OPERATIONAL RESERVATIONS:

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A TOTAL 

ARMY FORCE

John D. Ellis

Laura McKnight Mackenzie

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

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iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

OPERATIONAL RESERVATIONS:

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A TOTAL ARMY FORCE

John D. Ellis

Laura McKnight Mackenzie

June 2014

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iv

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ISBN 1-58487-631-X
v

FOREWORD

Drawdowns in Army funding and in the overall 

numbers of Soldiers have called attention to the “right 

sizing” of the “three Armies”—the Active Component, 

the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. As 

senior leaders of all three components weigh the various options and discuss the merits of an Operational 

Reserve, it is important that they and civilian policymakers consider the necessary reforms that might 

have impact on implementing the Army Total Force 

Policy directed by the Secretary of the Army. 

The authors examine the tenets of the Army Total Force Policy, the details of what exactly the term 

“Operational Reserve” means, and the potential obstacles that are currently in place to disrupt successful 

reform. The monograph includes questions for senior 

leader policy considerations, examples of potential 

concerns, and recommendations to help mitigate obstacles in achieving a suitable and workable Total 

Army end state. The authors note that the significant 

changes created by the Reserve Components’ eventual 

integration will demand concomitant significant organizational cultural change by all three components. 

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish 

this timely thought piece discussing the “field” realities of such an endeavor. It is hoped that this monograph will inspire both senior and junior leaders to 

recognize the necessity of that cultural shift commencing in the near future.

 

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

JOHN D. ELLIS is a current U.S. Army Reserve colonel, serving as the Deputy Commander of the 9th Mission Support Command at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. In his 

civilian capacity, he is a joint training system specialist working as a contractor for Camber Corporation 

in the U.S. Pacific Command’s Training and Exercise 

directorate. Colonel Ellis is a graduate of Princeton 

University and the U.S. Army War College. 

LAURA MCKNIGHT MACKENZIE is a retired U.S. 

Army colonel who served in both the active and reserve components, beginning her career as a Military 

Police officer in Cold War Europe and ending as the 

J-5/7 (Director of Strategic Plans, Policies, Joint Training and Exercises) for the Kansas National Guard. 

Colonel (Ret.) Mackenzie has a bachelor’s degree 

from the University of Notre Dame and master’s 

degrees from Drake University and the U.S. Army 

War College.

ix

SUMMARY

As the Army Reserve Components—the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard—assume an “operational” mission as the force drawdowns in overseas contingency operations occur, the Army senior 

military and civilian leadership should consider the 

ramifications and realities of such a mission in what is 

expected to be a relatively peaceful time. This monograph explores some of the considerations regarding 

the implementation of the Army Total Force Policy, 

identifies potential obstacles, and makes recommendations to better engage the “three Armies” in a successful and meaningful reform effort. Throughout, the 

authors call for significant cultural shifts in thinking 

about how the Reserve Components are used and 

integrated into a Total Force.

1

OPERATIONAL RESERVATIONS:

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A TOTAL ARMY FORCE

INTRODUCTION

The Battle Update Briefing for the theater-level 

command post exercise was going well. The Current 

Operations Officer, an active duty major, was confident that he had all of the information needed by the 

Deputy Commanding General, an Army Reserve (AR) 

major general.

“Sir, we have the three detachments of the 999th 

MP Company located here, here, and here,” he said, 

indicating three different sectors on the map. “Their 

primary mission is to secure the main supply—.”

“Whoa there!” interrupted the general. “I happen 

to know that unit—Reserves, yes?”

“Yes, sir.”

“When was it mobilized? On whose authority?”

“It was mobilized for this exercise, sir. We mobilized it. It worked well, because the company is already located there in the AO [area of operations].” 

“Well, there are a couple problems here, Major. 

One, we can’t simply mobilize a Reserve unit without proper authority. Two, I happen to know this unit 

and know that one detachment is in Kuwait, one is in 

Djibouti, and one is in Kyrgyzstan. How can they just 

show up on your map?”

“But sir, they are assigned to us.”

“Then you should know where they are, and it 

ain’t there,” the general said, pointing to the map.

“Well, it is just for the purposes of the exercise, sir.”

“Then I suggest you learn the proper way to mobilize and integrate Reserve forces—we need to train 

as we fight.”
2

“B-b-but, sir, our Reserves are supposed to be 

operational . . .”

*****

That incident actually occurred in mid-2012 (although the unit designation and locations have been 

changed).1

 As illustrated here, there is often a large 

disconnect between what Active Component (AC) 

and Reserve Component (RC) leaders believe about 

what “Operational” Reserve forces can and cannot 

accomplish, and how they can be used by Active 

Component forces. 

Importantly, this disconnect has manifested itself 

in a dichotomy between the Department of Defense 

(DoD) intentions for an Operational Reserve (OR) and 

the realities experienced by the RC. While there has 

been tremendous progress in the last 5 years, it is prudent to review the results and challenges of the Army’s 

effort toward institutionalizing the OR. 

Indeed, the very definition of “OR” is not universally understood, a fact uniformly acknowledged by 

the senior leaders interviewed for this project. This is 

mainly because its abstract definition lends itself to being defined as whatever one wishes. This monograph 

will examine the various definitions and expectations 

related to the OR and explore how the concept came 

into being. It will also touch briefly on recent arguments that the federal budget can no longer support 

an OR.

The monograph will look in-depth at the requirements of both the DoD’s directive to manage the RC 

as an operational force and the Army’s Total Force 

Policy (ATFP). A number of potential problems with 

ATFP will be examined, and suggestions will be made 
3

to mitigate those problems. An examination of the 

Army’s Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model is also 

included, with recommendations on how to make the 

model more useful for planning RC operations and 

training. Finally, we will examine the almighty budget 

issue and its implications for the future of the RC. 

Throughout the monograph there is a discussion 

of the various mindsets and organizational cultures 

that permeate the AC, Army National Guard (ARNG), 

and Army Reserve (USAR). These have a tremendous 

impact on the components’ ability to interact and will 

play a pivotal role in determining the success of the 

Army’s Total Force efforts. 

This monograph will raise more questions than it 

will provide answers. Although the report will end 

with a list of recommendations, the most essential 

takeaway is that the Army must engage in robust discussions about the intent, challenges, and viability of 

maintaining the RC as a permanent operational force. 

Only then can prudent decisions be made about the 

fate of the OR. 

BACKGROUND: THE SHIFT FROM 

STRATEGIC TO OPERATIONAL RESERVE (OR) 

Dating back to the militias that fought the Revolutionary War, the United States has benefited from the 

contributions of “citizen soldiers.” Within the last century, Reservists (both USAR and ARNG) were used 

extensively in World War I, World War II, and the 

Korean War.2

Following those conflicts, the RCs were used less 

and were considered to be a strategic reserve—units 

and individuals to be called to duty only for the most 

extreme national crises. Although some RC units and 
4

individuals were called up for duty in Vietnam, overall RC involvement was limited. The Cold War was 

conducted almost exclusively with active duty units, 

with only occasional RC training missions to Europe 

and Korea.3

The role of the RC began to change in 1990, when 

both USAR and National Guard (NG) units were 

called up for Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT 

STORM. The majority of RC units deployed were 

combat support and service support, but a number of 

RC combat units were also mobilized. Despite some 

concern about units that were not able to deploy 

due to training issues, those units that did deploy 

performed well.4

After their proven performance in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the RC demobilized 

and reverted to being a strategic reserve. Overseas 

training deployments increased somewhat,5 but RC 

units were once again resourced against the assumption that they would not be called upon for service any 

time soon.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), 

the nation was galvanized and patriotism flourished. 

Both civilians and Soldiers asked, “What can I do to 

help?” Predictably, RC Soldiers and leaders wanted 

to help with the effort against al-Qaeda, fight for their 

country, and “get in the game.”

Post-9/11 RC mobilizations began with thousands 

of RC Soldiers providing security at airports and 

critical infrastructure in support of Operation NOBLE 

EAGLE. As AC forces headed to Afghanistan to begin 

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), Reservists 

were also mobilized to fill training base slots in the 

United States. 

As the United States expanded its operations in 

Afghanistan, RC forces began joining the AC over-
5

seas. While the early deployment of RC forces to OEF 

was somewhat limited, RC deployments steadily increased. RC contributions to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) were significant from the start. RC units 

were a part of the initial assault into Iraq in March 

2003, and AC/RC deployments rose and fell in proportion throughout OIF. RC units blended with AC 

forces to provide a strong and balanced American 

force in Iraq.6

In total, over 800,000 RC Soldiers of all services 

served in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of those, over 533,000 

were ARNG and USAR.7 Of particular note were the 

contributions of civil affairs, water purification, mail 

handling, psychological operations, military history, 

and Enemy Prisoner of War processing units, which 

came almost exclusively from the RC.8

 Because those 

capabilities were largely absent from the AC, it was 

assumed that RC units would be included routinely in 

future operational endeavors.9

As the frequency and scale of RC deployments 

increased in both Afghanistan and Iraq, military and 

civilian leaders began viewing the RC with a different 

lens. The RC was recognized for having well-trained 

units, critical specialties, and motivated Soldiers who 

could be used in a variety of missions and roles. Although there was not a formal plan to do so, the RC 

became an operational force; this meant they were 

made more readily available for a sustained period 

of time than had been planned under the strategic 

reserve construct. By 2005, Army planners began acknowledging that the RC would be used as an operational, rather than just strategic, force.10

Later in 2005, the nation was reminded of its dependence on RC forces to respond to domestic emergencies; over 50,000 of the 72,000 responders to Hurricane Katrina were RC personnel. Much to the RC’s 
6

chagrin, however, the comprehensive NG and USAR 

response was overshadowed by the AC. Despite the 

presence of thousands of National Guardsmen in 

New Orleans, the arrival of Lieutenant General Russel Honore (the AC First Army Commander) and the 

82nd Airborne Division created such a media frenzy 

that many people believed that AC forces were the 

only ones responding to the crisis. The presence of 

National Guardsmen and Reservists from multiple 

states was ignored.11

The press did not seem to realize that the active 

duty troops, limited by Posse Comitatus, were used 

mainly for presence patrols in relatively secure areas 

of the city. National Guardsmen, with broader law 

enforcement authority, provided backup to the beleaguered New Orleans Police Department, evacuated 

the Superdome, and patrolled the more dangerous 

areas of the city.12

Ironically, the civilian media were not alone in 

portraying the AC as the main force involved in Katrina. The U.S. Army Military History Institute, in its 

summary of the Army’s response to the hurricane, 

published a glowing account of the AC’s contributions in The Army Response to Hurricane Katrina. The 

NG received only three sentences in the entire article; 

the USAR received none.13 Even the Louisiana NG, 

which continued operations despite its headquarters 

being flooded, was ignored in the report.14 There was 

no mention of the RC Soldiers who responded, despite 

being victims themselves;15 the 17,000 rescues done 

by RC troops;16 or the Louisiana National Guard’s 

Joint Task Force Gator, which stayed on duty for 

3 1/2 years after the hurricane to provide additional 

security in New Orleans.17 The RC, it seemed from the 

Army’s report, was still considered to be just a backup 

to the AC. 
7

Despite RC Soldiers’ frustration at having their 

contributions minimized, it was obvious that RC units 

were needed for the Army to continue fighting two 

wars and to keep the homeland safe. Discussions began in-depth to consider the future role of the RC.

In January 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 

issued a memorandum entitled Utilization of the Total Force to address his concerns about “whether we 

have the right policies to govern how we utilize members of the Reserve, National Guard, and our Active 

Components [sic] units.”18 The memorandum limited 

RC mobilizations to 1 year (with certain exceptions) 

and directed that involuntary mobilizations should 

be managed on a unit basis to maintain cohesion and 

predictability for RC units. The memorandum further 

instructed the services to strive for a 1:2 Deployed: 

Dwell ratio for AC and 1:5 year Mobilized: Dwell ratio 

for RC. Secretary Gates acknowledged the challenges of frequent and multiple deployments but stated, 

“Just as we are asking the active forces to do more in 

this time of national need, so we must ask more of our 

Reserve components.”19

The year 2008 was a watershed for the RC. The 

year began with a final report from the Commission 

on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR)20—a report that strongly recommended recognizing and resourcing the RC as an operational force and finished 

with the DoD issuing a directive entitled “Managing 

the Reserve Components as an Operational Force.”21

The CNGR report, Transforming the National Guard 

and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force, was 

based on 3 years of extensive research, analysis, and 

forecasting to determine the best use of RC forces 

in the future. The CNGR determined that the Army 

would be unable to sustain future operations without 
8

extensive involvement by the RC and recommended 

that the DoD formally create a sustainable and adequately resourced OR.22

The CNGR’s final report gave almost 100 recommendations in six major categories: (1) Creating a 

Sustainable OR; (2) Enhancing the DoD’s Role in the 

Homeland; (3) Creating a Continuum of Service; (4) 

Developing a Ready, Capable, and Available OR; (5) 

Supporting Service Members, Families, and Employers; and (6) Reforming the Organizations and Institutions that Support an OR.23 Although many of the 

commission’s recommendations have yet to be acted 

upon, the CNGR report was a critical work in defining 

what was needed to operate and maintain the RC as 

an operational force.

