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AL-QAEDA IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN:

AN ENDURING THREAT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 20, 2014

Serial No. 113–156

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. David Sedney (Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, U.S. Department of Defense) ...................................... 4

The Honorable Michael A. Sheehan, distinguished chair, Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy at West Point ...................... 15

Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, senior fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ... 22

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. David Sedney: Prepared statement ................................................................. 6

The Honorable Michael A. Sheehan: Prepared statement ................................... 18

Mr. Thomas Joscelyn: Prepared statement ........................................................... 24

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 44

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 45

(1)

AL-QAEDA IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN: 

AN ENDURING THREAT 

TUESDAY, MAY 20, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m., in room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Kinzinger presiding. 

Mr. KINZINGER. The subcommittee will come to order. Without 

objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, 

questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject to the 

length limitation in the rules. I want to say on behalf of all of us, 

thank you to our witnesses for being here to talk about what I 

think is an extremely important issue, the issue of the future of 

what we are seeing with regards to al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. As we actually look forward right now at a post-2014 

plan in Afghanistan, we see that the threat of al-Qaeda, in my 

mind, has not diminished really at all from what we saw pre-9/11. 

We continue to see a country that is overridden by al-Qaeda. It is 

no secret that I support a strong, robust, residual force to protect 

the significant strides that we have made in Afghanistan. 

I recently had the privilege of leading a CODEL to Afghanistan 

and Pakistan this past November with the hope of getting an objective view of what is needed on the ground by our troops, our commanders, and our State Department personnel serving in the region. I came away with renewed sense of optimism on happenings 

on the ground. The Afghan forces have been improving. The green 

on blue killings that was strategized by our enemy to try to undermine the sense of trust that exists have been on the decline. Infiltrators have been sharply cut down, and we are no longer conducting unilateral missions except for counterterrorism operations. 

With that said, al-Qaeda remains very strong. 

Reducing our footprint in Afghanistan will inevitably curtail our 

ability to directly confront al-Qaeda in the region. When making 

post-2014 troop level determinations, we must fully evaluate the 

risk that comes with a too aggressive drawdown. To arbitrarily pick 

a number based on political expediency, diminishes the sacrifice 

that our brave men and women continue to make in Afghanistan. 

You know, I remember in 2001, I was actually driving to work, 

and I had just graduated from Illinois State University, and I remember hearing that a plane hit the World Trade Center and it 

2

went through my mind as a newly minted private pilot, I said, 

well, how in the world can a plane hit a building on a beautiful 

morning? And then I heard a second plane hit the World Trade 

Center, and then the field in Pennsylvania, and the Pentagon not 

far from here. 

And at that point, I think American life changed completely. Up 

through the 1990s, we were under this impression that America 

was a country that was protected by two oceans, the idea of any 

kind of a terrorist attack was always for over there, and not necessarily for here with the exception of the occasional domestic terrorist. And that whole reality was changed. 

And as a country, we mobilized to this idea of defeating al-Qaeda 

where they exist. This idea of finding America’s enemies that 

would seek to destroy us, and, in essence, destroying them first and 

depriving them of their ability to recruit more people and more 

fighters. And I think when you look at the history of both Iraq and 

Afghanistan, we can judge the last 10 to 13 years and say there 

were things we could have done better. I think there are things we 

could have done worse. When I look into Afghanistan today and I 

see girls going to school, I see women with rights that they didn’t 

have prior to 9/11, I see al-Qaeda with the fear that there is going 

to be a missile that strikes them at any moment, I think we have 

made a lot of gains. 

And my big concern, and one of the things I look forward to hearing from the witnesses about, my big concern is that for the hope 

of political expediency, as I briefly touched on, we are going to end 

what President Obama called ‘‘the Good War,’’ the war in Afghanistan, that we are going to end this prematurely simply to follow a 

campaign promise. 

So I do look forward to hearing from the witnesses and at this 

point I will turn over to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman from 

California, for 5 minutes for his opening comments. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be in and out of 

this room because for me, today is a festival of subcommittees. We 

have not only this, but the Asia Subcommittee and the Insurance 

Subcommittee all meeting simultaneously. I thank the witnesses 

for being here. I was hoping to see my old friend, Husain Haqqani 

who I know cannot be here for medical reasons. This hearing will 

help us understand al-Qaeda’s evolving structure and hopefully 

help us craft a more effective counterterrorism policy. Al-Qaeda has 

failed to carry out a major attack on the United States’ homeland, 

however, the danger still remains. Al-Qaeda’s structure, of course, 

has become more decentralized with most terrorist activity now 

conducted by its regional and local affiliates. 

Over the past few years, al-Qaeda’s core in Pakistan has been 

weakened by the loss of key leaders, most notably, a truly heroic 

attack that netted bin Laden, one that took incredible courage from 

our special forces to carry out, and also took very substantial political courage to order. I am sure that the efforts by President Carter 

to rescue our hostages came to mind when political leaders had to 

make the decision as to whether to go forward with that mission. 

And of course, that decision was correct. 

Congress should work with the administration to reform the Authorization for the Use of Military Force. I was here when that was 

3

passed. It was passed in haste as it should have been with great 

emotion, which was natural. But it now needs substantial revision 

to balance our desire to deal with terrorism on the one hand, and 

defend our privacy and liberties on the other. And now, as we see 

Boko Haram and other terrorist organizations that may not fall 

under the ambit of the authorization to use military force, because 

they may not exactly be linked, may be ideologically linked to alQaeda, but such terrorist organizations pose just as great a threat 

to us as the al-Qaeda franchises. So whether you are—whether you 

have the al-Qaeda franchise in North Africa, or Yemen, or wherever, or you don’t, Islamic extremism poses a threat to the United 

States. 

Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must 

continue as the President himself said. We would like to end this 

war. It is the longest in our history. But we can’t end it until the 

enemy is vanquished. As to whether we are leaving Afghanistan 

too quickly and for political reasons, I would have to disagree with 

our acting chairman. First of all, remember, it was not this administration who picked Karzai and installed him. And it is Karzai 

who, to this moment, is prohibiting any troops from remaining in 

Afghanistan through—past the end of this year. 

The generals, our military staff has determined what is an appropriate number of forces to leave there with the goal of combating terrorism and training the Afghan Army. This is not a political decision. This is an appropriate military decision, and I think 

that we ought to unify behind it. 

The United States, hopefully with a new President of Afghanistan, will remain active in that country. We continue to offer $25 

million reward for Zawahiri. We continue to seek out the other key 

al-Qaeda leadership. 

I would like our witnesses to focus on a number of issues. One 

of those is the current strength and capacities of Afghan security 

forces, and their adversaries, the Taliban, the Haqqani network, alQaeda itself. The second is the nature of the ISI’s relationship with 

the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, the Haqqani network, 

and al-Qaeda, and Islamabad’s cooperation with the United States. 

And this is a truly difficult to understand situation. It is clear that 

there are elements of the Pakistani Government that are cooperating with terrorists, and it is clear that there are terrorists who, 

given the chance, would murder the entire family of many of the 

leaders in the Pakistani Government. 

