* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined th a t

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-50903

Summary Calendar

ESTELA ORTEGA and EDNA GASTELUM,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

VERSUS

GTE CORPORATION, GTE MOBILNET OF THE SOUTHWEST,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Texas

(EP-97-CV-27)

August 14, 1998

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM * :

Appellants Estela Ortega and Edna Gastelum appeal from the

order of the district court granting Appellee GTE Corporation

summary judgment on all claims of discrimination and retaliation

under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Emplo yment Act

(“ADEA”). Upon review of the record and arguments of the parties,

we conclude that the judgment of the district court should be2

affirmed.

BACKGROUND

Estela Ortega is an Hispanic female over the age of forty.

Ortega was hired by GTE on August 21, 1987, as an Administrative

Assistant, and has held variou s clerical and indirect sales

positions during her tenure with GTE. She was promoted to Agent

Support Representative in 1989 and was promoted to Account Manager

in 1991.

Ortega applied fo r the position of Sales Support Manager in

July of 1994 and was not selected for the pos ition. In August

1996, Ortega applied for the position of Service Manager and was

not selected for the position. Ortega alleged that from January to

October 1996 her job title was changed, she was excluded from the

Churn Task Fo rce, given the lowest pay raise in nine years, not

given a company car, excluded from agent dinner meetings, had her

assistant removed from her supervision, and was not pr omoted to

Service Manager.

After filing two complaints with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), Ortega filed the instant lawsuit

alleging age discrimination under the ADEA, and gender, national

origin, pattern and practice of discrimination, an d retaliation

under Title VII.

E dna Gastelum is an Hispanic female. Gastelum alleges that

between July and October 1994, she was not selected for five

positions she applied for. She further alleges that in the spring

and summer of 1995, she was not s elected for two positions she3

applied for. Gastelum also alleges that she suffered retaliation

for having filed an EEOC complaint and that there exists a pattern

and practice of discrimination at GTE against Hispanics.

After filing two complaints with the EEOC, Gastelum filed suit

under Title VII alleging discrimination on the basis of gender and

national origin, a pattern and practice of discrimination against

Hispanics, and retaliation.

GTE moved for summary judgment on all of appellants’ claims.

The district court granted GTE ’s motion. Ortega and Gastelum

timely appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. Pattern and Practice of Discrimination

GTE argued that the appellants’ pattern and practice claims

could not be maintained because both Ortega and Gastelum failed to

allege a pattern and practice of discrimination in their charges of

discrimination to the EEOC. The district court found that Ortega

and Gastelum’s claims to the EEOC were individualized and pertained

to unique instances which were not reasonably capable of yielding

allegations of pattern and practice discrimination.

We disagree. This court held in F ellows v . Universal

Restaurants, Inc.

, 701 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1983), that a class cause

of action under Title VII may be maintained despite the fact that

the EEOC charge contains only complaints of individual

discrimination. In Fellows , the charge of discrimination alleged

as follows:

I believe that I have been discriminated against because

of my sex, female, in that:4

1. Phil Varacharo paid the male Wine Steward $40.00 to

$50.00 per shift plus a percentage of 2% over $200.00 and

I was paid only $3.10 per hour for performing the same

duties.

2. I performed all of my duties in an outstanding

manner, and the discharge by Phil Varacharo was not

justified.

3. I was the only female employed in the position of

Wine Stewardess, and I believe I was paid less and

discharged because of my sex, female.

4. Phil Varacharo denied my application for positions

as a Waitress, and Captai n in Marios, Les Saisons, and

the Old Warsaw Restaurant owned b y the above named

employer because of my sex, female.

701 F.2d at 448 n.1.

In Fellows

, not only were the complaints in the charge of

discrimination of an individual nature, but the EEOC confined its

invest igation solely to the claim of individual discrimination.

Nonetheless , the court concluded that an EEOC investigation of

class discrimination against women could reasonably be expected to

grow out of Fellows’ allegations in her initial EEOC charge; thus

a class cause of action under Title VII was cognizable. In Paige

v. California

, 102 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit

adopted the approach used in Fellows

. The P aige court quoted

Fellows in concluding that “given the liberal construction accorded

EEOC charges, especially thos e by unlawyered complainants” the

wording of the plaintiff’s charges “could

. . . be understood to

complain of d iscriminatory employment treatment of all women

applicants and employees

. . . .” 102 F.3d at 1042 (quoting

Fellows , 701 F.2d at 451).

