alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1299 KA 14-01072 PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CENTRA, LINDLEY, DEJOSEPH, AND SCUDDER, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SAMUEL DIPALMA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. (APPEAL NO. 2.)

THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (TIMOTHY P. MURPHY OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

MICHAEL J. FLAHERTY, JR., ACTING DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (NICHOLAS T. TEXIDO OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (M. William Boller, A.J.), rendered October 15, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1192 [3]; 1193 [1] [c] [i] [A]) and, in appeal No. 2, he appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). The People correctly concede that the waiver of the right to appeal his conviction did not encompass defendant’s contention in appeal No. 2 that the period of postrelease supervision is unduly harsh and severe and thus does not foreclose our review of that contention ( see People v Maracle , 19 NY3d 925, 927-928; People v Diaz
, 142 AD3d 1332, 1333). We nevertheless reject that contention.

Contrary to defendant’s contention in appeal No. 1, Supreme Court did not impose a fee of $350, rather than the proper fee of $50, for the DNA databank fee ( see Penal Law § 60.35 [1] [a] [v]). Although the sentencing transcript reflects the imposition of a DNA databank fee of $350, the transcript further reflects that the court correctly stated the total amount due from defendant for fees and surcharges, which establishes that the court properly imposed a fee of $50. Moreover, the certificate of conviction correctly states that $50 was assessed for the DNA databank fee. We therefore conclude that no corrective action is necessary inasmuch as the record establishes-2- 1299 KA 14-01072
either that the court misspoke or that there is a transcription error ( see People v Kaetzel , 117 AD3d 1187, 1190, lv denied 24 NY3d 962).

Entered: December 23, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
§ 63.11 Application and issue. ( a ) An application for a certificate and appropriate class rating, or for an additional rating, under this part must be made on a form and in a manner prescribed by the Administrator. Each person who applies for airmen certification services to be administered outside the United States for any certificate or rating issued under this part must show evidence that the fee prescribed in appendix A of part 187 of this chapter has been paid.
( b ) An applicant who meets the requirements of this part is entitled to an appropriate certificate and appropriate class ratings.
( c ) Unless authorized by the Administrator, a person whose flight engineer certificate is suspended may not apply for any rating to be added to that certificate during the period of suspension.
( d ) Unless the order of revocation provides otherwise, a person whose flight engineer or flight navigator certificate is revoked may not apply for the same kind of certificate for 1 year after the date of revocation.
(Secs. 313, 601, 602, Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. 1354, 1421, and 1422); sec. 6(c), Department of Transportation Act (49 U.S.C. 1655(c)); Title V, Independent Offices Appropriations Act of 1952 (31 U.S.C. 483(a)); sec. 28, International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979 (49 U.S.C. 1159(b)))
[Doc. No. 1179, 27 FR 7969, Aug. 10, 1962, as amended by Amdt. 63-3, 30 FR 14559, Nov. 23, 1965; Amdt. 63-7, 31 FR 13523, Oct. 20, 1966; Amdt. 63-22, 47 FR 35693, Aug. 16, 1982; Amdt. 63-35, 72 FR 18558, Apr. 12, 2007 ]
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

Independent Auditors’ Consent

 

The Board of Directors 

Pulaski Financial Corp.: 

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (No. 333-32986, No. 333-84392 and No. 333-84515) on Form S-8 of Pulaski Financial Corp. of ourreport dated October 28, 2003, with respect to the consolidated balance sheet of Pulaski Financial Corp. as of September 30, 2003, and the related consolidated statements of income and comprehensive income, stockholders’ equity, and cash flowsfor the year then ended, which report appears in the September 30, 2003, annual report on Form 10-K of Pulaski Financial Corp. 

 

/s/ KPMG LLP 

 

St. Louis, Missouri 

December 29, 2003
#### William F. BANDLOW and Karl Sorenson, Appellants, v. Stuart ROTHMAN et al., individually and as General Counsel, Chairman and Members, respectively, of and constituting the National Labor Relations Board, Appellees.

No. 15279.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued March 10, 1960.

Decided March 31, 1960.

