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U.S.–RUSSIA NUCLEAR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS:

UKRAINE AND BEYOND

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 29, 2014

Serial No. 113–150

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ms. Anita E. Friedt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear and 

Strategic Policy, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, 

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 7

Mr. Brent Hartley, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and 

Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State ...................................................... 17

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ms. Anita E. Friedt: Prepared statement .............................................................. 10

Mr. Brent Hartley: Prepared statement ................................................................ 20

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 38

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 39

Written responses from Ms. Anita E. Friedt to questions submitted for the 

record by the Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats ................................................................................ 40

(1)

U.S.–RUSSIA NUCLEAR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS: 

UKRAINE AND BEYOND 

TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. Subcommittees will come to order and without objection 

all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and 

extraneous materials for the record and subject to the length of 

limitation in the rules. 

In a matter of weeks, Putin and his commandos stole Crimea. 

Now he is on to Eastern Ukraine. I and other Members of Congress 

were in Ukraine last week and the people were rightfully concerned about Putin’s next move into their nation. 

According to press reports this morning, Secretary Kerry said 

that we now have intelligence revealing that operatives in Ukraine 

are taking orders directly from Moscow. Secretary Kerry also said 

that some of the same Russian operatives from Crimea and Georgia have shown up in Eastern Ukraine. 

When I went to Eastern Ukraine one of the officials gave me a 

wanted poster for what he called Russian saboteurs. It is in 

Ukrainian and he—it is on the screen, I hope it is up—this is a 

copy of the wanted poster and he was willing to pay out of his own 

money for Russian equipment that had been—it was confiscated by 

Ukrainians, everything from machine guns, rifles. To anybody that 

is occupying one of the Ukrainian buildings without permission he 

is willing to offer rewards for that. 

So I thought that was quite interesting that they are concerned 

about the insurrection or insurgence in his own part of the state. 

I believe these actions should—we should understand that we 

have to reevaluate our agreements with the Russians because of 

their failure to abide by international law in that they have entered Crimea, Ukraine and even other Baltic states are concerned 

and so reflected that in conversations with them. 

In my opinion, the Russians are not our allies. They are not our 

friends and we certainly can’t take them for their word. Exhibit A 

2

is the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the INF, and 

this treaty between the United States and Russia places limits on 

ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 

500 and 5,500 kilometers. 

The United States has held up our agreement in the treaty. It 

appears the Russians have not. According to press reports, it appears the Russians have tested a ground-launched cruise missile 

from an operational launcher. The Russians have responded this is 

a sea-based missile, which does not fall under the treaty. 

There is no way to know if it is a sea-based missile until it is 

actually deployed. But even so, if it was a sea-based missile and 

the Russians tested it on land using an operational launcher it is 

violation of the treaty. 

Either way, the Russians are violating this treaty. According to 

press reports, the administration knew about the violation back in 

2008. Six years later, the State Department says the violation is 

still under review and has not officially classified it as a violation 

or not. Time for the State Department to pick a horse and ride it. 

Either it is a violation or it is not a violation. 

I have introduced H. Con. Res. 94 with Representative Rogers 

and Joe Heck, calling the Russians out for their violation and the 

administration for its refusal to tell it like it is. 

We had hoped that a formal determination would be in this 

year’s arms control compliance report but the report itself due in 

April is already late. 

Apparently, the State Department needs more time to figure out 

what the rest of us already believe. The Russians do not have to 

worry about violations as much as the New START treaty. During 

negotiations, they gutted the verifications that were in the old 

START treaty. 

The most significant changes were the elimination of verification 

measures for some ICBMs and reduction of total number of inspections. When the Senate was debating approval in 2010, critics argued the treaty was nonsensical because the Russians were already 

at or below the required levels in key categories while we had delivery vehicles and warheads that were way above these new levels. 

Just like the critics warned, the Russians have since undergone 

the most extensive nuclear modernization since the end of the Cold 

War, all without violating the New START treaty. We had a reason 

to be distrustful of the Russians when the New START went into 

effect in 2010 and we have more reasons today. 

The fact is Russia is willing to treat these treaties as less than 

binding when it suits them. That is not how treaties are supposed 

to work. Despite this, the administration has pledged to seek deeper cuts in nuclear arms. 

In June 2013, the President called for the reduction of our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third. My personal 

opinion is this would be dangerous and is misguided, based on the 

information that we have about the Russians. 

Fortunately, Putin may have saved us from ourselves. The Russians have ‘‘no apparent interest in further arms reductions before 

2017,’’ according to numerous arms control experts. 

The United States should not continue to seek agreements with 

the Russians when they either cheat or show no interest in those 

3

agreements. I don’t think—it is not now the time to be kowtowing 

to Putin, and I will now turn to the ranking member from California for his opening statement, Mr. Sherman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KEATING. I thank Mr. Sherman for allowing me to attend a 

meeting where my presence is required for a quorum and I thank 

Chairman Poe and Chairman Rohrabacher for convening this important hearing. 

I would like to begin thanking Ms. Friedt and Mr. Hartley for appearing today. Both witnesses have extensive experience on Russia 

and on European security interests. I am looking forward to hearing their assessment of the long-term strategic implication of Russia’s illegal invasion of Crimea, its subsequent efforts to destabilize 

Ukraine’s interim government and other matters. 

Despite its April 17th pledge to help de-escalate the crisis in 

Ukraine, Russia has done exactly the opposite. The role that Russian special forces have played in destabilizing Eastern Ukraine is 

indisputable in supporting so-called separatist-coordinated armed 

attacks on government buildings and on orchestrating kidnaps and 

violence against local politicians, reporters and even OSCE monitors. 

Russian disinformation campaigns have only made matters 

worse. Russian forces use the masked warfare and other covert tactics seen to signal a strategic shift in its approach to the region and 

to European security. 

It is essential that the United States and NATO allies respond. 

I welcome the administration’s decision yesterday to impose a third 

round of sanctions on individuals and entities closely linked to the 

Russian leadership’s inner circle. 

I also welcome the decision to impose export restrictions on 13 

Russian companies and the additional restrictive measures on defense exports. 

The goal of these targeted sanctions is to send a clear signal that 

Russian aggression against Ukraine comes at a price. I share the 

President’s hope that these measures will persuade President Putin 

to reverse course. 

Unfortunately, I am not optimistic that the steps taken to date 

will be sufficient. I therefore fully support the administration’s 

readiness to impose additional penalties if Russia continues to 

press forward including targeted sanctions against specific sectors 

of the Russian economy. 

As the United States moves forward, it is imperative that we do 

so in a coordinated effort with our European allies. I applaud today’s announcement of further EU sanctions on Russia. 

I look forward to hearing from Mr. Hartley about the status of 

the administration’s ongoing discussions with the EU as well as 

plans within NATO to counter Russian aggression and reassure 

our Central European and Baltic allies. 

