This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2017 UT 4

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TYLER HERTZSKE,

Appellee,

v.

LINDA SNYDER,

Appellant.

No. 20150735

Filed January 18, 2017

On Direct Appeal

Third District, Salt Lake Dep’t

The Honorable Su Chon

No. 140905282

Attorneys:

Michael E. Day, Nathan Whittaker, Salt Lake City, for appellee

Brian S. King, Salt Lake City, for appellant

JUSTICE DURHAM authored the opinion of the court, in which CHIEF 

JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, JUSTICE HIMONAS, 

and JUSTICE PEARCE joined. 

JUSTICE DURHAM, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 Linda Snyder and Tyler Hertzske each claim sole 

entitlement to the death benefits of a life insurance policy (Policy) 

held by decedent Edward Hertzske. There are two issues presented 

in this case: (1) how Utah Code section 30-3-5(1)(e) should be 

interpreted in correlation with Utah Code section 75-2-804; and (2) 

the proper interpretation of “express terms” in section 75-2-804(2). 

The district court granted summary judgment to T. Hertzske, finding 

that there was “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that 

T. Hertzske was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In support 

of the district court’s conclusion, the judge held that where section 
HERTZSKE v. SNYDER

Opinion of the Court

2

30-3-5(1)(e) was not considered or included in the divorce 

proceedings, it did not apply, and the Policy did not contain 

“express terms” that would except it from revocation under section 

75-2-804(2). We affirm the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In August 2004, while Linda Snyder and Edward Hertzske 

were engaged, E. Hertzske obtained a $500,000 life insurance policy 

from Lincoln Benefit Life Co. (Lincoln). The Policy named 

Ms. Snyder as the primary beneficiary and T. Hertzske as the 

secondary beneficiary. The terms of the Policy provided a method 

for naming new beneficiaries during E. Hertzske’s lifetime, but were 

silent as to whether the designation of a spouse as a beneficiary 

would survive a divorce. The Policy instructions regarding 

beneficiaries states, in relevant part,

The beneficiary will receive the death benefit when 

the insured dies and we have received due proof of death. 

The beneficiary is as stated in the app[lication], unless 

changed.

. . . .

We will pay the death benefit to the beneficiaries 

according to the most recent written instructions we 

have received from you. 

. . . .

You may name new beneficiaries. We will provide a 

form to be signed. You must file it with us. Upon receipt, 

it is effective as of the date you signed the form, subject 

to any action we have taken before we received it.

¶3 Ms. Snyder and E. Hertzske were married in March 2005 

and separated at the end of 2011. In May 2013, E. Hertzske executed 

his will disinheriting Ms. Snyder “to the fullest extent permitted by 

law.”1 In January 2014, E. Hertzske filed for divorce. During the 

1 Ms. Snyder argues that it was E. Hertzske’s intention to leave 

her as the beneficiary on the Policy. However, she offers no support 

for this other than her self-serving statements. E. Hertzske’s will 

seems to directly contradict this claim. Regardless, E. Hertzske’s 

intention does not need to be established by evidentiary findings. 

Statutory language prescribes how a donor’s intentions are 

interpreted. 

[Section] 75-2-804(2) attributes an intent to the donor based 

on an assessment of a typical donor’s intention. . . . [T]his 

statutory attribution of intent is rebuttable. . . . ‘by the 
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Opinion of the Court

3

divorce proceedings neither E. Hertzske nor Ms. Snyder mentioned 

the Policy in the petition or subsequent divorce proceedings, nor did 

they identify or reference Utah Code section 30-3-5(1)(e). On May 6, 

2014, the court issued a divorce decree that was silent as to the 

Policy and contained none of the language required by section 30-3-

5(1)(e).2

¶4 E. Hertzske died at age sixty-eight, less than a month after 

the divorce decree was entered. Both Ms. Snyder and T. Hertzske 

declared an interest in the Policy funds. The district court ruled in 

favor of T. Hertzske. Ms. Snyder appeals the decision.3 This court 

has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code section 78A-3-

102(3)(j).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5 “Whether [a statute] applies . . . is a matter of statutory 

interpretation, which presents a question of law.” Vorher v. Henriod, 

2013 UT 10, ¶ 6, 297 P.3d 614 (second alteration in original) (citation 

omitted). In this appeal, “[w]e review the district court’s decision de 

novo, according no deference to its legal determination.” State v. 

Steinly, 2015 UT 15, ¶ 7, 345 P.3d 1182.

 

express terms of a governing instrument . . . , a court order, 

or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate.’”

