In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 06-1333

DANUT FLOROIU, ALINA FLOROIU,

and DANIA FLOROIU,

Petitioners,

v.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES,

Respondent.

____________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals.

Nos. A95-920-814, A95-920-813, and A95-920-815

____________

ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

____________

AUGUST 22, 2007

____________

Before RIPPLE, ROVNER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. In a previous opinion, we granted the

petition for review filed by Mr. and Mrs. Floroiu, Seventhday Adventists from Romania who, along with their

daughter Dania, had been denied asylum, withholding

of removal and relief under the Convention Against

Torture. Floroiu v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 970, 971 (7th Cir.

2007). We remanded the case and recommended that it
2 No. 06-1333

be assigned to a different immigration judge (“IJ”); we

did so because we concluded that the original IJ in the

Floroius’ case had manifested a clear bias against them that

had denied them due process of law. Id. at 971, 973. The

petitioners have now moved for an award of attorney’s fees

and costs. They seek reimbursement of $7,600 in attorney’s

fees, which represents 47.50 hours at a rate of $160 per

hour. They also request $324 in costs, which includes the

filing fee and the cost of making copies. The total award

sought is $7,924. For purposes of this opinion, we presume

familiarity with our previous opinion.

Private litigants in immigration cases are eligible for

attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28

U.S.C. § 2412 (“EAJA”), if they can establish the statutory

grounds for an award. See Muhur v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 653

(7th Cir. 2004). To prevail on a motion for fees under

the EAJA, a party must show that: (1) he was a prevailing

party; (2) the Government’s position was not substantially justified; (3) there existed no special circumstances

that would make an award unjust; and (4) he filed a

timely and complete application for fees. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d)(1)(A)-(B); Cunningham v. Barnhart, 440 F.3d 862,

863 (7th Cir. 2006). It is undisputed that the Floroius are

prevailing parties, but the Government contends that its

position was substantially justified and that the application for attorney’s fees is incomplete.

The Government bears the burden of establishing that its

position on appeal was “substantially justified.”

Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 382 F.3d 721, 724 (7th Cir. 2004).

A position that is substantially justified is one that is

“justified in substance or in the main” or “justified to a

degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v.

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
No. 06-1333 3

In its memorandum in opposition to the fee request, the

Government does not attempt to justify in the slightest its

prior position to this court that the IJ may have been “rude

and impatient,” Respondent’s Br. at 41, but remained

“impartial[],” id. at 42. Indeed, the Government concedes

that the IJ’s characterization of the petitioners as “religious

zealots” was “inappropriate.” Respondent’s Mem. at 5.

Instead, the Government argues that it was substantially

justified in defending the IJ’s decision on the ground that

the petitioners had not established past persecution or a

well-founded fear of future persecution. In short, despite

the due process violation, the Government contends that

it was substantially justified in defending the agency

action on the basis of what it contends is the Floroius’

ultimate failure to establish statutory eligibility for the

relief sought.

The Government’s position on this matter rests on a

fundamental misunderstanding of the decision of this

court. The reason that we were required to remand this

case was not that the IJ had made an “inappropriate”

comment. Id. at 5. Instead, the comment, alongside the

other improprieties in the conduct of the hearing that

we discussed in our opinion, were evidence of the clear

bias of the IJ. That bias “taint[ed] the proceedings, erode[d]

the appearance of fairness and create[d] substantial uncertainty as to whether the record below was fairly and reliably

developed,” consequences so severe that they amounted to

a deprivation of due process of law. Floroiu, 481 F.3d at 974

(emphasis added). The Government’s contention that the

Floroius’ claim fails on the merits does not recognize that,

until the taint of bias is removed, there is no basis for any

conclusion whatsoever about the merits of the Floroius’ claim.

Therefore, not only was the position of the United States
4 No. 06-1333

regarding the due process issue itself not substantially

justified, so too is any position that argues from the record

developed in those proceedings—before a biased decisionmaker—lacking in substantial justification. The Government’s position, therefore, was not simply incorrect; it

was unreasonable. See Marcus v. Shalala, 17 F.3d 1033, 1036

(7th Cir. 1994) (stating that a position is substantially

justified if a reasonable person could believe it correct and

citing Pierce, 487 U.S. at 566 n.2); see also Golembiewski, 382

F.3d at 725 (noting that our recommended reassignment of

a case to a different Administrative Law Judge and firm

condemnation of the agency’s position, as occurred in this

case, both support the conclusion that the Government’s

position lacks substantial justification).

Moreover, as we have noted, it is the Government’s

burden to establish that its position was substantially

justified. In its response, the Government does not cite a

single authority in support of its position. As outlined

above, our independent review of this case, in light of the

EAJA standards, confirms to us that this is an appropriate

circumstance for an award of fees.

The Government also argues that, if fees are awarded,

the petitioners should not recover their fees at the $160

per hour rate requested because that rate exceeds the

statutory maximum. The maximum statutory rate for a

fee award under the EAJA is $125 per hour, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii), but the statute does permit a court to

award higher rates; a higher rate may be appropriate

only when “the court determines that an increase in the

cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved,

justifies a higher fee.” Id.; see also Raines v. Shalala, 44 F.3d

1355, 1360-61 (7th Cir. 1995).
No. 06-1333 5

In support of his request for a higher fee, the petitioners’

attorney states that he has twenty years of experience in

immigration law and is a member of an association of

immigration lawyers. Petitioners’ Mtn. at 4. We have

endorsed the view that attorneys with specialized immigration experience may be entitled, in certain cases, to an

award in excess of the statutory maximum. We have

suggested such an award may be appropriate when a

petitioner demonstrates that his attorney brought “relevant

expertise to a case, such as knowledge of foreign cultures

or of particular, esoteric nooks and crannies of immigration law, in which such expertise is needed to give the

alien a fair shot at prevailing.” Muhur, 382 F.3d at 656.

Here, we have only counsel’s statement of his years of

experience in immigration law and a conclusory statement that this case involved “complexities” and extensive

“research [of] procedural rules, substantive and constitutional law.” Aff’t. at 1. We do not consider this blanket

statement of the difficulty of the issues presented and the

years of experience of the practitioner involved sufficient

to justify piercing the statutory ceiling. See Johnson v.

Gonzales, 416 F.3d 205, 213 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that a

case involving straightforward application of established

standards, rather than “little-known areas of immigration

law or particular knowledge of [the petitioner’s] culturefactors” did not justify a fee enhancement). As in Muhur

v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2004), this request is

unaccompanied by sufficient information regarding the

particular qualifications of the attorney involved, the

manner in which those qualifications were brought to

bear on this litigation or information regarding the availability of attorneys with qualifications that would permit

them to pursue adequately this case. Id. at 214 (denying a

fee enhancement to one of the petitioner’s attorneys
6 No. 06-1333

who had not supported the request with relevant information regarding her qualifications). We therefore recalculate the award at a rate of $125 per hour, which, multiplied

by 47.50 hours—a block of time the Government does not

challenge and we think reasonable—yields $5,937.50.

Adding in the uncontested bill of costs of $324, we award

petitioners $6,261.50.

IT IS SO ORDERED

A true Copy:

Teste:

 _____________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—8-22-07