Docket No. 91464–Agenda 6–May 2002.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 

								LAMONT JACKSON, Appellant.

Opinion filed November 21, 2002.

	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

	In this case, we consider for the first time whether, in a

criminal bench trial, the State may present evidence relating to a

witness’ polygraph examination “for a limited purpose” if that

purpose has not been established prior to the admission of the

evidence.   We hold that it cannot.

	Defendant, Lamont Jackson, was indicted in the circuit court

of Cook County on several charges, including first degree murder  

(720 ILCS 5/9–1(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3) (West 1992)) and attempted

armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/8--–  4, and 720 ILCS 5/18--–  2 (West 1992)). Williford

subsequently admitted his involvement in the crime, implicated

defendant as the shooter, and entered a guilty plea. When called as

a State witness in defendant’s bench trial, however, Williford

denied that either he or defendant had been involved in the

incident.

	In response, the State asked Williford whether he had made his

prior inculpatory statement after being told he was a “liar” based

on the results of his polygraph test. Defense counsel objected, and

the State argued that the polygraph evidence was admissible to

show the “course of conduct” leading to Williford’s confession.

The trial judge admitted the evidence “for a limited purpose.” The

State then elicited additional testimony from Williford indicating

that he named defendant as the shooter after being confronted with

his polygraph results. In subsequent testimony, however, Williford

insisted that his confession was the product of police coercion. During

defnendant’s bench trial,  , the State elicited polygraph testimony from

one of its witnesses. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial

court admitted the evidence “for a limited purpose” despite the

absence of a legally valid purpose at that time.

	The trial court subsequenstlysubsequently found defendant guilty of first

degree murder and attempted armed robbery. Defendant appealed,

and the appellate court held that although it was error to admit the

polygraph evidence, the error was harmless because the evidence

had been considered by the trial court “for a limited purpose.” 321

Ill. App. 3d 498, 505-06.

	We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.

2d R. 315) and now reverse and remand the cause for a new trial

based on the improper admission of the polygraph evidence.

BACKGROUND

	Defendant Lamont Jackson and codefendant Jessie Williford were indicted on several

charges, including first degree murder and attempted armed

robbery, related to the July 13, 1996, death of a female shopper at

Tops and Bottoms, a retail clothing store in Chicago, Illinois. Williford

initially denied any involvement in the crime, but after being

confronted with the results of his polygraph test, he confessed in

a court-reported statement, naming defendant as the shooter. In December 1998, Williford entered a guilty plea and was sentenced

to concurrent prison terms of 25 years for the murder and 4 years

for the attempted armed robbery.

	In his court-reported statement to police, Williford claimed

that he was driving with defendant on July 13, 1996, when

defendant showed him a black semiautomatic pistol in his

waistband. Williford then suggested robbing a store to get some

money, and defendant agreed. The two men discussed their

respective roles in the robbery: defendant would pull out the gun

and yell “stick up” while Williford got the money from the cash

register and gave it to defendant.

	According to Williford, the men then drove to Trak Auto,

where Williford remained in the car while defendant made some

purchases. After defendant returned to the car, the two men

decided to rob Tops and Bottoms, a retail clothing store. At some

point after entering the store, defendant looked toward the back

and raised his pistol. Williford, who was standing in another aisle,

looked and saw a man near the back of the store. Williford then

ducked and heard shots being fired behind him from defendant’s

position. When the shooting stopped, Williford ran to his

grandmother’s house.

	Williford’s statement concluded with averments that he had

been treated well by the police and the assistant State’s Attorney

and that he had no complaints. In addition, he stated that he was

not threatened or promised anything in exchange for his statement.

Finally, Williford indicated that he was not under the influence of

drugs or alcohol at the time and that the facts provided in the

statement were true.

	As for defendant, he initially denied any involvement in the

crime. Later, he gave the police an inculpatory statement that was

generally consistent with Williford’s statement, but named

Williford as the shooter.

