alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Editorial Note on Part 47
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 47 appear at 75 FR 41979, July 20, 2010.

§ 47.7 United States citizens and resident aliens. ( a ) *U.S. citizens.* An applicant for aircraft registration under this part who is a U.S. citizen must certify to this in the Aircraft Registration Application, AC Form 8050-1.
( b ) *Resident aliens.* An applicant for aircraft registration under 49 U.S.C. 44102 who is a resident alien must furnish a representation of permanent residence and the applicant's alien registration number issued by the Department of Homeland Security.
( c ) *Trustees.* An applicant for aircraft registration under 49 U.S.C. 44102 that holds legal title to an aircraft in trust must comply with the following requirements: ( 1 ) Each trustee must be either a U.S. citizen or a resident alien.
( 2 ) The applicant must submit with the Aircraft Registration Application— ( i ) A copy of each document legally affecting a relationship under the trust;
( ii ) If each beneficiary under the trust, including each person whose security interest in the aircraft is incorporated in the trust, is either a U.S. citizen or a resident alien, an affidavit by the applicant to that effect; and
( iii ) If any beneficiary under the trust, including any person whose security interest in the aircraft is incorporated in the trust, is not a U.S. citizen or resident alien, an affidavit from each trustee stating that the trustee is not aware of any reason, situation, or relationship (involving beneficiaries or other persons who are not U.S. citizens or resident aliens) as a result of which those persons together would have more than 25 percent of the aggregate power to influence or limit the exercise of the trustee's authority.
( 3 ) If persons who are neither U.S. citizens nor resident aliens have the power to direct or remove a trustee, either directly or indirectly through the control of another person, the trust instrument must provide that those persons together may not have more than 25 percent of the aggregate power to direct or remove a trustee. Nothing in this paragraph prevents those persons from having more than 25 percent of the beneficial interest in the trust.
( d ) *Partnerships.* A partnership may apply for a Certificate of Aircraft Registration, AC Form 8050-3, under 49 U.S.C. 44102 only if each partner, whether a general or limited partner, is an individual who is a citizen of the United States. Nothing in this section makes ineligible for registration an aircraft which is not owned as a partnership asset but is co-owned by— ( 1 ) Resident aliens; or
( 2 ) One or more resident aliens and one or more U.S. citizens.
[Amdt. 47-20, 44 FR 61939, Oct. 29, 1979, as amended by Amdt. 47-27, 70 FR 244, Jan. 3, 2005; Amdt. 47-29, 75 FR 41980, July 20, 2010; Doc. No. FAA-2015-7396; Amdt. 47-30, 80 FR 78645, Dec. 16, 2015]
§ 102.12 Contents. ( a ) A charge must contain the following: ( 1 ) The full name and address of the person making the charge.
( 2 ) If the charge is filed by a labor organization, the full name and address of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit.
( 3 ) The full name and address of the person against whom the charge is made (referred to as the Charged Party).
( 4 ) A brief statement of the conduct constituting the alleged unfair labor practices affecting commerce.
( b ) Attachments to charges are not permitted.
§ 65.121 Type ratings. ( a ) The following type ratings are issued under this subpart: ( 1 ) Seat.
( 2 ) Back.
( 3 ) Chest.
( 4 ) Lap.
( b ) The holder of a senior parachute rigger certificate who qualifies for a master parachute rigger certificate is entitled to have placed on his master parachute rigger certificate the ratings that were on his senior parachute rigger certificate.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Consumer Product Safety Commission

# AGENCY:

U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission Washington, DC 20207.

# TIME AND DATE:

Friday, May 12, 2000, 10 a.m.

# LOCATION:

Room 420, East West Towers, 4330 East West Highway, Bethesda, Maryland.

# STATUS:

Open to the Public.

# Matter to be Considered:

## Mid-Year Review

The staff will brief the Commission on issues related to fiscal year 2000 mid-year review.

For a recorded message containing the latest agenda information, call (301) 504-0709.

