alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 12.1**

 

**Digital River, Inc. Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges (in thousands, except ratios)**

** **
| ** **                                     | ** ** | **Years ended December 31** | ** ** |
|------------------------------------------------|------------|----------------------------------|------------|
| ** **                                     | ** ** | **2000**                         | ** ** | **2001** | ** ** | **2002** | ** ** | **2003** | ** ** | **2004** | ** ** |
| Net Income (Loss) from operations as  reported |       | $                                | (40,112    | ) | $ | (20,103 | ) | $ | (916 | ) | $ | 16,298 |   | $ | 34,762 |   |
| Add: Fixed charges                             |       | 84                               |       | 137 |   | 165 |   | 235 |   | 2,094 |   |
|                                           |       |                             |       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Earnings as defined                            |       | (40,028                          | )          | (19,966 | ) | (751 | ) | 16,533 |   | 36,856 |   |
|                                           |       |                             |       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Fixed charges                                  |       | $                                | 84         |   | $ | 137 |   | $ | 165 |   | $ | 235 |   | $ | 2,094 |   |
|                                           |       |                             |       |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Ratio of earnings to fixed charges(1)          |       | —                           |       | — |   | — |   | 70.5 |   | 17.6 |   |

 

----

(1)           The ratio of earnings to fixed charges iscomputed by dividing income (loss) from operations plus fixed charges by fixedcharges.  Fixed charges consist ofinterest expense, amortization of debt issuance costs and that portion ofrental payments under operating leases that we believe to be representative ofinterest.  Earnings were insufficient tocover fixed charges in 2000 through 2002 by amounts equal to the net loss forthe period.

 

----
§ 415.3 Types of launch licenses. ( a ) *Launch-specific license.* A launch-specific license authorizes a licensee to conduct one or more launches, having the same launch parameters, of one type of launch vehicle from one launch site. The license identifies, by name or mission, each launch authorized under the license. A licensee's authorization to launch terminates upon completion of all launches authorized by the license or the expiration date stated in the license, whichever occurs first.
( b ) *Launch operator license.* A launch operator license authorizes a licensee to conduct launches from one launch site, within a range of launch parameters, of launch vehicles from the same family of vehicles transporting specified classes of payloads. A launch operator license remains in effect for five years from the date of issuance.
( c ) Notwithstanding the duration for a license established in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, no license issued under this part will be valid after March 10, 2026.
[Amdt. 415-03, 64 FR 19616, Apr. 21, 1999, as amended by Doc. No. FAA-2019-0229, Amdt. 415-7, 85 FR 79715, Dec. 10, 2020]
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You have reached the FederalDepository Library Program Electronic Collection (FDLP/EC) Archive. Thisarchive assures ongoing access to publications in the FDLP/EC. Access topublications in the archive is available through GPO's suite of cataloging andlocator services, including the Catalog of U.S. Government Publications(CGP).  Archived copies of publications are retrieved in the event thatpublications are no longer available from the original publishing agency site. 
**Title:****Buckskin Peak quadrangle,Oregon : 7.5 minute series (topographic)**
 
2012 | 2014 | 2015 | 2017
 
SuDoc Number:A 13.28/6:42123-A 7/
Item Number:0080-G-04 (online)
CGP systemNumber: 000932355
 
January 26, 2018
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. ss.1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In  connection  with the  Quarterly  Report  of iQ Power  Technology  Inc.  (the
"Company")  on Form 10-Q for the period ended  September  30, 2003 as filed with
the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I,
Peter E. Braun,  Chief Executive Officer and acting Principal  Financial Officer
of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

          (1) The Report fully complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a)
     or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2) The information  contained in this Report fairly presents,  in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Company.


                                    /s/ Peter E. Braun
                                    -------------------------------------------
                                    Peter E. Braun, Chief Executive Officer and
                                    acting Principal Financial Officer
November 13, 2003





A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to iQ Power Technology Inc. and will be retained by iQ Power Technology
Inc. and furnished to the Securities  and Exchange  Commission or its staff upon
request.
#### VON YEAGER v STATE OF FLORIDA

Case No. AP89-36 (Lower Court Case No. TO88-147441)

Ninth Judicial Circuit, Orange County

June 17, 1991

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Robert L. Thomas, Esquire, for appellant.

Office of the State Attorney (no appearance for appellee).

Before LAWRENCE R. KIRKWOOD, Circuit Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT

This is an appeal from a determination of infraction. On May 5, 1989, the trial court found that Appellant Yeager had committed the traffic infraction of Careless Driving (Florida Statutes §316.1925). Yeager was traveling down Interstate “4” near Maitland overpass, five to ten miles per hour in bumper to bumper traffic, which was starting and stopping. The automobile in front of Yeager stopped and he hit the rear of that vehicle.