	Defendant subsequently waived his right to a jury trial. At

defendant’s bench trial, the State called Williford as a witness. On

direct examination, Williford denied making any deals with the

State’s Attorney’s office in exchange for his testimony. He then

gave testimony contradicting his prior inculpatory statement to police, insisting that neither he nor defendant had been in Tops and

Bottoms on the day of the homicide and denying any involvement

in a plan to rob the store. In response to this testimony, the State

asked Williford whether he had taken a polygraph test and been

told by the examiner that he was a “liar” just prior to making his

inculpatory statement.

	Defendant’s counsel objected, arguing that Williford’s

polygraph examination was immaterial to defendant’s case. The

State countered that while polygraph evidence was inadmissible

against defendant, it was admissible to show the “course of

conduct” leading to Williford’s prior inculpatory statement to the

police. The trial court admitted the evidence, stating that it would

be considered “for a limited purpose.”

	The State continued to question Williford about the polygraph

test, and Williford indicated that after he had been confronted with

the negative polygraph results, he admitted his involvement in the

crime and implicated defendant as the shooter. He also

acknowledged that he had changed his story “plenty of times.” In

addition, Williford claimed that he gave his statement “for his

safety” and that he was suffering from severe heroin withdrawal

and the police had promised to free him and not pursue first degree

murder charges if he implicated defendant.

	Defendant testified in his own defense, specifically denying any

involvement in the attempted armed robbery and homicide at Tops

and Bottoms or even being in the store that day. He maintained

that he gave an inculpatory statement only after he had received a

number of improper threats from the police and the assistant

State’s Attorney. According to defendant, these threats included

that he was going to be chargeding him with first degree murder based on Williford’s

statement to the police and that he would never seebarring him from wvever seeing  his

children again unless he implicated himself in the crime and named

Williford as the shooter.

	The State also presented testimony from a detective who had

interviewed both defendant and Williford, as well as the assistant

State’s Attorneys who had taken the inculpatory statements from

the two men. Each of these witnesses denied using any threats,

false promises, or other improper inducements to obtain statements

from either defendant or Williford. They also denied advising defendant to protect himself by admitting his involvement in the

robbery and naming Williford as the shooter. Furthermore, they

maintained that the two men were treated well and never

complained about their well-being or treatment while in police

custody.

	After considering the testimony of the witnesses and the

arguments of the parties, the trial judge found defendant guilty of

first degree murder and attempted armed robbery, sentencing him

to 50 years in prison for the murder and 15 years in prison for the

attempted armed robbery. Defendant’s post-trial motions were

denied, and he appealed.

	The appellate court found that although the trial court erred by

admitting evidence of Williford’s polygraph examination, the error

was harmless because Williford subsequently testified that his

confession was “ ‘for his safety’ ” and based on false promises from by

the police. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 505. The court believed that because

the State could have offered the polygraph evidence to refute

Williford’s claims of improper police conduct the error was one of

timing, not substance. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 506. In addition, the

appellate court excused the error because the trial court stated that

it was considering the polygraph evidence “for a limited purpose,”

and judges are presumed to use evidence only for the stated

purpose. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 506. Finally, the appellate court

rejected defendant’s arguments concerning the propriety of his

sentencing hearing. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 507. This court

subsequently allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. 177

Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

	Defendant argues that the admission of evidence concerning

the polygraph test conducted prior to Williford’s confession was

reversible error because it violated the general rule barring

polygraph evidence. He asserts that, although he failed to include

this issue in his post-trial motion, this court should address it under

the doctrine of plain error because it affected his substantial rights.

See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).

	 The State counters that plain error is a narrow exception to

the general rule of waiver and should be applied only where the

evidence is closely balanced or where the error has deprived

defendant of a fair trial. People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 100 (1992). The State asserts that neither condition is met here because

the evidence of defendant’s guilt was not closely balanced and the

alleged error was not serious enough to have resulted in an unfair

trial.

