19 

Risk Analysis: 

Risk of Importing Foot-and-Mouth Disease 

in Susceptible Species and Products 

from a region of Patagonia, Argentina 

Veterinary Services 

 National Import Export Services 

Regionalization Evaluation Services 

Updated January 2014 
1

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ 1 

LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... 2 

LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ 2 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................................... 3 

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 5 

Background ..................................................................................................................................... 7 

Objectives ....................................................................................................................................... 8 

Hazard identification ....................................................................................................................... 8 

Risk analysis ................................................................................................................................... 9 

Release assessment ..................................................................................................................... 9 

Eleven factor analysis ........................................................................................................... 10 

1. The authority, organization, and infrastructure of the veterinary services organization 

in the region ................................................................................................................ 10 

2. Disease status .............................................................................................................. 22 

3. The status of adjacent regions with respect to the agent ............................................. 23 

4. The extent of an active disease control program, if any, if the agent is known to exist 

in the region ................................................................................................................ 26 

5. The vaccination status of the region ........................................................................... 26 

6. The degree to which the region is separated from adjacent regions of higher risk 

through physical or other barriers ............................................................................... 26 

7. The extent to which movement of animals and animal products is controlled from 

regions of higher risk, and the level of biosecurity regarding such movements ......... 27 

8. Livestock demographics and marketing practices in the region ................................. 39 

9. The type and extent of disease surveillance in the region .......................................... 46 

10. Diagnostic laboratory capacity ................................................................................... 60 

11. Policies and infrastructure for animal disease control in the region ........................... 65 

Release Assessment – Summary of risk factors and mitigations considered ....................... 68 

Likelihood of FMD introduction into Patagonia South .................................................... 68 

Likelihood of detection of FMD if reintroduced into the Argentina The Patagonia 

Region ......................................................................................................................... 69 

Release Assessment – Conclusion ........................................................................................ 69 

Exposure Assessment................................................................................................................ 70 

Consequence Assessment ......................................................................................................... 73 

Risk Estimation ......................................................................................................................... 77 

References ..................................................................................................................................... 78

Appendix I: Epidemiological characteristics of foot-and-mouth disease............................ 81 

Appendix II.................................................................................................. .86 
2

LIST OF TABLES 

Table 1. Animal Health Personnel in the Patagonia Region, 2013. .............................................. 19 

Table 2. Human Resources at Strategic Control Posts in the Three Patagonia Sanitary Regions 

in 2012. ................................................................................................................................. 28 

Table 3. Airports with Sanitary Inspection in Patagonia South and North A and B. ................... 35 

Table 4. Livestock Producers, Establishments, and Bovine and Sheep Populations in the 

Patagonia Region in 2009............................................................................ 40 

Table 5. Pig and Goat Livestock and Establishments in the Patagonia Region in 2009........... 40 

Table 6. Livestock figures used to construct sampling lists........................................... 51 

Table 7. Compliance with Sampling for Viral Activity During 2004 and 2005............................52 

Table 8. Results of tests to detect antibodies against nonstructural proteins in bovines........... 52 

Table 9. Sampling to determine viral activity by region, 2007 and 2008.............................53 

Table 10. Interpretation of the LP ELISA according to percentage protection expectancy........54 

Table 11. ELISA 3ABC and EITB Results from Cattle in the Areas that Vaccinate Against 

FMD..................................................................................................... 55 

Table 12. Sampling Design for 2013 Surveillance Study to Evaluate Implementation of the 

National Vaccination Plan at the Local Level......................................................59 

Table 13. Number of Diagnostic Tests for FMD and VS Serology...................................63 

Table 14. Number of Diagnostic Tests for Vesicular Disease Suspect Cases, 2012................ 63 

Table 15. Economic Impacts of FMD.....................................................................74 

LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 1. Map of Argentina and List of Associated Provincial Acronyms. ................................... 4 

Figure 2: Map of Argentina FMD Regionalization Status Recognized by the OIE. ...................... 7 

Figure 3. Map of SENASA Regional and Local Units as of 2006. .............................................. 14 

Figure 4. Regional operative offices of SENASA. ....................................................................... 16 

Figure 5. SENASA’s Structure............................................................................ 17 

Figure 6. Explanation of RENSPA Number. ................................................................................ 41 

Figure 7. Individual Bovine ID system in the FMD Free with Vaccination Region................42 

Figure 8. Epidemiological Zoning of Argentina for the Purpose of Serological Sampling.........48 

Figure 9. Bovine (blue) and Ovine/Caprine (green) Premises Sampled ............................. 56 

Figure 10. Functional Organizational Chart of SENASA Laboratory........................... ......61 
3

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 

APHIS: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

BSL2: Biosafety Level 2 

BSL3: Biosafety Level 3 

CCFyC: Quarantine, Borders and Certifications Unit 

CFR: United States Code of Federal Regulations 

CONALFA: National FMD Eradication Committee 

COPROSA: Provincial Animal Health Committee 

CUIG: Unique Holding Identification Code

DILACOT: Laboratories and Technical Control Office 

DNFA: National Agrifood Inspection Office 

DNSA: National Animal Health Office 

DTA: Animal Transport Document 

EITB: Enzyme-linked Immunoelectrotransfer Blot 

ELISA: Enzyme-linked Immunosorbent Assay 

EU: European Union 

FUNBAPA: Patagonian Barrier Foundation 

FMD: Foot-and-Mouth Disease 

INTA: National Farming Technology Institute 

NESS: National Epidemiological Surveillance System 

OIE: World Organization for Animal Health (Office International des 

Epizooties) 

PCR: Polymerase Chain Reaction 

RENSPA: National Sanitary Registry of Ag-producers 

SAGPyA: Argentine Office of Agriculture, livestock, fisheries, and food 

SENASA: National Health and Agrifood Quality Service 

USDA: United States Department of Agriculture 

VIAA: Virus Infection Associated Antigen 
4

Figure 1. Map of Argentina and List of Associated Provincial Acronyms 

PROVINCES

BUE BUENOS AIRES 

CAT CATAMARCA 

CBA CORDOBA 

CHA CHACO 

CHU CHUBUT 

CRR CORRIENTES 

DOZ MENDOZA 

ERI ENTRE RIOS 

FSA FORMOSA 

JUA SAN JUAN 

JUJ JUJUY 

LAP LA PAMPA 

LAR LA RIOJA 

MNE MISIONES 

NEU NEUQUEN 

RIN RIO NEGRO 

SAL SALTA 

SCZ SANTA CRUZ 

SDE SANTIAGO DEL 

ESTERO 

SFE SANTA FE 

TDF TIERRA DEL FUEGO 

TUC TUCUMAN 

UIS SAN LUIS 

Used by permission from the Canadian 

Food Inspection Agency. 
5

Executive Summary 

Argentina requested that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service (APHIS) recognize the Patagonia Region of Argentina as free of foot-andmouth disease (FMD). The Patagonia Region includes the region located south of the 42nd

parallel known as Patagonia South, and the region immediately north of the 42nd parallel known 

as Patagonia North B. The last outbreak of FMD in the region occurred in 1994. Due to the 

historic lack of FMD occurrence in this part of Argentina, APHIS conducted a qualitative risk 

assessment to evaluate the FMD status of the Patagonia Region. 

Argentina’s Servicio Nacional de Sanidad y Calidad Agroalimentaria (SENASA) initially 

submitted information to support the request for recognition of FMD freedom of Patagonia 

South. APHIS evaluated the submission and conducted a site visit to Argentina in December 

2003 to substantiate the information reported in the documentation and collect any new data. The 

site visit focused on the veterinary and legal infrastructure of SENASA, border control 

procedures, laboratory and diagnostic capabilities, biosecurity procedures on sheep farms and in 

slaughter facilities, animal health recordkeeping systems, movement controls, and disease 

surveillance systems. APHIS completed the Patagonia South risk analysis in 2005 and published 

it in the Federal Register in January 2007. 

As a result of public comments stating that the information described in the risk analysis was not 

current, APHIS revisited this region in February 2009 in order to update the 2005 risk 

analysis. Additionally, APHIS conducted another site visit in November 2013 to further update 

its risk analysis, to fully incorporate Patagonia North B into its evaluation of the FMD status of 

the Patagonia Region, and to expand its assessment of the ability of SENASA to comply with 

APHIS’ requirements for exporting FMD-ruminant susceptible commodities. APHIS has visited 

the region north of the 42nd parallel of Argentina on three occasions: (1) a site visit to evaluate 

the risk of importation of beef (under certain mitigations) in 2005; (2) a visit to the Corrientes 

province (near Paraguay) where an FMD outbreak occurred in 2006; and (3) a visit to the 

province of Buenos Aires to further evaluate the risk of importation of fresh beef in 2013. The 

current version of the risk analysis is updated to include new evidence gathered since the 2005 

Patagonia South risk analysis was finalized. 

This document describes the animal health system in the Patagonia Region and the adjacent 

buffer zone of Patagonia North A. It identifies potential areas of risk, and discusses how this risk 

is mitigated. The following factors were considered to be of particular importance in determining 

the FMD status of the Patagonia Region: 

 No FMD outbreaks have occurred in the Patagonia Region since1994; 

 Comprehensive surveillance programs are in place and have not detected the presence of 

the FMD virus in this region since that time; 

 No FMD vaccination is carried out in the Patagonia Region, so any susceptible species in 

that region would act as good sentinel animals if exposed to the FMD virus; and 
6

 Argentina has in place a comprehensive system of movement controls for animals and 

animal products going into or moving within the region. 

Based on these and other observations, APHIS concludes that the legal framework, animal health 

infrastructure, movement and border controls, diagnostic capabilities, surveillance programs, and 

emergency response capacity provide a comprehensive system with redundant safeguards, and 

thus are sufficient to detect, prevent, and control and eradicate FMD outbreaks within the 

boundaries of the Patagonia Region of Argentina. Moreover, the Argentine veterinary authority 

is capable of complying with the requirements specified in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations

(CFR) to prevent the commingling of FMD-susceptible animals or products from the region with 

animals or products originating in regions with a different FMD status. 

Although the expected consequences of an FMD outbreak in the United States would be severe, 

the likelihood of such an outbreak occurring due to exposure of the domestic livestock 

population to FMD-susceptible animals and products imported from the Patagonia Region of 

Argentina is very low. Therefore, the overall risk of FMD to U.S. animal health from imports of 

these commodities is also very low. 
7

Background

Argentina requested that APHIS recognize a region of Patagonia which consists of Patagonia 

South (the region of Argentina south of the 42nd parallel), plus the adjacent region known as 

Patagonia North B, as free from FMD. Susceptible species in these regions are not vaccinated 

against FMD. Both of these areas are recognized as free of FMD by the World Organization for 

Animal Health (OIE). For the purposes of this risk analysis, these two areas will be referred to 

collectively as the Patagonia Region1

 (Figure 2). The last outbreak of FMD in the Patagonia 

Region occurred in 1994. 

Animal health officials from SENASA first submitted documentation in support of their request 

for recognition of FMD freedom of Patagonia South in 2002. APHIS conducted a site visit in 

December 2003 to verify and complement the information submitted by Argentina. It focused on 

the legal framework and veterinary infrastructure, border and movement controls, agricultural 

practices, laboratory diagnostics, and surveillance programs. APHIS completed the Patagonia 

South risk assessment in 2005 and published it in the Federal Register in January 2007. 

Figure 2: Map of Argentina FMD Regionalization Status Recognized by the OIE 

 
8

As a result of public comments stating that the information described in the risk analysis was not 

current, APHIS revisited this region in February 2009 in order to update the 2005 risk 

analysis. APHIS conducted another site visit in November 2013 to further update its risk 

analysis, to fully incorporate Patagonia North B into its evaluation of the FMD status of the 

Patagonia Region, and to expand its assessment of the ability of SENASA to comply with 

APHIS’ requirements for exporting FMD-susceptible commodities. Additionally, APHIS has 

visited the region north of the 42nd parallel of Argentina on three occasions: (1) a site visit to 

evaluate the risk of importation of beef (under certain mitigations) in 2005; (2) a visit to the 

Corrientes province (near Paraguay) where an isolated FMD outbreak occurred in 2006; and (3) 

a visit to the province of Buenos Aires to further evaluate the risk of importation of fresh beef in 

2013. This version of the risk analysis is updated to include new evidence gathered since the 

2005 Patagonia South risk analysis was finalized. 

The final analysis was based upon information obtained from the site visits, in writing from 

Argentina, and from published reports. 

Objectives 

This document is an analysis of the risk of introducing FMD virus into the United States in 

FMD-ruminant susceptible species and associated unprocessed products from the Patagonia 

Region of Argentina (because rinderpest has never been established within the continent it will 

not be addressed further within this document). The risk analysis is intended as a decisionmaking tool that will enable APHIS to determine whether and under what conditions to allow 

imports from the Patagonia Region and allow development of appropriate regulatory conditions 

and mitigations to address any potential risks of disease introduction if trade is initiated. It also 

constitutes an information source for APHIS stakeholders, providing justification for the 

conditions proposed in any resulting rulemaking. 

Supporting data 

The analysis is based on documentation provided by SENASA [1-8], and observations made by a 

joint APHIS and Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) site visits in 2003 and 2009. The 

analysis also includes observations made by the APHIS teams visiting Argentina in 2005, 2006, 

and 2013[9-14], as well as published information. SENASA, which translates into English as the 

National Health and Agrifood Quality Service, is the government agency in Argentina 

responsible for animal health activities. 

Hazard identification

APHIS has identified several OIE listed diseases [15] as the primary hazards associated with 

initiating trade in animals and animal products from foreign regions. Listed foreign animal 

diseases of primary concern are addressed specifically in APHIS regulations (9 CFR Part 94). 

FMD is recognized in APHIS regulations as such a hazard [16]. In this regard, before opening or 

resuming trade in FMD-susceptible species and related products with any region or country that 

is not recognized by APHIS as free of FMD, APHIS routinely conducts an evaluation to support 

its decision-making (9 CFR 92.2) [17]. 
9

The hazard identified is the FMD virus. Epidemiological characteristics of the disease agent 

relevant to the import risk it may pose are described in Appendix 1. 

Risk analysis

This analysis is composed of four components: the release assessment, the exposure assessment, 

the consequence assessment, and the risk estimation. These components are defined in OIE 

guidelines and represent the internationally accepted components for conducting animal health 

import risk analysis. 

Release assessment 

For the purpose of this report, the term release assessment refers to the evaluation of (1) the 

likelihood that FMD exists in the Patagonia Region of Argentina, and (2) the likelihood that 

FMD (if present) would be introduced into the United States through imports of FMDsusceptible animals or their products. The report includes an in-depth assessment of the 11 

factors [17] used by APHIS to evaluate the animal health status of a region prior to 2012. In 

2012, APHIS consolidated the eleven factors listed in 9 C.F.R. § 92.2(b) into eight factors. 

APHIS introduced this simplification in order to facilitate the application process; however, 

since the evaluation of the Patagonia Region started before 2012, and the topics addressed by the 

11 factors are encapsulated in the eight, this report follows the 11 factor format. Appendix II 

describes the consolidation of the 11 factors into eight. The 11 factors described in this 

evaluation are: 

1. The authority, organization, and infrastructure of the veterinary services organization in 

the region; 

2. Disease status (i.e., is the restricted disease agent known to exist in the region?); 

3. The status of adjacent regions with respect to the agent; 

4. The extent of an active disease control program, if any, if the agent is known to exist in 

the region; 

5. The vaccination status of the region; 

6. The degree to which the region is separated from adjacent regions of higher risk through 

physical or other barriers; 

7. The extent to which movement of animals and animal products is controlled from regions 

of higher risk, and the level of biosecurity regarding such movements; 

8. Livestock demographics and marketing practices in the region; 

9. The type and extent of disease surveillance in the region; 

10. Diagnostic laboratory capacity; and 

11. Policies and infrastructure for animal disease control in the region. 

Risk factors are identified from the information gathered on these topics and applicable 

mitigations are discussed. 
10

Eleven-factor analysis 

This evaluation focuses on the Patagonia Region of Argentina, which includes the region that 

lies south of the 42nd parallel (Patagonia South) and the adjacent North B region. Livestock 

systems in the Patagonia Region are mainly extensive (animals are grass-fed and range over vast 

areas of land with minimum labor or expense). The climate and the environment of the Patagonia 

Region are major factors that make the sheep industry the prevailing livestock activity. 

1. The authority, organization, and infrastructure of the veterinary services organization 

in the region

Central authority 

All regulations related to the control of FMD are based on the General Animal Health 

Enforcement Law (Law No. 3959/1903). This law, along with its accompanying regulations of 

1906, grants authority to the Government to restrict and regulate individual rights to pursue the 

general welfare and establishes the measures necessary to protect safety and health. Legal 

authority for control relative to Argentina’s FMD status is provided by several SENASA 

resolutions and other decrees, laws, and resolutions. National Law No. 24.305/93, along with 

Decree No. 643/96, establishes the FMD National Eradication Plan and requires immediate and 

mandatory reporting of FMD cases in Argentina. SENASA Resolutions 5/2001, 18/2001, and 

58/2001 are additional regulations that complement and provide authorization for the FMD 

National Eradication Plan. SENASA Resolution No. 234/96 implements the National 

Epidemiological Surveillance System (NESS), authorizing the involvement of certain 

government and private sector offices and units to work at local, provincial, and national levels 

to control reportable animal diseases. SENASA Resolutions Nos. 478/99, 779/99, 192/2001, 

370/2001, 383/2001, 510/2001, and 37/2002 and SAGPyA (Secretariat of Agriculture, 

Livestock, Fisheries, and Food of Argentina) Resolution No. 378/99 establish measures in 

controlling FMD outbreaks including sanitary steps with susceptible, ill, and in-contact animals 

in the region of the outbreaks, notification, and operative procedures if FMD is detected on a 

farm, prevention of spread of the disease, and implementation of the National Sanitary 

Emergency System. There are also a large number of resolutions that establish procedures and 

conditions for the import of various animals and animal products, disposal of organic waste from 

ships and airplanes, passenger and luggage control procedures, and movement of animals within 

the country. SENASA Resolutions Nos. 495/2001 and 115/2002 establish requirements for 

shipping FMD-susceptible livestock to slaughter for export of meat and meat products to the 

European Union (EU) or from farms approved to export to the EU or markets with equivalent 

requirements [1-3]. 

SENASA is divided into several sections, three of which focus on animal health issues: (1) the 

National Animal Health Office (DNSA); (2) the National Agrifood Inspection Office (DNFA); 

and (3) the Laboratories and Technical Control Office (DILACOT). These offices report directly 

to the President of SENASA. This structure reflects organizational changes made in 2001 and 

2002 [1, 2, 11] to address issues and problems identified during the FMD outbreaks that occurred 

north of the Patagonia Region in 2000/2001. 
11

The DNSA organization and structure is defined in SENASA Resolution No. 274/2002 [2]. The 

DNSA is specifically responsible for border controls, animal health control and eradication 

programs, including the necessary preventive, control and eradication actions to ensure 

compliance with current statutes. The actions of this office are carried out in the region of 

Patagonia South and Patagonia North by the 29 and 16 local offices, respectively [14]. The 

Epidemiology Office of DNSA carries out, coordinates, assesses, and oversees the FMD 

program in Argentina. The DNSA is also responsible for strategic prevention activities, risk 

analysis, and surveillance and assessment of the vaccination programs [1]. Within the DNSA, 

there is also a department responsible for overall coordination in the area of identification and 

registration of animals, animal movement controls, and traceability. 

The General Field Coordination Unit, which reports to the DNSA, implements its responsibilities 

through the local offices and regional supervisors. Its duties include [2]: 

 Coordination and management of the prevention, control and eradication actions of 

animal disease control programs; 

 Control of compliance of sanitary actions and enforcing the Law of Sanitary Police and 

pertinent regulations; and 

 Supervision of livestock movement, premises approval and certification. 

The responsibilities of the local SENASA veterinarians include: 

 Implementation of prevention, control, and eradication actions of the animal control 

programs in their jurisdiction; 

 Investigation of notifications, suspicions, and outbreaks; 

 Permanent monitoring of diseases of interest and epidemiological tasks; 

 Implementation of sanitary police actions and compliance of the regulations in force; 

 Control and supervision of livestock movement and transport and issuance of the 

pertinent certificates; and 

 Updating producers’ document registries, establishments, livestock existences, 

movements, and sanitary and administrative controls in their jurisdiction. 

The responsibilities of the regional supervisors include: 

 Supervision of disease prevention, control, and eradication actions in their jurisdictions 

and epidemiological surveillance actions; 

 Supervision of compliance of legal regulations in force; 

 Organization and operation of local offices; 

 Assessment of the field staff performance; and 

 Official representation of SENASA in their zone. 

The DNICA (Directorate of National Quality and Food Safety) is responsible for enforcing 

hygiene and health requirement compliance in slaughtering plants, processing plants, and storage 

facilities for animal and plant products and byproducts (edible or inedible). The Veterinary 

Inspection Service performs these controls at slaughtering plants approved for export [1]. 

The DILACOT has two units – the Laboratory for Animal Products and Byproducts and the 

Laboratory for Plant Products and Byproducts. This office operates the National Reference 
12

Laboratory for food safety and animal and plant health. In addition, the DILACOT has regional 

laboratories and manages a network of laboratories accredited by SENASA (for more 

information on DILACOT please refer to factor ten). The functions of the DILACOT are as 

follows [1]: 

 Establish the methods and test protocols that are used at the Central Laboratory and the 

laboratories that participate in the national network; 

 Intervene in dispute resolution; 

 Confirm positive test results issued by the laboratories in the network; 

 Carry out and participate in interlaboratory tests; 

 Audit the network of laboratories; 

 Provide assistance to other SENASA offices to assess analytical results; and 

 Participate in reviewing regulations pertinent to its field of action and participate in 

international meetings (e.g. Codex Alimentarius, MERCOSUR, OIE). 

Under the 2013 structure, the Quarantine, Borders, and Certifications Unit (CCFyC) falls under 

DNSA. The CCFyC oversees the Animal and Plant Quarantine Unit, the International 

Movements Unit, and the Borders and Sanitary Barriers Unit. The Borders and Sanitary Barriers 

Unit operates the control posts at the inland sanitary barriers and border crossings (fluvial and 

marine ports, airports, and border crossings) [1, 14]. 

The 14 Regional Operative Offices (ROs – Centros Regionales) report directly to the SENASA’s 

General Manager. Support for the animal health system comes from a participatory structure 

based on 360 local animal health offices, 30 of which are located in the Patagonia Region. These 

local offices represent various local organizations and have technical subcommittees chaired by 

official or private veterinary physicians that practice in the area that work closely with SENASA 

officials [1]. These offices, as authorized by Law No. 24.305, are part of the Epidemiological 

Surveillance System (NESS) in accordance with the responsibilities and functions spelled out in 

the legal regulations in force. Officials work at the local, provincial, and national levels and 

comply with established methodologies, procedures, and operations [2]. 

At the regional level, 24 Provincial Animal Health Committees (COPROSAS) participate in the 

National FMD Eradication Committee (CONALFA). CONALFA provides a forum for 

consensus where the provincial governments, SENASA, and representatives of the farmers 

associations define the operational strategies to carry out the zoosanitary policies defined by 

SENASA [1]. 

SENASA’s Reorganization 

SENASA’s reorganization focused in three major areas [11]: 

(1) Structure 

(2) Financial resources 

(3) Human resources 

Structure: 
13

The first important SENASA reorganization was defined by Decree 394/2001 [2]. It was 

intended to increase the efficiency of the existing geopolitical system and address international 

perception that SENASA had not been transparent with its trading partners about its FMD 

situation. In fact, in 2000, SENASA failed to report the first FMD outbreaks for several months 

after they had been detected [18]. 

In the 2001 structure of SENASA, the veterinary units were no longer based on political borders 

and the chain of command was changed to address issues that arose during the 2000/2001 FMD 

outbreaks, including centralization of command and control of the animal health programs. Prior 

to the 2006 reorganization, SENASA personnel in each province reported to one of three 

regional directors, each of which administered huge regions. Resources were not allocated to 

address the regional workload. Specifically, regions with high levels of activity (large livestock 

population and movements) were assigned the same number of personnel as regions with lower 

levels of activity, so the system was inefficient. Also, SENASA concluded that there was too 

much autonomy given to the regional directors. 

The regional directors had too much discretion in carrying out the orders from the central office, 

and the field people had such a wide range of duties that they had trouble focusing on animal 

health. In regard to transparency, many of the reorganization elements addressed issues of 

internal monitoring, accountability, and compliance with national policies. 

In the 2006 reorganization, boundaries of regional units were redefined so that personnel were 

assigned at a level appropriate to the activity occurring in the region. For example, the province 

of Buenos Aires, which constituted a very busy single region before the reorganization, was 

broken into six separate units. This increased the efficiency of the system by distributing the 

workload more evenly [11]. Region 21 and most of region 22 on the map in figure 3 make up the 

Patagonia North B region. Regions 23 and 24 make up Patagonia South. The 2006 reorganization 

also addressed international standards, certification requirements, and an increased emphasis on 

border controls [11]. 
14

Figure 3. Map of SENASA Regional and Local Units as of 2006

In 2007, SENASA redefined its regional units by issuing Resolutions 225/2006, 335/2007, and 

362/2007, and created a Regional Operative Unit (Unidad Regional Operative) (ROU) within the 

Central Unit (Vice-presidential Unit) to coordinate activities of the 14 Regional Operative 

Offices. 
15

The objective of this structure was to facilitate communications between the central and regional 

levels and to improve interactions with the local government (e.g., provincial, municipal) and 

non-governmental authorities. 

The ROU represents a liaison between SENASA central and regional levels. The regional offices 

provide the oversight to the local field offices and coordinate regional animal health programs. 

SENASA assigns a budget to each of the regional offices, based on its needs. For instance, the 

Buenos Aires Regional Unit is the largest (comprises 13 percent of the total budget), and 

oversees 43 local SENASA offices. Regional Operative Offices are shown in figure 4. 
16

Figure 4. Regional Operative Offices of SENASA 

In 2013, SENASA established the direct reporting between Regional Units and the Central 

Manager by issuing Resolution 354/2013. The 2013 Resolution also assigns to the General 

Manager other responsibilities, such as the coordination and monitoring of the Regional 
17

Operative Offices. Further, it adds a research component to the SEANSA’s functions and 

responsibilities. The diagram of the new structure is represented in Figure 5 

Figure 5. SENASA’s Structure 

Financial resources: 

SENASA reported that its 2013 budget was 1.3 billion pesos (approximately $200.7 million U.S. 

dollars). SENASA officials described the system as self-sufficient because user fees are required 

for almost every service SENASA provides, including slaughter surveillance, issuances of 

certificates, and laboratory tests [19]. The budget for the laboratory is 60 million pesos 

(approximately $12 million U.S. dollars) 

Human resources: 

In November 2013, SENASA reported a total of over 5,500 employees, which includes plant as 

well as animal personnel. Of these, over 80 percent have a professional degree, of which 1,054 

are veterinarians. Rules are in place for employees to address conflict-of-interest issues. For 

example, slaughter plant and field inspectors are not allowed to own livestock or sell beef. 

SENASA can expand its staff, when necessary, by hiring contract personnel, including 

veterinarians and animal health technicians. Contract personnel are hired on the basis of a 

standardized profile defined by SENASA for four month increments, and their contracts are 

renewable. Permanent and contract veterinarians have the same authority. 
18

SENASA can also broaden the scope of its activities through agreements with outside parties. 

For example, it has entered into agreements with some academic institutions to cooperate in 

activities such as conducting risk analyses. Other agreements have been implemented with 

enforcement agencies like the border police, who assist with security at border control points 

along land or water borders. Border police also assist SENASA with enforcement of quarantines. 

They played a significant role in security during previous FMD outbreaks. Security forces that 

work at slaughter facilities also assist in the disease control program [11]. SENASA can call 

upon border police and other security forces to help prevent entry of disease into Argentina. The 

number of animal health officials and affiliates in the Patagonia Region is listed in Table 1. 
19

Table 1. Animal Health Personnel in the Patagonia Region, 2013 [14] 

Neuquén Río Negro Chubut Santa 

Cruz 

Tierra del 

Fuego 

SENASA local offices 4 11 6 6 2 

SENASA’s Commisions 12 19 0 0 0 

SENASA’s Veterinarians 4 19 12 12 1 

SENASA Technical personnel 4 7 9 4 0 

SENASA’s Administrators 5 11 3 5 3 

Private/acredited veterinarians 66 94 237 33 49 

Veterinarian licensure, training and roles in the animal health programs

Veterinarians in Argentina are licensed after obtaining a veterinary degree authenticated at the 

Ministry of Culture and Education. They are registered at the National or Provincial Professional 

Association of Veterinary Physicians in the jurisdiction of employment. The respective 

association issues their license. National and provincial licensure is mandatory [2]. 

The National Private Veterinary Physician Registry, created by SENASA Resolution No. 470/95, 

registers private veterinarians that take part in the NESS. Registered veterinarians must notify the 

local DNSA commission of suspect cases of notifiable diseases, including suspect cases of FMD. 

In addition, SENASA Resolutions Nos. 234/96 and 422/03 incorporate Veterinary Physician 

Professional Associations and Councils into the NESS. Registration must be renewed annually 

and veterinary licensure must be kept up-to-date. SENASA issues the Registry Veterinarian 

certificate and guarantees the necessary training for proper performance of duties. This registry 

has different sections, according to the areas of responsibility of the corresponding office or unit. 

These veterinarians must comply with a continuous training program which includes procedures 

and standards that are currently in force to control reportable diseases [2]. 

In 2003, SENASA Resolution No. 181 was enacted. It establishes the requirements to accredit 

private veterinarians in the FMD National Eradication Program, including verification that the 

veterinary license is up-to-date and compliance with scheduled training goals. The 2009 and 

2013 site visit team verified that the resolution was fully implemented. 

Private veterinarians accredited by SENASA also perform FMD vaccinations in some regions of 

the country and preloading inspection on bovine and ovine animals intended for slaughter to 

export meat and meat products to the EU. They verify the health status of the animals and the 

accuracy of the premises documents. If satisfactory, then a health pre-certificate is issued which 

is later endorsed by the local SENASA veterinarian. 

Official and accredited SENASA veterinarians must comply with training requirements that are 

in line with the main strategies in the FMD National Eradication Plan. The goal of the Plan is to 

promote measures to strengthen the national and continental structure of FMD surveillance 

programs. These measures include training activities for the different participants of the program 

(technicians and administrative staff) and promotion of the different activities of the Plan. The 

purpose of the Plan is to provide technical resources to the SENASA staff in important subjects 

such as FMD control. 
20

Training of official SENASA employees is part of a central theme in the development of national 

animal health programs. Training programs for all the staff levels are developed within the 

Bureau of Human Resources and Training of SENASA. Staff is responsible for supervising each 

activity of the FMD National Eradication Plan and their adequate performance is vital to meet 

the established goals. The content of training courses meets the technical guidelines established 

by the FMD National Eradication Plan and the specific bibliography of the OIE. Veterinarians 

must also comply with the guidelines of the Training Operative Plan established by SENASA 

and the Civil Service National Institute, which includes training on various animal diseases 

besides FMD. All programs are conducted by experts and teachers from SENASA and other 

institutions through agreements with national universities, research institutes such as INTA 

(National Institute for Agricultural Technology), and others (FAO, etc.). Training activities for 

SENASA staff and laboratory were provided during the site visits, including the latest training 

activities in 2013 [20]. 

Training for staff in the DNFA includes the following subjects: legislation in force (Decree 

4238/68 and others), approval of establishments producing products intended for domestic 

consumption and export, hazard analysis and critical control point principles, good 

manufacturing practices, standard operating procedures (for establishments treating products and 

by-products of animal origin of all species, including birds and fish), diseases spread by food, 

animal welfare, traceability, residues, and hygiene control [1]. 

Provincial veterinarians also take an active role in the sanitary commissions that fight against 

endemic diseases. They work together with SENASA official veterinarians, private veterinarians, 

cattle farmers, and others, along with the respective COPROSAs of each province as part of the 

Epidemiological Surveillance Commissions (Resolution 445/95 – Regional Patagonia Plan) [2]. 

SENASA Field offices 

Field offices implement local prevention and control measures, eradication, compliance, 

emergency actions, health actions (e.g., vaccination), premises identification, movement 

controls, and recordkeeping. Many of these responsibilities are controlled through registration of 

premises and assignment of a unique premises identification number, which, in addition to other 

information on premises, is maintained in a national database. 

Through the years, the APHIS site visit team visited several local offices. At the different 

locations, the team observed that SENASA’s personnel at the local offices were diligent and 

efficient in implementing control and management activities as issued at the national level and 

were well integrated with the regional offices in terms of communication, oversight, and 

supervision. In 2009, the site visit team visited regional and field offices in Viedma, Carmen de 

Patagones, and Choele Choel in Patagonia North A and in Río Grande in the Tierra del Fuego 

province and Río Gallegos in the Santa Cruz province in Patagonia South. In 2009, the team 

visited the regional office of Bahia Blanca (located north of the 42nd parallel), the local office of 

San Antonio Oeste (in Patagonia North A), the local office of Bariloche (in Patagonia North B), 

and the local office of Esquel and Trelew (in Patagonia South). The last three of these offices 

are audited by their regional SENASA office at least three times per year. 
21

The Rio Grande office mainly deals with animal movement control and recordkeeping and 

inspections at the local airport. The emergency response system was tested when an outbreak of 

sheep scabies occurred in Tierra del Fuego in 1998. The disease was quickly contained and 

eradicated. When a suspect animal is reported to SENASA, an investigator must be sent out 

within 12 hours or less to investigate the case. A notification document is sent to Buenos Aires 

and the regional supervisor is informed only after the SENASA official confirms the suspect case 

after examination [10]. 

The Río Gallegos office is one of three local offices in Santa Cruz province. The office has the 

same duties as the Río Grande local office, but also has additional staff that inspects baggage on 

the Argentina-Chile border at the Monte Aymond border post. 

FUNBAPA (Fundacion Barrera Patagonica [Patagonian Barrier Foundation]) is a contract 

foundation that coordinates with SENASA to guarantee the health and quality of agriculture 

products in Patagonia. The Foundation was set up by a SENASA resolution, but no money 

comes from the SENASA budget. The annual budget in 2009 was about $3 million U.S. dollars, 

which is acquired through the collection of fees (50 percent from spraying fees and 50 percent 

from producers moving products). Contributions mainly come from fruits and vegetables, about 

$1 per ton of fruit or product that is exported out of the region. 

SENASA sets the regulations related to the control of FMD and FUNBAPA enforces them. The 

chair of FUNBAPA is the president of SENASA. FUNBAPA’s responsibilities at land and 

airport border control facilities are discussed in Section 7 below. 

Swill feeding

SENASA Resolution No. 225/95 regulates housing and maintenance of pigs. This resolution 

bans feeding pigs with raw viscera of any origin, including kitchen garbage; hospital, clinic, or 

nursing home garbage; and garbage from national or international ports and airports. It 

authorizes feeding pigs with leftovers of food substances of animal origin coming from stores 

approved by the competent authority to manufacture or sell food. Authorization is on condition 

of compliance of the following requirements: 

 The swill is subjected to a cooking process guaranteeing destruction of pathogenic 

organisms, and 

 The existence on the premises of equipment necessary to carry out the requirements of 

the above cooking process with an operation capacity allowing treatment of all the 

leftovers in a period of time not longer than eight hours after arrival on the premises. 

There are no establishments exclusively approved to process swill. Swill treatments are carried 

out by the pig producer in the establishment, or the producer obtains the processed swill from 

slaughtering establishments [2]. Compliance is monitored using regulations that deal with other 

sanitary/hygiene issues. SENASA Resolution No. 350/98 sets up a mechanism by which 

SENASA veterinarians can more easily confiscate animals infected with Trichinella or that 

constitute a risk because of inadequate sanitary conditions, due to failure to comply with 

SENASA Resolution No. 225/95. Also, work is presently being done on a regulation combined 

with 350/98 to regulate pig activity and widen the scope of the current regulations with the 
22

purpose of more effectively controlling trichinellosis. As a consequence, there will be safeguards 

that spill over to grant additional sanitary protections against FMD contamination of feed [2]. 

Conclusions

Argentina has the veterinary and regulatory organization and infrastructure to adequately 

monitor and control any incursion of FMD into the country. APHIS considers that SENASA has 

sufficient legal authority to carry out official disease control, eradication, and quarantine 

activities. There is sufficient monitoring of animal premises and movements to permit effective 

surveillance and detection programs that would result in sufficient administration of eradication 

efforts, if needed. 

APHIS recognizes that there were substantial delays (approximately nine months) in reporting of 

the FMD outbreaks in Argentina in 2000-2001 that raised questions in the international arena 

regarding SENASA’s transparency with regard to disease reporting. For this reason, APHIS has 

been particularly thorough in its subsequent reviews of Argentina’s veterinary infrastructure. 

Despite earlier problems, APHIS observed during site visits to the Patagonia Region and 

Northern Argentina, which included the regions where isolated outbreaks were detected in 2003 

and 2006, that Argentina had made changes to its veterinary infrastructure since the 2000-2001 

outbreaks. APHIS confirmed that these improvements were effectively implemented and 

maintained in its subsequent visits to Argentina in 2006, 2009 and 2013. Based on these 

observed changes and the responses SENASA personnel provided to the site visit teams’ 

questions, APHIS is confident that, in the event of another outbreak, reporting would be prompt 

and transparent. 

2. Disease status

The Patagonia Region of Argentina has not recorded an outbreak of FMD since 1994, when six 

outbreaks were reported. A stamping-out policy was applied and a total of 565 cattle, 8,286 

sheep, 296 pigs, one goat and one camelid were destroyed (ill and contact animals). SENASA 

imposed quarantine and movement restrictions on all adjacent departments, established control 

and disinfection posts on highways and other strategic locations, carried out stamping-out of 

contact susceptible species in the focal area, and conducted ring vaccination in perifocal and 

surveillance areas. Results of the epidemiological investigation concluded that the virus 

originated in Patagonia North A and entered into Patagonia North B, either through infected 

bovine slaughtered in Patagonia North B or through the movement of infected bone-in beef and 

offal. The investigation further concluded that the disease was spread through the feeding of 

contaminated slaughter waste to swine. Molecular characterization of the virus revealed that the 

strain was closely related to a vaccine virus strain commonly used in South America 

(O1/Campos/Brazil 58) [1, 2]. 

The area south of parallel 42 reported the last outbreak in 1976 in the Chubut Province. The 

virus, which was type A, was introduced into the province from animals that had come from 

northern Argentina. When the suspicion of FMD became known, SENASA implemented 

quarantine procedures, closed streets and neighboring roads, established control and disinfection 

posts, and conducted epidemiological tracing and staff reinforcement. Animal movement 
23

restrictions and ring vaccination were carried out to stop the spread of the disease. The animals 

vaccinated included 4,789 bovine, 8,881 sheep, and 391 pigs. This was the only case when a 

stamping-out policy was not applied [1, 2]. 

No reports of suspect vesicular diseases were made in 2012 or 2013 in the Patagonia Region. 

Sheep are the predominant livestock species in Patagonia South. Almost 60 percent of the sheep 

in Argentina reside in Patagonia. The livestock density is less than one animal per hectare. Due 

to extensive husbandry practices and low animal density, contact between sheep and other 

species and with other sheep is minimized [1, 2]. No vaccination is carried out in the Patagonia 

Region, so any cattle or swine in that region exposed to the FMD virus would act as good 

sentinels of an outbreak. 

Federal, provincial, and municipal authorities, veterinarians in private practice, and citizens must 

report any signs of FMD, the existence of suspect cases of this disease, or positive test results for 

this disease to the local animal health authorities or to the National Animal Health Office of 

SENASA (Law No. 3959/1903, Law No. 24.305/93, Decree No. 643/96) [1, 5, 6]. There is no 

indemnification for destroyed animals if the disease is not reported and anyone that fails to report 

the disease is fined. 

Conclusions

The last FMD outbreak in the Patagonia Region of Argentina occurred in 1994. There is no 

evidence that any species has been infected with the FMD virus in this region since 1994. 

3. The status of adjacent regions with respect to the agent

Argentina is bordered by Paraguay to the north, Bolivia to the northwest, Uruguay and Brazil to 

the northeast, and Chile to the west. APHIS only considers Chile to be FMD-free [30]. The 

Patagonia Region itself is bordered by either the ocean or areas that are FMD-free without 

vaccination (Chile) or FMD-free with vaccination (Patagonia North A) according to OIE 

standards. 

Argentina recognizes the FMD status for surrounding countries as classified by OIE. Chile is 

recognized as FMD-free without vaccination (last FMD outbreak reported in 1987). Uruguay is 

considered FMD-free with vaccination (last FMD outbreak reported in 2001). The Brazilian 

States of Río Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina, which border Argentina, are recognized as 

FMD-free regions with and without vaccination, respectively. The OIE recognizes a region in 

Bolivia that is located in the Macro-region of the Altiplano as FMD-free and the following three 

zones as FMD-free with vaccination: (1) zone of Chiquitania; (2) zone adjacent to the east of 

Chiquitania; and (3) zone consisting of the regions of Chaco and part of Valles) [2, 4]. In 

November 2013, Paraguay was recognized by the OIE as FMD-free with vaccination (last FMD 

outbreak reported in 2012). 

Information on the epidemiological situation of the countries in the region around Argentina is 

acquired through data systematically and periodically submitted by the Pan American Foot-andMouth Disease Center (PANAFTOSA), bilateral agreements, and joint border programs. Since 
24

the regional FMD outbreak in 2000-2001, a program of joint actions and adoption of strategies 

among the countries of the region was established within the action plan of the Hemispheric 

Program for FMD Control and Eradication (PHEFA). This program comprises border work 

subprojects, reimplementation of vaccination against FMD, epidemiological surveillance actions, 

and improvement of the Continental System of Information. In response to this effort, Argentina 

incorporated border programs, guaranteeing full notification of the epidemiological situation in 

the country, development of the vaccination campaigns, joint training, and reciprocal guarantees 

strengthening the Regional and National Epidemiological Surveillance Systems [2]. 

The PHEFA is coordinated by PANAFTOSA. As a subprogram of the Hemispheric Plan, the 

Cuenca del Plata Agreement for the Eradication of FMD coordinates common strategy between 

Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in the fight against FMD. The initial agreement was signed in 

1987 in Porto Alegre, Brazil. The strategic program was developed in 1988 by technicians of the 

three countries and was implemented in 1989. Paraguay signed on in 1992 and then Bolivia 

joined the agreement. Chile participates as an observer country. The agreement works through an 

executive committee made up of the animal health authorities of each one of the member 

countries, with a technical group advising the Committee. The technical group includes five 

veterinarians from each country and two permanent consultants, the Coordinator and the 

epidemiologist, all of which advise the member countries. The group meets four times a year. All 

of the activities of the agreement are channeled through this group. 

Argentina provides technical assistance to Bolivia by transferring technology and aiding in 

technical matters in the fight against FMD. The Bureau of Laboratories of SENASA has trained 

scientists from Bolivia on performance and standardization of FMD diagnostic serological tests 

(VIAA and EITB). 

Argentina has a bilateral agreement with Paraguay to make a joint effort to establish an FMD 

vaccination, prevention, and epidemiological surveillance program in the border area between 

the two countries. The aim of the program is to mitigate the risk of an FMD occurrence in the 

area. In 2003, SENASA signed a letter of intent with SENACSA (Paraguay’s sanitary service) 

and the White Helmet Commission to “agree on a participation and cooperation mechanism” of 

the latter on both sides of the border, within the framework of the Regional Program for the 

Eradication of FMD and supported by the South Farming Council. The White Helmets, a United 

Nations-sponsored group that deals with emergency situations related to public health throughout 

the world, has played a role in enhancing communications in the region. 

FMD outbreaks in the rest of Argentina since 2001. 

Patagonia North A, 2001 

Patagonia North A serves as a buffer zone between the Patagonia Region and most of northern 

Argentina. Vaccination in Patagonia North A was stopped in March 2013 by SENASA 

Resolutions 82/2013 and 141/2013. At the time of the 2013 site visit, SENASA was in the 

process of submitting the FMD dossier to the OIE for FMD freedom recognition of Patagonia 

North A. 
25

The last FMD outbreaks in Patagonia North A occurred in 2001 with seven outbreaks reported in 

the region. All the outbreaks were confirmed to be caused by a type A virus. The source was 

most likely from the central zone where the epidemic developed. Five outbreaks were registered 

in the Department of Patagones, Province of Buenos Aires. They took place between May 11 and 

July 23, 2001. The exposed population included 3,268 cattle, 2,690 sheep and 35 pigs. One 

hundred ninety-nine young cattle under two years of age were the only clinically ill animals. 

Initial attack rates varied from 0.3 to 12 percent. 

Two more isolated outbreaks occurred in the Province of Río Negro in Patagonia North A as a 

consequence of entry of the virus from the central zone where the epidemic developed. Between 

August 2 and August 8, 2001, two suspicious cases were detected in the Department of Pichi 

Mahuida, Province of Río Negro. Both were located on premises on the south bank of the 

Colorado River. The second outbreak occurred near the Department of Patagones like the earlier 

ones. A link between the last case, which was the only confirmed (by laboratory diagnosis) 

FMD-positive case among the later outbreaks, and the primary affected area in Patagones was 

established. There was a familial relationship between owners of the affected premises in the 

initial affected area and the later outbreak in Patagones which probably resulted in transport of 

the virus to the other premises. Control of the outbreaks included animal quarantine and 

movement controls along with ring vaccination of animals in the surrounding areas. 

Salta, 2003 

In 2003, Argentina reported an outbreak in the city of Tartagal, province of Salta. 

Corrientes, 2006 

In 2006, SENASA reported an outbreak of virus type O in San Luis del Palmar (Corrientes) near 

the border with Paraguay. This outbreak was contained and eliminated. Molecular 

characterization of the virus revealed that the strain was indigenous to the region and shared 

common similarities with the isolates responsible for the type O outbreaks in South America 

between 2000 and 2005. Specifically, studies showed that the virus presented a high degree of 

homology (96 percent) with virus types isolated in Pozo Hondo (Paraguay) in 2003 and in Tarija 

(Bolivia) in 2000, and with 92 percent homology with virus isolated in Mato Grosso do Sul 

(Brazil) in 2005 [31]. 

Both of the outbreaks had limited spread and were quickly identified; the disease was contained 

and eradicated within a few months and international authorities were timely notified. 
26

Conclusions

There is no evidence that FMD has been transported from surrounding countries or other regions 

of Argentina into the Patagonia Region in almost 20 years. All sides of this region are bordered 

by either the ocean or areas that are free of FMD with or without vaccination according to OIE 

standards. Administrative barriers to animal movement in Argentina prevented the introduction 

of FMD into the rest of the country during the 2003 and 2006 outbreaks in Northern Argentina. 

In addition, FMD was not introduced into the Patagonia Region as a consequence of the 1987 

outbreak in Chile or the 2001 outbreak in Patagonia North A. 

4. The extent of an active disease control program, if any, if the agent is known to exist in 

the region

No active disease control program is currently being carried out in the Patagonia Region since no 

FMD outbreaks have occurred since 1994 [1, 14, 19]. Surveillance programs do exist, but 

passive surveillance and strong border and animal movement controls are the major defenses 

against an incursion of disease into this area. 

Any Argentine citizen is responsible for reporting FMD. Indemnification is provided only when 

disease is reported, a situation that should serve to encourage reporting. Indemnities are paid at 

market value. 

Conclusions

There is no evidence that FMD is present in the Patagonia Region. No FMD outbreak has 

occurred in the region since 1994; therefore, there is not an active disease control program. There 

are measures in place, including strict animal movement controls, border inspections, and 

clinical surveillance for prevention and early detection if the disease were introduced. Argentina 

has a control program and a national plan sufficient to respond quickly to any FMD emergencies. 

Argentina has a system of FMD indemnity which provides compensation at market value. 

5. The vaccination status of the region

Vaccination is not practiced in Patagonia South and has never been systematically applied. 

Vaccination is also not performed in North Patagonia B. Administration of serum against FMD 

infection is not permitted in these regions [1]. 

Conclusions

Vaccination is prohibited in the Patagonia Region. In the absence of vaccination, it is likely that 

clinical signs compatible with FMD resulting from an incursion of disease would be quickly 

identified. 

6. The degree to which the region is separated from adjacent regions of higher risk 

through physical or other barriers
27

The Patagonia Region is located in the southern region of the country and is made up of the 

provinces of Chubut, Santa Cruz, and Tierra del Fuego, islands of the South Atlantic and part of 

Antarctica, and a large part of Río Negro and Neuquén Provinces. In May 2002, the OIE 

recognized the area south of the 42nd parallel (Patagonia South) as FMD free without 

vaccination. In May 2007, the OIE recognized Patagonia North B as FMD free without 

vaccination. The geographic description of the Patagonia Region borders is as follows: 

 Chile (west and south); 

 Atlantic Ocean (south and east); and 

 Northern Argentina and Patagonia North A regions, Argentina (north). 

The border with Chile consists of the Southern Andes Range, which forms a natural border 

between the Patagonia Region and Chile. This area has an average height of 2,500 meters above 

sea level, with dry and cold climatological conditions that do not favor livestock production. 

Chile does not conduct vaccination against FMD and is considered to be free of FMD by the OIE 

and the United States. The northern border of the Patagonia Region abuts an area of Argentina 

which is considered by the OIE to be free of FMD with vaccination (Northern Argentina) and an 

area known as Patagonia North A, a buffer zone where vaccination against FMD was halted in 

2013. The Patagonia Region under evaluation in this document is separated from Northern 

Argentina by the Barrancas River, which separates Neuquén from the Province of Mendoza, to 

the north. 

The Patagonia North A region comprises the area of Río Negro Province located between the 

Colorado and Negro Rivers, the district of Patagones, Buenos Aires Province, and the 

Confluence area of the Province of Neuquén. The Patagonia North A and B regions are bordered 

by constantly flowing rivers that make crossing difficult. 

The climate in the Patagonia Region is mostly dry and windy in the summer and cold, windy, 

and snowy in the winter. The land is not used for growing crops, but mainly for sheep meat and 

wool production. The terrain and desolate nature of the area act as an effective barrier to disease 

incursion through illegal trafficking of prohibited products. Areas where there are no natural 

barriers have control mechanisms which include mobile patrols and a permanent coordination 

between national and provincial entities to maintain a constant presence at the region route 

controls (National Border Police and other police authorities). 

Conclusions

Most of the Argentine border is protected by natural barriers that help reduce the unrestricted 

flow of animals and animal products from areas of higher risk. Government movement control 

measures compensate in those areas where natural barriers do not exist. In addition, Argentina 

has sanitary barriers in place between the Patagonia Region and other areas in Argentina with 

different FMD status that function to preserve the FMD-free status of the Pagatonia Region. 

7. The extent to which movement of animals and animal products is controlled from 

regions of higher risk, and the level of biosecurity regarding such movements
28

Both international and domestic movement of animals and their products and byproducts are 

regulated by federal rules. International and national border controls are administered by 

SENASA’s Quarantine, Borders, and Certifications Unit [4]. Importations of live animals, 

genetic material, animal products, and animal by-products are allowed only under permit issued 

by SENASA. Animals and animal products may only enter the country through one of 45 

authorized border stations, which include terrestrial, maritime, and river ports and airports. 

International border crossings authorized by SENASA in the Patagonia Region are listed below: 

Chile 

 Cardenal Samoré crossing (Province of Neuquén in Patagonia North B) 

 Huemules crossing (Province of Chubut in Patagonia South) 

 Coandhaique crossing (Province of Chubut in Patagonia South) 

 Integración Austral crossing (Province of Santa Cruz in Patagonia South) 

SENASA officials are assisted at border control points by various security forces, including the 

National Border Patrol, the Argentine Coast Guard, and the National Aeronautical Police [23]. 

National Border Control agents assist along international borders and number around 14,000 in 

the entire country. Coast Guard personnel assist at seaports and Aeronautical Police at airports. 

Permanent SENASA personnel at border crossing points numbered 394 in 2003, including 

veterinarians, agricultural engineers, and administrative personnel [7]. Cooperation with these 

groups occurs under the terms of official agreements [7, 11]. Other groups assisting with border 

inspections include the National Customs Bureau and Provincial and Local institutions. 

SENASA considers agreements with the security forces to be critical to the control program. 

Argentina port authorities check and confiscate products prohibited for movement domestically 

(because of potential FMD risk to Patagonia, which Argentina considers to be FMD-free without 

vaccination) and internationally. Human resources associated with control posts in the Patagonia 

Region and Patagonia North A in 2012 are listed in table two. 

Table 2. Human Resources at Strategic Control Posts in the Three Patagonia Sanitary 

Regions in 2012 

Sanitary Regions Human Resources 

Professional 

Barrier 

Coordinator 

Provincial 

Link 

SENASA 

Local Link 

SENASA 

Supporting 

professionals/ 

Technician Point 

Chief 

Supervisor/ 

auxiliary 

Administrative 

Patagonia North A 

Colorado River barrier 

2 2 5 8 15 4 

Patagonia North B

Terrestrial points – airports 

2 2 3 3 2 -- 

Patagonia South

Terrestrial points – airports 

2 3 10 2 10 -- 

Totals 2* 5* 18 13 27 4 

*Some of the personnel have responsibilities for the 3 regions 

 

FUNBAPA plays an instrumental role in the operations of land and airport border control 

stations, providing staff for the conduct of inspections at 38 posts. In addition, FUNBAPA 

employs the use of approximately 25 dogs that are trained to detect agricultural products. These 

dogs are primarily used at the busiest land and air ports and can be rotated to meet the needs at 

various locations. 
29

Commercial imports 

Prior to 2005, SENASA Resolution 9/2001, as amended by SENASA Resolutions 25/01 and 

58/01, implemented a sanitary barrier by law at the 42nd parallel in order to preserve the area 

south of the Parallel as a region free from FMD without vaccination [2]. Since 2002 (Resolution 

1051/02), Argentine authorities do not allow live susceptible animals to enter the Patagonia 

Region except from regions or countries recognized as FMD free without vaccination by the OIE 

and SENASA. In 2005, SENASA published Resolution 109/2005 recognizing the regions 

located south of the 42nd parallel and Patagonia North B as having the same FMD sanitary 

status. The same year, Resolution 725/2005 specified traceability requirements (see following 

section on “Livestock demographics and marketing practices”) as well as the additional 

conditions listed below for moving FMD-susceptible animals from Patagonia North B to 

Patagonia South (areas were FMD vaccination was not practiced): 

 FMD-susceptible animals must have remained in the source facilities for at least 90 days 

prior to movement application; 

 Two negative serological tests for FMD from FMD-susceptible species within an interval 

of 21 days between tests, during which period the animals must be isolated under 

quarantine from other animals or other species; 

 Two negative Probang tests from cattle and sheep with an interval of 21 days between 

samples; 

 Movement of animals to destination with official dispatch and previous notice; 

 Animals must be transported in sealed trucks and shall not move through zones where 

FMD vaccination is practiced; and 

 Animals must be kept isolated for 21 days at the destination, after which period premises 

shall be cleared of potential disease contamination after a clinical inspection of FMDsusceptible animals on the premises. 

In 2008, after the EU recognized Patagonia North B as free of FMD without vaccination, 

SENASA published Resolution 148/2008 (which amended Resolution 725/2005) and Resolution 

370/2008, allowing the movement of FMD-susceptible species from Patagonia North B into 

Patagonia South under some restrictions [32]. These restrictions include: 

 Animals must be transported in SENASA authorized trucks with a valid truck 

disinfection certificate; 

 The owner of the farm must submit to SENASA the itinerary that the truck must follow; 

 Animals must be transported in sealed trucks and must not move through zones where 

FMD vaccination is practiced; 

 If animals are destined to slaughter, the shipment will be authorized only to 

slaughterhouses inspected and authorized by SENASA; 

 The owner of the farm receiving the animals must communicate to SENASA within 48 

hours of arrival of the animals; and 

 Upon arrival at the destination farm, the animals must remain separated from all other 

animals of FMD susceptible species for 21 days; during that time, animals may be sent to 

slaughter only if authorized by the local SENASA veterinarian. 
30

Shipping of animal-origin products to the Patagonia Region can only be done from official 

establishments under SENASA control. 

Matured, deboned fresh beef is imported into the Patagonia Region from areas in northern 

Argentina for local consumption only, since beef is not produced in sufficient quantities for local 

demand. This meat has a very low risk of introducing the FMD virus into the export region since 

it must go through a maturation and deboning process consistent with EU and current U.S. 

requirements. The drop in pH that occurs during maturation inactivates the FMD virus. Border 

control posts visited during the site visits appeared capable of monitoring this movement and 

preventing illegal entry of animals and animal products into the Patagonia Region. Additionally, 

swill which may contain meat scraps must be properly treated before being fed to pigs, and sheep 

do not come into contact with the meat since they go directly from the range to the slaughter 

facilities. 

Imports to Northern Argentina 

Argentina requires a risk analysis for all imports of live animals to determine the epidemiological 

status of the country or region of origin, the existence of national or regional programs to control 

exotic diseases, the specific capabilities of the laboratories or quarantine facilities and their staff, 

and other factors that reduce the risk of importing exotic or high risk diseases into the country. 

SENASA Resolution 1354/94 defines the pre-importation procedures and the health certificate 

requirements for live animals and their reproductive material. 

Argentina follows OIE guidelines in its importation policy regarding products of animal origin 

considered as possible carriers of the FMD virus from countries or regions with a lower sanitary 

status. Argentina requires risk assessment and mitigation to minimize the potential risks 

associated with the importation of these products. SENASA resolutions that regulate and set 

sanitary standards for importation of such products specifically to Patagonia South include 58/01 

and 1051/02. Resolution 816/02 defines the general pre-importation procedures and controls for 

animal products and byproducts [1, 2]. 

The procedures and criteria applied by Argentine officials for imported live animals, animal 

genetic material, and animal products and byproducts are based on the principles of Risk 

Analysis, Regionalization and Equivalence in the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 

Measures of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the standards set by the OIE. Permits to 

import such items are required before the goods arrive in the country. The importer is issued an 

import permit only after all the applicable zoosanitary requirements stated in SENASA 

regulations are met. The import permits must be approved by the SENASA Central Office. 

The procedures to assess the risk and approve processing plants and processing procedures in the 

country of origin are stated in Resolution 816/02. Import permits may be issued after an analysis 

of the following [1]: 

 The type of product that will be imported; 

 The health status of the exporting country; 

 Approval of the slaughtering or processing plant in the country of origin; 
31

 Type of shipment; 

 Transit of the product through other countries; 

 Border post at the point of entry into Argentina; and 

 Expected use of the product. 

All products and live animals that require approval from SENASA must meet similar security 

requirements. Import requirements are summarized as follows [1]: 

 Pre-importation authorization; 

 Verification of the health certificate issued by the country of origin; 

 Physical inspection, document control and verification of the identity of the imported 

products; and 

 A Restricted Transit Permit for shipments of animal products to processing plants with 

official SENASA veterinary inspection. Live animals must be placed in quarantine at the 

Official Quarantine Facility. 

After inspection, the imported products are sampled for the purpose of the CREHA (National 

Residue Control in Food Products and Hygiene) program, and the release document is issued. In 

the case of live animals, the release document is issued at the end of the quarantine period if no 

evidence of disease is found. 

Imported animals are placed in SENASA’s quarantine facility, “Lazareto Capital” in Buenos 

Aires. Animals that require special conditions or treatment are placed in special quarantine 

facilities (e.g., zoo animals, ornamental birds, fish). The duration of the quarantine period varies 

to allow sufficient time for completion of all required testing procedures, depending on the 

species and the place of origin. The quarantine period is between 15 and 60 days. At the end of 

the quarantine period, the imported animals are placed under observation at the farm of 

destination for a period of 60 days. After this period, the local SENASA veterinarian must issue 

a report certifying that the post-quarantine period has been completed. 

Inspections of imports are conducted in all cases, without exemptions, if the products are under 

SENASA jurisdiction. Documents are checked, and products or animals are physically inspected 

and identified. Two inspection modes are used at borders [2]: 

 Direct inspection: Questioning, observation, and manual inspection of luggage and 

vehicles (e.g., trunks, rooms, cabins, boxes), and 

 Indirect inspection at the most relevant entry points: Auxiliary methods used to detect 

organic products that could be potential carriers of pests or diseases (e.g., organic 

material scanner, beagle dog squad) 

In case of animal health emergencies in the region or in neighboring regions or countries, 

additional control mechanisms are activated such as reinforcement of regulations and personnel, 

increasing vehicular disinfection tasks and strengthening of patrol and control tasks. Security 

forces (National Border Police, Argentine Navy, National Air Force Police) that carry out 

sanitary supervision tasks at the border will be alerted to be more vigilant. 
32

At the inspection posts, shipments into all Argentina are inspected and checked for proper 

documentation and identification. If the shipment has the proper documents and passes 

inspection, it is authorized to continue to its destination after resealing the vehicle and recording 

that the shipment had passed through the check point region [2, 10]. 

Noncommercial traffic

The proportion of travelers, means of transportation, and types of luggage inspected varies 

according to the recommendations of the procedures manual and regional characteristics of each 

control post. The particular types of inspection activities that occur depend on the control posts. 

Direct inspections (e.g., observation, questioning, manual inspection) are carried out mainly at 

terrestrial posts and sea ports while indirect inspections with detecting scanners are used at the 

main airports of the region (Aeroparque Jorge Newbery, Bariloche, Neuquén, Comodoro 

Rivadavia, Ushuaia and, soon, El Calafate) and some sea ports. 

Sanitary barriers were established to prevent unauthorized crossings at points other than border 

posts. Control posts are located in strategic places along the borders. Trained staff are present at 

all times and interact with security forces to enforce sanitary regulations. It is difficult to 

accurately estimate the amount and frequency of unauthorized crossings because they are 

conducted illegally, but the measures explained above aim at minimizing the risk of introduction 

of animals or products of risk through illegal means [2]. 

Property confiscation and transport infringements

Controls applied at the Patagonia sanitary barriers follow federal transit standards by prohibiting 

entry of forbidden and restricted animals and products as well as low-risk products such as cold 

meats or eviscerated chicken. 

Airports [10] 

During the several visits to Argentina, the site teams visited several airports which act as control 

points mainly for tourist traffic. The Jorge Newberry Airport in Buenos Aires handles a 

significant level of traffic to Patagonia. 80 percent of the flights are domestic and 20 percent are 

international (from Uruguay). Two airlines handle the Uruguay traffic which numbers about 400-

500 passengers/day. Four airlines fly to the south into Patagonia carrying about 2500 

passengers/day to the Patagonia Region and Patagonia North A. A number of safety measures 

(described below) are implemented to prohibit the introduction of risky material to Patagonia. 

Other airports visited in the Patagonia Region included the Río Grande, Ushuaia, Río Gallegos, 

and Neuquén airports. 

The security measures implemented at the Jorge Newberry Airport are thorough. Aeronautical 

police assist SENASA in its activities. All carry-on baggage is put through scanners that can 

differentiate organic materials from other substances. Checked baggage from domestic flights is 

usually not scanned unless it is going to Patagonia. International flights from Uruguay have a 
33

separate line to scan baggage, and all checked baggage and hand carried luggage from 

international flights is examined by scanner. During the 2009 site visit, Jorge Newberry Airport 

officials indicated that approximately 35 kg of plant and animal products are confiscated daily 

during the high tourist season. The average volume of confiscations drops to 8 kg during the low 

travel season. This airport employs a staff of ten individuals who work in shifts between 4 a.m. 

and 11 p.m. daily. 

Passengers are provided with information on prohibited substances and are required to fill out a 

customs declaration form if arriving on an international flight. Passengers carrying food products 

are given information on prohibited material regardless of destination. Any unauthorized cargo is 

confiscated. In 2003, a new statement was developed to accompany packages stating that certain 

products are not being shipped in the packages or with a passenger. The statement is used for all 

airplane and bus travelers. One side has the declaration statement and signature stating that no 

prohibited plant or animal products are being carried by the passenger and the other side lists the 

Resolutions involved and prohibited items. If undeclared prohibited items are found on 

inspection, SENASA conducts a review to determine if a fine should be levied. 

Products shipped as cargo directly from plants must be accompanied by relevant documentation. 

Air freight of perishable goods is rare but would be checked at the airport of destination and not 

released until after SENASA approves. 

Checked baggage heading for a different destination than Newbery is subject to inspection by the 

Beagle patrol. A beagle dog is used to sniff for prohibited substances in baggage on the carts 

outside. Luggage that is suspect is identified, sealed, and inspected at the point of destination. A 

fax is sent to the destination airport to notify them of the suspect package. The luggage can only 

be opened with the owner present. Any confiscated material is denatured and then treated as 

waste and sent to the landfill. The destination airport then sends a report back to the airport office 

from where the package had been shipped. 

Members of the site visit team observed a beagle working that, in the process, detected a suspect 

package. The SENASA official labeled it so officials at the point of destination would 

investigate the package. They do not open these packages at the airport where the dog detects 

something suspicious. The package is flown to its destination and then the owner is notified and 

SENASA opens the package with the owner present. 

The site visit team noticed that all carry-on luggage was examined by inspectors when 

passengers entered the airport and checked baggage was spot checked in the presence of the 

owner at the Río Grande airport. Passengers walked over a carpet with disinfectant (usually 

Virkon S) as they entered the terminal from the tarmac. 

Checked baggage is usually scanned at the Ushuaia airport, but at the time of the visit, the 

scanner was not operational and all such baggage was examined manually along with the carryon baggage. A footbath with Virkon S was located in the passenger exit ramp to disinfect shoes. 

Any baggage that was identified in Buenos Aires as suspect by the beagle and tagged is 

examined by the officials in this airport with the owner present. A report of the investigation is 
34

sent back to Buenos Aires. Confiscated material from passengers is denatured and disposed of as 

waste. 

All baggage originating north of Patagonia North B is examined by SENASA officials at the Río 

Gallegos airport. Baggage originating from within Patagonia is randomly checked. Any 

prohibited material seized is kept in the office, treated with methylene blue, picked up by a 

SENASA official at the end of the day and destroyed in the digester at a slaughter plant. Cargo is 

usually scanned. Suspicious packages go to the SENASA main office. Perishables are 

refrigerated. The owner must go to the office to retrieve the cargo and be present when SENASA 

opens it. 

