Henry Sokolski

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MOVING BEYOND PRETENSE:

Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation

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MOVING BEYOND PRETENSE: 

NUCLEAR POWER AND NONPROLIFERATION

Henry Sokolski

Editor

June 2014

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This volume is the 17th in a series of edited volumes of contracted research the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center 

(NPEC) has published in cooperation with the Strategic Studies 

Institute of the U.S. Army War College. 

The volume features research done over the last 2 years and 

is part of a larger project to reassess the prevailing assumptions 

driving current U.S. and international nuclear nonproliferation 

policies. Funding for this project came from the Carnegie Cor-
v

poration of New York, the MacArthur Foundation, and the U.S. 

Department of Defense.

Much of the work to prepare the book for publication was 

undertaken by NPEC’s research associate, Kate Harrison, and 

the staff of the Strategic Studies Institute, especially Dr. James 

Pierce and Rita Rummel. This book would not have been possible 

without their help. Special credit also should go to Victor Gilinsky, who helped guide this project. Finally, heartfelt thanks to 

the project’s authors and reviewers, who contributed their time 

and ideas.

ISBN 1-58487-620-4

vii

CONTENTS

Foreword ......................................................................xi

1. Introduction: Nuclear Energy’s 

 Security Story .........................................................1 

Henry Sokolski 

Part I: Nuclear Proliferation Matters ......................15

2. Nuclear Proliferation—Looking Back, 

 Thinking Ahead: How Bad Would the 

 Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons Be? .........17 

François Heisbourg 

3. The History of Proliferation Optimism: 

 Does It Have a Future? ....................................... 45

Matthew Kroenig 

4. Preventive War and the Spread of Nuclear 

 Programs ...............................................................91

Matthew Fuhrmann 

Part II: Nuclear Power, Nuclear Weapons—

Clarifying the Links ................................................117

5. Nuclear Power, Nuclear Weapons—

 Clarifying the Links .......................................... 119

Victor Gilinsky

6. Scoping Intangible Proliferation Related to 

 Peaceful Nuclear Programs: Tracking Nuclear 

 Proliferation Within a Commercial Nuclear 

 Power Program ..................................................149

Susan Voss
viii

7. Persuading Countries to Forgo Nuclear

 Fuel-Making: What History Suggests .............185

Richard S. Cleary

8. Centrifuges: A New Era for Nuclear 

 Proliferation ....................................................... 227

R. Scott Kemp

Part III: How Well Can We Safeguard the 

Peaceful Atom?......................................................... 263

9. How Well Will the International Atomic

 Energy Agency Be Able to Safeguard 

 More Nuclear Materials in More States? ........265

Patrick S. Roberts

10. International Atomic Energy Agency

 Inspections in Perspective ................................303

Olli Heinonen

11. Looking Beyond Iran and North Korea for 

 Safeguarding the Foundations of Nuclear 

 Nonproliferation ................................................311 

Pierre Goldschmidt

Part IV: Ignoring Nuclear Weapons 

Proliferation Intelligence........................................323

12. Casting a Blind Eye: Kissinger and 

 Nixon Finesse Israel’s Bomb............................. 325

Victor Gilinsky

13. The 1979 South Atlantic Flash: 

 The Case for an Israeli Nuclear Test................ 345

Leonard Weiss
ix

14. The Nonuse and Abuse of 

 Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence in the 

 Cases of North Korea and Iran ........................ 373

Robert Zarate

15. Facing the Reality of Iran as a 

 De Facto Nuclear State .......................................411

Gregory S. Jones

Part V: Serious Rules for Nuclear 

Nonproliferation.......................................................455

16. Serious Rules For Nuclear Power 

 without Proliferation..........................................457

Henry Sokolski and Victor Gilinsky

About the Contributors ............................................501

xi

FOREWORD

The President of the United States and nearly all 

his critics agree that the spread of nuclear weapons 

and the possibility of their seizure and potential use 

is the greatest danger facing the United States and the 

world. Looking at the way government and industry 

officials downplay the risks of civilian nuclear technology and materials being diverted to make bombs, 

though, a person would get almost the opposite impression. In fact, most governments have made the 

promotion of nuclear power’s growth and global development a top priority. Throughout, they have insisted that the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation are manageable either by making future nuclear 

plants more “proliferation-resistant” or by strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

safeguards and acquiring more timely intelligence on 

proliferators. 

How sound is this view, though? How useful might 

civilian nuclear programs be for states that want to get 

nuclear weapons quickly? Are current IAEA nuclear 

safeguards sufficient to block military nuclear diversions from civilian programs? Are there easy fixes to 

upgrade these controls? How much can we count on 

more timely intelligence on proliferators to stem the 

further spread of nuclear weapons? 

This volume taps the insights and analyses of 13 

top security and nuclear experts to get the answers. 

What emerges is a comprehensive counternarrative 

to the prevailing wisdom and a series of innovative 

reforms to tighten existing nuclear nonproliferation 

controls. For any official, analyst, or party concerned 
xii

about the spread of nuclear technology, this book is 

essential reading.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION:

NUCLEAR ENERGY’S SECURITY STORY

Henry Sokolski

Governments have funded most of the nuclear industry’s research and development, financed or guaranteed loans for its construction and export of nuclear 

plants, capped its liability for off-site damages in the 

case of nuclear accidents, and promoted its development internationally. Throughout, officials have insisted that the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation attendant to the further spread of nuclear energy 

programs are manageable. 

This view is fortified with a narrative. A sharp line 

is drawn between boiling water and making nuclear 

fuel. The nuclear weapons risks attendant to nuclear 

power are marginalized, whereas those related to 

making nuclear fuel are recognized. Nuclear supplier 

states, it is argued, though, should be able to persuade their nonweapons state customers not to make 

nuclear fuel because this activity is expensive and 

complex. Future nuclear plants also can be made more 

proliferation-resistant. The narrative then emphasizes 

the utility of International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) safeguards. These can be strengthened to deter and detect most of what matters, and what they 

cannot deter or detect, it is argued, can be countered. 

How? This can be accomplished with more timely intelligence to support covert national operations, which 

the United States and other like-minded states can 

be counted to take against Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty (NPT) violators. Finally, although several more 
2

countries are certain to acquire nuclear weapons, this 

will not matter, it is argued, since nuclear weapons are 

not militarily useful except to deter use, a mission that 

these weapons can easily accomplish.1

This is the complete proliferation narrative. Although not every nuclear proponent makes it, all of 

these arguments are now, in one fashion or another, 

made by industry, academics, and public officials. It is 

powerful and bolsters nuclear power’s further expansion. Indeed, so far, no real counternarratives, only 

counterpoints (i.e., qualifications), have yet been offered to challenge this upbeat view. Some have noted 

that truly proliferation-resistant reactors and fuel cycles are not yet at hand, that what has been proposed 

is unlikely to work, and that nuclear power is currently too expensive to be practical.2

 Yet, the rejoinder 

to these counterpoints—that in time, affordable proliferation-resistant systems will be developed—has 

been easy to make. A true counternarrative would be 

more difficult to deflect. It would show how the truth 

is actually the opposite of each of the nuclear security 

points made herein. Again, such a counternarrative 

has not yet been offered.

This volume is designed to do so. It features research my center commissioned over a 2-year period 

to reassess the assumptions currently driving U.S. and 

international nonproliferation policies. It spotlights 

the analysis and insights of some of the world’s top 

security scholars. 

The first section, “Nuclear Proliferation Matters,” 

features the work of François Heisbourg, chairman 

of the International Institute for Strategic Studies 

(IISS), Matthew Kroenig of Georgetown University 

and the Council on Foreign Relations, and Matthew 

Fuhrmann of Texas A&M University. They contend 
3

that nuclear weapons proliferation is more likely to 

occur with the spread of civilian nuclear technology 

and that such nuclear proliferation constitutes a threat 

to international security—certainly if there is nuclear 

weapons use, but even if there is not.

The volume’s second section, “Nuclear Power, 

Nuclear Weapons—Clarifying the Links,” makes the 

case that civilian nuclear power programs actually afford a major leg up for any nation seeking development of a nuclear weapons option. It showcases four 

studies. The first, by former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commissioner and RAND Science Division director 

Victor Gilinsky, explains just how useful and quickly 

transformable power-reactor plutonium is to making 

a proliferator’s first nuclear weapons. His analysis includes plutonium generated in the most proliferation 

resistant of power plants, the light water reactor. Susan 

Voss, formerly with Los Alamos National Laboratory, 

adds to this argument by detailing just how much intangible nuclear weapons material production-related 

technology and training is imparted along with any 

“peaceful” nuclear power program. Taken together, 

these studies more than suggest that nuclear power 

programs present nuclear weapons proliferation risks 

for any state but those we are certain to have forsworn 

making nuclear weapons and their key ingredients—

highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium.

Optimism that we can easily persuade states to 

forswear making these nuclear fuels because of the 

cost and complexity doing so, moreover, is misplaced. 

Here, Richard Cleary of the American Enterprise Institute’s account of previous American failures to get 

Iran, Brazil, South Korea, and Pakistan to stop making 

enriched uranium or separated plutonium is a cautionary tale. Compounding this sad historical record 

are the technical facts that nuclear fuel-making is not 
4

as complex or daunting as generally portrayed. Victor 

Gilinsky makes this point in regard to quick and dirty 

plutonium reprocessing schemes, at least one that is 

available in the unclassified literature. As for uranium 

enrichment, Scott Kemp of MIT’s nuclear engineering 

department documents how basic centrifuge uranium 

enrichment technology is good enough to make bombs 

and is actually a relatively easy and affordable hurdle 

for states to climb over. Worse, it is an activity that 

can be hidden relatively easily from IAEA inspections 

until a state chooses to break out quickly to acquire 

nuclear weapons.

This, then, brings us to the book’s third section, 

“How Well Can We Safeguard the Peaceful Atom?” 

and the question of how well the IAEA and the United 

Nations (UN) are likely to do their job enforcing the 

NPT in the future. The short answer is mixed. The key 

concern here is how well these institutions will be able 

to cope with the likely spread of nuclear energy programs to new states. In his analysis, Patrick S. Roberts 

of Virginia Tech raises a number of worrisome questions. What are the risks associated with simply scaling up the IAEA’s current inspection system even assuming it had the funds to do so? Would it tolerate 

the inevitable increase in false alarms that must come 

with more inspections or would it tune the system to 

filter out such alarms even further than it already has? 

What, moreover, should be the metrics for IAEA success or failure in conducting its inspections? Would 

we know when and if the IAEA was failing at its mission and be able to take timely corrective action?

We get worrisome, partial answers from the analyses of two of the IAEA’s best known deputy directors general for safeguards, Olli Heinonen and Pierre 

Goldschmidt. Dr. Heinonen notes that the IAEA could 
5

have the authority to conduct more special short-notice inspections and that it could do so without necessarily securing the unanimous consent of the agency’s 

governing board. He argues that it would be most 

useful in the future for the IAEA’s safeguards department to exercise such authority. It remains to be seen 

if it ever will.

Will there be clear consequences for those that violate the nuclear rules? Pierre Goldschmidt homes in on 

this question and recommends that the enforcement 

of safeguard agreements be made mandatory for any 

IAEA member and that they remain in force whether 

or not the country in question remains a member of 

the NPT. He also recommends that a set of countryneutral sanctions be agreed to by the UN Security 

Council in advance so that any country the IAEA finds 

in breach of its IAEA or NPT obligations will be certain to be sanctioned. The prospects for these recommendations’ adoption are doubtful to unclear. 

Until and unless they are adopted, whatever enforcement there might be will be taken by the major 

states relying on their own intelligence. But how much 

should we rely on such actions? This issue is examined in the book’s fourth section, “Ignoring Nuclear 

Weapons Proliferation Intelligence.” 

Conventional wisdom presumes governments 

want to collect all the intelligence they can on proliferating states and that they are eager to act on this intelligence, especially if the proliferators are violating 

the rules. All that is lacking, according to this view, 

is sufficient, timely intelligence. With more situational 

awareness, it is argued, the United States and likeminded states can do much more to combat nuclear 

proliferation. 
6

This supply side view of countering proliferation, 

however, ignores significant demand problems Washington and other states have for such timely proliferation information. Certainly, the United States sat on 

intelligence regarding A. Q. Khan in Pakistan and 

acted only very belatedly regarding intelligence concerning North Korea’s uranium enrichment program. 

Such reticence, moreover, is hardly new. 

Consider the case of Israel’s acquisition of U.S. nuclear weapons material in the 1960s. Israel promised 

Presidents John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon that it would not acquire nuclear weapons. 

When intelligence emerged that Israel had illicitly acquired U.S. weapons-grade uranium and developed 

nuclear arms, Nixon and, to a lesser extent, Johnson 

glossed over or excused it. This sad history is detailed 

in Victor Gilinsky’s history and backgrounder to the 

now famous meeting between Nixon and Golda Meir 

in l969. 

In yet another chapter, Leonard Weiss, formerly 

chief of staff of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, which had oversight of nuclear proliferation 

matters, details how the U.S. Government did all it 

could to deny the possibility that the Israelis, who ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty, conducted a nuclear 

test off the coast of South Africa in 1979, even though 

the evidence clearly suggests they did. 

Israel, however, was not the only country to receive such treatment. In his historical analysis, Robert Zarate of the Foreign Policy Initiative details how 

American policymakers either ignored or distorted 

proliferation intelligence on Iran’s and North Korea’s 

nuclear programs in order to avoid taking timely 

action against either state.
7

Finally, there is the problem with how we interpret 

the intelligence we get. Today, most officials would 

like to believe that there is still time to prevent Iran 

from developing nuclear weapons. This has encouraged the view that Iran is still far from getting its first 

bomb. Gregory Jones, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center’s (NPEC) senior researcher, though, details how, in fact, Iran’s nuclear weapons capability is 

so advanced that it no longer is a problem to be solved 

so much as a fact with which to be reckoned. That 

many intelligence officials cannot bring themselves to 

agree to this in public suggests how uncertain relying on their intelligence findings would be to assure 

timely counterproliferation actions to manage nuclear 

weapons proliferation.

How, then, are we to prevent more Irans? Mr. Jones 

suggests that we tighten the nuclear rules. This, then, 

brings us to the most important part of this volume’s 

offerings: the nonproliferation principles and steps 

recommended in “Serious Rules for Nuclear Power 

without Proliferation.” Victor Gilinsky and I developed this chapter initially as a thought exercise. What 

would a proper set of nonproliferation rules look like 

if one did not put nuclear power sales and promotion 

first, but instead emphasized security?

As we see it, this question has only been seriously 

tackled twice before: in 1946 with the Acheson-Lilienthal Report on the international control of nuclear 

power, and in 1976 with the Ford-Carter executive 

branch decisions to defer the use and production 

of commercial plutonium-based nuclear fuels. The 

Acheson-Lilienthal proposals were rejected by the 

Soviets. Shortly thereafter, the Dwight Eisenhower 

administration decided to share U.S. civilian nuclear 

energy internationally in the hopes that the control 
8

issues raised in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report could 

be solved later. This gave rise to the Atoms for Peace 

program, the creation of a loose set of nuclear controls 

administered by the IAEA, and the wholesale export 

of nuclear technology internationally. Atoms for Peace 

remained U.S. policy until 1974, when this approach 

was literally blown away by India’s “peaceful” nuclear explosion of a bomb made of plutonium that was 

produced using “peaceful” U.S. and Canadian civilian nuclear assistance. Shortly thereafter, the London 

Suppliers Group secretly agreed to restrict the export 

of nuclear fuel-making technologies to nonweapons 

states, and Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter 

announced U.S. efforts to defer the commercial use of 

plutonium-based fuels both domestically and abroad.

That was over 40 years ago. Now, after Iraq, Iran, 

North Korea, Libya, A. Q. Khan, and Syria, there is 

cause to review the bidding once again. Certainly, 

the experience of the last 3 and a half decades has 

challenged the assumptions that drove the nuclear 

policies of Presidents Ford and Carter. These policies 

presumed that we could detect nuclear fuel-making.

Uranium enrichment centrifuges, which are relatively 

easy to hide, were not yet readily available then, nor 

had much thought been given to just how small one 

could make a dedicated, covert reprocessing plant. It 

also was presumed that if illicit nuclear activities were 

detected, swift, effective international enforcement 

would follow. Our experience with Iran and North 

Korea, though, has jilted many of these notions. In 

fact, the United States and others now find it challenging just to maintain existing nuclear nonproliferation 

controls, much less to tighten them.

Much of this nonproliferation defensiveness is reflected in how the United States and others view the 
9

NPT. This view is encapsulated in a diplomatic formulation known as “the three-pillars of the NPT.” 

According to this view, the NPT and the nuclear nonproliferation regime rest on three objectives that must 

be balanced against one another. The first is nonproliferation (as manifested by Articles I, II, and III of the 

NPT). This roughly translates into IAEA safeguards 

and UN Security Council enforcement measures 

against NPT violators. The second is nuclear disarmament (as manifested by Article VI of the NPT). It 

focuses on reducing the NPT nuclear weapons states’ 

atomic arsenals (almost exclusively the United States 

and Russia). The third is sharing “peaceful” nuclear 

technology (as manifested by Article IV of the NPT). 

This can range, depending on who is defining “peaceful,” from the sharing of benign medical isotopes to 

transferring proliferation-prone nuclear fuel-making 

technologies.

Putting aside how little of the NPT’s diplomatic 

history actually supports this popular diplomatic interpretation,3

 the key problem with this three-pillar 

formulation is how intellectually self-defeating it is. 

First, if the nuclear-armed states are judged not to 

have sufficiently disarmed their nuclear stockpiles, 

why or how should this be used as the pretext for 

promoting less nonproliferation? Would not backing 

off necessary nonproliferation controls only increase 

the prospects for more proliferation and, therefore, 

increase demands for more nuclear armament?

Similarly, how is supplying nonweapons states 

with ever more “peaceful” nuclear technology a prerequisite for securing more or tighter nonproliferation 

controls? If the technology in question is truly peaceful 

and benign, by definition, it ought to be safe to share 

without any apprehensions that it might be diverted 
10

easily in order to make bombs. Also, if it could not be 

used to make bombs, nuclear supplier states would 

hardly need a nonproliferation incentive to share it. If, 

on the other hand, a specific civilian nuclear technology was particularly proliferation-prone and therefore 

not clearly safe to share, why would any state wanting 

to promote nonproliferation believe it was under an 

NPT obligation to transfer it?

Again, does not the promotion of nonproliferation 

presume the sharing of only truly “peaceful” nuclear 

goods and technology and the general encouragement 

of nuclear restraint? Why would any state want to bargain away achieving the goal of nonproliferation with 

its presumed benefits? How much sense does any of 

this make? The short answer is: not much. At the very 

least, sounder thought ought to drive our nonproliferation policies.

To pursue any sound undertaking to promote 

nuclear power without proliferation, Victor and I suggest five guiding principles:

1. Locking down the NPT. It is not consistent 

with the NPT’s purpose for members to exercise the 

withdrawal provision after gaining technology of relevance to weapons—whether by importing it or developing it domestically—as this was done under the 

assumption by other members that it was for peaceful 

uses. Treaty members cannot exercise the withdrawal 

clause without squaring accounts. As a practical matter, this would mean membership in the Treaty was essentially permanent. Under this interpretation, North 

Korea’s 2003 announcement of “withdrawal” while in 

noncompliance of IAEA inspection requirements left 

that country in a state of Treaty violation.

2. Assuring a technological margin of safety. The 

Treaty cannot be a vehicle for a state to legally come 
11

overly close to a weapons capability. There has to 

be a technological safety margin between genuinely 

peaceful and potentially military applications. As a 

consequence, the “inalienable right” language in the 

Treaty has to be interpreted in terms of the Treaty’s 

overriding objective, and thus there have to be restrictions on the kinds of technology that are acceptable 

for nonmilitary use. Nuclear power needs to develop 

in a way that does not provide easy access to nuclear 

explosives. Where to draw the line is now coming to a 

head in the context of Iran’s nuclear program.

3. Adjusting nuclear sovereignty for greater security. Countries involved with nuclear energy must 

accept that the inherent international security dangers 

such involvement implies require them to relinquish 

a considerable degree of sovereignty to international 

security organizations, in particular the IAEA inspectorate. In view of the concerns about clandestine facilities, both with respect to enrichment and reprocessing, countries have to agree to essentially unlimited 

inspection rights for international inspectors if the 

circumstances warrant. The Additional Protocol is a 

good start toward expanding inspectors’ rights, but 

this unfortunately goes along with a reduction in the 

frequency of normal inspections.

4. Getting serious about enforcement. The NPT 

needs an established enforcement mechanism to deal 

with Treaty violations in a predictable way. The foregoing rules for operating nuclear power plants in a 

manner that is consistent with international security 

are not self-enforcing. There has to be agreement 

among the Treaty parties concerning reasonably predictable responses to particular violations, and most 

particularly any effort by a state to withdraw from the 

Treaty, so as to remove the notion that violators can 

escape with impunity.
12

5. Applying nuclear limitations and reductions 

to all nuclear weapons states. All nuclear weapons 

states have to participate in weapons reductions. This 

is essential for gaining the cooperation of the other 

NPT members in restrictive measures. In the first instance, this includes Britain, France, and China, which 

up to now have not participated in the reduction process that has involved the United States and Russia. 

But it also has to include India, Israel, Pakistan, and 

North Korea. With 190 nations adhering to the NPT, 

its obligations should be regarded as universal, thus 

applying to all countries whether or not they formally 

joined the Treaty. From this point of view, North Korea and the three countries that never joined would 

be regarded as members who are out of compliance. 

But by participating in a suitably monitored weapons 

reduction process, they could be viewed as members 

in the process of coming into compliance.

Of course, pushing these principles in policy is 

sure to create considerable friction. Some have argued 

that it simply is impractical to push such policies. In 

the end, this sadly may be the case. But if so, it suggests the urgency of curbing our own enthusiasm and 

that of other nuclear supplier states for the international spread of nuclear energy programs where they 

currently do not exist. At the very least, until governments have tougher nonproliferation controls in 

place, they ought not be spending more to promote 

the export of this technology.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. See, e.g., Steven Kidd, “Nuclear Proliferation Risk—Is It 

Vastly Overrated?” Nuclear Engineering International, July 23, 2010, 

available from www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?storyCode=2056931.
13

2. See, e.g., Richard Lester, “New Nukes,” Issues in Science 

and Technology, Summer 2006, available from www.issues.org/22.4/

lester.html; Jungmin Kang, Frank von Hippel, “Limited Proliferation-Resistance Benefits from Recycling Unseparated Transuranics and Lanthanides from Light-Water Reactor Spent Fuel,” 

Science and Global Security, No. 3, 2005, pp. 169-181; James M. Aton, 

“The Myth of Proliferation-Resistant Technology,” The Bulletin 

of Atomic Scientists, November/December 2009, available from 

cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/brc/20120621022618/http://brc.

gov/sites/default/files/meetings/presentations/james_m_acton-the_

myth_of_proliferation-resistant_technology.pdf; Jerry Taylor, 

“Nuclear Energy: Risky Business,” Reason, October 22, 2008, available from www.cato.org/publications/commentary/nuclear-energyrisky-business; “Nuclear Power: Fracked Off,” The Economist, June 1, 2013, available from www.economist.com/news/

united-states/21578690-thanks-cheap-natural-gas-americas-nuclearrenaissance-hold-fracked; and Mycle Schneider and Anthony 

Froggett, The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013, Paris, 

France/London, UK: July 11, 2013, available from www.world

nuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/20130716msc-worldnuclearreport2013-lrv4.pdf.

3. On reading the NPT, see Albert Wohlstetter, “Spreading 

the Bomb without Quite Breaking the Rules,” Foreign Policy, No. 

25, Winter 1976-77, pp. 88-96, 145-179; Arthur Steiner, “Article 

IV and the ‘Straightforward Bargain,’” PAN Heuristics Paper 

78-832-08, in Albert Wohlstetter et al., Towards a New Consensus 

on Nuclear Technology, Vol. II, Supporting Papers, ACDA Report 

No. PH-78-04-832-33, Marina del Rey, CA: PAN Heuristics, 1978, 

pp. 1-8; Eldon V.C. Greenberg, The NPT and Plutonium: Application of NPT Prohibitions to “Civilian” Nuclear Equipment, Technology and Materials Associated with Reprocessing and Plutonium Use, 

Washington, DC: The Nuclear Control Institute, 1993, available 

from www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=292; Henry Sokolski, “The 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Energy,” 

Testimony before “Assessing ‘Rights’ under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” a hearing of the U.S. House of Representatives, 

Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, March 2, 2006, available 

from www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=392&rtid=8; Robert Zarate, 

“The Three Qualifications of Article IV’s ‘Inalienable Right’,” and 

Christopher Ford, “Nuclear Technology Rights and Wrongs: The 
14

NPT, Article IV, and Nonproliferation,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., 

Reviewing the NPT, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, 2010, pp. 219-384, available from www.npolicy.

org/thebook.php?bid=2.
PART I:

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION MATTERS

15

17

CHAPTER 2

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION—LOOKING BACK,

THINKING AHEAD: HOW BAD WOULD THE

FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BE?

François Heisbourg

A re-visit of past proliferation helps us understand 

the dangers of the further spread of nuclear weapons. 

Notwithstanding the establishment of an international 

nonproliferation regime and occasional, selective, and 

sometimes vigorous country-specific nonproliferation 

policies, the fight against the spread of nuclear weapons has not been recognized in the past as an overriding policy objective by the international community, 

jointly or severally. It will be argued that it is largely 

due to an overly sanguine assessment of the consequences of past proliferation, which has been less benign than is suggested by the reassuring persistence 

of the taboo on the use of nuclear weapons. Future 

proliferation’s consequences appear all the more dire 

as a result of a misunderstanding of the past, which 

meshes in with new and worrying technical, operational, and strategic developments. “Proliferation futures” will be examined in this combined light of a 

flawed narrative and new developments, which may 

lead eventually to the deliberate or inadvertent use of 

nuclear weapons. In order to avoid such an outcome, 

policy recommendations will be flagged.

A LESS THAN OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE

At first blush, the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons appears as a rare and important feature 

of global consensus spanning close to half a century. 
18

This is clearly the case in multilateral declaratory 

undertakings such as the 1978 Final Document of the 

United Nations (UN) Special Session on Disarmament,

1

notable for its universal nature committing all member states of the UN at the time, which states inter alia 

that “Non proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern” (§36) and “It is imperative 

. . . to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons” 

(§65). Previously, and more operationally, the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), opened to signature 

on May 1, 1968, laid out the elements of an international regime that, over the years, has acquired quasiuniversal status, with only India, Israel, and Pakistan 

holding out, and only one state (North Korea) opting 

out. The NPT in turn built upon an initially modest set 

of safeguards, established by the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) after its creation in 1957, that 

have developed into an extensive, more intrusive system of inspections, materialized in particular by the 

so-called Additional Protocol, formalized in 1997, 

which has been acceded to by 115 states and which another 25 have signed.2

 Out of the 44 countries3 possessing at least one operational nuclear reactor, 35 have 

ratified the Protocol, and three others (India, Iran, and 

Israel) have signed it. Even the three countries that 

never joined the NPT have not signaled their intent 

to act against the nonproliferation aims of the NPT. 

Only North Korea breaks what is in effect a universal declaratory pattern to which countries pay collective and individual obeisance in words, if not always 

in deeds.

However, this doesn’t amount to an overriding policy imperative at either the multilateral or 

national levels. On occasion, the UN as a whole has 

given an overriding importance to nonproliferation 
19

as opposed to other aspects of international relations, 

but on a highly selective basis. Such was the case of 

the imposition of mandatory UN Security Council 

sanctions against South Africa when that country’s 

work on a nuclear test site was uncovered in 1977,4

and again in the wake of the Gulf War of 1991 when 

the Security Council mandated the nuclear, biological, and chemical disarmament of Iraq.5

 But these 

policies were country specific, not general in nature. 

Similarly, nonproliferation only rarely, and usually 

selectively, takes precedence over other elements of 

bilateral relations between given states. Israel takes 

firm exception to nuclear “wannabes” insofar that 

they deny their right to exist, but is little interested 

beyond that. American militancy against Pakistan’s 

nuclear ambitions withered when Islamabad’s help 

was required after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 

In 2005, Washington spectacularly conceded to India 

privileges that are normally reserved to bona fide NPT 

signatories when it signed a bilateral nuclear agreement with that country, a precedent that China is now 

tempted to grant Pakistan. Russia, France, Britain, or 

other industrialized states take a “pick and choose” 

approach. Despite the misgivings and reservations of 

some, the 45 member states of the Nuclear Suppliers 

Group did not prevent the lifting of restrictions vis-àvis India flowing from the U.S.-India nuclear agreement.6

 The weakening of the NPT entailed by that 

agreement took second place to other considerations, 

such as India’s economic or strategic importance.

There is thus a substantial contrast between nonproliferation as an objective and its actual level of priority. In itself, this is neither unusual in international 

relations (how many other lofty goals are simultaneously proclaimed and neglected?) nor readily avoid-
20

able, as the examples cited previously demonstrate. 

However, nuclear weapons by general acknowledgement (which rests on an all-too reliable set of unimpeachable physics and an even less debatable set of 

practical data from nuclear use and testing) have a 

unique ability to instantaneously destroy entire populations. That consideration would normally have 

given nonproliferation a higher rank and a broader 

remit in the order of international priorities, even if 

one takes fully into account the Realpolitik requirements of the Cold and post-Cold War eras. There are 

strong and mutually reinforcing empirical and logical 

reasons that explained this disconnect in the past and 

that continue to inform the manner in which prospective further proliferation is being approached.

In empirical terms, two facts stand out: Runaway 

nuclear proliferation has not occurred, and nuclear 

weapons have not been used, in anger or by accident, 

since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. 

As long as proliferation had remained confined to 

countries that were in alliance with the United States, 

such as the United Kingdom (UK) and France (which 

tested their first devices in 1952 and 1960, respectively), there was little additional fear of breaking the taboo on nuclear use in either Washington or Moscow—

although the United States was even less happy than 

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) about 

French nuclear ambitions. However, a go-it-alone nuclear Red China rang loud alarm bells when it was set 

to test in 1964, leading both to rumblings about a decapitating Soviet or Soviet-American strike7

 and, more 

practically, to the drafting of the NPT, which sought 

to limit the nuclear club to those countries that tested 

before January 1, 1967. This was an era in which runaway proliferation had been hitherto considered as 
21

a mainstream scenario:8 In a world with nuclear free 

agents (the expression “rogue state” had not yet been 

coined) such as an unpredictable Red China, nuclear 

use would occur. Neither development has happened. 

Proliferation has remained restricted to a limited set 

of countries (the five “official,” the three “de facto,” 

the North Korean “sort-of,” and the Iranian “putative” nuclear powers), and roll-back has occurred 

willy-nilly: Nuclear South Africa was disarmed; quasi-nuclear Sweden and the once-aspiring or potential 

nuclear states of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Germany, 

Iraq, Italy, Libya, South Korea, Switzerland, Syria, 

and Taiwan eventually renounced the nuclear road; 

and the nuclear legacies in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 

Ukraine were liquidated. The “system,” however defined (from the role of the NPT to preemptive military 

strikes against Iraq and Syria by way of defense guarantees within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

[NATO] or to Sweden and Ukraine), has more or less 

worked during the last decades of the 20th century. 

Nor has the formal advent of India and Pakistan to 

nuclear military status in 1998 led to nuclear weapons 

use, while the prospect of Mao’s China running amok 

has been superseded by a quiescent nuclear doctrine 

in the Middle Kingdom.

The power of this empirical evidence appears in 

the choice of our leaders’ words. Dire forecasts and 

corresponding practical calls for concrete action are 

made rightly by mostly Western leaders about the 

possible consequences of Iran going nuclear; pie-inthe-sky speeches are made about the need to eliminate 

all nuclear weapons. But what is largely missing is the 

bridging language between these two levels of concern 

of the sort U.S. President John F. Kennedy used to address the perceived challenge of short-term, runaway 
22

nuclear proliferation and its implied consequences. 

In his March 1963 press conference (see endnote 8), 

Kennedy linked nonproliferation to a prospective test 

ban treaty.9

Largely missing, but not entirely so, is nonstate 

proliferation resulting in nuclear terrorism. This was 

correctly seized upon after September 11, 2001 (9/11) 

by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, 

leading to the first global Nuclear Security Summit in 

Washington, DC, in April 2010. However necessary it 

may be to address that fear, identified earlier by able 

novelists,10 it has not, mercifully, yet materialized in 

empirical terms. The empirical evidence that informs 

nonproliferation’s policy status sustains and is sustained, in turn, by reasoning on the supposed inherent 

stability of deterrence in all of its declensions: unilateral, bilateral, or even multilateral.

Given their disproportionate power, nuclear 

weapons cannot serve to achieve limited policy goals, 

thus excluding their use as Clausewitzian weapons. 

Further, the possession of nuclear weapons may even 

inhibit actions that an aggressive nonnuclear power 

might otherwise contemplate, but a nuclear power 

might not. Stalin, at the head of a still clearly nonnuclear USSR, blockaded Berlin, an action that none 

of his nuclear-armed successors sought to emulate. As 

a nonnuclear power, Red China bombed Taiwan repeatedly. The worst of it ceased after Beijing acquired 

nuclear weapons. Possession of nuclear weapons, 

possibly after a learning curve, appears to self-deter 

escalatory aggressive behavior.

Bilateral deterrence between two nuclear powers 

has long been deemed to moderate direct confrontation and to deflect aggressive behavior towards proxies.11 Although no such theoretical consensus exists 
23

vis-à-vis the possible stability of multicornered possession of nuclear weapons, the case has been made 

by powerful authors such as Ken Waltz and Pierre 

Gallois.12 In practice, a global multipolar nuclear order was established to some extent since the 1960s, 

with the USSR, the United States, and China forming a strategic triangle that was perceived as such by 

the authors of the Nixon-to-Beijing visit. A regional 

multipolar dispensation arguably also exists between 

China, India, and Pakistan. These relationships have 

apparently not led to instabilities greater than (or even 

as great as) those that have characterized the U.S.-

Soviet nuclear standoff.

In short, proliferation has been a manageable, 

slow-motion process. Nuclear weapons have not been 

used nor has the probability of their use appeared to 

have increased. The overall status of nuclear proliferation today is satisfactory provided some adjustments 

are made in terms of securing material from nonstate 

actors. Still, the policy mix sustaining the current situation is messy and occasionally fraught, as so many 

things are in international life. Difficult case-specific 

situations, such as Iran today, will continue to be handled as such, as Iraq was yesterday.

THE PAST IS NOT WHAT IT USED TO BE

The problem with this reassuring reading of the 

past is that it is not entirely true. Yes, the NPT had 

a major material effect by gradually making the new 

normal non-nuclear. Yes, again, U.S. defense guarantees weaned Germany, Italy,13 South Korea, Taiwan, 

and even neutral Sweden away from the nuclear road, 

as did the U.S.-French-British assurances to post-Soviet Ukraine. Yes, too, various levels of coercion worked 
24

against Iraq, Libya, and Syria. But no, the practice of 

even the most “classical” bilateral deterrence was not 

nearly as reassuring as the mainstream narrative inherited from the Cold War would have one believe. 

Nor can we consider that our elements for empirical judgment are as methodologically satisfactory in 

terms of their breadth and depth as they need to be. 

These two negatives will be examined in turn.

Nuclear archives, as other sensitive governmental 

archives, open up usually after an interval of decades, 

and even then with varying levels of culling and redaction. Even oral histories tend to follow this pattern, 

as aging witnesses feel freer to speak up. Hence a paradox: When the Soviet-American nuclear confrontation 

was central to our lives and policies during the Cold 

War, we did not know how bad things really were. 

Now that we are beginning to know, there is little 

public interest, given the disappearance of the EastWest contest. Yet there are lessons of general interest 

that can be summarized as follows.

The first lesson is that the Cuban Missile Crisis 

brought us much closer to the brink than we were even 

aware of at the time and for reasons that are germane 

to the current situation. These reasons include massive failures of intelligence on Soviet nuclear preparations and dispositions in Cuba (notably on tactical 

nukes and on the operational readiness of a number of 

intermediate range ballistic missiles [IRBMs] and their 

warheads); dysfunctional or imperfect command and 

control arrangements (notably vis-à-vis Soviet submarines); and unintentionally mixed signals (on each antagonist’s actions). These reasons are effectively laid 

out in Michael Dobb’s book, One Minute to Midnight.

14

The second lesson relates to the safety and security of nuclear forces, which are subject to potentially 
25

calamitous procedural, technical, or operational mishaps and miscalculations, somewhat along the lines of 

what applies to related endeavors (nuclear power and 

aerospace). Scott Sagan, in his Limits of Safety,

15 provides compelling research on the American Cold War 

experience. It would be interesting to have a similar 

treatment on the Soviet experience.

Although it can be argued that today’s nuclear arsenals are much smaller and easier to manage and that 

the technology for their control has been vastly improved, several facts remain. First, the United States 

has continued to witness serious procedural lapses in 

the military nuclear arena.16 Second and related, the 

de-emphasis of the importance of nuclear weapons 

in the U.S. force structure is not conducive to treating 

them with the respect that is due to their destructive 

power. Third, other nuclear powers do not necessarily 

benefit from the same technology and learning curves 

as the older nuclear states, and notably the United 

States. Instead, cheek-to-jowl nuclear postures, which 

prevailed in the Cuban Missile Crisis and which help 

explain why World War III nearly occurred, characterize India and Pakistan today. Indeed, despite the 

dearth of detail on Indian and Pakistani nuclear crisis 

management, we know that the stability of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan is by no means 

a given, with serious risks occurring on several occasions since the mid-1980s.17

At another level of analysis, we have to recognize 

the limits of the database on which we ground our 

policies on nonproliferation. The nuclear age, in terms 

of operationally usable devices, began in 1945, less 

than 70 years ago, less than the age of an old man. The 

fact that there has been no accidental or deliberate nuclear use during that length of time is nearly twice as 
26

reassuring as the fact that it took more than 30 years18

for a nuclear electricity generating plant to blow up, 

in the form of the Chernobyl disaster of 1986. But 

given the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, 

twice as much reassurance (in the form of no use of 

nuclear weapons for close to 70 years) is probably not 

good enough.

Furthermore, the Chernobyl disaster involved the 

same sort of errors of judgment, procedural insufficiencies, and crisis mismanagement visible in Sagan’s 

book, not only, or even mainly, flawed design choices. 

Inadvertence was at work, in other words, of the sort 

that could prevail in a time-sensitive, geographically 

constrained Indo-Pakistani or Middle Eastern conflict. 

Give it another 70 years to pass judgment.

The same empirical limits apply to the number of 

actors at play: We have simple bipolar (U.S.-USSR/

Russia or India-Pakistan) and complex bipolar (U.S.-

France-UK-NATO-Soviet Union/Russia) experiences; 

we have had U.S.-Soviet-Chinese or Sino-Indian-Pakistani tripolarity; and we have had a number of unipolar moments (one nuclear state vis-à-vis nonnuclear 

antagonists). But we mercifully have not had to deal 

with more complex strategic geometries—yet—in 

the Middle East or East Asia. We only know what 

we know; we do not know what we do not know. 

A historical narrative that is not reassuring and an 

empirical record that is less than compelling need 

to inform the manner in which we approach further 

proliferation.
27

PROLIFERATION PUSH AND PULL

Ongoing proliferation differs from that of the 

first half-century of the nuclear era in three essential 

ways. On the demand side, the set of putative nuclear actors is largely focused on the most strategically 

stressed regions of the world. On the supply side, the 

actual or potential purveyors of proliferation are no 

longer principally the first industrialized generation 

of nuclear powers. Instead, the technology involved 

in proliferation is somewhat less demanding than it 

was during the first nuclear age. Taken together, these 

changes entail growing risks of nuclear use.

Demand is currently focusing on two regions, the 

Middle East and East Asia (broadly defined), and involves states and, potentially, nonstate actors. In the 

Middle East, Iran’s nuclear program is the focus of 

the most intense concerns. A potential consequence in 

proliferation terms would be to lead regional rivals of 

Iran to acquire nuclear weapons in turn: This concern 

was vividly described in 2007 by the then-President of 

France, Jacques Chirac19 who specifically mentioned 

Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The likelihood of such a “proliferation chain reaction” may have been increased by 

President Obama’s recent repudiation of containment 

as an option.20 Short of Iran being persuaded or forced 

to abandon its nuclear ambitions, the neighboring 

states would presumably have to contemplate security options other than a Cold War-style U.S. defense 

guarantee. Given prior attempts by Iraq, Syria, and 

Libya to become nuclear powers, the probability of 

a multipolar nuclear Middle East has to be rated as 

high in case Iran is perceived as having acquired a 

military nuclear capability. Beyond the Middle East, 
28

there is a possibility of civil war in nuclear-armed 

Pakistan, leading to state failure and the possibility of 

nukes falling out of the hands of an effective central 

government. 

There are historical precedents for such a risk, 

most notably, but not only21 in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union: Timely and lasting action 

by outside powers, such as the United States with the 

Nunn-Lugar initiative, and the successor states themselves has prevented fissile material from falling into 

unauthorized hands in significant quantities. Pakistan 

could pose similar problems in a singularly more hostile domestic environment. As things stand, nonstate 

actors such as post-Soviet mafiya bosses (interested in 

resale potential) or al-Qaeda22 have sought, without 

apparent success, to benefit from opportunities arising 

from nuclear disorder in the former USSR and Central 

Asia. Mercifully, the price al-Qaeda was ready to pay 

was way below the going rate (upwards of hundreds 

of millions of dollars) for the sorts of services provided by the A. Q. Khan network to some of his clients.

Although North Korea’s nuclear ambitions appear to be both more self-centered and more containable than is the case for Iran, the possibility of state 

collapse in combination with regional rivalry leaves 

no room for complacency. More broadly, we are facing the prospect of a multipolar nuclear Middle East 

linked to an uncertain nuclear Pakistan, already part 

of a nuclear South Asia tied via China to the Korean 

nexus in which nuclear America and Russia also have 

a stake. More broadly still, such a nuclear arc-of-crisis 

from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Japan would 

presumably imply the breakdown of the NPT regime, 

or at least its reversion to the sort of status it had during the 1970s when many of its currently significant 
29

members had not yet joined,23 thus unloosening both 

the demand and supply sides of proliferation.

On the supply side, “old style” proliferation relied on official cooperation between first-generation 

nuclear or nuclearizing powers, of which the Manhattan Project was a forerunner (with American, British, 

and Canadian national contributions and multinational scientific teams), followed inter alia by post-1956 

French-Israeli, post-1958 U.S.-UK, and pre-1958 USSRChina cooperation. If India relied heavily on the “unwitting cooperation” of others, notably the involvement of Canada and the United States in the Atoms 

for Peace CIRUS research reactor, Pakistan set up the 

first dedicated, broad spectrum, cross-border trading 

network to make up for the weakness of its limited industrial base. This import-focused organization thus 

went beyond traditional espionage-aided efforts, as 

practiced by the USSR during and after the Manhattan Project, or case-by-case purloining or diversion of 

useful material on the global market, as practiced by 

Israeli operatives. Even before the Pakistani network 

had fulfilled its primary task of supplying the national 

program, it began its transformation into an exportoriented venture.

Libya, Iran, North Korea, and a fourth country that 

remains officially unnamed became the main outlets 

of what became the world’s first private-sector (albeit 

government originated and, presumably, supported) 

proliferation company, which was only wound down 

after strong Western pressure on Pakistan after 9/11. 

Although the by-now richly documented A. Q. Khan 

network24 appears to have ceased to function in its 

previous incarnation, it has powerfully demonstrated 

that there is an international market for proliferation 

that other operators can expect to exploit. Further-
30

more, budding, resource-weak nuclear powers have a 

strong incentive to cover the cost of their investment 

by selling or bartering their nuclear-related assets, including delivery systems. The fruits of state-to-state 

cooperation between Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan 

are clearly apparent in the close-to-identical genealogy of their nuclear-capable ballistic missiles of the NoDong/Ghauri/Shahab families displayed in military 

parades and test launches. Not all such cooperation 

consists of televised objects.

Even in the absence of game-changing breakthroughs, technical trends facilitate both demand and 

supply-side proliferation. For the time being, the plutonium route towards the bomb remains essentially 

as easy and as difficult as from the earliest years of 

the nuclear era. Provided a country runs a (difficultto-hide) research or power reactor from which lowirradiated fuel can be downloaded at will, such as 

CANada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) type natural 

uranium reactors, reprocessing is a comparatively 

straightforward and undemanding task. Forging and 

machining a multiple-isotope metal that is notorious 

for its numerous physical states and chemical toxicity 

is a substantial challenge, along with the companion 

complications of devising a reliable implosion mechanism. Nuclear testing is highly desirable to establish 

confidence in the end-result. Opportunities for taking the plutonium-proliferation road may increase 

somewhat as new techniques such as pyro-processing 

come on line. Developments in the enriched uranium field have been more substantial in facilitating 

proliferation. The development of lighter and more 

efficient centrifuges makes it easier for a state to extract enriched uranium speedily in smaller and less 

visible facilities. Dealing with the resulting militarylevel highly enriched uranium (HEU) is a compara-
31

tively undemanding task. The long-heralded advent 

of industrially effective and reliable laser enrichment 

technology may eventually further increase ease of 

access. Downstream difficulties would still remain. 

Although implosion mechanisms are not mandatory, 

they are desirable in order both to reduce the critical 

mass of uranium-235 for a nuclear explosion and to 

make for a lighter, smaller, more readily deliverable 

weapons package.

In sum, incremental improvements increase the 

risk of proliferation. However, nonstate actors are not 

yet, and will not be on the basis of known technical 

trends, in a position to master the various steps of the 

two existing military nuclear fuel cycles, which remain the monopoly of states. Nonstate actors would 

need the active complicity from (or from accomplices 

within) states, or benefit from the windfall of state 

collapse, to acquire a military nuclear capability. The 

threat of nuclear terrorism continues to be subordinated to developments involving state actors, a remark 

that is not meant to be reassuring since such developments are increasingly likely as proliferation spreads 

to new states and as state failure threatens in the “arc 

of proliferation” extending from the Mediterranean to 

Northeast Asia. Furthermore, nonstate actors can be 

satisfied with levels of nuclear reliability and performance that states could not accept. A difficult-to-deliver or fizzle-prone nuclear device would not provide 

a state with the level of deterrence needed to shield it 

from pre-emptive or retaliatory action, whereas a terrorist group would not be seeking such immunity. A 

road or ship-delivered imperfect device, which would 

be closer to a radiological bomb than to a fully fledged 

atomic weapon, would provide its nonstate owners 

with immense potential. The road to a nonstate device 

does not need to be as well-paved.
32

NUCLEAR FUTURES

“New” lessons from a revisited past and current 

trends in nuclear proliferation will tie into a number 

of characteristics of contemporary international relations with potentially destabilizing consequences 

leading to an increasing likelihood of nuclear use. 

Four such characteristics will be singled out both because of their relevance to nuclear crisis management 

and because of their growing role in the world system 

in the age of globalization:

1. Strategic upsets;

2. Limits of imagination;

3. Unsustainable strains; and,

4. Radical aims.

The 2008 French Defense and National Security White 

Paper25 developed the concept of ruptures stratégiques

(strategic upsets) to describe the growing tendency of 

the world system to generate rapid, unexpected, morphing upsets of international security as a consequence 

of globalization broadly defined against the backdrop of urbanizing populations generating economic 

growth and environmental and resource constraints. 

In themselves, such upsets are not novel (see inter alia, 

a pandemic such as the Black Death in 1348-49, the 

Great Depression, and not to mention the World Wars 

or the major and benign strategic upset of 1989-91), 

but the very nature of globalization and the relationship between human activity and the Earth’s ability 

to sustain them mean more frequent, as well as more 

complex upsets. If this reading is correct—and the 

Great Financial Crisis, the Arab revolutions, the accession of China to superpower status can be mentioned 
33

as examples that followed the publication of the white 

paper—then the consequences in the nuclear arena 

will be two-fold. First, nuclear doctrines and dispositions that were conceived under a set of circumstances 

(such as the Cold War or the India-Pakistan balance 

of power) may rapidly find themselves overtaken by 

events. For instance, it is easier to demonstrate that 

U.S. and Russian nuclear forces still visibly bear the 

imprint of their 1950s template than it is to demonstrate their optimal adaptation to post-post-Cold War 

requirements. Second, more challenges to international security and of a largely unforeseeable nature means 

greater strains will be placed on the ability of nuclear 

powers to manage crises against the backdrop of their 

possession of nuclear weapons. In many, indeed most, 

cases, such ruptures stratégiques will no doubt be handled with nuclear weapons appearing as irrelevant: 

Hypothetical security consequences of an epidemic, 

such as the interhuman transmission of the H5N1 bird 

flu virus, or prospective conflicts resulting from climate change do not have prima facie nuclear aspects. 

But beyond the reminder that we do not know that as 

a fact, the probability is, under the rupture stratégiques

hypothesis, there will be more occasions for putting 

all crisis management, including nuclear, to the test.

Human societies tend to lack the imagination to 

think through, and to act upon, what have become 

known as “black swan” events.26 That which has never 

occurred (or which has happened very rarely and in 

a wholly different context) is deemed not to be in the 

field of reality, and to which must be added eventualities that are denied because their consequences are too 

awful to contemplate. The extremes of human misconduct (the incredulity in the face of evidence of the Holocaust, the failure to imagine 9/11) bear testimony to 
34

this hard-wired trait of our species. This would not 

normally warrant mention as a factor of growing salience, if not for the recession into time of the original 

and only use of nuclear weapons in August 1945. Nonuse of nuclear weapons may soon be taken for granted 

rather than being an absolute taboo. Recent writing 

on the reputedly limited effects of the Hiroshima and 

Nagasaki bombs27 may contribute to such a trend in 

the name of reducing the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. Recent, and often compelling, historical accounts 

of the surrender of the Japanese Empire that downplay the role of the atomic bombings in comparison to 

early research can produce a similar effect, even if that 

may not have been the intention.28 However desirable 

it has been, the end of atmospheric nuclear testing29

has removed for more than 3 decades the periodic reminders that such monstrous detonations made as to 

the uniquely destructive nature of nuclear weapons. 

There is a real and growing risk that we forget what 

was obvious to those who first described in 1941 the 

unique nature of yet-to-be produced nuclear weapons.30 The risk is no doubt higher in those states for 

which the history of World War II has little relevance 

and that have not had the will or the opportunity to 

wrestle at the time or ex post facto with the moral and 

strategic implications of the nuclear bombing of Japan 

in 1945.

Unsustainable strains are possibly the single most 

compelling feature of contemporary proliferation. 

Examples include tight geographical constraints—

with, for instance, New Delhi and Islamabad, located 

within 300 miles of each other; nuclear multipolarity against the backdrop of multiple, crisscrossing 

sources of tension in the Middle East, as opposed to 

the relative simplicity of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation; 
35

the existence of doctrines, such as India’s “cold start,” 

and force postures, such as Pakistan’s broadening array of battlefield nukes, that rest on the expectation of 

early use; and the role of nonstate actors as aggravating or triggering factors when they are perceived as 

operating with the connivance of an antagonist state 

(in the past, the assassination of the Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo in 1914, and in the future, Hezbollah 

operatives launching rockets with effect against Israel 

or Lashkar-e-Taiba commandos doing a “Bombay” 

redux in India). Individually or in combination, these 

factors test crisis management capabilities more severely than anything seen during the Cold War with 

the partial exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Even 

the overabundant battlefield nuclear arsenals in Cold 

War Central Europe, with their iffy weapons’ safety 

and security arrangements, were less of a challenge: 

The U.S. and Soviet short-range nuclear weapons so 

deployed were not putting U.S. and Soviet territory 

and capitals at risk.

It may be argued that these risk factors are known 

to potential protagonists, and that they therefore will 

be led to avoid the sort of nuclear brinksmanship that 

characterized U.S. and Soviet behavior during the 

Cold War in crises such as the Korean War, Berlin, the 

Cuban Missile Crisis, or the Yom Kippur War. Unfortunately, the multiple nuclear crises between India 

and Pakistan demonstrate no such prudence, rather 

the contrary. Were such restraint to feed into nuclear 

policy and crisis planning, along the lines of apparently greater U.S. and Soviet nuclear caution from the 

mid-1970s onwards, the fact would remain that initial 

intent rarely resists the strains of a complex, multiactor confrontation between inherently distrustful 

antagonists. It is also worth reflecting on the fact that 
36

during the 1980s, there was real and acute fear in Soviet ruling circles that the West was preparing an outof-the-blue nuclear strike, a fear that in turn fed into 

Soviet policies and dispositions.31

The Cold War was a set of crises and misunderstandings that came within a whisker of a nuclear 

holocaust. India and Pakistan’s nuclear standoff is 

deeply unstable, not least as a result of the interaction 

with nonstate actors. A multipolar nuclear Middle 

East would make the Cuban Missile Crisis look easy 

in comparison.

Great conflicts tend to occur when one or several 

of the antagonists views the status quo as sufficiently 

undesirable and/or unsustainable to prompt forceful 

pro-action. Notwithstanding widespread perceptions 

to the contrary, this was not the case of the USSR and 

the United States during the Cold War. The United 

States had chosen a policy of containment, as opposed 

to roll-back, of the Soviet Empire within the limits 

established as a result of World War II. The Soviet 

Union seized targets of opportunity outside of its 1945 

area of control but avoided direct confrontation with 

U.S. forces. Messianic language from the USSR on 

the global victory of communism or from the United 

States about the end of the “Evil Empire” did not take 

precedence over the prime Soviet concern of preserving the Warsaw Pact and the U.S. pursuit of containment, or, no less crucially, their mutual confidence 

that they could achieve these aims without going to 

war one with the other.

No such generalization can be made about the 

Middle East, a region in which the very existence of a 

key state, Israel, is challenged while other states have 

gone to war with each other (e.g., Iran-Iraq war, and 

the Gulf War of 1990-91) or are riven by deep internal 
37

conflicts. Actors such as Hezbollah, with its organic 

and functional links with Islamic Iran and Alawite 

Syria, add to the complexities and dangers. Extreme 

views and actions vis-à-vis the strategic status quo are 

widely prevalent. Although the India-Pakistan relationship corresponds to something akin to the U.S.-

Soviet “adversarial partnership,” that does not apply 

to radical nonstate actors prevalent in Pakistan with 

more or less tight links to that country’s military intelligence services (Inter-Services Intelligence). The 

potential for danger is compounded by the variety 

of such groups: the Pashtu-related Pakistani Taliban, 

Kashmiri-related groups, and Jihadi militants from 

the core provinces of Punjab and Sind. Their common 

characteristics are extreme radicalism, high levels of 

operational proficiency, and shared enmity of India. 

Their potential for triggering a conflict between the 

two countries is substantial, above and beyond the intentions of government officials.

In summary, some 70 years after the launch of 

the Manhattan Project, there is every reason to upgrade and reinforce nonproliferation policies if 

nuclear use is to be avoided during the coming decades. Some markers to that end will be laid in the 

concluding section.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

In light of the preceding analysis, the most obvious 

short run implication is the absolute need to secure 

a satisfactory conclusion of the Iranian file. Anything 

that feeds the perception of less-than-full compliance 

of Iran with the strictest international safeguards or, 

worse, that creates the impression that recessed deterrence is in place, would lead to further proliferation 
38

in the Middle East and beyond. What happens to the 

Iranian nuclear program will be essential to the future 

of proliferation and nonproliferation prospects.

In the medium term, those states that share the 

view that current proliferation trends would have 

catastrophic outcomes must display greater readiness to make those concessions that could reinforce 

the nonproliferation regime. Since the vast majority of 

countries subscribe to the proposition that reinforced 

nonproliferation norms imply determined moves 

towards nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapons 

states, a serious attempt has to be made to test that 

linkage. In practice, this means the polar opposite of 

the sort of linkage that led to a vacuous consensus at 

the 2010 NPT review conference. On that occasion, 

there was a link between the industrialized states, including the Western nuclear weapons states, suspending their pursuit of the universalization of the IAEA 

Additional Protocol in exchange for the nonaligned 

states dropping their insistence on a calendar for nuclear disarmament. No nonproliferation in exchange 

for no nuclear disarmament. At the 2015 NPT Review 

Conference, the opportunity will exist to turn that sort 

of linkage inside out. The recommendations of the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation 

and Disarmament (ICNND) in 200932 offer practical 

goals in terms of nuclear disarmament of the sort that 

could be implemented in synergy with a reinforced 

nonproliferation regime. In particular, the ICNND’s 

report suggests a so-called vantage point of nuclear 

disarmament compatible with prevailing strategic circumstances but that leads in a 15-year timeframe to a 

reduction of some 90 percent of the world’s nuclear 

weapons and the capping of the arsenals of the smaller nuclear powers. Such progress, however desir-
39

able, cannot be achieved without strong political will, 

which is unlikely to be on call in the absence of either a 

successful resolution of the Iran file or an unexpected 

proliferation wake-up call.

