U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

94–232 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–30] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 25, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

STEVE KITAY, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Cardillo, Robert, Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency .................. 7 

Hyten, Gen John E., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command ............... 3 

Loverro, Douglas L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 4 

Raymond, Lt Gen John W. ‘‘Jay,’’ USAF, Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space ................................................................................. 6 

Sapp, Betty, Director, National Reconnaissance Office ........................................ 103 

Weatherington, Dyke, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Space, Strategic, and Intelligence Systems, Department of Defense ............... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Cardillo, Robert ................................................................................................ 96 

Hyten, Gen John E. .......................................................................................... 31 

Loverro, Douglas L. .......................................................................................... 52 

Raymond, Lt Gen John W. ‘‘Jay’’ .................................................................... 78 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 29 

Sapp, Betty ........................................................................................................ 107 

Weatherington, Dyke ....................................................................................... 68 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 127 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 121 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL 

SECURITY SPACE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 25, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:58 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. Good afternoon. I want to welcome everyone to the 

Strategic Forces Subcommittee’s hearing on the fiscal year 2016 

national security space activities of the Department of Defense. 

We are honored to have a panel of expert witnesses who lead 

multiple areas of national security space enterprise. They are General John Hyten, Commander, Air Force Space Command; Mr. 

Douglas Loverro, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space 

Policy; Mr. Dyke Weatherington, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space, Strategic, and Intelligence Systems; 

Lieutenant General John ‘‘Jay’’ Raymond, Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space; Mr. Robert Cardillo, Director of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency [NGA]. And we are 

awaiting Ms. Betty Sapp, Director of the National Reconnaissance 

Office. She still hasn’t been able to—we haven’t been able to reach 

her since we moved the hearing back from 6 o’clock, but we have 

her opening statement. 

This is a big panel. We will work to give every member a chance 

to ask questions in this open hearing, at which point, we will adjourn to a closed session to continue our oversight in an appropriately secure fashion. 

I would like to take note that this is the first time we are having 

the Director of NGA testify at the Strategic Forces annual space 

posture hearing. This is important both literally and symbolically. 

From a literal point of view, NGA has a critical role within the 

national security space community and, as a combat support agency, NGA provides tremendous support to our warfighters. From a 

symbolic point of view, the six of you on this panel, along with the 

other armed services and members of the space community, need 

to be working extremely closely together. 

While each of you has your own missions with different roles and 

responsibilities, it is essential that national security space is integrated across the Department of Defense, both unclassified and 
2 

classified programs. In the end, all of your jobs are to support and 

defend our country. 

Regarding the posture of national security space, we currently 

face many serious challenges. On January 28 of this fiscal year, the 

Armed Services Committee held a hearing with Mr. Frank Kendall, 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics, as a witness. 

Chairman Mac Thornberry opened up the hearing with a question regarding the U.S. technological superiority and asked Mr. 

Kendall to provide his greatest concern. Mr. Kendall responded, 

‘‘We are at risk, and this situation is getting worse.’’ 

He further went on to state, ‘‘The U.S. is being challenged at an 

unprecedented rate. It is not just missiles. It is other things, such 

as electronic warfare capabilities, anti-satellite capabilities, and a 

spectrum of things to defeat our space system. It is a number of 

things which I think are being developed very consciously to defeat 

the American way of projecting power, and we need to respond to 

that.’’ 

Mr. Kendall could not talk specifics in an open session. But when 

the most senior acquisition and technology leader of the Department of Defense [DOD] says we are at risk of losing our technological superiority, he must have our attention. We want to understand how you will be addressing that threat. 

Aside from the growing foreign threat, we have also heard from 

our senior DOD and Air Force leaders about their concern about 

our assured access to space posture going forward. We held a hearing on this last week, and we will have a few more questions on 

that topic today. 

Separately, we have heard risks of not maintaining the appropriate space-based weather-collection capabilities for top Department of Defense requirements. I am concerned we are not taking 

a strategic long-term view and are headed down a path with significant risk. We will not allow critical capabilities our warfighters 

rely on to be based out of Moscow or Beijing. 

Additionally, we have systems on orbit that we have invested billions of taxpayer dollars in that we are still not fully using because 

of delays in ground systems and user terminals. We must do better 

for the taxpayer and the warfighters. 

And, lastly, we are all aware of the current budget pressure. This 

means we need to do business smarter without sacrificing capability. As I have said multiple times in the past, I believe we can 

save money in wideband satellite communications, as one example. 

It will take strategic planning, better partnerships with commercial 

industry, and new contracting approaches. 

Regarding the budget request, I support technology development 

and evolutionary acquisition, but remain concerned with efforts to 

create new programs, such as in missile warning and protected 

communications, and will conduct close oversight of such activities. 

I will need to be convinced that this is the right time to make billions of dollars in investments in new programs when our current 

programs are working better than expected. 

I know the great men and women of the Department of Defense, 

including military, civilian, and industry partners, will not shy 

away from these challenges. It will take work, and I believe that 
3 

we need to strengthen national security space through capabilities 

development, organization, management, policy, and funding. 

Thank you again for your leadership and for being with us today 

regarding these important topics. I look forward to your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I now recognize my friend and colleague from Tennessee, the ranking member, Mr. Cooper, for any opening statement. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to work 

with you. 

And I, too, welcome the distinguished witnesses. 

We have a crowd of witnesses to hear from today. So I will forego 

an opening statement and look forward to the testimony of the witnesses. 

Mr. ROGERS. Now you know why I like him so much. 

Roll Tide. 

General Hyten, you are recognized for your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR 

FORCE SPACE COMMAND 

General HYTEN. Thank you, Congressman. And Roll Tide. 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be here today to represent the 38,000 men and women in the Air Force Space Command and tell our story. It is also a privilege to be here with my 

distinguished colleagues and friends to discuss some very important issues with you. 

Everyone here has been fortunate enough to witness our Nation’s 

evolution in space power. Our combatant and theater commanders 

have fully realized how fundamental space-based effects have become, but our potential adversaries have been watching and working to challenge these very capabilities. 

So to prepare for tomorrow’s fight, we have to be ready to respond to any threat. That response starts with command and control. And so we have to assure that our Space Operations Center 

is prepared to meet the challenges of daily operations and demands 

of war, and that starts with the Joint Space Operations Center 

[JSpOC] mission system [JMS] at Vandenberg Air Force Base. This 

is the key to everything. 

Winning tomorrow’s war also includes countering adversarial actions, and we are working to increase our overall resiliency by investigating desegregation, hosted payloads, onboard satellite protection, and defensive operations, as well as leveraging commercial 

capabilities. But we can build resilient architectures all day and, 

without assured access to space, it means nothing. 

With today’s national reliance on space capabilities, assured access has gone from important to imperative. It is our highest priority. So, in case you missed it just a couple hours ago, this afternoon we had another successful launch from Cape Canaveral. Delta 

IV with GPS [Global Positioning System] IIF–9 onboard was successfully launched, and that makes 82 successes in a row for the 

EELV [Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle] program and ULA 

[United Launch Alliance]. 
4 

But we also support competition in a healthy space launch industrial base and must move as fast as we can towards rocket engines 

that are built in the United States. So the Air Force and SpaceX 

are aggressively working together to close all the remaining criteria that we have to meet a June 2015 certification, and we are 

collaborating with private partners to invest in industry solutions 

for U.S.-made rocket propulsion systems. 

Finally, returning to funding levels as directed by the Budget 

Control Act of 2011, the Air Force Space Command is going to have 

a difficult time meeting operational requirements. Compromises 

will be made. Risks would increase in any scenario. But we know 

that we have to continue to provide the Nation with necessary capabilities and not lose ground in the space arena. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your support, and I look forward to working with Congress to provide resilient, capable, and 

affordable space capabilities for the joint force and the Nation. 

Thank you very much, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Hyten can be found in the 

Appendix on page 31.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Loverro, you are recognized for 3 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS L. LOVERRO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE 

Mr. LOVERRO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the 

DOD’s national security space program and, in concert with my fellow panelists, report to you on the shared progress we have all 

made to respond to the growing threats in that domain. Those 

threats continue to mature, and our adversaries are not sitting 

still. Let me assure you, neither are we. 

In order to address these threats, the Department has increased 

its budget for space security by $5 billion. This substantial increase 

is intended to make certain that U.S. space forces are as dependable as the terrestrial forces which depend upon them. These investments, as well as other nonmaterial changes, will make clear 

to all that attacks in space are not only strategically ill-advised, 

but militarily ineffective. 

Notwithstanding our increased focus on the national security dimensions of space, we remain absolutely committed to assuring the 

peaceful use of space for all. Space is a global good and has been 

a driver for economic growth, environmental monitoring, verification of treaties, and an enabler for everyday citizens at home and 

abroad. Several of the initiatives I will discuss today are intended 

to extend that commitment, deter conflict in space, and enhance 

the economic benefit we all derive. 

But let me be clear. We can no longer view space as a sanctuary. 

Potential adversaries understand our reliance on space and want 

to take it away from us. We won’t let them. The U.S. leads the 

world in space on the commercial side, the civil side, and the national security side. We will not cede that leadership. 
5 

Together with allies and commercial partners, we will continue 

to defend the right of all nations to access space for peaceful purposes. But where that access is threatened, where others would 

seek to remove the national security or economic benefits we derive 

from that access, we will defend our use just as we would in any 

other domain. 

My written remarks include additional detail. But in the interest 

of time, I would like to go ahead and thank you for the opportunity 

to discuss these policies and programs with you today. I look forward to working closely with Congress on these issues, and I stand 

ready to answer your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Loverro can be found in the Appendix on page 52.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Loverro. 

And now we will go to Mr. Weatherington for 3 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DYKE WEATHERINGTON, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE, STRATEGIC, 

AND INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking 

Member Cooper, and distinguished members of this subcommittee. 

It is my pleasure to be part of this esteemed panel, which together represents the full spectrum of the United States national 

security space enterprise. 

With your permission, I would like to submit my written statement for the record and just offer a very short oral statement so 

we can get to your questions more quickly and have a meaningful 

discussion. 

Mr. ROGERS. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. I am pleased to report to you that the Program Executive Officers for Space have been able to leverage that 

which has been provided by Better Buying Power initiatives undertaken by my boss, Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics, to generate significantly improved prices and real 

savings as the government negotiates production contracts for several space systems. We look forward to seeing how these latest 

iterations of Better Buying Power 3.0 will continue this trend and 

save the taxpayers real dollars. 

