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THE ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN AND ITS IMPACT ON BORDER 

SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER 

AND MARITIME SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 12, 2014 

Serial No. 113–55 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONDALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

VACANCY, Staff Director 

MICHAEL GEFFROY, Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Chairwoman 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

VACANCY

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (Ex Officio) 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

PAUL L. ANSTINE, II, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DEBORAH JORDAN, Subcommittee Clerk 

ALISON NORTHROP, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security ........................................................................................................ 1 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security ........................................................................................................ 3 

WITNESSES

Mr. Mark Borkowski, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition, Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

(1) 

THE ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN AND ITS IMPACT ON BORDER SECURITY 

Wednesday, March 12, 2014 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller [Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Miller, Duncan, Jackson Lee, O’Rourke, 

and Gabbard. 

Mrs. MILLER. The Committee on Homeland Security, our Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the CBP’s border 

technology plan and its impact on securing our Nation’s borders, 

and we are very pleased today to be joined by Assistant Commissioner, Mark Borkowski, again. 

Welcome back to the committee. 

He is from the Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition 

at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 

Rebecca Gambler, we welcome you back to the committee as well. 

Rebecca is the director of homeland security and justice issues 

with the Governmental Accounting Office, and I will more formally 

introduce them after we do our opening statements. 

Technology has really been an integral part of the proposed solution to secure the vast and rugged terrain of the Southwest Border 

for a long time, and it is one part of an overall set of solutions that 

must include manpower, intelligence, and where appropriate, infrastructure. 

Unfortunately, a series of miscues and missteps has plagued 

Customs and Border Protection’s previous efforts to produce a 

large-scale border security solution. 

The prior program known as SBInet was the subject of many 

criticisms from the GAO and the Congress before then-Secretary 

Napolitano canceled the program actually in 2011, and our goal in 

holding today’s hearing is to ensure that we are finally on the path 

to success after a number of false starts. 

Hundreds of millions of dollars were spent for SBInet. We have 

a grand total of 53 miles of the border under surveillance to show 

for it. That is just 53 miles out of nearly 2,000, so I don’t think any 

of us can say that that is an acceptable outcome. 
2 

I am sure there is enough blame to go around for that, but we 

are not here today to assign blame. We are here today to make 

sure that moving forward the American people get the border security that they need, that they want, that they have paid for, certainly that they deserve. 

In this time of limited budgets we cannot repeat the mistakes of 

the past and this subcommittee will hold the CBP accountable to 

ensure that the largest and most expensive part of the Arizona 

Border Surveillance Technology Plan, the integrated fixed towers, 

is on track. 

Years of delay have not inspired Congressional confidence in the 

IFT project or the larger Arizona Border Surveillance Technology 

Plan. According to the GAO report said to be released today, some 

of the smaller-scale purchases do not meet the needs of the Border 

Patrol and others have been contracting challenges. 

More troubling, CBP did not concur with several of GAO’s recommendations when it comes to testing the IFT and the integration of the smaller-scale technologies into a master schedule, and 

I certainly hope to hear more of the rationale for that non-concurrence. 

On a very positive note, I was certainly pleased to see that the 

Department did release the $145 million award for the IFT contract last year—excuse me, last week—but for many of us in Congress, this is a project that has certainly taken far too long. 

It has been 3 years since the cancellation of SBInet. We may not 

see additional border security capabilities come on-line until later 

this summer. To that end, we are troubled as well by the current 

roll-out time line that will deploy eight towers fairly rapidly in the 

Nogales area, but then we are going to have a gap of time before 

other towers are deployed. 

Mr. Borkowski is shaking his head, so I know he is going to be 

addressing these concerns, and I appreciate that. I certainly would 

encourage the Department to move quickly to resolve any outstanding impediments to the deployment of this technology quickly 

consistent with the operational needs of the men and women of the 

Border Patrol. 

It has taken several years to get technology deployed to Arizona 

and in that time the threat has shifted actually to south Texas. 

Our procurement process has to be more agile and quicker otherwise by the time we deploy a solution, the threat may have moved 

elsewhere. 

I also want to work with the Office of Technology Innovation and 

Analysis to help bring effective technology to the border faster. We 

should look to the Department of Defense and some of the novel 

models that they have used to solve this very challenge. 

Our committee and this subcommittee in particular has a vested 

interest in securing the border. We have worked on a bipartisan 

basis to pass legislation that defines operational control as a 90 

percent effectiveness rate and as for a comprehensive border security technology plan so that the Department is not putting technology on the border in an ad hoc way. 

Each piece of technology that we put on the border should align 

with the Border Patrol’s operational needs and must support the 
3 

twin goals of increasing our situational awareness and effectiveness in keeping those that would do us harm out of our country. 

The development of border security metrics will help with this effort because without metrics there is no way to measure success or 

failure. Congress and the American people have to know what increase in security we are achieving with their taxpayer dollars. 

GAO recommended that the Department work toward a better 

understanding of how technology contributes to border security and 

we certainly all have a very keen interest in that effort. 

We certainly look forward to hearing how the Department has 

learned the lessons from previous failures and assurances that the 

taxpayers are getting tangible, measurable border security from 

the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan. 

At this time, the Chairwoman would recognize our Ranking 

Member of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for any statements she may have. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Chairwoman, thank you so very 

much, and together we are concerned about this technology as we 

have been discussing technology throughout this session of Congress. 

I want to acknowledge the gentleman from Texas, Mr. O’Rourke, 

and the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms. Gabbard, present for this 

hearing. I want to thank Chairwoman Miller for holding today’s 

hearing on the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan. 

As a senior Member of both this committee and the Judiciary 

Committee and as a Member from a border State, I have closely 

followed DHS’ efforts to deploy much-needed technology and resources to our Southwest Border. 

Unfortunately, DHS has a poor track record with its major border security technology acquisitions. 

More recently, the SBInet program was canceled by Secretary 

Janet Neapolitan in 2011 after delivering only 53 miles of border 

security technology in Arizona at a cost to the American people of 

about $1 billion. 

That is a mouthful, and I hope however that that does not alter 

or dismiss the value of technology and the reality that technology 

can really work. 

Now 3 years later, CBP is moving forward with the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan which is intended to provide additional border security capability in Arizona. I would take note of 

Congressman Barber and former Congresswoman Giffords who 

raised this issue continuously so I know the concept is important. 

Already though, there may be some cause for concern. The Government Accountability Office released a report today that CBP is 

not following all best practices and DHS guidance for acquisition 

management with this new program. 

Given the challenging nature of these kinds of acquisitions and 

the limited staffing resources CBP has to carry them out, it is imperative that the agency follows all guidelines to minimize risks to 

the plan and get a successful result. 

I hope to hear in detail from our GAO witness today about what 

the most pressing challenges are with respect to scheduling, cost 

estimates, testing, and performance metrics for the plan. 
4 

I also hope our CBP witness will provide convincing answers 

about how they are addressing these challenges to prevent a repeat 

of the problems that ultimately undermine SBInet. 

We simply cannot afford to spend another $1 billion on border security technology that fails to deliver as promised. 

Madam Chairwoman, as I even say that amount I get a sense of 

fear for going down that route again. Certainly, the Border Patrol 

must have resources that will meet its needs to address the everchanging threats it faces among our borders and as well those 

threats that impact the American people. 

With that in mind, I am particularly interested in hearing from 

CBP about how it intends to ensure the plan technology will meet 

the Border Patrol’s needs especially given scheduling delays that 

have occurred and the dynamic in nature of the border security 

mission. 

I believe collectively Chairwoman Miller and myself have been a 

very supportive team of CBP. We have worked to ensure funding 

and I would hope that this hearing would not be perceived as accusations against CBP but only instructive collaborative efforts to 

make what we all want and that is a safer homeland. 

Specifically it is my understanding, the chief of the Border Patrol 

recently communicated that his agency no longer needs as many 

integrated fixed towers in Arizona and instead requires more mobile technology to deploy to increasingly problematic tech areas 

along the border in South Texas. 

Having been to the border, both borders, but in South Texas particularly at night when we first began to give mobile equipment to 

CBP I can assure you that it is a reality of how important that 

equipment is. 

I hope that the needs of the Border Patrol and the requirements 

of their mission are always being considered throughout this process, and I look forward to hearing from our CBP witness about how 

this recent request will be resolved. 

Again, I thank the witnesses for joining us today, and I look forward to a robust discussion about how we can ensure the Arizona 

border technology plan succeeds where its predecessors did not. 

Madam Chairwoman, just a moment as I conclude. 

All of us have had our eyes poised, if you will, on the Malaysian 

air liner tragically lost; our sympathy to those families who are 

both mourning and waiting and now in a very confused state. 

But I know that everyone was struck by the issue of the false 

passports that two individuals managed to get on. We have no conclusion. We have speculation. We do not know. 

But I know that, Madam Chairwoman, all of us on Homeland Security were aghast that most countries are not using the database 

check, and I believe that because we are a border security subcommittee that it would it be very helpful for us to leap into that. 

I know that there is jurisdiction, cross-jurisdiction with Judiciary, but I would love to request a hearing on that because it is 

brought to our attention. A tragedy has occurred. We cannot suggest or we do not have the facts as to what might have provoked 

that, but I believe that that is a sore that is waiting to spread and 

creating a devastating degree of nonsecurity around the world, so 
5 

I hope that we will have a discussion about that and as we do 

many other items of importance. 

With that, Madam Chairwoman, I yield back. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentlelady. I certainly thank the 

gentlelady for her comments about the Malaysia flight, and as you 

mentioned, we all share shock and certainly our prayers going out 

to the families of those that are missing, where no one knows 

where they are or what has happened. 

Certainly that is one of the great mysteries I think that any of 

us have ever seen, but it is interesting you mention about the passports because we have already been talking to staff about putting 

together sort-of looking at what is the entire passport issue and the 

other countries and how they are in compliance or noncompliance 

with looking at some of these things. 

Now it appears—again speculation—we are only talking about 

what we are reading in the papers I guess, that these two with the 

stolen passports were not on the watch list, but we will see where 

that goes, but I certainly appreciate those comments and we do, as 

I think this committee, subcommittee, and our full committee 

needs to take a look at that entire issue as well. 

In regards to the subject at hand, I would also just remind other 

Members of the committee that opening statements might be submitted for the record and we are certainly pleased to have as I 

mentioned two very distinguished witnesses to speak to our subcommittee today. 

