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i 

86–962 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–72] 

MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY IN THE 

EAST AND SOUTH CHINA SEAS 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

MEETING JOINTLY WITH

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

[Serial No. 113–137] 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JANUARY 14, 2014 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

DOUGLAS BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Clerk 
(III) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director 

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, January 14, 2014, Maritime Sovereignty in the East and South 

China Seas ............................................................................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, January 14, 2014 ..................................................................................... 33 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 2014 

MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY IN THE EAST AND SOUTH CHINA SEAS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bera, Hon. Ami, a Representative from California, Acting Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific ............................................................... 6 

Chabot, Hon. Steve, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Asia and the Pacific ........................................................................................ 1 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................................. 3 

Johnson, Hon. Henry C. ‘‘Hank,’’ Jr., a Representative from Georgia, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................................. 9 

McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................... 4 

Rohrabacher, Hon. Dana, a Representative from California, Subcommittee 

on Asia and the Pacific ........................................................................................ 7 

Salmon, Hon. Matt, a Representative from Arizona, Subcommittee on Asia 

and the Pacific ...................................................................................................... 8 

Sherman, Hon. Brad, a Representative from California, Subcommittee on 

Asia and the Pacific ............................................................................................. 7 

WITNESSES 

Dutton, Peter A., Strategic Researcher, China Maritime Studies Institute, 

U.S. Naval War College ....................................................................................... 10 

Glaser, Bonnie S., Senior Advisor for Asia, Freeman Chair in China Studies 

and Senior Associate, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies .................................................................................................................. 12 

Smith, Jeff M., Director of South Asia Programs, Kraemer Strategy Fellow, 

American Foreign Policy Council ........................................................................ 14 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Chabot, Hon. Steve ........................................................................................... 37 

Connolly, Hon. Gerald E., a Representative from Virginia, Subcommittee 

on Asia and the Pacific ................................................................................. 42 

Dutton, Peter A. ................................................................................................ 44 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 40 

Glaser, Bonnie S. .............................................................................................. 56 
Page

VI 

PREPARED STATEMENTS—Continued 

Smith, Jeff M. ................................................................................................... 70 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Statement of Hon. Ami Bera, ‘‘Setting and Enforcing International Norms 

for Airspace,’’ December 19, 2013 ................................................................ 87 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 91 
(1) 

MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY IN THE EAST AND 

SOUTH CHINA SEAS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJEC- TION FORCES, MEETING JOINTLY WITH COMMITTEE ON

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE

PACIFIC, Washington, DC, Tuesday, January 14, 2014. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:24 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE CHABOT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 

Mr. CHABOT. Good afternoon and welcome to this joint subcommittee hearing of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia 

and the Pacific and the Armed Service Subcommittee on Seapower 

and Projection Forces. I want to thank Chairman Forbes for joining 

us this afternoon and collaborating with the Asia Pacific Subcommittee on the critically important topic of today’s hearing, 

which is the issue of maritime security in the South and East 

China Seas. I also want to thank Mr. Ami Bera for serving as the 

Acting Ranking Member for Asia and Pacific Subcommittee and 

Ranking Member McIntyre for also joining us this afternoon. We 

look forward to an excellent hearing. 

Today’s hearing could not come at a more critical time, as we 

have seen over the last few months a growing level of tension in 

the Asia-Pacific region as a result of unilateral actions taken by 

China to exert its control over disputed maritime territories. We 

are witnessing a dangerously aggressive China trying to assert 

greater control over these territories to change the regional status 

quo in a way that violates core principles of international law. The 

implications of these actions for the United States are substantial 

since we have strategic and economic interests that are increasingly threatened by the growing tension and confrontational incidents in these waters. 

An American presence in Asia is built on maintaining peace and 

stability that is upheld through respect for international law, freedom of navigation, and unhindered, lawful commerce in the maritime regions. This is pursued through our alliances with Japan, 

South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines, in addition 

to our steadfast relationships with Taiwan and Singapore, and 

evolving relationships with Vietnam and Indonesia. 

In recognition of the region’s growing importance, the U.S. policy 

rebalance toward Asia largely served as an acknowledgment of our 
2 

long-term goal of ensuring we remain firmly engaged in this region. 

This so-called ‘‘pivot’’ came at a crucial time, no doubt long overdue, because our regional friends and allies needed assurance of 

sustained U.S. commitment. While I may take issue with the lack 

of depth of the Administration’s rebalance strategy, one thing is 

certain, we do have a grounded diplomatic, economic, and military 

commitment to the region. 

There is no other issue right now in the Asia-Pacific region more 

worrisome than the rise in tensions we are seeing as a result of 

China’s efforts to coercively change and destabilize the regional 

status quo. While I am disappointed by China’s behavior, I am also 

not terribly surprised that it is failing to behave as a responsible 

global actor. Among the most prevalent reasons why China is motivated to fight for its claims, which include oil and gas reserves, 

fishing rights, control of fishing lanes, and establishment of security buffer zones, its view that its maritime territorial claims have 

deep historical roots is the most problematic. 

There are a number of instances in history where nationalism 

was used to further international political goals with damaging 

consequences. Take, for instance, the incident when back in 1983 

Soviet jet fighters intercepted a Korean Airlines passenger flight 

allegedly flying in Russian airspace and with heat-seeking missiles, 

shot it down in the Sea of Japan, killing all 268 passengers and 

crewmembers, including a U.S. Congressman. President Reagan 

called the incident a massacre and tensions between the U.S. and 

Soviet Union dramatically increased. 

Similar motivations were behind the April 2001 Hainan Island 

incident when a People’s Liberation Army Navy jet recklessly or intentionally collided with the U.S. EP–3 aircraft flying within China’s exclusive economic zone. And now China’s unilateral decision 

to establish an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China 

Sea is its latest move to act upon historically contentious maritime 

territorial disputes with Japan. This move was further intensified 

this month when China established a new Hainan administrative 

zone and ordered all foreign fishing vessels to obtain approval before fishing in or surveying two-thirds of the South China Sea. 

Both these actions have only further inflamed what former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd called an Asian ‘‘tinderbox on 

water.’’ 

While China’s actions over the past few years, in piecemeal, may 

seem small, as a whole they depict a fundamental change in China’s foreign policy and strategy. It is no longer following the policy 

of peaceful resolution or taking actions that align with international law, if it ever did in the first place. China’s attempting to 

take the disputed territories by gradual force under the guise and 

misguided hope that Japan, Southeast Asian nations, and the U.S. 

will just grudgingly accept it. This ‘‘provocative’’ behavior, as the 

Obama administration has called it, unnecessarily raises tensions, 

threatening the security and stability of the region, targeting key 

U.S. allies and challenging the U.S. presence as a Pacific power. 

As we have seen, players in the region are responding. Japan is 

taking steps to reshape its own national security apparatus to better respond to the rise of Chinese threats, a policy I support. The 

Philippines has also been vocal about its disagreements with Chi-
3 

na’s territorial claims, requesting arbitration against China under 

the U.N. [United Nations] Convention on the Law of the Sea last 

year. Reports this weekend indicate the Philippines is building its 

military presence in the Zhongye Island and China is now insisting 

that it plans to attack Philippine forces on the island to recover territory that Philippines allegedly ‘‘stole.’’ 

This all follows the Administration’s decision to send B–52 bombers out of Guam to fly through the new defense zone in the East 

China Sea, and its plans to give nearly $32 million to Vietnam to 

strengthen maritime security, with a promise to provide the Philippines with $40 million to do the same. While these actions should 

send a strong message to China to be wary of taking further provocative actions, we cannot be sure. As we saw when the USS 

Cowpens narrowly avoided collision with a Chinese warship in December, heightened tensions between the U.S., China and also our 

allies are only increasing the risk of miscalculation in the region. 

I believe steps taken by the U.S. and Japan to revise our alliance’s bilateral defense guidelines to better deal with new contingencies is a good step, as is the consideration to locate U.S. troops 

in the Philippines on a rotational basis, as we have done in Australia. At the same time, I believe the Administration needs to do 

a better job at understanding and predicting China’s strategic goals 

and clearly conveying that the U.S. is committed and prepared to 

work with and support our regional allies. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses this afternoon regarding their views on how the U.S. can better manage obligations 

to our friends and allies to limit conflict with China in the coming 

months. I want to again thank Chairman Forbes and his subcommittee for collaborating on today’s hearing, and I would now 

like to recognize Chairman Forbes for the purpose of making an 

opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chabot can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. And I would like to thank Chairman 

Chabot for offering to work with our subcommittee on this important topic. 

There are many areas of interest that overlap between our two 

subcommittees and create natural areas for cooperation, and I hope 

this joint hearing will be the first of many to come in the future. 

With the continued escalation of tensions in the East and South 

China Seas, or what China calls its Near Seas, I think it is essential for Congress to closely monitor this issue and affirmatively 

state our reservations with its present course. 

My greatest fear is that China’s coercive methods of dealing with 

territorial disputes could manifest into increased tensions that 

could ultimately lead to miscalculation. 

This heightened use of coercive actions by Chinese naval vessels 

now spans the East and South China Seas from Japan’s Senkaku 

Islands, the Scarborough Shoals, the Spratly Islands and, indeed, 

the entire South China Sea. 
4 

It is difficult for me to understand why China is pursuing the 

more aggressive actions it has over the past years given how much 

it has benefited from the rules-based order the U.S. and its allies 

have sustained in the Asia-Pacific region for the last 65 years. 

This order has made the region more prosperous, more transparent and, above all, more peaceful. However, it is clear that as 

China has expanded its military forces and capabilities, their government has chosen a more strident path in the pursuit of its regional goals and ambitions, including the territorial claims we are 

here to discuss today. 

I believe we must be 100 percent intolerant of China’s territorial 

claims and its continued resort to forms of military coercion to alter 

the status quo in the region. 

This requires not just maintaining a robust military and strong 

diplomatic posture, but also working closely with our friends and 

allies to understand their concerns and find ways to strengthen our 

common cause to preserve free access to the global commons. 

As Congress shifts its attention more closely to the Asia-Pacific 

region, I am pleased to see bipartisan support for our Nation continuing to play a strong leadership role in the region. 

Before I conclude, I also want to recognize Mr. Mike McIntyre for 

his dedicated support to the men and women in uniform, the 7th 

District of North Carolina, and to the greater United States. 

Mike, you have been a good friend and a consummate statesman, 

and our Nation will be at a loss when you depart the House of Representatives at the conclusion of this session. I will clearly miss 

your friendship and your expertise. 

Today I also want to thank our experts for being here. We look 

forward to your testimony, and we greatly appreciate you taking 

time to be here to share your knowledge and expertise with our two 

committees. 

Again, I want to thank Chairman Chabot for holding this joint 

hearing, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 40.] 

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman. 

I would now like to turn to the Ranking Member from North 

Carolina, Mr. McIntyre, for the purpose of making an opening 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NORTH CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to our witnesses today and to those who are here. 

