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Unless Modified, FEMA’s Temporary Housing Plans 


Will Increase Costs by an Estimated 


$76 Million Annually 


OIG-13-102 June 2013
 
OF

s eneral 

Emergency Managemen

FICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 I www.oig.dhs.gov 

JUN 2 5 2013 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph Nimmich 

Associate Administrator for Response and Recovery 

Federal E Agency 

FROM: 

t Oversight 

SUBJECT: Unless Modified, FEMA's Temporary Housing Plans Will 

Increase Costs by an Estimated $76 Million Annually 

Attached is our final report, Unless Modified, FEMA's Temporary Housing Plans Will 

Increase Costs by an Estimated $76 Million Annually. We incorporated the formal 

comments from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the final report. 

The report contains one recommendation aimed at improving FEMA's temporary 

housing plans. Your office concurred with the recommendation. Based on the 

information provided in your response to the draft report, we consider the 

recommendation resolved and closed. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we are providing 

copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and 

appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post 

the report on our website for public dissemination. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Kaye McTighe, Director, 

Office of Emergency Management Oversight, at (202) 254-4100. 

Attachment 
 

 

 

 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................. 1 

Background ........................................................................................................................ 2 

Results of Audit ................................................................................................................... 5 

An Alternative for the Smaller Park Model Housing Unit Will Save $76 Million 

Annually .................................................................................................................. 5 

FEMA Resolved Most Hurricane Katrina-related Temporary Housing Unit 

Health Concerns ..................................................................................................... 9 

Concerns with 2011 Deployed Units....................................................................... 9 

Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 10 

Recommendation .................................................................................................. 11 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis .......................................................... 11 

Appendixes

Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ............................................ 12 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report ............................... 14 

Appendix C: State Summaries ............................................................................ 16 

Appendix D: Major Contributors to This Report ................................................ 30 

Appendix E: Report Distribution ........................................................................ 31 

Abbreviations

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

HUD U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 

HVAC heating, ventilating, and air conditioning 

IATAC Individual Assistance Technical Assistance Contractor 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

UFAS Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Executive Summary

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) announced a change in its 

temporary housing program that we estimate will increase costs and reduce efficiency 

and effectiveness. In 2012, FEMA announced that it would no longer use park models as 

a housing option, and instead would use only manufactured housing certified by the 

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Unless FEMA takes actions to 

ensure that it maintains the ability to use temporary housing units similar in size to the 

park model, this decision will increase program costs by tens of millions of dollars 

annually, and may hinder FEMA’s ability to provide shelter to disaster survivors quickly. 

In reacting to the decision, FEMA field staff expressed concerns to us about their ability 

to house disaster survivors quickly and cost effectively. Further, FEMA officials said that 

many homeowners prefer units that can fit on their home sites, because it allows them 

to remain on their own property near their places of employment and schools while they 

rebuild their homes. Often, the larger manufactured housing units can be situated only 

on commercial sites, if available, or on FEMA-developed group sites. For 2011 disasters, 

80 percent of units on private sites were park models. Based on our cost analysis, if 

FEMA placed manufactured housing units on group sites instead of park models on 

private sites, the increased cost of the temporary housing mission would be $76 million 

for a 12-month deployment. We question the decision to eliminate the park models. 

Since Hurricane Katrina, FEMA has improved the quality of its temporary housing units. 

FEMA resolved the unhealthy formaldehyde levels and the fire hazards related to the 

temporary housing units. A major contributing factor to improved housing conditions

was FEMA’s decision to discontinue the use of travel trailers, designed for recreational 

use, which were the source of many of the previous health and safety problems. 

Instead, FEMA provided survivors with manufactured housing units certified by the U.S. 

Department of Housing and Urban Development, along with smaller park models that 

are not certified. However, both of these deployed units still had various product 

quality, installation, and transportation issues. We have made one recommendation to 

improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the temporary housing unit program. 

Appendix C contains summaries of the challenges and successes of the 2011 temporary 

housing deployments in Missouri, Pennsylvania, New York, North Dakota, Alabama, 

Mississippi, and North Carolina.

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Background 

Section 408 of the RobertfT.fStaffordfDisasterfRelieffandfEmergencyfAssistancefActf

(42 U.S.C. 5174) authorizes FEMA to provide housing assistance to disaster survivors, 

including rental allowance and direct assistance in the form of temporary housing units. 

The temporary housing unit program, which is the subject of this report, involves the

acquisition, transport, placement, maintenance, and deactivation of temporary housing 

units for use by disaster survivors. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita displaced approximately 700,000 people, exhausting the 

supply of available housing and resulting in a massive FEMA temporary housing effort. 

In response to these two disasters, FEMA placed more than 200,000 manufactured 

housing units, travel trailers, and park models in private sites, existing mobile home 

parks, and group sites throughout the Gulf Coast area. Because this exceeded the

inventory of available temporary units, FEMA had manufacturers quickly produce travel 

trailers, park models, and manufactured housing units. The group site effort experienced 

major problems. Many communities did not want FEMA to place group sites in their 

community. Placing the sites increases costs, as noted in a 2007 Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) report. GAO estimated that the cost of placing units at 

group sites (including site improvements) ranged from $69,000 to exceeding $220,000 

per unit. In contrast, GAO reported that the cost of placing a unit at a private site was 

about $30,000. 

More important, many FEMA-supplied units presented health and safety issues. The 

most serious health issue was formaldehyde levels. In a 2008 report, the Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention reported that 38 percent of the units tested had 

formaldehyde levels that could cause health effects in sensitive individuals. The report 

also stated that travel trailers had higher formaldehyde levels than manufactured 

housing units or park models. 