Mr. Mark Borkowski became the assistant commissioner for the 

Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition at the United 

States Custom and Border Protection in July 2010. 

In this role he is responsible for ensuring technology efforts are 

properly focused, on mission, and well-integrated across CBP. Prior 

to his appointment as assistant commissioner, Mr. Borkowski was 

the executive director for the Secure Border Initiative. 

Ms. Rebecca Gambler—I welcome back again to the committee— 

is an acting director in the U.S. Government Accountability’s Office 

of Homeland Security and Justice team. She leads GAO’s work on 

the border security and immigration issues, and their full written 

statements will appear in the record. 

At this point, the Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Borkowski for 

his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MARK BORKOWSKI, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND ACQUISITION, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Well, thank you. 

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, Members of 

the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to come 

and describe to you where we have been, where we are, where we 

think we are going. 

You laid an agenda quite a bit of material that I will do my best 

to cover at least with some introductory things, and I will look forward to the questions. 

I also do want to note that we certainly have appreciated the 

support of this committee. We recognize that it has required a tre-
6 

mendous amount of tolerance and forbearance on your part as we 

have gone through the last 2 to 3 years of trying to get ourselves 

to the point where we finally have contracts awarded, so we appreciate the support. 

We understand it has been frustrating. We understand that you 

are at least as frustrated as we have been by the delays, but I will 

try to take you through where we are, how we got there, and why 

we think maybe we are about to turn the corner. 

You both mentioned SBInet and the history of SBInet. SBInet 

taught us a lot of things as we all well know. It taught us how not 

to buy things for the Department of Homeland Security, but as Ms. 

Jackson Lee mentioned, it also taught us that technology does 

some very good things. 

Where we did deploy the two SBInet deployments, it had a nearimmediate effect on our ability to deal with those areas of the border, and although I couldn’t give you something more quantitative 

than this, as we fly over those areas today, a year or 2 years after 

they have been deployed, the activity in those areas is down tremendously. 

So technology not only supports the actual gaining of control of 

an area but it tends to stand as a sentry afterwards and maintain 

that reduced activity which then gives us more flexibility to move 

Border Patrol agents and other technology, so we have learned that 

technology is a significant factor when it is deployed properly. So 

we all share the interest in getting the technology out there. 

But some of the lessons that we learned from SBInet are lessons 

that we tried to apply into the current Arizona technology plan and 

there are a couple of key lessons that I want to really emphasize 

because they get to the point as to why we non-concurred with a 

couple of the GAO recommendations. 

Put simply, in our view, the GAO recommendations are driving 

us back to what we don’t want to do, an SBInet. Put simply, that 

is the issue. 

What do I mean by that? SBInet was a system development. Now 

that is a term of art in my business and I have struggled with— 

because to me the difference between SBInet and IFT is so clear 

because I have done this—I have trouble explaining it—but think 

of it this way. 

If you went to buy a car you would have a choice. You could say, 

‘‘I am going to pretend there are no cars to buy, and I am just 

going to go ask somebody to build me a car from scratch,’’ or you 

could go to a car dealer and pick what is off the lot. 

We normally buy things in the Government unfortunately that 

first way as if there is nothing on the lot, and you can imagine 

what the costs, but it turns out in this business there is a lot of 

stuff on the lot and so we went to buy it on the lot. That is a big 

deal and we disaggregated pieces. We didn’t tie it all together. We 

broke them apart. 

It turns out that that has had a significant effect because in almost everything we have bought we have bought it for lower than 

we anticipated cost. I attribute it to the non-developmental nature 

and the fact that we are willing to be flexible about the technical 

definition of requirements and I would be prepared to discuss that 

in more detail as we go, to the point where we have the freed-up 
7 

resources that have allowed us to do things like fly Aero stats over 

South Texas. 

When you talk about putting things in Texas we have started to 

do that with money that was freed up from savings generated by 

the strategy in the Arizona technology development plan. 

So we think we are making progress. As you mentioned, we 

awarded the IFT contract last week. I will tell you compared to the 

initial estimate, we saved 75 percent, and I know that sounds unbelievable and we are going to study that as to how did that happen. 

How could it be 75 percent savings, but as we have started to 

dig in, we think we are learning some lessons that may apply and 

provide that kind of experience in the future if we change our 

strategies. 

So in that context, as we have been buying these things, we have 

also been trying to strengthen our competency, the technical detail 

about how you buy these things and that is where the GAO has 

come in. 

While it is true that the GAO report continues to note areas of 

weakness, I would also point out that if you go back over the last 

few years I believe if you read these reports over the last few years 

you are going to see an improving trend. 

I believe that the issues that we are finding are becoming increasingly business frankly arcane, and we really are to the point 

where we have to make decisions about trading off cost versus perfection. 

So while we agree with the recommendations generally, where 

those recommendations tell us to tie things together that should be 

broken apart, which is what the IMS recommendation does, or tells 

us to build a new car rather than buying a car on the lot, which 

is what the test and evaluation recommendation would tend us to, 

we would object to those. 

We think it is a better approach to take this new method of buying—let’s try that for a while and then generate lessons learned 

from that. So that is kind of where we are at this point. I look forward to your questions, and again, I very much appreciate the committee’s support and forbearance to this point. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Borkowski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK BORKOWSKI

MARCH 12, 2014 

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members 

of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the status 

of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) border security technology programs 

in Arizona, and to reflect on the most recent Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) report about the management of those programs. 

I appreciate the partnership and support we have received from Congress, this 

subcommittee, and your staff, whose commitment to the security of the American 

people has enabled the continued deployment of key border security technologies, 

even in the face of significant challenges. I am confident that our collective efforts 

will continue to result in a better-managed and more secure border. 

This subcommittee is familiar with the outcome of CBP’s SBInet program, an earlier component of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI) that was designed as a comprehensive and integrated technology program to provide persistent surveillance across the northern and southern land borders of the United States, starting with the border of Mexico. The program experienced significant schedule delays and cost overruns because it did not allow nec-
8 

essary flexibility to adapt to differing needs in the various regions of the border. 

SBInet eventually delivered systems to two Areas of Responsibility in Arizona that 

continue to operate successfully. Nevertheless, DHS cancelled SBI on January 14, 

2011, because it was too costly and the idea of one, all-encompassing program was 

unnecessarily complex for border technology. 

Since 2011, we have learned from the issues identified in from the SBInet approach and moved away from an all-encompassing SBInet concept. Instead, DHS 

and CBP have approached our border technology requirements in more manageable 

pieces tailored to specific regions on the border. Working closely with the Border Patrol to develop requirements, we created a menu of different, sophisticated technology systems, ranging from small to large, simple to complex. For Arizona, we selected systems from the menu and tailored those technology solutions based on realistic capabilities of current technologies and the operational needs of particular 

areas. We then created detailed acquisition plans for each of the technologies on the 

menu and have been in the process of buying and deploying them for the last few 

years. We refer to this approach as the Arizona Technology Plan (ATP). 

ATP or ‘‘the Plan’’ is not a program as traditionally defined within the acquisition 

business. Instead, it is a set of programs that, taken together, will provide what we 

believe is the optimal set of systems for our current operational needs. One key 

point is that the Plan is not a so-called ‘‘system of systems.’’ In fact, our acquisition 

strategy moved intentionally away from the ‘‘system of systems’’ concept because we 

had learned from our SBInet experience that this approach was unnecessarily complex and costly. 

Another change in CBP’s ATP acquisition strategy based on lessons learned from 

SBInet, is a shift from pursuing what is known as ‘‘system development’’ toward a 

concept of leveraging ‘‘non-developmental items.’’ Put simply, system development 

involves the creation of a system that does not currently exist. System development 

is a very disciplined and exhaustive process that requires engineering design, analysis to compare the design to requirements, comprehensive testing, and eventually 

deployment and operation. System development is an appropriate acquisition approach when: (1) The requirements are understood with high confidence, (2) there 

is limited flexibility to relax the requirements, and (3) no existing system meets the 

requirements. However, system development is costly, challenging, and often risky— 

more so when the conditions that would support system development do not exist. 

In the case of SBInet, we did not have a highly confident understanding of the requirements, or a solid justification for why our requirements were inflexible. Therefore, it was unclear whether existing systems would be adequate for our needs. 

Based on lessons learned from SBInet, we explicitly and intentionally rejected system development as our approach for the programs within the Plan. 

For the programs under the ATP, we embarked on a non-developmental item 

(NDI) approach because after conducting extensive market research, we had high 

confidence that technology systems already existed that could provide most, if not 

all, of the capabilities we felt were required. CBP’s Office of Technology Innovation 

and Acquisition (OTIA), which I oversee, worked collaboratively with the Border Patrol to develop the technical requirements. We also created the flexibility to trade 

those requirements against cost. Under this NDI strategy, we created an opportunity to do things like buy a system that met 90 percent of our interests at 50 percent of the cost, as compared to a system that might have met 100 percent of our 

interests but at twice the cost. 

STATUS OF ARIZONA TECHNOLOGY PLAN PROGRAMS

While acquisition of the programs within the Plan is admittedly behind schedule 

I believe our actions have been prudent and have actually resulted in some very 

positive outcomes. In short, we elected to trade schedule for higher likelihood of success in the ultimate deployments of the NDI technologies and to take advantage of 

opportunities to reduce costs. 

Using the NDI approach, most of the programs within the Plan are on contract 

and many have already been deployed, including: Agent Portable Surveillance Systems (APSS); Thermal Imaging Devices; Underground Sensors (UGS); and some Mobile Video Surveillance Systems (MSC). Although it is too early to declare complete 

success, the early indications of the ATP acquisition strategy are quite positive and, 

in some cases, far exceed our expectations. 

For example, the most complex and costly program within the Plan is the Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) program. This program, ostensibly, looks something like 

the old SBInet program. As such, it is often treated as if it were SBInet renamed. 

However, IFT is not SBInet. It is an NDI program, and it is a narrowly-tailored solution to select parts of the border. 
9 

Early external assessments of the program questioned whether NDI systems for 

IFT existed and whether CBP’s program cost estimates were too low. While the specific numbers are still sensitive, I can report that we received far more proposals 

from industry for the IFT contract than we anticipated and, for that matter, more 

than I have ever seen for this type of procurement during my roughly 30 years in 

this business. The proposals were quite credible, and the sheer number rebuts any 

doubts about NDI availability. Also, almost every program in the Plan has been contracted at less than our initial estimates—often much less. The IFT contract, for example, came in at a savings approaching 75 percent of our initial estimate. Although we will likely have routine changes in the contract over time that will add 

slightly to the final cost, a 75 percent cost savings leaves a lot of room for those 

routine changes. It is also important to note that, because these are NDI systems, 

we have been able to use firm fixed-price contracting, which reduces the risk to the 

Government of substantial and uncontrolled cost growth, compared to cost reimbursable contracts for system developments like SBInet. 