And thank you to my subcommittee chairman and my good 

friend, Randy Forbes, for your very kind words—and unexpected at 

this time; thank you, that really means a lot personally and professionally. And thank you for your leadership. 

The Chinese government’s recent behavior regarding maritime 

and airspace boundaries is of growing concern to the U.S. and to 

our allies in the region. And it is important for Congress to keep 

a close watch on this situation. 
5 

I am especially pleased we are doing this hearing jointly today 

with the Foreign Affairs Committee because we know in many situations, there is not always a military solution. 

We have to always be ready, militarily, but we realize that it is 

critical that we have diplomatic and political aspects to be considered and obviously they are always the first recourse and the first 

choice when trying to resolve concerns. 

We want to make sure that we have that perspective. We have 

a full range of tools at our disposal to consider when we look at 

various crises that may arise in this region. 

Not every problem we know has a military solution. It is likely 

to mean that we should be in a position to look at how best we can 

resolve maritime disputes with China and that we can have a more 

robust diplomacy engaged in this region rather than seeking a military standoff. 

We know that Japan has a strong military; however, some of our 

other allies in the region do not. And they are being intimidated, 

especially in the South China Sea. 

So, without the naval and maritime air capabilities to patrol and 

protect this territory, many nations in the region are at a major 

disadvantage when they do feel threatened militarily. 

So, over time, we have to address these imbalances between 

China and the regional—the countries in that region that could 

have a significant impact on China’s actions but also have a significant impact on these countries and their security and safety. 

The U.S. does have a major role to play in working with China 

with regard to international standards of conduct, and we should 

support our regional allies in every way we can to make sure that 

our allies are considered equal partners with us. 

And we have had other briefings where the military has laid out 

its ambitions to engage with and in some—sometimes train our regional allies. Those military efforts are absolutely important, but 

we realize those military efforts cannot stand as the sole response. 

We must have a concerted diplomatic effort. And right now, we 

do not quite seem to have reached that goal of having that concerted diplomatic effort. 

We must be able to make sure that we are not always reacting, 

but also being proactive in making sure that we have the best possible diplomatic solutions, as well as the best possible military 

preparation to make sure that we are in a situation where we can 

resolve differences and be able to avoid conflict. 

We are very thankful for those who serve in our military, and 

are always ready and on standby. We want them to always be in 

a position to be prepared. We also now must make sure that we 

are always prepared to handle matters diplomatically, and do what 

we can to help resolve conflict. 

We look forward to hearing from today’s panel of experts, and 

thank you for your time with us. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

and Mr. Ranking. 

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman for his opening statement. 

The Ranking Member of the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee is unable to be here, Mr. Faleomavaega. So the acting Ranking Member 

is Mr. Bera from California, I would like to recognize him for making an opening statement. 
6 

STATEMENT OF HON. AMI BERA, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

CALIFORNIA, ACTING RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 

Dr. BERA. Great. Thank you, Chairman Chabot. Thank you, 

Chairman Forbes, for what is an incredibly important, crucial, and 

timely hearing on maritime sovereignty in the South and East 

China Seas. 

I believe it is important for us, as a Congress, to really begin exploring what actions we should take to maintain these key maritime and airspace routes, and keep them open. I also am deeply 

concerned about the actions China took, particularly the rapidity of 

the announcement on unilaterally establishing a new East China 

Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, an ADIZ. 

China’s dramatic ADIZ expansion really extends over the East 

China Sea territories that historically have been under the hands 

of administrative control, and certainly overlaps with ADIZs of 

Japan and the Republic of Korea, two important allies of the 

United States. 

China is also now requiring that foreign aircraft file flight plans 

if they intend to fly in Chinese airspace, and has threatened that 

their armed forces would respond in cases of non-compliance. Furthermore, China continues to exhibit a disturbing trend in their 

foreign policy. 

We have seen this before, if we look at the example of the South 

China Sea, you know, as they extended. And if you look at the 

nine-dash line area, it creates conflict, it creates tension and uncertainty. And, you know, if we don’t respond immediately, you know, 

over time, it becomes much more complex and much more difficult 

for us to address. 

The nine-dash line affects island groups and reefs that are also 

claimed by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, 

all important trading partners of the United States, and all at a 

crucial time when we are demonstrating this pivot to Asia. And the 

United States has a role in mediating and, you know, lowering the 

volume here a bit. 

China is also requiring that all foreign fishing vessels obtain permission from China to navigate these contested waters. Unacceptable. China—China—Chinese authorities are showing vigor, and 

pushing maritime power as a fundamental national goal, and one 

that they are willing to challenge anyone on. 

We have got to send, as a body, in a bipartisan manner, a strong 

message to China that these threatening and provocative moves to 

assert their maritime territorial claims are unacceptable. These 

steps clearly undermine the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific. 

If China is left unchallenged, China’s claims over the region will 

solidify, thus altering the status quo. 

The time for a provocative and strategic engagement with our allies is now, before China’s next move, like more ADIZ expansions 

for the South China Sea or the Yellow Sea. We have got to do this 

immediately. China and the other nations in the region must address any outstanding territorial and jurisdictional issues by engaging in diplomatic dialogue, and not through coercion, threats, or 

force. 
7 

International laws and norms must be upheld in order to deescalate tensions and mitigate any risk of an accidental military 

clash. And that is dangerous. Given the importance of trade and 

transport in this region, the U.S. must navigate and enforce the 

right to freely navigate in these contested areas. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing. I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses and 

working together as a body. I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman for his statement, and the 

chair would be pleased to extend an opportunity for members to 

make a 1-minute opening statement if they would like to do so. The 

gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DANA ROHRABACHER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE 

PACIFIC 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. The alarm bells may 

finally be ringing, what some of us have been warning about for 

years. The fact that we have been treating China, the world’s worst 

human-rights abuser, as if it was a democratic ally, we have been 

giving trade and economic benefits to the Chinese government, 

which as I say, the world’s worst human-rights abuser, a vicious 

dictatorship. 

We have been giving better rights than we do to some of our own 

friends and some of our democratic allies. They have had mostfavored-nation status now for almost 20 years. Some of our other 

allies haven’t had that. 

And now they have built up their economic might, and surprise, 

surprise, they are using their new capabilities to build a very powerful military machine that threatens the peace and stability not 

only of that region, but of the world. 

Well, I would call on this Administration and my colleagues, and 

all of us who want peace, and want and believe in democracy. It 

is time for us to back up 100 percent our allies who are front line, 

confronting this new threat, whether it is Australia, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, or the Philippines. We need to get behind them in a 

big way, and send that message to Beijing. 

There is no faltering on our part, supporting these countries, 

these democratic countries, against this dictatorship’s claims and 

its military buildup in the region. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time is expired. The 

gentleman from Connecticut? The gentleman from California, Mr. 

Sherman, is recognized for the purpose of making a 1-minute statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BRAD SHERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 

Mr. SHERMAN. Our national policy establishment has embraced 

the new phrase, ‘‘pivot toward Asia,’’ which sounds like more trade 

delegations to Tokyo and more Chinese language courses in our 

university, but actually means that the fight against Islamic extremism is either over or it is inconvenient, and we are directing our 
8 

national security efforts toward confronting China as the new 

enemy. 

Already, the Pentagon is shifting its design of its research, and 

ultimately forces toward taking on the Chinese navy. We are told 

that we need to pivot to Asia to protect tiny specks that may be 

of some economic value to countries that spend far less of their 

GDP [gross domestic product] than we do, protecting their own little—little island specks. 

The fact is that a confrontation with China may give our national 

security establishment a—the kind of glorious enemy that they 

would like to have, rather than the frustrations of dealing with 

asymmetric conflict against an enemy that doesn’t wear uniforms. 

But the fact is, these are tiny specks. Those nations that claim 

them are willing to fight to get—as long as we spend trillions of 

dollars to protect what might be billions of dollars of assets. I yield 

back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time is expired. Gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Salmon, is recognized for a minute. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MATT SALMON, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM ARIZONA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I would like to thank my chairman, 

Steve Chabot, and Chairman Forbes for holding this joint hearing 

on this critical national security and foreign-policy issue. 

Over the last several years, we have seen increased aggressions 

in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, and more recently, 

the East China Sea. As China has sought to expand their control 

of the region, U.S. allies are struggling to ensure their sovereignty 

is maintained and navigational rights to the South and East China 

Sea is protected. 

Military and commercial access to the navigable waters of the 

South and East China Seas are critical to the security and economic viability of every country in the region. Strong U.S. allies, 

including Japan, Taiwan, and Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea, 

have come under increasing pressure from China to cede or temper 

these inalienable sovereign rights to the Chinese will. 

There must be a peaceful pass forward to protect the U.S. regional allies that ensures U.S. national security interests and 

avoids unnecessary conflict and aggressions. 

President Ma of Taiwan has proposed the East China Sea Peace 

Initiative as a means to resolving disputes peacefully by exercising 

restraint, refraining from taking antagonistic actions, following 

international law, and continuing dialogue. I hope the Chinese and 

the other regional powers will embrace this as a solution going forward. 

China has indicated a desire to settle disputes peacefully, but 

has been unwilling to open dialogue and negotiations in a multilateral way. This is disappointing. We have got to continue to align 

with our allies in assuring their sovereign rights to open commercial and military access to the waters of the South and East China 

Seas. 

Hopefully, the Chinese will work with their neighbors and implement a peaceful, multilateral dispute resolution system that will 
9 

protect all countries’ sovereign rights going forward. Thank you. I 

yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Georgia. The gentleman from Georgia is recognized. 

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE FROM GEORGIA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I will. I will take the opportunity to say that, 

you know, we face some very serious issues throughout the world. 

Sequestration and budget numbers in that area don’t help us out 

a whole lot when it comes to confronting these challenges, both in 

the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific. 

But I will say, I am happy to share this—this room today with 

members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, because if we have 

ever—if ever there has been a time for diplomacy, it is now. And 

so with that, I will yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman for yielding back. Would 

other members like to make opening statements on either side? If 

you could indicate you do, I would be happy to recognize others. If 

not, we will go ahead and proceed to the introduction of the witness 

panel. 

We have a very distinguished panel of witnesses here this afternoon. We will begin with Mr. Peter Dutton, who is a professor of 

strategic studies, and the Director of the China Maritime Studies 

Institute at the U.S. Naval War College. Professor Dutton’s current 

research focuses on American and Chinese views of sovereignty and 

international law of the sea, and the strategic implications to the 

United States and the United States Navy of Chinese international 

law and policy choices. Professor Dutton is widely published, and 

has previously testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He also researches and lectures on topics related to international law of the sea, issues in the East and South China Seas, 

East and Southeast Asia and the Arctic, in addition to the Proliferation Security Initiative and Maritime Strategy. 

He is a retired Navy Judge Advocate and holds a Juris Doctor 

from The College of William and Mary, my alma mater, a Masters 

with Distinction from the Naval War College, and a Bachelor of 

Science cum laude from Boston University. 