It is the politics I don’t completely understand. Perhaps the witnesses will shed some light on it. I hope they also focus on how 

well the Gulf states are in stopping terrorist financing and whether 

there are any elements of the terrorist organizations that we are 

talking about here that some of those countries find acceptable as 

a recipient of charitable dollars. And so we have a lot to hear and 

I will yield back. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, thank you, Mr. Sherman. Without objection, all of the witnesses’ prepared statements will be made a part 

of record. I ask that each witness please keep your presentation to 

no more than 5 minutes and we will begin with our first panel of 

witnesses. 

4

Mr. David Sedney is the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia in the Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security 

Affairs. Mr. Sedney has received the Secretary of Defense medal for 

Meritorious Civilian Service, Department of State’s Superior Honor 

Award six times, and the Department of State’s Meritorious Honor 

Award twice. It is nice to have you here, sir. Mr. Sedney, we will 

start with you. You have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID SEDNEY (FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE) 

Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking 

Member, representatives, thank you for holding this hearing, the 

subject of which I think is vital to national security. As both of you 

have pointed out in your statement, al-Qaeda remains a threat to 

the United States. There is a narrative about al-Qaeda that I think 

is proving to be increasingly wrong, and that narrative is that alQaeda is much less of a threat today and is on the way to extinction or to strategic defeat. That narrative, I find is belied by the 

facts, and I think it is very important for us to look at this and 

my co-panelists are more experienced in some of the ramifications, 

but I look at it very much from the perspective of Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. We went into Afghanistan after 9/11 as you described, 

Mr. Chairman, with the explicit intention of defeating al-Qaeda 

and making sure that the Taliban couldn’t come back to Afghanistan and make a safe haven for Afghanistan again for themselves 

and for al-Qaeda or similar terrorist organizations. 

We have succeeded for the time being in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda 

is virtually not present in Afghanistan except for a small group in 

Nuristan, which is primarily right now focused on events inside Afghanistan, is not, at least in my judgment, is not a direct threat 

to the United States now, but could be in the future if pressure was 

not continued to be placed on them. 

However, where did al-Qaeda go? It went to Pakistan. And as the 

ranking member described, we have kept, as you, Mr. Chairman, 

have described, we have kept strong pressure on al-Qaeda, but we 

have not managed to defeat al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda still has a number 

of leaders there. There are still numbers of adherents for al-Qaeda 

go to Pakistan seeking training, seeking entry. Al-Qaeda is very 

choosey about who they let into their ranks, but they continue to 

have people who want to join. The reason for that is what is important about al-Qaeda is not so much any individual leader, it is the 

organization. And what is important about the organization is the 

ideology behind it. And that ideology is based on a belief that it is 

the destiny of humanity, to live under a caliphate similar to that 

which ruled in what is now Saudi Arabia almost 1,500 years ago. 

The al-Qaeda have been very explicit in that that is their goal, the 

recreation of a caliphate and to have it first in the areas where 

their religion began, but then to have it spread throughout the entire world. 

So this is really an ideological conflict, and the attraction of people who come to join al-Qaeda is an attraction of ideology. They believe in that vision as well. They see the United States and our 

5

western allies as an obstacle to achieving that vision, and they see 

the country of Afghanistan as a place where they played a major 

role. This is again their narrative, in defeating one of the two superpowers of the 20th century, the Soviet Union, and that they are 

now in the process of defeating the second superpower, now the 

world’s only superpower, the United States in Afghanistan. And 

they do so because they have this narrative because they are less 

worried about what happened yesterday, what’s happening today, 

or what is happening tomorrow, than what their destiny is, which 

is to take over, first Afghanistan, and then other areas that they 

want to have the caliphate in. 

The effort in Afghanistan after the United States pushed the 

Taliban out and pushed al-Qaeda out in 2001, has been an extremely strong and resilient effort on the part of the Taliban with 

the support of al-Qaeda. When I was in Afghanistan from 2002, 

2003, and 2004, we clearly had some initial successes, but we saw 

the buildup of opposition to the government there, and it was very 

effective. By 2008, Afghanistan was close to falling to the Taliban, 

and if they had, they would have brought al-Qaeda back with 

them. 

President Obama announced a surge, and put in place a surge 

that pushed the Taliban back, but has far from negated the 

Taliban’s ability to threaten the state of Afghanistan. One of the 

most important successes in response to the ranking member’s 

question about the capability of the Afghan security forces, is success of the Afghan security forces, particularly the Afghan Army, 

which in the recent elections had not just a lead role, but almost 

completely exclusive responsibility for protecting those elections 

against the Taliban’s declared intention to prevent those elections 

from happening. Not only did they not prevent them from happening, but the elections succeeded beyond anyone’s expectation, 

with almost twice as many people voting in this year’s election as 

did 5 years ago. 

That is a strategic defeat for the Taliban and a strategic defeat 

for al-Qaeda. That is the kind of strategic defeat that we need to 

continue to inflict by having the kind of strong military, civilian, 

and assistance presence in Afghanistan that you described, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Sedney. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sedney follows:]

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Mr. KINZINGER. The Honorable Michael Sheehan is the distinguished chair of the Combating Terrorism Center at the West Point 

Military Academy. Ambassador Sheehan has held positions at the 

New York Police Department, United Nations, U.S. Department of 

State, and was appointed by President Clinton as Ambassador-atLarge for Counterterrorism. Honored to have you here, sir. You 

have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, DISTINGUISHED CHAIR, COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER, 

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY AT WEST POINT 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member. I will keep my remarks short. My general theme is 

that we need to be a little bit more optimistic in what we are going 

to be able to achieve in Afghanistan and in fighting al-Qaeda and 

its affiliates around the world because sometimes our pessimism 

undermines our will to persevere in a war that I think is very winnable if we maintain certain tracks of action. 

Let me highlight five key points from my written testimony, if 

I could, Mr. Chairman. First, that our CT policy in the AFPAK region for the last 13 years, actually has been an enormous success 

by the most important metric, and that is to prevent al-Qaeda from 

coming to our homeland and attacking again. It is very important 

to recognize this. We can push these guys back when we are determined. 

Number two, the AFPAK area, both sides of the border is a 

unique place on the planet that breeds international terrorism and 

a brand of international terrorism with a history of targeting the 

United States’ homeland. 

Number 3, Afghanistan is a winnable war, but we must narrow 

our objectives, be a little bit more optimistic, and we are going to 

need to stay the course a little bit longer, but it is winnable. We 

should not despair. There is too much pessimism coming out of the 

news every day that the Pakistani Government is hopelessly corrupt, the Afghan Government is corrupt, the Pakistani Government 

is helping the Taliban, that things are horrible. We need to remain 

a little bit optimistic in order to persevere. 

Fourth, a U.S. military and intelligence presence is absolutely essential to be in Afghanistan in order for us to continue our war 

against al-Qaeda central, which currently resides in Western Pakistan primarily in the FATA, as you know, the Federally Administered Tribal Area. 

Fifth, we need to guarantee our mission in Afghanistan. If required, in my view, with U.S. air power, directed by our SOF elements that are on the ground there, if the Kabul government is 

threatened to be toppled by the Taliban. And if you recall that combination of U.S. air power and U.S. special forces after 9/11, they 

routed the Taliban within a few months. That is a very lethal combination. Of course, that type of authorization will only be provided 

by the President of the United States and the highest levels in Afghanistan. Let me quickly elaborate on these five points. 

