alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.6 to 2009 10-K

Amendment to Agreement

Employee Name: Mr. Robert A.
Lento

Date of Original Agreement: September 1, 2002

This is an Amendment to the Agreement of the date shown above (the Agreement) between Convergys Corporation (the
Employer) and the Employee stated above (Executive), which Amendment is made to meet the requirements of Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the Code), effective January 1,
2009 (Effective Date). The Agreement is hereby amended as follows:

1. Any severance pay to be paid upon
involuntary termination by the Employer without cause which is calculated by reference to base salary will be paid in a lump-sum no later than 74 days after Executives Termination Date. Executive must complete and return any required release
and the time for revocation thereof must expire prior to 74 days after Executives Termination Date. Executives Termination Date is the date the Employer reasonably concludes that Executive will not perform any more services for the
Employer or any entity under common control under Code Sections 414(b) and (c) (but using 50% common control), as an employee or independent contractor, and provided that Executive shall not be considered to have separated while on leave with
re-employment rights until six months have passed, all in accordance with Treasury Regulations under Code Section 409A. For clarity, Executive must cease all services for Employer to be eligible for severance pay.

2. Any reimbursements to the Executive provided for in the Agreement will be made in accordance with the normal policies of the Employer,
and will in no event be paid later than the last day of the Executives taxable year following the taxable year in which the expense is incurred.

3. The Employer and the Executive agree and confirm that this Agreement is intended by both parties to provide for compensation that is exempt from Code Section 409A as separation pay (up to the Code
Section 409A limit) or as a short-term deferral, and to be compliant with Code Section 409A with respect to any compensation that is not so exempt. This Agreement shall be interpreted, construed, and administered in accordance with this
agreed intent, provided that the Employer does not promise or warrant any tax treatment of compensation hereunder. This Agreement shall not be amended or terminated in a manner that would accelerate or delay payment of severance pay or bonus pay
except as permitted under Treasury Regulations under Code Section 409A.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed
this Amendment to the Agreement as of the Effective Date but actually on the date(s) stated below.



CONVERGYS CORPORATIONBy

/s/ Clark D. HandyClark D. Handy, Senior Vice PresidentHuman ResourcesDate:

December 29, 2008EXECUTIVE/s/ Robert A. LentoRobert A. LentoDate:

December 29, 2008
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 450


## ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION III No. CV

- 16

- 486
GREGORY ALLEN KIDD APPELLANT
V.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES and MINOR CHILDREN APPELLEE S Opinion Delivered: September 28, 2016
APPEAL FROM THE HEMPSTED COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO S. 29JV

- 15

- 130, 29JV

- 15

- 131, 29JV

- 15

- 132, 29JV

- 15

- 133, 29JV

- 15

- 134 ]
HONORABLE RANDY WRIGHT , JUDGE
AFFIRM ED

WAYMOND M. BROWN , Judge Appellant appeals from the circuit court ’ s March 29, 2016 adjudication order in which it adjudicated Z.S., born 9/12/2004; J.C., born 9/27/2005; A.C., born 1/2/2008; J.S., born 8/12/2009; and C.S., born 12/10/2011 , as dependent

- neglected and specifically found that C.S. had been sexually abused by appellant. On appeal, appellant argues that the
circuit court (1) erred in exercising jurisdiction in the case absent joinder of all indispensable parties and (2) acted in a manner inconsistent with hi s due process rights, thereby rendering its judgments and orders void. We affirmed

. Appellant’s argument is that the noncustodial parents to the juveniles were not give n notice of the proceedings, therefore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. 1 C onstitutional

1 While appellant references all defendants in his “ Statement of the Nature of the Case[,]” he does not discuss his own rights at all in his “Legal Analysis” ; he only discusses the rights of three of the other defendant s, specifically, Candy Collier, the children’s mother ;Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 450

