alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### JOHNSON v CLEVELAND (city)

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 9790.

Decided March 25, 1929

Harold T Gassoway, for Johnson.

L O Payne, Cleveland, for City.'

SULLIVAN, J.

It is well settled law that the doctrine of reasonable doubt employed in criminal cases applies vitally to the question of knowledge upon the part of the accused, so that upon this question, under the rulé of law universally adopted, if under all the circumstances upon this question there is a reasonable hypothesis of innocence fairly and justly derivable from the entire record in the case, the law prevents a verdict of guilty.

Again, upon the question of unlawful possession there must be evidence of sufficient legal strength that the person accused had such physical control and custody of the liquor that the logical result of it would be unlawful possession of the same.

It appears from the record that the automobile was halted by an officer of the law on account of the speed of same, and that in connection with this incident, a search and seizure of the liquor were made but without the authority of a search and seizure warrant. While the lack of this warrant would not of itself alone discharge the .accused from g.uilt, inasmuch as an automobile cannot be treated in the same light as a bona-fide home, yet, it is 'an incident in the case which cannot be entirely ignored.

Our unanimous judgment is that on the question of the commission of the offense, the record is obviously impregnated with reasonable doubt and while the accused may possibly be guilty - of the offense charged, it is our unanimous judgment that the record admits of too much uncertainty to form a conviction by applying the rules of the criminal law.

Thus it appears that upon the question of the ownership of the car and the further issue of guilty knowledge there is no challenge in the record excepting the circumstance of a bottle of whiskey being found- in the rear of the car owned by the brother of the accused who was using the car apparently under the authority of the brother who had control and possession of the machine. , With this state of the record there is no question about the same being permeated with uncertainty and doubt.

Thus holding the judgment of the lower court is reversed and inasmuch as the record shows the ultimate facts, the plaintiff in error is 'discharged.

Vickery, PJ and Levine, J, concur.
#### §§ 91.423-91.499 [Reserved]
#### *Ex parte*Heyfron.

It is error to strike an attorney from the roll, on motion, without giving him notice of the proceeding.

IN ERROR from the circuit court of the county of Jasper.

Mayes and Clifton for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Justice Turner

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error from the circuit court of Jasper county. The record states “that, it appearing to the satisfaction of the court that Joseph Heyfron, an attorney and counsellor of this court, and a licensed attorney and counsellor of the several courts of law and equity in this state, has been guilty of mal-practice in said office of attorney and counsellor of this court, &c. &c. in embezzling the money of his clients and absconding from the country— it is ordered by the court, that the said Joseph Heyfron be put out of the roll of attorneys and counsellors, as aforesaid, of this court, and that the license heretofore given to the said Joseph Heyfron to practice as an attorney and counsellor in the courts of this state, as aforesaid, be and the same is hereby revoked, annulled and set aside.”

The errors assigned are, that the said order and judgment was without notice, either actual or constructive; that the circuit court had no power to set aside and vacate the license of an attorney; and that the record does not show on what evidence the court proceeded.

It is a cardinal principle in the administration of justice, that no man can be condemned or divested of his rights until he has had the opportunity of being heard. He must either, by service of *128process, publishing notice, or in some other way, be brought into court; and, if judgment is rendered against him before that is done, the proceedings will be as utterly void as though the court had undertaken to act where the subject matter was not within its cognizance. 15 J. R. 121; 19 idem. 739; 1 Hill’s N. Y. Rep. 139; 4 How. 401.

Judgment reversed.
1

Hutson, Nick

From: Szabo, Aaron <Aaron_L_Szabo@omb.eop.gov>

Sent: Friday, July 31, 2015 8:46 AM

To: Hutson, Nick; Culligan, Kevin; Harvey, Reid

Cc: Frey, Nathan J.; Grossman, Andrea

Subject: Summary of Interagency Comments under EO12866 and 13563 -- 111b 

Attachments: SummaryOfInteragencyCommentsUnder_EO12866_13563_111bMod.docx

Attached please find a summary of interagency comments under EO 12866 and 13563 on the EPA final rule entitled, 

Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: 

Electric Utility Generating Units.

Thank you and please let me know if you have any questions. 

Aaron L. Szabo 

Policy Analyst 

Office of Management and Budget 

202-395-3621 

Aaron_L_Szabo@omb.eop.gov
#### OHLEMACHER etc v BENNETT

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist, Erie County

No 291.

Decided April 22, 1929

*297King Ramsey & Flynn, Sandusky, for Ohlemacher.

G F. Eshenroder, Sandusky, for Bennett.

WILLIAMS, J.

Plaintiff ip error claims that the trial court erred in refuging to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant.

