alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 91.1713 Instruction, checking, and evaluation. ( a ) *Flight Instructor (Airplane).* No flight instructor may provide instruction or conduct a flight review in a Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane unless that flight instructor ( 1 ) Meets the pilot training and documentation requirements of § 91.1705 before giving flight instruction in the Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane;
( 2 ) Meets the currency requirements of §§ 91.1715(a) and 91.1715(c)
( 3 ) Has a minimum total pilot time of 2,000 pilot-in-command hours and 800 pilot-in-command hours in multiengine airplanes; and
( 4 ) Has: ( i ) 300 pilot-in-command hours in the Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane, 50 hours of which must have been within the preceding 12 months; or
( ii ) 100 pilot-in-command hours in the Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane, 25 hours of which must have been within the preceding 12 months, and 300 hours providing instruction in a FAA-approved Mitsubishi MU-2B simulator or FAA-approved Mitsubishi MU-2B flight training device, 25 hours of which must have been within the preceding 12 months.
( b ) *Flight Instructor (Simulator/Flight Training Device).* No flight instructor may provide instruction for the Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane unless that instructor meets the requirements of this paragraph— ( 1 ) Each flight instructor who provides flight training for the Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane must meet the pilot training and documentation requirements of § 91.1705 before giving flight instruction for the Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane;
( 2 ) Each flight instructor who provides flight training for the Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane must meet the currency requirements of § 91.1715(c) before giving flight instruction for the Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane;
( 3 ) Each flight instructor who provides flight training for the Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane must have: ( i ) A minimum total pilot time of 2000 pilot-in-command hours and 800 pilot-in-command hours in multiengine airplanes; and
( ii ) Within the preceding 12 months, either 50 hours of Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane pilot-in-command experience or 50 hours providing simulator or flight training device instruction for the Mitsubishi MU-2B.
( c ) *Checking and evaluation.* No person may provide checking or evaluation for the Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane unless that person meets the requirements of this paragraph— ( 1 ) For the purpose of checking, designated pilot examiners, training center evaluators, and check airmen must have completed the appropriate training in the Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane in accordance with § 91.1705;
( 2 ) For checking conducted in the Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane, each designated pilot examiner and check airman must have 100 hours pilot-in-command flight time in the Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane and maintain currency in accordance with § 91.1715.
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-0306-255  -017   -CV

InN rReE JiImMmMyY D. WeEbBbBIN RE 21ST CENTURY TECHNOLOGIES, INC.	RELATOR

	------------

	ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	The court has considered relator's petition for writ of mandamus and is of the opinion that relief should be denied.  Accordingly, relator's petition for writ of mandamus is denied.

	Relator shall pay all costs of this original proceeding, for which let execution issue.

								_____________________________PER CURIAM____

							SUE TERRIE LIVINGSTON

WALK							JUSTICE

PANEL AB:    LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT, and WLALKER	CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and DAUPHINOT, JJ.

DAUPHINOT, J.	, would request a response . .to the petition for to ,

DELIVERED: January 21, 2003  July 312787, 2006In re Jimmy D. Webb
###### Editorial Note on Part 380

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 380 appear at 84 FR 15940, Apr. 16, 2019.

#### § 380.67 Waiver of sovereign immunity.

By accepting an approved registration form under this subpart, an operator waives any right it may have to assert any defense of sovereign immunity from suit in any proceeding against it, in any court or other tribunal of the United States, that is based upon a claim arising out of operations by the operator under this part.
###### Editorial Note on Part 1251

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 1251 appear at 81 FR 3709, Jan. 22, 2016.

#### §§ 1251.531-1251.539 [Reserved]
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 00-31263

Summary Calendar

 

BENJAMIN BOYD; JOHN BAZILE, III, Individually

and on behalf of all those similarly situated; 

JUAN P. SCOTT; CYNTHIA HOWARD; DAVID A. JOHNSON,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

EDWARD BAINES,

Movant-Appellant,

versus

CHARLES C. FOTI, JR., Individually and in his capacity 

as Criminal Sheriff of Orleans Parish; THE ORLEANS PARISH

CRIMINAL SHERIFF’S OFFICE,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 94-CV-204-B

--------------------

August 7, 2001

Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment denying them relief under 

the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 

They argue that (1) they were wrongfully denied overtime

compensation because the district court erroneously determined

that certain of them fell within the “law enforcement” exception

to the FLSA and (2) the trial court applied the wrong statute of
No. 00-31263

-2-

limitations based on its erroneous finding that the Sheriff did

not “willfully” violate the FLSA. 