Petition for Rehearing En Banc Denied June 29, 1960.

Mr. Karl M. Dollak, Bethesda, Md., for appellants.

Mr. Duane B. Beeson, Atty., N. L. R. B., of the bar of the Supreme Court of California, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, with whom Messrs. Thomas J. McDermott, Associate Gen. Counsel, N. L. R. B., and Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, N. L. R. B., were on the brief, for appellees.

Mr. Richard J. Scupi, Atty., N. L. R. B., also entered an appearance for appellees.

Before Edgerton, Bazelon and Burger, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants asked the District Court to require the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board to issue a complaint charging unfair labor practices. They also sought to compel the Board to set aside the General Counsel’s refusal. This appeal is from an order dismissing the complaint on the grounds that the District Court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The court was clearly right. It “has no power to order the General Counsel to issue a complaint and no power to require the Board to issue an order in a matter which is not before the Board.” Hourihan v. National Labor Relations Board, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 316, 317, 201 F.2d 187, 188, certiorari denied 345 U.S. 930, 73 S.Ct. 792, 97 L.Ed. 1359.

Affirmed.
---

Exhibit
32.2


CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
 18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Tower Financial Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q/A for the period ending June 30, 2009 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Richard
R. Sawyer, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:
  (1)           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2)           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
  /s/
      Richard R. Sawyer
 Richard
R. Sawyer
 Chief
Financial Officer
 January
29, 2010
**Exhibit
      32.2**




**CERTIFICATION**





In
      connection with the periodic report of Asiamart, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form
      10-Q for the quarter ending June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and
      Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Kwan Pui Wong, Chief Financial Officer
      (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer) of the Company, hereby certify
      as
      of the date hereof, solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350
      of
      the United States Code, that to the best of my knowledge:





(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
      applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and





(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates
      and for the periods indicated.




Date: August
              19, 2008
            By:
            /s/ Kwan
              Pui WongKwan
                Pui Wong
              Chief
                  Financial Officer
                (Principal
                  Financial and Accounting
                  Officer)
#### AMERICAN ASBESTOS PRODUCTS CO v HENDRICKS

Ohio Appeals, 6th Dist, Wood Co

No 438.

Decided Dec 24, 1928

Earl D Bloom, Bowling Green, for Products Co.

S W Bowman, Bowling Green, for Hendricks.

WILLIAMS, J

We think it was erroneous for the trial court to admit evidence tending to show that the agent, before the execution of the contract, made oral statements to the effect that the paint would come ready and in condition to apply to the roof. The contract was one which could not be varied or contradicted by parol evidence.

We think it was competent, however, for the defendant to show, if he could, that the written order was changed after execution, without defendant’s authority, by placing the figure “2” before the fraction *“Vz”,*so as to make the contract, in so far as it related to the goods ordered, read *“2Vz*barrels Green Texkote” instead of *“V2*barrel Green Texkote.”

The trial judge charged the jury upon the law relating to the question of acceptance, but it appears that he did not charge that the buyer would be deemed to have accepted the goods when, after the lapse of a reasonable time, he retains them without intimating to the seller that he has rejected them. Section 8428, General Code. It appears from the evidence that a considerable length of time elansed before any notice of refusal to accept the goods was given by the buyer to the seller, and it further appears therefrom that although the buyer undertook to ship the goods back to the seller, in the first instance, the shipment was erroneously made to some one else. The jury should have been charged on this phage of the -case.

*94On the question of acceptance, we think the verdict is manifestly against the weight of the evidence. . .

. The errors referred to were prejudicial to the plaintiff in error and therefore require a reversal of this judgment.

Richards and Lloyd, JJ, concur.
#### *Peter Montfort *against*Myndert Vanarsdalen.

ON CERTIORARI.

General judgment against administrator. General judgment against administrator. (a)

to revive judgment.

Rule of reference.

Uniting private accounts with accounts as administrator. *(b)*

THIS case was argued by *M’Donald,*for plaintiff. *Frederick Frelinghuysen,*for defendant.