This court has held in the case of Valentine vs. Pavilonis, Vol. 33, Court of Appeals Opinions, Sixth District, unreported, p 33, (6 Abs 462) that where a pedestrian looks both ways before starting across a street and it does not appear from such testimony as to whether he looked in either direction after he left the curb, and he is struck by an automobile just before he gets to the center of the street, he can not be held to be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

In the case of Taylor vs. Bauman, Vol. 26 Court of Appeals Opinions, Sixth District, unreported, p. 9. (1 Abs 734) the pedestrian entered the highway in the business section of Castalia in the daytime between cars which were parked closely together and. were so high as to obscure the pedestrian’s vision until he passed into the street beyond the rear of the autos and was struck by an automobile as he came out from the rear of such cars, it was held that the pe.destrian was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, although it did not appear from the evidence that he looked to see whether a vehicle wás approaching after he had proceeded beyond the line of the automobiles. In that case the judgment was reversed on another ground and the cause remanded for a new trial. Upon retrial a verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff, which was sustained by this court.

We cannot say that the plaintiff below was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and as there was evidence tending to show actionable negligence on the part of the defendant below, the court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant.

It is also contended that the court erred in failing to charge the law as to Section 6310-34, General Code, which provides in substance that pedestrians shall not walk upon the portion of a highway travelled by vehicles except at crossings or cross walks, unless the crossings or cross walks are an unreaonable distance apart. The trial court in the charge read this section of the statute to the jury but did not comment upon it. It does appear, however, from the record, that any request was submitted by the defendant below. We think the charge is not misleading as given and that the plaintiff in error, having failed to make request that the court charge upon this subject, can not now complain.

We find that substantial justice has been done as between the parties and that there is no prejudicial error apparent upon the face of the record. The judgment will-therefore be affirmed.

Richards, J, concurs. Lloyd, J, concurs in judgment.
#### KELLY v. CHARLES AREY DISTILLING CO.

(Decided February 1, 1917.)

Appeal from Russell Circuit Court.

Heard before Hon. J. S. Williams.

No counsel marked for either party.

Per curiam.

Appeal dismissed for want of prosecution.
§ 1614.504 Compliance with settlement agreements and final action. ( a ) Any settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties. Final action that has not been the subject of an appeal or civil action shall be binding on the agency. If the complainant believes that the agency has failed to comply with the terms of a settlement agreement or decision, the complainant shall notify the EEO Director, in writing, of the alleged noncompliance within 30 days of when the complainant knew or should have known of the alleged noncompliance. The complainant may request that the terms of settlement agreement be specifically implemented or, alternatively, that the complaint be reinstated for further processing from the point processing ceased.
( b ) The agency shall resolve the matter and respond to the complainant, in writing. If the agency has not responded to the complainant, in writing, or if the complainant is not satisfied with the agency's attempt to resolve the matter, the complainant may appeal to the Commission for a determination as to whether the agency has complied with the terms of the settlement agreement or decision. The complainant may file such an appeal 35 days after he or she has served the agency with the allegations of noncompliance, but must file an appeal within 30 days of his or her receipt of an agency's determination. The complainant must serve a copy of the appeal on the agency and the agency may submit a response to the Commission within 30 days of receiving notice of the appeal.
( c ) Prior to rendering its determination, the Commission may request that parties submit whatever additional information or documentation it deems necessary or may direct that an investigation or hearing on the matter be conducted. If the Commission determines that the agency is not in compliance with a decision or settlement agreement, and the noncompliance is not attributable to acts or conduct of the complainant, it may order such compliance with the decision or settlement agreement, or, alternatively, for a settlement agreement, it may order that the complaint be reinstated for further processing from the point processing ceased. Allegations that subsequent acts of discrimination violate a settlement agreement shall be processed as separate complaints under § 1614.106 or § 1614.204, as appropriate, rather than under this section.
[57 FR 12646, Apr. 10, 1992, as amended at 64 FR 37660, July 12, 1999; 77 FR 43506, July 25, 2012]
Exhibit 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Greens Worldwide Incorporated (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Connie S. Ross, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:



(1)

the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.









/s/ Connie S. Ross



Connie S. Ross

Chief Executive Officer

May 16, 2005



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





Exhibit 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Greens Worldwide Incorporated (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ending ending March 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Margaret M. Eardley, Acting Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:



(1)

the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.









/s/ Margaret M. Eardley



Margaret M. Eardley

Acting Chief Financial Officer

May 16, 2005



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### § 102.91 Compliance with determination; further proceedings.

If, after issuance of the determination by the Board, the parties submit to the Regional Director satisfactory evidence that they have complied with the determination, the Regional Director will dismiss the charge. If no satisfactory evidence of compliance is submitted, the Regional Director will proceed with the charge under Section 8(b)(4)(D) and Section 10 of the Act and the procedure prescribed in §§ 102.9 through 102.51 will, insofar as applicable, govern. However, if the Board determination is that employees represented by a Charged Union are entitled to perform the work in dispute, the Regional Director will dismiss the charge as to that union irrespective of whether the employer has complied with that determination.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

July 30, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

133646 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 133646 

 COA: 272306 

Wayne CC: 01-005893 

LAMONT D. McCLURE,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 30, 2007 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). 

s0723 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

July 30, 2007 

 Clerk
#### § 437.41 Mishap plan.

