SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2450-15T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER FIGUEROA,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________________

Submitted May 25, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Hoffman and O'Connor.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 

07-09-3171.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (David A. Gies, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief).

Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Patrick 

D. Isbill, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel 

and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

June 20, 2017
A-2450-15T3

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Defendant Christopher Figueroa appeals from an October 26, 

2015 order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) 

without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

I.

Charged with two counts of first-degree murder in addition 

to other offenses, in 2010 defendant pled guilty to one count of 

first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1). 

During the plea hearing, defendant admitted he was in a vehicle 

with two other men on March 8, 2007, when he purposely shot both 

in the head after a disagreement over money. Consistent with 

the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to a twenty-fiveyear term of imprisonment, with an eighty-five percent period of 

parole ineligibility, and the remaining charges were dismissed. 

Defendant did not file a direct appeal. 

In 2014, defendant filed a PCR petition as a selfrepresented litigant; a brief and amended petition were 

thereafter filed by his counsel. The principal issues defendant 

raised relevant to this appeal were plea counsel was ineffective

because he: (1) failed to file a motion to suppress statements 

defendant provided to law enforcement in violation of the Fifth 

Amendment;

1 2) failed to investigate C.O., an alibi witness; (3) 

failed to take into consideration the recantation of a statement 

 

1 U.S. Const. amend. V.
A-2450-15T3

3

by R.M., a State witness; (4) advised defendant he had no

alternative but to plead guilty; and (5) had a conflict of 

interest, which induced counsel to encourage defendant to plead 

guilty. Defendant also argued he was entitled to withdraw his 

guilty plea because counsel's ineffectiveness forced him to 

enter the plea. 

In a lengthy, comprehensive opinion, the PCR court denied 

defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing. We briefly 

summarize the pertinent evidence. 

At 10:50 p.m. on March 8, 2007, the day defendant shot both 

men, officers from the Camden Police Department were dispatched 

to the location where there had been a report of an automobile 

accident. The police found both victims dead in an overturned 

vehicle. 

One week later, defendant's live-in girlfriend, R.M., gave 

a statement to the police. She reported defendant and codefendant Jason Rodriguez entered her and defendant's home at 

midnight on March 9, 2007. Defendant brought home a black, 

plastic bag from which he removed $20,000 in cash. Defendant 

gave some cash to the co-defendant and stored the remainder in 

their home. R.M. observed blood on defendant's shirt sleeve, 

and saw him remove and put his clothes in a plastic bag. 
A-2450-15T3

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Defendant then told R.M. he was leaving to discard the clothing 

and a gun. 

R.M. further reported that, the following day, defendant 

returned home and told her he had been with the co-defendant and 

both victims the evening before. The four planned to commit a 

robbery and obtain $20,000. Defendant told R.M. he had an 

argument with one of the victims, and then shot both victims in 

the head. At the time of the shooting, the car was still 

moving; the car struck a tree and flipped over. Defendant 

managed to climb out of the car, taking $20,000 in cash that had 

been in the victims' possession. 

Defendant also told R.M. he discarded the gun and the 

clothes he was wearing at the time of the shooting. He then 

gave R.M. $1,000 from the $20,000 he obtained the day before. 

R.M. deposited $1,000 into her bank account that day; the police 

later confirmed R.M. had in fact deposited this amount into her 

account on March 9, 2007. 

On March 10, 2007, defendant advised R.M. he had bought a 

van and was going to Brockton, Massachusetts, where he was going 

to stay with family. He stated he wanted to leave New Jersey 

because he expected the police would be looking for him with 

respect to "the two dead bodies." Thereafter, R.M. agreed to a 
A-2450-15T3

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consent search of her home, where dried blood was found and 

tested. The blood matched that of one of the victims.

Approximately six months later, R.M. purportedly hand-wrote 

a statement recanting her previous one. This unsigned document 

stated her first statement was written to hurt defendant because 

he had been unfaithful to her, and that defendant never told her 

he had committed the murders. She also stated she wrote the 

first statement while recovering from a caesarian section, and 

was under the influence of Percocet, Ibuprofen, and Diazepam to 

control the pain. 

Approximately one month after the incident, C.O. contacted 

the police and also provided a statement. She told the State's 

investigator she was defendant's girlfriend. She reported that, 

on the evening of the incident, she received a telephone call 

from defendant between 10:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m., advising he 

was coming over to her home. She recalled the time of day 

because FOX News was on television at the time. 

