This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

31109

Vol. 65, No. 95

Tuesday, May 16, 2000

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2000–NM–100–AD]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell

Douglas Model DC–8 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the

adoption of a new airworthiness

directive (AD) that is applicable to

certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC–

8 series airplanes that have been

converted from a passenger to a cargocarrying (‘‘freighter’’) configuration.

This proposal would require a revision

to the Airplane Flight Manual

Supplement to ensure that the main

deck cargo door is closed, latched, and

locked; inspection of the door wire

bundle to detect discrepancies and

repair or replacement of discrepant

parts. This proposal also would require,

among other actions, modification of the

hydraulic and indication systems of the

main deck cargo door, and modification

of the existing means to prevent

pressurization to an unsafe level if the

main deck cargo door is not closed,

latched, and locked. This proposal is

prompted by the FAA’s determination

that certain main deck cargo door

systems and the existing means to

prevent pressurization to an unsafe level

if the main deck cargo door is not

closed, latched, and locked do not

provide an adequate level of safety. The

actions specified by the proposed AD

are intended to prevent opening of the

cargo door while the airplane is in

flight, and consequent rapid

decompression of the airplane including

possible loss of flight control or severe

structural damage.

DATES: Comments must be received by

June 30, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–114,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000–NM–

100–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Comments may be inspected at this

location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00

p.m., Monday through Friday, except

Federal holidays. Comments may be

submitted via fax to (425) 227–1232.

Comments may also be sent via the

Internet using the following address: 9-

anm-nprmcomment@faa.gov. Comments

sent via fax or the Internet must contain

‘‘Docket No. 2000–NM–100–AD’’ in the

subject line and need not be submitted

in triplicate.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Michael E. O’Neil, Aerospace Engineer,

Airframe Branch, ANM–120L, FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate, Los

Angeles Aircraft Certification Office,

3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood,

California 90712–4137; telephone (562)

627–5320; fax (562) 627–5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications shall

identify the Rules Docket number and

be submitted in triplicate to the address

specified above. All communications

received on or before the closing date

for comments, specified above, will be

considered before taking action on the

proposed rule. The proposals contained

in this notice may be changed in light

of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report

summarizing each FAA-public contact

concerned with the substance of this

proposal will be filed in the Rules

Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice

must submit a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket Number 2000–NM–100–AD.’’

The postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this

NPRM by submitting a request to the

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,

ANM–114, Attention: Rules Docket No.

2000-NM–100–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue,

SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Discussion

Supplemental Type Certificates (STC)

SA1862SO and ST00309AT [originally

issued to Agro Air Associates, Inc.]

specify a design for installation of a

main deck cargo door, associated door

cutout in the fuselage, door hydraulic

and indication systems, and Class ‘‘E’’

cargo interior with a cargo barrier on

McDonnell Douglas Model DC–8 series

airplanes. STC SA1862SO installs a

main deck cargo door and associated

hydraulic and indication systems. STC

ST00309AT installs the Class ‘‘E’’

compartment, a cargo handling system,

and a 9g crash barrier. The FAA has

conducted a design review of Model

DC–8 series airplanes modified in

accordance with STC’s SA1862SO and

ST00309AT and has conducted

discussions regarding the design with

the STC holder. From the design review

and these discussions, the FAA has

identified several potential unsafe

conditions. [Results of this design

review are contained in ‘‘DC–8 Cargo

Modification Review Team, Review of

Agro Air Supplemental Type Certificate

SA1862SO—Installation of a Cargo Door

and ST00309AT—Installation of a Cargo

Interior, Final Report, dated August 2,

1999,’’ hereinafter referred to as ‘‘the

Design Review Report,’’ which is

included in the Rules Docket for this

NPRM.]