	In People v. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d 191, 204-05 (1994), we addressed for the first time the applicability of the plain error

doctrine when evidence relating to the polygraph examination of a

witness other than the defendant is admitted in a criminal trial.

During the defendant’s trial, both the State and the defense in Gard made numerous references to the witnesses’ polygraph

examinations.

	In our discussion of plain error, we focused on the inherent

unreliability of polygraph testing. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d at 204-05. Noting that the scientific reliability of the evidence was not

dependent on the test subject, we concluded that the general rule

precluding the admission of a criminal defendant’s polygraph test

applied equally to polygraph evidence obtained from a witness in

a criminal trial. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d at 204. Our opinion explicitly acknowledged the lack of closely balanced evidence in the case, but

still found plain error due to our strong concern for protecting and

preserving the integrity and reputation of the judicial system. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d at 205. Thus, we held that “the admission of evidence

of polygraph testing of witnesses at defendant’s trial constituted

plain error because it was error compromising the integrity and

tarnishing the reputation of the judicial process itself.” Gard, 158 Ill. 2d at 205.

	 Our rationale in Gard was largely premised on our prior decision in People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225 (1981). In Baynes, this court held that evidence relating to the polygraph testing of a

criminal defendant was inadmissible because it did not have

sufficient indicia of reliability. Consequently, the prejudicial effects

of admitting the evidence substantially outweighed its probative

value. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d at 244. Moreover, the admission of polygraph evidence constituted “an unwarranted intrusion” into the trier of fact’s role in determining the credibility of the witnesses.

Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d at 244.

	Based on these considerations, we concluded that the

admission of the defendant’s polygraph evidence rose to the level

of plain error because it “impinge[d] upon the integrity of our

judicial system.” Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d at 244. We reached this conclusion despite a stipulation by the defendant that the test

results would be admissible, reasoning that a mere stipulation

cannot reduce the danger that admitting scientifically unreliable

tests would undermine the judicial process. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d at 233-34.

	In the instant case, the State attempts to distinguish our prior

analyses, asserting that any error that may have occurred did not

adversely affect the judicial process. It fails, however, to offer any

explanation for this conclusion, and we are unable to conceive of

any justification for it in light of our reasoning in Gard and Baynes.

	The State next claims that Gard is factually distinguishable because the jury in that case was permitted to consider the

polygraph evidence for any purpose, while here a trial judge

considered it only “for a limited purpose.” As the appellate court

noted, “[i]n a bench trial if the court has admitted evidence for a

limited purpose the court is presumed to only have considered it

for that purpose.” 321 Ill. App. 3d at 506, citing People v. Avery, 227 Ill. App. 3d 382, 392 (1991). In reviewing thise Stgate’s 

argument, we must consider the possible distinctions both between

a jury and a judge serving as the fact finder and the use of

polygraph evidence for general versus “limited” purposes.   We turn

first to the question of first consider how the identity of the fact finder impacts

our analysis.

	As in Gard, our overriding concern in this case is the preservation of the integrity of the judicial process. See Gard, 158 Ill. 2d at 205. We have long recognized that, generally, the

admission of polygraph evidence unjustifiably intrudes on the trier

of fact’s ability to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d at 244. The identity of the trier of fact in any specific case

cannot imbue inherently unreliable polygraph evidence with

reliability or lessen the damage to the integrity and reputation of

the judicial process caused by admitting scientifically unreliable evidence. See Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d at 239-40. The same principles control regardless of whether the trier of fact is a panel of

competent jurors or an experienced trial judge. People v. Yarbrough, 93 Ill. 2d 421, 426-27 (1982). Thus, we reject the State’s argument that this case is distinguishable from Gard and Baynes because here the trier of fact was a trial judge, not a jury.