In parallel, multilateral and unilateral policies limiting the spread of reprocessing and enrichment facilities should be pursued, a task that overcapacity in 

the global market readily justifies in economic terms. 

Similarly, the entry into industrial service of new technologies that could facilitate proliferation needs to be 

discouraged (here again, market forces provide some 

leverage). A strengthening of the control on, and the 

recycling of, weapons-grade fissile material, along the 

lines of what has been successfully done during the 

last 2 decades in the former Soviet Union; the tracking 

and securing of radioactive sources as promoted by 

the Nuclear Security Summits; and the reinforcement 

of the Proliferation Security Initiative’s work, notably 

on the trafficking of proliferation-relevant material 

and knowledge, are all necessary, not least in reducing the risk of nonstate access to something approaching a nuclear capability. However, such necessary 

technical measures will only serve their purpose if the 

political causes of proliferation are also addressed. At 

heart, the decision to proliferate is political and strategic in nature, and nonproliferation policy needs to 

provide a broader response than a narrow, technical 

one. This was the particular genius of the NPT and its 

ability to generate a bandwagon effect over time; this 

explains the effectiveness of defense guarantees and 

related blandishments as nonproliferation tools, and 

this also means that in certain circumstances broadspectrum coercion, sometimes including the use of 

military force, may be required. This policy mix remains entirely relevant. It is the associated doses that 
40

need to be reconsidered: tougher nonproliferation 

norms, a greater readiness to reward the virtuous and 

act against the wayward, and the acceptance by the 

nuclear powers and their allies that it is in their interest to accept the trade-offs that may be required for 

such an outcome to be achieved. The Western powers 

may and should lead by example here, as they have 

been trying to do in their handling of the Iran dossier.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Available from www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/SSOD/

A-S-10-4.pdf.

2. Figures derived from www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/

es2008-tables.pdf.

3. The so-called Annex 2 countries singled out in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

4. Notably UN Security Council Resolution 418, November 

4, 1977.

5. Notably UN Security Council Resolution 707, September 

19, 1991.

6. The so-called 123 agreement between India and the United 

States became effective on December 10, 2008, after the Nuclear 

Suppliers Group (NSG) granted its waiver.

7. Thomas C. Reed and Danny Stillman, The Nuclear Express: a 

Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation, Minneapolis, MN: 

Zenith, 2009, p. 104.

8. President Kennedy’s press conference of March 21, 1963, 

on “a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these weapons (in the 1970s),” available from www.jfklibrary.org/Research/

Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/JFK-Quotations.aspx.
41

9. The Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed on October 7, 1963.

10. Such as Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, The Fifth 

Horseman, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1980.

11. For instance, in Thomas Schelling’s work on the strategy of 

conflict, Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, 

MA: Harvard University Press, 1960.

12. See Ken Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More 

May be Better,” Adelphi Paper No. 171, London, UK: International 

Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 1981; and Pierre Gallois, Stratégie de l’âge nucléaire (Strategy of the Nuclear Age), Paris, France: 

Calman-Lévy, 1960.

13. In the framework of the secret French-German-Italian 

agreement of November 1957 (revealed and declassified after the 

Cold War). See Georges-Henri Soutou, L’Alliance incertaine: les 

rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands 1954-1996 (The Uncertain Alliance: Franco-German Political and Strategic Relations, 

1954-1996), Paris, France: Fayard, 1996.

14. Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War, New York: Knopf, 2008.

15. Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 1995.

16. Such as the unauthorized flight of a B-52H bomber loaded 

with six nuclear-tipped AGM-129 ACM cruise missiles in August 

2009 (leading to the resignation of the Secretary of the Air Force 

and of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force); or the mistaken shipment to Taiwan of fuses for the nuclear payload of Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles in 2006 (leading to the disciplining 

of 17 senior officers). On these incidents, see inter alia Lolita Baldur, “Report slams Pentagon nuke oversight,” Associated Press, 

January 7, 2009, available from www.nbcnews.com/id/28547375/ns/

us_news-military/t/report-slams-pentagon-nuke-oversight/.

17. Beginning with the Operation BRASS TACKS, Indian 

military exercises in 1986-87; the Kargil conflict in Kashmir 
42

in 1999; and the very tense standoff that followed for close to 

half a year the terrorist attack against the Indian Parliament in 

December 2001.

18. The Soviet reactor at Obninsk was the first to feed power 

into the electricity grid in 1954; the Chernobyl nuclear accident 

occurred 32 years later.

19. Elaine Sciolino and Katrin Bennhold, “Chirac Strays from 

Assailing a Nuclear Iran,” The New York Times, February 1, 2007 

(quote: “Why wouldn’t Saudi Arabia do it? Why won’t it help 

Egypt to do it as well?”).

20. “I do not have a policy of containment; I have a policy of 

preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons,” Barack Obama, 

Remarks by the President at American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) Policy Conference, speech at the Washington 

Convention Center, Washington, DC, March 4, 2012, available 

from www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/04/remarks-president-aipac-policy-conference-0.

21. During the attempted military coup by French generals in 

Algeria in April 1961, there was a question about the exercise of 

control on the French nuclear test site in the Sahara and of a nuclear device that was being prepared for testing there. See Bruno 

Tertrais, “A ‘Nuclear Coup’? France, the Algerian War, and the 

April 1961 Nuclear Test,” Henry D. Sokolski and Bruno Tertrais, 

eds., Nuclear Weapons Security Crises: What Does History Teach?, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2013, pp. 25-64, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.

mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1156.

22. “Al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons 

for at least 10 years,” quoted from National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “The 9/11 Commission 

Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 

Attacks Upon the United States,” Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004, p. 386.

23. China, France, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Algeria, 

among others, only acceded to the NPT after 1990.
43

24. See “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the 

rise of proliferation networks. A Net Assessment,” London, UK: 

IISS, 2007. For a narrower, racier read, see Catherine Collins and 

Douglas Frantz, Fallout: the True Story of the CIA’s Secret War on 

Nuclear Trafficking, New York: Free Press, 2011.

25. For an English-language presentation, see www.archives.

livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/white_paper_press_

kit.pdf.

26. An expression coined, in this meaning, by Nassim Taieb in 

his The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbably, New York: 

Random House, 2007.

27. Ken Berry et al., “Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons: Examining the Validity of Nuclear Deterrence,” Monterey, CA: Center 

for Nonproliferation Studies, May 2010, available from cns.miis.

edu/opapers/pdfs/delegitimizing_nuclear_weapons_may_2010.pdf.

28. See Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing for the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005; and Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the 

Imperial Japanese Empire, New York: Random House, 1999.

29. The last atmospheric test was conducted by China on 

October 16, 1980.

30. Otto Frisch and Rudolph Pierls, “Frisch-Peierls Memorandum, March 1940: On the Properties of a Radioactive Superbomb,” available from www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Begin/FrischPeierls.shtml.

31. For the so-called Operation RYAN (the Russian initials 

for nuclear missile attack), see Benjamin Fischer, “A Cold War 

Conundrum. The 1983 Cold War Scare,” Washington, DC: CIA 

Center for Intelligence Studies, 1997, available from www.cia.gov/

library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-andmonographs/a-cold-war-conundrum/source.htm.

32. International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation 

and Disarmament, “Eliminating the Nuclear Threat: A Practical 

Agenda,” Canberra, Australia: Paragon, 2009, available from icnnd.org/Reference/reports/ent/downloads.html.

45

CHAPTER 3

THE HISTORY OF PROLIFERATION OPTIMISM:

DOES IT HAVE A FUTURE?

Matthew Kroenig

Should we worry about the spread of nuclear 

weapons? At first glance, this might appear to be an 

absurd question. After all, nuclear weapons are the 

most powerful weapons ever created by man. A single 

nuclear weapon could vaporize large portions of a major metropolitan area, killing millions of people, and 

a full-scale nuclear war between superpowers could 

end life on Earth as we know it. For decades during 

the Cold War, the public feared nuclear war, and postapocalyptic nuclear war scenarios became a subject of 

fascination and terror in popular culture. Meanwhile, 

scholars carefully theorized the dangers of nuclear 

weapons and policymakers made nuclear nonproliferation a top national priority. To this day, the spread 

of nuclear weapons to additional countries remains a 

foremost concern of U.S. leaders. Indeed, in his 2012 

annual threat assessment to the U.S. Congress, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper argued that 

nuclear proliferation poses one of the greatest threats 

to U.S. national security.1

Recently, however, academics have become more 

vocal in questioning the threat posed by the spread 

of nuclear weapons. Students of international politics known as “proliferation optimists” argue that the 

spread of nuclear weapons might actually be beneficial because it deters great power war and results in 

greater levels of international stability.2

 Other scholars, 

whom I label “proliferation anti-obsessionists,” main-
46

tain that nuclear proliferation is neither good nor bad, 

but irrelevant.3 They claim that nuclear weapons do 

not have any meaningful effect on international politics and that the past 70 years of world history would 

have been roughly the same, had nuclear weapons 

never been invented. Some take this line of argument 

even further and argue that the only real problem is 

not the nuclear weapons themselves, but great power 

nonproliferation policy.4

 They argue that the cure that 

countries like the United States implement in order 

to prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons is much worse than the disease of the spread of 

nuclear weapons itself.

While these arguments remain provocative, they 

are far from new. The idea that a few nuclear weapons 

are sufficient to deter a larger adversary and keep the 

peace has its origins in the early strategic thinking of 

the 1940s. Moreover, a critical review of this literature 

demonstrates that many of these arguments are much 

less sound than they initially appear. Indeed, both 

proliferation optimism and proliferation anti-obsessionism rest on internal logical contradictions.

In this chapter, I argue that the spread of nuclear 

weapons poses a grave threat to international peace 

and to U.S. national security. Scholars can grab attention by making counterintuitive arguments about 

nuclear weapons being less threatening than power 

holders believe them to be, but their provocative 

claims cannot wish away the very real dangers posed 

by the spread of nuclear weapons. The more states 

that possess nuclear weapons, the more likely we are 

to suffer a number of devastating consequences, including nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained U.S. freedom of action, 

weakened alliances, and the further proliferation of 
47

nuclear weapons. While it is important not to exaggerate these threats, it would be an even greater sin to 

underestimate them and, as a result, not take the steps 

necessary to combat the spread of the world’s most 

dangerous weapons.

The chapter is in three parts. First, I provide a critical review of the proliferation optimism literature, including a careful consideration of the argument’s historical origins. Next, I detail the various threats posed 

by nuclear proliferation, supported by nuclear deterrence theory and historical evidence, and frequently 

illustrated with a discussion of a case currently on the 

minds of nonproliferation officials: Iran’s advanced 

nuclear program. I conclude with an implication of 

my analysis for the scholarly study of nuclear proliferation and for U.S. nonproliferation policy.

AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF 

PROLIFERATION OPTIMISM

Many of the key pillars of proliferation optimism 

arguments made today can be found in early Cold War 

debates about nuclear strategy. These pillars include 

the ideas that a small nuclear arsenal capable of targeting an enemy’s cities is sufficient for deterring a powerful adversary and that nuclear wars, because they 

would be so devastating for everyone involved, will 

never be fought. These ideas stood in stark contrast to 

other strands of deterrence thinking that emphasized 

counterforce targeting, nuclear vulnerability, nuclear 

brinkmanship, inadvertent and accidental nuclear escalation, and limited nuclear wars.5

 It is noteworthy 

that some of the most influential early advocates of 

minimum deterrence and proliferation optimism (indeed, as we will see, these ideas are mutually reinforc-
48

ing) cannot truly be understood without reference to 

the parochial interests and resource-constrained environments in which the strategic thinkers who developed them operated.

Early Academic Writing.

Shortly after the first use of nuclear weapons on 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, U.S. strategists began to 

grapple with the question of what the atomic bomb 

meant for international peace and security. The first 

answer given is one that presaged the contemporary 

proliferation optimism literature, namely, that nuclear 

weapons are “absolute weapons” that are terrifyingly 

destructive, that are invulnerable to enemy attack, and 

that render great power war obsolete.6

Perhaps the first person to articulate this position 

was University of Chicago economist Jacob Viner in 

a speech to the American Philosophical Society in 

Philadelphia, PA, on November 16, 1945—just months 

after the first use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima 

and Nagasaki, Japan.7 In the speech, Viner argued 

that counterforce nuclear targeting would be useless 

and splendid first strikes impossible. In doing so, he 

laid the basis for subsequent claims about a minimum 

nuclear posture being sufficient to deter a more powerful adversary. Viner argued, “The atomic bomb, 

unlike battleships, artillery, airplanes, and soldiers, 

are not an effective weapon against its own kind. A 

superior bomb cannot neutralize the inferior bomb of 

an enemy.” Viner went on to argue that the awesome 

destructive power of nuclear weapons would induce 

great caution in leaders and possibly produce peace 

among the major powers. In his words: 
49

the universal recognition that if war does break out, 

there can be no assurance that the atomic bombs will 

not be resorted to may make statesmen and people determined to avoid war even where in the absence of 

the atomic bomb, they would regard it as the only possible procedure under the circumstances for resolving 

a dispute or a clash of interests.8

The proliferation optimism position received further elaboration a few months later in Bernard Brodie’s classic book, The Absolute Weapon.

9

 In great detail, 

Brodie explained the basic features of the minimum 

deterrence and proliferation optimism position. He 

argued that nuclear weapons are invulnerable, ruling 

out the possibility of an enemy launching a disarming first strike. He also claimed that nuclear weapons 

have such terrifying effects that they would make war 

too costly to wage, potentially leading to peace. In his 

most oft-quoted line, Brodie declared, “Thus far the 

chief purpose of our military establishment has been 

to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be 

to avert them.”10

The optimism position was quickly countered, 

however, in what would become the first incarnation of the optimism-pessimism debate, predating 

the now-famous Kenneth Waltz-Scott Sagan debate 

by over 30 years.11 Beginning with a series of basing 

studies done for the Department of Defense (DoD), 

Albert Wohlstetter, an American strategist working 

at the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, CA, argued 

that nuclear weapons are not as invulnerable as they 

appeared to optimists like Brodie. Rather, he argued 

that the “balance of terror” that optimists had written 

so eloquently about, was actually quite “delicate.”12

He demonstrated that U.S. nuclear forces were potentially vulnerable to a Soviet first strike, and that this 
50

vulnerability could tempt Moscow to launch a nuclear 

war. His study led to a number of improvements in 

the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces, including the 

moving of U.S. air bases beyond the range of Soviet 

bombers and the hardening of ballistic missile silos.

Wohlstetter’s study also undermined a key pillar 

of proliferation optimism. If nuclear forces were potentially vulnerable, encouraging an enemy nuclear 

attack, it was not a great leap to argue that the spread 

of nuclear weapons would not necessarily lead to 

peace. Just as a belief in minimum deterrence supports the idea of a nuclear peace, attention to nuclear 

vulnerability and counterforce nuclear war necessarily leads to proliferation pessimism. Indeed, it is difficult to find analysts who simultaneously believe that 

nuclear posture matters and that the spread of nuclear 

weapons necessarily leads to peace. It should come as 

no surprise, therefore, that Albert Wohlstetter was a 

proliferation pessimist. In subsequent writing, Wohlstetter catalogued the potential downsides of nuclear 

proliferation for U.S. interests, even if nuclear weapons spread to friendly states, such as America’s North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies.13 First, he 

identified nuclear war as a potential problem. A few 

nuclear weapons would not be enough for deterrence, 

but rather “The problem of deterring a major power 

requires a continuing effort because the requirements 

for deterrence will change with the counter-measures 

taken by the major power.”14 But, if that investment 

was not made, deterrence could fail and nuclear war 

could result. Second, Wohlstetter worried that the 

spread of nuclear weapons within the NATO alliance 

would undermine alliance cohesion by making the 

allied states less interdependent. Third, Wohlstetter 

forecasted that the spread of nuclear weapons would 
51

lead to the further spread of nuclear weapons. He criticized U.S. decisionmakers for calculating the pros and 

cons of nuclear proliferation to an “Nth” state without 

also figuring in the potential negative consequences of 

what he called the “N+1 problem.”15

The optimism-pessimism debate did not remain relegated to the ivory tower for long, however. Shortly thereafter, powerful players in government began adapting the ideas of proliferation to fit 

their strategic circumstances and to advance their 

parochial interests.

The French Force de Frappe.

In 1960, France entered the nuclear club with its 

first nuclear test.16 French leaders, including President 

Charles de Gaulle, did not believe that France could 

rely on the United States and NATO to provide for 

France’s security. As de Gaulle would famously ask, 

would Washington really be willing to trade New 

York for Paris in a nuclear war? France, therefore, 

acquired an indigenous nuclear weapons capability 

that would allow Paris to pursue a more independent 

foreign policy. Having developed the bomb, French 

strategic and military thinkers were soon confronted 

with a new problem: how would they use their nuclear weapons? In the early- and mid-1960s, therefore, 

France began developing a nuclear doctrine.

At the same time that U.S. and Soviet thinkers began articulating the aspects of nuclear doctrine that 

would come to characterize the superpower nuclear 

competition throughout the Cold War (counterforce 

nuclear targeting, limited nuclear options, the importance of assured destruction, the advantages provided 

by nuclear superiority over rivals, and the pursuit of 
52

active and passive defenses), France, a medium power 

operating with fewer resources than the superpowers, was compelled to develop a more modest nuclear 

strategy. In large part due to its limited means, France 

eschewed the warfighting strategies of the superpowers and instead developed a minimal deterrent doctrine, in which French military planners aimed to be 

able to threaten significant damage against Soviet cities in the event of a Soviet invasion of France.17

Unlike the superpowers, France did not have the 

luxury of working down from strategy to capabilities, but instead had to work backwards, developing 

a strategy around given capabilities. As French strategic thinker Colonel Pierre Marie Gallois put it, France 

pursued a nuclear “strategy of the means.”18 In the 

words of de Gaulle, “We do not have the ambition to 

make a force as powerful as those of the Americans or 

Soviets, but a force proportionate to our means, our 

needs, and our size.”19 Accordingly, the key pillars 

of French doctrine reflected France’s resource constraints. “Deterrence of the strong by the weak” was 

the belief that a small state could deter a much larger 

adversary as long as the smaller state had the ability 

to conduct a nuclear attack against the larger state’s 

cities.20 “Sufficiency” was the idea that a small number 

of nuclear weapons was sufficient for deterrence and 

that anything more was overkill.21

France’s small size and lack of strategic depth prevented it from adopting the warfighting postures of 

the superpowers. As Gallois put it, “France has nothing to cede that would not be herself.”22 France’s vulnerability, therefore, demanded that France launch an 

immediate and full-scale nuclear attack on an adversary at the initiation of hostilities. Unable to build a 

large enough arsenal to maintain an assured destruc-
53

tion capability against the Soviet Union, France aimed 

only, according to Gallois, to “tear an arm” off the 

aggressor.23 While U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert 

McNamara famously assessed that destroying large 

portions of the Soviet population and economy was 

necessary to deter Moscow, French thinkers thought 

that the Soviet Union could be deterred if France could 

inflict damage on the Soviet Union roughly equivalent 

to the destruction of the entire country of France. In 

the words of one French official:

French nuclear forces have been calculated to permit 

reaching a population of the adversary of the same 

order as that of our own country. If France were destroyed, our adversary would lose the equivalent of 

France.24

A lack of adequate delivery vehicles also prevented France from following a counterforce strategy. 

France’s plans for the development of a land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) were canceled 

due to their expense, leaving Paris with a countervalue 

option only. As strategist Raymond Barre described: 

it was the less costly option. . .France, a medium-sized 

nation with limited resources, cannot pretend seeking parity with the two great nuclear powers. The 

only way which is opened to us is that of the current 

strategy.25

Like proliferation optimists on the other side of the 

Atlantic, French strategists believed that if a small nuclear arsenal in France could deter the Soviet Union, 

then the spread of nuclear weapons elsewhere could 

have a pacifying effect on international politics more 

broadly. As Gallois argued, a nuclear arsenal:
54

increases the risk, counsels discretion, and consequently strengthens the strategy of dissuasion. As 

atomic armament grows more widespread . . . the 

notion of dissuasion will also become more common, 

each nation practicing it according to its means. . . . It 

will not be long before we may have to give up war 

altogether.26

Unsurprisingly, pessimists in the United States 

were skeptical of French strategy and doctrine. Albert 

Wohlstetter assessed that if the United States struggled to develop a survivable nuclear arsenal capable 

of deterring the Soviet Union, then the French did 

not stand a chance of developing a truly independent 

deterrent capability. At the end of the day, thought 

Wohlstetter, “The burden of deterring a general war 

as distinct from limited wars is still likely to be on the 

United States and therefore, so far as our allies are 

concerned, on the alliance.”27

In sum, the notion that a few nuclear weapons 

would be sufficient to deter great power war was 

warmly welcomed and advocated by strategic thinkers in Paris. Once it became a nuclear weapon state, 

France’s resource-constrained environment did not 

permit it to adopt anything other than a minimum 

deterrent posture. France was not the only place, 

however, where nuclear doctrines emphasizing minimum deterrence were developed in response to the 

available means.

Polaris. 

In the late-1950s and early-1960s, a similar minimum deterrence strand was developing among U.S. 

nuclear strategists.28 Like in France, circumstances 
55

would compel military planners, this time in the U.S. 

Navy, to argue that a few nuclear weapons would be 

sufficient to deter a more powerful foe, paving the 

way for proliferation optimists that would follow in 

their footsteps. 

In the early stages of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy 

was the only major U.S. military service cut out of 

the strategic nuclear mission. This would have major 

implications for service budgets and interservice rivalries, as nuclear capabilities were of paramount importance in the Cold War’s superpower rivalry, and 

the Navy desired a foothold in the nuclear game. The 

Navy sought to edge its way into a role by developing “super carriers,” aircraft carriers large enough for 

nuclear-armed fighters to take off and land, but the 

program was cancelled by President Harry Truman in 

1949 for budgetary reasons. 

Then, in the mid-1950s, under the leadership of Admiral Arleigh Burke, the Navy began developing the 

innovative Polaris submarine launch ballistic missile 

(SLBM) system. Polaris provided the Navy with a nuclear role. Indeed, Burke argued that Polaris’s unique 

advantages, such as greater survivability, made it a 

candidate to replace the more vulnerable fixed ICBMs 

operated by the Air Force. 

Critics in other services soon countered, however, 

that SLBMs did not meet the requirements of U.S. 

nuclear strategy. SLBMs, unlike bombers and landbased ICBMs, were not accurate enough to engage in 

counterforce targeting. Moreover, submarines could 

not carry sufficient firepower to guarantee an assured 

destruction capability against the Soviet Union.

The Navy could not credibly argue that Polaris 

had capabilities that it did not have, but they could, 

and did, challenge the prevailing logic of deterrence. 
56

In a prize-winning essay, Paul Bracken, a naval commander working under Burke, coined the term “finite 

deterrence.” Bracken, and eventually Burke, argued 

that the massive nuclear attacks and counterforce targeting envisioned by the Air Force and the Army were 

unnecessary. Rather, they claimed that a few survivable nuclear weapons capable of destroying enemy 

soft targets—the precise capabilities provided by Polaris—were sufficient for deterrence. 

In the end, Burke and the Navy lost the bureaucratic battle. While SLBMs became a central element 

of U.S. nuclear force structure, they did not replace 

bombers and ICBMs. Arguments about maintaining 

superiority across the entire spectrum of capabilities 

were more persuasive in the context of a heating up 

cold war. Nevertheless, the ideas of “finite” and “minimum deterrence” developed by Bracken and Burke, 

motivated in no small part to advance the Navy’s 

position in an interservice competition, are alive and 

well today in the writings of academic proliferation 

optimists.

Proliferation Optimism.

Proliferation optimism received what may have 

been its clearest articulation by Kenneth Waltz in his 

seminal 1981 Adelphi paper, “The Spread of Nuclear 

Weapons: More May Be Better.”29 In this and subsequent works, Waltz argued that the spread of nuclear 

weapons has beneficial effects on international politics. He maintained that states, fearing a catastrophic 

nuclear war, will be deterred from going to war with 

other nuclear-armed states. As more and more states 

acquire nuclear weapons, therefore, there are fewer 

states against which other states will be willing to 

wage war. The spread of nuclear weapons, accord-
57

ing to Waltz, leads to greater levels of international 

stability. Looking to the empirical record, he argued 

that the introduction of nuclear weapons in 1945 coincided with an unprecedented period of peace among 

the great powers. While the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in many proxy wars in peripheral 

geographic regions during the Cold War, they never 

engaged in direct combat. Despite regional scuffles 

involving nuclear-armed states in the Middle East, 

South Asia, and East Asia, none of these conflicts resulted in a major theater war. This lid on the intensity 

of conflict, according to Waltz, was the direct result of 

the stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons.

Following in the path blazed by the strategic thinkers reviewed here, Waltz argued that the requirements 

for deterrence are not high. He argued that, contrary 

to the behavior of the Cold War superpowers, a state 

need not build a large arsenal with multiple survivable delivery vehicles in order to deter its adversaries. Rather, he claimed that a few nuclear weapons 

are sufficient for deterrence. Indeed, he went even 

further, asserting that any state will be deterred even 

if it merely suspects its opponent might have a few 

nuclear weapons because the costs of getting it wrong 

are simply too high.

Not even a nuclear accident is a concern, according to Waltz, because leaders in nuclear-armed states 

understand that if they ever lost control of nuclear 

weapons, resulting in an accidental nuclear exchange, 

the nuclear retaliation they would suffer in response 

would be catastrophic. Nuclear-armed states, therefore, have strong incentives to maintain control of 

their nuclear weapons. Not even new nuclear states, 

which lack experience managing nuclear arsenals, 

would ever allow nuclear weapons to be used or to 

fall into the wrong hands.
58

Following Waltz, many other scholars advanced 

arguments in the proliferation optimism school. For 

example, Bruce Bueno de Mesquite and William Riker explore the “merits of selective nuclear proliferation.”30 John Mearsheimer made the case for a “Ukrainian nuclear deterrent” following the collapse of the 

Soviet Union.31 In the run up to the 2003 Gulf War, 

John Mearsheimer and Steven Walt argued that we 

should not worry about a nuclear-armed Iraq because 

a nuclear-armed Iraq can be deterred.32 In recent years, 

Barry Posen and other scholars have argued that nuclear proliferation in Iran does not pose an unmanageable threat, again arguing that a nuclear-armed Iran 

can be deterred.33

What’s Wrong with Proliferation Optimism?

The proliferation optimist position, while having a 

distinguished pedigree, has several major flaws. Many 

of these weaknesses have been chronicled in brilliant 

detail by Sagan and other contemporary proliferation pessimists.34 Rather than repeat these substantial 

efforts, I will use this section to offer some other 

critiques of the recent incarnations of proliferation 

optimism. 

First and foremost, proliferation optimists present 

an oversimplified view of nuclear deterrence theory. 

Apart from the optimists, leading nuclear deterrence 

theorists believe that nuclear proliferation contributes 

to a real risk of nuclear war even in a situation of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) among rational 

states.35

 In the 1940s, Viner, Brodie, and others argued that 

the advent of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) 

rendered war among major powers obsolete, but nu-
59

clear deterrence theory soon advanced beyond that 

simple understanding.36 After all, great power political competition does not end with nuclear weapons. 

Nuclear-armed states still seek to threaten nucleararmed adversaries. States cannot credibly threaten to 

launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they still want to coerce their adversaries. This leads to a credibility problem: how can states credibly threaten a nuclear-armed 

opponent? Since the 1960s, academic nuclear deterrence theory has been devoted almost exclusively to 

answering this question.37 Unfortunately for proliferation optimists, the answers do not give us reasons to 

be optimistic. 

Thomas Schelling was the first to devise a rational 

means by which states can threaten nuclear-armed 

opponents.38 He argued that leaders cannot credibly 

threaten to intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war, 

but they can make a “threat that leaves something to 

chance.”39 They can engage in a process, the nuclear 

crisis, which increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. 

As states escalate a nuclear crisis, there is an increasing probability that the conflict will spiral out of control and result in an inadvertent or accidental nuclear 

exchange. As long as the benefit of winning the crisis 

is greater than the incremental increase in the risk of 

nuclear war, threats to escalate nuclear crises are inherently credible. In these games of nuclear brinkmanship, the state that is willing to run the greatest risk of 

nuclear war before backing down will win the crisis 

as long as it does not end in catastrophe. It is for this 

reason that Thomas Schelling called great power politics in the nuclear era a “competition in risk taking.”40

This does not mean that states eagerly bid up the risk 

of nuclear war. Rather, they face gut-wrenching deci-
60

sions at each stage of the crisis. They can quit the crisis 

to avoid nuclear war, but only by ceding an important 

geopolitical issue to an opponent. Or they can escalate 

the crisis in an attempt to prevail, but only at the risk 

of suffering a possible nuclear exchange.

Since 1945, there have been many high stakes nuclear crises (by my count, there have been 20) in which 

“rational” states like the United States run a frighteningly real risk of nuclear war.41 By asking whether 

states can be deterred, therefore, proliferation optimists ask the wrong question. The right question to 

ask is: What risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis? Optimists are likely correct when they assert that 

Iran will not intentionally commit national suicide by 

launching a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack on the 

United States or Israel. This does not mean that Iran 

will never use nuclear weapons, however. Indeed, it 

is almost inconceivable to think that a nuclear-armed 

Iran would not, at some point, find itself in a crisis 

with another nuclear-armed power. It is also inconceivable that in those circumstances, Iran would not 

be willing to run any risk of nuclear war in order to 

achieve its objectives. If a nuclear-armed Iran and the 

United States or Israel have a geopolitical conflict in 

the future, over, for example, the internal politics of 

Syria, an Israeli conflict with Iran’s client, Hezbollah, 

the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf, passage through 

the Strait of Hormuz, or some other issue, do we believe that Iran would immediately capitulate? Or is 

it possible that Iran would push back, possibly even 

brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to coerce 

its adversaries? If the latter, there is a real risk that 

proliferation to Iran could result in nuclear war.
61

An optimist might counter that nuclear weapons 

will never be used, even in a crisis situation, because 

states have such a strong incentive, namely national 

survival, to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used. 

But, this objection ignores the fact that leaders operate 

under competing pressures. Leaders in nuclear-armed 

states also have very strong incentives to convince 

their adversaries that nuclear weapons could very 

well be used. Historically, we have seen that leaders 

take actions in crises, such as placing nuclear weapons 

on high alert and delegating nuclear launch authority 

to low level commanders, to increase purposely the 

risk of accidental nuclear war in an attempt to force 

less resolved opponents to back down.

Moreover, not even the optimists’ first principles 

about the irrelevance of nuclear posture stand up to 

scrutiny. Not all nuclear wars would be equally devastating.42 Any nuclear exchange would have devastating consequences no doubt, but if a crisis were to 

spiral out of control and result in nuclear war, any 

sane leader would rather be facing a country with five 

nuclear weapons than one with 35,000. Similarly, any 

sane leader would be willing to run a greater risk of 

nuclear war against the former state than against the 

latter. Indeed, systematic research has demonstrated 

that states are willing to run greater risks and are, 

therefore, more likely to win nuclear crises when they 

enjoy nuclear superiority over their opponents.43 Proliferation optimists miss this point, however, because 

they are still mired in 1940s deterrence theory. It is 

true that no rational leader would choose to launch a 

nuclear war, but, depending on the context, she would 

almost certainly be willing to risk one.

Nuclear deterrence theorists have proposed a second scenario under which rational leaders could in-
62

stigate a nuclear exchange: limited nuclear war.44 By 

launching a single nuclear weapon against a small 

city, for example, a nuclear-armed state could signal 

its willingness to escalate a crisis, while leaving its 

adversary with enough left to lose to deter the adversary from launching a full-scale nuclear response. In 

a future crisis between China and the United States, 

for example, China could choose to launch a nuclear 

strike on Honolulu to demonstrate its seriousness. In 

that situation, with the continental United States intact, would Washington choose to launch a full-scale 

nuclear war on China that could result in the destruction of many more American cities? Or would it back 

down? China might decide to strike, calculating that 

Washington would prefer a humiliating retreat over 

a full-scale nuclear war. If launching a limited nuclear 

war could be rational, it follows that the spread of nuclear weapons increases the risk of nuclear use. Again, 

by ignoring contemporary developments in scholarly 

discourse and relying exclusively on understandings 

of nuclear deterrence theory that became obsolete decades ago, optimists fail to make a compelling case.

The optimists also err by confusing stability with 

the national interest. Even if the spread of nuclear 

weapons contributes to greater levels of international 

stability (which discussions herein suggest it might 

not), it does not necessarily follow that the spread of 

nuclear weapons is in the U.S. interest. There might 

be other national goals that trump stability, such as 

reducing to zero the risk of nuclear war in important geopolitical regions. Optimists might argue that 

South Asia is more stable because India and Pakistan 

both possess nuclear weapons, but certainly the risk 

of nuclear war is higher than if nuclear weapons did 

not exist on the subcontinent. In addition, it is wrong 
63

to assume that stability is always in the U.S. national 

interest. Sometimes it is, but sometimes it is not. If 

stability is obtained because Washington is deterred 

from using force against a nuclear-armed adversary 

in a situation where using force could have advanced 

national goals, stability harms, rather than advances, 

U.S. national interests.

The final gaping weakness in the proliferation optimist argument, however, is that it rests on a logical 

contradiction. This might come as a surprise to some, 

given that optimists are sometimes portrayed as hardheaded thinkers, following their premises to their 

logical conclusions. But, the contradiction at the heart 

of the optimist argument is glaring and simple to understand: either the probability of nuclear war is zero, 

or it is nonzero, but it cannot be both. If the probability 

of nuclear war is zero, then nuclear weapons should 

have no deterrent effect. States will not be deterred by 

a nuclear war that could never occur and states should 

be willing to launch large-scale wars against nucleararmed states intentionally. In this case, proliferation 

optimists cannot conclude that the spread of nuclear 

weapons is stabilizing. 

If, on the other hand, the probability of nuclear war 

is nonzero, then there is a real danger that the spread 

of nuclear weapons increases the probability of a catastrophic nuclear war. If this is true, then proliferation 

optimists cannot be certain that nuclear weapons will 

never be used. 

In sum, either the spread of nuclear weapons 

raises the risk of nuclear war and, in so doing, deters 

large-scale conventional conflict or there is no danger 

that nuclear weapons will be used, and the spread of 

nuclear weapons does not increase international stability. But, despite the claims of the proliferation optimists, it is nonsensical to argue that nuclear weapons 
64

will never be used and to simultaneously claim that 

their spread contributes to international stability. 

Proliferation Anti-obsessionists.

Other scholars, whom I label “anti-obsessionists,” 

argue that the spread of nuclear weapons has neither 

been good nor bad for international politics, but rather irrelevant. They argue that academics and policymakers concerned about nuclear proliferation spend 

too much time and energy obsessing over nuclear 

weapons, that, at the end of the day, are not all that 

important. 

In Atomic Obsession, John Mueller argues that widespread fears about the threat of nuclear proliferation 

are overblown.45 He acknowledges that policymakers and experts have often worried that the spread of 

nuclear weapons could lead to nuclear war, nuclear 

terrorism, and cascades of nuclear proliferation, but 

he then sets about systematically challenging each of 

these fears. He contends that nuclear weapons have 

had little effect on the conduct of international diplomacy and that world history would have been roughly 

the same had nuclear weapons never been invented. 

Finally, Mueller concludes by arguing that the real 

problem is not nuclear proliferation but nuclear nonproliferation policy, because states do harmful things 

in the name of nonproliferation, such as take military 

action and deny countries access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

Similarly, Ward Wilson argues that, despite the 

belief held by optimists and pessimists alike, nuclear 

weapons are not useful tools of deterrence.46 In his 

study of the end of World War II, for example, Wilson 

argues that it was not the U.S. use of nuclear weap-
65

ons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki that forced Japanese 

surrender, but a variety of other factors, including the 

Soviet Union’s decision to enter the war. If the actual 

use of nuclear weapons was not enough to convince a 

country to capitulate to its opponent, he argues, then 

there is little reason to think that the mere threat of 

nuclear use has been important to keeping the peace 

over the past half-century. Leaders of nuclear-armed 

states justify nuclear possession by touting their deterrent benefits, but if nuclear weapons have no deterrent 

value, there is no reason, Wilson claims, to keep them.

Finally, Anne Harrington de Santana argues that 

nuclear experts “fetishize” nuclear weapons.47 Just as 

capitalists, according to Karl Marx, bestow magical 

qualities on money, she argues that leaders and national security experts do the same thing to nuclear 

weapons. Nuclear deterrence as a critical component 

of national security strategy, according to Harrington 

de Santana, is not inherent in the technology of nuclear weapons themselves, but is rather the result of how 

leaders in countries around the world think about 

them. In short, she argues, “Nuclear weapons are 

powerful because we treat them as powerful.”48 But, 

she maintains, we could just as easily “defetishize” 

them, treating them as unimportant and therefore 

rendering them obsolete. She concludes that “Perhaps 

some day, the deactivated nuclear weapons on display 

in museums across the United States will be nothing more than a reminder of how powerful nuclear 

weapons used to be.”49

The anti-obsessionists make some thought-provoking points and may help reign in some of the most 

hyperbolic accounts of the effect of nuclear proliferation. They remind us, for example, that our worst fears 

have not been realized, at least not yet. Yet, by taking 
66

the next step and arguing that nuclear weapons have 

been, and will continue to be, irrelevant, they go too 

far. Their arguments call to mind the story about the 

man who jumps to his death from the top of a New 

York City skyscraper and, when asked how things are 

going as he passes the 15th story window, replies, “So 

far, so good.”

The idea that world history would have been 

largely unchanged had nuclear weapons never been 

invented is a provocative one, but it is also unfalsifiable. There is good reason to believe that world history 

would have been different, and in many ways better, 

had certain countries not acquired nuclear weapons.

Let us take Pakistan as an example. Pakistan officially joined the ranks of the nuclear powers in May 

1998 when it followed India in conducting a series of 

nuclear tests. Since that time, Pakistan has been a poster child for the possible negative consequences of nuclear proliferation. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have 

led to further nuclear proliferation as Pakistan, with 

the help of rogue scientist A. Q. Khan, transferred uranium enrichment technology to Iran, Libya, and North 

Korea.50 Indeed, part of the reason that North Korea 

and Iran possess uranium enrichment programs today is because they got help from Pakistan. Pakistan 

has arguably become more aggressive since acquiring 

nuclear weapons, displaying an increased willingness 

to sponsor cross-border incursions into India with 

terrorists and irregular forces.51 In a number of highstakes nuclear crises between India and Pakistan, 

U.S. officials worried that the conflicts could escalate 

and intervened diplomatically to prevent a nuclear 

exchange on the subcontinent. The U.S. Government 

also worries about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, fearing that Pakistan’s nukes 
67

could fall into the hands of terrorists in the event of a 

state collapse or a break down in nuclear security. We 

still have not witnessed the full range of consequences 

arising from Pakistani nuclear proliferation. Islamabad has only possessed the bomb for a little over a 

decade, but they are likely to keep it for decades to 

come. It is possible that we could still one day witness 

a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. In short, 

Pakistan’s nuclear capability has already had deleterious effects on U.S. national security. and these threats 

are only likely to grow over time. 

In addition, the anti-obsessionists are incorrect to 

argue that the cure of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation 

policy is worse than the disease of proliferation. Many 

observers would agree with Mueller that the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a disaster, costing much in 

the way of blood and treasure and offering little strategic benefit. But the Iraq War is hardly representative 

of U.S. nonproliferation policy. For the most part, nonproliferation policy operates in the mundane realm of 

legal frameworks, negotiations, inspections, sanctions, 

and a variety of other tools. Even occasional preventive military strikes on nuclear facilities have been far 

less calamitous than the Iraq War. Indeed, the Israeli 

strikes on nuclear reactors in Iraq and Syria in 1981 

and 2007, respectively, produced no meaningful military retaliation and a muted international response. 

Moreover, the idea that the Iraq War was primarily 

about nuclear nonproliferation is a contestable one, 

with Saddam Hussein’s history of aggression, the unsustainability of maintaining the pre-war containment 

regime indefinitely, Saddam’s ties to terrorist groups, 

his past possession and use of chemical and biological weapons, and the window of opportunity created 
68

by September 11, 2001 (9/11), all serving as possible 

prompts for U.S. military action in the spring of 2003. 

The claim that nonproliferation policy is dangerous because it denies developing countries access to 

nuclear energy also rests on shaky ground. If anything, 

the global nonproliferation regime has, on balance, 

increased access to nuclear technology. Does anyone 

really believe that countries like Algeria, Congo, and 

Vietnam would have nuclear reactors today were it 

not for Atoms for Peace, Article IV of the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and other aspects of 

the nonproliferation regime that have provided developing states with nuclear technology in exchange 

for promises to forgo nuclear weapons development? 

Moreover, the sensitive fuel-cycle technology denied 

by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and other 

supply control regimes is not necessary to the development of a vibrant nuclear energy program as the 

many countries that have fuel-cycle services provided 

by foreign nuclear suppliers clearly demonstrate. Finally, the notion that nuclear energy is somehow the 

key to lifting developing countries from third to first 

world status does not find support. Given the large 

upfront investments, the cost of back-end fuel management and storage, and the ever-present danger of 

environmental catastrophe exemplified most recently 

by the Fukushima disaster in Japan, many argue that 

nuclear energy is not a cost-effective source of energy 

(if all the externalities are taken into account) for any 

country, not to mention those developing states least 

able to manage these myriad challenges.

Taken together, therefore, the argument that 

nuclear nonproliferation policy is more dangerous 

than the consequences of nuclear proliferation, including possible nuclear war, is untenable. Indeed, it 
69

would certainly come as a surprise to the mild mannered diplomats and scientists who staff the International Atomic Energy Agency, the global focal point 

of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, located in 

Vienna, Austria.

The anti-obsessionsists, like the optimists, also 

walk themselves into logical contradictions. In this 

case, their policy recommendations do not necessarily 

follow from their analyses. Wilson argues that nuclear 

weapons are irrelevant, and therefore we should eliminate them.52 But if nuclear weapons are really so irrelevant, why not just keep them lying around? They will 

not cause any problems if they are as meaningless as 

anti-obsessionists claim, and it is certainly more cost 

effective to do nothing than to negotiate complicated 

international treaties and to dismantle thousands 

of warheads, delivery vehicles, and their associated 

facilities.

Finally, the idea that nuclear weapons are only important because we think they are powerful is arresting, but false. There are properties inherent in nuclear 

weapons that can be used to create military effects 

that simply cannot, at least not yet, be replicated with 

conventional munitions. If a military planner wants to 

quickly destroy a city on the other side of the planet, 

his only option today is a nuclear weapon mounted 

on an ICBM. Therefore, if the collective “we” suddenly decided to “defetishize” nuclear weapons by 

treating them as unimportant, it is implausible that 

some leader somewhere would not independently 

come to the idea that nuclear weapons could advance 

his or her country’s national security and thereby 

re-fetishize them.

In short, the optimists and anti-obsessionists have 

brought an important perspective to the nonprolifera-
70

tion debate. Their arguments are provocative and raise 

the bar for those who wish to argue that the spread of 

nuclear weapons is indeed a problem. Nevertheless, 

their counterintuitive arguments are not enough to 

wish away the enormous security challenges posed 

by the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons. These myriad threats will be considered in the 

next section.

WHY NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 

IS A PROBLEM

The spread of nuclear weapons poses a number of 

severe threats to international peace and U.S. national 

security, including nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, 

global and regional instability, constrained freedom 

of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. This section explores each of these threats 

in turn.

Nuclear War.

The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear 

weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability 

that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic 

nuclear war. A nuclear exchange between the two superpowers during the Cold War could have arguably 

resulted in human extinction, and a nuclear exchange 

between states with smaller nuclear arsenals, such 

as India and Pakistan, could still result in millions 

of deaths and casualties, billions of dollars of economic devastation, environmental degradation, and a 

parade of other horrors.
71

To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in 

warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear 

weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World 

War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plusyear tradition of nuclear nonuse as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to 

think that nuclear weapons will never be used again 

simply because they have not been used for some time. 

After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide 

economic downturns like the great depression were 

a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dotcom bubble bursting in the late-1990s and the Great 

Recession of late-2000s.53 This author, for one, would 

be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again 

sometime in my lifetime.

Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states 

go through a transition period in which they lack a 

secure second-strike capability. In this context, one or 

both states might believe that it has an incentive to use 

nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires 

nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed 

rival, Israel, will have a secure second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, 

given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel 

might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear 

strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. 

Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a 

large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first 

crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small 

and vulnerable nuclear force.

In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least 

three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the 

state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a 

splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, 

therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike 
72

to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities and eliminate the 

threat of nuclear war against Israel. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive 

strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. 

Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear 

arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel “use ‘em or loose 

‘em” pressures. That is, if Tehran believes that Israel 

might launch a preemptive strike, Iran might decide 

to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear 

arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has 

argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.54 If there are advantages to 

striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in 

the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be 

better to go first than to go second. In a future IsraeliIranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both 

prefer to avoid a nuclear war but decide to strike 

first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from 

an opponent. 

Even in a world of MAD, there is a risk of nuclear 

war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nucleararmed states are governed by rational leaders who 

would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. 

This assumption appears to have applied to past and 

current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that 

it will continue to hold in the future. For example, 

Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign 

policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who genuinely hold millenarian religious worldviews and who 

could one day ascend to power and have their finger 

on the nuclear trigger. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some 

leader will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing 

full well that it could result in self-destruction.
73

One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine a nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear 

weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of 

international politics. As discussed previously, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest, and 

leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. 

This leads to the credibility problem that is at the heart 

of modern deterrence theory: How can you credibly 

threaten to attack a nuclear-armed opponent? Deterrence theorists have devised at least two answers 

to this question. First, as stated earlier, leaders can 

choose to launch a limited nuclear war.55 This strategy 

might be especially attractive to states in a position of 

conventional military inferiority that might have an 

incentive to escalate a crisis quickly. During the Cold 

War, the United States was willing to use nuclear 

weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western 

Europe, given NATO’s conventional inferiority. As 

Russia’s conventional military power has deteriorated 

since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to 

rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its strategic 

doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of 

nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that 

most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an 

invasion from conventionally stronger India. Finally, 

Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of 

nuclear use against a U.S. superpower in a possible 

East Asia contingency.

Second, as was also discussed earlier, leaders can 

make a “threat that leaves something to chance.”56

They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these 

risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can in-
74

crease the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force 

a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical 

crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of 

them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have 

come close. Scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents could have led to war.57 When 

we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as 

Iran and Israel, there are fewer sources of stability 

than existed during the Cold War, meaning that there 

is a very real risk that a future Middle East crisis could 

result in a devastating nuclear exchange. 

Nuclear Terrorism. 

The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the 

risk of nuclear terrorism.58 It used to be said that “Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people 

dead,” but the terrorist attacks of 9/11 changed expert 

perceptions of the terrorist threat.59 These attacks demonstrated that al-Qaeda and other modern terrorist 

groups are interested in imposing massive casualties, 

and there are few better ways of killing large numbers of civilians than detonating a nuclear weapon in 

a major metropolitan area. While 9/11 was one of the 

greatest tragedies in American history, it would have 

been much worse had Osama Bin Laden been able to 

acquire nuclear weapons. Osama Bin Laden declared 

it a “religious duty” for al-Qaeda to acquire nuclear 

weapons, and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in jihad 

against the West.60 Unlike states, which can be more 

easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists 

acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them. Indeed, in recent years, many U.S. politicians and secu-
75

rity analysts have agreed that nuclear terrorism poses 

the greatest threat to U.S. national security.61

Wanting nuclear weapons and actually possessing 

them, however, are two different things, and many 

analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles 

that terrorists would have to overcome to acquire 

nuclear weapons.62 Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons 

spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall 

into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material 

required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are 

good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer 

nuclear weapons to terrorists, but as nuclear weapons 

spread, the possibility that a leader might someday 

purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, 

for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and 

Hezbollah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even 

if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear 

capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or 

ideologically motivated insiders to transfer dangerous 

material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, 

that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with al-Qaeda members to discuss a 

possible nuclear deal.63 Finally, a nuclear-armed state 

could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and 

order and a loose nuclear weapons problem. U.S. officials are currently very concerned about what would 

happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this 

problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country 

with a history of revolutions and a government with 

a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that 
76

Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could 

actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran 

suffered a break down in authority, forcing us to 

worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal. 

Regional Instability. 

The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens 

nuclear powers contributing to regional instability. 

States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct 

military attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an 

intentional military attack, giving them an incentive 

to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign 

policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield 

under which states can feel free to engage in lowerlevel aggression. Indeed, international relations theories about the “stability-instability paradox” maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to 

conventional instability.64

Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and 

contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly 

analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for 

other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more 

likely to engage in conflict than non-nuclear weapon 

states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced 

in new nuclear states that have less experience with 

nuclear diplomacy.65 Similarly, research on internal 

decisionmaking in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the 

acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged 

them to initiate militarized disputes against India.66

Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because 

it fears a major military retaliation from the United 
77

States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons, it could feel 

free to push harder. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and 

engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy. With 

a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight 

around in the region, we could witness an even more 

crisis-prone Middle East. In a poly-nuclear Middle 

East with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other 

states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those 

crises could result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange.

Nuclear proliferation can also lead to regional instability due to preventive strikes against nuclear programs. States often conduct preventive military strikes 

to prevent adversaries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Historically, the United States attacked German 

nuclear facilities during World War II; Israel bombed 

a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981; Iraq bombed Iran’s 

Bushehr reactors in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, and 

Iran returned the favor against Iraq’s Osiraq reactor; 

a U.S.-led international coalition destroyed Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure in the first Gulf War in 1991; and 

Israel bombed a Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007. These 

strikes have not led to extensive conflagrations in the 

past, but we might not be so lucky in the future. At the 

time of this writing in 2012, the United States and Israel were polishing military plans to attack Iran’s nuclear program, and some experts maintain that such a 

strike could result in a wider regional war.

Constrained Freedom of Action. 

The spread of nuclear weapons also disadvantages American’s national security by constraining U.S. 

freedom of action. As the most powerful country on 

the planet with the ability to project power to every 
78

corner of the globe, the United States has the ability 

to threaten or protect every other state in the international system. This is a significant source of strategic 

leverage and maintaining freedom of action is an important objective of U.S. national security policy.67

As nuclear weapons spread, however, America’s 

military freedom of action is constrained. The United 

States can use, or credibly threaten to use, force against 

nonnuclear states. The threat of military action against 

nuclear-armed states is much less credible, however, 

because nuclear-armed states can deter U.S. military 

action with the threat of nuclear retaliation. In January 

2012, for example, Iran threatened to close the Strait 

of Hormuz, a narrow Persian Gulf waterway through 

which roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil flows, and 

the United States issued a counterthreat, declaring 

that Washington would use force to reopen the Strait 

if necessary. If Iran had had nuclear weapons, however, Washington’s threats would have been much 

less credible. Would a U.S. President really be willing 

to risk nuclear war with Iran in order to reopen the 

Strait? Maybe. But, maybe not. While the United States 

might not be deterred in every contingency against a 

nuclear-armed state, it is clear that, at a minimum, the 

spread of nuclear weapons greatly complicates U.S. 

decisions to use force.

Undermines Alliances. 

The spread of nuclear weapons also complicates 

U.S. alliance relationships. Washington uses the promise of military protection as a way to cement its alliance 

structures. U.S. allies depend on America’s protection, 

giving Washington influence over allied states’ foreign 

policies. Historically, the United States has offered, 
79

and threatened to retract, the security guarantee carrot to prevent allied states from acting contrary to its 

interests. As nuclear weapons spread, however, alliances held together by promises of military protection 

are undermined in two ways. First, U.S. allies may 

doubt the credibility of Washington’s commitments 

to provide a military defense against nuclear-armed 

states, leading them to weaken ties with their patron. 

As Charles de Gaulle famously asked about the U.S. 

commitment to defend France from the Soviet Union 

during the Cold War, would Washington be willing to 

trade New York for Paris? Similarly, if Iran acquires 

nuclear weapons, U.S. partners in the Middle East, 

such as Israel and Gulf States, will question Washington’s resolve to defend them from Iran. After all, if the 

United States proves unwilling to use force to prevent 

Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, would it really 

be willing to fight a war against a nuclear-armed Iran? 

Qatar, for example, already appears to be hedging 

its bets, loosening ties to Washington and warming 

to Tehran.

Second, nuclear proliferation could encourage 

client states to acquire nuclear weapons themselves, 

giving them greater security independence and making them less dependable allies. According to many 

scholars, the acquisition of the force de frappe was instrumental in permitting the French Fifth Republic 

under President Charles de Gaulle to pursue a foreign policy path independent from Washington and 

NATO.68 Similarly, it is possible that Turkey, Saudi 

Arabia, and other regional states will acquire independent nuclear capabilities to counter Iran’s nuclear 

arsenal, greatly destabilizing an already unstable region and threatening Washington’s ability to influence 

regional dynamics.
80

Further Proliferation. 

Nuclear proliferation poses an additional threat 

to international peace and security because it causes 

further proliferation. As former Secretary of State 

George Schultz once said, “proliferation begets proliferation.”69 When one country acquires nuclear weapons, its regional adversaries, feeling threatened by its 

neighbor’s new nuclear capabilities, are more likely to 

attempt to acquire nuclear weapons in response. Indeed, the history of nuclear proliferation can be read 

as a chain reaction of proliferation. The United States 

acquired nuclear weapons in response to Nazi Germany’s crash nuclear program. The Soviet Union and 

China acquired nuclear weapons to counter the U.S. 

nuclear arsenal. The United Kingdom (UK) and France 

went nuclear to protect themselves from the Soviet 

Union. India’s bomb was meant to counter China, and 

it, in turn, spurred Pakistan to join the nuclear club. 

Today, we worry that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, other Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt, 

Iraq, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, might desire nuclear 

capabilities, triggering an arms race in a strategically 

important and volatile region.

Of course, reactive proliferation does not always 

occur. In the early-1960s, for example, U.S. officials 

worried that a nuclear-armed China would cause 

Taiwan, Japan, India, Pakistan, and other states to acquire nuclear weapons.70 In hindsight, we now know 

that they were correct in some cases but wrong in others. Using statistical analysis, Philipp Bleek has shown 

that reactive proliferation is not automatic, but rather 

that states are more likely to proliferate in response 

to neighbors when three conditions are met: 1) there 

is an intense security rivalry between the two coun-
81

tries, 2) the potential proliferant state does not have a 

security guarantee from a nuclear-armed patron, and 

3) the potential proliferant state has the industrial and 

technical capacity to launch an indigenous nuclear 

program.71 In other words, reactive proliferation is 

real, but it is also conditional. If Iran enters the nuclear 

club, therefore, it is likely that some, but not all, of the 

countries that we currently worry about will eventually follow suit and become nuclear powers.

We should worry about the spread of nuclear 

weapons in every case, therefore, because the problem 

will likely extend beyond that specific case. As Wohlstetter cautioned decades ago, proliferation is not an 

N problem but an N+1 problem. Further nuclear proliferation is not necessarily a problem, of course, if the 

spread of nuclear weapons is irrelevant or even good 

for international politics as obsessionists and optimists 

protest. But, as the previous discussion makes clear, 

nuclear proliferation, and the further nuclear proliferation it causes, increases the risk of nuclear war and 

nuclear terrorism, threatens global and regional stability, constrains U.S. freedom of action, and weakens 

America’s alliance relationships, giving us all good 

reason to fear the spread of nuclear weapons. 