We attribute these positive indications to our acquisition strategy, our thorough 

market research, our staff’s hard work, our willingness to trade schedule for risk 

reduction, and our on-going dialogue with industry. DHS and CBP acknowledged 

that we needed to do things differently if we wanted a better result from past acquisition failures. In a sense, our approach to the Plan was an experiment. While not 

without risk, we believe the plan represents the most viable option for a successful 

acquisition process, one that might prove to be a useful model going forward. As I 

indicated, we are quite encouraged by what we have seen so far. 

The cost savings alone have already had a major impact for us. We have harvested those savings to do many of the things that this subcommittee has advocated. 

For instance, we have worked closely with the Department of Defense (DoD) to receive or borrow their technologies. We currently have three DoD aerostats flying 

over the Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley Sector as part of an extended Field Deployment Evaluation. While undergoing evaluation, the systems concurrently support real-world operations and boost technological capabilities in a high-priority area 

of the border. We are able to fund this exercise, as well as a number of other notable 

efforts, because of the cost savings incurred as a result of our Arizona Technology 

Plan strategy. 

GAO RECOMMENDATIONS

CBP’s border security efforts are critically important, and we appreciate GAO’s 

engagement with CBP’s technology acquisition activities from the SBInet days 

through the present. GAO has been consistently objective and has always been very 

open to our thoughts and opinions. It is important to consider the latest GAO report 

in the context of our history to date. While the recent March 2014 report, ‘‘Arizona 

Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen 

Management and Assess Effectiveness,’’ continues to identify some areas of potential 

weakness and risk, I believe it also demonstrates a continuing improvement trend. 

Piece by piece, we are building the program management infrastructure that did not 

exist in the early days of SBInet. The GAO has helped us prioritize our efforts over 

the years and deserves great credit for helping to point the way to better performance. 

In the latest report, we concur with many of the GAO recommendations because 

they represent well-established best practices for any acquisition program—including the non-developmental programs that comprise the Plan. In most of these cases, 

we are aware of the shortcomings highlighted by the GAO. However, we also recognize that, we had to prioritize the activities that offered the least risk to our success 

by conducting a cost-benefit analysis. For example, although we did not complete 

formal independent cost estimates for our programs, we had substantial data and 

market research to give us high confidence in the conservatism of our life-cycle cost 

estimates. Similarly, while it is true that not all required acquisition documentation 

was formally approved at set times, the documents were virtually final, well-understood, and complete enough to enable key decisions with little risk. Going forward, 

we will strive to perform better in these areas. 

We have non-concurred with two of the GAO recommendations, mainly because 

they contradict the foundation of the acquisition strategy we implemented for the 

Plan. Each program in the Plan has an Integrated Master Schedule (IMS), as required by our policy and practice. However, the GAO recommends CBP create an 

IMS for the Plan, as if the Plan itself is a program or ‘‘system of systems.’’ As discussed above, CBP intentionally designed the Plan not to be a system of systems. 

It has been the separation of the old SBInet program into nearly independent and 

dis-aggregated elements that has, in my view, enabled the positive trends we have 
10 

seen to date. We maintain an appropriate level of integration and schedule connection among the programs in the Plan; however, the GAO recommendation runs 

counter to the lessons learned from SBInet and risks returning us to an acquisition 

strategy we already know to be high-risk. 

Similarly, the GAO calls for formal Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), as 

if the Plan were a system development. As noted above, CBP structured the Plan 

with NDI programs as a result of lessons learned from SBInet. Since we are familiar with the technologies, we are willing to trade requirements and performance for 

cost and other benefits. We have committed to purchasing, at firm-fixed price, a system that will perform to the specifications asserted by the contractor. Formal OT&E 

would create unnecessary bureaucracy, threaten the NDI nature of the program by 

creating a set of requirements that may demand system development activities, and 

compromise the nature of the Plan that has already suggested very positive results. 

For example, we will manage IFT as we have done for several of the other programs in the Plan. We have worked with the Border Patrol to define the kind of 

operational experience and analysis Border Patrol agents believe they need to understand and assess the system performance. We have documented this agreement 

in the Test and Evaluation Master Plan. This meets much of the intent of formal 

OT&E, does it without unnecessary bureaucracy, and provides the Border Patrol 

with oversight, control, and data to influence decisions about future deployments 

and potential system upgrades. 

CONCLUSION

In short, we concur with the GAO where the recommendations represent best 

practices and risk reduction for acquisitions like the Arizona Technology Plan. We 

do not concur where those recommendations are inconsistent with the intentional 

design of the programs in the Plan and where implementation of those recommendations would compromise the foundation of the Plan. 

Some have characterized our acquisition approach to the Plan as innovative—especially with regard to how it leverages NDI opportunities and offers an opportunity 

to trade-off requirements. Innovation in acquisition means we will apply lessons 

learned, experiment with new things, and break new ground. We have a solid understanding of where we need to break new ground, and we look forward to working 

with the GAO as we continue our efforts to develop what could become a new set 

of best practices. 

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, thank you for the opportunity 

to testify today. I look forward to your questions. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentleman very much. I think we do 

have a lot of questions after that. 

At this time, the Chairwoman now recognizes Ms. Gambler. 

STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. GAMBLER. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking 

Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the subcommittee. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify in today’s hearing to discuss GAO’s work reviewing the status of DHS’ Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan. 

This plan followed DHS’ announcement in January 2011 that it 

was canceling further procurements of Secure Border Initiative 

Network Systems referred to as SBInet. DHS announced the 

launch of the secure border initiative in 2005 as a multi-year, 

multi-billion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders. 

SBInet was intended to include various technologies such as 

fixed sensor towers and tactical infrastructure to create a virtual 

fence along the Southwest Border. 

After a cost of about $1 billion, SBInet systems are now operating along 53 miles of Arizona’s border. 
11 

The Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan includes a mix 

of radars, sensors, and cameras to provide security for the remainder of the Arizona border. 

My remarks today will focus on three areas related to CBP’s 

management of the plan and its efforts to assess the contributions 

of planned and deployed technologies to border security. 

First, we reviewed CBP’s schedules and life-cycle cost estimates 

for the plan and its highest-cost programs and we compared them 

against best practices. Those best practices, if followed consistently, 

are designed to help agencies better ensure the reliability of their 

schedules and cost estimates. 

Overall, the schedules and estimates for the plan’s programs reflected as some but not all best practices. For example, we found 

that the schedules for some of the programs were not fully credible 

because CBP had not identified all risks that would be most likely 

to delay the programs. 

CBP also has not developed an integrated master schedule for 

the plan. Such a schedule could help provide CBP with a comprehensive view of the plan and more reliably commit to when the 

plan will be fully implemented. 

We also found that CBP has not independently verify its lifecycle cost estimates for two of the plan’s programs, the integrated 

fixed towers and remote video surveillance system. 

Second, we reviewed the extent to which CBP followed key aspects of DHS’ acquisition guidance in managing the plan. CBP followed this guidance in some areas, but for the plan’s three highest 

cost programs we found that DHS and CBP did not consistently approve key acquisition documents when called for in DHS’ guidance. 

For example, for the integrated fixed towers DHS approved four 

of the six required documents at the time they were to be approved 

but two other documents, the life-cycle cost estimate and the test 

plan were not approved on time based on documentation we received from CBP. 

With regard to the test plan this plan calls for CBP to conduct 

limited user testing of the integrated fixed tower to determine mission contributions for 30 days at one site along the Arizona border, 

however such an approach is not consistent with DHS’ acquisition 

guidance which calls for operational tests and evaluation of systems to occur in the environmental conditions in which a system 

will be used. 

Conducting unlimited user tests at one location for 30 days could 

limit the information available to CBP on how the towers will perform in other locations and under different environmental conditions along the border. 

More robust testing is particularly important in light of the previous challenges we identified in testing of SBInet systems. 

For example, we previously reported that some SBInet test plans 

were not defined in accordance with the guidance. We concluded 

that not doing effective testing can unnecessarily increase the risks 

of problems going undetected until late in a system’s life cycle. 

Thus, conducting more robust testing on the integrated fixed 

towers could help CBP better ensure that the towers meet Border 

Patrol’s operational needs. 
12 

1GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen 

Management and Assess Effectiveness, GAO–14–368 (Washington, DC: Mar. 3, 2014). 2The SBInet fixed-sensor towers were intended to transmit radar and camera information 

into a common operating picture at work stations manned at all times by U.S. Border Patrol 

agents. The SBInet Common Operating Picture was intended to provide uniform data through 

a command center environment to Border Patrol agents in the field and all DHS agencies, and 

to be interoperable with the equipment of DHS external stakeholders, such as local law enforcement. Tactical infrastructure includes pedestrian and vehicle fences, roads, and lighting. Ports 

of entry are officially designated places that provide for the arrival at, or departure from, the 

United States. 3See, for example, GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program, GAO–10–340 (Washington, DC: May 5, 2010), and Secure 

Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, GAO–08–1086 (Washington, DC: Sept. 22, 2008). 

Finally, DHS had the database through which Border Patrol can 

record whether or not an asset such as a camera assisted in an apprehension or seizure. This indicator is referred to by the Border 

Patrol as an asset assist. 

Data on asset assist, if used with other performance metrics or 

indicators, could help CBP assess the contributions of surveillance 

technologies to apprehensions and seizures. However Border Patrol 

does not require agents to record data on asset assist, and thus the 

agency does not have complete data to help assess technologies’ 

contributions to border security efforts. 

In closing, we have made recommendations to DHS in all of 

these areas to help the Department in its efforts to manage and 

implement the plan. DHS has agreed with some but not all of these 

recommendations and has actions planned or under way to address 

some of them. We will continue to monitor DHS’ efforts in response 

to our recommendations. 