Plaintiffs mistakenly construe the district court’s decision

denying them overtime compensation as the product of their

classification as law enforcement personnel. The district court

ultimately based its decision that no overtime was owed on the

fact that neither their testimony nor the exhibits established

that the Department of Labor’s (DOL) audit results, which did not

identify them as employees to whom overtime pay was owed, were

erroneous. Because the district court’s holding was not based on

the employees’ classification as law enforcement personnel but

rather on its factual finding in accordance with Fed. R. Civ.

P. Rule 52(c) that the DOL’s wage calculations were correct, we

review it for clear error and find none. See Southern Travel

Club, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 986 F.2d 125, 128 (5th

Cir. 1993). 

Plaintiffs argue that the Sheriff’s FLSA violations should

be construed as “willful,” thus entitling them to a three-year

limitations period, because the violations were of a continuous

nature. Plaintiffs similarly have not shown that the district

court clearly erred on this issue. See Reich v. Tiller

Helicopter Servs., 8 F.3d 1018, 1036 (5th Cir. 1993). 

Plaintiffs also argue that the FLSA’s three-year limitations

period does not apply to cases where an employee has been

discharged in retaliation for filing a complaint under the FLSA,

apparently inferring that the Sheriff wrongfully terminated some

unnamed employees. This argument was rejected by the district
No. 00-31263

-3-

court because the plaintiffs had put forth no material evidence

to substantiate allegations of retaliation. We reject it for the

same reason.

The district court’s decision is AFFIRMED.
The Honorable Christine Gregoire 

Governor of Washington 

P.O . Box 40002 

Olympia, WA 98504 0002 

The Honorable Ted Kulongoski 

Governor of Oregon 

900 Court Street NE 

Salem, OR 97301 4047 

SEP 3 - 1810 

Dear Governors Gregoire and Kulongoski : 

Thank you for your joint letter of August 11, 2010 regarding the Deepwater Horizon 

(Gulf Coast) oil spill . We greatly appreciate your support for the work of the U.S . Coast Guard 

and Environmental Protection Agency in responding to this spill. We also greatly appreciate 

your states providing oil spill response resources and other assistance during this unprecedented 

tragedy. 

At the same time, we recognize your priority to maintain response capabilities to protect 

the Pacific Northwest's environment in light of the June 28, 2010 joint Coast Guard-EPA 

emergency interim rule, which provided additional resources for the unprecedented response in 

the Gulf. 

Following the explosion of the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit "Deepwater Horizon," a 

number of steps were taken to surge resources and oil spill response vessels capable of skimming 

oil released by the BP Deepwater Horizon well. 

This interim rule, one of the many steps taken to allow for additional resources, allowed 

vessels that otherwise may be required to stay in port to deploy to the Gulf and assist in this 

response on a voluntary basis. The rule will remain in effect until the end of this calendar year, to 

allow for return travel time. 

During this interim rule, local Coast Guard commanders, in coordination with EPA, state 

and local governments and affected local industries, will continue to work in close coordination 

to maintain a level of equipment able to best protect all localities . If there were to be a scenario 

in which more response resources were needed in the Gulf, we would work closely with these 

partners and the Regional Response Teams and Area Committees, to ensure that we do not 

deploy equipment and personnel that would result in the loss of response capability below worst 

case and maximum most probable discharge response time requirements in the Pacific 

Northwest. Any decision to request or accept such deployment of equipment or personnel will 

consider carefully the distances and travel time from the West Coast to the Gulf Coast spill. 
Again, thank you for your letter. If you have further questions please contact us, or your 

staff may call Sarah Hospodor-Pallone, EPA's Deputy Associate Administrator for 

Intergovernmental Relations, at 202-564-7178, or Captain Peter Gautier, National Incident 

Command Chief of Staff at (202) 372-1731 . 

Sincerely, Sincerely, 

THAD W. ALLEN 

Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.) 