I also look forward to hearing from Ms. Friedt about the status 

of existing arms and existing control agreements between the 

United States and Russia. 

4

While further arms control reductions seem unlikely in the current environment, I am relieved that the United States and Russia 

have continued to implement the New START agreement included 

by exchanging notifications and conducting on-site inspections. 

These exchanges provide much needed stability and predictability at a time of increasing mistrust and uncertainty. I also support the administration’s efforts to work through INF treaties’ compliance review mechanisms to address concerns that Russian activities may be inconsistent with its treaties obligations. 

I strongly supported the administration’s decision to cut off defense cooperation with Russia. I have consistently called on our European allies to follow suit and to exercise similar scrutiny with respect to defense exports to Russia. However, when it comes to nuclear security, the stakes are much too high to break off communication. 

Continued implementation of our arms control agreements with 

Russia is essential, especially given the unprecedented and unpredictable nature of the crisis in Ukraine. The last thing we need is 

another nuclear arms race in Europe. With that, I thank you and 

yield back. 

Mr. POE. Gentleman yields back his time. I now will turn to the 

chairman of the Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats Subcommittee, Mr. Dana Rohrabacher, from California for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Chairman Poe, for 

calling this hearing is jointly being held between your Terrorism, 

Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee and the subcommittee 

which I chair of Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats. 

During the 1980s, I had the honor of working with and for President Ronald Reagan. Through his leadership and strength, the 

United States brought about the collapse of the Evil Empire—the 

Soviet Union. 

I would add that there are many people who I worked with during that time period who can’t seem to get over that the Cold War 

is over and are still treating the Soviet—the current Russian Government as if it was the Soviet Government. 

We are thankful, however, that the world no longer lives in fear 

of annihilation and no longer lives with a Soviet Union that is controlled by a diabolical philosophy of Marxism, Leninism which motivated people to attempt to put on the world a Marxist, an atheistic dictatorship in the name of perfecting humankind. 

We are thankful that that world has been changed and that reality no longer is present and that we no longer live in fear of annihilation between—of a nuclear exchange between those who are 

motivated by this evil theory—Marxism, Leninism, communism—

and the people of the free world. 

One of Reagan’s greatest accomplishments was negotiating and 

signing the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which 

banned two entire categories of horrific weapons. 

I look forward to this hearing today from witnesses about the 

current efforts to maintain and verify the provisions of that agreement. 

I look forward in the future to be discussing with my colleagues 

some of the fundamental information that they have gleaned from 

their visits to Ukraine and other places and to have a broader disVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:00 Jun 26, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\042914\87711 SHIRL
5

cussion of the nature of the government in Russia today and the 

threat that it poses or does not pose to the free world as compared 

to what it was like when I worked for Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. 

I also want to speak about another power when we are discussing this issue Mr. Chairman. We should not lose sight that we 

are not just talking about Russia and the United States. 

We are talking about other nuclear weapons in other countries 

in relationship to what we are doing with the Russians and that 

is, what is Communist China doing and what are we doing with 

Russia and other countries that relate to this very issue of strategic 

weapons with Communist China? 

I fear that by continuing to focus our arms control efforts only 

on Russia while excluding China we are making a grave miscalculation. Our negotiations with Russia dictate our nuclear posture and define our military capabilities. 

It should be a major concern that China is not included in these 

limits including caps set by the New Strategic Arms Limitation 

Treaty signed in 2010. 

Over the past two decades the People’s Liberation Army, the 

armed wing of the Communist Party of China, I might add, has engaged in a massive arms build-up. 

Their capability has increased in every area. It is illogical to believe that China’s strategic forces and their nuclear stockpile have 

not also, likewise, been expanded and improved. The United 

States-China Economic Security Review Commission stated in 2012 

the PLA continues to modernize and expand its nuclear stockpile. 

China is now on the cusp of obtaining a credible nuclear triad 

of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarinelaunched ballistic missiles and air-dropped nuclear bombs. 

We also know, thanks to the research by Dr. Phillip Karber of 

Georgetown University, that China has built some 3,000 miles of 

underground tunnels to store and to transport their nuclear missiles and warheads. 

This secret effort by the Chinese military is so massive that it 

is known as the Underground Great Wall. Beyond this incredible 

infrastructure, China is also researching hypersonic missiles, 

ICBMs with maneuvering warheads which then can outmaneuver 

our defensive systems. 

Communist China, in short—and in closing, I would say—Communist China must be included in any discussion of arms control 

and if we focus only on Russia we are doing a great disservice to 

the security of our country. 

Addressing concerns and priorities with Russia does remain important and the things that are being said today need to be taken 

into consideration. 

Ignoring China’s strategic weapons is not an option and will lead 

us to a much more dangerous world. They must be part of this discussion today and hopefully in the weeks ahead. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the ranking member from the 

Terrorism Subcommittee, Mr. Sherman from California, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. If you watch American television you would think 

foreign policy is as simple as a cheap Western. Some people are in 

6

white hats. Some cowboys are in black hats. If you watch Russian 

television, you come to the same conclusion only the hat colors 

have been changed. 

If you review what has happened you see that this is far more 

complicated. A pro-Russian President was elected in legitimate 

elections in the Ukraine. That legitimately elected President broke 

his promises, turned his policy on a fundamental issue. 

Democratic-elected Presidents have been known to do that. He 

was swept from power by an insurrection. Those in the insurrection 

occupied Maidan and it is considered a criminal act to use armed 

forces—organized government armed forces to dislodge them. Now 

the government that has taken over in Kiev is using armed government forces to dislodge Eastern Ukrainian occupiers not of Maidan 

but of various government buildings. 

Throughout foreign policy we are faced with the tension between 

territorial integrity and self-determination. Those were the two 

greatest wars fought on our own territory—our fight for self-determination from the British and our fight for our territorial integrity 

and against the self-determination objectives of the confederate 

states. We look at Crimea as a effort at the self-determination of 

the Russian-speaking majority there as an illegal act. 

We used our Air Force to achieve the independence of Kosovo, 

which, like the Crimea, was a autonomous region within a republic, 

which was a relatively newly independent republic, having seceded 

from a federation—one seceding from the Yugoslav federation, the 

other seceding from the Soviet Union. 

So we have been on both sides of territorial integrity and selfdetermination both on our own territory in the first 150 years of 

our existence and in Eastern Europe more recently. 

The Russians are interfering in the Eastern Ukraine. Our friends 

in Kiev are not without fault. They have adopted a change in law 

that would strip the Russian language of its official status in its 

southern and eastern provinces. 

Fortunately, that law was vetoed. But, clearly, a Parliament, and 

I should point out a Parliament in which many of the Eastern 

Ukrainian members felt unsafe and did not attend, would be allowed to pass such a law shows that this is not a government dedicated to reaching out to all of its citizens. 