	As for the State’s argument that the evidence was properly

considered “for a limited purpose,” we initially note that the trial

court did not clearly define this “limited purpose.” From our review

of the record, we conclude that the judge intended to consider the

evidence as part of the “course of conduct” leading to Williford’s

inculpatory statement to the police. Based on that limited purpose,

we address the State’s argument that the evidence was properly

admitted.

	The State cites People v. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d 486 (1998), in support of its contention that the polygraph evidence was properly

admitted to establish the sequence of events leading to Williford’s

inculpatory statement because he claimed his statement was

procured by the use of threats and false promises from the police

and the assistant State’s Attorney. For the reasons that follow, we

believe the State’s reliance on Jefferson is misplaced.

	In Jefferson, this court affirmed the trial court’s admission of rebuttal evidence showing that the defendant confessed after

agreeing to undergo a polygraph examination the next day.

Notably, prior to the admission of the polygraph evidence, the

defendant in Jefferson claimed at trial that she confessed because

the police had promised her that if she gave a statement she would

be released from custody to see her child, whom she had been told

had only hours to live. We held that the defendant’s claim of police

misconduct opened the door to the introduction of the polygraph

agreement for the limited purpose of establishing an alternative

explanation for the defendant’s confession. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d at 495. If the State’s polygraph evidence had not been allowed, the

trier of fact would have been misled by the defendant’s prior

testimony concerning the circumstances preceding her confession. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d at 496.

	In contrast, the polygraph evidence in the instant case was

presented during the State’s direct examination of Williford, prior to his claim of police coercion. At the time the evidence was admitted, it served no proper legal purpose. The appellate court

incorrectly reasoned that the trial court in this case must be

presumed to have considered the evidence for a proper limited

purpose. Where, as here, there is no legally proper purpose at the

time the evidence is admitted, we will not afford the trial court that

presumption. For this reason, we cannot agree with the appellate

court’s conclusion that the introduction of polygraph evidence

before the witness has opened the door to its admission was merely

a harmless timing error. See 321 Ill. App. 3d at 506.

	In Jefferson, the State used the polygraph evidence as a shield against the defendant’s allegation of police misconduct. Here, the

State attempted to use the evidence affirmatively as a sword to

advance its own case. Moreover, the State’s premature

introduction of the polygraph evidence may have actually

compelled Williford to justify his prior actions by claiming coercion

in his subsequent testimony. We did not approve the offensive use

of polygraph evidence in Jefferson, and we will not now allow the State to create a straw man only to knock him down, all within its

own case in chief.

	The dissent criticizes this decision, asserting that in a new trial

the same evidence will be admitted, only in a different order.   While

this may be true,

		“let it be again remembered that delays and little

inconveniences in the forms of justice are the price that all

free nations must pay for their liberty in more substantial

matters; that these inroads upon this sacred bulwark of the

nation are fundamentally opposite to the spirit of our

constitution; and that, though begun in trifles, the

precedent may gradually increase and spread to the utter

disuse of juries in questions of the most momentous

concern.”  4 Blackstone, Commentaries *350.  

See also Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614-15, 90 L. Ed. 350, 355-56, 66 S. Ct. 402, 406, 90 L. Ed. 350, 355-56 (1946).

 Moreover, “[a]ll law is technical if viewed solely from concern for punishing crime

without heeding the mode by which it is accomplished.”  

Bollenbach, 326 U.S. at 614-15, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 355, 66 S. Ct. at 406, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 355.

.

	Here, requiring the State to offer some legally valid foundation

prior to admitting inherently unreliable and prejudicial evidence

seems but a small intrusion on judicial expediency in light of this

court’s long-standing general bar on polygraph evidence.  Surely,

the integrity and reputation of the judicial process merits such

minimal protection.  While formal requirements may often be

scorned because they do not serve the ends of expediency, this

court must apply a longer view.   Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 40, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35, 66, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1848, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35, 66 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Souter and

Ginsburg, JJ.).