2 rights, including the guarantee of due process, are personal rights and may not be asserted by a third party. 2 In Burdette v. Dietz , where the a ppellant made the same argument as to
the natural father , this court stated the following: We need not discuss this issue in detail for the following reasons: first, appellant has no standing to raise the issue of lack of proper service upon the natural father. Second, even if appellant had such standing, she failed at trial to raise issues as to sufficiency of process and jurisdiction in the manner required by ARCP Rule 12(b), (h)(1). 3 Likewise, appellant has no standing to raise the issue of lack of proper service on the

non custodial parents. Because appel lant makes no argument regarding his own notice, instead focusing his efforts on making an argument for other parties who have chosen no t to make said argument for themselves, he has made an argument that he does not have proper standing to make.
Affirmed

. V AUGHT and H IXSON , JJ., agree. Stayto n & Associates , by: Rowe Stayto n , for appellant.
Andrew Firth , Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee. Chrestman Group, PLLC , by: Keith L. Chrestman , attorney ad litem for minor children.

Terrance Scott, legal father of Z.S., J. C ., and A.C.; and Matthew Collier, legal father of J.S. and C.S.

2 Cox v. Stayton , 273 Ark. 298, 302, 619 S.W.2d 617, 619 (1981) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma , 413 U.S. 601 (1973 ); Barrows v. Jackson , 346 U.S. 249 (1953)).

3 18 Ark. App. 107, 109, 711 S.W.2d 178, 180 (1986) (internal citations omitted).
You are here: Census.gov › Business & Industry › Economic Indicators › Quarterly Financial Report 

# Quarterly Financial Report (QFR) Manufacturing, Mining, and Trade Corporations Latest QFR Press Releases TheThird Quarter 2010 QFR press release for Manufacturing, Mining, and Wholesale Trade was released on December 13, 2010 at 10:00 a.m. Latest QFR Press Release (Manufacturing, Mining, and Wholesale Trade): PDF [113 Kb] Excel [179 Kb] TheThird Quarter 2010 QFR press release for Retail Trade was released on December 20, 2010 at 10:00 a.m. Latest QFR Press Release (Retail Trade): PDF [78 Kb] Excel [150 Kb] 

## Latest QFR Publication Data TheThird Quarter 2010 QFR publication was released on December 13, 2010 at 10:00 a.m. Latest QFR Publication PDF [1398 Kb] Latest QFR Financial Data Tables Excel [2526 Kb] Latest QFR Summary Data Tables Excel [283 Kb] TheThird Quarter 2010 QFR financial data tables for Retail Trade were released on December 20, 2010 at 10:00 a.m. Latest QFR Retail Trade Financial Tables Excel [94 Kb] 

## Latest QFR Bar Charts The following bar charts present After Tax Profit information for U.S. manufacturers and large retailers. U.S. Manufacturers Seasonally Adjusted (Billions of Dollars) JPG [37 Kb] U.S. Manufacturers Seasonally Adjusted (Per Dollar of Sales) JPG [43 Kb] Large U.S. Retailers (Billions of Dollars) JPG [38 Kb] Large U.S. Retailers (Per Dollar of Sales) JPG [36 Kb]

Source: U.S. Census Bureau | Quarterly Financial Report | 800-272-4250 | Last Revised: January 12, 2011 

### 3/14/2011 Quarterly Financial Report Main Page

http://www.census.gov/econ/qfr/ 1/1
#### PALM v COMMUNITY TRACTION CO

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist, Lucas Co

No 2182.

Decided Feb 25, 1929

Joseph G Gluck and M M Garfinkel, both of Toledo, for Palm.

Tracy, Chapman & Welles and Frank Harrington, all of Toledo, for Traction Co.

RICHARDS, J.

This charge was given to the jury in ad-' vanee of'argument and over the exception of counsel for plaintiff, and was again given to the jury in the course of the general charge. It made the right of the plaintiff to recover depend solely upon whether she was injured on the precise day that she stated in her testimony, even though other testimony was introduced which would indicate that the accident occurred at a time when Rymariewicz was the motorman, wearing badge No. 277, and when car No. 624 was' in use on Erie street. We think this charge was manifestly erroneous and prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff.