We welcome you, Mr. Dutton. 

I would like to also introduce the other panel members. 

We have Bonnie S. Glaser, who is a senior advisor for Asia and 

the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies [CSIS] where she works on issues related to Chinese foreign and security policy. She is concurrently a 

senior associate with CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the 

U.S. government on East Asia. Ms. Glaser previously served as 

senior associate in the CSIS International Security Program. Prior 

to joining CSIS, she served as a consultant for various U.S. government offices including the Departments of Defense and State. Ms. 

Glaser has written extensively on Chinese threat perceptions and 

U.S.-China strategy. She received her B.A. in Political Science from 

Boston University and her M.A. with concentrations in inter-
10 

national economics and Chinese studies from the John Hopkins 

School of Advanced International Studies. 

And we welcome you here this afternoon, Ms. Glaser. 

Our final witness will be Jeff M. Smith, who is the Kraemer 

Strategy Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC) 

and the author of a forthcoming book on China-India relations in 

the 21st century. He also serves as the managing editor of the 

World Almanac of Islamism and the editor of AFPC’s South Asia 

Security Monitor. He has provided briefings and consultations for 

the Pentagon, State Department, and intelligence community. Mr. 

Smith’s writings have appeared in the Wall Street Journal of Asia, 

U.S. News and World Report, among others. Additionally, he has 

been a commentator for many world news organizations such as 

BCC and others. 

Mr. Smith has an MPIA [Master of Public and International Affairs] from the University of Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public 

and International Affairs and studied abroad at Oxford University 

in 2005. He has lectured at the graduate and undergraduate level. 

We welcome all three of you this afternoon. I apologize for my 

voice which is not up to the standards it ought to be, but not much 

I can do about it. 

I am sure that the panel is familiar with the 5-minute rule. You 

will each have 5 minutes to testify. We have a lighting system. The 

yellow light will come on when you have 1 minute to wrap up. We 

would appreciate it if you wrapped up as closely to when the red 

light comes on as possible. 

And, Professor Dutton, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF PETER A. DUTTON, STRATEGIC RESEARCHER, 

CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE, U.S. NAVAL WAR 

COLLEGE 

Mr. DUTTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairmen, Ranking 

Members, and distinguished members of the subcommittees. Thank 

you very much for the opportunity to testify before you today. 

The first question I was asked to address has to do with what 

it is that China’s extension of power over the Near Seas gains for 

China, and the extension of China’s strategic power over its Near 

Seas through expanding military capabilities, growing law enforcement capacity, sweeping legal frameworks, augmented by orchestrated civilian activities and political and economic arm-twisting, 

has deep strategic roots. 

And the roots are grounded, in China’s view, that prior to 1840— 

and this goes back in history, but prior to 1840 when China dominated the East Asian system, it was a continental system, all of the 

strategic events occurred on the continent and China could dominate the maritime periphery and the maritime periphery could not 

dominate China. 

After 1840, that reversed. It is the maritime periphery where the 

strategic actions in Asia have been evolving, and it is in the American interest for it to remain that way. 

So, first and foremost, it is the failure of previous Chinese leaders to close the maritime gap in China’s arc of security and the invasions from the sea that resulted that motivates China’s current 

leaders to extend strategic power over the Near Seas and which 
11 

provides them internal domestic legitimacy. I think that is important to note. 

Second, as China advances, the aim of China’s regional maritime 

strategy as it advances is to expand its interior control over the 

Near Seas to cover the maritime demand under an umbrella of continental control for the purpose of enhancing that perceived security that China gains from this. 

So the two attributes that China gets are security and leadership 

legitimacy from extending its control over the region. 

Second, what does this have to do with the Senkakus? Chinese 

activities around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have, since December 2008, been designed to create a circumstance that puts Japanese control over the islands in doubt. 

The manner in which Chinese activities are conducted is carefully calibrated to achieve the objective without provoking outright 

conflict with the United States. 

China’s strategy can best be described, in my view, as non-militarized coercion. Non-militarized coercion involves the direct and indirect application of a broad range of national capabilities to favorably alter the situation at sea in China’s favor. 

That does not mean that the military has no role to play. The 

military’s role, however, is indirect as part of the escalation control 

mechanism that China uses not to provoke conflict with the United 

States as it pursues its objectives. 

The integrated process of power and law accurately describes the 

events around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and also with the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, over which China wrestled 

full control from the Philippines over a year ago. 

There are many other examples in various stages of development 

around China’s periphery, including China’s claim to the East 

China Sea continental shelf and China’s advancing claims to administer the waters within the nine-dash or U-shaped line in the 

South China Sea. 

The third question is what does the Air Defense Identification 

Zone have to do with this? Well, China’s strategy to control water 

and airspace is similar to its power and approach to controlling the 

islands in the East and South China Sea. 

The purpose of China’s force structure component is obviously to 

develop the power to dominate events in the Near Seas according 

to will—China’s will. The purpose of the legal component of China’s 

strategy is to articulate a legitimizing narrative for the development and employment of this power. 

So China’s ADIZ is part of a coordinated legal campaign to extend maximal security jurisdiction over the East China Sea and the 

international airspace above it, beyond the authorities currently allowed by international law, in support of its objectives related to 

security, resource control, and regional order. 

And so what are the policy implications for the United States? 

Well, there are many, but I would like to point out just a few. 

The first is the Chinese have been talking this great power— 

‘‘new-type great power relationship’’ with the United States. I think 

we need to come back with expectations that China will become a 

responsible leading power. 
12 

Leading in the sense of leadership over the existing global system of institutionalized economic and security mechanisms designed to foster regional and global stability and economic progress. 

Responsible as a supporter and defender of that system and all 

its attributes, the institutions, the laws, the rules, the principles 

and norms, and refraining from self-interested actions that conflict 

with them. 

And, power, in recognition that China is one of only a few states 

with global economic, political, and security interests and some capacity to exercise global leadership. 

I have a number of recommendations we can talk about during 

testimony if you would like. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dutton can be found in the Appendix on page 44.] 

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman for your testimony. 

We will turn to Ms. Glaser. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

If you could turn the mic on please. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF BONNIE S. GLASER, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR 

ASIA, FREEMAN CHAIR IN CHINA STUDIES AND SENIOR ASSOCIATE, PACIFIC FORUM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND 

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ms. GLASER. Mr. Chairmen, Mr. Ranking Members, distinguished members of the subcommittees, for this opportunity to 

offer my thoughts on China’s maritime disputes. 

As you all said, disputes in the waters and airspace off China’s 

eastern coastline have fueled increased tensions in recent years, 

both between China and its neighbors as well as between China 

and the United States. 

How Beijing manages these disputes is widely seen as a litmus 

test of China’s broader strategic intentions, and how the United 

States responds to China’s growing propensity to use coercion, bullying, and ‘‘salami-slicing’’ tactics to secure its territorial and maritime interests is increasingly viewed as the key measure of success 

of the U.S. rebalance to Asia. 

The risk of a clash with the attendant potential for escalation is 

highest today, I think, between China and Japan in the East China 

Sea. And the United States could become entangled in such a SinoJapanese conflict as a result of its obligations under the U.S.-Japan 

mutual security treaty. 

China’s recent declaration of an ADIZ that overlaps substantially 

with Japan’s ADIZ and covers the disputed islands significantly increases that risk of accident and miscalculation. 

China’s ‘‘salami-slicing’’ tactics have been evident in both the 

East China Sea and the South China Sea. Through a steady progression of small steps, none of which by itself is a casus belli, 

China seeks to gradually change the status quo in its favor, and 

it is scoring some victories without adequate consequences. 

Chinese efforts to restrict free use of the maritime commons is 

also worrying. We saw the recent example on December 5th in 

which the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] Navy vessel engaged in 

dangerous maneuvers to stop the USS Cowpens from observing 

drills conducted by China’s aircraft carrier. 
13 

And as U.S. and Chinese vessels operate in increasingly close 

proximity, I think such incidents are likely to increase. 

Regional concerns about territorial and maritime disputes in the 

Asia-Pacific are very much on the rise. East Asian governments increasingly view closer ties with the United States as a useful hedge 

against potential domineering behavior by China. 

Virtually every country in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia 

has been publicly or privately supportive of the U.S. rebalance to 

Asia. They hope the U.S. will sustain its role as balancer and counterweight to growing Chinese power. 

But I must emphasize that doubts persist about the credibility 

and the constancy of U.S. power. 

The U.S. has multiple interests at stake in these maritime disputes. We all know the U.S. supports—we have at stake the maintenance of freedom of navigation, the encouragement of a rulesbased international system, the maintenance of U.S. credibility and 

influence in the region, certainly the peaceful resolution of disputes. 

We also have an interest in the development of a cooperative relationship with a rising China. In the coming decade, the U.S. role 

I think will be pivotal in shaping the strategic landscape in the 

Asia-Pacific region. 

We must continue to be engaged economically, diplomatically, 

and militarily to influence the future balance of power in the region 

and ensure it remains favorable to the interests of the United 

States, its allies, and its partners. 

Congress can play a vital role in this process and my recommendations for Congress going forward are as follows: 

First, Congress should require the executive branch to produce a 

strategy paper on the rebalance to Asia. The paper should establish 

explicit objectives and benchmarks for evaluating progress. 

And it should include incentives to China to abide by international law and practices, as well as consequences for violating 

them. 

Second, Congress should encourage other governments and legislatures in the Asia-Pacific to back the Philippines’ right to use 

available international arbitration mechanisms to address its territorial dispute with China. 

If this tribunal rules in Manila’s favor, and China does not comply, this will have profoundly negative impact on peace and stability in the region. This is a way to tether China to a rules-based 

order. It is an opportunity. 

Third, the United States Senate, I believe, should ratify 

UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea], to 

increase the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to pursue a rules-based approach to managing and resolving disputes over maritime jurisdiction. 

And fourth, Congress should enact trade promotion authority legislation so that the Administration can persuade the other countries negotiating the TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership] that the U.S. 

will be able not just to sign, but also ratify a high-standard TPP 

agreement. 

Maintaining American economic leadership in the Asia-Pacific is 

imperative to enhancing the U.S. ability to achieve its other inter-
14 

ests, including the promotion of a rules-based system and the 

peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Glaser can be found in the Appendix on page 56.] 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much for your testimony. Mr. 

Smith, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JEFF M. SMITH, DIRECTOR OF SOUTH ASIA 

PROGRAMS, KRAEMER STRATEGY FELLOW, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL 

Mr. SMITH. I would like to thank the chairmen and the ranking 

members for the opportunity—— 

Mr. CHABOT. If you could turn the mic—thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. I would like to thank the chairmen and the ranking 

members for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

In recent months, the world attention has been focused on China’s provocative behavior towards the Senkaku and Diaoyu Island 

dispute, and for good reason. That dispute demands our utmost attention, and poses a tangible risk for interstate conflict in the years 

to come. 

