An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in 

accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of 

Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA15-4

Filed: 15 September 2015

New Hanover County, No. 13 CRS 055297

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

CALVIN DEMETRIUS THOMPSON, Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 31 July 2014 by Judge Arnold O. 

Jones in New Hanover County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 

August 2015.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Belinda A. 

Smith, for the State.

Dunn, Pittman, Skinner & Cushman, PLLC, by Rudolph A. Ashton, III, for 

defendant-appellant.

BRYANT, Judge.

Where the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the State was such 

that a jury could reasonably find that defendant aided and abetted in a burglary, 

defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence was properly denied. 

Where the trial court conducted a Rule 403 balancing test and found that a Facebook 
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Opinion of the Court

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posting by defendant was more probative than prejudicial, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in the admission of that evidence. 

On 12 August 2013, defendant Calvin Demetrius Thompson was indicted on 

charges of second-degree burglary, felony larceny, possession of stolen goods, injury 

to real property, the resist, delay, or obstruct of an officer, and driving while license 

revoked. A superseding indictment for the same charges was entered 9 September 

2013. The charges came on for trial during the 28 July 2014 criminal session of 

Superior Court, the Honorable Arnold O. Jones, Judge presiding. At trial, the State’s 

evidence tended to show the following.

During the evening and early morning hours of 23—24 June 2013, Tyson 

Amick and his fiancé observed a car driving slowly down the street with its headlights 

turned off. After observing the car, a Jeep Cherokee, make a third slow pass down 

the road and stop in front of a neighbor’s, Mr. Spangler’s, house, Amick called 911 to 

report the activity as suspicious. After the car stopped in front of Spangler’s house, 

Amick watched people exit the car. As the car slowly drove away down the street, 

Amick “noticed what seemed to be activity coming from the interior of the residence 

[of Spangler’s house].” After a few minutes, Amick watched five individuals exit the

house and walk past his house; Amick described the individuals as “carrying several 

objects,” including a flat-screen TV and “garbage bags that had been filled with 
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Opinion of the Court

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stuff[.]” The car returned and stopped in front of Amick’s house where it picked up 

the individuals and the items before slowly driving off. 

As the car drove away, Amick flagged down a police car responding to his 

earlier 911 call. After pointing out the departing car’s taillights to the police officer,

Officer Creech, Amick stated that Officer Creech “immediately drove away” in pursuit 

of the car. 

Officer Creech testified that after he caught up to the car Amick had pointed 

out to him, it took “about seven blocks” for the car to stop. Upon stopping the car, 

Officer Creech observed six occupants in the vehicle, including an individual laying 

down on top of a large flat-screen TV in the back of the vehicle. Three individuals 

sitting in the car’s back seats were observed holding a small TV and a black bag. The 

driver of the car identified himself as Aaron Edge and told Officer Creech that he did 

not have a driver’s license. Additional police officers arrived to assist Officer Creech 

at this time, and one officer identified the driver of the car as defendant. A computer 

search by Officer Creech determined that Aaron Edge was a fictitious name and that 

defendant was in fact the driver of the car. 

While Officer Creech processed defendant and the other individuals in the car, 

Corporal Willet went to Spangler’s house and determined that the house had been 

broken into. Officer Creech placed defendant and the other occupants of the car under 
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Opinion of the Court

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arrest. Corporal Willet later contacted Mr. Spangler and confirmed that the items 

seized from defendant’s car had been taken from Spangler’s house. 

Prior to the trial commencing, the State dismissed the charge of driving while 

license revoked. At the close of the State’s evidence, defendant moved to dismiss all 

charges; the trial court granted the motion for the charge of resisting arrest only. 

On 31 July 2014, a jury convicted defendant of second-degree burglary, felony 

larceny, possession of stolen goods, and injury to real property. Defendant was 

sentenced to a term of 15 to 27 months for second-degree burglary, a consecutive term 

of 9 to 20 months for felony larceny, and a term of 120 days for injury to real property. 

Judgment was arrested for possession of stolen goods. Defendant appeals.

