J-S78034-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOHNNIE LEE BOWIE

 Appellant No. 497 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 26, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division

at No(s): CP-02-CR-0009855-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J., and FITZGERALD,*J.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED MARCH 16, 2017

Appellant, Johnnie Lee Bowie, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas following his bench 

trial convictions of persons not to possess firearms,1and two counts of theft 

by unlawful taking―moveable property.2 Appellant challenges the weight of 

the evidence and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm. 

The trial court’s opinion summarized the relevant facts as follows:

[Appellant] and Julie Cosentino were involved in a 

romantic relationship. On April 26, 2014, they spent the 

night together at Ms. Cosentino’s apartment. After she 

awoke the next morning, Ms. Cosentino decided that she 

wanted to go to the local Giant Eagle supermarket to buy 

some food for breakfast. [Appellant] remained in the 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1). 

2 18 Pa.C.S. 3921(a). 
J-S78034-16

- 2 -

residence. When Ms. Cosentino returned home, 

[Appellant] was gone. Cash in the amount of 

approximately $2,000 and a Taurus nine millimeter firearm 

were missing from Ms. Cosentino’s apartment. The cash 

had been kept inside Ms. Cosentino’s bedroom closet. The 

firearm had been kept in a backpack in Ms. Cosentino’s 

bedroom. Ms. Cosentino suspected [Appellant] of taking 

the items because he had previously seen her retrieve 

cash from her closet.

Ms. Cosentino immediately attempted to contact 

[Appellant]. She sent him text messages advising him 

that she needed the cash and asking him to return the 

cash and the firearm. [Appellant] sent text messages back 

to Ms. Cosentino telling her, “I'll be back, I promise.” He 

texted, “I'll explain.” He further texted

It was wrong how I did that, but things went 

smooth. I know I probably lost you but here’s the 

deal. I can give you $250 every other day. Shit’s 

going to move. 

Ms. Cosentino sent him a text message telling [Appellant] 

that she wanted the gun back. [Appellant] sent her a text 

message back advising that, “[y]ou can have your fucking 

gun. I know what happened wasn’t cool but you are not 

going to keep talking shit to me.” Ms. Cosentino never 

gave [Appellant] permission to take the cash or the 

firearm. . . . 

Trial Ct. Op., 6/29/16, at 2-3. During the bench trial, Ms. Cosentino testified 

on direct examination:

[The Commonwealth:] When did the firearm go missing?

[Witness:] The day I had woke up in April, that morning.

* * *

Q. And who else had access to your home during that 

period of time?

A. Just my roommate and [Appellant].
J-S78034-16

- 3 -

* * *

Q. You mentioned the gun was missing. Was there 

anything else you noticed missing when you woke up on 

that morning?

A. All of my money.

Q. Where had your money been?

A. I had it stashed away in [my bedroom] closet.

* * *

Q. Did you show him where the money was?

A. I believe he seen me one day get money out of my 

closet. That’s the only way I could possibly think of him 

knowing where it was.

* * *

Q. How much money was taken?

A. About $2,500.

* * *

Q. How did you know how much money there was?

A. I usually keep a record in my phone about how much 

money I keep in that box and how much money I have in 

my bank account.

Q. What did you do when you discovered these items 

were missing?

A. I continuously texted him, called him. . . . 

Q. You indicated that you sent text messages to him?

A. Yes. 
J-S78034-16

- 4 -

Q. When did you do that?

A. Immediately as soon as I came home and I noticed 

that he was no longer in my place. 

Q. . . . Did you notice these items were missing around 

the same time you noticed [Appellant] was missing from 

your home?

A. Yes. 

* * *

Q. And how do you know [these text messages] are 

between you and [Appellant]?

A. He’s had the same number the whole time I have 

talked to him. 

N.T. Trial, 10/28/15, at 10-14. On cross-examination, defense counsel 

questioned Ms. Cosentino regarding the amount of money missing:

[Defense Counsel:] Now, you reported to the police officer 

that [Appellant] had taken $2,500; is that right?

[Witness:] Yes.

Q. But in the text messages you are referring to $2,000?

A. I believe I say two and then I say three in another text 

message just because I wasn’t 100 percent sure at the 

time what amount it really was. 