However, the issue of maritime sovereignty in the East and 

South China Seas encompasses more than simply China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors. I want to focus my remarks on 

a disagreement between the U.S. and China over the type of sovereignty China is claiming in its 200 nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, or EEZ, and specifically, the right of the U.S. military 

to conduct surveillance operations there. 

Our dispute derives from differing interpretations of the U.N. 

Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, a treaty the U.S. 

has not signed, but whose maritime boundary distinctions we observe and practice. Under Beijing’s interpretation, China enjoys expansive sovereign rights in its EEZ, including the right to deny 

U.S. military access to conduct surveillance operations. 

China is not alone in this interpretation. At least 16 other countries share Beijing’s position. But China is the only country that 

has operationally challenged U.S. forces, leading to more than half 

a dozen dangerous confrontations at sea over the past decade, 

which are documented in the appendix to my testimony. 

The U.S. and most countries of the world reject this interpretation of UNCLOS, arguing that China cannot treat the EEZ as if it 

were a sovereign territorial sea. My testimony shows how U.S. 

scholars have thoroughly debunked Beijing’s reading of the treaty, 

and that UNCLOS does not require home-state consent to conduct 

surveillance operations in an EEZ. 

Yet the confrontations continue. And if the U.S. and China don’t 

come to a modus vivendi on a code of maritime conduct in Western 

Pacific, the possibility for escalation and confrontation is very real. 

Further aggravating the situation is the poor military-to-military 

[mil-mil] relationship between our two countries. Though we have 

taken some small steps forward in engaging the PLA in recent 

years, mil-mil remains the most underdeveloped and concerning aspect of bilateral relations. 

While the political and professional Chinese elite are experiencing an unprecedented level of exposure to the outside world, 
15 

this encouraging trend has not yet reached the People’s Liberation 

Army, which tightly restricts contacts with the U.S., particularly 

for junior officers. 

By design, the PLA ranks remain conspiracy-minded, hawkish, 

and insulated from the Western world, and even to some liberal influences within China. This is worrying, because many Chinese nationalists inside and outside the PLA see the U.S. as engaged in 

a containment strategy designed to prevent China’s rise and undermine its security. 

Firebrand nationalists are taking to the airwaves and Web pages 

to denounce a U.S. foreign policy they believe is aggravating China’s territorial disputes with Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. 

And China’s leaders are increasingly pandering to these nationalists, escalating their own hawkish rhetoric, and in the process, restricting their freedom to maneuver in the future. 

The trend is worrying enough that last year, the vice president 

of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science warned publically that 

PLA commentators were ‘‘inciting public sentiment and causing interference with our high-level policy decision-making and deployments.’’ 

Testing boundaries and establishing new status quos favorable to 

China has been a defining feature of its regional policy in recent 

years. When the U.S. and other countries have faltered in the face 

of this policy, as was the case with the Philippines in the Scarborough Shoal, China has advanced its goals and established new 

status quo. 

However, where the U.S. has held firm in its position and demonstrated resolve, Beijing has backed down. The same result must 

be committed to surveillance activities in China’s EEZ. 

America’s position on this issue is not only within the U.S. national interest, it is fully supported by domestic and international 

law. Were we to accept China’s interpretation of UNCLOS, U.S. 

military vessels could be barred from operating in large swaths of 

the world’s oceans, an outcome that is clearly unacceptable to 

Washington and one never envisioned by the drafters of UNCLOS. 

The U.S. has in the past attempted to create a code of conduct 

with China on these matters. However, talks have been stalled on 

Chinese demands that the U.S. end arm sales to Taiwan, put an 

end to surveillance activities, and repeal provisions of the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act. 

The U.S. should do everything at its disposal to ensure future incidents do not escalate, but it must reaffirm that U.S. policy will 

not be subject to fear, intimidation, coercion, or reckless behavior 

from Chinese naval forces. 

Furthermore, Washington must do a better job drawing clear red 

lines around unacceptable behavior in the maritime arena and enforce those red lines when they are crossed. To that end, the U.S. 

should continue an active schedule of surveillance activities, patrolling, and freedom of navigation operations. 

America carries a special burden on this issue. While Beijing 

views its neighbors as subservient regional powers, the Chinese 

leadership acknowledges and respects American power, even as 

they increasingly resent that power. 
16 

As perhaps the only country capable of drawing and enforcing 

red lines, America’s allies in the region are depending on the U.S. 

to be a firewall against Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 70.] 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much for your testimony. I now recognize each of the Members for 5 minutes to ask questions. And 

I will recognize myself at this time. 

Ms. Glaser, let me start with you first, if I can. In your testimony, you recommended that Congress urge the executive branch 

to impose consequences on China when they violate international 

laws and norms. How do you propose the Administration penalize 

China, or punish China, or whatever the proper verb would be, for 

violating international laws such as its decision to unilaterally impose an Air Defense Identification Zone, for example? 

Ms. GLASER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your very 

important question. I think that the Administration took one very 

important step, and that was flying our B–52s through that zone, 

not recognizing the zone. 

I think we should be doing more. The United States and Japan, 

for example, could conduct joint flights through that zone. 

In other words, the message is that China’s behavior threatens 

the security of its neighbors, and therefore, there is a stepped-up 

military response. So there should be, I think, greater cooperation. 

I would also like to see the United States continue to encourage 

greater military cooperation among Japan, and South Korea, and 

the United States, which is ongoing, and I think has been somewhat complicated by some of the political decisions recently made 

in Japan by Prime Minister Abe in his visit to the Yasukuni 

Shrine. But I think that ultimately, these are very, very important. 

In other cases, I think that the United States can adopt targeted 

sanctions or responses to Chinese behavior. For example, in the 

cyber area, it has been widely discussed how the United States 

might adopt some very targeted sanctions that are aimed at responding to China’s use of cyber to steal intellectual property, commercial proprietary information. 

So those are some of the examples that I would give. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. Professor Dutton, let me 

turn to you next, if I can. You mention a couple of things that I 

wanted to touch on. 

In your testimony, you said that unless current trends in the region change, there is no reason to believe that China’s campaign 

will stop short of achieving its aims, which are gaining the upper 

hand on regional security, redeveloping regional order, and gaining 

control of maritime resources. You also said that the U.S. should 

seek to develop a new type of great-power relationship with China. 

What does such a relationship look like? Also in terms of this trend 

China is creating, I believe it is in our interest to slow that trend 

down, and in fact, to stop it. How do you also suggest that we accomplish that? 

Mr. DUTTON. Yes, thank you very much for the question. First, 

I would like to say that U.S. and regional strategies have largely 
17 

been reactive. In other words, China has had and maintained the 

initiative. 

I think we need to restore the initiative in this process by thinking about rather than what I will call ‘‘negative objectives,’’ in 

other words, prevent bad things from happening, let’s have a positive objective, which is to create a region that is fully integrated 

into the global system and stable at the same time. 

So part of what I was articulating since I submitted the testimony, I thought more about your question. And actually, in my 

oral comments, made the point that we need to expect China to be 

a responsible leading power, not just a, frankly, self-interested regional leading power, right. We need to expect them to do more for 

the system and to support the system, because of the benefits that 

they receive from it. 

What that means is, in terms of the consequences that my colleague, Ms. Glaser, is talking about, we need to think about consequences that broaden the horizon of options. In other words, if 

we just respond in kind—if China provokes, we respond with a 

similar kind of action—then we are still being reactive. 

So we need to think more broadly about the type of responses. 

So if China does something in the security field, well, maybe we 

need an economic or political reaction to it, not just a security reaction, in ways that imposes a cost on China, that China would prefer not to have to pay. 

For instance, China was invited to join the Arctic Council recently. That is a benefit that China has received. There are other 

similar kinds of things that China would like to receive. 

Well, we need to impose costs when China fails to act in ways 

that benefit and support the system. We are inviting them to share 

responsible leadership into the system; now we need to expect them 

to maintain proper leadership over the system’s rules, norms, principles, and laws. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you very much. My time is expired. 

The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for organizing this hearing and the witnesses for their outstanding testimony. 

Mr. Dutton, in your sort of policy recommendations starting on 

page nine, again, deterrence was certainly one of the recommendations you set forth. 

And in particular, you said, ‘‘In terms of naval power, I am especially concerned that the U.S. continue to invest in maintaining its 

advantage in undersea warfare.’’ 

I mean, given the fact that some of these bodies of water are described as relatively shallow, maybe you could just sort of explain 

your thoughts on that. 

Mr. DUTTON. First I would—certainly, sir. Thank you for the 

question. I—first of all, the ability to impose maritime actions in 

East Asia requires our ability to access the water space. 

And although, yes, in some parts of the East China Sea, in particular, the water space is relatively shallow and submarine operations in that particular location may or may not be appropriate— 

I am not a submariner, I don’t know. 
18 

But the truth of the matter is the submarine component of American naval power is one in which we enjoy an advantage, and that 

advantage is one that we need to maintain in order to maintain our 

access for all forces within the region. That is the point I am trying 

to make. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Okay, thank you. And your second recommendation, again, talked about sort of coordinating with our allies in the 

region in terms of, you know, making sure that not everybody is, 

you know, kind of duplicating, I guess, resources. 

The New York Times the other day had an editorial, ‘‘The Submarine Race in Asia,’’ which talked about how, you know, the Vietnamese navy and the Malaysian navy and—I mean, everybody’s 

navy is sort of rushing to, you know, buy or build submarines. 

Your recommendation seems to be that some of these allies 

should be more focused on sort of Whitehall Coast Guard-like capability and sort of—I guess I am sort of—well, maybe you can tell 

me. 

Are you sort of suggesting that the sort of military side should 

be sort of the U.S. Navy’s realm? Am I reading that right? 

Mr. DUTTON. Well, it is sort of—we certainly welcome support. 

I think the United States Navy has been very open and clear about 

that. 

I don’t mean to speak for the Navy. What I mean to say is that 

the Navy has been very open in terms of support for naval activities in the region. 

But what we don’t want to see is a negative spiral—negative security spiral. What we want to see is a more positive direction for 

maritime power in the region. 

And one of the things—countries will make their own decisions 

about what force structures they need to have—but one of the 

things that is important that all countries in the region be able to 

do is to enforce their own maritime interests in terms of their exclusive economic zone and the fisheries issues that they have rather than simply allowing China to continue to build its law enforcement capacity without any regional response. 

So, I am not suggesting that the regional states should not make 

their own decisions about their force structure, but I do hate to see 

a negative regional spiral in which countries are starting to get 

into arms races that could be very destabilizing. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Great, thank you. 

Ms. Glaser, you know, sort of—there has been a little bit of what 

came first, the chicken or the egg. Is it the Asia pivot that stimulated the claim of territorial space or is the pivot in reaction to the 

claims of territorial space? 

And I just wondered if you could sort of give your thoughts in 

terms of, you know, the Asia pivot, in terms of whether it was justified or whether it is provoking a negative reaction. 