So we have the simplicity of Westerns. We have the reality of foreign policy in Eastern Europe. It is overly simplistic to say that one 

side is entirely right and one side is entirely wrong just as it is 

even more simplistic to say that everything would go our way if 

only we had a President with a different personality. 

We had a President with a radically different personality just a 

decade ago when Georgia lost not one but two of its autonomous 

regions to Russia, Georgia being smaller, the regions being smaller, 

the issues being smaller. But you can say what you like about our 

last two Presidents. The one thing everybody agrees on is they had 

different personalities. 

As to arms control agreements, we have got to trust but verify. 

Ronald Reagan entered into agreements with a Soviet Union that, 

clearly, was less trustworthy than Putin is today. Those who enter 

into these agreements and rely on trust are fooling themselves. 

7

The allegations are twofold. One, that the—that a Russian missile that they call long range was tested at an intermediate range. 

It seems clear that it is a long range missile. 

The other is that a mid-range missile that the Russians say was 

for sea-based purposes was tested on ground, which is allowed, but 

tested on ground with what appears to be a operational useable 

ground-based launcher perhaps one, and I would like to hear from 

our witnesses, that was mobile. And so it appears as if they were 

developing a ground-based capacity for this intermediate missile. 

Finally, I will point out that four countries have given up their 

nuclear weapons or their nuclear programs—South Africa, where it 

worked out well—Saddam, Gaddafi and the Ukraine. 

Two of them lost their lives. One of them lost the Crimea. It may 

be more difficult in the future for us to convince dictators to give 

up nuclear weapons. It doesn’t always work out well. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Without objection, all of the witnesses’ prepared statements will be made part of the record and I ask that each witness 

keep your presentation to no more than 5 minutes. 

We are in the middle of votes. We will see how far we can go before we recess for votes and we will resume immediately after the 

votes. I will introduce both of the witnesses at this time. 

Ms. Anita Friedt is the principal deputy assistant secretary for 

nuclear and strategic policy for the Bureau of Arms Control, 

Verification and Compliance at the U.S. Department of State. 

Ms. Friedt has earned numerous awards including seven superior honor awards for her work on U.S.-Russian European——

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, are other members allowed to give 

short opening statements? 

Mr. POE. All members may have 5 days to submit statements 

due to the fact that we have votes and we also have two subcommittees. So they can make their comments during their questioning if they wish. 

Mr. Brent Hartley is the deputy assistant secretary for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the U.S. State Department. Mr. Hartley has extensive experience in European security 

issues and has served in various roles related to arms control, 

counter terrorism in NATO and more. 

Ms. Friedt, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MS. ANITA E. FRIEDT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC POLICY, BUREAU OF ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION, AND COMPLIANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. FRIEDT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Poe, Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Members Sherman and Keating and members of this committee, I am grateful for 

the opportunity to speak to you today about the administration’s 

arms control policy toward Russia. 

Today, I want to speak to you about three things. One, why arms 

control agreements with Russia continue to be an important tool to 

enhance the security of the United States, our allies and partners; 

two, how we have used arms control tools since the crisis in 

Ukraine began to increase transparency and stability in support of 

8

our broader regional efforts; and three, the seriousness with which 

the administration takes compliance and arms control treaties. 

First, as it has been recognized for over four decades, arms control is a tool that can be used to enhance the security of the United 

States, our allies and our partners. 

The Obama administration has continued the longstanding bipartisan approach to arms control with Russia that had its origins 

in the days of the Cold War. The administrations of Presidents 

Ronald Reagan, George W.—and George H.W. Bush were the architects of many of our most successful and enduring arms control efforts. 

Let me affirm that the United States is committed to maintaining strategic stability between the United States and Russia and 

to encouraging mutual steps to foster a more stable, resilient, predictable and transparent security relationship. 

That said, Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine have undermined 

trust. While diplomacy between the United States and Russia continues, no one can ignore that Russia’s actions in Ukraine have violated the very principles upon which cooperation is built. 

Further, as we consider arms control priorities this year or in 

any year, we will continue to consult closely with our allies and 

partners every step of the way. Our security and defense as well 

as that of our allies and partners is non-negotiable. 

We will only pursue arms control agreements that advance our 

national interest. During the Cold War, Washington and Moscow 

found it in our mutual interest to work together to tap and then 

to begin reducing the number of nuclear weapons in service in reversing the nuclear arms race and improving mutual security instability. 

We judged that the New START treaty was in the United States’ 

national security interest for the same reasons and that is why we 

continue to implement the New START treaty with Russia today. 

We are now in the fourth year of implementation, and despite 

the crisis in Ukraine we in Russia continue to implement the treaty in a business-like manner. Since entering into force in 2011 the 

United States has inspected with boots on the ground Russian nuclear weapons facilities 58 times. 

These inspections are as a part of New START’s treaty 

verification regime which is a vital tool in ensuring transparency 

and predictability between the world’s largest nuclear powers. 

In the realm of conventional arms control, the United States and 

our allies have been using arms control mechanisms in an effort to 

promote stability in Europe, provide transparency in Russia’s provocative actions and assure our allies and partners. 

I want to underscore that our NATO allies and other partners in 

Europe strongly support arms control in Europe as well as our active participation and leadership in those efforts. 

Since the Ukraine crisis began, the United States and our treaty 

partners have used the Open Skies treaty to fly 11 missions over 

Ukraine and western Russia, yielding imagery of thousands of 

square miles of territory. These flights have resulted in valuable 

data and insights not only for the United States but our partners 

and allies as well. 

9

We also have confidence-building measures in the Vienna Document to conduct inspections of use and confidence-building measures in Ukraine. 

Let me now turn to the issue of compliance. First and foremost, 

the administration takes compliance with all arms control agreements extremely seriously. For this reason, this administration 

worked hard to produce a compliance report in 2010, the first compliance report delivered to the Congress since 2005, and we have 

produced one every year since. 

We endeavor every year to produce a compliance report by April 

15th. This is admittedly challenging, given the volume of information, the multiple agencies that must comment on it and the seriousness with which the administration conducts its annual compliance review. 

Despite this, we plan to have the report fully coordinated and 

available later in the spring. As we have previously stated, we have 

concerns about Russian compliance with the INF treaty. 

We have raised them—raised these concerns with Russia and are 

pressing for clear answers in an effort to resolve these concerns because of the importance of the INF treaty to Euro-Atlantic security. 

We have briefed our NATO allies on our concerns and will continue to coordinate with them on this and other matters that affect 

our common security. 

We have kept Congress informed on this matter through briefings with relevant congressional committees and will continue to do 

so. We will continue to work with Russia to resolve our concerns 

and to encourage mutual steps to help foster a more stable, resilient, transparent security relationship. We are not going to drop 

the issue until our concerns have been addressed. 