For airplanes modified in accordance

with STC SA1862SO, this NPRM

proposes corrective actions for those

potential unsafe conditions that relate to

the hydraulic and indication systems of

the main deck cargo door and the means

to prevent pressurization to an unsafe

level if the main deck cargo door is not

fully closed, latched, and locked. These

conditions, if not corrected, could result

in opening of the cargo door while the

airplane is in flight, and consequent

rapid decompression of the airplane

including possible loss of flight control

or severe structural damage.

31110 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 95 / Tuesday, May 16, 2000 / Proposed Rules

Other Related Rulemaking

The FAA is considering further

rulemaking to address the remaining

potential unsafe conditions on Model

DC–8 series airplanes modified in

accordance with STC SA1862SO that

relate to the main deck cargo door

hinge, and fuselage structure in the area

modified by installation of a main deck

cargo door. In addition, the FAA is

considering further rulemaking to

address the potential unsafe conditions

on Model DC–8 series airplanes

modified in accordance with STC

SA1377SO that relate to the

unreinforced main deck floor, 9g crash

barrier, and fire/smoke detection

system.

Main Deck Cargo Door Systems

In early 1989, two transport airplane

accidents were attributed to cargo doors

coming open during flight. The first

accident involved a Boeing Model 747

series airplane in which the cargo door

separated from the airplane, and

damaged the fuselage structure, engines,

and passenger cabin. The second

accident involved a McDonnell Douglas

DC–9 series airplane in which the cargo

door opened but did not separate from

its hinge. The open door disturbed the

airflow over the empennage, which

resulted in loss of flight control and

consequent loss of the airplane.

Although cargo doors have opened

occasionally without mishap shortly

after the airplane was in flight, these

two accidents served to highlight the

extreme potential dangers associated

with the opening of a cargo door while

the airplane is in flight.

As a result of these cargo door

opening accidents, the Air Transport

Association (ATA) of America formed a

task force, including representatives of

the FAA, to review the design,

manufacture, maintenance, and

operation of airplanes fitted with

outward opening cargo doors, and to

make recommendations to prevent

inadvertent cargo door openings while

the airplane is in flight. A design

working group was tasked with

reviewing 14 CFR part 25.783 [and its

accompanying Advisory Circular (AC)

25.783–1, dated December 10, 1986]

with the intent of clarifying its contents

and recommending revisions to enhance

future cargo door designs. This design

group also was tasked with providing

specific recommendations regarding

design criteria to be applied to existing

outward opening cargo doors to ensure

that inadvertent openings would not

occur in the current transport category

fleet of airplanes.

The ATA task force made its

recommendations in the ‘‘ATA Cargo

Door Task Force Final Report,’’ dated

May 15, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as

‘‘the ATA Final Report’’). On March 20,

1992, the FAA issued a memorandum to

the managers of the Transport Airplane

Directorate (TAD) and Los Angeles,

Seattle, and Atlanta Aircraft

Certification Offices (hereinafter

referred to as ‘‘the FAA Memorandum’’),

acknowledging ATA’s recommendations

and providing additional guidance for

purposes of assessing the continuing

airworthiness of existing designs of

outward opening doors. The FAA

Memorandum was not intended to

upgrade the certification basis of the

various airplanes, but rather to identify

criteria to evaluate potential unsafe

conditions identified on in-service

airplanes. Appendix 1 of this AD

contains the specific paragraphs from

the FAA Memorandum that set forth the

criteria to which the outward opening

doors should be shown to comply.

Utilizing the applicable requirements

of Civil Air Regulations (CAR) part 4b

and the design criteria provided by the

FAA Memorandum, the FAA has

reviewed the original type design of

major transport airplanes, including

McDonnell Douglas Model DC–8

airplanes equipped with outward

opening doors, for any design deficiency

or service difficulty. Based on that

review, the FAA identified unsafe

conditions and issued, among others,

the following AD’s and NPRM’s:

• For certain McDonnell Douglas

Model DC–9 series airplanes: AD 89–

11–02, amendment 39–6216 (54 FR

21416, May 18, 1989);