This concludes my oral statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions that Members may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gambler follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER

MARCH 12, 2014 

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the findings from our March 

2014 report, being released today, in which we assessed the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) efforts to develop 

and implement the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan).1 In recent years, nearly half of all annual apprehensions of illegal entrants along the 

Southwest Border with Mexico have occurred along the Arizona border, according 

to DHS data. A top priority for CBP is preventing, detecting, and apprehending illegal entrants. In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of the Secure Border 

Initiative (SBI), a multi-year, multi-billion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. 

borders and reducing illegal immigration. CBP intended for the SBI Network 

(SBInet) to include technologies such as fixed-sensor towers, a common operating 

picture, and tactical infrastructure to create a ‘‘virtual fence’’ along the Southwest 

Border to enhance CBP’s capability to detect, identify, classify, track, and respond 

to illegal breaches at and between land ports of entry.2 At a cost of about $1 billion, 

in 2010, CBP deployed SBInet systems, referred to as Block 1 systems, along the 

53 miles of Arizona’s 387-mile border with Mexico that represent one of the highestrisk areas for illegal entry attempts. However, in January 2011, in response to internal and external assessments that dentified concerns regarding the performance, 

cost, and schedule for implementing the systems, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced the cancellation of further procurements of SBInet systems.3

After the cancellation of SBInet in January 2011, CBP developed the Plan, which 

includes a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras to help provide security for the remainder of the Arizona border. Under the Plan, CBP identified seven programs to 

be implemented ranging in estimated costs from $3 million to about $961 million. 

The three highest-cost programs under the Plan are the Integrated Fixed Tower 
13 

4The IFT consists of towers with, among other things, ground surveillance radars and surveillance cameras mounted on fixed (that is, stationary) towers. The RVSS includes multiple color 

and infrared cameras mounted on monopoles, lattice towers, and buildings and differs from the 

IFT, among other things, in that the RVSS does not include radars. The MSC is a stand-alone, 

truck-mounted suite of radar and cameras that provides a display within the cab of the truck. 5GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is 

Needed before Proceeding, GAO–12–22 (Washington, DC: Nov. 4, 2011). A Life-cycle Cost Estimate provides an exhaustive and structured accounting of all resources and associated cost elements required to develop, produce, deploy, and sustain a particular program. 6Measures and key attributes are generally defined as part of the business case in order to 

explain how they contribute to the mission’s benefits. See Office of Management and Budget, 

OMB Circular No. A–11, Part 7, Section 300, Planning, Budgeting, Acquisition, and Management of Capital Assets (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, July 2010). 7GAO–14–368. 

8DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102–01, Jan. 20, 2010, and DHS Instruction Manual 

102–01–001, Acquisition Management/Instruction Guidebook, Oct. 1, 2011. 9 An asset assist is what happens when a technological asset, such as a SBInet surveillance 

tower, or a non-technological asset, such as a canine team, contributes to apprehensions or seizures. In our March 2014 report, apprehensions data included individuals arrested and identified as deportable aliens, consistent with Border Patrol’s definition. 10GAO, GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Program Schedules, GAO–12– 

120G (exposure draft) (Washington, DC: May 2012). We developed this guide through a compilation of best practices that Federal cost-estimating organizations and industry use. According to 

this guide, for a schedule to be comprehensive, among other things, the schedule should: (1) 

Continued 

(IFT), Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS), and Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC), accounting for 97 percent of the Plan’s estimated cost.4 In November 

2011, we reported on CBP’s development of, and estimated life-cycle costs for, implementing the Plan.5 Specifically, we reported that CBP needed more information for 

the Plan and its costs before proceeding with implementation, and we recommended 

that CBP, among other things, determine the mission benefits to be derived from 

the implementation of the Plan and develop and apply key attributes for metrics 

to assess program implementation, conduct a post implementation review and operational assessment of SBInet, and update the cost estimate for the Plan using best 

practices.6 DHS concurred with these recommendations and has actions under way 

to address some of them. 

My testimony today is based on and summarizes the key findings of our report 

on the status of the Plan, which was publicly released today. 7 Like the report, my 

statement will address CBP’s efforts to: (1) Develop schedules and Life-cycle Cost 

Estimates for the Plan in accordance with best practices, (2) follow key aspects of 

DHS’s acquisition management framework in managing the Plan’s three highestcost programs, and (3) assess the performance of technologies deployed under 

SBInet and identify mission benefits and develop performance metrics for surveillance technologies to be deployed under the Plan. To conduct work for the March 

2014 report, we analyzed DHS and CBP program schedules and Life-cycle Cost Estimates and interviewed DHS and CBP officials responsible for developing and overseeing schedules and cost estimates, including officials from CBP’s Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition (OTIA), which manages implementation of the 

Plan. We also analyzed DHS and CBP documents, including DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102–01 and its associated DHS Instruction Manual 102–01–001, 

program briefing slides, budget documents, Acquisition Decision Memorandums, and 

program risk sheets.8 Finally, we analyzed performance assessment documentation 

and metrics used by CBP to determine the effectiveness of technologies deployed 

under SBInet and interviewed CBP officials responsible for performance measurement activities, and analyzed CBP data on apprehensions, seizures, and asset assists from fiscal year 2010 through June 2013 to determine the extent to which the 

data could be used to measure the contributions of SBInet technologies in enhancing 

border security.9 We conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted 

Government auditing standards. More detailed information on the scope and methodology of our published report can be found therein. 

CBP’S PROGRAM SCHEDULES AND LIFE-CYCLE COST ESTIMATES REFLECT SOME BUT NOT

ALL BEST PRACTICES

In our March 2014 report, we assessed OTIA’s schedules as of March 2013 for the 

IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs and found that these program schedules addressed 

some, but not all, best practices for scheduling. The Schedule Assessment Guide 

identifies 10 best practices associated with effective scheduling, which are summarized into four characteristics of a reliable schedule—comprehensive, well-constructed, credible, and controlled.10 According to our overall analysis, OTIA at least 
14 

Capture all activities, as defined in the work breakdown structure, (2) reflect what resources 

are needed to do the work, and (3) establish the duration of all activities and have specific start 

and end dates. To be well-constructed, among other things, all schedule activities are sequenced 

in the order that they are to be implemented with the most straightforward logic possible. To 

be credible, the schedule should reflect the order of events necessary to achieve aggregated products or outcomes, and activities in varying levels of the schedule map to one another. Moreover, 

a schedule risk analysis should be conducted to predict a level of confidence in meeting the program’s completion date. For a schedule to be controlled, the schedule should be updated periodically using actual progress and logic to realistically forecast dates for program activities, and 

a baseline schedule should be maintained to measure, monitor, and report the program’s 

progress. 11GAO–12–120G. 

partially met the four characteristics of reliable schedules for the IFT and RVSS 

schedules (i.e., satisfied about half of the criterion), and partially or minimally met 

the four characteristics for the MSC schedule, as shown in Table 1. For example, 

we reported that the schedule for the IFT program partially met the characteristic 

of being credible in that CBP had performed a schedule risk analysis for the program, but the risk analysis was not based on any connection between risks and specific activities. 

TABLE 1.—SUMMARY OF OUR SCHEDULE ASSESSMENTS FOR THE THREE 

HIGHEST-COST PROGRAMS UNDER THE ARIZONA BORDER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY PLAN 

Schedule Characteristic Integrated Fixed 

Towers 

Remote Video 

Surveillance 

Systems 

Mobile Surveillance 

Capability 

Comprehensive ........ Partially met Partially met Partially met 

Well constructed ..... Substantially met Partially met Partially met 

Credible ................... Partially met Partially met Minimally met 

Controlled ................ Partially met Partially met Minimally met 

Source.—GAO analysis of Customs and Border Protection data. 

Note.—Not met—CBP provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion. Minimally 

met—CBP provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion. Partially met—CBP 

provided evidence that satisfies about half of the criterion. Substantially met—CBP provided 

evidence that satisfies a large portion of the criterion. Met—CBP provided complete evidence 

that satisfies the entire criterion. 

We recommended that CBP ensure that scheduling best practices are applied to 

the IFT, RVSS, and MSC schedules. DHS concurred with the recommendation and 

stated that OTIA plans to ensure that scheduling best practices are applied as far 

as practical when updating the three programs’ schedules. 

Further, in March 2014 we reported that CBP has not developed an Integrated 

Master Schedule for the Plan in accordance with best practices. Rather, OTIA has 

used the separate schedules for each individual program (or ‘‘project’’) to manage 

implementation of the Plan. OTIA officials stated that an Integrated Master Schedule for the overarching Plan is not needed because the Plan contains individual acquisition programs as opposed to a plan consisting of seven integrated programs. 

However, collectively these programs are intended to provide CBP with a combination of surveillance capabilities to be used along the Arizona border with Mexico. 

Moreover, while the programs themselves may be independent of one another, the 

Plan’s resources are being shared among the programs. 

OTIA officials stated that when schedules were developed for the Plan’s programs, 

they assumed that personnel would be dedicated to work on individual programs 

and not be shared between programs. However, as OTIA has initiated and continued work on the Plan’s programs, it has shared resources such as personnel among 

the programs, contributing, in part, to delays experienced by the programs. According to schedule best practices, an Integrated Master Schedule that allows managers 

to monitor all work activities, how long the activities will take, and how the activities are related to one another is a critical management tool for complex systems 

that involve the incorporation of a number of different projects, such as the Plan.11

Thus, we recommended that CBP develop an Integrated Master Schedule for the 

Plan. 

DHS did not concur with this recommendation. In particular, DHS stated that 

maintaining an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan undermines the DHS-approved implementation strategy for the individual programs making up the Plan 

and that a key element of the Plan has been the disaggregation of technology pro-
15 

12GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO–09–3SP (Washington, DC: March 2009). The methodology 

outlined in the Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide is a compilation of best practices that 

Federal cost-estimating organizations and industry use to develop and maintain reliable cost estimates throughout the life of an acquisition program. 

curements. However, we continue to believe that developing an Integrated Master 

Schedule for the Plan is needed. As we reported in March 2014, this recommendation is not intended to imply that DHS needs to re-aggregate the Plan’s seven programs into a ‘‘system of systems’’ or change its procurement strategy in any form. 

The intent of the recommendation is for DHS to insert the individual schedules for 

each of the Plan’s programs into a single electronic Integrated Master Schedule file 

in order to identify any resource allocation issues among the programs’ schedules. 

Developing and maintaining an Integrated Master Schedule for the Plan could allow 

OTIA insight into current or programmed allocation of resources for all programs 

as opposed to attempting to resolve any resource constraints for each program individually. 