Ms. GLASER. Well, thank you very much for that question. I 

think that is actually a narrative that is quite common in China. 

And I think when the Obama administration came to power, they 

had the idea that—this is particularly in 2009—that China was 

going to be a partner on a range of issues that were very important 

for the United States. 
19 

We heard officials talk about how no global problem could be 

solved without Chinese cooperation. So, global warming, proliferation, the global financial crisis—these were all things that the 

United States was going to work with China on. 

And this was really borne out of the same time that the pivot 

really came into being, even though it wasn’t really announced 

until later. Very early on, as we heard from former National Security Advisor Tom Donilon in a speech that he gave at CSIS, Administration advisors even before the President was inaugurated, I understand, talked about where we were overinvested in the region, 

where we were underinvested. 

It was so clear that the economic dynamism in the Asia-Pacific 

was so important to the rejuvenation of the American economy and 

the institutions that were being formed in the Asia-Pacific region 

like the East Asia Summit—we needed to be a part of; and that 

decision was made really very, very early on. 

So, I think that the rebalance to Asia from the beginning was 

about including China, and it is China’s more coercive behavior 

that we saw really take full form, I think, in 2010 and then thereafter, that has caused it to have a sharper edge in dealing with 

China—in large part because of the magnetic demand pull from the 

region which has been calling on the United States to be more involved diplomatically, economically, and militarily—to give them 

some backing so that they, too, can stand up for their interests. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Chairman Forbes is recognized. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you for being here. You know, to each of you 

three witnesses, I appreciate your work. I have enormous respect 

for what you have done—your expertise. 

Undoubtedly, that is shared by both of our subcommittees and 

the staffs or else they wouldn’t have invited you here. 

So, in that collective expertise, Ms. Glaser, I want to start with 

you, but I want both of our other witnesses to weigh in on this. 

You mention this concept of strategy. We have been groping 

around in the night to try to find it. 

And as I think all of us recognize, we agreed with the concept 

of a pivot or rebalance to the Asia-Pacific area, but we also believe 

very strongly we needed to have a strategy that we could get our 

hands around. 

In July of last year, I wrote a letter to Susan Rice requesting 

that the Administration do an interagency review of their strategy 

so that we could articulate that and note what it was. 

I got a very prompt response back 3 months later that said that 

they had done that. They called it a vision, first of all, and then 

they came back and said, ‘‘We are continuing to implement our 

comprehensive strategy.’’ 

But I have yet to find anybody that can really articulate that 

strategy or any of the agencies that say, ‘‘Yes, we have sat down 

and done this.’’ 

In the new omnibus bill that is coming up there is good language 

in here because we require within 90 days after the enactment of 

that provision that the Secretary of State do just that—develop 

that strategy and give an integrated, multi-year planning and 
20 

budget strategy for rebalancing of United States policy in Asia back 

to the respective committees. 

In your expertise and knowledge, do you believe that strategy exists today? Do we have any such interagency strategy that we have 

developed or do you think that is something that yet needs to be 

designed and developed? 

Ms. GLASER. That is, indeed, a very important question. I think 

that there are pieces of the strategy. I don’t think they are necessarily well-coordinated. 

I think that the Defense Department [DOD] is working very effectively within the constraints of budget cuts and potential future 

sequestration cuts and I think that they are very focused on the 

problem—— 

Mr. FORBES. I don’t want to interrupt you—I want to just add 

this, too. We are being told by so many people that weigh in on this 

that this needs to be a more holistic approach, though; it can’t be 

just—— 

Ms. GLASER. Yes. 

Mr. FORBES. DOD. Do you agree with—— 

Ms. GLASER. And that is exactly the point that I was going to 

make. We really do need more of a whole-of-government approach. 

You can’t just have the diplomatic piece working at—by itself and 

independently—and the economic piece and the military piece. 

I think it is very helpful when there is a central document that 

is generated in the Administration that assigns various responsibilities to certain agencies and then they all see how the means and 

the ends come together to—in the pursuit of very specific objectives. 

I don’t think that the Administration has done that yet. There 

have been some very good speeches that have been given by senior 

Administration officials, but they are not seen by the region as sufficient enough to ease their concerns about U.S. staying power. 

There is growing concern in the region that the United States is 

being distracted—that the priorities of some of the officials in government are elsewhere. And the United States is a global power— 

we have priorities in many places in the world. And just because 

we happen to be doing something in the Middle East today doesn’t 

mean that we can’t also address our interest and the interests of 

the wider countries in the region at the same time. 

And a document like this, I think, will go a long way towards 

easing that concern and actually generating a more coherent strategy within the Administration. So, I am very much in support of 

this effort. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Dutton? Mr. Smith? How do you feel about? 

Mr. DUTTON. I do agree, actually. And one of the problems we 

are confronting is that there is really a certain—I am going to call 

it strategic ambivalence here—in that on the one hand, the Administration seems to want to achieve a stable relationship with China. 

On the other hand, it wants to reassure friends, allies, and partners in the region. 

And that—those have become an increasingly difficult goals to 

reconcile because of the friction between the two in the region. So, 

we do, I think, need to, rather than simply say we want to deter, 
21 

prevent, and maintain stability, we need to articulate a positive regional end state. 

In other words, what would a region in the—what would a positive regional system in Asia look like and how could we, then, 

begin to move closer toward it over time, rather than simply saying—rather we don’t want anything bad or destabilizing or negative to occur in the region. How do we make it a positive region? 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. I want to associate myself with Bonnie and Peter’s 

remarks and also say that I do think there is a great deal of room 

for us to further flesh out this pivot strategy. 

I get frequently asked, not only by Chinese guests but also by 

visiting fellows from other Asian countries, what does the pivot 

mean? Is it sustainable? What exactly are you trying to accomplish 

with it? 

And we are not always able to provide them good answers. There 

is a great deal of uncertainty that remains in the region. 

One trend I do think that is positive is that we have been emphasizing more of an economic and diplomatic component to it, 

rather than a purely military component. And I think that has 

helped the image of the pivot in the region, and I think we should 

continue to emphasize that. 

But I also don’t think we should be ashamed of admitting our 

concerns. I think we should be candid with China, and we should 

note that some aspects of the pivot are our reaction to increasingly 

provocative behavior. And while we are not putting ourselves in a 

position to contain China, we are putting ourselves in a position to 

respond if China’s behavior grows more provocative. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

I believe the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms. Hanabusa, is recognized for 5 minutes at this time. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In reading the testimony—I am going to begin with Mr. Dutton— 

you had an interesting statement in your conclusion, that, basically, you said, ‘‘first and foremost, the United States must develop 

and deploy the naval, air, space, and cyber technologies required to 

ensure East Asia remains a maritime system.’’ 

I am curious about how you anticipate or envision that it remains a maritime system, versus what other kind of system. 

Mr. DUTTON. Yes. Thank you very much for the question. 

So, I started to introduce the idea in my opening comments that 

prior to 1840 and the introduction of British maritime power in the 

region, that Asia was a continental system that—in other words, 

China, on the continent, could dominate the region, because there 

were no threats that could impose challenges—strategic challenges 

for China from the sea. And this is really what China is trying to 

change in developing its force structure and in jurisdictionalizing 

the region. 

The problem with that is that there is the possibility of it becoming over time a closed system. In other words, limiting the economic and political freedom of action of other regional states, un-
22 

less China acknowledges or accepts what they are doing as being 

appropriate for China’s interests. 

That limitation is also a problem for the United States, because 

our political, our economic, and our security access requires an 

open system, as well. 

Technology is the basis of maritime—an open maritime system. 

Ships, aircraft, supported by space and cyber power, are the way 

in which strategic power is generated in the region. And so, I don’t 

have specific force structure recommendations, but I do know that 

we need to develop and maintain the kind of force structure, the 

technology in the region, that enables us to ensure that the maritime domain remains open, remains—freedom of navigation remains, not just for commercial purposes, but for security purposes, 

as well, in order to keep this system vibrant and open and connected to the global system. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So, am I hearing you correctly then? When you 

talked about it—I mean, maintaining or remaining a maritime system, that you are really saying that the United States must maintain its dominance in Asia-Pacific as a maritime power? Is that 

what you are saying? And that somehow, that maritime power base 

will then keep China in check, and keep our commercial lines open, 

trade flowing? Is that what you are alluding to with this statement? 

Mr. DUTTON. In short, the answer is yes. But it—what I mean, 

too, to say is exactly how much power and how much force structure is required—that is a very difficult assessment that I am not 

qualified to make, frankly. And so, one thing that is important, 

though, is that there is a scale between dominant sea supremacy 

and sea denial on the other end, where you can’t go. And somewhere in between there is where the United States needs to be 

sure that we can act. We don’t need sea supremacy or total control. 

We need to recognize that China has legitimate security interests, 

right? 

But we do need to, also at the same time, recognize that we have 

legitimate security interests in the same space. And so, we need to 

ensure our access to that space to preserve our security interests. 

Ms. HANABUSA. And one of the recommendations, of course, that 

you made that was pointed out earlier was our undersea dominance, which is really submarine capacity, correct? 

Mr. DUTTON. Yes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Now—but still, what you are alluding to, though 

you said you don’t know what the force structure will look like— 

what you are alluding to is that it is really not a balanced system 

that you want out there. You want something that will keep China 

in check. So, therefore, it would only make logical sense if the 

United States and its allies must somehow dominate, or have an 

advantage to keep China in check. That seems to be—though you 

don’t know what it means yet, that seems to be where you are 

headed with that statement. 

Mr. DUTTON. Well, I would say sufficient power to ensure our access. That is a little—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. In other words, and so—— 

Mr. DUTTON [continuing]. Different. That is—— 
23 

Ms. HANABUSA [continuing]. And so, we don’t have to worry 

about what we would call the A2/AD [anti-access/area-denial], area 

access and access denial. Is that what you are saying? 

Mr. DUTTON. It is our ability to overcome any kind of A2/AD, or 

counter-intervention capability, as China often, I think, refers to it. 

It is our ability to ensure that we cannot be excluded at China’s 

will. It is not the same thing as ensuring that we keep China in 

check. It is a balance in between the two. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I understand what you are saying, but it still has 

to come down to some measure of something. In other words, we, 

as policymakers, as we sit here, we are going to have to put numbers to what you are saying. And there has got to be something 

that measures that for us. And what you are saying is, you don’t 

have the answer. It is just that it has got to be measured somehow. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. DUTTON. That is fair enough. Yes, sir, I think I would—or, 

ma’am, I would defer to the Navy staff for that. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

From what I am understanding from the testimony so far is that 

there is no strategy in place right now in terms of American strategy in the far Pacific Asian region. Anybody disagree with that? 

Okay. 

Let me suggest then that what I have heard suggests to me that 

the pivot was a slogan. A slogan signifying that we are changing 

emphasis, but it is not based on some thought-out strategy. Is 

that—would that be inaccurate? Correct, or correct? 

