1 RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 16a0100p.06 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

B ARBARA F AKHOURI , Plaintiff-Appellant ,

v

.

O BER G ATLINBURG , I NC ., Defendant-Appellee

. ┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┘ No. 15-5972

Appeal from the United St ates District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville. No. 3:13-cv-00517—Curtis L. Collier, District Judge. Decided and Filed: April 21, 2016
Before: SUTTON and GRIFFIN, Circu it Judges; OLIVER, District Judge. *

_________________ COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Shawn C. Cabot, CHRISTOPHER TR AINOR & ASSOCIATES, White Lake, Michigan, for Appellant. Benjamin W. Jone s, Caitlyn Luedtke Elam, LEWIS, THOMASON, KING, KRIEG & WALDROP, P.C., K noxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

_________________ OPINION

_________________ SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Barbara Fakhouri so ught damages from a Tennessee ski resort after she suffered injuries wh ile using a tramway on the reso rt’s property in August 2012.
Because a Tennessee statute immunizes the ski resort from liability for this claim, we affirm the district court’s grant of summ ary judgment to the resort.

* The Honorable Solomon Oliver, Jr., Chief Judge, United St ates District Court for th e Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation. 

### >No. 15-5972 Fakhouri v. Ober Gatlinburg, Inc. Page 2

Fakhouri, a resident of Michigan who uses a wheelchair, traveled to eastern Tennessee for a family vacation in the summer of 2012. She vi sited Ober Gatlinburg, a ski resort that has at least four slopes, including advanced and expert routes. The business model for a Tennessee ski resort, no surprise, does not depend on earnings from ski lift tickets al one. The resort also has a year-round amusement park, restau rant, lounge, and shopping center alongside the ski paths and mountain trails. To bring visito rs to and from the ski area a nd associated attractions, Ober Gatlinburg operates a tramway, which Fakhouri rode without incident up the mountain when she
arrived at the site. When she tried to enter th e tram for her return tr ip, however, her wheelchair caught on the tram, breaking one of the wheels and causing her leg to buckle underneath the chair. She sought medical treatment for injuri es to her leg and neck, and she continues to experience swelling, weakness, poor blood flow, and discoloration in the affected leg.
Invoking the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction, Fakhouri sued Ober Gatlinburg in the
Eastern District of Tennessee. She claimed that the resort negligently failed to ensure her safe passage on the tram under Tennessee law. The di strict court granted summary judgment to the resort, relying on a Tennessee statute that precludes liability for ski resort operators under certain
conditions. Fakhouri v. Ober Gatlinburg, Inc. , No. 3:13-CV-517, 2015 WL 4724207, at *2–4 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 10, 2015). Fakhouri appealed.
“[N]o action shall lie against any [ski area] operator by any skier or passenger,” Tennessee’s Ski Area Safety and Liability Act sa ys, as long as the operator complies with the Act itself and with “other state acts pertaining to ski areas.” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-114-101, -107(a). The reason for the limited liability is th at, unless specified exceptions apply, “each skier or passenger is deemed to have assumed the risk of and legal responsibility for any injury to the skier’s or passenger’s person or prop erty arising out of the skier’s or passenger’s pa rticipation in Alpine or downhill skiing or the use of any pa ssenger tramways associated with Alpine or downhill skiing.” Id. § 68-114-103.
These provisions, taken together, preclude Fakh ouri’s lawsuit if (1) she was a “skier or passenger,” (2) Ober Gatlinburg is a “ski area operat or,” and (3) her injuries “aris[e] out of” her “use of any passenger tramways as sociated with Alpine or downh ill skiing.” All three conditions for the resort’s immunity apply.No. 15-5972 Fakhouri v. Ober Gatlinburg, Inc. Page 3