I am also happy to report—and this is in no small part due to 

the diligence of my distinguished colleagues, General Hyten and 

Ms. Sapp—that, with a few exceptions, our defense and intelligence 

satellite constellations are currently in a relatively stable, healthy, 

and well-populated situation to support both the Nation and our 

warfighters. 

That said, we also need to recognize that many of these constellations will be entering a window of recapitalization in the coming years. How we approach these recaps will be a primary concern 

of the Department and will hinge on many ongoing analysis and 

study efforts, chief among those being the Secretary’s strategic 

portfolio review and several key analysis of alternative studies. 

And, of course, those plans and programs will be drastically and 

harmfully impacted should the Department be hampered by another sequestration. 
6 

Moreover, I believe you will certainly take away a common theme 

from this panel today, a theme that no uncertain term portrays the 

rapidly emerging additional vulnerability. And, of course, I am 

speaking to the point that space is no longer a sanctuary. Wouldbe adversaries are developing formidable capabilities, capabilities 

designed to operate for the express intent of denying our intelligence professionals and uniformed warfighters the asymmetric 

advantages derived from our space capabilities. 

You will hear from all my colleagues on this point, each from 

their own unique vantage point. From where I sit, it is my job to 

ensure the Department acquisitions for new capabilities stay 

abreast of this rapidly evolving challenge and that our warfighters 

have the capability they need, but not at the price that is untenable to Congress and the American people. 

The President’s fiscal year 2016 budget offers just these solutions, with a mix of sustainment of current capabilities, refreshing 

and upgrading other capabilities, and offering new starts for some 

very unique capabilities. 

Let me wrap up, as I promised to be short. Thank you for working with us to provide space capabilities that address a warfighter’s 

needs, prepares for future challenges, and looks at the broad range 

of our national security interests and protects the U.S. taxpayers. 

I look forward to your questions, Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weatherington can be found in 

the Appendix on page 68.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Weatherington. 

Now General Raymond is recognized. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN JOHN W. ‘‘JAY’’ RAYMOND, USAF, COMMANDER, JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR 

SPACE 

General RAYMOND. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, 

and members of the subcommittee, it is indeed an honor to appear 

before you again with my distinguished colleagues as the Commander of the United States Strategic Command’s Joint Functional 

Component Command for Space [JFCC Space]. In doing so, I am 

representing the 3,200 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, civilians, 

and allied exchanges officers that make up the command. 

Last year, I testified just shortly after my change of command 

that the space environment had changed. It was no longer the relative sanctuary it once was. Over this past year, the pace of change 

has accelerated and today the domain is even more congested, contested, and competitive than it was before with no signs of slowing 

down. We are quickly approaching the point where every satellite 

and every orbit can be threatened and the strategic, operational, 

and tactical advantages derived from space are no longer a given. 

Now, more than ever, our responsive and flexible global space 

force is critical to our ability to continue to exploit the advantages 

of space. We are transforming our Joint Space Operations Center 

from an organization focused largely on cataloging objects in space 

to a command and control capability with the space domain awareness needed to meet those current and future challenges. With the 

help of the United States Strategic Command and the services, this 
7 

transformation is being fueled through innovation, experimentation, and partnerships. 

As U.S. Strategic Command’s Functional Component Commander 

responsible for conducting space operations in the domain, I am 

concerned that, if we do not receive relief from the Budget Control 

Act, our ability to provide our Nation assured access to these critical space capabilities will be at risk. 

We are absolutely committed to assuring global access to space 

and peaceful operations in and through the space domain. Credible, 

reliable, and assured space capabilities are vital to our Nation’s 

strategic deterrence. I look forward to continuing to work with you 

and your staffs as we advance and protect our Nation’s space capabilities. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Raymond can be found in 

the Appendix on page 78.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, General. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Cardillo for 3 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT CARDILLO, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 

GEOSPATIAL–INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Mr. CARDILLO. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for 

the invitation to join my colleagues here to testify before you today. 

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is the Nation’s primary provider of geospatial intelligence [GEOINT] for both the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community. Every local, 

regional, and global conflict has geolocation at its heart. 

In a complex world of accelerating change, GEOINT delivers spatial awareness, temporal context, and insight that enables understanding and reveals unknown activities. NGA produces GEOINT 

with content from an array of platforms. As the GEOINT functional manager, I oversee current and future GEOINT requirements, evaluate sensor system performance to meet those needs, 

and we continue to require high-resolution imagery and have an increasing need to image targets frequently to maintain persistent 

awareness. 

The sensors we use are not exclusively spaceborne. However, defense space programs are critical to accomplishing our diverse and 

worldwide mission. For spaceborne reconnaissance, NGA relies 

heavily upon platforms and services provided by the National Reconnaissance Office. NRO spaceborne assets continue to meet national security requirements that only its program could accomplish. 

The fiscal year 2016 budget request also funds acquisition of 

commercial satellite imagery. This imagery enables NGA to provide 

GEOINT in current, high-interest and rarely imaged areas of the 

world. It also allows us to develop products that support air and 

sea navigation and humanitarian assistance missions. 

The commercial satellite imagery market is expanding at an extraordinary rate, darkening the skies with small satellites that 

present a remarkable opportunity for NGA and our customers. If 

we can embrace the explosion in commercial sources and leverage 

the exquisite capabilities of our national technical space architec-
8 

ture, we have the opportunity to realize the persistent GEOINT 

coverage that NGA and our customers have sought for so many 

years. 

In closing, the President’s budget for fiscal year 2016 supports 

NGA’s requirements for space and space-based systems and services, provides us the resources and the capabilities we need to support our warning, targeting, mission planning, navigation, and 

flight safety missions. 

So on behalf of the men and women of NGA, thank you for this 

opportunity to appear before the committee. I look forward to addressing your questions, and I look forward to earning a second invitation to testify before this committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cardillo can be found in the Appendix on page 96.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you for that comment and for being here. 

And I recognize myself now for the first set of questions. 

General Hyten and Mr. Loverro and General Raymond, this will 

be targeted toward you. 

The Department’s requested a pretty significant increase in investment over the next several years for the protection and security 

of space systems. 

Could you tell us about those investments and why you think 

they are important. 

Let’s start with you, General Hyten. 

General HYTEN. So, yes, sir. As we look at the threat—and you 

have heard each of us in a different way talk about the threat 

being significant. And when we get into a closed hearing later, we 

will go into more detail about what that threat is. 

But as you look at that, it is clear that the United States must 

increase our ability to respond to that threat. So in that increased 

investment that Mr. Loverro referred to, you will see increased efforts in space situational awareness as well as response options 

that will allow us to respond to threats that we see coming in the 

future. 

And I think, as far as an open hearing, that is probably as far 

as I could go, but we can address that in more detail in the closed 

hearings. 

Mr. ROGERS. Would you say the increased investments are proportionate to the need? 

General HYTEN. I would say they are proportionate to need and 

they start us down a path. It would be nice to take more resources 

and begin. But, as you start programs, it is important to begin 

them in a prudent way so you understand what the initial investments are going to be and then grow from there. And that is what 

you will see in the fiscal year 2016 President’s budget, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Loverro. 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I couldn’t agree 

more with what General Hyten has already said. I think he is spot 

on. 

Let me just add a couple of remarks. As I alluded to in my opening statement, we have to recognize that space is not a sanctuary. 

And several of us have said it up there. That means a lot. That is 

not the way we designed and operated systems for many years. 
9 

We designed and operated them as if it were. We did not lay out 

our space architectures. We did not build them with the notion in 

mind that they would be attacked by conventional means. That requires us to go ahead and make a change. 

I am very pleased that we have aggressively pursued that change 

in the President’s budget. I think that we made many, many good 

investments. As General Hyten said, we can’t do everything at 

once. To do so would be foolhardy. We would probably fail. 

But we have absolutely made a significant turn towards the 

space capability that we need to defend against adversaries, and 

we think that this will start us in the correct direction. There may 

be more in the future, but right now we think that we have got a 

very good balance within the fiscal year 2016 budget. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

General Raymond. 

General RAYMOND. Thank you, Chairman. 

I concur with what General Hyten and Mr. Loverro said. You 

know, for the last 20 years, we have worked hard to integrate 

space capabilities into the fight, and we have done so and it has 

fueled our way of war. We must protect those capabilities. 

Our capabilities were really designed at a time when the domain 

was a sanctuary. Today, if you look at our space capabilities with 

the lens of the contested threat that we see emerging, then challenges materialize and we need this investment to keep pace with 

those challenges. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. Thank you. 

General Hyten, in the launch hearing last week, we didn’t get an 

opportunity to hear your perspective on the EELV launch capability [ELC] contract. 

Can you provide your perspectives on the importance and how 

you can have fair competition with this contract in place. 

General HYTEN. So, to be honest, Congressman, I don’t think you 

can have fair competition with that contract in place. There will 

have to be a change. We are working with the acquisition community to figure out what that change is going to be. You may want 

to ask Mr. Weatherington about some of those issues. 

But let me just give a little bit of history of why we have the 

EELV launch capabilities, the ELC contract in place. It was really 

put in place to preserve a very fragile industrial base because, in 

the mid part of the last decade, the mid-2000s, we were facing an 

era where the satellites we were building for the national security 

were not being delivered and the commercial marketplace that we 

thought was going to boom did not materialize either. And, therefore, the industry was in a very fragile perspective because there 

was not launches there available to support that industry. 

So we created the ELC contract as a way to make sure that, even 

if we didn’t launch—and there were years that we launched very 

small number of satellites—there would still be a healthy industrial base at the end of that period. 

It was also put in place that, God forbid, we ever had a launch 

failure, that there would be a means to preserve that industry as 

we worked through the issue of that launch failure as well. So it 

is really an industrial-based concern. 
10 

As you build into a competitive environment, those reasons become much different. And so the competition and the existence of 

multiple capabilities really provide the resilience that you need to 

get through those kind of issues. 

And we believe that the launch manifest will be increased. It will 

still be a significant challenge for our acquisition community to figure out how to transition from the current structure into the future, and they are working that issue now, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

Mr. Weatherington, the general wanted to put you on the spot. 

So I will do what the general ordered me to do. 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. Mr. Chairman, General Hyten is absolutely correct. There were and are very valid reasons for the ECL 

construct as it exists today. 