# CONTACT PERSON FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Sadye E. Dunn, Office of the Secretary, 4330 East West Highway, Bethesda, MD 20207 (301) 504-0800.

Dated: May 3, 2000.

Sadye E. Dunn,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 00-11425  Filed 5-3-00; 2:46 pm]

BILLING CODE 6355-01-M
FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT OCT 13 , 2006 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1546 8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ T ax Co urt N o. 324 0- 00 PETER A. CALDERONE , Pe tit ion er -Appe llant,
ve rs us COMM ISSI ONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent -Appellee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1546 9

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ T ax Co urt N o. 122 53- 99 GEOFFREY K. CALDERONE , SR., Pe tit ion er -Appe llant,
ve rs us COMM ISSI ONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent -Appellee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ A ppe al s f ro m the D ec isi ons of

the United States T ax Court

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (O ct ob er 13, 200 6)Honora ble Anne C. Conway , United States District J udg e for the Middle District of * Florida , sitti ng by

desig nation. Ap pe lla nts a lso a sse rt

the Tax Cour

t ( 1) a bu se d it s d isc re tio n w he n it de nie d th e ir 1 Dec ember

2004 motion for leave to amend their O ctober 2003 motion to i nclude a reque st for relief under F eder al Rule of Civil P roce dure 60( b), and ( 2) cle arly err ed in re achingsever al finding s of fa ct. We disag ree . Given Appe llants’ failure to make their D ece mber 2004 motion un til the da

y of the e vid e nti ary

he ari ng , w e c on c lud e the Tax Cour t di d n ot a

bu se its dis c re tio n in denying the motion. Additi onally , afte r re viewing the re cord, w e dete rmine the Ta x Court had a mpl e e vid e nc e to s up po rt the c ha lle ng e d f

ind ing s. 2 Before BL ACK

and HU LL , C ircuit Judg es, a nd CON W AY , District Judge. * PE R CU RIA M: Appellants Geoff

rey K. Calderone, Sr. , a

nd his brother, P eter A . C alderone, contend th e U .S . T ax Court abused its di scretion when it denied their Oc tober 2003 m oti on f

or le av e to f

ile am oti on t o va ca te the T ax Co urt’ s F eb ru ar y 200 2 stipu lated final decisions. Specif ically , Appellants argue these stip ulated final 1 de ci sio ns r es ult ed

f ro m f ra ud o n th e co urt by

the ir f orm er a tto rn ey , A rthur

Ja co b,
an d th e Co m

m iss ion er ’ s a tto rn ey s, D av id W ei ne r an d D av id C onr ad
. T his Ci rc uit has not recognized fraud on the court as a ground for vacating a tax court’ s final de ci sio n. W e ne ed

not r ea ch the iss ue in thi s c as e. T he T ax Co urt di d no t a buse its dis cr et ionbe ca

use the r ec or d a nd r el ev an t c as e la w sup ports i ts f ind ing tha t no frau d o n t he co ur t o ccu rred
. See 89 T. C.M . ( CCH ) 1479 (200 5); se e als o Davenport Rec

ycling Assocs v. Comm ’r , 220 F
. 3d 1 255, 126 2 ( 11t h C ir
. 200 0)3

(h old ing , ba se d on the tot al ity of the f ac ts, the T ax Co urt di d no t a buse it s discretion in reje cting the appellants ’ fra ud-on-the-court claim ). AFFIR MED.
---

Exhibit 32.2


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tower Financial Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Richard R. Sawyer, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
  (1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
  /s/ Richard R. Sawyer
 Richard R. Sawyer
 Chief Financial Officer
 August 12, 2009
#### BRIZZI v INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Ohio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co

No 9272.

Decided May 20, 1929

Gurney, Gurney & Gurney, Cleveland, for Brizzi.

Gilbert Bettman, Atty Gen and Arthur Krause, Cleveland, for Commission.

SULLIVAN, J.