One: Fakhouri was a passenger on the tramway. The statute defines “[p]assenger” to include “any person . . . in th e act of boarding or embarki ng upon or disembarking from[] a passenger tramway.” Id. § 68-114-102(2). Fakhouri acknowle dges that her injury occurred while she was getting onto the tram, meaning sh e comfortably fits the statutory definition.
Two: Ober Gatlinburg is a sk i area operator. That term cove rs “a person or organization having operational responsibil ity for any ski area.” Id. § 68-114-102(5). A “ski area,” in turn, “means all the ski slopes and ski trails and passenger tramways administered or operated as a single enterprise within [Tennessee].” Id. § 68-114-102(4). Ober Gatlinburg operates “ski slopes,” “ski trails,” and a “passenger tramway[]” in Tennessee, which means it qualifies as a ski area operator.
Three: Fakhouri’s injuries “ar[ose] out of” her use of a “passenger tramway[] associated with Alpine or downhill skiing.” Id. § 68-114-103. Fakhouri testified that her injuries occurred
when her wheelchair “hit” someth ing and “tipped forward” as sh e “headed towards the tram” to go down the mountain. R. 20-2 at 18–19. And the tr am itself is “associated with Alpine or downhill skiing” because it brings visitors up to and (sometimes) down from the slopes at Ober Gatlinburg.
Because the resort satisfied all three grounds for immunity, the Ski Area Safety Act bars Fakhouri’s claim. She “assumed the risk” for inju ries arising from her use of the tramway, which means “no action shall lie” against Ob er Gatlinburg. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-114-103, -107(a).
Fakhouri’s rejoinders do not alter this conclu sion. She claims that Ober Gatlinburg was not acting as a “ski area operator” at the time of her injuries, b ecause “there was no snow on the ground” and no one was “engaged in ski-related or wi nter activities” at the time of her trip: August 2012. Appellant’s Br. 15. But the resort ’s status as a “ski area operator” does not change with the seasons. The “ski area” that Ober Gatlinburg “operat[es]” consists of the “ski slopes,” “ski trails,” and “passenger tram way[].” Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-114-102(4). The tramway does not become any less a part of that area when the snow melts each spring (or lateNo. 15-5972 Fakhouri v. Ober Gatlinburg, Inc. Page 4

winter). Ober Gatlinburg t hus “operat[es]” a ski area whenever it operates the tramway, which it does each month of the year, making it a “ski area operator” year round.
Fakhouri adds that her injuries did not “a ris[e] out of” her “u se of any passenger tramways associated with Alpine or downhill skiing.” Id. § 68-114-103. As she reads the provision, the final phrase (“associated with Alpi ne or downhill skiing”) modifies the word “use,” making the statute applicable only to th ose who use Ober Gatlinburg’s facilities for a purpose “associated with” skiing—namely, a skiing- related purpose. But that is not the first thing someone thinks when reading these words. The most natural reading of the provision is that it applies when one uses a tramway associat ed with skiing. That a tramway is associated with skiing, as this one is, does not require that it be used for skiing each time, as Fakhouri claims. Rules of grammar support this interpreta tion. “[A] limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.” Barnhart
v. Thomas , 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003); see Lockhart v. United States , 136 S. Ct. 958, 962–63 (2016);
In re Sanders , 551 F.3d 397, 399 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 152–53 (2012) (discussing the nearestreasonable-referent canon). Because “associated with” immediately follows “tramways,” that is the word it modifies. As long as the tramway itself is “associated w ith Alpine or downhill skiing,” as this tramway undoubtedly is , the statute precludes liability.
Fakhouri’s interpretation, moreover, reads tw o crucial words out of the Ski Area Safety Act. Recall that the law pr otects ski area operators from lawsuits brought by a “skier or
passenger .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-114-107(a) (emphasis added). A skier, the statute says, is “any person present in a ski area for the purpo se of engaging in the sport of skiing, Nordic, freestyle or other types of ski jumping and who is using skis, a sled, a tube or a snowboard.” Id. § 68-114-102(6). Because the Act covers lawsuits brought by “skier[s] or passenger[s],” it must capture some claims brought by people not “present in a ski area fo r the purpose of engaging in the sport of skiing.” Fakhouri’s theory, however, leaps over “or” and “passenger,” drastically reducing, if not eliminating altogether, the class of “passengers” not alread y covered as “skiers.”
Trying to overcome this problem, Fakhouri frames her “intent” in coming to the resort as seeking “to enjoy the various summer amusem ents and sights in Gatlinburg, none of whichNo. 15-5972 Fakhouri v. Ober Gatlinburg, Inc. Page 5

