least 4,500 to 4,600. 

In addition, they had to do different kinds of training. There is 

a separate requirement which says that we can only vary by 3 percent the different categories of training and we varied more than 

that. So, some of the technology training was increased. Some of 

the training for controllers that are already trained but now need 

to be trained for new positions, that was higher than we anticipated, as well. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So, you thought the most you were 

going to pay for was 4,500. You paid for 5,600, correct? 

Ms. MCNALL. I would—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is that correct, Ms. Langan-Feirson, that 

they paid for 5,600 the first year? 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON. The numbers that we have are that FAA 

underestimated the number of controllers by 41 percent. There 

were 5,620 developmentals rather than 4,000 that was in the solicitation. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So, here is the problem. You are paying 

a thousand over. Forty percent is the figure that they are using. 

Ms. MCNALL. Right. 
12 

Senator MCCASKILL. And what happened when that occurred? 

Were there alarm bells that rang? Did everybody get together and 

say, we have to look at this contract, we have to change some 

things and we have to figure out what our number is for next year, 

and so the next year, it got better? 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes, ma’am, we did—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. No, it did not. You still had major cost overruns the next year. 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes, we did, but the cost runs were less, not nearly—do not get me wrong, the cost overruns were still present and 

they were present for the third year, as well, and I am horrified 

by that, as well, all right. But, we started a positive trend, all 

right. We got our controls. I will tell you, honestly, the first 3 years 

of the contract, management in particular were very troubling. The 

fourth year, we got better. That is why I am saying we succeeded 

in our most important goal, which is getting air traffic controllers 

trained as needed and providing the quality of training that was 

needed. The problem was the cost control—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I think, there, the issue is that—even 

in this testimony today, there does not seem to be a clear explanation that can be articulated between the difference in what you 

contracted for and what you paid for, and it does not even appear 

that you agree that they were training—that they should have 

been training all the people they were training, based on the testimony you have just given, that they were doing training you did 

not even anticipate them doing. 

And so you say it was a lot different in the second year, but my recollection is the first year, it was $40 million over—or $20 million 

over? 

Ms. MCNALL. No, 20 over. 

Senator MCCASKILL. The first year 20 over, and then the second 

year, was it not 20 over again? 

Ms. MCNALL. Not quite. 

Senator MCCASKILL. It was $29 million the first year and $31 

million the second year. 

Ms. MCNALL. I will be happy to double-check those numbers for 

you, with you and confirm back. The issue we had that was—keep 

in mind, the difference between a level of effort contract or our contract where I am paying per controller, which was an idea we originally contemplated, but the IG appropriately pointed out to us 

would not be appropriate, it is a performance-based contract. So, 

we are not training per controller. We are training the volume of 

controls, whatever that amount might be, so long as it is within 10 

percent of 4,000, right. Above that, we recognize, yes, where the 

contract is entitled to an equitable adjustment, as well as if the 

mix changes of controllers beyond what we anticipated, and we 

agreed, that mix also did change. It did entitle the contractor to an 

equitable adjustment. 

One of the things we did that first year, for example, on the incentive fee, they only got their minimum fee. They got nothing 

more than that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. All right. Let me let Senator Johnson 

ask, and then I will come back and followup. 

Ms. MCNALL. Mm-hmm. 
13 

Senator JOHNSON. Let me use a little accounting lingo here. You 

have a price variance and you have a—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. A volume variance. It sounds to 

me like the problem with the contract was a volume variance. You 

had to train more air traffic controllers, is that accurate? 

Ms. MCNALL. That is largely accurate, and the only reason why 

I am hesitating at all is one of the things the FAA did was require 

this contractor to mirror the level of services being provided by the 

prior contractor without first evaluating, were all of those services 

the prior contractor had providing needed. We just told the contractor, go out, every facility at which our prior contractor was at, 

provide at least that amount of staffing. While we were running 

the procurement, which in this case was a little bit longer process 

than normal, that prior contractor was continuing to expand the 

sites at which they were present and providing training. In fact, 

that grew, although it was known within the agency—— 

Senator JOHNSON. So, you had training overlap between two contractors, which—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. 

Ms. MCNALL. Three contractors, in fact, since we were replacing—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Let us just back up—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Right. 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. Because, I mean, I am new to 

this whole issue. Can you give me a little bit of history of training 

in the air traffic control system? For example, after the professional 

air traffic controllers organization (PATCO) strike, we had to hire 

a lot of people. We had to train a lot of people. 

Ms. MCNALL. That, we did. 

Senator JOHNSON. Was that done internally, on-the-job training? 

Was that done with an outside contractor? 

Ms. MCNALL. It was done with the help of an outside contractor, 

just as it is today. For approximately 20 years before this contract, 

all right, we started off with training at our Academy in Oklahoma 

City. The Academy in Oklahoma City contracts, and at that point, 

they were contracting with Oklahoma University to provide training at the Academy. So, that was the starting point. That was the 

same up until we competed and Raytheon won the contract. 

Senator JOHNSON. So, prior to that, you were actually contracting 

with a university to do the training? 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes, at FAA’s facilities. So, it is not like we were 

sending them to college or university. 