C.O. then fell asleep and, at some later point, defendant 

arrived and stayed at her home until 8:00 a.m. the following

day. She did not know when he arrived at her home. In 2015, 

eight years after she gave her first statement, C.O. purportedly 

told defendant's investigator defendant arrived at her home at 
A-2450-15T3

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10:00 p.m. on the night of the incident, and spent the night in 

her home. 

Also relevant to the issues on appeal are the circumstances 

surrounding defendant's custodial interview by an investigator 

and detective from the Camden County Prosecutor's Office. On

March 17, 2007, defendant was arrested in Brockton for a parole 

violation. The investigator and detective traveled to Brockton 

to conduct the interview. As depicted on the video-recording of 

the interview, just before the interview, a Brockton police 

officer read defendant his rights pursuant to Arizona v. 

Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 

Defendant then signed a document which set forth the 

Miranda warnings and a statement advising he had a right to 

telephone an attorney, friends, or family at any time. 

Defendant also signed that portion of the form stating he was 

waiving his Miranda rights and was willing to speak to the 

police. Defendant told the officer he understood he only had to 

answer questions if he wanted and could stop at any time. The 

police also offered and defendant accepted water and crackers.

Also depicted is the investigator and detective's 

interview, at the beginning of which defendant confirmed he 

received his Miranda rights and knew he did not have to speak to 
A-2450-15T3

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them. He also stated that despite his awareness he did not have 

to speak to them, he was willing to do so. 

At the outset of the interview, the investigator advised 

defendant she and the detective wanted to talk to him because he 

was implicated in both murders. During the course of the 

interview, defendant admitted he stole money from drug dealers

and had purchased two guns the week the victims were killed, but 

denied committing the subject homicides. 

Four times during the interview defendant complained he was 

cold. The detective also commented it was cold in the interview 

room and noted defendant was not wearing pants but, as the PCR 

court observed, defendant was wearing a hooded sweatshirt, and 

other evidence revealed he was wearing "thermals." At one point 

during the video-recording, defendant stood up and it is clear 

he was wearing pants of some nature. The investigator and 

detective were not in heavier clothing, merely wearing suits. 

Defendant also commented he had been shot the previous December 

and was still recovering from his wounds, but at no time during 

the interview did he appear to be in pain or discomfort. 

Defendant was indicted six months later, in September 2007.

One year later, his attorney moved to be relieved as counsel 

because defendant was not paying his bill in accordance with the 

retainer agreement, and was not participating in his defense. 
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Counsel later withdrew his motion. Two years later, defendant 

pled guilty. 

The PCR court made the following findings. On the issue 

counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a motion to 

suppress defendant's interview with law enforcement, after 

reviewing the evidence and various decisional authority, the PCR 

court determined defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his 

right to remain silent before he was interviewed. Further, at 

no time during the four-hour interview was defendant coerced 

into or unable to resist making a statement he was unwilling to 

make. 

In addition to defendant explicitly stating he knew he did 

not have to answer any questions and could stop the interview at 

any time, the court observed the police were civil toward him.

The court also noted defendant appeared comfortable and relaxed 

throughout the interview, and even "laugh[ed] and smile[d] and 

appear[ed] conversant with the . . . interviewers." Thus, the 

court determined counsel had not been ineffective for failing to 

file a suppression motion, because there was no evidence 

defendant would have prevailed had he filed such motion. 

As for counsel's alleged failure to interview and evaluate 

R.M.'s credibility in light of her recantation, the court found 

the recantation inconsequential. The court also rejected the 
A-2450-15T3

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claim C.O. allegedly made in 2015 that defendant was in her home 

by 10:00 p.m. on the night of the incident, because the document 

in which such claim was asserted was not created and signed by 

C.O. under oath. See State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 

170 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999) (holding

when a defendant claims counsel inadequately investigated his or 

her case, defendant must assert facts supported by affidavits or 

certifications based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant 

or the person making the certification).

In addition, the court found no evidence counsel had a 

conflict of interest while representing defendant, not to 

mention some two years elapsed from the filing of counsel's 

motion to be relieved and the time defendant pled guilty. 

Finally, after examining the factors in State v. Slater, 198 

N.J. 145 (2009), the court found no basis to grant defendant's 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

II.

On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our 

consideration.