Some confusion as to date may have' arisen from the fact that the first day of *244January, 1928, was on a Sunday, and that the following Monday was observed as a holiday. If the plaintiff had in mind that the accident occurred two days after the day that was observed as New Year’s day, that would bring the date January 4th instead of January 3rd, and-it appears from the record that the defendant company has a different schedule for Sundays and holidays. The effect of the instruction was to make the right of recovery depend wholly and absolutely on the plaintiff’s recollection of the date on which she claims to have been injured, rather than on the merits of the case.

It is urged, however, that under the doctrine announced in McAllister vs. Hartzell, 60 Ohio St., 69, and other kindred cases, the judgment could not be reversed for this error. This court recognizes and has often applied the rule to which reference has been made, but that rule can have no application where the charge is of such a character that it relates to all the issues and the instruction given in this case covered the whole scope of all of the issues. The Scioto Valley-Railway & Power Co. vs. Rutter, Admx. 112 Oh St., 500. The instruction was equivalent to saying to the jury: “No matter how seriously the plaintiff was injured, nor under what circumstances, she is not entitled to recover unless the injury occurred on January 3rd, 1928, at about 7:30 P. M.”

For the reasons given the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

Williams and Lloyd, JJ, concur.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 21

- 3160

_____________________________
N SPR C ARE C ENTERS , L LC
, d /b/a N SPIRE H EALTHCARE T AMARAC /X L S PECIALTY I NSURANCE C OMPANY , a nd A LTERNATIVE S ERVICE C ONCEPTS , L LC
, Appellant s /Cross

- Appellees
,

v.

N ATHANIEL H OUSTON , Appellee /Cross

- Appellant

.

_____________________________

On appeal from an order of the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims. Iliana Forte , Judge

.
Date of Accident: June 24, 2019.

September 16, 2022

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
R OWE , C.J., and R AY and M AKAR , JJ., concur

.2 _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________ Paul T. Terlizzese of Hurley, Rogner, Miller, Cox & Waranch, P.A., Fort Pierce, and William H. Rogner of HR Law, P.A. , Winter Park
, for Appellant s /Cross

- Appellees

. Kenneth B. Schwartz of Winer Law Group, Fort Lauderdale, and Adam G. Werner of Gordon & Partners, P.A. , Palm Beach Gardens
, for Appellee /Cross

- Appellant

.
§ 77.17 Obstruction standards. ( a ) An existing object, including a mobile object, is, and a future object would be an obstruction to air navigation if it is of greater height than any of the following heights or surfaces: ( 1 ) A height of 499 feet AGL at the site of the object.
( 2 ) A height that is 200 feet AGL, or above the established airport elevation, whichever is higher, within 3 nautical miles of the established reference point of an airport, excluding heliports, with its longest runway more than 3,200 feet in actual length, and that height increases in the proportion of 100 feet for each additional nautical mile from the airport up to a maximum of 499 feet.
( 3 ) A height within a terminal obstacle clearance area, including an initial approach segment, a departure area, and a circling approach area, which would result in the vertical distance between any point on the object and an established minimum instrument flight altitude within that area or segment to be less than the required obstacle clearance.
( 4 ) A height within an en route obstacle clearance area, including turn and termination areas, of a Federal Airway or approved off-airway route, that would increase the minimum obstacle clearance altitude.
( 5 ) The surface of a takeoff and landing area of an airport or any imaginary surface established under § 77.19, 77.21, or 77.23. However, no part of the takeoff or landing area itself will be considered an obstruction.
( b ) Except for traverse ways on or near an airport with an operative ground traffic control service furnished by an airport traffic control tower or by the airport management and coordinated with the air traffic control service, the standards of paragraph (a) of this section apply to traverse ways used or to be used for the passage of mobile objects only after the heights of these traverse ways are increased by: ( 1 ) 17 feet for an Interstate Highway that is part of the National System of Military and Interstate Highways where overcrossings are designed for a minimum of 17 feet vertical distance.
( 2 ) 15 feet for any other public roadway.
( 3 ) 10 feet or the height of the highest mobile object that would normally traverse the road, whichever is greater, for a private road.
( 4 ) 23 feet for a railroad.
( 5 ) For a waterway or any other traverse way not previously mentioned, an amount equal to the height of the highest mobile object that would normally traverse it.
forms1a2111309ex10-2.htm


