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Filed 12/14/21 In re K.C. CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not 

been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re K.C. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN MATEO COUNTY HUMAN 

SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A162413

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. 19JD0918)

D.C. (mother) appeals from juvenile court orders (1) finding 

that the San Mateo Human Services Agency (Agency) provided 

her reasonable family reunification services and (2) declining to 

extend her services for an additional six months. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On November 6, 2019, based on a request by the San Mateo 

County Human Services Agency (agency), the juvenile court 

issued a protective custody warrant because mother was unable 

to provide shelter for her two children, then ages five and six

(collectively, the minors), and had been unwilling to engage in 

services. According to the agency’s request for a warrant, mother 
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had been “exited” from the shelter where she had been living 

with the children on October 31, 2019 due to her failure to send 

the children to school, and she admitted to walking the streets 

with the children that night because she had no plan for shelter.1 

On November 1, 2019, the agency provided mother with a 

voucher for 5 days in a motel, as mother had already used her 

shelter voucher for the year. The agency requested a protective 

custody warrant because mother did not have a plan to provide 

shelter for the minors after her motel voucher ran out. As a 

result of the issuance of the protective custody warrant, the 

children were detained in a county foster home. 

On November 8, 2019, the agency filed a petition pursuant 

to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1)2, 

alleging mother’s failure or inability to protect the minors and 

her inability to provide regular care for the minors due to mental 

illness. The juvenile court ordered the children detained on 

November 12, 2019 and scheduled a jurisdictional hearing.3

At the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing in February 

2020, the court sustained the petition and declared the minors to 

be dependents of the court. Notably, mother had been 

hospitalized due to mental health issues in late 2019 and the 

original January 2020 hearing date had to be continued because 

1 The children had attended school only five days between 

July 29, 2019 and October 31, 2019. 

2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare 

and Institutions Code.

3 The minors’ presumed father was also involved in the 

dependency proceedings, but he is not a party to this appeal. 
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mother was in a mental health treatment facility and unable to 

attend. Mother informed the social worker that she had been 

diagnosed with schizophrenia and obsessive compulsive disorder 

(OCD), and she was living at Redwood House, a residential 

treatment facility, and engaging in therapy through the facility 

and through Felton Group. The court granted reunification 

services and ordered mother to engage in mental health services, 

medication management (including taking prescribed 

medication), parent education, and visitation. 

At the six-month review hearing in August 2020, the 

agency reported that mother had left Redwood House and then 

briefly lived with the minors’ maternal grandmother before being 

accepted into the Spring Street Shelter, where she continued to 

engage in mental health treatment with a psychiatrist and 

therapist from Felton Group (Felton). The agency noted that 

mother was not engaging in parenting classes due to a need to 

focus on her mental health, admitted that she was not ready to 

reunify with her children, had declined to engage in visitation 

with her children between November 2019 and late March 2020, 

and had repeatedly been non-responsive to the agency’s efforts to 

contact her. The director of Spring Street Shelter stated that 

mother was on the verge of being discharged due to not following 

program rules and not working toward her goals. After the onset 

of the pandemic, mother engaged in twice-weekly video visits 

with her children, missing only three visits between March 28, 

2020 and August 2020. The agency recommended that the 

children remain dependents of the court, and that the court order 
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continued reunification services and a 12-month hearing. The 

court adopted the recommendations, found that the agency had 

provided reasonable services, ordered additional reunification 

services and supervised visitation (including via virtual visits 

while sheltering in place.) The court set a 12-month review 

hearing for January 2021. 

In late December 2020, the agency submitted its report in 

advance of the 12-month review hearing. Since the six-month 

review, mother had been discharged from Spring Street Shelter 

due to program non-compliance and admitted to a psychiatric 

hospital due to hallucinations. Mother then went to Redwood 

House, a crisis residential program, and from there to Caminar’s 

Eucalyptus House, a six-month residential program that provides 

supportive independent living. Mother continued to receive 

therapy and medication through Felton. Mother’s therapist and 

psychiatrist from Felton reported that mother was suffering from 

debilitating OCD and psychosis, sometimes refused to take her 

medication, and was unable to live independently. The report 

further noted that mother had been amenable to virtual visits 

with the minors (although she had failed to attend one scheduled 

video visit), and that mother had canceled two in-person visits 

with the minors. Mother had also failed to respond to calls from 

her social worker and her provider of parenting services. Mother 

agreed she was not ready to reunify with her children. 

In the first addendum report submitted prior to the 

continued 12-month review, the agency reported that mother had 

missed in-person and video visits with the minors. The Director 
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of Eucalyptus House reported that mother was frequently unable 

to get out of bed before noon and was therefore not participating 

in morning programming at Eucalyptus House; the Director 

further noted that mother seemed “overwhelmed.” Likewise, the 

Assistant Director reported that mother frequently yelled from 

her bedroom to Eucalyptus House staff to ask for things like 

toilet paper, rather than following program rules that required 

her to go to the front desk. The Assistant Director opined that 

mother’s failure to follow program rules was “concerning” if her 

goal was to live independently, and that mother’s progress had 

been “slow.” 

Subsequent addendum reports similarly stated that mother 

continued to “sleep[] a lot,” with the result that she missed 

medication and had limited engagement in programming. 