FEMA received a great deal of criticism in the press, from Congress, and from the 

accountability community concerning these health and safety issues, particularly

formaldehyde levels. FEMA officials researched the causes of these problems and 

instituted corrective actions. Also, FEMA officials worked with manufacturers to 

develop park model units with so few formaldehyde-emitting components that the 

formaldehyde levels would be less than even the manufactured housing units certified 

by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). In addition, FEMA 

tested a variety of housing options at a test site in Maryland. However, FEMA ultimately 

decided to terminate its programs to develop and provide improved air quality park

models, and to rely solely on HUD-certified units. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Historically, FEMA used three types of temporary units for disaster survivors: travel 

trailers, park models, and manufactured housing units. Figure 1 briefly describes these 

units. 

Figure 1. Historical FEMA Temporary Housing Units 

Travel Trailer Travel trailers are designed to provide temporary living 

quarters for recreational purposes. They are not 

regulated by HUD. FEMA told us that it decided to 

terminate the use of travel trailers in response to 

formaldehyde concerns following Hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita. FEMA now does not consider such units appropriate 

for long-term use as a dwelling.

Park Model Park models are 12 feet wide and 33 feet long. They are 

transportable, primarily designed for long-term or 

permanent placement, and are not regulated by HUD.

Park models are designed to provide temporary living 

quarters for recreation, camping, or seasonal use, and 

some zoning laws provide more flexibility in their 

placement. 

Manufactured Housing Unit Manufactured housing units are 12 to 14 feet wide and 

40 to 64 feet long. They are designed in one-, two-, or 

three-bedroom models. They are regulated by HUD and 

are intended as permanent housing, with some zoning 

laws restricting their placement.

After Hurricane Katrina, FEMA decided to terminate the use of travel trailers because of 

health concerns and adverse publicity. Therefore, in 2011 FEMA used park models and 

manufactured housing units for its disaster response. 

FEMA places housing units at three site types: 

Private Sites – Units are placed directly on private property, typically in a front 

yard or driveway. Disaster survivors prefer these sites because they are able to 

stay on their own property while repairs are made to their homes and they can 

maintain a sense of community. Private sites are the least expensive option. 

Commercial Sites – Units are placed on existing property, typically in commercial 

trailer parks or campgrounds, that have all the necessary utility hookups and are 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

ready for occupancy. The cost effectiveness of these sites depends greatly on 

whether FEMA can place units on vacant pads or has to fund a site expansion. 

Group Sites – Units are placed on sites that are built, including the installation of 

utilities, to accommodate housing units for displaced survivors. These sites 

require time to develop and are FEMA’s most expensive option. FEMA told us 

that group sites are the least desirable option. 

Implementing guidance specifies that unit placement, whenever practicable, should be 

located on sites provided by the State or local government, the owner of the site, or the 

displaced occupant. As an alternative, group sites provided by FEMA can be used if they 

are more economical or accessible. 

In 2011, FEMA reviewed its direct housing program to identify ways to make greater use 

of existing resources and increase efficiency while ensuring the comfort and security of 

disaster survivors. FEMA convened the direct housing program review in response to 

comments from stakeholders, including members of Congress; State, local, and tribal 

government officials; nonprofit organizations; and private sector partners. During this 

effort, FEMA took into account information received over the years from housing 

partners, including HUD, members of Congress, States, local governments, housing 

associations, nonprofit organizations, and disaster survivors. As a result of its review, 

FEMA decided that it would use only larger HUD-certified manufacturing housing units. 

In support of this decision, FEMA stated that HUD standards for manufactured housing, 

with respect to formaldehyde, cover the use of various wood products in manufactured 

housing. Based on this issue, FEMA told us it decided to purchase HUD-certified 

manufactured homes to replace travel trailers and park models in its inventory, both of 

which are not regulated by HUD. FEMA also told us that although this decision will 

prevent the use of park models, it considered that the HUD-certified manufactured

homes will provide disaster survivors with temporary accommodations more suitable 

for longer-term occupancy. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Results of Audit 

FEMA’s decision to rely solely on HUD-certified units for its temporary housing unit 

program will likely increase the cost of the program. Our analysis of FEMA cost and 

usage data shows that this decision will increase program costs by an estimated $76 

million and place a greater burden on future displaced survivors. In 2011, 80 percent of 

the temporary housing units that FEMA placed at private sites were park models. If 

FEMA used only manufactured housing units, some may have been placed in 

commercial or group sites at a substantially higher cost. 

In 2011, FEMA used two types of units to house temporarily nearly 4,000 families 

impacted by disasters. Those units consisted of FEMA-approved park models and HUDcertified manufactured housing units. Neither the park models nor the HUD units had 

the formaldehyde-related air quality and fire hazard issues that plagued the units 

provided to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita survivors. FEMA and State officials and disaster 

survivors were generally pleased with temporary housing units used in 2011; however, 

they cited problems with some units’ design and quality. Appendix C contains 

summaries by State of the unit deployments. 

In supporting its decision to use only HUD-certified homes, FEMA asserted that it will 

have greater access to manufactured housing sold in the United States, and it will not 

have to incur the cost of storing a large number of units in its inventory. The 

conclusions reached in this report assumed that FEMA would continue to maximize the 

use of available manufactured housing and minimize the number of units in its 

inventory. Therefore, we did not estimate cost of storing temporary housing units 

because there is not a reliable way of estimating that amount. 

An Alternative for the Smaller Park Model Housing Unit Will Save $76 Million 

Annually

In 2012, FEMA announced plans to use only the HUD-certified units in the future, 

eliminating the more compact park model units. Because of their size and some 

State/local zoning limitations, the HUD-certified units cannot be used on some 

private sites unless FEMA takes action to reduce the size of the units. This 

decision will force FEMA to place units at the more expensive commercial and 

group sites. Based on the number of FEMA-deployed park models on private 

sites in 2011, we estimate that the decision will cost FEMA an additional $76 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

million if manufactured housing units are placed in group sites.1 Our analysis of 

the nearly 4,000 units deployed in 2011 is consistent with the average annual 

number of about 4,400 temporary housing units occupied from 2004 through 

2010.2

 This number excluded housing units occupied in Louisiana and Mississippi 

for Hurricane Katrina, since the housing mission for this disaster was 

extraordinarily high. In addition to the added costs, FEMA field staff and State 

officials expressed concern regarding this new policy since commercial 

expansions and group sites require more time to construct, and survivors may be 

displaced longer and relocated to areas with a greater distance from their 

community, places of work, and children’s schools. 