But please feel free to comment, disagree, whatever. 

Ms. GLASER. Okay, I am happy to—Mr. Congressman, I think 

that your critique perhaps, from my perspective, is a bit harsh. 

There was no initial strategy document that was guiding the pivot. 

I think that it evolved piecemeal over a period of time. I think we 

have seen some important diplomatic, economic, and military aspects of it, but they haven’t yet come together, from my perspective, in a coherent strategy—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right, so there is no strategy? It is not a 

strategy. 

Ms. GLASER. Okay. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It is something—it is piecemeal. It is going 

by time. 

Let me—to let you know, I flew over the Spratly Islands about 

10 years ago, after being kept from doing this. As a member of the 

Foreign Affairs Committee, our government, meaning our State Department, felt compelled to prevent me from seeing what was going 

on in the Spratly Islands. And I eventually had to commandeer a 

plane from the Philippine air force to fly me over the Spratly Islands, all right? 

At that time, the Spratlys were—there were some Chinese naval 

vessels there, clearly warships. Have the Spratly Islands been fortified since those days when I flew over there? So, for the last 10 

years, as piecemeal policy is being developed here in Washington, 
24 

or a response, that they have been fortifying Spratly Islands? Am 

I inaccurate in that suggestion? 

Yeah, they are fortifying the Spratly Islands. So, the piecemeal 

message we have been giving them as to our strategy is that we 

are cowards and we are weak. Just don’t confront us and you can 

get away with what you want. And now, we see China challenging 

us in a way that threatens our security and threatens the peace of 

the world, by putting Japan and our other allies on the spot. Surprise, surprise. 

Well, I would hope that the pivot becomes more than just a slogan, and that we really take advantage of maybe whatever time we 

have got left to work with our allies. Luckily, we have a new sign 

of strength in Japan. And we should all be grateful and praise 

President Abe, and give him all the backing we can, coupled with 

one thing: we are weaker than we were 10 years ago. We are weaker than when we walked into Iraq and wasted a trillion dollars and 

thousands of our lives, and demoralized the American people so we 

are not able to make those kind of foreign commitments again. 

So, you know what we have to do? We have to make sure Australia, we have to make sure Japan, Korea, and our other allies in 

that area know that we will support them in their efforts to confront this aggression. And that is the—that should be the strategy 

and the formula. Maybe you would like to comment on that strategy. 

Anybody? 

I guess what I am saying is, maybe we should agree with Abe 

that he should expand his military forces, and thus, we don’t necessarily have to send another two aircraft carrier battle groups 

there at a cost of, what, $50 billion to the American people, to offset this expansion of China into that region. Does that make sense? 

Ms. GLASER. I—we are—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Go right ahead. 

Ms. GLASER. We are undertaking a project at CSIS. We are looking at—it is our president, John Hamre’s idea—to look into how we 

could pursue more what he calls ‘‘federated defense.’’ Which is, encouraging greater collaboration among our allies—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 

Ms. GLASER [continuing]. Not only in the area of deployments, 

but also in exercises and procurement—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Ms. GLASER [continuing]. So we can try and limit duplication—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I have got 20 seconds left. 

Ms. GLASER [continuing]. Get force multipliers—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It is a great idea what you said. How about 

the idea of creating an OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], that is now focused on Europe, of course—but 

an OSCE that would be Asia-focused, and having just an organization of democratic states like that for Asia? Would that help give 

China a message that we are united behind democratic countries? 

Ms. GLASER. In principle, it is a good idea, but in a short answer, 

what I would say is, there is no country in the region that wants 

to be compelled to choose between the United States and China. 

And being part of that kind of organization would appeal to some 

countries, but for some that are geographically very close to China, 
25 

very dependent on China economically, would not want to be put 

in that position. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, let’s just make sure that Mr. Abe and 

our Korean friends and our friends down in Australia, and our 

other close friends who do want to be with us know that we are 

encouraging them to stand up to this challenge, because they will 

be the ones who have to stand up. Our government seems to be 

pivoting around the world, and trying to take in the information 

and develop some strategy for the future. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The gentleman from the Commonwealth of Virginia, Mr. 

Connolly, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. And, Mr. Chairman, I have an 

opening statement I would ask to be entered into the record. 

[The statement of Mr. Connolly can be found in the Appendix on 

page 42.] 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair, and I thank the panel for 

being here. 

And I am always—I always enjoy the thoughts of my friend from 

California. And I have so many reactions to so much of what he 

had to say. 

I would note, as a student of history, there are others in Asia 

who have made the miscalculation of mistaking American resolve, 

and with tragic consequences for them and for us. 

But I would hope that others in the region today would not make 

a similar miscalculation, because some think we are weak. Weakness is in the eye of the beholder. I certainly share my colleague’s 

views about the folly of Iraq, and the terrible price the United 

States has paid, and the diversion it represents. 

I am not sure, maybe my friend would be happier if we had a 

white paper on the pivot, and then we could call it a strategy. I 

happen to think the pivot is an enlightened decision by the United 

States, and is going to involve lots of elements. 

We are seeing one of them as we speak, the TPP, the TransPacific Partnership, which is going to be a very important economic 

anchor and political anchor. And it is very much in the face of 

China. 

My friend lionizes the prime minister, now president of Japan, 

Mr. Abe. It might be useful if Mr. Abe wishes to really exercise 

moral, as well as political, leadership in the region, if he were to 

acknowledge the sins of Japan, especially with respect to Korea, 

from the recent unpleasantness known as World War II. That 

might be a useful start if Mr. Abe wishes to exercise regional leadership. 

Let me ask you about the situation. I mean, China seems to have 

gone out of its way to provoke the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Japan, and the United States, the Spratly Islands, 

as Mr. Rohrabacher talks about, the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands. 

What is in the thinking of Japan—I mean, of China? Is it deliberately being provocative, or is it unmindful or uncaring of the consequences of such provocation? Your sense, Mr. Dutton. And we 

can go down the panel. 
26 

Mr. DUTTON. Thank you very much. Yes, I believe it is deliberate 

provocation for the purpose of achieving at least two sets of objectives. One set of objectives is domestic, it is internal. 

This type of friction, I think, is managed friction. It is creating 

it, but managing it, avoiding escalation, in order to ensure domestic 

stability in the sense that the Chinese Communist Party remains 

the center of governance within the—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You think it is more internal than anything else? 

Mr. DUTTON. It is tough to assess. But it is a very important 

part. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am going to come back and ask you about miscalculation. But I want to give Ms. Glaser and Mr. Smith a quick 

chance to comment. 

Ms. GLASER. Very quickly, I think there is an inextricable linkage between the domestic situation and the external situation for 

China. I think that the Communist Party is seeking to rejuvenate 

itself. Its legitimacy is very much wrapped up with not making any 

concessions on territorial and sovereignty in these maritime disputes. 

So I think that the Chinese are going to continue to adhere to 

this. They don’t want to make concessions on these. They also want 

good relations with their neighbors. Up until now, they haven’t 

been compelled to make a choice. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. I would like to add India to that long list of countries 

that China has been provoking in recent years. In fact, India may 

have been one of the first. 

I think this behavior really began in 2009. And actually, in doing 

some research for a book on China-India relations, one of the 

things that frequently came up was in assessing China’s behavior 

in recent years, don’t underestimate the effect that the global financial crisis had on the thinking of their leadership; that really, 

America’s—this was the beginning of America’s decline, and the 

time had come for China’s rise. 

They had weathered the storm much better than we had, or in 

fact, anyone else around the world. And if the time to assert China’s—reassert China’s authority in Asia, it was now. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. Final point, though, what worries me 

about, as a student of history, is miscalculation. Okay. So that is 

your thinking, and that is what you are doing. And it has a lot of 

internal domestic pressure, which, not unique to China, not unique 

at this moment in history. 

But what can happen is a miscalculation. Because the fact externally is this is a provocative set of behavior that could provoke 

something, not planned, not intended, nonetheless real. 

Mr. Dutton, Ms. Glaser, Mr. Smith, do you want to quickly comment? 

Mr. DUTTON. Yes, it is absolutely—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. The chair will allow them to finish answering. 

My questions are over. 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

Mr. DUTTON. It is absolutely the case that it is a dangerous 

game. And what we can see clearly is that it has provoked Amer-
27 

ican attention and American concern, and the same thing throughout the region. And I think it has achieved what China sought to 

prevent, which is balancing behavior against China directly. It is 

unfortunate, but I think that is what it has achieved. 

Ms. GLASER. I would just say that the Chinese are insufficiently 

worried about miscalculation and accident, and quite confident, 

frankly, that they could control escalation. 

If they were worried about this, they would not have announced 

that new ADIZ, which the potential for their aircraft flying over 

these disputed islands in the East China Sea, then being intercepted by Japanese fighters, and responded to by Chinese fighters 

scrambling. 

This carries, I think, great inherent danger. And I don’t think 

the Chinese appreciate this significantly. 

Mr. SMITH. I would agree, and I understand why China’s policy 

in the region seems so counterintuitive, because I think it has done 

their image great harm. And on the flipside of that, we must never 

forget sort of the silver lining, which is that countries in the region 

who maybe 10 years ago were tiring of American power and authority, or looking for alternatives, are now welcoming the U.S. 

back with, you know, great enthusiasm. 

So as we confront this challenge, we must also look at it as an 

opportunity. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman 

from California, Mr. Sherman, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. First, I am just trying to understand 

the law of the sea, and the conventional law of the sea. It is my 

understanding that if there is a tiny speck just barely above water, 

the smallest possible island, that whoever owns that island controls 

125,000 nautical miles, 200 miles in every direction, of that speck, 

with regard to economic exploitations. Is that true? 

Mr. DUTTON. I am sorry, sir. No, it is not true. A small island 

that is uninhabitable, or that can produce no economic activity of 

its own, gets no more than 12 nautical miles around it. And that 

is only if it is above water at high tide. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Does an artificial island get anything? 

Mr. DUTTON. It does not. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And if there is like one family that lives on the 

island, does it then get the 200 miles? 

Mr. DUTTON. Well, we are hoping that the Philippine arbitration 

can help us understand what the law says about these questions. 

It is one of the most important aspects of China’s—or of the Philippines, a desire to get an international law perspective on these 

questions. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. And if the—if it is inhabited, I assume that 

an island that was previously uninhabited, that gains habitation, 

counts as a habitable island. Is that accurate? 

Mr. DUTTON. Well, it is a little difficult to know, and here is why: 

Because what does habitation mean, has so far not been answered. 

And if you have—you just put soldiers down on an island, but you 

have to truck in water, or fly in water, is that habitation? No, probably not. 
28 

So the answer is not yet definitive in international law, but it is 

pretty clear that it has to be self-sustaining habitation. And that 

was meant, was a permanent—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, of course, a vacation—there are many vacation islands with thriving economies that exist only because tourists spend money to be there. 

Mr. DUTTON. Well, if they are self-sustaining, and from what the 

resources of the island can produce, then they probably would 

get—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. You put a rich family on an island, you have a 

tourist resort. 