Let me conclude by reiterating our strong belief that arms control treaties and agreements continue to be an important tool that 

can enhance the security of the United States and our friends and 

allies. 

The successful implementation of the New START treaty and the 

important contributions that Open Skies treaty and the Vienna 

Document have played recently in Ukraine demonstrate the continued relevance of arms control for our national security. 

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Friedt follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, Ms. Friedt. 

Mr. Hartley, we just have a few minutes left in the voting process so we will do your testimony as soon as we come back. 

We have two votes. After the second vote is concluded we will 

start immediately after that and we will hear what you have to 

say. Committee is in recess. 

[Recess.] 

STATEMENT OF MR. BRENT HARTLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. HARTLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of 

the committees. I appreciate very much your inviting me to testify 

here today on our efforts to reassure allies and partners and to bolster security in Ukraine and the region, and I would like to thank 

the members of both subcommittees or both committees for your 

engagement on European security in light of the Ukraine crisis. 

It is important to remember how we got to this point. Russia’s 

illegal annexation and occupation of Crimea and its continued campaign to undermine and intimidate the Government of Ukraine 

have up-ended the post-Cold War security architecture that Russia 

had in fact helped to create. 

Russia is maintaining a 40,000—a contingent of 40,000 troops on 

Ukraine’s eastern border and conducting military activities that 

raise deep concerns. There is strong evidence demonstrating that 

the actions of recent weeks—the roadblocks, building seizures, hostage takings and other violent acts in Eastern Ukraine, primarily 

in the Donetsk Oblast—have not been a spontaneous set of events 

but rather a well orchestrated campaign led by Russian special 

services. 

We strongly condemn the abduction last Friday of the Germanled Vienna Document inspection team and their Ukrainian escorts 

in Slovyansk by pro-Russian separatists. 

We are deeply disappointed that senior officials in Moscow have 

not condemned the abduction of the team nor have they demanded 

the team’s immediate release. 

Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine are in violation of international law and do not uphold the letter or the spirit of the April 

17th Geneva statement. 

Yesterday, the United States acted, imposing new sanctions on 

seven Russian Government officials including two members of 

President Putin’s inner circle and 17 companies linked to Putin’s 

inner circle. 

These steps demonstrate that the United States is committed to 

increase the costs on Russia as it persists in its efforts to destabilize Ukraine and that we will hold Russia accountable for its provocative actions. 

Russia’s actions have also forced the United States and NATO allies to fundamentally reexamine our strategic engagement in Europe. My testimony today will focus on three areas of this effort. 

First, I will talk about efforts to reassure NATO’s front line allies 

and to bolster our other partners in the region. Second, I will discuss the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s important role in monitoring the security situation and facilitating 

18

dialogue in Ukraine. Third, I will address U.S. bilateral security 

assistance to Ukraine. 

First, we are pursuing measures through NATO and bilaterally 

to reassure our allies and partners in the region and in particular 

to demonstrate our solemn commitment to our collective defense responsibilities to our NATO allies. We have deployed six additional 

F–15s to the Baltic air policing mission. 

We have deployed 12 F–16s and other aircraft and personnel for 

exercises—joint U.S.-Polish exercises coordinated by the U.S. aviation training detachment in Lask, Poland. 

NATO has deployed AWACS to provide aerial surveillance over 

Poland and Romania as well as a mine counter measure naval 

group into the Baltic Sea. The United States deployed—has deployed ships into the Black Sea for exercises with Romania and 

Bulgaria. 

On April 16th, NATO allies agreed on additional measures to 

provide reassurance and demonstrate NATO’s resolve and solidarity. U.S. Army in Europe has deployed over the last week company-sized contingents of paratroopers to Poland, Latvia, Lithuania 

and Estonia for exercises with those host governments’ troops. 

These will be the first in a series of expanded land-force training 

exercises in the region that will take place at least through the end 

of the year. As we prepare for the NATO summit in Wales, it will 

be an opportunity to reassess the alliance’s long-term priorities in 

the wake of Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine—that, along 

with NATO-Ukraine relations questions related to the open-door 

NATO enlargement, Afghanistan capabilities and enhancing NATO 

partnerships. 

Beyond NATO’s borders, we are engaged with other front line 

states like Georgia and Moldova and I would be happy to get into 

more detail on that in my—in the question and answer period. 

Second, we see a vital role for the OSCE in this crisis. Along 

with our allies in Europe we are committed to maintaining a large 

presence of international monitors as part of the OSCE special 

monitoring mission. 

This mission is positioned to objectively assess the security situation and investigate claims of human rights abuses as well as to 

assist in de-escalating tensions in Eastern Ukraine. 

But for this mission to be properly implemented in accordance 

with the Geneva statement, Russia must take active and concrete 

steps immediately to de-escalate the crisis including public and private messages to pro-Russian elements engaged in illegal activities 

in Ukraine as well as active support for the monitoring missions 

role. 

OSCE is also involved in election observation for the May 25th 

election. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 

or ODIHR, is laying the groundwork for the largest observation 

mission in its history—in its 40-year history, planning to deploy approximately 1,000 observers in the run-up to the election. 

Third, we are working with the Ukrainian Government to provide security assistance. As Vice President Biden announced last 

week, we are providing $8 million in assistance to allow the 

Ukrainian armed forces and border guard service to fulfill core security missions. 

19

This is in addition to the $3 million of meals ready to eat, $3.5 

million of health and welfare assistance to the armed forces and $3 

million in other security assistance to Ukraine’s state border guard 

service. 

Looking forward, the United States will continue to reaffirm the 

security and stability of the region across multiple fronts using 

multiple tools at our disposal. 

In this effort, we appreciate Congress’ bipartisan attention and 

support for Ukraine and for stability across the region and will continue to work in close coordination with you on all three of these 

areas. 

Chair, thank you very much and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hartley follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thanks for yielding back time. The Chair will now recognize the chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and 

Emerging Threats—Mr. Rohrabacher—for 5 minutes of questions. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The 

focus of this hearing, we originally thought would be our nuclear 

weapons and the relationship between the United States and Russia in terms of cooperating on reducing and restricting the number 

of nuclear weapons that threaten human kind. 

We have gone beyond that and we, of course—however, I believe 

the purpose of that is to put in perspective the decisions we must 

make in terms of weapons control after the events that have happened in Ukraine. 

Let me just note that from my perspective, there has been too 

gleeful a response by so many of my former colleagues, and I am 

not talking about members of the House. I am talking about people 

who have worked with me over the years in various administrations and various anti-Communist causes. 

There seems to be a gleeful response to what has happened in 

Ukraine because it then gives them yet a purpose in going back 

and beating up the old enemy. And, frankly, the Soviet Union was 

our enemy because it was directed by people with an ideology that 

it was trying to supplant in the rest of the world and doing so in 

a big way as well as building up their own military. Russia is a 

powerful force in the world, which we need to deal with as a major 

country—a major nation. 