• For all Boeing Model 747 series

airplanes: AD 90–09–06, amendment

39–6581 (55 FR 15217, April 23, 1990);

• For certain McDonnell Douglas

Model DC–8 series airplanes: AD 89–

17–01 R1, amendment 39–6521 (55 FR

8446, March 8, 1990);

• For certain Boeing Model 747–100

and –200 series airplanes: AD 96–01–51,

amendment 39–9492 (61 FR 1703,

January 23, 1996);

• For certain Boeing Model 727–100

and –200 series airplanes: AD 96–16–08,

amendment 39–9708 (61 FR 41733,

August 12, 1996);

• For certain McDonnell Douglas

Model DC–8 series airplanes: NPRM

Rules Docket No. 99–NM–338–AD (64

FR 245, December 22, 1999);

• For certain McDonnell Douglas

Model DC–8 series airplanes: NPRM

Rules Docket No. 2000–NM–01–AD (65

FR 7796, February 16, 2000); and

• For certain McDonnell Douglas

Model DC–8 series airplanes: NPRM

Rules Docket No. 2000–NM–49–AD (65

FR 20390, April 17, 2000).

In late 1997, the FAA informed the

STC holders and operators of Model

DC–8 series airplanes that it was

embarking on a review of Model DC–8

series airplanes that have been

converted from a passenger to a cargocarrying (‘‘freighter’’) configuration by

STC. The FAA proposed at a subsequent

industry sponsored meeting in early

1998, that DC–8 operators and STC

holders work together to identify and

address potential safety concerns. This

suggestion to the affected industry

resulted in the creation of the DC–8

Cargo Conversion Joint Task Force (JTF)

(hereinafter referred to as ‘‘the JTF’’).

The current composition of the JTF

includes holders of each of the six STC’s

that addresses the installation of a main

deck cargo door in Model DC–8 series

airplanes and operators and lessors of

those modified airplanes. At the JTF’s

request, the FAA participates in its

meetings to offer counsel and guidance

with respect to the FAA’s regulatory

processes. The JTF is a clearinghouse for

the gathering and sharing of information

among the parties affected by the FAA

review of STC cargo conversions of

Model DC–8 series airplanes. The JTF

also is a liaison between the FAA,

operators, and STC holders.

The JTF has been working with the

FAA to provide data relating to the

number of STC modified Model DC–8

series airplanes and operators of those

airplanes, and identified which

airplanes are modified by each STC. It

also was instrumental in polling the

operators and providing maintenance

schedules and locations to the FAA,

which helped the FAA arrange visits to

operators of airplanes modified by each

of the STC’s. These visits allowed the

FAA to review both the available data

supporting each STC and modified

airplanes and to identify potential safety

concerns with each of the STC

modifications. Additionally, the JTF has

coordinated funding of the industry

review of the data supporting the STC’s

and ongoing efforts to resolve safety

issues identified by the FAA.

Using the applicable requirements of

CAR part 4b and the criteria specified in

the FAA Memorandum as evaluation

guides, the FAA, in collaboration with

the JTF, conducted an engineering

design review and inspection of an

airplane modified in accordance with

STC SA1862SO. The actions in this

proposed rulemaking address only the

modification associated with this STC.

The FAA identified a number of design

features of the main deck cargo door

systems of STC SA1862SO that are

unsafe and do not meet the applicable

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 95 / Tuesday, May 16, 2000 / Proposed Rules 31111

requirements of CAR part 4b or the

criteria specified in the FAA

Memorandum. These systems include

the door indication and hydraulic

systems. The FAA design review team

also determined that the design data of

this STC did not include an adequate

safety analysis of the main deck cargo

door systems.

For airplanes modified in accordance

with STC SA1862SO, the FAA

considers the following five specific

design deficiencies of the main deck

cargo door systems to be unsafe:

1. Indication System

The main deck cargo door indication

system for STC SA1862SO utilizes door

warning lights at the door operator’s

control panel and the flight engineer’s

panel. The warning lights do not

adequately indicate either the door open

or closed status, or latch or lock status.