In the absence of a bill of exceptions showing on what ground the court vacated the judgment of the plaintiff and thereafter rendered judgment for defendant, it is presumed as a matter of law that the court acted within its right, because it might have rendered judgment for defendant on the ground that it had no jurisdiction. Again the court might have changed its judgment upon the theory that in entering judgment for plaintiff it intended to enter judgment for defendant and thus the change was made to correct a clerical error. Again it may be that upon examination of'the plaintiff’s claim the court came to the conclusion that there could be no recovery as there was no legal liability and thus there are many reasons which naturally come to the legal mind as to why the court found it necessary to render judgment for defendant after vacating judgment for the plaintiff. None of these reasons however might exist but it is impossible so to determine for the reason that there is no bill of exceptions by which the reviewing court might be guided and thus it is impossible for us as a reviewing court to reverse the judgment because of the alleged error assigned.

Thus holding the judgment of the Common Pleas Court is hereby affirmed.

Vickery, PJ and Levine, J, concur.
#### [590] Benton *vs.*Foote and others.

A defendant who makes a case to apply to a circuit judge for a new trial, and who does not appear to argue the same, and a new trial is refused on his default to appear, is not entitled to *appeal*to the supreme court from the order made by the circuit judge.

In this case the defendants applied to a circuit judge for a new trial, a verdict having been rendered against them. The plaintiff noticed the case for argument before the circuit judge, and the defendants not appearing to bring, on the argument, an order upon, the default of the defendants was made *denying a new*trial. From this order the defendants appealed to this court, and on the motion of the plaintiff the appeal was dismissed : The Court holding that in sucli a case the defendant has no right to appeal.
§ 415.33 Safety organization. ( a ) An applicant shall maintain a safety organization and document it by identifying lines of communication and approval authority for all launch safety decisions. Lines of communication, both within the applicant's organization and between the applicant and any federal launch range providing launch services, shall be employed to ensure that personnel perform launch safety operations in accordance with range safety requirements and with plans and procedures required by this subpart. Approval authority shall be employed to ensure compliance with range safety requirements and with plans and procedures required by this subpart.
( b ) *Safety official.* An applicant shall identify by name, title, and qualifications, a qualified safety official authorized to examine all aspects of the applicant's launch safety operations and to monitor independently personnel compliance with the applicant's safety policies and procedures. The safety official shall report directly to the person responsible for an applicant's licensed launches, who shall ensure that all of the safety official's concerns are addressed prior to launch.
#### § 102.38 Rights of parties.

Any party has the right to appear at the hearing in person, by counsel, or by other representative, to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce into the record documentary or other evidence, except that the Administrative Law Judge may limit the participation of any party as appropriate. Documentary evidence must be submitted in duplicate for the record with a copy to each party.
March 2 4 , 2015

Daniel Nugent

12227 Mossycup Drive

Houston, TX 77024

Dear Mr. Nugent :

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption. It

explains why we cannot process your request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Can n o t Process Your Request

We entered your February 20 , 2015 exemption request into the public docket (No. FAA

- 20 15

-

0538 ) , but we are unable to process your request any further. The information you sent does

not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider the request

any further, you must send us all of the following:

• The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief and th e extent of

the relief you seek

.

• The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would

benefit the public as a whole.

• The reasons why the exemption would not adversely affect saf ety or how the exemption

would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which you

seek an exemption.

• Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request.

W hat You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your

petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption.2

If We Do No t Hear From You

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you

further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267

- 9521

.

Sincerely,

/s/

Jake Troutman

Program Analyst , Airmen and

Airspace Rules Division

Enclosure
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-6480

JASON DENNIS HIBBS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

JACK LEE, Warden; RICHARD CULLEN,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, District Judge.

