IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-2010

Filed March 6, 2019

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JEAN PEAK HADSALL, Deceased.

JOHN D. HADSALL,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Jeffrey D. Farrell, 

Judge.

John Hadsall appeals the probate court’s judgment ordering him to return 

$383,595.63 to his mother’s estate. AFFIRMED.

Anthony Zane Blessum and Susan R. Stockdale, Winterset, for appellant.

Nicholas A. Carda and Ryan Ellis of Ellis Law Offices, P.C., Indianola, for 

appellee.

Heard by Doyle, P.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
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DOYLE, Presiding Judge.

Attorney John Hadsall, son of decedent Jean Hadsall, appeals the probate 

court’s judgment ordering him to return $383,595.63 to his mother’s estate. The 

court determined John had a confidential relationship with Jean and transferred 

essentially all of her assets into accounts owned by him, contrary to Jean’s wishes. 

Because John failed to establish he acted in good faith while making the transfers 

or that Jean acted freely, intelligently, and voluntarily in gifting him money from her 

accounts, the court ordered John to return money to the estate. Upon our review, 

we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In 1990, as part of their estate plans, Jean and Robert Hadsall established 

the revocable “Robert C. Hadsall and/or Jean A. Hadsall Trust.” Jean and Robert 

transferred their farmland into the trust. Upon the death of the surviving spouse, 

the trust provided that any trust property “shall be equally divided” between their 

four children, per stirpes. In accordance with the trust, Jean also executed a last 

will and testament bequeathing any property not held by the trust to the trust upon 

her death.1 Both instruments identified Jean and Robert’s four children, including 

their sons John and Bruce.

Robert Hadsall passed away in December 2007. In January 2008, John, 

an attorney licensed to practice law in Florida, drafted for Jean a document titled 

“Voluntary Appointment of Durable Power of Attorney/Healthcare Surrogate.” 

Jean designated John as her power of attorney, and she executed the document 

 

1 Jean later amended her will, but the substance was not changed in relative parts.
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before a notary. John thereafter regularly assisted Jean with her financial affairs.

Jean subsequently sold the farm in two parcels; the first in January 2008 

and the second in February 2008. The farm machinery was sold in June 2008. 

The funds she received from those sales were not deposited in accounts owned 

by the trust. Neither were other monies Jean received, such as life insurance 

proceeds relating to Robert’s death. Rather, the funds were deposited into mostly 

new accounts in Jean’s name, wherein John was generally named as a joint 

owner.

At some point, John’s siblings questioned what was happening with Jean’s 

assets. In 2010 and 2013, John wrote letters to his siblings on Jean’s behalf to 

advise them of Jean’s “wishes and to stop wrongful and false accusations.” John’s 

2010 letter, addressed to his three siblings, stated:

With this year’s gift, Mom has given us all $40,000 in the past 4 years 

for a total of $160,000 out of her’s and Dad’s estate, the remainder 

in certificates of deposit in hers and our names to be given upon her 

death to her surviving children with a further distribution after 

payment of her bills and taxes from the sale of the farm; please join 

me in hoping her good health remains for many, many years.

John’s 2013 correspondence—“An Open Letter to [Each of My Siblings] from their 

brother John”—stated:

For almost the past month I’ve heard from family, friends and 

colleagues that I’ve been accused of embezzlement and [am] 

facing . . . years in prison for ripping our Mother off of her estate 

based upon the review of four (4) of her personal bank savings 

account statements, three (3) of which contain identical amounts and 

although not stated on the statements for whatever reason that only 

the bank knows are held in trust for immediate initial distribution upon 

her death to you three equally. The other account containing less 

than one-third of the aforementioned accounts was specifically 

stated to be in trust for me, and since it was less than the other three, 

it was assumed I must have raided it; actually it was the operating 

account from which the $40,000 . . . we’ve all already received came 
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from. The most important missing aspect of these accusations is the 

fact our Mother also has an additional checking account and two (2) 

additional savings accounts which not only contains any and all of 

the funds in question alleged to have been embezzled but additional 

amounts from Dad’s accidental death life insurance policies payable 

to Mom albeit taxes, etc. will be deducted.

I’m glad I’ve been in the position I’ve been in regards to the 

farm and parents. I’ve not spent our Mother’s estate, it’s all there, 

and quite frankly, she can do with it as she pleases as long as she’s 

of sound mind, just as you and I can do with our estates without 

unwarranted oversight.

This letter was signed by John and by Jean.

Jean passed away in 2016. For a short period of time prior thereto, Jean 

lived in a nursing home. Both John and Bruce agreed their mother was of sound 

mind until that time. At the time of her death, Jean’s main bank account held only 

$819.53. On the basis of that balance, John helped his mother fill out the 

application for state medical assistance. The “No” box was selected on the 

application in answer to the question, “Did anyone in your home sell or give away 

anything of value for less than its value within the last five years?”