According to the Stafford Act, temporary housing units, whenever practicable, 

should be located on sites provided by the State or local government, the owner 

of the site, or the displaced occupant.3

 As an alternative, group sites provided by 

FEMA can be used if they are more economical or accessible. By restricting the 

use of smaller units such as the park models, FEMA has in effect eliminated 

many smaller-capacity economical sites, a decision that appears inconsistent 

with the Stafford Act’s guidance on site location. Furthermore, the Stafford Act, §

408(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 5174(b)(2), sets forth procedures that FEMA is to follow 

when providing housing assistance, stipulates factors such as (1) cost 

effectiveness; (2) convenience to the individuals and households; and (3) the 

suitability and availability of the types of assistance. FEMA’s decision to limit 

temporary housing choices to HUD-certified units that sometimes cannot fit on 

residential sites, are more expensive, and often involve time-consuming 

relocations, seems contrary to the Act’s intent. 

We have categorized FEMA’s temporary housing unit program costs into three 

broad types: (1) unit acquisition costs; (2) one-time costs to make the site ready, 

place, and deactivate the unit; and (3) recurring costs for unit cleaning and 

maintenance, pad leases, and utilities.4

 In the 2011 deployment, the park 

1

 We based the $76 million estimate on FEMA needing to replace the 1,373 park models it placed on

private sites with HUD-certified units at group sites. We believe that this estimate is a valid assumption

because 93 percent of the HUD-certified units FEMA used were the large three-bedroom models. To

avoid overstating the estimate, we limited recurring costs to a 12-month period—not FEMA’s allowable 

18-month period. See figure 2. 

2

 We excluded the 127,726 housing units that FEMA used in 2005 in the states of Louisiana and Mississippi 

for Hurricane Katrina.

3

 42 U.S.C. 5174(d)(1), Terms and Conditions Relating to Housing Assistance Sites. We based our analysis 

on FEMA’s compliance with the economy and accessibility concerns for disaster survivors in this section of 

the Stafford Act. 

4

 We did not estimate cost of storing temporary housing units because there is no reliable way of 

estimating that amount. 

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models (costing about $24,000 each) comprised 80 percent of the units at 

private sites. The HUD-certified units (costing an average of about $33,000 

each) were placed mainly at group and commercial sites and comprised only 20 

percent of the units at private sites.5

Figure 2 shows that the group site one-time setup costs for 2011 exceeded the 

one-time private site setup costs by $45,000. The reason for this significant cost 

difference is that FEMA pays for site preparation and infrastructure, including 

utilities and roads, at group sites. These costs are seldom necessary at private 

sites. As for recurring costs, FEMA pays to maintain the units at all three types of 

sites, but other costs vary by site. For instance, monthly pad rentals are a part of 

the cost of commercial sites, whereas private or group sites do not have this 

cost. Utilities are a cost of group sites, while that expense is usually included in 

the pad rental at commercial sites.

Figure 2. Average 12-Month Cost of a FEMA Temporary Housing Unit by Type 

of Site for 2011 Disasters6

Source: OIG analysis of FEMA data

5

 Most manufactured housing units placed by FEMA were two- and three-bedroom models. FEMA did 

place five one-bedroom units on commercial sites in 2011.

6

 To avoid overstating the estimated increased costs, our analysis did not rely on a weighted average of 

the cost of temporary housing units used during 2011. If we had, the weighted average cost of the HUDcertified units would have been $43,756 and the weighted average of the park models would have been 

$22,148. This is because 93 percent of the HUD units that FEMA used were the larger three-bedroom 

units that cost about $45,000 and 87 percent of the FEMA park models were a less expensive model that 

cost only $21,500.

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Few commercial sites had adequate vacancies to accommodate the number of 

pads needed for the temporary housing units. As a result, FEMA funded 

upgrades and expansions to permit additional units to locate at these sites. 

These upgrades can be very expensive. For example, in Prattsville, NY, FEMA 

hired the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to expand a commercial site. During the 

2011 temporary housing unit mission, only 10 units were placed in the park and 

the expansion cost FEMA more than $270,000 per unit. 

In response to the 2011 North Dakota flooding, FEMA placed 1,056 park models 

at survivors’ private sites, thus saving taxpayers $58 million that might have been 

required to construct group sites that accommodate HUD-certified 

manufactured housing units.7 In North Dakota, FEMA used park models on 94 

percent of the private sites. If FEMA had to use HUD-certified manufactured 

housing units and place them at newly constructed group sites, the estimated 

additional cost to construct those sites is about $46 million. 

After Hurricane Irene struck North Carolina, FEMA installed 209 temporary 

housing units for disaster survivors. Initially, some of these units were not a 

viable option because most of the areas affected were low elevation and 

designated as Special Flood Hazard Areas.8

 Manufactured housing units are 

restricted from being placed in Special Flood Hazard Areas by local or county 

zoning ordinances. However, impacted counties, the State, and FEMA developed 

a compromise to allow the use of two-bedroom park models with the 

requirement that they were vacated and retrieved prior to the 2012 hurricane 

season. As a result, 174 park models were able to be placed on private sites. 

Without the option of the park model, the HUD-certified manufactured housing 

units would have been placed in commercial or group sites and survivors would 

not have been able to stay on their own property. 