(CA-99-726)

Submitted: September 26, 2000 Decided: October 19, 2000

Before WILKINS, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John William Acree, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. John

H. McLees, Jr., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Jason Dennis Hibbs seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West

1994 & Supp. 2000). We have reviewed the record and the district

court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the

reasoning of the district court. See Hibbs v. Lee, No. CA-99-726

(W.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**1273 KA 14-00297** 
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, LINDLEY, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WHITE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

EASTON THOMPSON KASPEREK SHIFFRIN LLP, ROCHESTER (DONALD M. THOMPSON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

DAVID W. FOLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, MAYVILLE (ANDREW M. MOLITOR OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Chautauqua County Court (John T. Ward, J.), rendered January 27, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a nonjury verdict, of driving while intoxicated, a class D felony (two counts), and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree.

It is hereby ORDERED that the case is held, the decision is reserved and the matter is remitted to Chautauqua County Court for a determination of the motion following further proceedings if
necessary.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her, following a nonjury trial, of two counts of driving while intoxicated as class D felonies (Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1192 [2], [3]; 1193 [1] [c] [ii]) and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree (§ 511 [3] [a] [i]). At the close of the People’s case, defense counsel moved for a trial order of dismissal on the ground that the arresting officers, who were employed by the Town of Ellicott (Town), exceeded their jurisdictional authority when they arrested defendant in the City of Jamestown (City). Defendant also requested that County Court take judicial notice of the location of the arrest and the boundaries of the City and Town. The proof had not closed at that point, and the court reserved decision on the motion to allow the parties to make written submissions. The court never ruled on the motion, but issued a written verdict finding defendant guilty of the charges and noting that it had reviewed the parties’ submissions.

Defendant contends that the court erred in refusing to take judicial notice of the relevant geographical facts and in denying her motion to dismiss the charges. We do not address that contention because, in accordance with People v Concepcion (17 NY3d 192, 197-198)**-2- 1273 KA 14-00297** 

and People v LaFontaine (92 NY2d 470, 474, rearg denied 93 NY2d 849), “we cannot deem the court’s failure to rule on the . . . motion as a denial thereof” ( People v Spratley , 96 AD3d 1420, 1421). We therefore hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to County Court for a ruling on the motion following such further proceedings as may be necessary.

Entered: December 23, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
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</TABLE>
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER ON MOTION

Appellate case name: In the Interest of K.M., Jr., A Child

Appellate case number: 01-19-00286-CV

Trial court case number: 2018-01409J

Trial court: 315th District Court of Harris County

This is an accelerated appeal from a judgment in a suit in which the termination of 

the parent-child relationship is at issue (“parental termination case”) for both the father, 

K.M., and the mother, D.M., of K.M., Jr., a child. On May 7, 2019, D.M.’s counsel filed 

an unopposed extension requesting twenty days from May 20, 2019.

Appeals in parental termination cases are to be brought to final disposition within 

180 days of the date the notice of appeal is filed, so far as reasonably possible. See TEX.

ST. JUD. ADMIN. R. 6.2(a) (West 2018). Here, the first notice of appeal was timely filed

on April 9, 2019, in the trial court from the April 8, 2019 final decree for termination by 

appointed counsel for the mother, D.M., setting the 180-day compliance deadline for 

October 4, 2019. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b).

Although this is D.M.’s counsel’s first extension and it is unopposed, the accelerated 

schedule in termination cases requires greater compliance with briefing deadlines and 

greater scrutiny of extensions. Appellant D.M.’s counsel contends that an extension is 

needed because he was recently appointed as co-counsel in a different termination case 

with a jury trial set for May 17 and 20, 2019, which requires him to prepare for trial now, 

and he will need more time to file appellant’s brief in this case after finishing that trial.

Accordingly, appellant D.M.’s motion for an extension of time to file appellant’s 

brief is GRANTED until June 10, 2019, but no further extensions will be granted

absent extraordinary circumstances. See TEX. R. APP. P. 4.1(a), 10.5(b)(1)(C), 38.6(d).

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: _/s/ Laura Carter Higley____________________

 ☒ Acting individually Acting for the Court

Date: ___May 14, 2019________