CONCLUSION

This chapter analyzed the past, present, and future of proliferation optimism. It began by reviewing the academic and policy origins of the pillars of 

proliferation optimism thinking. Next, it examined 

more recent work in this tradition, including a review of both proliferation optimism and proliferation 

anti-obsessionism. I demonstrated that this literature 

brings an important perspective to bear on the ques-
82

tion of nuclear proliferation and reins in worst-case 

analyses of the consequences of nuclear proliferation. 

At the same time, I argued that, in making the case 

for the irrelevance of nuclear weapons, this literature 

swings too far in the opposite direction. Moreover, I 

demonstrated that too often these theorists support 

their arguments with contradictory logics and weak 

empirical evidence. Finally, I restated the argument 

about why the spread of nuclear weapons continues 

to pose a threat to international peace and security. 

Despite the claims of optimists, there is no getting 

around the fact that nuclear proliferation increases the 

risks of nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, regional instability, constrained U.S. freedom of action, weakened 

U.S. alliances, and further proliferation. 

The findings of this chapter have important implications for the scholarly study of nuclear proliferation. 

While proliferation optimism and proliferation antiobsessionism have made the field of nonproliferation 

studies more interesting in recent years, their inherent logical weaknesses means that they should remain 

niche, not mainstream, approaches to the study of 

nuclear proliferation. This chapter, therefore, aims to 

bring proliferation pessimism back in. The diffusion 

of the most powerful weapons ever invented by man 

is a serious problem. The burden of proof is on those 

who wish to claim otherwise. So far, the optimists and 

anti-obsessionists have made us think, but they have 

not made their case. It is not yet (and my guess is that 

it never will be) time for the discipline to shift its null 

hypothesis from the point of view that the spread of 

nuclear weapons is bad to the position that it is either 

good or irrelevant. 
83

The argument of this chapter is mostly good news 

for U.S. nonproliferation policy. It is difficult, if not 

impossible, to find U.S. national security officials who 

believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is beneficial or irrelevant. That is not to say that proliferation 

optimism has not crept into the corridors of power in 

more subtle ways. Its influence can be found whenever national security officials too easily dismiss the 

problems posed by nuclear proliferation or breezily 

assert that a new nuclear state can be deterred. On 

balance, however, optimism has had more of an effect 

in the classroom than in the situation room. U.S. officials are correct to treat the spread of nuclear weapons as a serious threat and to go to great lengths to 

prevent it. Indeed, it would be downright dangerous 

if Washington were to follow the advice of optimists 

and anti-obsessionists. Would U.S. citizens (including proliferation optimists) really stand by if Washington distributed nuclear weapons to other countries in a quixotic quest for stability? Would foreign 

officials be able to take us seriously if U.S. officials 

were to announce at the next NPT Review Conference 

that the aim of U.S. nonproliferation policy was to 

“defetishize” nuclear weapons? 

Of course, there are things that U.S. officials could 

do better, and the fine-tuning of U.S. nonproliferation 

policy makes an important subject for another article. 

For now, however, we should rest assured, knowing 

that U.S. policymakers are too reasonable to be anything other than proliferation pessimists.
84

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, “Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence,” January 31, 2012, available from 

www.intelligence.senate.gov/120131/clapper.pdf.

2. See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.

3. See, for example, John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear 

Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

4. Ibid.

5. On the evolution of nuclear strategy, see Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

6. See, for example, Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: 

Atomic Power and World Order, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1946.

7. Jacob Viner, “The Implications of the Atomic Bomb for International Relations,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, delivered November 16, 1945.

8. Ibid.

9. Brodie, The Absolute Weapon.

10. Ibid.

11. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear 

Weapons: A Debate, New York: W. W. Norton, 1997.

12. Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Power,” Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1958.
85

13. Albert Wohlstetter, “Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 

Country,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 3, April 1961, pp. 355-387.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. On France’s nuclear program, see Lawrence Scheinman. 

Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic, Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965.

17. For a thorough discussion of the development of French 

nuclear strategy, see Bruno Tertrais, “‘Destruction Assurée’: The 

Origins and Development of French Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1982,” 

Henry D. Sokolski ed., Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004, pp. 51-122.

18. Ibid., p. 95.

19. Ibid., p. 86.

20. Ibid., p. 64.

21. Ibid., p. 86.

22. Pierre Marie Gallois, Le Sablier du Siecle: Mémoires (The 

Hourglass of the Century: Memoirs), Lausanne, France: L’Âge 

d’homme, 1999, p. 402.

23. Tertrais, p. 83.

24. Ibid., p. 82.

25. Ibid., p. 96.

26. Pierre Marie Gallois, Stratégie de l’âge nucléaire (Strategy of 

the Nuclear Age), Paris, France: François-Xavier de Guibert, 1960.

27. Wohlstetter, “Nuclear Sharing.” 
86

28. This section draws heavily from Harvey M. Sapolsky, 

“The U.S. Navy’s Fleet Ballistic Missile Program and Finite Deterrence,” Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Getting MAD, pp. 123-135.

29. Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More 

May Be Better,” Adelphi Papers, No. 171, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981.

30. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, “An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation.” Journal 

of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2, June 1982, pp. 283-306.

31. John Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Deterrent,” 

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 50-66.

32. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “An Unnecessary 

War,” Foreign Policy, January/February 2003, pp. 51-59.

33. Barry R. Posen, “We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran,” The 

New York Times, February 27, 2006.

34. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons.

35. See, for example, Robert Powell, “Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information,” American Political 

Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 1, 1988, pp. 155-178; Robert Powell, 

“Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation,” 

American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 2, 1989, pp. 503-519; 

and Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of 

Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes,” International Organization, Vol. 67, Issue 1, January 2013, pp. 141-171.

36. Brodie, The Absolute Weapon.

37. See, for example, Robert Powell. Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility, New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 1990.

38. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, New Haven: Yale 

University Press, 1966.

39. Ibid.
87

40. Ibid.

41. Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of 

Resolve.” 

42. See for example, Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 

New York: Greenwood Press, 1978.

43. Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of 

Resolve.” 

44. Klaus Knorr, Limited Strategic War, New York: 

Praeger, 1962.

45. Mueller, Atomic Obsession.

46. Ward Wilson, “The Myth of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, November 2008, pp. 421-439.

47. Anne Harrington de Santana, “Nuclear Weapons as the 

Currency of Power: Deconstructing the Fetishism of Force,” The 

Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2009, pp. 325-345.

48. Ibid., p. 327.

49. Ibid., p. 342.

50. Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer 

and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 

Press, 2010.

51. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University 

Press, 2007.

52. Wilson, “The Myth of Nuclear Weapons.” 

53. Steven Weber, “The End of the Business Cycle?” Foreign 

Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 4, July/August 1997, pp. 65-82.
88

54. Thomas Schelling, “Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack,” 

Santa Monica, CA: Rand Paper, 1958.

55. Knorr, Limited Strategic War.

56. Schelling, Arms and Influence. 

57. See, for example, Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 1993.

58. On nuclear terrorism, see, for example, Michael Levi, 

On Nuclear Terrorism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 

Press, 2007.

59. Brian Michael Jenkins, “The New Age of Terrorism,” Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2006.

60. Fissile Materials Working Group, “After Bin Laden: Nuclear Terrorism Still a Top Threat,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 

May 13, 2011.

61. Ibid.

62. Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism.

63. David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade 

Arms America’s Enemies, New York: Free Press, 2012.

64. Glenn H. Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance 

of Terror,” Paul Seabury, ed., The Balance of Power, San Francisco, 

CA: Chandler, 1965, pp. 184-201.

65. Robert Rauchhaus, “Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 

Vol. 53, No. 2, April 2009, pp. 258-277; Michael Horowitz, “The 

Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?” Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 53, No. 2, April 

2009, pp. 234-257.

66. Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent.
89

67. See, for example, Donald Rumsfeld, The National Defense 

Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 2005.

68. See, for example, Scheinman, Wilfred L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971.

69. Philipp Bleek, The Nuclear Domino Myth: Why Proliferation 

Rarely Begets Proliferation, Ph.D. Dissertation, Washington, DC: 

Department of Government, Georgetown University, 2010. 

70. Francis J. Gavin, “Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3, Winter 

2004/2005, pp. 100-135.

71. Bleek, The Nuclear Domino Myth.

91

CHAPTER 4

PREVENTIVE WAR AND THE 

SPREAD OF NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

Matthew Fuhrmann

What are the consequences of nuclear proliferation?1

 Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons and 

North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 have 

heightened concerns about the further spread of the 

bomb. Yet, debates persist about the political effects 

of proliferation. Some argue that the spread of nuclear 

weapons constitutes a major threat to international 

security, in part because it raises the risk of nuclear 

war and increases the odds that terrorists will acquire 

the bomb.2

 Others contend that nuclear weapons can 

promote international peace and stability by raising 

the costs of armed conflict.3 According to this perspective, the slow and deliberate spread of nuclear weapons may actually be a good thing. Still others assert 

that the threat posed by nuclear proliferation is overblown and that nuclear weapons have little effect on 

international politics. As John Mueller pithily states,

“The nuclear diffusion that has transpired has proved 

to have had remarkably limited, perhaps even imperceptible, consequences.”4

This chapter contributes to ongoing debates about 

the consequences of nuclear proliferation by analyzing the connection between nuclear programs and 

preventive war. Does the pursuit of nuclear weapons increase the likelihood of preventive military 

force? If so, under what conditions does it do so? In 

this chapter, I provide answers to these questions. To 

begin, I raise further awareness about the targeting 
92

of nuclear programs by surveying historical cases in 

which countries have bombed or considered bombing 

nuclear facilities. Although attacks of this nature are 

relatively rare, countries have seriously considered 

using military force to delay proliferation on a number of occasions. I subsequently offer an explanation 

for why states strike (or consider striking), based on 

existing scholarly research. In the end, the evidence 

presented here supports the view that preventive war 

is a potential danger associated with the spread of nuclear programs that policymakers and scholars should 

take seriously.

ATTACKING NUCLEAR FACILITIES: 

THE HISTORICAL RECORD

Nuclear facilities or materials in non-nuclear 

weapons states have been targeted on more than a 

dozen occasions since 1941.5

 The first attempted strike 

against a nuclear plant occurred in 1942 when British 

commandos targeted the Norsk-Hydro heavy water 

plant in German-occupied Norway. This raid was 

unsuccessful, but the Allies followed up with several 

other strikes against the same facility, which was believed to be the main chokepoint of Germany’s nuclear 

weapons program.6

 In November 1943, for example, 

Allied aircraft dropped hundreds of bombs on the 

heavy water plant, setting back production by a few 

months. Frustrated by continued attacks against the 

facility, Germany attempted to transport heavy water 

and related equipment out of Norway in 1944 on the 

ferry Hydro; saboteurs intercepted and sank the ferry 

in Norway’s Lake Tinnsjø.

The Iran-Iraq War provided the setting for a series 

of strikes against nuclear facilities.7

 In 1977, prior to the 
93

onset of hostilities, Israel approached Iran to discuss 

joint military strikes against Iraqi nuclear infrastructure.8

 Tehran was not interested in attacking Iraq’s 

nuclear program at that time, but it naturally warmed 

up to the idea after Saddam Hussein invaded Iran on 

September 22, 1980. Days later, Iranian F-4 Phantoms

attacked Iraq’s nuclear research reactor, Osiraq, en 

route home from a bombing raid, although the strike 

caused only minor damage to the facility. Later in the 

war, on March 24, 1984, Iraq raided Iran’s nuclear 

power plant that was under construction at Bushehr. 

Baghdad targeted this facility on multiple other occasions during the conflict, despite an Iranian-backed 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution prohibiting strikes against nuclear installations. 

The Iraqi raids, which damaged the Bushehr facility 

to varying degrees, occurred as part of a broader campaign to destroy economic and industrial targets.

During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United 

States bombed numerous Iraqi nuclear facilities, including the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center near 

Baghdad.9

 This campaign heavily damaged some 

Iraqi nuclear plants, but many of the bombs that were 

dropped missed their intended targets.10 Moreover, 

some facilities escaped the war unscathed, partially 

because the United States was unaware of their existence or their location.

Iraqi nuclear infrastructure was targeted on two 

other instances in the 1990s. On January 17, 1993, 

the U.S. Navy used Tomahawk land attack missiles 

against the Zaafaraniyah uranium enrichment plant, 

which was left largely intact following the Gulf War.11

These strikes, which were intended to punish Baghdad 

for its refusal to fully comply with the United Nations 

(UN)-mandated nuclear inspections regime, signifi-
94

cantly curtailed Iraq’s electromagnetic isotope separation program.12 Then, in December 1998, the United 

States and Great Britain launched Operation DESERT 

FOX, a campaign that was intended to degrade Iraq’s 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. Despite the stated objective of the operation, it appears 

that only one facility relevant to Baghdad’s nuclear 

program was targeted: a plant housing machine tools 

relevant for centrifuge development.13

Israel has conducted two “bolt from the blue” 

raids against nuclear programs. In 1981, after Iran 

failed to destroy Iraq’s Osiraq reactor, the Israeli Air 

Force bombed the facility in a mission known as Operation OPERA. This strike was successful in the sense 

that it destroyed Osiraq, which was widely regarded 

as the centerpiece of Baghdad’s nuclear program, although other aspects of this raid’s effectiveness are 

still debated.14 More recently, in September 2007, Israel bombed a Syrian reactor at al Kibar that had yet 

to become operational. The plant, being built with assistance from North Korea, was heavily damaged as a 

result of the Israeli strike.15 After the raid, Syria bulldozed what was left of the site in an apparent effort to 

prevent others, particularly the IAEA, from obtaining 

additional information about the plant.16 Few leaders 

condemned the Israelis for using preventive military 

force, leading some to conclude that the international 

community secretly welcomed the destruction of the 

Syrian nuclear facility.17

On a number of other occasions, countries seriously considered attacking nuclear programs but ultimately did not strike.18 Egypt had plans to destroy 

Dimona, Israel’s main nuclear facility, during the 1967 

crisis, possibly with assistance from the Soviet Union.19

Indian Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi (in 1982 and 
95

1984) and Rajiv Gandhi (in 1986-87) actively sought 

to destroy the Pakistani enrichment plant at Kahuta 

in a joint operation with Israel.20 Indira Gandhi even 

approved plans for a preventive strike, but the raid 

was called off at the “last minute.”21 Pakistani officials 

likewise considered attacking nuclear installations 

in India during the 1984 crisis.22 In a lesser-known 

case, the Soviet Union considered preventive strikes 

against South Africa in the 1970s when Moscow detected apparent preparations for a nuclear test. The 

Soviet Union approached the United States and asked 

for assistance in attacking the Y Plant, one of South 

Africa’s key nuclear installations.23 Washington did 

not respond positively to this overture.

The United States did, however, strongly consider 

using military force to delay nuclear proliferation on 

other occasions. In the early-1960s, some in Washington feared that China would soon become the world’s 

fifth nuclear power.24 President John F. Kennedy, in 

particular, was deeply concerned about the prospect 

of a Chinese bomb and seriously considered using 

military force to frustrate Beijing’s nuclear program. 

The options that were put on the table included the 

use of tactical nuclear weapons against Chinese nuclear facilities, as well as employing Taiwanese saboteurs 

to infiltrate the mainland and destroy key plants.25

U.S. officials ultimately chose not to attack, and Beijing conducted its first nuclear test in 1964.

Washington likewise considered using force during the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis.26 This crisis 

began when the IAEA detected irregularities at North 

Korean nuclear plants and called for the UN Security 

Council to authorize a special inspections regime, 

leading Pyongyang to announce its withdrawal from 

the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Some U.S. 
96

officials believed that military action could reduce the 

threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program. For 

example, Secretary of Defense William Perry later 

indicated, “We believed that the nuclear program on 

which North Korea was embarked was . . . dangerous, and were prepared to risk a war to stop it.”27 Any 

American operation against North Korea would likely 

have involved cooperation from South Korea, which 

had seriously considered raiding nuclear facilities at 

Yongbyon as early as 1991. In the end, a diplomatic 

bargain known as the Agreed Framework brought a 

(temporary) end to the crisis.28

Iran’s nuclear program has also raised the prospect 

of preventive military action. Some elites in Washington and Jerusalem have recently called for military 

raids against Tehran’s nuclear facilities. President 

Barack Obama has not publicly threatened to bomb 

Iranian nuclear facilities, but he has said that “all 

options are on the table,” and that the option of last 

resort is the “military component.”29 Israeli officials, 

including Prime Minister Benjamin Natanyahu, have 

more forcefully advocated for military strikes. Speaking about the prospect of attacking Iran, Natanyahu 

said, “None of us can afford to wait much longer. . . . I 

will never let my people live in the shadow of annihilation.”30 Officials outside of the United States and Israel—including Saudi King Abdullah—have similarly 

voiced support for preventive raids against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. It remains to be seen, however, 

whether Israel or the United States will take military 

action against Iran.

In the cases previously mentioned, the target state 

had yet to acquire nuclear weapons. Does the danger 

of preventive war disappear once a potential target 

assembles a nuclear arsenal? Kenneth Waltz, a promi-
97

nent proponent of “nuclear optimism,” maintains 

that “preventive strikes against states that have, or 

may have, nuclear weapons are hard to imagine.”31 It 

is true that attacks against nuclear states are potentially more dangerous than strikes against states that 

are still non-nuclear. However, countries have occasionally considered raiding nuclear infrastructure in 

states that possessed nuclear arsenals. Some elites in 

the United States called for preventive strikes against 

the Soviet Union during the 1950s.32 The Soviet Union 

seriously contemplated striking Chinese nuclear facilities during the 1969 border crisis.33 Libya hoped to 

launch a retaliatory raid against Israel’s Dimona plant 

following the 1981 Osiraq strike. Tripoli sought cooperation to implement such a strike from Iraq and the 

Soviet Union, both of whom expressed little interest in 

attacking Israel.34 Iraq did, however, launch Scud missiles at Dimona during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, but 

they did not come close to hitting the target.35

WHY COUNTRIES ATTACK

The preceding discussion underscores that concerns about nuclear proliferation have occasionally led 

to preventive strikes against nuclear facilities. Why do 

countries attack or consider attacking nuclear plants 

in other states? Prior research has shown that states 

are more likely to target nuclear programs when they 

are highly threatened by the target state’s potential

acquisition of nuclear weapons.36 Two main factors 

shape this threat perception: violent interstate conflict 

and the proliferator’s regime type.37

Nuclear proliferation can be especially threatening 

to states that fear that they could be targeted with the 

bomb. The likelihood of nuclear use is generally low, 
98

and nuclear weapons have not been used in war since 

the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, 

in 1945. However, a history of bad relations among 

states can increase fears of a future nuclear attack, 

perhaps leading to the perception that a rival’s acquisition of the bomb poses an existential threat. For example, some Israeli officials viewed the Iraqi nuclear 

program as a threat of the highest magnitude, in part 

because Iraq fought against Israel in the 1948 War of 

Independence and the 1973 Yom Kippur War.38 As 

Prime Minister Menachem Begin proclaimed shortly 

after the strike against Osiraq in 1981: 

If we stood by idly . . . Saddam Hussein would have 

produced his three, four, five bombs. . . . Then, this 

country and this people would have been lost. . . . 

Another Holocaust would have happened in the 

history of the Jewish people.39

States are substantially less threatened when their 

nonrivals pursue nuclear weapons. Attacks against 

nuclear infrastructure are therefore unlikely in the 

absence of hostile relations—even when states are far 

from friendly. Algeria, for instance, may have coveted nuclear weapons,40 and Algiers was one of the 

last capitals to consider normalizing relations with Israel.41 Yet, Israel did not raid Algeria’s nuclear plants, 

in part because the absence of major war between the 

two countries lessened the threat posed by an Algerian bomb.42 Needless to say, attacks become exceedingly unlikely when the potential attacker and target 

are military allies. It is unthinkable, for instance, that 

the United States would have attacked British nuclear 

facilities in the early-1950s to delay London’s ability to 

build the bomb.
99

A country’s regime type also affects the degree to 

which other states are threatened by its nuclear program. Highly authoritarian proliferators are more 

likely than democracies to be attacked. Indeed, all of 

the strikes against non-nuclear weapons states had a 

nondemocratic target even though many democracies 

thought about building (or built) the bomb (e.g., Australia, Britain, France, and India). Why is this the case?

Democratic leaders are constrained by domestic institutions such as legislatures and judiciaries, 

which can limit capricious foreign policy decisions 

and promote compliance with international norms.43

Authoritarian countries, on the other hand, often have 

less respect for norms because of opaque institutions 

and relatively little domestic accountability. Autocrats 

might thus be more likely to threaten other states with 

nuclear weapons, use the bomb first during a crisis, or 

engage in other provocative actions. Concerns such as 

these can motivate states to use military force to delay proliferation. For example, U.S. National Security 

Advisor Brent Scowcroft believed that Saddam Hussein’s “notoriously mercurial” behavior magnified the 

threat of an Iraqi bomb and helped justify targeting 

Baghdad’s nuclear program during the Persian Gulf 

War.44 President George W. Bush likewise believed 

that the world should not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons because Tehran has a “nontransparent” 

government, implying that its regime type heightens 

the risk of aggressive or unpredictable behavior.45

Aside from the perceived threat posed by the 

target’s nuclear program, two other general considerations may also affect the likelihood of preventive 

strikes.46 First, potential attackers are likely to consider whether raids against nuclear facilities could be 

successful. The likelihood of success depends partially 
100

on the military capabilities of the attacker. Weak states 

will often be unable to destroy their enemies’ nuclear 

programs in the absence of cooperation from their allies. For instance, although Zambia may have been 

threatened by the prospect of a South African bomb 

in the 1970s, it would have struggled mightily to successfully destroy the relevant facilities on its own, decreasing the odds that officials in Lusaka would even 

consider the military option.

The number of nuclear facilities that the target possesses also influences the likelihood that raids against 

nuclear programs will be successful. Iraq and Syria 

each possessed one main chokepoint facility at the 

time that they were attacked, and neither state was on 

the verge of building nuclear weapons. Israel therefore 

needed only to destroy a single facility to delay proliferation in these two cases. This situation becomes 

more complex, however, when potential targets have 

well-developed nuclear programs. Iran, to cite one 

example, has multiple facilities that would probably 

need to be destroyed to curtail significantly its nuclear 

program: the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz 

and Qom, the heavy water production facility at Arak, 

the uranium conversion center at Isfahan, the Bushehr 

nuclear power plant, and the Tehran research reactor. 

This does not mean that it is impossible for Israel or 

the United States to delay successfully Iran’s nuclear 

program using military force, but the probability of 

success is substantially lower relative to a scenario in 

which Iran possessed a single nuclear chokepoint.47

Second, the costs of raiding nuclear programs 

could deter countries from attacking. States may be 

unlikely to attack if they believe that a limited preventive strike would lead to a large-scale war or produce 

other undesirable outcomes. For example, the United 
101

States refrained from bombing Chinese and North 

Korean nuclear facilities in part because officials in 

Washington believed that the military costs of such 

operations were too high. Concerns about costs have 

also influenced the debate about how to respond to 

Iran’s nuclear program. U.S. officials that are considering bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities today must wrestle with the possibility that Tehran could retaliate by 

closing the Strait of Hormuz or engage in other actions 

that threaten core U.S. politico-strategic interests.48

States may also worry about the normative costs of 

targeting nuclear programs. There is an international 

norm against the preventive use of force, and Article 

56 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions 

(1977) specifically prohibits the targeting of nuclear 

plants. Thus, states might be deterred from using 

military force by the prospect of political or economic 

isolation. One reason that India ultimately refrained 

from bombing Pakistan’s Kahuta enrichment plant in 

the 1980s was because officials in New Delhi feared 

that “the international community would condemn 

us.”49 Similarly, after Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert asked President George W. Bush to bomb Syria’s 

al Kibar reactor during a 2007 phone conversation, 

Bush concluded that the normative and political costs 

were too great. As he recounted in his memoir: 

As a military matter, the bombing mission would be 

straightforward. The Air Force could destroy the target, no sweat. But bombing a sovereign country with 

no warning or announced justification would create 

severe blowback.50
102

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Scholars have previously argued that nuclear 

weapons programs are dangerous, in part because 

they can lead to preventive war.51 This chapter lends 

credence to this argument by identifying numerous 

historical cases in which countries attacked or considered attacking nuclear programs. I have also articulated the conditions under which nuclear weapons 

programs are likely to lead to military strikes. When 

the potential attacker and the target have a history of 

violent conflict—and when the target state is authoritarian—preventive strikes are considerably more likely.52 Other factors may also affect the use of force, but 

the perceived threat posed by the target’s acquisition 

of the bomb is among the most important in triggering interest in preventive military action. This implies 

that nuclear weapons programs can be destabilizing, 

at least under certain conditions. Those interested in 

conflict management would therefore do well to engage in more diplomacy aimed at limiting the onset of 

new nuclear weapons programs.

One might dispute this conclusion, however, on 

the grounds that the violence caused by nuclear programs to date has been relatively minimal. Outside 

of ongoing interstate wars, nuclear facilities have 

been bombed on just a handful of occasions. During 

the Osiraq raid, the highest profile attack against a 

nuclear facility, only 10 Iraqi soldiers and one French 

civilian were killed.53 Although it is important not 

to exaggerate the threat posed by nuclear weapons 

programs, the danger of preventive force should not 

be dismissed due to the modest amount of violence 

caused by the attacks discussed in this chapter. First, 
103

there were a number of close calls—particularly in 

South Asia—where attacks were strongly considered 

but ultimately not conducted. Had Indira Gandhi followed through on her initial decision to attack Kahuta, 

it is possible, and perhaps likely, that war would have 

resulted between India and Pakistan. Second, attacks 

against nuclear programs could occur more frequently—and become deadlier—in the future, particularly 

if there are doubts about whether states pursuing the 

bomb would act as “responsible” nuclear powers.54

Compounding matters further, interest in nuclear 

energy is growing around the world—despite the 

March 2011 accident at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear 

power plant—as part of a movement that some have 

labeled the “nuclear renaissance.”55 Although existing 

research tends to downplay the strategic effects of nuclear energy,56 there is a growing recognition among 

scholars that nuclear programs could raise the risk of 

international conflict even when they are “peaceful” 

in nature.57 This is in part because the development of 

a civilian nuclear program in one state might provide 

incentives for others to launch preventive strikes.

There is precedent for using military force against 

civilian facilities. Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power 

plant—bombed during the Iran-Iraq War—was being 

built with assistance from West Germany to produce 

electricity. Osiraq was also technically a civilian facility. The reactor was supplied by France exclusively for 

peaceful purposes and placed under IAEA safeguards, 

meaning that it should have been difficult for Iraq to 

use Osiraq for military purposes. Many policymakers 

and analysts therefore condemned the Israeli strike 

and interpreted it as an indictment of the nonproliferation regime. For example, Sigvard Eklund, Director General of the IAEA, stated, “The Israeli attack 
104

on Iraq’s nuclear research center was also an attack 

on the Agency’s safeguards.”58 Why would countries 

have incentives to bomb civilian nuclear plants?

Nuclear facilities are dual use in nature, meaning 

that they can serve civilian or military purposes. Reactors can be employed to produce medical isotopes 

or to help meet a country’s energy needs by producing electricity. These same facilities, however, also 

provide a potential source of plutonium for nuclear 

weapons. This so-called dual-use dilemma means 

that countries can draw on civilian nuclear programs 

to augment their military capabilities. India, for example, used a civilian research reactor supplied by 

Canada in the 1950s to conduct its first nuclear test 

in 1974. France similarly built between 63 and 250 

nuclear weapons using plutonium that was produced 

in civilian power plants.59 Examples such as these are 

not uncommon. Recent research shows that, on average, states that receive foreign assistance in developing peaceful nuclear programs are statistically more 

likely than states that do not receive atomic aid (or receive lower levels of assistance) to pursue and acquire 

nuclear weapons—especially if they later experience 

an international crisis.60

Therefore, when states build nuclear facilities, it 

is difficult for outsiders to know for certain whether 

the plants are meant for electricity production, the 

manufacture of nuclear weapons, or both. This problem is evident in the contemporary case of Iran. Many 

in the West suspect that Iran intends to build nuclear 

weapons, yet Tehran has repeatedly asserted that 

its program is intended only to serve peaceful ends. 

The oft-discussed 2007 National Intelligence Estimate 

(NIE) on Iran’s nuclear program underscored this tension. The NIE concluded with “high confidence” that 
105

Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 

but that it continued the civilian uranium enrichment 

program, and this program could be applied to nuclear weapons production if Iran decided to proliferate.61 Countries aspiring to develop nuclear programs 

can use signals to convey that their intentions are 

peaceful.62 For instance, willingness to subject nuclear 

facilities to international inspections could alleviate 

concerns about whether a state’s plants might be used 

to build bombs. On the other hand, states that refuse 

to accept measures such as the 1997 IAEA Additional 

Protocol (AP), which provides the Agency with greater authority to inspect nuclear sites, are likely to create ambiguity about their intentions.63 One reason that 

some believe that Iran covets nuclear weapons is that 

Tehran has signed, but not ratified, the AP.

Yet, even if states accept the AP and allow the IAEA 

to inspect their nuclear plants, they may be unable to 

convince others—especially their rivals—that their intentions are peaceful. Interstate rivalries, which ensue 

from a history of conflict, erode trust and often cause 

states to adopt worst-case thinking when analyzing 

actions taken by others.64 For example, during the 

height of the Cold War, seemingly every policy adopted by Moscow was viewed suspiciously in Washington, even those that were probably innocuous. This 

helps explain why placing Osiraq under safeguards 

did not stop Israel from believing that Saddam Hussein intended to use the research reactor to produce 

plutonium for nuclear bombs. That said, if Iraq’s intentions were peaceful, Baghdad did not help its cause 

by making hostile statements towards Israel and engaging in other actions that raised questions about the 

true purpose of Osiraq.
106

The current list of nuclear energy aspirants includes states that might struggle to persuade some 

in the international community that they are procuring technology strictly for peaceful purposes. In the 

Middle East, for instance, 12 countries are considering 

building nuclear power plants.65 Many assume that 

these states want nuclear energy programs as a hedge 

against a possible Iranian bomb. If countries such as 

Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia expand their 

civilian nuclear programs, it may be difficult for them 

to convince others that their intentions are entirely 

harmless, even if they sincerely have little interest in 

nuclear weapons. This does not imply that these states 

will have their nuclear facilities bombed in the future, 

but the probability of preventive strikes may increase 

if nuclear technology diffuses around the globe to the 

degree that some predict.66

My analysis in this chapter leaves an important 

question unanswered: Are countries wise to target 

nuclear programs preventively? There is evidence 

that prior strikes against nuclear facilities delayed the 

targets’ nuclear weapons programs.67 However, looking into the future, policymakers should be exceedingly cautious when contemplating preventive strikes. 

First, the conditions that led to success in the past may 

not be present in the future. Importantly, many of the 

conditions that facilitated success in Iraq (1981) and 

Syria (2007) are notably absent in the case of Iran, as 

discussed elsewhere in this chapter.68 Second, worstcase assessments about the consequences of nuclear 

proliferation are unwarranted. Although nuclear 

weapons affect international politics in some respects, 

they are generally poor instruments for coercion and 

intimidation. Based on an analysis of more than 200 

militarized compellent threats69 issued from 1918 to 
107

2001, recent research shows that nuclear-armed states 

are not more likely than non-nuclear states to blackmail their adversaries successfully.70 Some countries 

may still believe that their rival’s acquisition of the 

bomb constitutes an existential threat, but fears about 

nuclear blackmail should not be used to justify preventive strikes against nuclear facilities.

In any case, history suggests that the risk of preventive war is unlikely to disappear in the future. It 

is therefore important for scholars to continue to examine this issue and devote greater attention to the 

consequences of nuclear technology diffusion more 

generally. Additional research in this vein could 

further inform enduring policy questions, such as 

what officials in Washington should do in response 

to the development of nuclear programs in countries 

of concern.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. This chapter draws partially on two articles coauthored 

with Sarah E. Kreps. See Matthew Fuhrmann and Sarah E. Kreps, 

“Targeting Nuclear Programs in War in Peace: A Quantitative 

Empirical Analysis, 1941-2000,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 

35, No. 6, 2010, pp. 831-859; and Sarah E. Kreps and Matthew 

Fuhrmann, “Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 34, No. 

2, 2011, pp. 161-187.

2. See, for example, Scott Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread 

of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1994, 

pp. 66-107.

3. Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More 

May Be Better,” Adelphi Papers, No. 171, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981.
108

4. John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from 

Hiroshima to Al Qaeda, New York: Oxford University Press, 

2009, p. 237.

5. See Fuhrmann and Kreps, “Targeting Nuclear Programs in 

War and Peace.” For other surveys of the historical record, see 

Dan Reiter, “Preventive Attacks against Nuclear, Biological, and 

Chemical Weapons Programs: The Track Record,” William Walton Keller and Gordon R. Mitchell, eds., Hitting First, Preventive 

Force in U.S. Security Strategy, Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press, 2006; and Bennett Ramberg, “Preemption Paradox,” 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 62, No. 4, 2006, pp. 48-56.

6. See, for example, Per F. Dahl, Heavy Water and the Wartime 

Race for Nuclear Energy, London, UK: Taylor and Francis, 1999; 

Knut Haukelid, Skis against the Atom: The Exciting, First-Hand Account of Heroism and Daring Sabotage During the Nazi Occupation of 

Norway, Minot, ND: North American Heritage Press, 1989; and 

Thomas Gallagher, Assault in Norway: Sabotaging the Nazi Nuclear 

Program, Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2002.

7. Ronald Bergquist, “The Air War,” The Role of Airpower in 

the Iran-Iraq War, Montgomery, AL: Air University Series, 1988, 

pp. 41-68; Mark Hibbs, “Bushehr Construction Now Remote after 

Three Iraqi Air Strikes,” Nucleonics Week, Vol. 28, No. 48, 1987, 

pp. 5-6; Mark Hibbs, “Iraqi Attack on Bushehr Kills West German 

Nuclear Official,” Nucleonics Week, Vol. 28, No. 47, 1987; and Dilip 

Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq War, London, UK: Grafton, 

1989, pp. 129-166, 192.

8. Amos Perlmutter, Michael I. Handel, and Uri Bar-Joseph, 

Two Minutes over Baghdad, New York: Routledge, 2003, p. xxxi.

9. Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. 1: Planning and Command and Control, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 1993.

10. Most of these bombs were unguided. See Gulf War Air 

Power Survey.

11. Jeremy Tamsett, “The Israeli Bombing of Osiraq Reconsidered: Successful Counterproliferation?” The Nonproliferation 
109

Review, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2004, pp. 70-85; and “Zaafaraniyah,” Federation of American Scientists, October 9, 2000, available from www.

fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/zaafaraniyah.htm. 

12. Tamsett, “The Israeli Bombing of Osiraq Reconsidered,” 

p. 81.

13. Anthony Cordesman, “The Lessons of Desert Fox: A Preliminary Analysis,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 16, 1999; and Charles Duelfer, Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence, Comprehensive 

Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Vol. 2, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004, pp. 45-46.

14. See, for example, Tamsett, “The Israeli Bombing of Osiraq 

Reconsidered”; Dan Reiter, “Preventive Attacks Against Nuclear 

Programs and the ‘Success’ at Osiraq,” Nonproliferation Review, 

Vol. 12, No. 2, July 2005, pp. 355-371; and Kreps and Fuhrmann, 

“Attacking the Atom.”

15. Bill Gertz and Sara Carter, “US: Syria Hid N. Korea-aided 

Nukes Plant,” Washington Times, April 24, 2008.

16. Joby Warrick and Robin Wright, “Search is Urged for Syrian Nuclear Sites,” The Washington Post, May 29, 2008.

17. Leonard S. Spector and Avner Cohen, “Israel’s Airstrike 

on Syria’s Reactor: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2008. 

18. Fuhrmann and Kreps, “Targeting Nuclear Programs in 

War and Peace.”

19. Avner Cohen, “Cairo, Dimona, and the June 1967 War,” 

The Middle East Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2, 1996, pp. 190-210; Avner 

Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, New York: Columbia University Press, 

1998, pp. 243-276; Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, Foxbats Over 

Dimona: The Soviets’ Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007.

20. Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World’s Most Dangerous 
110

Secrets and How We Could Have Stopped Him, New York: Twelve, 

2007, pp. 88-89; Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2005; and Bharat Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008.

21. Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy, p. 57.

22. Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, p. 58.

23. David Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 50, July/August 1994, pp. 

37-47; Nuclear Threat Initiative, “South Africa Profile: Nuclear 

Overview,” May 2007, available from www.nti.org/e_research/

profiles/SAfrica/Nuclear/index.html; and Ramberg, “Preemption 

Paradox,” p. 56.

24. William Burr and Jeffrey Richelson, “Whether to Strangle 

the Baby in the Cradle: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear 

Program, 1960-64,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2000/01, 

pp. 54-99; Gordon Chang, “JFK, China, and the Bomb,” Journal 

of American History, Vol. 74, No. 4, 1988, pp. 1289-1310; Office of 

National Estimates, Chinese Communist Capabilities for Developing 

an Effective Atomic Weapons Program and Weapons Delivery Program, 

Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, June 24, 1955; Policy Planning Council (PPC) Director George McGhee to Secretary 

of State Dean Rusk, “Anticipatory Action Pending Chinese Demonstration of a Nuclear Capability,” September 13, 1961, Washington, DC, Digital National Security Archive.

25. Burr and Richelson, “Whether to Strangle the Baby in 

the Cradle.”

26. Ashton Carter and William Perry, Preventive Defense: A 

New Security Strategy for America, Washington, DC: The Brookings 

Institution, 1999, pp. 123, 131; Lyle Goldstein, Preventive Attack 

and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Historical Analysis, 

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006, pp. 133-135; David 

Sloss, “Forcible Arms Control: Preemptive Attacks on Nuclear Facilities,” Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 4, 2003, pp. 39-58; 

and Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert Gallucci, Going Critical: 

The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2004, pp. 210-11, 219-220, 244.
111

27. Ashton Carter and William Perry, “Back to the Brink,” 

Washington Post, October 20, 2002.

28. Under the terms of the deal, the United States and its allies agreed to supply North Korea with light water reactors for 

electricity production, and Pyongyang agreed to remain part of 

the NPT.

29. Quoted in Jeffrey Goldberg, “Obama to Iran and Israel: 

‘As President of the United States, I Don’t Bluff’,” The Atlantic, 

March 2, 2012.

30. Quoted in Jeffrey Heller and Matt Spetalnick, “Netanyahu Tells Obama: No Israeli Decision on Iran Attack,” Reuters, 

March 6, 2012. Note, however, that this view is not universally 

shared among Israeli officials. For example, Mossad head Tamir 

Pardo has argued that a nuclear-armed Iran would not pose an 

existential threat. See Barak Ravid, “Mossad Chief: Nuclear Iran 

Not Necessarily Existential Threat to Israel,” Haaretz, December 

29, 2011.

31. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 15. For a critique of this argument, see Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation.”

32. “Acheson Rules out ‘Preventive War’,” The New York Times, 

June 14, 1950; Goldstein, Preventive Attack and Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, pp. 37-42.

33. William Burr, “Sino-American Relations, 1969: The SinoSoviet Border War and Steps Towards Rapprochement,” Cold War 

History, Vol. 1, No. 3, April 2001, pp. 73-112; and Elizabeth Wishnick, Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow’s China Policy from 

Brezhnev to Yeltsin, Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 

2001, pp. 34-36.

34. Ginor and Remez, Foxbats Over Dimona, p. 121; Ludmilla B. Herbst, “Preventive Strikes on Nuclear Facilities: An Analytic Framework,” M.A. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 

1995, p. 8; and George Russell, “Attack—and Fallout,” Time, June 

22, 1981.
112

35. Bob Hepburn, “Is Nuclear Plant Iraq’s New Target in Israeli Desert?” The Toronto Star, February 19, 1991; “Iraq Reports 

‘Destructive’ Attack on Israeli Reactor ‘Dedicated to War Purposes’,” BBC, February 18, 1991; Richard Owen, “Missiles Aimed at 

Dimona Nuclear Reactor,” The Times, February 18, 1991; Stewart 

Stogel, “Iraq Fired Scuds at Israeli Reactor; ’91 Attack Sought to 

Crack Dome,” Washington Times, January 1, 1998.

36. Fuhrmann and Kreps, “Targeting Nuclear Programs in 

War and Peace.”

37. Another factor that influences this threat perception is 

the similarity of foreign policy interests between the potential attacker and the proliferator. See Fuhrmann and Kreps, “Targeting 

Nuclear Programs in War and Peace,” p. 840.

38. Iraq was not classified as a formal participant in the 1967 

Six-Day War because it did not commit at least 1,000 troops or 

suffer 100 battle-related deaths. Meredith Reid Sarkees and 

Frank Wayman, Resort to War: 1816-2007, Washington, DC: CQ 

Press, 2010.

39. Quoted in Spector and Cohen, “Israel’s Airstrike on Syria’s Reactor.”

40. David Albright, and Corey Hinderstein, “Algeria: Big 

Deal in the Desert?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, 2001, 

pp. 45-52.

41. Jacob Abadi, “Algeria’s Policy toward Israel: Pragmatism and Rhetoric,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2002, 

pp. 616-641.

42. Note, however, that Algeria did provide some support to 

Arab forces in 1967 and 1973.

43. See, for example, Matthew Fuhrmann and Jeffrey D. Berejikian, “Disaggregating Noncompliance: Predation versus Abstention in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2012, pp. 355-381.
113

44. George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1998, pp. 306-307.

45. Jim Garamone, “Bush: Iran Cannot Gain Nuclear Weapons,” American Forces Press Service, January 30, 2006.

46. Note, however, that many of the factors discussed 

here were insignificant in the statistical analysis conducted by 

Fuhrmann and Kreps, “Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and 

Peace.”

47. Matthew Fuhrmann and Sarah E. Kreps, “Why Attacking 

Iran Won’t Stop the Nukes,” USA Today, January 31, 2012.

48. See, for example, Caitlin Talmadge, “Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,” International 

Security, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2008, pp. 82-117.

49. Ramberg, “Preemption Paradox,” p. 53.

50. George W. Bush, Decision Points, New York: Random 

House, 2010, p. 421.

51. For example, see Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation.”

52. This is relative to a scenario in which the target is democratic, and there is no history of violence between the potential 

attacker and the target.

53. “Factfile: How Osiraq Was Bombed,” BBC, June 5, 2006, 

available from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5020778.stm. 

54. For a similar argument, see Dan Reiter, “The Global Nuclear Renaissance and the Spread of Violent Conflict: A Comment,” Adam N. Stulberg and Matthew Fuhrmann, eds., The Nuclear Renaissance and International Security, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford 

University Press, 2013.

55. See, for example, Steven Miller and Scott Sagan, “Nuclear 

Power without Nuclear Proliferation?” Daedalus, Vol. 138, No. 4, 

Fall 2009; and Stulberg and Fuhrmann, The Nuclear Renaissance 

and International Security.
114

56. Research on the strategic effects of nuclear energy conducted to date focuses mostly on the relationship between nuclear 

power and nuclear proliferation. See, for example, Albert Wohlstetter, Thomas Brown, Gregory Jones, David McGarvey, Henry Rowen, Vince Taylor, and Roberta Wohlstetter, Swords from 

Plowshares: The Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear Energy, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1979; Matthew Fuhrmann, 

Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear 

Insecurity, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012; Matthew 

Fuhrmann, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful 

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” International Security, Vol. 34, 

No. 1, Summer 2009, pp. 7-41.

57. Notable examples include Kyle Beardsley and Victor Asal, 

“Nuclear Weapons Programs and the Security Dilemma,” Stulberg and Fuhrmann, eds., The Nuclear Renaissance and International 

Security; Michael C. Horowitz, “Nuclear Power and Militarized 

Conflict: Is There a Link?” Stulberg and Fuhrmann, eds., The Nuclear Renaissance and International Security; and Reiter, “The Global 

Nuclear Renaissance and the Spread of Violent Conflict.”

58. Quoted in Fuhrmann, Atomic Assistance, p. 230.

59. Matthew Fuhrmann, “Australia’s Uranium Exports and 

Nuclear Arsenal Expansion: Is There A Connection?” Michael 

Clarke, Stephan Frühling, Andrew O’Neil, eds., Australia’s Uranium Trade: The Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges of a Contentious Export, London, UK: Ashgate, 2011, p. 48.

60. Fuhrmann, Atomic Assistance.

61. Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, Washington, 

DC: National Intelligence Council, November 2007, available 

from www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20

Pubs/20071203_release.pdf.

62. On the role of signaling in international relations, see 

James Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands 

Versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 

1, 1997, pp. 68–90.
115

63. For a good overview of the Additional Protocol, see Theodore Hirsch, “The IAEA Additional Protocol: What It Is and Why 

It Matters,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 11, No. 3, Fall/Winter 2004, pp. 140-166.

64. See, for example, Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz, War and 

Peace in International Rivalry, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000.

65. Miller and Sagan, “Nuclear Power without Nuclear Proliferation?” p. 10.

66. Of course, this does not imply that states should oppose 

nuclear energy. The development of nuclear power might help 

states meet growing energy needs, enhance their energy security, 

and, possibly, help address the problem of global climate change. 

These potential benefits must be weighed against the costs in order to determine whether the diffusion of peaceful nuclear programs is desirable. Matthew Fuhrmann, “Splitting Atoms: Why 

Do Countries Build Nuclear Power Plants?” International Interactions, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2012, pp. 29-57. See also Henry Sokolski, ed., 

Nuclear Power’s Global Expansion: Weighing Its Costs and Risks, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010.

67. Kreps and Fuhrmann, “Attacking the Atom.” For an alternative perspective, see Reiter, “Preventive Attacks against Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Programs.”

68. For further details, see Kreps and Fuhrmann, “Attacking 

the Atom”; Fuhrmann and Kreps, “Why Attacking Iran Won’t 

Stop the Nukes.”

69. A compellent threat is a demand to make some change to 

the existing status quo.

70. Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail,” International Organization, Vol. 67, 

Winter 2013, pp. 173-195.

117

PART II:

NUCLEAR POWER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS—

CLARIFYING THE LINKS

119

CHAPTER 5

NUCLEAR POWER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS—

CLARIFYING THE LINKS

Victor Gilinsky

It was obvious from the beginning of the nuclear 

age that nuclear energy for power and nuclear energy 

for bombs overlapped. The 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal 

Report said the two were “in much of their course interchangeable and interdependent.”1

 Therefore, and 

this was also understood from the beginning, gaining 

the benefits of the new energy source without spreading the bomb entailed strict international rules backed 

up by military force. This coupling did not diminish 

enthusiasm for developing nuclear energy. The United States proposed international ownership and control of what the report called intrinsically dangerous 

nuclear activities.2

The report contained powerful insights, but the 

proposal for international ownership was in many 

ways unrealistic and therefore failed. Less than a 

decade later, the United States, reluctant to give up 

the benefits of U.S. nuclear technology—at that time 

mostly political—reversed course to launch Atoms 

for Peace. The program promoted nuclear technology 

worldwide on the optimistic assumption that periodic international inspections would be sufficient to 

make sure that “peaceful” technology would not be 

used for weapons. This was the very arrangement the 

Acheson-Lilienthal Report had said would not work: 

“No system of inspection, we have concluded, could 

afford any reasonable security against the diversion 

of such materials to the purposes of war.”3 Not for the 
120

last time, the immediate attractions of nuclear energy 

overwhelmed distant security concerns.

Aside from occasional modest adjustment, we 

have been on that Atoms for Peace course ever since. 

But concerns about the weapons consequences kept 

intruding and stoked a continuing argument over 

whether occasional inspections by the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were really enough 

to keep the spread of nuclear electric facilities from 

contributing to the spread of nuclear weapons.4

 The 

present arguments over additional controls, especially 

in relation to reprocessing technology to separate plutonium and uranium enrichment, have their roots in 

that early history. 

MAKING WAY FOR PLUTONIUM FUEL: 

FROM ATOMS FOR PEACE TO THE NPT 

Plutonium is, of course, one of the two important 

nuclear explosives.Under Atoms for Peace, the United 

States declassified plutonium fuel technology, and the 

U.S. national laboratories trained foreign scientists in 

reprocessing technology.5

 The justification was that a 

shift to reliance on plutonium fuel was then considered inevitable so that reprocessing was regarded as 

an integral part of nuclear power operation.6 A further 

rationalization, based on the scientifically incorrect 

argument first made in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report 

was that plutonium could be “denatured” to make it 

unusable for weapons.7

The other important nuclear explosive is highly enriched uranium (HEU). The United States did not release its uranium enrichment technology, then based 

on gaseous diffusion, and expected to monopolize it 

for many years. The United States, however, did ex-
121

port dozens of research reactors that were fueled with 

HEU, and ultimately exported over 30 tons of HEU.8

Initially, the U.S. Government saw the various exports 

as too small to pose security concerns. Then, as the 

research and power reactor sizes increased, American 

and other exporters argued that IAEA inspections, or 

“safeguards” as they were optimistically called, were 

sufficient to make sure exports were not used to make 

material for bombs. The idea behind the inspections 

was that the threat of being found out and then sanctioned by the international community was sufficient 

to deter any would-be bomb maker from breaking the 

rules. The IAEA inspections were then gentlemanly 

affairs, with scientist-inspectors looking in on fellow scientists, and, in truth, the system was intended

more to legitimize nuclear trade than to prevent 

wrongdoing. 

In the late-1960s and early-1970s, the number and 

size of nuclear power installations increased rapidly. 

The preferred reactor type around the world was the 

light water reactor (LWR). Nuclear planners concluded from the large number of LWRs projected by national programs, and the limited then-known world 

uranium resources, that as early as 1980, the LWRs 

would have to be replaced by fast breeder reactors fueled with plutonium, thousands of them. 

This meant many thousands of tons of plutonium 

in commercial channels, which gave pause to the security minded, as a bomb only requires a few kilograms. 

But the enthusiasms about plutonium as the fuel of 

the future overrode any concerns about its weapons 

potential. The interest in making way for the breeder 

reactor was strong enough to influence the negotiations over the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The inspection provisions of the NPT were limited specifi-
122

cally to alleviate German and Japanese concerns that 

intrusive inspections would put them at a competitive 

disadvantage in supplying plutonium fuel for fast 

breeder reactors.9

Most of the less advanced non-nuclear countries 

saw the NPT negotiations as an opportunity to trade 

their signature for access to nuclear technology. They 

changed the NPT, which came into force in 1970, 

into a deal—or at least portrayed it as one—in which 

non-nuclear countries pledged not to make bombs in 

return for essentially unlimited access to “peaceful” 

nuclear technology. Article III stated that inspections 

were “to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties . . . including the 

international exchange of nuclear material and equipment.”10 Article IV gave NPT members the inalienable 

right to develop and use nuclear energy, and to benefit from the obligation by all parties “to facilitate” the 

“fullest possible exchange” of nuclear technology.11

In principle, all these activities had to conform to the 

overriding and fundamental prohibition on developing nuclear weapons. In practice, “peaceful” came to 

mean whatever a country said was peaceful and subject to IAEA inspections. In many quarters, that is still 

how the NPT is interpreted, and the phrase “inalienable right” is still thrown back at anyone who would 

place restrictions on nuclear technology transfers.

SECOND THOUGHTS ON PLUTONIUM: 

INDIA’S BOMB TO 1976 FORD STATEMENT 

It was widely believed in the early days of Atoms 

for Peace that, while a country might decide to make 

bombs on its own, no country would violate a “peaceful uses” pledge to another.12 This complacency was 
123

punctured by India’s 1974 nuclear explosion. India 

had obtained the plutonium for its bomb from a small 

Canadian reactor that used heavy water obtained from 

the United States. India had agreed to restrict use of 

the reactor and heavy water to “peaceful uses.”13 After 

setting off its bomb, India insisted there was no problem, as the bomb was peaceful. This was too much for 

the U.S. Congress and led to its rethinking of America’s permissive nuclear export policy—and ultimately 

to the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, which tightened the rules for U.S. nuclear export and effectively 

forbade nuclear fuel exports to India because it did 

not accept comprehensive IAEA inspections.14

The experience with India made clear that a country 

with direct access to nuclear explosives could quickly 

arm nuclear bombs if it wanted to. For countries with 

this capacity, one could no longer rely on the IAEA 

inspection system to provide “timely warning,” that 

is, warning in time to stop the bomb manufacture. To 

keep nuclear weapons capabilities from spreading, 

it was necessary—despite the liberal wording of the 

NPT—to restrict access to fuels that were also nuclear 

explosives, and therefore also to reprocessing and enrichment facilities that can produce them. 

Several of the chief exporting countries met secretly in London, England, in April 1975 to form the 

Nuclear Suppliers Group to place restrictions on the 

export of what they now called “sensitive” technology 

(as opposed to the Acheson-Lilienthal designation of 

“dangerous”). It appeared that France and Germany 

were getting ready to sell reprocessing plants to Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil. The United 

States set out to block these projects.15 In September 

1975, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told the 

United Nations (UN) General Assembly, “The great-
124

est single danger of unrestrained nuclear proliferation 

resides in the spread under national control of reprocessing facilities.”16

In the course of the 1976 presidential campaign, 

U.S. President Gerald Ford launched a study on the 

proliferation dangers of nuclear power programs and 

what could be done to keep them from contributing to 

proliferation. The President’s October 1976 statement 

laid out the problem and announced his decisions.17 It 

was the most important statement since the AchesonLilienthal effort.18

“The root of the problem,” the President said, was 

that “the same plutonium produced in nuclear power 

plants can, when chemically separated, also be used 

to make nuclear explosives.” He believed that nuclear 

power could proceed economically on the basis of the 

so-called once-through fuel cycle—without reprocessing spent fuel to extract plutonium and recycling it. 

In spite of the view at the time that recycling plutonium was economically beneficial, the President 

declared: 

The reprocessing and recycling of plutonium should 

not proceed unless there is sound reason to conclude 

that the world community can effectively overcome 

the associated risks of proliferation. I believe that 

avoidance of proliferation must take precedence over 

economic interests. . . .19

The October 1976 statement also made a number 

of ancillary proposals that became part of the nonproliferation boilerplate up to the present. It urged 

nuclear suppliers to provide reliable fuel services 

instead of providing “sensitive” facilities, and proposed “suitably-sited multinational fuel-cycle centers 

to serve regional needs.” But President Ford added 
125

the condition—often forgotten today—that any such 

centers had to be economically warranted. He raised 

an economic test again in asking all nations “to turn 

aside from pursuing nuclear capabilities which are of 

doubtful economic value and have ominous implications for nuclear proliferation and instability in the 

world.”20 He refused a subsidy to the still unopened 

Barnwell reprocessing plant and thereby ensured it 

would not begin operation. 

The nuclear industry reacted with considerable 

antagonism.

THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: 

PLUTONIUM ISN’T A PROBLEM, 

AND IF IT IS, SO WHAT?

In proposing the once-through fuel cycle, an approach his successor, Jimmy Carter, would endorse, 

the President was trying to find a way of developing 

nuclear energy that preserved a safety margin for international security.21 It was a reasonable approach, 

but the nuclear devotees saw it as way of postponing 

indefinitely their dream of moving beyond LWRs to 

plutonium-fueled fast breeders, in their view the ultimate objective of nuclear energy development. 

In reality, Adam Smith’s “Invisible Hand” had 

already moved that dream beyond the horizon. Fast 

breeder programs had fallen behind overoptimistic 

schedules, and their estimated costs mounted. Meanwhile, cheap uranium became plentiful and reprocessing turned out to be expensive, so there was no 

economic incentive to move beyond uranium-fueled 

LWRs. But the plutonium enthusiasts in government 

and industry would not relent. To keep the reprocessing efforts on track, they shifted their objective from 
126

recycling LWR plutonium in fast breeders to recycling it in LWRs. It made no economic sense—it was 

rationalized as a stopgap until breeder development 

caught up. By the time that became an unrealistic 

hope, fueling LWRs with a mixture of plutonium and 

uranium oxides, called mixed oxide fuel (MOX), had 

taken on a life of its own, with supportive government 

bureaucracies and industrial contractors.

