NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

# A RIZONA 

# C OURT OF 

# A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

In re the Marriage of:

MITCHELL GENE REYNOLDS
, P etitioner /Appel lee
,

v.

TAMARA LYNN WALKER , Responden t/Appell ant

.

No. 1 CA

- CV 22

- 0711 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. P1300DO202200152 The Honorable Cele Hancock
, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART

APPEARANCES
Mitchell Gene Reynolds , P rescott Valley P etitioner /Appell ee
Tamara Lynn Walker, Prescott Valley Responden t/Appell ant FILED 8-22-2023REYNOLDS v. WALKER Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

W I L L I A M S , Judge:

¶1 Tamara Walker (“Wife”) appeals two provisions of the superior court’s divorce decree: (1) the denial of her request for spousal maintenance and (2) the division of community deb t

. For the following reasons, we affirm the denial of spousal maintenance but remand the issue of a specific debt to allow the court to assign the r emaining debt equitably between the parties

.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTO R Y 1

¶2 Wife and Mitchell Reynolds (“Husband”) married in 2007 and divorced in 2022 ( though they ha d been together for more than four decades, have adult children together, and grandchildren )

. During the marriage, Husband was the primary breadwinne r

— working construction

as a self

- employed subcontractor installing marble. Wife worked for the State of Ariz ona for about a decade until she qualified for and began receiving Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) b enefits in 2012.

¶3 Before trial , t he superior court awarded Wife temporary spousal maintenance of $600.00 monthly

. Two months later, Husband wa s diagnosed with Parkinson ’ s disease and stopped working.

¶4 At trial, Husband opposed Wife’s request for continued spousal maintenance, testif ying that the Parkinson’s disease prevented him from working as a marble installer

. Husband said that he “want[ed] to work” and had applied for a job driving “RVs back and forth” but had not yet heard back

. He also testified that Wife was “as capable [of working] as [him] ,” just “in a different field ” like “computer work” because Wife had “been doing a lot of computer work with [Husband’s] accounts.”

1 Though Father did not file an answering brief, in our discretion we decline to regard this as a con c ession of error. Thompson v. Thompson , 217 Ariz. 524, 526, ¶ 6 n.1 (App. 2008)REYNOLDS v. WALKER Decision of the Court

3 ¶5 Wife testified that
, besides her SSDI benefit s , she earned $100 weekly babysitting her grandkids

. W ith the grandkids starting back at school, however, Wife wasn’t sure how her income might change. When ask ed by the court whether she could work part

- time, Wife stated, “I don’t think so. I really don’t.” L ater in the trial, the court pressed the issue
, and Wife re s ponded, “I mean, I

— I could probably try.” As for Husband’s ability to work with his recent Parkinson’s diagnosis, Wife testified that “with [Husband’s ] e xperience on his job that he could get a

— like a supervisor . . . project manager [position or] something like that.”

¶6 The superior court found that Wife was eligible for spousal maintenance unde r A.R.S. § 25

- 319(A)(1) (lacking “sufficient property . . . to provide for” her “reasonable needs”) but decided against an y award because of Husband’s “Parkinson’s disease, which will preclude him from earning income in the marketplace ,” and because “Wife has earning ability sufficient to support herself.”

¶7 As for community debt, the court determined it was “unclear ” which debts were incurred during the marriage and, therefore, treated all debts as community debt. The court chose not to divide th e delinquent debts that had gone to collections

. But o f the remaining community debts , the court ordered that “both parties are equally responsible” and that Wife provide Husband with all necessary information for him “to pay one

- half the payments . . . each month until the debt[s] [are] paid off.”

¶8 Wife timely appeal ed

. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9
, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12

- 120.21 ( A )( 1 ) and

- 2101 (A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Spousal Maintenance

¶9 We review the superior court’s denial of spousal maintenance for an abuse of discretion and will affirm the decision if reasonable evidence supports it

. Helland v. Helland , 236 Ariz. 197, 202, ¶ 22 (App. 2014).

