RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1721-18T1

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

R.F.,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF H.S.F., 

a Minor.

___________________________

Submitted October 2, 2019 – Decided October 9, 2019

Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County, 

Docket No. FG-16-0066-18.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender, 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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of counsel; Carol A. Weil, Designated Counsel, on the 

briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney General, 

of counsel; Patricia O'Dowd, Deputy Attorney General, 

on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy 

Public Defender, of counsel; James Joseph Gross, 

Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this Title 30 guardianship case, R.F., the father of H.S.F.1("Heather") 

appeals from the trial court's termination of his parental rights after a two-day 

trial. We affirm the final judgment. We do so substantially for the sound 

reasons set forth on November 30, 2018 in the twenty-nine-page written opinion 

of Judge Imre Karaszegi, Jr., who presided over the trial. 

The father has a long history of mental illness, including schizoaffective 

disorder and alcohol use disorder. He has had hallucinations and several inpatient psychiatric hospitalizations. He has a history of drug and alcohol 

addiction and relapses.

 

1 We use initials to protect the privacy of the minor. R. 1:38-3(d)(12). We will 

refer to the child by the pseudonym "Heather."
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Heather was born in June 2012. She was first removed from her parents 

by the Division of Child Protection and Permanency ("the Division") in the fall 

of 2015 because her mother, M.S., overdosed on heroin. Heather was initially 

placed in a non-family foster placement. Several months later in April 2016, 

the mother died.

After the death of the mother, the father made a voluntary surrender of 

Heather to his sister (the paternal aunt) and her husband in May 2017. Heather 

was taken out of the foster home and placed in the care of the paternal aunt and 

uncle. 

The aunt and uncle had difficulties in caring for Heather. They reported 

that Heather was struggling in school, exhibiting "multiple personalities," and 

behaving in antisocial ways towards their non-adoptive children. 

In light of these persisting problems with Heather's placement, in March 

2018 the aunt informed the Division that she and her husband were no longer 

interested in adopting Heather. Several days later, the Division placed Heather 

back with her previous resource parents.

In the meantime, the father continued to have behavioral and substance 

abuse problems. However, the father did maintain visitation with Heather and 

the two of them developed significant bonds.
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At the trial, the judge considered testimony from two caseworkers who 

described the pertinent chronology of events and the Division's involvement. 

The judge also heard testimony from the Division's psychological expert, Dr. 

Carolina Mendez, Ph.D. Dr. Mendez recommended termination of the father's 

parental rights, despite the bonding with his daughter. 

Among other things, Dr. Mendez opined that the father's history of mental 

illness, persisting substance abuse problems, and noncompliance with treatment 

regimens indicated he would be "overwhelm[ed]" by the responsibilities of 

parenting Heather. She concluded the father would not be able to "parent 

independently now or in the foreseeable future." Dr. Mendez also found that 

Heather had bonded well with her resource family. The resource family would 

like to adopt Heather, and Heather told Dr. Mendez that she would like to live 

with them. 

The Division also presented expert testimony from a psychiatrist, Joel 

Federbush, M.D., who had performed an evaluation of the father to assess his 

parenting abilities. According to Dr. Federbush, the father's history of mental 

health issues and substance abuse, his living situation, and consistent 

unemployment all raised significant issues about his ability to parent. The father
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admitted to Dr. Federbush he had multiple positive tests for alcohol in the past 

year and was "hearing voices" as recently as a month prior to the evaluation. 

Dr. Federbush acknowledged that the father stated he wanted to parent 

Heather. But he also noted the father's contrary actual behavior – for instance,

not taking advantage of scheduled phone calls with Heather – was inconsistent 

with this desire. The psychiatrist concluded the father was not currently able to 

parent Heather, and that this was unlikely to change in the immediate future. 

The judge heard competing testimony from a psychological expert, Dr. 

Andrew Brown called by the defense. Dr. Brown recommended against 

termination largely because of Heather's deep emotional attachment to her

father. Dr. Brown recommended that additional services be provided to 

potentially enable the father to maintain the relationship with the child. 

After considering this testimony and other proofs, Judge Karaszegi 

concluded all four statutory factors for termination under N.J.S.A. 30:4C15.1(a) had been proven by the requisite level of clear and convincing evidence. 