Defenders of this substitute recycling insisted that 

it posed no proliferation problem because “reactor 

grade” plutonium, the plutonium formed in LWRs, 

unlike that from weapons production reactors, was 

contaminated with unwanted isotopes and thus unusable for weapons.22 This echoed the Acheson-Lilienthal 

Report’s denaturing concept, known to be incorrect at 

the time by those with access to weapons information 

but still widely believed 30 years later by those who 

did not. IAEA Director General Sigvard Eklund and 

his IAEA safeguards staff certainly believed it in 1976, 

as I discovered in talking to them in Vienna, Austria. 

Upon returning to Washington, DC, I notified the U.S. 

National Security Council staff, which arranged for 

a briefing on reactor grade plutonium at an international meeting Eklund would attend. I sat in and saw 

Elklund’s jaw literally drop when Bob Selden, of the 

Los Alamos National Laboratory, made clear that the 

stuff could be used for bombs.23

LWRs can be an even more useful source for nuclear explosives than described in Selden’s briefing. LWR 

plutonium is not necessarily heavily laden with unwanted isotopes, as would be the case if it came from 

spent fuel irradiated for the three fuel cycles, or about 

5 years, that LWR fuel normally spends in the reactor. 

If the fuel is removed after one refueling, at about 18 

months or earlier, the plutonium it contains is quite 

good even for low-technology bombs.24
127

The nuclear industry then took another tack to defend commercial reprocessing. In 1977, with the encouragement of the Electric Power Research Institute, 

an expert team at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

designed a small reprocessing plant that a country 

with minimal industrial base could build quickly 

and secretly. The Oak Ridge exercise’s objective was 

to show that even if power reactor plutonium could 

be used for bombs, it was not going to do any good 

to ban commercial reprocessing, because a country 

could quickly build a small clandestine reprocessing plant, using essentially off-the-shelf components, 

and use it to produce militarily significant numbers 

of warheads.25 An essential point is that an amount of 

plutonium (or HEU) that is commercially insignificant 

can be highly significant militarily.

The idea, of course, was to undermine the FordCarter anti-reprocessing policy. But it also undermined the Ford-Carter assumption that LWRs with no 

commercial reprocessing was a safe proposition. If a 

country with LWRs but no commercial reprocessing 

could secretly build a small “quick and dirty” plant to 

reprocess LWR spent fuel, then—contrary to conventional wisdom—it could rapidly separate enough plutonium for nuclear weapons, likely before the IAEA 

inspection system could set off a timely alarm. 

FAST-FORWARD TO THE PRESENT: 

THE CENTRIFUGE AND OTHER PROBLEMS 

If we fast-forward to the present, an important 

addition to proliferation concerns is the commercialization and wide distribution of gas centrifuge enrichment technology and the realization that centrifuge 

manufacturing capabilities are widespread, too. Un-
128

like gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge enrichment uses 

small amounts of electric power and lends itself to 

small-scale operation, which makes it easier for many 

states to get into small-scale enrichment. It also means 

that a small plant, likely difficult to spot from outside, 

could produce militarily significant quantities of HEU. 

A country could build such a plant quite apart 

from any nuclear power program, but the presence 

of nuclear power plants would be advantageous. It 

would obviously provide a useful cloak to mask some 

of the clandestine activities and provide a source of 

trained personnel, but most importantly, it could provide a source of low enriched uranium fuel. The use 

of such feed material would reduce (either in size or 

duration) the enrichment effort to produce HEU by as 

much as a factor of five. Any such effort would also require ancillary conversion facilities for uranium compounds, which would make secrecy more difficult, but 

the presence of a nuclear power program would amplify the possibilities for small-scale clandestine HEU 

production. This provides another reason, in addition 

to the concern about small clandestine reprocessing, 

why LWRs by themselves are not necessarily a safe 

proposition from the point of view of proliferation.

We know that some countries, including NPT 

members, have cheated on their “peaceful uses” commitments, so one cannot exclude that possibility. Nor 

can we be confident that clandestine facilities would 

be found in time by the IAEA or even by national 

intelligence means, as it took years to find a number 

of secret nuclear facilities (the latest being the secret 

Syrian reactor). 

Identifying clandestine weapons activities would 

become much harder if nuclear power programs expanded significantly, especially if many new coun-
129

tries adopted such programs, and even more so if 

these new countries were in the less stable parts of the 

globe. The IAEA bureaucracy would be faced with a 

larger and more complex job. It is unclear whether it 

could scale up effectively. 

So far, the prospects are low for a large worldwide 

expansion in nuclear power installations. Such an increase has been held back by the nuclear power plants’ 

extremely high cost, which is likely to be increased 

further by the lessons learned from the 2011 Fukushima, Japan, accident. Still, in recent years, the major 

nuclear bureaucracies have dedicated themselves to a 

worldwide nuclear “renaissance.” The U.S. Congress, 

with the support of President Barack Obama, has voted large subsidies for U.S. nuclear plants. The nuclear 

vendors press their wares throughout the world, and 

quite a few countries, including a number in volatile 

regions in Asia and Africa, have expressed interest, 

and some of them may be willing to foot the steep bill 

to enter the nuclear power ranks.26

There is another ominous note—the nuclear “renaissance” movement includes efforts to revive 

commercial reprocessing. In 2007, the George Bush 

administration launched the Global Nuclear Energy 

Partnership, a crash futuristic reprocessing and recycling program. The advertised purpose was to “solve” 

simultaneously the nuclear waste and proliferation 

problems by having the United States and other major 

nuclear supplier countries provide a full range of fuel 

services. It was a poorly thought-out scheme based 

on exotic reprocessing and fuel technology that did 

not exist in practicable form.27 The real purpose was 

to rekindle the nuclear dream of a fast reactor future 

and to start by reversing the Ford/Carter reprocessing restrictions, which always rankled the nuclear 
130

research and development (R&D) community. The 

enthusiasts sold President Bush on their idea, and on 

the occasion of signing the 2006 U.S.-India nuclear 

agreement, he said, “I don’t see how you can advocate 

nuclear power . . . without advocating technological 

development of reprocessing.”28 The Obama administration continued a slowed down version of the Bush 

program with a new name, International Framework 

for Nuclear Energy Cooperation, but with the same 

basic purpose: “mainly in relation to closing the fuel 

cycle by reprocessing used fuel and burning actinides 

in fast reactors.”29 This effectively takes us back to the 

pre-1976 policy.

The 2006 U.S.-India agreement, proposed by 

former President Bush but supported by President 

Obama, by carving out a generous exception for India, which fought the NPT for 40 years, has seriously 

diminished the Treaty, and with it respect for what 

used to be called the nonproliferation regime. The 

U.S.-India agreement explicitly allows India to operate several of its nuclear power plants as part of its 

weapons complex.30

The United States also uses civilian power reactors 

to support its nuclear weapons program—the Department of Energy uses Tennessee Valley Authority’s 

Watts Bar power reactor to produce tritium for warheads. When the arrangements were first announced 

and drew criticism, U.S. Department of Energy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy Ben Rusche said the 

difference between civilian and weapons applications 

was only “psychological.”

Despite these setbacks in anti-proliferation policy, 

there has been no letup in discussions over anti-proliferation measures because everyone knows there is 

a problem. Perhaps the most talked about, but also 
131

the most ineffectual, such measure is the recurring 

proposal for a “fuel bank” that would assure nuclear 

fuel supplies to countries with nuclear power plants 

to dissuade them from pursuing reprocessing or enrichment technology.31 This rationale takes at face 

value the excuse countries give—that they worry 

about “security of supply”—to mask other reasons. In 

reality, existing commercial contracts provide a high 

level of assurance.32 The talk about fuel banks allows 

governments to maintain the illusion of measures 

to control proliferation without having to incur any 

political costs.

A number of other proposals fall in the same category, for example, a much stricter and more intrusive IAEA inspection regime. Such an expanded and 

intrusive IAEA is unlikely to be realized because it 

would be inconsistent with industrial operations and 

national sovereignty and would be costly. However, 

an additional problem—a considerable leap from information to international action—exists. There are 

conflicting interests among the major states that impede a rapid response, and sometimes countries do 

not even want to know about illicit nuclear activities precisely because such information would force 

them into actions they do not want to take.33 In other 

words, in an international complex of nuclear power 

programs, one cannot count on IAEA inspections or 

even national intelligence revelations leading reliably 

to enforcement. To maintain a decent margin of safety, there needs to be some limitation on the nuclear 

facilities in place. 
132

THE LAST REFUGE: CLAIMING NUCLEAR 

POWER HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH 

PROLIFERATION 

When all is said and done, the nuclear power 

lobby’s ultimate argument against strict anti-proliferation rules for commercial nuclear facilities is that 

these facilities do not contribute to the proliferation 

problem, and so placing restrictions on commercial 

nuclear power programs would do little to affect proliferation. As the Nuclear Energy Institute puts it: “All 

nuclear weapons programs have either preceded or 

risen independently of civilian nuclear energy,” and 

any future bomb makers would likely do the same because this would still be the easiest approach.34

As it was, of course, the nuclear age started with 

weapons rather than power plants, and the first five 

NPT weapons states did indeed start with dedicated 

weapons facilities. Civilian applications then piggybacked on weapons facilities and designs. The British 

and French built dual-purpose reactors to produce 

plutonium for warheads and also generate electricity.35 The U.S. enrichment complex, built to produce 

highly enriched uranium for bombs, was later used to 

produce low enriched fuel for reactors.36

But would future bomb programs follow this historical pattern? Suppose, for example, that the historical sequence were reversed, and nuclear power facilities had been in place before World War II. Would 

the belligerents not have used them to obtain nuclear 

explosives for weapons? If the most readily available 

source of nuclear explosives will be in the commercial 

sector, then that is likely where bomb makers will go.

When the next group of countries—Israel, India, 

Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea—decided, 
133

over the next 30 years, to build nuclear weapons, they 

did not yet have domestic power plants and fuel facilities that could supply nuclear explosives. They did 

have small nuclear research reactors that provided 

a focus for training a nuclear cadre.37 At the same 

time, after the early-1960s, they had to cope with the 

fact that the international scene had become significantly less accepting of overt weapons programs. To 

build the larger “research” facilities they needed, the 

would-be bomb makers advanced secretly, or cloaked 

their weapons preparations in claims that they were 

only engaged in research directed toward “peaceful” 

nuclear power programs.38

The current situation is now different again. All 

the non-nuclear weapons countries are members of 

the NPT. A country intending to make nuclear weapons would have a choice of withdrawing from the 

NPT, and thus inviting a hostile reaction, or cheating 

under cover of the NPT. Unless we believe that this 

could never happen, we need to take this possibility 

seriously. 

If a country is going to cheat—and we know that 

countries that were members of the NPT have cheated—it will want to limit the period of maximum vulnerability from the time its bomb program is evident, 

or might be discovered, to when it has bombs in its 

armory. The quickest future access to nuclear explosives for a country with a nuclear power program, and 

especially one with associated fuel facilities, is likely 

to be in some way related to that ongoing program. 
134

WHAT THIS ADDS UP TO: 

CURB YOUR ENTHUSIASM

It is clear that countries enriching uranium for fuel, 

or separating plutonium from their spent fuel in order 

to recycle it as nuclear fuel, have the means to produce 

nuclear explosives for bombs. (There is not much argument about this, although some people still cling to 

the notion that plutonium from commercial facilities 

is effectively unusable for bombs). With the general 

advance of technology and spread of information, the 

list of candidate countries that could, if they wanted, 

design and manufacture bombs given the necessary 

nuclear explosives continually expands. It is less obvious but nevertheless true that even countries lacking commercial enrichment or plutonium separation 

plants still have quite a leg up on making bombs if 

they have nuclear power plants or related research 

reactors.39

Ted Taylor, a former Los Alamos weapons 

designer, put it aptly: 

The connections between nuclear technology for constructive use and for destructive use are so closely tied 

together that the benefits of the one are not accessible 

without greatly increasing the hazards of the other.40

So far, we have not developed the technology or 

the international institutions to break this connection. 

To cope with the hazards of proliferation in the 

face of weak international restraints on national nuclear programs—basically IAEA inspections and export controls—we seem to be slipping into reliance 

on greatly increased national intelligence operations, 

both to gather information and to carry out black op-
135

erations to sabotage worrisome nuclear programs, 

and keeping open the possibility of air attacks.41 That, 

at least, is what the Iran experience appears to suggest. In a sense, this is the logical consequence of expanding nuclear power around the world, one foreseen in the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal Report. After all, 

someone has to enforce the NPT rules. In this respect, 

nuclear energy is the only electric energy source that 

poses major military risks if it is in the wrong hands, 

and that requires constant surveillance by highly alert 

intelligence operations with an enforcement backstop 

of military force. At the same time, it is difficult to 

imagine the current intense intelligence focus on Iran 

and the open option of large-scale violence as a workable model for the broader problem of proliferation. It 

is not even clear it will work in Iran. 

It would be an especially problematic approach if 

the number of countries with nuclear programs, and 

the number of facilities, expanded significantly. Of 

course, there may not be any such expansion in view 

of nuclear power’s high cost, now likely to go higher 

after the Fukushima accident. But increased worldwide reliance on nuclear energy remains a goal of the 

United States and other industrial countries. So politically powerful is this idea that President George W. 

Bush made a point of saying he would not object to 

Iranian nuclear power plants if Iran gave up enrichment. Meanwhile, Iran’s example has provoked interest in nuclear power in a number of Middle Eastern 

and African countries.

One of the more naïve aspects of the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal was to distribute dangerous nuclear 

facilities owned by an international authority among 

the various countries with the thought that this would 

best dissuade countries from seizing the facilities for 
136

national weapons use. The idea was that each country would be deterred from doing so because it would 

know that other countries could do the same. Whatever deterrent value this arrangement had, it also had 

the intrinsic potential for massive failure with an avalanche of weapons decisions. Yet, that is essentially 

the arrangement that we are drifting toward today. 

Up to now we have allowed, over and over, the 

interest in gaining the benefits of nuclear power to 

trump bomb worries. It is time to return to the principle stated 35 years ago by President Ford that, if a 

choice had to be made, “nonproliferation objectives 

must take precedence over economic and energy benefits.” This would also likely mean holding up nuclear 

energy expansion worldwide until—to generalize 

President Ford’s statement on plutonium use—”The 

world community can effectively overcome the associated risks of proliferation.”

Restraining further expansion of nuclear power 

would not eliminate the possibilities of additional 

nuclear weapons countries, but it would limit the dangers—whose outlines we barely understand—inherent in further expansion, and it would be an important first step in coping with the international security 

implications of nuclear energy.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. A Report On The International Control Of Atomic Energy, 

Washington, DC, March 16, 1946. President Harry Truman appointed Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson to head a committee to set forth U.S. policy on what was then called atomic 

energy. The other members were scientists James Conant and 

Vannevar Bush, who headed the office that controlled the Manhattan Project; John McCloy; and General Leslie R. Groves, the 

military officer in charge of the Manhattan Project. Acheson ap-
137

pointed a board of consultants chaired by David Lilienthal, chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority. J. Robert Oppenheimer, 

head of the Los Alamos during WWII, was the most influential 

member. The committee’s report became known as the AchesonLilienthal Report. (Hereafter Report.)

2. “We were given as our starting point a political commitment already made by the United States to seek by all reasonable 

means to bring about international arrangements to prevent the 

use of atomic energy for destructive purposes and to promote the 

use of it for the benefit of society.” Report, Sec. I.

3. Report, Chap. V.

4. The Agency was founded in 1957.

5. Soon after announcement of the Atoms for Peace program, 

Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov asked U.S. Secretary 

of State John Foster Dulles why the United States wanted to spread 

nuclear weapons capabilities through the program. Dulles had no 

idea what Molotov was talking about, and when he returned to 

Washington, asked his assistant, Gerard Smith, to confirm that 

Molotov was wrong. As he later told me, Smith had to explain to 

the surprised Dulles that Molotov’s question was a valid one. For 

example, Indian scientists trained in reprocessing at Oak Ridge, 

TN, became the nucleus for the Indian reprocessing program and 

hence the production of plutonium for bombs.

6. What this really means is that uranium-235, the fissionable isotope that makes up less than 1 percent of uranium, was 

thought to be too rare to fuel nuclear power plants for long and 

therefore use would have to be made of the abundant isotope, 

uranium-238, that with the addition of a neutron can be converted 

into plutonium. 

7. It appeared in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and in fact 

was central to the Report’s conclusion that certain plutonium activities could be conducted on a national basis: “U 235 and plutonium can be denatured; such denatured materials do not readily 

lend themselves to the making of atomic explosives, but they can 

still be used with no essential loss of effectiveness for the peaceful applications of atomic energy.” See Report, Chap. V. In the 
138

case of uranium, the Report had in mind the use of low enrichment uranium fuel, as in today’s LWRs. This material cannot be 

used for weapons without upgrading in an enrichment facility. In 

the case of plutonium, it meant what we would now call “reactor 

grade” plutonium, material that had been irradiated sufficiently 

to increase the fraction of unwanted isotopes. This is a much iffier concept, as plutonium of pretty much any composition can be 

made to explode. Robert Oppenheimer, the intellectual force behind the Report, pushed the denaturing concept, key to the whole 

Acheson-Lilienthal scheme, hoping it could be made to work but 

probably knowing it was wrong. The Report adds the following 

qualification: “It is not without importance to bear in mind that, 

although as the art now stands denatured materials are unsuitable for bomb manufacture, developments which do not appear 

to be in principle impossible might alter the situation.”

8. That amounts to over a thousand bombs’ worth. (IAEATECDOC-1452) Initially, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 

(AEC) did not even keep track of what was exported and where it 

went. The agency left this to private firms. The AEC commissioners became aware of this in the course of investigations around 

1966 after the loss of about 100 kilograms of HEU at a fuel plant in 

Pennsylvania that could not be accounted for and was feared to 

have ended up in Israel. It is hard to understand why the United 

States was so casual about the export of HEU.

9. Wolf Haefele, the chief technical advisor to the German NPT 

delegation, believed that the economic opportunities were going 

to lie in manufacturing fast breeder fuel rather than in building 

the reactors themselves. (“It’s the razor blade not the razor.”) He 

thought Germany was well positioned to compete on fuel technology but worried that it would be at a disadvantage if, as a 

non-nuclear state, it was subject to more intrusive international 

inspection and was thus more vulnerable to industrial espionage. 

He convinced the Japanese to join in Germany’s complaints. As 

a result, the Treaty Preamble encourages inspecting “the flow of 

source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and 

other techniques at certain strategic points.” (Emphasis added.) 

10. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 

1, 1968. (Hereafter NPT.)
139

Article III 3. The safeguards required by this article 

shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply 

with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering 

the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful 

nuclear activities, including the international exchange 

of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, 

use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article 

and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

11. NPT: 

Article IV 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted 

as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to 

the Treaty to develop research, production and use 

of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of 

this Treaty. 2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake 

to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the 

fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and 

scientific and technological information for the peaceful 

uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone 

or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of 

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the 

territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the 

Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

12. The IAEA inspections were not seen as performing a police function to catch wrongdoers, but rather verifying material 

balances to add confidence that agreements were being observed.

13. The 1956 India-U.S. heavy water contract restricted the reactor to “peaceful uses.” When finally called on this, India said 

there was no problem because its bomb was peaceful. The American position was not as clear as it could have been. At the time, the 

United States had a program on so-called peaceful nuclear explosives. That was bad enough, but its real purposes were clouded. 

In a 1964 briefing I attended, Director of the Livermore weapons 
140

laboratory John Foster explained that the real purpose of the program was to get the public used to nuclear explosions so that the 

military could get a release for battlefield use in wartime.

14. When congressional hearings raised questions, the U.S. 

State Department, intent on protecting nuclear exports, tried to 

hide the existence of the U.S.-India heavy water contract, and then 

lied about whether U.S. heavy water was still in the Indian reactor. It ultimately led to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, 

which required tightening nuclear cooperation agreements, including the one with India that covered the General Electric-built 

reactor at Tarapur. The United States essentially gave the nuclear 

station to India in order to introduce IAEA inspections into India. 

It was a unique agreement that tied Indian acceptance of IAEA 

inspections to the U.S. supply of fuel. The 1978 Act forbade fuel 

supply to countries that did not accept full-scope IAEA inspections, which India did not. The State Department scurried to find 

a replacement fuel supplier. 

15. But neither the United States nor the other exporters ever 

publicly addressed the tensions in the NPT between prohibitions 

on bombs and liberal promises of technology, so the NPT’s ambiguities remained.

16. Kissinger’s apparent concern has to be put in context. 

When the State Department staff learned of the Indian explosion, 

they assumed the United States would react firmly. Kissinger cabled back from the Middle East, rejecting any strong reaction. He 

was apparently in the process of putting together a nuclear deal 

of his own that he did not want upset. In the 1975 speech to the 

UN, he pointed to the dangers of reprocessing conducted under 

national auspices and proposed a multilateral approach. This became a standard “solution” to the problem of reprocessing. It is 

unlikely that Kissinger understood that the activity made no economic sense at all. He would have looked at it in purely political 

terms. In a talk at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica before 

he assumed his role in the Richard Nixon administration—I was 

then a department head—he said, “Never underestimate the superficiality of important people.” 

17. Gerald R. Ford, “Statement on Nuclear Policy,” October 

28, 1976.
141

18. And we are still waiting for the third one.

19. It subsequently became clear that plutonium reprocessing and recycling were highly uneconomic. At the time, I also 

accepted that plutonium recycling was marginally economic. I 

calculated that the advantage was about 3 percent of the cost of 

power, and planned to say so in a speech. I showed the draft to a 

fellow commissioner—Richard Kennedy. His reaction said a lot 

about the extent to which the nuclear community at the time was 

invested in the idea of plutonium recycle. He told me I had every 

right to deliver the speech saying the plutonium advantage was 

only 3 percent. But he wanted me to know that if he had wanted 

to kill U.S. nuclear power, that was what he would say.

20. Gerald R. Ford, “Statement on Nuclear Policy,” October 

28, 1976. Emphasis added.

21. The restriction would apply to HEU as well, but hardly 

any power reactors used this material for fuel—it was mainly 

used in research reactors. The United States proposed shifting 

these reactors to lower enrichment fuels. After a lot of foot dragging, most of these reactors have now been converted, although 

some, including the research reactor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), still resist.

22. One claim is that a bomb made of this material would “fizzle.” Using the technology in the first bombs, the yield of such a 

fizzle would still be on the order of a kiloton.

23. The top German officials who were exporting the technology to Brazil shared the same belief that the plutonium separated 

from LWRs would be unusable for weapons, or at least professed 

to believe that. The Selden briefing was described in a memorandum for the commissioners of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) from James Shea, director of the NRC Office of 

International Programs. He wrote: 

From November 15 to 19 ERDA [Energy Research and Development Administration, DOE’s predecessor] conducted 

a series of briefings, presented by Bob Selden (Livermore) 

and Carson Mark (Los Alamos), directed at convincing in-
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terested international VIP’s attending the ANS-AIF-ENS 

[American Nuclear Society-Atomic Industrial Forum-European Nuclear Society] International Meetings that reactor 

grade plutonium is highly useful for constructing nuclear 

explosives.

The attendees at these meetings included Sir John Hill (UK 

Atomic Energy Authority), Mr. Andre Giraud (Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission-France), Dr. S. Eklund and 

R. Romettsch (International Atomic Energy Agency), Dr. Daennert (Fundamental Research Grant-Ministry of Research and 

Technology), and Dr. Imai (Japan Atomic Power Company), and 

others from Japan. See also “ERDA says reactor grade plutonium 

can make powerful, reliable bombs,” Nucleonics Week November 

16, 1976. The story included the following: 

Most recently NRC commissioner Victor Gilinsky said that 

reactor grade plutonium would make a bomb of 1-10 kilotons yield. A source said that ERDA provided Gilinsky with 

the material for his statement. The ERDA source stated that 

such bombs would be variable [in yield] but certainly not 

unreliable. 

24. At the end of its first refueling, a new LWR contains about 

300 kilograms of plutonium that is quite suitable for weapons by 

any standard. That would be enough for about 50 warheads. Of 

course, it first would have to be separated.

25. It was promoted by Chauncey Starr, Electric Power Research Institute’s head, and by Floyd Culler, one of the developers 

of PUREX reprocessing at Oak Ridge. See www.npolicy.org/article.

php?aid=172&rt=&key=fresh%20&sec=article.

26. A sign that conventional opinion is changing is evident in 

an October 6, 2011, opinion editorial by Jim Hoagland: “In short, 

the proliferation of nuclear reactors across Asia is certain to facilitate and encourage nuclear weapons proliferation as well.” Jim 

Hoagland, “Nuclear energy after Fukushima,” The Washington 

Post, October 6, 2011.

27. For a discussion on the program’s technical flaws, see 

“A Minority Opinion: Dissenting Statement of Gilinsky and 

Macfarlane,” Review of DOE’s Nuclear Energy Research and De-
143

velopment Program, Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 

2008, pp. 73-76, available from www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_

id=11998&page=73.

28. “President, Prime Minister Singh Discuss Growing Strategic Partnership,” New Dehli, India, March 2, 2006. The U.S.-India 

agreement approved by Congress in October 2008 waived U.S. 

export restrictions on India, which has fought the NPT regime for 

40 years. It makes a mockery of NPT compliance. In effect, with 

Democratic congressional support, Bush drove a truck through 

the NPT. A related U.S.-sponsored Nuclear Supplier Group waiver gave India access to the international nuclear trade. The Indian 

government succeeded in steamrolling the very U.S. and international criteria that were put in place in response to its initial 

pursuit of the bomb—without giving up anything. 

29. See www.ifnec.org. 

30. “Taking Stock of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” Remarks 

of Geoffrey Pyatt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau 

of South and Central Asian Affairs, Mumbai, India, September 

30, 2011. 

First, India agreed to draw a clear line between its civilian 

and military nuclear facilities, and to voluntarily place its 

civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. India’s 

2005 Separation Plan identified 14 thermal power reactors, 

as well as a number of upstream and downstream facilities, 

and nine research facilities for the safeguarded side of India’s nuclear complex. . . .

But the separation leaves several power reactors on the military 

side. Pyatt also makes clear the motivation for making an NPT 

exception for India: 

And we are open for business. In fact, U.S. companies 

representing the full spectrum of commercial nuclear activities have participated in six commercial trade missions to 

India in the past few years, including: . . . I should note—

unequivocally—that all of our companies involved in these 

missions have the strong support of the United States 

government. . . .
144

31. See, for example, one of the recommended actions arising 

from the 2010 NPT review conference: 

Continue to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and 

transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional 

forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the 

nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities of creating 

mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well 

as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel 

cycle without affecting rights under the Treaty and without 

prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the 

technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding 

these issues, including, in this regard, the requirement of 

IAEA full scope safeguards. 

NPT/CONF.2010/50, 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to 

the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final 

Document, Vol. I.

32. India is mentioned as the classic example (but I believe 

it is the only such example) of a country that faced a halt in uranium fuel shipments from its supplier. But this happened after 

it exploded its 1974 bomb in violation of a peaceful uses pledge 

and then refused to accept comprehensive IAEA inspections as 

required by the 1978 U.S. export law. Even so, the U.S. State Department found an alternative supply for India, and there was no 

gap in its fuel shipments.

33. As was the case in 1969 at the start of the Nixon administration when Henry Kissinger decided it would be best if the United 

States did not know whether Israel had built nuclear weapons.

34. “Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Materials,” Nuclear Energy Institute, October 2011, available from www.nei.org/

Master-Document-Folder/Backgrounders/Fact-Sheets/Preventing-theProliferation-of-Nuclear-Materials:

Uranium enrichment facilities that produce fuel for commercial reactors pose no risk of proliferation . . . Used nuclear fuel, which contains plutonium generated as a byproduct 

of the commercial fuel cycle, poses little risk of proliferation

. . . All nuclear weapons programs have either preceded or 

risen independently of civilian nuclear energy.
145

“Safeguards to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation,” World Nuclear 

Association (WNA), April 2012, available from www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Non-Proliferation/Safeguards-to-Prevent-Nuclear-Proliferation: 

Civil nuclear power has not been the cause of or route to nuclear weapons in any country that has nuclear weapons, and 

no uranium traded for electricity production has ever been 

diverted for military use. All nuclear weapons programmes 

have either preceded or risen independently of civil nuclear 

power. . . . No country is without plenty of uranium in the 

small quantities needed for a few weapons. . . . There is no 

chance that proliferation will be solved by turning away 

from nuclear power.

The same WNA document, however, continues in a more 

insightful mode: 

While nuclear power reactors themselves are not a proliferation concern, enrichment and reprocessing technologies are 

open to use for other purposes, and have been the cause of 

proliferation through illicit or unsafeguarded use. . . . The 

NPT does not adequately deal with the issue of SNT [sensitive nuclear technology]. It refers to the ‘inalienable’ right 

to use nuclear energy, but certainly does not guarantee the 

right to develop SNT. Nor, however, does the it explicitly 

limit the development of SNT, other than by the fundamental obligations of Non-nuclear Weapons States not to acquire 

(or seek to acquire) nuclear weapons, and to place all their 

nuclear material under IAEA safeguards.

Current approaches to control the spread of SNT have focused on measures against the transfer of equipment, components, special materials and technology, through national 

export controls and multilateral coordination within the 

Nuclear Suppliers Group (see below). However, these approaches do not fully address the problems of illicit acquisition of enrichment technology and development of indigenous enrichment technology. A way is needed to assess the 

international acceptability of enrichment projects.

Concerns about SNT programs are not addressed simply by 

having these activities placed under safeguards. Safeguards 
146

are an essential part of international confidence building, 

but safeguards alone cannot provide assurance about a 

country’s future intent. An enrichment or reprocessing facility under safeguards today could be used as the basis for 

breakout from non-proliferation commitments in the future. 

In the case of enrichment, a large centrifuge plant, using LEU 

feed, could produce sufficient HEU for a nuclear weapon in 

a matter of days. An essential aspect of non-proliferation is 

minimising the risk of breakout occurring, through limiting 

the countries with SNT facilities to those regarded as presenting a low proliferation risk.

35. The Soviet-designed RBMK reactors were used for both 

plutonium and power production, but it is unclear whether the 

plutonium was ever used for weapons.

36. It is also significant that the U.S. light water reactors, ultimately the basis for essentially all the world’s reactors, grew out 

of the U.S. Navy’s submarine reactors developed by Admiral Hyman Rickover.

37. Israeli Research Reactor 1 (IRR1), started in 1960, was donated by the United States under Atoms for Peace. The 5-megawatt ton (MWt) reactor used HEU fuel. India claims to have built 

a 1-MWt research reactor that went critical in 1956. Canada supplied the CIRUS, started in 1960, which was a 40-MWt heavy water moderated and light water cooled reactor fueled by natural 

uranium. The United States supplied the heavy water under a 

contract signed in 1956. Pakistan’s PARR-I Reactor was supplied 

by the United States. The 5-MWt reactor used HEU fuel and went 

critical in 1965. South Africa’s SAFARI-1 20-MWt reactor was 

commissioned in 1965. The U.S.-supplied reactor used HEU fuel, 

initially operated at 6.75-MWt, and was upgraded in 1968. North 

Korea’s IRT-2000, an 8-MWt (2-MWt from 1965-74, 4-MWt from 

1974-86) heavy-water moderated research reactor, was supplied 

by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1965.

38. Israel was the first of these countries to develop nuclear 

weapons. Israel lied to President Kennedy about the purpose of 

the Dimona reactor, claiming it was for peaceful purposes. Had Israel tested full-scale when it built its first bombs in the late-1960s, 

it might have qualified as one of the original nuclear weapon 
147

states under the NPT. India drew the plutonium for its 1974 nuclear explosion from CIRUS, a small Canadian-supplied research 

reactor that used U.S. heavy water. India had given both countries 

“peaceful uses” assurances. When challenged, India replied that 

its bomb was peaceful. The U.S. State Department did not press 

the issue. India then continued to stockpile CIRUS plutonium for 

weapons. Pakistan also claimed its enrichment was for peaceful 

uses. No one actually believed this, but the United States looked 

the other way to keep Pakistani assistance in Afghanistan. South 

Africa claimed its Valindaba enrichment plant was built to supply 

fuel for its research reactor. The North Korean weapons program 

started in the 1980s with a nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. In 1985, 

under Soviet pressure, Pyongyang agreed to join the NPT, but refused to sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Iran claims 

its enrichment program is intended to supply enriched uranium 

for its power and research reactors. Time will tell whether this 

is true.

39. Victor Gilinsky, Marvin Miller, and Harmon Hubbard, 

“A Fresh Examination of the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors,” Washington, DC: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, October 22, 2004, available from www.npolicy.org/

files/20041022-GilinskyEtAl-LWR.pdf.

40. Theodore B. Taylor, Nuclear Power and Nuclear 

Weapons, Santa Barbara, CA: Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, July 

12, 1996, available from www.wagingpeace.org/nuclear-power-andnuclear-weapons/.

41. A fuller list of the steps envisioned in current anti-proliferation doctrine would include: Count on only a few countries 

being interested in nuclear weapons; apply the various mild restrictions and inspections to intimidate those who worry about 

getting caught; make compromises on access to fuel technology 

that delay weapons capabilities, even if it means shaving the security safety margins; ramp up IAEA inspections and (mainly) 

national intelligence; concentrate on hostile states that do not yet 

have bombs; in the last analysis, count on sabotage, assassinations, and bombings; let the future take care of itself; and hope 

for the best. 

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CHAPTER 6

SCOPING INTANGIBLE PROLIFERATION 

RELATED TO PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAMS: 

TRACKING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 

WITHIN A COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR 

POWER PROGRAM 

Susan Voss

INTRODUCTION

It requires an estimated 3,000 people to construct a 

large commercial nuclear power plant and 800 to 900 

people to operate two 1,000-megawatt-electric (MWe) 

light water reactors. If a country has a reactor built by 

a commercial company or a consortium from another 

country, there is a large exchange of experts working 

together from both countries. This includes training 

for language skills, experts on sites, safety experts, 

reactor and balance-of-plant design, and plant operations, to name just a few. Construction and manufacturing of the reactor system requires that the plant 

construction contractor provide highly skilled labor 

and technical expertise on-site to ensure the work 

meets nuclear quality assurance standards. Therefore, the construction process brings together experts 

with backgrounds in many different fields and varied 

levels of education and skill.

One of the key proliferation concerns is that a country may choose to develop a commercial nuclear power program as a means of concealing nuclear weapons 

development by exploiting direct contact with nuclear 

experts in another country in order to obtain nuclear 

weapons-related information and produce nuclear 
150

weapons-useable materials and equipment. There are 

historic cases where nuclear power development has 

been used as a front for a nuclear weapons program, 

and technology has also been transferred within the 

framework of nuclear research outside of formal international agreements. The purpose of this chapter is to 

discuss the systematic tracking of information needed 

to follow and interdict nuclear proliferation and the 

difficulties in doing this work. A summary of technologies that have reportedly been illicitly transferred to 

Iran are provided as an example.

NEW CONSTRUCTION

During the past 15 years or so, there have been a 

number of surprises in the field of nuclear proliferation, including the discovery of the construction of the 

Syrian research reactor with the Democratic People’s 

Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) support; the recent reports that China provided Pakistan nuclear material 

and the design for a weapon; the Khan network providing uranium enrichment equipment and expertise, 

along with nuclear weapons design information, to 

Libya, the DPRK, Iran, and a still unnamed fourth 

nation; and the surprising advancements within the 

Iranian nuclear program that were revealed by a dissident group—including heavy water production, the 

operation of a heavy water reactor, and uranium enrichment using centrifuge technology. These examples 

point to the difficulties faced by the nonproliferation 

community in tracking illicit nuclear agreements and 

transfers of technology, which have steadily grown 

with the advent of global trade. The potential transfer of technology is a more significant issue in nuclear 

weapons states where nuclear institutions and educa-
151

tion centers work on technology that can be used for 

nuclear weapons materials production, nuclear weapons design, and nuclear weapons testing. Therefore, 

to help clarify the problem of technology transfers, the 

issue can be divided into three categories: nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons testing.

NUCLEAR MATERIALS

The construction of a nuclear power plant requires 

the exchange of scientists, engineers, material scientists, and technicians between two countries unless it is 

being built with indigenous technology. This affords a 

country that may have the production of nuclear material for a nuclear weapon as its ultimate goal an opportunity to have direct contact with nuclear experts 

in other countries and the possibility of establishing 

outside contracts or agreements.

Nuclear weapons materials production is a rather 

broad category that includes uranium mining and conversion, uranium enrichment, fuel pin manufacturing, 

the operation and construction of research reactors, 

reprocessing spent fuel, and plutonium production. 

Often, knowledge of these key technical areas coexists at the institutes, companies, and educational centers involved in commercial nuclear power since the 

processes for producing nuclear power and nuclear 

weapons materials utilize complementary technologies and capabilities. Also, some of the manufacturing 

organizations work on many different technologies 

and may have expertise in manufacturing what are 

called dual-use capabilities. What this implies is that, 

given a cooperative agreement to construct a nuclear 

power plant, a country seeking a nuclear weapons capability will have an increased probability of having 
152

access to experts, institutions, companies, and educational centers that have expertise in the production of 

nuclear materials that could be used for weapons.

Given the large quantity of people, equipment, and 

correspondence—over 1,000 people; tens of thousands 

of pieces of equipment; and tens of thousands of documents, drawings, and communications—involved in 

the design and construction of a nuclear power plant, 

it is possible that a country seeking a nuclear weapons capability could use a nuclear power plant as a 

cover to obtain information on nuclear materials production. That said, it is ironic to note that the Syrian 

research reactor, reportedly being built with the help 

of the North Koreans, was not noticed, in part because 

Syria’s partnership with the DPRK was unknown, 

and therefore Syria was not under the same scrutiny 

to which a country suspected of developing a nuclear 

weapons capability would be subjected. Examples of 

nuclear material pathways include the following:

1. Pakistan chose the highly enriched uranium 

(HEU) path based upon the illicit use of information 

obtained from the commercial URENCO plant. It has 

since built heavy water research reactors for the production of plutonium.

2. The DPRK chose a plutonium path, using spent 

nuclear fuel from its 5-MWe research reactor. There 

are recent reports that it is pursuing the HEU option, using centrifuge technology reportedly obtained 

through the Khan network.

3. Syria was possibly pursuing a plutonium path 

using the research reactor it was developing with 

North Korea.

4. South Africa chose an HEU path with support 

from Israel.
153

5. Iran appears to have chosen a multipronged 

approach for HEU production—including the use 

of centrifuge technology obtained through the Khan 

network and, early in its program, laser enrichment—

while simultaneously pursuing possible plutonium 

production through its heavy water research reactor. 

Iran obtained much of its technological base through 

interactions with Pakistan’s Khan network, China, 

and Russia.

6. Libya was pursuing an HEU path with centrifuge technology purchased from the Khan network.

These examples are included to illustrate the different pathways taken by some countries pursuing 

nuclear material production capability. Of the countries that have pursued, or appear to have been pursuing, a nuclear weapons capability during the past 

15 years, Iraq, Syria, and Libya had nuclear research 

programs but not a civilian nuclear power program, 

whereas North Korea and Iran developed fuel cycle 

capabilities and nuclear power programs as the cornerstone for their broader nuclear research. Both the 

North Koreans and Iranians received nuclear training 

in Russia. It is reported that more than 300 North Korea nuclear specialists of various qualifications were 

trained at various Soviet institutes of higher education. These facilities included the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI), the Bauman Higher 

Technical School, the Moscow Energy Institute, and 

other educational establishments. Some of the nuclear 

specialists worked at the Joint Institute for Nuclear 

Research in Dubna and the Institute of Physics and 

Power Engineering in Obninsk.1

 Specific examples 

of Iranians training in Russia are referenced in the 

following text.
154

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WEAPONS TESTING

The second category of nuclear weapons expertise 

represents a much smaller core group of individuals, institutions, companies, and educational centers. 

While these groups may still be involved in the commercial nuclear power business, they are far fewer in 

number and generally work within a secure or classified environment.

According to Jeffrey Richelson, “While thousands 

were involved in India’s nuclear program, only 50 

to 75 scientists were actually part of the effort to design and build an explosive device.”2

 (See Figure 6-1.) 

The number of individuals with specialized nuclear 

materials production and weapons knowledge is a 

relatively small fraction of those with knowledge in 

nuclear power plant construction, manufacturing, and 

operation.

Figure 6-1. Individuals with Specialized Nuclear 

Materials Production and Weapons Knowledge 

Compared to Those with Knowledge in Nuclear 

Power Plant Construction, Manufacturing, 

and Operation.

NW Expertise

NM Expertise

NPP Expertise and 

Manufacturing
155

Finally, the third category, nuclear weapons testing, also has a reduced number of people working 

within the civilian nuclear power business, but crossover is still possible. More difficult to trace are the 

affiliated organizations or front companies for the 

weapons laboratories that provide specialized expertise in support of nuclear weapons work and testing.

EXISTING AND NEW NUCLEAR 

POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION

According to the World Nuclear Association 

(WNA), there are 435 nuclear power reactors operating in 30 countries, plus Taiwan, representing 2,630 

billion kilowatthours (kWh) in 2010 figures, or around 

14 percent of the world’s electricity.3 There are currently 60 new reactors under construction in 14 countries, including some countries with existing nuclear 

power capability: the United States, Canada, Finland, 

France, the United Kingdom (UK), Romania, Slovakia, 

Bulgaria, Russia, South Korea, Japan, China, Pakistan, 

and India. Nations that are far along in their planning 

for a commercial nuclear power capability include Poland, Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 

Jordan, Turkey, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand.4

Overall, there are “45 countries actively considering 

embarking upon nuclear power programs which do 

not currently have it.”5 According to the WNA, the 

following countries are actively considering nuclear 

power programs (NPP):

• In Europe: Italy, Albania, Serbia, Croatia, Portugal, Norway, Poland, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Ireland, and Turkey.
156

• In the Middle East and North Africa: Iran, Gulf 

states including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait, Yemen, Israel, Syria, Jordan, 

Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, and 

Sudan.

• In West, Central, and Southern Africa: Nigeria, 

Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Uganda, and Namibia.

• In South America: Chile, Ecuador, and 

Venezuela.

• In Central and Southern Asia: Azerbaijan, 

Georgia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Bangladesh, 

and Sri Lanka.

• In Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, 

and New Zealand.

• In East Asia: North Korea.

Of the 14 countries with new reactors under construction, seven of them—the United States, France, 

the UK, Russia, China, Pakistan, and India—are already nuclear weapons states; and two of the seven 

nonweapons states, Japan and Canada, have expertise in the production of weapons-usable materials. 

Both countries are under International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Primary reactor design, 

manufacturing, and construction are from private 

commercial, or state-owned companies within the 

United States, Canada, France, Russia, South Korea, 

and Japan.6

TRACKING PROLIFERATION

Therefore, given the increase in new countries seeking a civilian nuclear power program and the potential 

for increased interaction with individuals, companies, 
157

organizations, institutions, and educational centers 

with nuclear production expertise and technology, 

and to a lesser extent with those with expertise in 

nuclear weapons and testing, we have to ask, What 

do we need to do to track proliferation in this environment? If we estimate that there are thousands of 

people working on a nuclear power plant within the 

country building the plant, several thousands more 

visiting that country, thousands of pieces of equipment being shipped, and thousands of documents and 

communiqués being generated, is it possible to find illicit activity between nations, institutions, companies, 

or even between individuals?

A “systems approach” is required to set up an infrastructure to track nuclear proliferation and identify 

potential gaps or discrepancies. The key to the effort is 

gaining an understanding of the fundamental governmental and organizational structures for each country 

involved in receiving or transferring nuclear technology. Without an understanding of the organizational 

structures, it is impossible to understand the relationship between people, companies, technologies, projects, and other important indicators of proliferation. 

Creating a detailed understanding of an organization 

and identifying the key people takes a significant 

amount of time and effort.

Once a model is established, it is important to keep 

it current as changes are made—i.e., a dynamic systems model or living document. Once organizational 

structures are established, additional information—

such as relationships, publications, history, timelines, 

technologies, and projects—can be correlated. Timelines are critical for gaining a spatial understanding 

of the inter-relationship between technology development and a country’s overall capability. Relation-
158

ship charts help to map interactions between different organizations, groups, and individuals, thereby 

providing possible ties between military and civilian 

interests. Tracking past relationships can provide insights into current transactions as well. Maps, material/facility flow sheets, organization charts, and relationship charts all provide an integrated picture that 

incorporates thousands of pieces of information and 

can capture the state of knowledge at that moment.

Given the obvious need to develop not only indepth tracking but also integrated systems thinking, 

why is this not accomplished more often? Interestingly, 

one of the primary concerns has to do with the power 

dynamics and the interests of the individual analyst. 

A nonproliferation analyst is noted for the research he 

or she performs on a specific topic and therefore, in a 

sense, the analyst owns that piece of the puzzle. When 

an analyst surrenders it to a larger model, it results in 

a loss of power and a place at the table. Therefore, one 

of the keys to developing extended systems thinking 

is finding a way to ensure that each analyst has a place 

in the larger picture.

Yet, even establishing an understanding of the organizational dynamics does not guarantee there will 

be a clear path for action. For example, it was never 

clear what role former President Pervez Musharraf or 

the military may have played in the Khan network.

There are many similar examples where the line of 

information ends and it is indeterminable as to why; 

in other words, is it because there are no further connections and links, or might it simply be that we were 

unable to obtain additional information?
159

Example: Iran’s Nuclear Program.

The Iranian nuclear program is used as an example 

of a nation whose civilian nuclear program has been 

identified as providing cover for illicit activity.7

 To 

understand their nuclear program, it is important to 

establish the organizational relationships of the Iranian government, the military, and the religious leadership. To gain a systems perspective of Iran’s program, 

a model of the organizations that work with nuclear 

technology or nuclear policy and their inter-relationships needs to be built. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) has the lead for civilian nuclear 

development, including uranium mining, conversion, 

fuel fabrication, research reactors, the Bushehr nuclear 

power plant, and uranium enrichment. The AEOI has 

its headquarters in Tehran and operates a number of 

different facilities and research centers throughout 

Iran. A good summary of the AEOI organization, capabilities, and facilities is provided by Dr. GhannadiMaragheh in his 2002 paper.8

Since February 13, 2011, the director of the AEOI 

has been Dr. F. Abbasi-Davani. He has a dual role as 

head of the AEOI and Vice President of Iran. The dual 

appointment shows the importance of the nuclear 

program within Iran. Information on the military dimension to Iran’s nuclear program has emerged in 

the past 10 years or so. Dr. Abbasi-Davani has been 

linked to the military side of Iran’s government. According to the Institute for Science and International 

Security (ISIS),9

 “Prior to his appointment as AEOI 

head, he chaired the physics department at Tehran’s 

Imam Hossein University, which is linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and work on 

nuclear weaponization.” Dr. Abbasi-Davani’s unique 
160

role of being linked to the military aspect of the weapons program and his recent placement as the head of 

the AEOI may indicate the Iranian government’s decision to ensure closer ties between civilian and military 

nuclear development. Both the IRGC and regular military are subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and 

Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). MODAFL and 

IRGC have a number of affiliated institutions, universities, and businesses, including the Imam Hossein 

University in Tehran, Shahid Behreshi University, Institute of Applied Physics (IAP) (formerly the Physics 

Research Center [PRC]), and many others.10 The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) provides 

additional background on Iran’s nuclear program, 

and in 2004, it made the claim that the P2 centrifuge 

technology development program was not under the 

AEOI but rather the military.11

Developing highly advanced organization charts of 

both the civilian and military governmental structures 

with ties to companies, institutions, technologies, and 

key individuals makes it possible to observe patterns 

and relationships that would otherwise be missed. 

Figures 6-2 and 6-3 are organization charts prepared 

by the IAEA on Iran’s military program. Their detail 

reflects a significant effort to piece together information over many years.
161

Figure 6-2. IAEA Organization and Flow Chart

of the Military Side of Iran’s Nuclear Program.12

Figure 6-3. IAEA Chart of the Iranian Military 

Program Departments, Projects, and Centers.13

What is interesting about the MODAFL organization structure developed by the IAEA, as shown in 

Figures 6-2 and 6-3, is that it implies that nuclear research, although considered to be under the AEOI, the 

civilian branch of the Iran nuclear program, may fall 
162

either completely or in part under the military organization, MODAFL, instead. The implications of this 

governmental structure are that the technologically 

critical infrastructure to producing weapons material 

is actually part of the military infrastructure rather 

than the civilian infrastructure. This is a wonderful example of integrating information over time and across 

different venues, including organizations and technologies. It provides a powerful overview of Iran’s 

nuclear program in two simple charts.

Iran Nuclear Program and International 

Agreements.

Iran has worked primarily with Pakistan’s Khan 

network, China, and Russia in establishing its broad 

based nuclear capability. To understand Iran’s proliferation pathways would require establishing detailed 

knowledge of the Pakistani nuclear program; the 

Khan network with associated people and businesses; 

and Russia and China’s civilian and military nuclear 

complex, institutions, companies, and technologies. 

This is a thoroughly complex and daunting task.

Russia’s nuclear organization, Rosatom, is a highly 

complex organization consisting of governmental offices, technical and research institutes, design institutes, large-scale manufacturing and testing, materials development, nuclear reactor operation, nuclear 

weapons stockpile maintenance, materials production, 

universities with expertise in nuclear training, banks, 

and many other entities. During the 1990s, Russia was 

in a state of transition and economic chaos and had 

less control over its nuclear institutes, which opened 

up possibilities for technology transfer.
163

Its current organization chart is diverse and multifaceted. Many of the technical institutes also have 

affiliated private companies called limited liability 

companies, or LLCs. The predecessor organization to 

Rosatom signed the agreement with Iran to complete 

the unfinished Bushehr nuclear power plant back in 

the mid-1990s. This baseline agreement resulted in 

additional agreements for language training, nuclear 

physics and engineering education, reactor operations, nuclear safety, and others.

Training was included as part of the Bushehr 

Nuclear Power Plant agreement between Russia and 

Iran. The following list provides just a few specific examples of the sites and number of people identified 

for training and construction at the Bushehr Nuclear 

Power Plant (BNPP):

• July 22, 1989, and August 25, 1992: Russia and 

Iran establish training agreement with Zarubezhatomenergostroi (later to become part of Rosatom) to train up to 100 Iranians per year.14

• 1993-95: 18 Iranians reported to have completed 

their master’s degrees at the Russian All-Union 

Research Institute for Power Plant, Moscow 

(possibly N.A. Dollezhal Scientific Research 

and Design Institute of Energy Technologies 

(NIKIET).15

• 1995: Within the 1995 Bushehr reactor agreement, 10-20 students trained per year in Russian schools such as the Kurchatov Institute of 

Atomic Energy (KIAE), MEPhI, and Novovoronezh Nuclear Power Plant.16

• 1998: Began training Iranians on reactor operations at the Novovoronezh Nuclear Power 

Plant; by 2001, a total of 342 Iranians had 

been trained.17
164

• 1998: Iranian student trained at the Mendelev 

Institute of Chemical Technology.18

• 2003: Up to 200 Iranians trained at Obninsk 

Atomic Energy University, where they learned 

basic skills in operating the BNPP.19

• Published estimates of the number of workers 

at the BNPP construction site:

— 1998: 700 Russians working at the BNPP 

site.20

— 2002: Approximately 3,900 Russians and 

Iranians working on the BNPP; another 

source reports there were 1,200 Russians 

and Ukrainians.21

• Published estimates of the amount of equipment shipped to Iran from Russia:

— By the end of 2002: 5,000 tons of equipment 

had been delivered to the BNPP.22

— 2003: 7,000 tons of equipment had been delivered.23

— 2000-05: large pieces of equipment were

shipped to Iran. This includes the reactor 

vessel, steam generators, turbine, piping, 

and other large equipment needed for the 

system.

• By 2008: A total of 82 megatons of fuel enriched

up to 3.62 percent U-235 were delivered to the 

BNPP.24

In summary, given the number of Iranians receiving training at Russian nuclear institutes, the number of Russians traveling to and living in Iran for the 

construction of the BNPP, and the massive amount of 

equipment shipped from numerous manufacturing 

centers throughout Russia, it was possible for nuclear 

proliferation activity to go undetected and unchecked 
165

within the civilian nuclear power umbrella. Quite 

simply, the amount of exchange of people, equipment, 

and documentation between two nations engaged in 

the purchase and construction of a nuclear power 

plant is large. Tracking nuclear proliferation is highly 

complex, difficult to unravel, and time- and personnel-consuming.

ISSUES WITH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

According to the intelligence community (IC) unclassified report to Congress in September 2001:

These projects [referring to Russian projects with 

Iran] will help Iran augment its nuclear technology 

infrastructure, which in turn would be useful in supporting nuclear weapons research and development. 

The expertise and technology gained, along with the 

commercial channels and contacts established—particularly through the Bushehr nuclear power plant 

project—could be used to advance Iran’s nuclear 

weapons research and development program.

25

This document specifically flags the U.S. concern 

over the use of the BNPP to support Iran’s nuclear 

weapons program.

The IC has since changed its position, stating that 

since 2003, it believes that Iran has ended nuclear 

weapons development. From the 2007 IC unclassified 

assessment to Congress:

Analysis of events and activities associated with the 

Iranian nuclear program during the reporting period 

has yielded the following conclusions: We assess that 

Iran had been working to develop nuclear weapons 

through at least fall 2003, but that in fall 2003 Iran 

halted its nuclear weapons design and weaponization 

activities, and the military’s covert uranium conver-
166

sion-and enrichment-related activities. We judge that 

the halt lasted at least several years, and that Tehran 

had not resumed these activities as of mid-2007.26

Since the BNPP agreement in 1995, there have been 

a number of projects reported in the press and by 

nongovernmental organizations as illicit technology 

transfers among Iran and Russia, China, and the Khan 

network for nuclear materials production and nuclear 

weapons design and testing. Nuclear materials production projects include: atomic vapor laser isotope 

separation (AVLIS), heavy water (HW) production, 

HW research reactor (HWRR), centrifuge enrichment 

technology, and uranium-hexafluoride (UF6

) gas for a 

centrifuge cascade. Weapon-related capabilities identified include high explosives (HE) technology and 

expertise, high-speed cameras, and containment vessels for weapons testing. A short summary of each is 

provided here.27

Nuclear Material Production Technologies.

• Russia-Iran AVLIS: During early-2000s, the 

U.S. and Russian governments engaged in discussions concerning the transfer of an AVLIS 

system from Russia to Iran. According to the IC 

unclassified report to Congress: 

A component of the Russian Ministry of 

Atomic Energy (MINATOM) contracted with 

Iran to provide equipment clearly intended for 

AVLIS. The laser equipment was to have been 

delivered in late-1999 but continues to be held 

up as a result of U.S. protests. AVLIS technology could provide Iran the means to produce weapons quantities of highly enriched 

uranium.28
167

Minatom, the predecessor organization to 

Rosatom, had evaluated that the equipment 

could not be used for uranium enrichment but 

agreed to stop the transfer to Iran under U.S. 

pressure. Reportedly the AVLIS equipment 

was designed and manufactured at a Rosatom 

Institute, the Yefremov Scientific Research Institute for Electrophysical Apparatus in St. 

Petersburg.29 Discussions in laser technology 

were part of the Russia-Iran technical agreement from 1995.

• Russia-Iran HW Production and HWRR: It was 

reported that prior to 1999, the Mendeleyev 

Russian Chemical-Technological University 

provided information on HW technologies 

to Iran30 and in December 1998, . . . press articles citing U.S. intelligence sources reported 

that Russia’s Research and Design Institute 

of Power Engineering (NIKIET) and the Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology 

were negotiating to sell Iran [a] 40-MWt heavywater research reactor and a UF6

 uranium 

conversion plant.31

 Mendeleyev University, as noted earlier, was 

also training an Iranian student.

— NIKIET was identified as the U.S. focus of 

concern.32 NIKIET and the Mendeleyev institute were subsequently placed under U.S. 

sanctions in January 1999; they have since 

been removed from U.S. sanctions. Since 

these earlier revelations in the early-1990s, 

ISIS released a technical note in 2009 with 

information on Iran’s HWRR, claiming that: 
168

Based on interviews with knowledgeable 

officials, NIKIET and a Russian company in 

Obninsk provided technology for the Arak 

reactor. This assistance included modifying 

the design of a RBMK fuel rod bundle for 

use in the Arak heavy water reactor. As a result of U.S. pressure, this assistance for Arak 

stopped in the late-1990s.33

This provides further confirmation of NIKIET’s 

role in the HWRR and identifies a Russian company in Obninsk as providing technology.