An applicant must submit a mishap plan that meets the requirements of § 450.173 of this chapter.

[Docket No. FAA-2019-0229, Amdt. 437-3, 85 FR 79718, Dec. 10, 2020]
#### § 1472.610 Controlled substance.

*Controlled substance* means a controlled substance in schedules I through V of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 812), and as further defined by regulation at 21 CFR 1308.11 through 1308.15.
#### BROWN v. CITY OF TUSCALOOSA.

(Decided November 25, 1915.)

Appeal from Tuscaloosa County Court.

Heard before Hon. H. B. Foster.

No counsel marked for appellant. Brown & Ward, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

Appeal dismissed for want of assignment of error.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JUNE 2, 2023

NO. 03

- 21

- 00418

- CV

Eric Handy, Sr. , Appellant

v.

Zurich American Insurance Company , Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 459TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
BEFORE JUSTICES BAKE R, SMITH, AND THEOFANIS

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE SMITH

This is an appeal from the judgment signed by the tr i a l court o n September 2, 2023

. Having

reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, the C ourt holds that there was no reversible error

in the trial court’s judgment

. Therefore, the C ourt affirms the trial court’s judgment

. Because

appellant is indigent and u nab le to pay costs, no adjudica t i on of costs is made.
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**Title:****Annual report**
 
1969
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January 31, 2018
#### TOLEDO FACTORIES CO v ACE GARAGE

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist, Lucas Co

No 2176.

Decided Feb 18, 1929

Eliot L. Kaplan, Toledo, for Factories Co.

Miller, Brady & Yager, Toledo, for Garage.

*181LLOYD, J.

We think there is nothing, ambiguous or uncertain in the expressed intent and purpose of the hereinbefore quoted provision of the written endorsement attached to the lease. It provides for two electric signs with respect to one of which the lessor reserved the right to determine as to the “exact location,” thereof. As to the other electric sign which was to be placed above the storeroom of lessee, there is no reservation as to approval of the sign or otherwise. It gives the lessee the unqualified privilege of maintaining such a sign during the term of the lease and vests in it the right to determine the character of the sign, impliedly conditioned, of course, that it shall be of reasonable size and so located as not unnecessarily or unreasonably to interfere with the use by the lessor of that part of the building, above the premises leased to defendant. Plaintiff owned the entire building and could contract with respect to any part thereof, and having privileged defendant to erect and maintain a sign attached to a portion of the building not leased by it, can not be heard to complain because of the use by defendant thereof for such purpose. Nor can tenants, subsequently leasing same, complain thereof, at least so far as the defendant is concerned, since their rights, acquired also from plaintiff, are subject to any privileges theretofore granted by it to others.

Petition of plaintiff is therefore dismissed . and judgment is rendered in favor of defendant for coste.

Williams and Richards, JJ, concur.
#### § 1602.24 Commission's remedy for failure to file report.

Any person failing or refusing to file Report EEO-3 when required to do so may be compelled to file by order of a U.S. District Court, upon application of the Commission, under authority of section 709(c) of title VII.

[37 FR 9220, May 6, 1972]
#### § 102.138 Definition of *meeting*.

For purposes of this subpart, *meeting* means the deliberations of at least three Members of the full Board, or the deliberations of at least two Members of any group of three Board Members to whom the Board has delegated powers which it may itself exercise, where such deliberations determine or result in the joint conduct or disposition of official Agency business, but does not include deliberations to determine whether a meeting may be closed to public observation in accordance with the provisions of this subpart.
#### DUCHON v GOLUB

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No. 9561.

Decided Dec 24, 1928

Theo. Kowan and L. S. Sobel, Cleveland, for Duchon.

*122Sogg & Woodle, Cleveland, for Golub.

VICKERY, J

That there can be a valid gift by a father to his daughter there can be no question, and if the title had been transferred to her, it remained in her, unless she be divested by some act of her own, for it must be remembered that the question of transferring property in defraud of creditors could not be claimed in this case, inasmuch as this debt for which the suit was brought was not created until long after the transfer by the father to the daughter. The record does not show that there was a bill of sale or any transfer from the daughter to the father. The evidence shows that Betty still owned this car and she should have been given the property on a third party claim. The property was hers and the bailiff had no right to levy on- the property that belonged to her, for the father’s debt. The deputy might well be excused from making a levy in that he found the license to be in the father’s name but when the evidence was introduced in court it was the court’s duty to release this property of Betty Duchon, and not having done so, he committed' error, for which the judgment must be reversed, and inasmuch as the ultimate facts are in the record, this court has the power to -enter the judgment that the court below should have entered.

The judgment will, therefore, be reversed and final judgment entered for the plaintiff in error.

Sullivan, PJ, and Levine, J, concur.