    PROMISSORY
NOTE

    


    


    $
1,205.00                                                                                     Dated:  December
2, 2008

    


    Principal
Amount                                $1,205.00                                         State
of New York

    


    FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the
undersigned hereby jointly and severally promise to pay to the order of Joseph
C. Passalaqua, the sum One Thousand Two Hundred Five Dollars ($1,205.00),
together with interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum on the unpaid
balance.  Said sum shall be paid in the manner following:

    


    In full upon demand.

    


    All payments shall be first applied to
interest and the balance to principal.  This note may be prepaid, at
any time, on whole or in part, without penalty.  All prepayments shall
be applied in reverse order of maturity.

    


    This note shall at the option of any
holder hereof be immediately due and payable upon the failure to make any
payment due hereunder within 5 days of its due date.

    


    In the event this note shall be in
default, and placed with an attorney for collection, then the undersigned agree
to pay all reasonable attorney fees and costs of collection.  Payments
not made within five (5) days of due date shall be subject to a late charge of 5
% of said payment.  All payments hereunder shall be made to such
address as may from time to time be designated by any holder
hereof.

    


    The undersigned and all other parties
to this note, whether as endorsers, guarantors or sureties, agree to remain
fully bound hereunder until this note shall be fully paid and waive demand,
presentment and protest and all notices thereto and further agree to remain
bound, notwithstanding any extension, renewal, modification, waiver, or other
indulgence by any holder or upon the discharge or release of any obligor
hereunder or to this note, or upon the exchange, substitution, or release of any
collateral granted as security for this note.  No modification or
indulgence by any holder hereof shall be binding unless in writing; and any
indulgence on any one occasion shall not be an indulgence for any other or
future occasion.  Any modification or change of terms, hereunder
granted by any holder hereof, shall be valid and binding upon each of the
undersigned, notwithstanding the acknowledgment of any of the undersigned, and
each of the undersigned does hereby irrevocably grant to each of the others a
power of attorney to enter into any such modification on their
behalf.  The rights of any holder hereof shall be cumulative and not
necessarily successive.  This note shall take effect as a sealed
instrument and shall be construed, governed and enforced in accordance with the
laws of the State first appearing at the head of this note.  The
undersigned hereby execute this note as principals and not as
sureties.

    


    /s/ John F.
Passalaqua

                                                                                         Borrower-
John F. Passalaqua

                               Secretary,
Pegasus Tel, Inc.
§ 65.45 Performance of duties. ( a ) An air traffic control tower operator shall perform his duties in accordance with the limitations on his certificate and the procedures and practices prescribed in air traffic control manuals of the FAA, to provide for the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic.
( b ) An operator with a facility rating may control traffic at any operating position at the control tower at which he holds a facility rating. However, he may not issue an air traffic clearance for IFR flight without authorization from the appropriate facility exercising IFR control at that location.
( c ) An operator who does not hold a facility rating for a particular control tower may act at each operating position for which he has qualified, under the supervision of an operator holding a facility rating for that control tower.
[Doc. No. 10193, 35 FR 12326, Aug. 1, 1970, as amended by Amdt. 65-16, 35 FR 14075, Sept. 4, 1970]
exhibit4_9.htm

 

    
      

    

     

     

    
       EXHIBIT
4.9

      


      


      


      


      


      SEE
ATTACHED PDF
[No. 49084-2-I.

Division One.