But clearly there is an understanding that, with increased competition with the potential inclusion of new entrants into the 

launch capability family, that that capability, that function, has to 

be changed. 

And so we are working very diligently with the Air Force to adjust, and we have that flexibility in Phase 1A, the competitive activity that is currently undergoing. Phase 2, fundamentally, that 

function will be likely wrapped into the rates that we pay on a perlaunch basis. 

And so the Department is committed to modifying and continuing to evolve its space launch capability to take advantage of 

the competitive launch environment that we see coming in the future. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member for any questions 

he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Hyten, I noticed in your testimony that you have made 

some organizational changes. In fact, you lead your testimony with 

it. And I am just curious. 

By combining the A2, A3 and A6, is that something unique to 

your organization or is this something that is going to spread 

throughout the military? 

General HYTEN. Right now it is unique to our organization, Congressman. But I think it is going to spread. And let me explain the 

fundamental reasons why. 

If you look at the capabilities that we have integrated, the -2, the 

-3, the -6, which is intelligence, operations, and cyber, you put 

those three things together and you think about what we do as a 

command, those are three operational missions that we do. 

If you go to an intelligence organization, whether it is the 18th 

Intelligence Squadron that is related to Space Command or another 

squadron in another command, and you look at the business that 

they do and you look at how we do space operations and then you 

go to San Antonio and you look at how we do cyber operations, it 

is very much the same. 

So I believe that, in the future, the power of the military is the 

ability to integrate all information. And in our command, there is 

three elements of that: space, intel, and cyber. And so it is a logical 

step to take those three pieces and integrate them together because 
11 

the integration of information is going to be the power of military 

in the future. 

Mr. COOPER. So is it too much to say that, by breaking down 

these silos, that you have created a new best practice in the military? 

General HYTEN. We have not created a new best practice yet because we are still going through it. It is a significant challenge because it is a change of culture as well. 

But our command is committed to changing that culture. We are 

committed to looking at each of those three areas as equal partners 

in the operations. And that is why we will have one flag officer on 

top of that pyramid that is responsible for integrating all those operations. We have had success so far, but we still have a long way 

to go. 

Thank you for the question. 

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Cardillo, in his testimony, makes the point very 

forcefully that one of his main problems is information overload, 

this vast array of data that comes in, how do you make sense of 

it. 

And I hope that we have good answers to those questions because understanding an infinite number of visual images, which 

you say are increasing exponentially, that is a big problem to get 

your arms around. 

How are we faring in that regard? 

Mr. CARDILLO. Congressman, I couldn’t agree with you more 

about the challenge. I have to tell you I am equally excited about 

the opportunity. 

What I mean is that, if we are successful in managing the data 

in a way that we haven’t before, I think it is going to elicit signatures, patterns, indicators we haven’t seen before. But I won’t 

argue with you that this challenge isn’t large. And we are taking 

it head on. 

Mr. COOPER. General Raymond’s testimony was particularly interesting because I am not sure that the average constituent understands how crowded space is, with some 500,000 pieces of space 

junk up there. That is quite a lot to keep up with. 

And I forget whether it was your testimony or another person 

who said, basically, we are going to have the first 24/7 traffic cop 

to warn people of collisions because there is some 23 announcements a day of potential collisions between, you know, satellites 

and space junk. 

General RAYMOND. Yes, sir. The Joint Space Operations Center 

at Vandenberg actively tracks about 23,000 objects. Those are 

about 10 centimeters or greater. That is the size that we can track. 

As you mentioned, 500,000 are below that level that we can’t 

track. The JSpOC, by its nature, serves as that traffic cop. We provide space traffic control, if you will, for the world, providing warning of potential conjunction to keep the domain safe for all. 

Last year, in 2014, alone, 121 times we recommended that a satellite move and it moved, including the International Space Station 

3 times. 

Mr. COOPER. It worried me a little bit that the number of warnings is increasing so much regarding possible missile launches from 
12 

the ground. You said there were 588 of those and some 9,648 infrared events. That is a lot to keep up with. 

General RAYMOND. It is a lot to keep up with. 

Mr. COOPER. How do we separate the wheat from the chaff here? 

General RAYMOND. It is a lot to keep up with. We have the 

world’s greatest capabilities with SBIRS [Space-Based Infrared 

System] and DSP [Defense Support Program]. We have got the 

world’s best airmen that are operating that. And one of the keys 

is that, when you are dealing with warning of potential missile attack to theater or potential attack on the homeland, you take that 

very, very seriously and put a lot of emphasis on it to make sure 

we do it perfectly. 

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Loverro, I would be interested—you made a 

pretty forceful statement about domain and protecting our domain. 

I would be curious, in the rhetoric of this and other administrations, is yours the most forceful statement or are you mirroring 

other rhetoric? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, sir. I don’t know if I want to call mine the 

most forceful, but it is certainly what I believe strongly. And I don’t 

necessarily want to call it just pure rhetoric either. It is absolutely 

our intent. 

You know, it probably has been an evolving state of affairs because the threat has evolved. Quite frankly, it is one thing to anticipate an imaginary threat. It is another thing to see that threat 

develop, watch it be exercised, as we have on the Chinese on several occasions, recognize what it can do to our capability, and react 

to that. 

And that is what we are doing right now, is reacting to it and 

making it very clear. We have no desire to have a conflict extend 

to space. That is not in our interest. We don’t believe it is in the 

interest of anybody on the face of the planet. 

We want our potential adversaries to understand that, if it does, 

the U.S. will be prepared to defend our space assets. Attacking our 

space assets is not a way to get the United States to back off of 

a fight. 

We are going to make sure that space assets are there to support 

the men and women that General Hyten and General Raymond 

have talked about so we can do the job that you have asked us to 

do. 

Mr. COOPER. Finally, Mr. Weatherington, you mentioned the terrific recapitalization problem that we are about to face. A generation or two earlier we had huge nuclear investments that we are 

struggling to be able to recapitalize right now. 

And it would be great to have some sort of early warning system 

for how many years we need to be planning recap for our space assets. So I hope you can help us with that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

And I want to recognize Ms. Sapp, who has made it. I want to 

apologize to her for the moving target of start time, but we are at 

the mercy of the leadership and when they call votes. But I do appreciate you being here. We did accept your opening statement for 

the record already. 
13 

[The opening and prepared statements of Ms. Sapp can be found 

in the Appendix beginning on page 103.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Now I will recognize the gentleman from Colorado, 

Mr. Lamborn, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here and for your service to our 

country in various ways. 

General Hyten, we talked earlier today about an issue I would 

like to ask you a little bit more about, the Air Force space-based 

weather collection program. And I am concerned about the future 

planning. 

In October 2014, in response to a congressional-directed report, 

there was a briefing by the Air Force that stated, ‘‘DOD does not 

currently rely on nonallied international sources for environmental 

data, but may be required to do so as early as 2017 due to 

EUMETSAT’s recent decision not to replace Meteosat-7.’’ 

I have another memo on this topic that was written just last 

month by the Air Force. It states, ‘‘New information has come to 

light that demonstrates an unacceptably high risk for relying on 

civil and international sources.’’ 

And the memo further states, ‘‘While China and Russia have mature technical systems, recent events indicate they present unacceptable security and operational risk. This dependency, particularly over the USCENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] area of responsibility, provides an unnecessary risk to U.S. operations and 

American lives.’’ 

So, actually, my first question will be to Mr. Loverro. But thank 

you for the discussion that we had earlier, General Hyten. 

Mr. Loverro, should we be creating new reliances on China and 

Russia for weather data for our warfighters? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Mr. Congressman, I like the fact that you started 

off with General Hyten first, so—— 

No. This is a very complex issue. But let me make one thing very 

clear before I answer in detail. The DOD has no intent, no plans, 

and has no current reliance on Chinese or Russian weather satellites. We do not have it today. We will not have it in the future. 

That is not where we are heading. 

We had a conversation with this committee 2 years ago on a 

problem with satellite communications in that regard. We fixed 

that. And thank you very much for helping us do that. We are not 

going to go ahead and repeat that error with the weather satellites. 

Now, we do have an issue. What we are talking about is geosynchronous weather prediction and monitoring. That is not primarily a DOD mission. That is a NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] mission for which the DOD uses their 

capabilities. 

And NOAA makes arrangements with other international capabilities around the world. The one you mentioned, EUMETSAT, 

has been our partner in the Indian Ocean for many years. 

Because of the kind of budget problems the Europeans have been 

having, they are having a hard time trying to fill that gap. And 

they in the World Meteorological Organization have decided that, 

for civilian purposes, that organization would like to use indige-
14 

nous capabilities, which includes Chinese and Russian and Indian 

satellites. 

We right now do not—I cannot tell you today how we will go 

ahead and address this gap. We are working with NOAA. I met 

with them just last week along with the folks from Air Force A3, 

who wrote the letter that you quoted from, to figure out how we 

can move forward. 

NOAA has several alternative plans that they are examining. 

Some of them are to move another European satellite, EUMETSAT–8, over to the region. There are other capabilities that we 

might look at. And I also visited India 2 weeks ago to start the conversation with them about Indian satellites. 

So there are several alternatives that we are looking at. I cannot 

tell you what the answer is today. But let me make it clear, once 

again, we do not intend to, we have no plans to, we will not rely 

on Chinese and Russian satellites. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, that is a concern. Also, cost is a concern. 

With constrained budgets, we have to make every dollar count. I 

understand that. But getting the maximum capability out of our 

existing constellation is also a concern. 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. No. Absolutely. And, you know, 

today that is not a mission that the DOD flies. So as we look at 

that gap and we examine how we need to fill that, we will have 

to assess whether or not there is something the DOD needs to invest in or simply get NOAA to invest in. It is one of those issues 

that is developing as we speak. I wish I had an answer for you 

today. We know it is an issue. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. 

Mr. LOVERRO. We are following it. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. Thank you. 

And let me—General Hyten, let me try to work in one—well, I 

am going to have to wait for a second round, I am afraid. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now goes to Mr. Garamendi from California for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen and ma’am, thank you very much for being here. 

I guess this goes to Mr. Loverro and probably Mr. Weatherington 

and Mr. Cardillo. 

What are the opportunities to leverage the growing commercial 

capabilities, services, for example, Skybox and Planet Labs? And 

how long will it take for the U.S. Government to replicate those assets or to use them? 

So start at the right or the left. Let’s start over here. 