Senator JOHNSON. Who would be the other potential competitors 

for this contract, other universities? Other private sector businesses? 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes to both, because Oklahoma University was 

only providing Academy training, which was sort of the initial basics course at this one facility. We hired potential air traffic controllers. They take a test so we can determine, are they likely to 

be good air traffic controller candidates. If they pass that test, we 

hire them. We send them to the Academy to begin their training. 
14 

From there, we send them to the facilities where we think we are 

going to need the personnel, all right. Again, that is an estimate, 

because we do not know exactly who is going to retire when. But, 

based on statistics and historical patterns—— 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. 

Ms. MCNALL [continuing]. We do our best guess. At the field, a 

private sector contractor takes over, historically, a separate contractor. It was a small business company, Washington Consulting 

Group, held that contract for many years. 

Senator JOHNSON. How many different air traffic control positions are there? I mean, how many different classifications of air 

traffic controllers are you training for, approximately? 

Ms. MCNALL. I—— 

Senator JOHNSON. I mean, is there just one kind of air traffic 

controller, or—— 

Ms. MCNALL. No. 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. Are there 10? Are there 30? 

Ms. MCNALL. No. The reason I am hesitating—I will promise I 

will get back to you for the record with a better answer. I can tell 

you that we have over 15 levels of facilities, so that is—— 

Senator JOHNSON. That was my next question. 

Ms. MCNALL. OK. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. So you have 15 different types of facilities. 

Ms. MCNALL. No, 15 levels. OK. I will back up a little bit further. 

Senator JOHNSON. Because, then I was going to say, different 

types of equipment configurations. I am trying to get—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Right. 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. My arms around the complexity 

of the training situation. 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. Absolutely. 

Senator JOHNSON. You have different sized airports—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Different sizes of facility. 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. Different sized towers, different 

equipment configuration, you have different—— 

Ms. MCNALL. And not just towers, sir, if I may, respectfully. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. 

Ms. MCNALL. Right. We have towers. Then we have what are 

called Terminal Radar Control Facilities. They may or may not be 

located where the tower is. And then we have 22 route facilities 

across the country that handle air traffic. They basically handle 

different volumes of air traffic. 

So, not only do we have the difference in facility size and the difference in equipment, the layout, et cetera, we also have different 

positions in that facility. So, one controller, for example, will only 

handle arriving air traffic. Another controller will handle only departing air traffic. Another controller will be watching, generally, 

out for field—— 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. So, let us go back. A number of different 

types of towers. 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Senator JOHNSON. Are they all the same, or are there different 

configurations of that? 

Ms. MCNALL. They are all—— 
15 

Senator JOHNSON. Pardon? 

Ms. MCNALL. They have very different configurations. 

Senator JOHNSON. So, how many different configurations, approximately? I mean, are you talking about 100 different configurations? I mean, is each one—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Each—— 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. Totally separate, totally unique? 

Ms. MCNALL. We have tried to standard the physical layout of 

the towers, but the physical layout of each airport tends to be a little bit different, which means there are changes for each airport, 

accordingly, right. If there is a mountain here, if there is a cliff 

there, right, that is going to alter the procedure. The air routes 

that the controllers have to guide the pilots along, those vary, as 

well. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. 

Ms. MCNALL. And, in fact, we have a variety of different air 

routes that go into any one facility. In fact, and then what air route 

can be used depends on the equipage of the aircraft, and the controller has to know and visualize within their mind not only where 

is that aircraft, but which route can I give this aircraft based on 

the training of the pilot from that aircraft as well as the equipage 

onboard the aircraft. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. So, the bottom line here, without getting—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Mm-hmm. 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. Spend a lot of time on the detail, 

which I—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Sorry. 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. Would be glad to get into at some 

point in time, but the bottom line is there is a great deal of complexity—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. In trying to anticipate over a 10- 

year contract what those training requirements are going to be. 

Ms. MCNALL. Exactly. 

Senator JOHNSON. Is that at the core? And I will ask all three 

of you to comment, because, to me, just writing down, well, you 

have to define the training requirements, well, yes, of course. 

Ms. MCNALL. Right. 

Senator JOHNSON. But then, all of a sudden, you realize, defining 

the training requirements is unbelievably complex and it is very 

hard to anticipate. I mean, is that-—— 

Ms. MCNALL. You are absolutely right, Senator. 

Senator JOHNSON. Does anybody want to disagree with that? 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON. I would say—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Or chime in? 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON. I would agree. It is a very complex task. 

I would also say that the FAA has been training controllers for a 

very long time and it is a very important task. 

Senator JOHNSON. Ms. Dugle. 

Ms. DUGLE. And all I would answer is that one of the steps that 

we have taken is to actually create a very simple tool, but a very 

powerful tool, that takes that complexity, decomposes it, puts it 

into an automated spreadsheet where all of our then-onsite train-
16 

ers—we talked about coming from headquarters predicting and 

scheduling training out onto the site. We then take that each 

month, analyze 30 days of history, we look at our current 30 days, 

and then we do the forward planning that—— 

Senator JOHNSON. So, Raytheon does its 10 to 25 percent—I am 

looking at 25,000 versus 250 and I am saying that is 10—— 

Ms. DUGLE. Yes—— 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. But somewhere in that 10 to 25 

percent of the training, you do that on the very front end and 

then—— 

Ms. DUGLE. We do that now on a continuous basis. 