Stillman v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n Coll. Ret. Equities Fund, 

343 F.3d 1311, 1318 (10th Cir. 2003).

2 See infra ¶ 9.

3 T. Hertzske argues that this court cannot assert jurisdiction over 

this appeal because Ms. Snyder’s notice of appeal “does not 

specifically identify the order sought to be appealed” as required by 

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(d). However, the requirements 

of rule 3(d) allow an appellant to designate “the judgment or order, 

or part thereof, appealed from” provided the appellant is filing an 

appeal from a final order or judgment. UTAH R. APP. P. 3(a), (d) 

(emphasis added). Ms. Snyder filed an amended notice of appeal on 

August 28, 2015, stating that she “appeals from the Summary 

Judgment entered on May 3, 2015” as referenced in the “final 

judgment disposing of the case . . . on August 5, 2015.” As 

Ms. Snyder referenced the specific part of the final judgment that she 

is appealing, she has met the burden required by the Rules of 

Appellate Procedure and this court asserts jurisdiction over this

appeal.
HERTZSKE v. SNYDER

Opinion of the Court

4

ANALYSIS

¶6 T. Hertzske moved for summary judgment, and Ms. Snyder 

entered a cross-motion for summary judgment, each asserting that 

“his or her interest in the funds . . . [is] superior to that of the other 

party.” Summary judgment is appropriate “if the moving party 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” UTAH R.

CIV. P. 56(a). Neither T. Hertzske nor Ms. Snyder disputes the 

material facts in this case. The only dispute “is a matter of statutory 

interpretation, which presents a question of law.” Vorher v. Henriod, 

2013 UT 10, ¶ 6, 297 P.3d 614. Therefore, the court properly issued a 

summary judgment, which we review for correctness. See McBroom 

v. Child, 2016 UT 38, ¶ 18, ___ P.3d ___. We affirm the district court’s 

holding “that the divorce revokes Ms. Snyder’s status as a 

beneficiary” and that T. Hertzske is the sole remaining beneficiary 

holding an interest in the Policy. 

¶7 We first explain the function of Utah Code section 75-2-

804(2), as this statute’s function is essential a determination of the 

parties’ arguments. We then determine the applicability of Utah 

Code section 30-3-5(1)(e) to a beneficiary designation of a former 

spouse in a life insurance policy when there is no mention of the 

policy in the divorce proceedings or decree. Finally, we decide 

whether a life insurance policy’s procedural directive for changing a 

beneficiary designation constitutes “express terms” as used in Utah 

Code section 75-2-804(2).4

I. UTAH CODE SECTION 75-2-804(2) CREATES A REBUTTABLE 

PRESUMPTION THAT A BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION IN A 

LIFE INSURANCE POLICY IS REVOKED UPON DIVORCE

¶8 Under section 75-2-804(2) a beneficiary designation in a life 

insurance policy is revoked upon divorce unless the “express terms” 

of the policy as “a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract 

relating to the division of the marital estate” indicate otherwise. 

UTAH CODE § 75-2-804(2). This section “revokes any revocable . . . 

4 Except as provided by the express terms of a governing 

instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the 

division of the marital estate made between the divorced 

individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or 

annulment, the divorce or annulment of a marriage . . . 

revokes any revocable . . . disposition or appointment of 

property made by a divorced individual to the individual’s 

former spouse in a governing instrument . . . .

UTAH CODE § 75-2-804(2) (emphasis added). 
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Opinion of the Court

5

disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced 

individual to the individual’s former spouse in a governing 

instrument” unless the “express terms of a governing instrument, a 

court order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital 

estate” contains an exception. Id. In the definitions section, a 

“’[d]isposition or appointment of property’ includes . . . any . . . 

benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument.” Id.

§ 75-2-804(1)(a). A governing instrument is “a governing instrument 

executed by the divorced individual before the divorce . . . .” Id. § 75-

2-804(1)(d). Read as a whole, the statute creates a rebuttable 

presumption that a beneficiary designation in a life insurance 

policy—a governing instrument—is revoked upon divorce. The 

presumption can be rebutted by express terms in the life insurance 

policy; a court order, including a decree of divorce; or a “contract 

relating to the division of the marital estate made between the 

divorced individuals.”5 Id. § 75-2-804(2).

II. UTAH CODE SECTION 30-3-5(1)(e) DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS 

INSTANCE AND UTAH CODE 75-2-804 GOVERNS

¶9 This court’s efforts at statutory interpretation attempt to 

give the meaning to a statute that the legislature intended. We use 

both the plain language of section 30-3-5(1)(e) and the function of 

section 30-3-5(1)(e) within the context of the entire statutory scheme 

to determine what the legislature intended when it enacted section 

30-3-5(1)(e). We conclude that section 75-2-804 creates a rebuttable 

presumption that beneficiary designations of a former spouse on a 

life insurance policy are revoked in a divorce proceeding. This 

revocation can be rebutted using section 30-3-5(1)(e) in divorce 

proceedings only through the inclusion of the statutory language in 

the decree of divorce. 