Mr. LOVERRO. Why don’t I deal with the general, and then I 

think Mr. Cardillo is better suited to answer the specific questions. 

So, sir, you are absolutely right. We have a great opportunity 

here. As the DOD budget shrinks and as we focus more on the security of space, we need to figure out how to do things smarter. 

One of the smarter things we can do is to leverage the commercial 

field far better. 

There are certainly two areas where the commercial field is burgeoning, mostly the U.S. commercial field, which is great for us and 
15 

our Nation’s industry. You mentioned one of them, commercial imagery, Skybox, Planet Labs. There are about 20 names out there, 

all of which will try their hand at trying to figure out how to revolutionize this field, as well as our tried and true providers, like 

Digital Globe. 

The commercial SATCOM [satellite communications] world is 

just as exciting. While we still have the legacy of 40 or 50 years 

of commercial SATCOM, we have a whole bunch of new entrants, 

from the likes of Elon Musk to many others. We are looking at new 

constellations and new configurations. All of these can provide capability. We need to figure out how to leverage them better. 

Let me turn over the specifics, maybe, to Mr. Weatherington or 

Mr. Cardillo. 

Mr. CARDILLO. First, I couldn’t agree more with the opportunity 

that is before us. I can’t answer your specific question about exactly when. I can just tell you we are fully engaging with each. 

And I should also say, too, I am a huge commercial imagery consumer today. I just use it for what we call our foundation mission. 

This is mapping, charting, geodesy, so the baseline products upon 

which we then apply NRO’s capabilities to provide that exquisite 

level of intelligence and information. And I can give you more examples about that in closed. 

But we are fully engaged with the companies that you just mentioned to explore. We are looking to do pilots and test beds to be 

able to answer your question, and we will keep you fully informed. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Good. I am going to go to another series of questions. I know my colleague to my right here has this issue, and he 

will pick it up, I am sure, in just a moment. 

I want to go to the vulnerability of the GPS system and should 

we have a backup system available to us, specifically the eLoran 

program. And it is maybe $50 million to put it in place, another 

$10 million a year to keep it going. 

Should we move forward with such a backup system? 

I will start—you are nodding your head, Mr. Loverro. 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, sir. So we have had a lot of discussion of this 

within the DOD. Our fiscal year 2016 budget includes an initial investment into eLoran, as you are aware. We do believe that is a 

good idea. 

However, it is not a panacea. It is great for backing up the use 

within the continental United States. For civilian use, however, 

eLoran, as currently configured, is not nonspoofable. It doesn’t extend around the world. It doesn’t meet the needs of our 

warfighters. So, absolutely, for civil concerns, it is a good solution. 

But from DOD concerns, we need to do more. We are doing more. 

We are investing significantly in anti-jam capabilities both on the 

satellites, in our user equipment. We, in fact, accelerated—part of 

that $5 billion investment that I talked about was a large acceleration of nonspoofable, nonjammable user equipment that the Air 

Force will be building for the new GPS signals. 

We are also in talks with our allies. Galileo, Japan and their 

Quasi-Zenith satellite systems, these are other systems that perform the same functions, are separate from GPS, yet perform a capability. We are looking very strongly at how do we leverage those 

as a backup as well. 
16 

Because for military use, we do need that worldwide or at least 

regional overhead system that we can’t get from the eLoran system 

which basically provides two-dimensional timing and navigation, 

but doesn’t really help us in the three-dimensional overseas world 

that we fight in. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. I appreciate all of that. 

Also, the Coast Guard is interested because it does go about 

1,000 miles off the coast. And so it is useful in many different 

ways. 

Mr. LOVERRO. Absolutely agree. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

I yield back my remaining time. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. 

Bridenstine, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to our distinguished panel for being here. 

General Hyten, I have heard you comment in the past that we 

need to get past the days when we think about military satellite 

communications and commercial satellite communications. Just 

start talking SATCOM. 

One of the parts of the last NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] that we did, we had section 1603, and it specifically asked 

the Department to look at the idea of having SMC [Space and Missile Systems Center] as the single acquisition agent for space. 

My question for you is: In your best professional military judgment, is having a single acquisition agent for space necessary to 

get the architecture to include both mil [military] and commercial 

satellite communications capabilities? 

General HYTEN. Well, thanks very much for the question, Congressman. 

So, in my judgment, it is essential that there is a single point 

in the Department of Defense, a single agency in the Department 

of Defense, that is responsible for integrating how we provide 

SATCOM. If we have multiple agencies that are looking at buying 

and leasing capabilities, we will never have a fully integrated, most 

cost-effective, most military-useful capability to do that. 

And so you asked me about SMC. I think the Department is in 

agreement that we need to have a single place that does that. From 

my judgment, the best place to do that is in Los Angeles at SMC 

because that is where the bulk of military satellite communications 

is procured. So if you have the bulk of a single procurement agency 

in one place, it makes sense to look at how you integrate those. 

Now, the Department as a whole is still looking at that. We owe 

you an answer to that 1603 language. We will work that. But you 

asked my opinion, and I am glad to give it. Thank you. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Loverro, section 1603 of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA also requires the DOD to revise the Executive Agent for Space’s directives 

and guidance with respect to SATCOM strategies, architectures, 

and programs and, also, a report on reforming the SATCOM organizational structure. 

Can you briefly describe where you are in that process and when 

we might be able to see that report. 
17 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, sir. I would be glad to. 

So both the CIO’s office, our chief intelligence officer’s office, and 

our acquisition, technology, logistics office—excuse me—chief information—thank you—and our acquisition, technology, and logistics 

organization—not Mr. Weatherington’s office, but another sector of 

that—have been given the lead to answer that question. 

They have been convening a series of working groups in order to 

go ahead and look at it. I believe they have scheduled an interim 

brief to this committee on the 19th of April. I cannot tell you what 

the results are yet. I have not been personally part of that. But 

they are working on that. 

It comes at an opportune time. We are rewriting right now our 

DOD instruction on SATCOM management. In fact, I have a copy 

of it in front of me here as the draft. And so we will integrate that 

into the rewrite of this instruction as well as what Congress has 

directed us to do, which is to look at how we rewrite the EA [Executive Agent] for Space charter. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. General Hyten, have you been part of those 

discussions or the planning process? 

General HYTEN. We have not been part of those planning processes yet. Congressman, I fully expect to—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

General HYTEN. As you have said earlier, I have some strong 

opinions on that. I think the Department knows what those opinions are. Certainly Mr. Loverro does. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

General HYTEN. And so I fully expect to be brought in, as does 

the Executive Agent for Space, who happens to be the Secretary of 

the Air Force. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. Mr. Loverro, I have got a minute and 

23 seconds left. 

Section 1605 of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA authorized a SATCOM pilot program using working capital funds. 

Can you share with us the status of that program, if there is 

anything we can do here on this committee to help assist with that. 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, sir. So we very much appreciate the help Congress gave us in authorizing those funds. 

Unfortunately, because of the way the pilots are constructed and 

the way working capital funds work, the match isn’t 100 percent 

perfect. We are trying to work through it. But as I have shared 

with you previously, that is a very difficult match to make. 

I am not the financial wizard within the Department to be able 

to tell you how to modify that today. I am happy to go ahead and 

take that for the record and come back on a better way to do that. 

But we absolutely want to move forward on the Pathfinders that 

that was intended to fund. Those Pathfinders have been laid out. 

I think we are anxious to get started. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you for that. I have 33 seconds remaining. 

General Hyten, speaking of the Pathfinders, if you could, for this 

committee—I think it is critically important that we get those 

Pathfinders funded. It doesn’t appear that the President’s budget 

request funded Pathfinder 2 or any of the other Pathfinders. 
18 

Can you share with this committee with why the Pathfinders are 

so important. 

General HYTEN. The Pathfinders are important for a number of 

reasons. The quick answer is that, if we are going to walk down 

the path where we leverage the commercial sector in the right way, 

we need to figure out the business models to do that. The Pathfinders are structured in order to do that. 

The Pathfinders also have the opportunity for us to test different 

capabilities. It is possible that we can work the protected tactical 

waveform inside a Pathfinder program and explore the operational 

utility of that before we actually have to make an operational decision. 

Those are the fundamental issues that make the Pathfinder so 

important. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Roger that. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 

Franks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you for being here, for your commitment to freedom. 

Lieutenant General Raymond, let me, if I could, direct a question 

to you, sir. 

As you may be aware, the Director of the Defense Intelligence 

Agency, Lieutenant General Stewart, at a House Armed Services 

Committee hearing on worldwide threats earlier this year said that 

‘‘China and Russia are developing capabilities to deny the U.S. use 

of space in the event of a conflict.’’ And that is a quote. 

I mean, I find that pretty sobering and having implications of a 

pretty profound nature. And it seems to me the United States is 

facing the most challenging environment we have ever seen in 

space. 

And I would like to ask you directly: Would you agree that this 

is the most challenging space environment we have seen? 

General RAYMOND. Yes, I would. I would agree. I think the 

threats are real. I think they are technologically advanced and they 

are concerning. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Well, if I could, then, turn to Mr. Loverro 

and Mr. Weatherington. 

As you also very likely know, previous congressionally mandated 

commissions have reported on the value of setting up a major force 

program [MFP] in the budget structure itself for space. And I am 

aware that a virtual MFP was set up, but I am not sure that it 

truly provides the benefits the commissions were originally seeking. 

What is your position on the benefits and challenges of establishing a true MFP with centralized authority for space? And, beyond an MFP, do you think that it is important that we evaluate 

all aspects of the national security space, not just the capabilities 

and development, but, also, organization, management, policy, doctrine, training, to strengthen national security space within the Department of Defense? And, if so, what are we doing about that? 
19 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, sir. As Secretary Carter testified during his 

confirmation hearing, we do intend to go ahead and look at the organization of space within the DOD. 

An MFP, a major force program, may or may not be an important step, but I think that is putting the cart before the horse, 

quite frankly. 

I think we need to figure out what, if any, organizational changes 

do we need to make and then find out if an MFP is necessary to 

have that organization function in much the same way we stood up 

SOCOM [Special Operations Command] and then decided we need 

an MFP–11, not vice versa. 

So I would say we need to do our study first. Secretary Carter 

has committed to doing that. We intend to do that. And then we 

can come back to you and tell you whether an MFP is necessary 

in order to go ahead and enhance the capability of that structure. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Weatherington, could I ask you to address the 

same question. 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. Congressman, I really can’t add anything 

more than Mr. Loverro just commented on. I mean, it is really— 

you know, the acquisition organization supports the warfighter, 

and we align with the policy decisions. 