— As noted earlier, in 2003, there were up to 200 

Iranians trained at Obninsk Atomic Energy 

University, where they learned basic skills 

in operating the BNPP.34 This places Iranian 

students in the same town as the company 

that ISIS identifies as providing technology 

for the HWRR at Arak. Both the HW production plant and HWRR project were kept 

hidden from the IAEA through the use of 

front companies until revealed by an Iranian 

opposition group in August 2002.35 Tehran 

claims it needs the Arak facility to produce 

isotopes for medical purposes,36 and that “as 

of October 2008, Iran had not yet installed 

equipment in the hot cells, including manipulators and specialized windows”37 that 

could be used for isotope production.

• China-Iran Uranium-Hexafluoride: In February 2003, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei was shown the 164-centrifuge cascade 

uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, and it 

was revealed that the Iranians had received 

1,000 kilograms (kg) of natural UF6

 gas from 
169

China in 1991.38 This information had previously been concealed.39 The Chinese provided 

a significant amount of expertise, technology, 

and facility design for Iran’s civilian nuclear 

complex within the Iranian IAEA safeguards 

agreement. Yet, the transfer of the UF6 gas is 

an example of nuclear material transferred outside of the legal IAEA declaration.

• Pakistan Khan Network-Iran Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment: Perhaps one of the more surprising stories of proliferation was the transfer 

of technology and expertise from the Khan network to Iran’s nuclear program, which began 

as early as 1985 when Dr. Khan met with the 

Iranians in Dubai and provided detailed construction plans and two centrifuges diverted 

from Kahuta.40 This was followed by the supply of “two containers of surplus Pakistan centrifuge equipment to Iran in 1994 and 1995 for a 

payment of $3 million.”41 The centrifuges have 

been the basis for Iran’s uranium enrichment 

program, which has continued to advance 

technically.

— It is interesting to note that during nuclear 

negotiations with the Russians in 1995, the 

Iranians requested the purchase of a centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. Reportedly, the Russians had planned on providing 

the centrifuge technology but opted not to 

do so after the United States pressed them to 

end the agreement.

— Later, in December 1998, NIKIET and Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology 

were reportedly negotiating with Iran over 

the sale of a facility to convert uranium into 
170

UF6 after the Chinese canceled work on a UF6

facility with Iran.42 During the same time, the 

Iranians were purchasing an AVLIS system 

for uranium enrichment from Russia.

— It would appear there might have been some 

overlap within the Iranian nuclear program. 

This is where it would be interesting to trace 

each purchase and negotiation by organization, institution, company, and individual to 

see if the military and civilian sides of the 

nuclear program were working together. 

Recent studies by ISIS show that there were 

parts of the Iranian government purchasing 

equipment and materials for the centrifuge 

enrichment program in the late-1980s, and 

it is not clear how the civilian and military 

programs were split.43 It is difficult to ascertain whether the technology transfers 

completed by the Khan network had the official involvement of the Pakistani government. The centrifuge uranium enrichment 

work was well hidden within Iran’s larger 

nuclear program until it was revealed by the 

Iranian opposition group, NCRI, in August 

2002. The IAEA director general visited the 

uranium enrichment plants for the first time 

in 2003.44
171

WEAPONS DESIGN AND NUCLEAR TESTING

• Russia-Iran Explosives Testing: According to 

news reports, Vyacheslav Danilenko, a former 

scientist from Chelyabinsk-70 (a weapons laboratory under Rosatom), contacted the Iranian 

embassy to inquire about possible joint ventures 

and later worked for the head of Iran’s Physics 

Research Center (PRC) (see Figure 6-1). Per the 

IAEA organization chart, the PRC worked for 

the military side of Iran’s nuclear program.45

Danilenko claimed he was in Iran training on 

nanodiamond technology from 1995 to 2001. In 

the summer of 2003, Tehran engineers reportedly conducted test detonations based upon a 

Russian method using information obtained 

from Danilenko.46

• Russia-Iran Containment Vessel for Explosive 

Testing: Based upon news reports, the explosive vessel at the Iranian Parchin military site 

was designed with the help of Danilenko.47

Danilenko denies he worked on the vessel.48

— According to the IAEA: 

the HE vessel, or chamber, is said to have 

been put in place at Parchin in 2000. A building was constructed at that time around a 

large cylindrical object. The IAEA was able 

to confirm the date of construction of the 

cylinder and some of its design features . 

. . and that it was designed to contain the 

detonation of up to 70 kg of HE . . .49

 for hydrodynamic experiments consistent with possible weapons 

development.
172

— While a former IAEA inspector has insisted 

that 70-kg is beyond a plausible design for 

a containment vessel, a report on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) states 

that the Russian nuclear design laboratories, which would include Arzamas-16 and 

Chelyabinsk-70, conducted weapon-related 

experiments using large containment vessels. The CTBT report continues that, based 

upon a paper from Arzamas-16 , the Russian 

Federal Nuclear Center (VNIIEF), the design laboratory in the late-1970s and early1980s needed to develop explosive-resistant 

chambers: 

capable of hermetically holding inside 

its volume an explosive release of energy 

equivalent to 150 to 200 kilograms of TNT. 

. . . Development of these vessels–called 

Kolba in Russian–was completed by 1983.50

— It is reported that the Parchin vessel is a vacuum vessel with a diameter of 4.6 meters (m) 

and a length of 18.8-m. In the early-1990s, I 

had the opportunity to visit the Russian Research Institute of Chemical Machine Building in Zagorsk where they had large vacuum vessels for testing space equipment. One 

was large enough to test the Russian space 

shuttle with its wings clipped to fit within 

the chamber. This is to say that Russia has 

designed and built impressive facilities and 

large vacuum chambers consistent with the 

reported design of the Parchin vessel.

— Therefore, if the Iranians did receive help 

from the Russians in the design of contain-
173

ment vessels for high explosive testing of 

implosion systems, then 75 kg of HE is well 

within the design limits of Russian technology. What is not clear is whether the Russian 

weapons laboratories helped in the design 

of the Iranian vessel at Parchin.

• Russia-Iran High-speed Camera Diagnostics 

for HE Testing: According to ISIS,51 the BIFO 

company, a subsidiary to the Russian Institute 

for Optical and Physical Measurement (VNIIOFI), sold two high-speed cameras, K008 stream 

and “uniframe” camera and K011 “nineframe” 

camera to a German trading company who had 

purchased them for an Iranian front company. 

A technical description of each camera can be 

found in a VNIIOFI publication.52 The cameras 

were purchased for $42K53 and can be used for 

the diagnostics of HE implosion testing as described previously, with operating time scales 

in nanoseconds. It is worth noting that, according to the ISIS report, VNIIOFI has joint publications on weapons testing with Arzamas-16, 

one of Russia’s two nuclear weapons design 

laboratories.

In summary, there are a number of examples where 

nuclear materials, nuclear materials production technology, and nuclear weapons-related technology may 

have been transferred to Iran while hidden within 

its larger civilian nuclear power program. While it is 

plausible that these transfers occurred as a result of 

contacts made while training or within the larger technical agreements, it is difficult to prove without more 

substantial information. During the 1990s, Russia was 
174

undergoing a significant transformation and created 

openings that may no longer be open. Since the mid2000s, Rosatom management has established a clear 

vision for creating a professional organization aimed 

at meeting national and international needs in the 

nuclear field and implemented it through the Russian 

government energy program. Similarly, China has 

moved to the international standards for nonproliferation and export controls with the goal of becoming 

an international supplier of nuclear technology. The 

competitive economic and technical basis between nations raises the bar regarding when proliferation activities can tarnish a country’s reputation. The previous 

examples of proliferation primarily took place during 

the 1990s and demonstrate what can occur within a 

larger commercial program if governmental oversight 

is not strictly enforced.

Iran’s nuclear program extends over 30 years, and a 

timeline of its program would help provide a foundation for understanding technology developments and 

transfers. A timeline can be used to track interactions 

and changes in relationships and agreements. There 

are literally thousands of people and interactions 

within the Iranian nuclear umbrella, spanning back to 

the 1980s. Iran also has a large number of technology 

development programs where the inter-relationships 

between people, companies, organizations, and educational centers, if tracked, could provide insights into 

their activities. A systems model keeps building and 

building, as this is the type of complex and detailed 

framework needed to track potential proliferation 

activity.

What is clear from the previous example is that a 

few people can provide invaluable support to a nation seeking a nuclear weapons capability. A. Q. Khan 
175

created and directed an effort to provide centrifugebased uranium enrichment technology to several nations, and Danilenko is reported to have provided 

training on implosion technology and the design of an 

explosive vessel. These specific examples demonstrate 

how difficult it can be to trace nuclear proliferation 

within a larger commercial nuclear power program. It 

is the proverbial needle in a haystack.

A FEW MORE THOUGHTS

• Technical expertise is critical to understanding proliferation pathways and how seemingly 

uninteresting information can be passed on 

without a second look by someone who lacks 

a deeper understanding of the materials, technologies, and types of technology that are used 

in materials production and nuclear weapons 

design and testing. Unfortunately, many of 

the U.S. experts who know much of the more 

obscure information are retiring.

• Curiosity, time, and a healthy environment 

for “failure” are all needed to allow analysts 

time to track odd information “down the rabbit 

hole.” Failure needs to be encouraged.

• The initial question is of great importance in 

framing the research and in determining the 

final product. Questions should encourage 

seeking the answer from multiple views and 

perspective. Every question requires a new 

tact and approach and thereby brings in new 

insights.

• Physical space to do systems work is needed 

for sharing ideas, putting charts on the wall, 

and for spreading out information.
176

• Finally, cultural knowledge and insights, not 

from books, but from experience in country, is 

essential.

More often than not, a country chooses a civilian 

nuclear power program not as a cover for a nuclear 

weapons program, but for energy. In the cases where 

it does occur, a nation’s pursuit of a weapons program may be accompanied by signs of noncompliance 

with the NPT agreement. Also, there might be a sense 

of a defense imbalance in the region that would become balanced if that nation obtains a nuclear weapons capability. When you consider the list of nations 

that are currently considering new nuclear power 

programs or expanding their existing program, it is 

clear that their trade and economic roles in the international community are of great importance to them 

and may serve as an incentive not to develop a nuclear 

weapons capability.

There are two camps on how to move forward on 

nuclear power when considered within the reference 

frame of nonproliferation: 1) Limit the transfer of any 

and all nuclear power technology; or 2) Provide the 

technology for nuclear power production, but empower the IAEA and United Nations (UN) to track 

and enforce any anomalies or illicit activity.

There are arguments for both perspectives, and 

neither has worked “perfectly.” For example, in trying to limit the transfer of technology to Iran and 

Libya, the door was opened for the transfer of illicit 

technology by other nations and the establishment 

of a shadow organization outside of governmental 

purview—a much more difficult and dangerous issue 

to track and control. In cases where nuclear technology was provided and kept under IAEA control, it has 
177

been difficult for the IAEA to limit the growth of a nation’s nuclear weapons program, including programs 

in North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. One of the contributing 

factors is the varying level of concern over proliferation activates among nations. The United States has 

a much more conservative idea of what limiting proliferation should be than, say, Russia or China does. 

Therefore, where the United States may not be willing to engage with a specific nation due to concerns 

of nuclear proliferation—for example, in Iran, Burma, 

or North Korea—Russia or China may be willing to 

step in.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall it takes much time and funding to develop a systems perspective on nuclear proliferation. 

It requires a dedicated team with a passion for digging deeper and pursuing the question longer. It also 

requires policy representatives who want a greater 

understanding of the issues of nonproliferation and 

who are willing to push the experts in nonproliferation to do more and perform at a higher level. It is 

a highly complex process, but given the complexity 

of the global interactions and concerns over nuclear 

proliferation, it is the only possible way to establish 

a framework to track nuclear interactions and find 

the inconsistencies that may signal a country is seeking more than civilian nuclear technology. This type 

of systems approach will be needed as the number of new countries seeking commercial nuclear 

technology expands.
178

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. J. C. Moltz and A. Y. Monsourov, The North Korean Nuclear 

Program: Security, Strategy and New Perspectives from Russia, New 

York: Routledge, 1999.

2. Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea, New York: 

Norton, 2006.

3. “Plans for New Reactors World Wide,” World Nuclear Association, May 2012, available from www.world-nuclear.org/info/

inf17.html.

4. “Plans for New Reactors World Wide,” World Nuclear 

Association; and “Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries,” World 

Nuclear Association, 2012, available from www.world-nuclear.org/

info/inf102.html.

5. “Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries,” World Nuclear 

Association.

6. It may be possible to reduce the number of people required 

for planning, construction, training, and operation by moving to 

small or medium reactors (SMR) for nations that currently do not 

have a nuclear power program. Small reactors can be manufactured, built, and transported as complete units to the operating 

site, where they are installed in the facility. At the end of life, the 

complete unit is shipped back to the originating country after a 

few years of cool down within the reactor compartment. The other advantage to SMRs is that they allow a developing nation to 

build up power at the location where it is needed and expand as 

more power is needed within the region. 

7. “Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass 

Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions: 1 July 

Through 31 December 2000,” Unclassified Report to Congress 

from the Director of Central Intelligence, 2001, available from 

www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/july_dec2000.htm, 

hereafter DCI, Acquisition of Technology, 2000.
179

8. M. Ghannadi-Maragheh, “Atomic Energy Organization of 

Iran,” in World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium, London, UK, 2002, available from www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/

iran-aeoi-worldnuclearassociation-090402.pdf.

9. David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Andrea Stricker, “Will 

Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani lead Iran to nuclear weapons? (Rev. 

1),” Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, June 24, 2011, available from isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/

will-fereydoun-abbasi-davani-lead-iran-to-nuclear-weapons.

10. Ibid.

11. Mohammad Mohaddessin, “New Nuclear Revelations: 

Text of the Press Conference of Mohammad Mohaddessin, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council 

of Resistence of Iran,” Iran Watch, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear 

Arms Control, September 10, 2004, available from www.iranwatch.

org/privateviews/NCRI/perspex-ncri-nuclearprogram-091004.htm.

12. “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and 

relevent provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic 

Republic of Iran,” Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy 

Association, November 8, 2011, available from www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-65.pdf.

13. Ibid.

14. Judith Perera, “Nuclear Industry of Iran,” Opensource.gov, 

April 2003.

15. Mark Gorwitz, “Iranian Nuclear Science Bibliography: 

Open Literature References,” September 2003.

16. “Specialists to Train Iranians for Bushehr Nuclear Plant,” 

ITAR-TASS, NTI: Russia: Nuclear Exports to Iran: Training and 

Know How, 1996.

17. Perera, “Nuclear Industry of Iran”; S. Sergievskiy, “Iranskiye stazhery na Balakovskoy AE” (“Iranian trainees at Balakovo 

AE”), Nezavisimaya Gazeta online edition, 1999.
180

18. Perera, “Nuclear Industry of Iran.” 

19. Nick P. Walsh, “Russian Lessons,” The Guardian, June 

16, 2003.

20. Perera, “Nuclear Industry of Iran.”

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. “Bushehr: Fueling the Reactor,” GlobalSecurity.org, available from www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/bushehr-fuel.htm.

25. DCI, Acquisition of Technology, 2000. Emphasis added.

26. “Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass 

Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions: 1 January 

to 31 December 2007,” Unclassified Report to Congress from 

the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, 2007, 

hereafter DDNI, Acquisition of Technology, 2007.

27. It is worth noting that the details of the stories are much 

richer and interesting than what I am able to provide in these 

short summaries.

28. DCI, Acquisition of Technology, 2000.

29. Perera, “Nuclear Industry of Iran”; Michael Knapik, “Russia tells U.S. officials it will not export lasers to Iran,” Nucleonics 

Week, Vol. 42, March 8, 2001.

30. Michael R. Gordon, “Russia to Offer U.S. Deal to End Iran 

Nuclear Aid,” The New York Times, March 17, 1999.

31. Perera, “Nuclear Industry of Iran.”

32. Gordon, “Russia to Offer U.S. Deal.”
181

33. David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Robert Kelley, “Mysteries Deepen Over Status of Arak Reactor Project,” Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Studies, August 

11, 2009, available from www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/ArakFuelElement.pdf; David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Robert Kelley, “Update on the Arak Reactor in Iran,” Washington, DC: 

Institute for Science and International Studies, August 25, 2009, 

available from www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/Arak_Update_25_

August2009.pdf.

34. Walsh, “Russian Lessons.”

35. “Iran Nuclear Milestones,” Iran Watch, Wisconsin Project 

on Nuclear Arms Control, February 2011, available from www.

iranwatch.org/wmd/wmd-nukemilestones.htm.

36. James Phillips, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: What Is Known 

and Unknown,” Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, March 26, 2010, available from www.heritage.org/research/

reports/2010/03/iran-s-nuclear-program-what-is-known-and-unknown.

37. Albright et al., “Mysteries Deepen Over Status of Arak Reactor Project.”

38. Mohammad Sahimi, “Iran’s Nuclear Program. Part I: 

Its History,” October 2, 2003, available from www.payvand.com/

news/03/oct/1015.html.

39. John R. Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option : Defending 

America at the United Nations and Abroad, New York: Threshold 

Editions, 2007.

40. Erich Follath and Holger Stark, “The Birth of a Bomb, A 

History of Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions,” Der Spiegel, June 17, 2010, 

available from www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,701109,00.

html; “Pakistan: Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan Discusses Nuclear Program in TV Talk Show,” Karachi Aaj News Television in Urdu, 

from “Islamabad Tonight” discussion program hosted by Nadeem 

Malik, August 31, 2009.
182

41. Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, “Proliferation 

Rings,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2, Fall 2004, pp. 5-49.

42. “Russia: Nuclear Exports to Iran: Enrichment, Mining and 

Milling,” NTI, June 22, 2011. 

43. David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Iranian Smuggling 

for Military Nuclear Programs: From Shahid Hemmat Industrial 

Group to the Physics Research Center,” Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, May 16, 2012.

44. “Iran Nuclear Milestones,” Iran Watch.

45. Joby Warrick, “Iran-Russian Scientist Vyacheslav Danilenko’s Aid to Iran Offers Peek at Nuclear Program,” The Washington 

Post, November 13, 2011; Mark Gorwitz, “Vyacheslav Danilenko—Background, Research, and Proliferation Concerns,” Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, November 29, 2011, available from isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/

vyacheslav-danilenko-background-research-and-proliferation-concerns/.

46. For more information on the Iranian high explosive test 

and a diagram of the configuration, see Follath and Stark, “The 

Birth of a Bomb.”

47. “Parchin chamber raises nuclear test suspicions,” AP, May 

19, 2012, available from gulfnews.com/news/region/iran/parchinchamber-raises-nuclear-test-suspicions-1.1024807.

48. Ibid.

49. “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and 

relevent provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic 

Republic of Iran,” Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy 

Agency, November, 8, 2011.

50. Kathleen Bailey and Thomas Scheber, The Comprehensive 

Test Ban Treaty: An Assessment of the Benefits, Costs, and Risks, Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, March 2011, available 

from www.nipp.org/CTBT%203.11.11%20electronic%20version.pdf.
183

51. David Albright and Christina Walrond, “The Trials of the 

German-Iranian Trader Mohsen Vanaki: The German Federal Intelligence Service Assesses that Iran Likely Has a Nuclear Weapons Program,“ Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, December 15, 2009, available from isis-online.

org/isis-reports/detail/the-trials-of-the-german-iranian-trader-mohsenvanaki-the-german-federal-in/.

52. Vyatcheslav S. Ivanov, Yuri Zolotarevsky, Vladimir Krutikov, Vitaly B. Levedev, and Grigory G. Feldman, “High-speed 

image converter instrument engineering of VNIIOFI is 40 years 

old,” presented at the 27th International Congress on High-Speed 

Photography and Photonics, Xi’an, China, 2007.

53. Albright and Walrond, “The Trials of the German-Iranian 

Trader Mohsen Vanaki.”

185

CHAPTER 7

PERSUADING COUNTRIES TO FORGO 

NUCLEAR FUEL-MAKING: 

WHAT HISTORY SUGGESTS

Richard S. Cleary

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been a resurgence of 

proposals designed to limit the spread of nuclear 

fuel-making facilities, with the understanding that 

ostensibly peaceful technology can allow for the production of the fissile material required for a nuclear 

weapon. With U.S. proposals ranging from the Global 

Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) to a revamped, 

“Gold Standard” bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, a wider array of tools has been put at the disposal of American policymakers. Prominent members 

of the international community have become agitated 

about the prospect of the proliferation of fuel-making 

technology as well, with numerous proposals of fuel 

assurances put forward by such disparate figures as 

Russian President Vladimir Putin and former Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

Mohamed El Baradei. But renewed enthusiasm for 

nonproliferation begs questions about how novel are 

the proposed instruments, and, moreover, how effective they are likely to be, particularly for the country 

historically at the head of nonproliferation efforts, the 

United States. A review of this historical record suggests that optimism about the U.S. ability to dissuade 

countries from this path is misplaced.
186

This chapter considers supply side proposals of 

fuel assurance and multilateral fuel-making, as well as 

specific interventions on both the supply and demand 

sides, consulting particular cases in Iran (1974-78), 

West Germany-Brazil (1975-77), South Korea (1974-

76), and Pakistan (1972-80) to draw lessons about the 

effectiveness of U.S. practices under differing circumstances. The record these cases give is mixed, due 

to two principal causes. The first is the failure of the 

United States to prioritize consistently nonproliferation efforts, given Washington’s global and competing 

interests that tend to be embraced by different factions 

in the federal government apparatus but whose ultimate arbiter is the President (along with his close advisors). The second is the tendency of decisions about 

nuclear fuel-making by the state in question to be influenced more by fundamental trends or factors than 

diplomatic maneuvering from Washington; diplomacy is most effective when it has the political, economic, and military backing to implicate these issues. 

The most important factor in U.S. efforts has tended to 

be the bilateral relationship between Washington and 

the country at hand. Decisionmakers who consider 

their country’s relationship with the United States to 

be strategically vital—and believe that fuel-making 

would threaten this relationship—are most likely to 

forgo enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology. 

This calculus can be informed by a range of dynamics, 

some beyond U.S. control, such as security concerns, 

issues of prestige, and commercial and industrial interests. Domestic politics and public opinion, both in 

the United States and in the country considering fuelmaking, can be influential.

One of the fundamental tensions of American nonproliferation efforts lies with the Nuclear Nonprolifer-
187

ation Treaty (NPT), the international legal framework 

of reference in nonproliferation matters. The prevailing interpretation of the NPT centers on what has been 

referred to as the “fundamental bargain”: in exchange 

for nuclear-weapons states’ movement toward disarmament and their sharing of technology and expertise for peaceful nuclear energy, non-nuclear weapons 

states will not pursue the bomb.1

One portion of the NPT, in particular, has borne 

on U.S. efforts to persuade countries not to pursue 

nuclear fuel-making technology: In Article IV, the 

NPT enshrines the “inalienable right . . . to develop 

research, production and use of nuclear energy for 

peaceful purposes,” and pledges signatories to “undertake to facilitate . . . the fullest possible exchange of 

equipment, materials and scientific and technological 

information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”2

Traditionally, the United States has elected for an ambiguous middle ground, not denying an Article IV 

“inalienable” right to fuel-making, but not acknowledging it either.3

 While U.S. interpretations of the NPT 

have not, as a practical matter, stemmed its attempts 

to convince countries to eschew nuclear fuel-making 

technology, the NPT’s bargain has shaped certain 

stances, particularly supply side proposals such as 

fuel assurances.

The application of U.S. national power, on both the 

supply and demand sides of nuclear fuel-making, can 

play a role in convincing countries of the benefits of 

their relationship with Washington and the costs to be 

incurred if this relationship were fractured. The adroit 

use of “sticks” and “carrots” can withhold or provide 

incentives for cooperation, convincing countries considering ENR that the risks of doing so outweigh the 

benefits. The case studies examined here suggest that 
188

if the United States is to give the impression that a 

bilateral relationship rests in the balance, Washington may have to undertake risks of its own, perhaps 

compromising other policy objects for the sake of nonproliferation. When the circumstances have called for 

Washington to put nonproliferation goals above others, policymakers have often failed to do so.

ASSURANCES OF SUPPLY AND 

MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS

The earliest American efforts to dissuade countries 

from developing nuclear fuel-making facilities were 

offers of international control of the atom. When the 

Soviet Union developed a nuclear arsenal, proposals 

of international control gave way to multilateral fuelmaking facilities and fuel banks. There is a consistency of spirit in these proposals, grounded in the belief 

that a positive inducement is possible on the supply 

side and, more particularly, that countries will forgo 

nuclear fuel-making if satisfied by disarmament, or 

promises thereof, as well as fuel supply and other 

assurances.

The first systematic American attempt to grapple 

with the potential for nuclear weapons proliferation—

and the role of fuel-making facilities in proliferation—

was the so-called Acheson-Lilienthal Report. This 

document was the product of a committee organized 

by Secretary of State James Byrnes, and which included Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Tennessee Valley Authority chairman David Lilienthal, and 

a number of prominent members of the Manhattan 

Project, notably Robert Oppenheimer. The committee 

was charged with elaborating a U.S. nuclear policy to 

be put forward to the newly-created United Nations 
189

Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC).4 The AchesonLilienthal Report, drafted over the course of only a 

few months, proposed that all fissile material—and its 

means of production—be concentrated in an “Atomic 

Development Authority.” The text acknowledged explicitly the connection between fuel-making, both in 

enrichment and reprocessing, and the manufacture of 

nuclear weapons:

Operations, like those at Hanford and Oak Ridge and 

their extensions and improvements, would be owned 

and conducted by the Authority. Reactors for producing denatured plutonium will be large installations 

and by the nature of the process they will yield large 

amounts of energy as a byproduct. . . . These production plants are intrinsically dangerous operations. 

Indeed they may be regarded as the most dangerous, 

for it is through such operations that materials can be 

produced which are suitable for atomic explosives.5

The hope of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report was 

that by investing an international body with authority 

over fuel-making facilities, uranium ore mining assets, 

inspections powers, and “licenses to those countries 

wishing to pursue peaceful nuclear research,” proliferation of nuclear weapons could be averted.6

 A key 

portion of the text was the elimination of the “national 

nuclear arsenals”—that is, the only then-extant arsenal, the American one—and the report implied that 

U.S.-Soviet cooperation would be crucial. This grand 

bargain, premised on U.S. generosity in giving up its 

nuclear weapons and Soviet compliance in not developing them, was intended to give the world the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, while keeping a close 

hold on sensitive facilities. While the hope for Soviet 

cooperation was misplaced—Moscow was hard in 
190

pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability—the authors 

did have a clear-eyed understanding of the dual nature of nuclear fuel-making technology.7

The next major proposal, closely based on the 

Acheson-Lilienthal Report, would come from Bernard 

Baruch, the U.S. delegate to the UNAEC. Baruch’s insistence that UN Security Council members should 

forgo their vetoes on proliferation-related matters, 

as well as his modified stance on U.S. nuclear disarmament—Washington should only disarm when 

“guarantee[d] of safety”—were objected to by the 

Soviet Union, which refused to agree to the proposal. 

However, Baruch’s plan did retain the Acheson-Lilienthal elements related to international control of 

fuel-making facilities, seeing their utility both in the 

nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the spread 

of peaceful nuclear power.

Just as Acheson-Lilienthal had, Baruch envisaged 

an international body that “should exercise complete 

managerial control of the production of fissionable 

materials in dangerous quantities and must own and 

control the product of these plants.” The rejection of 

the Baruch Plan spelled the end of U.S. proposals for 

international control of nuclear fuel-making. Later 

proposals of multilateral or international fuel-making 

facilities would not concentrate all fuel-making capacity in a single body. Rather, they would see multilateral facilities as enabling the spread of peaceful nuclear 

energy to nonweapons states, while minimizing the 

threat of diversion toward nuclear weapons. These 

facilities were understood as part of a grand bargain 

whereby nonweapons states would be assured of 

fuel for peaceful purposes in exchange for eschewing 

nuclear weapons.
191

U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s “Atoms for 

Peace” speech, delivered to the UN General Assembly 

in 1954, outlined this basic bargain, later enshrined 

in the NPT. By the time of Eisenhower’s speech, the 

Soviet Union had conducted nuclear weapons tests—

including at least one hydrogen bomb test—and the 

United Kingdom (UK) and Canada also had access to 

“the secret.”8

 Atoms for Peace kept the spirit of earlier proposals, which had emphasized disarmament, 

nonproliferation, and the spread of “peaceful” nuclear 

energy, but the President never touched on the danger 

of fuel-making facilities and their dual application. In 

his speech, Eisenhower called for the creation of an international body that would both conduct inspections 

and, by receiving contributions of fissile materials in 

what might be called today a fuel bank, ensure that all 

states would receive the benefits of peaceful nuclear 

energy. Eisenhower’s proposal was premised in part 

on the idea that “the knowledge [of nuclear weapons 

development] now possessed by several nations will 

eventually be shared by others, possibly all others.”9

Just as the Acheson-Lilienthal and Baruch plans 

had reflected the dynamics of a world where only 

one nation held nuclear weapons, Atoms for Peace 

was penned in a period when the peaceful benefits 

of nuclear power were expected to be great. To some, 

there was good reason to think that the trade-off between civilian and military nuclear power could be 

a favorable one. Eisenhower’s speech resulted in a 

program, also called Atoms for Peace, whereby the 

United States transferred small-scale research reactors 

and fuel to developing countries around the world. 

The Atoms for Peace program has been criticized for 

spreading sensitive technology to countries that went 

on to develop nuclear weapons. Still, the basic bargain 
192

elaborated in Atoms for Peace would be incorporated 

in the 1968 NPT, which remains the legal framework 

of reference in matters of nonproliferation.

In recent years, the United States has again proposed a multilateral fuel facility as a means of resolving supply side concerns—and denying countries the 

argument that building fuel-making facilities is necessary. U.S. President Barack Obama, in a noted speech 

in Prague, The Czech Republic, has called for an international fuel bank.10 Obama’s proposal follows a number of appeals for multilateral, or international, facilities following Mohamed ElBaradei’s 2003 proposal 

for putting all fuel-making facilities under “multinational control.”11 U.S. President George W. Bush also 

proposed, while not a multilateral facility, assurances 

by fuel-cycle states to those seeking fuel for peaceful 

purposes.12

The persistence of fuel-assurance proposals, particularly those related to multilateral fuel-making facilities, is striking—as is the absence of a multilateral 

facility in the mold proposed by Eisenhower, Obama, 

ElBaradei, and others. While there are a number of 

reasons why such a facility has not materialized, the 

best explanation seems to be that, other than satisfying the demand for equity as understood in the NPT 

grand bargain, there would be little discernible commercial advantage to one. An ample supply of nuclear 

fuel already exists and is priced on the international 

marketplace, and most countries have no difficulty 

in accessing this supply.13 This supply side solution, 

then, has not taken hold because it has not assured the 

commodity in demand.
193

MULTILATERAL REPROCESSING

IN SHAH REZA PAHLAVI’S IRAN

The multilateral fuel-making facility has not simply been an abstract offer reserved for international 

fora. This concept, supported publicly by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, was folded into negotiations between the Gerald Ford administration and 

Shah Reza Pahlavi’s regime toward a bilateral nuclear 

cooperation agreement.14 The multilateral option figured prominently in a proposed text of the agreement 

in May 1976, but was rejected by Iranian negotiators, 

and eventually discarded by U.S. negotiators.15 Amid 

increasingly strict oversight from Congress, the multilateral option was absent altogether from the second 

proposed agreement text, presented in August 1978.16

Indeed, negotiations between the United States and 

Iran never materialized in a signed, binding agreement, interrupted first by the 1976 presidential election and later by turmoil in Iran that led to the Shah’s 

overthrow.17 This case raises larger questions about 

how the United States has prioritized nonproliferation, how the policymaking process works, the means 

the United States has had at its disposal to combat 

the proliferation of sensitive fuel-making technologies, and, finally, what motivates countries to pursue 

nuclear fuel-making facilities.

Negotiations between Washington and Tehran, 

lasting from 1974 until late-summer 1978, came in a 

period of great nonproliferation concern internationally in the aftermath of the May 1974 Indian nuclear 

test. The U.S. Congress was particularly exercised 

about the prospect of the further spread of fuel-making technology, and multilateral ownership of ENR 

facilities was embraced as a potential solution. The 
194

U.S. National Security Council’s Under Secretaries 

Committee reached the same conclusion, advising a 

policy “encouraging multinational plants” (or bilateral plants involving the U.S.) in order to “restrict the 

spread of independent national uranium enrichment 

and chemical reprocessing facilities.”18 The multilateral option was attractive in part because it did not 

deprive countries of fuel-making technology, thereby 

adhering to promises made in NPT negotiations.19

Limiting the proliferation risk of the Shah’s nuclear 

program would be crucial, given U.S. suspicions about 

Tehran’s true intent. In an interview in Paris following 

the 1974 Indian nuclear test, the Shah was quoted as 

saying that Iran would have a nuclear weapon “without any doubt, and sooner than one would think.”20

This gaffe echoed the conclusions of the U.S. intelligence community that Iran was a proliferation threat, 

albeit not in the short-term.21 Another indication, 

perhaps, of the Shah’s ultimate objective came with 

the attempted May 1975 purchase of Lance surfaceto-surface missiles, judged to be uneconomical for 

any nonnuclear purpose by the U.S. Department of 

Defense (DoD).22

Despite these concerns, there were several perceived advantages to reaching an agreement with the 

Shah, advantages that, in the eyes of some, could be 

compromised by over-zealous nonproliferation efforts.23 First, the Shah’s regime was a cornerstone of 

U.S. policy in the greater Middle East. National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 219, which would 

inform an April 1975 presidential directive on the nuclear negotiations with Iran, described the discussions 

as critical to the U.S.-Iran relationship:
195

Our [the U.S.’] ability to reach a mutually satisfactory 

agreement with Iran on the proposed nuclear accord 

is expected to have a very considerable political as 

well as economic importance to U.S.-Iranian relationships. . . . Conversely, failure on our part to resolve the 

remaining issues could have serious short, as well as 

long-term, adverse effects in our relations, given the 

Shah’s sensitivity towards U.S. attitudes and Iran’s 

strong desires to be treated in a non-discriminatory 

manner and as a nation that often has supported U.S. 

interests.

Second, the potential commercial benefits to reaching an agreement with Iran were substantial: The 

Shah planned a 20,000-megawatt civilian nuclear system, with 6-8 reactors presumably coming from the 

United States, for an estimated total of $6.8 billion.24

Were the Shah to invest in an enrichment plant on U.S. 

soil, he would have brought an additional $1 billion to 

U.S. hands. Finally, and counterintuitively, there was 

a nonproliferation advantage to reaching an agreement: Should the United States demand overly stringent guidelines, it might drive the Shah away from 

the U.S. and toward less scrupulous nuclear suppliers, 

undermining U.S. goals in this area.25 Iranian dealings 

with France and West Germany seemed to affirm this 

concern.26

The multilateral option figures prominently in early proposals as a way to soften Washington’s “veto” 

on the reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel. For 

example, U.S. negotiators indicated to their Iranian 

counterparts that Washington, despite its veto: 

would look sympathetically on Iran’s request to perform such reprocessing services. We [the U.S.] have 

indicated that one factor favoring U.S. approval would 

be a decision on the part of Iran to establish any repro-
196

cessing plant on a multinational basis with the active 

involvement of the country helping to establish the 

facility.27

The multinational option, however, was quickly 

derailed. In negotiations in Vienna, Austria, in October 1975, the U.S. veto over reprocessing, as well as 

the multinational concept, was rejected by Iran for 

both principled and practical reasons. According to 

Richard Helms, U.S. Ambassador to Iran:

Iranians recognize and resent the regional reprocessing plant concept as a device to impose international 

control on this very sensitive stage in the nuclear fuel 

cycle. Iranian bruised honor aside, they believe the 

idea is ridiculous in the Middle East setting. The concept may have validity and a chance [of] success in a 

part of the world which is highly integrated economically, such as the EC [European Community], but the 

likelihood of Iran being able to work out close functional relationships with its neighbors for reprocessing appears remote.28

Meanwhile, Kissinger himself began to voice 

doubts in private about the effectiveness of the multinational concept, which he labeled a “fraud”—despite 

his public position that multilateral approaches could 

be effective. Furthermore, Kissinger noted the danger 

of placing a fuel-making facility in a proliferation-sensitive country, where the plant would be “just a cover” for the production of weapons-grade material.29

Kissinger also put his finger on a critical weakness of 

the multilateral plant, that, if the foreign participant 

were “kicked out,” it might be unwilling to protest for 

fear of jeopardizing other interests: Nonproliferation 

required fortitude.30
197

As negotiations ground to a halt and the multinational facility was found wanting, U.S. negotiators 

turned to another solution to Iran’s quest for reprocessing: the “buy back” option, where the United 

States would be able to elect to purchase spent fuel of 

American origin while supplying fresh fuel for reactors in Iran. In May 1976, the United States proposed 

a draft agreement with the “buy back” option front 

and center, but retaining language requiring that reprocessing be “performed in facilities acceptable to 

the parties.” Iran would be obligated to “achieve the 

fullest possible participation in the management and 

operation of such facilities of the nation or nations 

that serve as suppliers of technology and major equipment,” but, should this fail—and should the United 

States not elect to buy back spent fuel—it could reprocess nationally.31 While Kissinger insisted that 

the Iranian right to reprocess independently would 

never be realized—the United States would exercise 

its right to repurchase fuel in every instance—the 

willingness to allow, even in principle, reprocessing 

of U.S.-origin fuel was controversial within the Ford 

administration.32

The Shah’s negotiating team, led by chairman of 

the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Ahmad Etemad, rejected this proposal—despite its recognition of 

an Iranian right to reprocess—leading to a stalemate 

that persisted until 1977, when Jimmy Carter succeeded Gerald Ford in the White House following a 

campaign where nonproliferation policy had figured 

prominently.33 With Carter promising a tougher nonproliferation stance on the campaign trail, Etemad 

seemed more open to the multilateral option and went 

so far as to eschew national reprocessing altogether.34

With the April 27, 1977, announcement by Carter that 
198

the United States would insist on a veto of reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel, the dynamics of negotiations were beginning to shift, and an agreement 

later initialed by negotiators in August 1978, though 

never signed by Carter or the Shah, would include 

this veto and preclude reprocessing of U.S.-origin 

spent fuel on Iranian soil.35 This agreement followed 

the Glenn Amendment of 1977, which allowed for no 

aid for those countries that transferred or received 

reprocessing technology, multinational ownership or 

not; despite the sympathies of some in the executive 

branch toward permitting reprocessing in Iran, Congress had put its foot down. Though Iranian negotiators eventually came around to Washington’s tougher 

line, Tehran’s nuclear planning grew more suspicious. 

In particular, U.S. scientists from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory were wary of the proposed Esfahan 

Nuclear Technology Center (ENTEC) facility, noting 

“that the unusually large size of the planned facility 

makes it theoretically possible to produce weaponsgrade plutonium.”36

This episode is most notable, first, for the gradual 

marginalization of the multilateral option during 

negotiations and, second, for the flexibility that the 

Ford administration displayed regarding fuel-making 

technology. The multilateral option was shown to be 

intrinsically weak as a nonproliferation tool—simply 

to meet U.S. nonproliferation objectives, it had to be 

coupled with a veto and, as Kissinger suggested in 

private, it was hardly foolproof, with success contingent on political dynamics in the country in which the 

facility was located. But the balance of key interests at 

stake, namely the relationship with a major partner, 

the prospect of lucrative nuclear sales, and the wish to 

adhere to Article IV of the NPT for a signatory such as 
199

Iran, was enough to drive U.S. policymakers, at least 

initially, to propose the multilateral reprocessing facility. Furthermore, the Ford administration’s decision 

to sanction in principle a national reprocessing facility 

despite Iran’s proliferation risk illustrates the way in 

which competing priorities can win the day over nonproliferation.

INTERVENTION WITH A SUPPLIER: 

WEST GERMANY’S SALE TO BRAZIL

The negotiations between the Ford and later Carter administrations and the Shah’s regime took place 

amidst a considerable amount of activity in the nonproliferation realm. One of the most notable cases during this period was the 1975 deal between West Germany, a close U.S. ally, and Brazil, ruled by a military 

junta and not party to the NPT. U.S. efforts to thwart 

the deal, despite its close relationship with West Germany, were unsuccessful, though Washington was 

able to convince Brasilia, Brazil, and Bonn, Germany, 

to enter into a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.37

Although the deal would not live up to expectations 

due to financial constraints, higher-than-expected 

costs, questions about the need for significant increases in energy output, and the poor performance of the 

West German “jet nozzle” enrichment technology, it 

represented the limits of Washington’s ability to convince even its closest allies of the virtues of nonproliferation.38 Because Brazil would go on to master fuelmaking on its own in a secret, parallel program, this 

case suggests that intervention with nuclear exporters 

is not a definitive solution (a point the Pakistan case 

soon to be discussed echoes).
200

In what was called the “most controversial deal in 

the history of West German industry,” Bonn agreed 

to sell between two and eight reactors, as well as enrichment and reprocessing technology, to Brazil.39

This was a major sale by any measure and the first to 

include the full fuel cycle. It also came on the heels of 

spurned attempts by Brazil to secure enrichment technology from the United States and in the aftermath of 

the 1974 decision not to sign any new contracts for the 

provision of enriched uranium. According to a Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA) report, Bonn had gained a 

decisive advantage in the sale through its willingness 

to share fuel-making technology: “Brazil chose West 

Germany as its major nuclear supplier primarily because Bonn was willing to provide a uranium enrichment plant.”40 In addition to financial compensation of 

between $2 and $8 billion for the reactors (depending 

on the number sold), West Germany stood to receive 

20 percent of the uranium ore recovered in Brazil.41

The motives of Brazil and West Germany, and 

their relationships with the United States, would play 

a large role in the unfolding of this drama. Brazil, referred to as a “potential third-generation proliferator” 

by the CIA in a 1974 National Intelligence Estimate, 

was in a rivalry with neighbor, Argentina.42 Brazil’s 

military government, headed by Ernesto Geisel, held 

“what later proved to be very unrealistic estimates 

of growing energy demand” and valued the independence and prestige that mastery of the fuel cycle 

would bring.43 Having fallen behind Argentina’s nuclear program, the deal with West Germany would 

allow Brazil to “leapfrog” its competitor.44

Bonn, a close strategic ally of Washington, was 

central to American security and defense policy in Europe. West Germany was also a commercial competi-
201

tor of the United States, increasingly so in the nuclear 

field. For Bonn, the financial advantage of the deal 

was considerable, ensuring a way to “pay off” German government subsidies for the nuclear industry, 

provide work for 300 companies in the Federal Republic, and give long-term security to Kraftwerk Union, 

the firm responsible for building the reactors. German banks, at the government’s behest, would lend 

the capital for the first two reactors to Brazil’s newly 

created Nuclebras organization responsible for the nuclear program.45 The sale came at a time of economic 

duress in Germany, promising a much-welcomed 

commercial boost.46

The Ford administration’s intervention yielded little result, except convincing Bonn to adopt safeguards 

on the technology to be transferred.47 These safeguards 

were secured through a multilateral agreement among 

Brazil, West Germany and the IAEA, which did go beyond traditional Agency measures by applying safeguards to the use of know how gained from the deal 

in facilities across Brazil.48 Furthermore, in the spirit of 

the multilateral controls that would appear in the Iranian negotiations, the Ford administration convinced 

Germany to play a role in the management of the enrichment project, with German nationals intimately 

involved.49

Counterintuitively, Germany’s close relationship 

with the United States afforded Bonn latitude in this 

deal: The Ford administration proved unwilling to 

jeopardize their relationship with Bonn in order to 

persuade German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to 

forgo the sale.50 Although Kissinger and Ford “felt 

uneasy” about the deal, they refused to bring up the 

subject “during top-level discussions between the 

German and American governments.”51 In May, July, 
202

and October 1975 meetings between Kissinger, Ford, 

and Schmidt, the Brazil deal went untouched, with 

economic, oil supply, and European political and security issues taking priority.52 Kissinger decided not to 

use U.S. military units in Europe, or agreements with 

the Soviet Union, to pressure Bonn, even reassuring 

German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Gemscher in 

June 1975 that the safeguards agreement had met with 

Washington’s approval, giving Gemscher the green 

light to sign the contract later that month.53

The Ford administration’s tepid response, at least 

at the high level, was not shared by all in Washington; certain members of Congress and media outlets 

voiced their opposition. Senator Abraham Ribicoff of 

Connecticut noted that the demand for energy had 

given rise to a: 

cutthroat nuclear competition . . . leading to the spread 

of plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment 

facilities. The capability to produce nuclear explosives 

is spreading ‘like the plague’, in the words of the Inspector General of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency.54

The New York Times editorial board labeled the 

arrangement:

a reckless move that could set off a nuclear arms race 

in Latin America, trigger the nuclear arming of half a 

dozen nations elsewhere and endanger the security of 

the United States and the world as a whole.55

U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who had criticized 

the deal in his campaign, did not improve upon the 

Ford administration’s record.56 A high-level diplomatic flurry between Bonn and Washington took place in 
203

the early days of the Carter administration, including a visit by U.S. Vice President Walter Mondale to 

Bonn. 57 A stalemate had been reached by March 1977, 

and on April 7, 1977, West Germany confirmed that 

it would proceed with the deal. This announcement 

came the same day as Carter’s own announcement on 

the issue of nonproliferation. Schmidt was politically 

invested and felt he could not back down.

The Brazil-West Germany sale exposed, similarly 

to Iran, unwillingness in Washington to prioritize 

nonproliferation if doing so might sow discord in a 

crucial bilateral relationship. The proliferation risks of 

making the technology transfer itself, however, were 

minimal. Jet nozzle enrichment technology had not 

yet been demonstrated commercially and performed 

poorly. The pilot reprocessing plant was delayed indefinitely as the costs of Brazil’s nuclear program, and 

the true need for this expensive technology, came under scrutiny in Brasilia. In June 1977, West Germany 

announced that it would not grant any further license 

for the export of reprocessing facilities, following in 

the footsteps of a similar decision by France in 1976.58

The close U.S. relationship with West Germany 

failed to translate into an immediate nonproliferation 

victory. In fact, the inter-reliance of the two countries 

may have limited Washington’s leverage, making instruments, particularly on the “stick” side, less credible. The decision not to bring up the deal in high level 

diplomatic exchanges, despite public and congressional pressure, does suggest that preventing fuel-making in Brazil did not fall among the administration’s 

top priorities.
204

INTERVENTION ON THE BUYER: 

SOUTH KOREA

Over the course of the 1970s, the Park Chung-hee 

regime in South Korea (Republic of Korea [ROK]) 

pursued reprocessing technology with the purpose 

of developing a nuclear weapons option in light of 

uncertainty over U.S. security guarantees.59 The Ford 

administration, making clear that the relationship between the two countries would be jeopardized should 

Seoul continue down this path, convinced Park’s government not to go forward with the transfer of a crucial 

piece of technology, a pilot reprocessing plant from 

France.60 The alignment of nonproliferation with other 

U.S. policy objectives, namely stability in Northeast 

Asia, the security of South Korea, and détente with 

the great powers, meant that the Ford administration 

avoided the difficult decision it had faced in the cases 

of Iran and the Brazil-West Germany deal of balancing 

competing policy objectives.61 Willing to apply more 

fully its diplomatic leverage on Seoul—and employ 

credible threats of deeper retrenchment—and the beneficiary of intervention in the early stages of the South 

Korean program, Washington tasted success.

Seoul was a close U.S. ally, bound by the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, occupying a critical cog in the 

front against communism, contributing troops to the 

war in Vietnam, and enjoying a high-level political 

relationship with Washington. It was also reliant on 

American security assurances, particularly after a series of arms transfers from the Soviet Union and China 

to North Korea gave Pyongyang significant numerical 

advantages in materiel.62 As the balance of power on 

the Korean Peninsula tilted, however, and North Korean provocations continued, Washington embraced 
205

a policy of retrenchment, beginning with the 1969 announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, which asked that 

the burden for defense be increasingly shifted to U.S. 

allies.63 The March 1970 disclosure to ROK President 

Park that the U.S. military presence on the Korean 

peninsula would be decreased from 63,000 to 42,000, 

the political fallout from the Vietnam War in the 

United States, and the period of détente, particularly 

dialogue between the United States and China, have 

been understood as major drivers of Korea’s twin conventional forces modernization and nuclear weapons 

programs.64

The South Korean nuclear weapons program’s 

origins can be traced to two agencies created in the 

aftermath of the Nixon Doctrine’s announcement, the 

Agency for Defense Development and the Weapons 

Exploitation Committee, the latter recommended the 

pursuit of nuclear weapons to President Park.65 With 

Park taking the decision in December 1974 to proceed 

with a nuclear weapons program, secretly of course, 

Seoul entered negotiations with France in 1975 to 

purchase a pilot reprocessing plant.66 These talks triggered a U.S. response—unlike in the West GermanBrazil deal, U.S. officials engaged their South Korean 

counterparts at the highest level, threatening to withdraw U.S. assistance with Korea’s civilian nuclear 

program and, more importantly, U.S. troops from the 

peninsula.67 American diplomats also pressured Seoul 

to sign the NPT, which it did in April 1975, leading to 

the adoption of IAEA safeguards in September 1975.68

U.S. efforts, though most notable on the demand side 

of the deal, were also important in persuading the 

French to go along with the South Korean decision to 

cancel the reprocessing plant deal in December 1975.69
206

The stakes were high for South Korea. As Mitchell Reiss notes, had Washington withdrawn its forces 

from the peninsula, Seoul would have lost its ability 

to deter the North, at least for a period of time.70 But 

the United States also, irrespective of the state of the 

weapons program, held significant advantages in its 

relationship. It was Seoul’s top trading partner, holding significant amounts of South Korean debt.71 Furthermore, in the great geopolitical game on the Korean 

Peninsula, the United States provided certain assurances that Seoul required, making it more likely that 

China and the Soviet Union would value “stability on 

the peninsula.”72 In an August 1975 meeting, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger explained to Park 

that the United States was: 

best suited to provide nuclear deterrence on behalf of 

its allies. We can deal with nuclear threats against a 

central power in a way that smaller nuclear powers 

cannot. We can deter Soviet nuclear threats while the 

ROK could not and a ROK effort to develop its own 

nuclear weapons would end up providing the Soviets with justification for threatening the ROK with 

nuclear weapons.73

South Korean goals of force modernization also relied heavily on U.S. assistance; if South Korea was to 

achieve conventional independence, it would be best 

served by continued U.S. support.74 Finally, while the 

Nixon Doctrine and related messaging lent credibility 

to U.S. threats to withdraw all troops from the peninsula, Washington continued to respond forcefully to 

North Korean provocations, such as the August 1976 

Panmunjom incident, which led to U.S. and South Korean forces being placed on high alert, U.S. naval assets being dispatched to the area, and U.S. B-52 bombers conducting exercises.75
207

There are less auspicious aspects to the South Korean case, however. First, the pursuit by South Korea of reprocessing and a broader military nuclear 

program was calculated in part on half-hearted U.S. 

nonproliferation efforts elsewhere. Park and his close 

associates, looking to the example of Israel, hoped that 

Washington would reconcile itself to a South Korean 

nuclear program, even retaining significant benefits 

from its relationship with the United States. Second, 

although the Ford administration’s intervention regarding the pilot reprocessing plant was successful, 

the Carter administration allowed the transfer of a 

post-irradiation examination facility, the use of which 

can imitate an important part of chemical reprocessing, protesting only then, asking that the size of the 

facility be limited.

The South Korean episode was a success, and the 

Ford administration pursued nonproliferation aims 

vigorously. But the particularity of the South Korean 

case raises questions about how replicable it might be. 

The South Korean decision to forgo the pilot reprocessing facility in 1975 was based less on U.S. diplomatic maneuvering than the fundamental economic 

and strategic relationship of the two countries, developed over time and bound by a bloody conflict little 

more than 2 decades before. American willingness to 

prioritize South Korea’s incipient nuclear weapons 

program in its communication with Seoul, and to use 

sticks and carrots to its advantage, meant that this relationship could be exploited. But even the decision in 

Washington to apply pressure was an easy one: The 

development of a nuclear weapons program on the 

Korean peninsula could have been disastrous, setting 

off a chain of events implicating the great powers.
208

PAKISTAN: THE LIMITATIONS OF SUPPLIER 

CONTROLS

Pakistan, also a U.S. ally, embarked on a nuclear 

weapons program in the aftermath of its 1971 war 

with India. Islamabad’s disastrous military defeat and 

partition led Pakistani Prime Minister Zulqifar Ali 

Bhutto, who entered office after the war, to initiate the 

program. These efforts would be accelerated following India’s May 1974 nuclear test and would result in 

an established weapons program by the 1980s, with 

a series of tests in 1998. From the mid-1970s onward, 

successive U.S. administrations attempted to dissuade 

Pakistan from pursuing the nuclear fuel-making facilities necessary for a weapons program. While U.S. 

efforts on the supply side had some success, namely 

in convincing France to defer and later cancel the 

sale of a reprocessing plant to Pakistan, they failed to 

persuade Islamabad from developing an indigenous 

enrichment facility.76 While, given Pakistan’s abiding 

interest in developing nuclear weapons, preventing 

Islamabad from developing ENR technology would 

have been difficult, the Ford and Carter administrations’ unwillingness to apply more fully and consistently diplomatic, political, economic, and military 

tools ensured that Pakistan’s efforts would go unchecked. In this case, broader U.S. goals in South Asia 

won the day, precluding tougher nonproliferation 

measures. As Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in a 

July 1976 briefing said tersely, “Non-proliferation is 

not our only objective in South Asia.”77

The Pakistani nuclear weapons program was understood as a way of shoring up Pakistan’s defense 

and correcting a shifting balance of power in the subcontinent. Particularly since the 1965 war between 
209

India and Pakistan, India had pulled ahead in conventional fighting ability, an advantage demonstrated decisively in the short 1971 war. The Pakistani military 

leadership, which had once seen the United States as a 

dependable supporter, was disenchanted with Washington after an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan during and after the 1965 conflict. Between 1965 

and 1971, absent U.S. arms sales, Islamabad turned 

to Beijing for military support. Although the Richard Nixon administration did, contrary to Congress’ 

wishes, facilitate arms transfers from other states to 

Pakistan during the 1971 war and went so far as to dispatch the U.S.S. Enterprise off the coast of Pakistan, it 

was still seen as an ally of dubious commitment. Still, 

Pakistan played a crucial role in enabling Nixon’s outreach to China and remained in close political contact 

with the United States.

Thus, particularly for Bhutto, who had expressed 

sympathy for a Pakistani nuclear arsenal before, proclaiming in 1965, “If India builds the bomb, we will 

eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get 

one of our own,” a nuclear weapons program was essential.78 Only weeks after assuming the prime ministry, Bhutto convened Pakistan’s top nuclear scientists 

and instructed them to build a nuclear weapon within 

3 years. In 1973, Pakistan began negotiating with a 

French corporation regarding reprocessing technology. The Indian test of May 1974 would only serve 

to accelerate this drive, with the chief of Pakistan’s 

Atomic Energy Commission commenting after the 

detonation that India had “opened the floodgate for 

nuclear weapons” and implying that Pakistan might 

be next to join the “nuclear club.”79 A U.S. intelligence 

report issued shortly after the Indian test indicates 

concern that Islamabad may be next.80
210

Following the Indian test, Pakistan sought a U.S. 

security guarantee and “arms for cash” transfers, 

where Pakistan would, as other allies did, compensate the United States for weapons sales.81 The Ford 

administration, though unwilling to extend a security 

guarantee, did remove its embargo on weapons sales 

to Pakistan and India, after persistent requests from 

Islamabad in February 1975.82 This decision, however, yielded relatively little in the way of actual arms 

transfers, and the balance of power on the subcontinent continued to drift in India’s favor even after the 

embargo was lifted.83

Meanwhile, Islamabad continued its nuclear 

weapons program, turning to France for a reprocessing facility in February 1976.84 With Pakistan having only a single reactor, a heavy water model from 

Canada similar to that used by the Indian program, 

the ambitions of Bhutto were clear: In the words of 

U.S. Under Secretary of State Philip Habib in an exchange with Kissinger, “What he [Bhutto] wants is to 

build a bomb.”85 With this in mind, the administration 

moved to intervene, and Ford himself sent a letter to 

Bhutto in March 1976 asking “that you . . . give serious 

consideration to foregoing present plans to acquire 

reprocessing and heavy water facilities. . . .”86 When 

Bhutto rejected this offer, the Ford administration applied only limited pressure. For example, rather than 

withholding all military aid from Pakistan, Kissinger 

insisted on withholding only the sale of A-7 fighter 

aircraft, suggesting that some military aid was appropriate, given Pakistan’s alliance with the United 

States, and that providing such assistance now would 

be necessary if it was to be used as leverage later.87

Despite the promise of 100 A-7 fighter aircraft in exchange for forgoing reprocessing in August 1976 and 
211

repeated threats after the 1976 elections that the incoming Carter administration might “make an example” of Pakistan, the Ford administration was unable 

to dislodge Pakistan.