Major countries have their interests. I do not see what is going 

on in Ukraine as a—as a outcome of the Communist ideology but 

instead you have a very important international power there, Russia, that is governed by someone who is looking out for its national 

interests and who that leadership of that country, obviously, believes that what was going on in Ukraine was contrary to their national interests and that they were not being treated fairly in a 

way in which a pro-Russian leader was removed from office by 

street violence rather than by elections, which was going to result 

in their losing the—what they had was access to the Crimea and 

a port for their fleet. 

That said, I would like to go back to the original purpose that 

we came here today was to talk about arms control and how that 

will be impacted by this new shift in our relations with Russia, and 

I say that no matter what I just said the bottom line is it is in recognition that we are now not in as a positive relationship or a neutral relationship that we were in 2 years ago with Russia. 

We are in fact in a—things have—our relationship with Russia 

has deteriorated. Whose fault that is and does the Russian Government—does Putin and—we share—have all the blame or do we 

share some of it or was there a power grab by the EU? That is 

something that would take long to discuss. But the fact is we know 

that relationship has deteriorated. 

What I would like to ask the panel is does this mean that what 

we negotiated with—and I am very proud of what Ronald Reagan 

accomplished in eliminating a whole classification of nuclear weapons and brought down the number of nuclear weapons that threaten the world—does that mean that we can no longer work with 

Russia in this area? 

26

Should we postpone our efforts or pull back from cooperation 

with the current Russian Government on those issues? Should we 

then also pull back from economic cooperation? 

Should we declare the space program that we are in partners 

with Russia now to be not something that we believe we can count 

on and thus we should go the opposite direction? What about that? 

What are the implications for arms control? What are the implications for cooperating in other areas with Russia on this whole 

Ukrainian situation? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be pleased to answer that question. 

First of all, I would say that this administration has made it very 

clear that it is important to continue to cooperate with Russia 

where we can, where our national security interests coincide. But 

then when we disagree we disagree and we make our disagreement 

very clear. 

So there is no question that it is in our national security interest 

to continue to work with Russia and international partners in multilateral efforts that are key to global security. 

Such efforts as elimination of Syria chemical weapons, for example, our work together on Iran and, I would add, also our work together in the arms control field, and that means a continued implementation of arms control——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we are not advocating—so the administration and what you are suggesting today—good policy would be not 

to punish Russia in those areas for what they are doing in 

Ukraine? 

Ms. FRIEDT. I would not say punish. We have a very clear position on the events in Ukraine and——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we should not let cooperation be a tool 

then. Mr. Hartley, could you answer that and then I will—I have 

already taken too much time. I am sorry. 

Mr. HARTLEY. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question. Well, as 

Anita said we—there are areas where both we and the Russians 

perceive our national interest to coincide and Anita outlined a 

number of them. One area where we now have a very profound difference is over what the post-Cold War European security environment should be—what the ground rules are. 

Coming out of the Cold War, we had—we thought some very 

clear rules based on the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and other 

agreements that European borders would not be changed by force. 

The Russians have undertaken to do that with regard to Crimea. 

We believe that they are actively involved using their special forces 

and other agents to destabilize Eastern Ukraine and it is for that 

reason because of this behavior contrary——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. Thank you very much. And Mr. 

Chairman, again, as we discuss this China is still in the world and 

in the picture and I hope that as we look and we work these problems out that we keep in mind that China has to be part of the 

equation or the world will be less secure. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. I will—the Chair will recognize 

the ranking member of the subcommittee from California, Mr. 

Sherman, for 5 minutes. 

27

Mr. SHERMAN. This has become to some extent a Ukraine hearing and we are honored by the presence of the deputy assistant secretary from the relevant bureau. 

Mr. Hartley, has the Ukrainian Government been successful in 

disarming anti-Russia militias? 

Mr. HARTLEY. Thank you, sir, for that question. My expertise 

falls more on the NATO, the OSCE and the bilateral security assistance side. It is my impression that they have made some 

progress there but I would be happy to take that question for a 

more authoritative response. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. While you take that question, the other 

question is what are we doing to urge the government in Kiev to 

honor and even make less subject to alteration statutes adopted in 

the past to assure the Russian language would be an official language in the south and east of Ukraine? 

What are we doing to say yes, there may be forces—political 

forces in Kiev that say let us impose the Ukrainian language on 

everyone and there may be forces on the other side? 

I for one understand America is spending its treasure and taking 

risks for the territorial integrity of the Ukraine. I am an agnostic 

as to what language should be spoken in the East and I would hate 

to think that we find ourselves exposed to risk and cost because the 

noncompromising elements prevail in Kiev on these language 

issues. 

Ms. Friedt, what—does Russia put forward any arguments that 

we are in violation of any of the arms control agreements that we 

have entered into with Russia or with its predecessor government? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Thank you for that question, sir. Yes, as a matter 

of fact Russia, when we issue our annual compliance report every 

year, at least this administration, the Russians regularly come 

back with some—their own——

Mr. SHERMAN. So they have an annual compliance report which 

may even be issued on time. Sorry about that. Sorry. Go ahead. 

And what do you think is their strongest complaint? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Strongest complaint, the one I would say—I can’t 

give you all of their complaints right now because I haven’t looked 

at them recently but certainly our missile defense is what they 

focus on. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And which treaty do they believe the missile defense efforts are in violation of? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Well, it would be more than likely the INF treaty 

is one. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. Now, as—I am trying to understand what 

is the legal obligation of Russia with regard to intermediate missiles that they claim will be used only in naval warfare. 

As I understand it, they are allowed to test these missiles from 

a ground-based launcher but not if that ground-based launcher 

would be the effective launcher to use in case hostilities broke out. 

What are they allowed to do on land in order to test weapons that 

they say are exclusively for naval use? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Sir, quite frankly, thank you for your question. I am 

not prepared right now to go into technical details. The focus here 

is——

28

Mr. SHERMAN. I am asking you what the treaty provides. I am 

asking for you to just inform us what the treaty provides. What is 

the United States allowed to do? What is the—and I am not asking 

for a secret here. 

Ms. FRIEDT. No, no. Not at all a secret. But let me just briefly 

state that what, as I mentioned before, that we have very serious 

concerns and as you have stated that Russia is developing a 

ground-launched cruise missile that is inconsistent with the INF 

treaty and we have made those concerns very clear to the Russians. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I am hoping you would make them clear to us. Is 

the mere testing of—and Mr. Hartley, I don’t know if you have a 

comment on this—the mere testing of this missile a violation if 

they can claim that it is—that they only plan to deploy it on ships? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Sir, that would go into the specific range and such 

that it is tested. So it——

Mr. SHERMAN. It is being tested for—you know, it is an intermediate range missile. The question is is it a naval intermediate 

range missile or are they creating a ground-based intermediate 

missile? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Sir, I can’t get into details here, I am afraid, on that 

topic because of the—I would be happy to talk about it in 

closed——

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. The details I want are what are the provisions of the treaty but my time has more than expired. I thank you 

for your time. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Friedt, it has taken 5 years 

for the State Department to reach a verdict on this treaty, in my 

opinion. 