So once we have made this decision on the organizational structure, then we can align the resources to whatever that organizational structure is, assuming there are any changes. 

Mr. FRANKS. And so, therefore, it is your perspective and testimony that the original congressionally mandated commissions—do 

you think that the MFP that was set up on sort of a—do you think 

that that is actually what they were looking for? I mean, in other 

words, just a virtual MFP, is that what they were looking for? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. Sir, you are asking me to interpret the intent. I can tell you from the Department’s perspective that we can 

provide the oversight responsibilities of your committee with where 

every dollar in the space enterprise is going. 

Now, whether that was the original intent, I mean, that—as Mr. 

Loverro said, Secretary Carter took this on. We are working this 

very hard, and we will have a response back this summer. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. And, Mr. Loverro, not to belabor the subject, but you think that this—you know, again, congressionally 

mandated commission, do you think that you have satisfied that requirement? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Sir, I think both the Rumsfeld Commission and 

the Allard Commission, as we call them, both had many recommendations about how to go ahead and improve space organization management. 

Many of those recommendations were implemented. MFP–12 

that they recommended was part of some of those recommendations. We certainly did not execute all of the recommendations for 

those commissions, and a lot has changed since then. 

While I think those were both valuable studies, I really do think 

in today’s world, where we see a different threat than was present 

in 2000 or 2006, we really need to look at the question again. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Well, thank you. 
20 

Quickly, Ms. Sapp and Mr. Cardillo, as you know, previously the 

director of the NRO was also the Under Secretary of the Air Force, 

and those days are gone. 

But do you believe it is important to have appropriate integration 

in this warfighting domain between this so-called white and black 

space or unclassified and classified space committees? And what is 

being done to strengthen this integration? And are there opportunities for improvement? 

Ms. SAPP. I think we have a great relationship. As you said, we 

think the threats in space are very real, and that is across white 

and black space. We have a great relationship with General Raymond and General Hyten. We do joint exercises, joint games. We 

have linked our op [operations] centers. So there is a very, very 

close relationship there. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. And, Mr. Cardillo, would you like to take 

a shot at it? 

Mr. CARDILLO. No. I am a customer of that relationship. So I am 

good. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. All right. Thank you all very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlemen from Colorado, Mr. 

Coffman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Well, first of all, I think the GPS system is incredible. As somebody who served on the ground when it was first introduced at 

least to us on the conventional level during the first gulf war, it 

was an extraordinary asset. 

What are the challenges right now? I know synchronization is 

one of them with other systems. But what are some of the challenges we have in terms of upgrading and updating the GPS system? 

General HYTEN. So, Congressman, I will go ahead and answer 

first, and then we will open it up across the board. 

But I think there is two big challenges we really face now with 

GPS—actually, three. One is the satellite piece of it. The other is 

the ground command and control piece. And the final one is the 

user equipment piece. Those three elements have to be synchronized. 

We are actually very close to having those in line right now. But 

on the ground segment, we have a program called OCX, the new 

operational control segment for GPS, that we are moving into the 

future with. The challenge there is that that capability is required 

to provide us the information assurance capabilities that we need 

to defend our system against the cyber threat. 

The GPS system today has external interfaces into 35 different 

organizations in the world. Each of those interfaces go out into the 

world. We have to tighten those down and protect them. That is 

one of the biggest concerns I have with GPS, in general. 

And then, as we go forward in the user equipment, we need to 

figure out how to take advantage of the anti-jam capabilities, the 

various capabilities that Mr. Loverro talked about earlier, and the 

new satellite systems have to be able to provide the signal structure that will allow that. 
21 

So if you put those three things together, it is a complicated 

problem, but one that we are making good progress on. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. Anything else? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman—oh. Sorry. Go ahead. Yeah. 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. Congressman, the only thing I would add 

to General Hyten’s remarks are last month Mr. Kendall personally 

led a deep dive on the OCX activities, that it has got significant 

attention at both the Air Force and the AT&L [Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics] level. We are tracking that progress very, 

very closely because OCX is really critical to the next capability set 

that GPS is going to provide. And, for now, we believe we have a 

plan to execute that program and deliver that capability. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. 

General RAYMOND. Could I jump in and say one thing? 

Mr. COFFMAN. Please. 

General RAYMOND. I just wanted to say thanks for that question. 

The GPS constellation is a national treasure. General Hyten talked 

about the launch occurring. 

I will tell you that on that we have made first contact with the 

satellite that was launched today. That will continue to provide 24/ 

7 navigation with the other satellites that are up there. And we are 

completely integrated with those forces in theater to make sure 

that they have the precision navigation timing that they need. 

Thank you. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, thank you. 

I was just a simple infantry guy for the Marine Corps. But, you 

know, to go from having a map and trying to figure out where you 

are in order to call in air support or artillery with, you know, sand 

dunes that are shifting, roads that don’t exist, and all of a sudden, 

you know, to be able to, you know, get a grid coordinate, you know, 

within, at that time, probably 100 meters was extraordinary. 

Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentlemen. 

We have been called for votes. But before we head out, Mr. 

Lamborn had something else he wanted to revisit. So he is recognized. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Yeah. Thank you. And I will try to make this 

quick for everyone, although some, I am sure, will have to leave in 

a minute to vote before I finish, perhaps. 

General Hyten, last year we were briefed that the JMS program 

would be integrating and delivering advanced SSA [Space Situational Awareness] commercial capabilities in Increment 2 of the 

program by the end of the calendar year 2016 to help detect and 

track these threats. 

Is the Air Force’s JMS program still on track with this Increment 

2 delivery schedule? 

General HYTEN. So the JMS program is making good progress. 

If you go to Vandenberg today—and General Raymond sees it every 

day, at least every day he is at Vandenberg. He sees the capabilities coming in. 

And the commercial elements of that are a very important element. In fact, the commercial element really is the visual display 

capability and the user interface into that system. 
22 

And so we have taken tremendous advantage of commercial capabilities in Increment 2. We plan to take even further advantage 

of those capabilities in Increment 3. But we are making great 

progress with the Joint Space Operation Center’s mission system. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Do you believe it is on schedule? 

General HYTEN. Right now those capabilities are on schedule. 

Right now we are getting ready to deliver—Service Pack 9 is the 

element that is being delivered. 

And the reason that is an important element is because that is 

the delivery that will eliminate—or develop the new catalog that 

eliminates the reliance on the old SPADOC [Space Defense Operations Center] system that was built in the mid-1990s, and we 

need that to move forward in the future. 

General RAYMOND. Sir, I would just add I agree. It is on the operations floor today in increments. It is delivering real-time capability today that is very useful. 

And like any other commander in any other domain, if you are 

going to conduct operations, you have to have the ability to command and control, and this is the key to that for me. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you very much. 

And, lastly, Mr. Loverro, I wrote section 913 of the fiscal year 

2013 NDAA. 

And on the European code of conduct, will the Department of Defense issue any manner of guidance or instruction to the military, 

to our military, if the President were to sign this or a similar code 

of conduct? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. 

So we have been—my office is the lead for the Department of Defense on the code of conduct, working very closely with the Joint 

Staff, and we have worked very closely with the Department of 

State as well. 

We would indeed issue implementing guidance if we decide to go 

ahead and subscribe to the code of conduct. We are working very 

vigorously to make sure that what gets signed is something that 

we absolutely can live with. 

We will not sign a code we cannot live with, and we will issue 

implementing guidance so it is very clear what the responsibilities 

of the United States DOD is with regard to that agreement. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I am really concerned because, on the surface, a code of conduct would be nonbinding. Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. LOVERRO. It is absolutely correct. Not legally binding. We 

have many such agreements between nations. 

What the code of conduct does is it sets out rules of behavior that 

good citizens in the domain follow. It really helps us to distinguish 

who are good citizens and who are not. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Yeah. 

Mr. LOVERRO. You know, sometimes it seems like that doesn’t 

mean much. But I can tell you, for example, as you are well aware, 

in 2007, the Chinese, of course, demonstrated their ASAT [anti-satellite weapon] capability and blew apart a satellite, which now—— 

Mr. LAMBORN. Oh. 

Mr. LOVERRO [continuing]. General Raymond used to do. 
23 

But in the latest one they didn’t mostly because of the condemnation of the world, not because there was anything that prevented 

them from doing it legally. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, my concern is something on the surface 

would be nonbinding, but through you issuing a guidance for the 

employment of force instruction, a GEF instruction, it becomes 

binding upon the military. 

And so, as a Congressman, I am concerned about the interaction 

between the executive branch and Congress, and this is something 

that would not be submitted to the Senate for treaty ratification 

and could be viewed as kind of an end run around Congress. 

Mr. LOVERRO. Mr. Congressman, if I could take that for a closed 

session, I can, I think, provide you a more nuanced answer on how 

this will work. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

We have been called for votes. And we are going to recess until 

approximately 6:50, when we will reconvene in the closed session 

next door in 2216. 

[Whereupon, at 5:58 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in closed 

session.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 25, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 25, 2015 

(29) 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 25, 2015 

(121) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the major acquisition challenges regarding the development, deployment, and sustainment of space systems? 

What plans are in development and/or in place for addressing these challenges? 

General HYTEN. We continue to improve in addressing affordability in the acquisition of space systems. We are actively pursuing revisions to our processes on how 

we acquire the space enterprise to include our satellites, ground systems, and 

launch services. 

To improve our satellite acquisitions, we are implementing the Better Buying 

Power 3.0 (BBP 3.0) initiatives instituted by USD/AT&L. BBP 3.0 represents the 

Department’s new increment of process improvement efforts intended to increase 

the buying power across all weapon systems. In satellite acquisition, we are adapting contracting strategies, such as the use of fixed priced contracts to not only control costs, but to also reduce the requirements creep common to cost reimbursable 

contracts. To that end, we are also pursuing initiatives to better define the government’s role in owning the technical baseline of our contracts, such as identifying 

critical interfaces and required data rights. 

Space ground systems will continue to provide the information pathway to and 

from orbit for our systems. A major ongoing effort is to create a common ground 

architecture that can communicate with multiple satellite systems. Such a ground 

system would leverage modular and open architectures to increase resiliency, and 

will significantly reduce the lifecycle cost by providing common operations across 

multiple mission areas. 