First, about our counterterrorism policy’s enormous success. We 

have to remember that prior to 9/11 when al-Qaeda was not under 

pressure, they attacked us three times strategically in 37 months. 

16

That is a strategic attack every year. They attacked our Embassies 

in East Africa, the USS Cole, and the 9/11 attacks from 1998 to 

2001. If you leave al-Qaeda alone, they will have the capability to 

attack us strategically either at home or in core assets that are 

abroad. That is a clear lesson of that time. But when we are able 

to put pressure on them, as we have in the FATA primarily over 

the last 3 years, we prevented them from being able to organize 

those types of strategic attacks, and they have tried to do so. I will 

go into some of those examples if I have time later. 

Secondly, the AFPAK area is unique. It is the heart of al-Qaeda 

that attacked the U.S. historically. It is a unique place, a stew of 

foreign fighters, wannabe terrorists and numerous violent jihadi 

groups with agendas against Afghanistan, United States, India, 

Pakistan. Many of them are supported by the Pakistani Government for different agendas. They mix together, in a very lethal 

combination of organizations that sometimes work together, sometimes independently, but they are very problematic. 

We should recall my nightmare from when I was at NYPD someone like Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, lived in Connecticut, smart guy, married, Wall Street guy, traveled to Pakistan 

four times, wanted to get to al-Qaeda, but couldn’t and was trained 

by the TTP. Fortunately, his training was bad and the bomb in 

Times Square fizzled out. In my view, that was not an accident. 

His failure was a direct result of the pressure we put on those 

groups in the FATA. If we removed the pressure, they will reconstitute the safehouses, training areas, lines of communication, indoctrination places that existed prior to 9/11 when I was Ambassadorat-Large for Counterterrorism and I was looking through different 

aerial images of bin Laden in his camps and we weren’t able to get 

to him. They were not under pressure and they were able to attack 

us. We can never allow that to happen again. 

Third point, the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is essential to continue providing, to continue pounding al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. There is simply no other viable alternative than Afghanistan, especially now after Ukraine, the countries up in the north, 

it is very unlikely we are going to be able to do anything there, and 

it is too far away. The seaborne area where we conducted operations, launched missiles from the Indian Ocean in 1998 and 1999, 

that doesn’t work very well either. We need to be in Afghanistan 

not only because it is close, but to continue our human intelligence, 

our other intelligence operations that enable us to pound al-Qaeda 

in the FATA, or in Afghanistan if they try to get back in there. 

Number four. This is a winnable war. Too often we despair. The 

Taliban are not 10 feet tall. They do have sanctuary in Pakistan, 

however, which is extremely problematic. An insurgency always 

needs sanctuary, either in a—ideally, across a border which gives 

them some protection, or in some remote area within the country. 

The Taliban used both, but the border area of Pakistan, the support they get from them is extremely problematic, and we should 

understand while that happens, and I don’t see it stopping any 

time soon, the Taliban is going to be around for a long time. They 

will likely control areas in Afghanistan for a long time. And they 

will be able to conduct the periodic terrorist attacks in Kabul that 

17

we see. But I hope that the Afghan Government can persevere 

through that. 

The conditions of the 1990s when the Taliban took over Afghanistan do not exist now and their prospects are dim for repeating 

that. One of it has to do with the security forces that are in Afghanistan that David Sedney talked to. This is a serious army. We 

also, I have been out many times with their special forces units 

that were trained by our special forces units about 14,000 or 15,000 

of them. These are tough fighters committed to action, multiethnic, 

and a serious fighting force. So it is a very different situation in 

the 1990s. 

Fifth and finally, I believe we must guarantee our commitment 

to Afghanistan with our U.S. Air Force there supported by SOF on 

the ground, just in case the Taliban try to run of the ring highway 

like they did in 1995 and 1996. If they were to do that with a major 

offensive, we can pound them, route them into submission and 

keep the government secure. 

So in sum, the area of Afghanistan and Pakistan is a vital interest to U.S. security. It is uniquely a terrorist threat to our homeland. We must remain in Afghanistan in order to deal with the 

threat in Pakistan. Perhaps 10,000 or some other number that is 

kicked around may be enough. But we need to have the right forces 

there in order to sustain that operation. And we should be optimistic that we can do that. And my final point——

Mr. KINZINGER. I will have to ask you to wrap it up very briefly, 

sir. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. My final point, Mr. Chairman, is that al-Qaeda, 

unique among other organizations, seeks WMD and would use it 

tomorrow to kill us in mass numbers. Thank you. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Well said. Thank you Mr. Ambassador. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sheehan follows:]

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Mr. KINZINGER. Mr. Tom Joscelyn, is that correct? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. That is correct. 

Mr. KINZINGER. All right—is a senior fellow at the Foundation 

for Defense of Democracies, and Senior Editor of The Long War 

Journal, a publication dealing with counterterrorism and related 

issues. Much of his research focuses on how al-Qaeda and its affiliates operate around the globe, and sir, you have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS JOSCELYN, SENIOR FELLOW, 

FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Thank you, Congressman, and thank you to this 

committee for inviting me to testify again before you. It is a great 

honor. I am just going to make five quick points. I am the counterterrorism nerd, and I tend to delve in the weeds and I promise not 

to do that here very quickly. My five quick points are, one of the 

big things really sort of was eye-opening for me, I think, for The 

Long War Journal was that most of al-Qaeda’s assets since its existence, since its founding in 1988, have actually not been focused 

on attacking us. That is somewhat of a stark revelation. 

Actually, most of their assets have been focused on other things, 

mainly waging insurgencies against ‘‘local governments,’’ trying to 

seize power for themselves throughout the Muslim world and 

throughout South Asia all the way through the Middle East, and 

into North Africa. That is important because I think that it is not 

by any accident that what is going on around the world where alQaeda groups, al-Qaeda-style groups start popping up throughout 

this whole wide area. 

The second point I would like to make is that there is still a lot 

of confusion about how to define al-Qaeda. You hear a lot of talk 

about al-Qaeda core and everything else as affiliates. I think what 

is really meant by al-Qaeda core is actually what is known as the 

general command of al-Qaeda, and this is actually an organization 

to Mr. Sedney’s point, that still exists. If you go back to the 9/11 

Commission Report, there were several committees in the al-Qaeda 

prior to 9/11. These committees still exist. They have been reorganized, they have been restaffed, but there is still an infrastructure 

of bureaucracy that al-Qaeda exists. So despite all the successes we 

have had in killing and capturing top al-Qaeda leaders, they still 

have this organization. 

And if you go back to my testimony before this committee last 

July, I pointed out that this organization is not confined to South 

Asia, that some of its leadership in the general command is actually elsewhere. And my big point was that al-Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula is headed by the protege and former aide-de-camp to 

Osama bin Laden. And in fact, a couple of weeks after my testimony, that same guy, Nasser al-Wuhayshi, was actually appointed 

to be the general manager of al-Qaeda globally. 