Senator JOHNSON. But, I mean, in terms of the cycle of an air 

traffic controller. I mean, are you primarily handling the first year 

of training of an individual, and then it gets turned over to on-thejob training with FAA personnel? 

Ms. DUGLE. It would be approximately a year. So, we do the 

Academy training. We then do the onsite training and then we 

transition to the FAA for the actual on-the-job training. So, we 

handle two of the three components. 

Senator JOHNSON. So, we can criticize the FAA for not having defined this training requirement. How critical are you of that? I 

mean, are you actually pretty sympathetic with the complexity of 

it, or do you think there could be just a far better job, even within 

the complexity, that we can always do a better job, but—— 

Ms. DUGLE. I think we can always do a better job. What I will 

say, this program came under my responsibility in April and I became a student of air traffic control training. I never had any appreciation for the level of complexity. So, you have the individual 

component—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Are you asking for reassignment yet, or—— 

Ms. DUGLE. Yes, that is right. [Laughter.] 

Ms. DUGLE. I do not think I could pass the training, quite frankly. But when you put the variables—and I am from an engineering 

background, right, so to get a consistent answer, I have to have so 

many known variables in an equation. When I put in the personal 

talents, we screen candidates coming in, but this is a very complicated job. Not everyone can do it. Then we have all the factors 

that Pat talked about. So, I am—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Let me go over time just a little bit, just because this ties in. How much remedial training are you on the front 

end having to do just because the applicants coming in, yes, they 

have a degree, but there are just deficiencies and you have to bring 

people up to speed in terms of whatever our education system 

should have done? 

Ms. DUGLE. So, probably the best factual indicator of that is our 

fallout rate. When we assumed responsibility for training, that failure rate was 29.5. Over the time period, we have reduced that to 

17 percent. I think in this kind of training, you would always run 

in some level of double-digits because you just absolutely cannot 

screen all the temporal and visual talent. 

Senator JOHNSON. So, the reduction really is better screening, 

better application process, better hiring procedures, and that would 

be—— 

Ms. DUGLE. Well, and—— 
17 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. On your part or on FAA’s part? 

Ms. DUGLE. And on our ownership, constantly improving that 

training, right, modernizing the techniques so that people are better able to digest and retain knowledge. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. Thank you. Sorry for going over. 

Senator MCCASKILL. No, it is no problem. Ms. McNall, the $250,000 figure that you cited in your testimony 

a few minutes ago, that is the first we have ever heard that number. 

Ms. MCNALL. I apologize. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, you know, we have been at this since 

2010. 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I have been writing letters. We have been 

trying to communicate with you and your agency. Now, we got 

some spreadsheets, finally, on Friday—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. and Ms. Langan-Feirson, I am not even 

sure if you have seen these, but we have on Friday, you finally 

gave us some information that says your Air Traffic Training Detail for fiscal year 2012 is $359 million, is that correct? 

Ms. MCNALL. I believe that would be for the—if that is the sheet 

that shows the cost of FAA providing the training, I do not believe 

that sheet necessarily includes the contractor training. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You do not know whether it does or does 

not? 

Ms. MCNALL. I hate to put it this way. I am trying to—from that 

sheet, that would be FAA cost only. 

Senator MCCASKILL. This is FAA costs only? 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. And is there a reason why this was unavailable to us for years and we got it the Friday before the hearing? Would you not have this available? 

Ms. MCNALL. We do have that available. We have had that information available. I am sorry I did not know, at least personally. 

I, too, only joined this job fairly—well, 2011. Anyway, I did not 

know that you wanted that data, but, of course, we will be happy 

to provide that data-—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, let me just explain what we are trying 

to do here. 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. We are trying to figure out if you know 

what this costs. 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And we are trying to figure out if you know 

what it is you are buying. 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I get that what you are doing is complicated. 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. But, at the end of the day, acquisition is 

about the people who know what they need buying it and having 

some idea what it costs. 

Ms. MCNALL. Absolutely. 
18 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, you understand my concern that we 

would have two IG reports and we would have a lot of criticism 

about cost overruns, and for the first time at this hearing, we finally hear a figure about what you think it costs to train someone 

to be a functioning, well-informed, well-trained air controller, and 

the Friday before the hearing, we finally get numbers—do you have 

these numbers, Ms. Langan-Feirson? 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON. No, I do not. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Have you tried to get these numbers? 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON. In our report, we have—those—I do not 

know what those numbers are, but in our report, basically, one of 

the findings that we have is that the FAA is responsible for the onthe-job training. Raytheon is responsible for the Academy training 

and the developmental training, and then they get handed off for 

on-the-job. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON. The point is that the contract costs are 

under the contract and there are other costs that the FAA incurs 

to train an air traffic controller. You need to put those two together 

to get the total cost. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Absolutely. 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON. And when we went into the field and we 

interviewed people in the field, we asked them whether they were 

capturing the costs for kind of the off-loading of the courses that 

Raytheon could not train because they ran up against the cost ceilings, were those being captured, those costs that the controllers 

were basically—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Absorbing. 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON. They were self-performing and absorbing. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON. And we do not think that they are. We 

know that the FAA is basically capturing what they call OJT costs, 

which those probably are, but we did not see accounting codes that 

would then differentiate and kind of pull out those costs that were 

being self-performed that should have been performed our would 

have previously been performed under the Raytheon contract. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, the issue here is this. Complicated training, but this is to try to simplify the problem we have. They cannot 

train, under the contract they have been given, do as much work 

as they need to be doing. You ran out of money. You had to start 

the option early, because you guys ran out of money, and you have 

cut staff by, what, 30 percent, that are doing the training? 