¶10 It has been a long-held practice of the courts in this state to 

“seek to give effect to the intent of the Legislature” when 

interpreting statutes. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 10 & n.14, 356 

P.3d 1258. The best indicator of legislative intent is the plain 

language of the statutes themselves. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster 

Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, ¶ 46, 164 

P.3d 384 (“[W]e look first to the statute’s plain language with the 

primary objective of giving effect to the legislature’s intent.”). In 

looking at the relationship between sections 75-2-804 and 30-3-

5(1)(e), we look at the provisions in the context of the entire statutory 

5 As there is no indication in the record that “a contract related to 

the division of the marital estate between the divorced individuals” 

exists, we do not address this exception in this opinion. UTAH CODE

§ 75-2-804(2).
HERTZSKE v. SNYDER

Opinion of the Court

6

scheme. See LPI Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, ¶ 11, 215 P.3d 135 (“We 

read the plain language of the statute as a whole[] and interpret its 

provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and 

related chapters.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 

Ms. Snyder urges us to look at the legislative history of section 30-3-

5(1)(e), arguing that the legislature enacted this provision in order to 

“carv[e] out life insurance policies and annuities from the 

revocation-by-divorce prescription of § 75-2-804.” However, we 

decline to look at the legislative history here because “[w]hen the 

plain meaning of the statute can be discerned from its language, no 

other interpretive tools are needed.” LPI Servs., 2009 UT 41, ¶ 11. 

¶11 The notice provisions in section 30-3-5(1)(e) are clear, and 

the plain meaning of the statute can be determined from its 

language. A conditional departure from the presumption of 

revocation in section 75-2-804 is provided in section 30-3-5(1)(e). 

Where the judge is aware that “either party owns a life insurance 

policy or an annuity contract,” the statute requires the judge issuing 

the decree of divorce to include 

an acknowledgement by the court that the owner: 

(i) has reviewed and updated, where appropriate, the 

list of beneficiaries; 

(ii) has affirmed that those listed as beneficiaries are 

in fact the intended beneficiaries after the divorce 

becomes final; and 

(iii) understands that if no changes are made to the 

policy or contract, the beneficiaries currently 

listed will receive any funds paid by the insurance 

company under the terms of the policy or 

contract.

UTAH CODE § 30-3-5(1)(e). When implemented, this statute reverses 

the presumption created in section 75-2-804 that the former spouse is 

revoked as a beneficiary on a life insurance policy in divorce 

proceedings. The statutory language in section 30-3-5(1)(e) is thus 

intended to supply the express terms of a court order fulfilling the 

exception in section 75-2-804. However, this occurs under section 30-

3-5(1)(e) only when the judge “acknowledge[s]” that the party 

owning the life insurance policy has “reviewed and updated” the 

policy, “affirmed” the listed beneficiaries and the intended 

beneficiaries, and “understands” that the currently listed 

beneficiaries will receive the proceeds and then includes the 

statutory language in the decree. The plain language of section 30-3-

5(1)(e) requires specific actions to reverse the presumption of 

revocation established in section 75-2-804. 
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Opinion of the Court

7

¶12 The legislative intent of section 30-3-5(1)(e) is further 

clarified when read in context with section 75-2-804. “When 

interpreting a statute, we look first to the plain and ordinary 

meaning of its terms. But we do not interpret statutory provisions in 

isolation.” Andarko Petroleum Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2015 UT 

25, ¶ 11, 345 P.3d 648 (citation omitted). “[O]ur statutory 

interpretation requires that each part or section be construed in 

connection with every other part or section so as to produce a 

harmonious whole.” State v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 29, 309 P.3d 209 

(citation omitted). Thus, we look at section 30-3-5(1)(e) and section 

75-2-804 together, as part of one statutory scheme, to “[d]etermin[e] 

which plausible statutory interpretation evinces the Legislature’s 

intent.” Id. We conclude that these sections work in harmony: section 

75-2-804(2) allows for the “express terms of . . . a court order” as a 

means of rebuttal to its presumptive revocation; section 30-3-5(1)(e) 

legislates how one particular court order, the divorce decree, can use 

“express terms” to reverse the presumption created in section 75-2-

804. We conclude that section 30-3-5(1)(e) rebuts the presumption of 

revocation in a life insurance policy in divorce proceedings only

when the statutory language is expressly included in the decree of 

divorce.