All three conditions (i.e., door closed,

latched, and locked) must be monitored

directly so that the door indication

system cannot display either ‘‘latched’’

before the door is closed or ‘‘locked’’

before the door is latched. If a

sequencing error caused the door to

latch and lock without being fully

closed, the subject indication system, as

currently designed, would not alert the

door operator or the flight engineer of

this condition. As a result, the airplane

could be dispatched with the main deck

cargo door unsecured, which could lead

to the cargo door opening while the

airplane is in flight.

The light on the flight engineer’s

panel is labeled ‘‘Cargo Door’’ and is

displayed in red since it indicates an

event that requires immediate pilot

action. However, if the flight engineer is

temporarily away from his station, a

door unsafe warning indication could be

missed by the pilots. In addition, the

flight engineer could miss such an

indication by not scanning the panel. As

a result, the pilots and flight engineer

could be unaware of or misinterpret an

unsafe condition and could fail to

respond in the correct manner.

Therefore, an indicator light must be

located in front of and in plain view of

both pilots since one of the pilot’s

stations is always occupied during flight

operations.

The warning lights have a ‘‘Press-toTest’’ feature that is adequate to check

the light bulb functionality, but is not

adequate to check the cargo door closed,

latched, and locked functions.

During an FAA review of STC

modified airplanes, instances of distress

of the wire bundle between the fuselage

and main deck cargo door. Additionally,

instances of damaged, loose, or missing

hardware mounting components were

also noted. Therefore, a one-time

general visual inspection of this area to

detect crimped, frayed, or chafed wires

is necessary to ensure the electrical

continuity of the existing door

indication system during the interim

period.

2. Means to Visually Inspect the Locking

Mechanism

The locking system of STC SA1862SO

consists of a lock pin installed at one of

the seven latches of the main deck cargo

door. The single view port of the main

deck cargo door installed in accordance

with STC SA1862SO monitors the

position of the torque tube that actuates

the door latches, but it does not provide

a means to ensure the position of the

lock pin. Therefore, this view port is

inadequate to ensure that the door is

fully closed, latched, and locked.

As discussed in the ATA Final Report

and the FAA Memorandum, there

should be a means of directly inspecting

each lock or, at a minimum, the locks

at each end of the lock shaft of certain

designs, such that a failure condition in

the lock shaft would be detectable.

3. Means to Prevent Pressurization to an

Unsafe Level

McDonnell Douglas Model DC–8

series airplanes modified in accordance

with STC SA1862SO are equipped with

a means to inhibit pressurization of the

airplane in the event that the main deck

cargo door is not closed and locked. In

the event the door is not closed and

locked, the air conditioning turbocompressors normally cannot be turned

on to pressurize the airplane. However,

there may be failure modes in the

system that would allow pressurization

of the airplane to an unsafe level in the

event that the main deck cargo door is

not closed and locked. Therefore, a

means must be installed to prevent

pressurization of the airplane to an

unsafe level if the door is not fully

closed, latched, and locked.

4. Powered Lock Systems

STC SA1862SO utilizes a landing gear

squat switch to remove power from the

door control master switch (i.e.,

electrical and hydraulic) while the

airplane is in flight. Latent failure of the

squat switch together with other latent

and/or single point failures could

precipitate inadvertent door openings.

Therefore, a means to remove power

from the door controls must be installed

to prevent inadvertent opening of the

main deck cargo door in flight.

A systems safety analysis would

normally evaluate and resolve the

potential for these types of unsafe

conditions. The design data for STC

SA1862SSO do not include a system

safety analysis to specifically identify

these failure modes and do not show

that an inadvertent main deck cargo

door opening is extremely improbable.

The need for a system safety analysis is

identified in the ATA Final Report and

the FAA Memorandum.