Ms. DUGLE. At various points in the contract. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes. Well, you have had to cut staff because 

there is not enough money. So, that means that the agency is absorbing the costs of doing some of the training that Raytheon is not 

doing now. So, if you are going to recompete this contract, you cannot do it unless you figure out what everything costs—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Right. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. And have any hope that the 

amount you are paying for the contract is the right number. That 

is my sense of urgency here. I am very respectful that this is hard. 

But if you are not even attempting to capture your costs that you 

are absorbing because the contract amount is clearly not correct, 
19 

then all we are going to have is more of this ad nauseam in the 

future until you figure that out. So, is the $250,000 number one I can bank on at this hearing? 

Is that the number it costs to adequately train air controllers in 

the FAA? 

Ms. MCNALL. That is our best calculation. It is an average figure. 

Keep in mind, individual controllers—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. And that includes both Raytheon money 

and the money that the agency is spending? 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. In addition, if I may, one of the points, as the 

Inspector General pointed out, was the importance of us tracking 

costs that our controllers are incurring, particularly if they are 

going to pick up training that Raytheon otherwise could have performed, right. That sheet that we provided you has different categories of training put on it. One of those categories is on-the-job 

training, which is the type of training that the FAA controllers 

have always done. That is work that Raytheon has never done, 

and, frankly, it is our anticipation no contractor would be doing, 

right. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Ms. MCNALL. That is the last step, right. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Of course. 

Ms. MCNALL. You will also see a category in there called ‘‘Proficiency Training.’’ That is a type of training that Raytheon has historically performed. That is a type of training that we have moved 

in-house, and there are a number of very good reasons that I will 

be happy to go into if you like, but you will see that we are tracking that cost. 

Another cost is called ‘‘Training, Other.’’ It is under a ‘‘Training, 

Other’’ category that we track the time our controllers spend providing training that otherwise would have been done by Raytheon, 

all right. So, we are tracking all those types of costs. 

The other item that the Inspector General quite rightly brought 

up was the potential of overtime. We are continuing to track overtime to see if there is any increase or decrease. And, in fact, our 

overtime cost had been, overall, decreasing, and it is less than 1.7 

percent currently. 

So, yes, I fully agree with the Chairman. It is very critical that 

we have a good understanding of our cost and what is the right 

mix to be using between our—when we use a contractor or when 

we are using our own personnel, along with what is the right capability and skills that are involved. So, that is engaged. We are 

keenly watching that. 

One of the processes that we have changed since the ATCOTS 

contract was originally awarded was starting to bring the types of 

tools—and I apologize for going on—but beginning with the types 

of tools that we have historically used when making capital investments or information technology acquisitions to our service contracts so that we can do that by alternatives analysis. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, that would be—yes, and here is the 

thing. My colleague, who I have a great respect for because I think 

that he would agree with me, it would be a good idea if every member of the Senate has had to make a payroll, it would be a great 

requirement for this job, because I guarantee you, if you were a 
20 

private business, you would have figured out these costs before you 

had cost overruns of $89 million over a period of just a few years. 

You would have figured it out. You would have figured out whether 

or not it was cheaper or more expensive to have Raytheon be doing 

this and asking for increased contract amounts or whether it is 

more expensive for the government to be doing it. 

To be honest, Ms. McNall, I think you are just now getting your 

arms around that. I think you went years thinking it was not that 

big of deal, and I think that is why we are here, because I think 

if you thought it was that big of deal, you would not have had this 

same major finding in an audit 2 years after the first one, and that 

is what brought us here today. I did not know how else to get your 

attention, because it felt like, to me, that you guys thought we 

were just bothering you, and if you just held on long enough, we 

would go away. 

I can assure you, I am not going away. We are going to get this 

fixed. And when you recompete this contract, I am going to be on 

it like a rabid dog, watching how this works, whether or not you 

have finally figured out what you need and what it should cost, and 

whether it is more cost effective to do some of it in-house and more 

of it through Raytheon or another contractor, whether you have the 

right mix, most of all, if you understand what each different potential would cost, and that is what I think really has been lacking. 

I have a few more followups, but I have gone over and I want 

to turn it over to Mr. Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Apparently, we have a vote called, so I will 

keep this pretty short, but just really second what the Chairman 

has said. It is about information. It is about being able to have the 

tools and being able to make that evaluation as to whether or not 

it is better to do it in-house versus hire an outside contractor and 

who the different contractors are. 

Ms. MCNALL. Right. 