	While in this case the State had the good fortune to obtain

subsequent testimony from Williford that may have justified the

introduction of the polygraph evidence to refute his claim of

coercion under our rationale in Jefferson, in many other cases, the State will not be so fortunate. It would be unwise to allow the

State to procure otherwise inadmissible and potentially damaging

polygraph evidence in the speculative hope that a witness will later

justify its admission. If the justification does not materialize, then

the admission of the unreliable evidence has done irreparable

damage to both the individual defendant’s case and the integrity of

the entire judicial process.

	If the State wishes to admit polygraph testimony to flesh out

the circumstances surrounding a confession, it may attempt to do

so only in the limited circumstances outlined in Jefferson. We will not condone the anticipatory introduction of polygraph evidence by

the State.

	For these reasons		As for the dissent’s claim that the polygraph evidence was

merely elicited to show Williford’s state of mind at the time he

made his confession, the State itself never tendered that

explanation to the trial court, insisting instead only that the

evidence was offered to show the witness’ “course of conduct.” 

Thus, we need not address the merits of the dissent’s proffered

speculation.

	For this reason 		Accordingly, , we conclude there was no proper “limited

purpose” for the trial court’s admission of the State’s polygraph

evidence in this case. In light of our holding on this issue, we need not and do not reach the merits of defendant’s other argument on

appeal.

CONCLUSION

	We hold that it is plain error to admit polygraph evidence in a

criminal trial in anticipation of evidence potentially justifying its

admission as an alternative explanation for an inculpatory

statement. unless the issue has been previously raised during trial. This is true regardless of whether the case is tried before

a judge or a jury. 	

	In light of our disposition of this case, we need not reach the

merits of defendant’s other argument on appeal, claiming that the

admission of multiple victim impact statements at his sentencing

hearing violated his due process rights.

 	The judgments of the appellate court and the trial court are

therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

circuit court judgment reversed;

cause remanded.

	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or

decision of this case.

	JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting:

	Like the appellate court, I believe that the premature

admission of evidence relating to Williford’s polygraph

examination was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I therefore

respectfully dissent.

	Plain error is a limited and narrow exception to the general

waiver rule, to be invoked only where the evidence is closely

balanced or the alleged error is so substantial that it deprived the

defendant of a fair trial. People v. Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d 105, 128 (2001). The second prong of the plain error exception is to be

invoked only where the alleged error is so serious that its consideration is necessary to preserve the integrity and reputation

of the judicial process. Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d at 128. Here, the evidence of defendant’s guilt was not closely balanced. Thus, the

plain error doctrine applies only if the premature admission of

evidence relating to Williford’s polygraph examination threatens

the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. As the

majority’s own analysis demonstrates, however, the integrity and

reputation of the judicial process is not the least bit at risk in this

case. 

	First, the majority concedes that, under Jefferson, the State could have solicited evidence relating to Williford’s polygraph

examination to rebut Williford’s subsequent claim of police

coercion. Slip op. at 89. According to the majority, then, the

“integrity of the entire judicial process” (slip op. at 98) is at risk

because, in an isolated case, the trial court entertained perfectly

admissible evidence a little bit too soon. Stated differently, the

majority is convinced that the evidentiary error that occurred in this

case is of such magnitude as to threaten “the integrity of the entire

judicial process.” Slip op. at 8. Yet the majority’s remedy is to

remand this cause for a new trial at which the exact same evidence will come in, only in a slightly different order. Surely, if the judicial

system’s integrity is as fragile as the majority suggests, something

more than mere formalism is called for.

	Second, and more importantly, the majority’s concern for the

judicial system’s integrity is based not upon what happened in this

case but upon what would happen if the facts of this case were exactly the opposite of what they are. As the majority explains:

			“While in this case the State had the good fortune to

obtain subsequent testimony from Williford that may have

justified the introduction of the polygraph evidence to

refute his claim of coercion under our rationale in

Jefferson, in many other cases, the State will not be so fortunate. It would be unwise to allow the State to

procure otherwise inadmissible and potentially damaging

polygraph evidence in the speculative hope that a witness

will later justify its admission. If the justification does not

materialize, then the admission of the unreliable evidence

has done irreparable damage to both the individual defendant’s case and the integrity of the entire judicial

process.” Slip op. at 9 8.