In large part, the Ford administration was constrained by recent history and events beyond its immediate control, namely a lack of faith in American 

promises after the 1965 and 1971 wars and a deeply 

held belief in Pakistan of the importance of a nuclear 

option. The United States also was unable to address 

Pakistan’s conventional security concerns: As Kissinger observed, because U.S. arms sales did not flow 

as quickly to Pakistan following the lifting of the embargo (mostly for administrative reasons) as some had 

hoped, the threat of not selling them implied practically the status quo. Ford’s team, despite securing a 

commitment from France not to sell any additional 

reprocessing plants, was unable to convince French 

President Valérie Giscard d’Estaing to renege on the 

deal with Pakistan.

The arrival of the Carter administration opened a 

new chapter in U.S. negotiations with Pakistan, one 

where Islamabad would lose its contract with France 

for the reprocessing facility but, through the leadership of Abdul Qadeer Khan, open a new path to a 

nuclear weapon: uranium enrichment. The Carter administration, too, decided not to use its full leverage 

in Pakistan. When presented with a package in April 

1977 that would have provided military aid, economic 

assistance, and a financed French reactor, Carter favored only the military sale of the A-7 and not of more 

advanced U.S. technology and questioned the need for 

U.S. financing of the “French purchase,” no matter the 

nonproliferation gain to be had.88 By September 1977, 

with Bhutto ousted in a coup by General Muhammad 
212

Zia-ul-Haq, the Carter administration had eliminated 

development aid to Pakistan on the grounds of the reprocessing deal with France.89

Meanwhile, the sale of French reprocessing technology to Pakistan was foundering, thanks in part to 

U.S. pressure. French officials had begun to push an 

alternative to reprocessing, called “co-processing,” 

which would produce a mixed oxide fuel that was understood to be proliferation-resistant.90 After Pakistan 

rejected this proposal, Giscard d’Estaing’s administration decided to cancel the sale altogether, informing 

Kissinger on Memorial Day of 1978.91 At the time, U.S. 

intelligence believed that this would make the “odds 

favoring any sort of explosive program [in Pakistan]

. . . sharply diminish.”92

Soon thereafter, despite intelligence that Pakistan 

was considering indigenous fuel-making options, certain State Department officials began to advocate considering a return of arms sales and economic aid.93 But 

mounting evidence of a uranium enrichment program 

led to the invocation of the 1976 Symington Amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act, which precluded 

aid for countries that operated national uranium enrichment facilities outside of safeguards.94 With the 

Symington Amendment enforced, the United States 

moved with little success to rally western allies to 

maintain export controls and reached out to China, 

a close partner of Pakistan.95 Administration officials 

also reached out to India’s Prime Minister, hoping to 

reach some kind of regional solution, such as a joint 

commitment not to use or develop nuclear weapons, 

but to no avail.96 However, writings within the White 

House suggested concerns that U.S. nonproliferation 

efforts had come at an inopportune time with instability in Iran and Afghanistan, and that Pakistan was 
213

a more reliable partner.97 With more disturbing news 

coming of the extent of Pakistan’s enrichment program, U.S. officials were at a loss to find a solution. 

In the words of Charles van Doren at a meeting of the 

General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and 

Disarmament, “We have a great deal of talent within 

the U.S. government scratching its head.”98

If the Carter administration was ambivalent about 

what steps to take regarding the Pakistani nuclear 

program, this would soon cease to be the case. The 

December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan fixated 

Washington and transformed perceived U.S. interests 

in the region; suddenly, Pakistani acquiescence with 

U.S. policy goals in Afghanistan became vital. In January 1980, Carter offered not only to restore the transfer 

of aid, but also to increase it dramatically to a total of 

$400 million per annum, split between military and 

economic assistance. Islamabad, well aware of its 

newfound leverage, spurned the offer—the American 

package was too modest. Within the next year, the 

Ronald Reagan administration had agreed upon a new 

assistance package extended over several years, and 

soon an exception to the Symington Amendment had 

been crafted so as to allow for U.S. aid to Pakistan.99

While the drama surrounding the Pakistani nuclear 

program was far from over—it was October 1990 before the U.S. executive branch confirmed that Islamabad did not have nuclear weapons—the pattern of 

vacillation, mixed messaging, and half-hearted effort 

had been established and would continue.
214

CONCLUSION

The cases presented offer a common lesson: The 

United States, though constrained or empowered by 

circumstance, can exert considerable sway in nonproliferation matters but often elects not to apply the 

most powerful tools at its disposal for fear of jeopardizing other objectives. The persistent dilemma of 

how much to emphasize nonproliferation goals, and 

at what cost, has contributed to cases of nonproliferation failure. The inconsistent or incomplete application of U.S. power in nonproliferation cases is most 

harmful when it gives the impression to a nation that 

either sharing sensitive technology or developing it is, 

or will become, acceptable to Washington. U.S. reticence historically, with some exceptions, to prioritize 

nonproliferation—and in so doing reduce the chance 

of success in these cases—does not leave room for 

great optimism about future U.S. efforts at persuading 

countries to forgo nuclear fuel-making.

The most successful case, South Korea, saw the 

United States put in question the basis of its relationship with Seoul, its security assurance, for nonproliferation aims. The potential near-term consequences of 

a South Korean nuclear weapon made this bold diplomatic maneuver worth the risk. But in other cases, 

competing U.S. aims, often worthy, have impinged 

on nonproliferation goals, diluting efforts and sending mixed signals. In the case of Pakistan, for example, 

even well before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 

the United States failed to use sufficiently forceful 

sticks or attractive carrots. U.S. efforts were bound by 

increasing distrust between Islamabad and Washington, a delicate geopolitical situation in the subcontinent 

given India’s close relationship with the Soviet Union, 
215

and facing a great challenge in a Pakistani leadership 

that was humiliated in 1971 and keen to reestablish 

some power equity with India. In negotiations with 

Iran regarding the nuclear cooperation agreement, 

U.S. policymakers—hoping to reinforce the NPT after 

the Indian test, avoid offending the Shah, and secure 

civilian nuclear contracts—were initially willing to 

make concessions on the issue of national reprocessing. In the case of the West Germany-Brazil contract, 

Kissinger went so far as to tell his counterpart in Bonn 

that, with expanded safeguards, the deal would be acceptable to Washington despite the clear proliferation 

risk from Brasilia.

The previous examples show the limitations of 

both demand and supply side efforts. Supply side 

diplomatic interventions, made before the transfer of 

technology, have been at times effective, particularly 

in precluding nuclear fuel-making in the short term 

and buying time for more lasting solutions. However, 

as the Pakistan and Brazil cases illustrated, supply 

side interventions are no substitute for demand side 

solutions: Countries face political choices regarding 

nuclear fuel-making. A nation set upon an independent fuel-making capacity, such as Pakistan or Brazil, 

is unlikely to give up efforts because of supply side 

controls. Multilateral fuel-making arrangements, as 

proposed repeatedly by the United States, have not 

materialized and therefore seem to have had little 

tangible influence.

In recent years, a new nonproliferation instrument 

has appeared: a restructured 123 nuclear cooperation 

agreement, developed in the course of negotiations 

with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and signed in 

2009. This agreement, unlike previous bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, offers a model for demand 
216

side nonproliferation, with the UAE vowing to forgo 

all enrichment and reprocessing technology on its 

own soil. It goes far beyond, for example, the “veto” 

on reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel broached in 

the negotiations with the Shah. This “Gold Standard” 

agreement, much hailed at first, particularly in contrast to Iran’s enrichment activities, has begun to lose 

its luster as, once again, competing priorities marginalize nonproliferation. In January 2012, the Obama 

administration announced that a “case by case” approach would be taken to the application of the Gold 

Standard. Countries such as Vietnam, where the 

United States holds out hope for a grander partnership aimed at countering China, may not be held to 

the UAE’s standard.100 Today, as in the 1970s with the 

Symington and Glenn Amendments, Congress seems 

most concerned about the prospect of proliferation of 

ENR technology.

The UAE case is a striking reminder of the lasting 

challenge facing American nonproliferation efforts. 

As a global power with ranging interests, governed 

by a political system where dissenting factions in Congress, the White House, and bureaucratic organs can 

influence policy in a number of ways, and operating 

in an international system with its own constraints on 

U.S. power, the United States has struggled to marshal 

its strength toward persuading countries to forgo nuclear fuel-making. While there is no guarantee that the 

decisive and steadfast application of “sticks and carrots” in the cases presented would have changed the 

outcomes—it may have brought unintended consequences of its own—a commitment to doing so would 

have improved the chance of persuading countries to 

eschew fuel-making.
217

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. Norman A. Wolf, “Misinterpreting the NPT,” Arms Control Today, September 2011, available from www.armscontrol.

org/2011_09/Misinterpreting_the_NPT.

2. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, available from www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/

npt2.htm.

3. There have been exceptions, most notably Ambassador 

John R. Bolton, who, while in office, rejected the per se right to 

reprocessing and enrichment technology.

4. Office of the Historian, “The Acheson Lilienthal and Baruch 

Plans,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, available from 

history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/BaruchPlans.

5. Department of State “A Report on the International Control 

of Atomic Energy,” Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, March 16, 1946, pp. 35-36, available from www.learnworld.

com/ZNW/LWText.Acheson-Lilienthal.html.

6. “The Acheson Lilienthal and Baruch Plans.” 

7. Bernard Baruch, “Baruch Plan,” Presented to the United 

Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946, available 

from www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml.

8. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to the 470th 

Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly,” New 

York, December 8, 1953, available from www.iaea.org/About/

atomsforpeace_speech.html.

9. Ibid.

10. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” 

Prague, The Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, available from www.

whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-BarackObama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.
218

11. Mohamed ElBaradei, “Towards a Safer World,” The 

Economist, October 16, 2003, available from www.economist.com/

node/2137602.

12. Mark A. Christopher, “International Fuel Supply Guarantees,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, available from csis.org/images/stories/poni/110921_Christopher.pdf.

13. Pierre Goldschmidt, “Multilateral Nuclear Fuel Supply 

Guarantees and Spent Fuel Management: What Are the Priorities?” Daedalus, Vol. 139, No. 1, Winter 2010, available from carnegieendowment.org/2010/01/01/multilateral-nuclear-fuel-supply-guarantees-and-spent-fuel-management-what-are-priorities/2a7s.

14. Harold Feiveson et al., “Can Future Nuclear Power Be 

Made Proliferation Resistant?” College Park, MD: Center for International and Strategic Studies at Maryland, July 2008, available 

from www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/future_nuclear_power.pdf.

15. Richard Helms, “Iranian Counterproposals for Atomic 

Energy Agreement,” State Department Cable Tehran 7485, July 

23, 1976, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/

doc21.pdf.

16. Secretary of State, “US-Iran Nuclear Agreement,” State 

Department Cable State 125797, May 17, 1978, available from 

www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc31a.pdf.

17. William Burr, “US-Iran Negotiations in 1970s Featured 

Shah’s Nationalism and U.S. Weapons Worries” The National 

Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 268, January 13, 

2009, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/

index.htm.

18. NSC Under Secretaries Committee, “US Nuclear Nonproliferation,” December 4, 1974, enclosing Memorandum for the 

President from Robert S. Ingersoll, Chairman, December 4, 1974; 

and NSSM 202 Study, “Executive Summary,” SECRET, available 

from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc03.pdf. 
219

19. Ibid.; National Security Study Memorandum 219 Working 

Group, “Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Iran,” April 1975, 

SECRET, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/

doc05a.pdf.

20. American Embassy Paris, “Interview with Shah,” State 

Department cable 15305, June 24, 1974, available from www.gwu.

edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc01a.pdf.

21. Director of Central Intelligence. “Prospects for Further 

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” Special National Intelligence Estimate 4-1-74, August 23, 1974, available from www.gwu.

edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB240/snie.pdf.

22. Live Leak, “A Brief History of Iranian Missile Technology,” June 9, 2007, available from www.liveleak.com/view?

i=6a6_1181429741.

23. American Consulate Shiraz, “The Persepolis Conference 

on Transfer of Nuclear Technology: A Layman’s View, “State 

Department Cable A-16, April 18, 1977, available from www.gwu.

edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc27.pdf.

24. National Security Study Memorandum 219 Working 

Group, “Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Iran,” April 1975, 

SECRET, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/

doc05a.pdf.

25. Ibid.

26. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 

Security Affairs, “Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Iran—Action Memorandum,” enclosing Atomic Energy Commission 

and Department of State memoranda, CONFIDENTIAL, with 

handwritten note attached, June 1974, available from www.gwu.

edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc02.pdf; and Office of the Secretary of State, “The Secretary’s Meeting with FRG Ambassador 

Von Staden on the FRG/Iran Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation,” Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, D.C. July 2, 

1976, SECRET, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/

ebb268/doc20.pdf.
220

27. National Security Study Memorandum 219 Working 

Group, “Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Iran,” April 1975, 

SECRET, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/

doc05a.pdf.

28. Richard Helms, “US/Iran Nuclear Agreement,” State Department cable Tehran 11539, November 26, 1975, SECRET, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc09c.pdf.

29. Department of State, “Proposed Cable to Tehran on Pakistani Nuclear Reprocessing,” Memorandum of Conversation, 

May 12, 1976, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/

ebb268/doc17.pdf.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Richard Helms, “Nuclear Energy Discussion,” State Department cable Tehran 7886, August 3, 1976, available from www.

gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc22.pdf.

33. “Presidential Campaign Debate between Gerald R. Ford 

and Jimmy Carter,” San Francisco, CA, October 6, 1976, available from www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/speeches/760854.

asp; Gerald R. Ford, “Statement on Nuclear Policy,” October 28, 1976, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.

php?pid=6561#axzz1uo0bKAxs.

34. American Embassy Tehran, “Nuclear Power: Comments 

of Head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI),” State 

Department cable Tehran 1232, February 7, 1977, available from 

www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc25a.pdf.

35. Jimmy Carter, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Fact Sheet 

on the Proposed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977,” April 

27, 1977, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.

php?pid=7409#axzz1uo0bKAxs.

36. American Embassy Tehran, “GOI/AEOI Plans for Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, Entec,” State Department 

cable Tehran 1437, February 14, 1977, available from www.gwu.

edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc25b.pdf.
221

37. David Binder, “US Wins Safeguards in Brazil Deal,” The 

New York Times, June 4, 1975. 

38. Director of Central Intelligence, “Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints,” Special National Intelligence 

Estimate, October 21, 1983, pp. 5-6.

39. Norman Gall, “Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All,” Foreign 

Policy, No. 23, Summer 1976, pp. 157, 160.

40. Director of Central Intelligence, “Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints,” Special National Intelligence 

Estimate, October 21, 1983, p. 6.

41. Gall, p. 160.

42. Director of Central Intelligence, “Prospects for Further 

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” 

43. Michael Barletta, “The Military Program in Brazil,” Stanford, CA: Stanford University, Center for International Security 

and Arms Control, February 1985. 

44. Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain 

Their Nuclear Capabilities, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson 

Center Press, 1995, p. 50.

45. Gall, p. 158.

46. The White House, Memorandum of Conversation 

at the Ambassador’s Residence, Brussels, Belgium, May 29, 

1975, available from www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553091.pdf. 

47. David Binder, “US Wins Safeguards in Brazil Deal,” The 

New York Times, June 4, 1975; Karl Kaiser, “The Great Nuclear Debate: German-American Disagreements,” Foreign Policy, No. 30, 

Spring 1978, p. 89.

48. Gall, p. 159.

49. Kaiser, p. 89.
222

50. Ibid., pp. 89-90.

51. Ibid.

52. Memorandum of Conversation at the Ambassador’s 

Residence, Brussels, Belgium; The White House, “Memorandum of Conversation at the Chancellery,” Bonn, Germany, July 

27, 1975, available from www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/

document/0314/1553186.pdf; and The White House, Memorandum of Conversation in the Oval Office, Washington, DC, October 3, 1975, available from www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/

document/0314/1553253.pdf.

53. Kaiser, pp. 89-90.

54. U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 

1st sess., June 3, 1975, p. S9323, quoted in Norman Gall, “Atoms 

for Brazil, Dangers for All.” 

55. “Nuclear Madness,” The New York Times, June 13, 

1975, p. 36.

56. Kaiser, p. 97.

57. “Schmidt May Modify Rio Pact,” The New York Times, January 27, 1977; and Kaiser, pp. 99-100. 

58. Kaiser, p. 100.

59. National Foreign Assessment Center, “South Korea Nuclear Development and Strategic Decisionmaking,” National Intelligence Estimate, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, June 1978, pp. 1-2; Memorandum from Richard Smyser and 

David Elliott of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of 

State Kissinger, Washington, DC, February 28, 1975, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. E-2, Documents on East 

and Southeast Asia, 1973-76, Document 264.

60. “South Korea Nuclear Development and Strategic Decisionmaking,” pp. 1-2; Jungmin Kang and H. A. Feiveson, “South 

Korea’s Shifting and Controversial Interest in Spent Fuel Re-
223

processing,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 

2001, p. 71.

61. Smyser and Elliott.

62. “South Korea Nuclear Development and Strategic Decisionmaking,” p. 1.

63. Richard Nixon, “Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen,” July 25, 1969, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/

ws/?pid=2140#ixzz1uyyKCC8j; “South Korea Nuclear Development and Strategic Decisionmaking,” p. 2; Rebecca K. C. Hersman and Robert Peters, “Nuclear U-Turns: Learning from South 

Korean and Taiwanese Rollback,” The Nonproliferation Review, 

Vol. 13, No. 3, November 2006, available from cns.miis.edu/npr/

pdfs/133hersman.pdf. 

64. “South Korea Nuclear Development and Strategic Decisionmaking,” pp. 1-2.

65. Kang and Feiveson, p. 71.

66. “South Korea Nuclear Development and Strategic Decisionmaking,” pp. 5-7.

67. “Nuclear Peril,” The New York Times, June 9, 1975, p. 30.; 

Hersman and Peters, “Nuclear U-Turns: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback,” p. 541. 

68. Smyser and Elliott; Kang and Feiveson, p. 71.

69. “Korea’s Atomic Reversal,” The New York Times, February 

15, 1976, p. E12. 

70. Hersman and Peters, p. 541.

71. Ibid. 

72. “South Korea Nuclear Development and Strategic Decisionmaking,” p. 17.
224

73. Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, Korea, August 27, 

1975, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976. Vol. E-12, 

Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973-1976, Document 272.

74. “South Korea Nuclear Development and Strategic Decisionmaking,” p. 17.

75. Peter Hayes and Chung-in Moon, “Park Chung Hee, the 

CIA & the Bomb,” Global Asia, September 2011, p. 52. 

76. Flora Lewis, “France Holds Up Proposed Sale Of a Nuclear Plant to Pakistan,” The New York Times, June 1, 1977, p. 42.; 

American Embassy, Paris, France, “French Complaint Concerning US Action on Pakistan Reprocessing Plant,” State Department 

cable Paris 24112, August 1, 1978.

77. Department of State, “Pakistani Reprocessing Issue,” 

Memorandum of Conversation, July 9, 1976. 

78. “The Spider’s Stratagem: Pakistan’s Nuclear Ambitions,” 

The Economist, January 3, 2008. 

79. Central Intelligence Agency, “Indian Test Will Spur 

Pakistani Effort,” National Intelligence Daily, May 24, 1974, 

available from www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_

conversions/89801/DOC_0000845822.pdf.

80. Ibid. 

81. “US Arms Policy Toward Subcontinent Following Indian 

Nuclear Test,” State Department cable, June 12, 1974. 

82. National Security Council, “National Security Decision Memorandum 289,” March 24, 1975, available from www.

fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0310/nsdm289.pdf.

83. “Pakistani Reprocessing Issue,” pp. 6-8.

84. Central Intelligence Agency, “Pakistan Nuclear Study,” 

Memorandum, April 26, 1978, TOP SECRET, excised copy, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/doc05.pdf. 
225

85. “Pakistani Reprocessing Issue,” pp. 6-8. 

86. Gerald Ford, Letter to Prime Minister Zulkifar Ali Bhutto 

of Pakistan, March 19, 1976, available from 2001-2009.state.gov/

documents/organization/97435.pdf.

87. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, July 

9, 1976, pp. 4-5, available from history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/

frus1969-76ve08/d232. 

88. Warren Christopher, “Reprocessing Negotiations with 

Pakistan: A Negotiating Strategy,” Memorandum for the 

President, April 2, 1977, SECRET, available from www.gwu.

edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/doc02.pdf.

89. William Burr, “The United States and Pakistan’s Quest 

for the Bomb,” December 21, 2010, available from www.gwu.

edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm#12.

90. “Pakistan Nuclear Study.” 

91. Secretary of State, “Reprocessing Issue,” State Department 

cable State 136685 May 30, 1978, SECRET, available from www.

gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/doc06.pdf.

92. “Pakistan Nuclear Study.”

93. Memorandum to Chris [Warren Christopher] from Steve 

[Oxman], enclosing edits to draft cable to Islamabad and “Evening Reading” reports to President Carter on Pakistan, October 4, 

1978, SECRET, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/

ebb333/doc18.pdf.

94. “Pakistan,” Presidential Review Committee Meeting, 

March 9, 1979, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/

ebb333/doc29.pdf.

95. Paul H. Kreisberg to David D. Newsom, “Presidential Letter on Pakistan Nuclear Program to Western Leaders,” Department of State action memorandum, March 30, 1979, SECRET, 

available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/doc33.pdf; 

Gerard Smith to the Secretary, “Consultations in Europe on Paki-
226

stan,” November 15, 1979, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/

nukevault/ebb333/doc45.pdf.

96. Smith to the Secretary, “Consultations in Europe on

 Pakistan.” 

97. Ibid. 

98. Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, 

Friday Morning Session, September 14, 1979, General SECRET, 

excised copy, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/

ebb333/doc42.pdf.

99. Peterson Institute for International Economics, “Case 

Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism: Case 79-2: US v. Pakistan 

(1979-Nuclear Missile Proliferation),” available from www.iie.com/

research/topics/sanctions/pakistan.cfm. 

100. Elaine Grossman, “Nuclear Trade Reform Faces Hostile Lobbying, as Obama Team Renews Policy Review,” National 

Journal.com, May 12, 2013, available from www.nationaljournal.com/

congress/nuclear-trade-reform-bill-faces-hostile-lobbying-as-obamateam-renews-policy-review-20120504.
227

CHAPTER 8

CENTRIFUGES: 

A NEW ERA FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

R. Scott Kemp

The last decade has seen many new ideas for 

strengthening the nonproliferation regime. In 2004, the 

United Nations (UN) Security Council passed Resolution 1540 mandating that all UN member states adopt 

systems of export control to restrict transfers of sensitive technologies used in the production of weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD). That same year, U.S. President George W. Bush proposed to restrict the rights 

of states to build enrichment and reprocessing plants.1

In 2005, the head of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, suggested that a 

multinational fuel cycle be established to limit national capabilities.2

 Since then, many other concepts, from 

fuel banks to cradle-to-grave nuclear-power leasing, 

have been proposed as ways to deter the proliferation 

of national fuel cycle capabilities. While these proposals are cast as general enhancements to the nonproliferation regime, they are all motivated by instances of 

centrifuge proliferation.

The uranium-enriching gas centrifuge has become 

one of the most coveted pieces of nuclear technology. 

Every aspiring nuclear-weapons state since 1975 has 

considered the centrifuge for its weapons program. 

Pakistan’s first nuclear bomb was built using centrifuges, and Brazil, Iraq, Libya, Iran, South Africa, Syria, 

and North Korea all sought centrifuge technology for 

military purposes.
228

If centrifuges have become the proliferation technology of choice, it is not without cause. They are 

small, highly flexible, easy to hide, and much less 

resource-intensive than alternative options.3 They 

produce highly enriched uranium, which is easier to 

handle and use in nuclear weapons than plutonium. 

Moreover, centrifuge programs can be deployed for 

ostensibly peaceful purposes and then rapidly used to 

make fissile material for weapons without significant 

modification or delay.

Policymakers have responded to recent cases of 

centrifuge proliferation by advocating for stronger 

export controls that would make it harder for states 

to build centrifuges. In parallel, policymakers have 

also considered new institutional arrangements that 

would make it more difficult for states to claim that 

their acquisition of centrifuge technology had a peaceful basis. These policies keep with a long tradition of 

focusing on the supply of nuclear technology rather 

than the demand for nuclear weapons. The newest 

threat to the supply-side regime has come from blackmarket transfers: from Germany to Iraq and South 

Africa; from the Netherlands to Pakistan; and from 

Pakistan to Libya, Iran, Syria, and North Korea.4

 By 

shutting down these networks and by establishing appropriate guidelines for licit transfers, many hope the 

centrifuge problem can be largely solved.5 Underlying 

these proposals, however, is an unspoken assumption that centrifuge technology can be controlled. The 

proposals do not acknowledge that the centrifuge is 

a 50-year-old device based on straightforward principles of mechanical engineering, that essentially all 

of the required design information needed is in the 

public domain, or that basic centrifuges require no 

exotic tools or materials to make. If centrifuges can be 
229

indigenously produced, they cannot be effectively restrained by technology controls.

The effort needed to make basic centrifuges is, by 

today’s standards, quite modest: Prototype centrifuges have been built by small groups of 10 to 20 engineers in 1 to 2 years, and such machines have been 

subsequently deployed on large scales to make nuclear 

weapons (particularly in the Soviet Union). Of the 20 

countries that have successfully acquired centrifuges, 

17 started with small, simple machines of the kind not 

effectively controlled by export restrictions. Fourteen 

of them succeeded without foreign assistance in developing these centrifuges to a level suitable for making 

weapons. An analysis across all 20 programs suggests 

that simple centrifuges are probably within the technical capability of nearly any country, including many 

or most developing countries.6

 Supply-side controls 

would not address this state of affairs; only motivations and the organizational capacity of states would 

restrain centrifuge proliferation. If this is indeed 

the case, then the nonproliferation system needs 

rethinking. 

This chapter begins with a brief history of the effort to control the spread of fuel-cycle technologies. 

It explains how the centrifuge emerged from the field 

of other technologies as the most pernicious and most 

difficult to control. It then gives the history of centrifuge proliferation, first by black market transfers, 

followed by indigenous development, with a focus 

on important questions like the role of secrecy, tacit 

knowledge, and the human and industrial resources 

required for success. The discussion of the potential 

for states to acquire centrifuges is followed by a discussion of how difficult it would be to prevent centrifuges from being used for weapons purposes. The 
230

centrifuge has certain technical characteristics that 

make both safeguards and counterproliferation difficult or impossible. The chapter concludes with a critical review of several recent proposals for coping with 

proliferation. While this report does not outline a specific solution, it suggests that none of the supply-side 

options appear to offer any hope of success. As such, a 

focus on the demand for nuclear weapons, rather than 

on the capabilities, is perhaps the only way to mitigate 

centrifuge proliferation in today’s technologically 

advanced world.

THE EMERGENCE OF SUPPLY-SIDE CONTROLS

Plutonium, not uranium, was the material of 

choice during the first half of the nuclear age. Plutonium powers nearly all the nuclear weapons of the first 

four nuclear-weapons states. In time, however, some 

countries found it convenient to enrich uranium, and 

its popularity as a bomb fuel has been growing ever 

since. China (1960), South Africa (1977), and Pakistan (1979) all used highly enriched uranium (HEU) 

for their first nuclear weapons, and three of the five 

most recent efforts to acquire nuclear weapons—those 

of Iraq, Libya, and Iran—had centrifuge-based HEU 

production as a central focus of the program. North 

Korea, the most recent nuclear-weapons state, started 

with a plutonium capability but has since replaced it 

with a centrifuge capability.7

 Of this group, only Syria 

has focused more on plutonium, its centrifuge program having been interrupted at an early stage.8

The increasing popularity of uranium enrichment 

as a route to the bomb is due in part to an easing of 

the technical hurdles involved in its production. In 

the 1950s, uranium enrichment entailed the construc-
231

tion of large, energy- and resource-intensive plants. A 

basic nuclear reactor was comparatively simple, and 

although it would be difficult to hide because reactors 

produce large quantities of heat, it could be easily justified as part of a peaceful research program. Large research reactors could even be bought from advanced 

nuclear countries, while enrichment plants had yet to 

be commercialized.

To counter the growing threat of plutonium, nonproliferation advocates began to minimize its role in 

the nuclear fuel cycle. Research reactors that produced 

weapons-grade plutonium as a byproduct of operation were replaced by models that used low-enriched 

fuel and only produced plutonium very slowly. For 

electricity production, the light-water power reactor 

was promoted over other more weapon-friendly designs. For power production, the light-water reactor 

needs to be refueled only every 1 to 2 years. More 

frequent refueling is needed to produce the kind of 

weapons-grade plutonium preferred by weapons designers, and such refueling would easily raise suspicions. Finally, the spent-fuel reprocessing facilities required to extract plutonium from reactor fuel (needed 

regardless of reactor type) were delegitimized by emphasizing that they were neither economic nor technically essential elements of the civilian nuclear fuel 

cycle. The United States took the lead in establishing 

this norm by abandoning its own reprocessing efforts 

in the 1970s.9

But while the plutonium route was getting more 

difficult, the uranium route was becoming easier. One 

of the unintended consequences of anti-plutonium 

policies was that reactors that were poor at producing 

plutonium also require enriched uranium to operate. 

During the 1950s and 1960s, this material could only 
232

be practically purchased from major weapons states 

like the United States or the Soviet Union. This gave 

nuclear-weapons states the ability to regulate to some 

extent the nuclear activities of nonweapons states. In 

the early-1960s, all this began to change. A new enrichment technology—the gas centrifuge—was invented. Unlike its predecessor, the centrifuge was a 

small-scale, affordable technology that was potentially 

within the reach of a great number of states.10 By 1970, 

the centrifuge had become the most economically viable method for enriching uranium, and it remains so 

today.11 Whereas the preceding enrichment technology, called gaseous diffusion, had required massive 

amounts of infrastructure and was therefore successfully developed only by nations with large nuclear 

programs, centrifuge plants could be built on smaller 

scales out of simple modules that were individually 

cheap to build and inexpensive to operate. Countries 

that depend on the United States or the Soviet Union 

for the supply of nuclear fuel began to look toward 

the centrifuge as a way to free those countries from 

dependency. The Netherlands, Germany, Israel, the 

United Kingdom, France, China, Australia, Sweden, 

Italy, India, and Japan all started centrifuge programs 

for the nominal purpose of self-sufficiency. In 1973, 

the perils of dependency were dramatized when the 

United States, fearing that the demand for enriched 

uranium would outstrip its capacity to supply, briefly 

closed its order books, reinforcing the perceived importance of self-sufficiency.

Officials in the United Kingdom (UK) and United 

States immediately recognized that gas centrifuges 

could be used to make weapons.12 Further still, they 

understood that the small footprint and low electricity 

requirements of a gas-centrifuge plant would make 
233

weapons production by means of the centrifuge difficult or impossible to detect. In 1960, Chairman of the 

U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) John McCone 

warned of this problem: 

[D]o not minimize the potential importance of this 

process. . . . If successfully developed, a production 

plant using the gas centrifuge method could be simply 

housed. Its power requirements would be relatively 

small, and there would be no effects of the operation 

which would easily disclose the plant. Although the 

gas centrifuge does not pose an immediate prospect 

for the production of weapons material, there is no 

doubt in my mind it will introduce an additional complicating factor in the problems of nuclear arms among 

nations and our quest for controlled disarmament.13

The United States acted immediately to classify 

centrifuge design information worldwide. Delegations were sent to every research program in the West, 

all of which complied. Unfortunately, this effort came 

too late. The United States had already published most 

of the basic information required to build a centrifuge 

in a series of technical reports, now widely distributed 

around the world. Within a decade, nine countries 

had successful gas-centrifuge programs, despite the 

U.S. Government’s classification efforts.14

With time, centrifuges have become easier and easier to build. By the end of the 1990s, additional technical publications and advances in computing and 

manufacturing had come together to create a situation 

in which nearly any country—including developing 

nations—could access the technology and information 

needed to build a proliferation-scale centrifuge program (whether they could organize themselves well 

enough was a different matter).15 Compounding this 
234

problem, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran all built centrifuge 

programs for nuclear weapons, raising global awareness of the technology and demonstrating its proliferation advantages. Today, many regard the centrifuge 

as the proliferation technology of choice.16

THE DEVELOPMENT AND SPREAD 

OF CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY

Traditionally, the nonproliferation community 

looks towards the most recent cases of proliferation 

for guidance on how to improve the nonproliferation regime. The approach has the advantage of being 

empirical, but selecting the dependent variable can 

lead to misinterpretations of causality. It is better to 

look at a broader history of centrifuge development 

and the spread of centrifuge technology to understand the true nature of centrifuge proliferation. With 

over 20 historical cases, there is a considerable basis 

for drawing new conclusions about the nature of the 

proliferation problem.

Black Market Networks and State-To-State 

Transfers.

The spread of the gas centrifuge is widely, but 

incorrectly, understood to be primarily the work of 

black market networks. Most famous is A. Q. Khan, 

a Pakistani metallurgist who worked for a Dutch centrifuge contractor. In 1975, he stole design and supplier information to help Pakistan build a centrifuge 

capability for its nuclear weapons program. Khan 

later sold this stolen technology to Libya, Iran, North 

Korea, and possibly China (then already in possession 

of basic centrifuges, but interested in learning as much 
235

as it could). He offered it to several others, including 

Iraq and Syria. Pakistan’s program and many of its 

subsequent retransfers were aided by a number of Canadian, Dutch, Swiss, British, and especially German 

engineers, and some of the German engineers appear 

to have assisted independently centrifuge programs 

in Iraq, South Africa, and Brazil.

While black market transfers are not unimportant 

in the history of centrifuge proliferation, their importance is often exaggerated. China, Pakistan, India, 

Iran, South Africa, and Brazil all had centrifuge programs prior to the receipt of foreign assistance. These 

programs were either already successful or would almost certainly have been successful if left to their own 

autonomous development.17

In some cases, assistance may even have been 

counterproductive. Consider Pakistan, for example. 

The drawings A. Q. Khan provided were for an advanced and difficult-to-make centrifuge. The machine 

was immensely complex relative to most entry-level 

designs, and this diversion probably slowed his country’s nuclear progress relative to what could have 

been accomplished had Pakistan simply worked on its 

own. According to histories of the program and statements from its former head, as well as the program’s 

chief scientist, the information initially supplied by A. 

Q. Khan was not even complete: It lacked key manufacturing specifications that would have hinted at the 

difficulty of making the advanced machine, and it 

forced the program to make a number of compromises 

that ultimately eliminated the performance advantages the advanced machine supposedly offered. The 

result was a machine that performed less well than 

the machines usually developed by programs of independent development. Iran, Libya, and Iraq also had 
236

centrifuge programs prior to their interaction with the 

black market. The receipt of black market assistance 

may have improved the level of funding and support 

from political leadership, but the technical information they received was frequently problematic. Those 

who turned to A. Q. Khan for assistance also received 

incomplete, unreliable assistance and were directed 

to develop the same highly problematic design with 

which Pakistan started. Only South Africa and Iraq 

appear to have received foreign assistance that was 

technically sound and of sufficient timeliness that it 

advanced the date at which a meaningful centrifuge 

capability could have been produced. In both of these 

cases, assistance came from highly experienced German engineers, not A. Q. Khan.18

Despite the limited benefit the black market has 

had for centrifuge proliferation, the potential for 

high-impact technology transfers remain. The South 

African and Iraqi cases demonstrate that technically 

competent foreign consultants can accelerate a program—especially if it consists of hands-on engineering guidance and well-annotated design documents. 

Another appropriate concern is the transfer of a complete, turnkey centrifuge plant purchased outright 

from a foreign nation. North Korea has been known 

to provide this kind of comprehensive assistance for 

missile programs and is believed to have provided 

a complete nuclear reactor to Syria on such a basis. 

The same could easily be done with a centrifuge plant. 

Among all states currently possessing centrifuge technology, Iran and North Korea are the most probable 

suppliers of the technology, given their status as nonproliferation pariahs and their relative freedom from 

international political constraints.19 The problem of 

state-to-state and black market transfers thus remains, 

but it is not the only path of concern.
237

A Larger History of Independent Development.

The alternative to buying or bartering for centrifuge technology is to develop it indigenously. In fact, 

most countries with centrifuges acquired them in this 

way. By studying these programs, we can learn about 

the resources required to build a proliferation-scale 

centrifuge capability from scratch and the potential 

for other states to do the same in the future.

The history of independent development goes back 

to the late-1950s. The basic Soviet centrifuge, from 

which all modern designs are derived, was perfected 

in 1953. Austrian and German scientists captured by 

the Soviet Army during World War II were used as 

a source of skilled labor. Starting with an unsuccessful American design, these German prisoners of war 

(POWs), in collaboration with Soviet scientists, were 

able to evolve a very successful machine. When the 

POWs were repatriated in 1956, they carried in their 

heads the basic principles of the successful design. In 

1957, this information spread to three new countries. 

U.S. intelligence obtained Soviet design information 

through interviews with one of the POWs; West Germany hired two of the POWs to build centrifuges; 

and Dutch centrifuge designers met one of the POW 

engineers at a conference and learned of the basic design concepts in a long discussion. In 1958, the United States commissioned one of the POWs—Gernot 

Zippe—to come to the United States and replicate the 

Soviet machine.20

Until this point, the basics of modern gas-centrifuge design were not public knowledge. The knowledge was spreading slowly in the expert community, 

but there was no physical documentation of how the 
238

Soviet centrifuge worked. Then between 1958 and 

1960, the reports written by Zippe in fulfillment of his 

contract with the AEC were released to the public by 

the U.S. Government.21 While the AEC considered its 

own centrifuge research secret at the time, doubts as 

to the potential of the Soviet design and the inconvenience of classifying reports written by a foreign national were sufficient for the AEC to ignore its own 

classification guidelines.

The publication of Zippe’s reports appears to have 

fueled a rapid expansion in the number of centrifuge 

programs around the world. The United States did 

what it could to classify all further centrifuge research 

at home and abroad, but new programs nonetheless 

emerged in Israel (circa 1960), France (1960), China 

(1961), Australia (1965), Sweden (1971), Italy (1972), 

India (1972), Japan (1973), and Brazil (1979). Although 

nominally for peaceful purposes, many, if not most, 

of these programs were motivated by the understanding that centrifuges would give their countries a latent 

nuclear-weapons capability; and almost all of them 

developed the centrifuge using the reports released 

by the U.S. Government as the basis for their research. 

Along with this accidental proliferation, the United 

States also deliberately transferred the technology 

to the British government in 1960 and informally assisted the Israeli effort by allowing Israeli students to 

study centrifuge physics with U.S. centrifuge experts 

during the 1970s and 1980s.

Detailed histories are available for a number of 

independent programs. They reveal that the effort 

needed to build the basic, Soviet-style centrifuge is 

considerably smaller than the effort needed to build 

the more difficult designs that were provided by A. Q. 

Khan. The engineers in the early U.S. and British cen-
239

trifuge programs, for example, had essentially no prior knowledge relevant to centrifuges and, unlike the 

scientists involved in the Manhattan Project, had only 

modest educations. Both programs started in 1960 and 

had access only to basic metalworking equipment, 

similar to what might be found today in a college 

machine shop. The technical staff never numbered 

more than 15 persons. Despite modest resources and 

the small effort, these programs were able to perfect 

a centrifuge design suitable for mass production in a 

little over a year (about 15 months). The Australian 

program is another interesting case. Notable because 

it is the slowest program of independent development 

on record, it took Australia almost 6 years to go from 

nothing to a working cascade of proliferation-relevant centrifuges. However, the program was also the 

smallest: It started with three and at no point exceeded 

six persons.

The record of centrifuge development for 20 historical cases is summarized in Figure 8-1. The average time taken to develop a basic centrifuge so it is 

ready for mass production across all historical programs with known dates is 25±11 months (about 1 to 3 

years, in round terms). Note that these initiatives were 

mainly from the 1960s and 1970s. A present-day program could also benefit from more modern machine 

tools, vastly more numerous open-source publications 

about centrifuge design, desktop computers to aid in 

design and diagnostics, and the Internet to ease the 

sourcing of technical information.
240

Figure 8-1. Time Required to Develop a 

Centrifuge Capability Suitable for Weapons 

Production by Programs Operating Free of 

Foreign Assistance.

The mass production of centrifuges, along with the 

operation of a centrifuge plant, is a larger but technically easier effort than the research and development 

(R&D) phase. About 5,000 Soviet-type centrifuges are 

needed to produce 25 kilograms (kg) of weaponsgrade (enriched to greater than 90 percent) uranium 

per year, the approximate quantity needed for a first 

generation implosion-type weapon, or one-half the 

amount required for a primitive gun-type weapon. A 

program of this scale would be consistent with many 

historical weapons programs.22 Mass production of 

the basic Soviet-type centrifuge does not require specialized tooling or skilled labor. The British program, 
241

for example, built its first pilot plant by hiring unskilled labor (“milkmen”) to make centrifuge parts on 

an assembly line. If such an assembly line were able 

to produce 20 centrifuges per day, this would be sufficient to produce the 5,000 needed for a proliferationsized plant in 1 year. The effort might require 15 to 30 

workers. Thus, the core staff sizes required for a basic 

centrifuge program are small. A small cadre of half-adozen suitably trained engineers and a slightly larger 

force of unskilled but trainable laborers can probably 

be organized in nearly any country. Building a centrifuge program may still be outside the capability 

of loosely organized terrorist groups, but the task is 

within the capability of a small engineering firm with 

a few dozen people.

The cost of a program would also be modest. The 

first German version of the Soviet-type centrifuge 

was built by a firm named DEGUSSA in 1959 and had 

about the same performance as Iran’s IR-1 centrifuge 

(possibly slightly better).23 This centrifuge was offered 

for sale for a small-batch cost of U.S.$235 per centrifuge, about U.S.$1,800 per centrifuge in 2012 currency. 

Assuming the DEGUSSA price reflected the actual 

cost of production, the centrifuge portion of the plant 

might be built for less than U.S.$10 million in 2012 

currency. The majority of the final costs of the plant 

might actually be associated with noncentrifuge costs, 

such as building costs, piping, and control systems.

Not only are centrifuges economical and relatively 

straightforward to make, but the potential of export 

and other technology controls to stop indigenous centrifuge programs is very limited. Under normal circumstances, export controls can only be applied to a 

small subset of highly specialized materials and tools. 

The simple Soviet-style centrifuge needs few, if any, 
242

of these. The most controlled items are the materials 

for rotor tubes and the variable-frequency drives used 

to run the centrifuges. Centrifuge rotors need high 

strength, lightweight materials. They are export controlled when pre-formed into centrifuge rotor shapes. 

Unformed material, however, is not controlled, and 

most countries could acquire the simple tools needed to produce centrifuge rotors from the raw inputs. 

Even if the raw materials were themselves controlled, 

most states could probably produce a suitable material domestically. Variable-frequency drives designed 

for high-speed centrifuges are also controlled, but 

alternatives exist: The British program, for example, 

used hi-fi stereo amplifiers to drive its first centrifuges. The basic Soviet machines require no other exportcontrolled tools or materials.

Counterproliferation.

If it is not possible to prevent the acquisition of 

centrifuge technology with export controls, might it 

be possible to reverse proliferation programs using 

counterproliferation strategies such as diplomacy, interdiction, sabotage, military destruction of facilities, 

or regime change? The critical prerequisite for all of 

these strategies is that the proliferation program becomes known to the international community well 

before the successful acquisition of a weapon. Historically, most nuclear weapons programs have been detected at early stages, but most centrifuge programs 

have not. For example, Iraq’s nuclear weapons ambitions were suspected from the early-1980s because of 

its visible pursuit of various fuel cycle technologies, 

but its centrifuge program was missed. The international community did not learn about it until after 
243

the 1991 invasion, when Iraq disclosed its existence 

during an IAEA inspection.

The Soviet Union opened its first gas-centrifuge 

plant in 1957 and proceeded to build additional plants 

in the following years as it slowly replaced much of its 

older diffusion capability with centrifuges. Although 

the Soviet nuclear weapons program was the target 

of an intense intelligence effort, the United States routinely assessed that the Soviets did not have centrifuges. The Soviet capability was only learned of after 

the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Russia told the 

United States about the existence of these plants, some 

34 years after the first large-scale plant opened.

China’s centrifuge program started in 1961, 3 years 

prior to China’s first nuclear weapons test. A U.S. national intelligence estimate released after China’s 1964 

test states with conviction that China did not have 

centrifuge technology, but internal histories from 

China’s program indicate that the Chinese were working on second-generation centrifuges at the time. In 

the 1970s, U.S. intelligence received a human source 

tip-off that China had made weapons-grade uranium 

with centrifuges, but as the intelligence community 

had no way to validate this tip, it continued to assess 

that there was no credible evidence of a centrifuge 

plant in China.24 Knowledge of China’s centrifuge remained ambiguous for almost 2 decades.

The record of detection is somewhat better for 

states that were connected to the black market. Newspaper reports indicate that Iran’s program must have 

been detected before January 1991, within 6 years of 

the program’s inception, and may have been detected 

earlier. According to data published in the 2005 report 

of The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the 

United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
244

however, Libya’s program went undetected for approximately 16 years. The report also notes that a “disproportionately large volume” of U.S. intelligence was 

related to Libya’s procurement activities—in other 

words, its dealings with the A. Q. Khan network—and 

that little or no information was known about Libya’s 

internal activities. It appears that A. Q. Khan not only 

slowed down programs by providing incomplete assistance and problematic designs, but he also caused 

his customers’ programs to be discovered because he 

was being watched. Similarly, IAEA officials have said 

it was German centrifuge engineer Gotthard Lerch, a 

member of the Khan network, who led investigators 

to South Africa’s secret centrifuge program.

Independent centrifuge programs rarely have connections to known proliferators. The detection of these 

programs, therefore, would require either technical 

signatures that indicate the presence of a centrifuge 

plant or penetration of the country’s political or technical leadership. Regarding technical signatures, centrifuge plants are very easy to hide. Nuclear reactors 

have visual and thermal signatures that can usually 

be seen using satellite reconnaissance, and they emit 

radioactive and chemical tracers that can be detected 

in the environment. Centrifuge plants have no such 

signatures, nor do they produce significant electromagnetic emanations that might reveal their existence 

at significant distances. This may help explain why 

Russia and China’s programs went undetected for 

so long. 

The value of human and signals intelligence is also 

in question when it comes to finding centrifuge plants. 

The U.S. intelligence community failed to detect Iraq’s 

and Libya’s centrifuge programs in early stages, despite the overt nuclear-weapons ambitions of these 
245

countries. North Korea was long suspected of having 

a centrifuge program because of visits by North Koreans to Pakistan and North Korea’s purchase of several 

centrifuge-related materials, but it was not possible to 

confirm that this constituted anything more than curiosity. The existence of centrifuge research could not 

be validated. Even though North Korea has revealed 

that it does, indeed, have a centrifuge program, there 

are strong reasons to suspect that other facilities exist, 

but their locations are still unknown. These cases suggest that penetrating the inner workings of suspected 

proliferators is not always easily achieved, even with 

obvious targets. This in turn implies that the opportunities for trying counterproliferation mainly depend 

on states having connections to known proliferators, 

and that even when a state is a known proliferator, 

there may be sufficient ambiguity for it to be difficult 

to formulate a coherent counterproliferation strategy.

The Counterproliferation Track Record.

Should good fortune lead to detection, it still does 

not ensure that counterproliferation will work. The 

early detection of Pakistan’s and Iran’s program was 

used to stifle procurement efforts and delay the program, but it did not produce a reversal. Military attacks on nascent nuclear weapons programs have had 

mixed success. Thus far, Israel appears to have ended 

Syria’s nuclear program when it bombed the Al-Kibar 

reactor in 2007. This reactor was detected because of 

its black market connections to North Korea, and the 

program remained dead after the attack because Syria 

lacked an indigenous capability to rebuild. Israel tried 

to do the same with Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981, but 

in that case, the bombing appears to have strength-
246

ened Iraq’s nuclear ambitions and drove the country 

to pursue the indigenous development of centrifuges, 

which were not detected. One might conclude that 

military intervention can work in a case such as Syria, 

where the state is heavily reliant on a foreign supplier 

and not comfortable with re-establishing the relationship, but a more fully indigenous capability is apt to 

be harder to eliminate unless the military attack also 

kills most of the engineers who retain the knowledge 

required to build a weapons program.

Diplomatic engagement is yet another way to 

counter a revealed nuclear weapons program. This 

has been most successful in cases where significant 

political pressure could be brought to bear, such as in 

the nuclear weapons programs of Taiwan and South 

Korea. However, pressure approaches appear mainly 

to have worked for states that depend on a strong 

nonproliferation advocate for their security. Pressure 

has not been successful, for example, in the cases of 

Pakistan and Iran.

Centrifuges complicate diplomatic efforts because 

the technology is a legitimate part of the peaceful nuclear-fuel cycle. This allows a proliferator to declare 

its capability as entirely peaceful and stare down criticisms, and so slow the rate at which the international 

community can apply political pressure to reverse the 

program. In principle, an incentives-based approach 

might work where negative pressure has not, but the 

incentives would need to outweigh the perceived benefit of having a nuclear weapon or nuclear-weapons 

option. In Libya’s case, it was sufficient to provide 

major sanctions relief, minor cooperation in peaceful nuclear activities, and general rapprochement. In 

1994, North Korea responded positively to incentives 

of massive foreign aid and negative security assur-
247

ances, although the motivations behind North Korea’s 

program were not fundamentally addressed, and the 

weapons program later re-emerged. The abandonment 

of a program might require more than simple bilateral 

incentives. Influential states may need to reshape the 

security environment of the proliferator to eliminate a 

security threat that is the essential motivation behind 

the nuclear weapons program. Such steps can be exceptionally difficult when the proliferator is seen as a 

violator of international agreements and norms, and 

thus not worthy of security assurances.

RECONSIDERING NONPROLIFERATION 

OPTIONS

Centrifuges, because of their technical qualities—

including the ease with which they can be made, the 

difficulty of detecting them, and the lack of visible 

distinction between weapon oriented and peaceful facilities—are a challenge the like of which existing nonproliferation institutions have never known. A modification of the current approach, which relies heavily 

on technology controls and detection, is obviously 

necessary if the nonproliferation regime is to keep up 

with the changes brought about by the centrifuge.

Technology Controls.

Most nonproliferation institutions created since 

the signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 

(NPT) were designed to address state-to-state technology transfers, like those that backed the nuclear weapons programs of China, India, Brazil,25 and Iraq. The 

newest of these institutions, such as UN Resolution 

1540, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and various 
248

national export and financial regimes, respond specifically to black market technology transfers like those 

that backed the centrifuge programs of Pakistan, Iraq, 

Libya, North Korea, and Iran. Neither set of institutions attempts to address the problem of indigenous 

technology development.

However, history shows that there has been no 

lack of interest in indigenous technology development: Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and South Africa all 

started indigenous centrifuge programs before receiving outside assistance. It was only because outside 

assistance was later obtained that these programs 

shifted their mode of operation to one of dependency, which resulted in opportunities for detection and 

counterproliferation. As nonproliferation champions 

work to eliminate black market agents, future proliferators might be more likely to stay the course with 

indigenous programs and, in doing so, keep their 

programs secret and increase their probability of 

proliferation success.

Unfortunately, export controls are unable to restrict access to the basic technologies needed for a 

Soviet-type centrifuge, the type that has formed the 

basis of nearly every indigenous centrifuge program 

in history. A more expansive set of export controls, 

called “catch-all” controls, prohibit the sale of any 

general-use item if there is a reason to believe it might 

assist a WMD program. Catch-all controls can restrict 

the technologies needed for simple Soviet-type centrifuge programs, but they will only be implemented if 

the program has been detected in advance, and history shows that indigenous centrifuge programs have 

a remarkable ability to stay secret for decades.26 Catchall controls also require that most states agree that 

the proliferator is seeking weapons because, without 
249

consensus on this point, the proliferator’s access to 

international markets will not be effectively blocked. 

Building this consensus is difficult because centrifuge 

plants built for peaceful purposes have an inherent 

weapon-making capability.

Enrichment Regimes: Reducing the Motivations to 

Build Centrifuge Plants for Peaceful Purposes.

The situation previously described suggests that 

policymakers might more productively focus their attention on the underlying motivations for building a 

centrifuge capability. One possible motivation, apart 

from weapons, is the desire to use centrifuges to make 

fuel for a civilian power reactor. This entirely peaceful 

application is not itself problematic, but these peaceful plants give their possessors a weapons making capability that might be used later. More significantly, 

countries can build centrifuge plants claiming peaceful intent but actually harbor ulterior motivations to 

acquire a weapons or a weapon-making capability. 

This has led to a growing interest in restricting the 

legitimate use of centrifuges—although it is not yet 

clear whether this is a useful way to restrict proliferation, given the potential for small-scale indigenous 

production of centrifuges. Nevertheless, policymakers 

are now considering technology regimes that would 

establish legal or normative limits on the use of centrifuges for peaceful purposes.

In principle, states with nuclear power are justified 

in building a national centrifuge plant for the purposes of energy security (provided their reactors use enriched uranium as fuel; CANDU-type reactors do not 

require enriched fuel). Proposals have been made to 

suppress this justification by banning national plants 
250

and by creating alternative ways of guaranteeing the 

supply of reactor fuel. The most dramatic include international agreements to establish enrichment-free 

zones, such as the now-defunct agreement between 

North and South Korea. A widely used tactic is to implement so-called “flag rights” on raw uranium. Flag 

rights constitute a bilateral agreement between the 

buyer and seller of raw uranium. The buyer promises 

not to enrich it in a domestic facility without the prior 

approval of the seller. One can also imagine reverseflag rights in which the buyer of a reactor promises 

not to put domestically enriched uranium fuel into it 

without prior consent. Softer proposals allow national 

enrichment but seek to render it less attractive for 

those with proliferation intent. These proposals include multilateral enrichment and fuel-supply guarantees, both of which would help ensure that all states 

have unfettered access to enrichment services, making it more difficult to justify the creation of a national 

enrichment plant.

In general, all of these enrichment regimes are conceptually similar to the normative regime that helped 

limit the spread of plutonium reprocessing plants in 

the 1970s and 1980s. However, these regimes are more 

formal and also may be more difficult to enforce. When 

a state chose not to build a reprocessing plant, it lost 

its ability to establish a large-scale weapons program 

easily, but it still retained an ability to build a quickand-dirty reprocessing setup in the event of a crisis. 

Restrictions on enrichment would be more complete. 

Without a plant, there is no quick-and-dirty enrichment-based path to the bomb. At the same time, forgoing enrichment has greater consequences for civil 

nuclear power. Reprocessing of spent fuel essentially 

made no sense from an economic perspective and thus 
251

had arguably little to no role in a civil nuclear power 

program, whereas national enrichment clearly does. 

Thus, a ban on enrichment, while more complete in 

its ability to block some proliferation routes, may be 

more difficult to justify and sustain. Given both the 

more severe effect on proliferation potential and the 

consequences for national energy security, nations 

may be less willing to sign up to such a regime in the 

first place.

Multinational Enrichment Plants.

One of the most widely supported enrichment regimes is to require that all new (and possibly existing) 

enrichment plants be operated as part of a multinational consortium. Multinational ownership does not 

eliminate a country’s ability to pursue centrifuge technology overtly, but it requires that other states be mutually invested in the plant’s operation and, in principle, may reinforce the barriers to using it for weapons. 