Senator JOHNSON. And this is going to just get more complex as 

you move on to more technology. From my standpoint, I would 

think moving forward with technology, particularly in an area like 

air traffic control—I mean, I have watched my son do in-flight simulators, amazed at the technology there. So, I would think, being 

a real supporter of the private sector and the innovation of the private sector, I would think the private sector would probably be a 

little more nimble and be able to bring some real technological advancements to the training process to actually improve quality, 

which, by the way, that has got to be the first consideration—quality, safety. That is the first. I am concerned about cost, but, boy, 

we do not want to compromise quality and safety at all. 

But really taking a look at technology, and only with the information, really understanding what the true internal costs are in it, 

and I recognize that can sometimes be difficult to ascertain, but it 

all depends on how complex it is in terms of the use of personnel. 

So, let me quickly ask that question. Do you have full-time trainers within the FAA? Is that their entire task? Or is this also where 

people have split duties, where they are air traffic controllers at 

some point in time and—I mean, is just gathering that information 

also complex, or is it just that there has not really been the desire 
21 

within the agency to really make a real push on getting the information? 

Ms. MCNALL. So, within the agency, we track the time of all of 

our personnel, including our air traffic controllers, which is then allocated to a particular cost code. That is one of the things the Inspector General—— 

Senator JOHNSON. So, you should really have very accurate information in terms of really what the training costs would be internally. 

Ms. MCNALL. And that is the information we have now provided 

to the Committee. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. And, again, so you are saying it is about 

$250,000, add to that about $25,000—— 

Ms. MCNALL. The $25,000 includes the contractor cost as well as 

the FAA employee cost. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. So, it is $225,000 plus about $25,000. 

Ms. MCNALL. Right. 

Senator JOHNSON. I mean—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Keep in mind, it, generally speaking, takes about 

21⁄2 years to train a controller. 

Senator JOHNSON. Right. 

Ms. MCNALL. That will include the training cost of the controller 

who is being trained. Their salaries are also in that—— 

Senator JOHNSON. So, to me, the metric—but even then, what is 

the differentiation between full training of a raw recruit versus refresher? Do you have some sort of sense of that breakout? 

Ms. MCNALL. Mm-hmm. 

Senator JOHNSON. I mean, how much are your training costs in 

your annual budget, if it is $360,000—$360 million, how much of 

that is refresher versus brand new? 

Ms. MCNALL. So, that is a very shifting number. In fact, that 

was one of the changes, again, that we had not—I hate to go back, 

but if we go back to the length of time to train and why that did 

not improve, the year 2009 was an anomaly, and one of the reasons 

that was an anomaly is because the proportion of that training mix 

was fewer raw recruits and more training of actual controllers in 

place, which is a shorter period of time, so—— 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. So, are you tracking it—as long as we 

have this—— 

Ms. MCNALL. But we track it all. 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. The tracking code—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. So you should be able to say, this 

training was done for refresher. This training was done on new recruits—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Exactly. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. So, my bottom line, and we have to go to 

a vote, is the development of better information, not just for the 

sake of getting information, but actually targeted, and then working with the contractor to actually hone in on what—because it 

may be a more lucrative contract to Raytheon but save the government money. The total value proposition here is what we are after. 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 
22 

Senator JOHNSON. But, you need the information. So, again, I 

just want to second what the Chairman was talking about, is the 

desire and the need for accurate information—because, again, reading through the Inspector General’s report, I just had a lot of questions, and there should not be. I mean, we should really have in 

a management information system the kind of detailed information 

that would just really point us in the direction of how we should 

manage this training—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Absolutely. 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. Because it is crucial. 

But, with that, I will finish my questioning remarks. Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And we have votes. 

Senator JOHNSON. Yes. We have time here. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, I have a little bit more. I would ask your 

forbearance. I am going to run over, vote, and come back. I want 

to talk about the award fees. It is a thing that I care about. I have 

done this, and by the way, you should talk to the folks at DOD on 

award fees and performance fees—Raytheon knows I have been on 

this—about how we do this and whether or not we are using them 

as the tools they should be used, and a few other questions. So I 

am going to run, vote, and come back. It should be 10 to 15 minutes at the max. Thank you. 

Senator JOHNSON. She is letting you off the hook. Thank you all. 

[Recess.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. I am so sorry. I will tell you, though, it is 

not lost on me that I sit up here and rail against government agencies for being inefficient and ineffective and I am a member of the 

U.S. Congress. I just want you to know, I get the joke. [Laughter.] 

This is one of those days that I feel that in a painful way, that 

this is an ineffective and inefficient Congress. 

Let me go through just a few more things I want to make sure 

we get on the record before we close today, and I do not have—we 

have covered most of it. Who would you say is in charge of this program? 

Ms. MCNALL. So, the person—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. You need to turn your microphone on. 

Ms. MCNALL. So, we have a program manager who works within 

the Air Traffic Organization who is in charge of the program. That 

person reports directly to the Air Traffic Vice President for Safety 

and Technical Training. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is there an Air Traffic President? 

Ms. MCNALL. There is an Air Traffic Chief Operating Officer. 

Senator MCCASKILL. But then there is a Vice President? 

Ms. MCNALL. There are several Vice Presidents. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Weird. 