In the launch enterprise, we are encouraging competition to invigorate the industrial base and eliminate sole source procurements. As a part of this effort, we are 

streamlining the certification process for potential new entrants. We are also taking 

a competitive approach to mitigating reliance on foreign entities with regard to our 

launch capability to maintain the United States’ assured access to space. 

In support of all of these initiatives, we are reevaluating how we manage risk. 

As we move forward and prepare for tomorrow’s threat environment, we must focus 

on modernizing our constellations. In the past, we focused on minimizing the cost 

and schedule risks to our large programs by producing near copies of our development assets. Moving forward, we must continue to minimize the cost and schedule 

risks, but modernize our systems by smartly planning for incremental upgrades/improvements to our systems. Within the space enterprise, we are preparing for the 

future through the Space Modernization Initiative or SMI. SMI is a disciplined approach to planning for the system modernization of our largest programs by investing early in technology maturation to minimize future obsolescence and maximizing 

the warfighting utility of our existing systems. SMI is critical to the future of our 

weapon systems in order to ensure our systems are resilient against future threats. 

However, SMI is constantly in the cross hairs in a constrained fiscal environment. 

Our biggest challenge going forward will be being able to smartly prepare for tomorrow through SMI while simultaneously ensuring the capabilities we deliver today 

remain world class. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Space Based 

Infrared System (SBIRS) programs are in the process of assessing options for future 

systems through Analyses of Alternatives (AOAs). Both programs face the reality of 

making acquisition decisions for future systems within the next several years. However, the AOA efforts have experienced delays. 

a. To what extent will the AOA delays affect the DOD’s ability to make informed 

acquisition decisions? 

b. When do decisions need to be made for how to proceed with satellite systems, 

such as AEHF and SBIRS? 

General HYTEN. Answer for AEHF: a. Service and acquisition authority representatives have participated extensively in the Protected Satellite Communication Services (PSCS) AOA, and are familiar with the findings. This knowledge has been 

factored into the Air Force FY16 President’s Budget (PB) request planning efforts 

to ensure we remain consistent with the likely outcome of the AOA. MILSATCOM 
122 

acquisition plans and schedules allow time for results of the PSCS AOA to inform 

decisions for input to the FY17 PB. 

b. Protected MILSATCOM capability need dates are driven by the need to sustain 

current capabilities (EPS, MILSTAR and AEHF services), and to satisfy new mission needs for which existing capabilities are inapplicable or insufficient. 

c. Acquiring a new military satellite system with a traditional approach normally 

takes about 10–12 years from initial program directive, including satellite development and launch, and even 6–8 years for systems only involving ground assets. We 

need to explore alternative approaches otherwise decisions are needed by early 2016 

for the Polar SATCOM Follow-on and to enable timely fielding of protected tactical 

SATCOM capabilities. 

Answer for SBIRS: a. The AoA is nearing completion and will be undergoing Departmental deliberations this summer. This timing has no negative effects on the 

DOD’s ability to make an informed acquisition decision for the SBIRS Follow-on program. In fact, this completion date is ahead of the need date in the first quarter 

of FY16 (shown on page 9, Figure 1 of the Air Force Congressional Report Space 

Modernization Initiative (SMI) Strategy and Goals, dated April 2014). While the 

AoA team’s final report submission was delayed from the originally planned December 2014 goal, the delay allowed completion of comprehensive and accurate analysis 

of the architectural alternatives. The DOD and the Air Force are poised with the 

necessary analysis to support the SBIRS Follow-on decision and planned program 

start in FY18. 

b. As described in the April 2014 SMI Congressional Report, the SBIRS Followon program must be started in FY18 to allow timely replenishment of the SBIRS 

constellation. Allowing for appropriate acquisition planning lead time, the final architectural decision for the SBIRS Follow-on program is required by the end of 

FY16, at the latest. The AoA completion earlier than the first quarter of FY16 allows the DOD to make the SBIRS Follow-on decision earlier and allows more time 

for deliberate planning of the acquisition strategy. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the plans for the Operationally Responsive Space program 

office? 

General HYTEN. Consistent with the FY14 ORS Report to Congress the ORS Office will be maintained to execute critical Urgent Needs as identified by 

USSTRATCOM and approved by the Executive Committee. In FY15, the ORS Office 

will test the ORS–4 Super Strypi experimental launch vehicle and will continue the 

development of the ORS–5, Space Situational Awareness operational demonstration 

satellite, in conjunction with SMC/SY. The 22 April 2015 EXCOM approved the ORS 

office to mitigate gaps in space based environmental monitoring. The ORS Office 

and SMC/RS will jointly execute the program. Funding will go to the AFSPC Weather Mission program element. The program will address two JROC validated capability gaps: the 2015 gap for ‘‘Ocean Surface Vector Winds’’ and the 2021 gap for 

‘‘Tropical Cyclone Intensity.’’ SMC/RS will pursue the most responsive option to 

minimize the impending gaps which is expected to be a passive space-based microwave solution as the operational gap filler. The program team will also work with 

USSTRATCOM and Joint Staff to prioritize the requirements for the program by 

June 2015. Lifecycle Sustainment will be addressed by SMC/RS. These programs 

are consistent with the stated AFSPC goal of integrating the principles of operationally responsive space into AFPSC missions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Several systems continue to experience synchronization problems 

(such as Global Positioning System [GPS] III, GPS Next Generation Operational 

Control System, and Military GPS User Equipment; Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites and Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals; Mobile 

User Objective System and the user terminals; and the Space Based Infrared System and its supporting ground system). What is being done to avoid these alignment 

issues in the future? What have the opportunity costs been as a result of these 

delays? 

General HYTEN. Answer for Global Positioning System [GPS] III, GPS Next Generation Operational Control System, and Military GPS User Equipment: 

Through the GPS Enterprise Integrator, the Air Force executes rigorous systems 

engineering and integration, synchronizing GPS capabilities to ensure programs 

meet warfighter requirements and identifying mitigation steps when synchronization fails. Delays to the delivery of the GPS III satellites and the GPS Next-Generation Operational Control Segment (OCX) have challenged synchronization, but 

mitigation efforts are being executed. For example, incremental deliveries such as 

the OCX program’s Launch and Early Checkout System (LCS) will support the first 

GPS III satellite launch and its checkout expected in FY17. Furthermore, battery 

life extension on the GPS IIR satellites extended the health of the current constellation and has so far avoided any opportunity cost from the OCX/GPS III delay. 
123 

An additional effort to synchronize the GPS Enterprise is the acceleration of the 

Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) program to ensure new anti-jam capabilities 

offered by the M-Code signal can be used at the earliest possible time. The M-Code 

signal is currently transmitted by 7 GPS IIR–M and 9 GPS IIF satellites (for a total 

of 16 M-Code transmitting satellites), nearing the necessary 18 satellites for 24-hour 

coverage. Today, the GPS system is broadcasting a modernized GPS test message 

that supports this MGUE acceleration by enabling early risk reduction events and 

operational demonstrations. The live-sky test signals also support critical space, 

ground, and user equipment development, integration and testing for the new civilian signals, L2C and L5. Since MGUE is ahead of schedule, there has been no opportunity costs associated with the user equipment. 

Answer for Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites and Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals: 

The Family of Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminal (FAB–T) is the planned command 

and control terminal for the Milstar and Advanced Extremely High Frequency 

(AEHF) satellite constellation. FAB–T development experienced technical difficulties 

leading the Department to open the production contract to competition. The competition led to lower cost terminal, however the fielding date was delayed. The 

AEHF Program currently delivers EHF capability to the warfighter through the 

Navy Multiband Terminal and the Army’s Secure Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable Tactical 

Terminal and all legacy Milstar terminals. The National Security Satellite Communications Systems Synchronization Roadmap indicates that the AEHF terminal 

fielding is synchronized with AEHF Initial Operational Capability (IOC). 20% of Extended Data Rate (XDR) capable terminals were fielded in FY13 (2 years before 

IOC) and 49% of AEHF XDR capable terminals will be fielded by the AEHF IOC 

date this summer. 

The opportunity costs associated with the delay of FAB–T fielding are difficult to 

accurately quantify. A FAB–T delay forces a risk due to reliance on current, hard 

to maintain, and poor performing systems, which increases operational risk. However, the delay did require the AEHF Program to develop an interim constellation 

command and control terminal. The program modified the planned design for AEHF 

Calibration Facility test terminals to meet nuclear hardening and operational suitability requirements. The AEHF Program produced and delivered six Interim Command and Control (IC2) terminals, which cost $50M to develop and $6M/year more 

to maintain than a FAB–T terminal. 

Answer for SBIRS: 

After overcoming early satellite and ground development delays, SBIRS has established a stable ground baseline and stable production delivery schedules for GEO 

satellites 3 and 4 which has allowed for improved synchronization of the space and 

ground segments. The current SBIRS program is synchronized with final space and 

ground systems being delivered in FY18. Three of the five mobile survivable/endurable ground systems will also be operational by 2018. The two remaining are programmed in FY16 for delivery in 2020. Moving forward, the space and ground segments will remain synchronized as the future GEO 5/6 production effort focuses on 

replenishment of the existing architecture. 

The opportunity costs related to ground development delays are difficult to accurately quantify. A portion of the planned ground capability had to be accelerated to 

provide interim operations to support the GEO 1 launch in 2011. This development 

was approximately 17% ($334M) of the total contractual effort between 2008–2011 

($1,936M), the actual opportunity cost of the acceleration cannot be discretely identified from the development cost. Additionally, the interim on-orbit sustainment efforts have successfully extended the life of the DSP constellation which enabled 

avoidance of opportunity costs from the SBIRS delays. In addition, starter data has 

been provided to Battlespace Awareness (BA)/Technical Intelligence (TI) users since 

FY2014 and will be certified as an independent source for BA/TI by the National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in July 2015. 

Mr. ROGERS. When does the Air Force plan to finalize its acquisition strategy for 

the next phase, phase 2 starting in fiscal year 2018, of the EELV program? Please 

describe the options being considered for that strategy. 