In addition in March 2014, we reported that OTIA’s rough order of magnitude estimate for the Plan and individual Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the IFT and RVSS 

programs met some but not all best practices for such estimates. Cost-estimating 

best practices are summarized into four characteristics—well documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible.12 Our analysis of CBP’s estimate for the Plan 

and estimates completed at the time of our review for the IFT and RVSS programs 

showed that these estimates at least partially met three of these characteristics— 

well-documented, comprehensive, and accurate. In terms of being credible, these estimates had not been verified with independent cost estimates in accordance with 

best practices. We recommended that CBP verify the Life-cycle Cost Estimates for 

the IFT and RVSS programs with independent cost estimates and reconcile any differences. 

DHS said it concurred with this recommendation, although we reported that 

DHS’s planned actions will not fully address the intent of the recommendation unless assumptions underlying the cost estimates change. In particular, DHS stated 

that at this point it does not believe that there would be a benefit in expending 

funds to obtain independent cost estimates and that if the costs realized to date continue to hold, there may be no requirement or value added in conducting full-blown 

updates with independent cost estimates. DHS noted, though, that if this assumption changes, OTIA will complete updates and consider preparing independent cost 

estimates, as appropriate. We recognize the need to balance the cost and time to 

verify the Life-cycle Cost Estimates with the benefits to be gained from verification 

with independent cost estimates. However, we continue to believe that independently verifying the Life-cycle Cost Estimates for the IFT and RVSS programs and 

reconciling any differences, consistent with best practices, could help CBP better ensure the reliability of the estimates. 

CBP DID NOT FULLY COMPLETE DOCUMENTS FOR ACQUISITION DECISIONS CONSISTENT

WITH THE GUIDANCE

In March 2014, we reported for the Plan’s three highest-cost programs—IFT, 

RVSS, and MSC—DHS and CBP did not consistently approve key acquisition documents before or at the Acquisition Decision Events, in accordance with DHS’s acquisition guidance. An important aspect of an Acquisition Decision Event is the review 

and approval of key acquisition documents critical to establishing the need for a program, its operational requirements, an acquisition baseline, and test and support 

plans, according to DHS guidance. On the basis of our analysis for IFT, RVSS, and 

MSC programs under the Plan, we reported that the DHS Acquisition Decision Authority approved the IFT program and the CBP Acquisition Decision Authority approved the RVSS and MSC programs to proceed to subsequent phases in the Acquisition Life-cycle Framework without approving all six required acquisition documents for each program. Furthermore, we reported that one document for the IFT 

program, five documents for the RVSS program, and two documents for the MSC 

program were subsequently approved after the programs received authority to proceed to the next phase. DHS plans to complete and approve those documents for 

the IFT, RVSS, and MSC programs that have not yet been completed and approved. 

With regard to one of the required documents—the Test and Evaluation Master 

Plan—we reported in March 2014 that this document for the IFT program, which 

was approved by DHS in November 2013, does not describe testing to evaluate the 

operational effectiveness and suitability of the system. Rather, the Test and Evaluation Master Plan describes CBP’s plans to conduct a limited user test of the IFT. 

According to the Test and Evaluation Master Plan, the limited user test will be de-
16 

13GAO–12–22. 14GAO, 2013 Annual Report: Actions Needed to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits, GAO–13–279SP, (Washington, DC: Apr. 9, 2013). 

signed to determine the IFT’s mission contribution. According to OTIA and the Test 

and Evaluation Master Plan, this testing is planned to occur during 30 days in environmental conditions present at one site—the Nogales station. CBP plans to conduct 

limited user testing for the IFT under the same process that is typically performed 

in any operational test and evaluation, according to the Test and Evaluation Master 

Plan. The November 2013 IFT Test and Evaluation Master Plan notes that, because 

the IFT acquisition strategy is to acquire non-developmental IFT systems from the 

marketplace (sometimes referred to as a commercial off-the-shelf system), a limited 

user test will provide Border Patrol with the information it needs to determine the 

mission contributions from the IFTs, and thus CBP does not plan to conduct more 

robust testing. However, this approach is not consistent with DHS’s acquisition 

guidance, which states that even for commercial off-the-shelf systems, operational 

test and evaluation should occur in the environmental conditions in which a system 

will be used before a full production decision for the system is made and the system 

is subsequently deployed. 

As we reported, we recognize the need to balance the cost and time to conduct 

testing to determine the IFT’s operational effectiveness and suitability with the benefits to be gained from such testing. Although the limited user test should help provide CBP with information on the IFTs’ mission contribution and how Border Patrol 

can use the system in its operations, the limited user test does not position CBP 

to obtain information on how the IFTs may perform under the various environmental conditions the system could face once deployed. Conducting limited user testing in one area in Arizona—the Nogales station—for 30 days could limit the information available to CBP on how the IFT may perform in other conditions and locations along the Arizona border with Mexico. As of November 2013, CBP intended 

to deploy IFTs to 50 locations in southern Arizona, which can include differences 

in terrain and climate throughout the year. 

We recommended that CBP revise the IFT Test and Evaluation Master Plan to 

more fully test the IFT program, before beginning full production, in the various environmental conditions in which IFTs will be used to determine operational effectiveness and suitability. DHS did not concur with this recommendation and stated 

that the Test and Evaluation Master Plan includes tailored testing and user assessments that will provide much, if not all, of the insight contemplated by the intent 

of the recommendation. However, as we reported in March 2014, we continue to believe that revising the Test and Evaluation Master Plan to include more robust testing to determine operational effectiveness and suitability could better position CBP 

to evaluate IFT capabilities before moving to full production for the system, help 

provide CBP with information on the extent to which the towers satisfy Border Patrol’s user requirements, and help reduce potential program risks. 

CBP HAS IDENTIFIED MISSION BENEFITS, BUT DOES NOT CAPTURE COMPLETE DATA ON

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ITS SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES

We reported in March 2014 that CBP has identified the mission benefits of its 

surveillance technologies, but does not capture complete data on the contributions 

of these technologies, which in combination with other relevant performance metrics 

or indicators, could be used to better determine the contributions of CBP’s surveillance technologies and inform resource allocation decisions. CBP has identified mission benefits of surveillance technologies to be deployed under the Plan, such as improved situational awareness and agent safety. 

While CBP has defined these mission benefits, the agency has not developed key 

attributes for performance metrics for all surveillance technologies to be deployed 

as part of the Plan, as we recommended in November 2011.13 In our April 2013 update on the progress made by the agencies to address our findings on duplication 

and cost savings across the Federal Government, CBP officials stated that operations of its two SBInet surveillance systems identified examples of key attributes 

for metrics that can be useful in assessing the Plan’s implementation for technologies.14 For example, according to CBP officials, to help measure whether illegal 

activity has decreased, examples of key attributes include decreases in the amount 

of arrests, complaints by ranchers and other citizens, and destruction of public and 

private lands and property. While the development of key attributes for metrics for 

the two SBInet surveillance systems is a positive step, CBP has not identified attributes for metrics for all technologies to be acquired and deployed as part of the 

Plan. Thus, to fully address the intent of our recommendation, CBP would need to 
17 

15 In addition to maintaining data on asset assists, the Border Patrol collects and maintains 

data on apprehensions and seizures in DHS’s EID. 16 In our March 2014 report, we defined an ‘‘apprehension or seizure event’’ as the occasion 

on which Border Patrol agents make an apprehension of an illegal entrant or a seizure of drugs 

or other contraband. The event is recorded in the EID and a date and unique identifying number are assigned. An event can involve the apprehension of one or multiple illegal entrants or 

types of items, and each individual illegal entrant apprehended or type of item seized in the 

event is associated with the assigned unique identifying number. Our analysis of apprehension 

events included instances in which an event had at least one deportable individual. 

develop and apply key attributes for performance metrics for each of the technologies to be deployed under the Plan to assess its progress in implementing the 

Plan and determine when mission benefits have been fully realized. 

Furthermore, we reported in March 2014 that CBP is not capturing complete 

asset assist data on the contributions of its surveillance technologies to apprehensions and seizures, and these data are not being consistently recorded by Border Patrol agents and across locations. Although CBP has a field within its Enforcement 

Integrated Database (EID) for maintaining data on whether technological assets, 

such as SBInet surveillance towers, and non-technological assets, such as canine 

teams, assisted or contributed to the apprehension of illegal entrants, and seizure 

of drugs and other contraband, according to CBP officials, Border Patrol agents are 

not required to record these data.15 This limits CBP’s ability to collect, track, and 

analyze available data on asset assists to help monitor the contribution of surveillance technologies, including its SBInet system, to Border Patrol apprehensions and 

seizures and inform resource allocation decisions. 

We reported that according to our analysis of EID asset assist data for apprehensions and seizures in the Tucson and Yuma sectors from fiscal year 2010 through 

June 2013, information on asset assists was generally not recorded for all apprehension and seizure events.16 For instance, for the 166,976 apprehension events reported by the Border Patrol across the Tucson sector during fiscal year 2010 

through June 2013, an asset assist was not recorded for 115,517 (or about 69 percent) of these apprehension events. In the Yuma sector, of the 8,237 apprehension 

events reported by Border Patrol agents during the specified time period, an asset 

assist was not recorded for 7,150 (or about 87 percent) of these apprehension events. 

Since data on asset assists are not required to be reported, it is unclear whether 

the data were not reported because an asset was not a contributing factor in the 

apprehension or seizure or whether an asset was a contributing factor but was not 

recorded by agents. 

As a result, CBP is not positioned to determine the contribution of surveillance 

technologies in the apprehension of illegal entrants and seizure of drugs and other 

contraband during the specified time frame. We reported that an associate chief at 

Border Patrol told us that while data on asset assists are not systematically recorded and tracked, Border Patrol recognizes the benefits of assessments of asset 

assists data, including those from surveillance technologies, such as the SBInet system. The associate chief further noted that these data in combination with other 

data, such as numbers of apprehensions and seizures, are used on a limited basis 

to help the agency make adjustments to its acquisition plans prior to deploying resources, thereby enabling the agency to make more informed deployment decisions. 

We recommended that CBP require data on asset assists to be recorded and 

tracked within EID and that once these data are required to recorded and tracked, 

analyze available data on apprehensions and technological assists, in combination 

with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, as appropriate, to determine 

the contribution of surveillance technologies to CBP’s border security efforts. CBP 

concurred with our recommendations and stated that Border Patrol is changing its 

data collection process to allow for improved reporting on asset assists for apprehensions and seizures and intends to make it mandatory to record whether an asset 

assisted in an apprehension or seizure. DHS plans to change its process by December 31, 2014. 

