NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL

- TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 15a0249n.06
Case No. 14

- 3981
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AME RICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v.
RENEE BROOKS , Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

O P I N I O N
BEFORE: GUY , COOK , and Mc KEAGUE, Circuit Judges. McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Renee Brooks pleaded guilty to theft of government funds and received a within

- guidelines sentence of thirty

- seven months

. She challenges the substantive reasonableness of that sentence. Finding no error, we affirm. Over the course of fifteen years, Brooks lied to the Social Security Administration to steal $92,081.53 in benefits , which violated 18 U.S.C. § 641

. She pleaded gu ilty to the indictment wi thout a plea agreement and faced a fine and up to ten years in prison. Because of Brooks’ s extensive criminal history

— dating back to 1985 and including no less than fifteen separate convictions for theft

- related crimes

— she recei ved the hig hest criminal

-Case No. 14

- 3981 , United States v. Brooks

2

history category: VI

. Her guideline s range was 30 to 37 months. The court ordered Brooks to pay back the money she stole and sentenced her to 37 months in prison

. Brooks appeals her sentence, arguing only that it was substantively unreasonable

— i.e. ,

“ greater than necessary to achieve any sentencing goals

. ” Appellant Br. 6. We review for abuse of discretion and, b ecause her sentence is within the correctly calculated guidelines range, we
presume it to be substantively reasonable. See Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)

. Brooks has not rebutted that presumption. Brooks specifically argues that the district court abused its discretion by relying on crimin al activity dating back to the mid

- 1980s

. But t he gui delines allow courts to consider criminal activity up to ten or fifteen years (depending on the type of offense) before the

“ commencement of the instant offense .” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e) (1)

– (2) (emphasis added)

. The instant offense c ommenced , at the latest, in 1996 , R. 3 at 1 , and so t he court properly consider ed Brooks’ s criminal history from at least 1986

. See R. 28 (Sentencing Transcript) at 9 , 11 , 13 ; Appellant Br. 6 (conceding such consideration was proper). And the court did not give “an unreasonable amount of weight” to this history. Appellant Br. 9 (quoting United States v. Peppel , 707 F.3d 627, 635 (6th Cir. 2013)). It instead considered all of the § 3553 (a) factors and properly “place[d] great weight on [this] one f actor [because] such weight [was] warranted under the facts of th[is] case.” United States v. Adkins , 729 F.3d 559, 571 (6th Cir. 2013)

. Brooks concedes tha t considering this criminal history was “technically correct ” and “procedural[ly] reasonable[],” but she asks us for a less “rigid[],” “formalistic” application of the guidelines . Appellant Br. 6

– 7 ; Reply Br. 1

. This is a fine argument . . . when made before a sentencing judge. But we will not find an abuse of discretion for a sentencing court’s ad herence
to the plain language of the guidelines. Nor, in any event, do we disagree with the sentence theCase No. 14

- 3981 , United States v. Brooks

3

district court imposed . Brooks paints her criminal history as if she committed a few “mistakes in the 1980s and 1990s ” and then toed the line since (besides , of course, for her continuing theft of social

- security benefits). Appellant Br. 8; see Reply Br. 4. T hat badly misrepresents her actual criminal past

— a life of crime

— including no less than fifteen theft

- related criminal convictions for crimes l ike grand theft, passing bad checks, falsification, insurance fraud, tampering with evidence, obstructing official business, and shoplifting. R. 18 (Presentence Report) at 7

– 14

. State and federal courts alike have label ed Brooks a “ career thief ” and a “ h igh risk offender .” R.
28 at 26

– 27. Based on this record, we agree. Nor, finally, did the district court base its sentence on impermissible factors. Appellant
Br. 9

– 10

. T he court , as Brooks correctly notes, questioned the truthfulness of her mental

- health issues. R. 28 at 24, 29. But it did not factor that skepticism into the sentence. Rather, when imposing the sentence, the court took as true her mental

- health issues and explained why they do not “in any way, shape or form prevent her from engagi ng in these sophisticated crimes” or “mitigate against the sentence”

— because Brooks “ kn ows right from wrong. ” Id. at 28

– 29. Though she knew right from wrong, she continually chose wrong : S he “ milked the system

. . . her entire life

. ” Id. at 25

– 26. And now she must serve thirty

- seven months in prison for those
wrong choices.
W e affirm the district court’s reasonable sentence

.