*92It is the duty of the judge to make a determination as to the infraction, taking into consideration all of the attendant circumstances in the case. A rear-end collision does not create a rebuttable presumption of a determination under the careless driving statute. Each case must be evaluated on its own facts based on all the attendant circumstances. A rear-end collision is just one such attendant circumstances. The appellate court cannot begin to canvas all of the myriad attendant circumstances which daily confront judges hearing traffic cases. *State v*Steele, 348 So.2d 398, 402 (3d DCA 1977).

Florida Statutes Section 316.1925(1) is set out as follows:

> Any person operating a vehicle upon the streets or highways within the state shall drive the same in a careful and prudent manner, having regard for the width, grade, curves, comers, traffic, and all other attendant circumstances, so as not to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person. Failure to drive in such manner shall constitute careless driving and a violation of this section.

The trial judge analyzed, on the record, various facts and circumstances which went into the decision:

1. The trooper was a witness to the accident.

2. The trooper observed traffic and was there to keep motorists from driving in the emergency lane.

3. The trooper testified that the first car was driving in the right lane close to the emergency lane and within five feet of the car in front of it and no turn signal was used. The vehicle stopped abruptly when the trooper was noticed. Yeager was in the second vehicle and was “kind of close” or within one-half car length of the first car.

4. Yeager testified that he was in “stop and go” traffic. The car in front of him had put on a blinker and started like it was going into the right (emergency) lane, and then it stopped.

The appellate court can express no view on whether the evidence herein requires a determination of infraction. The appellate court is not the trier of fact, and without a complete lack of evidentiary foundation, the appellate court will not set aside the trial court’s order. AFFIRMED, and the Clerk is directed to issue a Mandate forthwith.
In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-23-00071-CR 

 

EX PARTE ROY CLEMON TUNIS III 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

March 2, 2023 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ. 

Roy Clemon Tunis III, proceeding pro se, has filed documents with this Court 

seeking release from pretrial confinement in his pending criminal case. We construe the 

documents as an application for writ of habeas corpus. However, intermediate courts of 

appeals do not have original habeas corpus jurisdiction in criminal law matters. See TEX.

GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.221(d) (limiting original habeas jurisdiction of intermediate 

appellate courts to civil cases); Ex parte Hawkins, 885 S.W.2d 586, 588-89 (Tex. App.—

El Paso 1994, orig. proceeding) (per curiam). That jurisdiction instead rests with the Court 

of Criminal Appeals, the district courts, and the county courts. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 11.05, 11.08, 11.09; Ex parte Hawkins, 885 S.W.2d at 588. 
2

Accordingly, we dismiss Tunis’s application for writ of habeas corpus for want of 

jurisdiction.

Per Curiam

Do not publish.
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION

I, Ajay Sabherwal, certify that:

1.     I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of FairPoint Communications, Inc. (the "Company");

2.     Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.     The
Company's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act") Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the Company and have:



5.     The
Company's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Company's auditors
and the audit committee of the Company's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



Date:
September 29, 2010

/s/ AJAY SABHERWALAjay Sabherwal Chief Financial Officer


---



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#### § 89.105 Remote identification requirement.

Except as otherwise authorized by the Administrator or as provided in § 89.120, after September 16, 2023, no person may operate an unmanned aircraft within the airspace of the United States unless the operation meets the requirements of § 89.110 or § 89.115.
#### Joseph Finn et al., Plaintiffs, v Town of Southampton et al., Defendants. (Action No. 1.) Joseph E. McVeigh, Respondent, et al., Plaintiff, v Town of Southampton et al., Defendants, and Mercedes-Benz Credit Corporation, Appellant. (Action No. 2.)

[698 NYS2d 539]

—In two related actions to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., Mercedes-Benz Credit Corporation, a defendant in Action No. 2, appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Hall, J.), dated February 10, 1999, as denied that branch of its motion which was to compel Joseph E. McVeigh, a plaintiff in Action No. 2, to provide authorizations for his complete academic, employment, and medical records.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the motion of Mercedes-Benz Credit Corporation (hereinafter MBCC), a defendant in Action No. 2, which was to compel Joseph E. McVeigh, a plaintiff in Action No. 2, to provide authorizations for his complete academic, employment, and medical records. The notice to produce of MBCC was overbroad and failed to specify the documents sought with “reasonable particularity” (CPLR 3120 [a] [2]; *Harrison v Bayley Seton Hosp.,*247 AD2d 513; *Julius Blum, Inc. v Allied Hardware,*237 AD2d 492; *Fascaldi v Fascaldi,*209 AD2d 578, 579; *American Reliance Ins. Co. v National Gen. Ins. Co.,*174 AD2d 591). O’Brien, J. P., Sullivan, Gold-stein and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.2
 Certification of Chief Financial Officer
Pursuant to Securities and Exchange Act Rule 13a-14,
as Adopted Pursuant to Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
      (a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused
such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,
to ensure that material information relating to we, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;(b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and(c)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal
quarter reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal
control over financial reporting; and
  (a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of the internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and(b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management
or the other employees who have a significant role in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting.
  /s/ Michael S. BrowneMichael S. BrowneChief Financial Officer
#### § 31.39 Protection.