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any 

questions that you may have. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much. 

I think, Mr. Borkowski, I will pick up right where Ms. Gambler 

on her last point there about this asset assist. 

I am not quite sure the mechanics of how that would work, but 

I suppose that is something out in the field where as they would— 
18 

as they are going through their checklist of how an apprehension 

happened or whatever the incident was. 

What is your thought about why you are not accumulating that 

kind of information? Is it just too much of a burden for the folks 

out in the field or you don’t think it would be worth its time or 

what? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. I think the issue at this point is just having the 

systems and the capacity to do that. We generally have the information. The question is how do we get that recorded and documented, but the Border Patrol is working on that and it is committed to doing that because we believe it does tell us something. 

I would caution about how much it tells us, right, because you 

get in situations where various components came together to 

produce an apprehension and it is tempting to say this apprehension was caused by the agent or this apprehension was caused by 

the technology. 

Ultimately, we like to get that sensitivity—how much can we attribute to technology, but the reality is these things merge together. So I think we want to collect the data, but I would caution 

until we collect it and study it, it is still an open question as to 

how much utility that will provide us downstream in terms of a 

reasonable performance metric. 

Mrs. MILLER. You know I asked that question because as you are 

aware, this subcommittee unanimously and the full committee 

unanimously passed our border bill which is going to be an accountability matrix at the border in utilizing various kinds of systems and whatever we can to really be able to effectively have accountability and measure our success or failure for that matter, so 

that won’t be the end of that line of questioning I would guess. 

I also wanted to pick up on something you mentioned about a 75 

percent savings. As you said, to paraphrase, it is something that 

doesn’t normally happen in Government to have a 75 percent savings, and I guess I would ask both of you this question of whether 

or not Ms. Gambler was surprised to see the 75 percent savings, 

and what was the construct of that budget request to have a 75 

percent savings. 

I know that the Department of Homeland Security would have 

had to review your budget request. Did they have all the pieces 

available? It certainly calls in to—makes us think a bit about some 

of the budget requests that we are seeing. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. I think what is important to understand is first 

of all where those numbers come from. Life-cycle cost estimate, 

right. That was a term you heard. In life-cycle cost estimates there 

are a bunch of methodologies of generating them, but they are all 

based on experience. 

When it comes right down to it, you get a life-cycle cost estimate 

based on your past experiences and you try to find the closest examples of systems like the things you are buying and what did 

they cost. 

But when your experience is all based on that, ‘‘I am not going 

to the lot to buy a car. Instead I am going to go find somebody; I 

am going to ask them to build me a car from scratch.’’ That is 

where most of our cost experience is from, so that is what comes 

into a life-cycle cost estimate. 
19 

The GAO looks at this. We look at this. Did they follow best 

practices? The answer is largely I would argue it did based on the 

way we do life-cycle cost estimates. 

But we tried to buy these differently. We tried to buy them by 

going to the lot. You can imagine the difference it would cost me 

to get a car if I went to Sam’s manufacturing plant and said build 

me a car from scratch or if I go to the local Ford or Chrysler or 

GM dealer, whoever I go to. 

I think in your own mind you can imagine the difference between 

those, so that is factor No. 1. By the way, I was surprised by 75 

percent. When we built the life-cycle cost estimate, and I think if 

we go back to testimony of this committee and similar discussions, 

there was some concern; is that number too low? 

We were arguing we put contingency in it because we are doing 

something that we haven’t done before, but I was surprised by 75 

percent to be honest. I was hopeful we would have cost savings. I 

was actually surprised by 75 percent. 

Here is the other thing that happens, and I have been trying to 

find a good way to make this case because these are subtle things 

that are hugely important as it turns out. 

A lot of times when we want performance in something—let’s say 

I want 90 percent probability detection. When I am designing that 

from scratch because of the way we test it, I actually have to design it to say 93, 94, 95 percent even though what I want is 90 percent. 

The reason is the statistics that go into testing to be sure that 

I really get 90. So I am trying to think of an analogy here, and I 

am in your area, not mine, but this is what it looks like to me. 

You are running a campaign for election and you have got two 

candidates. You need 50 percent of the vote and you run a poll. The 

poll says I have 51 percent. 

Now you may feel comfortable about that but in the fine print 

it says with a margin of certainty plus or minus 3 percent, which 

means the poll really said you have somewhere between 48 and 54, 

so now you have a decision I would think. Do you go after that last 

3 percent to make sure you don’t hit the 48? 

That costs a lot more than the first 3 percent cost. That is exactly what happens to us when we buy things. Going from 90 to 

95 percent to guarantee I got 90 percent—that costs a lot more 

than the first 5 percent did. 

When I go and buy the things off the lot and I say look tell me 

what you have got and we will accept your definition of it because 

I don’t really care about 1 or 2 percent either way, huge cost savings. So it looks like that is what happened here. 

I think that this is something new, and that is another point I 

think when we do something new we have to tailor the past practices to the thing that is new. 

I believe we need to study this some more. I believe the jury is 

still out, but it looks to me like a good deal of this is real. 

Mrs. MILLER. I am going to ask Ms. Gambler to respond as well, 

but in regards to your analogies being from the motor city, I would 

stay away from the campaign analogies. Stick with the car analogies. They are better. 

[Laughter.] 
20 

Mrs. MILLER. Ms. Gambler. 

Ms. GAMBLER. I would just add that I think that what will be 

important going forward and in looking at the contract and the deployment of these IFT’s is how CBP, how the Government will hold 

the contractor accountable and provide that oversight for the systems that are being deployed. 

From our perspective what isn’t clear from the test plans that we 

have seen from CBP thus far is how they will be able to ensure 

that the IFTs once deployed are meeting the Border Patrol’s operational needs and will work and the locations and under the conditions that those technologies planned to be deployed. 

So I think what is critical here going forward is how CBP will 

be positioned to have the information it needs to provide oversight 

for the contractor in the systems that are being deployed. 

Mrs. MILLER. Just one other question and for both of you as well 

and this would be in regards to the testing that has been done 

which the GAO mentioned is one of the recommendations, and you 

had some concerns about all of that. 

We just want to make sure it is working, right? When we think 

about the lessons learned and the involvement or not enough involvement perhaps of those that are—the customers really—the 

end-users of this is the folks in the field. 

Could you expand a little bit on the testing that was done and 

why you feel that this is going to work and why you are—why GAO 

is raising this as a concern about the amount of testing that was 

done and how it all unfolded? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. First of all, what was done was a demo. Remember, we wanted something that was on the lot so we wanted bidders to prove to us that it was really on the lot and it wasn’t just 

a brochure. 

So the bidders actually had to take their system out to the field, 

take it out of the box, turn it on, and show that it did what they 

said it would do, which is unique. We don’t normally do that. 

By the way, most of industry asked us to do that because they 

said, you know, Fred is going to lie to you but I am telling the 

truth, but you won’t know it unless you make both of us prove it. 

So it was a demo. It was not a full-blown test. However, these 

are systems that have been around for a while and we were able 

to get an initial indication of that. 

The other thing that I want to emphasize is, it is not like there 

will be no testing. There will. There is a term of art that is being 

tossed around here called operational test and evaluation, but 

there is a whole bunch of different kinds of test and evaluation, so 

we will have extensive testing that these systems produce the results that were committed to in the contract. 

That will start with something called system acceptance test, 

which technically is developmental test and evaluation, so there is 

a whole rubric here that comes into play. 

Then limited user testing is a test that is operational test and 

evaluation designed to meet the Border Patrol’s desire to get answers to its questions. 

So what we have actually done, rather than formal operational 

test and evaluation is sat down with the Border Patrol and said, 
21 

what do you want to check out? What do you want to know about 

the system? 

That is all documented. It is all committed. All of that testing 

will be done to advise the Border Patrol on how much more of this 

it wants to do. 

So we are doing the intent of that, but when I go to formal operational test and evaluation I create aspirational goals that get me 

to that 3 percent more problem that I was describing and that is 

what we want to avoid. 

So we have tailored the approach to this, but there is extensive 

testing intended in this plan. 

Mrs. MILLER. Ms. Gambler. 

Ms. GAMBLER. I think what is key here is that testing helps an 

agency manage risks and it doesn’t necessarily mean that there is 

going to be fewer problems. It just means you are getting information on potential risks or potential risks of problems to a system 

earlier on in the process than you might otherwise have. 

That information is key to providing program managers with 

what they need to know and what they need to do to address any 

issues that comes up, and then positions them to be able to address 

those issues earlier in the process. 

So from our perspective there is an opportunity here for CBP to 

do more robust testing than what they currently plan to do to help 

ensure that the technology that is delivered by the vendor meets 

Border Patrol’s needs and will operate in the different environments where the towers are intended to be placed. 

We think this is important given—or in light of some of the testing challenges that SBInet encountered including, for example, the 

Army Test and Evaluation Command identifying that there were 

some issues with how terrain affected the radars of SBInet. The 

ATEC officials referred to it as a technology terrain mismatch. 

So we think in light of those challenges there is an opportunity 

here for CBP to do some additional testing that would give them 

the information they need to effectively manage the program. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much. 

The Chairwoman recognizes the gentlelady from Texas. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Ms. Gambler, if I might pose a question to 

you. Based on your work on the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan and GAO’s prior work on SBInet are there similar 

challenges of warning signs you are seeing with the plan that GAO 

believed contributed to some of SBInet’s failures? What must be 

done to address these warning signs? 

Ms. GAMBLER. Based on our work, DHS and CBP certainly have 

followed best practices and DHS’ acquisition guidance in certain 

areas, but we did report that they faced similar types of challenges 

in managing the plan as they encountered under SBInet. 

For example, for both SBInet and the new Arizona technology 

plan we identified that CBP has schedules and life-cycle cost estimates that don’t substantially meet best practices in all areas. 

As I mentioned, for both SBInet and the Arizona technology plan, 

we identified some challenges with test plans for those two systems 

and for both SBInet and the Arizona technology plan we identified 

in both cases that CBP hadn’t identified performance metrics for 

assessing basically what we are getting for the technology. So in 
22 

those areas there are similar types of challenges between the two 

systems. 