APHIS visited the Neuquén airport in 2003 and 2009. The airport has a zoophytosanitary post 

operated to enforce Resolution 58/01, which prohibits the entrance of products that could 

potentially carry the FMD virus. It is a control point that examines passenger carry-on and 

checked luggage and commercial cargo from northern Argentina. This airport deals mainly with 

small cargo, although it is a commercial airport that could potentially receive larger cargo 

shipments. 

There are six domestic flights from the Jorge Newbury airport to the Neuquen airport daily, 

about three hours apart. Charter flights occasionally fly in from Chile. Three employees work at 

the airport for FUNBAPA, and SENASA staff is not present at this airport. There is at least one 

person on duty at all times in case an unscheduled flight arrives or any other sanitary questions 

arise. 

All baggage is scanned (carry-on and checked) using a scanner capable of detecting organic 

material. Very few animal products are found; most material is fruit. Most of the travelers are 

people from the area going to Buenos Aires, so most are aware of the sanitary situation and the 

restrictions. There is very little tourism to this area. All confiscated items and airplane garbage 

are incinerated daily on the premises, and items confiscated are recorded. During 2008, the 

airports confiscated 82 kg of plants/vegetable products and 16.8 kg of animal products from local 

flights. In 2012, SENASA the same airport confiscated 73kg from local flights. There were no 

reports on confiscations of plants/vegetable and animal products from international flights 

between 2008 and 2012 [14, 19]. 

During the 2009 site visit, activities at the Trelew airport were also observed. Trelew airport was 

equipped with a state-of-the-art scanner and all incoming passenger luggage is scanned. Officials 

at the Trelew airport confiscated over 400 kg of fruit in 2008, and over 260 kg of animal 

products between 2007 and 2008. In 2012, the same airport confiscated 72 kg of animal 

products. 

The airports in the Patagonia region with sanitary inspection are listed in Table 3. 
35

Table 3. Airports with Sanitary Inspection in Patagonia South and North A and B 

Sanitary Region Airports 

North A 3 (Viedma, G. Roca (closed), Neuquén) 

North B 3 (R. Sauces, Bariloche, Capelco) 

South 9 (Pto. Madryn, Rawson, C. Rivadavia, 

Trelew, Esquel, Río Gallegos, Calafate, Río 

Grande, and Ushuaia) 

Total Airports 14 

Land ports 

General: International borders

Permanent SENASA personnel are stationed at each international border port; however, 

SENASA is not the only group responsible for biosecurity at borders. The number of personnel 

available for border control is supplemented through agreements with security forces like the 

gendarmeria (special type of military forces). As a result, 14,000 officials are stationed along 

9,370 miles of border [11]. As previously mentioned, SENASA is assisted at import centers by 

several designated security forces. SENASA officials emphasized the importance of the national 

forces (i.e., the land, water and border police) in identification of illegal imports [11]. If needed, 

SENASA also has the authority to call upon local police to assist. 

SENASA checkpoint officials are notified approximately 15 days before an agricultural animal 

or animal product shipment arrives. This minimizes potential problems with the customs 

authority and helps facilitate and expedite the process. All exporters and importers must be 

registered with SENASA. The shipment must be accompanied by a permit and must originate 

from an approved location. Both the origin and the destination of the product appear on the 

permit. 

Shipments can be rejected if documentation is incomplete or if it appears to be falsified. There 

are no fines for commercial shipments that are rejected because the paperwork is incomplete; 

however, the shipments are denied entry and SENASA may confiscate and destroy the product. 

In comparison, if SENASA detects deliberate falsification of documents, a fine of 800 pesos is 

levied. This is equivalent to one month’s salary [11]. 

Border patrol police on land, on water, and at the ports are the primary personnel responsible for 

identifying illegal shipments. The number of illegal shipments has been reduced significantly 

since the economic collapse in Argentina in 2001. SENASA has monthly meetings with these 

border patrols to discuss issues and procedures. 

Patagonia Region: International border

The Patagonia Region borders one country, Chile. As previously mentioned, Argentina is 

separated from most of Chile by the Andes Mountains and works with Chile on joint surveillance 

for the monitoring of movement across the border (i.e., monitoring transport of prohibited 
36

materials/animals by people crossing the border). Much of the movement control focus is 

directed towards FMD. In this regard, since the OIE recognizes Chile as FMD-free without 

vaccination, SENASA does not consider Chile as a high-risk region [33]. Chile is also 

recognized as FMD-free (without vaccination) by the United States. 

Four terrestrial border stations are located along this border [1]: 

1. Los Huemules in the Andes Mountains in Chubut Province; 

2. Cohayque in the Andes Mountains in Chubut Province; 

3. Intergración Austral (Monte Aymond) in the southern part of Santa Cruz Province; and 

4. Cardenal Samoré crossing in Neuquén. 

The site review team visited the border post at Monte Aymond. This post is under the joint 

control of the Argentine and Chilean governments. Argentina inspects Chilean shipments, and 

Chile checks Argentine shipments. Joint inspection teams are made up of Border Patrol staff 

which act as an international trade enforcement authority. The plan is to integrate the two border 

post facilities into one unit with integrated staff from both countries. 

Bus traffic between Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego Provinces must go through several posts for 

inspection. When leaving Argentina to enter Chile, passengers must pass through Joint 

Argentine-Chilean Immigration and Customs and repeat this step again when entering Tierra del 

Fuego from Chile, where customs officials checks passports and luggage. Customs then passes 

passengers on to the Border Patrol. If someone is suspected of carrying hazardous agricultural or 

food items they are passed on to a SENASA inspector. If SENASA personnel are not present, the 

Border Patrol staff carries out SENASA duties. When the joint border post is in operation, 

SENASA staff will be present 24 hours a day. 

Tri-language (English, Spanish, and Portuguese) notices are posted at border crossings and other 

ports of entry to inform visitors of biologically hazardous materials and products. A scanner that 

can detect organic materials is present at the Monte Aymond post but was not in operation at the 

time of the 2003 site visit. Officials stated that it would be in operation in a month from the time 

of the visit. 

The FMD status of Chile and the Patagonia Region is recognized as equivalent by both countries. 

Both areas are considered free from FMD and fruit flies. Breeding stock is traded between these 

two regions. Commercial meat shipments are also allowed; however, passengers cannot bring 

meat over the borders. The vast majority of the contraband agricultural and food products 

confiscated are fish products and certain fresh plant/fruit products are also prohibited into the 

area. 

A standard certificate for export/import must be presented by shippers at the border crossing. 

SENASA must be notified so staff can be present when the shipment arrives at the border, but 

staff from the Border Patrol can also inspect shipments. The border posts are staffed 24 hours a 

day, seven days a week by Border Patrol officials, who check seals and documents but do not 

open the seals to inspect cargo. The seals are inspected to ensure that they have not been broken 

and that they match the entries on the export/import documents. 
37

Customs turns over all contraband products seized to Border Patrol or SENASA officials. A 

record of all seized products is made and products are then put in a barrel and sprayed with 

methylene blue or povidone to render them inedible. They are then burned in large holes and 

covered with soil once the holes are filled. 

Patagonia Region: Internal borders [10] 

Land control posts between the Patagonia Region and the northern part of Argentina run along 

the Barrancas River. They are located near bridges at Barrancas, Desfidero, Mora and El Porton. 

There are 10 control posts around the city of Neuquén in the Confluent Department between 

Patagonia North B and North A. The rest of the land control posts between North A and B run 

along the Negro River. They are located near bridges at Paso Cordova, Valle Azul, Pomona, and 

San Antonio Oeste. The site visit review team visited the control post at San Antonio Oeste. 

San Antonio Oeste is a small post near the sea port of the same name. It is only an animal and 

animal product post. The staffing in this post has increased from six employees in 2003 to ten in 

2009, and the post operates 24 hours a day. All vehicular traffic going south into Patagonia North 

B and all cargo vehicles going north into Patagonia North A are checked for proper paperwork. 

FMD-susceptible species are not allowed to pass this post and proceed south into Patagonia 

North B. Around 500 vehicles pass through this point daily. Inspectors have stopped wool being 

shipped without the correct documentation. There is a documented case in which a sealed truck 

could not be adequately inspected, so the staff re-sealed it and notified SENASA at the 

destination point so that officials could inspect the truck during unloading. 

Before 2003, due to an increased rate of smuggling of bone-in meat to Neuquén, SENASA 

decided to vaccinate animals in the surrounding area to guard against potential introduction of 

FMD. A circular area around the city of Neuquén with ten control posts was established and 

included as part of Patagonia North A (Department of Confluencia). That area is the only region 

in the Province of Neuquen that is a part of Patagonia North A. This zoning was done in 

consultation with OIE. More than 18,000 vehicles cross the bridge daily between the cities of 

Neuquén and Cipolleti. 

The area between the control posts separating Patagonia North A from the rest of the Patagonia 

Region is very inhospitable in the western region with very few animal movements from North 

to South. It is mainly an oil-producing area with no electricity or water. FUNBAPA has mobile 

units to patrol the area and check vehicles. Vehicles passing through this area will eventually 

have to pass through a town, and police will stop anyone attempting to bypass a control post. 

Land control points between Patagonia North A and the northern part of Argentina run along the 

Colorado River. They are located near bridges at 25 de Mayo, Dique Catnel, Medanitos, Casa de 

Piedra, La Japonesa, Pichimahuida, Río Colorado, Adela, Pedro Luro, and Km 714. 

All control posts along the border are for animal and animal product inspection; only some of 

them include plant and fruit inspection. The 2003 and 2009 site visit review teams visited the 

control posts at Km 714 and Pedro Luro. 
38

The control post at Km 714 is located north of the barrier between Patagonia North A and the 

northern part of Argentina. It is located north of the Colorado River at the point just before the 

main road splits in two. Most of the traffic heads west toward Neuquén, while a small amount 

goes south to Pedro Luro. Seventy percent of the traffic going into Patagonia goes through this 

control point, and it is strategically situated for fruit fly control (outside of the production area). 

There are at least two signs on each side of the highway warning travelers to stop for agricultural 

inspection as they approach the control post. All vehicles heading south into Patagonia are 

inspected, and all trucks and cars are sprayed and disinfected for fruit flies; however, not all 

vehicles are sprayed for FMD virus disinfection. Only in an emergency situation, such as an 

active outbreak of FMD, are trucks and cars disinfected for FMD. The site review team 

witnessed a truck going through the disinfection process which consisted of sprayers in the road 

that spray the vehicles from the sides and from below. 

The post has an adequate infrastructure (employees, space, electricity, equipment). There were 

three eight hour shifts with a total of 52 people staffing the post as of 2009. Agricultural 

inspectors number 10-11 during the day and eight at night, when there is less traffic. Officials 

can dispatch police for violations of trucks and autos. In some instances, confiscated animal or 

fruit products (originating in areas that vaccinate against FMD or areas considered at risk for 

fruit flies) from this control post can be donated to underserved populations north of the post; 

however, only the large confiscated shipments can be donated. Substances seized from personal 

vehicles are destroyed in front of their previous owners so that the public knows the products are 

not just being stolen. Data is entered into a computer about what animals, animal products, and 

fruits are transported and for what purpose, and all confiscated materials are recorded on paper 

records. Since 2004, the post has used sniffer dogs to help with vehicle and cargo inspection. 

During the 2009 site visit, team members observed a beagle detect meat products in a 

passenger’s luggage. The product was confiscated, treated, and disposed of properly, and all 

necessary forms documenting the violation were completed. An average of around eight kg of 

plant/fruit and animal products are confiscated daily. 

The Pedro Luro Control Post is a smaller post (the office is in a small trailer) through which a 

small minority of the main traffic through Km 714 passes. Generally, more traffic heads out of 

the area than goes in on that road. This post distributes about 30,000 leaflets per year to let 

people know what they can and cannot bring into the region. Generally, people do know what is 

prohibited and are cooperative. The post is staffed by five people and there is also a police car at 

all times outside of the office with at least two policemen. The same standard procedures are 

followed in this post as in Km 714 and other posts visited. The staff appeared to be adequately 

trained and knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. 

The control post inspectors confiscate about ten kg of meat products per day. Meat in-bone is 

returned to the place of origin, unless it had been hidden, in which case it is destroyed. Examples 

of other interdictions include sausage, ovine meat, bees, dirty empty trucks, trucks without 

proper paperwork, and dirty trucks carrying passengers. Most of the confiscated items, such as 

prohibited foodstuffs and animal products, are burned immediately after seizure and buried in a 

hole in the ground on the side of the road by the post. 
39

Training of personnel

SENASA personnel conduct training of security and other forces working on border security. A 

manual of procedures applies at a national level for all types of border crossings [4]. The manual 

includes: 

 The legal framework; 

 The national and international zoosanitary status; 

 A glossary of terms; 

 The list of officials that are authorized to sign the international certificates and a list of 

authorized border control posts throughout the country; 

 An epidemiological characterization of the border posts (in the process of 

implementation); and 

 Import and export procedures. 

In addition to the procedures manual, SENASA has a product manual that lists products allowed 

to enter the country (Resolutions 295/99 and 299/99 list approved plant/fruit and animal 

products). The policies and guidelines in these documents are applicable at a national level and 

define a standardized approach for border personnel. 

FUNBAPA employees receive a one-day instruction course prior to employment and then are 

given materials to study at home. At the end of ten days they are required to take written and oral 

examinations on the materials. If the scores are satisfactory, they are subjected to an interview 

before the hiring decision is made. They are also trained in various technical duties, including 

recognition of FMD clinical signs and laws and regulations. The probationary period is six 

months. Employees receive mandatory training once a year in a refresher course that covers any 

new rules or regulations. All posts are audited monthly by FUNBAPA and every four months by 

SENASA. 

Conclusions

APHIS considers SENASA officials in Argentina, including the ones in the Patagonia Region, to 

have adequate controls at ports of entry for legal commercial and noncommercial importation of 

FMD-susceptible species and livestock products. SENASA also has the legal framework, proper 

coverage of borders, and adequate staffing to monitor the influx of animals and products via 

traffic from adjacent areas of higher risk and to deal with the entry of illegal animal or animal 

products into the region. The border control posts (land and air) visited during the site visits 

demonstrated adequate staffing levels, knowledge of requirements and procedures, and 

professionalism and efficiency. Staff were well trained and updated on a regular basis and 

employed the use of appropriate technology when available. 

8. Livestock demographics and marketing practices in the region

Livestock production systems in the Patagonia Region are mainly extensive on large farms 

where large numbers of sheep are kept. These sheep farms traditionally send lambs and culled 

ewes directly to slaughter with little movement of animals between holdings. Cattle farming is 
40

limited to small cattle breeding areas with low stocking rates. The climate and the environment 

of Patagonia are major factors that make the sheep industry the prevailing livestock activity. This 

area contains almost 60 percent of the entire sheep population of Argentina. There were over 

seven million sheep in 2003 (8.4 million in 2008) and more than 72 percent of Argentina’s best 

wool is produced in this region. 

Prevailing breeds in the region are Merino and Corriedale. Average livestock density is 14 sheep 

per km2

 with Santa Cruz province having the lowest density at 9.5 sheep per km2. Total sheep 

exports from the Patagonia Region surpassed 90 percent of the total of sheep exports from all of 

Argentina. Currently, Argentina is exporting 10,000 tons/year of sheep meat to the EU. 

Argentina estimates that it will export 6,000 tons/year of sheep meat to the United States, with a 

maximum of 9,000 tons/year and a minimum of 4,000 tons/year. Sheep production is highest in 

the province of Chubut, followed by Santa Cruz and then Tierra del Fuego [1, 2, 34]. 

Bovine production is secondary, and beef produced in the Patagonia Region is consumed locally. 

Matured and deboned beef must be imported to meet the consumption demands of the population 

in Patagonia South. Pigs are also raised only for local consumption. Fresh pork meat (chilled and 

frozen) and pork sausages are not allowed into the Patagonia Region from other parts of 

Argentina. Livestock statistics for 2009 are listed in Tables 4 and 5 below. During the 2013 visit, 

SENASA reported that there were not significant differences between the 2009 and 2013 

livestock statistics. 

Table 4. Livestock Producers, Establishments, and Bovine and Sheep Populations in the 

Patagonia Region in 2009 [35]

Province Total 

Establishments 

Total 

Producers 

Establishments 

with Bovines 

Bovine 

Population 

Establishments 

with Sheep 

Sheep 

Population 

Chubut 4,593 5,178 2.214 252,582 3,605 4,786,274 

Santa Cruz 773 807 230 58,968 595 3,324,012 

Tierra del 

Fuego 

81 90 72 32,770 52 572,464 

TOTAL 5,447 6,075 2,516 344,320 4,252 8,628,750 

Table 5. Pig and Goat Livestock and Establishments in the Patagonia Region in 2009 [35] 

Province Establishments 

with Pigs 

Pig Population Establishments 

with Goats 

Goat Population 

Chubut 256 8,890 953 144,681 

Santa Cruz 47 3,101 10 1,296 

Tierra del 

Fuego 

8 630 0 0 

TOTAL 311 12,621 963 145,977 

Premises identification
41

SENASA requires that all premises involved in animal production register with SENASA and 

obtain a RENSPA (Registro Nacional Sanitario de Productores Agropecuarios [National Sanitary 

Registry of Agricultural Producers]) number. This is an alphanumeric identifier that encodes 

information about individual premises and identifies the province, the municipality, and various 

aspects characterizing a particular premise such as ownership, rental status, or shared occupancy 

[1, 11]. A diagram of the RENSPA number is represented in figure 6. 

Figure 6. Explanation of RENSPA Number 

XX XXX X XXXXX XX 

Province District Internal 

Control No. 

Unique Farm No. 

(unique in province) 

Possession Type 

Owner (00) 

Renter (01) 

Etc. 

The name of a responsible veterinarian must be included on the application for a RENSPA 

number and is entered into the database. The veterinarian is held accountable for failing to report 

problems that he or she might observe on the premises. Veterinarians named on registration 

documents are required by law to report problems on the premises, such as unusual numbers of 

sick and dead livestock. If the veterinarian or owner of the animals fails to report suspicion of 

disease, indemnity will not be paid. This can be a significant loss, since the indemnity paid is 

typically the market value of the animal. In addition, a fine is levied on the veterinarian, the 

owner, or both, depending on who fails to notify SENASA. 

The RENSPA database is maintained by field officials and includes census information on all 

species on the premises, permit information showing animal movements, as well as other 

pertinent data. The database also records the FMD test status of the premises, as defined by the 

national surveillance program. Monthly statistical reports are generated from this database. 

In addition to the RENSPA number, livestock owners are assigned a unique identifying code 

called a CUIG number (unique holding identification code), consisting of a series of four digits. 

The CUIG number is shorter than the RENSPA number and is used as a more convenient form 

of premises identification. The CUIG must be included on eartags of cattle (CUIG on the front). 

The RENSAPA and CUIG codes are linked to the integrated management system for animal 

health (Sistema Integrado de Gestión en Sanidad Animal – SIGSA), which ensures prompt 

access to all information needed in case of any animal health event, such as the number and 

individual identification of animals (for cattle) present in a particular farm at a certain time, all 

animal movements in and out and detailed geo-referenced data that allow for a quick 

identification of other farm or geographical areas at risk of any possible transmission of a 

reportable disease. All cattle and sheep movements are individually authorized and registered by

the SIGSA through the issuing of the electronic animal movement permit (Documento de 

tránsito electrónico – DT-e), which must accompany all cattle and sheep that are moved in 

Argentina. The owner could request the DT-e either electronically or from the local office. 
42

In 2007, Argentina instituted a compulsory cattle identification program, requiring that all calves 

born after September 2007 carry official tags (Resolution 754/2006). Resolution 563/2012 

requires that bovines from the older age groups be individually identified. At the time of the 

2013 site visit, SENASA reported that the entire Argentine herd was individually identified. 

Individual identification of bovines is unique and permanent. The number of tags needed is 

requested by the animal owner and is crosschecked at the local office to the inventory in the SGS 

(animal health information system software). The owner is responsible for applying the tags and 

then notifying the local office as to which tags have been used. The color of tags issued to cattle 

holders is determined by the FMD status of the region in which the cattle reside. Green tags are 

used in regions that are FMD-free without vaccination, yellow for regions that are FMD-free 

with vaccination, red in buffer areas, and blue tags are used for tag replacement purposes only. 

Figure 7 shows the IDs used for bovine 

Figure 7. Individual Bovine ID system in the FMD Free with Vaccination Region 

Left ear Right ear 

 

For sheep, individual identification is required in the event the farm is approved for export to the 

EU; otherwise premises identification is required, either by eartag, which includes the CUIG 

number of the farm, or ear notch. The eartag color and shape may be selected by the farmer (the 

color is not specific to the FMD status of the region as in cattle). Ear notches are controlled by 

and registered with SENASA to ensure that they are unique. 
43

 

Movement controls within Argentina 

A DT-e is required when animals move to slaughter, to market, or from farm to farm in 

Patagonia, cross provincial lines, or if they are exported. These permits are required in order to 

establish that the farm of origin is registered so that tracing can be conducted quickly. The 

identification numbers of both the premises of origin and the premises of destination must be 

recorded on the DT-e. Permit applications are checked against farm inventory in the SGS 

database. If a registered farm attempts to ship more animals than are recorded in the inventory, 

the discrepancy is noted and the permit application is denied. The number and species are then 

recorded on the permit, the information is entered into the database, and the inventory is updated. 

Movement of FMD-susceptible animals is limited in the Patagonia Region. The local SENASA 

office issues a DT-e to keep track of all animal movements off each farm. Another movement 

permit, a provincial transit certificate (Guia), is issued by the Provincial Authority to validate 

ownership and identification of the animals. When animals are shipped from farm-to-farm, the 

DT-e must be returned within five days to the local office of destination, which will inform the 

local office of origin of the shipment arrival (http://www.senasa.gov.ar/Archivos/File/File1528-

Anexo%20356-08.pdf). SENASA Resolution 38/2010 describes penalties for not complying 

with the animal movement requirements. If animals are going to slaughter for domestic 

consumption, the veterinary inspection is limited to the antemortem inspection at the slaughter 

facility. If the carcasses are going to be exported to the EU, the local SENASA veterinarian goes 

to the farm and seals the transportation vehicle, which is later opened by the veterinarian 

responsible for the antemortem inspection at the slaughter facility [10]. 