After Jean’s death, Bruce could not locate any of his mother’s estate 

documents. He then filed a petition before the probate court seeking to open an 

estate, and Bruce asked to be appointed the administrator. John subsequently 

filed a motion to dismiss the petition, stating Jean “did not die intestate” and had 

died “with a valid living trust known to all of her children for years.” The petition for 

administration was set for hearing. The probate court thereafter granted the 

petition and appointed Bruce administrator. John then filed a “Motion for 

Assessment of Fees and Costs,” asserting Jean’s estate planning documents were 

easily accessible at the recorder’s office, listing the date and page of the 

document’s recording information. He again requested the matter be dismissed 
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since it was not an intestate matter, and he requested fees be assessed against 

the proponents of the action. John’s motion was denied, but he was allowed to file 

his request as a claim against the estate.

Bruce located a copy of Jean’s 1990 will filed with the recorder’s office. The 

estate filed a motion for hearing on the will. John resisted. The estate filed a 

motion to construe John’s conduct as Jean’s power of attorney pursuant to Iowa 

code chapter 633B. A rocky discovery process followed. Ultimately, a trial was 

held on the matters in 2017.

Bruce and John each testified. Bruce, on behalf of the estate, produced 

numerous bank documents showing monies transferred from Jean’s account into 

John’s accounts. John admitted the transfers were made. He maintained he made 

every transfer at his mother’s direction, stating Jean gave him gifts over the years. 

He testified his siblings were jealous she chose to give him more than them. Bruce 

had a different take, testifying he believed his mother “had full trust in John [but 

was] unknowing of what was going on. She . . . wasn’t getting her banking 

accounts [statements]. After a certain point in time they were going to [John’s] 

address. I don’t think she had a clue if she had any money.”

Following the trial, the probate court entered its order finding in favor of the 

estate. In a thorough and well-written ruling, the court concluded John had a 

confidential relationship with Jean, during which John transferred to himself Jean’s 

assets and could not show he acted in good faith or with Jean’s free, intelligent, 

and voluntary assent. Consequently, the court concluded John’s actions were the 

result of his undue influence. The court ordered John to return $383,595.63 to his 

mother’s estate. Other facts will be discussed as necessary below.
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John now appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

The parties agree the case was tried in equity and our review is de novo. 

See Iowa Code § 633.33 (2017); Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; Jackson v. Schrader, 676 

N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2003). “In a de novo review, the appellate court examines 

the facts as well as the law and decides the issues anew.” Brede v. Koop, 706 

N.W.2d 824, 826 (Iowa 2005). “When reviewing factual findings, particularly on 

the credibility of witnesses, we give weight to the probate court’s findings, but we 

are not bound by them.” In re Tr. No. T-1 of Trimble, 826 N.W.2d 474, 482 (Iowa 

2013); see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g). “As difficult as it is to assess credibility 

of live testimony, it is more difficult to assess credibility from a cold transcript.” 

Zaerr v. Zaerr, 222 N.W.2d 476, 477 (Iowa 1974); see also Trimble, 826 N.W.2d 

at 493 (“The probate court heard the live testimony . . . while we must rely on a 

cold transcript.”). These principles also apply to the review of the probate court’s 

finding of the existence of a confidential relationship. See In re Estate of Herm,

284 N.W.2d 191, 199 (Iowa 1979).

III. Discussion.

On appeal, John contends the probate court erred in three respects. First, 

he argues he did not have a confidential relationship with his mother. On that 

basis, John next asserts the court incorrectly found he had the burden to show he 

acted in good faith and with Jean’s assent and the estate failed to establish the 

transfers were the result of John’s undue influence over Jean. Finally, John offers 

the alternative argument that, should we agree with the probate court that he had 

a confidential relationship with his mother and did not meet his burden to show 
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there was not undue influence on his part, the court erred in its overall calculation 

of the amount he allegedly owes. For the following reasons, we disagree.

A. Confidential Relationship.

A confidential relationship “exists when one person has gained the 

confidence of another and purports to act or advise with the other’s interest in 

mind.” Oehler v. Hoffman, 113 N.W.2d 254, 256 (Iowa 1962). Such a relationship

has been defined or described as any relation existing between 

parties to a transaction wherein one of the parties is duty bound to 

act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the other party. In its 

broadest connotation the phrase embraces those multiform positions 

in life wherein one comes to rely on and trust another in his important 

affairs. A confidential relationship arises whenever a continuous 

trust is reposed by one person in the skill and integrity of another, 

and so it has been said that all the variety of relations in which 

dominion may be exercised by one person fall within the general term 

“confidential relation.”

Dibel v. Meredith, 10 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Iowa 1943). Neither a fiduciary relationship 

nor a blood relationship is required to have a confidential relationship, though those 

conditions may increase the likelihood of such a relationship. See Mendenhall v. 

Judy, 671 N.W.2d 452, 455 (Iowa 2003); Oehler, 113 N.W.2d at 256. “That a 

person by kind and considerate treatment induces an affectionate regard on the 

part of another raises no presumption of confidential relation . . . in the absence of 

some showing that by this means a dominant influence was obtained over the 

other.” Oehler, 113 N.W.2d at 256.