5. Lock Strength

Analysis of the existing latching and

locking mechanism of the main deck

cargo door indicates that in the event of

a system jam, continued operation of the

hydraulic cylinders could result in

structural deformation of elements of

the latching and locking mechanisms.

Structural deformation of the locking

mechanism could result in the single

door latch equipped with a lock not

being locked and consequent erroneous

indication to the pilots that the latch is

locked properly. Further, the FAA has

determined that a lock on a single latch

is inadequate to provide the level of

safety envisioned by the applicable

certification requirements. Therefore,

the latching and locking systems for the

main deck cargo door must be modified

to prevent structural deformation,

which could result in incorrect

indication to the pilots that the door is

not fully closed, latched, and locked.

Explanation of Requirements of

Proposed Rule

Since unsafe conditions have been

identified that are likely to exist or

develop on other products of this same

type design, the proposed AD would

require, within 60 days after the

effective date of this AD, the following

actions:

• A general visual inspection of the

wire bundle of the main deck cargo door

between the exit point of the cargo liner

and the attachment point on the main

deck cargo door to detect crimped,

frayed, or chafed wires;

• A general visual inspection for

damaged, loose, or missing hardware

mounting components; and repair, if

necessary.

These actions would be required to be

accomplished in accordance with FAAapproved maintenance procedures.

The proposed AD also would require,

within 60 days after the effective date of

the AD, a revision of the Limitations

Section of the appropriate FAAapproved Airplane Flight Manual

Supplement (AFMS) for STC SA1862SO

by inserting therein procedures to

ensure that the main deck cargo door is

closed, latched, and locked prior to

dispatch of the airplane; and installation

of any associated placards. These

actions would be required to be

accomplished in accordance with a

31112 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 95 / Tuesday, May 16, 2000 / Proposed Rules

method approved by the Manager, Los

Angeles Aircraft Certification Office

(ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate.

The proposed AD also would require,

within 18 months after the effective date

of this AD, the following actions:

• Modification of the indication

system of the main deck cargo door to

indicate to the pilots whether the main

deck cargo door is fully closed, latched,

and locked;

• Modification of the mechanical and

hydraulic systems of the main deck

cargo door to eliminate detrimental

deformation of the elements of the door

latching and locking mechanisms;

• Installation of a means to visually

inspect the locking mechanism of the

main deck cargo door;

• Installation of a means to remove

power to the door while the airplane is

in flight; and

• Modification of the existing means

or installation of a new means to

prevent pressurization to an unsafe level

if the main deck cargo door is not fully

closed, latched, and locked.

The modifications and installations

would be required to be accomplished

in accordance with a method approved

by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

Accomplishment of the modifications

and installations would constitute

terminating action for the general visual

inspections, AFMS revision, and

associated placards described

previously.

Cost Impact

There are approximately 5 Model DC–

8 series airplanes of the affected design

in the worldwide fleet. The FAA

estimates that 4 airplanes of U.S.

registry would be affected by this

proposed AD.

It would take approximately 1 work

hour per airplane to accomplish the

general visual inspections, at an average

labor rate of $60 per work hour. Based

on these figures, the cost impact of the

general visual inspections proposed by

this AD on U.S. operators is estimated

to be $240, or $60 per airplane, per

inspection cycle.

It would take approximately 1 work

hour per airplane to accomplish the

AFMS revision and installation of

associated placards, at an average labor

rate of $60 per work hour. Based on

these figures, the cost impact of the

AFMS revision and installation of

associated placards proposed by this AD

on U.S. operators is estimated to be

$240, or $60 per airplane.

The FAA estimates that it would take

approximately 210 work hours per

airplane to accomplish the modification

required by paragraph (c) of the

proposed AD, at an average labor rate of

$60 per work hour. The FAA also

estimates that required parts would cost

approximately $45,000 per airplane.

Based on these figures, the cost impact

of this modification proposed by this

AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be

$230,400, or $57,600 per airplane.