Movements of cattle are carried out under the conditions established by SENASA Resolutions 

No. 178/01 and related Resolutions 356/2008, 810/2009, and 238/2013. These resolutions require 

that the animals be accompanied by a DT-e and the pertinent livestock Guia, have individual 

animal IDs, and be transported in a vehicle approved by SENASA with a certificate accrediting 

washing and disinfection of the vehicle before loading and seals on each of the vehicle doors. It 

establishes joint liability among the official staff that issues the health certificate, the owners or 

persons responsible for the animals, the shippers, and the slaughter plants [1, 2,19]. 

All vehicles carrying commercial shipments must also be registered with and approved by 

SENASA and issued a number. SENASA Resolution No. 809/81 (updated by Resolution 

238/2013) establishes the mandatory washing and disinfection of all livestock vehicles that 

transport livestock within the country. Typically, the number issued by SENASA is painted on 

the trucks and the driver must show proof of the authenticity and validity of that number. Trucks 

must be cleaned and disinfected before every transportation and must show a proof of truck 

disinfection in the form of a bill issued by a SENASA-approved facility. There is only one bill 

per movement. No dirty animal trucks are allowed on the road or they will be cited. Disinfection 

is carried out in all freight transports, including farm machinery, and is performed at random in 

automobiles at all entrance points into the country and into the free areas where vaccination is 

not practiced. These points are approved by SENASA and are located at certain risk borders [1, 

2]. 
44

Transport washers must be approved by SENASA. They are required to use products specific for 

veterinary use and approved by SENASA. The washing and disinfection tasks are performed by 

official staff or staff hired by SENASA using motor-propulsion machinery or sprinkler 

equipment and products approved for vehicular disinfection [2]. 

There is no charge for work done at the control posts (except for the spraying done at points of 

first entry into Patagonia North A). There are automatic sprayers at all commercial entry points 

and handheld sprayers at others. Currently, there is a charge for the DTA (one Argentine peso, 

which is equivalent to $0.5 U.S. dollars). The Province charges for the Guia, which includes a 

fee that is then used for agricultural projects in the Province (e.g., herd improvement) and 

funding for the Guia issuing offices. There is also a fee per kilo of wool shipped that is collected 

by the Province and used the same way. It is only the fruit and vegetable industry that funds 

FUNBAPA via fees collected for spraying at the border and for cargo per ton shipped. The 

animal industry funds go to the Province, except for the vaccination programs where the farmers 

must pay for the FMD vaccine and the brucellosis vaccine [10]. 

Movement controls within the Patagonia Region 

Movements of livestock within the Patagonia Region are limited. There are no livestock 

concentration markets in this region. Annual exhibitions/fairs for selling breeding rams occur 

once a year in Santa Cruz (Río Gallegos) and Chubut (Comodoro Rivadavia, Trelew, and 

Esquel). Each auction sells about 400 rams. Also, large farms carry out their annual breeder 

auctions on their own premises so breeding livestock transport is limited mainly from farm to 

farm. 

Due to the type of production and marketing systems in Patagonia, there are no livestock 

concentration markets for fattening and slaughter. Trade is carried out directly from the farm to 

the slaughterhouse with direct selling of cull animals and lambs to slaughter plants. Lambs are 

usually destined for export. 

Slaughter Facilities in the Patagonia Region 

There are 19 slaughter plants approved by SENASA in the Patagonia Region that comply with 

the established regulations. All plants approved by SENASA are federally inspected. Three 

plants are approved for export of sheep meat to the EU; two are located in the city of Río 

Gallegos in the Province of Santa Cruz and one is in the city of Puerto Madryn in the Province of 

Chubut. No slaughter facilities are currently approved for export to the United States. 

The procedures to approve plants for export are regulated by SAGPyA Resolution 310/04, which 

updates the requirements of Decree 4238/68 and other previously abolished standards. The 

facility must first be registered on a list of establishments authorized to export. The Bureau of 

Supervision of Products of Animal Origin then has to conduct an assessment of the compliance 

of building, operative, and documentary requirements, in accordance with a Procedures 

Initiative. Also, it must verify that the requirements of the country of destination and those of the 

National Bureau of Agricultural and Livestock Trade Control, an agency of the Secretariat of 

Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food, have been met. 
45

The following parameters are taken into account for the assessment of compliance: 

 Capacity of pens at the export area; 

 Daily slaughter numbers intended for export; 

 Slaughter capacity (animals/hour); 

 Capacity of the maturations chambers, if pertinent; and 

 Capacity of carcasses that can be introduced into chambers intended for “maturation,” 

complying with the following items in accordance with Decree 4238/68: 

o Prohibition of commingling of carcasses coming from areas of different sanitary 

conditions. 

o Presence of viable technical methods to register environmental temperature in the 

maturation chambers. 

The slaughter establishments must be approved for the activity appropriate to the requested 

destination and a predetermined volume of production. The establishment has to have 

documented procedures to identify and trace the products to be exported and provide the Service 

of Veterinary Inspection an updated list of livestock suppliers. They must not have any 

infringements of the Residues and Food Hygiene Plan and must correct any problems that were 

observed by auditors of foreign sanitary authorities. Documentary proof of compliance with all 

the requirements of the country of destination must be provided. 

According to the regulations, by the authority of Decree 4238/68, the following controls must be 

carried out at all SENASA-approved slaughter facilities: 

 Pens: Animals are kept within pens and cannot leave the slaughtering plant once they 

enter the premises. 

 Effluent treatment: All effluents from the coldstore (pens, slaughter yard, and water used 

in all the processes) are treated by separating out solids, fats, liquids and chlorinates 

before releasing them to the general sewage system. 

 Sanitary complex: Effluents from the sanitary complex are individually treated by 

disinfection before dumping them with the rest of the common, treated effluents. 

 Fallen and dead animals: Fallen animals are slaughtered at the emergency yard and their 

meat and products not used for export. Dead animals, including their skin, are treated at 

the necropsy digester after diagnosis. 

 Raw slaughter wastes: Wastes are sent to processing plants with thermal treatments for 

nonedible uses in closed vehicles approved for the purpose. They may be processed at the 

same plant in melters or digesters with thermal treatment to make nonedible byproducts. 

 Slaughter pathology wastes: Wastes are processed in digesters with pressurized steam or 

in melters to obtain byproducts. 

A slaughter facility visited in Río Gallegos buys animals (sheep) from regional farms and 

markets the meat. It is approved for export to the EU, Israel, and Islamic countries and has about 

70 employees. 

A SENASA official conducts antemortem inspection, and any sick animals are placed in an 

isolation pen. Animals from the same ranch are all placed in the same pen. The number of 
46

animals and other information are recorded on a card which is kept in the office. A postmortem 

examination of any animals that die is performed in a nearby necropsy room. 

After animals are killed, an inspector examines the carcass and organs. There are SENASA 

inspectors plus four plant staff that examine the organs. Condemned whole carcasses go through 

a different line and are put into the digester. There are no rendering plants in Patagonia South. 

Carcasses are stamped with the flock number and animal number. The barcode label includes 

weight, animal number, and flock number. Carcasses for market are stored at about -22°C. 

The 2009 site visit team observed activities at a sheep slaughter facility in Puerto Madryn which 

has been exporting to MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) member nations and other 

countries, and since 2004 to the EU. 

Conclusions

Large extensive sheep operations and export-approved slaughter facilities would likely be the 

source of sheep meat and products exported to the United States from the Patagonia Region of 

Argentina. The livestock industry in Patagonia appears to be well organized, committed to the 

production of quality products, and aware of necessary biosecurity precautions. There appears to 

be high awareness and compliance with these measures. Processing facilities are under adequate 

official control and inspection. APHIS did not identify significant risk pathways as a likely 

source for introducing FMD into the United States. 

The SGS system is able to consistently and reliably capture farm inventory, animal movement 

information, sanitary information, and identification numbers, as well as to control movements 

as necessary. Observations indicated that the structure, effectiveness, and organization of 

SENASA were adequate to perform official animal health functions. In addition, APHIS 

observed that the identification system in place is able to track cattle movements and keep a 

reliable farm inventory. The National Identification System is comprehensive and able to comply 

with U.S. certification requirements for exporting products from the Patagonia Region to the 

United States. 

9. The type and extent of disease surveillance in the region

Documenting a surveillance system sufficient to ensure early detection of FMD is essential for 

the assessment of risk. An effective surveillance system combines both active surveillance 

(including ongoing laboratory-based testing) and passive surveillance (reporting and/or testing of 

animals with clinical signs of disease). This section explains the characteristics of the FMD 

surveillance program in place in Argentina.2

 

 

2

 The Epidemiology and Risk Analysis Unit of SENASA’s National Animal Health Directorate is responsible for 

designing the sampling and evaluating the results. It collaborates with and seeks technical assistance from the 

Epidemiology Advisory Commission, whose members are experts from SENASA, the National Farm Technology 

Institute, the Animal Virology Centre of the National Council for Technical and Scientific Research, and schools of 

veterinary sciences. Samples are collected by local SENASA veterinarians and specimens are processed by the 

Animal Department of the Official Laboratory and Technical Control Directorate of SENASA (Ref: Annex 

IV_Muestreo 2004 end.pdf). 
47

Objective of surveillance 

The primary objective of Argentina’s epidemiological surveillance activities since the July 2000 

epidemic has been to search for and eradicate FMD. This is done in accordance with the 

country’s FMD National Eradication Plan, of which serological sampling has been an integral 

part [24]. In addition, SENASA’s goal in conducting repeated countrywide serological samplings 

has also been to monitor the disease during the 2000/2001 outbreaks, and to measure the 

progress of its FMD-Eradication Plan [22, 36]. In particular, serological sampling in Argentina is 

conducted for the following reasons: 

 To detect viral activity (or infection), and 

 To estimate population immunity given by vaccination against FMD where vaccination 

was practiced. 

FMD surveillance activities in Argentina may be broadly characterized as passive and active 

surveillance. These two methods work in a complementary fashion resulting in efficient and 

effective surveillance. Passive surveillance gathers qualitative information about the disease and 

active surveillance gathers quantitative data. 

Passive surveillance 

Passive surveillance is accomplished by a wide variety of activities in Argentina. The most 

salient feature of passive surveillance is the education and involvement of the entire community 

in watching for any suspicion of FMD. Observations and qualitative information gathered under 

the passive surveillance effort are an integral part of the overall surveillance efforts in Argentina. 

Information from passive surveillance activities is utilized effectively in the national serological 

sampling design to help achieve better stratification and to concentrate sampling effort where 

needed the most (i.e., targeted sampling). Passive surveillance and follow-up efforts are further 

described under Factor 11 (Policies and infrastructure for animal disease control in the region) 

below. 

Active surveillance 

Active surveillance in Argentina primarily constitutes sampling of animals for serological 

testing. This sampling is conducted under the national plan (see Factor 11—Policies and 

infrastructure for animal disease control in the region). The design consists of a two-stage 

sampling strategy, at the herd level and the individual animal level, within each region (regions 

are based on the number and type of herds and animals and the disease history of each zones). 

As mentioned earlier, northern Argentina vaccinates cattle for FMD and, in addition to the 

surveillance sampling described above, SENASA also conducts annual nation-wide serological 

samplings to estimate the immunity offered by the FMD vaccine. These samplings, together with 

other surveillance activities, serve to assess the epidemiological status of FMD in the country 

and collect specific indicators on the evolution of the disease. 
48

Argentina has been conducting serological surveillance on a yearly basis since 2001 with a 

frequency of at least once a year. Additionally, other surveillance studies are conducted 

frequently for various purposes. Examples of such studies include assessing immunity levels in 

the young vaccinated cattle population, or in sheep and goats in areas that do not vaccinate for 

FMD, or for animal movements out of the Cordon Fronterizo bordering Bolivia, Paraguay and 

Brazil. During the 2012 FMD outbreak in Paraguay, Argentina also conducted intensive 

surveillance in the six border provinces. These studies are detailed below. 

Description of the sampling design 

The random selection of animals for serological testing is conducted according to a standard 

stratified two-stage probabilistic design. Under this design, the country — which has a surface 

area of 2,780,199 km2

 and 270,000 establishments, with a population of 52.5 million bovines and 

13.8 million sheep — is first divided into zones and subzones (i.e., strata) according to several 

factors such as livestock production systems and animal movement patterns, geographical and 

climatic conditions, and epidemiological characteristics with respect to the history of disease in 

the region and to the vaccination program (see Figure 8 below). From each zone, herds 

(establishments) are randomly selected at the first stage of sampling, and animals within herds 

are then randomly selected at the second stage of sampling. The design is flexible enough to 

permit changes and adjustments to target high-risk areas based on epidemiological and other 

relevant considerations at the time of sampling and the surveillance goals. APHIS considers 

Argentina’s sampling design to be appropriate, efficient, and scientifically sound. 
49

Figure 8: Epidemiological Zoning of Argentina for the Purpose of Serological Sampling

 
50

Determining sample size3 

The number of herds to be selected in each region (stratum) at the first stage of sampling is 

determined according to the following standard statistical formula [37]: 

Similarly, the number of animals to be selected from each of the selected herds is determined 

according to the following standard statistical formula [37]: 

where

Number of animals to be selected from each of the selected herds

Level of confidence for the detection of at least one positive animal

 within the selected herd 

w h h

w h

w

n n

D

g -

-

Number of infected animals within the selected herd (i.e., within-herd

 prevalence)

Average number of animals within a herd (i.e., average herd size).

h

Nw h

-

-

Changes in serological sampling from year to year 

The objectives, approaches, and intensity of serological sampling in Argentina might 

change slightly from year to year. In prior years, the main objective of surveillance was to 

estimate the prevalence of the FMD virus in different regions of the country,4 and to estimate the 

level of immunity in the national bovine population of herds with the application of the 

systematic vaccination for each region.5

 Since the last outbreak occurred in 2006, the 

surveillance objectives have been modified to serve the purpose of early detection of FMDV if it 

were to be present in the country, and to continue to evaluate population immunity in areas that 

vaccinate. 

 

3

 Sample size refers to the number of herds nh and the number of animals within herds nw-h to be selected for 

serological sampling in each region in a given sampling year. These are determined according to formulae (1.1) and 

(1.2), respectively. 

4

 Viral activities were measured in susceptible animals that were recently and/or previously infected with the FMD 

virus, as well as in vaccinated animals. Different species were sampled, including sheep, which were not vaccinated; 

and bovine, stratified in animals from 1 to 2 years old and animals older than 2 years. 

5

 The samples from the premises that were completely negative to the detection of viral activity were used in order 

to carry out a subsampling to determine seroprotection levels in the population. 
51

The sampling approach under the surveillance objectives remained the same through 2010, with 

changes in surveillance objectives and sampling design implemented in 2011. The changes in 

surveillance from 2011 onward are described later in this section. The random selection of 

animals is always conducted in two stages in accordance with the national sampling design 

described above. The country is divided into different regions (strata) from which herds are 

selected at the first sampling stage, then individual animals from within the selected herds are 

selected for sampling. Both targeted and random samplings may be conducted. 

For early detection of FMDV, a herd prevalence of five percent and a statistical confidence of 95 

percent were typically assumed each year through 2010. To determine the population immunity 

level, a prevalence (P) of protected bovines of 75 percent was assumed, with an acceptable error 

of six percent and a statistical confidence level of 95 percent. These were the typical assumptions 

each year in each region. Similarly, the number of animals to be selected from within a selected 

herd was determined for each region using formula (2) above. For the purpose of determining the 

within-herd sample size, the typical assumptions were two percent within-herd prevalence and a 

95 percent statistical confidence. 

Each year, samples from the premises that were completely negative to the detection of viral 

activity were used to estimate the sero-protection levels in the population. The statistical design 

typically required that at least 80 establishments be sampled in each region and approximately 

1200 samples be taken. This was done each year (approximately) by analyzing 15 bovine sera 

from each of the 80 establishments (960 from bovines aged one to two years and 240 of bovines 

older than two years). All of the sampled farms had complied with both vaccination campaigns 

corresponding to the current year, established by the National Plan, with at least 30 days from the 

last vaccination.
52

The list of herds, as well as all livestock census data in Argentina, are compiled and updated by 

RENSPA. Table 6 shows some of the demographic information and livestock figures used to 

construct sampling. 

Table 6: Livestock figures used to construct sampling lists 

Province Flocks Total 

Bovine

Total 

Sheep

Total 

Swine

Total 

Goats

BUENOS AIRES 61,742 21,050,731 1,194,435 532,465 9,620

CORDOBA 29,444 6,508,375 98,619 444,343 45,089

ENTRE RIOS 39,572 4,697,308 35,8300 42,155 3,277

LA PAMPA 9,351 3,342,981 12,8724 95,093 25,377

SANTA FE 30,252 6,968,040 55,738 695,451 47,635

CATAMARCA 3,690 154,575 11,388 3,159 54,695

JUJUY 4,032 88,918 473,463 6,518 106,126

LA RIOJA 3,092 278,874 8,209 26,658 142,781

SALTA 3,037 447,933 46,725 34,830 70,899

SANTIAGO DEL 

ESTERO 9,394 1,179,385 99,813 134,939 278,428

TUCUMAN 6,013 125,361 7,009 14,102 7,609

CORRIENTES 10,047 4,480,962 1,540,590 18,956 5,314

CHACO 10,911 1,640,889 284,351 59,811 129,262

FORMOSA 8,945 1,565,381 60,619 83,805 155,562

MISIONES 26,252 315,442 6,792 68,619 2,646

MENDOZA 894 137,378 8,680 4,529 192,020

SAN JUAN 733 30,727 0 2,811 30,639

SAN LUIS 5,747 1,523,289 43,225 21,327 38,940

NEUQUEN 3,757 133,758 194,007 6,039 568,500

RIO NEGRO 5,306 697,501 1,728,045 7,668 176,353

CHUBUT 4,095 188,347 4,633,518 10,818 140,364

SANTA CRUZ 1,567 46,798 2,333,526 1,481 1,250

TIERRA DEL FUEGO 87 30,815 520,403 432 0

Total 276,306 55,556,155 10,982,250 2,314,096 2,231,136

 
53

Serology results 

Compliance with sampling 

In some regions, the total number of samples could not be collected for the following reasons: 

 Problems submitting the samples (e.g., spills, broken tests tubes, storage 

problems, etc.), and 

 Samples not fit for testing (e.g., hemolysis). 

Table 7 demonstrates compliance with sampling by region. 

Table 7: Compliance with Sampling for Viral Activity During 2004 and 2005 

Region Farm 

Prevalence 

% 

Holdings 

required to 

be sampled 

Holdings 

sampled 

Percent 

sampled 

Species 

Central – 

Mesopotamia 

1 372 (313) 381 102.4 Bovine 

Fattening 1 335(313) 326 97.3 Bovine 

Border 1 459 (313) 456 99.3 Bovine 

NOA – Cuyo 1 459 (300) 455 99.1 Bovine 

Patagonia 

North A 

1 330 (313) 329 99.7 Bovine 

Patagonia 

South and 

North B 

1 459(313) 459 100 Bovine/sheep/goat

Total 2414(1,865) 2406 99.6 

Table 8 shows the results of the tests to detect antibodies against nonstructural proteins in bovine 

category one (six to 12 months of age) and category two (12 to 24 months of age) per region 

during 2004. 

Table 8: Results of tests to detect antibodies against nonstructural proteins in bovines 

Region Holdings 

tested 

Positive 

holdings 

sampled 

Category 1 Category 2 

N 

Positive 

N 

Positive 

N % N % N % 

Central – Mesopotamia 305 10 2.6 2272 2 0.08 1510 11 0.7 

Fattening 324 5 1.5 1942 2 0.1 1283 3 0.2 

Border 455 8 1.7 2717 15 0.5 1818 3 0.16 

NOA – Cuyo 453 5 1.1 2674 2 0.047 1782 3 0.17 

North A Patagonia 329 9 2.7 1973 3 0.1 1297 8 0.6 

Total 1941 37 1.9 11578 24 0.2 7690 23 0.3 
54

All holdings with animals that tested positive in the first sampling were sampled a second time. 

Positive holdings were immediately reported to the Epidemiology Division and follow-up was 

based on OIE standards. From each holding with a positive reactor, 60 cattle and 60 sheep or 

goats were identified by eartags, tested, and retested 21 days later. In addition, other holdings 

within the same area were included in the serological testing. During 2006, there were three 

positive bovines aged six to 12 months (two from Central Mesopotamia/Cuyo/NOA and one 

from the fattening area) and seven positive bovines aged 12 to 24 months (three from Central 

Mesopotamia/NOA/Cuyo, three from the fattening area, and one from the border area). Followup of the positive cases showed no evidence of clinical disease. In addition, epidemiological 

surveys failed to demonstrate any risk situation that could be associated with FMD. Further, 

sampling of contacts show that from the three cattle that remained reactive, only one maintained 

the same results after the initial sampling. No evidence of viral circulation was found after 

follow-up of premises with reactive animals. 

Table 9 summarizes the sampling for 2007 to 2008 by region. 

Table 9: Sampling to determine viral activity by region, 2007 and 2008 

Zone Year Establishments 

Sampled 

Bovines 

Sampled 

Ovines 

Sampled 

Total Animals 

Sampled 

CentralMesopotamia 2007 312 bovine 

222 ovine 8,182 2,183 10,365 

2008 300 bovine 

238 ovine 8,028 2,307 10,335 

Fattening 2007 281 bovine 

148 ovine 5,123 1,218 6,341 

2008 338 bovine 

144 ovine 8,883 1,398 10,281 

Border 2007 290 bovine 

23 ovine 7,809 283 8,092 

 2008 289 bovine 

62 ovine 8,530 590 9,120 

Frontera 2007 290 bovine 

23 ovine 7,811 283 8,094 

 2008 289 bovine 

62 ovine 4,573 590 5,163 

Patagonia Norte A 2007 301 bovine 

129 ovine 5,471 1,094 6,565 

 2008 340 bovine 

154 ovine 8,688 1,536 10,224 

Through 2008, the sample design was determined at the regional level. Beginning in 2009, the 

design is determined at the central SENASA level taking into account regional differences, 

which ensures a more consistent sampling approach. 
55

In addition to the serological testing, SENASA conducts official inspection of cattle in farms, 

livestock market, and slaughterhouses. The total number of individual bovine and ovine 

inspections reported in 2009 was 31,333,478 [29]. 

Population immunity 

To evaluate the population immunity, the titer obtained using ELISA LP (ELISA monoclonalbased liquid phase) from each serum sample was classified into low, medium, and high based on 

the percentage protection expectancy (PPE) for each of the serotypes under study. The ranges of 

each category are described in table 10. 

Table 10: Interpretation of the LP ELISA according to percentage protection expectancy 

O1 Campos 

(titre) 

A2001 

(titre) 

PPE Result 

<1.77 <2.1 <75% Low 

1.77-1.91 2.1-2.3 75%-85% Medium 

>1.91 >2.3 >85% High 

Animals with PPE over 75 percent are considered to have adequate protection against FMD. 

Results of the 2005 studies showed a PPE with medium-high immunity level for each category, 

zone, and type of virus [36]. 

Changes in Surveillance Sampling Design, 2011 [25]: 

In 2011, serological sampling was conducted to demonstrate the absence of disease in the 

Northern region that vaccinates against FMD and the Patagonia region that does not vaccinate. 

The surveillance objectives in the Northern region were to evaluate for presence of antibodies 

against non-structural proteins (NSP) in cattle and against structural proteins (SP) in other FMDsusceptible species, but also to assess the population immunity in the vaccinated region by 

determining presence of antibodies against SP for the types of viruses present in the administered 

vaccines in cattle that had tested negative to NSP. Four zones were established for sampling: 

Zone 1 with the highest bovine population density; Zone 2 which has predominantly extensive 

production systems; Zone 3 which corresponds to Patagonia North A; and Zone 4 comprised the 

areas without vaccination. 

The sampling strategy was designed based on detection of FMD if present at prevalence of 1% 

among herds and a10% prevalence among individuals within the selected herd, with a 95% 

confidence level. Based on the sampling design, a minimum of 313 farms were randomly 

selected in each zone. In Zones 1 to 3, 28 animals were sampled from each farm, 17 of which 

were from six to 12 months and 11 were 12-24 months. In addition, samples were collected 

from ten sheep and goats between six to 24 months for each farm that also raised these species. 

In Zone 4, a total of 28 cattle, sheep or goats were sampled from each of 313 farms. 

For Zones 1 to 3, a total of 25,421 cattle (15,360 from six to 12 months old and 10,061 from 12-

24 months) were sampled from 997 farms, while a total of 5,758 sheep and goats were sampled 
56

from 564 farms. No reactors were found among all sheep and goat sampled. Table 11 below 

shows the results for cattle and sheep/goats, respectively. 

Table 11. ELISA 3ABC and EITB Results from Cattle in the Areas that Vaccinate Against 

FMD 

Cattle 6-12 months Cattle 12-24 months 

Zone 

Number of 

Samples 

 Reactors

Number of 

Samples 

Reactors 

No. % No. % 

1 5794 0 0 3743 0 0 

2 4771 1 0.02 3294 4 0.12 

3 4795 0 0 3024 1 0.03 

Total 15360 1 0.01 10061 5 0.05 

Follow-up activities for all reactors included visits to each of the six premises to collect 

epidemiological information including animal movements in and out of the farm. 

Complementary serological sampling was conducted on the same animals initially sampled, their 

cohorts, and any unvaccinated sheep or goats if present on the farm or in a neighboring ranch. A 

total of 474 additional samples were collected in the follow-up studies which identified one more 

reactor to the ELISA EITB test. Esophageal-pharyngeal fluid (LEP) samples were taken from all 

reactors for Complement Fixation testing (CFT 50 percent) in each of two passages in BHK cell 

culture. Probang sampling was repeated after 21 days. All LEP samples from reactors were 

negative. 

Due to the predominance of sheep production operations in Zone 4 (areas that do not vaccinate 

against FMD), the majority of samples were collected from sheep and goats in this area. A total 

of 350 facilities were sampled, 326 of which were primarily sheep/goat operations. 

Figure 9 shows the geographical distribution of bovine and ovine/caprine farms sampled in Zone 

4. 
57

Figure 9. Bovine (blue) and Ovine/Caprine (green) Premises Sampled 

No reactors were found in a total of 9,259 samples tested. 

Other Directed Surveillance Efforts, 2011-2013 

In addition to their routine active surveillance, Argentina has conducted additional 

serosurveillance studies to assess viral activity or to estimate herd immunity in different 

subpopulations. 

2012 Studies [26]: Subsequent to the FMD outbreak in Paraguay, an enhanced surveillance 

effort was focused on the Northern provinces with international borders: Salta, Formosa, 

Corrientes, Misiones, Chaco, and Jujuy. A two-stage stratified random sampling design was 

based on a one percent prevalence among herds and a ten percent prevalence within individual 

animals in a herd, with a 94 percent confidence level. A total of 345 premises were selected and 

28 cattle were sampled in each premises. Up to ten sheep and goats were also sampled if present 

on these premises. Cattle between six to 12 and 12-24 months of age were sampled, while sheep 

and goats under 24 months were sampled. ELISA 3ABC/EITB was used to detect non-structural 

proteins in cattle, and the liquid-phase ELISA was used to detect antibodies against structural 

proteins in sheep and goats. 
58

A total of 8,336 cattle were sampled. Three reactors (0.06 percent) were identified out of the 

4,800 which were in the six to 12 month age grouping; no reactors were found in the 12-24 

month age group. A total of 1,698 sheep and goats from 183 premises were also sampled with no 

reactors identified. Although the overall percent of reactors (0.03 percent) from all cattle 

sampled was in accordance with the specificity of the diagnostic test used, epidemiological 

follow-up of all reactors and cohorts was conducted, which included serological and LEP 

(repeated after 21 days) sampling of all reactors and serological testing of all cohorts. All 

follow-up tests were negative for FMDV. 

In a separate enhanced surveillance effort focused on the international border in 2011, 100 

animal movements (transport trucks typically carrying between 40-50 cattle) were sampled to 

detect viral activity and determine the immunity levels for cattle leaving the Cordon Fronterizo. 

Animals moved out of this area are considered high risk and these movements are regulated 

under SENASA Resolution No. 44/11 as described in earlier sections. The objective was to 

identify animals with inadequate protection with 95 percent confidence, so level of protection of 

animals within a single movement grouping was set at 70 percent. Sample size for this objective 

was set at 15 animals per transport unit or movement. A second sampling stage was conducted, 

assuming a 50 percent protection level. The focus of sampling was young cattle between six to 

12 months of age destined for slaughter. 

A total of 104 transport units of cattle were tested with 1,560 individual animals sampled. Test 

results for FMDV strain immunity showed that 89 percent of the animals tested showed 

protective levels against serotype O (the predominant strain in the Paraguay FMD outbreak), 

while 74 percent and 83 percent were protected against serotype A and C respectively. Five (4.8 

percent) out of 104 transport units had insufficient levels of protection. All sera were tested to 

detect circulating virus, with all negative results on ELISA 3ABC/EITB. 

Additional immunity studies were also conducted by SENASA in 2012 in the same six 

provinces. A total of 272 farms were randomly selected and a total of 3,521 serum samples from 

young cattle were tested using liquid-phase ELISA for detection of antibodies against structural 

proteins. An Expected Percent of Protection (EPP) of 75 percent was used as a standard for each 

serotype. Cattle in the six to 12 month age category would have likely received only one dose of 

vaccine, while those in the 12-24 month age range would have received more than one dose, 

resulting in higher antibody titers. Results show satisfactory immunity levels conferred by 

vaccination particularly in the older age grouping. 

2013 Serological Survey – Patagonia North A [27]: 

This survey was designed to supplement the information needed to apply for recognition of 

Patagonia North A as an FMD free zone without vaccination following the OIE Terrestrial Code

guidelines. Thus the study was designed to demonstrate the absence of FMDV in the provinces 

of Rio Negro, Buenos Aires and Neuquen. Indicators of infection were evaluated by testing for 

presence of antibodies against non-structural proteins in cattle and against structural proteins 

(A24/Cruzeiro and O1/Campos) in pigs. The last vaccination campaign in this area was held in 

late 2012 with a final date for complete cessation of vaccination set on March 4, 2013. 

Subsequently, the surveillance strategy for this area, for which annual surveillance has occurred 

since 2001, was revised to a risk-based sampling approach. 
59

The last vaccination campaign in this area was held in late 2012 with a final date for complete 

cessation of vaccination set on March 4, 2013. Subsequently, the surveillance strategy for this 

area, for which annual surveillance has occurred since 2001, was revised to a risk-based 

sampling approach. Factors considered included proximity to waterways, recent herd 

introductions, and proximity to slaughterhouses and landfills. This surveillance effort, designed 

to detect FMDV if present in the Patagonia North A area, focused on young cattle aged six to 12 

months. Fifteen animals in that age category were sampled in each facility. If the farm did not 

have fifteen cattle between six to 12 months of age, cattle up to 24 months were sampled. A total 

of 247 cattle establishments and of 3,674 animals were sampled, the majority (3,228) of which 

were in the six to 12 month age category. 

Two complementary studies were conducted involving swine and wild boars. In the serological 

study conducted in swine, a total of 462 samples were collected from 76 establishments in the 

Patagonia North A area. The wildlife surveillance consisted of a total of 21 samples. All porcine 

samples were tested using the LF ELISA test. 

All cattle samples were analyzed using the ELISA 3ABC and EITB tests, while all porcine 

samples were tested using LF ELISA. No reactors were identified in any of the samples 

collected. 

2013 Ongoing Surveillance Efforts [28]: 

Following an audit by the European Commission’s Food and Veterinary Office (FVO), and in 

collaboration with external animal health experts, Argentina revised its surveillance sampling 

design, focusing on the effectiveness of various vaccination campaign plans as implemented by 

the local offices. The surveillance objectives remain basically unchanged: to estimate herd 

immunity of the vaccinated cattle population and to demonstrate the absence of FMDV 

circulation. The sampling frame included all regions that conduct vaccination campaigns twice 

annually. Three-stage random sampling consisted of: 

 identifying and selecting the different vaccination campaign plans at the local level; 

 selecting establishments within each of the local units of consideration; and 

 selecting animals to be sampled within each selected establishment. 

Thirty-three establishments were randomly selected for each type of vaccination plan under 

evaluation. A minimum of 13 samples are to be taken in each establishment, or ten cattle 

between six to 12 months of age and three cattle between 12-24 months of age. A total number 

of 429 samples are expected to be collected for each vaccination plan. A total of 85 vaccination 

plans are under evaluation in this study. Table 12 details the number of vaccination plans, farms, 

and samples to be collected in each province under this sampling design. 
60

Table 12: Sampling Design for 2013 Surveillance Study to Evaluate Implementation of the 

National Vaccination Plan at the Local Level.1

1

The first column represents the coordinating region under which the different vaccination plans are implemented. 

The second column lists the number of operational vaccination plans in that area. The third and fourth columns list 

the number of farms to be sampled and the number of samples to be collected from individual animals. 

At the time of the November 2013 site visit, over 50 percent of samples had already been 

collected with only two reactors identified. On completion of the study, SENASA expects to be 

able to compare effectiveness of operational implementation of the National Vaccination plan at 

the local level. 

Conclusions

APHIS believes that the design under which serological sampling is conducted in Argentina is 

both valid and efficient and the sampling coverage is adequate. APHIS also considers that the 

serological sampling conducted in Argentina is adequate to detect disease and identify and 

measure viral activity (if any) in the area. Furthermore, APHIS considers the levels of immunity 

adequate to stop viral circulation if the virus were to be introduced in the susceptible population. 

10. Diagnostic laboratory capacity 

SENASA has one FMD diagnostic laboratory in Buenos Aires with a biosafety level NBS4 Ag 

(equivalent to biosafety level 4 [BSL 4]). The laboratory is authorized to handle the FMD virus 

and other microorganisms requiring a BSL-4 facilities or lower status. SENASA Resolution No. 

219/95 allows accreditation of private laboratories by SENASA to produce FMD vaccines [1, 2]. 

There are also ten regional laboratories within the structure of SENASA; however, those 

laboratories do not handle FMD virus; any suspicion of a vesicular disease is handled at the 

central laboratory. In addition, there are four experimental fields where SENASA conducts 

biological testing of veterinary products; one of those fields conducts testing of FMD vaccines 

for potency, safety, and purity. 

Planes Establecimientos muestras

Buenos Aires Norte 15                          495                  6.435   

Buenos Aires Sur 9                          297                  3.861   

Chaco ‐Formosa 11                          363                  4.719   

Cordoba 14                          462                  6.006   

Corrientes‐Misiones 8                          264                  3.432   

Entre Rios 4                          132                  1.716   

La Pampa‐San Luis 11                          363                  4.719   

Metropolitana 1                            33                      429   

Noa Sur 5                          165                  2.145   

Santa Fe 7                           231                   3.003   

TOTAL 85                       2.805                36.465   

Coordinación Regional

Tematica de Sanidad

Animal

cantidad
61

The FMD diagnostic laboratory is part of the OIE/FMD Reference laboratories Network. The 

FMD Reference Laboratory Network is a vital contributor to the global FMD control and 

provides expertise for developing FMD laboratory capacity and capability, exchange of materials 

and technologies, harmonizing approaches to FMD diagnosis, and supporting complementary 

research. Laboratories within the network regularly receive samples for FMD diagnosis from 

many parts of the world. This analysis assists the monitoring of the ‘real-time’ emergence and 

spread of FMD virus globally. 

The staff at the central laboratory is trained in manipulating FMD virus and diagnosing the 

disease. Training includes specific laboratory techniques, biosecurity standards, and quality and 

laboratory good practice standards. 

The Virology Advisory Committee also provides support to SENASA with the best technical 

expertise and human resources in the country. It was established in 1992, and its members 

include professionals from the INTA and the Animal Virology Center (CEVAN) of the National 

Council for Technical and Scientific Research (CONICET). 

The APHIS team visited with the Director of the DILACOT, Director of the General Department 

of Animal Laboratory, and the head of FMD section, at SENASA Central Laboratory in Buenos 

Aires in 2003 and 2013. Below are some observations from the visit [10, 20, 21] 

I. Laboratory structure and organization 

The DILACOT (figure 10) comprises the General Department of Animal Laboratory and the 

General Department of Plant Laboratory and Laboratory Networks. The General Department of 

Animal Laboratory includes the Department of Bacteriology, Department of FMD Virology, 

Chemistry and Chemical Resources, and Department of Food Products and Related Products. 

The Department of FMD Virology consists of Diagnostic Virology, Diagnostic Serology, 

Seroepidemiology, and Vaccine Control and Experimental Farm. The advisory board for 

Virology includes SENASA, INTA, and CEVAN laboratories. The FMD Laboratory is staffed 

with 16 professionals (12 veterinarians, 11 doctorates or maters in sciences, one biologist, one 

chemist, one geneticist, and one engineer), 13 technicians, five administrative, and three cleaning 

personnel. A list of training activities for DILAB staff has been provided during the site visits, 

including the latest activities in 2013 [20]. 

The laboratory uses a laboratory information management system (LIMS) for recoding samples 

coming in and for laboratory testing results that go out to the epidemiologists. The site review 

team was able to observe how the data was entered into the computer as well as the follow-up of 

the samples within the lab and the reporting of the testing. The staff was very capable in 

managing the system. 
62

Figure 10. Functional Organizational Chart of SENASA Laboratory 

II. National reference laboratory functions 

The main functions of the national reference laboratory are to establish protocols and validate 

reference assays for disease control as dictated by SENASA, perform quality control testing on 

FMD vaccines produced by the manufacturers, serve as a reference laboratory in confirming 

positive cases, apply biosafety standards as set by SENASA, and set forth the sampling strategy 

for disease control and surveillance. The laboratory has been accredited by the Argentine 

Accreditation Organization (Organismo Argentino de Acreditación – OAA) under international 

standard ISO 17025 in 2006. 

In addition, DILAB inspects and certifies the biosafety of the FMD vaccine manufacturers in 

Argentina. DILAB personnel perform on-site inspections of biologics manufacturing annually. 

They grant the licenses for the manufacturing of biological products. DILAB tests each serial of 

FMD vaccine for safety, potency and specificity. SENASA issues the Argentinian import and 

export permits for FMD strains and antigens. 

III. Diagnostic samples 

Epithelial tissue samples are preserved and transported in Vallee medium composed of 

phosphate glycerin (pH 7.2) with phenol red. Diagnostic samples (excluding samples for FMD 

virus isolation) are checked in at the front desk and logged into the database. Each submission is 

barcoded and each specimen is given a serial number within the submission. Sample history is 

kept confidential from the technical staff as part of the laboratory quality control standards. 

Submission for biocontainment is labeled on the package and opened in the BSL-3 lab. 
63

Epithelial tissues for FMD virus isolation are homogenized and frozen immediately upon arrival. 

Homogenates are thawed out and screened for FMD virus by the antigen ELISA. If ELISA 

results are negative, the homogenate is inoculated on to baby hamster kidney (BHK) cells for 48 

hours and then tested by ELISA for the presence of FMD virus. If the ELISA results are negative 

on the first passage, a second passage is carried on for another 48 hours and tested for FMD by 

ELISA. If the ELISA results are negative on the second passage the sample is considered 

negative. In 2011 and 2012, the laboratory received nine and five investigations, respectively, for 

suspect vesicular disease. The primary target of these investigations is FMD. 

For detection of viral activity in vaccinated cattle, random serum samples (with no animal IDs) 

from vaccinated cattle are screened for antibodies to nonstructural proteins by the 3ABC ELISA. 

Positive samples are confirmed by EITB tests. A second set of samples is collected from the 

farm if EITB is confirmed positive on the first set of samples. If animals remain positive for 

antibodies to nonstructural proteins, Probang samples are collected from the suspected herd. 

These samples are not necessarily from the same animals tested positive by serology. Probang 

samples are tested for the presence of FMD virus by carrying out virus isolation on BHK cell 

lines. 

Since 2006, the SENASA laboratory has the capability to run PCR for FMD. Consequently, 

samples submitted for PCR testing are processed in the BSL-3 facility where samples containing 

live FMD virus can be processed. Table 13 summarizes the FMD tests conducted during 2008, 

and Table 14 summarizes the FMD samples analyzed in 2012. 
64

Table 13. Number of Diagnostic Tests for FMD and VS Serology 2008 [35]

Test First Semester Second Semester 

VIAA 910 252 

3ABC ELISA 30,265 15,214 

EITB 1,180 830 

Structural ELISA 28,280 5,191 

Typing ELISA 50 41 

Total 60,685 21,528 

Table 14. Number of Diagnostic Tests for Vesicular Disease Suspect Cases, 2012 [19] 

 Typification 

ELISA 3ABC EITB VIAA Structural 

ELISA 

Vesicular 

suspects 

Antigen 

detection 

(vaccinated) 

33,560 1,259 2,957 15,574 1 41 

IV. Diagnostic tests capability 

The following technology is available for FMD diagnosis and ruling out other vesicular diseases: 

1. FMD 

a. Serology: 3ABC ELISA, EITB, VIAA and monoclonal-based liquid phase ELISA are 

used for serotyping. 

b. Virus detection: Antigen ELISA is used, with reagents produced by the 

PANAFTOSA laboratory. Virus isolation tests are conducted in BHK cells. The 

complement fixation test is used for antigen detection. Reagents for this test are 

produced in-house. PCR is also available 

2. Vesicular stomatitis 

a. Serology: Reagents for the IgG ELISA are purchased from the PANAFTOSA 

laboratory. Virus neutralization test is also available. 

b. Agent detection: Ag ELISA and PCR are used in the central laboratory. 

Conclusions

Argentina has the laboratory capacity to accurately diagnose FMD. In addition, quality control 

activities within the laboratories are sufficient, laboratory equipment is routinely monitored and 

calibrated, sufficient staff is available, an effective and efficient recordkeeping system for 

storage and retrieval of data is in place, and samples are turned around quickly. 
65

11. Policies and infrastructure for animal disease control in the region

Elements of the FMD disease control program are provided in the Foot and Mouth Disease: 

Manual of Procedures for Focus Attention (the Manual) [2]. 

Law No. 24.305 requires immediate and mandatory reporting of FMD in Argentina. SENASA 

has legal authority to apply severe penalties to any individual or company that fails to report an 

FMD case. The Animal Health Law Enforcement Act (3959/1903) requires all veterinarians in 

private practice that work in rural areas to report epizootic diseases. This law, with its 

amendments, specifies the penalties that a person could incur in different situations as a 

consequence of not notifying animal health authorities of a disease outbreak so that compliance 

of the regulations in force can be achieved with the purpose of preventing, detecting or applying 

the measures laid out in the FMD National Eradication Plan. Private diagnostic laboratories must 

also immediately report epizootic diseases. They, too, are subject to severe penalties for failure 

to comply with statutory requirements [1, 2]. 

Identification of outbreaks or suspicious signs of FMD is mainly carried out through passive 

surveillance in the Patagonia Region. Observations are made by the producers, animal 

caretakers, transporters and other people who see the animals every day and are well aware of 

FMD or other vesicular disease symptoms, reporting requirements and available resources to 

avoid the disease. In spite of the large size of the farms in Patagonia, animals are periodically 

inspected by the staff in charge of them. Also, the INTA has a network of experimental and 

extension facilities in rural areas that work with the farmers and receive updated information on 

the health conditions of the herds. 

Routine examinations of livestock occur during wool industry-related activities and official 

surveillance programs. Animals are also inspected at fairs and before and after slaughter. Many 

private veterinarians sit on the boards of technical subcommittees of the regional and local 

Animal Health Committees, so they are highly motivated and support the national eradication 

programs. 

In the event of an outbreak of exotic or endemic diseases that present as a health hazard to the 

national livestock herd, and if SENASA decides to follow a stamping-out policy, SENASA’s 

actions and level of involvement are defined in Resolutions 1410/2000 and 488/2002. The 

actions are listed in Resolution 779/1999 through which the National Animal Health Emergency 

System (SINAESA) was created as authorized by Law 24.305, Act 3959/1903 and Decree 

1585/1996 and 643/1996. By Decree 394/2001 that updated Decree 1585/1996, the president of 

SENASA has authority to take prompt actions to respond to emergency situations involving 

animal health. SENASA has special policies, logistics and a budget for zoosanitary and 

phytosanitary emergency situations. 

The SINAESA defines the responsibilities and functions to control FMD in emergency 

situations. It operates at three levels: central, regional, and local. At the central level, there is a 

Central Animal Health Emergency Committee that is responsible for describing the emergency 

scenario; defining the control measures, financing mechanisms and responsibilities; and 

assigning the human and other resources required for the eradication operations. 
66

In 2010, the registration and notification system for reportable diseases in animals was updated 

and enhanced under Resolution 540/10, creating a single uniform system for all reportable 

diseases. This system includes a standardized protocol and establishes forms of communication 

within and between institutions to ensure the rapid transmission of consistent, reliable collection 

of epidemiological information and follow-up on suspect cases. Within 12 hours of receiving 

notification of a suspect case, a veterinarian from the local SENASA office must visit the 

involved facility, collect the necessary epidemiological information, and fill out a reportable 

disease form determining the disposition of the suspect case. Necropsy and laboratory samples, 

where applicable, are linked to the original report by a single case number. A final report 

summarizes the particular case/incident, and all incidents are summarized in an annual report. 

At the regional level, response actions are carried out by SENASA’s regional resources. The 

Regional Animal Health Emergency Team is the functional unit of the system. It is coordinated 

by the Epidemiology Office of DNSA at SENASA headquarters. The team includes SENASA 

professionals, technicians, and administrative staff specialized in responding to emergency 

situations. The members of the team are specifically selected for their technical and 

psychophysical profile because they must be continuously available and able to respond 

immediately in cases of emergency. An alternate is available for each person in case a member is 

unable to respond. 

At the local level, the staff of the local SENASA Office in the affected area collaborates with the 

field technicians to provide support. The responsibilities of the local office include the following: 

 Provide a primary response to suspect cases (collection and remittance of samples, 

description of the operation, and implementation of preliminary measures); 

 Notify the Regional Supervisor; 

 Submit a status report to the Local Animal Health Emergency Committee; 

 Carry out the actions defined by the chief of operations; 

 Supply updated maps of the local area, including cadastre drawings; 

 Keep updated records on the characteristics of the production system in the area, 

including a geographic description; 

 Keep updated information on local suppliers and service suppliers, such as mobile 

telephone companies, equipment suppliers, transportation and rental companies of said 

equipment, trucks, etc; 

 Keep updated information on the livestock population, inventory of other products, 

shippers of animal products and byproducts, cattle dealers, other professionals related to 

the farming sector (veterinarians, agronomists, cattle buyers, dairy farm inspectors, etc.); 

 Keep updated records of the local authorities, such as municipal officials, law 

enforcement authorities, fire brigade, veterinarians in private practice, and others; and 

 Oversee the surveillance and repopulation of farming operations. 

The main control measure in the case of a confirmed FMD outbreak in the FMD-free area 

without vaccination is the stamping-out policy of all the affected animals and contacts. Other 

measures such as vaccination will depend on each situation (e.g., a primary outbreak or not, the 

number and location of the affected premises, the number and species of involved animals). Due 

to the regulations in force and the established Epidemiological Surveillance System, the time to 
67

detect a case of FMD in susceptible species in Patagonia should be no more than 48 hours. At 

that time, OIE is notified within 24 hours of the outbreak or suspicion of FMD. Argentina also 

notifies the EU, due to trade commitments, and bordering countries, if the outbreak occurs in a 

border area. 

At the international level, Argentina gives timely required notification of the diseases according 

to the time and conditions agreed upon with the world health entities. The Bureau of 

Epidemiology of SENASA develops weekly and monthly reports of animal health news. These 

reports are written using the information collected through the different levels of epidemiological 

surveillance and are submitted through the Coordination of International and Institutional Affairs 

of SENASA to international entities such as the OIE, the European Community, and the 

OPS/WHO Continental System for Vesicular Disease Surveillance. Likewise, a system of 

reciprocal systematic information was established through bilateral agreements with bordering 

countries. This system would allow immediate notification of any reportable disease detected in 

the country that could represent a sanitary potential risk for a neighboring country. One such 

bilateral agreement is the Cuenca del Plata Agreement among Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, 

Paraguay, Bolivia, and Chile. 

There is a training and promotion program for the staff of SENASA including the performance 

of drills. The training is carried out by the Bureau of Epidemiology. In addition, the Field 

General Coordination carries out permanent meetings on updating of information, methodology 

and standards that the local veterinarians should know. Training records are maintained by the 

Bureau of Human Resources and Training in which official agents get credits for the various 

classes they attend. The credits are added up in a score which is used towards promotions in the 

organization. The Bureau coordinates the training activities of each of the National Bureaus 

through training consultants. In the case of the National Bureau of Animal Health, by virtue of 

the complexity of personnel, two professionals work as consultants who will lead the 22 training 

delegates of the provinces who shall coordinate, audit and guide the process of teaching the 

official veterinarians. This program is under implementation. The training legal framework 

includes SAGPyA Resolutions 51/2003 and 02/2002 and SENASA Resolution 166/2003. 

Reporting of FMD suspect cases is infrequent in the Patagonia Region, with few animals 

presenting with clinical conditions compatible with vesicular diseases. In order to determine the 

ability of veterinary officials at local offices to respond to a suspicious case of disease, the site 

visit team asked to view records of reports of a suspected notifiable disease (in this case, mange) 

during the 2009 site visit. The information shared revealed that a visit to the affected farm was 

made within 24 hours of the report, and all animals on the farm were inspected, with samples 

collected and submitted to the lab on the same day. A quarantine was immediately applied upon 

suspicion and remained in place throughout the duration of the investigation. At the initial visit, 

neighboring farms were contacted to alert the owners of the disease suspicion and were told to 

make their animals available for inspection. At our request, the local office simulated a request 

for movement from the affected farm. Upon accessing the farm records a red warning screen 

appeared containing the disease and quarantine status of the farm, plus information on the course 

of the investigation. The issuance of movement permits for animals from the affected farm were 

prohibited without approval from the director of the office. 
68

All local offices maintain copies of a SENASA issued manual on procedures related to FMD 

outbreaks (Manual de Procedimientos para la Atencion de un Foco). Additionally, SENASA 

developed a containment plan (plan de contencion) in 2007, a copy of which is maintained at 

each local office. Veterinarians in local offices were well versed in the procedures contained in 

both documents. 

Conclusions

Argentina has the infrastructure and legal authority to declare an emergency and take appropriate 

action in case of an FMD outbreak. The country has a disease control program that is in written 

form in the Foot and Mouth Disease: Manual of Procedures for Outbreaks. The manual sets 

forth operating standards and is legally authorized by several SENASA Resolutions and 

Regulations. A plan developed by SENASA in 2007 (Plan de Contencion) also addresses 

procedures for rapid containment of disease in case of an outbreak. There are also systems for 

notification and training that ensure emergency preparedness and response with a legal 

framework to authorize needed actions. Local veterinary officials are well-trained in procedures 

for controlling and containing FMD outbreaks. The APHIS site visit team assessed the region’s 

emergency response capabilities by evaluating the procedures implemented in response to 

notifiable disease outbreaks. For example, the 2009 team reviewed documentation confirming 

that local veterinary officials had responded in a timely and effective manner to reports of 

suspect mange in local farms. 

Release assessment: Summary of risk factors and mitigations considered 

APHIS identified risk factors that might be associated with the importation of FMD-susceptible 

animals and their products into the United States from the Patagonia Region. APHIS discusses 

these risk factors in the context of the potential for counterbalancing circumstances or the 

application of appropriate risk mitigations to reduce the risk of introducing and establishing 

FMD in the United States. 

Likelihood of FMD introduction into the Patagonia Region 

Risk factors 

FMD has not been diagnosed in South America for almost two years (the last outbreak was 

reported in Paraguay in 2012). In addition, all sides of the Patagonia region are bordered by 

either the ocean or areas that are free of FMD with or without vaccination according to OIE 

standards. The last outbreak in Chile was in 1987. The last outbreak in Northern Argentina was 

in 2006. 

Consequently, there is a very low risk of reintroduction of FMDV from adjacent affected areas 

into the export region. Therefore, there is a very low risk that FMD-susceptible species or products 

from such species exported to the United States could originate from or be commingled with animals 

or animal products from affected neighboring areas. 
69

Discussion: Argentine authorities do not allow live susceptible animals to enter the Patagonia 

Region except from regions recognized as FMD free without vaccination by SENASA and the 

OIE. 

Matured, deboned fresh beef is imported into the Patagonia Region from areas in northern 

Argentina for local consumption only, since beef is not produced in sufficient quantities for local 

demand. This meat has a very low risk of introducing the FMD virus into the export region since 

it must go through a maturation and deboning process consistent with the EU and current U.S. 

requirements, and the associated drop in pH inactivates the FMD virus. Border control posts 

visited during the site visits appeared capable of monitoring this movement and preventing 

illegal entry of animals and animal products into the Patagonia Region. Additionally, swill which 

may contain meat scraps must be properly treated before being fed to pigs, and sheep do not 

come into contact with the meat since they go directly from the range to the slaughter facilities. 

Conclusion: Based on the production systems in the Patagonia Region, lamb meat is the major 

product that could potentially be exported to the United States. Under the U.S regulations, any 

sheep or sheep products exported to the United States will originate only from the Patagonia 

Region and are highly unlikely to be commingled with infected FMD-susceptible species or 

products originating from areas considered by APHIS to have a different FMD status. 

Mitigations: In order for live animals, meat or other FMD-susceptible commodities to be 

exported from the Patagonia Region to the United States, certification by a full-time salaried 

veterinary officer of the Government of Argentina will be required to certify that the commodity 

did not originate from outside the Patagonia Region and was not commingled with commodities 

that originated from outside the Region.

Likelihood of detection of FMD if re-introduced into the Patagonia Region 

Risk factors 

Sheep in the Patagonia Region of Argentina are primarily grass-fed on extensive establishments, 

and, depending upon the pasture rotation scheme in use, may not be subject to routine 

observation. Because some of the farms are extremely large, close observation of individual 

animals may not occur for significant periods of time, with the potential that clinical signs could 

be missed. However, producers, animal caretakers, transporters and other industry employees are 

well aware of the clinical signs of FMD or other vesicular diseases, reporting requirements, and 

available resources to avoid the disease. 

Conclusion: Husbandry and surveillance practices in the Patagonia Region serve to mitigate the 

lack of close animal supervision on extensive farms. The risk of missing FMD clinical signs in 

export herds is minimal. 

Release assessment: Summary 

Based on evaluation of the 11 factors, including observations from its several site visits, APHIS 

concludes that Argentina possesses the legal framework, animal health infrastructure, disease 
70

detection capabilities, reporting systems, and emergency response capacity that are necessary for 

maintaining the Patagonia Region as free of FMD. We further conclude that the region is free of 

FMD and that the likelihood of release of FMD virus from the region into the United States via 

exports of susceptible species or their products is very low. 

Exposure assessment 

As determined in the release assessment section, the likelihood of release of FMD from the 

Patagonia Region is very low. Nonetheless, in order to take a conservative approach to this 

analysis, we discuss the pathways through which the virus could be transmitted to susceptible 

livestock in the unlikely event that it was imported into the United States. 

Exposure assessment describes the biological pathway(s) necessary for exposure of animals and 

humans in an importing country to the hazards released from a given risk source and estimates 

the probability of the exposure(s) occurring, either qualitatively or quantitatively [15]. The 

following sections describe the likelihood of exposure to the FMD virus through the importation 

of contaminated sheep meat, infected live animals, and infected embryos or semen. 

Exposure through the importation of FMD-infected sheep meat 

Lamb meat is the major product that will potentially be exported from the Patagonia Region to 

the United States. APHIS considers that the most likely pathway of exposure of domestic 

livestock to FMD virus in imported sheep meat is through feeding of contaminated food waste to 

swine [25], based on APHIS’ prior studies analyzing the likelihood of exposure of FMDsusceptible species to FMD-infected beef. APHIS considers that exposure through the 

importation of FMD-infected sheep meat would take a similar pathway as that posed by imported 

beef. In 1995, VS conducted a pathway analysis to estimate the likelihood of exposing swine to 

infected waste [39]. The analysis included two pathways for exposure of swine to contaminated 

waste: exposure associated with illegal household imports and exposure associated with legal 

imports. With 95 percent confidence, VS estimated that 0.023 percent or less of plate and 

manufacturing waste would be inadequately processed prior to feeding to swine [39]. Based on 

this fraction, less than one part in 4,300 of imported beef that are fed to swine as plate or 

manufacturing waste is likely to be inadequately cooked. 

VS also conducted a survey in 2001 of the U.S. swine waste-feeding sector to update a similar 

study done in 1994 [40]. Based on this survey, VS estimated that the proportion of plate and 

manufacturing waste fed to swine diminished by about 50 percent between 1994 and 2001 due to 

a decrease in the number of waste-feeding operations. The study also found that: 

 The number of waste-feeding premises has decreased significantly since 1994; 

 Several States have prohibited feeding food wastes to swine; 

 The continental United States saw a 40.5 percent decrease in the number of waste-feeding 

premises, Hawaii a 37.5 percent decrease, and Puerto Rico a 52.3 percent decrease; and 

 Institutions and restaurants provide nearly 90 percent of all plate waste fed to swine. 

APHIS considers that prohibiting the feeding of unprocessed plate waste to swine contributed to 

the reduction of waste feeding to swine. In that regard, waste-feeder operations must be licensed 
71

and inspected regularly by USDA inspectors (9 CFR 166) [41]. The licensing process requires 

that producers adequately cook the waste fed to swine according to methods designed to reduce 

the probability of survival of foreign animal disease agents in the waste. 

Based on the 1995 estimate that a very small proportion of food waste is inadequately processed 

prior to feeding to swine, and the substantial reduction in waste-feeding operations in recent 

years, APHIS considers the likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine to FMDV through 

inadequately processed food waste to be low. Based on the results of the release assessment, 

APHIS further concludes that the likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine through the 

feeding of contaminated food waste originating in the Patagonia Region is very low. 

Exposure to FMD virus through importation of live susceptible species 

The likelihood of exposure of susceptible species to infected live animals was evaluated by 

briefly reviewing virus persistence and shedding in live ruminants and swine, as well as standard 

import requirements for these species. 

Considering the animal disease control program in the Patagonia Region, the chance of 

importing FMD-infected animals into the United States is very low, since any introduction of 

FMD into the Patagonia Region is likely to be detected. In the unlikely event that undetected 

infected animals were imported, they are required to undergo quarantine, which will mitigate that 

risk pathway. Only animals that have not been vaccinated for FMD are eligible for import, and 

infected unvaccinated animals will develop clinical signs of the disease during their quarantine 

of 30 days. 

Current U.S. import regulations require certification that ruminants and swine have been kept in 

a region entirely free of FMD for 60 days prior to export (9 CFR 93.405 and 93.505) and also 

require a minimum quarantine of 30 days for most imported ruminants (9 CFR 93.411) and 15 

days for all imported swine (9 CFR 93.510) from the date of arrival at the port of entry. These 

requirements serve to partially mitigate the risk of exposure by increasing the probability of 

disease detection once the animal is quarantined in the United States. 

Based on the release assessment, APHIS concluded that the risk of importing FMD-infected 

animals from the Patagonia Region is very low. This, coupled with the additional safeguards 

provided by our import regulations, leads APHIS to conclude that the likelihood of exposure of 

susceptible species in the United States via the importation of live animals from the Patagonia 

Region is also very low. 

Exposure to FMD virus through the importation of genetic material 

Genetic materials have been implicated in the introduction of foreign animal diseases into 

susceptible populations, as well as the spread of established disease epidemics over considerable 

distances. Embryos present a negligible risk of infecting an exposed recipient with FMDV, as the 

zona pellucida is an important barrier against pathogens, and only zona-pellucida-intact bovine 

embryos are permissible in international trade [42]. Furthermore, embryo washing could 

significantly reduce the risk of FMD if the virus was present. FMD virus may be present in 
72

semen up to four days before clinical signs become apparent. However, if the donor animal 

develops clinical signs, it becomes unlikely that embryos or semen would be collected from an 

infected herd or from a diseased donor. 

Based on the above, APHIS considers the risk of transmission of FMD via embryos to be low. 

Regarding semen, due to the extended period of survival of FMD virus in frozen semen, APHIS 

considers there is a likelihood of exposure of susceptible animals to this virus, if unmitigated, if 

the semen is collected from an infected animal. Based on the conclusion of the release 

assessment that diseased animals are not likely to exist in the Patagonia Region or, if they do, are 

not likely to go undetected, however, APHIS considers it highly unlikely that U.S. animals 

would be exposed to infected semen from the Patagonia Region. 

Exposure assessment: Summary 

Based on the pathway analyses, APHIS concluded that the likelihood of exposure of susceptible 

swine to FMD virus through inadequately processed food waste to be very low. This conclusion 

is supported by evidence that only a very small proportion of food waste is inadequately 

processed prior to feeding to swine and the substantial reduction in waste-feeding operations in 

recent years. Furthermore, based on the conclusion of the release assessment that diseased 

animals are not likely to exist in the Patagonia Region or, if they do, to go undetected, APHIS 

considers the probability of exposure of susceptible swine to FMD virus through inadequately 

cooked infected meat from the Patagonia Region to be very low. 

In addition, APHIS considers the likelihood of exposure of susceptible U.S. livestock to FMD 

virus via infected live ruminants or swine from the Patagonia Region to be very low. Under 

APHIS regulations, once a country is listed as FMD-free following USDA’s evaluation, certain 

requirements must be met to import ruminants into the United States. These requirements include 

the following: 

 The ruminants must be accompanied by a health certificate issued by a full-time salaried 

veterinary officer of the national government of the region of origin (9 CFR 93.405.a); 

 The ruminants must have been kept in the FMD-free region during the last 60 days 

immediately preceding the date of shipment to the United States (9 CFR 93.405.a.1) 

 The ruminants are not in quarantine in the region of origin (9 CFR 93.405.a.2); and 

 All ruminant imported into the United States (except from Canada, Mexico, Central America, 

and West Indies) must be quarantined for not less than 30 days starting from the date of 

arrival at the port of entry (9 CFR 93.411.a). 

These requirements serve to partially mitigate the risk of exposure by increasing the probability 

of disease detection prior to export and during quarantine in the United States. 

Based on the conclusion of the release assessment that FMD-infected animals are not likely to 

exist in Patagonia South or, if they do, to go undetected, APHIS considers exposure of a 

susceptible U.S. animal population to imported infected semen or embryos from the Patagonia 

Region to be highly unlikely. 
73

With regard to importation of animal products from regions that have less restrictive trade 

practices than the United States, as Argentina does, the requirements in 9 CFR 94.11 mitigate the 

risks associated with imports from such regions by, inter alia, (1) restricting the sourcing of meat 

of ruminants and swine to the FMD-free region, (2) prohibiting commingling of live animals, 

meat, or meat products for export with such commodities from regions not considered free of 

FMD, and (3) requiring exporting slaughter establishments to be approved by the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service. In addition, an official 

veterinarian of the exporting country must certify that these conditions have been met. 

Consequence assessment 

A consequence assessment describes the biologic and economic consequences of FMD 

introduction into the United States. This consequence assessment addresses both direct and 

indirect consequences as recommended by the OIE [18]. 

The magnitude of the biologic and economic consequences following an introduction of FMD 

would depend on a number of factors, including the location of the introduction, the FMDV 

serotype introduced, the rate of spread of FMD virus and whether other environmental conditions 

at the introduction site that might facilitate this spread, ability to detect the disease rapidly, 

livestock demographics and movement patterns, and ease of employing eradication procedures 

[43]. In addition, depending on the extent of export of livestock and their products, trade 

restrictions imposed by trading partners often result in severe economic consequences. 

Direct consequences 

Direct consequences include effects of the disease on animal health and the subsequent 

production losses, the total costs of control and eradication, the effect on the environment, and 

public health consequences. 

Effects on animal health and production 

FMD causes significant distress and suffering to animals regardless of the size and sophistication 

of their livestock unit. High mortality rates in young animals can occur, particularly among pigs 

and sheep [44]. In pigs, Dunn and Donaldson [45] estimated a general mortality rate of 40 percent 

for two outbreaks in Taiwan in 1997. Geering [46] cites mortality rates of 40, 45, and 94 

percent of lambs in several outbreaks. Mortality in older animals occurs less frequently but may 

be significant with certain virus strains. 

FMD causes significant losses in the production capacity of affected animals. Productivity losses of 

ten to 20 percent are reported in FMD-infected livestock [43] if the disease is allowed to run its 

course. For example, the drop in milk yield of dairy cattle averages approximately 25 percent per 

year [47]. In addition, FMD can cause reduction in the growth rate of animals raised for meat. 

According to Doel [48], estimates vary considerably but one study has indicated that cattle would 

require approximately 10 to 20 percent longer to reach maturity. The comparatively greater severity 

of FMD in pigs would imply at least similar losses to those described for cattle [48]. 
74

Control and eradication costs 

The overall cost of control and eradication depends on the mitigation or policy option chosen to 

control and eradicate the disease. Potential costs include disease control measures such as imposing 

quarantines and movement controls, direct costs related to stamping out of affected and other herds, 

carcass disposal, indemnity payments, vaccination costs, surveillance, and laboratory testing. 

For FMD-free countries like the United States that have a substantial export market for livestock 

and livestock products, the preferred option for control and eradication has traditionally been to 

stamp-out infected herds without the use of vaccine. In fact, the U.S. policy for FMD 

emergencies is to follow strict quarantine measures and stamping-out of infected and contact 

herds with ongoing assessment for the need for and implementation of strategic vaccination. 

Published studies indicate that where FMD eradication without vaccination is feasible, it is the leastcost policy option, even allowing for the costs of prevention and emergency preparedness and the 

risk of outbreaks. However, if the extent of the outbreak were large or if the disease were spreading 

at a fast rate, vaccination might be beneficial in protecting high-producing livestock 49]. A recent 

study using a stochastic simulation model showed that ring vaccination decreased the duration of 

outbreaks. Depending on the magnitude of the outbreak and the number of herds involved, the time 

and cost needed to dispose of vaccinated animals could be substantial [50]. 