POINT I – THE FAILURE OF THE DEFENDANT'S 

TRIAL ATTORNEY TO INTERVIEW TWO WITNESSES, 

ONE OF WHOM PRESENTED THE DEFENDANT WITH AN 

ALIBI, OR TO PURSUE A SUPPRESSION MOTION 

LENDS CREDENCE TO THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT 

HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY'S PERSONAL INTERESTS 

MATERIALLY LIMITED HIS ABILITY TO CONSIDER, 
A-2450-15T3

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RECOMMEND OR CARRY OUT THE MOST APPROPRIATE 

COURSE OF ACTION.

POINT II – THE DEFENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY 

WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE WHERE HE 

DID NOT PURSUE A SUPPRESSION MOTION ON FIFTH 

AMENDMENT GROUNDS.

POINT III – REVERSAL OF THE PCR COURT'S 

DENIAL OF THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW 

HIS GUILTY PLEA IS WARRANTED WHERE HIS TRIAL 

ATTORNEY WAS NOT IN POSITION TO REVIEW WITH 

HIM THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE 

EVIDENCE BECAUSE HE DID NOT INTERVIEW THE 

ALIBI WITNESS.

Although not raised in a separate argument point, defendant also 

contends the PCR court erred by denying his motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea. 

Having reviewed the briefs and the record, we are not 

persuaded by any of defendant's arguments and affirm the denial 

of defendant's PCR petition for essentially the same reasons 

stated in the PCR court's oral decision. However, we add the 

following comments. 

The standard for determining whether counsel's performance 

was ineffective for purposes of the Sixth Amendment was 

formulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, l04 S. Ct.

2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court 

in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (l987). In general, in order to 

prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

defendant must meet the following two-prong test: (l) counsel 
A-2450-15T3

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made errors so egregious he or she was not functioning 

effectively as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution; and (2) the errors prejudiced defendant's 

rights to a fair trial such that there exists a "reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different." 

Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 694, l04 S. Ct. at 2064, 

2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 698. 

If seeking to set aside a guilty plea based on ineffective 

assistance of counsel, the second prong a defendant must meet is 

"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty but would 

have insisted on going to trial." State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 

N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 

457 (1994)). 

Here, R.M.'s recantation had limited value, because her 

original statement was corroborated by other, objective

evidence. For example, in her first statement, R.M. claimed she 

saw blood on defendant's clothing within just a couple hours of 

the homicides. Blood found in the home matched that of one of 

the victim's. Further, her admission she deposited $1,000 of 

the $20,000 defendant reported taking from the victims after 

shooting them was confirmed by bank records. Other evidence 
A-2450-15T3

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neatly coincides with and lends credence to the claims she 

asserted in her first statement. Given R.M.'s recantation would 

have had limited impact at trial, counsel cannot be faulted for 

recommending defendant accept the State's plea offer. 

Defendant asserts C.O.'s 2015 statement provided him an

alibi. First, the only statement C.O. made by the time 

defendant pled guilty was one in which no exonerating 

information was provided. Second, the 2015 statement 

contradicts the first statement, making C.O.'s credibility 

suspect. Unlike R.M.'s statements, where there was evidence to 

show her first statement was valid, there was no evidence C.O.'s 

second statement was reliable. Third, C.O. did not certify or 

attest the contents of the 2015 statement were accurate. 

In addition, although we have not been provided with a 

transcript of his guilty plea, we are informed when the codefendant pled guilty, he implicated defendant. Shortly 

thereafter, defendant pled guilty, as well. 

Finally, on the question whether defendant should have 

filed a suppression motion, we merely add our Supreme Court has 

observed "[i]t is not ineffective assistance of counsel for 

defense counsel not to file a meritless motion." State v. 

O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007). Here, defendant failed to 

show, as was his burden, his suppression claim was meritorious. 
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See State v. Fisher, 156 N.J. 494, 501 (1998). He also failed 

to identify an incriminating statement from defendant's 

interview.

In the final analysis, defendant failed to meet the first 

prong of the Strickland test. Accordingly, we find no error by 

the PCR judge in rejecting defendant's claim his counsel's 

representation fell below professional norms.

Finally, defendant, who was facing two life sentences, 

received a very favorable plea offer of twenty-five years 

imprisonment. He has proffered no persuasive argument that, but 

for counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty and would 

have insisted on going to trial. That is, defendant failed to 

meet the second prong of the Strickland test.

Affirmed.