The cost impact figures discussed

above are based on assumptions that no

operator has yet accomplished any of

the proposed requirements of this AD

action, and that no operator would

accomplish those actions in the future if

this AD were not adopted.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein

would not have a substantial direct

effect on the States, on the relationship

between the national Government and

the States, or on the distribution of

power and responsibilities among the

various levels of government.

Therefore, it is determined that this

proposal would not have federalism

implications under Executive Order

13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I

certify that this proposed regulation (1)

is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’

under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not

a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44

FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if

promulgated, will not have a significant

economic impact, positive or negative,

on a substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft

regulatory evaluation prepared for this

action is contained in the Rules Docket.

A copy of it may be obtained by

contacting the Rules Docket at the

location provided under the caption

ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration proposes to amend part

39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations

(14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by

adding the following new airworthiness

directive:

McDonnell Douglas: Docket 2000–NM–100–

AD.

Applicability: Model DC–8 series airplanes

that have been converted from a passenger to

a cargo-carrying (‘‘freighter’’) configuration in

accordance with Supplemental Type

Certificate (STC) SA1862SO; certificated in

any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability

provision, regardless of whether it has been

otherwise modified, altered, or repaired in

the area subject to the requirements of this

AD. For airplanes that have been modified,

altered, or repaired so that the performance

of the requirements of this AD is affected, the

owner/operator must request approval for an

alternative method of compliance in

accordance with paragraph (e) of this AD.

The request should include an assessment of

the effect of the modification, alteration, or

repair on the unsafe condition addressed by

this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not

been eliminated, the request should include

specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To prevent opening of the cargo door while

the airplane is in flight, and consequent rapid

decompression of the airplane including

possible loss of flight control or severe

structural damage, accomplish the following:

Actions Addressing the Main Deck Cargo

Door

(a) Within 60 days after the effective date

of this AD, accomplish a general visual

inspection of the wire bundle of the main

deck cargo door between the exit point of the

cargo liner and the attachment point on the

main deck cargo door to detect crimped,

frayed, or chafed wires; and perform a

general visual inspection for damaged, loose,

or missing hardware mounting components.

If any crimped, frayed, or chafed wire, or

damaged, loose, or missing hardware

mounting component is detected, prior to

further flight, repair in accordance with FAAapproved maintenance procedures.

Note 2: For the purposes of this AD, a

general visual inspection is defined as ‘‘A

visual examination of an interior or exterior

area, installation, or assembly to detect

obvious damage, failure, or irregularity. This

level of inspection is made under normally

available lighting conditions such as

daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight, or droplight, and may require removal or opening of

access panels or doors. Stands, ladders, or

platforms may be required to gain proximity

to the area being checked.’’

(b) Within 60 days after the effective date

of this AD, revise the Limitations Section of

the appropriate FAA-approved Airplane

Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS) for STC

SA1862SO by inserting therein procedures to

ensure that the main deck cargo door is fully

closed, latched, and locked prior to dispatch

of the airplane, and install any associated

placards. The AFMS revision procedures and

installation of any associated placards shall

be accomplished in accordance with a

method approved by the Manager, Los

Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 95 / Tuesday, May 16, 2000 / Proposed Rules 31113

Actions Addressing the Main Deck Cargo

Door Systems

(c) Within 18 months after the effective

date of this AD, accomplish the actions

specified in paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3),

(c)(4), and (c)(5) of this AD in accordance

with a method approved by the Manager, Los

Angeles ACO.

(1) Modify the indication system of the

main deck cargo door to indicate to the pilots

whether the main deck cargo door is fully

closed, latched, and locked;

(2) Modify the mechanical and hydraulic

systems of the main deck cargo door to

eliminate detrimental deformation of

elements of the door latching and locking

mechanism;

(3) Install a means to visually inspect the

locking mechanism of the main deck cargo

door;

(4) Install a means to remove power to the

door while the airplane is in flight; and

(5) Install a means to prevent

pressurization to an unsafe level if the main

deck cargo door is not fully closed, latched,

and locked.