(a)

 Little *vs. Brannin, 1 South. 288. Woodruff vs. Woodruff, 1 South. 375. Campfield vs. Ely, 1 Gr. 150.*

(b)

**See *McKeen vs. Olyphant, 3 Har. 442. Crum vs. Moore, 1 McC. 436.*

Opinion of the court.

Kirkpatrick C. J.

The judgment in this case was against *Montfort,*as administrator of one Ilogland, for a debt due from the intestate, and was entered generally? binding his own proper goods, and not specially to be levied of goods of the intestate. Several years afterwards, there was a *scire facias,*to revive this judgment, and upon the return day, the defendant having alleged satisfaction, and having filed an account of particulars, by way of set off, against the same, a rule of reference was entered by mutual consent, *referring all matters in difference in that action, and also all accounts and demands between the parties,*to certain referees; these referees reported that there was due to the plaintiff 43 dollars and 23 cents; and upon that report, the justice entered judgment, again generally, against the defendant.

Upon the review of this proceeding, it is manifest that the first judgment was erroneous, for the administrator was not liable in his own estate; and it is quite as manifest that the second is no better; nay, that it is much worse, for instead of a general judgment, against the defendant, the only legitimate judgment that could have *790been entered, was, that execution should go for the balance found, and that against the goods of the intestate,

That there was a rule of reference, does not alter the case. The rule submits *all matters in controversy in that action, and also all accounts and demands between the parties.*What parties?- Why the parties to the suit, certainly, that is *Vanarsdalen,*the plaintiff, and *Montfort,*administrator of the defendant. The rule could mean nothing else, upop the fair construction of the words. It would have been perfect confusion, to mingle up the proper accounts of the defendant himself, with those of the intestate, a confusion which the law abhors.

Let the judgment, therefore, be reversed.
* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR
. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit

No. 96-41162 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

ADOLFO MORENO-RIOS, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of Texas

(M-96-CR-117-1) July 28, 1997 Before WISDOM, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Adolfo Moreno-Rios appeals his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than fifty kilograms of marijuana. He contends that his arrest, executed without a warrant, was not supported by probable cause. We conclude, based upon the testimony presented at the hearing on the motion to2

suppress, that the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant. See United States v. Carrillo-Morales , 27 F.3d 1054 (5th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED
.
#### W. R. Fletcher, Appellant, v. J. E. Moriarty, *Appellee.*

On Re-Hearing.

Whitfield, C. J.

— A petition for rehearing suggests that the court overlooked the contention that the lease conveyed only timber then on the lands and that the conclusion of the court that the patent referred to in the opinion may have been issued by reason of payments or otherwise and not by actual occupancy, is not warranted by the record.

The lease in this case contemplated the working for a period of three years each of different portions of the lands during succeeding years, and the ultimate termination of the lease was not provided for or shown.

The face of the patent warrants a conclusion that it may have been issued under section 8 of the Act of Congress approved May 20, 1862. Even of the patent to a portion of the lands included in the turpentine lease was issued upon a right acquired by occupancy and completed 'after the execution of the lease, the complainant will not be permitted in a court of equity to repudiate a lease with full warranty made by him, on the ground that a patent had not been issued to a portion of the lands when the lease was made, where the leassee seeks within his rights to enforce the lease only after the lessor had acquired complete title to the lands from the government.

*487Rehearing denied.

Shackleford, and Cockrell, J. J.', concur.