Ms. MCNALL. We are a little bit of a different agency. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is weird. We do not have Vice Presidents in government unless his name is Biden. [Laughter.] 

We have it in private companies, but we do not have it typically 

in agencies. So, you would say that the Vice President is the person 

who ultimately has the responsibility for the effective operation of 

this program and the effective use of contracts in support of this 

function? 
23 

Ms. MCNALL. He is the one responsible for seeing that air traffic 

controller training is done effectively and efficiently. I am the one 

who is responsible for seeing that the contracts he needs to accomplish that are done appropriately. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Who do both of you report to, in common? 

Ms. MCNALL. The Administrator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, the boss of this program is really 

Huerta—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Always. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. Because you have one on the 

programming side, one on the acquisition side, and the only time 

the two of you meet is at the very top. 

Ms. MCNALL. From an organizational perspective. Now, of 

course, I meet with the Vice President at least monthly, and then 

I have a variety of oversight processes—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. But you do not work for him. 

Ms. MCNALL. No, I do not. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And he does not work for you. 

Ms. MCNALL. Correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, I am trying—I have learned—— 

Ms. MCNALL. You are right. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I have learned the hard way that if you do 

not figure out who is in charge, the chances of you getting something fixed go down exponentially. So, you are telling me that, ultimately, if he is not doing his job or you are not doing your job, the 

only person who can make you accountable is, in fact, Administrator Huerta. 

Ms. MCNALL. That would be correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Let us talk about award and incentive 

fees. What is your understanding of what the contractor had to do 

to get what I think most Americans would call bonuses? 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. What the contractors had to do to achieve 

both its incentive fee and its award fee has varied over the period 

of the contract. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What was the first bonus and incentive fee 

they got? 

Ms. MCNALL. Right. So, in the first year of the contract, we established a target cost, right. The share ratio on that target was 

50/50. So, for each dollar that the contractor incurred above that 

target cost, reduced his fee by 50 percent. Each dollar below that 

target cost reduced that fee by 50 percent. That first year, because 

of the cost overruns—up to a min and max in each case. So, at 

some point, the fee that he can add to that target is limited, and 

the same thing at the top. As cost growth, he gets a minimum fee. 

The first year, the contractor ended up with the minimum fee. 

The same—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Wait a minute. 

Ms. MCNALL. Mm-hmm. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, he did get the fee that was supposed to 

be incentivizing costs? 

Ms. MCNALL. He got the smallest amount of fee possible under 

the—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. And how much was that? 
24 

Ms. MCNALL [continuing]. Contract. Roughly $1.5 million. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So, he got $1.5 million in a year that the cost overruns were $31 million. 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Why did he get anything? 

Ms. MCNALL. When we bid the contract, and this is one thing 

that is always done when you are bidding a cost plus incentive fee 

contract, is—at least in best practices—you allow the companies to 

propose back to the government what that target ratio should be, 

and then what the minimum and maximum fees should be, and 

that—you then pick on what you think is the best value for the 

government. In this—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, how can it be a value for the govern- ment if the cost overruns are $31 million and we still give them 

money for doing a good job on cost? Do you understand that sounds 

weird? 

Ms. MCNALL. I absolutely understand that sounds weird. It was 

a very small fee for the amount of work done, and the contractor 

was successful in performing the contract. I fully understand, right, 

this was not a controlled cost. I have other contracts where the contractor will bid and we will agree and write into the contract, there 

is no minimum fee, but that was not this contract. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. The FAA’s award fee contracting guideline—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. Says no performance element 

should be incentivized more than once. 

Ms. MCNALL. Correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is exactly what you did when you offered Raytheon an incentive fee and an award fee for containing 

costs. Why did that happen? 

Ms. MCNALL. In all honestly, I was not in this job at the time 

that happened, in their first years of the contract, so I cannot tell 

you exactly what that happened, other than the fact that the agency at that point was very interested in controlling cost. As you 

pointed out, we were incurring cost growth and we wanted to bring 

it under control. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, there were $14 million in the first 4 

years of the contract in incentive and award fees. Is that a correct 

figure? 

Ms. MCNALL. Excuse me just a moment. [Pause.] 

Seventeen million in incentive fee and—but more than that in 

the award fee. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Can you help—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Of course, that is going through the first 5 years. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is 5 years. 

Ms. MCNALL. We will be happy to get back to you. 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON. During the base period, there were $14 

million in cost incentives and approximately $17 million in award 

fees—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON [continuing]. For a total of $31 million. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Thirty-one million. And during that 

same period of time, what were the cost overruns? 
25 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON. The cost overruns were $89 million. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So, we had cost overruns of $89 million 

and we had two fees that were supposed to be incentivizing costs— 

two incentive and award fees incentivizing costs and they got $31 

million. 

Ms. MCNALL. That is correct. The award fee incentivized more 

than simply cost control. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What else did it incentivize? 

Ms. MCNALL. It incentivized, basically, performance of the contract. It successfully trained the controllers that we needed to have 

trained. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And what were the metrics on that? 

Ms. MCNALL. So, that is where the metrics varied for each performance period. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Who decided what the metrics were? 