What we have done is made recommendations to DHS and CBP 

both on SBInet and the new Arizona technology plan to get at some 

of those challenges to make sure that they more fully adopt and 

use best practices for scheduling and life-cycle cost estimating and 

also that they establish metrics for assessing the contributions of 

technologies to border security and that they collect data to be able 

to assess those metrics. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you have an update? Have they begun to 

do that specifically with life cycles and the test plan? Do you have 

a report that says where they are now? 

Ms. GAMBLER. So the recommendations we made with regard to 

SBInet have largely been closed because SBInet has been canceled. 

In terms of the recommendations that we have made as it relates 

to the Arizona technology plan, we made those—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I know that SBI has been—I am speaking 

about going forward. The new proposal. 

Ms. GAMBLER. Sure. We made those recommendations in the report being released today and CBP does plan to take some actions 

in response to that. 

For example, the Border Patrol is starting to work to make 

changes to how it collects data on asset assists so that it can set 

some metrics for how to assess contributions of border surveillance 

technologies and CBP also has plans to look at their schedules and 

life-cycle cost estimates as well. 

As they are updating those, they have plans to make sure that 

they do more fully comply with best practices. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. How do you know that? 

Ms. GAMBLER. That is what they reported to us in terms of what 

they plan to do, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and we will continue to monitor their progress in response to those recommendations as they start to implement those actions. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. How long would they need for compliance? 

How long would they need to engage in the process? 

Ms. GAMBLER. For the different recommendations they have set 

different time frames for completion. Some of them are 6 months 

to a year out and we will, as I said, continue to monitor their 

progress and would be happy to update you on their progress as 

they go forward. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So as we stand now from the recommendations made by GAO, CBP is not in compliance? Going forward, not 

on SBInet, which I know has been canceled. 

Ms. GAMBLER. Correct. CBP right now has not yet implemented 

the recommendations we have made. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. What is the give-and-take to—again I am 

going back—what is the give-and-take to expect compliance? What 

is the engagement and the report back that you get? 

Ms. GAMBLER. For recommendations that we make on any report, we regularly follow up with the agency to determine the status of actions they are taking in response to the recommendations. 

That could be exchange of documents or meetings with agency officials and then we make an assessment of the extent to which the 
23 

actions that the agency has taken are responsive to the intent of 

our recommendation. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. When do you expect then to get back with 

CBP on these present recommendations? 

Ms. GAMBLER. Some of the recommendations they indicated 

about 6 months or so, that we might be able to start getting some 

information from them, so that would probably be the time frame 

that we will start to follow up. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Borkowski, you acknowledge SBInet and 

in my statement I acknowledged that it was $1 billion in cost. You 

have now engaged with Elbit Systems of America on the deployment of integrated fixed towers and that valued contract was $145 

million although the initial projected cost was $600 million. 

To what do you attribute the significant cost discrepancy? Do we 

have a quality product? You just heard GAO, Ms. Gambler, mention that you are not yet in compliance. You have indicated at least 

6 months on certain aspects of the testing aspect. 

So would you comment on again the cost discrepancy? Is this a 

lesser technology than originally planned? Do you think you will 

see more inaccuracies? Are you confident that we have got the best 

contractor, but more importantly, is this a true answer to SBInet? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. With the last question, we are not trying to— 

in terms of the correction of the errors that led to SBInet, I think 

it is a good chunk of the way, 80, 90 percent of the way there. I 

do think that. 

Is this a good contractor? The system—we had many bidders, 

many bidders, and of those many bidders we saw several systems 

that appear to work right out of the box. 

The one that we awarded is actually used for border security in 

Israel as it turns out, but there were other bidders who had very 

effective systems of that worked right out of the box, so that is 

something different. 

Our sense is that the quality is high, and I think the cost difference is due to what I tried to describe earlier. When we buy 

things and go to a specialty shop to build them from scratch we pay 

more than when we buy something off the lot. 

Now if there is nothing off the lot to buy then we are stuck with 

going to a specialty vendor and that is the way we bought SBInet. 

The problem was there was stuff on the lot, so when we changed 

to that you have a significant impact. 

Then when I go to those folks and say look, I am not asking you. 

I am going to tell you what I am interested in, but I am not asking 

you to go to the last 3 percent. Tell me what you can do, give me 

some reason to believe that, and if that is good enough for me I 

will buy it. 

It is that last 3 percent cost that cost you an arm and a leg, so 

I think those are all things that led to this significant cost reduction. By the way, that $145 million covers 50 towers in Arizona and 

7 years of operations and maintenance, so it is quite a bit of 

functionality that we get out of it. 

What we saw in the demos was very impressive. I don’t know if 

the Border Patrol would say this, but when they described what 

they saw in that system in the demo, they almost were raving 
24 

about it to be frank. Hopefully that will get us to where we 

want—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Let me ask if I might, will you wrap this into the question that 

I am going to give you? I just want to make sure you answer, Ms. 

Gambler, that you will be making a definitive effort to follow 

through on the life cycle and test plan testing. 

But my question that I want to ask is in my statement I mentioned the Border Patrol Chief Michael Fisher informed the office 

that the Border Patrol needs fewer integrated fixed towers in Arizona than originally planned and instead wants more mobile surveillance technology to be used in South Texas—more mobile surveillance technology to be used which has increasingly become a 

hot spot for illicit cross-border activity in recent years meaning 

more of that in South Texas. 

Given that it has been 3 years since the cancellation of SBInet, 

keeping in mind the dynamic situation along the border, how confident are you that the number and type of technologies planned 

for the Arizona border is appropriate? How do you plan to address 

Chief Fisher’s inquiries, if you would? 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Certainly. Chief Fisher has maintained the requirement for all of the IFTs but he has said they are lower priority, so there is a subtle distinction there, but he says that is still 

a requirement. 

However, he would like to divert resources and do things in 

South Texas first. So what we have done there is, as you know, we 

have for example put up and these are demonstrations and evaluations, they are kind of temporary activities, but we have flown 

some aero stats there. 

The one part of the Arizona technology plan is a system called 

the mobile video surveillance system also known as a scope truck. 

It has got an infrared camera that is long-range that sees. The Border Patrol asked us to divert those to South Texas. That contract 

will be awarded around June. 

In addition, the contract that awarded it mobile surveillance capabilities, those are going to Arizona and will free up resources 

that will then be moved to South Texas; mobile resources that will 

be moved to South Texas. 

The other element of this is that again, as I have said we have 

saved some cost and the Border Patrol has asked us to prioritize 

those costs savings not in filling in the IFT in Arizona just yet, but 

in applying those resources to continue the kinds of things we have 

been doing in moving mobile video surveillance systems using DOD 

technology in South Texas. So to this point that is what we are 

able to do relatively quickly. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. I look forward to this continuing 

dialogue. I think it is going to be crucial as this system is put in 

place. I hope there is some synergism between GAO and DHS in 

getting this right. Thank you. 

I yield back, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mrs. MILLER. The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman 

from South Carolina, Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 
25 

Just to remind the committee, we are well over $17 trillion in 

debt. That is how big our financial hole is as a Nation. Hearing 

after hearing before the Oversight Management and Efficiency 

Subcommittee which I chair, we have identified DHS programs 

that have overspent and failed to fully deliver. 

Having been down there to the border in Arizona I know firsthand how rugged the terrain is. I was surprised to see that CBP 

plans only to test the towers in one location for 1 month, and I 

question how much sense that makes. 

Mr. Borkowski, I get the need to get these towers deployed. Listen, I appreciate technology being used, and I like the idea of integrated towers. I like the idea of aero stats. I like the idea of more 

different surveillance that can aid the CBP officers on the ground. 

We have got to have a multi-pronged approach. That includes 

fencing, that includes personnel, and that includes surveillance, so 

I get that. I get the need to deploy these quickly, but we have been 

down this road before of inadequate testing with SBInet. So what 

makes you think that you are in the best position for success with 

only one test? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Again, I think it is a misnomer to say there will 

be only one test. There will be extensive tests and the plan as it 

is written says we will test for as long as the Border Patrol wants 

to test. 

In fact, the appropriations act that was passed has language that 

we supported and already intended to do which says we will not 

do subsequent deployments until the chief of the Border Patrol 

says he is comfortable doing subsequent deployments. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me ask you this. This is pretty expensive technology. This contract is a fairly substantial reward. How much testing, real testing have been done by the contractor at no cost to the 

Government because we have got to be good stewards and if they 

want the contract they have got to—in the private sector, if somebody wants a contract, they get out there, they do all the testing, 

and they prove to the purchaser of their equipment that they have 

done the testing, so how much of that has gone on to save the taxpayers? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Well, we did run, as I said, demonstrations. We 

did make them take their system and put it up out along the 

Southwest Border, turn it on, and show us how it worked for a couple of days, but remember—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. For a couple of days. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Well, but they also, remember, they have deployed these in Israel. They have been using them for a significant 

amount of time. 

There is another element to testing that I think is getting lost 

in the discussion here, and it goes to this idea of a system development versus an off-the-shelf system. 

A lot of this discussion about testing incrementally comes when 

you say okay, I am going to build—let’s go to the car example. If 

I were going and building a car from scratch and designing it from 

scratch and went to Joe’s manufacturing company, when Joe built 

the carburetor, I would test the carburetor. 

When Joe built the engine, I would test the engine. I would test 

all of the sub pieces, and then I start to put subcomponents to-
26 

gether and test, and then I put the whole thing together and test. 

That is the kind of testing you do as you go. 

But when you have a whole car already built and you bought it 

off the lot, you don’t tear it apart to test the carburetor and the 

engine. You test the whole car, and you test it once you have 

bought it. 

That is exactly what we are doing. It is a change in paradigm 

because we are not doing system development, but we are doing 

testing. 

So I don’t think we are all getting the accurate picture here. 

That testing as I say we have designed with the Border Patrol to 

say we will test everything you want to test to answer your questions, and we will not do another thing until you tell us you are 

comfortable but I still have to buy the car. I went and bought it 

off the lot. I do have to buy the car so I can test it and that is what 

we are doing. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I appreciate that. Let me shift gears here for just 

a minute. The GAO’s report raises questions as to whether acquisition management lessons learned from SBInet are being applied to 

the new technology plan. 

I understand that there is some disagreement and that CBP has 

not concurred with all of the recommendations of the most recent 

report, so why did the Department not concur on two of GAO’s suggested recommendations? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Basically, because in our view, those two recommendations drive us back to system development, back to that 

approach that says I am not going to buy the car off the lot, I am 

going to go to Joe’s manufacturing company and build one from 

scratch. 