Taylor, Hocker and Parkhill, J. J., concur in the opinion.
§ 460.5 Crew qualifications and training. ( a ) Each crew member must— ( 1 ) Complete training on how to carry out his or her role on board or on the ground so that the vehicle will not harm the public; and
( 2 ) Train for his or her role in nominal and non-nominal conditions. The conditions must include— ( i ) Abort scenarios; and
( ii ) Emergency operations.
( b ) Each member of a flight crew must demonstrate an ability to withstand the stresses of space flight, which may include high acceleration or deceleration, microgravity, and vibration, in sufficient condition to safely carry out his or her duties so that the vehicle will not harm the public.
( c ) A pilot and a remote operator must— ( 1 ) Possess and carry an FAA pilot certificate with an instrument rating.
( 2 ) Possess aeronautical knowledge, experience, and skills necessary to pilot and control the launch or reentry vehicle that will operate in the National Airspace System (NAS). Aeronautical experience may include hours in flight, ratings, and training.
( 3 ) Receive vehicle and mission-specific training for each phase of flight by using one or more of the following— ( i ) A method or device that simulates the flight;
( ii ) An aircraft whose characteristics are similar to the vehicle or that has similar phases of flight to the vehicle ;
( iii ) Flight testing; or
( iv ) An equivalent method of training approved by the FAA through the license or permit process.
( 4 ) Train in procedures that direct the vehicle away from the public in the event the flight crew abandons the vehicle during flight; and
( 5 ) Train for each mode of control or propulsion, including any transition between modes, such that the pilot or remote operator is able to control the vehicle.
( d ) A pilot or a remote operator may demonstrate an equivalent level of safety to paragraph (c)(1) of this section through the license or permit process.
( e ) Each crew member with a safety-critical role must possess and carry an FAA second-class airman medical certificate issued in accordance with 14 CFR part 67, no more than 12 months prior to the month of launch and reentry.
[Docket No. FAA-2005-23449, 71 FR 75632, Dec. 15, 2006, as amended by Doc. No. FAA-2016-6761, Amdt. No. 460-2, 83 FR 28535, June 20, 2018]
#### The People of the State of New York. Respondent, *v.*Paul Weil, Appellant.

Submitted March 17, 1937;

decided April 20, 1937.

*654
      *Milton Friedman*and *Jerome G. Rosenhaus*for appellant.

*William Copeland Dodge, District Attorney (Philip*A. *Donahue*of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment affirmed; no opinion.

Concur: Grane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Loughran, Finch and Rippey, JJ.
Docket No: FAA - 2015 - 4812 Dir ID: 2015 - NM - 034 - AD
§ 91.1103 Pilots: Initial, transition, upgrade, requalification, and differences flight training. ( a ) Initial, transition, upgrade, requalification, and differences training for pilots must include flight and practice in each of the maneuvers and procedures contained in each of the curriculums that are a part of the approved training program.
( b ) The maneuvers and procedures required by paragraph (a) of this section must be performed in flight, except to the extent that certain maneuvers and procedures may be performed in an aircraft simulator, or an appropriate training device, as allowed by this subpart.
( c ) If the program manager's approved training program includes a course of training using an aircraft simulator or other training device, each pilot must successfully complete— ( 1 ) Training and practice in the simulator or training device in at least the maneuvers and procedures in this subpart that are capable of being performed in the aircraft simulator or training device; and
( 2 ) A flight check in the aircraft or a check in the simulator or training device to the level of proficiency of a pilot in command or second in command, as applicable, in at least the maneuvers and procedures that are capable of being performed in an aircraft simulator or training device.
March 24, 2015

Daniel Nugent

12227 Mossycup Drive 

Houston, TX 77024

Dear Mr. Nugent:

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption. It 

explains why we cannot process your request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Cannot Process Your Request

We entered your February 20, 2015 exemption request into the public docket (No. FAA-2015-

0538), but we are unable to process your request any further. The information you sent does 

not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider the request 

any further, you must send us all of the following:

• The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief and the extent of 

the relief you seek.

• The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would 

benefit the public as a whole.

• The reasons why the exemption would not adversely affect safety or how the exemption 

would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which you 

seek an exemption.

• Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request.

What You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described 

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your 

petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption.
2

If We Do Not Hear From You

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you 

further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267-9521.

Sincerely,

/s/

Jake Troutman

Program Analyst, Airmen and

Airspace Rules Division

Enclosure
#### In the Matter of the Application of George J. Gillespie et al., Constituting the Board of Water Supply of the City of New York, Appellants, to Acquire Real Property in the Towns of Shandaken, Woodstock and Olive. The New York Central Railroad Company, Respondent.

(Submitted September 28, 1936;

decided September 30, 1936.)

Motion to amend remittitur denied, with ten dollars costs and necessary printing disbursements. (See 272 N. Y. 18.)
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