J-S53040-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

AHMAAD RASHAD HOLTON

 Appellant No. 1756 MDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order September 22, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division

at No(s): CP-22-CR-0001297-2011

BEFORE: BOWES, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2016

Appellant, Ahmaad Rashad Holton, appeals pro se from the order 

entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his second 

Post Conviction Relief Act1(“PCRA”) petition. Appellant contends that his 

guilty plea counsel was ineffective and also avers that the trial court erred 

by failing to apply Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) 

retroactively. We affirm.

On September 21, 2011, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to 

robbery, criminal conspiracy, person not to possess firearms, and carrying a 

firearm without a license. That same day, the trial court sentenced him to 

an aggregate term of eleven to twenty-two years of imprisonment. 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S53040-16

- 2 -

Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion or direct appeal. On October 

3, 2011, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. Counsel was 

appointed on October 5, 2011, and was subsequently granted leave to file a 

supplemental PCRA petition on behalf of Appellant. However, PCRA counsel 

filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 

A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. 

Super. 1988) (en banc), which the PCRA court granted by order dated 

December 2, 2011. On December 28, 2011, the PCRA court issued an order 

dismissing Appellant’s first PCRA petition. Appellant filed a timely appeal, 

which this Court dismissed on May 8, 2012. 

Over two years later, on December 12, 2014, Appellant filed the 

instant, pro se PCRA petition. After the PCRA court denied Appellant’s 

motion for the assignment of counsel but granted him an extension of time, 

Appellant ultimately filed a supplemental PCRA petition on April 6, 2015. On 

July 2, 2015, the PCRA court issued a memorandum opinion and order 

containing the court’s Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss

Appellant’s second PCRA petition. On September 22, 2015, the PCRA court 

dismissed Appellant’s petition. Appellant filed a timely appeal and a courtordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. 2

 On December 29, 2015, the PCRA 

 

2 We note that the PCRA court found Appellant’s instant claims to be waived 

due to his failure to file a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of matters 

complained of on appeal. Trial Ct. Op., 12/28/15. Conversely, Appellant 

contends that he did file a timely Rule 1925(b) statement, based upon the 
J-S53040-16

- 3 -

court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion incorporating the analysis set forth in 

its Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss.

 This appeal followed wherein Appellant raises the following issues for 

our review:

1. Whether plea counsel (Deanna Muller, Esq. and Royce 

Morris, Esq.) rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by 

inducing Appellant to plead guilty to an aggregated 

sentence that ran consecutively which created a sentence 

that was manifestly excessive and clearly unreasonable.?

2. Whether plea counsel (supra) were ineffective for failing 

to conduct an independent inquiry as to whether 

Appellant’s plea colloquy was knowing, voluntary and 

intelligent?

3. Did the trial court err in asserting that Alleyne v. 

United States did not apply retroactively to those on 

collateral review, where the Supreme Court’s ruling is 

clearly one of a “substantial nature” pursuant to Schriro 

v. Summerline, 542 US 348 (2004)[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 3. 

Appellant argues that his plea counsel was ineffective for inducing him 

to plead guilty to a manifestly excessive sentence and for failing to ensure 

that his guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. Appellant 

also contends that his sentence is illegal pursuant to Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 

2163 (holding that any fact that invokes application of a mandatory 

 

timing in which he received the PCRA court’s order directing him to file such 

statement from the SCI-Houtzdale institutional mail. Appellant’s Letter to 

Prothonotary, filed 6/06/16. For purposes of this appeal, we assume that 

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was timely. 
J-S53040-16

- 4 -

minimum sentence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and 

submitted to a jury). Id.

“Our standard of review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition 

is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported 

by the evidence of record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. 

Wilson, 824 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc) (citation omitted). 

However, it is well established that the timeliness requirements of the PCRA 

are jurisdictional in nature as our Supreme Court has explained:

the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in 

nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court is precluded from 

considering untimely PCRA petitions. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 ([Pa.] 

2000) (stating that “given the fact that the PCRA’s 

timeliness requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional 

in nature, no court may properly disregard or alter them in 

order to reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA 

petition that is filed in an untimely manner”); 

Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 220 ([Pa.] 1999) 

(holding that where a petitioner fails to satisfy the PCRA 

time requirements, this Court has no jurisdiction to 

entertain the petition). We have also held that even where 

the PCRA court does not address the applicability of the 

PCRA timing mandate, th[e] Court will consider the issue 

sua sponte, as it is a threshold question implicating our 

subject matter jurisdiction and ability to grant the 

requested relief.

Commonwealth v. Whitney, 817 A.2d 473, 477-78 (Pa. 2003) (some 

citations and parallel citations omitted).

A PCRA petition “must normally be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment becomes final . . . unless one of the exceptions in § 9545(b)(1)(i)-

(iii) applies and the petition is filed within 60 days of the date the claim
J-S53040-16

- 5 -

could have been presented.” Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 941 A.2d

646, 648 (Pa. 2007) (some citations and footnote omitted). Pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3), “[a] judgment becomes final at the conclusion of 

direct review by this Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the 

expiration of the time seeking such review.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 

A.3d 14, 17 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).

When a petition is filed outside the one-year time limit, petitioners 

must plead and prove the applicability of one of the three exceptions to the 

PCRA timing requirements. Commonwealth v. Johnston, 42 A.3d 1120, 

1126 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“If the petition is determined to be untimely, and 

no exception has been pled and proven, the petition must be dismissed 

without a hearing because Pennsylvania courts are without jurisdiction to 

consider the merits of the petition.” (citation omitted)). The three 

exceptions to the general one-year time limitation are:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result 

of interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or 

laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of 

the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period 

provided in this section and has been held by that court to 

apply retroactively.
J-S53040-16

- 6 -

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). 

In the case sub judice, Appellant did not file a direct appeal and 

therefore his judgment of sentence became final thirty days after his 

September 2011 sentencing. See Jones, 54 A.3d at 17; 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(3). Thus, his instant PCRA petition, which was filed in December 

2014, is untimely on its face. Appellant does not assert that any of the 

exceptions in Section 9545(b)(i)-(iii) apply to this case. Accordingly, the 

PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant’s claim and 

we cannot address his PCRA petition. See Johnston, 42 A.3d at 1126. 

Further, it is of no moment that the PCRA court did not specifically address 

the untimely nature of Appellant’s PCRA petition, because this Court will 

address this threshold question sua sponte. See Whitney, 817 A.2d at 

477-78. 

We note that even had Appellant argued that his Alleyne claim 

constituted an after-discovered constitutional right pursuant to the PCRA 

time-bar exception 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), his claim would lack merit. 

Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court has held that Alleyne applies retroactively to untimely PCRA petitions. 

Indeed, our Supreme Court recently held that Alleyne does not apply 

retroactively to cases pending on collateral review. Commonwealth v. 

Washington, ___ A.3d ___ , ___ , 2016 WL 3909088 at *8 (Pa. July 19, 

2016). Accordingly, because Appellant has not established any of the 
J-S53040-16

- 7 -

timeliness exceptions to the PCRA time-bar, the PCRA court lacked 

jurisdiction to address his claims and we affirm the dismissal of Appellant’s 

instant untimely PCRA petition. See Johnston, 42 A.3d at 1126. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/15/2016