IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2021-NCSC-50

No. 280A20

Filed 23 April 2021

IN THE MATTER OF: M.J.B. III, G.M.B., and J.A.B.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 30 

March 2020 by Judge Regina R. Parker in District Court, Beaufort County. This 

matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 19 March 2021 but 

determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 

the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Miller & Audino, LLP, by Jay Anthony Audino, for petitioner-appellee Beaufort 

County Department of Social Services.

Tasneem A. Dharamsi for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Sean P. Vitrano for respondent-appellant mother.

BARRINGER, Justice.

¶ 1 Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court’s 30 March 2020 orders 

terminating her parental rights in her minor children M.J.B. III (Mark),1 G.M.B. 

 

1 Pseudonyms are used throughout this opinion to protect the identities of the 

juveniles.
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Opinion of the Court

(Gerry), and J.A.B. (James).2 Upon careful consideration, we affirm the trial court’s 

orders terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

¶ 2 On 28 June 2019, the Beaufort County Department of Social Services (DSS) 

filed juvenile petitions alleging that ten-year-old Mark, eight-year-old Gerry, and sixyear-old James were neglected juveniles. The juvenile petitions outlined DSS’s years 

of involvement with respondent-mother and her failure to properly feed, bathe, and 

clothe her children or protect them from harm. Throughout the children’s lives,

respondent-mother had been financially and emotionally dependent on various 

males, placing herself at risk of abuse. In addition, respondent-mother’s boyfriend, 

who subsequently became her husband, physically abused the children. After 

obtaining custody of the children, DSS placed them together in a licensed therapeutic 

foster home due to their special needs and the substantial trauma they had 

experienced.

¶ 3 The juvenile petitions were heard on 30 October 2019, and the children were 

adjudicated to be neglected juveniles. In its adjudication order, the trial court made

findings of fact consistent with the allegations in the juvenile petitions (summarized 

 

2 While the trial court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s father, he 

is not a party in this case. Thus, this decision does not address the trial court’s findings and 

orders concerning the children’s father.
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above). Accordingly, the trial court set the permanent plan for the children as 

reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption.

¶ 4 Following a permanency-planning hearing on 8 January 2020, the trial court 

found that respondent-mother had not made substantial progress toward resolving 

the need for DSS intervention. Among other things, the trial court found that the 

children had revealed new information about the abuse they had suffered while under 

respondent-mother’s care—including being hit, struck, and beaten by family

members and being sexually abused by respondent-mother’s boyfriends, including 

her now husband. Therefore, the trial court changed the children’s permanent plan 

to adoption with a concurrent plan of reunification.

¶ 5 On 22 January 2020, DSS filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of 

respondent-mother on grounds of neglect and dependency. See N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(1), (6) (2019). The termination motion was heard on 4 March 2020. On 

30 March 2020, the trial court entered an adjudication order, concluding that both 

grounds for termination alleged in the motion existed; and a disposition order,

concluding that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate respondentmother’s parental rights. Accordingly, the trial court terminated respondent-mother’s 

parental rights. Respondent-mother now appeals.

II. Analysis

¶ 6 Respondent-mother challenges the trial court’s adjudication of the existence of 
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grounds to terminate her parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and 

(6). Since “a finding of only one ground is necessary to support a termination of 

parental rights,” we address only respondent-mother’s challenge to the adjudication 

of neglect under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 194 (2019). 

After careful review, we conclude that the unchallenged findings in this case 

combined with the challenged findings that are supported by clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence are more than sufficient to support the trial court’s 

determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights

pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). Accordingly, we affirm the orders terminating

respondent-mother’s parental rights.

¶ 7 The Juvenile Code provides for a two-stage process for the termination of 

parental rights: adjudication and disposition. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109 to -1110 (2019). 

During the adjudicatory stage, “[t]he burden in these proceedings is on the petitioner 

or movant to prove the facts justifying the termination by clear and convincing 

evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(b); see also id. § 7B-1109(e)–(f). If one or more grounds 

exist, the trial court then proceeds to the dispositional stage where it determines

whether termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interests. N.C.G.S. 