FEMA and State officials told us that disaster survivors generally prefer being 

near their own property because it is less disruptive to their lives. Specifically, 

having the temporary housing unit near their damaged home is closer to both 

their children’s schools and often the homeowners’ place of employment. It also 

enables disaster survivors to monitor the progress being made to their home. 

FEMA informed us that it started to negotiate with manufacturers of HUD7

 The $58 million estimate consist of $10 million in additional costs housing unit costs, 2 million for 

recurring costs and $46 million in group site construction costs. 8

 Land areas that are at high risk for flooding are called Special Flood Hazard Areas or floodplains. These 

areas are indicated on flood insurance rate maps. A home located in a floodplain has a 26 percent chance 

of suffering flood damage during the term of a 30-year mortgage. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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certified manufactured housing units to construct smaller units that would 

replace the park models. 

FEMA Resolved Most Hurricane Katrina-related Temporary Housing Unit 

Health Concerns

In response to the housing unit problems that followed Hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita, FEMA studied the situation and instituted several corrective actions. Most 

notably, FEMA eliminated the travel trailer units from the program while 

continuing to use park models and full-size manufactured housing units. FEMA 

also instituted indoor air quality standards that park model and HUD-certified 

manufactured housing manufacturers had to meet. Because these actions did 

not add any mechanical device or alternative construction method, FEMA did 

not quantify the associated costs of these actions. According to FEMA, the 

roughly 4,000 temporary housing units deployed in 2011 did not have problems 

with unhealthy indoor air quality or fire safety. 

Concerns with 2011 Deployed Units

Although FEMA field staff and State officials were pleased with both the park 

models and the HUD-certified units, they reported some problems with units 

deployed in 2011 that detracted from disaster survivors’ well-being. Those 

problems by category were—

Product Quality

•	 Inefficient heating units; 

•	 Defective microwave ovens; 

•	 Ground fault circuit interrupters not installed, as required; 

•	 Inadequate sized wire for the electrical load of the heating, ventilation, 

and air conditioning (HVAC) unit; 

•	 Inoperative smoke detectors and weather radios; 

•	 Clogged drains; 

•	 Defective faucets; 

•	 Moisture and mold problems; 

•	 Faulty drains, with standing water in showers; 

•	 Water leaks in toilets, sinks, and showers; and 

•	 Inadequate air ventilation systems. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Installation Problems

•	 FEMA contractors did not provide timely installation;

•	 Electrical panel boxes were incorrectly installed; 

•	 Water lines froze when heat tape was incorrectly installed; 

•	 High winds in some areas destroyed trailer foundation skirting; and 

•	 Winterization (arctic doors, insulation, etc.) was inadequate in northern 

climates. 

Transportation-related Damages

•	 Some units’ tow hitches broke during transport; and 

•	 Water damage occurred during transport. 

Appendix C contains summaries of the challenges and successes of the 2011 

temporary housing deployments in Missouri, Pennsylvania, New York, North 

Dakota, Alabama, Mississippi, and North Carolina. 

Conclusion

Our audit of the 2011 disasters showed that FEMA made significant 

improvements in reducing formaldehyde exposure and fire hazards in its 

temporary housing unit program. However, our cost analysis shows that placing 

temporary housing units at group sites and commercial sites cost significantly

more than placing them at private sites. FEMA’s recent policy change to 

discontinue using the park model homes as a temporary housing alternative will 

result in a significant increase in the cost of the temporary housing program. 

The limited amount of space in commercial mobile home parks and the costs of 

developing vacant land for group sites will be even more pronounced for a largescale housing mission. In addition, State, local, and some FEMA officials predict 

that the decision to discontinue the use of park model homes as a temporary 

housing alternative will cause delays in providing occupancy-ready temporary 

housing. They also predict the decision will make it difficult for future disaster 

survivors to reside near their own property while rebuilding their homes and 

make it more difficult to establish normalcy in the aftermath of a disaster. In our 

view, this policy change will jeopardize FEMA’s ability to provide cost-effective 

and rapid disaster housing assistance. 

FEMA informed us that it started to negotiate with manufacturers of HUDcertified manufactured housing units to construct smaller units that would 

replace the park models. If those smaller units can be placed on the typical 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

private sites, we encourage FEMA to pursue that alternative and would consider 

that initiative to satisfy the intent of our recommendation. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Associate Administrator for Response and Recovery,

Federal Emergency Management Agency:

Recommendation #1: Provide a comparable housing alternative to the park 

model unit that (1) allows disaster survivors, when possible, to stay close to their 

home and (2) is cost effective, saving an estimated $76 million annually. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We received and reviewed written comments on the draft report from FEMA’s 

Associate Administrator for Policy, Program Analysis and International Affairs. 

FEMA concurs with our recommendation and is implementing an action plan. In 

2012, FEMA developed and executed a contract for a one-bedroom 

manufactured home that is comparable in size and cost to a park model. FEMA 

believes the current mix of sizes now available will allow for survivors’ needs to 

be met more effectively and efficiently. FEMA provided the Department of 

Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) with documentation of the 

solicitation for the one-bedroom manufactured homes. Based on the 

information provided, we consider this recommendation closed. Appendix B 

includes a copy of the management comments in their entirety. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the HomelandfSecurityfActfoff2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the InspectorfGeneralfActfoff1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department. 

The objective of this audit was to review the economy and effectiveness of FEMA’s 

temporary housing unit program, which included the safety and suitability of the 

housing units deployed in 2011. We audited the time required to place housing units at 

disaster sites, the quality and costs of the housing placement sites, the quality and costs 

of the different types of units, and the suitability and safety of the units as experienced 

by the disaster survivors. 

The scope of our review included FEMA temporary housing units deployed in calendar 

year 2011. We audited the temporary housing unit program operation in the seven 

States that had the most units deployed. The units in those seven States constituted 

more than 97 percent of all FEMA units deployed. 