The judge specifically found the testimony of the Division's witnesses to be 

credible. The Law Guardian supported the court's determination. 

On appeal, the father argues: (1) the Division did not adequately consider 

the paternal aunt as an alternative to termination; (2) reasonable services were 
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not provided by the Division to the father or to Heather; and (3) the judge 

erroneously found the Division had satisfied the first and second prongs of the 

termination standard.

In considering these arguments, we must bear in mind that the scope of 

our review in an appeal of a judgment terminating parental rights is limited. A 

reviewing court should not "disturb the family court's decision to terminate 

parental rights when there is substantial credible evidence in the record to 

support the court's findings." New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. 

E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008). The reviewing court should defer to the trial 

court's findings of fact "if supported by adequate, substantial, and credible 

evidence in the record." New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 

191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007). 

We also must recognize the considerable expertise of the Family Part, 

which repeatedly adjudicates cases brought by the Division under Title 9 and 

Title 30 involving the alleged abuse or neglect of children. See, e.g., N.J. Div. 

of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012); N.J. Div. of Youth 

& Family Servs. v. L.J.D., 428 N.J. Super. 451, 476 (App. Div. 2012).

That said, we recognize our scope of review is broadened "where the focus 

of the dispute is . . . alleged error in the trial judge's evaluation of the underlying 
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facts and the implications to be drawn therefrom[.]" See N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014) (quoting In re J.T., 269 N.J. 

Super. 172, 188-89 (App. Div. 1993)). In such instances, a trial court's 

interpretations of the law and subsequent legal consequences of the facts are 

afforded no special deference. See R.G., 217 N.J. at 552. 

Having applied these standards of review to the record and the trial court's 

analysis, we discern no persuasive reason to set aside the final judgment of 

termination. The judge carefully analyzed the evidence in his comprehensive 

written decision. He articulated ample grounds for why the Division met its 

burden of proof on all four of the statutory factors. 

The judge adopted the opinions of the Division's experts over the more 

optimistic assessments of the defense expert. The judge had the prerogative to 

do so, having heard their testimony and evaluated their credibility. Angel v. 

Rand Express Lines, Inc., 66 N.J. Super. 77, 85-86 (App. Div. 1961). 

There was ample evidence presented to establish that the father 

endangered Heather by his past conduct and behavioral issues, N.J.S.A. 30:4C15.1(a)(1) (prong one), and that he was unable to eliminate that harm in the 

future and provide Heather with "a safe and stable home," N.J.S.A. 30:4C15.1(a)(2) (prong two). There was also credible proof showing that separating 
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Heather from her resource parents would cause her "serious and enduring 

emotional or psychological harm to the child." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) (also 

prong two).

We reject the father's contentions under prong three of the statutory 

factors, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3), that the Division failed to make reasonable 

efforts to provide services, and failed to adequately consider other alternatives 

to termination of his rights. There is ample proof the Division provided or 

offered services to the father, the paternal aunt and uncle, and the child while 

she was placed with them. The eight-month placement simply did not work out, 

in part due to Heather's own behavioral issues. In addition, the Division and the 

trial court adequately considered other alternatives to termination.

The father's suggestion that kinship legal guardianship ("KLG") should 

have been pursued in this case is of no avail. As attested to by a caseworker's 

unrefuted trial testimony, the paternal aunt and uncle expressly asked to end the 

adoption process and have Heather removed from their home. Moreover, since 

the resource parents are committed to adopting Heather, KLG is inapplicable. 

See New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 508 (2004) 

(stating KLG, is only available "[w]hen adoption is neither feasible nor likely.")
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Id. at 509; see also New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. M.M., 459 

N.J. Super. 246, 264 (App. Div. 2019). 

Lastly, the trial court had ample grounds to conclude termination would 

not cause Heather more harm than good. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4) (prong 

four). The Division's experts articulated cogent reasons that support the judge's 

conclusion. The judge properly considered and implemented in this regard the 

strong policies in Title 30 cases to provide a child with permanency. See, e.g.,

N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.F., 392 N.J. Super. 201, 209 (App. Div. 

2007) ("Children must not languish indefinitely in foster care while a birth 

parent attempts to correct the conditions that resulted in an out-of-home 

placement.").

Affirmed.