So my question is are the Russians, in our point of view, in violation of the treaty? And I see only one of three answers—yes, no, 

you don’t know. So which one of those is the answer? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Sir, we are in the process of finalizing the annual 

compliance report and we will have a finding so shortly. 

Mr. POE. So you can’t tell me whether you—it is yes or no or you 

don’t know? 

Ms. FRIEDT. I can’t at this point because, as I mentioned, it 

is——

Mr. POE. When are you going to have this report ready? It is—

like the ranking member said, it is overdue. 

Ms. FRIEDT. Sir——

Mr. POE. It is 5 years taken to get a report here. Either they are 

in compliance or they are not in compliance. We’ve got to make foreign policy decisions and we don’t know if the Russians are cheating or not? So how long is it going—when are we going to get a 

verdict on the report? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Sir, we report on this issue every year on the INF 

treaty and at this point the annual compliance report is in the 

process of being finalized. 

Mr. POE. So when will it be finalized? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Later this spring. 

Mr. POE. You don’t know. Okay. Each of you have said that the 

actions by Putin are illegal. You have seen that there is some disVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:00 Jun 26, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\042914\87711 SHIRL
29

agreement here as to whether Russia can do what they are doing 

internationally or not. 

Why is the action of Russia going into Crimea and then now 

Eastern Europe—Ukraine—illegal in the United States’ point of 

view? You both said it was illegal. So why is it illegal? 

Mr. HARTLEY. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question. The—undertaking the actions they did the Russians have violated their commitments under the U.N. charter. That is from a legal standpoint. 

From a political standpoint, they have violated—well, they have 

broken commitments made under the 1994 Budapest memorandum 

and as well as the commitments under the Helsinki Final Act, 

among others. 

Mr. POE. Ms. Friedt, do you have any other comments other than 

what Mr. Hartley has already said on why the action is illegal? 

Ms. FRIEDT. No, sir. I think Mr. Hartley has answered the question. 

Mr. POE. When I was in Ukraine and in recent weeks have 

talked to other heads of state in the area they are not the only 

country that is concerned about their territorial integrity—

Moldova, other former Soviet republics not yet in NATO and some 

that are in NATO. Are there concerns warranted? Mr. Hartley. 

Mr. HARTLEY. Yes, sir, if I may. The—of course, they——

Mr. POE. And I am talking about concerns of Russia coming in 

and taking over some of their territory. That is my question. 

Mr. HARTLEY. Yes, sir. The actions that the Russians have undertaken with regard to Crimea and what they are doing in Eastern Ukraine gives deep cause for concern on the part of those nations. 

Any country that has a Russian minority or a Russian-speaking 

minority, at least according to Mr. Putin in his March—April 18th 

speech, according to Mr. Putin’s public statements is—would seem 

at risk of being—be at risk of Russian intervention. 

Mr. POE. The Ukrainian Government, on the issue of interest of 

Russians in the east, there is no definition as to what a Russian 

is. 

Is it a Russian that was born in Russia? Is it a Russian that has 

moved to Eastern Ukraine? Is it a Russian who wants to be Russian? There is no definition as to what a Russian is. 

Do we have a definition of what a Russian is in the eastern part 

of the Ukraine? 

Mr. HARTLEY. I don’t know that we do, sir. 

Mr. POE. It means different things to different people? 

Mr. HARTLEY. That is true, and the way Mr. Putin seems to define it is an ethnic Russian or a Russian speaker. 

Mr. POE. The elections in Ukraine are coming up May 26th, I believe. I think it is important for stability in Ukraine that they have 

these elections, that they are fair, that people vote. 

Do you see—I am asking you just to kind of look 26 days in the 

future—do you see that the Russians may cause a disturbance, a 

crisis, to try to postpone these elections? It seems like to me they 

cause a crisis, then they want to solve the crisis by moving in their 

troops. So are we expecting a possible crisis to try to get these elections postponed? 

30

Mr. HARTLEY. Sir, thank you for that. Well, I would be hesitant 

to speculate too far into the future. The conditions are such that 

that is a legitimate concern. 

In the negotiation of the Geneva statement, the U.S, the EU and 

the Ukrainians all urged the inclusion of a sentence that referred 

to the May 25th elections and the need that they be carried out in 

an orderly and transparent way. 

The Russians refuse to include that in the text of the statement. 

The disruptions are already taking place in Eastern Ukraine that 

are bound to complicate the election efforts and we believe that 

those—that the instability there is being fomented by the Russians. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Hartley, Ms. Friedt. We will—chair will 

yield to the gentleman from New York, Mr. Meeks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me—you know, there 

was a beginning where we thought that we would be entering a 

new world where we would be able to have as we did with the New 

START treaty, for example, we are not abolishing nuclear weapons 

altogether. There was a—we were moving in the right direction. 

Senate ratified it—the treaty, and the Russian Federation then 

right after ratified the treaty, and there was a lot of things going 

on because it seems to me when we are dealing with Crimea and 

dealing with the east Ukraine we have got to balance a number of 

issues also—our NATO allies. 

I believe that sanctions work but only when they are multilateral 

sanctions. If we do sanctions individually they are not as strong as 

they would be multilaterally. 

Yet a number of our NATO allies have concerns and we have got 

to make sure that they are part of whatever we do. We can’t separate ourselves, in my viewpoint, from them and that is why our 

NATO allies are tremendously important. 

Some of them are more dependent upon Russia than others and 

some arms experts—control experts continue to report that Russia 

could potentially withdraw from treaties such as the INF and that 

they may further—any further expansion of arms control efforts 

will likely make no headway for the foreseeable future. 

So and some of my colleagues, and I hear some of the pundits, 

et cetera, saying give weapons and some saying more sanctions. 

Very few people are talking about diplomatic solutions. 

So my first question is do—either one of you do you still see—

you know, I always try to believe that there is hope, that we all—

we should talk and have conversations with nations that we don’t 

disagree with. 

Is diplomacy an option here? Do you see diplomacy having a 

chance here or have we—you know, or it has no chance? What role 

do you think diplomacy has in this? 

Mr. HARTLEY. Thank you, sir. We believe that diplomacy is a 

critical aspect of this. That is why Secretary Kerry has had, I forget, six, eight, 10 conversations with Mr. Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, over the last couple of weeks. 

That is why he went to Geneva to negotiate the terms of the Geneva statement that laid out a pathway for de-escalation and so we 

very much believe that the—that that is the—that diplomacy is the 

way to resolve this to find a political solution. 