We interviewed FEMA officials at headquarters and at field offices in the seven States 

visited. In cases where FEMA Joint Field Offices completed housing operations, we 

interviewed the FEMA regional officials who assumed responsibility for those 

operations. We also interviewed State and local officials knowledgeable about or 

responsible for housing unit operations in those seven States. We reviewed documents 

related to the temporary housing unit program and examined a sample of units in the 

field at private sites, commercial mobile home parks, and group sites. We conducted 

fieldwork in the District of Columbia, Missouri, Pennsylvania, New York, North Dakota, 

Mississippi, Alabama, Colorado, and Georgia. 

To be conservative in our calculation of the additional cost of the change in FEMA 

temporary housing policy, we used the straight average of a cost of a park model 

($23,948) and the straight average of the cost of one-, two-, and three-bedroom mobile 

homes ($33,319). The amount would be more if we used the weighted average of the 

units based on the total deployment of housing units in 2011. For the park models, 87 

percent deployed were standard and 13 percent were Uniform Federal Accessibility 

Standards (UFAS), which produced a weighted average of $22,148. For the mobile 

homes, only 0.4 percent were one-bedroom models, 6.6 percent were two-bedroom 

models, 82 percent were three-bedroom models, and 11 percent were three-bedroom 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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UFAS models, which produced a weighted average of $43,756. This would have 

increased the estimate by approximately $17 million.

We conducted this performance audit between February and October 2012 pursuant to 

the InspectorfGeneralfActfoff1978, as amended, and according to generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our

findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objectives.

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

l'.S. noporcmonl of ll omola ~ Scruri1r 

Washinglon. DC 20472 

JUN 0 4 2013 

MEMORANDUM FOR: D. Michael Beard 

Assistant Inspector General 

Office of Emergency Management Oversight 

FROM: David J. Kaufman ~-\ ' ' 1='1-l 7>-..~ 

Associate Administrator tor 

Policy. Program Analysis and International Affairs 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

SUBJECT: FEMA Response to OIG Draft Report: OIG Project Number 12-

114-EMO-FEMA ... Unless Modified. FEMA 's Temporary 

Housing Plans Will Increase Costs by an Estimated $76 Million 

Annually .. 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on OIG Draft Report: OIG Project 

Number 12-114-EMO-FEMA, '·Unless Modified, FEMA's Temporary Housing Plans Will 

Increase Costs by an Estimated $76 Million Annually ... 

The draft report contains one (I) recommendation in which our o ffice concurs. This 

memorandum serves as our wrillen comments on the drafl report and specific responses to each 

recommendation. 

OIG Recommendation: We recommend that the Acting Associate Administrator for Response 

and Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency provide a comparable housing 

alternative to the park model unit that (I) allows disaster survivors. when possible, to stay close 

to their home and (2) is cost effective. saving an estimated $76 million annually. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis: During our exit conference with FEMA on 

February 20, 2013, they said they were addressing this issue. Once they provide us with 

infonnation conce rning their action plan. we would consider this recommendation closed. 

FEMA Respon se to Recommendatio n: Concur. In 2012 FEMA developed and executed a 

contract for a one-bedroom manufactured home that is comparable in size and cost to a park 

model with five vendors; Recreation By Design, LLC; GSJi of Alabama. LLC: Scotbilt l-lomes. 

Inc.; Champion Home Builders, Inc.: and PKMM.lne. This model was not available in 201 1, 

the year for which the OIG report is based. We believe that had the one-bedroom model been 

available in 20 II, they would have been suitable substitutes for the majority of park models. 

FEMA 's decision to use only manufactured homes that meet I-IUD standards is based on an 

W\\\\'.fc:ma gov 

www.oig.dhs.gov 14 OIG-13-102
 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

overriding concern for health and safety of disaster survivors. We believe the current mix of 

sizes now available will allow us to more effectively and efficiently meet survivors' needs. 

FEMA believes that our response satisfies the intent of this recommendation and requests that 

recommendations be closed. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on OIG Draft Report: OIG Project Number 12-

114-EMO-FEMA, "Unless Modified, FEMA's Temporary Housing Plans Will Increase Costs by 

an Estimated $76 Million Annually". Please direct any questions regarding this response to Gary 

McKeon, FEMA's Chief Audit Liaison, at 202-646-1308. 

Attachment: 

Solicitation contains all ofFEMA's requirements regarding the Temporary Housing Units (THU's). 

2 

www.oig.dhs.gov 15 OIG-13-102
 
 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

State Summaries 

Missouri

On May 22, 2011, an Enhanced Fujita scale-5 tornado struck the city of Joplin, 

MO, leaving a 6-mile long and 1.5-mile wide path of destruction. More than 160 

people were killed, many more were injured, and about 400 structures (including 

major structures such as a high school and hospital) were destroyed. Most of

the destroyed structures were residences. Presidential Declaration FEMA-1980-

DR was signed. 

The destruction left by the Joplin Tornado. Source: OIG

Because many homeowners had adequate insurance, they were able to stay in 

hotels or motels while their homes were rebuilt. However, disaster responders, 

along with the insured homeowners, rapidly filled area hotels and motels, 

leaving little available housing for displaced renters. A housing task force was 

established with local, State, and Federal government collaboration. During the 

task force field assessment, it became apparent that temporary housing units 

and community group sites would be required. 

Local government officials identified land adjacent to the Joplin Airport for the 

development of group sites. Roads, a police station, a fire substation, and 

tornado shelters were built at the sites, and electrical, water, and sewer 

connections were established. The first 100 units were in place by the end of 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

July and an additional 411 units were set up in August. Two of the three group 

sites were developed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the third, along 

with the commercial site expansion, was constructed by a FEMA Individual 

Assistance Technical Assistance Contractor (IATAC). A total of 586 units were 

occupied out of the 597 units placed. Approximately 90 percent of the survivors 

had been renters prior to the disaster. 