included Alpine or downhill skiing or any winter-related sport.” Appellant’s Br. 12–13. But if the Act precludes only lawsuits brought by those who “inten[d]” to ski, it precludes only lawsuits brought by “skiers,” shearing any substance from the term “passenge r.” Our reading avoids that pitfall, ensuring that the statute covers acti ons brought by anyone who, li ke Fakhouri, is injured while “boarding or embarking upon” the tram, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-114-102(2)— regardless of the individual’s “int ent” in visiting the resort and re gardless of the season in which
the individual makes the visit.
Fakhouri points to two case s that purport to support her view. The first is Terry v. Ober Gatlinburg, Inc. , an unpublished Tennessee Co urt of Appeals case hol ding that the Ski Area Safety Act “does not protect a ski area operator fr om negligent rental operations,” such as renting out skis and ski bindings to guests. No. 03A01-9701-CV-00026, 1998 WL 54700, at *1, *3–4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1998). But Terry found only that the Act was “silent concerning liability for rental operations.” Id. at *4. That silen ce, in light of th e canon “that statutes in derogation of [the] common law are to be stric tly construed and conf ined to their expre ss terms,” meant that the law did not preclude liability for a ski area’s rental business. Id. The same reasoning does not apply to Fakhouri’s claim, because the statute does , by its “express terms,” id. , limit liability arising from the use of passenger tramways. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-114-103.
Albert ex rel. Albert v. Ober Gatlinburg, Inc. , is no more helpful. No. 3:02-CV-277, 2006 WL 208580 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 25, 2006). It is an unpublished district court decision that denied summary judgment to a ski area operator that arguably “failed to exercise reasonable care when it opened [a] ski reso rt” during unsafe conditions. Id. at *5. But recall that the Ski Area Safety Act does not shield operators from liability when th ey fail to comply with state statutes. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-114-107(a) . The plaintiff in Albert claimed just that, introducing evidence that the operator violated state law by “fail[ing] to designate” the hill’s level of difficulty and declining “to warn skiers of . . . changing conditions on the slopes.” 2006 WL 208580, at *3, *5;

see Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-114-106(1), (2)(A).
Fakhouri has not submitted any similar evidence pointing to a statutory violation by Ober Gatlinburg. Her complaint, it is true, seemed to alle ge violations of a state law that gives ski area operators “primary responsibility for the design , construction, maintenance, and inspection ofNo. 15-5972 Fakhouri v. Ober Gatlinburg, Inc. Page 6

any passenger tramway.” Id. § 68-114-105. But the district court did not read it that way, reasoning that Fakhouri’s claims related only to negligence in overs eeing “the embarking, disembarking, and riding of the pa ssenger tramway,” not to the ma intenance or inspection of the tramway itself. Fakhouri , 2015 WL 4724207, at *4. Fakhouri does not challenge that determination on appeal. Once Ober Gatl inburg met its summary judgment burden by demonstrating that Fakhouri’s claims failed unde r the Ski Area Safety Act, she could overcome that showing only with proof of her own—proof indicating that an exception to the Act applied because the resort did not meet the statutory requirements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). She failed to do so, never invoking § 68-114-105 in her summary judgment filing (or her briefs on appeal). Because Ober Gatlinburg established that the Ski Area Safety Act applies, and because Fakhouri never rebutted that showing, the di strict court correctly granted su mmary judgment to the resort.

For these reasons, we affirm.