¶10 A court may award maintenance to either spouse after following a two

- step process

. First, the court must determine whether the requesting spouse is eligible for an award by analyzing five eligibility factors listed in A.R.S. § 25

- 319(A) . The court consider s each factor as it applie s to the spouse requesting maintenance. In Re Marriage of Cotter and Podhorez , 245 Ariz. 82, 85, ¶ 7 (App. 2018). If the court de termines theREYNOLDS v. WALKER Decision of the Court

4 requesting spouse is eligible for maintenance , the court then consider s the factors in A.R.S. § 25

- 319(B) to determine whether t he spouse is entitled to an award , including the amount and duration of the award

. Id .; s ee also Sherman v. Sherman , 241 Ariz . 110, 114, ¶ 17 (App. 2016); Helland , 236 Ariz. at 203
, ¶ 28

. The court need not consider every factor under A.R.S. § 25

- 319(B) , but neglecting to consider relevant factors can constitute an abuse of discretion

. Rainwater v. Rainwater , 177 Ariz. 500, 502 (App. 1993).

¶11 Here, t he court determined that Wife was eligib le for spousal maintenance under A.R.S. § 25

- 319(A) (1) because she lacked sufficient property , including property apportioned to her, to provide for her reasonable needs. The court also, apparently, considered Father’s eligibilit y for an award because the court found that “there is little property to be divided between [both] parties” and that “[n]either party ha[d] any property that would provide any passive income to either of them to assist in providing for their reasonable needs.” Record evidence supports the court’s finding as to both parties

. ¶12 Despite Wife ’s eligibility for spousal maintenance , the court determined Wife was not entitled to an award. And while the court made

no express findings under A.R.S. § 25

- 319(B), it impl iedly considered at least some factors it was required to when it found (1) that H usband’s Parkinsons’ disease “pre cl ude[d] [him] from earning his previous salary
, ” from continuing “in his current profession,” or even “from earning income in the marketplace ,” and ( 2 ) that “Wife ha[d] earning ability sufficient to support herself.” The c ourt impliedly considered at least the following factors under A.R.S. § 25

- 319 (B) : subsection (B) ( 4 ) direct ing courts to consider the “ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet that spouse’s needs while meeting those of the spouse seeki ng maintenance ” ; subsection (B)( 5 ) consider ing the “comparative financial resources of the spouses, including their comparative earning abilities in the labor market ” ; and subse c tion (B)(9) consider ing the “financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property apportioned to that spouse, and that spouse’s ability to meet that spouse’s own needs independently

. ”

¶13 Husband and Wife presented conflicting evidence on these factors
, and the superior court seemingly found Husband more credible. Because “[ w ] e defer to the superior court’s ‘determination of witnesses’ credibility and the weight to give conflicting evidence, ” Nia v. Nia , 242 Ariz. 419, 423

- 24, ¶ 14 (App. 2017) , on this re cord , Wife has not shown that the court abused its discretion

.REYNOLDS v. WALKER Decision of the Court

5 II. Community Debts

¶14 Wife also argues that the superior court erred in dividing community deb t s

. Any debt obtained by one spouse during marriage is presumed to be community debt. Hammett v, Hammett , 247 Ariz. 556, 562, ¶ 29 (App. 2019)

. We review the division of community debts for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 559, ¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion when its findings lack support from evidence in the record. Brucklier v. Brucklier , 253 Ariz. 579
, 582, ¶ 10 (App. 2022).

¶15 Wife specifically challenges the court’s determination that a debt from the West Yavapai Guidance Clinic (“WYGC”) was in collections and
, consequently, not assigned to either party by the court. At trial, Wife testified she incurr ed th e WYGC debt in 2018 and stated that she was still making payments at the time of trial. No contrary evidence was presented. Thus, n othing in the record supports the court’s determination that this debt was in collectio n s

. To the contrary, the only evi dence presented was that the monthly debt payments were current and that the debt was incurred during the marriage. The court should have equitably assigned the debt to one or both parties. Failing to do so constituted an abuse of discretion. We therefore remand the matter to the superior court to treat the WYGC debt as a community debt and assign the remaining obligation between the parties equitably

.
CONCLUSION

¶16 We affi rm the superior court’s denial of spousal maintenance. We remand the issue of the WYGC debt to allow the court to assign the remaining debt equitably between the parties

.