General HYTEN. During phase 2, the Air Force plans to transition off the Russian 

RD–180 by investing in launch systems that enable assured access to space by allowing the Air Force to acquire launch services from two or more domestic, commercially viable launch providers. The Air Force plans to use a four step plan that both 

invests in industry’s emerging launch system development and procures the phase 

2 launch services starting in FY2018. Step 1, the Technical Maturation and Risk 

Reduction addressing the highest technical risks associated with transitioning off 

the RD–180, is underway. The acquisition strategy for steps 2 and 3, which is the 

Government investment in industry’s Rocket Propulsion Systems (Step 2) and the 
124 

associated Launch Systems (Step 3), was signed by the Air Force Service Acquisition 

Executive on 5 June 2015. The development of the acquisition strategy for step 4, 

procuring the launch services starting in FY2018, will begin later this year. Therefore the final acquisition strategy for step 4 will likely not be approved in late 

FY2016 or early FY2017. Regardless, the goal of the strategy will be to assure access to space with two or more launch systems available at all times, while 

leveraging competition to the maximum extent possible. 

Mr. ROGERS. With the delays of both GPS III and OCX, when does the Air Force 

plan to deploy Military code (M-code) signal capability? 

General HYTEN. M-Code test and user equipment integration capability is available today, with 16 satellites broadcasting M-Code messages provided by a test capability attached to the ground system. The current estimate for the space segment 

to attain 18 satellites broadcasting M-Code is 4QCY2015 with GPS IIF–11. The 

ground segment full command and control capability (OCX Block 1) is scheduled for 

delivery July 2019. The Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) is based on service 

schedules, however the first platform scheduled to complete is the B–2 in 2017. 

Mr. ROGERS. Given the GPS III and OCX delays, what is the risk of not sustaining the current, as well as required, levels of GPS service, and what is being 

done about this risk? 

General HYTEN. The required GPS level of service is at risk if capability is not 

delivered by the constellation sustainment need date. This date is currently driven 

by GPS III Space Vehicle 01 (SV01) entering the operational constellation, which 

requires GPS III SV01 to be ready to launch as well as having a ground system 

ready to launch, checkout, and operationally command the satellite. The GPS Next 

Generation Operational Control System (OCX) is under development to provide the 

ground launch, checkout, and command and control capability. 

The current schedules for both OCX Block 1 and GPS III SV01 project delivery 

in time to meet the constellation sustainment need date and maintain the required 

levels of GPS service. In the event of future schedule delays to the OCX Block 1 

ground system, the program office initiated development of a short-term GPS III 

Contingency Operations capability that will enable interim on-orbit operation of 

GPS III satellites and reduce risk of diminished levels of PNT services should OCX 

Block 1 delivery be further delayed. Although the GPS III satellite development has 

been delayed more than 2 years, we are seeing progress and believe it will be delivered prior to the constellation sustainment need date with margin. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Space Based 

Infrared System (SBIRS) programs are in the process of assessing options for future 

systems through Analyses of Alternatives (AOAs). Both programs face the reality of 

making acquisition decisions for future systems within the next several years. However, the AOA efforts have experienced delays. 

a. To what extent will the AOA delays affect the DOD’s ability to make informed 

acquisition decisions? 

b. When do decisions need to be made for how to proceed with satellite systems, 

such as AEHF and SBIRS? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Both the Protected Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Advanced 

Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) 

Analyses of Alternatives (AoAs) will conclude this summer, and although this is 

later than originally planned, there has been minimal effect on the Department’s 

ability to make informed acquisition decisions. Acquisition decisions for both followon capabilities will benefit from the additional comprehensive analysis of architectural alternatives. Military Department and capability acquisition representatives 

have participated extensively in both AoA processes, and they have used this knowledge to inform their Fiscal Year 2016–2020 President’s Budget request submissions. 

Both AoAs will have concluded prior to the Department needing to begin making 

decisions on future acquisitions. Initial acquisition decisions are needed in early 

2016 for a polar SATCOM follow-on capability and to enable timely fielding of protected tactical SATCOM capabilities. Based on constellation replenishment needs 

dates, the Department will need to make a decision for both the AEHF follow-on 

capability and the SBIRS follow-on decision to support program starts by FY2018. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the plans for the Operationally Responsive Space program 

office? 

Mr. LOVERRO. The Operationally Responsive Space Program Office will continue 

to provide a transformational way by which DOD designs, builds, and launches national security satellites. Specifically, the Program Office is intended to ensure rapid 

development and deployment capability for satellites in response to unanticipated 

needs and persistent threats in space. The FY 2016 DOD Budget Request requests 

$6.5M for the Program Office to continue its work on this mandate. The Air Force 

Space and Missile Systems Center is working with the Program Office to incor-
125 

porate transformational concepts into its own acquisition and development processes, and retains the possibility of utilizing the Program Office to meet warfighter 

requirements on a rapid timeline if the need arises. 

Mr. ROGERS. Several systems continue to experience synchronization problems 

(such as Global Positioning System [GPS] III, GPS Next Generation Operational 

Control System, and Military GPS User Equipment; Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites and Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals; Mobile 

User Objective System and the user terminals; and the Space Based Infrared System and its supporting ground system). What is being done to avoid these alignment 

issues in the future? What have the opportunity costs been as a result of these 

delays? 

Mr. LOVERRO. The Department takes seriously all program delays and issues with 

systems synchronization. To address these issues and avoid them in the future, in 

late 2014 the Department conducted a comprehensive study to look at these programs and their associated synchronization issues. The study found that many of 

the synchronization issues are the result of insufficiently defined measures and 

processes for system alignment. To address these issues, the study provided standardized Department-wide metrics for whole-of-system synchronization. DOD is now 

implementing a standard assessment of integration and synchronization efforts 

across the space portfolio to ensure that issues are addressed early in the development and acquisition process and are successfully resolved. 

Beyond the establishment of standard metrics of assessment, tangible mitigating 

efforts are being implemented to ensure future synchronization. For example, the 

Space-Based Infrared System is now operating on a stable delivery schedule for its 

third and fourth Geosynchronous Earth Orbit satellites, and the current program 

has effectively synchronized space and ground system development for delivery of 

additional capability in FY2018. Furthermore, a lack of synchronization between the 

Global Positioning System (GPS)-III constellation and its Next-Generation Operational Control Segment has largely been mitigated by extending the battery life on 

current GPS IIR satellites. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the major acquisition challenges regarding the development, deployment, and sustainment of space systems? 

a. What plans are in development and/or in place for addressing these challenges? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. The major acquisition challenges to space systems are driven by the increasingly contested space environment. With the emergence of new 

threats to satellite systems from China and Russia, resiliency has become a top requirement for our space architectures to ensure those capabilities will be there when 

needed. The need for resilience has driven the Department to examine a range of 

alternate future architectures for our space capabilities. The major challenge will be 

to transition to these more resilient architectures, across several mission areas, 

while maintaining current capabilities and services. Specifically, 1) our development 

and deployment timelines must be aligned with need dates, 2) our new architecture 

must, in some cases, be compatible with existing ground and user infrastructure, 

and 3) our architecture decisions must be coordinated and synchronized across related mission areas. All of this must be accomplished against the backdrop of a challenged industrial base and constantly evolving threat environment. 

At the same time, the increase in both private sector and international activity 

in space provides opportunity. The Department may be able to achieve more of its 

space-based capability needs through agreements and collaboration with foreign 

strategic partners and emerging private sector space-based services. Fully exploring 

and leveraging these opportunities, however, will require increased acquisition agility to keep pace with the private sector decision timelines. We must also develop 

new approaches to risk management; putting sufficient safeguards in place to ensure national security objectives can be achieved even in the event of bankruptcy, 

strikes, partner nation budget fluctuations and other uncertainties. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Space Based 

Infrared System (SBIRS) programs are in the process of assessing options for future 

systems through Analyses of Alternatives (AOAs). Both programs face the reality of 

making acquisition decisions for future systems within the next several years. However, the AOA efforts have experienced delays. 

a. To what extent will the AOA delays affect the DOD’s ability to make informed 

acquisition decisions? 

b. When do decisions need to be made for how to proceed with satellite systems, 

such as AEHF and SBIRS? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. The delays will impact the DOD, but in a positive manner. 

Our experience gained from the recent AoAs have resulted in a higher level of collaboration and understanding across the DOD for these informational needs and 

various perspectives, and added attention to resiliency driven by increased threats. 
126 

As part of the Department’s decision process, insights from AoAs complement other 

important information derived from national security strategy and future challenges, relationships to future plans and programs, knowledge of current and projected capabilities and gaps, current and projected intelligence and threat assessments. The results of these AoAs should strengthen DOD’s decision making process 

from the perspective of capabilities/needs assessment, PPBE, and acquisition. 

The SBIRS Follow-On AoA has completed the analysis phase and the Air Force 

is synthesizing the insights including cost, schedule, performance, and resiliency, to 

inform architectural deliberations across the Department this summer. Similarly, 

the Department expects to gain important insights from the Protected Satellite 

Communications AoA when its analysis phase concludes later this summer. 

The decisions for these systems need to be made by Fall 2015/early in FY 2016. 

More specifically, the formal acquisition decisions for the aforementioned systems 

depend on the selected architecture, functional availability analysis of the existing 

SBIRS, AEHF and Enhanced Polar System constellations, and the transition strategies from today’s architectures to the future architectures. The results of the Department’s deliberations this summer will inform decisions potentially as early as 

FY2016 and guide pre-acquisition activities in advance of formal program initiation. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the plans for the Operationally Responsive Space program 

office? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. The Department of Defense included $6.5M in its FY16 

Budget Request for the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office. The program 

office has a unique mandate and acquisition authorities to drive down cost and decrease delivery time for urgently needed space capabilities, thus enabling a broad 

range of replenishment and reconstitution options. 

Two examples where the Air Force looks to integrate ORS concepts are Weather 

System Follow-On (WSF) and Space Based Space Surveillance Follow-On (SBSS– 

FO). These candidate programs have well defined funding and requirements, good 

commercial small system concepts, and will benefit from streamlined acquisition authorities. 

The WSF program plans to use flight proven technologies and designs for a low 

risk solution to satisfy weather capability gaps. It also plans to utilize ORS contractual vehicles that allow for a responsive procurement of a commercial satellite bus 

and responsive acquisition practices to deliver the operational capability over two 

years sooner. The SBSS–FO mission is a cost-constrained program using mature 

‘‘commercial-like’’ technologies to meet a current space surveillance system end-oflife capability gap. It is utilizing technology from the prototype ORS–5 mission in 

order to provide reuse of government reference designs. 