A Joplin FEMA Group Site Scene. Source: OIG 

Local government officials said that they were generally pleased with the 

temporary housing sites’ development process, the speed with which temporary 

housing was provided, and the adequacy of the units. They said that the quick 

establishment of the Missouri joint housing taskforce was an effective means to 

address any problems as they developed. FEMA officials in Missouri reported 

that there were no major problems with the temporary housing units. The most 

common housing issues were that some park models had been delivered with 

sawdust-clogged plumbing drains and the high winds common to the area tore 

the skirting around the foundation. Most problems were readily corrected. 

FEMA officials said that temporary housing in future disasters could be costlier if 

only manufactured housing units will be used since these do not fit on most 

private lots and FEMA housing officials will have to find available commercial 

sites or develop group sites. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 17 OIG-13-102
 
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Pennsylvania
 

From August 26 through 30, 2011, Hurricane Irene hovered over eastern 

Pennsylvania, causing catastrophic flooding and extensive damage. Four days 

later, Tropical Storm Lee struck the same general area and caused additional 

damage. Fifteen people died as a consequence of the storms and more than 

11,000 applicants required rental and direct housing assistance from FEMA. 

Presidential Declarations FEMA-4025-DR and FEMA-4030-DR were signed on 

September 3, 2011, and September 12, 2011, respectively. Because Pennsylvania

has had an influx of workers developing the natural gas fields, little unused 

housing was available in some affected areas. FEMA needed to place 330 

temporary housing units in 10 different counties. Both manufactured housing 

units and park models were used. The 330 units were placed at two FEMAdeveloped group sites, two FEMA-funded commercial park expansions, vacant 

pads in mobile home parks, and private sites (such as on the property of 

damaged homes). FEMA officials said that placing units in commercial parks on 

existing pads was less costly than the new development of group sites, which is 

the most costly option. FEMA made use of both the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers and a FEMA IATAC in developing sites and placing units. 

Flood-damaged home in Pennsylvania. Source: OIG

The biggest problem faced by FEMA officials in Pennsylvania was the 

performance of the FEMA IATAC in getting units installed in a timely manner. 

FEMA used both the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and an IATAC. FEMA officials 

said that the Corps performed satisfactorily, but the IATAC did not. The IATAC 

and its subcontractors were not adequately staffed, and did not know or follow 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

local building codes, resulting in code violations and delays. Sometimes the 

IATAC subcontractors performed sloppy and inadequate work and had to be 

recalled to correct errors. The IATAC took an average of 17 days to deliver and 

install each housing unit once the unit had arrived at the Pennsylvania staging 

area. FEMA officials said that installation was to be completed in 72 hours rather 

than 17 days. As a consequence, the last disaster survivors were not placed in 

housing units until December 24, 2011, nearly 4 months after the disaster. 

FEMA officials said that placement could have been completed a month earlier if 

the IATAC performance had been satisfactory. 

Apart from the installation problems, FEMA and a local government official said 

that they were generally pleased with the quality and suitability of the 

temporary housing units. Problems with the housing units in Pennsylvania 

included the following:

• Water leaks due to plumbing defects; 

• Cheap faucets with plastic components that would break off and leak; 

• Electrical breaker boxes installed upside-down in 87 units;

• Damage during the hauling to Pennsylvania; and 

• Heating system problems. 

Many units were difficult and expensive to heat adequately. The units have 

electric heat, and FEMA officials said that air flow velocity contributed to the 

problem. Survivors at private sites, who have to pay their own utility bills, 

complained of high electric bills. Commercial site owners, who pay utility costs 

out of pad rent, reported unusually high electrical bills and have demanded, and 

received, an increase in rent payments from FEMA. 

Occupants said that FEMA units can be uncomfortable because of excessive air 

from the ceiling vents, which in many cases blow right onto beds or seating 

areas. When it is cold, some residents said that they addressed the lack of 

comfort and high costs of heating the FEMA units by adding supplemental 

heaters, which can introduce possible fire hazard conditions.

Unfortunately, some housing units already placed on private sites needed to be 

moved to commercial or group sites because of potential flooding concerns. 

Pennsylvania considers the park model units to be manufactured housing and, 

therefore, neither the manufactured housing units nor park model units could 

stay in any designated floodplains.

www.oig.dhs.gov 19 OIG-13-102
 
 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

New York
 

Hurricane Irene struck large areas of the State of New York on August 26, 2011, 

resulting in widespread flooding and a Federal disaster declaration covering 31 

counties. The remnants of Tropical Storm Lee hit 12 southern New York counties 

(7 of which were also part of the area damaged by Hurricane Irene) early in 

September. Presidential Declarations FEMA-4020-DR and FEMA-4031-DR were 

signed on August 31, 2011, and September 13, 2011, respectively. Some areas 

had a shortage of available housing and required the use of FEMA temporary 

housing units. FEMA officials ordered 240 housing units, manufactured housing 

units, and park models, of which 128 were occupied. The majority of the units 

were installed in commercial mobile home parks since the homeowners’ private 

sites were often in designated floodplain areas. FEMA used a local contractor to 

install units and had some contractor performance problems. A State official 

said that disaster survivors became frustrated with the amount of time it took to 

get manufactured housing units ready for occupancy, and some obtained 

alternative housing. 