If a gift is “obtained by a person standing in a confidential, or a fiduciary 

relation to the donor,” the “gift” is “presumptively fraudulent.” Marron v. Bowen, 16 

N.W.2d 14, 16 (Iowa 1944). Put another way, where “a confidential relationship 

exists, a transaction by which the one having the advantage profits at the expense 
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of the other will be held presumptively fraudulent and voidable.” Herm, 284 N.W.2d 

at 200. The purpose of this general principle is “to defeat and correct betrayals of 

trust and abuses of confidence.” Oehler, 113 N.W.2d at 256.

On appeal, John essentially takes issue with court’s factual findings. 

Though he asserts the probate court “ignored the evidence regarding Jean’s 

mental capacity,” the court clearly found Jean was competent. The court simply 

found that her competency did not rule out the existence of a confidential 

relationship between Jean and John. While a person’s diminished mental capacity 

could be a factor in determining whether a confidential relationship exists, we, like 

the probate court, believe a confidential relationship can exist between a mentally 

sound donor and a trusted donee, when the donor places trust and ability in 

another to act on the donor’s behalf in the donor’s best interests and complicit with 

the donor’s interests.

At trial, John did not dispute that Jean put her trust in him to assist in her 

financial matters. She relied upon his advice, as her son, who was an attorney 

that handled numerous legal matters for her and her husband. She even permitted 

John to receive her bank statements. That Jean could have been more active in 

her financial affairs does not prohibit a finding of the existence of a confidential 

relationship. Upon our de novo review, we agree with the probate court that the 

record clearly evidences a confidential relationship existed between Jean and 

John.

B. Undue Influence.

The existence of a confidential relationship triggers a presumption of undue 

influence. Mendenhall, 671 N.W.2d at 454. Because there was a confidential 
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relationship between Jean and John, the burden was on John to show he acted in 

good faith or with Jean’s voluntary and knowing assent. See Jackson, 676 N.W.2d 

at 605. John’s testimony is the only evidence he offered to support his actions. 

However, the court did not find John’s testimony credible, and we find no reason 

to disagree with the court’s finding upon our de novo review of this record.

Of particular significance are the two letters written by John to his siblings. 

John argues Jean could have fully funded her trust at any time prior to her death 

and her lack of action evidences her intent. But the two letters clearly implied Jean 

intended to divide all of her assets equally between the four children. And, as the 

probate court pointed out, the 2013 letter specifically stated “that Jean had 

accounts which contain[ed] ‘all funds in question’ plus proceeds from [his father’s] 

insurance policies.” However, the evidence shows “all the funds in question” were 

not, at that time, in Jean’s accounts. Rather, substantial funds had been 

transferred from Jean’s accounts to John and his wife’s accounts, where Jean had 

no ownership over the assets. John “asserted that he had not spent Jean’s estate 

and that ‘it’s all there,’” but it was not. The court found Jean’s signature on the 

letter showed “she continued to follow her plan to give to all of her children equally.” 

Moreover, why write the letter at all if she had no intent to distribute all of her assets 

equally? Similarly, why not ask John to draw up a new will? Jean was clearly a 

woman of action. We believe her lack of action combined with John’s letters 

without any mention that there were no funds in the trust or that Jean had given 

substantial assets to John demonstrates she was not aware of the circumstances 

regarding her finances. Ultimately, we agree with the probate court that John failed 

to meet his burden that the numerous transfers of assets from Jean’s accounts to 
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his accounts during her lifetime were made in good faith and at Jean’s direction or 

with Jean’s understanding or assent. His failure to meet his burden establishes 

his actions were the result of his undue influence upon Jean. Consequently, we 

agree with the probate court’s conclusion that John was required to refund “gifts” 

from Jean to the estate.

C. Amount of Money Owed to Estate.

Finally, John asserts the amount the probate court determined he was to 

return to the estate was unsupported by the evidence. He seems to argue that 

had he not placed the funds in his accounts, Jean would have spent some of the 

money, so the amount calculated should be lower. He does not explain what he 

believes that amount should be.

The amount of an award is generally an issue for the trier of fact, and 

appellate courts will not disturb the award when it is within a reasonable range of 

evidence. See Stender v. Blessum, 897 N.W.2d 491, 517 (Iowa 2017). Upon our 

de novo review of the record, we find no reason to disturb the probate court’s 

calculation of the amount of money John is to return to the estate.

IV. Conclusion.

Because John was in a confidential relationship with Jean, and because he 

failed to show that his transfers of substantial amounts of Jean’s assets from her 

accounts to his were made in good faith or at the direction of or with the assent of 

Jean, we agree with the probate court that John must return the “gifted” assets to 

Jean’s estate. Additionally, the amount calculated by the probate court to be 

returned was within the permissible range of evidence, and we find no reason to 
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disturb the calculation. We therefore affirm the probate court’s ruling in all 

respects.

AFFIRMED.