Ms. MCNALL. So, the FAA did. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I thought that Raytheon developed the 

performance metrics early in this contract, that the FAA did not 

do the performance metrics but, rather, they were drawn up by 

Raytheon. 

Ms. MCNALL. As part of the contract bidding process, each company bid metrics, proposed metrics, for the award fees. One of the 

reasons why we asked for them to bid the proposed metrics for the 

award fee was to see how well they understood what the contract 

was aiming for and how good they were at metrics development, 

which would give us a clue as to how good they might be at actually achieving those metrics. So, Raytheon bid proposed metrics. 

The FAA changed those metrics before we awarded the contract. 

But we did accept some of them, the basic underlying premise of 

them. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So, you had a set of metrics before this 

contract was—before you had the competition on this contract, you 

had a set of metrics developed within FAA that you were going to 

measure a contractor by. 

Ms. MCNALL. In all honestly, again, I was not here at the time, 

so I do not know that we had those metrics prepared. I can tell 

you, I guess, that we did allow the offerors to bid proposed metrics 

to us, and that in this case, before we awarded the contract to 

Raytheon, we accepted some of their metrics and we changed others and that is what went into the contract for the first award fee 

period. Thereafter, the agency established the award fee criteria. 

Senator MCCASKILL. All right. Do you believe that she has characterized this accurately, Ms. Langan-Feirson? 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON. Senator, we had a great deal of difficulty 

going through the performance measures, because the performance 

measures on this contract varied from period to period. In the beginning, in our first report, it was reported that some of the performance measures, Raytheon was assisting with the development 

of the measure. 

But, I will tell you, in the second report, we did look at Award 

Fee Periods 5, 6, and 7 of the base contract and there were essentially four performance measures, two of them associated with cost, 

that were totally ineffective because the costs kept changing, and 

there was one associated with quality assurance which was rel-
26 

atively effective, and then there was the one about staffing efficiency that we put in the report—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON [continuing]. Which we did not find effective. So, we did not find that the award fee performance measures 

were very effective on the contract. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And the new fee structure, the new award 

fee structure after the exercise of the option, it is my understanding, Ms. Langan-Feirson, that your report—in looking at your 

report, you saw some conflict there. Could you talk about that? 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON. There were five performance measures in 

the first period. We were only able to audit what is called Award 

Fee Period 8, which is the first performance period in the option, 

and there were basically five performance measures. It is the first 

one that was the most troubling to us, which basically required 

that Raytheon deliver the performance work State and the annual 

workplan requirements, but also stay within the cost target. If they 

did not do one or the other, they would fail. If they had an unsatisfactory, they would fail all of the other performance measures. So, 

while there might have been other performance measures that 

would have incentivized the contractor, those all went out the window if you achieved an unsatisfactory on either one. 

We also felt it was very troubling, because if you met the target 

cost, what essentially happened was you were not delivering 

enough training, and vice-versa. If you delivered enough training, 

you might not have been under the target cost. We did not think 

this was a very effective performance measure. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And that has got to be really hard for 

Raytheon, because you cannot do both. That is impossible with this 

contract, correct? 

Ms. DUGLE. It is correct. What we are trying to do is optimize 

the value of every training dollar, but at some point, we are capped 

on the amount of training that we can deliver due to the constraints of the budget. 

If I may, Senator, I just wanted to clarify or expand upon one 

point that you made. It is obviously factual that Raytheon received 

approximately $31 million in fee over the time period. 

Senator MCCASKILL. In addition to cost-plus. 

Ms. DUGLE. Well, that is the entire fee that we earned, and that 

is what I wanted to clarify, is that it was not a bonus on top of 

any kind of normal fee. It was simply those were the dollars that 

we earned on the work that we did. And I would make the point 

that, yes, the budget, we expended more than was budgeted, but 

we trained between 40 percent more students in year one and in 

net over the 4-year, 20 percent more students. And so it is a bit 

counterintuitive to say the contract was overrun and you are being 

paid fee, but you have to equate it back to the volume of students. 

Otherwise, it would be an unfair burden on a company. 

Since year one of this contract, each year, we sat down with the 

FAA. We target the amount trained and the dollars. And since that 

time, since year one and the 1.5 percent fee that Ms. McNall referenced, in years two, three, and four, we have hit our targets and 

we have delivered to those numbers. I bring that forward because 

we are improving progressively as we go and I just wanted to go 
27 

on record that incentive and award fee is the only monies earned. 

It is not in addition to any other kind of base beyond the program. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK; I am confused. So, I thought this was 

a cost-plus contract. 

Ms. DUGLE. It is. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, you get your costs plus a margin of profit. 

Ms. DUGLE. We get our costs plus an incentive fee award and an 

award fee. Those comprise our fee. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, both the incentive fee and the award fee 

are the only things that you are getting above your costs? 

Ms. DUGLE. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, this is not a cost-plus-award contract. 

This is just a cost plus incentive fee or award program. 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Ms. DUGLE. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Oh, OK. Well, that makes a difference. 