A temporary housing unit on a private property site. Source: OIG

Other problems reported by FEMA officials were as follows:

•	 Units were difficult to heat, and expensive;

•	 Three units flooded due to plumbing breaks and had to be removed from 

service; 

•	 More than 25 units had problems with faulty and leaking kitchen faucets; 

and 

•	 Some units arrived with the electrical breaker box installed upside-down. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

The most common problem was with the units’ electric heat systems. Since 

manufactured housing units in New York usually are heated with propane, many 

mobile home parks were not wired to support electrically heated units. FEMA 

spent more than $700,000 to rewire the mobile home parks. In addition, the 

heating systems were not satisfactory. In cold weather, the heating systems in 

some FEMA units could not keep the temperature above 65 degrees. Although 

FEMA spent $230 per unit to have a contractor adjust the heating system baffles, 

the airflow from the overhead heating vents still caused the units to feel chilly 

even when the temperature was adequate. Some mobile home parks provided 

residents in FEMA units with space heaters. In addition, the units’ heating 

systems were expensive to operate. FEMA officials estimated that the units’ 

heating systems cost two to three times the amount of propane systems in 

similarly sized units. 

The Prattsville Mobile Home Park expansion funded by FEMA. Source: OIG 

This FEMA-funded mobile home park expansion in Prattsville, NY, is an example 

of the high costs involved in the use of temporary housing. Although small, with 

a population of 1,036, Prattsville had extensive flooding. The damaged homes 

were generally in the floodplain, precluding the use of manufactured housing 

units on private lots. FEMA officials in New York decided to fund the expansion 

of a mobile home park in Prattsville. FEMA officials wrote that the project was 

needed to “minimize the amount of time displaced individuals and families 

spend at alternative locations, and thus limit further economic and personal 

hardship for affected residents, disrupt school attendance and the school

system, and further strain the Town’s social and economic infrastructure [sic].” 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Since much of the 2.85 acre expansion was in the floodplain, the project required 

an extensive and expensive fill operation in addition to the costs of road, 

electrical, sewer, and water connections. 

FEMA arranged for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to alter the site to 

accommodate 20 additional mobile home pads at a cost of more than $2.7 

million, or more than $135,000 per pad. However, only 10 of these pads were 

occupied by FEMA units because by the time the project was completed, some 

of the families had found other options. Consequently, the expansion alone cost 

FEMA more than $270,000 for each of the 10 occupied units. By the time 

manufactured housing units were purchased and installed, access ramps or stairs 

constructed, and rent paid on the pads, each of the 10 occupied units would cost 

FEMA around $340,000.

North Dakota

Heavy rain caused flooding in the City of Minot and other parts of Ward County, 

ND, between February 14 and July 20, 2011. Approximately 800 structures were 

destroyed and an additional 2,400 structures were significantly damaged. 

Presidential Declaration FEMA-1981-DR was signed on May 10, 2011. Nine 

counties and one Tribal Nation were approved for Individual Assistance.

Minot, ND, July 6, 2011 – Parts of Minot, ND, still under water after the Souris 

River overflowed its banks. Source: FEMA

Three of the affected counties in North Dakota already had housing shortages 

because of the economic boom created by the oil industry. The temporary 

housing mission provided shelter to a total of 1,981 households in 2,041 units. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 22 OIG-13-102
 
 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Some families were provided two units placed on a private site to accommodate 

their family size. All eligible applicants were housed by December 24, 2011.

FEMA’s Virgil Workman Group Site in Minot, ND. Source: OIG

FEMA used all available direct housing options in North Dakota. Units were 

placed at 1,118 private sites to allow residents to be close to their damaged 

homes while making needed repairs. Pads were leased at five commercial 

mobile home parks to place 261 units. FEMA initiated a $40 million mission 

assignment with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the construction of three 

group housing sites to hold a total of 850 units. The Corps was chosen because 

of the proposed aggressive timeline and the limited construction season due to 

the approaching winter. The timeline proved to be unrealistic because of a 

number of delays. It took until December 24, 2011, to have all disaster survivors 

in their units. The paving of roads became a secondary concern as the focus was 

to house the applicants. The Corps had to go back after the thaw to resurface 

the roads. 

Housing unit problems due to design and manufacturing quality control included 

the following: 

•	 Water leaks from sinks and toilets; 

•	 The air returns over beds were a common complaint and some survivors 

began to use space heaters in order to turn the systems off and stay warm;

•	 Some two-axle units from one manufacturer commonly had hitches 

break during transport, forcing drivers to repair units on the side of the 

road prior to arrival at the staging area; 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

•	 449 units from one manufacturer had electrical boxes installed upsidedown; and 

•	 Some units had underrated electrical wire for the size and electrical load

of the HVAC unit. 

North Dakota’s weather presented challenges for FEMA’s direct housing mission 

and caused FEMA to spend $13 million to winterize units. Above-ground utilities 

on private sites were heat taped, insulated, and further insulated with a spray 

foam casing. There were still some issues with frozen pipes on private sites 

mainly because the utility lines were connected to the applicant’s utilities in the 

basement of their homes, which required the basement to be heated. Insulated 

skirting was applied to all units throughout all private, commercial, and group 

sites to protect the plumbing and keep the wind from circulating underneath the 

unit. In addition, spray foam insulation was applied under the units to cover 

exposed pipes. Arctic Entryways were applied to all housing units on group and 

commercial sites and given as an option to households with units on private sites 

to protect against wind and provide a dry area during the winter months. These 

entryways initially made some UFAS units noncompliant because the space 

between the door and the wall of the arctic room was not enough to turn a 

wheelchair. Adjustments were made and some ramps also had to be 

reconstructed. 

Despite the winterization processes, there were still issues with frozen pipes in 

group sites, especially with park models constructed by two manufacturers. One 

manufacturer’s units were constructed so that the water lines rested on the 

frame of the unit, and when the frame froze it would freeze the water line. All 

47 units from another manufacturer in the Virgil Workman Group Site had pipe 

freezing issues. The water lines were heat taped and insulated from the ground 

to the unit, but there was insufficient insulation in the walls and floor of the unit 

causing the lines to freeze and break.

FEMA faced housing unit size issues when trying to place units on private sites. 