_____________________________

Defendant raises three issues on appeal as to whether the trial court erred (I) 

in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, (II) in allowing the prosecutor to crossexamine defendant about a Facebook posting, and (III) in failing to dismiss 

defendant’s charges because of a faulty indictment.

I.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. 

We disagree.

Upon defendant's motion for dismissal, the question 

for the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of 

each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser 

offense included therein, and (2) of defendant's being the 
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Opinion of the Court

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perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly 

denied. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion. We view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all 

reasonable inferences. Contradictions and discrepancies do 

not warrant dismissal of the case but are for the jury to 

resolve. 

State v. Parlee, 209 N.C. App. 144, 146, 703 S.E.2d 866, 869 (2011) (citations and 

quotations omitted). 

Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the 

charges of second-degree burglary, felony larceny, and injury to real property for 

insufficiency of the evidence, “even upon the theory of aiding and abetting.” 

To pursue a charge based on the theory of aiding and abetting, the State must 

present evidence “(1) that the crime was committed by another; (2) that the defendant 

knowingly advised, instigated, encouraged, procured, or aided the other person; and 

(3) that the defendant's actions or statements caused or contributed to the 

commission of the crime by the other person.” State v. Marion, ___ N.C. App. ___, 

___, 756 S.E.2d 61, 68 (2014) (quoting State v. Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 24, 478 S.E.2d 163, 

175 (1996)). 

A person may be guilty as an aider and abettor if that 

person . . . accompanies the actual perpetrator to the 

vicinity of the offense and, with the knowledge of the actual 

perpetrator, remains in that vicinity for the purpose of 

aiding and abetting in the offense and sufficiently close to 

the scene of the offense to render aid in its commission, if 

needed, or to provide a means by which the actual 
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Opinion of the Court

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perpetrator may get away from the scene upon the 

completion of the offense.

State v. Pryor, 59 N.C. App. 1, 7, 295 S.E.2d 610, 615 (1982) (citation and quotation 

omitted). Indeed,

[i]t is not necessary for any of those elements to be proven 

to the trial court beyond a reasonable doubt before the trial 

court may instruct on aiding and abetting; there needs only 

to be evidence supporting the instructions, and the jury is

to determine whether the State has proved the elements 

beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Baskin, 190 N.C. App. 102, 111—12, 660 S.E.2d 566, 573—74 (2008) (citation 

omitted). 

The State’s evidence against defendant included the testimony of eyewitness 

Amick who stated that defendant drove his car slowly, with the headlights turned off, 

up and down the street multiple times, and that the individuals who burglarized 

Spangler’s house were let out of defendant’s car in front of Spangler’s house and then 

picked up by defendant (while carrying items taken from the Spangler residence) a 

short time later. Defendant contends his trial testimony, as well as that of a codefendant, Michael Vann, showed no express agreement by defendant to commit 

robbery; however, notwithstanding defendant’s evidence to the contrary, the State’s 

evidence was sufficient for a jury to find defendant committed the offenses charged. 

See, e.g., State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 596, 573 S.E.2d 866, 869 (2002) (“In reviewing 

challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most 
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Opinion of the Court

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favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences. 

Contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of the case but are for the 

jury to resolve. . . . [T]he defendant's evidence should be disregarded unless it is 

favorable to the State or does not conflict with the State's evidence. The defendant's 

evidence that does not conflict may be used to explain or clarify the evidence offered 

by the State.” (citations and quotation omitted)). Therefore, regardless, “[w]hen 

ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court should be concerned only about whether 

the evidence is sufficient for jury consideration, not about the weight of the evidence.” 

Id.; see also Parlee, 209 N.C. App. at 146, 703 S.E.2d at 869 (in reviewing a motion to 

dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence, only evidence favorable to the State is to be 

considered). As such, defendant’s argument is overruled.

II.

Defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to crossexamine him about a Facebook posting. We disagree.

Pursuant to Rule 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, “[a]lthough 

relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed 

by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 

by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 

cumulative evidence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (2013). We review a trial 
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court's Rule 403 ruling for abuse of discretion. State v. Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. 127, 

130, 726 S.E.2d 156, 159 (2012).