§ 7B-1110(a). On appeal, respondent-mother does not challenge the trial court’s 

determination in the dispositional stage that termination was in the children’s best 

interests.
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A. Standard of Review

¶ 8 “We review a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 ‘to determine 

whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the 

findings support the conclusions of law.’ ” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 392 (2019)

(quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). “A trial court’s finding of fact 

that is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is deemed conclusive even 

if the record contains evidence that would support a contrary finding.” In re B.O.A., 

372 N.C. 372, 379 (2019). “Findings of fact not challenged by respondent are deemed 

supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. Moreover, we review 

only those findings necessary to support the trial court’s determination that grounds 

existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 

(2019) (citations omitted). As for the trial court’s conclusions of law, this Court 

reviews them de novo. In re M.C., 374 N.C. 882, 886 (2020).

B. Neglect

¶ 9 A trial court may terminate parental rights for neglect if it concludes the 

parent has neglected the juvenile such that the juvenile is a “neglected juvenile” 

within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). A neglected 

juvenile is defined, in pertinent part, as one “whose parent, guardian, custodian, or 

caretaker does not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline; or who has been 

abandoned; or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.” 
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N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019). In some circumstances, the trial court may terminate

a parent’s rights based on neglect that is currently occurring at the time of the 

termination hearing. See, e.g., In re K.C.T., 375 N.C. 592, 599–600 (2020). However, 

such a showing is not required if, as in this case, the child is not in the parent’s 

custody at the time of the termination hearing. In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 80 (2019). 

Instead, the trial court looks to “evidence of neglect by a parent prior to losing custody 

of a child—including an adjudication of such neglect” as well as “any evidence of 

changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a 

repetition of neglect.” In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715 (1984). “The determinative 

factors must be the best interests of the child and the fitness of the parent to care for 

the child at the time of the termination proceeding.” Id. “After weighing this evidence, 

the trial court may find that neglect exists as a ground for termination if it concludes 

the evidence demonstrates ‘a likelihood of future neglect by the parent.’ ” In re B.T.J.,

2021-NCSC-23, ¶ 11 (quoting In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. 838, 841 (2020)).

C. Challenges to Specific Findings of Fact

¶ 10 On appeal, respondent-mother challenges several of the specific factual 

findings made by the trial court and then argues that the remaining findings do not 

support a finding that there was a likelihood of future neglect. Below, we address only 

those challenges that are necessary to support the trial court’s adjudication that 

neglect existed as a ground for termination. While respondent-mother challenges 
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other findings of fact, those findings are unnecessary to determine that there was a 

likelihood of future neglect, so we do not address them.

¶ 11 Respondent-mother’s first relevant challenge is to finding of fact 53:

“[Respondent-mother] has participated in parenting classes, but she has been unable 

to make any progress. Her pre-test and post-test indicate that she did not learn 

anything during the entirety of the classes provided.” Relying on parenting-profile 

evaluations completed approximately one month apart in August and September of 

2019, respondent-mother contends that the trial court’s finding of a lack of progress 

is not supported by the evidence. To the extent this contention involves the “pre-test 

and post-test,” we agree that the evidence does not support a finding that respondentmother “did not learn anything.” Rather, the record reflects that respondent-mother’s 

pre-test and post-test showed slight improvements in each of the five parenting 

constructs evaluated. Thus, we disregard that portion of the finding. See In re J.M., 

373 N.C. 352, 358 (2020) (disregarding a finding not supported by the evidence).

¶ 12 However, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the finding that 

respondent-mother has been “unable to make any progress” in her parenting skills.

Regarding the tests, respondent-mother only improved her scores by one to two 

points, leaving her in the medium risk range for all five categories. According to the 

social worker, this did not indicate demonstrable change. More concerningly, the 

social worker testified that respondent-mother did not use any of the parenting skills 
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taught in the class when she visited with her children. Respondent-mother does not 

challenge the trial court’s finding that each visit “was a retraumatizing episode [for 

the children] evidenced by anxiety, visible tremors, nightmares, insomnia, recurrence 

of selective mutism, refusing to eat [and] loss of appetite, encopresis, enuresis, 

aggressive behaviors towards siblings, and self-injurious behaviors.” Further,

respondent-mother stated that she could not remember what she learned in her 

parenting class other than to not raise her voice, talk calmly, and let the children 

help out with meals. We conclude this evidence supports the trial court’s finding that 

respondent-mother was unable to make any progress in her parenting skills.

¶ 13 Respondent-mother’s second relevant challenge is to the following emphasized

portion of finding of fact 82: “Due to [respondent-mother’s] . . . parental deficiencies, 

the juveniles have been exposed to many incidents of traumatic physical, sexual[,] 

and emotional abuse. The juveniles’ trauma is such that they will never likely be able 

to properly function if returned to [respondent-mother’s] . . . care.” (Emphasis added.) 

Respondent-mother contends that the therapist never made this determination and 

that the record otherwise lacks evidence that would support it.

¶ 14 However, the unchallenged findings of fact show that the children incurred 

significant trauma from the physical and sexual abuse they experienced under 

respondent-mother’s care, as well as from her inability to provide for their physical 

needs like health, nutrition, and hygiene. As a result, the children exhibited 
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substantial trauma-related behaviors. For the children to overcome their trauma and 

properly function, the trial court found that they would need many years of 

therapeutic care. Additionally, the therapist testified that they needed time in a safe 

environment. The unchallenged findings of fact reveal that respondent-mother failed 

to provide either a safe environment or even a minimally competent level of care prior 

to the children entering DSS custody. At the time of the termination hearing, 

respondent-mother still had not provided a safe environment but instead chose to 

maintain a romantic relationship with one of her children’s abusers and live with 

another one of them. In addition, even if respondent-mother had progressed in her 

parenting skills—which she had not—she also did not believe her children had been 

abused, completely undermining her ability to help the children heal from that abuse. 

And that does not even include the therapist’s testimony concerning the traumatic 

reactions the kids displayed after attending visitations with respondent-mother.

Thus, finding of fact 82, that the children would “never likely be able to properly 

function” if returned to respondent-mother’s care, was supported by clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence.

¶ 15 Further, respondent-mother argues that finding of fact 82 is related to the trial 

court’s best interests determination, not its adjudication of neglect. But the fact that 

the children would never be able to properly function if returned to respondentmother’s care establishes that returning the children to her care would place them 
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into an environment injurious to their welfare—one of the definitions of neglect. See 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in making this finding 

during the adjudicatory stage.

D. Argument Concerning Likelihood of Future Neglect

¶ 16 Respondent-mother further argues that the evidence presented at the 

termination hearing does not support the trial court’s finding that a likelihood of 

future neglect existed should the children return to respondent-mother’s care. 

However, as discussed above, the relevant findings that respondent-mother 

challenged were supported by competent evidence, and so we treat them as conclusive 

on appeal. In addition, the record contained numerous other unchallenged findings 

that when combined with the facts discussed above are more than sufficient to 

demonstrate a likelihood of future neglect.

¶ 17 Starting first with evidence of past neglect, we note that respondent-mother 

does not challenge any of the trial court’s findings concerning her history with the 

children before DSS obtained custody. Accordingly, we accept as binding the trial 

court’s findings that respondent-mother repeatedly failed to provide for her children’s 

basic needs, including food, shelter, clothing, and hygiene. In addition, respondentmother failed to protect the children from physical or sexual abuse, even when she 

knew it was occurring. This evidence is more than sufficient to support a finding of 

past neglect.
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¶ 18 Likewise, while respondent-mother contends that she had changed her 

circumstances since the children entered DSS custody, the evidence presented at the 

termination hearing supports the trial court’s finding that respondent-mother would 

likely neglect the children in the future if they returned to her care. As discussed 

above, this evidence included the fact that respondent-mother had not made any 

progress in her parenting skills, did not believe that her children had been abused, 

and continued to associate with their abusers. Accordingly, if returned to her care, 

the children would remain at risk of physical and sexual abuse, have unmet physical 

needs, and never heal from the trauma they had already endured. These facts are

more than sufficient to establish a likelihood of future neglect.

III. Conclusion

¶ 19 The trial court did not err by adjudicating that grounds existed to terminate 

respondent-mother’s parental rights for neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). 

Since the trial court needed to find only one of the grounds in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) 

to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights, we need not address its 

adjudication of dependency as a ground for termination. See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at

194. Having determined that grounds existed for termination and because 

respondent-mother does not challenge the trial court’s determination of the children’s 

best interests at the dispositional stage, we affirm the trial court’s orders terminating 

respondent-mother’s parental rights to Mark, Gerry, and James.
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Opinion of the Court

AFFIRMED.