It may still be technically possible for the government 

on whose territory the plant is built to take unilateral 

control of the facility and produce weapon quantities 

of HEU in just a few days. In this sense, the host state 

retains a quick-and-dirty option, and this may satisfy 

many states that see no immediate need for a weapon 

but nonetheless want a weapons capability as insurance. The political costs of taking over a multinational 

plant are likely to be higher than simply violating 

safeguards and using a national plant, but whether 

the additional costs are significant compared to the 

political costs of leaving or violating the NPT in the 

first place is debatable. If they are not, the multilateral 

arrangement has not increased the political barriers 

to proliferation.
252

Even if the barriers were not significantly enhanced, it could still be argued that a multinational 

arrangement would facilitate counterproliferation by 

legitimizing a military strike against the plant, or some 

equivalent forced shutdown, if it were being used to 

make weapons without international approval. Coinvestors from the multinational consortium presumably would have standing to ask for, or to execute, an 

attack against the plant once it had been taken over.27

Unfortunately, a multinational employee base would 

also provide a hostage opportunity that could be 

used to deter an attack on the facility, or defeat any 

autodestruct system.

Uncertainty about the ability of multinationals to 

increase the barriers to proliferation deserves to be 

taken seriously, because a multinational requirement 

might have unintended consequences that exacerbate 

the proliferation problem. For example, the legitimization of multinational plants might facilitate acquisition 

of a capability, or worse, overt centrifuge research that 

could be used to build a parallel centrifuge program 

in secret. The mantle of a multinational consortium 

might also help a state buy high-performance centrifuges from a commercial vendor, thereby enhancing 

its breakout capability beyond what would have been 

available in a go-it-alone approach. In other words, 

the world might wind up with more threshold states 

rather than fewer.

Fuel Banks, Guarantees, and Lifetime Supply Contracts.

Other types of technology regimes seek to deter 

the construction of enrichment facilities altogether or 

ban them by default except when meeting specific criteria. These include fuel banks and other guarantees 
253

of supply. These regimes will tend to be a more significant barrier to proliferation because states participating in them would not, in general, have a recognized 

reason to build centrifuge plants. On the other hand, 

the potential for these regimes to capture proliferation 

aspirants is in question.

One such proposal is to implement a legal or normative ban on national enrichment, balancing the loss 

of freedom with an improved assurance of supply 

backed by a fuel bank or other kind guarantee. The 

difficulty with these proposals is in their appeal. It is 

not clear if a state exists that would value a contrived 

fuel-security mechanism enough to trade the option of 

building a national plant for the benefit of that mechanism. The reason is that the marketplace traditionally 

has provided all the assurance that the state needs by 

default, and the additional benefit of the mechanism is 

seen to be marginal at best. States for which the market might not provide significant assurance because 

they are ultimately subject to some political manipulation probably are no more assured by an international 

fuel-supply assurance mechanism, which is also likely 

to be subject to political manipulation, perhaps even 

more so than the market. As such, the number of proliferation aspirants that the arrangement would capture successfully might prove to be vanishingly small.

Cabals, Flag Rights, and Agreements of Cooperation.

The no-reprocessing regime of the 1970s successfully stayed the completion of several reprocessing 

plants, yet the regime was completely voluntary. Participating states were explicit that they were not willing to give up their right to reprocess spent fuel.28 In 

the enrichment case, states may be less likely to buy 
254

into the normative regime because the lack of economic incentives and the centrality of enrichment for 

fuel-supply security are too important to forgo on a 

voluntary basis. A more coercive approach might be 

needed to formalize the regime. Flag rights, in which 

suppliers of uranium or nuclear reactors ask recipients 

to forswear enrichment, are at the leading edge of the 

coercive approach. A stronger sort of coercion could 

be had if nuclear suppliers colluded to withhold all 

nuclear fuel and civil technology from states that are 

not otherwise willing to give up their unconstrained 

right to enrich. There is a collective-action problem 

in building this kind of supplier cabal, as there is a 

strong incentive for a supplier government to be the 

last holdout in the creation of the regime, and thereby 

benefit its domestic nuclear industry by providing access to a broader market. However, these problems 

are not insurmountable and have been overcome in 

the past, such as in the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. One such approach has been outlined 

in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Association 

proposal and it, or a similar arrangement, may be 

worth pursuing.29

Problems with Technology Regimes.

All technology-control regimes aimed at stopping 

the spread of legitimate enrichment plants prevent 

states from building totally self-sufficient nuclear 

power programs, with the result that a state legitimately could reject the regime on the basis of economics and energy-security grounds alone.30 If a large 

number of states do this up front, the regime has little 

chance of success. The coercive regimes resolve this 

problem by creating a difficult choice for client states, 
255

but the inequity in these regimes may begin to erode 

support for the broader NPT regime, which is already 

plagued by problems of inequity.

Even if a regime could be implemented, it is necessary to ask to what extent banning legitimate enrichment activities helps to prevent nuclear proliferation. 

In the reprocessing case, the normative ban prevented 

large-scale nuclear programs, but states retained an 

unattractive quick-and-dirty option. Use of that option still required the diversion of plutonium-bearing 

reactor fuel to a makeshift or clandestine reprocessing 

plant. The diversion of fuel would almost certainly 

be detected by safeguards, so any breakout attempt 

would come with the large political cost of violating 

the NPT regime. Thus, proliferation via the plutonium 

route was attractive only in an emergency situation, 

and even then only feasible on a small scale. By contrast, the historical record suggests that indigenous 

centrifuge programs can be built and kept secret for 

years, even decades at a time. Secrecy has even been 

effective in countries like Iraq and Libya that were 

known to have nuclear-weapons ambitions and presumably were under intense scrutiny. The technology 

regime would compound the political costs associated with detection, but the probability of detection is 

low. One must ask if the extra political risk of getting 

caught violating the technology regime—computed as 

the probability of detection multiplied by the political cost—is substantial relative to the existing political cost of overtly violating the NPT with a national 

facility. If the extra risk is small relative to an NPT 

violation, then the technology-control regime has not 

added much. Furthermore, this gain then needs to be 

weighed against the potential negative consequences 

of legitimizing proliferation of fuel-cycle facilities or 
256

exacerbating the already contentious inequity in the 

NPT regime. It is obviously impossible to quantify 

these effects and make an actual computation of the 

relative costs and benefits, but this article has argued 

that detection rates are probably small and that support for a technology-control regime will be tepid given the legitimate purpose of centrifuges. Both of these 

arguments lead to the conclusion that the benefit of 

attempting to control states’ legitimate access to centrifuge technology is probably small, and may even 

be negative.

REDUCING THE MOTIVATION TO BUILD 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Instead of focusing on export controls that limit access to technology, which this article has argued are 

inoperative in the case of indigenous centrifuge development, or the motivations behind building legitimate facilities, which appear to be of uncertain value, 

it may be better to direct nonproliferation efforts to 

reducing the motivation for nuclear weapons.

Classically, it is argued that states tend to pursue 

nuclear weapons because they feel a security threat 

justifies the need or because nuclear weapons are seen 

as a symbol of great-power status or as tools of coercion.31 Nonproliferation in the centrifuge age may 

require that nonproliferation advocates better prepare 

themselves to address these motivations face on. More 

attention may need to be given to the security situation of states that feel their existence is threatened 

by more powerful states and which thus seek nuclear 

weapons as a kind of existential guarantee. Nucleararmed states that are not at peace with their neighbors 

(e.g., Israel) may need to reconsider the value of their 
257

own nuclear armaments if they prefer to maintain 

a conventional rather than nuclear standoff. Established nuclear powers may need to accelerate progress towards the reduction, and ultimately the complete elimination, of their arsenals if they are to deny 

weapons the symbol of great-power status. Finally, 

champions of the nonproliferation regime may need 

to be prepared to offer security guarantees of various 

sorts when a potential proliferator emerges on the international stage. All these require major changes in 

the way states conduct their foreign policy. They are 

unlikely to happen easily, but they are increasingly 

important in an age when nearly any state can make a 

proliferation-scale centrifuge program covertly, using 

only indigenous resources.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. George W. Bush, “President Announces New Measures to 

Counter the Threat of WMD,” Speech at National Defense University, Washington, DC, February 14, 2004, available from www.

fas.org/irp/news/2004/02/wh021104.html.

2. Mohamed ElBaradei, “Nobel Lecture,” Lecture at the Nobel 

Peace Prize Ceremony, Oslo, Norway, December 10, 2005.

3. Houston G. Wood, Alexander Glaser, and R. Scott Kemp, 

“The Gas Centrifuge and Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation,” Physics 

Today, Vol. 61, No. 9, September 2008. 

4. Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, “Proliferation 

Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” 

International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2, October 2004, pp. 5–49.

5. For example: Alexander Montgomery, “Ringing in Proliferation: How to Dismantle an Atomic Bomb Network,” International 

Security, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2005, pp. 153-187; David Albright, Peddling 

Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies, 1st Ed. 

New York: Free Press, 2010, Chap. 12.
258

6. R. Scott Kemp, “Nonproliferation Strategy in the Centrifuge Age,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, Princeton, 

NJ, 2010.

7. Siegfried S. Hecker, “What I Found in Yongbyon and Why 

It Matters,” APS News, March 2011.

8. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, GOV/2011/30, Vienna, Austria: International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), May 24, 2011.

9. Frank von Hippel, Managing Spent Fuel in the United States: 

The Illogic of Reprocessing, Research Report No. 3, International 

Panel on Fissile Materials, January 2007.

10. The technology, deployed on a large scale in the Soviet 

Union in 1957, was not perfected in the West until 1960. Information sufficient to start a well-directed centrifuge plant was 

published in Gernot Zippe, The Development of Short Bowl Ultracentrifuges, Progress Report No. ORO-216, Charlottesville, VA: 

Division of Engineering Physics, Research Laboratories for the 

Engineering Sciences, University of Virginia, November 6, 1959.

11. For the history of the effort to commercialize the centrifuge, see R. B. Kehoe, The Enriching Troika: A History of Urenco to 

the Year 2000, Marlow, UK: Urenco Limited, 2002.

12. This was not immediately evident, given the difficulties experienced by the Manhattan Project of enriching uranium to high 

levels with gaseous diffusion. A U.S. research program showed 

it to be trivial circa 1963; see Union Carbide Nuclear Company 

Proposal for the Development of the Gas Centrifuge Process of Isotope 

Separation. KA-621, Papers of Ralph A. Lowry, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN: Union Carbide Nuclear Company, 

July 11, 1960.

13. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Major Activities in the 

Atomic Energy Programs, January–December 1960 Washington DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961, Appendix 20, p. 500.

14. Australia, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, 

Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Libya, the Netherlands, North Korea, 
259

Pakistan, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Sweden, the United 

Kingdom (UK), and the United States.

15. For the most part, this change was due to general progress 

in mechanical and aerospace engineering. Of the documents originating from centrifuge programs, perhaps the most important 

were Zippe, The Development of Short Bowl Ultracentrifuges, final 

report No. ORO-315, Charlottesville, VA: Research Laboratories 

for the Engineering Sciences, University of Virginia, July 1960; S. 

Whitley, “The Uranium Ultracentrifuge,” Physics in Technology, 

Vol. 10, No. 1. January 1979. pp. 26–33; S. Whitley, “Review of 

the Gas Centrifuge Until 1962,” Reviews of Modern Physics, Vol. 56, 

No. 1, January 1984, pp. 41–97; H. G. Wood and J. B. Morton, “Onsager’s Pancake Approximation for the Fluid Dynamics of a Gas 

Centrifuge,” Journal of Fluid Mechanics, Vol. 101, 1980 pp. 1–31; F. 

Doneddu, P. Roblin, and H. G. Wood, “Optimization Studies for 

Gas Centrifuges,” Separation Science and Technology, Vol. 35, No. 8, 

2000, pp. 1207–1221.

16. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. 

Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their 

Nuclear Choices,. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 

2004, p. 339.

17. South Africa claims to have had an early centrifuge program, but no information has been published in the public domain 

to back this claim. However, South Africa did have a successful 

uranium-enrichment program based on a different technology, 

called the vortex or ‘stationary-wall centrifuge’ process. This 

process was used to make South Africa’s HEU-based nuclear 

weapons.

18. These German engineers were at times also associated 

with Khan, but they also operated separately from Khan, providing better assistance. Libya is an outlier here. Its program was 

never successful, either prior to or after A. Q. Khan’s assistance, 

largely because the country could not organize a stable development program.

19. Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North 

Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 

1, July 2007, pp. 80–111.
260

20. Gernot Zippe, “Unclassified Spots on History of Modern 

Gascentrifuges,” Workshop on Gases in Strong Rotation, 1983.

21. Gernot Zippe, Jesse W. Beams, and A. Robert Kuhlthau, 

The Development of Short Bowl Ultracentrifuges, Progress Report 

No. ORO-210, Charlottesville, VA: Ordnance Research Laboratory, University of Virginia, December 1, 1958; Gernot Zippe, The 

Development of Short Bowl Ultracentrifuges, Progress Report No. 

ORO-202, Charlottesville, VA: Ordnance Research Laboratory, 

University of Virginia, July 1, 1959; Zippe, The Development of 

Short Bowl Ultracentrifuges, Progress Report No. ORO-216; Zippe, 

The Development of Short Bowl Ultracentrifuges, Progress Report 

No. ORO-315. On the spread of the report, see Kemp, “Nonproliferation Strategy in the Centrifuge Age.”

22. Many countries start with programs of this scale: It is estimated that Pakistan started with a capability of one bomb every 2 

years, around 1983. North Korea, during its plutonium program, 

maintained a capability of less than one weapon per year. Iraq’s 

nuclear weapons program, though interrupted by war, had plans 

to build about one bomb every 2 and 1/2 years. South Africa’s 

nuclear weapons program produced at a rate less than one bomb 

every 2 years.

23. The IR-1 was supposed to operate at about 2.5 kg-Separative 

Work Unit (SWU)/year, but in reality, it operates at only 0.6-1.0 

kg-SWU/year. The DEGUSSA machine was claimed to have had 

a performance of about 1.02 kg-SWU/year. There was an error in 

the calculation of this figure. The actual performance was probably 

closer to 0.9 kg-SWU/year. See Zippe, The Development of Short Bowl 

Ultracentrifuges, p. 87.

24. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Nuclear Energy,” 

Weekly Surveyor, January 12, 1970.

25. According to Myron Kratzer (then Science and Technology counselor and in 1975, as Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Nuclear Energy at the U.S. Department of State), Brazil’s program 

was the major impetus behind the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The 

Indian nuclear test of 1974 served mainly to finalize an already 

active discussion. See Myron Kratzer, interview with the author, 

April 19, 2011.
261

26. Catch-all controls, while useful in principle, are highly imperfect. They are more easily bypassed through the creation of 

front companies intended to deceive exporters of the true end use. 

The detection of front companies is an intelligence function and 

is also highly imperfect. Compliance is also problematic because 

manufactures of normally uncontrolled items may not be aware 

that they needed an export license for particular buyers. Furthermore, not all states implement catch-all controls.

27. Such a right could be further codified in the original terms 

of cooperation. However, legal barriers have not deterred some 

states, notably Israel, from attacking facilities that belonged wholly to Iraq and Syria. Still, other states than these may feel more 

apprehension about military attacks.

28. On the opinions of states, see the proceedings of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), October 19–21, 1977, 

Washington DC, as published by the IAEA. (I assume by proceedings, he means part or all of the 8 volumes plus 1 summary volume published by the IAEA in 1980, which covered all 134 INFCE 

working group sessions from 1977-79 and the final plenary conference held in Vienna, Austria, in February 1980.)

29. See Christopher E. Paine and Thomas B. Cochran, “Nuclear Islands: International Leasing of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Sites to 

Provide Enduring Assurance of Peaceful Uses,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 17, No. 3, July 2010.

30. Even if a national centrifuge program were not competitive with the international market, a small centrifuge program 

might still be reasonable and economic insurance against a possible fuel-supply cutoff. To demonstrate this, consider that estimates for the real levelized cost of nuclear power per kilowatthour (kWh) can range from $0.09 in optimistic, forward-looking 

case studies to values in excess of $0.20/kWh (2008 dollars) for 

first-of-a-kind construction in regulation-heavy regions. Assume, 

for the sake of calculation, a median value of $0.15/kWh. Nearly 

all of that cost comes from the capital charge and staffing costs; 

less than $0.01 is the cost of fuel. At 85 percent capacity factor, the 

plant operates for about 7,500 hours/year. Thus, the real levelized 

cost for a nonoperating full-size 1 gigawatt/year (GWe/yr) plant 
262

is about $1.1 billion/year, approximately the cost of a modern 

centrifuge plant able to support approximately 30 GWe of nuclear 

power annually. For a primer on the economics of nuclear power, 

including estimates of the real levelized cost, see Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology, The Future of Nuclear Power, July 2003. The 

estimated cost of a modern enrichment plant is based on the projected cost of the Urenco/LES plant in Eunice, NM; see Michael 

Knapik, “LES Hopes for Fresh Start in New Mexico,” Nuclear Fuel, 

September 1, 2003.

31. Another common explanation is that nuclear weapons can 

be used to satisfy domestic constituencies, but presumably, constituencies that are large and well supported want nuclear weapons for one of the listed reasons.
263

PART III:

HOW WELL CAN WE SAFEGUARD 

THE PEACEFUL ATOM?

265

CHAPTER 9

HOW WELL WILL THE INTERNATIONAL 

ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY BE ABLE TO 

SAFEGUARD MORE NUCLEAR MATERIALS 

IN MORE STATES?

Patrick S. Roberts

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

will confront new proliferation risks if its safeguards 

system must operate in a world with more nuclear 

facilities in more and riskier places. The usual suggestions for upgrading IAEA safeguards focus on increasing the agency’s resources and improving technology. 

Yet improved technology and more resources for inspections will not help unless the agency can develop 

standards to gauge the strength of the safeguards 

system, and unless countries confront the problem of 

what to do after the IAEA detects a violation. 

Nuclear power will likely spread to new countries 

and new kinds of facilities in the coming years. Even a 

modest expansion of nuclear power will require more 

safeguards inspections, which at the very least raises 

budgeting problems for the agency. Even if money 

were no obstacle, however, it is not clear that the 

agency could simply scale up its operations to meet 

new demands. Scaling up is more complicated than 

making successful models from the past even larger. 

Consider one famous example, the RMS Titanic. The 

largest passenger steamship in the world was considered to be the pinnacle of engineering until it sank 

after striking an iceberg on its maiden voyage.

The IAEA may not be the Titanic, but the metaphor raises the question of how one would know 
266

whether the agency is headed for a disaster. After all, 

the Titanic’s engineers never expected their creation 

to become synonymous with hubris and disaster. 

To evaluate whether IAEA safeguards can function 

without a breakdown while monitoring and inspecting more kinds of nuclear facilities in more countries, 

the agency needs clear and transparent standards. 

The IAEA has used timeliness detection goals, which 

are based on calculations about whether the agency 

can detect the diversion of a significant quantity of 

nuclear material within the minimum time needed 

to make a bomb.1

 Timeliness detection goals have 

the advantage of being clear, but they involve calculations about hundreds of facilities that are very low 

risk, and the agency does not have the resources to 

meet these goals for all facilities. As a result, the IAEA 

is moving toward state-based declarations to evaluate safeguards risk and performance, but these standards are still being developed, and it will be a challenge to apply them to diverse countries in a fair and 

equitable way. 

So far, there is scant evidence for the agency actually having prevented diversion in a timely manner. 

In the four most prominent cases in recent memory 

of illicit nuclear activity, the IAEA appeared to formally meet its timeliness detection goals while countries pursued illegal nuclear activities. The agency 

detected violations in only one of these cases, North 

Korea. The agency’s safeguards division sees promising new tools in new technologies, training, and legal 

authority in the Additional Protocol (AP), but adopting these tools is sometimes slowed by goal conflict 

within the agency. The IAEA exists to provide technical assistance in developing nuclear power, prevent 

military diversions, and enhance safety, but it is not 

clear which of these should take priority.
267

Even if the agency is able to improve its detection 

capabilities through better technology, training, and 

standards, the safeguards system cannot be relied 

upon to react quickly enough to a diversion of nuclear 

materials toward a military program. Finally, there 

is no consensus on how to handle countries that may 

be in violation of IAEA and Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT) agreements. To fulfill the goals of nonproliferation, the IAEA must be able to detect violators, and 

the world political community, along with the agency, 

must be able to enact a sufficient penalty for violation.

If the agency does not change what it and the 

United Nations (UN) Security Council will do after a 

violation is discovered, then the system of preventing 

the proliferation of illicit nuclear materials is at risk of 

collapse. Iran could withdrawal from the NPT without penalty, and other states, including Syria, could 

continue to deny the IAEA access to suspect locations. 

Meanwhile, the IAEA’s credibility is at risk because 

it is expected to verify agreements in countries that it 

can at best only monitor but not truly safeguard.

INCREASING DEMAND FOR NUCLEAR POWER 

IN PROLIFERATION-RISKY REGIONS

Developing economies demand new energy sources, while North America and Europe are showing a 

greater resistance to the costs and potential consequences of nuclear power. Therefore, new nuclear reactors will likely be built in regions where the risks of 

proliferation are the highest.

While there is great uncertainty surrounding the 

price of energy in the future, it is clear that demand 

for energy will grow in the coming decades because 

of modernization and population growth. The Inter-
268

national Energy Agency, the chief international organization for monitoring energy demands, predicted 

growth in energy demand in each of its three scenarios from 2008 to 2035. Growth in demand is the only 

reliable prediction, however. The executive summary 

for the 2012 World Energy Outlook begins with the 

statement, “The energy world faces unprecedented 

uncertainty.”2

Investors do not know the price of fuels in the future or the precise risk of delays in plant construction. 

Nuclear power requires a high initial investment in 

the facility and in supporting technical staff, but longterm operational costs are relatively low. (From the 

perspective of investors, however, it can be difficult 

to disaggregate initial investments from long-term 

ones.) New nuclear plant construction often faces 

unpredictable delays and cost overruns that would 

decrease returns on investment to equity investors.3

Furthermore, there are limits to the world’s capacity 

to increase nuclear plant production and technical 

nuclear training; for example Japan Steel Works is the 

sole maker of certain reactor parts.4

Despite the uncertainty, more than 45 countries are 

considering embarking upon nuclear power programs, 

according to a May 2012 report from the World Nuclear Association.5

 It is unlikely that all of these countries 

will develop nuclear power soon, but some of them 

likely will. After Fukushima, Japan, nuclear power is 

likely to hold steady or slightly recede in Europe and 

the United States, although nuclear power plant construction has been part of climate change and energy 

legislation discussions in the United States.6

 There are 

443 nuclear plants in operation around the world, and 

64 new plants are under construction. Demand, however, appears to be shifting from Europe and North 
269

America to Asia and the Middle East, where many 

countries have expressed interest in building nuclear 

plants to meet their energy needs.7 More than half of 

the reactors currently under construction are in Asia, 

one-fourth in Eastern Europe, and some in the Middle 

East. Many of these countries are investigating new 

kinds of nuclear plants that pose safeguards challenges. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano expects 

“more than 20 new states, including many developing 

countries, [to] bring their first nuclear power plants 

online within 2 decades.”8

Fast-paced growth in emerging economies, led by 

Brazil, China, India, and Indonesia, will drive the bulk 

of demand.9 India remains committed to nuclear power even after the Fukushima disaster. “We are determined that our expanded nuclear power programme 

will follow the highest standards of nuclear safety and 

security,” Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 

said at a summit on nuclear security in 2012.10

Because investment in nuclear power provides 

such an unpredictable return on investment, it is likely that plants will be built in countries whose political 

leadership has decided that nuclear power is a strategic goal rather than an economic investment. In 2009, 

Citigroup concluded that: 

. . . it is extremely unlikely that private sector developers will be willing or able to take on the Construction, 

Power Price, and Operational risks of new nuclear 

stations. The returns would need to be underpinned 

by the government and the risks shared with the taxpayer / consumer. Minimum power prices (perhaps 

through capacity payments), support for financing, 

and government backed off-take agreements may all 

be needed to make new nuclear viable.11
270

The uncertainty in nuclear power investment and 

the high fixed costs make it more likely that certain 

kinds of countries will find it worthwhile to invest in 

nuclear power: large countries with ample resources; 

countries looking to develop power for political prestige; or countries that factor military uses into the cost 

of nuclear power investment. It is also more likely that 

countries that do not factor the high and uncertain 

cost of waste disposal into the investment calculation 

will pursue nuclear power more than those that do 

factor in disposal. All of these considerations make it 

more likely that countries attentive to military considerations and located in regions at risk of proliferation 

will invest in nuclear power, rather than countries in 

regions that are less at risk for proliferation, or countries that rely more on market pricing for energy. 

WILL MORE INSPECTIONS BE NEEDED?

If there will be an expansion of nuclear power into 

new countries and new types of facilities, the IAEA 

will need to perform more inspections. In 2010, the 

IAEA carried out 1,750 inspections, 423 design information verifications, and 142 complementary accesses.12 By 2030, the IAEA expects global nuclear electrical generating capacity to grow from between 40 and 

120 percent. It also expects between 10 and 25 new 

countries to attain nuclear power.13 Facilities in these 

countries, or expanded facilities in countries already 

with nuclear power, will require more inspections. 

This, at the very least, raises budgeting questions because IAEA member states are reluctant to approve 

budget increases. Former Deputy Director General of 

the IAEA and head of the Department of Safeguards 

Olli Heinonen concluded in 2010 that, “We must do 
271

more with less without compromising the necessary 

safeguards assurances. Smarter and better verification 

techniques and technologies should be explored.”14

In 2012, the IAEA had 1,125 facilities under safeguards, and with the expansion of nuclear activity 

into new states, it may have more. New facilities require more inspections than existing ones where the 

agency can rely more on accounting procedures for 

verification. New facilities will require more work 

because the agency must ensure that they are built 

according to standards, and it must work with states 

to develop a method for making initial and then annual declarations of nuclear material. The agency’s 

budgetary growth is limited, however, by UN policies 

to maintain zero real growth in budgets.15 An expansion of nuclear power around the world will provide 

a bigger nuclear haystack of sites to inspect but no 

more than the current number of inspections given 

budgetary constraints. 

From 1987 to 2010, the amount of significant quantities under IAEA safeguards increased by five times, 

but the number of inspection days remained roughly 

constant.16 A significant quantity is a standardized 

measure of nuclear material defined as “the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device 

cannot be excluded.”17 Inspection days refer to the 

number of days inspectors worked. Therefore, inspectors inspect more material than ever before using the 

same amount of human resources. 

The IAEA’s Safeguards Division, one of several 

such divisions, carries out a number of tasks meant 

to provide member states with a reasonable assurance that states are accounting for the nuclear material in their possession and that they are not diverting 
272

material or facilities for illicit use. The agency’s safeguards are based on assessments of the correctness 

and completeness of a state’s declarations of nuclear 

material and nuclear-related activities. Verification 

measures include on-site inspections, visits, and ongoing monitoring and evaluation. Basically, two sets 

of measures are carried out in accordance with the 

type of safeguards agreements in force with a state. 

First, the agency verifies state-issued reports of declared nuclear materials. Nuclear accountants check 

the record books to monitor consistency, and inspectors perform “material accountancy” by physically installing and observing tamper-proof seals on storage 

vessels and cameras in sensitive areas. These inspections verify nondiversion, essentially keeping tabs on 

nuclear material that states use for nuclear power to 

make sure that none goes missing by being diverted 

for weapons uses. Second, as of 2012, 115 of 181 countries with IAEA safeguards agreements concluded an 

agreement with the IAEA known as the Additional 

Protocol (AP).18 (Another 23 have signed the protocol 

but not brought it into effect). This is a legal agreement that permits the agency to perform more intensive supervision to not only verify nondiversion, but 

also to provide some evidence about the absence of 

undeclared nuclear material in a state.

Inspections come in several types. For new states 

and states making changes in their programs, the 

agency conducts ad hoc inspections to verify initial 

reports of nuclear material or report on changes to 

the report. Beyond that, the agency conducts routine 

inspections according to a predefined schedule and, 

occasionally, with very short notice. In either case, the 

agency technically enters with the permission of the 

state and, in some cases, there are delays as states at-
273

tempt to negotiate arrival and travel schedules with 

their hosts. The agency has the right to conduct routine inspections, but without the Additional Protocol 

or other agreements in place, it is limited to locations 

with a declared nuclear facility or declared sites that 

handle nuclear material. (There is a possibility that 

a state has nuclear material in undeclared or secret 

sites about which the agency could gather information but not perform on-site inspections). The agency 

has the authority to conduct special inspections if it 

believes that the information provided by the state is 

not adequate for the agency to fulfill its safeguards 

responsibilities, but this power has rarely been used. 

Member states are uncomfortable with the agency entering a state without the state’s permission because 

such inspections would appear to infringe upon national sovereignty. In addition, the agency conducts 

safeguards visits to verify that the design, construction, and decommissioning of facilities are conducted 

according to standards and the information contained 

in countries’ official reports. 

ARE SAFEGUARDS INFINITELY EXPANDABLE? 

The IAEA has developed a range of safeguards 

tools, from accounting procedures that date back to 

the agency’s earliest days, to basic tools such as tamper-proof seals and cameras, to more advanced methods for environmental sampling to measure traces 

of nuclear materials. These tools may provide some 

efficiency in performing safeguards in new places, 

particularly environmental sampling, which can be 

conducted at a distance. Most likely, however, each of 

these tools and each type of inspection will have to be 

repeated in new countries and new facilities with the 

expansion of nuclear power. 
274

This increase raises a question: Are IAEA safeguards infinitely expandable, or do they reach a 

breaking point at some level of capacity? It is not 

clear how one would know whether safeguards might 

reach a breaking point. Some systems are relatively 

easily scaled up. They can operate at higher levels of 

capacity, using a larger version of the same structure. 

Among computer programs, contemporary peer-topeer fire sharing systems without a central node are 

easily scaled up because increasing the number of 

peers does not increase demand on the system beyond 

the overall carrying capacity.19 (This is an improvement over the first online peer-to-peer music file sharing systems that fell victim to severe bottlenecks).20

In other cases, scaling up is much more complicated than making successful models even larger. In 

one famous example, the RMS Titanic, its scaled-up 

design failed for a number of reasons, including a lack 

of sufficient lifeboats. After the accident, new regulations required that there be enough lifeboats on board 

to carry everyone on the ship. Ocean liners kept communication systems open 24 hours a day (since no one 

heard the Titanic’s distress call), and ships were much 

more careful about spotting and avoiding icebergs. 

Though the Titanic became a paradigm for the 

hubris of engineers, it was not destined to fail on its 

maiden voyage. It was a victim of a faulty design and

bad luck. Had the ship not struck an iceberg and sank, 

people would have concluded that the celebrated 

scaled-up ocean liner design was a success. Shipbuilders would have built more ships modeled after it, 

and likely even larger ships.21 Designers might have 

added even more luxuries and reduced the number of 

lifeboats. Scaling up could have continued for years, 

maybe decades, until there was a catastrophic failure. 
275

How do we know that the IAEA’s safeguards system 

is not ripe for catastrophic failure? Safeguards could 

be like a Titanic that has been lucky enough not to 

strike an iceberg. 

THE PROBLEM OF STANDARDS

To evaluate whether IAEA safeguards can function adequately with more kinds of nuclear facilities 

in more countries—or even whether they function adequately now—the agency needs clear and transparent standards. Standards would clarify how well the 

agency is meeting the obligations found in its statute, 

which came into force on July 29, 1957, and has been 

subsequently amended. Its safeguards obligations in 

particular have been interpreted with almost ecclesiastical attention to nuance. The IAEA’s safeguards 

mission is to verify, “Through its inspection system 

that States comply with their commitments, under the 

Non-Proliferation Treaty and other non-proliferation 

agreements, to use nuclear material and facilities only 

for peaceful purposes.” Until the discovery that Iraq 

had a clandestine weapons program, however, the 

statement was interpreted to read, “to use declared

nuclear material and facilities. . . .”22 In other words, 

the agency read its mandate as to verify only the facilities that member states agreed to have inspected, leaving out other research, industrial, and military sites.23

The agency took seriously the idea that member states 

that consented to agency inspections might attempt to 

conceal facilities only after the discovery of the Iraq 

program. The agency’s mission in a post-Iraq world 

is more complicated if it cannot assume that countries 

that consent to inspections are acting in good faith and 

are attempting to fulfill the obligations of the NPT. 
276

One way to measure how the agency is doing 

would be to chart its progress relative to clear and 

transparent standards. The agency has developed 

quantitative measures of performance such as “timeliness detection” and “risk of early detection,” but it is 

difficult to find data on these. Even how much money 

the agency spends on particular country inspections 

remains inaccessible to anyone who is not agency staff 

or a qualified member state representative. Timeliness 

detection goals refer to measures specific to facility 

and material types of how quickly inspectors should 

be able to identify that a diversion has occurred, and 

these goals are used to establish the frequency of inspections.24 Instead of evaluating and measuring primarily at the facility level, the IAEA is now moving 

toward a system in which it evaluates state declarations for their consistency and thoroughness. At present, state criteria remain rudimentary, and measuring 

state criteria rather than facilities risks making verification an even more political issue than it is presently. 

If the agency can develop relatively neutral criteria for 

evaluating state declaration, however, the state-level 

criteria could prove useful, especially when combined 

with other measures such as timeliness detection. 

Standards have their virtues. It is difficult to gauge 

progress and improvement without measureable 

standards to show where performance is lacking. It is 

not clear, however, that the standards for IAEA safeguards are accurate performance measures. Unlike the 

Titanic example, what counts as a failure for the IAEA 

is ambiguous. A nuclear explosion or nuclear war is 

as much or more a political failure than an administrative one that can be blamed on the IAEA. 

However useful the data gathered during safeguards evaluations, their interpretations are not self-
277

evident. The agency performs careful analysis of state 

declarations about nuclear material possession and 

transfers, and sometimes the agency finds that these 

reports are incomplete. But state-based reports alone 

do not provide clear standards because their completeness and accuracy depends on factors other than 

whether a state is engaging in illegal activities. For example, rich countries with well-developed bureaucracies are better able to produce complete reports, as are 

countries that have produced such reports in the past 

and merely make routine updates. Countries with less 

developed bureaucracies may produce incomplete reports out of inexperience and lower capacity, not an 

intent to deceive. 

Timeliness detection goals do provide a clear standard for having met a goal. But it is not clear that these 

are used as standards any longer, since the agency is 

moving toward using state-based declarations. Furthermore, the agency’s move away from facility-based 

timeliness detection goals was in part a result of problems with those goals. It was not clear how accurately the goals were being measured, and even so, the 

agency rarely met the goals and lacked the resources 

to perform significantly more or longer inspections.25

 Safeguards are designed to detect the diversion 

of a significant quantity of nuclear material within a 

conversion time, which is the minimum time needed 

to build a bomb using diverted materials. Timeliness 

detection goals and inspection schedules are created 

according to the relevant conversion time. (The conversion time is defined as 7-10 days for plutonium or 

highly enriched uranium [HEU], 1-3 months for plutonium in spent fuel, and about 1 year for low enriched 

uranium [LEU]). The presence of safeguards and timeliness detection goals suggests that the IAEA aims to 
278

detect military diversions before they result in bombs, 

and even to prevent an attempt at diversion from 

occurring undetected. 

The agency’s performance in preventing diversion 

in a timely manner is mixed. In the four most prominent cases in recent memory of illicit nuclear activity, 

the IAEA appeared to formally meet its timeliness 

detection goals (though detailed such evaluations are 

not available to the public).26 Iraq, North Korea, Iran, 

and Libya all engaged in illegal nuclear activities, and 

it is generally agreed that all embarked on some stage 

of an illegal nuclear program. Nevertheless, the IAEA 

detected violations in only one case, and even there, 

the evidence is mixed. In Iraq, the United States discovered the country’s nuclear program just before the 

first Gulf War. After the war began and the agency 

gained access, IAEA inspectors learned that Iraq secretly enriched uranium and carried out reprocessing 

experiments in buildings at Tuwaitha, which is not 

covered by IAEA inspections agreements.

In Iran, an opposition group, The National Council 

of Resistance of Iran, provided initial evidence of illicit 

activities there. In Libya, the Libyan government announced its nuclear weapons program, though some 

government intelligence agencies may have known 

about it previously. In North Korea, however, IAEA 

inspectors operating under additional legal authority 

did uncover diversions and illicit activity, and the inspections were supported by U.S. satellite imagery.27

The IAEA has discovered other cases of materials unaccounted for and various discrepancies in nuclear 

accounting, but there are no other known cases of the 

IAEA detecting diversions of nuclear material to an 

illicit nuclear program. The recent history of the agency’s safeguards program leads to a disturbing conclu-
279

sion. The agency’s traditional safeguards of regular 

inspections and material accountancy failed to detect 

and deter all known cases of member states’ illicit 

nuclear programs. The North Korean case, however, 

shows that when given additional legal mandates, 

technical support, and political support, the agency 

can verify nuclear programs and make discoveries 

that qualify as meeting a performance goal—detecting 

illicit nuclear activity. 

Many of the proponents of reform for the IAEA 

advocate increasing the number of safeguards agreements the IAEA has with member states and expanding the legal and technical tools available to the 

agency by increasing the number of states covered by 

the AP. Former Deputy Director General of the IAEA 

and Head of the Department of Safeguards Pierre 

Goldschmidt writes that the “Department of Safeguards doesn’t have the legal authority it needs to 

fulfill its mandate and to provide the assurances the 

international community is expecting from its verification activities.”28 Goldschmidt advocates giving 

the IAEA greater authority and better technology so 

that it might more quickly detect violations and with 

greater certainty. 

AFTER DETECTION, WHAT?

Standards can help gauge the agency’s performance, but the real problems for dealing with more 

facilities in more countries and countries at higher 

risk of proliferation are structural. The problem with 

current standards is that the IAEA inspection system 

cannot be relied upon to react quickly enough to a diversion even once the agency detects a violation. To 

quote a classic article on arms control and disarmament, “After detection, what?”29
280

Much of the debate over safeguards focuses on 

how to detect violations. The agency developed verification procedures and measures for effectiveness such 

as timeliness detection goals, and it is investing in 

promising new detection measures such as environmental and remote sampling. New investments may 

increase the agency’s ability to detect violations and 

even to identify nuclear material in unauthorized locations. Technical questions about how to better detect 

violations dominate discussion about safeguards, as 

the conference agenda of a recent meeting in Vienna, 

Austria, shows.30 Debates over how to improve safeguards usually result in requests for larger budgets, 

more and better training for inspectors and analysts, 

and better technology.31

The IAEA presents the effort to detect violators as 

its central safeguards mission, and in public, the agency portrays more effective inspections as the key to 

detection. In 2002, IAEA Director General Mohamed 

El Baradei said: 

Inspections by an impartial, credible third party have 

been a cornerstone of international nuclear arms control agreements for decades. Where the intent exists to 

develop a clandestine nuclear weapons programme, 

inspections serve effectively as a means of both detection and deterrence.32

Detecting violations is not enough to achieve deterrence, however. Just as important are the consequences of a violation once it has been detected. While 

it is important that the IAEA be technically capable 

of detecting a violation, the agency’s Board of Governors, the UN, and world governments must be able to 

react quickly and effectively once a violation has been 

discovered. Focusing solely on the IAEA’s technical 
281

capacity and resources risks neglecting the important 

political challenges to dealing with a violation.33 In 

private and in expert-level discussions, safeguards 

officials worry that the agency lacks the capacity and 

authority to address cases of proliferation that are outside its mandate. In a July 2011 speech, IAEA Deputy 

Director General for Safeguards Herman Nackaerts 

said that: 

The [safeguards] system was manifestly failing in its 

primary objective, namely, to detect activities that did

raise potential compliance issues and proliferation 

concerns—such as those undertaken, for instance, in 

Iraq, Libya, Syria and Iran. 

The reason Nackaerts thought that the system was 

“manifestly failing” was that “major proliferation 

challenges have arisen in States with limited nuclear 

fuel cycle facilities, and involved previously exempted or undeclared nuclear material.”34 If proliferators 

were outside the IAEA’s authority, according to this 

logic, then increasing the agency’s capacity and legal 

authority would be the solution.

Technical and legal improvements within the 

agency will not be sufficient, however. A violator will 

not be deterred by the IAEA’s technical ability to detect a violation alone. The violator will be deterred 

by a calculation that the consequences of a violation 

will be too great to risk detection. Even if the agency’s 

standards and technical ability to detect a violation 

improve, a nation or an entity considering proliferation will not be deterred if it thinks that it can ignore, 

forestall, or withstand the consequences of detection. 

The IAEA realized in Iraq and elsewhere that a country could attempt to conceal violations or hide from 

inspectors. Similarly, a country could attempt to es-
282

cape the consequences of detection through political 

strategies. To fulfill the goals of nonproliferation, the 

IAEA must be able to detect violators, and the world 

political community, along with the agency, must be 

able to enact a sufficient penalty for violation. 

If a country’s violation is clear, then the IAEA has 

an easier job, and it can more easily refer the matter to 

the UN and world community. But in most cases, violations are not clear. The evidence is mixed, or the violation is clear to those in the know, but it is discovered 

through secret intelligence provided by a member 

state, and it cannot be scrutinized or it does not have 

the same level of credibility as a violation discovered 

by IAEA inspections. 

The IAEA’s inspection system is based on inspecting and auditing declared sites. If a country wants to 

hide a small nuclear program, it can probably escape 

detection from the agency, as happened with Libya’s 

nuclear program. Beginning in the 1990s, Libya had 

traded in uranium and other illicit material without 

IAEA detection.35 Former IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei conceded that “the system cannot 

detect easily concealable small items. Any verification 

system cannot do that.”36

The IAEA often relies on state intelligence agencies 

to provide satellite and other sensitive data. If intelligence is provided in secret, however, the accused state 

can question the veracity of the information and the 

motivations of its sources. In 2011, state intelligence 

agencies provided documents to the IAEA showing 

that Iran had sought and found foreign help to learn 

the steps necessary to build a nuclear weapon. The intelligence reports showed how, among other things, 

a former Soviet nuclear scientist provided sensitive 

information to Iran while under contract in Tehran in 
283

the 1990s. Because the information was provided in 

secret without details about the sources and probably 

by countries hostile to Iran, Iran questioned the credibility of the information. A former nuclear official in 

Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, described the controversy following the information as “100 percent political” and 

explained that the IAEA is “under pressure from foreign powers.”37 Iran’s ability to question secret intelligence about its nuclear program delayed international 

action to impose consequences.

Even if the IAEA does find noncompliance with 

the NPT and safeguards agreements and evidence of 

trafficking in illicit materials, a state could blame nonstate actors—legitimately or illegitimately—for the 

trades. Export controls and safeguards do not easily 

cover nonstate actors. By blaming nonstate actors, a 

state could avoid sanctions and other consequences of 

illicit activity. 

In one famous example, A. Q. Kahn was the mastermind behind an illicit nuclear enterprise that sold 

secrets to Iran, North Korea, and Libya, but the Pakistani government claimed that he was acting without 

their approval and that Pakistan should not be held 

responsible. Pakistani authorities apprehended Kahn 

in 2003, and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf 

pardoned him in exchange for a confession. Some 

investigations speculated that Kahn cooperated with 

the Pakistani government, while others found that 

he cooperated with corrupt parts of the government 

but escaped detection by the rest of the Pakistani 

authorities.38
284

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AS A DETERRENT 

OR A BURDEN?

The IAEA’s safeguards structure assumes that 

once a violation is detected, the violator will repent, or 

world opinion will impose consequences on the violator. Sometimes this happens. In 2004, South Korea revealed that it had failed to report nuclear material used 

in experiments to enrich uranium as recently as 2000. 

South Korea also revealed other undeclared materials 

used in enrichment and other experiments as far back 

as 1979. The revelations came as part of South Korea’s 

declarations in ratifying the AP, which expands the 

IAEA’s authority to investigate both declared and undeclared nuclear facilities. The protocol also requires 

that countries declare more of their nuclear activities than is required under traditional safeguards. In 

November 2004, the IAEA Board of Governors noted 

“serious concern” about Korea’s unreported activities, 

but the board did not refer South Korea to the UN Security Council, though referral is within the agency’s 

rights.39 The IAEA is required to report findings of a 

country’s noncompliance with safeguards agreements 

to the Security Council, but what rises to the level 

of noncompliance that merits reporting is open to 

interpretation. 

In the South Korean case, the system worked as 

many people hoped it would. The AP served as a 

deterrent of sorts, leading the country to at least report previously unreported material, sites, and activities and possibly leading the country to stop activity that might have continued otherwise, and to 

ensure greater accountability in its nuclear programs. 

(South Korea claimed that nuclear scientists conducted these experiments without telling high-level 

political officials.) 
285

While South Korea is a possible example of the 

AP’s deterrent ability, the AP may lead to additional 

burdens on the agency in the future. Some experts 

claim that adoption and implementation of the AP by 

additional countries will improve the effectiveness of 

safeguards. The AP is a legal document that enables 

the IAEA not only to verify the nondiversion of declared nuclear material but also to provide assurances 

as to the absence of undeclared nuclear material and 

activities in a state. In short, the AP gives the IAEA 

increased access to sites and information in a state. For 

the AP to be effective, and for safeguards generally, 

timeliness is everything. Safeguards are designed to 

detect the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear 

material (defined as enough to make one crude bomb) 

within a conversion time, which is the minimum time 

needed to build a bomb using diverted materials. The 

expansion of the AP to new states, combined with the 

need for timeliness and budget constraints, produces 

a worrisome new safeguards equation. Member states 

expect the AP not to cost more than current safeguards, 

but an increased number of facilities under the protocol multiplied by the cost of increased data analysis 

and environmental sampling per facility that comes 

with the AP, divided by a constant safeguards budget, 

equals a reduced number and intensity of inspections. 

The AP will likely lead (and has led) to countries covered by the AP being subject to fewer inspections, 

even as the IAEA obtains greater authority to provide 

assurances about declaring undeclared sites. 

Despite the potential for the AP to increase expectations of the IAEA beyond what the agency can accomplish, the adoption and implementation of the AP 

has been an article of faith among proponents of the 
286

IAEA’s safeguards program. In 2005, Director General 

Mohamed ElBaradei wrote that: 

I believe that, for the Agency to be able to fulfill its 

verification responsibilities in a credible manner, the 

Additional Protocol must become the standard for all 

countries that are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.40

Similar calls for wider adherence to APs came 

from the UN General Assembly, by member states at 

the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences, and by 

states at IAEA General Conferences. Yet if the IAEA 

expands verification activities under the AP without 

increasing its budget at a greater rate than in the past, 

it will have to seek new efficiencies, likely by reducing 

the number and intensity of inspections or decreasing 

inspections in countries not considered to be proliferation risks, a practice that opens the Agency to charges 

of unfairly applying its standards.41 Reducing inspections by increasing randomization may make sense 

from a cost-benefit standpoint, but it opens a window 

for diversion, especially if the inspections do not occur 

within the timeliness window.42

The AP confers a preferred traveler status to a 

country, allowing the IAEA to reduce inspections 

once it has reached a finding of “nondiversion.” A 

clever state, terrorist, or criminal (perhaps without 

state knowledge) may seek to attain the activation of 

the AP and then engage in diversion activities. Given 

the intensive background work required to implement the AP and inspect new nuclear facilities, the 

IAEA will likely reduce inspections for its “preferred 

travelers” because of resource constraints. Despite its 

advantages, the AP provides an increased possibility 

for diversion. 
287

With more nuclear facilities in more countries, 

whether under the AP or not, the IAEA faces a tough 

decision about whether to lower the false alarm rate 

and potentially increase the possibility for diversion. 

The IAEA has an acceptable false alarm rate of approximately 5 percent.43 In other words, the agency 

tolerates the inspectorate alleging that materials are 

unaccounted for when, in fact, there exists a good explanation about 5 percent of the time. The 5 percent 

rate, multiplied by an increasing number of inspections, leads to two options. First, the agency could 

pursue a politically unacceptable high number of false 

alarm reports and confront member states, who will 

demand that the agency lower the false alarm rate. 

Governments do not like the agency to give them 

negative publicity, give excessive attention to sensitive nuclear and industrial processes that are secret, 

or insult national pride. Second, the agency could allow more nuclear material to remain unaccounted and 

make a security case to member states and the Board 

of Governors for the IAEA to increase its permissible 

false alarm rate. It is not clear which of these will happen, but the agency’s leadership will have to make 

a choice. While technical constraints shape the process of material accountancy, the greatest challenges 

are political. 

THE LIMITS OF LEGAL TOOLS

Former IAEA officials agree that the legal framework of the IAEA needs revision. The NPT prohibits 

non-nuclear weapons states from making weapons, 

but it allows states to get extremely close to making 

weapons. The treaty has been interpreted as providing 

an inalienable right to peaceful use, which overlaps 
288

with much of what is needed for military purposes.44

Much of the delay in imposing penalties on Iran for 

its nuclear activities comes from disagreement about 

whether and to what degree Iran is in violation of the 

NPT. Iran maintains that it is fulfilling its obligations 

under the treaty and that hostile powers are unfairly 

seeking to deny its right to peaceful use of nuclear 

materials.45

The current safeguards legal framework relies 

on member states’ voluntary cooperation with the 

inspection process. IAEA inspectors are more like 

door-to-door salesmen asking for permission to enter a home than they are like police investigators demanding access. The IAEA also lacks the legal tools 

to gather information in case of noncompliance, and 

the international system has no regular sanction available if a country forbids or delays IAEA access, and no 

pre-established penalty if a country withdraws from 

the NPT. Without enforcement, detection risks lead 

to nothing more than empty threats. Alternatively, 

detection could lead to ad hoc penalties imposed by 

the UN Security Council or by coalitions of interested 

countries that risk being criticized as unfair. The agency will be in a better position if governments can agree 

on penalties for violation that apply to all countries 

and are agreed upon before any particular country 

is in violation. Without reform of the legal processes 

governing IAEA inspections, the IAEA will have more 

of the same—more evasion, as in the cases of Iran and 

Syria, and perhaps many more cases if nuclear power 

expands around the world.

Former safeguards officials agree that the IAEA 

and the UN need to have more authority for inspections and a standard procedure for dealing with 

evidence of diversion. The international system also 
289

needs agreement on what to do about countries that 

leave the NPT. Without standard measures for what 

counts as a violation and standard procedures for 

dealing with it, the IAEA risks a loss of credibility as 

a neutral arbiter when a crisis occurs and the agency 

does not have an impartial procedure to address these 

crises. For the IAEA to fulfill its obligation under the 

statute—and to maintain credibility with the world, 

fairly or unfairly—the agency must be able to detect 

violations of safeguards agreements and the NPT and 

be clear about the consequences if countries do not cooperate in addressing violations. 

PROSPECTS FOR REFORM

Goal conflict within the IAEA will not make resolving these challenges easy. The agency has at least three 

major goal conflicts. First, member states are unclear 

about whether the agency should privilege promoting nuclear power, preventing military diversions, or 

maximizing safety. Article II of the Agency’s statute 

provides for the first two missions simultaneously: 

The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the 

contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and 

prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so 

far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its 

request or under its supervision or control is not used 

in such a way as to further any military purpose.46

The goals of promoting peaceful use and preventing diversion are in conflict if nuclear power expansion makes identifying diversion more difficult because inspectors look for the “needles” of diversion 

in a bigger nuclear haystack, with more nuclear facilities, materials, transfers, and knowledge around the 

world. Furthermore, if, after Fukushima, the agency 
290

devotes more of its budget to safety and less to other 

aims, then the agency’s missions are locked in a zero 

sum game. 

Second, the agency’s responsibilities for inspection 

and verification conflict with member states’ desire 

for control and secrecy in nuclear energy. The agency wants unfettered access to facilities for safety and 

safeguards inspections and verification, but member 

states want their companies to protect proprietary information and want IAEA inspectors to have as little 

interference as possible with industrial routines. As 

the nuclear facilities under safeguards expand beyond 

light-water reactors, new safeguards demands may 

make reconciling these conflicts more difficult. Third, 

the agency’s conflicts over budget growth will force a 

choice as the number of states and kinds of facilities 

under safeguards expands. The agency can choose to 

constrain budget growth to near 0 percent a year and 

keep staff and financial burdens on member states to 

a minimum, or it can expand budget obligations on 

member states and expand its responsibilities and capacities. Each of these three goal conflicts will force 

the agency and its member states to make choices at 

higher levels of operations. 

The potential for goal conflicts prompts a question: 

Can the IAEA reasonably be expected to safeguard 

much larger nuclear programs throughout the world, 

including in many more countries than at present? 

Scaling up the agency’s operations, human capital, 

and technology at the same rate as has been done in 

the past is not sufficient, but the IAEA’s Secretariat 

can develop workarounds to improve performance. 

The agency can engage in selective scaling up, purchasing new surveillance equipment, better laboratory facilities, and training for inspectors. These efforts 
291

alone, however, are not sufficient, and the agency is 

not likely to dramatically increase its budget through 

the current financing structure. To reduce goal conflict 

and improve performance, the agency could reorganize according to mission, separating elements of the 

agency that promote nuclear power from those that 

conduct safeguards. The IAEA already has separate 

divisions, but the separation could go further, perhaps 

providing separate reports to the Board of Governors 

and to the director general, leaving it to the director 

general to find the appropriate balance among organizational goals and not to bureaucrats further down 

the organizational chart. This might resemble the 

competing intelligence analysis given to the President 

of the United States after intelligence reorganization 

following September 2001.47

Simply grafting a new branch onto an organization may not prove to be sufficient separation among 

divisions. To incorporate additional perspectives in 

the decisionmaking process, the IAEA could seek new 

sources of funding based not just on membership but 

on use.48 The current safeguards funding structure has 

a free rider problem in that those who benefit from nuclear power do not always pay more for safeguards, 

and those who do not benefit sometimes pay an 

amount disproportionate to their use. The excessive 

payers are especially reluctant to increase safeguards 

funding. Nevertheless, countries that benefit more 

from nuclear power could ante up for safeguards. Industry, too, could contribute to safeguards based on 

use either through member states or through other 

bodies. Some IAEA officials balk at the idea of anyone 

other than member states contributing to the agency’s 

work since it is a creature of member states. Yet nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have made con-
292

tributions to safeguards before, and Taiwan pays a 

safeguards fee even though it is not a member state. 

While the agency can seek new sources of funding 

to meet new challenges, the agency could also be honest about its limits. If governments and NGOs were 

more aware of the technical and political limits of the 

agency’s capacity, then they may not be so quick to 

give the agency new missions or to spread nuclear 

materials around the globe, both of which would 

make the agency’s job easier than it would be otherwise. Former Secretary General Mohamed ElBaradei’s memoir presents an expansive portrayal of the 

agency’s powers, which may undermine the agency’s 

authority in the long term if it is shown to be perpetually underperforming compared to expectations.49 For 

instance, ElBaradei asserts that the agency can, with 

the AP, declare that a state has no undeclared material. But proving the negative is impossible. The UN 

Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission 

conducted inspections in Iraq and did not find weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but it could not prevent the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was justified on the grounds that Iraq had WMD. 

Better transparency about performance goals 

could help the agency be more clear about its limits. 

Agencies resist establishing and publicizing data for 

a host of reasons: outcomes are difficult to measure; 

inequalities breed envy; and publicity could spawn a 

media blame-game. Nevertheless, performance metrics could help improve performance or secure more 

resources, even if the agency falls short. If the agency 

perpetually underperforms, it could make a case that 

member states expect far too much. The agency has 

developed quantitative measures of performance such 

as “timeliness detection” and “risk of early detection,” 
293

but it is difficult to find data on these measures. Traditionally, on-site verification efforts concentrated on 

the states with the largest nuclear programs, not on 

the programs that necessarily posed the greatest proliferation risks. Under traditional safeguards, “60 percent of the agency’s verification efforts was expended 

in just three states,” according to IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards Herman Nackaerts.50 Thus, 

the more materials and sites a state declared, the more 

it was inspected, independent of any analysis of the 

proliferation risk in a state or the state’s history of 

cooperation. The IAEA is moving toward a system in 

which it evaluates state declarations for their consistency and thoroughness, and away from evaluating 

and measuring facilities. If the agency can develop 

relatively neutral criteria for evaluating state declaration, however, the state-level criteria could prove useful, especially when combined with other measures, 

such as timeliness detection.51

Perhaps because of the agency’s exceptional professionalism among international organizations, and 

because of successes in the cases of North and South 

Korea, some politicians and the IAEA’s own leaders 

overstate the capabilities of the agency. Yet the safeguards system is fragile, and, without reform, more 

countries will advance to the brink of building weapons, even as they maintain their legal obligations under the NPT’s right to peaceful use. 