Some private sites could fit only a two-bedroom park model. FEMA officials said 

that units larger than the two-bedroom park model would have made many 

private sites infeasible. Smaller units had to be used in one site because 

electrical grids were not able to handle the electric requirements of larger units. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 24 	 OIG-13-102
 
 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

A winterized unit installed on a private site in North Dakota. An arctic room was 

constructed, insulated skirting was added, and spray foam was also added to insulate 

the utility lines. Source: FEMA 

Alabama

Alabama was affected by severe storms, tornadoes, straight-line winds, and 

flooding from April 15 to May 31, 2011. The storm system, which created 64 

tornadoes—20 of which were Enhanced Fujita scale 3 to 5—caused 241 

fatalities. It resulted in catastrophic or extensive damage to more than 14,000 

homes, mobile homes, and apartment units. Presidential Declaration FEMA1971-DR was signed on April 28, 2011. In total, 43 counties were approved for 

Individual Assistance. 

FEMA officials said that housing could be deployed quickly because one of 

FEMA’s major long-term temporary housing unit storage centers is located in 

Selma, AL. Consequently, the cost of transport was low and staging costs were 

nonexistent. Local officials said that the first housing units were placed about 10 

days after the disaster, possibly the quickest they have ever seen. Units were 

placed on 235 private sites and 18 commercial sites, which held an additional 94 

units, throughout the approved counties. Applicants moved into temporary 

housing units from May 11 to August 9, 2011. 

Local officials said that the overall housing mission was a big success. However, 

there were still some problems with the units, including the following: 

• Inadequate HVAC systems causing some mold issues; 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

• HVAC systems’ dampers requiring adjustments; and 

• Broken faucets and plumbing issues. 

In some cases, the larger units would not fit on private sites. Smaller park 

models fit the best and allowed survivors to stay on their own property while 

repairs were made. Local officials said that they would have liked to have had 

more park models available as the units allow for more private sites to be used 

and costs to be reduced. 

A housing unit on a private lot. Source: FEMA

Mississippi

Mississippi was affected by severe storms, tornadoes, straight-line winds, and 

associated flooding from April 15 to 28, 2011. The storm system caused 37 

fatalities and produced violent super-cell thunderstorms and at least 14 

tornadoes. Mississippi was also affected by flooding along the Mississippi River 

from May 3 to June 17, 2011. Presidential Declarations FEMA-1972-DR and 

FEMA-1983-DR were signed on April 29, 2011, and May 11, 2011, respectively.

www.oig.dhs.gov 26 OIG-13-102
 
 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

The rising waters of the Mississippi River surround this home in Vicksburg, MS. 

Source: FEMA

A largely rural area was affected, and the surrounding 50-mile radius that FEMA 

uses to identify rental resources would have put survivors out of the state to 

Tennessee. Many of the applicants would not have had the resources to travel 

between a rental property and their damaged homes or children’s schools. Local 

officials said that getting the 50-mile radius requirement waived and a direct 

housing mission approved caused delays.

Mississippi received a total of 209 temporary housing units, 159 of which were 

placed on private and commercial sites. FEMA did not use group sites in 

Mississippi, but units were placed in five commercial mobile home parks, which 

included one park expansion in Tunica County. 

Problems encountered included the following: 

•	 Getting the waiver for the 50-mile radius; 

•	 Getting the units placed in a timely matter; and

•	 Swapping out 13 park model units from one manufacturer because of 

moisture and mold issues. 

North Carolina

North Carolina was affected by severe storms, tornadoes, and flooding in April 

2011. Hurricane Irene caused flooding from August 25 to September 1, 2011, 

and was the most severe flooding in North Carolina since Hurricane Floyd in 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

1999. Presidential Declarations FEMA-1969-DR and FEMA-4019-DR were signed 

on April 19, 2011, and August 31, 2011, respectively. 

Home affected by Hurricane Irene. Source: FEMA

Because of limited rental housing in the affected area, FEMA placed 245 

temporary housing units in North Carolina. Disaster survivors affected by 

Hurricane Irene were placed in temporary housing units within 60 days of the 

units’ arrival at the staging area. Within 8 months, FEMA assisted 164 families in 

completing permanent housing plans and vacating the units. 

Housing units in a commercial mobile home park. Source: FEMA 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Problems encountered included the following: 

•	 Some units had to be returned because of interior water damage that 

occurred during transport; 

•	 Improper ventilation of the units because of inadequate HVAC systems; 

•	 Plumbing system leaks; and 

•	 Defective microwave ovens. 

The locations most affected by Hurricane Irene were subject to flooding, and 

therefore restricted as to the type of temporary housing permitted by State or 

local zoning codes. Initially, temporary housing units were not a viable option in 

those locations because of the number of displaced survivors; agreement was 

reached by the counties, the State, and FEMA to allow several two-bedroom 

park model units to be located in the area. Those units had to be removed from 

potential flood zones prior to the start of hurricane season, the following June. 

FEMA contractors placing a temporary housing unit on the private site. 

Source: FEMA 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix D 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Kaye McTighe, Director 

Nigel Gardner, Audit Manager 

Donald Norman, Audit Manager 

Kimberly Letnaunchyn, Program Analyst 

www.oig.dhs.gov 30 OIG-13-102
 
 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix E
 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff
 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy
 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

DHS Component Liaison 

Acting Chief Privacy Officer 

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Administrator 

Acting Chief of Staff 

Chief Financial Officer
 

Chief Counsel
 

Chief Procurement Officer
 

Acting Chief Privacy Officer 

Associate Administrator for Policy and Program Analysis 

Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation Division 

Director, Risk Management and Compliance
 

Audit Liaison, FEMA (Job Code 12-114-FEMA-EMO) 

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch
 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner
 

Congress

Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security
 

House Committee on Homeland Security 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

www.oig.dhs.gov 31 OIG-13-102
 

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