Mother remained unable to live independently, and the 

Eucalyptus House Director recommended a residential facility 

with a higher level of mental health services. While at 

Eucalyptus House, mother continued to engage in in-person 

therapy with her psychologist from Felton. Mother missed and 

declined in-person and video visits with her children in February 

and March 2021. 

After a contested hearing, the juvenile court ultimately 

found clear and convincing evidence that mother had failed to 

participate regularly and make substantive progress in her courtordered treatment plan, as she had made only minimal progress 

toward alleviating the concerns that had led to the placement. It 

further found by a preponderance of the evidence that returning 
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the children to mother’s care would create a substantial risk of 

detriment to the children. It therefore terminated reunification 

services as to mother.4

DISCUSSION

I. Reasonable Services

Mother first argues the juvenile court erred by finding the 

Agency provided reasonable services, contending that the Agency 

took inadequate measures to assist her with her case plan and 

that her services were substantially impacted by the pandemic.

We disagree. 

“ ‘[W]e review the record in the light most favorable to the 

trial court's order to determine whether there is substantial 

evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the 

necessary findings based on the clear and convincing evidence

standard.’ ” (T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 

1239–1240.) As mother notes, the burden is on the appellant to 

show that the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile 

court’s findings. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 962, 971.) 

“ ‘The adequacy of the reunification plan and of the department’s 

efforts to provide suitable services is judged according to the 

circumstances of the particular case.’ ” (In re K.C. (2012) 

212 Cal.App.4th 323, 329.) “To support a finding reasonable

services were offered or provided, ‘the record should show that 

the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss 

4 The court also continued reunification services for the 

presumed father and permitted further supervised visitation 

between mother and the minors.
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of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, 

maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the 

course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist 

the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . .’ ” 

(Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1426, 

italics omitted.)

In the present case, the minors were removed from mother 

due to mother’s serious mental health issues that led to her 

inability to care for herself and her children. Mother admits that 

the agency provided her “significant services,” but she 

nonetheless contends that the agency failed to “assure [she] was 

receiving the best available services within her residential 

programs.” Mother misapprehends the relevant standard. The 

question is not whether the agency provided the best possible 

services, but whether the services were reasonable under the 

circumstances. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 541.) 

The record contains substantial evidence that the agency 

provided mother with reasonable services designed to address her 

identified mental health and parenting concerns. Mother was in 

a variety of residential treatment programs and received therapy 

through both these programs and through Felton throughout her 

various placements, but she remained incapable of even self-care 

during the reunification period. The agency remained in 

appropriate contact with her treating psychiatrist and 

psychologist from Felton and her case managers at the various 

residential facilities. Mother faults the agency for not providing 

a physical copy of the case plan to staff at her residential 
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programs, but she does not explain how this failing caused any 

prejudice. Moreover, she admits that the supervising social 

worker discussed her case with the residential programs’ 

managers, and the record is clear that mother’s treatment 

professionals from Felton were aware of her case needs and that 

mother’s residential program managers and social worker were in 

contact with her Felton treatment team. 

We also reject mother’s contention that the services were 

not reasonable because they were partially virtual due to the 

pandemic. Mother asserts that she “could not be expected to 

demonstrate substantial progress on her serious mental health 

issues with only telephonic therapy.” This argument ignores that 

reunification services need only be reasonable under the 

circumstances (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547), 

and it was certainly reasonable for some of mother’s therapy to be 

provided remotely during a worldwide pandemic. Mother’s 

argument also ignores that in-person programming and therapy 

were provided at her residential treatment facilities, but she was 

frequently unable to get out of bed to participate in such 

activities. 

Mother’s contention that the lack of in-person visitation 

impacted her ability to “demonstrate her parenting skills” fares 

no better. Not only did the trial court find that her parenting 

skills were not the real concern in the case because she was able 

to complete the parenting education, mother ignores that she 

stated she was amenable to remote visits and repeatedly declined 

in-person visits when given that option. 
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Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by mother’s contention 

that the agency failed to provide reasonable reunification 

services. 

II. Extension of Services

Mother also asserts that the juvenile court abused its 

discretion in declining to extend her reunification services for an 

additional six months. Again, we disagree.

Citing Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 

996, 1016, mother argues that a court has discretion to continue 

an 18-month hearing and extend reunification services upon a 

showing of good cause. But Mark N. stated that “[a] juvenile

court has discretion to continue an 18-month hearing pursuant

to section 352 when, as here, no reasonable reunification

services have ever been offered or provided to a parent.” (Mark

N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017.) That is not the case

here. Even if we were to look at the other factors Mark N. said

a court should consider—such as the likelihood of success of

further reunification services and whether the minors’ need for

a prompt resolution of their dependency status outweighs any

benefitfrom further reunification services (ibid.)—wehave

little trouble concluding that the juvenile court did not abuse

its discretion in declining to extend mother’s reunification

services. Given mother’s failure to make more than minimal

progress in addressing her serious mental health issues over

the course of the dependency, despite significant and intensive

treatmentthroughout,there was no good cause to extend

mother’s reunification services.
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DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

BROWN, J.

WE CONCUR:

POLLAK, P. J.

ROSS, J.

In re K.C. et al. (A162413)

 Judge of the Superior Court of California, City and 

County of San Francisco, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.