(d) Compliance with paragraphs (c)(1),

(c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(4), and (c)(5) of this AD

constitutes terminating action for the

requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this

AD, and the AFMS revision and placards

may be removed.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(e) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Los

Angeles ACO. Operators shall submit their

requests through an appropriate FAA

Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may

add comments and then send it to the

Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

Note 3: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.

Special Flight Permit

(f) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

Appendix 1

Excerpt from an FAA Memorandum to

Director—Airworthiness and Technical

Standards of ATA, dated March 20, 1992

‘‘(1) Indication System:

(a) The indication system must monitor the

closed, latched, and locked positions,

directly.

(b) The indicator should be amber unless

it concerns an outward opening door whose

opening during takeoff could present an

immediate hazard to the airplane. In that case

the indicator must be red and located in

plain view in front of the pilots. An aural

warning is also advisable. A display on the

master caution/warning system is also

acceptable as an indicator. For the purpose

of complying with this paragraph, an

immediate hazard is defined as significant

reduction in controllability, structural

damage, or impact with other structures,

engines, or controls.

(c) Loss of indication or a false indication

of a closed, latched, and locked condition

must be improbable.

(d) A warning indication must be provided

at the door operators station that monitors

the door latched and locked conditions

directly, unless the operator has a visual

indication that the door is fully closed and

locked. For example, a vent door that

monitors the door locks and can be seen from

the operators station would meet this

requirement.

(2) Means to Visually Inspect the Locking

Mechanism:

There must be a visual means of directly

inspecting the locks. Where all locks are tied

to a common lock shaft, a means of

inspecting the locks at each end may be

sufficient to meet this requirement provided

no failure condition in the lock shaft would

go undetected when viewing the end locks.

Viewing latches may be used as an alternate

to viewing locks on some installations where

there are other compensating features.

(3) Means to Prevent Pressurization:

All doors must have provisions to prevent

initiation of pressurization of the airplane to

an unsafe level, if the door is not fully closed,

latched and locked.

(4) Lock Strength:

Locks must be designed to withstand the

maximum output power of the actuators and

maximum expected manual operating forces

treated as a limit load. Under these

conditions, the door must remain closed,

latched and locked.

(5) Power Availability:

All power to the door must be removed in

flight and it must not be possible for the

flight crew to restore power to the door while

in flight.

(6) Powered Lock Systems:

For doors that have powered lock systems,

it must be shown by safety analysis that

inadvertent opening of the door after it is

fully closed, latched and locked, is extremely

improbable.’’

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 10,

2000.

Vi L. Lipski,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 00–12249 Filed 5–15–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2000–NM–105–AD]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model

A300–600 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the

adoption of a new airworthiness

directive (AD) that is applicable to all

Airbus Model A300–600 series

airplanes. This proposal would require

repetitive high frequency eddy current

(HFEC) or rototest inspections to detect

cracking in the area surrounding the

frame feet attachment holes between

fuselage frames (FR) 41 and FR46;

installation of new fasteners for certain

airplanes; and follow-on corrective

actions, if necessary. This proposal is

prompted by issuance of mandatory

continuing airworthiness information by

a foreign civil airworthiness authority.

The actions specified by the proposed

AD are intended to prevent cracking of

the center section of the fuselage, which

could result in rupture of the frame foot

and reduced structural integrity of the

airplane.

DATES: Comments must be received by

June 15, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–114,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000–NM–

105–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Comments may be inspected at this

location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00

p.m., Monday through Friday, except

Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in

the proposed rule may be obtained from

Airbus Industrie, 1 Rond Point Maurice

Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France.

This information may be examined at

the FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Norman B. Martenson, Manager,

International Branch, ANM–116,

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington

98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–2110;

fax (425) 227–1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications shall

identify the Rules Docket number and

be submitted in triplicate to the address

specified above. All communications

received on or before the closing date

for comments, specified above, will be

considered before taking action on the

proposed rule. The proposals contained