Okay, now this is a core function. So we talk about core here, 

core al-Qaeda and these terms are very loosely defined. They don’t 

make a lot of sense to me. I think what you really have is an international network organization that has what they call their general 

command which makes decisions for the organization. 

And on the third point is, what is this organization actually 

doing in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region? Well, one of the 

23

main things they have been doing, yes, they have been plotting attacks against us unsuccessfully and trying to have mass casualty 

attacks in the West. They have absolutely been trying to do that. 

But one of the other things they have been doing, and primarily 

where their focus has been, is what they call their shadow army, 

which sounds kind of spooky and conspiratorial and it kind of is. 

But what they have done is they built this, basically a force multiplier for the insurgents in the region to try and make their attacks 

more efficient and effective against Afghan forces, coalition forces, 

and those type of things. 

Now, why is this important? Well, a lot of times we can’t actually 

detect al-Qaeda’s hand. They don’t announce exactly what they are 

doing a lot of times, but we can see it if you do very careful analysis. And so al-Qaeda is still very much in the region, still very 

much in the fight in Afghanistan. Everybody knows about their 

hub in Kunar and Nuristan where they have a very prominent alQaeda leader leading the charge. But we detect them elsewhere in 

other provinces. And in fact, one of the few documents released 

from bin Laden’s compound reveals that Osama bin laden told his 

minions basically to disperse out of Northern Pakistan to several 

provinces in Afghanistan, and we have been able to track 

operatives who took him up on that. 

The fourth point is that one of the reasons why al-Qaeda is still 

alive or still in the game is they have developed what we call strategic depth in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And so what former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called the syndicate model. Now, I 

wish I had come up with this phrase, syndicate, to describe it, because it is actually better than anything I have got. But Gates is 

right. And what it is, is they have these close relationships with 

all of these other groups in the area, and a lot of these other 

groups, to Ranking Member Sherman’s point, actually are sponsored by the ISI. And so what al-Qaeda has been able to do, as we 

kill or capture senior al-Qaeda leaders, a lot of times they have 

been able to replace those leaders with guys from other groups in 

the syndicate. And that is what makes them so effective and sort 

of keeps them going. 

And finally, when we talk about just a final point about the 

international network of al-Qaeda and what it really is, this general command, as I said, doesn’t just exist in South Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, actually it stretches across several countries. And 

some of these groups in these countries, these, what we call affiliates or something along those lines, I don’t actually like the word 

‘‘affiliates.’’ Some of these are actually regional branches of alQaeda that have sworn allegiance to bayat to Ayman al-Zawahiri, 

the head of al-Qaeda. They answer up the command in the chain 

to senior leadership in Pakistan, and elsewhere, and the best example of that is today is Syria, where we see this traffic going back 

and forth between Pakistan and Afghanistan and Syria. 

And it shows, to my mind, that we are not dealing with this sort 

of discrete core entity in Pakistan and Afghanistan that can be 

droned to death, but in fact, an international network that poses 

a lot graver challenges. And I will leave it there. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Joscelyn follows:]

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Mr. KINZINGER. Well, thank you. And again, thank you to the 

witnesses for being here and providing us with your fantastic insight. I will go ahead and start with my questions. You know, I 

have always been amazed America has had this, and I guess it is 

a testimony to how, in essence, opposed to war we are at our base, 

at the heart, but any time we get engaged somewhere, we immediately start talking about the withdrawal strategy and how to 

leave and how to get out, and I will say that Afghanistan has been 

a very long war. We understand that, but I will remind people that 

America has not yet been defeated on the battlefield. When we engage with Taliban or al-Qaeda, we win. 

So the only way we will ever been defeated in Afghanistan is if 

our willpower is defeated, not necessarily our military might. And 

so my concern, and my questions will somewhat center around the 

fact of, you know, in 10 or 20 years the history is going to write 

the decisions that we made today. And we have two options: We 

can either have the history books read that, you know, the Afghan 

people had victory, and the Afghan people were able to secure their 

own country, and women still have freedom, and they can go to 

school, and they can be successful, or we can read the thing that 

said America at a time when we were pressing the fight against 

al-Qaeda and the Taliban decided that we had had enough. I guess 

1 percent of America actually serves in the military. I served and 

still continue to serve in the military, but yet, somehow we have 

a war fatigue despite 99 percent of Americans having never served. 

I also would like to remind Mr. Sherman—he is not here. I am 

not talking bad about him, but Mr. Karzai will be gone shortly, and 

we will have a new President of Afghanistan, I think, which will 

be a positive development. Let me ask the entire panel and try to 

keep it as brief as you can. How many us troops do you believe are 

required to remain in Afghanistan post-2014, to combat al-Qaeda 

and al-Qaeda’s allies? And let’s keep it as short you can. We will 

just start this way. 

Mr. SEDNEY. I believe a total force of around 16,000, that would 

be about 10,000 U.S., and about 6,000 NATO is the minimum necessary to carry out those dual goals of having the capability to 

carry out counterterrorism operations and train, advise, and assist 

and equip the Afghan Army. A smaller number than that becomes 

purely a self-defense force. They are only there defending themselves and don’t accomplish anything. 

Mr. KINZINGER. It is just cooking food and protecting the fences, 

basically. Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. I would agree with that number, sir. That is the 

number that is kicked around interagency, the Department of Defense and CIA primarily. My concern is that if we go below that, 

that the CIA will have to withdraw even further back, and that we 

are going to lose our insight into the FATA. Also, the military 

needs to be there to protect the counterterrorism assets that conduct the attacks against al-Qaeda. So I agree that number is a 

minimum. 

Mr. KINZINGER. I just remind everybody what we see in Iraq 

today, right, the western—the place where the Marines fought the 

hardest they have fought since Khe Sanh, is now controlled by 

ISIS, because the administration, I believe for a political reason, so 

31

they could follow through on a political promise, pulled all of the 

troops out of Iraq and we find ourselves today with a lawless Western Iraq, also based out of Syria. Mr. Joscelyn, in terms of the 

number of troops. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I am actually not a military expert so I will defer 

to these gentlemen, but I think 10,000 to 20,000 sounds about right 

in terms of the numbers to protect our forces and actually keep in 

the fight there in the region. One of the big things that you have 

to keep your eye on is the ability for the drone air strike campaign 

to keep going, and the bottom line is, unless we have the proper 

forces in place to protect those assets and protect those bases, in 

addition to taking the fight to the enemies in Afghanistan, then 

that is going to necessarily impact our ability to strike in Pakistan 

and elsewhere. 

Mr. KINZINGER. How would you all rate the administration’s current counterterrorism strategy? Does it have one, and if so, is it 

successful? I guess we can start with you, sir, again, and then right 

to left. My right to left. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, I think the administration has had success 

in taking out certain key senior al-Qaeda leaders, obviously, including Osama bin Laden. I think the Bush administration had success 

in that regard before them. I think the problem, again, is I think 

both administrations early on made the same mistake, which is, 

they define al-Qaeda as this sort of this top-down pyramid with a 

hierarchical structure, that if you sort of lop off the top of the pyramid, the whole thing crumbles. They had that debate, that discussion about how to organize themselves about 20 years ago, and 

they decided against that organizational structure. And, you know, 

we still fight them a lot of times like they are structured that way 

and so they are growing in other ways. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. Mr. Ambassador, how would you rate 

the current administration’s——

Mr. SHEEHAN. I should mention, Mr. Chairman, I was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity 

Conflict. I just left that job last year, so I was part of the administration. So do I think they have good strategy? I do. Their strategy 

is to conduct kinetic and direct action strikes against those organizations that directly threaten the United States or U.S. personnel. 

For other groups that have not yet directly threatened the U.S., the 

strategy is more to assist the host country for them defeating them. 

So far they have been successful. I think they need to stay the 

course. The bottom line metric is protecting the homeland. That 

has been done. But there are a lot of problems out there. I think 

they need to stay the course like they have done the last few years 

and I hope they will. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Mr. Sedney. 

Mr. SEDNEY. I agree with my former colleague. We served together at the Pentagon, Ambassador Sheehan, that the administration has had a lot of successes in—on the counterterrorism field. 

However, it is not just—you can’t distinguish counterterrorism 

from all of the other aspects of our state and governmental policy. 

And I think, for example, the long debate over the last 2 years 

about whether there should be a zero option in Afghanistan has led 

to improved morale for al-Qaeda and others, has led other states 

32

such as Pakistan to hedge their policies against the possibility of 

a zero option in the United States. 

So while the counterterrorism policy, which I would say is sort 

of a subset of the overall policy, I think has a lot of successes, I 

think the overall ability to counter that has been undercut by the 

fact we have not made that definitive commitment to Afghanistan 

that you mentioned before. 

Mr. KINZINGER. And I think if we exercise the zero option, I 

think we will double or triple the size of al-Qaeda overnight, because we will hand them the strongest moral victory that they have 

had in decades. And let me just finally say, because I want to live 

by example, as someone that has to bring the gavel down on people, 5,000, 10,000, 15,000 troops are kind of a high-risk option, medium risk, and low risk option. In my mind, I think we need to put 

the number of troops in theater to provide the low-risk option, both 

to protect our men and women in the field and also to protect the 

victory for the Afghan people. 

So I appreciate all you all answering my questions. At this point 

I would like to recognize Mr. Schneider of Illinois, another from the 

same great State for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

the witnesses for your testimony and insight, but also for your 

service long before this. 

Ambassador, I would like to touch on something you said. You 

talked about Afghanistan or AFPAK being unique and distinctive. 

As you were saying, though, I was thinking about what is taking 

place in Syria, in Yemen, in Sinai, and thinking that while each 

of these are unique, there seems to be a lot of commonality. And 

so I guess I will start with a series of questions. Is what makes Afghanistan Pakistan so unique from the others? What lessons apply 

across the others? What coordination do we see with the affiliates 

of al-Qaeda in these other regions? And what happens, A, if we 

win, and as I will throw out to the whole group, if we are able to 

win, as you say, in Afghanistan, does that just push the balloon out 

to bulging in these other areas? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Thank you, sir. Let me try to answer a few of 

those questions. First of all, why is it unique, because of their track 

record. They actually have killed people and blown things up in the 

U.S. and against our other targets, them and AQAP. So it is the 

al-Qaeda central in AFPAK that is my number one concern for attacking the homeland, secondly the AQAP, which also has a track 

record. The other organizations right now, though potentially very, 

very problematic, are currently focused on the local fight. Whether 

eventually they shift to Europe first and then the U.S., we will see. 

Certainly, the potential is there. They are the same type of folks 

that are committed to attack us, so we have to be prepared for 

them to be able to shift their focus now which is local, to the local 

enemy as they called it, the near enemy, to the far enemy which 

is the United States and Europe. It remains to be seen when and 

if they will do that. But that’s why they are unique. Pakistan is 

also unique because of the various groups that are there that have 

been supported by the Pakistani state, groups like the Lashkar-eToiba that have attacked in India, directed by the Pakistani intelligence, murdering people in a hotel in Mumbai. This is a unique 

33

situation, where a state is actually involved in these organizations 

that are part of the stew I talked about earlier that directly threaten us. 

And so these are very serious organizations like the Haqqani network, the Pakistani Taliban. They are very well funded. They are 

ideologically determined, and they have capability and they have a 

track record. That is why I worry about that area. That is why I 

believe we have to stay there and continue pounding these people 

relentlessly for quite a while. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Sedney? 

Mr. SEDNEY. I agree entirely with the Ambassador’s analysis and 

leave that to the others. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Joscelyn, thoughts? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. My caveat there is that while other parts of the 

al-Qaeda network have not yet been successful or attempted a 

mass casualty attack on the U.S., there is always a potential there 

for that. The problem is that many of the senior al-Qaeda leaders, 

or some of the senior al-Qaeda leaders who were part of that general command in Afghanistan and Pakistan have relocated elsewhere. For example, in Syria just last week, the Treasury Department highlighted a very senior al-Qaeda operative, a guy who was 

on the military committee for al-Qaeda, he is involved, according 

to the Treasury Department, with a group in Syria that is plotting 

attacks against Western targets. So these are—their leadership is 

sprinkled amongst several different countries, not just Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Maybe the question, coming back to Ambassador 

Sheehan, you talk about victory or winning in Afghanistan. Does, 

however you define a victory in Afghanistan, just shift the battlefield, shift the front to one of these other areas? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. It will to certain extent, sir, they will move, I 

think. But by the way, I don’t think there will ever be a definitive 

victory in Western Pakistan for decades. These people, this is at 

least a multigenerational fight. They are not going away. They are 

burrowed into the mountains up there. They are committed. We 

are going to be there a long, long time. But as Tom said earlier, 

they are already dispersing. And they already are starting to direct 

these—taking advantages of countries that have lost their rule of 

law, or have ungovernmental places now we are seeing in Northern 

Nigeria. They take advantage of those places, Mali, Libya, et 

cetera, and are stirring up a very fertile ground to recruit radical 

jihadis of the same ideology. So they are already doing that, but 

having said that, I still don’t think they are going away in Pakistan. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I know I have a time limit. I turn to Mr. Sedney. 

As you talk, where you are going to see these lines, I think, is 

where there seams, whether it is in Nigeria, or in Syria, where you 

have failed states, and there are gaps and seams that these groups 

can operate within. The challenge ultimately becomes, as you 

talked about it, Mr. Sedney, a sense of ideology, or destiny. Is there 

any path, any strategy we can put together that will address the 

ideology as opposed to just the tactics of terrorism? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Yes, there is, and I think it is emerging sometimes 

despite our lack of a coordinated effort on that, and that is what 

34

is happening in Afghanistan right now because, yes, al-Qaeda has 

been trying to support the Taliban. The Taliban have been trying 

very actively, but in the elections that took place last month in Afghanistan, young people turned out. And the message from these 

young people across all ethnic lines, the message for women was 

that the vision of the future—that the al-Qaeda and Taliban put 

out of a return to the caliphate of an inward-looking, backwardlooking, oppressive regime, they rejected that. In the Afghan 

media, the number one headline after the elections was, we said no 

to the Taliban. By saying no to the Taliban, they said no to alQaeda. That is a competing vision for the future that can be applicable in other societies as well. Every one of the other societies you 

mentioned, every other place that al-Qaeda can go also has young 

people. 