Under the guiding principles of Fellows

, Ortega and Gastelum’s5

charge of discrimination would allow a pattern or practice claim to

be maintained. Thus, the omission of an express pattern or

practice claim in the charge of discrimination is an insufficient

basis to preclude such a claim in a Title VII complaint.

However, because the district court found in the alternative

that Ortega and Gastelum failed to offer any evidence that GTE had

a policy or standard operating procedure of discriminat ing, we

affirm the ultimate conclusion that summary j udgment was

appropriate on the pattern and practice claim.

II. Individual Claims of Discrimination and Retaliation

With respect to the in dividual claims of discrimination and

retali ation, we affirm for the reasons assigned by the district

court. S ee Memorandum Opinion and Order of August 28, 1997.

However, one issue involving Ortega deserves further discussion.

In response to GTE’s motion for summary judgment on Ortega’s

discrimination claims, Ortega submitt e d the affidavit of Greg

Lambert. Ortega claimed that GTE discriminated against her in 1996

when she was not promoted to the position of Service Manager, and

instead, Greg Lambert, a white male under forty years of age,

received the promotion. GTE stated as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason that Greg Lambert was more qualified. Ortega

argues that this reason is pretextual, and she submits Greg

Lambert’s affidavit in support. Lambert’s affidavit states that

during his employment he had the occasion to work with Ortega and

t hat in 1996 they were in competition for Service Manager.6

Lambert’s affidavit further states:

. . . I informed Ms. Ortega that if the Company (GTE)was

basing its decision on qualifications alone, then Estela

Ortega would have received the promotion. I was shocked

that the Company failed to even g ive Ms. Ortega an

interview.

It is my belief that Estela Ortega was the most

qualified candidate for the position of Service Manager.

It is my belief that the Company should have given her an

interview and that she should have been given the

promotion to Service Manager . . . .

Affidavit of Greg Lambert (R. Vol. 2, pgs. 286-87). Ortega

maintains that, in light of Lambert’s affidavit, at least a factual

dispute regarding pretext exists which precludes summary judgment

for GTE.

It appears that Lambert’s opinion, if admitted at trial, would

have a great impact on a jury deciding this case. However, it is

insufficient to get the case to a jury because Lambert was not a

decision maker in the process of deciding who would get the

promotion to Service Manager. At this stage, we are concerned with

whether a fact dispute exists as to GTE’s stated reason for

promoting Lambert over Ortega--that he was more qualified. Whether

Lambert disagrees that he was more qualified is of no more value to

this analysis than the opinion of any other employee of GTE who had

no input or authority to decide which person should be given the

promotion. To state it another way, Lambert’s affidavit is not

competent summary judgment evidence because it merely states his

opinion in a conclusory fashion, and at this stage, his opinion has

no weight. S ee Grimes v. Texas Dep’t of Mental Health , 102 F.3d

1 37, 140 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that summary judgment is7

appropriate if th e nonmoving party rests upon conclusory

allegations). Even if such evidence would be relevant at trial, it

is not relevant at the summary judgment stage.

We are careful to note, however, that had Lambert been a

decision maker in the promotion process, then his opinion that

Ortega was m ore qualified would indeed be competent summary

judgment evidence. Also, had Lambert’s affidavit stated the

factual basis for his ultimate conclusion that Ortega was more

qualified, we might have a different result. For example, if

Lambert’s affidavit outlined his qualifications compared to

Ortega’s qualifications, and further explained that he was

qualified to render an opinion because he had served in the

posi tion for a certain period of time and knew what the job

entailed, the n a fact dispute on pretext might exist. But as we

have stated previously, the party opposing summar y judgment is

required to identify specific evidence in the record and to

articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his

or her claim. S ee Forsyth v. Barr , 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir.

1994). "Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to

sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's

opposition to summary judgment." Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc.

,

953 F.2d 909, 915-16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is AFFIRMED.

AFFIRMED.