Well, you guys need to redo this. This is a mess, because it is too 

hard—all of it is counterintuitive. You all are being asked to train 

X-amount of people on not enough money to do that. You all are 

absorbing all the costs that they cannot do without really having 

a handle on what that is costing you every year. And, meanwhile, 

the only way they make any profit on them is giving them award 

and incentive fees for holding down costs when you have paid them 

more than the contract was worth most of the years they have had 

the contract. And you wonder why people shake their head. I mean, 

we have to do better at this. 

So, are you ready with performance metrics for the rebid? 

Ms. MCNALL. We have not yet decided whether or not we will 

use performance metrics for the rebid. One of the concerns we have 

is exactly what you have raised. We have had a great deal of difficulty of establishing good award fee criteria and a question of— 

incentive fee works absolutely wonderful if we can hold the target 

cost accurately, right, so there are no changes to the contract. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Ms. MCNALL. If I cannot do those two things, then I have to 

question whether or not I should do either an award or incentive 

fee. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, what is wrong with price certain? You 

know the different kinds of training, right? You may not know how 

much you are going to do in each category, but you are going to 

have just as much luck predicting that as you have had predicting 

everything through this whole contract. What is wrong with a price 

certain? 

Ms. MCNALL. So, what we are considering is a combination of 

firm fixed price, for example, possibly for the Academy training— 

this is not to say we have made any decisions, and, of course, I do 

not want to give any—too much advance information that I have 

not otherwise released to—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I think people, if you are in this hearing room—— 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. They know I like price certain 

a lot better than cost-plus. 
28 

Ms. MCNALL. And I fully agree with you. So, mixed with a time 

and material contract is what we are looking at. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, do you think that you all are prepared 

on the innovation front? Do you think it is realistic that you can 

get real innovation with 2 percent? I think $16.7 million of the 

$859 million that has been spent was spent on innovation. Do you 

think that is a realistic percentage to actually achieve innovation? 

Ms. MCNALL. No, I do not. The reality is the agency does not currently have the budget we would need to do the innovation that we 

know we need to do. Long-term with the innovation, it will save 

the agency money. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Ms. MCNALL. We also know that. It is short-term funding that 

I am struggling to find. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What was going on internally, after the IG 

made the recommendation to assess the long-term outlook of the 

ATCOTS program, prior to exercising the option? Why was that 

recommendation ignored before you exercised the option? What was 

going on internally that caused that particular recommendation to 

be set aside? 

Ms. MCNALL. With the greatest respect, actually, we took the 

recommendation very seriously. So, before we exercised the option 

on the contract, we asked ourselves the following questions. Do we 

now have enough basis to understand what our training requirement is? Do we understand it well enough that we can establish 

a target cost? And can we now manage this contract like a performance-based contract rather than the level of effort contract, which, 

in all honesty, for the first few years of the contract, we treated it 

much more like a level of effort contract than performance-based. 

At the same time, our No. 1 priority is always safety and efficiency, so the one thing we knew we could not let drop is that 

steady rate of training. We need that rate of training to continue 

without interruption. So that was No. 1. 

Then it became a question of, well, what is the best vehicle? 

What is my best acquisition vehicle to get to the spot I need to be 

right now, right, as we are using money, and then where do I want 

to go in the longer term? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Could you speak to what you think, Ms. 

Langan-Feirson, in terms of the exercising the option? It appears 

from the outside that it looked like that they just decided to ignore 

it, but you have spent a lot more time inside this agency than, obviously, I have. I want to get your take on what you think occurred. 

Ms. LANGAN-FEIRSON. I think the most troubling thing for us 

was that in our first report, we basically recommended that FAA, 

after the first couple of years of the overruns, get their arms 

around this. So, we gave them forewarning. Three years later, OK, 

they were backed up against the wall in contract year four. Eight 

months in, they were almost at 80 percent of the contract ceiling 

and they did not have very much time. They basically briefed a 

business case up the chain and the business case was, we are out 

of time, OK. They did not have many options left. This was due to 

lack of advanced planning, plain and simple. That is what was 

going on. 
29 

Senator MCCASKILL. I have other questions, but you have waited. 

I have had you here for a long time, especially in light of the fact 

that I had to leave and do votes. Do you feel like that—you have 

been there since when, Ms. McNall? 

Ms. MCNALL. 2011. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And what part of 2011? 

Ms. MCNALL. January. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So, you now have three full years. 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Do you have the adequate resources and the 

expertise available to you that you can plan for this next competition in a way that the recommendations that have been made in 

two different IG reports will be fully embraced? 

Ms. MCNALL. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. That is the answer I wanted. That 

means we have had success. I thank you. 

I thank all three of you. I think you are all strong, competent, 

smart women that are working hard at the task you have been 

given and I hope that you understand that I am weird. I like contract oversight, and this is, as you know, I do this in many agencies. 

Somebody said something, because I have been on the FAA about 

electronic devices, somebody tweeted me today, ‘‘What’s up with 

you and the FAA?’’ I said, well, I just love the FAA. [Laughter.] 

I hope I have as much success with the rebidding of this contract 

next year as I had with finally allowing us all to use our electronic 

devices when we take off and land. 

So, thank you very much, and we will get you more questions for 

the record. 

Ms. DUGLE. Thank you, Senator. 

Ms. MCNALL. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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