Available data do not allow quantification of the number of herds/farms that would be infected if 

FMD were introduced. Nevertheless, the cost of control, eradication and compensation is likely to 

be significant. Bates et al [51] used results from a FMD simulation model to estimate the direct 

costs associated with indemnity, slaughter, cleaning and disinfecting livestock premises for various 

vaccination and eradication strategies to control transmission of FMD virus in a cattle population of 

2,238 herds and five sale yards located in three counties of California. The study found that mean 

herd indemnity payments were $2.6 million and $110,359 for dairy and nondairy herds, 

respectively. Cleaning and disinfection costs ranged from $18,062 to $60,205 per herd. The mean 

vaccination cost was $2,960 per herd and the total eradication cost ranged from $61 million to $551 

million depending on eradication strategy. 

At the national level, McCauley et al. [43] conducted a comprehensive study to assess the potential 

economic impact of FMD in the whole of the United States. The study estimated the direct costs 

(control and eradication program costs) and increased costs borne by consumers of FMD 

introduction over a 15-year period (1976-1990). The study examined several control and eradication 

options. Relevant to this assessment are strategies employed to eradicate the disease by stamping 

out or area vaccination. In the extreme event of endemic FMD in the United States, the impact of 

compulsory or voluntary control programs was also considered. A summary of the findings are 

shown in table 14. The results were updated using the difference in the Implicit Price Deflator (DPI) 

in 2011 [52]. 
75

Table 15. Economic Impacts of FMD 

1., Source: 1976: 34.8 IPD, 2011: 111.668 (3.2 = ratio IPD start 1976) 1/IPD = Gross Domestic Product Implicit 

Price Deflator - U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis 

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/GDPDEF.txt 

Source: Adapted, McDowell 2011, personal communication. 

In a 2008 study modeling the economic impact and	disease‐spread	effects	from	a	hypothetical	

outbreak	of	FMD	arising	from	feeding	garbage	in	small	farrow‐to‐finish	operations,	the	total 

trade losses plus other disease-related costs to capital and management, totaled between $2,773 

million and $4,062 million compared with the 2001-2004 disease-free baseline [47]. 

Effect on the environment 

Environmental effects have been considered under all applicable environmental review laws in 

force in the United States. These are considered in a separate, but related, environmental 

assessment (APHIS proposed rule). The environmental assessment complies with the National 

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and implementing regulations [53]. 

Effect on public health 

Although public health consequences are not issues under APHIS’ regulatory authority, we 

address the issue in this assessment. FMD may rarely affect humans. The number of cases 

reported is so small when compared with the number of persons exposed that FMD is generally 

not considered a threat to humans. FMD virus has been isolated and typed in only 40 patients 

during the last century. Symptoms in humans are mostly mild and mainly include fever and 

blisters on the hands, feet, mouth, and tongue. Patients usually recover within a week after the 

last blister formation [54]. 

McCauley Estimates 

Consumer Impacts Program Costs Totals 

----------------------------millions of dollars ---------------------------------- 

1976 $ 2011 $ 1976 $ 2011 $ 1976 $ 2011 $ 

Endemic FMD w/ voluntary control $11,600 $37,215 Na Na $11,600 $37,215 

Eradication by strict slaughter 

& quarantine $10,600 $34,007 $539 $1,729 $11,139 $ 35,736 

Eradication by area vaccination $11,600 $37,215 $690 $2,214 $12,290 $ 39,429 

Compulsory vaccination program w/ 

endemic FMD $8,900 $28,553 $4,200 $13,474 $13,100 $ 42,027 
76

Perhaps more importantly, a FMD outbreak of the magnitude observed in the United Kingdom 

can result in severe psychosocial effects on farmers and farming communities. Farmers and their 

families can suffer from grief over losing animals, in some cases blood lines kept over many 

generations, as well as loss of control over their lives due to movement restrictions, disruptions 

in community life, and short- and long-term stress over their financial future. Researchers from 

Lancaster University in the United Kingdom conducted a new study into the social consequences 

of FMD in the Cumbria community; it revealed high rates of depression, alcohol consumption, 

and mortality among farmers during the crisis (Lancaster University, unpublished report) [55]. 

Indirect consequences 

In addition to the direct costs of FMD introduction, impacts on international trade and related 

domestic consequences need to be considered. Export losses due to restrictions imposed by trade 

partners on FMD-susceptible animals and products can run into billions of U.S. dollars. The 

value of U.S. exports of beef products alone, which would be immediately lost, was over 

US$3 billion in 2001. The impact of an outbreak of FMD on the rural and regional economic 

viability, including businesses reliant on livestock revenue, could also be substantial. 

In 2002, Paarlberg et al. [56] conducted a study to estimate the potential revenue impact of an 

FMD outbreak in the United States similar to the one that occurred in the United Kingdom. The 

study suggested that greatest impact on farm income would be due to loss of export markets and 

the decrease in demand by consumers. For example, losses of gross revenue for the animal sector 

were as follows: cattle (17 percent), beef (20 percent), milk (16 percent), swine (34 percent), 

pork (24 percent), sheep and lambs (14 percent), and sheep and lamb meat (10 percent). 

Thompson et al [57] estimated the loss of about 20 percent of the estimated total income from 

farming in 2001 because of the FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom. 

Japan, Korea, and Mexico constitute the three major U.S. export markets for ruminant products. 

The value of lost exports to these three ruminant markets would total $3 billion annually if trade 

restrictions were enforced against the United States: Japan ($1.2 billion), Mexico ($1.12 billion), 

and South Korea ($712 million). Indirect economic losses to U.S. firms that support ruminant 

exports to these three markets would equal an additional $2.5 billion annually. The magnitude of 

these values reflects both animal and product exports [58]. 

More than 33 thousand full-time U.S. jobs, accounting for almost $1 billion in wages annually, 

could be jeopardized by loss of these three markets. In the longer term, if trade restrictions 

persisted and alternative export markets did not develop, the U.S. ruminant production sector 

could contract, allowing other supplying countries to establish trade relationships in the absence 

of U.S. supply [58]. 

Other losses due to restrictions on live swine, pork, and pork products are likely to be significant 

as well. The U.S. exports of pork and pork products are estimated at $1.3 billion dollars in 2003 

[59]. Since the U.S. exports only small amounts of lamb and mutton, economic losses associated 

with these commodities are not likely to be significant compared to cattle and swine. 
77

Risk Estimation 

Risk estimation consists of integrating the results from the release assessment, exposure 

assessment, and consequence assessment to produce overall measures of risk associated with the 

hazards identified at the outset. Thus, risk estimation takes into account the whole risk pathway 

from hazard identified to the unwanted event [15]. 

APHIS concludes from the assessment that the surveillance, prevention, and control measures 

implemented by Argentina are sufficient to minimize the likelihood of introducing FMD into the 

United States via imports of FMD-susceptible species or products from such species from the 

Patagonia Region. APHIS further concludes that the likelihood of an outbreak occurring via 

exposure of the domestic livestock population to animal products imported from the Patagonia 

Region is very low. 

The consequences of a FMD outbreak in the United States would be extremely high. The major 

economic consequence of importing FMD would be export trade losses. The sum of the 

consumer impacts, direct costs and trade losses over a 15-year period would be between 

$37 billion and $44 billion (in 2001 dollars) depending on the magnitude of the outbreak and 

eradication strategy. Although such consequences are significant, it is important to note that the 

results of both the release and exposure assessment indicate that the likelihood of introduction 

and establishment of FMD is very low. 

In summary, although the consequences of a FMD outbreak in the United States would be very 

high, APHIS considers the risk of FMD-infected animals or products entering the U.S. from the 

export region and exposing the U.S. livestock to susceptible animals to be very low, based on the 

findings of the release and exposure assessments. 
78

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82

Appendix I 

Hazard identification—Foot and Mouth Disease 

OIE lists several animal diseases that are considered primary hazards associated with trade of 

animals and animal products. APHIS regulations mitigate the risk of introduction of these 

foreign animal diseases in to the United States. As such, APHIS conducts an import risk analysis 

addressing hazards of primary concern prior to initiating or resuming trade of animal 

commodities. APHIS considers FMD virus to be a potential hazard associated with trade of live 

ruminants and swine, as well as certain products and by-products derived from these species. 

FMD virus was eradicated from the United States in 1929. 

Causative agent 

FMD is a highly communicable disease caused by an Aphthovirus of the family Picornaviridae. 

FMD has seven immunologically distinct serotypes—O, A, C, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3, and Asia 

1—which do not confer cross immunity [1]. FMD virus serotype O (PanAsia strain) is the most 

prevalent and widely distributed, causing outbreaks in many parts of Africa, Asia, South 

America, and Europe since 1998 [2-4]. 

Host range 

The range of domestic hosts includes all cloven-hoofed animals such as cattle, swine, sheep, 

goats, water buffalo, and yaks [2-5]. All cloven-hoofed wild animals are also susceptible, 

including buffalo, deer, impala, and gazelles; hedgehogs, armadillos, nutrias, elephants, rats, and 

mice are also susceptible. Camels may be affected by some FMD strains whereas llamas, 

alpacas, and vicuñas have low susceptibility [5]. 

Incubation period 

The incubation period of the FMD virus is two to 14 days in cattle, depending on the viral strain 

and dose and the level of susceptibility of the animal [6]. The incubation period in pigs also 

varies with the strain, dose, and route of infection [7]. Serotype O—highly virulent in pigs—can 

produce clinical signs within 18 to 24 hours, while pigs with low-level exposures may take up to 

11 days to develop clinical signs. 

Morbidity and mortality 

Clinical signs in cattle during acute infection include fever, profuse salivation, and mucopurulent 

nasal discharge [6]. The disease is characterized by development of vesicles on the tongue, hard 

palate, dental pad, lips, muzzle, gum, coronary band, and interdigital spaces. Vesicles may 

develop on the teats. Affected animals lose condition rapidly, and there is a dramatic loss of milk 

production. The animal usually recovers by 14 days post infection provided no secondary 

infections occur [8]. Morbidity in unvaccinated herds can be high, but mortality usually does not 

exceed 5 percent. If an outbreak occurs during the calving season, calf mortality can be 

considerable [9]. Young calves may even die before the development of clinical signs usually 

because the virus attacks the heart muscles [6]. 

The most consistent clinical signs in pigs are lesions around the coronary bands and lameness; 

fever may be inconsistent [7, 10]. Pigs may develop vesicles on the tongue and snout, but these 

may be less conspicuous than lesions seen in ruminants. The severity of clinical disease depends 
83

on the age of the infected pig. Adult swine may recover or become chronically lame while 

younger pigs, especially those less than 8 weeks of age, may die from acute myocarditis without 

developing other clinical signs. 

FMD infection in sheep and goats is often subclinical or produces only mild clinical signs that 

may go unrecognized [11]. Reduced milk production may be seen in milking animals and death 

of young stock may occur without clinical signs. 

Sources of virus and transmission 

Sources of FMD virus include (1) incubating and clinically affected animals; (2) breath, saliva, 

feces, and urine; (3) milk and semen (up to 4 days before clinical signs); and (4) meat and byproducts in which pH has remained above 6.0 [11, 12]. Transmission occurs by direct or indirect 

contact or by aerosol. Fomites such as feed, drinking water, equipment, animal products, as well 

as human clothing, transportation vehicles, rodents, stray dogs, wild animals, and birds can 

transmit FMD over long distances. The five main elements that influence the extent of FMD 

spread are: 

(1) The quantity of virus released; 

(2) The means by which the virus enters the environment; 

(3) The ability of the agent to survive outside the animal body; 

(4) The quantities of virus required to initiate infection at primary infection sites; and 

(5) The period of time the virus remains undetected [13, 14]. 

The respiratory tract is the usual route of infection, particularly in environments that are heavily 

contaminated with FMD virus. Infection can also occur through abrasions of the skin or mucous 

membranes. Pigs may become infected through ingestion of FMD virus-contaminated products 

[7, 11]. 

In cattle and sheep, the earliest sites of virus infection and possibly replication appear to be in the 

mucosa and the lymphoid tissues of the pharynx [8, 15-17]. Following initial replication in the 

pharynx, the virus enters the bloodstream. Viremia in cattle lasts for three to five days, during 

which the virus spreads throughout the body and establishes sites of secondary infection, 

localizing in various organs, tissues, body fluids, bone marrow, and lymph nodes. 

Viral replication in cattle may reach peak levels as early as two to three days after exposure [15, 

16]. Recent data indicate that the most viral amplification occurs in the epithelia of the skin and 

mouth, including the tongue [18, 19]. Although some viral replication also occurs in the epithelia 

of the pharynx, the amount of virus produced there is apparently much less than the amount 

produced in the skin and mouth during the acute phase of the disease. By comparison, the 

amount of virus (if any) produced in other organs like salivary glands, kidneys, liver, and lymph 

nodes is negligible. 

Immunity to FMD is primarily mediated by circulating antibodies [17]. The host reaction, 

including antibody production, occurs from three to four days after exposure. In infected pigs, 

the virus is cleared in less than three to four weeks. In contrast, around 50 percent or more of 

cattle will develop a low-level persistent infection, localized to the pharynx [10, 20, 21]. 
84

Inactivation and survival 

FMD virus is a relatively resilient virus. It can survive up to 15 weeks in feed, four weeks on 

cattle hair, and up to 103 days in wastewater. The survival of the virus in animal tissues is 

closely associated with the acidity of that tissue [22, 23]. For example, in muscular tissues the 

acidity of rigor mortis, which occurs naturally, inactivates the virus. The production of lactic acid 

in these tissues during maturation is considered the primary factor for inactivation. An acid 

environment where the pH is less than 6.0 will destroy the virus quickly. Several studies showed 

that in tissues where no acidification occurs (e.g., lymph nodes, bone marrow, fat, and blood), 

the virus may survive for extended times in cured, uncured, and frozen meat [16, 22-25]. Heating 

at 50° C [26] and up to 155° F [27] will inactivate the virus. 

Vaccination 

Inactivated virus vaccines of varying composition are available commercially [12]. Many FMD 

vaccines are multivalent to provide protection against the different serotypes likely to be 

encountered in a given field situation. The finished vaccine must be shown to be free from 

residual live virus. Live attenuated vaccines are not suitable due to danger of reversion to 

virulence. 

Inactivated FMD vaccines may be classified as either standard potency (commercial vaccines) or 

higher potency (emergency vaccines) [12]. Standard potency vaccines are formulated with 

sufficient antigen to have a minimum potency level of 3 PD50 and provide six months of 

immunity after two initial vaccinations given one month apart. Higher potency vaccines are

formulated with sufficient antigen to have a minimum potency level of 6 PD50 to provide for 

more rapid onset and a wider spectrum of immunity against relevant field viruses. 

Laboratory diagnostics 

Field diagnosis of FMD relies heavily on recognition of clinical signs, which are similar to those 

seen in other vesicular diseases such as vesicular stomatitis, mucosal disease of cattle, 

bluetongue, and rinderpest. Virus isolation or demonstration of FMD viral antigen or nucleic 

acid in samples of tissue or fluid is therefore necessary for confirmatory diagnosis. 

Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA) can be used to detect FMD viral antigens and for 

serotyping [12, 14]. Lateral flow devices can also be used to detect FMD viral antigens. The 

ELISA has replaced complement fixation in most laboratories as it is more specific and sensitive; 

in addition, it is not affected by pro- or anti-complement factors. If the sample is inadequate or 

the diagnosis remains uncertain, sample materials can be tested by reverse transcription 

polymerase chain reaction and/or virus isolation. 

Demonstration of specific antibodies to structural proteins in non-vaccinated animals is 

indicative of prior infection with FMD virus [12, 14]. Virus neutralization tests (VNTs) and 

ELISAs for antibodies to structural proteins are used as serotype-specific serological tests. Tests 

for antibodies to some nonstructural proteins (NSPs) of FMD virus are useful in providing 

evidence of previous or current viral replication in the host, irrespective of vaccination status. 

Unlike structural proteins, NSPs are highly conserved and therefore are not serotype specific, so 

detection of antibodies to NSPs is not serotype restricted. 
85

References 

1. Kitching, R., et al, Development of foot-and-mouth disease virus strain characterization - 

a review. Trop An Health Prod, 1989. 21: p. 153-166. 

2. Knowles, N.J., et al., Pandemic strain of foot-and-mouth disease virus serotype O.

Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2005. 21(12): p. 1887-1893. 

3. Knowles, N.J. and A.R. Samuel, Molecular epidemiology of foot-and-mouth disease 

virus. Virus Research, 2003. 91: p. 65-80. 

4. Sakamoto, K. and K. Yoshida, Recent outbreaks of foot and mouth disease in countries of 

East Asia. Rev Sci Tech, 2002. 21(3): p. 459-463. 

5. Torres, A., Foot and mouth disease, in Foreign Animal Diseases, 7th edition, C. Brown 

and A. Torres, Editors. 2008, Committee on Foreign and Emerging Diseases of the 

United States Animal Health Association. Boca Publications Group, Inc: Boca Raton, 

Florida. p. 261-276. 

6. Kitching, R.P., Clinical variation in foot and mouth disease; cattle. Rev Sci Tech, 2002. 

21(3): p. 499-504. 

7. Kitching, R.P. and S. Alexandersen, Clinical variation in foot and mouth disease; pigs.

Rev Sci Tech, 2002. 21(3): p. 513-518. 

8. Woodbury, E.L., A review of the possible mechanisms for the persistence of foot-andmouth disease virus. Epidemiol Infect, 1995. 114(1): p. 1-13. 

9. Seifert, H., Foot-and-mouth disease, in Tropical Animal Health1996, Kluwer Academic 

Publishers: London, Massachusetts. p. 418-431. 

10. Kitching, R.P., Identification of foot and mouth disease virus carrier and subclinically 

infected animals and differentiation from vaccinated animals. Rev Sci Tech, 2002. 21(3): 

p. 531-538. 

11. Alexandersen, S., et al., The pathogenesis and diagnosis of foot-and-mouth disease. J 

Comp Pathol, 2003. 129: p. 1-36. 

12. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), Chapter 2.1.5 Foot and mouth disease, in 

Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals 2011: Available from 

:http://www.oie.int/international-standard-setting/terrestrial-manual/access-online/. 

13. Mann, J. and R.F. Sellers, Foot and mouth disease, in Virus Infections of Vertebrates, Z. 

Dinter and B. Morein, Editors. 1990, Elsevier. p. 903-912. 

14. Thomson, G., Foot-and-mouth disease, in Infectious Diseases of Livestock, Coetzer, 

Thomson, and Tustin, Editors. 1994, Oxford University Press: Cape Town, South Africa. 

p. 825-852. 

15. Sellers, R.F., Quantitative aspects of the spread of foot-and-mouth disease. Vet Bull, 

1971. 41(6): p. 431-439. 

16. Cottral, G.E., Persistence of foot-and-mouth disease virus in animals, their products and 

the environment. Bull Off Int Epizoot, 1969. 70(3): p. 549-568. 

17. Alexandersen, S., Z. Zhang, and A.I. Donaldson, Aspects of the persistence of foot-andmouth disease virus in animals; the carrier problem. Microbes Infect, 2002. 4(10): p. 

1099-1110. 

18. Alexandersen, S., M.B. Oleksiewicz, and A.I. Donaldson, The early pathogenesis of footand-mouth disease in pigs infected by contact; a quantitative time-course study using 

TaqMan RT-PCR. J Gen Virol, 2001. 82(4): p. 747-755. 
86

19. Oleksiewicz, M.B., A.I. Donaldson, and S. Alexandersen, Development of a novel realtime RT-PCR assay for quantitation of foot-and-mouth disease virus in diverse porcine 

tissues. J Virol Methods, 2001. 92(1): p. 23-35. 

20. Salt, J.S., The carrier state in foot and mouth disease; an immunological review. Br Vet, 

1993. 149(3): p. 207-223. 

21. Zhang, Z. and R.P. Kitching, The localization of persistent foot and mouth disease virus 

in the epithelial cells of the soft palate and pharynx. J Comp Pathol, 2001. 124: p. 89-94. 

22. Cottral, G.E., B.F. Cox, and D.E. Baldwin, The survival of foot-and-mouth disease virus 

in cured and uncured meat. Am J Vet Res, 1960. 21: p. 288-97. 

23. Henderson, W.M. and J.B. Broodsby, The survival of foot and mouth disease virus in 

meat and offal. J Hyg (Lond), 1948. 46(4): p. 394-402. 

24. Cox, B.F., G.E. Cottral, and D.E. Baldwin, Further studies on the survival of foot and 

mouth disease virus in meat. Am J Vet Res, 1961. 22: p. 224-226. 

25. Lasta, R., et al, Combined treatment of heat, irradiation, and pH effects on the infectivity 

of foot-and-mouth disease virus in bovine tissues. J Food Sci, 1992. 57(1): p. 36-39. 

26. Green, W. and J.L. Grannis, Economic impact of alternative management strategies for 

regulating Canadian ruminant/product imports. 2003: p. Unpublished report, Center for 

Epidemiology and Animal Health. 

27. Heidelbaugh, N. and J. Graves, Effects of some techniques applicable in food processing 

on the infectivity of foot and mouth disease virus. Food Tech, 1968. 22: p. 120. 

 
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Appendix II 

11 factors described under 9CFR 94.2 before 

2012 

8 factors described under 9CFR 94.2 after 

2012 

Scope of the evaluation Scope of the evaluation 

The extent of an active disease control program, 

if any, if the agent is known to exist in the region. Veterinary control and oversight The authority, organization, and infrastructure of 

the veterinary services organization in the region.

Disease status—i.e., is the restricted disease agent 

known to exist in the region? If “yes,” at what 

prevalence? If “no,” when was the most recent 

diagnosis? Disease history and vaccination practices The vaccination status of the region. When was 

the last vaccination? What is the extent of 

vaccination if it is currently used, and what 

vaccine is being used? 

The degree to which the region is separated from 

adjacent regions of higher risk through physical 

or other barriers. 

Epidemiological separation from potential 

sources of infection 

The extent to which movement of animals and 

animal products is controlled from regions of 

higher risk, and the level of biosecurity regarding 

such movements. 

The status of adjacent regions with respect to the 

agent. 

Livestock demographics and marketing practices 

in the region. Livestock demographics and traceability 

The type and extent of disease surveillance in the 

region—e.g., is it passive and/or active; what is 

the quantity and quality of sampling and testing? 

Surveillance practices 

Diagnostic laboratory capabilities. Diagnostic laboratory capabilities 

Policies and infrastructure for animal disease 

control in the region—i.e., emergency response 

capacity. 

Emergency preparedness and response