¶13 The parties in the E. Hertzske and Ms. Snyder divorce did 

not take the required actions or obtain the express terms in the 

decree needed to reverse the presumption of revocation. The court 

below noted that “[i]n the underlying divorce case between . . . 

Mr. Edward Hertzske and Ms. Snyder no mention was ever made of 

any life insurance policies in the petition, findings or decree.” Where 

the court was not aware of any existing life insurance policy, and the 

statutory language from section 30-3-5(1)(e) was not included in the 

decree of divorce, the presumption that the former spouse is revoked 

as a beneficiary remains. Therefore, section 75-2-804 applies here, 

and Ms. Snyder is presumptively revoked as a beneficiary on the 

Policy absent “express terms” in the Policy indicating otherwise. See

UTAH CODE § 75-2-804(2).

III. BARRING ANOTHER EXCEPTION, A LIFE INSURANCE 

POLICY MUST CONTAIN “EXPRESS TERMS” REFERRING TO 

DIVORCE IN ORDER FOR THE BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION OF 

A FORMER SPOUSE TO SURVIVE REVOCATION BY UTAH 

CODE SECTION 75-2-804(2)

¶14 The generic language found in almost every life insurance 

policy regarding the standard method to change a beneficiary does 

not constitute “express terms” enabling the beneficiary designation 

to survive revocation under section 75-2-804(2). It is standard 

practice for life insurance companies to “prescribe formalities to be 
HERTZSKE v. SNYDER

Opinion of the Court

8

complied with for the change of beneficiaries.” UTAH CODE § 31A-22-

413(2)(a). This is not for the benefit of the policyholder or the 

beneficiaries, but “for the protection of the insurer.” Id. Were we to 

adopt the notion that these formalities constitute express terms in a 

governing instrument, section 30-3-5(1)(e) would become 

superfluous. There would be no need for section 30-3-5(1)(e)’s 

specific method to rebut the presumption for life insurance policies 

in divorce decrees because all or nearly all policies would contain the 

express terms needed to meet the exception in section 75-2-804(2). 

The presumption against surplusage requires that we avoid 

interpreting one section of the Utah Code in a way that would 

render other sections unnecessary. See Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63, 

¶ 59, 323 P.3d 998 (Lee, J., dissenting). We therefore hold that a life 

insurance policy must contain language specifically stating that the 

beneficiary designation will remain in effect despite divorce to 

invoke the express terms exception for a governing instrument in 

section 75-2-804(2).

¶15 This is consistent with the court of appeals decision in 

Malloy v. Malloy, which used the “express terms” exception to 

uphold the district court’s summary judgment in favor of not 

revoking the beneficiary designation upon divorce. 2012 UT App 

294, ¶ 12, 288 P.3d 597. The insurance manual contained a provision 

that “[a] divorce does not invalidate a designation that names your 

former spouse as beneficiary. You need to complete a new 

[Designation of Beneficiary] to remove a former spouse.” Id. ¶ 4 

(alteration in original). The district court found that the language in 

the governing instrument—“the insurance policy and insurance 

manual, which is incorporated by reference in the election form”—

contained the necessary express terms to effect the exception because 

the manual explicitly stated that the beneficiary designation would 

not be invalidated through divorce. Id. ¶ 5. Like other jurisdictions

interpreting similar statutory language,6 we interpret section 75-2-

804(2) to require that the life insurance policy, as “the governing 

instrument[,] contain express terms referring to divorce, specifically 

stating that the beneficiary will remain as the designated beneficiary 

despite divorce” to invoke the “express terms of a governing 

instrument” exception. Buchholz v. Storsve, 740 N.W.2d 107, 112 (S.D. 

2007). 

¶16 Ms. Snyder’s argument that the language prescribing the 

method to change a beneficiary constitutes “express terms” fails. The 

6 See In re Estate of Lamparella, 109 P.3d 959, 960 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2005); Buchholz v. Storsve, 740 N.W.2d 107, 112 (S.D. 2007); Mearns v. 

Scharbach, 12 P.3d 1048, 1053 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
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Opinion of the Court

9

policy at issue here did not contain any language referring to what 

would happen in the case of a divorce. The express terms exception 

in 75-2-804(2) is, therefore, not applicable in this case. 

CONCLUSION

¶17 Ms. Snyder has failed to rebut the presumption that her 

divorce from E. Hertzske revoked his designation of her as primary 

beneficiary on the Policy. Because of the lack of express terms 

necessary to claim an exception under 75-2-804(2) in either the 

decree of divorce or the Policy, Ms. Snyder’s designation as primary 

beneficiary of the Policy was revoked upon divorce. We affirm the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment to Appellee Tyler 

Hertzske.