National Incident Commander 

.JACKSON 

Administrator 

Environmental Protection Agency
§ 406.109 Administrative law judges—powers and limitations. ( a ) *Powers of an administrative law judge.* In accordance with the rules of this subpart, an administrative law judge may: ( 1 ) Give notice of, and hold, prehearing conferences and hearings;
( 2 ) Administer oaths and affirmations;
( 3 ) Issue subpoenas authorized by law and requested by the parties;
( 4 ) Rule on offers of proof;
( 5 ) Receive relevant and material evidence;
( 6 ) Regulate the course of the hearing in accordance with the rules of this subpart;
( 7 ) Hold conferences to settle or to simplify the issues by consent of the parties;
( 8 ) Dispose of procedural motions and requests; and
( 9 ) Make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issue an initial decision.
( b ) *Duties to maintain the record.* ( 1 ) The administrative law judge must file with the FDMS, or instruct the party to file with the FDMS, a copy of each document that is submitted to the administrative law judge that has not bee filed with FDMS, except the portions of those documents that contain confidential information.
( 2 ) The administrative law judge must file with the FDMS a copy of each ruling and order issued by the administrative law judge, except those portions that contain confidential information.
( 3 ) The administrative law judge must file with the FDMS, or instruct the court reporter to file with the FDMS, a copy of each transcript and exhibit, except those portions that contain confidential information.
( 4 ) The administrative law judge must maintain any confidential information filed in accordance with § 406.117 and deliver it to the Assistant Chief Counsel for Litigation when the administrative law judge no longer needs it.
( c ) *Limitations on the power of the administrative law judge.* The administrative law judge may not issue an order of contempt, award costs to any party, or impose any sanction not specified in this subpart. If the administrative law judge imposes any sanction not specified in this subpart, a party may file an interlocutory appeal of right pursuant to § 406.173(c). This section does not preclude an administrative law judge from issuing an order that bars a person from a specific proceeding based on a finding of obstreperous or disruptive behavior in that specific proceeding.
( d ) *Disqualification.* The administrative law judge may disqualify himself or herself at any time. A party may file a motion, pursuant to § 406.141(f)(8), requesting that an administrative law judge be disqualified from the proceedings.
[Doc. No. FAA-2001-8607, 66 FR 2180, Jan. 10, 2001, as amended at 72 FR 68475, Dec. 5, 2007]
#### § 29.81 Landing distance: Category A.

The horizontal distance required to land and come to a complete stop (or to a speed of approximately 3 knots for water landings) from a point 50 ft above the landing surface must be determined from the approach and landing paths established in accordance with § 29.79.

[Doc. No. 24802, 64 FR 45338, Aug. 19, 1999]
#### Willingham *v.*The State.

Manslaughter.

(Decided June 6, 1916.

72 South. 213.)

Homicide; Threats by Others. — Where there was no evidence to show “that a witness was connected in any wise with the killing, attempts to elicit evidence as to threats made by such witness against deceased, were improper and objection thereto properly sustained.

Appeal from Randolph Circuit Court.

Heard before Hon. S. L. Brewer.

Joe Willingham was convicted of manslaughter and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Stell Blake, for appellant. W. L. Martin, Attorney General, for the State.

EVANS, J.

Appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree. We find no reversible error in the record proper. The only exceptions reserved by the bill of exceptions relate to the ruling of the trial court upon questions propounded to witness Tom Willingham by defendant’s counsel, inquiring whether witness had heard one Ben Carter, another witness, make threats against, deceased. There was no evidence to show that Ben Carter was connected in any wise with the killing, and the only suggestion thereof is in the implication of questions excepted to. The judgment of the court below is affirmed on the following .authorities: *Alston v. State,*63 Ala. 178; *Walker v. State,*139 Ala. 56, 35 South. 1011; *Toliver v. State,*142 Ala. 3, 38 South. 801.

Affirmed.
#### BYRD v. THE STATE.

(Decided February 1, 1916.)

Appeal from Pike Law Court.

Heard before Hon. T. L. Borum.

No counsel marked for appellant. W. L. Martin, Attorney General, for the State.

Brown, J.

No bill of exceptions and no error of record. Affirmed.
#### § 73.83 Restrictions.

No person may operate an aircraft within a prohibited area unless authorization has been granted by the using agency.
Exhibit 32.1

                              CERTIFICATION OF THE
                      CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                             PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection  with the Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31,
2006 of KeySpan  Corporation (the  "Corporation"),  as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  I, Robert B. Catell,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

          (1)  The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a)
               or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

          (2)  The information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all
               material  respects,   the  financial  condition  and  results  of
               operations of the Corporation.