Following a 9-month review of the CNGR report, 

the DoD issued Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve 

Component as an Operational Force.

24 The directive’s 

stated purpose was “establishing the overarching set 

of principles and policies to promote and support 

the management of the RC as an operational force.”25

The directive was considered a victory by RC leaders, and established the expectation of new policies, 

rules, funding mechanisms, and programs to institutionalize the OR.

Unfortunately, the directive did not come with 

plans or large pots of funding attached. A year after 

the directive was issued, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued two reports to congressional committees that emphasized the need for more 

planning and funding: GAO-09-720, Army Needs to Reevaluate Its Approach to Training and Mobilizing Reserve 

Component Forces,

26 and GAO-09-898, Army Needs to 

Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for 

Sustaining an OR Force.

27
9

Over the next 4 years, some progress was made, 

but much remains to be done. In 2012, the Army issued an “Army Total Force Policy” (ATFP) directive 

that called for the AC and RC to be integrated into a 

“Total Force.”28 As with the DoD directive, however, 

implementation has been limited by a lack of plans 

and funding. Critical issues have yet to be addressed, 

and practical measures to institutionalize the OR are 

still lacking. 

Most significantly, the question has again arisen of 

whether it is feasible to maintain a permanent OR. As 

troops are pulled out of Afghanistan and the DoD’s focus shifts to maintaining stability in the Pacific region, 

does the country still have the resources to maintain 

an OR force? Is an OR needed when the United States 

returns to a relatively peaceful status? While the full 

answer to these questions lies beyond the scope of this 

monograph, we will examine some recent indicators 

of an uncertain future for RCs.

WHAT IS “OPERATIONAL?”—DIFFERING 

DEFINITIONS AND EXPECTATIONS

As the opening vignette suggests, there is some 

degree of confusion regarding what is meant by an 

“OR.” Indeed, as late as March 2013, one senior AC 

commander remarked, “Nobody knows what that 

means!”29

Joint Publication 1-02 includes the following as the

official, albeit unhelpful, definition: “OR—An emergency reserve of men and/or materiel established 

for the support of a specific operation. (JP 5-0)”30 The 

CNGR report cited a working definition (draft) from 

the Joint Staff, dated October 15, 2007:
10

The total Reserve component structure which operates 

across the continuum of military missions performing 

both strategic and operational roles in peacetime, wartime, contingency, domestic emergencies and homeland defense operations. As such, the Services organize, resource, equip, train, and utilize their Guard and 

Reserve components to support mission requirements 

to the same standard as their active components. Each 

Service’s force generation plan prepares both units 

and individuals to participate in missions, across 

the full spectrum of military operations, in a cycle or 

periodic manner that provides predictability for the 

combatant commands, the Services, Service members, 

their families and civilian employers.31

The key aspects of this definition include: “across 

the continuum of military missions” (available for essentially all types of roles), calls upon the Services to 

resource their RCs as they would their AC units, and 

making employment of the RC “predictable.” In other 

words, this definition calls for the RC to do anything 

and everything to the same standard as the AC, and 

calls for the Services to prepare the RC to do anything and everything, and to do it on a specified time 

schedule. 

The CNGR report took issue with the Joint Staff 

definition, stating:

. . . does not answer the basic questions policymakers face: What missions will the National Guard and 

Reserves perform in their strategic and operational 

roles? How will DoD resource and equip the reserve 

components for these missions so they will be a ready 

force capable of operating both overseas and in the 

homeland? And what can combatant commands, 

the services, service members and their families, and 

civilian employers expect in terms of predictable 

deployments?32
11

For its part, the CNGR did little to define the term. 

A definition can be gleaned from the proposed reform 

objectives, calling for “improving the ability of the NG 

and Reserves to meet all threats to the nation as a part 

of a total integrated force” and: 

a force that is ready, capable, and available for predictable overseas rotations, responses to emergencies 

in the homeland, and strategic depth with the ability 

to surge when required.33

DoD Directive 1200.17, which mandated the OR, 

included the following definition:

RCs as an operational force. The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. 

defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, RCs participate in a full 

range of missions according to their Services’ force 

generation plans. Units and individuals participate in 

missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner 

that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, 

and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units and 

individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As such, 

the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to 

transition to operational roles as needed.34

This “official” definition describes a reserve force 

that can integrate seamlessly with AC forces to conduct a variety of missions, tempered by predictability 

for the RC. One wonders if the “predictable” aspect 

was an afterthought put in to appease those stakeholders (civilian employers, family members, and even the 

Soldiers themselves) who do not particularly like the 
12

alternative—undefined deployments with undefined 

time requirements.35

Regardless of DoD’s official definition and goal of 

predictability, there is still no agreement on what the 

OR should be or how it should be employed. There 

appear to be at least two definitions: one each from 

the AC and RC perspectives. The AC vision of “operational” embodies deployment for combat-related 

missions, largely in support of AC forces.36 The RC 

definition of being “operational” includes the idea of 

supporting the AC for overseas combat missions but 

also encompasses other “real world” missions. 

One NG Adjutant General (TAG) described operational forces as performing “any and all missions that 

have real world projects and impact, including nontraditional missions. Being operational is more than 

deploying.”37 Other RC leaders agreed, saying that 

participation in humanitarian, peacekeeping, stability, and domestic response operations helps to train 

their units and maintain their mission-capable edge.

With two fundamentally different views of what 

the OR should do, it is little wonder that confusion 

exists regarding what each component expects of the 

other. Recent initiatives to align forces with regional 

combatant command theaters may serve to further 

complicate the notions of what “support of AC forces” 

actually means. 

Is it important to define the term “OR” more clearly? Yes. A clear definition will provide a better sense 

of what is expected of the RC and allow a common 

frame of reference for force structure and resourcing 

discussions. Until all components agree and understand what the “OR” should be, animosity and “turf 

wars” will continue to plague the Army. 
13

Perhaps the true issue is the fact that there are three 

“Armies”: the AC, the NG, and the Army Reserve. 

Each one views issues first from its own parochial perspective, then perhaps acknowledges the views of the 

other two. Although the Army Total Force Policy provides a start in reconciling this disparity, policy alone 

cannot eliminate cultural boundaries. More important 

will be the willingness of senior leaders in all three 

components to discuss and agree on what the OR 

should be and do, then actively seek practical methods to integrate the force. One of these methods must 

include attacking the cultural mindsets manifested by 

the leaders in each component. 

WHY AN OR?

The question of why there should be an OR was 

never really asked. The Deputy Chief of the Army 

Reserve stated that operationalizing the RC “was the 

right thing to do.”38 That was pretty much all there was 

to it. In fact, this justification was repeated by senior 

leaders in numerous venues. There did not seem to be 

anyone in the higher reaches of leadership who advocated any other point of view or potential thought 

regarding how this was to be achieved or what this 

actually meant. (Perhaps that is why few alternative 

viewpoints were raised). 

The CNGR rightly explained that the OR concept 

sprang out of necessity due to increased frequency of 

RC use for both overseas contingencies (in Iraq and 

Afghanistan) as well as for homeland-based emergencies.39 The CNGR went to say that the future security environment would be difficult to discern, but 

it would be certain to require RC elements working 

in close conjunction with AC forces in order for the 

United States to achieve its strategic objectives.40
14

The RC has always suffered from a “second class 

citizen” anxiety and has eagerly sought relevance from 

the nation’s AC senior leadership. Increased usage of 

the RC for OEF and OIF was greeted with excitement 

by both USAR and NG leaders. Of course they agreed 

that operationalizing the RC was “the right thing to 

do.” Thus, there was little discourse on what the OR 

concept would mean for the future.

Despite senior AC leaders’ public statements of 

confidence in the RC, one can still sense that those very 

leaders look down on the RC. As the Chief of Staff of 

the Army, General Raymond Odierno, stated during 

a symposium at the American Enterprise Institute in 

July 2013: 

You know, the difference between National Guard, 

Reserve, and active component is the active component can practice every single day. The Guard gets to 

practice 39-40 days out of the year. So if you want a 

football team that can do one practice a month and 

then have two weeks spring training, versus a force 

that can train every single day, there’s a difference.41

Yes, it is a reality that some RC forces will never 

achieve the same training levels as their AC counterparts unless funding and resources are diverted to 

those forces in amounts comparable to those of the 

AC. But statements such as General Odierno’s indicate a lack of knowledge about the innumerable hours 

of extra training and unpaid work that RC Soldiers 

put into their military jobs. It is a standing joke within 

the RC that duty will be “1 weekend a month and 2 

weeks in the summer,” as the requirements are almost 

always greater. These extra efforts cannot erase the 

training gap between the AC and the RC, but AC leaders would be wise to recognize that RC training goes 
15

beyond “1 weekend a month and 2 weeks of spring 

training.” 

Granted, General Odierno followed his statement 

by saying: 

We need the Guard. We need them. We’ve proven that 

over the last 12 years and the Army Reserve. We’re 

going to continue to build an Army that is built on the 

Total Army concept.42

But what will that Army look like? Will it end 

up having an OR, or will the RC revert to being a 

strategic reserve?

FUTURE OF THE OPERATIONAL RESERVE

At this time, there is no way to accurately predict 

whether the Army will maintain the RC as an operational force or return them to being solely a strategic 

backup. Budget cuts will force large changes to the 

Army’s force structure and determine the destiny of 

the OR.

As General Odierno stated during the American 

Enterprise Institute symposium:

So what we should be looking at is what’s best for our 

future. So for me it’s maintaining the right balance of 

forces. We’ve already taken 80,000 out of the active 

component. We’re going to take a significant amount 

more out of the active component, based on sequestration. And we’re going to have to take a little bit out of 

the Guard and Reserve. It’ll be a much less percentage. 

So the overall percentage of our Reserve component 

will be much higher than—will be higher than the active component, where before, the active component 

was higher than the Reserve component. I think that’s 

the right balance. And we’ve got to look at how we’re 
16

going to employ them, not just rhetoric about certain 

parts of the force [emphasis added]. 

. . . So I think we’ve been working with them very 

carefully through all this. We will continue to work 

with them. And my job is to make sure we develop 

the best Army possible for the future. And that’s what 

we’re going to do.43

Regardless of budget issues and limited support 

from AC leaders, the RC has continued the push for 

the OR. At the Reserve Officers Association’s (ROA) 

2013 National Security Symposium, General Frank 

Grass, Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), stated:

We need to continue to engage in the operational missions of our services. . . . We have to look like the Army 

and the Air Force, and we have to have missions that 

get us into the fight so we can continue to grow leaders that can be ready at a moment’s notice anywhere 

in the world [emphasis added].44

The last portion of the CNGB’s statement is critical to understanding why the RC wants to remain 

operational. Without “real world” missions to continue training RC Soldiers and leaders, the experience 

gained in a decade of war will be lost. The RC leaders’ 

fight to maintain the OR cannot be viewed simply as 

wanting to justify their services’ existence. Rather, operational missions are key to maintaining experienced 

leaders and proficient units.

Interestingly, attendees at the ROA symposium 

discussed the possibility of having a partial OR, with 

some units being “operational” and others being resourced at lower, less readily deployable levels.45 This 

idea hearkens back to the mid-1990’s tiered resourcing 
17

when RC units had expectations of their deployability 

based on pre-assigned categories. Tiers were developed by considering the type of unit and how likely it 

was to be needed for deployment, how well the unit 

met its readiness standards, and other factors. In times 

of budget restrictions, such a tiered system is certainly 

more achievable than expecting every RC unit to be 

resourced as an operational asset.