Thus, according to the majority, “irreparable damage to both the

individual defendant’s case and the integrity of the entire judicial

process” occurs only when a justification for the“otherwise

inadmissible and potentially damaging polygraph evidence” does

not materialize. This may or may not be true. But what is

undeniable is the fact that, in this case, the necessary justification did materialize. Consequently, under the majority’s own analysis, no harm was done to either this defendant’s case or the integrity of the entire judicial process, and no plain error occurred.

	The bottom line is that the error that occurred in this case was harmless. It is well established that, in a bench trial, the judge is presumed to consider evidence only for its proper purpose. People v. Lewis, 30 Ill. 2d 617, 622 (1964). Under Jefferson, the State may properly introduce evidence relating to a polygraph

examination to rebut a witness’ claim that his or her statement was

the product of coercion. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d at 496. Here, the State introduced evidence relating to Williford’s polygraph

examination before any claim of coercion was made. While the trial

court should have sustained defense counsel’s objection at that

point, the fact remains that Williford shortly thereafter asserted that

his statement was coerced. At this point, the evidence relating to

Williford’s polygraph examination became perfectly admissible.

Thus, any error that the trial court committed in admitting the

evidence in the first instance was at worst harmless and at best

cured entirely.

	As for the majority’s concern that “the State’s premature

introduction of the polygraph evidence may have actually

compelled Williford to justify his prior actions by claiming coercion

in his subsequent testimony” (slip op. at 8), I have two responses.

First, absolutely nothing in the record supports the majority’s

conjecture. Second, and more importantly, the majority’s

conjecture is logically untenable. The majority apparently believes

that, had the State not asked Williford about his polygraph results,

Williford might never have mentioned the coercion that led to his

signed and sworn confession. What the majority’s theory

overlooks, however, is that Williford had just testified that the signed and sworn confession that landed him 25 years in prison was

a complete fabrication. Surely, the majority cannot believe that, had the State not asked Williford about his polygraph results,

Williford’s testimony would have concluded without either side

inquiring as to why Williford not only gave a false confession but also pleaded guilty and accepted 25 years in prison on the basis of

that confession. Of course those questions would have been asked,

and of course Williford’s claim of coercion would have come out

at that time.

	As a final matter, I wish to note that, while the majority talks

a great deal about “the inherent unreliability of polygraph testing”

(slip op. at 5), “sufficient indicia of reliability” (slip op at 56), and

“scientifically unreliable tests” (slip op. at 6), none of these

concerns are implicated in this case. This is because the State never

introduced the results of Williford’s polygraph examination.

Indeed, after reading the majority opinion, one would think that the

State not only introduced those results but also argued that they

constitute scientific proof that Williford lied during his polygraph

examination. In fact, the only thing that the State introduced was

Williford’s understanding of his polygraph results, and it did so only as evidence of Williford’s state of mind at the time he gave his inculpatory statement. As with all state of mind evidence, the

purpose of this testimony was to show what the witness believed at a certain relevant time, not whether that belief was in fact true.

That the State was interested in eliciting evidence only of

Williford’s state of mind is demonstrated by the fact that, from the

record, we have no idea (1) what Williford was asked during his

polygraph examination, (2) whether Williford in fact failed his

polygraph examination, or (3) whether Williford even took a polygraph examination. All we know is that, at the time he

confessed, Williford believed he had just failed a polygraph examination. Whether or not this evidence is admissible, its

reliability has nothing to do with a polygraph’s scientific integrity.

	For these reasons, I dissent.

	JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this dissent.