Mr. ROGERS. Several systems continue to experience synchronization problems 

(such as Global Positioning System [GPS] III, GPS Next Generation Operational 

Control System, and Military GPS User Equipment; Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites and Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals; Mobile 

User Objective System and the user terminals; and the Space Based Infrared System and its supporting ground system). What is being done to avoid these alignment 

issues in the future? What have the opportunity costs been as a result of these 

delays? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. USD(AT&L) constantly strives to eliminate synchronization 

issues in our acquisition efforts. The Department determined the definition and 

metrics for ‘‘synchronization’’ across space mission areas did not exist. The Department is implementing a standard assessment of integration/synchronization across 

the space portfolio more closely integrated with the budget formulation and deliberation process. As Mr. Kendall indicated in his January 26, 2015 letter to the congressional defense committees, the Department will be submitting an initial exemplar report covering a single representative program (Space Based Infrared System) 

in June 2015, and a comprehensive initial annual report with submission of the FY 

2017 President’s Budget. Additionally, this approach can be applied for future programs being approved at Milestone B in order to fulfill the statutory requirements 

contained in the FY 2013 NDAA. 

As Chairman Rogers noted, significant opportunity costs have resulted from the 

lack of synchronization. An example of this problem is the Mobile User Objective 

System (MUOS) waveform capable user terminals. The legacy transponder payload 

side of the MUOS satellite is being used for operations, but the full operational use 

of the MUOS satellites will not be possible until a significant number of terminals 

of different types are fielded. Synchronization of MUOS and the user terminals is 

highly complex and has significant challenges. Despite these challenges, the Navy, 

in close coordination with the Army, has successfully integrated the MUOS waveform with the Army’s Handheld, Manpack, Small Formfit (HMS) Manpack terminal. 

As much as the Department has recognized the synchronization problems with 
127 

MUOS, we have also identified synchronization issues in other space mission areas. 

In addition to the measures identified herein, the Department will continue to work 

diligently to close these synchronization issues across the space enterprise. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is your perspective on the importance of having a capability 

to support urgent warfighter space requirements, as the Operationally Responsive 

Space office was intended? 

General RAYMOND. It is imperative that the warfighter has access to responsive 

space-based capabilities in this increasingly contested, congested and competitive 

space environment. The Operationally Responsive Space Office is a great asset that 

anticipates, and responds to, challenges within the space domain. The office also addresses urgent warfighter requirements that can be met with space-based assets, 

and helps us to extend our advantages in space and increase resiliency. The importance of having this capability will increase as the trend toward smaller operationally relevant CubeSats materializes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are there any space capabilities that you currently rely on from the 

Air Force, in order to most effectively and efficiently perform your mission? Please 

describe these capabilities and dependency relationships, the plan going forward, 

and the impact on the warfighter. 

Mr. CARDILLO. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the major acquisition challenges regarding the development, deployment, and sustainment of space systems? 

a. What plans are in development and/or in place for addressing these challenges? 

Ms. SAPP. The operating environment in which the NRO finds itself continues to 

grow in complexity. Targets are becoming increasingly vague and fleeting, and our 

adversaries are aggressively pursuing denial and deception techniques. They are developing capabilities to threaten our collection assets, and the pace of change is as 

rapid as it has ever been. Therefore, we must continually seek increasingly innovative approaches to keep pace and improve our capabilities. At NRO, we are thinking 

outside the box to create unusual or unexpected uses of existing sensor systems. Our 

adversaries continue to develop new and improved means to destroy our freedom of 

action in space, so we must develop collection systems with enhanced survivability 

built in from the beginning. We must also factor in affordability; we are designing 

architectures, systems, and technologies to increase intelligence collection value, to 

improve efficiency, and to reduce cost of ownership. Innovation enables us to meet 

these challenges and lead the world in intelligence dominance. To ensure that we 

are always on the leading edge with the newest technologies, the NRO has one office, the Advanced Systems and Technology Directorate (AS&T), focused on research 

and development. AS&T explores, tests, and develops, and transitions revolutionary 

new capabilities to our current and future architecture. AS&T hosts a variety of forums and collaborative research programs with industry, government, and academia, always searching for the most promising technologies. Another mechanism 

to address acquisition challenges is having a strong acquisition workforce, which applies best practices and maintains and close and enduring partnership with our industry partners. A critical NRO organizational asset is the Acquisition Center of Excellence (ACE). For the past 17 years, ACE has provided targeted acquisition training; acquisition support services; and helped to ensure open communications with 

industry. ACE provides vital acquisition support services to the NRO workforce, particularly for competitive acquisitions. It provides the facilities, tools, and support for 

competitive source selection processes. In doing this, ACE helps to ensure the NRO 

selects the best value solution to its mission requirements. Additionally, ACE provides a communication capability with our industry partners. Within the ACE is the 

Acquisition Research Center, which provides classified and unclassified web sites as 

portals for industry into NRO business opportunities, including upcoming solicitations and on-going acquisitions. The ARC allows industry to access data on upcoming NRO acquisitions and helps ACE reach a broader industry base for NRO’s mission requirements. The ARC capability enables industry to communicate with the 

NRO early in the acquisition planning phase. This is extremely important since 

early industry input can help us revise our requirements to attract the widest industry interest. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. We know that civil agencies can get OPIR data, such as that from 

SBIRS, at a classified level. This is useful where those civil agencies can declassify 

the data. However, there are agencies who need the data, but who cannot declassify 

the data and/or who do not have appropriate clearances. What is the Air Force doing 
128 

to advance policy and technical solutions that meet the civil needs for declassified 

OPIR data, such as for use in fighting forest fires in Colorado and other high-risk 

states? 

General HYTEN. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) is in the process of completing a review and updating our security classification guidance across all programs to ensure that we provided consistent guidance with the appropriate classification risk levels. Specifically, we are conducting a review and in the process of 

updating Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) security classification guide. Today, 

AFSPC units provide OPIR data and reports to DOD and civil agencies where they 

are able to interpret the data and provide the appropriate context in conjunction 

with other data sources. In accordance with our current security guidance, when 

SBIRS derived products are combined with data from other sources, from areas 

where there is enough viable sources to provide plausible deniability, the end products would be unclassified. 

Mr. LAMBORN. We have read the recent press about the Air Force’s desire to turn 

Wideband Global SATCOM operations over to industry. How is the Air Force posturing itself to take advantage of this and other opportunities, such as enabling 

AFSCN connectivity to commercial antenna networks? 

General HYTEN. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) continues to explore opportunities to partner with commercial industry to provide uninterrupted space effects to 

the US warfighter. The initial space operation effort focuses on transitioning from 

purely military operations to a proper mixture of military and contractor personnel, 

with Global Positioning System (GPS) as the pathfinder. Additional potential manpower savings, either military or contractor can be gained through enhanced automation opportunities of ground command and control systems. 

Concerning the Air Force’s desire to transition Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) 

satellite vehicle operations from military operations to industry operations, AFSPC 

has not determined a specific timeline to potentially transition WGS Satellite operations from military to commercial industry. Lessons learned from GPS effort will 

inform decisions on future opportunities in other space capability areas. 

Concerning the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN), AFSPC conducted 

a preliminary study on AFSCN Commercial Provisioning, but there is more work 

to do. There is an independent review underway to explore broader options that 

could include AFSCN that should culminate later this year. 

Mr. LAMBORN. The performance issues with Raytheon’s OCX contract have been 

well documented, particularly in recent weeks. How is Air Force Space Command 

reducing risk and creating potential GPS III ground control requirement off-ramps 

should Raytheon continue to perform poorly? 

General HYTEN. The Space and Missile Systems Center, Global Positioning Systems Directorate has initiated a short-term GPS III Contingency Operations capability development to allow GPS III satellites to support the constellation 

sustainment need date. This provides risk reduction in the event of late GPS Next 

Generation Command and Control System (OCX) delivery. 

On 9 February 2015, a Federal Business Opportunities (FBO) announcement was 

released for this activity. Anticipated contract award is in 2QFY16. The program office is also studying a long-term solution to provide executable options in the event 

an off-ramp is needed. The Air Force will balance the affordability of the current 

strategy versus the regrets of pursuing an off-ramp strategy. 

Mr. LAMBORN. We know that civil agencies can get OPIR data, such as that from 

SBIRS, at a classified level. This is useful where those civil agencies can declassify 

the data. However, there are agencies who need the data, but who cannot declassify 

the data and/or who do not have appropriate clearances. What is the Air Force doing 

to advance policy and technical solutions that meet the civil needs for declassified 

OPIR data, such as for use in fighting forest fires in Colorado and other high-risk 

states? 

Mr. LOVERRO. The Air Force, through Air Space Command, provides Overhead 

Persistent Infrared (OPIR) data throughout DOD and to civil agencies for data interpretation and analysis. The Air Force understands that there is an issue with 

the release of classified OPIR data to U.S. departments and agencies without appropriate security clearances. To address this issue, Air Force Space Command is conducting a review of its security classification guidance, especially for data from the 

Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS). Once this review is complete, the Department expects to be able to release more unclassified SBIRS data to U.S. departments and agencies that require access to the data. 

Mr. LAMBORN. We have read the recent press about the Air Force’s desire to turn 

Wideband Global SATCOM operations over to industry. How is the Air Force posturing itself to take advantage of this and other opportunities, such as enabling 

AFSCN connectivity to commercial antenna networks? 
129 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and Space and Missile 

Systems Center (SMC) are exploring ways to contract for commercial services to operate Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) and AFSCN Telemetry, Tracking, and 

Command (TT&C) to take advantage of industry efficiencies. Currently, AFSPC and 

SMC are analyzing the results of a recently completed Commercial Provisioning 

study that will be used to develop future options based on mission requirements. 

This will also require legal review of the options to ascertain if there are any barriers to various approaches. 

Mr. LAMBORN. The performance issues with Raytheon’s OCX contract have been 

well documented, particularly in recent weeks. How is Air Force Space Command 

reducing risk and creating potential GPS III ground control requirement off-ramps 

should Raytheon continue to perform poorly? 

Mr. WEATHERINGTON. Air Force Space Command has initiated a short-term GPS 

III Contingency Operations ground system capability development to reduce the constellation sustainment risk associated with any additional delays to OCX. Contingency Operations will allow the Air Force, prior to the full OCX functionality, to 

launch and checkout the initial GPS III satellites and make their signals operationally available to GPS users. The Air Force is also studying a potential long-term 

solution for meeting all validated OCX requirements should intractable problems 

with the current acquisition program require the Service to pursue an alternative 

strategy. 

Æ