With the wars coming to a close and operational requirements drawing down, however, there is more 

friction developing between the AC and RC. Struggles 

for resources, relevancy, and mission assignments 

color interactions between the components. The AC, 

seemingly for budget savings and efficiency, has begun to resume missions that were routinely conducted 

by the RC for the last decade. Many ARNG and USAR 

units are being off-ramped from future missions for 

which they had already begun training. The AC has 

taken back ARNG commitments to the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) missions,46 the Multinational Force 

and Observers peace-keeping mission in the Sinai, 

Egypt47and in the Pacific, AC forces are replacing 

RC units that have traditionally conducted certain 

engagement-focused exercises.48

This concerns RC leaders, who fear that without 

real world missions to perform, the RC will, in the 

eyes of the AC, once again become irrelevant. As one 

ARNG general stated, ‘Without operational missions 

for us [RC forces], a reserve component ‘death spiral’ 

is likely.”49

In reality, budget restrictions will likely determine the extent to which the RC is maintained as an 

operational force. Tellingly, Congress failed to act on 

a proposed resolution that would have affirmed congressional support for a permanent OR.50 Likewise, 

the 2013 Army Posture Statement never mentioned an 
18

“OR.”51 In February 2013, General Odierno testified to 

the Senate Armed Services Committee that “. . . the 

reduction in overseas deployments which has sustained our reserve readiness over the past 12 years 

may result in us being unable to maintain our OR.”52

None of these bode well for proponents of a fully 

Operational Reserve. 

The future of the OR is still a question. Because the 

answer may involve maintaining at least a portion of 

the RC as an operational force, the remainder of this 

monograph will examine the realities of using the OR. 

First, we will examine the DoD and Army directives 

that outlined the goals and policies for establishing a 

permanent OR and Army Total Force. Then we will 

examine some of the problems and challenges associated with maintaining an operational RC. It is hoped 

that these discussions will assist policymakers in their 

decisions about the future of the RC.

DOD DIRECTIVE 1200.17—MANAGING THE 

RESERVE COMPONENTS AS AN 

OPERATIONAL FORCE 

The OR was formally recognized in October 2008 

when the DoD issued Directive 1200.17, Managing 

the Reserve Components as an Operational Force.

53 The 

directive was a straightforward document that established “the overarching set of principles and policies 

to promote and support the management of the Reserve Components (RCs) as an operational force.”54

The directive defined DoD policies (essentially end 

states), then assigned responsibilities and specific program taskings (ways) to the DoD Under Secretaries, 

Assistant Secretaries, and Secretaries of the Military 

Departments. Most significantly, the directive stated: 
19

It is DoD policy that:

a. The RCs provide operational capabilities and 

strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements 

across the full spectrum of conflict. . . .

b. The Active Component (ACs) and RCs are integrated as a Total Force based on the attributes of the 

particular component and individual competencies.55

Other policies in the directive included:

• Homeland Defense and Defense Support to 

Civilian Agencies (DSCA) are Total Force missions.

• The RCs provide connection to and commitment of the American public.

• The continuum of service is utilized to enhance 

and sustain the all-volunteer force with flexible 

service options. . . .

• Utilization rules enhancing predictability and

prudent use of the RCs are implemented to 

govern frequency and duration of activations, 

while acknowledging that “expectation management is critical to the success of the management of the operational force.”56

• Voluntary duty (per Titles 10 and 32 U.S. Code) 

is encouraged to meet mission requirements.

• RCs are resourced to meet readiness requirements, and tracking mechanisms are in place to 

provide visibility of resourcing efforts.

• Outreach services for RC members, their 

families, and employers are established 

and available from pre-activation through 

reintegration.57

In an enclosure to the directive, DoD assigned specific responsibilities and outlined numerous program 
20

expectations. Importantly, the first tasking was to ensure that “DoD policies support the planning, organization, and utilization of the RCs to provide operational capabilities and strategic depth across the full 

spectrum of conflict.”58 Two significant points were 

addressed here: The RC was to perform both operational and strategic roles, and the RC was to be used in 

missions across the full spectrum of conflict. Instead 

of being considered only as a backup for large-scale 

combat operations, RC units were also to be used for 

noncombat and nontraditional missions; peacekeeping, stability operations, etc. 

Another significant responsibility assigned to the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness was ensuring that:

total force policies encourage optimum integration 

of AC and RC personnel to provide the most efficient training opportunities to all personnel, allow for 

shared use of resources, and provide the most operational benefits and mission capability.59

Additionally, the office was charged with ensuring that “total force assignment policies encourage the 

consideration of RC members to serve in key senior 

leadership positions throughout DoD.”60

The responsibilities delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve and Personnel Affairs 

included developing “policies for managing the RCs 

as an operational force, which is a necessity in an era 

of persistent conflict and global engagement;” “policies that promote use of total force capabilities in support of domestic disaster without interference with 

core defense missions;”61 and “sufficient guidance . . . 

to guide Service implementation of the continuum of 

service concept.”62
21

Finally, the Secretaries of the Military Departments were directed to “implement the provisions of 

this Directive” and “manage their respective RCs as 

an operational force such that the RCs provide operational capabilities while maintaining strategic depth 

. . . across the full spectrum of conflict.”63

The directive’s enclosure detailed five pages of requirements to ensure that DoD provided an RC force 

“available for missions in accordance with the national 

defense strategy”—a rather broad goal. The OR force 

was also to have “capabilities useful for domestic 

disaster response” and “meet operational readiness 

requirements as identified by the President and Secretary of Defense [SecDef].” In other words, the SecDef 

was calling on the RC to conduct “business as usual” 

with respect to being able to respond to homeland disasters as well as to fight in ongoing wars or conflicts.

The Service Secretaries were ordered to “ensure 

appropriate level of full-time support personnel . . . to 

meet readiness requirements of the RCs”; “implement 

the continuum of service construct”; and “program 

and execute resources where required to support a 

‘train-mobilize-deploy’ construct.” The directive further mandated that “funds for training and equipment 

must be provided to coincide with the Services force 

planning cycle . . .” and stipulated that each Service 

Secretary would ensure “resources are provided” for 

medical and dental requirements, equipping needs, 

facilities, training requirements, and even legal assistance to support activation of military personnel.64

What the directive did not say was what would happen if those funds were unavailable. 

In summary, the DoD was directed to integrate the 

RC and AC to form a seamless organization ready and 

able to do all things required, and to do them efficient-
22

ly and effectively. Unfortunately, the directive was 

issued with the apparent assumption that resources 

were bountiful. Left unanswered was the question of 

what to do if resources were limited. Five years later, 

that question still awaits an answer.65

ARMY DIRECTIVE 2012-08. ARMY TOTAL 

FORCE POLICY

In September 2012, 4 years after the DoD directed 

the Services to use “total force policies,” the Secretary 

of the Army issued Army Directive 2012-08, Army Total Force Policy (ATFP). The purpose was to integrate 

the Army’s AC and RC as a “Total Force,” which was 

“an integrated operational force to provide predictable, recurring and sustainable capabilities . . . to fulfill 

national military needs.”66

The Army Total Force Policy has been hailed as a 

“significant step in the evolution of the all-volunteer 

force . . . .”67 The authors of this monograph concur 

that ATFP is a step forward but warn that the ATFP 

has ramifications that were either overlooked or not 

understood by its writers. The ATFP directive contains numerous requirements for the RC that are unrealistic and unachievable. Further, there is a seeming 

lack of recognition that budget constraints will limit 

execution of a significant portion of ATFP’s goals for 

both the AC and RC.

Regardless of the challenges, the success or failure of the ATFP will be determined mainly by the 

expectations and mindset of the leaders who must 

implement the policy. Are the components willing to 

educate themselves on the capabilities and limitations 

of their partners? Are the components willing to set 

aside parochial attitudes and consider the concerns of 
23

the other components? Are the components willing to 

alter their operations to meet the requirements of the 

ATFP? Are they willing to change their organizational 

cultures to replace component-oriented identities with 

a vision of the Total Army? 

To determine if achieving the goals of ATFP is 

even possible, this section will examine the most critical and challenging portions of the Total Force policy 

and suggest ways to mitigate the potential problems. 

The ATFP directive opened with several blanket 

statements that affirmed current methods of operating 

as policy but added the title “Total Force”:

As one Total Force, the Active Army, Army National 

Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve provide operating and 

generating forces to support the National Military 

Strategy and Army commitments worldwide.68

The Army will ensure that the Total Force is organized, trained, sustained, equipped, and employed to 

support combatant commander requirements as force 

packages tailored to achieve anticipated objectives.69

The remaining policy statements were more substantive and will require significant changes to the 

way the AC and RC interact. Although the analysis 

raises more questions than it provides answers, it is 

critical that Army leaders understand these questions 

and develop answers to ensure the success of the 

Army Total Force.
24

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE ARMY 

TOTAL FORCE POLICY

Integration of Tactical-Level Forces.

The ATFP directive stated:

3.c. As appropriate, the Army will integrate AC and 

RC forces and capabilities at the tactical level (division 

and below), consistent with the Secretary of Defense’s 

policies for use of the Total Force. . . . This will include 

some predeployment collective training of tacticallevel organizations, including those organizations that 

will routinely deploy as multi-component forces (for 

example, sustainment brigades and other multifunctional support brigades).70

This tasking can be interpreted in several ways. 

For those who support integration of the three 

Armies, this is a green light to plan together, train 

together, and even form standing multicomponent 

units (vice those that were formed only out of necessity within combat theaters). For those who oppose 

peacetime activations of the RC, execution could be 

limited to “some” combined training, only when RC 

units are slated to deploy. This interpretation would 

also limit intercomponent activity to those units that 

are, of necessity, comprised of multiple components 

(i.e., the type of brigade level units that usually reside 

in the AR). The goal of this statement, while perhaps 

well intended, is so broad that it can be interpreted in 

opposing ways.
25

Training Integration.

The objectives of the Army Total Force Policy—integrated Total Force packages—suggest avoiding the 

“separate but equal” approaches that most of the RC 

currently uses. In the struggle to provide unit-based 

capabilities, the RC has been largely separated from 

the AC, as it trains separately from the units it is 

intended to support. 

The Army School System (TASS), for example, 

encompasses myriad AC, NG, and USAR schools. 

Under TASS, most state NGs operate their own Regional Training Institute; course offerings include officer commissioning programs, the Noncommissioned 

Officer Education System (NCOES), and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) qualification courses. The 

USAR also operates its own schools, with the same 

type of offerings (minus officer commissioning). 

While TASS has done well in limiting overlap in MOS 

courses, there is significant redundancy in officer and 

Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) professional development courses.71

More significantly for the ATFP, most post-Initial 

Entry Training is usually conducted through separate AC and RC programs of instructions (POIs). In 

the past, RC POIs were structured around the RC 

training model, which provided for a weekend battle 

assembly each month and a 2-week annual training 

period per year. The number of slots for RC students 

was limited in AC schools, particularly when an RC 

equivalent was available. Likewise, AC participation in RC schools was limited because the POIs were 

markedly different.72 The Army is developing the One 

Army School System to address this, but challenges 

have arisen in developing POIs that are appropriate 
26

for both RC Soldiers (with limited training time) and 

AC Soldiers (who can train for as long as needed to 

achieve proficiency).73

Likewise, collective training rarely blends the AC 

and RC. RC collective training is normally conducted 

at the unit’s annual training. Few units develop training plans to include the units they are expected to work 

with when mobilized. It would behoove RC leaders to 

seek out their AC counterparts and nest their training plans together. The widely different planning time 

frames from the RC to the AC would need to be addressed (i.e., many RC units lock in their AT training 

sites and objectives 2 years in advance; few AC units 

have any idea what they will be doing in 2 years), but 

surely progress can be made in conducting multicomponent training.

Multicomponent Units.

It may be that the only way—or perhaps the only 

acceptable way—to meet the intent of the DoD Directive is to establish multicomponent units. Indeed, recent pronouncements seem to indicate a fondness for 

these constructs by the highest levels of Army leadership.74

Multicomponent logistic support brigades were 

widely and successfully used in OIF. Ironically, when 

those multicomponent units redeployed and the RC 

elements demobilized, the components went their 

various ways. It would benefit the Army to reestablish 

those unit/component relationships and continue to 

develop them with peacetime training opportunities.

To achieve the intended goals of integrating training and developing multicomponent units, planners 

would be well advised to examine the successes and 
27

challenges of multicomponent endeavors in the past.75

Planners should also interview the leaders of units 

who have trained with the other components, as well 

as those who have trained with other services. Consideration must be given to the vastly different planning timelines and training schedules of the AC and 

RC, and units must cooperate in altering their plans to 

accommodate each other’s needs.

The issues facing multicomponent units are numerous and complex. As the Army moves toward regional alignment of its RC forces, more multicomponent 

units will be formed. For a more detailed discussion of 

the challenges facing an RC unit that has already been 

integrated into an AC headquarters (the USAR’s 9th 

Mission Support Command), an appendix is included: 

Integration Experiences of a Reserve Component Unit Assigned to an Army Service Component Command. 

Uniform Predeployment Readiness and 

Professional Development Standards.

The next requirement contained in the ATFP 

directive was:

4. Army Commands and Army Service Component 

Commands will ensure that the procedures and processes for validating the predeployment readiness of 

assigned forces are uniform for AC and RC units and 

Soldiers. Army commanders will be responsible for 

certifying personnel readiness and individual training for assigned personnel. Standards for qualification 

and professional development will be the same for AC 

and RC personnel.76

Effecting this portion of the ATFP may be the 

most difficult of all. There are three potential problem 
28

areas: achieving uniform readiness validation processes, determining which commanders/headquarters will certify readiness, and requiring identical professional qualification standards for AC and RC.

First, it is impractical to require that the same procedures and processes be used to validate predeployment readiness. While AC units have at least 250 days 

per year to train and test their skills, RC units normally have only 39 days per year. RC units are authorized 

additional training days before deployment, but the 

number is limited by the DoD “1-year mobilization” 

policy.77 It is unlikely that RC units can be validated 

on the same range of skills as their AC counterparts. 

RC brigade and division level headquarters are already challenged by the requirement to validate their 

highest-level collective skills, rather than testing the 

skills they are most likely to use in the theater and 

mission to which they are deploying. While AC units 

might have the time to validate on multiple sets of 

skills, RC units do not. 

One OEF-bound RC brigade combat team, for example, was tested on leading a brigade-sized attack, 

despite the fact that brigade-sized attacks were virtually unheard of for U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Because of the time consumed by that task, the unit was 

unable to train on what it would be doing in theater: 

synchronizing numerous squad and platoon-sized actions across a large area.78 As the sending unit’s NG 

TAG suggested, it would have been worth taking the 

risk of not training on brigade-sized maneuvers in order to focus on the missions they knew the unit would 

have to perform.79

An additional challenge to implementation of the 

“uniform validation procedures” mandate is that 

there is no existing standard procedure for RC valida-
29

tions. Procedures vary widely from one mobilization 

station to another, from the USAR to the ARNG, and 

even from one state’s ARNG to another. For example, 

some TAGs have aggressively sought to validate their 

own units, while others leave it up to the mobilization stations. Many times, RC units are validated in 

a piecemeal fashion, with different headquarters and 

organizations validating different skills. For example, 

an ARNG contingent from 35ID that is deploying 

to Kosovo in January 2014 will be validated at three 

different training sites: Fort Hood, TX; Salina, KS; 

and Hohenfels, Germany.80 Each site’s training team 

will likely use different procedures and even different standards to determine that the unit is ready 

to deploy.

This policy measure will also prove to be difficult in 

that multiple headquarters (i.e., Army Commands or 

Army Service Component Commands) could claim to 

have primacy for validating units. In the case of units 

with multiple headquarters (i.e., regionally aligned 

RC units), who dictates the standards? For example, 

the USAR’s 9th Mission Support Command (MSC)—

the headquarters for the Pacific Army Reserve at Fort 

Shafter, HI—is operationally aligned with and assigned to U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), the active 

army’s Army Service Component Command for U.S. 

Pacific Command. However, resourcing for the 9th 

MSC comes from U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), which definitely has a vote in deciding what 

training it will buy. This is significant, especially if 

USARPAC’s validation standards are more expensive 

than what USARC can afford to provide. While this 

particular unit may be presently viewed as an “outlier,” this same type of relationship will be duplicated 

throughout the RC as it aligns and assigns forces to 

regional combatant commands. 
30

Finally, it is naive to suggest that RC Soldiers can 

meet identical standards for professional development and qualification. Already, many RC Soldiers 

are hard pressed to leave their civilian employers for 

extended Army schooling.81 Increasing requirements 

(i.e., the expectation that “Before the transition to field 

grade, captains should have achieved at least half of 

the credits necessary to earn a master’s degree”)82 will 

place a further burden on RC Soldiers, their families, 

and their civilian employers. 

Additionally, resource constraints will make it difficult for the RC to meet the same standards for qualification and professional development. For example, 

funding restrictions have reduced the number of seats 

available at Officer Educational System (OES) and 

NCOES courses. Some schools have, of necessity, prioritized AC Soldiers and limited the numbers of seats 

available for RC students.83 RC students often have 

to wait longer to obtain a seat and therefore attend 

professional development courses later in their careers than AC Soldiers. In addition, some RC courses 

(i.e., Intermediate-Level Education and the U.S. Army 

War College) may take a significantly longer time to 

complete, since the instruction can be spread out over 

years instead of months.84 RC leaders, who already get 

far less time leading their troops than their AC counterparts, are at a distinct disadvantage when resources 

limit leader development schools. 

A common answer to the problem—to use Distributed Learning (dL) computer classes to replace resident schools—requires RC Soldiers to dedicate countless hours of personal, unpaid time to complete the 

necessary schooling. Soldiers must complete lengthy 

online Structured Self-Development courses as prerequisites to attending NCOES courses.85 Although 
31

strides have been made in compensating Soldiers 

for dL hours,86 the majority of these courses are still 

completed by RC students on “Love Time” (unpaid 

hours). Ironically, RC Soldiers can earn retirement 

points for completing Army e-Learning courses that 

will enhance their civilian qualifications (i.e., information technology certification courses, business leadership, and project management)87 but earn nothing for 

mandated military courses. 

Few will argue that a computer-based course can 

provide the same depth and training experience that 

a resident course can. For example, a Soldier who is 

training to become a nuclear, biological, and chemical 

NCO can learn technical information online, but a dL 

course cannot provide the experience of suiting up in 

protective gear and performing the job in a contaminated environment. Similarly, U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-8-2 states: 

. . . use of dL is not typically as satisfying for leadership courses and does not provide the social benefits 

or professional relationships as that encountered in 

resident PME [Professional Military Education].88

While dL fills some training gaps, it cannot solve 

all of the challenges of achieving identical AC/RC 

qualification standards. 

Streamlined Procedures for Mobilizing the RC.

The next portion of ATFP stated:

5. The Army will streamline the voluntary and involuntary call to active duty of RC personnel and units to 

rapidly expand and sustain Total Army capabilities. 
32

While the intention is clear, the practical methods 

to effect this policy have not taken shape. Indeed, it 

appears the same rules regarding 1,095-day limitations and other prohibitive policies remain in effect. 

The approval authorities for moving from one component to the next remain in effect from previous years. 

To achieve this goal, planners must examine the myriad after action reports of RC mobilizations over the 

last decade. They must extract and analyze the success 

stories, while developing ways to address and correct 

systemic problems. Finally, the DoD must reconsider 

its rules and prohibitions regarding mobilization, and 

determine whether they can be changed to streamline 

the mobilization process.

Equipment.

ATFP’s equipping guidance was:

6. The Army’s equipping strategy will ensure the procurement and equipping processes enable the Total 

Force to perform missions of the Department of the 

Army. 

This policy seems to suggest, again, no necessary 

changes in practice to what is already occurring. The 

challenge will arise when wartime budget supplements are gone and equipment budgets are slashed. 

The Army made tremendous progress over the last 

decade in equipping RC units with modern equipment 

that is compatible with what their AC counterparts 

have. The ARNG generals who were interviewed for 

this project agreed that the ARNG has more and better 

equipment than ever before.89 Their fear is that, with 

decreased budgets and a potential return to strategic 

reserve status, RC units will once again be relegated to 

using obsolete and inadequate equipment.
33

In the current budget environment, it is unrealistic 

to think all RC units can be equipped at the same levels they were under the large wartime budgets of the 

last decade. At a minimum, however, the Army must 

continue to equip those RC units that are most likely 

to deploy. This may not be enough to satisfy RC leadership, but the RC must accept that future budgets 

will not bring all units to 100 percent of requirements.

Integrated Personnel and Pay Systems; Continuum 

of Service; Joint Opportunities.

The last significant policy issue in the ATFP 

directive was:

7. The Army will employ an integrated personnel management and pay system that contains standardized 

business processes and authoritative data for military 

personnel enabling access to secure and reliable data. 

Personnel policies shall incorporate Total Force values 

and facilitate continuum of service and opportunities 

for joint experiences.90

Two critical taskings are included here: Integrating the AC and RC personnel and pay systems, and 

changing personnel policies.

Integrating Personnel Systems.

This is clearly a “pie in the sky” objective for personnel, and pay systems are nowhere close to standardization. Indeed, the AC and RC “systems” comprise a myriad of subsystems and networks that have 

difficulty communicating with each other, let alone 

operating in a coherent fashion to support Soldiers 

from multiple components. 
34

Instead of trying to integrate existing systems, the 

most feasible method of achieving the ATFP’s objective would be to develop an entirely new personnel 

and pay system. Of course, integration was already 

attempted by the DoD when it tried to implement the 

Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS).91 The system, which was supposed 

to have integrated the various component human resource functions and subsumed over 90 subsystems, 

was plagued by problems and delays. When the DIMHRS experiment was finally cancelled, Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen told the 

Senate Armed Services Committee, “This program 

has been a disaster.”92 DIMHRS’s billion-dollar failure 

left the Army with its antiquated human resource systems and little hope for integration in the foreseeable 

future.93

The AC, USAR, and ARNG still have largely separate personnel systems. Some computer integration 

has been done through the use of the Electronic Military Personnel Office (eMILPO), but its capabilities are 

limited. All DD Form 93 (Record of Emergency Data) 

and Service-members Group Life Insurance forms are 

uploaded into the eMILPO system and tracked regardless of component. But that is the full extent of its AC/

RC interconnectivity. RC Soldiers’ retirement points, 

awards, and evaluations cannot be recorded, limiting 

e-MILPO’s ability to track a “continuum of service.”94

Continuum of Service and Joint Opportunities.

Little progress has been made in developing a continuum of service. This concept (also known as “Soldier for Life,”) would allow Soldiers to move more 

easily between the various Army components (Active, 

Reserve, and Guard) to meet the individual Soldier’s 
35

personal needs and desires. Continuum of service 

policies would provide a baseline system of credit so 

Soldiers would remain competitive for promotion and 

be eligible for retirement from any component. This 

goal, while admirable, has not prompted any changes 

to current policies. 

Indeed, the RC also has to contend with the 1,095-

day rule, which essentially prohibits active duty service for operational support for greater than 3 years 

in a 4-year period95—clearly violating any spirit of a 

continuum of service concept. As with many other aspects of having the OR, one must question whether 

there is truly a desire to implement the continuum of 

service. Without major changes to the personnel systems, this concept will remain merely a good idea. 

There is also much work to be done in creating 

joint opportunities for RC Soldiers. While joint opportunities are available for those Reservists who wish to 

deploy or take a full-time tour, part-time joint billets 

are scarce. Other than figurehead positions at large 

headquarters, there are few opportunities available 

for rank-and-file drilling RC Soldiers to work with the 

other services. Ironically, the most numerous joint positions seem to lie in the domestic response arena; each 

state has a multiservice team of Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) to work with the NG in 

planning and responding to domestic emergencies.96

Thankfully, there is hope that part-time joint billets 

will increase with the coming regional alignments of 

RC units to geographic commands. The authors recommend that specific effort be dedicated to identifying and publicizing those billets to increase the joint 

service experience level of the RC.
36

Cultures and Mindsets.

Perhaps one of the biggest obstacles to becoming a 

Total Force will come from the cultures and mindsets 

of the different components—not just the leadership, 

but also the rank and file. 

It is clear the ATFP was written to help combat 

the traditional perceptions that the RC comprised the 

“junior varsity” or “the B-Team”—terms that still get 

used today by even junior and mid-grade officers and 

NCOs in the AC. These perceptions tend to rankle RC 

Soldiers, especially if they have come from a wealth 

of experience in combat operations or from years of 

AC service (both are very common in the RC). In response, many RC Soldiers have adopted an inflated 

view of their own capabilities and insist that they are 

just as proficient as the AC. The RC sometimes fails to 

acknowledge that is it physically impossible to achieve 

the same level of expertise with only a fraction of the 

training time.97

Senior leaders in both components have recognized 

the strong performance of the RC in the recent wars. 

But while the overall acceptance and integration of RC 

units have improved, the reality is that the AC policies and procedures still treat the RC as second-class 

citizens. We see in the areas of training and personnel 

readiness, as well as operational integration within 

commands, a disjointed view of the RC. The situation 

calls for a mass change in organizational culture—one 

that may not be effected for decades.

Another cultural change needed is the recognition 

that each of the three “Armies” within Total Force 

has valuable, unique contributions to make. The AC 

would benefit from recognizing RC Soldiers’ civilian 

skills and domestic emergency response expertise.98
37

The RC would benefit by more gratefully accepting the AC’s training assistance, rather than chafing 

against perceived paternalistic attitudes. 

To gain acceptance by AC leaders, the RC needs to 

“remove the chip from its shoulder” and stop taking 

offense every time a suggestion is made to reduce RC 

funding or manning. Leaders in all components need 

to recognize that their force must share in the pain of 

sequestration and budget cuts. The “our force is more 

valuable and therefore should not be cut” arguments 

are often rooted in a defensive “us versus them” 

mentality and serve no valid purpose in working 

out problems. 

Us versus Them has no place in a Total Force. Leaders and Soldiers in all components need to examine 

their mindsets and discard parochial attitudes. Until 

cultures change, the Army will not change.

ATFP—Realistic or Idealistic?

Is the Army Total Force Policy realistic or idealistic? Cynics would say it is yet another instance of 

senior leader intent not taking into account the practical reality of what can (and cannot) be provided. 

Optimists and visionaries might respond that the 

policy represents a viable end state to which all Army 

efforts should be directed. The true answer probably 

lies somewhere in between. Regardless, it is clear that 

the three Armies have much work to do in the areas 

of integrating training and operations, personnel, resourcing, and—perhaps greatest of all—expectation 

management and cultural change.
38

FORCE GENERATION 

Mobilization of the RC is normally based on “demand signals” from the AC. When the AC anticipates 

a critical shortage of forces to meet its operational 

demands, it turns to the RC to fill the gap. When the 

available AC forces are sufficient to meet the demand, 

RC involvement is considered unnecessary. 

The conflicts of the past decade created a strong 

demand signal for RC forces, for both current and future operations in the “Long War.” To generate and 

ensure the flow of necessary forces (both AC and RC), 

the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model was 

created and implemented in 2006. The ARFORGEN 

model sought to provide a “sustained flow of forces 

for current commitments and to hedge against unexpected contingencies.”99 It was to increase predictability to combatant commanders—Central Command 

(CENTCOM) in particular—by cycling units through 

three force pools: RESET, Train/Ready, and Available. This cycling process was to be “the structured 

progression of unit readiness over time to produce 

trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment. . . .”100 

While not perfectly executed, not tied in with personnel policies, and expensive, it is this same essential 

process the RC seeks to use for continuing its operational support to the AC—even as we enter supposed 

years of relative peace. Is ARFORGEN’s supply-oriented process needed when demand is lacking? More 

to the point, is RC support needed when the AC can 

already meet its operational requirements?

Lacking a demand signal, it appears the RC is hoping to create demand by publicizing its capabilities, 

aggressively seeking nontraditional real world mis-
39

sions, and volunteering for a plethora of engagement 

and training exercises. Under the Army’s move toward 

regionally aligned forces, the RC is placing full-time 

RC Soldiers into Army Service Component Command 

(ASCC) headquarters to continuously remind the AC 

campaign planners and training personnel that the RC 

is still in existence and available for duty. 

It is unclear that the AC leadership fully embraces 

the notion of a RC supplement to the ongoing AC 

missions—to include engagement exercises or civil 

assistance programs. In the Pacific, the Army has reasserted its AC to indicate to the U.S. Pacific Command 

(USPACOM) commander that Army forces are ready 

and relevant to support the “rebalance to the Pacific 

Theater.”101 While this does not necessarily mean a 

complete ousting of RC participants in theater exercises, it certainly means a large reduction in the demand 

for such forces.

The looming question is, of course, whether the 

Army will be able to maintain the funding that is required to keep RC forces in the ARFORGEN’s readiness cycles. Considering that the mobilizations of the 

last decade have been funded almost exclusively by 

Overseas Contingency Operations funds, what will 

happen when those funds are reduced? If funding is 

required from the AC, what incentive exists to siphon 

its primary training dollars to RC training, when it is 

primarily responsible to train AC formations? These 

are questions that have yet to be adequately answered 

by the force generation plans currently being used.

If the goal as articulated in the Army Total Force 

Policy is to “ensure that the procedures and processes 

for validating the predeployment readiness of assigned forces are uniform for AC and RC units and 

Solders”102 and that “standards for qualification and 
40

professional development will be the same for AC and 

RC personnel,”103 then the cost to ensure this undoubtedly will have to rise (especially if other factors, such 

as healthcare, are added into the mix to make the components more equitable). If the supply of available RC 

units remains at its current level (based on rotations 

through the ARFORGEN cycle) but the demand for 

them drops, is it cost-effective to maintain the RC 

units at readiness levels that are not truly required? 

RC leaders would point out the efficiencies gained 

by using “part-time” forces that can be rapidly trained 

and assimilated into the war fight. These efficiencies 

have been cited in numerous venues (mentioned earlier), essentially stating that the RC comprises somewhere around 50 percent of the total Army force but 

costs only about 16 percent. Opponents would respond that because of the demand to get forces into 

Iraq and Afghanistan, predeployment training was 

done to a “good enough” standard—one that obviously worked and allowed quick integration into the 

two operational areas. 

Regardless of how many RC forces are ultimately 

committed to operational missions, the Army needs to 

decide whether ARFORGEN is still the right system 

to use for RC force generation. Proponents emphasize 

the predictability and levels of readiness that ARFORGEN provides, while others go back to the question of 

whether a demand-based model is the best to use in 

peacetime.

The ARFORGEN Model.

It appears the RC wants to continue using the 

ARFORGEN model to prepare and mobilize its units 

for operational missions, regardless of demand. The 
41

Chief, National Guard Bureau, General Frank Grass, 

recently stated, “One of the best things the Army ever 

did was adopt the ARFORGEN model.” His enthusiasm was apparently based on the model providing 

predictability and stability for Soldiers. “Everyone is 

in a cycle,” he said. “People do need a break.”104

Ironically, many of the lower-ranking generals 

who were interviewed for this project were considerably less enthusiastic about ARFORGEN. While 

all agreed the ARFORGEN model was a reasonable 

planning tool, they expressed concern that its planning timelines were disregarded more often than they 

were followed. Numerous examples were given of 

units that deployed two and even three times in 5 or 

6 years—a far cry from the “1 in 5” predicted by the 

model.105 If the model is not going to be followed, they 

asked, why have it?

Soldiers question its use, too. Whereas all of the 

general officers understood ARFORGEN was just a 

planning tool, Soldiers in the field tended to view its 

timelines as a promise. When they had to deploy more 

frequently than 1 year in 5, some Soldiers viewed it as 

a betrayal. They were willing to deploy and “get the 

job done” but were disappointed the Army wasn’t following its own guidelines.106

There was also a marked lack of knowledge about 

the length of ARFORGEN’s planning cycles. Only one 

interviewee even mentioned the steady-state 6-year 

cycle that is supposed to be the norm for RC units in 

peacetime. Instead, everyone spoke of a 5-year cycle: 

RC units would mobilize for 1 year and spend 4 years 

of dwell time. Few seemed to know the 5-year cycle 

was intended only as a surge—“when demand exceeded forces in the Available Force Pool.”107
42

In order for ARFORGEN to be a viable planning 

tool, it is essential that Soldiers understand its rotational cycles, guidelines, and limitations. For example, 

they should know the ARFORGEN regulation specifies an exception to the rotational cycles for “specialized units belonging to an ‘intensely managed 

structure that must maintain a level of readiness that 

allows them to be called upon for periods of high demand’.”108 In other words, certain units (i.e., civil affairs, aviation, and special operations units) are going 

to mobilize and deploy more often than 1 year in 5.109 If 

Soldiers understood the possibility their unit might be 

on a compressed rotational cycle, there would likely 

be fewer complaints about mismanagement of forces.

By and large, the Soldiers interviewed agreed a 

5-year cycle was reasonable for RC units (again, most 

being unaware that the ARFORGEN plan called for 

a 6-year steady-state cycle).110 All expressed concern 

that the necessary readiness levels might be difficult 

to achieve if adequate resourcing were not provided 

in the Train/Ready years. 

There were also RC-specific concerns about the 

model’s lack of realism in trying to achieve a steady 

buildup of readiness. For example, the ARFORGEN 

model posits that changes of command will occur in 

the RESET year.111 That is feasible for AC units that 

are on a 3-year cycle, but not for RC units with a longer cycle. RC command tours are usually limited to 2 

to 3 years, meaning a unit will see multiple commanders and senior enlisted leaders over a 5-year ARFORGEN cycle. This does not bode well for continuity of a 

5-year training plan, as each commander will conduct 

assessments with subjective criteria, regardless of the 

“aim point guidance,” and place different levels of focus on an ever-changing mission essential task list. 
43

Further, ARFORGEN calls for most individual 

training and professional development to occur in the 

RESET year. It is unrealistic to expect that this training 

will be sandwiched into only 1 year of a 5-year cycle. 

Many RC Soldiers are constrained by civilian employment and scheduling issues prohibiting them from 

attending OES and NCOES schools in a given year. 

Also, new personnel will join the RC unit throughout 

the training cycle; those joining in the later years will 

need to be trained, especially if they have not been able 

to get a RESET year to become individually proficient. 

To answer some of the questions about the viability of a 5-year training cycle for RC units, Major General Tim Orr, the Adjutant General of Iowa’s National 

Guard, proposed adapting the ARFORGEN model to 

reflect the realities of peacetime training for the RC. 

Since most RC units are not likely to deploy again in 

the near future, Orr suggested maintaining ARFORGEN’s timelines but revising the goals and expectations for what should be accomplished in each year of 

the cycle. This could also take into account the varied 

probability that units would deploy, laying out more 

stringent readiness aiming points for those specialized units more likely to be mobilized. 

Orr’s ideas for adapting ARFORGEN were practical, realistic, and easy to implement. They go beyond 

the scope of this monograph, but the authors recommend ARFORGEN program managers and RC leaders examine the ideas further.112

As with many other issues, the successful use of 

ARFORGEN as a planning tool will be determined in 

large part by funding available to resource the plan. 
44

BUDGETS AND BARGAINS

In January 2013, Chief of Staff of the Amy (CSA) 

General Raymond Odierno conducted an awards ceremony and had an informal dinner with leaders and 

spouses of the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade at 

Osan Air Force Base, Republic of Korea. During the 

dinner, the CSA spoke frankly about the looming DoD 

reductions in budget and basically affirmed that with 

the continuing resolution, the Army was “short about 

six billion dollars.” He also lamented “sequestration” 

and signaled that if sequestration were to occur, then 

it would likely mean a “17 billion dollar shortfall, and 

if this happens, it will come out of readiness dollars.” 

Regarding benefits, he further added that there would 

not likely be an “impact to Soldier benefits for at least 

several years,” but pointed out that “since 2001, the 

cost of an individual Soldier had doubled, with much 

of that cost found in health care.”113

One month later, testifying before Congress, Odierno spoke forcefully of the fiscal cuts the Army was 

already undertaking under the Budget Control Act 

of 2011: about $170 billion over the next 10 years. He 

cited the Army’s intent to:

[Reduce] active duty end strength from a wartime 

high of about 570,000 to 490,000; the Army National 

Guard from 358,000 to 350,000; the U.S. Army Reserve 

from 206,000 to 205,000; and the civilian workforce 

from 272,000 to 255,000 by the end of fiscal year 2017. 

. . [By 2017] we will downsize our active component 

force structure from 45 Brigade Combat Teams to potentially as low as 32 . . . In 2014, however, we will 

begin significant force reductions. . . .114
45

Perhaps one of the most thought-provoking details 

presented by the CSA was the minimal reductions to 

be allocated to the RC (just 13 percent of all Soldier 

reductions). What was the rationale behind making 

broad cuts to the AC and civilian work force rather 

than the RC? Why not make proportional cuts across 

the board? In an environment characterized by drastic 

reductions in budgetary resources, why was the RC 

spared draconian cuts in end strength?

What Odierno did not say (out loud) was that the 

RC is more “cost-effective.” This fiscal reality has been 

proven by numerous studies and is touted by RC leaders as one of the main reasons the RC should be maintained at current (or even increased) strength levels. 

Not surprisingly, one of those publicizing the fiscal 

wisdom of maintaining the RC is Lieutenant General 

Jeffrey Talley, the current Chief, Army Reserve (CAR). 

In recent testimony to Congress, he stated that: 

[a]s the Army’s Federal OR force provider, the Army 

Reserve provides a cost-effective way to mitigate risk 

to national security, comprising almost 20 percent of 

the Total Army for only 6 percent of the current budget, and adds that this is an excellent “return on investment.”115 Then Acting Director of the Army National 

Guard (DARNG), Major General Raymond Carpenter, 

cited statistics that reflected the ARNG’s 33 percent of 

the total Army’s force while consuming only 10 percent of the total Army budget.116

The 2008 CNGR report gave significant attention to 

discussing the economic and budgetary environment. 

The CNGR concluded that the RC is a bargain: The 

National Guard received about 12 percent of the total 

Army 2008 requested budget, while the Army Reserve 

received only 6 percent, (compared to 66 percent pro-
46

vided to the AC, with the remainder going to research, 

development, testing, and evaluation programs).117

Despite its small portion of the Army’s budget, the 

RC mobilized and deployed in huge percentages and 

greater frequencies than originally planned. 

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) also concluded that the RC provided a bargain for national 

defense:

[T]he most recent report of the Reserve Forces Policy 

Board (RFPB) concluded that while Reserve component forces comprise 39% of the total force, they account for 16% of the costs. It calculated that an Active 

component service member costs taxpayers $384,000 

compared to $123,000 for his counterpart in the Reserves, which would translate into about $2.6 billion 

in savings for every 10,000 positions shifted from fulltime to part-time.118

Critics of these numbers point out that RC formations require more training time to get ready for deployment than AC troops, and that this train-up period could cost more than a steady-state investment. 

They also say the numbers do not take into account 

the economic impact of RC Soldiers being out of the 

civilian economy and therefore may be costing the nation in ways not altogether measurable. 

There is also concern that increased usage of the 

National Guard in a warfighting role would diminish the NG’s ability to perform its homeland role of 

DSCA. Indeed, a state may suffer if its NG Soldiers 

are deployed elsewhere while a natural disaster or terrorist incident occurs in the state. This concern is mitigated in two ways: 1) It is unlikely that a state would 

ever have to deploy all of its forces at the same time; 

and, 2) Emergency Management Assistance Compacts 
47

(EMACs) exist between states to provide domestic response capabilities for states in need.119

Perhaps the real issue is that the AC does not want 

the RC to assume an operational role. Although Senior 

AC leaders have publicly echoed the “let’s have an 

OR” mantra, they have also more privately expressed 

concerns over the concept. Some have mentioned that 

mobilization of the RC during a crisis and during a 

shooting war is one thing, but a regular, peacetime 

mobilization could have drastic effects.

One senior Army commander said in an interview 

for this project, “. . . with the localization of the Reserve component, large mobilizations could destroy 

a community, take down an industry—that is where 

this is fuzzy.”120 This could, indeed, be an issue in certain towns and industries (i.e., law enforcement has a 

heavy percentage of reserve component Soldiers), but 

one must question whether it is a large enough concern to negate the benefits of having an OR.

The budgeting and resourcing process highlights 

the reality that we have three Armies: the AC, the 

ARNG, and the Army Reserve. When it comes to decisions regarding manning, equipping, training, and 

missions, the three Armies vie for precious dollars to 

each serve its own needs. While the Army Total Army 

Force Policy directs that the AC and RC be considered as one,121 it is idealistic to think that the parochial 

fights for resources will abate. 

For example, RC general officers have recently become bolder in directly asking Congress for increased 

funding for specific RC endeavors. Are the RC leaders 

making an “end run” around the Department of the 

Army, “asking lawmakers to do what the Pentagon 

may not want done”?122 As one critic noted, “[The RC 

generals] want to stay part of the operational force in-
48

stead of the strategic reserve because it means they’ll 

get much greater resources.”123 He further surmised 

that maintaining an operational RC “would also increase pressure for deeper cuts in the active-duty 

Army.”124 Are these legitimate concerns, or is this just 

another example of the three Armies posturing and 

vying for increasingly scarce resources?

At his Congressional testimony in January 2013, 

Odierno listed the steps the Army needed to take as 

a result of the expected budget shortfalls for Fiscal 

Year (FY) 13 and FY14.125 He first mentioned furlough 

planning and cuts to civilian personnel; cancellation 

of third and fourth quarter depot-level maintenance; 

cancellation of “all but one of the Brigade maneuver 

Combat Training Center rotations for nondeploying 

units”; and “large reductions of institutional training across the Army” (including reduction of aviation 

training flying hours; courses on DSCA and military 

intelligence; NCO common core courses; the Captains 

Career Course; and Intermediate Level Education 

[ILE]). Odierno also discussed cuts in base sustainment funds, severe reductions in RC pre-mobilization 

medical readiness accounts, and others. 

Odierno ended the long list of budget reduction 

measures by saying: 

Let me emphasize that these readiness issues are not 

limited to the Active Component. They will hit the 

Total Army. In fact, the reduction in overseas deployments which has sustained our reserve readiness over 

the past twelve years may result in us being unable to 

maintain our OR.

126

It remains to be seen whether Congress will deem 

it feasible (or even necessary) to pay for an OR in times 

of relative peace. As the Center for Strategic and Inter-
49

national Studies’ (CSIS) Christine Wormuth stated in 

an analysis of the CNGR recommendations on developing the OR:

[These] recommendations will truly make or break 

transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 

twenty-first century operational force. . . . [H]owever, 

these recommendations come with multi-billion dollar 

price tags—a fact that raises the barriers to their implementation very significantly. The financial cost of this 

transformation is high, but so is the cost of failing to 

make the transformation. Congress and the American 

public thus must engage in an explicit debate about 

the need for an operational force and how to prioritize 

this need against many other competing priorities.127

Indeed, that debate is sorely needed. Without it, 

the fate of the OR could be dependent on the actions 

of accountants with red pens, slashing items they do 

not understand from an extremely tight budget. Our 

Army and its Soldiers deserve better.

RECOMMENDATIONS 

The numerous challenges surrounding RC integration and an OR suggest the creation of a senior level 

working group to delve into the issues and develop 

concrete solutions to problems that have been “kicked 

down the road” for years. The working group should 

have representatives from all three components, preferably officers and NCOs who have both AC and RC 

experience, understand the challenges of the other 

components, and are willing to engage in robust and 

honest discussion.

The working group should address the issues outlined in the following text to develop and recommend 

comprehensive, holistic, and viable courses of action 
50

for the Army’s senior leadership. Emphasis must be 

put on setting aside parochial interests and looking 

at what is best for the Army as a whole. In this manner, an approach can be found that will best serve the 

long-term interests of all components and achieve a 

true Army Total Force.

The issues to be tackled by the working group 

should include:

1. Define with clarity and certainty: what “OR” 

means; the mission(s) of the AC and RC; and the ultimate “demand signal” of the AC to mobilize reserve 

elements. Specify what missions can be accomplished 

solely by the AC, which require RC assistance, and in 

what time frame. Additionally, which missions are 

best suited to the RC only?

2. Clarify the mission command of RC units with 

respect to alignment, allocation, and apportionment to 

AC and geographical combatant commands. Ensure 

all elements understand what is meant by these relationships and what the responsibilities are for each 

unit. Determine which headquarters will: provide 

mission taskings, issue training guidance and validate 

mission essential task lists (METLs), approve training plans, provide resources, ensure inclusion with 

current operational plans and orders, and determine 

availability schedules. 

3. Revisit the 2008 report of the Commission on the 

National Guard and Reserves. Review the commission’s recommendations and validate which are still 

needed to integrate the RC as an operational force. 

Develop courses of action to implement the commission’s recommendations. 

4. Complete a comprehensive, apples-to-apples 

cost-benefit analysis to determine the real costs of an 

OR with respect to the levels of proficiency desired (as 
51

identified in issue 1). Should a high level of proficiency be desired, then provide the necessary resources to 

make it happen (noting, of course, that the level of desired proficiency will be tied to the willingness of the 

Pentagon and Congress to spend on such resources). 

5. Develop personnel, communications, supply, 

maintenance, training, and readiness tracking systems 

that are identical (or at least complementary) for all 

components. Make service in each component “interchangeable” to facilitate the continuum of service. 

Although this would initially be quite expensive, over 

the long term, such efforts would likely pay for themselves through the cost savings of standardization and 

the reduction of three different support networks administering each component’s own method. 

6. Continue strong efforts to educate and involve 

RC families and employers. Without good relations 

between the Army and these civilian support providers, there can be no credible RC.

7. Determine if (or when) it is feasible to require 

identical standards of readiness and professional development as called for by ATFP. 

8. Seek to make RC access to health and dental care 

at the same level as that of the AC, should the determined missions of the RC warrant.

9. Examine the ARFORGEN model to determine 

its viability as a model for managing RC training 

and readiness in peacetime. Explore the possibility 

of maintaining the model but changing the expectations and requirements of each phase in the rotational 

cycle to better match RC training realities (per Orr’s 

recommendation). Determine what impact geographical alignments may have on the ability of the ARFORGEN model to provide globally available RC forces. 
52

10. Collaborate with other military services to share 

experiences and best practices for integrating the RC. 

Form a Joint Working Group to examine the OR from 

a multiservice perspective. 

11. Develop ways to replace component-oriented 

cultures with a Total Force culture. Educate leaders 

on critical thinking, and encourage them to recognize 

and set aside parochial views that place their component’s well-being above that of the total Army. 

CONCLUSION

As the Army confronts drastically reduced budgets 

and a changing security environment, it is essential to 

examine the challenges and requirements of having 

an OR. These recommendations do not encompass all 

of the issues that must be addressed to maintain the 

OR or to better integrate the RC into a Total Force, but 

they do provide a starting point. 

Leaders of both the AC and RC must tackle these 

critical issues. Frank discussion, lessened parochialism, and a willingness to make hard choices are essential. Otherwise, the OR may become a mere footnote 

in the Army’s history.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) Deputy Commanding General (Reserve Affairs) Major General William Beard, interview 

with author John Ellis, January 24, 2013.

2. Military.com, “A History of the Army Reserve,” available 

from www.military.com/army-birthday/history-army-reserve.html.

3. In peer review comments, Colonel Steve Araki mentioned 

that Cold War Reserve units were used in the CAPSTONE and 

WARTRACE programs—aligning strategic reserve capabilities to 
53

specific Active Component units. Oftentimes, this translated into 

individual augmentation fills rather than provision of a mission 

support capability.

4. Kathryn Roe Coker, The Indispensable Force: The Post-Cold 

War Operational Army Reserve, 1990-2010, Fort Bragg, NC: Officer 

of Army Reserve History, U.S. Army Reserve Command, 2013, 

pp. 11-39.

5. This is based on anecdotal evidence only (a perception from 

some RC Soldiers that their training opportunities increased following Operation DESERT STORM). The authors did not delve 

into research of the analysis of training data from the 1990s.

6. Timothy M. Bonds, Dave Baiocchi, and Laurie L. McDonald, Army Deployments to OIF and OEF, Santa Monica, CA, RAND 

Corporation, available from www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/

documented_briefings/2010/RAND_DB587.pdf.

7. Coker, p. 301. As of December 28, 2010, 793,567 Reserve 

Component forces of all services had been activated for Operations ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM, NEW DAWN, 

and NOBLE EAGLE. In the 2 1/2 years since, the number has 

risen to over 800,000.

8. Ibid., p. 18.

9. Reviewer Colonel Steve Araki noted that, while 96 percent 

of all CA assets remain in USAR, the AC is significantly increasing its CA capability, largely to address any immediate CA requirements for the future. 

10. Author Laura Mackenzie recalled first hearing of the RC 

being used as an operational force in April 2005 at a USAWC Reserve Component National Security Issues Seminar. The idea was 

met with surprise but was welcomed by the RC field grade officers who were briefed on the concept.

11. William B. Boehm, Renee Hylton, and Major Thomas W. 

Mehl, In Katrina’s Wake: The National Guard on the Gulf Coast 2005, 

Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, Office of Public Affairs 

Historical Services Division, pp. 29-31. 
54

12. Ibid., pp. 29-30.

13. Roberta Berthelot, The Army Response to Hurricane Katrina, 

Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, Army Heritage 

Education Center (AHEC), September 10, 2010, available from 

www.army.mil/article/45029/. Five years after Hurricane Katrina, 

AHEC published an article summarizing the Army’s response to 

the hurricane disaster. The article is illustrated with an oversized 

picture of the AC’s First Army Commander, Lieutenant Colonel 

Russel Honore, while the text describes almost exclusively the actions of AC units. There are only three sentences devoted to the 

National Guard contribution, and none to the USAR. From reading this article, it would appear that the Army considers only the 

contributions of its AC units to be worthy of remembrance. The 

contributions of the RC, which provided the vast majority of the 

responders to the hurricane, were merely a side note.

14. Ibid.; and Boehm et al, pp. 15-18.

15. Boehm et al, pp. 34-35.

16. Ibid., p 35.

17. “Guard wraps up its time in N.O.; Troops first deployed 

right after Katrina,” The Times Picayune, February 28, 2009, available from www.nola.com/timespic/stories/index.ssf?/base/news1/1235802341228280.xml&coll=1.

18. Robert M. Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 

Utilization of the Total Force, Washington, DC, January 19, 2007, 

p. 1. The memo was addressed to the Secretaries of the military 

departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 

Undersecretaries of Defense.

19. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

20. Arnold L. Punaro et al. “Commission on the National 

Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force,” January 31, 2008. 

Full text is available from www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/CNGR_finalreport.pdf; the Summary is available from www.csis.org/files/media/

csis/pubs/080201_wormuth_cngr.pdf. Hereafter cited as “CNGR.” 
55

21. Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Component as an Operational Force, Washington, DC, October 

29, 2008.

22. CNGR.

23. Christine Wormuth, “The CNGR Final Report: The Best 

Shot for a Stronger, Sustainable Reserve,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), available from 

csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080201_wormuth_ cngr.pdf.

24. DoD Directive 1200.17.

25. Ibid., p. 1, para 1, Purpose.

26. Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-09-720, 

“Army Needs to Reevaluate Its Approach to Training and Mobilizing Reserve Components,” Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Accountability Office (GAO), July 17, 2009.

27. Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-09-898, “Army 

Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy 

for Sustaining an OR Force,” Washington, DC: GAO, September 

17, 2009.

28. Army Directive 2012-08, Army Total Force Policy, Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, September 4, 

2012. Hereafter cited as “ATFP.”

29. U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) Commanding General, 

Lieutenant General Francis Wiercinski, interview with author 

John Ellis, March 1, 2013.

30. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms, Washington, DC: DoD, November 8, 2010 (as amended 

through April 15, 2013).

31. CNGR, quoting Joint Staff “OR Definition,” draft, p. 7. 

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., p. 4.
56

34. DoD Directive No. 1200.17, p. 8, Glossary.

35. Interestingly, when the RC was used for strategic purposes during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, 

there was no assurance that the conflict would limit boots-on-theground time. In 1990, RC personnel deployed without any idea 

of how long the conflict was likely to endure or how long their 

services were to be required.

36. The AC and RC definitions used herein were based on interviews with senior leaders in both components. Although none 

of the interviewees could give a specific definition, each expressed 

definite ideas about what he or she expected an Operational RC 

to do.

37. Adjutant General of Iowa, Major General Timothy Orr, interview with author Laura Mackenzie, March 29, 2013.

38. Deputy Chief of the Army Reserve Major General Alan 

Bell, in conference to 9th MSC command and staff during Battle 

Force Readiness Review in February 2007.

39. CNGR, p. 54. In describing the need for operationalizing 

and restructuring the RC, the CNGR cited the 2005 Defense National Strategy, which “outlined our nation’s security requirements as 

(1) a United States secure from direct attack, (2) ‘strategic access 

and . . . global freedom of action,’ (3) strong ‘alliances and partnerships,’ and (4) ‘favorable security conditions’.” 

40. Ibid., p. 55.

41. Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno in 

a speech to the American Enterprise Institute, July 29, 2013, transcript p. 11, available from www.aei.org/events/2013/07/29/squaringthe-circle-general-raymond-t-odierno-on-american-military-strategyin-a-time-of-declining-resources/.

42. Ibid. Odierno’s phrasing in this quote sounds slightly 

strange, but one must remember that he was responding orally 

to a question that was just posed to him. He was talking about a 

complex issue, and his thoughts were clearly running faster than 

his spoken words. 
57

43. Ibid.

44. “Reserve Chiefs Endorse Staying Operational,” National 

Guard, Vol. 67, No. 9, September 2013, Washington, DC: National 

Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), p 18. This article provides quotes from the meeting. The full meeting notes are 

not yet available from the Reserve Officers Association. 

45. Ibid., p 18.

46. 35th Infantry Division Commanding General Major General John Davoren Kansas ARNG, interview with author Laura 

Mackenzie, February 15, 2013.

47. “6-9 Cav. To support peacekeeping in Sinai,” Ft. Hood, 

TX: 1st Cavalry Press Center, June 19, 2013, available from www.

forthoodpresscenter.com/go/doc/3439/1807255/.

48. Observation by author John Ellis, who works as a contractor at USPACOM; he cites three examples of both Army and 

Air Force Reserve units being replaced in major exercises over 

the past 12 months. The exercises involved were Keris Strike and 

Talisman Saber. 

49. Major General John Davoren interview, February 15, 2013.

50. Senate Concurrent Resolution 48.IS, 112th Congress (2011-

2102), “Recognizing 375 years of service of the National Guard 

and affirming congressional support for a permanent OR as a 

component of the Armed Forces.” This bill was introduced on 

June 12, 2012, by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT). It was referred 

to the Senate Armed Services Committee, which did not act on it.

51. Secretary of the Army John McHugh and Chief of Staff of 

the Army Raymond Odierno, 2013 Army Posture Statement, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, July 3, 2013.

52. General Raymond Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, 

Testimony to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, February 12, 2013.

53. DoD Directive 1200.17, p. 1.
58

54. Ibid., p. 1, para 1, Purpose.

55. Ibid., p. 1, para 4.a. and 4.b.

56. Ibid., p. 2, para 4.f.

57. Ibid., p. 2.

58. Ibid., p. 3, para 1.a.

59. Ibid., p. 3, para 1.d.

60. Ibid., p. 3, para 1.e.

61. Ibid., p. 3, paras 2.a and 2.b.

62. Ibid., p. 3, para 2.c. The “continuum of service” concept 

(also known as the “Soldier for Life” concept), championed by 

Chief of the Army Reserve Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, involved allowing Soldiers to move more easily between the various 

Army components (active, Reserve, and Guard), depending upon 

the individual Soldier’s personal circumstances and “wants,” 

while providing him/her a baseline system of credit for promotion and retirement.

63. Ibid., p. 5, para 10.

64. Ibid., pp. 5-7. 

65. After initial submission of this monograph, the U.S. Army 

Forces Command issued guidance (signed by the U.S. Forces Command Commander, the Chief of the Army Reserve, and the Director of the Army National Guard) regarding ATFP, which echoed 

many of the directives previously issued. It also reinforced the 

concept of RC and AC units training together in a pre-mobilization effort. Once again, it appeared little thought had been given 

about how to accomplish this in a resource-constrained environment, for the policy relies on encouraging tactical commanders 

to train with each other—without any added budget outlays. 

Headquarters, Forces Command (FORSCOM) Memorandum, 

SUBJECT: Army Total Force Policy Implementation—FORSCOM 

Interim Guidance, December 10, 2013.
59

66. Ibid., p. 1.

67. Defense Report 12-1, “Army Total Force Policy: Fully Integrating the OR,” Arlington, VA: Association of the U.S. Army, 

Institute of Land Warfare, December 2012, available from www.

ausa.org/publications/ilw/Pages/default.aspx, link Army Total Force 

Policy: Fully Integrating the OR.

68. ATFP, p. 1, para 3.a.

69. Ibid. This statement may be the basis of the move to establish regionally aligned forces (RAF)—forces that are focused 

upon a certain geographical combatant command and are available for that command’s use during the units’ operational rotation 

time frame.

70. John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army, Memorandum, 

SUBJECT: Army Directive 2012-08, Army Total Force Policy, September 4, 2012, para. 3.c., p. 2.

71. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 350-18, The Army School System, Fort Monroe, VA: Department of the Army, July 21, 2010.

72. Authors’ observations are from John Ellis’s Army Reserve 

duties and reports from the U.S. Army Reserve Command in various venues/command and staff meetings, further informed by 

conversations with the command and staff of the 4960th Multifunctional Training Brigade; and Laura Mackenzie’s experience 

as a TASS battalion commander.

73. Colonel Steve Araki, Commander 4960th Multifunctional Training Brigade, in peer review comments to the authors, 

September 2013.

74. Specialist First Class Crista Mary Mack, U.S. Army 

Homepage, “Chief of Army Reserve Champions Use of Reserve 

and Multi-compo Units during Pacific Visit,” April 9, 2013, available from www.army.mil/article/100628. Lieutenant General Jeffrey 

Talley, CAR, is quoted: “Gen. Odierno [Chief of Staff of the U.S. 

Army] thinks multi-compo units are the way to go as the way of 

the future. . . .”
60

75. A study of World War II would provide myriad examples 

of multicomponent units. 

76. ATFP, p. 2.

77. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates Memo, Utilization of the 

Total Force, p. 1.

78. Major General Orr interview, March 29, 2013. This story 

referred to the experiences of 2nd Brigade, 34th Infantry Division, 

IAARNG. 

79. Major General Orr interview, March 29, 2013.

80. Interview conducted with a company grade 35ID officer at 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, September 2013.

81. The authors’ experiences and discussions with Soldiers 

throughout their careers have shown that lengthy professional 

development schools (both NCOES/OES and MOS qualification) 

are a hardship for RC Soldiers and their employers. In general, 

as the Soldiers progress in the military, they also move ahead in 

their civilian careers. As civilian job responsibilities increase, it 

becomes more difficult to break away for military schools.

82. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, The Army Learning Concept for 

2015, Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, U.S. Department of the Army, 

January 20, 2011, p. 54. 

83. The authors’ experiences and conversations with 

RC Training NCOs and staff at Regional Training Institutes, 

January 2014.

84. A common format for nonresident ILE is for students to 

attend classes either on weekends or at night, taking up to 18 

months just for the common core. Distance education for USAWC 

is done individually at home, taking 2 years and 3 months to complete (vice 10 months for the resident school). 

85. “Structured Self-Development,” Ft. Bliss, TX: U.S. Army 

Sergeants Major Academy, available from https://usasma.bliss.

army.mil/page.asp?id=9.
61

86. Some RC units now allow an occasional “Virtual inactive 

duty training”—a day when Soldiers can complete annual mandatory training courses (equal opportunity, ethics, safety, etc.) online from home in lieu of attending drill. Soldiers are given their 

full drill pay for completing the courses by the unit’s deadline. 

Often this is done to meet mandatory training/education requirements where computer resources at the battle assembly/drill site 

are lacking.

87. “Army e-Learning Overview,” available from www.dls.

army.mil/Army_e-Learning.html. RC Soldiers can earn one retirement point for every 3 hours of e-Learning training.

88. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, p. 52.

89. Author Laura Mackenzie’s interviews with Major General 

Orr (March 29, 2103), Major General Davoren (February 15, 2013), 

and the Adjutant General of Kansas, Major General Lee Tafanelli 

(February 15, 2013). 

90. ATFP, para. 7.

91. Tom Philpott, “Military Update: Mullen pulls plug on 

problem-plagued DIMHRS pay program,” Daily Press, February 

21, 2010, available from articles.dailypress.com/2010-02-21/news/

dp-local_milupdate_0222feb22_1_military-personnel-payroll-navyand-air-force.

92. Tom Philpott, “Combined Pay and Personnel Plan Nixed,” 

Military.com, February 18, 2010, available from www.military.com/

features/0,15240,210873,00.html.

93. “DIMHRS DoD: Integrated pay system is not total loss,” 

Air Force Times, March 15, 2010. 

94. Observation by author John Ellis, verified by G1 personnel 

specialists in the 9th MSC.

95. Ronald J. James, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Memorandum, “Policy for Management of Reserve Component Soldiers on Active Duty for 
62

Operational Support and Full-Time National Guard Duty for Operational Support,” Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 

February 21, 2008, p. 3.

96. Most states’ EPLO teams are comprised of Reservists from 

the USAR, Air Force Reserve, and Naval Reserve. The EPLOs’ 

role is to advise the region and state’s NG leaders on what Title 

10 resources are available to assist in domestic emergencies and 

to coordinate use of those resources when needed. Responsibilities for the EPLO program are outlined in DoD Instruction Number 

3025.16, September 8, 2011, SUBJECT: Defense Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) programs. 

97. The RC’s refusal to admit that it cannot achieve the same 

proficiency standards was clear in the recent arguments over CSA 

Odierno’s comments that AC and RC capabilities are not interchangeable. Odierno stated:

The capabilities are not interchangeable . . . there’s a reason 

why the active component is more expensive. It brings you 

a higher level of readiness, because they’re full time. They 

are trained and ready to do things at a higher level because 

they spend every day focused on that. Our National Guard, 

[which has] done an incredible job in the last 10 years, trains 

39 days a year.