Date:     February 22, 2007


                                        /s/ Robert B. Catell
                                        --------------------
                                        Robert B. Catell
                                        Chairman of the Board of Directors
                                        and Chief Executive Officer
§ 1471.50 How is this part written? ( a ) This part uses a “plain language” format to make it easier for the general public and business community to use. The section headings and text, often in the form of questions and answers, must be read together.
( b ) Pronouns used within this part, such as “I” and “you,” change from subpart to subpart depending on the audience being addressed. The pronoun “we” always is the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
( c ) The “Covered Transactions” diagram in the appendix to this part shows the levels or “tiers” at which the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service enforces an exclusion under this part.
§ 450.141 Computing systems. ( a ) *Identification of computing system safety items.* An operator must identify: ( 1 ) Any software or data that implements a capability that, by intended operation, unintended operation, or non-operation, can present a hazard to the public; and
( 2 ) The level of criticality of each computing system safety item identified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, commensurate with its degree of control over hazards to the public and the severity of those hazards.
( b ) *Safety requirements.* An operator must develop safety requirements for each computing system safety item. In doing so, the operator must: ( 1 ) Identify and evaluate safety requirements for each computing system safety item;
( 2 ) Ensure the safety requirements are complete and correct;
( 3 ) Implement each safety requirement; and
( 4 ) Verify and validate the implementation of each safety requirement by using a method appropriate for the level of criticality of the computing system safety item. For each computing system safety item that is safety critical under § 401.7, verification and validation must include testing by a test team independent of the development division or organization.
( c ) *Development process.* An operator must implement and document a development process for computing system safety items appropriate for the level of criticality of the computing system safety item. A development process must define: ( 1 ) Responsibilities for each task associated with a computing system safety item;
( 2 ) Processes for internal review and approval—including review that evaluates the implementation of all safety requirements—such that no person approves that person's own work;
( 3 ) Processes to ensure development personnel are trained, qualified, and capable of performing their role;
( 4 ) Processes that trace requirements to verification and validation evidence;
( 5 ) Processes for configuration management that specify the content of each released version of a computing system safety item;
( 6 ) Processes for testing that verify and validate all safety requirements to the extent required by paragraph (b)(4) of this section;
( 7 ) Reuse policies that verify and validate the safety requirements for reused computing system safety items; and
( 8 ) Third-party product use policies that verify and validate the safety requirements for any third-party product.
( d ) *Application requirements.* An applicant must: ( 1 ) Identify and describe all computing system safety items involved in the proposed operations;
( 2 ) Provide the safety requirements for each computing system safety item;
( 3 ) Provide documentation of the development processes that meets paragraph (c) of this section;
( 4 ) Provide evidence of the execution of the appropriate development process for each computing system safety item; and
( 5 ) Provide evidence of the implementation of each safety requirement.
1

The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the District of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-2029

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United

v. * States District Court for

* the District of Nebraska. 

Vladimir Polyansky, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: February 7, 2003

 Filed: February 19, 2003

___________

Before LOKEN, FAGG, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Vladimir Polyansky pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with

intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable

amount of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The district court1

sentenced him to 60 months imprisonment and 4 years supervised release. On appeal,

his counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under Anders v. California,

368 U.S. 738 (1967).
-2-

Having carefully reviewed counsel’s Anders brief, and having conducted our

own independent review of the record, see Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we

agree with counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues in this direct criminal appeal.

Among other things, we note that at the plea hearing, Polyansky affirmed he

understood the plea agreement, agreed with the factual basis for the conspiracy

charge, and admitted the charged conduct; that there were no sentencing objections

other than Polyansky’s motion for a downward departure based on an overrepresented

criminal history; and that the district court granted Polyansky’s departure motion, and

also imposed the lowest sentence possible, given the statutory minimum.

Accordingly, we affirm, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Order entered January 15 , 2019

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 19
- 00017
- CR RICARDO BELTRAN, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 194th Ju dicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F10
- 56077
- M



### O RDER
T he clerk’s record in the above appeal was filed January 11, 2019. T he trial court’s charge to the jury on guilt/innocence , which counsel requested included in the clerk’s record, is missing from that record

. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 34.5(a)(4) ; (b)

. We ORDER Dallas County District Clerk Felicia Pitre to file a supplemental clerk’s record containing the trial court’s charge to the jury on guilt/innocence in this appeal WITHIN
F OURTEEN DAYS of the date of this order.

/s/ CORY L. CARLYLE JUSTICE
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

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Billings & Pompeys Pillar 

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Map generated by the Billings Field Office in July 2011

Albers Equal Area, NAD83 Projection

This map is intended for display purposes. No warranty is made by the Bureau of

Land Management as to the accuracy, reliability or completeness of the data for

individual or aggregate use with other data, or for purposes not intended by BLM. 

This map may not meet National Map Accuracy Standards. This product was

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