Defendant testified on his own behalf during the trial. On cross-examination, 

the State, as part of its case against defendant as a knowing participant in the 

robbery, sought to question defendant about a posting on defendant’s Facebook page. 

Defendant’s posting was as follows: “Snitching at an all time high I just got back from 

court YO N****Z SNITCHING. . . .!!!!”1 Defendant objected and sought to suppress 

evidence regarding the posting. During voir dire, the State argued that the posting 

was relevant because it was posted on the same date as defendant’s earlier court date

and referenced a conversation defendant had that day with a co-defendant, Michael 

Vann, who had agreed to testify as a witness for the State in the instant case. The 

trial court, after hearing the arguments of counsel, denied defendant’s motion to 

suppress the posting, noting that:

The jury can hear it, find what they want to, they are the 

finders of fact. 

. . . 

I’m going to find that it is relevant pursuant to Rule 401. 

That in weighing the prejudicial effect or any potential 

prejudicial effect as to relevance through the factors 

contained in [Rule] 403 that it is admissible for the course 

of this trial, for the purposes of this trial. 

 

1 We note that in the transcript, defendant’s posting was read by defendant into court as 

“Snitchin is at an all time high. I just got back from court. Yo, n****** are snitchin.” 
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Opinion of the Court

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Because the trial court conducted a balancing test under Rule 403 and determined 

that the probative value of defendant’s Facebook posting outweighed its prejudicial 

effect, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the State 

to cross-examine defendant about this posting. See State v. Washington, 141 N.C. 

App. 354, 367, 540 S.E.2d 388, 397—98 (2000) (the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting evidence where the court conducted a balancing test under 

Rule 403 and found that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial 

effect); see also State v. Spellman, No. COA13-1192, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 689 (Apr. 

8, 2014) (finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting into evidence 

the defendant’s “About Me” statement on her Facebook page). 

Defendant further argues that even if the Facebook posting was relevant 

evidence, “the relevancy was substantially outweighed by prejudice to [him].” 

Defendant’s argument must fail for, as discussed above, the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in conducting a Rule 403 balancing test and concluding that the posting 

was admissible. Moreover, although defendant contends the posting “had nothing to 

do with whether he was driving the car as an aider and abettor[,]” the evidence 

concerning the posting—that defendant made this posting the same day that he spoke 

to one of his co-defendants in court and that co-defendant admitted to defendant that 

he would be testifying as part of a plea deal with the State—supported the trial court’s 
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Opinion of the Court

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determination that the posting was both relevant and more probative than prejudicial 

to the instant matter. Accordingly, defendant’s argument is overruled.

III.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss defendant’s 

charges because of a faulty indictment, and that although this issue was never raised 

before the trial court, we should review it based on plain error. Specifically, 

defendant contends the charges should have been dismissed “because the indictment 

failed to charge [him] with aiding and abetting said crimes.” We decline to do so, for 

it is well-established by our Courts that “plain error review in North Carolina is . . . 

limited to instructional and evidentiary error.” State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 516, 

723 S.E.2d 326, 333 (2012) (citation omitted). Therefore, defendant is not entitled to 

plain error review of this issue.

We further note that defendant, in his brief to this Court, requests that we “revisit [our] position on the exclusion of aiding and abetting in an indictment[,]” arguing 

that his indictment was insufficient because it failed to charge defendant with aiding 

and abetting. Defendant’s request must be denied, for it is well-established by this 

Court that “[b]ecause aiding and abetting is not a substantive offense but just a 

theory of criminal liability, allegations of aiding and abetting are not required in an 

indictment[.]” Baskin, 190 N.C. App. at 110, 660 S.E.2d at 573 (quoting State v. 
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Opinion of the Court

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Madry, 140 N.C. App. 600, 602, 537 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2000)). Defendant’s argument 

is, therefore, dismissed.

NO ERROR. 

Judges STEPHENS and DIETZ concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).