October 21, 2002.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. M.K., *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 01-8-01438-4, Nicole MacInnes, J., entered August 22, 2001. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Schindler, J., concurred in by Baker and Agid, JJ.
#### In the Matter of the Estate of Jane D. Ward, Deceased. Malcolm D’Ambrogio, Appellant; Fifth Avenue Bank of New York et al., as Executors of Jane D. Ward, Deceased, Respondents.

Argued March 1, 1937;

decided March 16, 1937.

*Edward H. Beck*and *Abraham G. Males*for appellant.

*Edward T. Corcoran*for respondents.

Order affirmed, with costs, unless within twenty days the appellant purges himself of the contempt or submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court, in which event the order is reversed, without costs. No opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Loughran, Finch and Rippet, JJ.
```

[Federal Register: September 7, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 172)]
[Notices]               
[Page 54299]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr07se10-15]                         

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

 
Agenda and Notice of Public Meeting of the Massachusetts State 
Advisory Committee

    Notice is hereby given, pursuant to the provisions of the rules and 
regulations of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act, that briefing and planning meetings of the 
Massachusetts State Advisory Committee will convene on September 23, 
2010, at 10 a.m. in the Council Room at City Hall, 536 Dwight Street, 
Holyoke, MA 01040. The purpose of the briefing meeting is for the 
Advisory Committee to continue its work on English Language Learners. 
The purpose of the planning meeting is to discuss future activities of 
the Committee.
    Members of the public are entitled to submit written comments; the 
comments must be received in the regional office by October 23, 2010. 
Written comments may be mailed to the Eastern Regional Office, U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights, 624 Ninth Street, NW., Suite 740, 
Washington, DC 20425. They may be faxed to 202-376-7748, or e-mailed to 
ero@usccr.gov. Persons who desire additional information may contact 
the Eastern Regional Office at 202-376-7533.
    Hearing-impaired persons who will attend the meetings and require 
the services of a sign language interpreter should contact the Eastern 
Regional Office at least ten (10) working days before the scheduled 
date of the meeting.
    Records generated from this meeting may be inspected and reproduced 
at the Eastern Regional Office, as they become available, both before 
and after the meeting. Persons interested in the work of this advisory 
committee are directed to the Commission's Web site, http://www.usccr.gov, or may contact the Eastern Regional Office at the above 
e-mail or street address.
    The meeting will be conducted pursuant to the rules and regulations 
of the Commission and FACA.

    Dated in Washington, DC, on September 1, 2010.
Peter Minarik,
Acting Chief, Regional Programs Coordination Unit.
[FR Doc. 2010-22149 Filed 9-3-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6335-01-P
```
Order filed November 30, 2021 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-21-00589-CV

____________

SYLVIA COOKE, Appellant

V.

RACHEL BAIER, Appellee

On Appeal from County Court at Law No 2

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CV-0087510

ORDER

This appeal is from a judgment signed March 30, 2021. The notice of appeal

was filed October 15, 2021. It appears the notice of appeal is untimely, but we are 

unable to make that determination because the clerk’s record has not been filed. 

We received notice from the clerk’s office that appellant has not designated a 

clerk’s record1and the notice does not reflect appellant has made arrangements to 

1We note that Tex. R. App. P. 34.5 sets forth the items to be included in the clerk’s record absent 

a designation.
pay for the clerk’s record.2 Appellant has filed a motion to extend time to file the 

notice of appeal, which cannot be determined in the absence of any clerk’s record.

Accordingly, we enter the following order. 

The Galveston County District Clerk is directed to file a clerk’s record on or 

before December 3, 2021, containing (1) the court’s judgment; (2) any request for 

findings of fact and conclusions of law, any post-judgment motion, and the court’s 

order on the motion; and (3) the notice of appeal.

PER CURIAM

Panel Consists of Justices Jewell, Bourliot, and Poissant.

2 An appeal is subject to dismissal for failure to arrange payment for the clerk’s record. See Tex. 

R. App. P. 35.3(c), 37.3(b).