Id. at 21. 

Appellant subsequently testified at the bench trial:

[Defense Counsel:] What did you do when you woke up on 

April 26?

[Appellant]: Panicked because I was―I’m a married man. 

I wasn’t supposed to be staying out all night. I jumped 

up, grabbed what I could and I was running out the 
J-S78034-16

- 5 -

house―out of the apartment because I, you know, I 

messed up, in lighter words. And she asked me―you 

know, she was talking about breakfast. I said I had to go. 

And she said, Why. And that’s when I told her, I’m 

married. I gotta go. 

Q. I believe you testified that she appeared to you to be 

angry when you told her that?

A. Surprised and angry. 

Q. In this conversation you had with Ms. Cosentino that 

morning . . . did she mention to you that a gun or $2,000 

was missing?

A. No.

* * *

Q. Did you contact [Ms. Cosentino] about it?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. I couldn’t actually. . . . [B]ecause when I ran out the 

house in the morning I left―I didn’t have my phone. So I 

couldn’t call her either. 

Q. When you woke up on the morning of the 26th and left 

out, you left your phone and other items at Ms. 

Cosentino’s apartment?

A. When I ran out in the morning, yes.

* * *

Q. Did you send those test messages to her?

A. No, I didn’t.

Q. So you believe they are fake?
J-S78034-16

- 6 -

A. They look like real messages, but they wasn’t from me. 

I didn’t even have my phone to send a message.

* * *

Q. Did you steal Ms. Cosentino’s gun?

A. No.

Q. Did you steal any money, $2,000, from Ms. Cosentino?

A. No.

Id. at 39-42. 

The trial court convicted Appellant of persons not to possess firearms 

and two counts of theft on October 28, 2015. Thereafter, counsel filed a 

motion to withdraw due to Appellant’s failure to cooperate. The court 

sentenced Appellant on January 26, 2016, to five to ten years’ imprisonment 

for the firearms offense, followed by two years’ probation for one of the theft 

offenses. The court imposed no further penalty on the remaining theft 

offense. That same day, the court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and 

appointed the Public Defender’s Office to represent Appellant. 

On February 11, 2016, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion nunc 

pro tunc, along with a motion for leave to file supplemental post-sentence 

motions nunc pro tunc and a motion for an extension of time for the court to 

decide all post-sentence motions nunc pro tunc. The court granted 

Appellant’s latter two motions on February 18, 2016. Appellant then filed a 

post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc, in which he raised his weight of the 

evidence and discretionary aspects of sentencing claims. The court 
J-S78034-16

- 7 -

subsequently denied all of Appellant’s post-sentence motions on April 1, 

2016. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on April 7, 2016. The court 

ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant timely complied. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in not 

granting [Appellant’s] Post-Sentence Motion requesting a 

new trial when the verdicts of guilty as to all three offenses 

were contrary to the weight of the evidence?

II. Whether the trial court’s sentence is unreasonable, 

manifestly excessive, and inconsistent with the Sentencing 

Code in that the trial court relied on impermissible factors 

when considering the gravity of the offenses as it relates 

to the impact on the victim and the community, and failed 

to consider relevant and required sentencing criteria, 

including the character, personal history, and rehabilitative 

needs of [Appellant], thereby violating 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9721(b)?

Appellant’s Brief at 6. 

In his first issue, Appellant argues his guilty verdicts were against the 

weight of the evidence because the Commonwealth’s primary evidence, Ms. 

Cosentino’s testimony, was vague, unreliable, and inconsistent. Appellant 

claims Ms. Cosentino never stated that she saw Appellant with her money 

and gun, but instead merely speculated based on the fact that Appellant saw 

her take her money out of a box in her closet. Appellant alleges Ms. 

Cosentino also admitted that her roommate’s ex-boyfriend had previously 

been charged with burglarizing their apartment. Appellant also contends the 

alleged text messages between Appellant and Ms. Cosentino were full of 
J-S78034-16

- 8 -

inconsistencies, such as the amount of money allegedly missing. Appellant 

maintains Ms. Cosentino had a motive to lie and fabricate the text messages 

because the morning of the alleged theft he revealed to her that he was 

married. Appellant concludes this Court should vacate his judgment of 

sentence and remand for a new trial. We determine that no relief is due. 