31

The sanctions that we are imposing have been imposed only after 

those efforts have so far proven fruitless. But our sanctions are 

scalable. They are flexible. If the Russians make the decision that 

they want to de-escalate the situation and return to behavior consistent with international norms then we can reverse the sanctions. 

But we—even as we go forward, taking a harder line on those, 

we want to keep the door open for a diplomatic solution. 

Mr. MEEKS. And that being the case try to prevent a scenario 

that we currently have and I do see some of the other regions, 

whether it is in the Caucuses, the Baltic or the Eastern Europe or 

Central Asia, you know, we have got to focus on some of those 

countries now. 

I have got a lot of friends in those countries that think Mr. 

Chairman Poe may have said something. What do we say to them 

now? What should we do. 

I mean, when you look at Ukraine its economy was in the tank 

and some say Crimea is going to be a big burden on Russia, as it 

seems right now. But we have got to firm up the rest of the 

Ukraine economically. 

What do you see that we can do? Mr. Hartley, you talked about 

that there is huge concerns right now about Russia, you know, at 

least some of these countries about Russia coming in. What can we 

do now before there is any possibility of Russia invading? 

What can we do to help those countries now so that we can make 

them—assure them that we are there, that NATO is there? What 

do think we can do right now, prospective? 

Mr. HARTLEY. Thank you, sir. Well, with regard to NATO allies, 

particular those on—we have now come to call front line states, the 

three Baltic countries—Poland, Romania, Bulgaria—we have already deployed U.S. forces—land, sea and air—and NATO allies 

are deploying at this point, principally sea and air assets in a 

measured way to underscore that the Article 5 commitment to collective defense is credible and has teeth. So we are in constant consultation with our NATO allies at NATO headquarters. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me just ask—and we are out of time—I just 

want to ask this one last question. Do you think Russia is backing 

down from its arms agreements with the United States and preparing to have a continued military escalation? 

You know, that is what some are saying—that in other words, 

people are saying that Russia is building up and they are strong 

and kind of daring the United States to have a military escalation 

on NATO to come up and make them militarily see that that is 

part and parcel of what is going on here? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Sir, thank you for that question. That is precisely 

why the New START treaty is so important. The fact that we 

have—and the fact that it has been successfully implemented since 

it was signed and inspections began in 2011. 

Russians are implementing the New START treaty and it does 

set the limits on their ability to build up nuclear forces. 

Mr. MEEKS. And you don’t see them violating that right now? 

Ms. FRIEDT. No, sir. No, sir. 

Mr. MEEKS. Okay. So there is still cooperation in that regards. 

Ms. FRIEDT. Yes, sir. 

32

Mr. MEEKS. And there are a number of other things that they 

are still cooperating with us on? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. HARTLEY. May I add to that, sir, or do you want to move on? 

Mr. POE. If you can make it brief. 

Mr. HARTLEY. Okay. On the conventional side, the Russians have 

been modernizing but—and it has been a source of some concern. 

But we feel as though the assets available to the NATO alliance 

are sufficient to deter any incursions on NATO territory. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Hartley. The Chair will recognize the 

gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Ladies and gentlemen, appreciate your time. Ms. Friedt, the State Department is aware that 

Russia may have been in violation of the 1987 Intermediate Range 

Nuclear Forces Treaty while negotiating the New START treaty. 

The first question is when, as far as you understand it, did the 

administration first learn of the possible violation of the INF treaty 

by the Russians? Was it in 2008? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Sir, the New START treaty—ratification of the New 

START treaty did not—I mean, at that time the—Russia was implementing the INF treaty successfully. At this point, I would go 

into—prefer to go into closed sessions to deal with the circumstances, the specific dates on the specific questions you asked. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. Then let me ask you this. When the President 

was overheard talking to Medvedev at the time he said that after 

the election he could be more flexible, and this is in the context of 

Members of Congress being concerned about our national security 

posture and our ability to secure our nation in light of adversaries 

and enemies, if you want to call some folks that. What did he mean 

by that? What do you think he meant by that? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Sir, what I can say here is that the United States 

and this administration will only pursue arms control agreements 

that are in the United States national security interest and that is 

something that this administration and the President believes. 

Mr. PERRY. But if we know or if we suspect with some credibility 

that our partner in negotiation is cheating at the time we are negotiating a reduction in our capability, how is that—and we don’t 

take that into account and we continue to march forward with our 

reduction, how—can you explain to me how that is in our best interest? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Sir, as I mentioned in my statement, this administration takes compliance with arms control treaties very seriously. 

During the negotiation of the New START treaty, we took compliance with arms control treaties into consideration. 

Mr. PERRY. But we knew or we suspected? We suspected while 

we were negotiating the treaty that they were cheating and we continued forward, and it is fine to continue forward with the negotiation. We, as far as you know, and as far as Russia is concerned, 

based on your testimony have upheld our end of the bargain. 

We still don’t know—according to your testimony, we won’t know 

until later this spring, and by the way, spring is almost over—to 

33

the extent of their cheating and I recognize and acknowledge the 

sensitivity of the date. 

So I will be happy to talk to you in closed session about that. But 

my concern is that we are unilaterally disarming America while we 

know or we suspect with some certainty that Russia is cheating on 

their end of the deal and I still don’t understand how that is in our 

best interest. 

Ms. FRIEDT. Thank you for that question, sir. The United 

States—arms control is in the United States’ national security interest. 

Mr. PERRY. It is in our interest when we are controlling theirs 

or they are controlling theirs within the paradigm as well as ours. 

But it is not in our interest when we are controlling ours and they 

are not controlling theirs to our satisfaction in accordance with the 

previous agreement. Would you agree? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Sir, we take compliance—this administration takes 

compliance with arms control very seriously. I am happy to discuss 

the specifics in closed session. 

Let me say with respect to the START treaty that was a very 

carefully negotiated agreement based on the nuclear posture review. That was a document that received interagency—a very close 

study by then Secretary Gates and by then chairman of the——

Mr. PERRY. But does it—but did they have the knowledge at that 

time? Because we didn’t—and again, maybe you want to wait to a 

closed session but it is my understanding that we didn’t report our 

suspicion or our knowledge of their breach of the previous treaty 

while the negotiation was happening to our NATO allies. 

Did our negotiators—did Secretary Gates—did he know at that 

time while he was in agreement with this accord that we had a 

very strong suspicion that they were cheating on the previous 

agreement? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Sir, I would like to take you up on your offer to do 

this in closed session. 

Mr. PERRY. All right. Then moving on, based on—based on recent 

actions in Crimea, can—how do you—do you think the American 

people should trust the Russians to adhere to a bilateral and multilateral arms control agreement, and if so, why? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Sir, this administration believes in trust but verify. 

So verification and compliance with arms control treaties is very 

important. 

Mr. PERRY. Let me ask you one final question, with due indulgence, Mr. Chairman. 