Plus, the other thing that they do is they take us back to the 

days of SBInet where we had everything all tied together as one 

program and couldn’t pull the pieces apart. 

So the one recommendation we non-concurred on was for something called an IMS, an integrated master schedule, which again 

is a sort of a term of art. It is a schedule but it is a schedule on 

steroids. 

It has got all kinds of interconnections and networking at very 

low levels of detail and each program has an integrated master 

schedule, and we did that on purpose. We want separate programs. 

I want to be able to buy IFT whether or not I buy RVSS and so 

forth and so on. 

The GAO says that we should take all of those separate programs and create an IMS for them as one program. That is not consistent with DHS practice and what it has the effect of doing is 

turning us back into SBInet. We think that is a really bad idea. 

The second recommendation that we non-concurred with had to 

do with operational test and evaluation. Not in the spirit, because 

as I have already explained, we are going to do all of those things 

with the Border Patrol, but when you do formal operational test 

and evaluation you set targets. 

As I was explaining to the Chairwoman, if I set a target of 90 

percent I actually have to pay to get to 95 percent to prove I can 

do 90 percent. We do not want to do that. We do not want to pay 

that premium. We do not need to pay that premium, so in our 
27 

view, those two recommendations are driving us exactly back to the 

things we tried not to do after we got out from under SBInet. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I am following acquisition very closely, so I am interested to see how this actually transpires. 

I don’t want to sit here, Madam Chairwoman, 2 years from now 

and try to justify to the American taxpayer why we had another 

SBInet and wasted their money. I hope this works. 

I am interested in seeing it, and I am going to wish for the success because security at the Southwest Border is very important to 

folks in South Carolina and across this Nation. 

I have got some other comments and questions. I will just wait. 

Ms. Gambler, I want you to chime in so I am going to wait for 

the second round hopefully and with that, I will just yield back. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Could I just ask you to yield just for one moment? 

I just want to thank you for the work you have done on contracts 

or procurement. I have said it on some of the hearings. I just want 

this one sentence. We all want this to work. We are in a new world 

and again I just want to repeat that our critique today is to make 

it better for America. 

I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thanks to the lady and the critique will make it 

better. I think that is what the Chairwoman is wanting on this to 

make sure that, (A) acquisition is happening. We are not spending 

taxpayer dollars recklessly and that we are making good decisions 

for the Nation. We are applying best management practices and we 

will secure the border and stop the flow of illegals into the country. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mrs. MILLER. Absolutely. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 

O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

For Mr. Borkowski, how much will we spend on the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. I am trying to add up the pieces in my head 

here. Our original estimates back when we first advertised the 

planned—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I just want to know what we are going to spend. 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. I am thinking it will be $500 million to $700 

million for deployment plus up to 10 years of operation and maintenance. I am thinking it will be in that ballpark when it is all said 

and done. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Five hundred million dollars to $700 million for 

deployment and what is O&M cost over 10 years? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. It is included in that number, so I would expect 

it would be roughly 50-50 between the deployment cost and the 

O&M cost for 10 years. That is a ballpark figure. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Okay. Going back to SBInet which I understand 

you were the executive director of before moving to this current position, we spent $1 billion and have a 53 miles monitored, so roughly just under $19 million a mile. 

In learning from SBInet and looking forward to what we are 

doing here with the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, 

one of the pieces that was missing before I think were performance 
28 

metrics that we would be able to look at and know whether or not 

we had a success. 

What are the performance metrics for this? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. The performance metrics for this are basically 

to—and we tailored them—to ask technology to look in areas where 

technology can see. 

So you heard for example that we couldn’t see through rough terrain—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I want to know to answer my colleague from 

South Carolina’s question, in 2 years, in 5 years, in 10 years, when 

we are looking back at the $600 million plus that we have spent, 

how do we know that it was a success? 

What are the objective numbers that I am going to be able to 

look at to make an objective judgment on whether or not that was 

money well-spent? 

Mr. BORKOWSKI. When you combine this technology with effectiveness ratio, I think you will get the numbers you are looking for. 

So what we will be able to tell you is, is or is not something going 

on, how much activity is in that area, and then the Border Patrol 

will be able to tell you of that activity how much did they interdict. 

I believe that is what you are looking for. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Okay. I don’t know that I totally understand 

that. I would hope that when we are going to spend this kind of 

money on the heels of I think one of the worst, most missed managed Federal projects in SBInet, a billion-dollar boondoggle that 

didn’t work and netted us 53 miles, I am not sure how we are 

doing in those 53 miles. 

When the GAO assesses that, makes recommendations, and you 

choose not to implement those recommendations when you don’t 

have clear performance metrics, when you don’t have an integrated 

master schedule, when you don’t have the true life-cycle cost estimates, when you say something like tell me what you can do and 

I will buy it to a vendor when I think we had vendors really controlling the situation in SBInet and kind of designing it as they 

went along. 

When you say that you are flexible on the technical details but 

you don’t have a coherent way to measure what we are going to 

do, I am worried that we are going to have something akin to 

SBInet again. 

To again answer the concerns from my colleague from South 

Carolina I watched a couple of years ago as a private citizen in an 

El Paso border community the god-awful waste that was SBInet 

and I swore that I would never allow something like that to happen 

again. 

So I don’t want to hope that we are not going to have this problem again. I want to stop it in its tracks now before we get there. 

If we had not had the problem with SBInet, I think some of what 

we are talking about today might be forgivable or understandable, 

but following that why not follow the recommendations of the 

GAO? 

I think it is—frankly it is a very difficult to hear you say that 

the GAO is trying to point you in the direction of replicating the 

errors of SBInet basically blaming the GAO for sending you back 
29 

into SBInet when I think it was the GAO that uncovered the awful 

problems within SBInet. 

I really—I have just got to say for the record, Madam Chairwoman, I think we need to stop this program now until you can 

adequately describe what the performance metrics are, what the 

value is that we are going to get for this money that is adding to 

the National debt and a better answer as to why you are not going 

to comply with the recommendations from the GAO. 

I find today’s testimony just very troubling for all of the reasons 

we have talked about from border security to the value of taxpayer 

dollars to official oversight and accountability from CBP. 

I think this money could be much better used in much better 

ways. 

With that, Madam Chairwoman, I will conclude. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentleman for his statement and his 

concerns. 

Neither myself or the Ranking Member have any additional 

questions. 

Does the gentleman from South Carolina wish to ask—take some 

additional time? 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

I would just like for Ms. Gambler to chime in on the last question 

I asked about the Department not concurring with GAO’s suggested recommendations and the differences between what GAO 

has said and what maybe Mr. Borkowski testified to. 

Ms. GAMBLER. Thank you, Congressman Duncan. 

From our perspective our findings and our recommendations are 

not intending for DHS or CBP to create a system of systems or reaggregate programs under the Arizona technology plan. 

Rather, they are intended to help ensure that CBP consistently 

follows best practices and acquisition guidance and those best practices and acquisition guidance exist and are designed to help ensure that acquisitions are managed effectively and efficiently and 

that acquisition programs deliver to meet operational needs. 

So for example, with regard to the integrated master schedule 

recommendation that we made—again, our intent isn’t for CBP to 

re-aggregate programs under that schedule. 

The intent of our recommendation is that DHS or CBP would 

take the schedules that they have for the individual programs, insert them into one master schedule file, and by doing that CBP 

could look at resource constraints or resource issues across the different programs and resolve those issues as they come up rather 

than resolving them on a program-by-program individual basis. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I apologize for interrupting you. They don’t have a 

master schedule now for the complete program to my understanding. Is that correct? 

Ms. GAMBLER. That is what our finding is, yes. 

We would also added that an integrated master schedule is 

viewed as being a good practice because even where there aren’t direct linkages between programs, in cases where programs are being 

reported to a single customer or single client, in this case the Border Patrol, it is helpful to have the schedules inserted into one file 

so that for reporting purposes the customer or client can have a 

comprehensive or a concise view of the programs and understand 
30 

when the programs will be completed and when the overall plan 

will be completed. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

I really don’t have anything further, Madam Chairwoman. I just 

wanted to give Ms. Gambler a chance to chime in and I ran out 

of time. 

Thank you so much for going back. 

Mrs. MILLER. You are welcome. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Chairwoman, I don’t have a question 

either. I just want to say this as I keep hearing integrated systems 

let me be very clear. Coming from Texas and being engaged in the 

border for all of these years, I want to see the strategic approach 

that is in a bill that has not yet passed the floor of the House, but 

a very good bill. 

I want to hear about California, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, 

and as we are discussing this, this is the title of this hearing—dealing with the Arizona fixed issues, I want to make sure that we are 

consistently saying to DHS, we want a consistent, responsible, respected border approach to allow for the free flow of those who 

come to do us good and who want to come and do many things that 

have added to our economy but also to be able to be in a block for 

those who want to do us harm. 

But we want to hear about Texas and Arizona, New Mexico, and 

California collectively together as it relates to the Southern Border 

and of course I always make mention of the Chairwoman’s very important area, the Northern Border. 

I yield back, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank all of the—certainly thank the witnesses 

today, and I thank my colleagues for that which I think is a very 

informative hearing. As it was just mentioned by the Ranking 

Member, we actually have, as you know Mr. Borkowski, SBInet 

that was deployed on the Northern Border and a section actually 

in my district and we have had pretty good success with it. 

It may be the one area of SBInet that people point to as it has 

been quite helpful in that particular area, but also as has been 

mentioned here we have this border bill that we hope to see some 

movement on in the House and one of the biggest components of 

that and I think has been a lot of debate across the country is how 

the Senate bill in our mind treats border security as just throwing 

huge pots of money at the border again in an ad hoc fashion without really having these accountability matrixes, et cetera and 

something that we all discussed during the construct of that bill 

was SBInet and the amount of money that we spent there and the 

failures that we have had there, et cetera. 

So I think as you can see clearly from this subcommittee and I 

think we can say as well the full committee we are really going to 

be watching this thing. We are really going to be looking at it, so 

there remains a number of questions. 

At this time I would say to the Members of the committee if they 

have any additional questions for the witnesses, we would ask you 

witnesses then to respond in writing. 
31 

Pursuant to Committee Rule 7(e), the hearing record will be held 

open for 10 days, and without objection, the committee stands adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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