Our standard of review regarding challenges to the weight of the 

evidence is as follows: 

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of 

fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. An 

appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of 

the finder of fact. Thus, we may only reverse the . . . 

verdict if it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s 

sense of justice. 

Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on the weight 

claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the 

underlying question of whether the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited 

to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in 

ruling on the weight claim. 

Commonwealth v. Devine, 26 A.3d 1139, 1146 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(citations omitted). 

Instantly, Appellant’s weight of the evidence issue is based solely on 

the credibility of Ms. Cosentino’s testimony. Ms. Cosentino testified that on 

the morning of April 26, 2014, she left Appellant at her apartment and 

returned home to find Appellant missing along with her gun and 

approximately $2,000. See N.T. Trial, at 10. At trial, the Commonwealth 

introduced screenshots of a text message conversation taken from Ms. 
J-S78034-16

- 9 -

Cosentino’s phone on April 26th, which purported to show Ms. Cosentino 

confronting Appellant about the missing items. Id. at 20-22. Appellant 

subsequently went on to refute Ms. Cosentino’s allegations and testified that 

he had left his cellphone at her apartment the morning of April 26th, after 

informing Ms. Cosentino that he was married and leaving her in a state of 

anger. Id. at 39-42. 

The trial court, acting as the fact finder, heard the testimony of both 

witnesses and found Ms. Cosentino to be credible. See id. at 63 (stating: “I 

find Ms. Cosentino’s testimony to be credible, particularly in light of the fact 

that she gets up, everything is fine, she goes to Giant Eagle to get 

breakfast, she is gone twenty minutes. In twenty minutes her gun, her 

money and [Appellant] are gone.”). After conducting a thorough 

examination of the record, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion 

in finding Ms. Cosentino to be a credible witness. See Devine, 26 A.3d at 

1146. Therefore, Appellant’s weight of the evidence issue merits no relief, 

as his guilty verdicts do not shock one’s sense of justice. See id.

In his second issue, Appellant argues his sentence of five to ten years’ 

imprisonment followed by two years’ probation is manifestly excessive. 

Appellant alleges the court relied on improper factors when imposing his 
J-S78034-16

- 10 -

sentence.3 Appellant also contends the court failed to consider mitigating 

factors, including that he had taken affirmative steps to become a 

rehabilitated member of society by being steadily employed, completing 

various programs while incarcerated, and having the support of his family 

and community. Appellant concludes this Court should vacate his judgment 

of sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing. We determine that 

no relief is due. 

This Court has stated that:

[c]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing do not entitle an appellant to appellate 

review as of right. Prior to reaching the merits of a 

discretionary sentencing issue:

[W]e conduct a four part analysis to 

determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a 

timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 

903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to 

reconsider and modify sentence, see

Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s 

brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial question that 

the sentence appealed from is not appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9781(b). 

Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are 

generally waived if they are not raised at the sentencing 

hearing or raised in a motion to modify the sentence 

imposed at that hearing. 

 

3 Appellant’s brief fails to articulate what improper factors the trial court 

allegedly relied on during sentencing. Therefore, this argument is waived. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (f). 
J-S78034-16

- 11 -

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533-34 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(quotation marks and some citations omitted). 

[T]he Rule 2119(f) statement must specify where the 

sentence falls in relation to the sentencing guidelines and 

what particular provision of the Code is violated (e.g., the 

sentence is outside the guidelines and the court did not 

offer any reasons either on the record or in writing, or 

double-counted factors already considered). Similarly, the 

Rule 2119(f) statement must specify what fundamental 

norm the sentence violates and the manner in which it 

violates that norm . . . . 

Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 727 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en 

banc). “Our inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is 

sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary 

only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Id. A claim that a sentence is 

manifestly excessive might raise a substantial question if the appellant’s 

Rule 2119(f) statement sufficiently articulates the manner in which the 

sentence imposed violates a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or the 

norms underlying the sentencing process. Commonwealth v. Mouzon,

812 A.2d 617, 627 (Pa. 2002). However, “[a] claim that a sentencing court 

failed to consider certain mitigating factors does not raise a substantial 

question . . . .” Commonwealth v. Lewis, 911 A.2d 558, 567 (Pa. Super. 