Each part of the balloon must be suitably protected against deterioration or loss of strength in service due to weathering, corrosion, or other causes.
#### United States Hat Company of New York, Appellant, *v.*Title Guarantee and Trust Company, Respondent.

Submitted March 1, 1937;

decided March 9, 1937.

*Einar B. Paust*for motion.

No one opposed.

Motion granted and appeal dismissed, with costs, and ten dollars costs of motion, unless appellant files and serves record and undertaking on appeal and pays ten dollars costs within ten days, in which event the motion is denied.
J~~jEo STqT

~

S UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460 

p ~ ~ 

i Q 

PROZ

02 

~G~\ 

MAR 1 6 2011 

OFFICE OF 

AIR AND RADIATION 

J R Stroble, Manager 

National TRU Program 

Carlsbad Field Office 

U.S. Department of Energy 

P.O. Box 3090 

Carlsbad, NM 88221-3090 

Dear Mr. Stroble: 

This letter provides the results of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) 

continued compliance inspection of the Central Characterization Project (CCP) waste 

characterization (WC) program for contact-handled (CH) and remote-handled (RH) transuranic 

(TRU) waste at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) near ldaho Falls, ID. This inspection 

occurred on November 16-17, 2010. As a result of this continued compliance inspection, F.,PA 

confirmed that the INL-CCP continues to characterize CH and RH TRU waste consistent with 

the conditions and limitations from EPA's baseline approval granted in November 2005 (CH) 

and January 2007 (RH) (EPA Air pocket No. A-98-49; II-A4-59 and No. A-98-49; I I-A4-72). 

The enclosed report (EPA Air pocket No. A-98-49;1I-A4-142) gives the details of the 

evaluation. 

In accordance with 40 CFR 194.8(b), during this on-site inspection, EPA sampled the 

following TRU waste characterization activities and processes: 

• Acceptable knowledge (AK) for CH and RH waste streams 

• Two nondestructive assay (NDA) systems operated by INL-CCP for characterizing CH 

TRU wastes: the Waste Assay Gamma Spectrometer (WAGS) and the Super High 

Efficiency Neutron Counter (SuperHENC) 

• Real-time radiography (RTR) for CH retrievably stored 'TRU debris waste (S5000) 

• Visual Examination (VE) for newly generated CH and RH TRU waste 

During the inspection, EPA issued a concern in the area of RTR of CH waste. That concern 

is resolved based on the infonnation submitted to EPA and through follow up discussions 

between EPA and DOE. 

Internet Address (URL) • http://www.epa.gov 

RecycledlRecyclable • Printed with Vegetable Oil Based Inks on 100% Postconsumer, Process Chlorine Free Recycled Paper 
EPA continues to approve the INL-CCP CH and RH TRU WC program in the 

configuration observed during this inspection consistent with the limitations described in the 

baseline inspection report and in follow on Tier 1 approval reports as cited. EPA confirmed that 

INL-CCP has appropriately implemented and informed EPA of Tier 2 changes since the baseline 

inspections cited above. 

If you have any questions, please contact Rajani Joglekar (202 343-9462) or rd Feltcorn 

(202 343- 9422). 

Sincerely > 

Tom Peake, Director 

Center for Waste Management and Regulations 

Enclosure 

ec:electronic distribution 

Alton Harris, DOE EM 

Ed Ziemianski, CBFO 

Court Fesmire, CBFO 

Norma Casteneda, CBFO 

Dennis Miehls, CBFO 

Martin Navarrete, CBFO 

Jon Edwards, EPA 

Steve Zappe, NMED 

David Ploetz, WTS 

Allison Pangle, CTAC
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without **

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

LA/Research

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HUSSEIN ABUSHINDI,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 06-70864

Agency No. A029-228-877

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 17, 2009** 

Before: ALARCÓN, TROTT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.

Hussein Abushindi, a native and citizen of Jordan, petitions for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an

FILED

DEC 07 2009

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
LA/Research 2 06-70864

immigration judge’s decision denying his application for adjustment of status. Our

jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We dismiss the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to review Abushindi’s contention that the BIA acted

ultra vires in its July 16, 2003 order because Abushindi failed to raise that issue

before the BIA in his appeal of right and thereby failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.

2004); see also Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e may not

entertain due process claims based on correctable procedural errors unless the alien

raised them below.”). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED.