Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 10, 2000 / Proposed Rules 30019

The petitioner explains that the portals

and gates are in place to ensure that

personnel who gain access to the

controlled access area have the proper

clearance or are under escort and

ensuring that prohibited articles are not

allowed into the controlled area. The

petitioner believes that the missing

element of security is whether the fence

line, which the petitioner believes does

minimize the unauthorized removal of

special nuclear material of 10 and 20

ton cylinders, adequately protects

against the unauthorized removal of

restricted information, equipment, and

other materials or the unauthorized

access to these types of materials.

The petitioner asserts that other

facilities that possess Category III

quantities of special nuclear material

regulated by the NRC do not share the

level of concern for classified matter,

equipment, and technology that exists at

the gaseous diffusion plants. The

petitioner suggests that the regulations

concerning security programs at the

gaseous diffusion plants, such as escort

requirements and physical security

measures, should be amended to be

made more stringent to protect this

technology.

Sabotage Events

According to the petitioner, the NRC

typically relies on local law

enforcement agencies to respond to

incidents of workplace violence or

sabotage at material licensee facilities.

The petitioner states that the scope and

complexity of a gaseous diffusion plant

makes it far different from other types

of NRC licensed materials facilities.

Furthermore, the petitioner believes that

these differences result in unique

problems in relying on local law

enforcement agencies to protect such a

facility from violent incidents. The

petitioner indicates that local law

enforcement agencies in the vicinity of

the Paducah plant have stated, for the

record, that they should not be viewed

as a replacement for on-site security

because of their lack of knowledge of

the plant site, the types of hazards

contained in the plant, and their limited

resources. The petitioner presents two

letters, attached to the petition, from

law enforcement agencies in the vicinity

of the Paducah plant that support this

contention.

Because of the unique nature of

gaseous diffusion plants and the

importance of their operation, the

petitioner believes that a violent

incident or an act of sabotage would

affect national security. The petitioner

also asserts that, because of the many

radiological and toxicological hazards

associated with these plants, an act of

sabotage could adversely affect the

safety of plant workers and the public.

The petitioner believes that these

dangers were not addressed as part of

the certification process. According to

the petitioner, current NRC standards do

not require a security force that is

capable of preventing a sabotage event.

The petitioner requests that the

regulations be amended to require that

security forces at the gaseous diffusion

plants be able to detect, respond to, and

mitigate violent incidents or acts of

sabotage.

The petitioner also notes that current

regulations do not require that the

security force be armed or empowered

to enforce the Atomic Energy Act. The

petitioner requests that security officers

at the gaseous diffusion plants be armed

and empowered to make arrests in

limited situations, such as for violations

of the Atomic Energy Act.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day

of May, 2000.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Annette Vietti-Cook,

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 00–11662 Filed 5–9–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2000–NM–103–AD]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing

Model 737–200, –300, –400, and –500

Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the

adoption of a new airworthiness

directive (AD) that is applicable to

certain Boeing Model 737–200, –300,

–400, and –500 series airplanes. This

proposal would require replacement of

existing door handle mounting hub

assemblies with new, improved hub

assemblies. This proposal is prompted

by reports of cracked or broken

mounting hub assemblies for the

interior door handles on the cabin

doors. The actions specified by the

proposed AD are intended to prevent

cracking or breaking of the door handle

mounting hub, which could result in the

interior door handle breaking off while

the door is being opened. In an

emergency situation, this could impede

evacuation of the airplane.

DATES: Comments must be received by

June 26, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–114,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000–NM–

103–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Comments may be inspected at this

location between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m.,

Monday through Friday, except Federal

holidays.

The service information referenced in

the proposed rule may be obtained from

Boeing Commercial Airplane Group,

P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington

98124–2207. This information may be

examined at the FAA, Transport

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Keith Ladderud, Aerospace Engineer,

Airframe Branch, ANM–120S, FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate, Seattle

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington

98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–2780;

fax (425) 227–1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications shall

identify the Rules Docket number and

be submitted in triplicate to the address

specified above. All communications

received on or before the closing date

for comments, specified above, will be

considered before taking action on the

proposed rule. The proposals contained

in this notice may be changed in light

of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report

summarizing each FAA-public contact

concerned with the substance of this

proposal will be filed in the Rules

Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice

must submit a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket Number 2000–NM–103–AD.’’

30020 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 10, 2000 / Proposed Rules

The postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this

NPRM by submitting a request to the

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,

ANM–114, Attention: Rules Docket No.

2000–NM–103–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue,

SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Discussion

The FAA has received reports

indicating that cracked or broken

mounting hub assemblies for the

interior door handles on the cabin doors

have been found on certain Boeing

Model 737–200, –300, –400, and –500

series airplanes. The primary use of the

interior door handle is to be turned to

latch the door after the door is shut

using the assist handles. If the interior

door handle is also used to close the

door, the moment arm of the door

handle puts too much force on the

existing aluminum door handle

mounting hub, which causes the

mounting hub to crack or break. This

condition, if not corrected, could result

in the interior door handle breaking off

while the door is being opened. In an

emergency situation, this could impede

evacuation of the airplane.

Explanation of Relevant Service

Information

The FAA has reviewed and approved

Boeing Service Bulletin 737–25–1322,

Revision 2, dated February 19, 1998.

That service bulletin describes

procedures for replacement of existing

door handle mounting hub assemblies

in the forward and aft entry doors,

forward galley door, and aft service

door, with new, improved hub

assemblies. The new mounting hub

assemblies are made of stainless steel

and are stronger than the existing

aluminum mounting hub assemblies.

Accomplishment of the actions

specified in the service bulletin is

intended to adequately address the

identified unsafe condition.

Explanation of Requirements of

Proposed Rule

Since an unsafe condition has been

identified that is likely to exist or

develop on other products of this same

type design, the proposed AD would

require accomplishment of the actions

specified in the service bulletin

described previously, except as

discussed below.

Differences Between the Proposed Rule

and the Service Information

Operators should note that the

proposed AD would require

replacement of existing door handle

mounting hub assemblies with new,

improved hub assemblies within 18

months after the effective date of this

AD. The service bulletin recommends

that the mounting hub in the forward

entry door be replaced at the next ‘‘A’’

check, and the mounting hub assemblies

in the aft entry door, forward galley

door, and aft service door be replaced at

the next ‘‘C’’ check. In developing an

appropriate compliance time for this

proposed AD, the FAA considered not

only the manufacturer’s

recommendation, but the degree of

urgency associated with addressing the

subject unsafe condition, the average

utilization of the affected fleet, and the

time necessary to replace the mounting

hub assemblies (approximately 3 work

hours per door). In light of all of these

factors, the FAA finds an 18-month

compliance time for initiating the

proposed actions to be warranted, in

that it represents an appropriate interval

of time allowable for affected airplanes

to continue to operate without

compromising safety.

Cost Impact

There are approximately 1,575

airplanes of the affected design in the

worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that

632 airplanes of U.S. registry would be

affected by this proposed AD, that it

would take approximately 12 work

hours per airplane (3 work hours per

door) to accomplish the proposed

replacement, and that the average labor

rate is $60 per work hour. Required

parts would cost approximately $2,150

per airplane. Based on these figures, the

cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S.

operators is estimated to be $1,813,840,

or $2,870 per airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed

above is based on assumptions that no

operator has yet accomplished any of

the proposed requirements of this AD

action, and that no operator would

accomplish those actions in the future if

this AD were not adopted.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein

would not have a substantial direct

effect on the States, on the relationship

between the national Government and

the States, or on the distribution of

power and responsibilities among the

various levels of government. Therefore,

it is determined that this proposal

would not have federalism implications

under Executive Order 13132.

For the reasons discussed above, I

certify that this proposed regulation (1)

is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’

under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not

a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44

FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if

promulgated, will not have a significant

economic impact, positive or negative,

on a substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft

regulatory evaluation prepared for this

action is contained in the Rules Docket.

A copy of it may be obtained by

contacting the Rules Docket at the

location provided under the caption

ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration proposes to amend part

39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations

(14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by

adding the following new airworthiness

directive:

Boeing: Docket 2000–NM–103–AD.

Applicability: Model 737–200, –300, –400,

and –500 series airplanes; as listed in Boeing

Service Bulletin 737–25–1322, Revision 2,

dated February 19, 1998; certificated in any

category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability

provision, regardless of whether it has been

modified, altered, or repaired in the area

subject to the requirements of this AD. For

airplanes that have been modified, altered, or

repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the

owner/operator must request approval for an

alternative method of compliance in

accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD.

The request should include an assessment of

the effect of the modification, alteration, or

repair on the unsafe condition addressed by

this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not

been eliminated, the request should include

specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To prevent cracking or breaking of the door

handle mounting hub, which could result in

the interior door handle breaking off while

the door is being opened, and, in an

emergency situation, could impede

evacuation of the airplane, accomplish the

following:

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 10, 2000 / Proposed Rules 30021

Replacement

(a) Within 18 months after the effective

date of this AD, replace existing door handle

mounting hub assemblies in the forward and

aft entry doors, forward galley door, and aft

service door, with new, improved hub

assemblies, in accordance with Boeing

Service Bulletin 737–25–1322, Revision 2,

dated February 19, 1998.

Note 2: Replacements accomplished prior

to the effective date of this AD in accordance

with Boeing Service Bulletin 737–25–1322,

dated January 19, 1995, or Revision 1, dated

December 19, 1996, are considered

acceptable for compliance with paragraph (a)

of this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(b) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Seattle

Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators

shall submit their requests through an

appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then

send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

Note 3: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Seattle ACO.

Special Flight Permits

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 4,

2000.

Vi L. Lipski,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 00–11725 Filed 5–9–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2000–NM–50–AD]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell

Douglas Model DC–10–10, –15, –30,

–30F (KC–10A Military), and –40 Series

Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the

adoption of a new airworthiness

directive (AD) that is applicable to

certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC–

10–10, –15, –30, –30F (KC–10A

military), and –40 series airplanes. This

proposal would require performing

repetitive ultrasonic inspections of the

attaching bolts on the inboard and

outboard support on the inboard and

outboard flap assembly to detect failed

bolts, or verifying the torque of the

attaching bolts on the inboard support

on the outboard flap; and follow-on

actions. This proposal also would

require replacing all bolts with bolts

made from Inconel, which would

constitute terminating action for the

repetitive inspection requirements. This

proposal is prompted by a report of an

in-flight loss of the inboard flap

assembly on an airplane during

approach for landing. The actions

specified by the proposed AD are

intended to prevent in-flight loss of

inboard and outboard flap assemblies

due to failure of H–11 attaching bolts,

which could result in reduced

controllability of the airplane.

DATES: Comments must be received by

June 26, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–114,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000–NM–

50–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Comments may be inspected at this

location between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m.,

Monday through Friday, except Federal

holidays.

The service information referenced in

the proposed rule may be obtained from

Boeing Commercial Aircraft Group,

Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood

Boulevard, Long Beach, California

90846, Attention: Technical

Publications Business Administration,

Dept. C1–L51 (2–60). This information

may be examined at the FAA, Transport

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at

the FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft

Certification Office, 3960 Paramount

Boulevard, Lakewood, California.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ron

Atmur, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe

Branch, ANM–120L, FAA, Transport

Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles

Aircraft Certification Office, 3960

Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood,

California 90712–4137; telephone (562)

627–5224; fax (562) 627–5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications shall

identify the Rules Docket number and

be submitted in triplicate to the address

specified above. All communications

received on or before the closing date

for comments, specified above, will be

considered before taking action on the

proposed rule. The proposals contained

in this notice may be changed in light

of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report

summarizing each FAA-public contact

concerned with the substance of this

proposal will be filed in the Rules

Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice

must submit a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket Number 2000–NM–50–AD.’’ The

postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this

NPRM by submitting a request to the

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,

ANM–114, Attention: Rules Docket No.

2000–NM–50–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue,

SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Discussion

The FAA has received a report of an

in-flight loss of the left inboard flap

assembly on a McDonnell Douglas

Model DC–10 series airplane during

approach for landing. Investigation

revealed that bolts made from H–11

steel, which attach the outboard hinge

to the lower surface of the flap, had

failed. Analysis of the bolts determined

the cause of failure to be stress

corrosion. The FAA has received no

damage or failure reports about the

outboard flaps. However, the inboard

and outboard hinges are attached to the

lower surface of the flap using similar

type design and the same material as the

installation of the inboard flap outboard

hinge. Failure of H–11 attaching bolts

could result in an in-flight loss of

inboard and outboard flap assemblies,

and consequent reduced controllability

of the airplane.

Explanation of Relevant Service

Information

The FAA has reviewed and approved

McDonnell Douglas Alert Service

Bulletin DC10–57A143, dated December