2006) (citations omitted). 

Initially, Appellant timely appealed, preserved his discretionary aspects 

of sentencing issue in his post-sentence motions nunc pro tunc, and included 

a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief. See Evans, 901 A.2d at 533. 
J-S78034-16

- 12 -

Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement, however, fails to indicate where his 

sentence fell in the sentencing guidelines. See Goggins, 748 A.2d at 727. 

Nevertheless, Appellant asserts the trial court imposed a manifestly 

excessive sentence. Generally, such a bald assertion does not raise a 

substantial question. See Mouzon, 812 A.2d at 627. In any event, we 

shall address the merits of Appellant’s issue. 

This Court has stated:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of 

the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed 

on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this 

context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an 

error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, 

by reference to the record, that the sentencing court 

ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for 

reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at 

a manifestly unreasonable decision. 

Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted). In making a reasonableness determination, a court should 

consider four factors: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and 

the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the opportunity of the 

sentencing court to observe the defendant, including any presentence 

investigation; (3) the findings upon which the sentence was based; and (4) 

the guidelines promulgated by the commission. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d)(1)-

(4). 

A sentence may be found to be unreasonable if it fails to properly 

account for these four statutory factors, or if it “was imposed without 
J-S78034-16

- 13 -

express or implicit consideration by the sentencing court of the general 

standards applicable to sentencing[.]” Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 

957, 964 (Pa. 2007). These general standards mandate that a sentencing 

court impose a sentence “consistent with the protection of the public, the 

gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and 

on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). 

“[W]here the sentencing court imposed a standard-range sentence 

with the benefit of a pre-sentence report, we will not consider the sentence 

excessive.” Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 298 (Pa. Super. 

2011); see also Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 

2010) (stating “where a sentence is within the standard range of the 

guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code”). Under such circumstances, “we can assume the 

sentencing court was aware of relevant information regarding the 

defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with 

mitigating statutory factors.” Corley, 31 A.3d at 298 (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988)) (quotation marks 

omitted). 

Here, Appellant’s sentence is in the standard range of the Sentencing 

Guidelines. Because the trial court reviewed Appellant’s presentence 

investigation report, we assume it took into consideration the mitigating 
J-S78034-16

- 14 -

circumstances raised in Appellant’s brief, such as his steady employment, 

family and community support, and the completion of various programs 

during incarceration. See Corley, 31 A.3d at 298. Moreover, the trial court 

summarized its reasons for imposing Appellant’s sentence:

This [c]ourt considered [Appellant’s] lengthy criminal 

history which includes, among other crimes, a prior 

conviction for a felony possession of a firearm, two 

separate felony drug convictions, three separate felony 

theft convictions, two separate felony criminal trespass 

convictions and one felony burglary conviction. 

[Appellant] has been committed and re-committed to state 

custody at least four times. The [c]ourt was also 

concerned that [Appellant] never returned the firearm he 

stole and that the firearm was unaccounted for as of the 

time of sentencing. 

Based on the totality of the circumstances, this [c]ourt 

believed [Appellant] had multiple opportunities to conform 

his conduct to the law and he repeatedly chose not to do 

so. He further demonstrated that he is a danger to the 

community. This [c]ourt considered all relevant 

sentencing issues, most notably [Appellant’s] substantial 

rehabilitative needs, protection of the public, deterring 

[Appellant] from engaging in future similar conduct and 

the impact on [Ms. Cosentino]. The sentence imposed in 

this case was not unduly harsh as it was within the 

standard range of the sentencing guidelines and it properly 

reflected [Appellant’s] culpability in this case. 

Trial Ct. Op. at 8-9. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

conclusions. See Sheller, 961 A.2d at 190. Therefore, Appellant’s sentence 

of five to ten years’ imprisonment followed by two years’ probation was not 

manifestly excessive. See Corley, 31 A.3d at 298; Moury, 992 A.2d at 

171. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
J-S78034-16

- 15 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/16/2017