UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 96-4292

MARCUS CLAY HALL,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Danville.

Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District Judge.

(CR-95-89-D)

Submitted: June 17, 1997

Decided: July 3, 1997

Before WIDENER and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Bruce A. Flora, Boones Mill, Virginia, for Appellant. Robert P.

Crouch, Jr., United States Attorney, Anthony P. Giorno, Assistant

United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Marcus Clay Hall pled guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine with

intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994), and was sentenced to

75

months imprisonment. He maintains on appeal that the district court

abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea at

the

sentencing hearing. We affirm.

Before accepting Hall's plea, the district court made the complete

inquiry required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 to determine whether his

plea

was voluntary. The district court did not explicitly accept the

plea

agreement or defer acceptance of it at the Rule 11 hearing. The

sentencing guidelines provide that the court should defer its decision

to

accept or reject a plea agreement until after the presentence

report has

been reviewed. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines

Manual, § 6B1.1(c), p.s. (Nov. 1995). Therefore, we conclude that

acceptance of the agreement was deferred.

Three months later, on the day he was sentenced, Hall moved to

withdraw his plea. He informed the court that he had not had time

to

fully consider the plea agreement before signing it. We review the

district court's decision for an abuse of discretion. See United

States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995). A defendant

must present a "fair and just reason" under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e),

even when acceptance of his plea agreement has been deferred. See

United States v. Hyde, ___ U.S. ___, 1997 WL 273691 (U.S. May 27,

1997) (No. 96-667). The factors to be considered in determining

whether a defendant has shown a "fair and just reason" are set out

in

United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991).

Here, Hall offered no fair and just reason for withdrawal of his

plea. There was a three-month delay between the entry of the plea

and

his request to withdraw it. He had the assistance of competent

counsel. He did not assert his innocence. To the extent that he

asserted that

his plea had been involuntary or unknowing, his representation was

undercut by the answers he gave during the plea colloquy. Further,

the government would have been prejudiced by having to prepare for

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trial again. We therefore find that the district court did not

abuse its

discretion in denying Hall's motion.

Accordingly, we affirm Hall's conviction. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid

the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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