So if we find out and if we prove and in the spring time if it is 

determined and you report that they had indeed cheated, for lack 

of a better phrase, on the previous treaty, the previous agreement, 

what will be the ramifications? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Sir, I am not prepared to discuss this at this point. 

When the report is finalized we will discuss it. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield. 

Mr. POE. Gentleman yields back his time. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Yoho, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate it—your 

testimony today. 

34

Why do you think Russia has become so emboldened here, going 

back to August 2010, as far as invading other countries? I thought 

it was a simple question. I am sorry. 

Mr. HARTLEY. Thank you, sir. If only there were simple questions 

in this life. The—it is, of course, difficult to know precisely why the 

Russians and Mr. Putin have taken the actions they have. 

There are factors related to history, factors related to concern 

about the influence that a successful democracy and market economy on its border by a land—a country that used to be part of Russia might have on the—or part of the Russian empire might have 

on the rest of the population in Russia. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Let me—let me go in a different direction here. 

As you said, there are the simple questions but the answers aren’t 

often simple. Do you see the 2010 START treaty with us reducing 

our weapons to 1,550 and with President Obama and the administration willingness to reduce further unilateral cuts to 1,000 do you 

think that has emboldened the Russians—Mr. Putin and the Russians? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Thank you for that question, sir. No, I do not. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Do you see Russia viewing us as weak, 

undecisive, not willing? Our credibility has been damaged. If you 

go back over the course of the last 2 or 3 years—you know, red 

lines, no red lines, regimes must change, we never said regimes 

must change, not fulfilling the missile defense system in Poland 

and, you know, putting a stop to that? Do you think they see us 

as just kind being weak and not with strong resolve? 

Ms. FRIEDT. Sir, I do not see U.S. foreign policy as weak. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. How about you, Mr. Hartley? 

Mr. HARTLEY. No, sir. I agree with Anita. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. So with what is going on in Venezuela in 

our own back yard, with what China is doing drawing an arbitrary 

no-fly zone with Syria and Iran and Iran is closer to a nuclear 

weapon—in fact, the last—just here a couple of months ago we 

were told that Iran would have enough material to develop five to 

six nuclear bombs within 4 to 5 months, I see—what I am seeing 

from where I am sitting and what I read is the lone superpower 

that Bill Clinton talked about that America could no longer afford 

to be becoming weaker, everybody else is becoming emboldened and 

I see people flexing their muscles because of our weakness and that 

lack of resolve that we have. 

Where do you think this will lead? Where do you think Russia 

will end up? Are they going to go into Transnistria? Do you see 

them going into there? Because that is a large Russian-speaking 

population. Do either one of you see that? 

Mr. HARTLEY. Sir, we see that there is a risk and the Russians 

have influence in Transnistria. But it is our policy to exact a cost 

from the Russians for their behavior that is in violation of international norms. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. And do you feel the sanctions that we are 

talking about that we have done do you think they will have any 

compact on Russia’s aggression? 

Mr. HARTLEY. Sir, the purpose of the sanctions is to try to influence Russian behavior, to bring it back within international norms. 

Mr. YOHO. How is it working so far, Ms. Friedt? 

35

Ms. FRIEDT. Actually, that’s Mr.—Brent, go ahead. 

Mr. HARTLEY. If I may, sir. 

Mr. YOHO. Yes. 

Mr. HARTLEY. This could be a long process, sir. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. But, again, do we have compliance with 

other nations? Are they putting strong sanctions in place too or is 

it just us doing this unilaterally? 

Mr. HARTLEY. Sir, yesterday as we announced our third round of 

sanctions we were joined by the G–7, which includes Japan, Canada and four of the major EU members. But the entire EU also 

joined. 

You could—we could—the Norwegians, who are not part of the 

EU, also adhere to EU sanctions. So we have a broad international 

coalition that is focused on bringing Russia back into compliance 

with international norms. 

Mr. YOHO. Let me ask you one other question. Do we have troops 

on the ground in Ukraine right now? 

Mr. HARTLEY. Sir, we do not have combat troops. I mean, it depends on how you define it. We have a defense attache. We have 

officials from the Pentagon that visit. But I think the simple answer is no. 

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back. A couple more questions 

from the Chair and then I will give the ranking member time if he 

wishes. 

Are the Russians going to give Crimea back, Mr. Hartley? 

Mr. HARTLEY. Sir, we are doing everything we can to encourage 

that. 

Mr. POE. Okay. I know we are doing that but are they going to 

give it back, at the end of the day? Is it going to be part of Ukraine 

or is it going to be part of Russia? 

Mr. HARTLEY. Sir, it is our policy that it remains a part of 

Ukraine and should be returned to Ukrainian control. 

Mr. POE. So you don’t know. How about you, Ms. Friedt? 

Ms. FRIEDT. I agree with Mr. Hartley. 

Mr. POE. Okay. We don’t know. The 20 kidnapped election 

watchers—who kidnapped them? 

Mr. HARTLEY. Sir, there were—it was a Vienna Document inspection team. They weren’t election observers. It was—the team originally—it was composed of eight Europeans led by the Germans and 

they had five Ukrainian escorts with them. They were kidnapped 

by pro-Russia individuals or a pro-Russia group in Eastern 

Ukraine. 

Mr. POE. Okay. What were they doing in Eastern Ukraine? You 

say they were inspectors of what? 

Mr. HARTLEY. They were there under the Vienna Document, sir. 

All 57 nations that are participating states in the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe to include Russia have agreed 

to a set of measures that are intended to build confidence among 

the partners—among the participants. 

Part one mechanism of that is our inspections that each participating state is obliged to receive a certain number of inspections 

every year. But they can also offer voluntary inspections. 

Mr. POE. So they went over there for inspections of what? 

36

Mr. HARTLEY. They were there to inspect Ukrainian military installations and deployments but also to——

Mr. POE. And they were kidnapped by Russian sympathizers? 

Mr. HARTLEY. Correct, sir. 

Mr. POE. All right. Last question. Is Europe slow walking sanctions because they are concerned about the fact that many of them 

are totally dependent on Russia for their energy and that Russia 

may then just retaliate? Is that one of their concerns about sanctions? 

Mr. Meeks asked about the Europeans and their not being too 

supportive, as we would hope in this. Is that part of the reason or 

do you know, Mr. Hartley? 

Mr. HARTLEY. Both we and the Europeans are looking for ways 

for sanctions that will maximize the impact on the Russians while 

minimizing the impact on our own economies and businesses. So it 

is fair to say that that is a consideration of the Europeans, sir. 

Mr. POE. All right. Thank you. 

I will yield to the ranking member if he has any more questions. 

All right. I want to thank both of our witnesses for their participation and any other questions that any members of the panel 

have will be put in writing and we would expect a response from 

you. 

Thank you very much for being here. The subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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