Both the Chief, National Guard Bureau, and President of the 

NGAUS disagreed with Odierno’s remarks. The CNGB stated 

“the idea of doing 39 days a year, to me, doesn’t exist anymore” 

(an idea that many RC Soldiers would echo). The NGAUS president, however, went so far as to state that Odierno’s remarks 

were “disrespectful and simply not true.” How so? They are factual, common-sense statements. It is beyond this author’s understanding how RC leaders can believe that training part-time can 

achieve the same proficiency as training full-time. Paul McLeary, 

“Trouble Brewing Between US Army’s Active Duty and Guard 

Forces,” Defense News, January 13, 2014.

98. The greater civilian expertise and advanced education of 

many Reservists are among the arguments against increasing civil 

affairs capability in the AC. Many AC Soldiers have only military experience; without complementary civilian experience, they 
63

might be lacking in the requisite background needed by successful civil affairs specialists.

99. Army Regulation 525-29, Army Force Generation, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, March 14, 2011, p. 1, para. 1-7.

100. Ibid.

101. Comments from Lieutenant General Robert Brown, Commander I Corps, during Exercise Talisman Saber, July 13, 2013. 

102. ATFP, p. 2, para 3.d.

103. Ibid., p. 2.

104. “Reserve Chiefs Endorse Staying Operational,” National 

Guard, Vol. 67, No. 9, September 2013, Washington, DC: National 

Guard Association of the U.S. (NGAUS), p 18. 

105. Tafanelli, Davoren, and Orr interviews.

106. This is based on the authors’ discussions with numerous 

RC Soldiers.

107. Army Regulation 525-29, p. 2, para 1-7.e.

108. AR 525-29, p 4, para 1-10.b. (3). The quotation within 

the cited paragraph (“. . . intensely managed structure that must 

maintain a level of readiness that allows them to be called upon 

for periods of high demand.”) has no reference within the AR to 

indicate its origin. 

109. Major General Davoren interview.

110. Davoren, Tafanelli, and Orr interviews.

111. Army Regulation 525-29, p. 3, para. 1-10.a.(1).

112. One means for exploring Orr’s ideas for adapting ARFORGEN for peacetime use would be for the Strategic Studies Institute to commission a study. 
64

113. Colonel Stacey Yamada, Commander of the 658th Regional Support Group, from notes he took while in attendance at 

the dinner, January 11, 2013.

114. Odierno testimony, February 12, 2013.

115. Lieutenant General Jeffrey Talley, Congressional testimony before the U.S. House Appropriations Subcommittee on 

Defense, 2nd Sess., 113th Cong., Washington, DC, March 20, 2013.

116. Major General Raymond Carpenter, Congressional testimony before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee No. 112-

75, Washington, DC, October 12, 2011.

117. CNGR, p. 65.

118. Christopher Holshek: “Preserve the Reserves,” Foreign 

Policy, March 15, 2103 available from www.foreignpolicy.com/

articles/2013/03/15/preserve_the_reserves. 

119. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

(EMAC) is an agreement signed by all 50 states and four territories 

that “offers assistance during governor-declared states of emergency through a responsive, straightforward system that allows 

states to send personnel, equipment, and commodities to help 

disaster relief efforts in other states.” The EMAC website offers 

further information at www.emacweb.org/index.php?option=com_ 

content&view=article&id=80& Itemid=256.

120. Wiercinski interview. 

121. ATFP.

122. Mark Thompson: “No [Strategic] Reservations,” Time, 

April 19, 2013, available from nation.time.com/2013/04/19/verbalattacks-on-strategic-reserve.

123. Ibid. Thompson was quoting Lawrence Korb, former 

Pentagon top civilian during the Reagan administration and currently at the Center for American Progress. 

124. Ibid.
65

125. Odierno testimony, February 12, 2013.

126. Ibid.

127. Wormuth, p. 2.
66

APPENDIX

INTEGRATION EXPERIENCES OF A

RESERVE COMPONENT UNIT ASSIGNED TO 

AN ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND

This case study is based on the personal experiences of this monograph’s lead author, John Ellis. 

He is a USAR colonel who is assigned as the Deputy 

Commander, 9th MSC.

To understand some of the less obvious challenges 

facing Reserve Component (RC) assigned to an Active 

Component (AC) headquarters, a case study of the 9th 

Mission Support Command (MSC) is presented. The 

issues discussed herein are not intended as criticisms 

of either the AC or RC. Rather, they are presented as 

points of discussion to assist planners and decisionmakers when considering the future integration of active and reserve units as well as the restructuring of 

the units into multicomponent formations.

BACKGROUND

The 9th Mission Support Command is a 3,500-member U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) unit assigned directly 

to U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), an Army Service 

Component Command (ASCC) headquarters. The 9th 

MSC receives its operational mission taskings from 

USARPAC in an operational control mission command relationship, but nearly all of its resources come 

from its RC headquarters, the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), which retains “shared administrative 

control” over the unit. The 9th MSC leaders answer 

to at least two different bosses, and there is some-
67

times confusion in determining which headquarters’ 

taskings and policies will take precedence. In such a 

situation, the unit’s standard operating procedure is 

to implement the more stringent, but nonetheless, adherence to two different requirements can be difficult. 

While the 9th MSC can be considered as an “outlier” because of its unique geographic and command 

situation, its experiences are illustrative of what other 

RC units will face as regional alignment takes place. 

Following are some of the less obvious areas that present challenges for this operationally assigned unit.

Inclusion of RC leaders in the Planning/Operations 

Processes.

USARPAC does a very good job of including its 

Reserve components into theater campaign planning 

and execution. Its primary RC unit, the 9th MSC, is 

invited to all battle rhythm events, to include the highest-level command and staff conferences, battle update briefings, coordinating and special staff endeavors, and installation-oriented meetings. Part of the 

challenge comes because the majority of these meetings are held Monday through Friday, when the 9th 

MSC leaders are working at their civilian, not USAR, 

jobs. Although there is a general understanding and 

acceptance when full-time civilian and authorized 

government representative (AGR) personnel have to 

attend in the stead of the commander and his deputy, 

the lower-ranking AGR personnel cannot necessarily 

commit the command to certain requests. Information 

and time are lost in the transmittal to the MSC commander, and the RC leaders’ input often comes after 

the AC staff has pressed on and gained a decision. 

However, we hasten to add that over the past 5 years, 
68

the integration of 9th MSC into USARPAC headquarters’ initiatives and efforts has increased markedly at 

the senior and even the action officer levels. Most of 

the challenges come from administrative and communications systems that tend to not address USAR 

abilities to participate more fully.

Constant Education Process Regarding Usage and 

Mobilization of RC Units.

As this monograph’s opening vignette illustrated, 

there is sometimes a lack of understanding about how 

RC units can be tasked and mobilized. RC personnel 

must be diligent in training their AC headquarters on 

mobilization procedures, time limitations, and RCspecific policies. They must also be honest in reporting 

readiness levels. Although the RC’s widespread crossleveling of the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM/Operation ENDURING FREEDOM mobilizations worked, it 

would not be a viable practice for the long term.

Another area for education is the different timelines upon which AC and RC units must operate. Every area of administration and operations has myriad 

examples of different timelines: completion of personnel evaluations, disciplinary actions, supply transfers, 

line of duty investigations, mandatory training requirements, etc. The components must educate each 

other on their timelines and make accommodation 

where necessary to meet differing requirements.

The USARC is currently addressing this nearconstant educational challenge with deployments of 

teams of AGR officers to assist the ASCC staff in the 

planning and integration of Reserve forces into AC 

operations in theater. These efforts are embryonic, and 

it remains to be seen how effective they can be with 
69

the ASCC leadership. The first of these teams (known 

as Army Reserve Engagement Cells) stood up in 

August 2013.

Mission Command.

A question that often arises is, “Which headquarters is in charge? The operational headquarters (USARPAC) or the administrative headquarters (USARC)?” 

Rather than being a turf war, this is a question that has 

wide-ranging implications.

In the case of validating readiness, for example, 

who will determine the readiness standards and 

compliance? The common-sense answer might be the 

operational headquarters, since they will be the ones 

employing the 9th MSC. However, resourcing comes 

from USARC, which definitely has a “vote” in what 

training it can and will pay for. This can be a problem, 

particularly if the USARPAC’s standards are more 

“expensive” than what USARC can afford to provide. 

Further, which headquarters should provide the 

necessary predeployment guidance and standards? 

From which headquarters will regionally aligned 

forces (RAF) get their marching orders? Which headquarters will approve their mission analyses, training 

METLs, and annual training plans? 

Information Assurance Measures. 

Many of USARPAC’s communications systems 

and information security requirements hinder RC 

inclusion. For example, the USARPAC LandWarNet 

communications system will automatically delete 

e-mail accounts for Soldiers who have not logged 

into the computers at least once every 30 days. This 
70

happens routinely for some troop program unit 

(TPU) drilling Soldiers, as battle assemblies may occur more than 30 days apart. Soldiers who are conducting training at a different location might also 

miss the time frame. When this occurs, the Defense 

Information Systems Agency (DISA) is currently requiring a redefinition of the Soldier’s requirement 

to possess an e-mail account, making the process 

cumbersome.

Additionally, the USARPAC servers can only 

be accessed from computers in and around the Fort 

Shafter area or from 9th MSC unit locations in Guam, 

Saipan, American Samoa, or Alaska. They cannot be 

accessed from civilian or even other Department of 

Defense (DoD) computers. This severely limits the 

RC Soldier’s ability to keep up with USARPAC message traffic. A Reserve officer who has a civilian job 

working at USPACOM could not, for example, access 

USARPAC SharePoint pages and/or webmail via his 

government computer during his lunch or after duty 

hours. The 30-day log-on requirement has therefore 

posed a real challenge to RC Soldiers who do not live 

close to the unit. 

Ironically, USARPAC’s LandWarNet is operated 

by a multicomponent unit (although the e-mail system is, as mentioned, operated by DISA).

Healthcare.

Another example of limited integration is found in 

the availability of healthcare services for 9th MSC Soldiers. Great strides have been made in the past decade 

regarding RC Soldiers’ access to a viable and workable healthcare system. Nevertheless, the RC healthcare system does not match or compare to that of the 
71

AC. This impacts readiness levels when 9th MSC units 

are compared to AC units, and the methods to achieve 

higher medical and dental readiness require a much 

greater deal of time, effort, and money to effect than 

the AC requires.

In many cases, while 9thMSC’s RC Soldiers can get 

(and pay for) Tricare insurance, they may live or be 

posted in a place where there are no Tricare providers 

available (like American Samoa or Saipan). Additionally, the RC Soldiers cannot receive medical or dental 

screening or treatment at AC clinics unless they are on 

orders lasting 30 days or more. This can be problematic for RC Soldiers living in Korea, Japan, Alaska, and 

Guam, where U.S. medical facilities exist but are not 

required to provide any care for these Soldiers.1

In those cases where medical or dental care is provided, RC Soldiers have a much lower priority. Granted, healthcare for the RC is one of the easiest areas to 

justify cutting during austere times. Considering that 

RC Soldiers want assurance that their post-deployment medical needs will be met (and preferably not 

just by an already overburdened Veterans Administration); however, decisionmakers may want to find 

ways to increase RC access to existing AC facilities.

SUMMARY

These examples are not cited to point fingers at 

USARPAC’s systems or the mindset of its senior officers, for indeed, this command is arguably the most 

integrated command of all the ASCCs. USARPAC and 

the 9th MSC have made tremendous progress in integrating their AC and RC units. The concern is that 

even with such forward-leaning leadership, the RC 

integration for the rest of the Army will have to deal 
72

with similar situations. Aligning and integrating the 

rest of the RC with the AC units they support will take 

considerable planning and procedural changes. 

Most importantly, the organizational cultures will 

have to change to better adapt to the mix of AC and 

RC operations. The AC must accept the strangeness of 

the RC and its idiosyncratic procedures, at least until 

the Army Total Force Policy takes practical and implementable effect. Likewise, the RC must understand 

that it must truly adapt to the needs of the AC units it 

supports—instead of often guessing what is required. 

Until that happens, the “talk” of integrating the RC is 

not matching the “walk” the RC faces each day. 

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX

1. There has been progress in this regard, and RC Soldiers in 

these areas now enjoy a small degree of access (for screening and 

some smaller-scale treatment). This access has been the result of 

“workarounds” and memorandums of agreement with the Pacific 

Regional Medical Command leadership. Clinic commanders can 

abruptly end the policy if it appears these facilities cannot meet 

the demand of the AC and their dependents.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Authors

Colonel John D. Ellis, U.S. Army Reserve

Colonel (Retired) Laura McKnight Mackenzie

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil
This Publication SSI Website USAWC Website 

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