Now—but there is no—even the smallest inhabited island does 

get the 125,000 square miles, nautical miles, it can be a small island with—as long as it is inhabited; is that correct? 

Mr. DUTTON. As long as it is inhabited, it gets 200-mile exclusive 

economic zone. Yes, I haven’t done the math. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Wow. Now, Japan would certainly—so the islands 

that are in dispute, for the most part, are viewed as uninhabited, 

and control only 12 miles? 

Mr. DUTTON. Yes. In the Spratlys, there are about 45 islands 

that are the major groups that are the larger of the islands, 45 of 

which are inhabited, technically inhabited. Whether they are legally inhabited is a different question, we don’t know—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. Got you. 

Mr. DUTTON. Technically inhabited by—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. So we have to both determine the ownership of 

the islands and whether they are inhabited. 

Mr. DUTTON. That is right. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And these islands have been of scant economic 

value up until now. We are told that we should be spending trillions of dollars reorienting our entire military establishment to defend the economic rights of countries that spend, in the case of 

Japan, only 1 percent of its GDP. 

This is a kind of rhetorical question, but if there is oil on any 

of these islands, the American taxpayer doesn’t get any of it, right? 

Mr. DUTTON. Sir, the answer to that question is there are three 

problems. We are only being asked to deal with one of them; not 

the sovereignty question, not even the jurisdictional question over 

how do you draw resource boundaries, but control. 

Whether the coastal state has, China, has the right to limit freedom of navigation for military purposes or not, that is the key 

American interest. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I understand. Well, the reason they are trying to 

do it, presumably is the resources. And of course, Japan also has 

the same kind of notification zone that China has been criticized 

for creating. My time is almost expired. I will ask any witness 

with—Ms. Glaser, do you have—— 

Ms. GLASER. With all due respect, sir, I do think that your perspective is a narrow interpretation of American interest. No, we 

may not get directly all the fish, or the oil—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. We have a tremendous interest in everything in 

the world. And we could have a $5 trillion military, and it wouldn’t 

be sufficient to deal with every occasion where people have sat in 
29 

front of me and said, ‘‘We have vital interests. And the interests 

of our allies are at stake. And we must take action.’’ 

Ms. GLASER. I believe that our interest—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. Sure. If—you know, if we could just phone this 

one in, fine. But our entire military is looking at this as a chance 

to face a noble foe, a chance to be in the kind of conflict that is 

far less frustrating than fighting insurgencies and fighting asymmetrical warfare, all for some islands where our interests may be 

just as vital as they are in every other square inch of this planet. 

And there is no shortage of interests. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Unless one of the witnesses wants to respond briefly. Ms. Glaser. 

Ms. GLASER. I would just like to briefly comment. There may be 

some individuals in the military that hold those views. Those that 

I speak with and people who are in higher levels in this Administration and even prior Administrations I think would argue differently. That our goal is not to encourage China to be an enemy 

or to organize our military against China. That we very much want 

to see China emerge peacefully and become part of this rules-based 

system. 

I don’t think about our presence in the Asia-Pacific is simply 

about protecting tiny specks of rocks or other things in the waters. 

I think it goes way beyond that. It is freedom of navigation. It is 

maintaining the access and freedom to maneuver within the area, 

without which we will have no credibility as a presence and a provider of a balancing force in the region to help protect not only our 

own interests, but those of our allies and partners. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Dutton. 

Mr. DUTTON. Yes, quite briefly, I would like to say the pivotal rebalance is not about looking for a glorious enemy or some noble foe. 

It is about a return to America’s fundamental security and strategic interests. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I would simply say that a nation with our economic problems has fundamental interests at home. And that the 

fundamental interests that you are talking about are no more significant than those in the eastern Mediterranean, those in the Caribbean, hundreds of other conflicts most of them not in the headlines today. 

And if—again, could we limit our military to merely a $5 trillion 

budget if we dealt with every set of witnesses that told us of a critical national security vital interest position, critical to our standing 

in the world. I would say that Japan, the real beneficiary of some 

of the actions you suggest, limits its military to 1 percent of GDP. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The chair would ask unanimous consent that all Members have 

5 days to supplement any statements or submit any questions. I 

would like to recognize Chairman Forbes, for the purpose of making a statement and recognize the panel. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you for allowing 

us to do this. 

And to each of you, we recognize the time that you spent to prepare to be here today. This is a very important hearing, but equally 

it is a very important record for us to create. So, our subcommittee 
30 

always likes to give our witnesses an opportunity, if you need to, 

to either complete or make sure your responses were complete and 

accurate. If there is anything that you feel briefly you need to put 

on the record, to supplement or clarify anything that you have said, 

we would like to give you that opportunity now. 

And if you don’t do it now, please feel free to submit it to us 

later. We will start in the order that you spoke. Mr. Dutton, anything else that you have for us for the record that you would like 

to offer? 

Mr. DUTTON. Yes, sir. I have four points. I will be as quick as 

I can. The first is I think it is important to note that China has 

not been as dangerously, quote, ‘‘aggressive’’ as (A) they could be, 

or (B) they have been at different times in the past. China has 

been through—the current, the People’s Republic of China, has 

been through four phases in their approaches to the island disputes 

and the water disputes in East Asia. The first phase from 1949 to 

1974 was they ignored them, essentially. From 1974 to 1988 or so, 

they did in fact use military power to change the circumstances on 

the ground a number of times during that timeframe. 

From roughly 1990 to the mid-2000s, China went on a charm offensive trying to buy the goodwill of the regional states regarding 

these disputes. And then finally, most recently, this nonmilitarized 

coercion that we are seeing now. And the problem with—that we 

are having with is that we have too few tools to grapple with this 

particular strategy. We could manage the previous ones. We have 

too few tools to manage this one. 

The second point that I would like to make is in talking about 

whether China will be weaker or stronger in the future, it is almost 

the wrong question. We have 1.3 billion globally connected, economically connected people now that a generation ago were not. 

That economic connectivity has a gravitational pull of its own, 

which means that China’s economy will be a powerful force of some 

kind in the future. 

Whatever the GDP futures look like, I don’t know. My crystal 

ball is cloudy. But I will say that China will have substantial economic and political power—substantial enough to choose to make 

military power in the future if that is where they choose to balance 

how to spend their money. Whether it is on social spending or military spending, we don’t know. But they will have plenty of spending when you have 1.3 billion globally connected, economically connected people. 

The third point I want to make is to reiterate that freedom of 

navigation and the essence of American security around the world 

is based on American ability to navigate around the world 

through—in and through the commons, and that requires us to 

support the laws and norms of freedom of navigation and to exercise leadership over those norms. I believe we need to accede to the 

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The world is 

crying out for American leadership of some kind. And in order for 

us to exercise that leadership, getting inside the system and running the system from inside, rather than standing outside it is how 

we are going to best get the support and the coalescence of power 

that we need in order to confront what China is pushing at us 

with—on this point. 
31 

And then the last point I wanted to make, it is also related to 

freedom of navigation. It is also related to the fundamental strategic roots of American security. And that is our ability to ensure 

our security presence in Europe and the Middle East and in Asia. 

Those three regions are—and our ability to access them for security 

purposes is the foundation of American security. It is possible for 

America to re-articulate a fundamentally different security strategy 

and that may be something we would want to do in the future. But 

it is a world in which our options and our opportunities become significantly constrained. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

Ms. Glaser, very briefly, any other comments that you—— 

Ms. GLASER. Yes, thank you very much. I will just make two 

points. 

One is that there are these ongoing worries and concerns about 

U.S. staying power in the region. This is not going to be attainable, 

this reassurance, probably over any period of time. It is just an effort that the United States has to keep up at every day, every 

week, every month, every year. 

We have to give these countries in the region confidence that the 

United States is going to continue to be there. It is not enough just 

to say we are a resident power. But we really have to be involved 

in the life of the region. 

And countries are so welcoming of the United States. So it is a 

great opportunity, but we really have to continue to do this. If we 

are not sufficiently providing this reassurance, I really do think 

that there is a risk that some of the smaller countries in the region 

are going to feel that they have to accommodate to terms that are 

being dictated to them, in part and mostly by China, but that they 

prefer not to accede to. 

The second point that I would like to make is that one of the fundamental sources of instability in the region and particularly in the 

South China Sea is the nine-dash line and the ambiguity of the 

nine-dash line. 

So, it originated 1947. It was an 11-dash line. You know, we all 

know this. But today, what does it mean? The Chinese themselves 

have these internal debates about what it means. 

And we all need to compel China to tell us and the world, and 

particularly its neighbors, what does it mean? Is it China’s EEZ? 

Is it a national boundary? Does China simply claim the land features and then the waters that those legally generate under 

UNCLOS? 

Clarification of this by China I think would go a long way towards beginning to create the kind of circumstances in which countries can begin to collaborate, maybe join economic exploitation, 

fisheries agreements, and things of that nature that might diffuse 

some of the tensions. 

Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

And Mr. Smith, last brief word on your account? 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, just a brief remark for Congressman Sherman 

who I think in an era of budget constraints, this type of skepticism 

is actually very healthy. This is an issue where we all seem to be 
32 

on the same page. So, having some critical thinking and really 

prodding us to think through this is most welcome. 

And I think—I am sure everyone who comes before you says that 

their issue and their region of the world is of utmost importance 

and is, you know, vital national security interest. 

I think in this case, you really can make a valid and rational 

case that China is unique—that it is the one country that is capable of posing a genuine conventional threat to the U.S. military in 

the 21st century. 

And in addition to that, is the one country that is really doing— 

is engaging in a lot of provocative behavior with its neighbors. 

And it is not just a territorial dispute issue with its neighbors— 

it is also attempting to restrict our freedom to operate in the Western Pacific. It is something that impinges directly on our national 

security interests and is not merely an issue for our allies. 

But thank you for voicing this concern. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. 

I would like to thank the chair and the ranking members that 

were here earlier for their cooperation in making this very important hearing possible, and I want to especially thank our distinguished panel this afternoon for their very helpful testimony. 

If there is no further business to come before the committees, we 

are adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:59 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JANUARY 14, 2014 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JANUARY 14, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. It was reported that a Chinese naval vessel nearly collided with the 

USS Cowpens after the Chinese vessel moved to block passage of the USS Cowpens. I understand that the USS Cowpens was operating in international waters. There 

have been other incursions by the Chinese military to impede U.S. military operations in other areas including the USNS Impeccable in 2009 and the interdiction 

of an EP–3 aircraft in 2001. How effective is China in coordinating actions of local 

military commanders? In your estimation, are these incidents coordinated by the 

central government or are they actions by rogue military agents? 