That is the battleground. And if Afghanistan, despite all of the 

problems it has had, can be a success, then those other states can 

be a success, too. But I agree entirely with Ambassador Sheehan. 

This is not something that is going to happen by a certain date or 

time. It is a multigenerational struggle, and it is one that it is 

going to be very hard for us to have the commitment that is needed. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, thank you. I wish we could spend more 

time. I am out of time but, again, thank you for your time and 

service. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. I now recognize the 

gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Joscelyn, let me direct it, I am sorry, to Mr. Sedney. Do the Afghan national security 

forces currently have the capabilities and equipment to combat, or 

have the skills to combat al-Qaeda? 

Mr. SEDNEY. They have some of them. They have the basic fighting ability. They have the fighting spirit. They have the on-theground organization tactically. What they lack, are key enablers. 

The most important one is the one that Mr. Sheehan already highlighted is air power, both transport and attack aircraft as well as 

helicopters. They lack advanced capabilities in intelligence, which 

is really key to the kind of struggle they are fighting. And in areas 

of logistics and organization, they still need to make a great deal 

of progress. 

So, those are the kind of capabilities that require years more for 

them to be successfully acquired, and without that, they risk degrading in the future. So they have a good start, but we need to 

stay the course. 

Mr. PERRY. I would concur with that. I just wanted to hear your 

assessment. I would turn the good Ambassador here, regarding a 

report that we have in our reading here, that in October 2013, 

there was a police raid in Islamabad regarding a house that was 

purpose built as it is described with a lab in the basement dedicated to the research and development of explosives-laden drone 

aircraft. If I couple that with your comment regarding al-Qaeda’s 

specific, and very particular interest in WMD, can you put those 

two together for me and describe the threat as you see it if there 

is a nexus between the two? And then who are the enablers to that 

threat? 

35

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir. Everybody wants drones now and actually you can buy a drone in a store here in the United States. You 

can buy a helicopter with a camera on it. Putting a weapon on it 

is much more difficult. So I don’t think they are ever going to have 

that capability in the near term to put a weapon on a drone. Will 

they be able to have the capability to perhaps purchase some kind 

of rudimentary drone, perhaps. But I don’t see it. 

On WMD, this is something that I focused on for about 15 years, 

al-Qaeda’s ability to get it. Right now, you know, they had a ricin 

program. They might have had anthrax program. They have looked 

around for dirty nuclear bombs, radiological bombs, a little bit on 

the chemical side, but they really kind of given up on that right 

now. They would like to go back to it, but quite frankly, it is too 

hard for them. The reason it is too hard for them, because they are 

under enormous pressure. They are under enormous pressure in 

their headquarters and they are under enormous pressure also in 

Europe and the United States. Prior to 9/11, and I was Ambassador 

prior to 9/11. I was doing al-Qaeda before 9/11. There was no pressure on this organization, overseas, or in the U.S. They moved 

around, 19 people came into the United States, blow up our Trade 

Center with impunity. That has dramatically changed. 

They are still here in the United States, but they are under pressure. It is difficult for them to obtain those type of weapons. And 

when I was at NYPD, we worked very hard to protect a radiological 

chemical and other sources that they might be able to tap to conduct that type of attack. So right now I think they are years away 

from coming up with that kind of capability. 

Mr. PERRY. So who would be, you know, their enablers in that 

regard? If you talk about weaponizing a crude drone, not a drone, 

with VX, or something of that nature. Are we looking at Syria? Are 

we looking at friends in Pakistan in the government, in the intelligence services? Who are we looking at? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Yes, sir, it is a good question. I think it is a—you 

are right, that it would probably require a state to give them real 

capability for a WMD. It is just too hard to weaponize these things. 

I have spent a lot of time trying to figure those—how to weaponize 

them and it really comes down to a state, otherwise, it is going to 

be a very small attack. Certainly, Syria won’t help al-Qaeda. They 

are fighting them. The Pakistanis helping al-Qaeda, that is our 

worst nightmare. We hope that never happens. 

Mr. PERRY. And is there evidence to support the theory that 

there are members of the Pakistani Government, whether it is the 

intelligence services or otherwise, that are willing to be very helpful in that regard? How much of a concern do we have, should we 

have? When I talk about Syria, I just meant the environment 

where the opportunity exists to receive the contraband, so to speak. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. Right, sir. I believe that perhaps this is one of our 

most important intelligence requirements is to keep our eye on the 

Pakistani intelligence and other people as to their relationship with 

some of these groups. Because certainly, they have had long, long 

relationships, decades of relationships with some of these families, 

people, and groups, and would it be impossible for some of these, 

either rogue or directed people, to provide dangerous weapon systems to some of these organizations? It is possible. Especially the 

36

organizations that they might arm to attack in Kashmir or in 

India. Those same type of weapon systems can then be turned 

against us. But I don’t believe the Pakistani army, Pakistani Government would count on such an activity. It would come from 

below, perhaps, from a rogue, and I don’t see any evidence of that 

happening right now. It is something we have to keep an eye on. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Perry. At this point, seeing now 

that it is—we will go into a quick round two, and then we will let 

you all go, because I think we have a few more questions, still. Let 

me just ask to whoever can answer this question. I recently saw 

an article in The Daily Beast. It was entitled, ‘‘CIA falls back in 

Afghanistan.’’ Describe the CIA efforts to dismantle their operations in Afghanistan, and how is this going to be harmful to the 

effect to combat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan? I will just throw that out 

to whoever can answer that. 

Mr. SEDNEY. To a large degree, I know I am really not in a position to comment on that issue in an open hearing, Mr. Chairman. 

I would have to be in a closed hearing to make a—to give you my 

views on that issue. One thing that I will say, that I did travel to 

Afghanistan in December and a number of Afghans raised concerns 

to me about that issue. That is something that I learned in an unclassified setting. But aside from that, I apologize, I am not able 

to answer that question in this setting. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Understood. Go ahead, sir. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. The key commander who figures in those press 

reports is Farouq al-Qahtani and to your point, Congressman, 

about al-Qaeda and the Taliban not having a lot of success against 

us historically in a direct fight against American forces, that is absolutely right. Unfortunately, Farouq al-Qahtani is one of the few 

guys who actually did have some success against American forces 

in a head-to-head fight. And he is the head of the organization in 

Kunar and Nuristan. 

Now, those are remote regions of Afghanistan. That is a good 

thing. However, I think if you look at al-Qaeda more wholistically, 

you realize that we need that ongoing CIA help to fight them beyond Kunar and Nuristan. 

Mr. KINZINGER. And does core al-Qaeda still matter? I mean, I 

still get confused with the idea of core al-Qaeda, and you did a good 

job of explaining it, but to me, I think core al-Qaeda kind of seems 

like a way of hedging this idea that we have al-Qaeda on the run. 

We have got core al-Qaeda on the run even though we have these 

huge offshoots. So does core al-Qaeda still matter? I will start with 

you. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I think the hedging point is right. I mean, that 

was the only way to argue that al-Qaeda was being decimated or 

defeated, because if you look at their expansion elsewhere, it is 

kind of hard to argue that. But on a day-to-day basis at our Web 

site, you can see us document communications to and from alQaeda senior leadership including Zawahiri and others in the core 

‘‘al-Qaeda’’ with their regional branches, and that includes in 

Yemen, or Syria, or else elsewhere. 

37

So, yeah, they do still matter. They are providing—and it is not 

just ideological Shahidi guidance. We find them providing, on occasion, tactical guidance in the day-to-day fight. 

In fact, I will point back to that Treasury Department designation last week, a senior al-Qaeda member in that designation relocated from Pakistan to Syria, and one of the reasons he did was 

to help the al-Qaeda affiliate groups acquire heavy weapons from 

different sources and throughout the Gulf. 

Mr. KINZINGER. I am going to go ahead and yield back my time, 

and I am going to recognize Mr. Sherman for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. It is clear that Islamic extremism 

hasn’t been defeated. We have won some important victories. I 

want to get away from the partisanship of, oh, well, al-Qaeda—all 

Islamic extremism hasn’t been destroyed, therefore this President 

is bad, that President is good. Al-Qaeda happened during this administration. Bin Laden was killed during that administration. It 

is one effort. And Truman and Eisenhower weren’t bad Presidents 

just because at the end of their terms the Soviet Union had not 

been defeated. 

We are engaged in a long war. We don’t like long wars. We are 

going to have to win this long war. And I just got out of a hearing 

called Pivot to Asia. Well, what is that pivoting away from? I mean, 

I watched some basketball games. You can’t pivot and then pivot. 

The fact is that a few rocks in the Pacific that remain uninhabited 

even though they are off the coast of the most teaming continent, 

remain totally useless and uninhabited throughout history, which 

is why nobody knows who owns them, should not be our focus at 

a time when, as the gentlemen have testified, there are forces that 

would pull off another 9/11 if not confronted every single day. 

I am trying to understand the Pakistani Government. As far as 

I understand, those in Islamabad would not kill each other. That 

is to say, you don’t have an ISI general who would kill another ISI 

general or a regular Pakistani army general or even one of the 

elected leaders. Okay, there is one former unelected leader who is 

in prison now. But aside from that. 

And yet, correct me if I am wrong, there are elements of the Pakistani Government waging effective war on the terrorists and there 

are elements of the Pakistani Government cooperating with the 

terrorists. I see some nodding heads, but perhaps I could get an 

oral response. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, I think that’s right. I think there are two 

issues: One is the direct relationship between parts of the military 

intelligence establishment in Pakistan and al-Qaeda. And I think 

those relationships do exist. Carlotta Gall from The New York 

Times reported about the ISI’s bin Laden’s death. I think the best 

way to fact-check that and get into what the actual relationship is, 

and how that works, is probably to have a more complete discussion about bin Laden’s documents, the extensive files that were 

found in his compound and what they say. There has been reporting about what is in those files, but they haven’t been released. 

And there has been no sort of systematic accounting for what is in 

them in this regard publicly. I mean, from your perspective. 

The second thing is——

38

Mr. SHERMAN. Then maybe Congress should get a classified 

briefing as to what is in those documents, at least our subcommittee, since that is the heart of what we do. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I think that, Congressman, that is a great idea. 

I think all congressmen should get a full briefing on the bin Laden 

documents, and I mean the full contents of the documents, and exactly asking how many files were captured, how many have been 

exploited and translated and what they say in totality about 

the——

Mr. SHERMAN. The idea that the administration or any administration would actually tell Members of Congress anything, is a 

wonderful fantasy. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. It is a wonderful fantasy. But a quick second 

point is, there is also the question about the Pakistani establishment as the U.N. calls it, relationship with these other groups that 

all allied with al-Qaeda. In fact, we have this monograph I contributed a chapter for my think tank where I describe how all these 

groups, that are sponsored by the ISI that are creatures of the ISI 

establishment are also allied with al-Qaeda. And that is part of 

how al-Qaeda gets the strategic depth. And I lay it all out in great 

detail how that works, from the Afghan Taliban, to Lashkar-eToiba——

Mr. SHERMAN. Is there elements of the Pakistani establishment 

who would be killed by the very people being aided by the Pakistani establishment? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, that is right. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I see Ambassador Sheehan nodding, but how—you 

know, those people that want to murder me, I usually don’t donate 

to. Can anybody give us——

Mr. JOSCELYN. Right. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. If I could. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I do want to bring in one other factor, and that 

was, our imposition of Karzai in Kabul creating the risk in Pakistani military thinking, to being attacked from both sides, a large 

Indian Embassy in Kabul, which I am sure is doing wonderful development work, but there are so many other poor countries around 

the world which could benefit from that. And of course, it rings 

alarm bills in Islamabad. Why—so I can understand a bit why 

some in Islamabad say well, we need the Taliban because we can’t 

trust Kabul, you know, why we didn’t install somebody who could—

who is more acceptable to Pakistan in Kabul, I don’t know, but that 

was a long time ago. Ambassador Sheehan. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. One other observation I will try to talk a little bit 

about Pakistan. In 2002 and 2003, there were three attempts on 

the life of President Musharraf. At that time he said, wait a second, what is going on here? These are groups that my own organization is supporting and he did turn against them fairly aggressively in that period. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So that was with the second or third assassination. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. The third attempt. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. But I think in order to understand Pakistan, you 

have to understand their history and the trauma they have gone 

39

through when Bangladesh broke off, and Balochistan almost broke 

off, and Pashtunistan, they are always trying to break off. And so 

Pakistan is paranoid about the break up of its state with good reason, by the way. It is not a state that truly exists. It is a state that 

is organized ad hoc, after the World War II, and——

Mr. SHERMAN. So they are paranoid not only of India, but also 

of separatism. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. That is right. And so right now what they are trying to do, is control Pashtun’s power within their Federal tribal 

areas and in Afghanistan to make sure they control that so that 

they will never have a breakup of their state. That is one of the 

reasons. It is much more complicated than that. But I think you 

have to understand in terms of their paranoia about a breakup of 

the state, also they talk about strategic depth about India, which 

I never really quite understood, but I do understand their desire 

to control those areas of Pashtunistan, and what they do is they 

ride the strong horse to control that. And often that strong horse 

may be a group like the Haqqani network or others that are contrary to their own interest. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Sedney. 

Mr. SEDNEY. A couple of points. I agree with what my co-panelists said, but it is even more complicated than that, in response to 

your point, Representative Sherman. Even sometimes the fact that 

somebody wants to kill you is outweighed by the fact that they are 

even more valuable to you because of what they can do to people 

who are more likely to kill you. In other words, there is a calculation here. If I am really good at killing you, and Mr. Sheehan is 

less good at killing you, maybe you will support him, even though 

he wants to kill you, if he will attack me. So that is the kind of 

complicated equation that the Pakistanis find. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But in that analysis, Karzai would have to be 

wanting to kill Pakistani leaders, and last I checked, that wasn’t 

his objective. 

Mr. SEDNEY. Well, President Karzai and a number of other Afghans over the years, have raised the issue of what is called 

Pashtunistan which is essentially an extension of Afghanistan to 

the banks of the Indus, which goes right to the heart of that state 

identity that Ambassador Sheehan was saying. But one final point 

about Pakistan that is important. Pakistan is not a country. It is 

not a government. It is—there are a number of systems there. The 

most important overwhelming one is the military intelligence one. 

This is a country where last month Hamid Mir, the Larry King, if 

you will, of Pakistan, the number one journalist interviewer, who 

had interviewed almost all of the top leaders of Pakistan on his 

show, was the subject of an assassination attempt. He, before the 

assassination attempt, had communicated to his family that if such 

an assassination attempt took place it was ISI that was trying to 

kill him. So just imagine in the United States, if——

Mr. SHERMAN. There are many in our establishment that would 

want to kill various journalists, but—so far that hasn’t occurred. 

Mr. SEDNEY. That is the kind of complicated geography of politics 

and terrorism that the Pakistanis live under. And this is a country 

that has some serious structural problems, as Ambassador 

40

Sheehan has mentioned. That is until they are solved which won’t 

be for years, the al-Qaeda threat is going to remain. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And how many nuclear weapons do they have in—

don’t bother answering. 

Mr. KINZINGER. All right. The gentleman yields back. And I now 

recognize the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Cotton, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you. And thank you all for your time today. 

I read with interest over the weekend some news reports about FBI 

Director James Comey who was reflecting on his early tenure at 

the Bureau saying that when he had entered, he expected to put 

the FBI back in its traditional footing of law enforcement based on 

the public statements of the administration and al-Qaeda being on 

the run. 

He now says, and this is a quote from those stories:

‘‘I didn’t have anywhere near the appreciation I got after I 

came into this job just how virulent those affiliates had become. They are both many more than I appreciated, and they 

are stronger than I appreciated.’’

Starting with you, Mr. Joscelyn, and then moving from right to 

left, my right, your left, do you care to comment on what Mr. 

Comey as a private citizen might have been missing and now what 

he might be seeing as a senior official in the administration? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, I think the simple fact of the matter is that 

they are putting the organizational relationships aside for a moment, and that is my specialty, but putting that aside. There are 

now more groups fighting in al-Qaeda’s name or in al-Qaeda’s ideology, or espousing al-Qaeda’s style of jihad than ever, you know, 

and that goes from Africa, throughout the Middle East, into South 

Asia. And so, you know, if you actually delve into that each story 

is different in each location, but you now have a threat that is 

much different than the one that existed on 9/11. In some places 

it is a lesser threat, in some places it is a growing threat and becoming more problematic. 

Mr. COTTON. Mr. Ambassador? 

Mr. SHEEHAN. I think there is two parts to it, sir. One, he was 

getting intelligence briefs internationally. As Tom had said, alQaeda is spreading and taking advantage of unlawful places all 

around the world and growing in strength in a very troubling way. 

But he also was probably briefed domestically. When I was at 

NYPD, I was part of the Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York 

City, and he probably found all of these briefings about—within the 

United States the types of folks that he needs to worry about. That 

right now, that the ones that I worried about when I was in New 

York City were the ones that would travel to Pakistan and come 

back, like Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, or those that 

were willing to get support from the outside and conduct an operation, and some like the Boston bombers who did it pretty much 

on their own. 

So I am sure he was getting those briefings, and probably was 

surprised to find how many people within the United States, given 

the chance, would be willing to take violence against American citizens. 

Mr. COTTON. And Mr. Sedney? 

41

Mr. SEDNEY. I think that the new FBI director went in thinking 

the way most Americans do, that this is really something that has 

pretty much passed, this threat from al-Qaeda. And going back to 

the point that Ambassador Sheehan made, in our military, our intelligence, our law enforcement agencies over the last 12-plus 

years, have made an incredible effort. They have been hugely successful. A lot of that success is not known. People are safe today. 

People are alive today because of the many plots that have been 

stopped, and unless you know all of the things that are coming 

after us, and unless you know that they have been stopped and 

most of that can never be told, then you don’t appreciate the 

threat. 

And I think that is, in many ways, a core message from all of 

us here, that those threats are still happening, and the threat of 

more to come is still happening. And yes, this has been a long war. 

It is going to continue to be a long war, but if we don’t keep fighting it, it won’t be just something that we will read about in history 

books because then there will be a question of whether there is history books to read. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you. The second news report I read with interest recently said that Iran is recruiting Afghan refugees, paying 

them several hundred dollars a month to fight in Syria, on behalf 

of Bashar al Assad. I would presume transporting them through 

Iran, through Herot and Farah Provinces. The reports alluded to 

them being Shiites. I was wondering if you would care to comment 

on the report and whether, in fact, this is happening, where they 

are coming from in Afghanistan, and if they are. But secondarily, 

do we see much evidence of links between al-Qaeda in the AfghanPakistan border region doing the same on the Sunni side in Syria? 

Again, starting with Mr. Joscelyn. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, I will take the latter part. Actually, there 

is this relationship that I have documented and it is very curious 

between al-Qaeda and the Iranian regime. And this administration 

in July 2011, December 2011, February 2012, October 2012, and 

2013, and again earlier this year, has repeatedly, through the State 

Department and the Treasury Department, documented the relationship between the Iranian regime and al-Qaeda the fact that 

there is this facilitation network on Iranian soil that al-Qaeda uses 

to move fighters around to Syria and elsewhere. 

So this is something that the core, or general command leadership in AFPAK is sort of very interested in doing and is doing 

through Iranian soil, so it doesn’t surprise me. 

Mr. COTTON. Mr. Sheehan. 

Mr. SHEEHAN. I agree with Tom, and it is interesting we talk 

about Pakistan’s dysfunction. The Iranians do the same thing. 

Here they are supporting al-Qaeda members coming through their 

country to join forces that are then fighting against their own surrogates in Syria and against Assad who they are supporting. So 

they, too, all operate on both sides of the fence, and it is somewhat 

interesting. I have been out of government. I read the same report, 

sir, and I believe it to be plausible. And they are probably Shi’as 

that are being paid, mercenaries. The Iranians are paying people 

to fight that war, primarily Hezbollah, and others to help the 

Assad regime fight the opposition. 

42

Mr. COTTON. And Mr. Sedney. 

Mr. SEDNEY. I agree. Again, this is another complex issue. The 

al-Qaeda is clearly anti-Shi’a. Al-Qaeda is clearly anti-Iran, but alQaeda has had leadership figures in Iran under the semi-protection 

of the Iranian Government since certainly 2002. And so Iran has 

been protecting those whose ideology is to destroy the state. The 

role of the United States there is important because going back to 

the point that I made to Mr. Sherman, Iran also sees the United 

States as an enemy, and certainly elements of the Iranian security 

forces are ready to use any tool, even those that might threaten 

themselves, in order to be able to do things that undermine the 

United States. But this is a complicated thing. It is not just a good 

guy versus bad guy. There are many varieties of bad guys out 

there. 

Mr. COTTON. Thank you. I see my time, but hopefully not the 

witness’ patience is expired. 

Mr. KINZINGER. All right, the gentleman yields back. Seeing no 

other questions, the chair wishes to thank our witnesses and the 

subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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