Mr. DUTTON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. As to the establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone by the 

Chinese in the East China Sea, it appears that our response was not well coordinated with our partners. I understand that FAA included a Notice to Airman to our 

commercial airline industry that required them to abide by the Chinese notice. I 

also understand that the Japanese and the South Korean initially blocked implementation of this notice and the Japanese remain opposed to using the notice. While 

I applaud the PACOM’s decision to send a B–52 flight without notice into the Air 

Defense Identification Zone thereby establishing our intent to follow international 

law, I am concerned that the executive branch did not effectively coordinate an 

international response with our partners and allies for our commercial sector. From 

your perspective, can you elaborate what you believe would have been an appropriate response to this incursion and did the U.S. effectively coordinate a response 

with our partners and allies? 

Mr. DUTTON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. The Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces had a hearing 

in December to discuss Chinese trends and potential impacts of a reduction in GDP 

growth. I was surprised at the near unanimity in thought among those witnesses 

as to their anticipated growth assessments for China. If China GDP continues to 

decline, can you project how their economy will impact Chinese military decisions? 

Would you anticipate a reduction in GDP could possibly embolden Chinese military 

activities to more vigorously exert territorial claims in the near to mid-term? 

Mr. DUTTON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. It was reported that a Chinese naval vessel nearly collided with the 

USS Cowpens after the Chinese vessel moved to block passage of the USS Cowpens. 

I understand that the USS Cowpens was operating in international waters. There 

have been other incursions by the Chinese military to impede U.S. military operations in other areas including the USNS Impeccable in 2009 and the interdiction 

of an EP–3 aircraft in 2001. How effective is China in coordinating actions of local 

military commanders? In your estimation, are these incidents coordinated by the 

central government or are they actions by rogue military agents? 

Ms. GLASER. Regarding the Cowpens incident specifically, the PLAN undoubtedly 

anticipated that U.S. surveillance vessels would be monitoring this exercise, which 

was the first major exercise conducted by the Liaoning carrier escorted by destroyers and frigates. It is likely that the naval ships involved in the exercise were instructed as to the rules of engagement with U.S. surveillance vessels. They may not 

have anticipated that the Cowpens would sail as close to the carrier as it apparently 

did. In a January 23 News briefing, U.S. Pacific Command Commander Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III stated that the Chinese believed that their carrier operations 

were properly notified, but the Cowpens was not aware of any notification. It is my 

understanding that China’s Maritime Safety Administration issued on December 6 

three no-sail ban warnings for the areas where PLAN training was taking place 

from December 3, 2013 to January 3, 2014. The incident with the Cowpens occurred 

on December 5, so it seems that the late issuance of the no-sail warning played an 

important role in this incident. 

To your larger question, coordination between Chinese civilian and military actors, and between law enforcement ships and navy ships (white hulls and grey 

hulls), has improved. Xi Jiping was put in charge of a task force to manage maritime issues even before he became general secretary of the Chinese Communist 

Party, and he has taken steps to strengthen coordination. Nevertheless, it is plau-
92 

sible that there could be instances in which individual ship commanders or even pilots behave more aggressively than the central government has authorized. The PLA 

is not a rogue actor, however; it is very much under the control of the CCP. 

Mr. FORBES. As to the establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone by the 

Chinese in the East China Sea, it appears that our response was not well coordinated with our partners. I understand that FAA included a Notice to Airman to our 

commercial airline industry that required them to abide by the Chinese notice. I 

also understand that the Japanese and the South Korean initially blocked implementation of this notice and the Japanese remain opposed to using the notice. While 

I applaud the PACOM’s decision to send a B–52 flight without notice into the Air 

Defense Identification Zone thereby establishing our intent to follow international 

law, I am concerned that the executive branch did not effectively coordinate an 

international response with our partners and allies for our commercial sector. From 

your perspective, can you elaborate what you believe would have been an appropriate response to this incursion and did the U.S. effectively coordinate a response 

with our partners and allies? 

Ms. GLASER. It is my understanding that the FAA reiterated longstanding practice and policy that, for the safety and security of passengers, U.S. civilian aircraft 

flying internationally operate in accordance with NOTAMs issued by foreign countries. I do not believe that there was an instruction issued to specifically abide by 

China’s notice. However, since this reiteration by the FAA of U.S. policy was made 

after China issued its new ADIZ regulations, it appears that the FAA was telling 

U.S. airlines to follow Chinese regulations. The Japanese opposed complying with 

China’s notice. 

Perhaps even of greater significance, there was a gap between Japan and the U.S. 

in their official responses to Beijing after the announcement of the ADIZ. Tokyo insisted that China rescind the ADIZ; the U.S. only demanded that China not implement it and said it would not recognize the ADIZ. It is clear from both these instances that the U.S. and Japan did not adequately coordinate their responses. 

Given the fact that there were ample signals in the Chinese media and from other 

sources that Beijing was planning to announce an ADIZ, this is disappointing and 

inexcusable. 

I believe that ensuring the safety of American citizens flying abroad should be the 

number one priority of the U.S. government, so I do not oppose the U.S. decision 

to not instruct U.S. airlines to ignore China’s ADIZ regulations. I do think, however, 

that the U.S. should have coordinated more effectively with Japan and minimized 

the gap between the allies, which works to China’s advantage. Tokyo and Washington should work harder to anticipate Chinese actions and coordinate responses. 

I understand that there are plans to conduct a series of US-Japan tabletop exercises 

to enhance preparedness for such contingencies and I applaud this effort. 

Mr. FORBES. The Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces had a hearing 

in December to discuss Chinese trends and potential impacts of a reduction in GDP 

growth. I was surprised at the near unanimity in thought among those witnesses 

as to their anticipated growth assessments for China. If China GDP continues to 

decline, can you project how their economy will impact Chinese military decisions? 

Would you anticipate a reduction in GDP could possibly embolden Chinese military 

activities to more vigorously exert territorial claims in the near to mid-term? 

Ms. GLASER. China has entered an era of slower growth after three decades of 

double-digit annual economic expansion. Mainstream economists predict that China’s annual growth will slow to between 6 and 7 per cent over the next decade. If 

this forecast is accurate, China will continue to be a formidable economic power and 

its economic influence on the region, indeed on the world, will be enormous. China’s 

military expenditures will likely remain substantial, and will continue to exceed the 

military budgets of most of China’s neighbors. 

Today, China is the number one trading partner of 124 countries in the world. 

These include Japan, Korea, Australia and every ASEAN country with the exception 

of the Philippines. Beijing will therefore be able to use economic tools to influence 

the political decisions of its neighbors. China is likely to rely on diplomacy and economic tools, rather than military means to enforce its claims. The Chinese know 

that any use of force to secure their claims would be counterproductive in that it 

would make the regional states more wary of Chinese intentions and push them into 

closer alignment with the United States. In the past few years, there has been a 

pattern of Chinese coercion and assertiveness, but not Chinese aggression. I do not 

expect that in the near to mid-term the Chinese will shift to the blatant employment of military force to exert control over their claims. 

China’s GDP is only one of several variables that will affect Chinese decision 

making regarding maritime disputes. Chinese assessments of U.S. economic 

strength and commitment to the Asia-Pacifica region will also be important factors. 
93 

If the U.S. is strong and deeply involved in the region, there is a reduced potential 

for miscalculation by China. 

Mr. FORBES. It was reported that a Chinese naval vessel nearly collided with the 

USS Cowpens after the Chinese vessel moved to block passage of the USS Cowpens. 

I understand that the USS Cowpens was operating in international waters. There 

have been other incursions by the Chinese military to impede U.S. military operations in other areas including the USNS Impeccable in 2009 and the interdiction 

of an EP–3 aircraft in 2001. How effective is China in coordinating actions of local 

military commanders? In your estimation, are these incidents coordinated by the 

central government or are they actions by rogue military agents? 

Mr. SMITH. This question has been the subject of fierce speculation outside of 

China—to what degree are provocative actions by Chinese forces the result of initiatives taken by local commanders, and to what degree are they orchestrated by China’s senior political leadership? I frequently encountered this question when conducting research for my book on China-India relations, as it related to border incursions across the Line of Actual Control by Chinese border patrols. In this case, and 

in the case of our multiple maritime incidences at sea, a convincing body of circumstantial evidence suggests the behavior is encouraged and condoned by the senior leadership. Were these limited to a handful of incidents the possibility of rogue 

behavior by a local commander would be more credible. Unfortunately, U.S. Navy 

ships have been harassed on nearly one dozen occasions, as documented in my testimony, and in the case of Chinese incursions across the China-India border, happen 

several hundred times a year. We are unaware of local commanders facing any consequences for this provocative behavior. The most insightful China watchers I am 

in contact with are in fairly uniform agreement that the behavior is encouraged and 

condoned by the senior leadership. 

Mr. FORBES. As to the establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone by the 

Chinese in the East China Sea, it appears that our response was not well coordinated with our partners. I understand that FAA included a Notice to Airman to our 

commercial airline industry that required them to abide by the Chinese notice. I 

also understand that the Japanese and the South Korean initially blocked implementation of this notice and the Japanese remain opposed to using the notice. While 

I applaud the PACOM’s decision to send a B–52 flight without notice into the Air 

Defense Identification Zone thereby establishing our intent to follow international 

law, I am concerned that the executive branch did not effectively coordinate an 

international response with our partners and allies for our commercial sector. From 

your perspective, can you elaborate what you believe would have been an appropriate response to this incursion and did the U.S. effectively coordinate a response 

with our partners and allies? 

Mr. SMITH. As you rightly point out, our policy regarding the protocols for civilian 

airliners operating in China’s ADIZ was both ambiguous and poorly coordinated 

with U.S. allies like Japan. In many respects, the episode boiled down to a question 

of semantics. The Obama administration was able to claim that, like Japan, it did 

not ‘‘require’’ civilian carriers to comply with China’s ADIZ regulations. Instead, it 

merely ‘‘advised’’ them to do so. According to the State Department: ‘‘The U.S. government generally expects that U.S. carriers operating internationally will operate 

consistent with NOTAMs (Notices to Airmen) issued by foreign countries.’’ An FAA 

spokesman also said they were ‘‘advising for safety reasons that [U.S. civilian carriers] comply with notices to airmen, which FAA always advises.’’ While technically 

not a demand, in practice the policy was perceived as very much at odds with Japan’s. This created the impression of distance between the two treaty allies and 

caused Tokyo a great deal of discomfort in the process. Our poor coordination with 

the Japanese government was evident in Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s response to the announcement: ‘‘We have confirmed through diplomatic channels that 

the U.S. government didn’t request commercial carriers to submit flight plans.’’ This 

confirms the suspicion that Washington only consulted with Japan after the fact. 

Mr. FORBES. The Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces had a hearing 

in December to discuss Chinese trends and potential impacts of a reduction in GDP 

growth. I was surprised at the near unanimity in thought among those witnesses 

as to their anticipated growth assessments for China. If China GDP continues to 

decline, can you project how their economy will impact Chinese military decisions? 

Would you anticipate a reduction in GDP could possibly embolden Chinese military 

activities to more vigorously exert territorial claims in the near to mid-term? 

Mr. SMITH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Æ