Some reformers advocate improving the IAEA’s 

technical abilities and giving more discretion to the 

agency’s Secretariat.52 Not doing so, they argue, would 

risk further politicizing issues in the UN Security 

Council, where countries would pander to their most 

powerful constituencies. The UN Security Council 

lacks neutral dispute resolution procedures unlike, for 
294

example, the World Trade Organization. Meanwhile, 

the IAEA has more legal authority than it uses. The 

agency’s statute allows for it to suspend technical cooperation to problematic member states who value the 

agency’s expertise, and the agency could ask for the 

international Court of Justice or other litigation bodies 

to intervene in disputes. In short, working around the 

UN Security Council gives the agency the best chance 

at deterring violators.

Another school of thought advocates reform in cooperation with the UN Security Council and the UN 

as the best path forward for the IAEA. The UN Security Council and UN are the most effective bodies 

for aggregating world opinion and for legitimate enforcement action, the argument goes, and their participation is essential in an equitable system of nonproliferation that imposes consequences for violations. 

Not all consequences should be punitive, however. 

Studies of regulation enforcement show that different 

kinds of violators respond to different kinds of consequences.53 For example, regulators should be reasonable toward more cooperative organizations, harsh 

with chronic evaders, and conciliatory with repentant 

organizations.

Mohamed ElBaradei has been a leading proponent 

of comprehensive reform, recommending that the 

IAEA and the UN Security Council work together to, 

“effectively deter, detect, and respond to possible proliferation cheats.”54 Former Head of the Department of 

Safeguards Pierre Goldschmidt warns that if reform 

is not adopted, “we will see more of the same and we 

should not be surprised if one day Iran withdraws 

from the NPT and other states like Syria continue to 

deny the IAEA access to suspect locations.”55 In other 

words, he predicts a breakdown of the nonprolifera-
295

tion system. Goldschmidt offers a series of thoughtful 

international-level reforms. These include: 

imposing penalties for withdrawal from the NPT; announcing that safeguards agreements and the IAEA’s 

power of special inspection will outlast withdrawal; 

giving the agency new tools for monitoring the nuclear trade; and being clear and objective about when a 

violation occurs and the steps a country must take to 

address the violation; and, in some cases, imposing 

penalties for violations that would ultimately improve 

the agency’s effectiveness and credibility.56

When asked about these proposals, experts in the 

nonproliferation community provided few solid arguments against them except that they will be difficult 

to achieve. Enacting these reforms will require that 

enough interested governments take the matter to 

the international community, specifically the UN and 

the UN Security Council. In the meantime, the IAEA 

can do its part by sounding the alarm for reform and 

calling attention to the limits to what it can safeguard, 

especially if nuclear power expands. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. Safeguards Glossary, 2001 Edition,” International Atomic 

Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria, p. 23, available from www-pub.

iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/NVS3_prn.pdf. Inspection intervals are based on the time required to divert a significant quantity for non-peaceful uses, but a significant quantity 

could be more than enough to make a bomb. The IAEA safeguards 

glossary defines significant quantity as: “the approximate amount 

of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a 

nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”

2. “World Energy Outlook for 2010,” International Energy 

Agency, Paris, France, 2010, p. 1. 
296

3. Citigroup Global Markets finds recent delays in construction in several new nuclear power plants reduce the likelihood 

that nuclear power will be considered a viable investment by the 

market. Citigroup finds that nuclear power investments are economically viable only when governments intervene in the market 

to provide explicit assurances of a minimum return on investment. Peter Atherton et al., “New Nuclear: The Economics Say 

No,” Citigroup, November 2009, p. 4-6, available from npolicy.org/

article_file/New_Nuclear-The_Economics_Say_No.pdf.

4. Ibid, p. 8.

5. “Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries,” World Nuclear Association, London, UK, May 2012, available from www.world-nuclear.

org/info/inf102.html.

6. Ryan Lizza, “As the World Burns,” New Yorker, October 

11, 2010. 

7. Heather Timmons, “Emerging Economies Move Ahead 

With Nuclear Plans,” The New York Times, March 14, 2011; Trevor 

Findlay, “The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030 and its Implications for Safety, Security and Nonproliferation: Overview,” The 

Centre for International Governance Innovation, Waterloo, Ontario, 

Canada, 2010; Jaeyeon Woo, “Seoul’s U.A.E. Deal Caps Big Sales 

Push,” The Wall Street Journal, December 29, 2009. 

8. Yukiya Amano, “International Cooperation Vital for Nuclear Renaissance,” Le Monde, March 7, 2010.

9. “World Energy Outlook 2011,” International Energy Agency,

Paris, France, p. 2.

10. “India Needs Nuclear Energy, Says PM Manmohan 

Singh,” BBC News India, March 27, 2012, available from www.bbc.

co.uk/news/world-asia-india-17520589.

11. Atherton et al., p. 3.

12. “Safeguards Statement for 2010,” International Atomic 

Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria, available from www.iaea.org/

OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es/es2010.html.
297

13. Herman Nackaerts, “A Changing Nuclear Landscape: 

Preparing for Future Verification Challenges,” International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 

Vienna, Austria, February 2, 2011, available from www.iaea.org/

newscenter/statements/ddgs/2011/nackaerts020211.html. The IAEA’s 

2009 projections high growth scenario forecast that nuclear power production could double by 2030, and its low-growth scenario 

has nuclear power production increasing by about 40 percent. See 

IAEA, Energy Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period 

up to 2030, Vienna, Austria, 2009.

14. Olli Heinonen, “Belfer Center Release,” Cambridge, MA: 

Harvard University, October 12, 2010, available from www.iaea.

org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2009/table_a5.pdf.

15. “The Agency’s Programme and Budget, 2010-11,” International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria, August 2009, available from www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/GC53Documents/

English/gc53-5_en.pdf.

16. “Annual Reports, 1987-2010,” International Atomic Energy 

Agency, Vienna, Austria. 

17. “Safeguards Glossary, 2001 Edition,” International Atomic 

Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria, p. 23, available from www-pub.

iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/NVS3_prn.pdf.

18. Mark Hibbs, “The Unspectacular Future of the IAEA Additional Protocol,” Carnegie Proliferation Analysis, April 26, 2012. 

19. Lucia D’Acunto, Tamas Vinko, and Johan Pouwelse, “Do 

BitTorrent-like VoD Systems Scale under Flash-Crowds?” IEEE 

Communications Society P2P 2010 Proceedings Paper, 2010.

20. Yingwu Zhu, Xiaoyu Yang, Yiming Hu, “Making Search 

Efficient on Gnutella-like P2P Systems,” Proceedings of the 19th 

IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium, 2005; A. Rowstron and P. Druschel, “Pastry: Scalable, decentralized object location, and routing for large-scale peer-to-peer 

systems,” Proceedings of the 18th IFIP/ACM International Conference 

on Distributed System Platforms (Middleware), Heidelberg, Germany, November 2001, pp. 329–350.
298

21. Henry Petroski, Success through Failure: The Paradox of Design, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006, pp. 95-96.

22. “IAEA Mission Statement,” available from www.iaea.org/

About/mission.html. On the relationship of declared to undeclared 

sites, see IAEA, The IAEA’s Safeguards System, Ready for the 21st 

Century, Vienna, Austria, undated, available from www.iaea.org/

Publications/Booklets/Safeguards2/part5.html.

23. This authority is in accord with non-nuclear weapons states 

who are members of the NPT under the Model Safeguards Agreement pursuant to IAEA INFCIRC 153. For more on how the agency 

interpreted its safeguards mission in the past, see Herman Nackaerts, “IAEA Safeguards Cooperation as the Key to Change,” talk 

to the INMM 52nd Annual Meeting, July 18, 2011, available from 

www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/IAEA_Safeguards_Cooperation

_as_the_Key_to_Change.pdf.

24. “Safeguards Glossary,” available from www-pub.iaea.org/

MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/NVS3_prn.pdf.

25. See Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful 

Atom, Henry Sokolski, ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008.

26. Performance according to timeliness detection goals is reported in the Safeguards Implementation Report. Annual and facilities-specific data is not available to the public, but occasionally 

the agency reveals performance data as an illustration in various 

reports. In the United States, relevant bureaucrats and congressional committees have access to this data. 

27. For a chronology of the IAEA’s discoveries in North Korea, see the agency’s fact sheet available from www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeadprk/fact_sheet_may2003.shtml.

28. Pierre Goldschmidt, “Looking Beyond Iran and North Korea for Safeguarding the Foundations of Nuclear Nonproliferation,” see Chap. 11 in this volume, p. 1.
299

29. Fred Charles Iklé, “After Detection: What?” Foreign Affairs, 

Vol. 39, No. 2, January 1961, pp. 208-220.

30. See the Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges, Vienna, Austria, November 

1-5, 2010, available from www-pub.iaea.org/iaeameetings/38095/

Symposium-on-International-Safeguards-Preparing-for-FutureVerification-Challenges.

31. Pierre Goldschmidt, “Identifying the Right Skills and 

Expertise for the Challenges of the 21st Century: Where to Find 

Them? How to Retain Them?” IAEA Safeguards Symposium, 

Vienna, Austria, November 1, 2010.

32. IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Vienna, Austria, 2002, p. 1, available from www.iaea.org/

Publications/Factsheets/English/S1_Safeguards.pdf.

33. The IAEA often makes statements such as, “With wider 

access, broader information and better use of technology, the 

Agency’s capability to detect and deter undeclared nuclear material or activities is significantly improved.” While this is probably true, better technology and more information is only half 

the battle. What to do after detection is the other half. See “IAEA 

Safeguards: Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Atomic Energy Agency Information Series Division of Public 

Information Factsheet, 2002. 

34. Herman Nackaerts, “IAEA Safeguards: Cooperation as 

the Key to Change,” Keynote Address to the INMM 52nd Annual 

Meeting, July 18, 2011.

35. Borzou Daragahi, “Details Told of Libya’s Nuclear Bid,” 

The Los Angeles Times, September 13, 2008.

36. Elbaradei, “Coming Clean Background,” PBS NewHour, 

December 30, 2003.

37. Joby Warrick, “IAEA Says Foreign Expertise Has Brought 

Iran to Threshold of Nuclear Capability,” The Washington Post, 

November 6, 2011.
300

38. Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist: 

The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World’s Most Dangerous Secrets . . . And How We Could Have Stopped Him, New York: Twelve 

Books, 2007; Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: 

Pakistan, the United States and the Global Nuclear Weapons Conspiracy, New York: Walker & Company, 2005. 

39. Paul Kerr, “IAEA: Seoul’s Nuclear Sins in the Past,” Arms 

Control Today, December 2004.

40. IAEA, Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security, Vienna, Austria, May 2005, p. 2, available from www.iaea.

org/Publications/Booklets/nuke.pdf.

41. Dapo Odulaja, “Broader Use of Statistical Techniques 

in the Design of Advanced Safeguards Approaches,” 2010 Safeguards Symposium: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges,

Vienna, Austria, November 2010, p. 3.

42. It is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain actual data on 

the relationship between the probability that random inspections 

will take place within the timeframe of detection goals. The IAEA 

does make some theoretical models for random inspections and 

timeliness goals available, but these models do not necessarily 

reflect practice.

43. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency, OTAISS-615, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 

1995, p. 45; Marvin M. Miller, “Are IAEA Safeguards on Plutonium Bulk-Handling Facilities Effective?” Washington, DC: Nuclear Control Institute, August 1990, available from www.nci.org/k-m/

mmsgrds.htm.

44. The first clause of article IV of the NPT reads: “Nothing in 

this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of 

all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and 

use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.”
301

45. Peter Crall, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: An Interview with 

Iranian Ambassador to the IAEA Ali Asghar Soltanieh,” Arms 

Control Today, October 2011. 

46. IAEA, Article II.

47. Richard A. Posner, Uncertain Shield: The U.S. Intelligence 

System in the Throes of Reform, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, 2006, pp. 55-86; John Diamond and Judy Keen, 

“Bush’s Daily Intel Briefing Revamped,” USA Today, August 25, 

2005, p. A1; Douglas Jehl, “Intelligence Briefing for Bush is Overhauled,” The New York Times, July 20, 2005, p. A18.

48. Tom Shea and Henry Sokolski have suggested this idea. 

See Falling Behind, pp. 13, 36. 

49. Mohamed ElBaradei, The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2011. 

For example, the agency said that it is not yet “in a position to 

conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.” This assumes that the agency could potentially be in 

such a position. See the “Report on the Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2006/15, International Atomic Energy Agency, February 27, 2006.

50. Herman Nackaerts, “IAEA Safeguards Cooperation as the 

Key to Change,” talk to the INMM 52nd Annual Meeting, July 

18, 2011, available from www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/IAEA_

Safeguards_Cooperation_as_the_Key_to_Change.pdf.

51. In “IAEA Safeguards Cooperation as the Key to Change,” 

Nackaerts describes the new safeguards thusly: 

This means moving away from such a heavy reliance on 

routine quantitative measurements and the mechanistic application of generic criteria. Instead, it requires taking into 

account a wide range of factors—qualitative and quantitative, reaching an informed judgment based upon a detailed 

analysis and evaluation of all the information available to 

the Agency, and then deciding to act accordingly. To do 
302

this, our focus needs to be on each State as a whole, rather 

than solely on the nuclear material and particular facilities 

within that State.

52. Sebastian Harnish, “Minilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-Building: The E3/EU-3 Iran Initiative,” European 

Security, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 1-27.

53. John T. Scholz, “Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement,” Law & Policy, Vol. 6, Issue 4, October 1984, 

pp. 385-404.

54. Mohamed ElBaradei, “A Recipe for Survival,” The New 

York Times, February 16, 2009, available from www.nytimes.

com/2009/02/16/opinion/16iht-edelbaradei.1.20216338.html?_

r=1&pagewanted=all.

55. Pierre Goldschmidt, E-mail Interview with author, 

December 4, 2011.

56. “Looking Beyond Iran and North Korea for Safeguarding 

the Foundations of Nuclear Nonproliferation.”
303

CHAPTER 10

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

INSPECTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE

Olli Heinonen

The nuclear nonproliferation regime continues to 

face a broad array of challenges. It is easy to see why 

new solutions are needed. The world is undergoing 

rapid changes on many fronts—including technologically. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force 40 years ago. It should not surprise 

us that the solutions of 1970 are not a perfect fit to the 

challenges of the 21st century. In particular, during the 

last 2 decades, we have seen three major developments 

related to nuclear proliferation: (1) the increased dissemination of nuclear technology and nuclear “knowhow”; (2) a renewed drive on the part of (a few) state 

as well as nonstate actors seeking to acquire nuclear 

weapons; and (3) the emergence of clandestine nuclear 

procurement networks. The following reality is before 

us: Either we continue to overcome the vulnerabilities 

or accept a nominal international nuclear safeguards 

system. Some improvements to the system do require 

political will and agreement, but there are also technical fixes that can be implemented by the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in capitalizing on its 

verifications objectives and without additional external endowed authorities. 

Which, then, are the areas that the IAEA should 

focus on in providing for a more effective safeguards 

regime? Looking back, proliferation cases of the last 2 

decades have shared several common features. Proliferation countries used clandestine facilities and 
304

exploited loopholes within the IAEA verifications 

system itself, such as acquiring nuclear material like 

uranium from ore or yellow cake where no actual 

IAEA verification is applied. Much of the clandestine 

work also took place at undeclared/unreported facilities. The logic is simple—the IAEA verification system 

is good enough to detect diversion of nuclear material 

but still falls short of any foolproof method to detect 

clandestine facilities or, to a certain extent, a misuse of 

declared facilities. Efforts have been made to address 

these deficiencies. The IAEA verification system was 

overhauled 15 years ago by providing the inspectorate with more access rights, namely introducing the 

Additional Protocol and an early provision of design 

information. A state-level approach system was also 

implemented, where the state’s nuclear program is assessed annually using a holistic method. Equally vital 

to the IAEA’s verification scheme was the inculcation 

of an investigative inspection culture, a cornerstone to 

complement better access and information provided 

for under a reformed verification regime.

At the same time, while approaching safeguards 

from a more critical approach, the IAEA state level 

concept system also has, as its byproduct, a reduction 

of actual on-site inspection activities by complementing it with enhanced information analysis. This means 

that the physical presence of inspectors, the eyes and 

arms of the international community, at the nuclear 

installations is less frequent but occurs at a fairly predictable rate. By and large, this is a progressive step 

for the Agency to provide for cost effectiveness while 

stepping up and maintaining safeguards assurances. 

For the state level approach to function optimally, all 

the ingredients must be in place to ensure broader 

conclusions are drawn on a state’s nuclear activities 

and cooperation from states themselves. 
305

Concerns are certainly heightened when a state 

uses sensitive technologies such as uranium enrichment or reprocessing. Article III of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) lays down as the objective 

to prevent diversion of nuclear energy to nuclear 

weapons. This objective is wider than just the detection of diversion of nuclear material. Is the Agency’s 

verifications system able to see those indications? 

To better understand the modifications and fixes 

needed, it is important to look at the current verification system. One is in the area of nuclear “transparency.” Another is in the area of expanding unannounced 

and special inspections. A third is in the area of monitoring to prevent a “breakout” scenario.

UNANNOUNCED INSPECTIONS

Routine inspections—the most common type of 

inspections—are carried out according to a defined 

schedule. The Agency ́s right to carry out routine 

inspections under comprehensive safeguards agreements is limited to those locations within a declared 

nuclear facility, or other locations containing nuclear 

material, through which nuclear material is expected 

to flow (strategic points). The safeguards agreement 

also has a provision that allows for unannounced inspections. Unannounced inspections have been the 

core of safeguards at enrichment plant sites but are 

rarely used elsewhere. 

Unannounced inspections in reality are not quite 

as its name implies but are carried out with a short advance notice, typically about 2 hours, so that appropriate security arrangements can be completed and the 

state inspectors can be present. These requirements 

arise from the subsidiary arrangements concluded be-
306

tween the IAEA and inspected state. Such short notice 

inspections have been carried out at the light water 

reactors in South Korea, where they form part of a 

quality assurance component of remote monitoring 

that is being applied. In Japan, such inspections have 

been used at its fuel fabrications plants to monitor nuclear material flow. At the uranium enrichment plants 

worldwide, this scheme has been used to ensure that 

the enrichment cascades are not modified or used to 

produce high-enriched uranium. More recently, the 

short notice inspections have also been modified to 

cover nuclear material flows at the enrichment plants. 

Currently, the IAEA annually conducts a total of 

few hundred person-days of unannounced inspections, which are only a fraction of the total annual 

8,000 person-days of inspection. The unpredictability 

of such (unannounced) inspections is meant to enhance the effectiveness of the inspection regime. They 

are also incorporated with the Agency’s integrated as 

well as traditional safeguards approaches. Many other steps also go into providing assurances, inter alia, 

periodical confirmation of nuclear material balances, 

covering of credible scenarios for diversion of nuclear material and misuse of facilities, and detection of 

signs of turning nuclear material for weapons purposes before it actually takes place. The implementation 

parameters between traditional and integrated safeguards approaches may differ from each other, but in 

both cases, the verification system has to ensure that 

the detection probabilities remain high and timely.
307

SPECIAL INSPECTIONS

The IAEA also has in its toolbox the authority to 

conduct “special inspections.” The term “special inspection” has an unnecessarily negative connotation 

that resulted from the circumstances under which it 

was discussed in the past. Cases linked to the call for 

special inspections to be evoked included North Korea, Iran, and Syria. States, indeed, would not suffer 

any disadvantage from the use of special inspections. 

On the contrary, the possibility of dispelling doubts 

through such inspections should be an advantage to 

all except those states who have violated their commitments. A debate in the Board on the use of special inspections will not, under current circumstances, 

bring a solution to the problem of its use. Rather, the 

IAEA Secretariat should be constantly encouraged to 

use all its inspection rights, including that of special 

inspections as an option. The proliferation cases mentioned previously also reveal that the IAEA deputy 

general’s position and interpretation is instrumental 

in the willingness to evoke special inspection procedures. To date, it appears that the bar of its actual use 

remains unnecessarily high. 

Nuclear Transparency.

In the early-1990s, during IAEA Board discussions 

on strengthening the Agency’s safeguards, former 

Deputy General Hans Blix advocated “transparency 

visits” to clarify questions and ambiguities on several 

states’ nuclear programs. The IAEA conducted several 

such visits to North Korea, South Korea, Iran, Taiwan, 

and South Africa. Such visits were also carried out at 

a later date to remove some ambiguities in Japan and 
308

elsewhere. The outcomes of the various transparency 

visits were of mixed success. In the case of North Korea and Iran, the alarm bell had not rung on the clandestine activities of their nuclear programs.

Instead, transparency visits to Iran in the 1990s provided a false sense of security, both within the IAEA 

as well as to the larger international community. The 

IAEA provided assurances through press statements 

following each of the various transparency visits 

made to Iran, without inspectors taking environmental samples (with one exception) or conducting more 

technical investigations. This significance cannot be 

understated since inspectors did come up with proof 

of undeclared nuclear material. 

Short of an implemented Additional Protocol that 

provides the legal basis for more intrusive inspections, transparency visits also remained at the behest 

of the “goodwill” of the inspected state. Moreover, the 

limitations of transparency visits were not well understood by the Board and the public. As such, it was 

unclear whether assurances made by the IAEA about 

a lack of evidence of external reports of undeclared 

nuclear activities undertaken in Iran at sites visited by 

the IAEA were derived as a result of rigorous safeguards carried out. The danger of providing a sense of 

complacency had telling consequences on implementing safeguards in Iran years down the road, as we are 

now witnessing. 

The Secretariat should be clear that transparency 

implies openness, communication, and accountability. 

Occasional visits by diplomats or invitations to IAEA 

officials do not replace Iran’s Nonproliferation Treaty, 

the United Nations (UN) Security Council, and IAEA 

obligations. Since Iran continues to remain in deficit 

in fulfilling those international requests, it is in equal 
309

deficit in its transparency with regard to its actions 

and nuclear activities.

MONITORING TO PREVENT NUCLEAR 

BREAKOUT SCENARIOS

In proliferation cases such as Iran where there 

remains risks involved for a breakout scenario with 

the presence of enrichment and unresolved military 

dimensions on its nuclear program, the case for effective nuclear verifications is at the same time both 

more important and more challenging. For the case 

of Iran, an Additional Protocol-plus type of agreement implemented in a cooperative manner by Iran 

would be required. There are also important distinctions to be made between Iran and other countries 

that conduct enrichment or have a developed nuclear 

fuel cycle. Japan, Germany, and the Netherlands, for 

example, are presented as “latent or virtual nuclear 

weapon states.” There are four differences in these 

countries compared to Iran: there are no indications 

of nuclear weapon related research and development; 

these states are in compliance with the terms of their 

safeguards agreements; they are applying additional 

protocols; and they do not appear to have uranium 

enrichment excess to their needs. Prevailing conditions in these countries may change over time. With 

proper safeguards in place, detection should be easier 

to detect at an early stage. 

This brings up a related point concerning the 

IAEA’s reporting practices. The vital nature of noticing and reporting early signs in any state that could 

involve potential diversion or cause for suspicion 

of safeguards failures cannot be overstressed. Early 

corrective measures can be useful. In more serious 
310

cases of potential subversion of peaceful nuclear use, 

early notification to the IAEA Board, including on 

safeguards implementation problems, can provide 

for more timely ratification or ramifications. To this 

end, the IAEA Annual Safeguards Implementation Report

would also benefit from more detailed findings and 

conclusions drawn and written in a more targeted approach to fulfilling such assurances.

CONCLUSION

As measures are developed to continue to 

strengthen the IAEA verifications regime, it is equally 

important to ensure its thorough implementation and 

maximum effectiveness. A robust IAEA inspections 

regime contributes directly to preventing, detecting, 

and deterring untoward nuclear activities. This is no 

easy task. To this end, critical self-reflection, recognition of weaknesses in the inspections system, and 

seeking the best possible solutions are necessary to 

provide the meaningful assurances to uphold nuclear 

nonproliferation.

ENDNOTES—CHAPTER 10

1. International Atomic Energy Agency, Press Release 92/11, 

February 14, 1992.
311

CHAPTER 11

LOOKING BEYOND IRAN AND NORTH KOREA 

FOR SAFEGUARDING THE FOUNDATIONS 

OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Pierre Goldschmidt

Those who do not remember the past are condemned 

to repeat it.

 George Santanaya1

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are both the principal means of verifying a 

state’s compliance with international nuclear obligations, as well as detecting the potential transgression 

of these obligations. In the coming years, the IAEA 

will be asked to safeguard an increasing number of 

nuclear facilities, including new types of facilities 

(such as laser enrichment and pyroprocessing plants, 

floating nuclear power plants, and nuclear propelled 

submarines) and decommissioned ones. It will need 

additional funds to procure new types of and more 

effective equipment,2

 and expertise to carry out these 

additional responsibilities.3

But the real issue does not stem from resource 

constraints. Even with greater human and financial 

resources, there is nothing more the Agency would 

have done in fulfilling its verification mandate in Iran 

and North Korea. The real constraint was identified by 

current IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards 

Herman Nackaerts in a July 2011 speech:
312

Experience has shown that proliferation risk is not 

only associated with the amount of declared nuclear 

material that a State possesses or the number and type 

of declared facilities. Indeed, the major proliferation 

challenges have arisen in States with limited nuclear 

fuel cycle facilities, and involved previously exempted 

or undeclared nuclear material. . . . [The safeguards] 

system was manifestly failing in its primary objective, 

namely, to detect activities that did raise potential 

compliance issues and proliferation concerns—such 

as those undertaken, for instance, in Iraq, Libya, Syria 

and Iran.4 

There are two main reasons the safeguards system 

has been “manifestly failing.” First, the Department of 

Safeguards does not have the legal authority it needs 

to fulfill its mandate and to provide the assurances the 

international community is expecting from its verification activities. Second, the Department lacks the 

necessary cooperation and transparency from Member States of the IAEA. Redressing both deficiencies 

would significantly strengthen the role of IAEA safeguards in preventing further proliferation. 

LIMITED LEGAL AUTHORITIES

Under the Article III.A.5 of the IAEA Statute, 

safeguards are: 

designed to ensure that special fissionable and other 

materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information . . . under [Agency] supervision or control are not 

used in such a way as to further any military purpose.5

To reach that objective, Article XII.A.6 provides 

that the Agency will have the right and responsibility: 
313

to send into the territory of the recipient State inspectors . . . who shall have access at all times to all places 

and data and to any person who by reason of his occupation deals with materials, equipment, or facilities 

which are required by this Statute to be safeguarded, 

as necessary . . . to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in furtherance 

of any military purpose.6

This excellent and forward looking mandate was 

agreed to more than half a century ago. Unfortunately, in practice, the commitments accepted by Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWSs) under Comprehensive 

Safeguards Agreements (CSA)7

 and even the Additional Protocol (AP)8

 are much more limited.9

Under a CSA (with or without an AP), a state has 

the right to construct a uranium enrichment facility 

and to produce not only low-enriched uranium (LEU), 

but also highly-enriched uranium (HEU), or to extract 

plutonium from spent nuclear fuel, as long as these 

activities and material are declared and placed under 

IAEA safeguards. This right holds even if there is no 

clear economic justification for undertaking these activities. However, in such a case, it seems legitimate 

for the international community to wonder, in light 

of Article III.A.5 of the IAEA statute, whether such 

legal activities are undertaken in furtherance of any 

military purpose. 

It is likely that in the future, should they decide to 

do so, an increasing number of NNWSs will acquire 

the necessary scientific, technical, and industrial capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. To increase 

the likelihood that those states will be deterred from 

making such a decision—most likely under maximum 

secrecy, since it would be a clear violation of Article 

II of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—it 
314

is necessary that the international community be informed of any indications of nuclear weapons activities as soon as possible. Maximum IAEA scrutiny in 

such states should therefore be a priority. 

Some possible indicators that would raise suspicion about a military nuclear program include: 

• The state has denied or unjustifiably delayed 

access to locations by IAEA inspectors and/or 

is not fully cooperating with the Agency;

• There is a domestic enrichment or reprocessing 

facility in a state that has no AP in force;

• The state is producing and stockpiling uranium enriched beyond 5 percent uranium 235 

(U-235);

• The state’s military establishment is directly or 

indirectly involved in “peaceful” nuclear-related activities (including procurement);

• The state has previously been found in breach 

or in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement;

• There has been a nuclear weapons program in 

the past;

• The state has publicly threatened to withdraw 

from the NPT;

• There are serious indications that the state is 

acquiring or developing the non-nuclear components of a nuclear device;10

• The state is developing or otherwise acquiring 

ballistic missiles or other means of delivering 

nuclear warheads; and,

• There is evidence that national scientists are 

undertaking research on nuclear explosions or 

related disciplines suitable to nuclear weapons 

development.
315

These individual activities may not be illegal,11

but a combination of many of them in the same state 

should be a matter of concern and a reason for the 

IAEA to increase its verification activities in and scrutiny of that state. If the Agency is unable to do so because the state is not fully cooperating, the secretariat 

should explicitly report these findings to the IAEA 

Board of Governors, at least in the publicly available background statement of the annual Safeguards 

Implementation Report (SIR). 

IMPROVING COOPERATION AND 

TRANSPARENCY

All states that have been called out by the IAEA 

secretariat for failing to report nuclear material and 

activities in accordance with their safeguards obligations were implementing a State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (SSAC), which 

was not fully independent of nuclear operators and 

state authorities, and did not provide unrestricted 

access and cooperation to IAEA inspectors. This has 

been the case in Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, the Republic of Korea, Egypt, and Syria. It is therefore not 

surprising to note that under “Areas of Difficulty in 

Safeguards Implementation,” the SIR for the year 2010 

reports that: 

The performance of State and regional authorities and 

the effectiveness of SSACs and RSACs [Regional Systems of Accounting and Control] have a significant 

impact upon the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation. In 2010, in some States SSACs 

still did not exist. Moreover, not all existing State and 

regional authorities have the necessary authority, independence from operators, resources and technical 
316

capabilities to administer the requirements of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. In particular, some States do not impose and verify proper 

nuclear material accountancy and control systems at 

nuclear facilities and LOFs [locations outside facilities] 

to ensure the required accuracy and precision of the 

data transmitted to the Agency.12

The 2008 SIR, for instance, stated: 

The Agency was informed in 2004 by Egypt’s SSAC, 

the Atomic Energy Authority (AEA), that it did not 

have the authority necessary for it to exercise effective control of all nuclear material and activities in the 

State. A Presidential Decree was issued in May 2006 

to redefine the AEA’s authority. Ministerial Decrees 

were issued in October 2006 for the practical implementation of the Presidential Decree. The AEA then 

undertook a State-wide investigation of its nuclear 

material holdings, during which additional, previously unreported, nuclear material was identified, including several depleted uranium items for which Egypt 

subsequently provided accounting reports.13

The Egyptian Atomic Energy Agency’s incomplete 

authority is an explanation, but not an excuse, for the 

lack of effective control of all nuclear material and 

activities in the State. 

This example demonstrates once more the necessity for the IAEA Board of Governors to request the 

Secretariat to provide an evaluation of the effectiveness and necessary independence of SSACs, starting 

with those states that have previously been found to 

be in breach of their safeguards obligations.14 It is as 

important to guarantee this independence and effectiveness (in particular in States with no AP in force) as 

it is to assess those of national safety authorities.15
317

In this regard, one wonders whether an objective 

evaluation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials would 

conclude that this organization is sufficiently independent from the operators of nuclear facilities and 

from the Brazilian and Argentinean authorities, and 

whether it fully and satisfactorily cooperates with 

the Agency. This last question is particularly relevant 

given that the 2010 SIR notes that short notice random 

inspections, which are critical to verifying material 

flows in conversion and fuel fabrication plans, are still 

under discussion and not yet being implemented in 

Argentina and Brazil.16

Although it is not public, it is rumored that the 

2010 SIR also mentions that three states restricted 

Agency access, two states did not report material that 

should have been reported, and three states did not 

permit environmental sampling. These are very important shortcomings and, for the sake of transparency, as well as effectiveness, the Secretariat should 

name these states. 

STRENGTHENING FOUNDATIONS OF 

NONPROLIFERATION

The objective of IAEA safeguards is to help prevent 

proliferation by deterring states from seeking nuclear 

weapons due to the risk of early discovery of a nuclear 

weapons program. For deterrence to be effective, states 

must be convinced that any deliberate noncompliance 

has a high probability of being detected early and that 

a noncompliant state that does not cooperate fully and 

proactively with the IAEA to resolve the problems 

will inevitably face serious consequences. Further, the 

Agency should be seen as exercising its existing legal 
318

authority to the fullest. In particular, whenever justified by the circumstances, it should promptly make 

use of its right to conduct special inspections at suspicious undeclared locations when states are otherwise 

denying access.17

Recently, the obligation of states to provide early 

design information about new facilities and the Agency’s right to verify it have been challenged by Iran’s 

refusal to comply with its safeguards obligations. The 

IAEA Director General should make it clear in a document to the Board of Governors that, when and where 

such refusals occur, they will be recognized for what 

they are: noncompliance. The Agency should not 

be complacent toward states that are violating their 

obligations. 

However, the weakest link in the nonproliferation 

regime today is not the performance of the IAEA Department of Safeguards, but that of the international 

community in responding to noncompliance. Before 

the next crisis occurs, generic procedures for responding to noncompliance should be discussed and agreed 

upon. With a “veil of ignorance” about which states 

might be involved in the future, such discussions 

should be easier and less acrimonious than in the heat 

of a specific crisis. Moreover, agreement upon a set 

of standard responses to be applied evenhandedly to 

any state found in noncompliance—regardless of who 

its allies might be—would significantly enhance the 

credibility of the nonproliferation regime. 

Against this background, a necessary first step is 

for the IAEA to acknowledge where it has acted inconsistently in the past. In particular, the Board of 

Governors should adopt a resolution recognizing 

that failures and breaches committed by South Korea 

and Egypt in 2004 and 2005 respectively, constituted 
319

cases of noncompliance with their safeguards agreements. This resolution, without seeking any punitive 

measure against either state, would correct damaging 

precedents by reasserting the impartiality and universality of procedures for reporting noncompliance as 

envisioned in the IAEA Statute. 

For its part, the United Nations (UN) Security 

Council should adopt legally-binding generic resolutions that would set out a “roadmap” for responding to noncompliance. Experience demonstrates that 

in investigating safeguards violations in a state not 

fully and proactively cooperating with the Agency, 

the IAEA needs, for some limited period of time, enhanced legally binding authority to conduct effective 

inspections in that state. Such authority extending beyond that provided by the AP can only be granted by 

a Chapter VII UN Security Council resolution.18

Furthermore, considering the precedent of North 

Korea’s 2003 withdrawal from the NPT, it would be 

wise to plan for the possibility of another state withdrawing as well. As a deterrent, it is essential that the 

UN Security Council adopts a Chapter VII resolution 

declaring that the withdrawal of a noncompliant state 

from the NPT is a threat to international peace and 

security. In order to secure the irreversibility of safeguards on nuclear material and sensitive fuel-cycle 

facilities even if a state withdraws from the NPT, the 

Board of Governors should urge all states with enrichment or reprocessing facilities to conclude “back-up” 

safeguards agreements that would not terminate in 

case of NPT withdrawal.19 Such a facility-specific safeguards agreement would be subsumed to the state’s 

CSA without any additional cost to either the state or 

the IAEA. Countries like Germany, the Netherlands, 

Japan, Brazil, and Argentina should lead by example.
320

The current difficulties in resolving the problems 

the IAEA is facing in Iran, North Korea, and Syria 

demonstrate the necessity to act now to ensure that, 

when the Agency confronts the next proliferation crisis, it has the tools, authority, and political support to 

avoid repeating history. 

If adopted, concrete measures such as those recommended would significantly strengthen the nonproliferation regime and make a real difference in protecting against nuclear proliferation. It depends now on 

the political will of key governments to make this a 

reality before the next crisis occurs.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

1. George Santayana (1863-1952) was a Spanish-American 

philosopher, essayist, poet, and novelist.

2. For instance, improved surveillance systems, seals, and 

containment verification equipment, portable and resident nondestructive assay equipment, and new types of equipment to increase the IAEA capability to detect possible undeclared nuclearrelated activities.

3. Including well-qualified and trained safeguards inspectors with analytical skills, as well as expertise and resources to 

carry out disarmament verification activities at the request of 

member states.

4. Herman Nackaerts, “IAEA Safeguards: Cooperation is the 

Key to Change,” presentation for the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, July 18, 2011, available from www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/IAEA_Safeguards_Cooperation_as_the_Key_to_

Change.pdf.

5. Statute of the IAEA, October 6, 1956, available from www.

iaea.org/About/statute.html.

6. Ibid.
321

7. See IAEA, The Structure and Content of Agreements between 

the Agency and States Required In Connection With the Treaty on the 

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), 

June 1972, available from www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/

Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf.

8. Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) 

and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), September 1997, available from 

www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf.

9. The main areas of limitation are relating to access to information, to persons, to locations, and to data and documents. 

A detailed analysis of these limitations and the way they should 

be corrected can be found in Pierre Goldschmidt, “IAEA Safeguards: Dealing preventively with noncompliance,” Washington, 

DC: Harvard University Belfer Center and Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace, July 12, 2008, available from www.

carnegieendowment.org/files/Goldschmidt_Dealing_

Preventively_7-12-08.pdf.

10. As long as no nuclear material is used, a state is entitled, 

without having to report to the Agency, to study and test the 

effect of shock waves on non-nuclear materials; to develop high 

explosives for high-precision applications such as shaped charges; to undertake theoretical studies of the effect of nuclear explosions; or to develop or procure neutron sources (e.g., for applications such as oil well logging) that can also be used as initiators 

in nuclear weapons. The NPT prohibits manufacture by NNWS 

of nuclear explosive devices. It seems generally accepted that this 

includes the production of components that would only have 

relevance to a nuclear explosive device.

11. Except the first one.

12. IAEA, Safeguards Statement for 2010, para. 43, available 

from www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/es2010.pdf.

13. Safeguards Statement for 2008, para. 45, available from www.

iaea.org/safeguards/documents/es2008.pdf.
322

14. Pierre Goldschmidt, “Concrete Steps to Improve the 

Nonproliferation Regime,”April 5, 2009, available from www.

carnegieendowment.org/2009/04/05/concrete-steps-to-improvenonproliferation-regime/4mp.

15. In 2007, the IAEA undertook an Integrated Regulatory 

Review Service of the Japanese Nuclear and Industrial Safety 

Agency (NISA). Among the 10 main recommendations made by 

the IAEA, almost 4 years before the Fukushima accident, were: 

“NISA should more clearly define its expectations with respect 

to reporting of minor inspection findings and events, in order to 

screen them for early identification before they become a problem”; and another one which also sounds particularly familiar to 

safeguards inspectors: 

NISA should ensure that its inspectors have the authority to 

carry out inspections at the site at any time, on a continual 

basis. This would ensure that inspectors have unfettered access to the site, to interview people, and to request the review of documents at any time rather than just at prescribed 

inspection times as in the law. This applies to both the construction and the operational inspection programmes.

IAEA, Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) to Japan, 

IAEA-NSNI-IRRS-2007/01, June 25-30, 2007, available from www.

nsr.go.jp/archive/nisa/genshiryoku/files/report.pdf.

16. Safeguards Statement for 2010, para. 46.

17. Delaying for months, or even years, a request for special 

inspection would, in most cases, be self-defeating because the 

state concerned would have plenty of time to remove any incriminating evidence.

18. A draft of such a resolution and the precise description of 

the necessary additional IAEA verification rights can be found in 

Annex I of Goldschmidt, “Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime.”

19. A facility-specific IAEA INFCIRC/66-type safeguards 

agreement, contrary to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, 

does not lapse when an NNWS withdraws from the NPT.
323

PART IV:

IGNORING NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

PROLIFERATION INTELLIGENCE

325

CHAPTER 12

CASTING A BLIND EYE: 

KISSINGER AND NIXON FINESSE 

ISRAEL’S BOMB1

Victor Gilinsky

It is now widely accepted that 1969 marked a 

turning point in U.S. policy regarding Israeli nuclear 

weapons. A “stopping point” may be a better description. The pivotal moment appears to have come in a 

private, unrecorded September 1969 meeting between 

Richard Nixon and Golda Meir: She is supposed to 

have admitted having the bomb, and Nixon is supposed to have promised that, as long as Israel kept 

its bomb under wraps, the United States would not 

ask questions about it. Up to that point, the United 

States had been urging Israel to join the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).2 After the 1969 meeting, as General 

Yitzhak Rabin (the Israeli Ambassador at the time) put 

it, the subject “dropped off the agenda.” In fact, the 

entire subject of Israeli nuclear weapons dropped off 

the U.S. foreign policy agenda.

This history is still important today because the 

subject is still off the U.S. agenda. In fact, the U.S. Government is still committed to keeping Israel off the 

international nonproliferation agenda.3 But the pretense of ignorance about Israeli bombs does not wash 

anymore. President Barack Obama looked foolish, or 

worse, when he said he did not want to “speculate” 

whether any countries in the Middle East had nuclear 

weapons. The evident double standard undermines 

efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons 

worldwide.5
326

It is useful, therefore, to try to understand the 1969 

origins of the current approach toward Israeli nuclear 

weapons and to inquire about the continuing validity 

of U.S. promises at the time. We have more material 

to work with, since a few years ago the Nixon Library 

released many Nixon-era White House documents 

related to Israeli nuclear weapons, including recommendations to the President from his national security 

advisor, Henry Kissinger. The released documents—

some of them formerly Top Secret—provide a fascinating glimpse into the White House policy reviews 

before the critical meeting with Meir.

The story has now been told in some detail, most 

recently by Avner Cohen, who used the 1969 NixonMeir meeting as the point of departure for his critique 

of Israel’s policy of “opacity,” or total secrecy about its 

bomb.6 What strikes me about this, and other accounts 

of the 1969 U.S. policy shift, is that, however interesting they are, these accounts are focused mainly on the 

Israeli side of the interaction. From my own brief look 

at the documents, there is rather more to the story of 

interest from the U.S. point of view.

Let me sketch some points that strike me about: (1) 

the Kissinger-directed White House policy analyses 

and recommendations; (2) Nixon’s own handling of 

the Israeli nuclear issue; and, (3) the current weight of 

Nixon’s promises to Meir, including any promise to 

shield Israel from the NPT.

NIXON SUBMITS THE NON-NUCLEAR 

PROLIFERATION TREATY FOR APPROVAL

It was President Nixon, by the way, who ratified 

U.S. membership in the NPT after President Lyndon 

Johnson had negotiated it and signed it. Nixon had no 
327

particular attachment to the Treaty—it does not even 

rate a mention in his memoirs—and neither did Kissinger.7 Still, Nixon submitted the NPT to the Senate 

soon after he entered office and received its approval 

in March 1969. Apparently, Nixon was persuaded the 

United States did not thereby give up any freedom of 

action. In any case, he had no intention of pressing 

other countries to adhere to it.8

 However little Nixon 

thought of the NPT, other senior officials did take 

it seriously, and the ratified Treaty formed part of 

the backdrop to dealing with Israel’s rapidly evolving 

nuclear weapons project. Since Israel was not one of 

the NPT-authorized five nuclear powers, the confrontation with Israel was to be the first test of the universality of the new Treaty.

DECISION ON PHANTOM II AIRCRAFT 

LEFT FROM THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

The immediate nuclear-related Israeli question 

Kissinger had to address actually had to do with conventional arms—whether to permit delivery of 50 F-4 

Phantom aircraft that Israel had bought in the last days 

of the Johnson administration. The F-4 was the top 

fighter-bomber in the world, and the Israelis wanted 

it badly. The outgoing administration had written into 

the F-4 contract the possibility of delivery cancellation 

if it appeared Israel was getting nuclear weapons.

The Defense and State Departments had wanted, 

as a condition of the F-4 sale, an explicit Israeli pledge 

not to build nuclear weapons.9 Israel offered instead 

its standard declaration that it would “not be the first 

country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle 

East.”10 The U.S. interpretation of this was that not “to 

introduce” nuclear weapons meant not to obtain them. 
328

But Rabin would not agree, nor would he provide an 

alternative definition. When Defense Assistant Secretary Paul Warnke, who was handling the plane sale, 

asked, “What do you mean by ‘introduce’?” Rabin responded with, “What do you mean by ‘nuclear weapon’?”11 The discussion went round and round until 

finally Rabin allowed—and this stuck as the Israeli 

interpretation—that an unadvertised and untested

nuclear device would not be a nuclear weapon. This 

made explicit that Israel’s declaration did not exclude 

physical possession of nuclear weapons.

Warnke would not yield on the F-4 sale, so Rabin 

found ways to get around the Department of Defense 

(DoD).12 Seventy senators signed a letter to the President supporting the sale. Arthur Goldberg and others 

spoke directly to President Johnson, who then ordered 

the DoD to approve the F-4 sale without conditions.13

Despite this order, Defense Secretary Clark Clifford 

permitted Warnke to say in his approval letter to Rabin 

that the United States retained the option to withhold 

delivery if Israel was not complying with its pledge 

not to introduce nuclear weapons—as the United 

States understood it.14 Since the planes were not yet 

built, the final decision on their delivery was left to 

the incoming Nixon administration.

KISSINGER LAUNCHES POLICY REVIEW ON 

ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPONS

To make the new administration’s decision more 

difficult, intelligence indicated the Israeli nuclear 

weapons project was advancing rapidly and possibly had already succeeded in producing bombs. 

(U.S. experts had been visiting Dimona more or less 

annually since the early-1960s, supposedly to ensure 
329

the work there stayed “peaceful,” but the Israelis had 

easily hoodwinked them.)15 Israel was also producing 

Jericho missiles, which, because of their low accuracy, 

could only have been intended for carrying nuclear 

warheads. Additionally, as Kissinger later informed 

the President, there was “circumstantial evidence that 

some fissionable material available for Israel’s weapons development was illegally obtained from the 

United States by about 1965.”16

It was against this background that Kissinger 

ran a White House study (National Security Study 

Memorandum [NSSM] 40) in mid-1969, responding 

to the issue of Israeli nuclear weapons. The principal 

participants were the DoD, the Department of State, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA). They all agreed that Israeli acquisition 

of nuclear weapons raised the prospect of a more dangerous Middle East and undermined efforts to control proliferation worldwide. They also agreed that a 

major U.S. effort to stop the Israelis was justified. But 

they did not agree on what that meant.

In truth, it was too late to stop the manufacture of Israel’s first bombs. Any possibility of keeping 

Israel from going any further depended entirely on 

the United States—on which Israel depended for advanced weapons—making this a firm condition of the 

weapons supply. But as the Johnson administration 

history showed, this condition would not be easy to 

make stick in the U.S. domestic political environment.

The DoD and the Joint Chiefs, as they did under 

the previous administration, advocated withholding delivery of the F-4 Phantom jets to gain an Israeli 

commitment not to build nuclear weapons or nuclear 

missiles, or at least not to deploy them. The State Department, on the other hand, wanted to avoid a con-
330

frontation with Israel, in part to preserve political capital for Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. It advocated 

keeping weapon sales and nuclear issues on separate 

tracks and proposed a series of well-meaning but ineffectual steps to deal with the nuclear issue.17 The State 

Department rationalized that there was still time for 

negotiations over the issue, that the Israelis had still 

not completed nuclear weapons, and that, in fact, they 

really only wanted a nuclear option and might stop 

on their own. If the Israelis did not stop, the State Department advised, we should at least “make a record 

for ourselves” of having tried to stop them.

In the hope of facilitating Israeli adherence to the 

NPT, the State Department offered the view that reasonable interpretation of the NPT’s Article III would 

draw the difference between maintaining and exercising the option to manufacture nuclear explosives. 

In other words, State was saying that so long as a 

country had not taken the last step in nuclear weapon 

manufacture, it could be judged to be in conformance 

with the Treaty.

In his recommendation to the President on possible Israeli adherence to the NPT, Kissinger went even 

further in watering down the meaning of the Treaty. 

He wrote:

The entire group agreed that, at a minimum, we want 

Israel to sign the NPT. This is not because signing will 

make any difference in Israel’s actual nuclear program 

because Israel could produce warheads clandestinely. 

Israel’s signature would, however, give us . . . a way of 

opening the discussion. It would also publicly commit 

Israel not to acquire nuclear weapons.

Kissinger apparently believed that the Israelis 

might actually sign the NPT—a course they pretend-
331

ed to be evaluating—with the thought of still keeping 

clandestine bombs. And he was willing to go along 

with that arrangement.

In the end, the touchstone of U.S. seriousness about 

stopping Israel’s nuclear weapons program was still a 

willingness to tie delivery of the F-4 Phantoms to the 

nuclear issue. This Kissinger did not propose to do—it 

seems, on the basis of Nixon’s guidance—although he 

kept the door open to doing so at a later stage. He concluded that holding the planes back would unleash 

a fierce political response against the administration 

from Israel’s domestic supporters, and that this was 

too high a price for the administration to pay to uphold the principle of nonproliferation.18 Without the 

leverage of the fighter aircraft deal, however, there 

was no chance of gaining Israeli agreement on the nuclear issue. The only option left was to see what could 

be salvaged in terms of appearances.

In writing to the President about what the United States really wanted, Kissinger subtly shifted the 

ground away from trying to stop the Israelis from 

accepting their nuclear weapons but trying to: (1) 

avoid the appearance of U.S. complicity in Israel becoming a nuclear power; and, (2) keep Israel’s bomb 

from leading to Arab pressure on the Soviets to match 

it.19 “While we might ideally like to halt Israeli possession,” Kissinger wrote, “what we really want at a 

minimum may be just to keep Israeli possession from 

becoming an established international fact.” In other 

words, if no one knew that Israel had bombs, that was 

almost as good as if the bombs did not exist—and it 

was a lot cheaper in political capital.

To make this work, both the United States and 

the Soviet Union had to pretend total ignorance of 

the situation. In the case of the U.S. Government, with 
332

its difficulty in keeping secrets, it would be best if the 

government really was ignorant of the truth and so 

should stop asking questions. The Israelis had to go 

along with this by keeping their bomb under wraps, 

but of course, they were going to do so anyway. In 

short, after all the high-level White House analyses of 

what to do about Israeli nuclear weapons, the recommended option was for the U.S. Government to stick 

its head in the sand.

Kissinger and the top U.S. diplomats still pursued 

Israeli adherence to the NPT, just as had their predecessors in the Johnson administration, and continued 

fencing with Rabin over the meaning of “introduce” 

in the Israeli nuclear mantra—again, without resolution. The fact was that, by August 1969, the first of 

the F-4s were already getting delivered to the Israelis. 

They did not have to give in on anything.

NIXON DECIDES

Since we have Kissinger’s memoranda and his formal recommendations, it is tempting to see in them the 

intellectual lineage of the President’s decision. There 

is, however, a tendency to exaggerate the importance 

of the written bureaucratic record—and the work of 

advisors altogether. High-level decisions often move 

on other tracks. In the end, it appears that Nixon did in 

his private meeting with Meir on the nuclear issue—

the meeting on that day covered other important topics—what he would have done anyway, quite apart 

from any advice he got. He gave the Israelis a pass on 

their nuclear weapons program primarily because he 

wanted them on his side in what he saw as his worldwide struggle with the Soviets. He did not care about 

the NPT and ignored Kissinger’s (seemingly genuine) 
333

recommendation to pursue an Israeli signature.20 Nixon seems to have decided the United States would 

not pursue the question of Israeli nuclear weapons, 

would not press Israel to join the NPT, and would end 

the by-then farcical U.S. “visits” to Dimona.21

It would also have been natural for Nixon to want 

to keep the entire arrangement secret, for one thing, 

to avoid charges of complicity in Israel’s nuclear program. Similarly, Meir agreed to keep, or acquiesced in 

keeping, the existence of her weapons secret, which 

she had every incentive to do, anyhow.22

Nixon had already set his course in favor of providing Israel with advanced weapons during the 1968 

presidential campaign. He said:

The United States has a firm and unwavering commitment to the national existence of Israel . . . as long as 

the threat of Arab attack remains direct and imminent 

. . . the balance must be tipped in Israel’s favor.23

In speaking to a Jewish group, Nixon explicitly promised that, if elected, he would send the 50 

Phantoms, and he told Rabin the same in a private 

meeting.24

A March 1970 memorandum written by the President to Kissinger provides further insight into Nixon’s 

thinking underlying the 1969 Nixon-Meir deal.25 Nixon wrote the memorandum after his decision in earlyMarch 1970 to delay delivery of a later batch of F-4 

Phantoms provoked a storm of protest from Israel’s 

U.S. supporters.26 He had held up the planes because, 

with an eye on possible Soviet reaction, he did not 

want to tip the military balance in the Middle East too 

far in favor of Israel. His willingness to hold up delivery of the F-4s is interesting in itself. This is the same 
334

act that Kissinger earlier judged as too risky politically for reasons related to nuclear proliferation or the 

NPT. But Nixon was prepared to make it for reasons 

he thought were important.27

In the March 1970 memorandum, Nixon told Kissinger that, in further talks with Meir and Rabin, Kissinger needed to “lay it on the line.” Nixon said the key 

to his own pro-Israel stance was opposition to Soviet 

expansion. He was counting on Israel to stand with 

the United States. The Israelis had to understand that 

their “only reliable friends are the hawks in this country,” not the liberals. RN (as Nixon referred to himself) 

“does not want to see Israel go down the drain and 

makes an absolute commitment that he will see to it 

that Israel always has ‘an edge’.” Nixon pointed out 

that he did not get many Jewish votes in New York, 

Pennsylvania, California, or Illinois—the implication of which was pretty clear.28 At the same time, 

he said, his “silent majority” voters would expect Israel to oppose Soviet expansion everywhere. He also 

stated they:

will not stand for a double standard . . . it is a question 

of all or none. This is cold turkey, and it is time that 

our friends in Israel understood this. . . . Unless they 

understand it and act as if they understood it beginning now they are down the tubes.

29

Nixon was irked that U.S. Jews were hawks when 

it came to Israel but doves on Vietnam, and he obviously wanted the Israelis to help straighten out his 

domestic political opponents. But what mattered to 

Nixon most was that Israel stand fast with him against 

Soviet expansion. That is primarily what the 1969 

Nixon-Meir deal concerned.
335

WHAT U.S. OBLIGATIONS REMAIN FROM 

THE DEAL?

That 1969 deal still casts a shadow over U.S.-Israeli 

relations. There are reports that in 2009, President 

Obama provided Prime Minister Netanyahu with a 

letter that was said to “reaffirm” the 1969 agreement 

in writing.30 In light of this, it is worthwhile to reconsider the assumptions of the original 1969 deal and to 

ask to what extent they are still valid today.31

In their dealings with both the Johnson and Nixon 

administrations, the Israelis accepted that not being 

“the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the 

Middle East” meant keeping their weapon’s existence 

secret and not performing nuclear tests. By Kissinger’s 

account, Nixon emphasized these conditions to Meir 

as the “primary concern.”32 Despite this, the Israelis 

conducted a nuclear test in 1979 in the oceans below South Africa.33 More importantly, everyone now 

knows about the existence of Israel’s nuclear weapons. 

There is no longer even any ambiguity.

There were a number of reasons the United States 

worried in the past about public knowledge of Israel’s 

nuclear weapons: One was that the Soviets might then 

have had to help the Arab countries in some way that 

increased the risk of a U.S. confrontation with the Soviets. But now the Soviets are gone. Another reason 

was the fear that public knowledge of the Israeli nuclear weapons program would undermine the NPT, 

especially in the Middle East, by forcing Arab governments to respond with nuclear programs of their own. 

Now everyone outside Israel already knows and talks 

freely about Israeli nuclear weapons. Still another reason was the concern that knowledge about the Israeli 

weapons might expose the United States to charges 
336

of complicity in the Israeli nuclear program. But it is 

precisely the current policy of pretended ignorance 

about Israel’s weapons that makes the United States 

look foolish, hypocritical, and complicit to boot.

In the end, it is up to the Israelis to decide how they 

want to deal with their half of the 1969 deal—whether 

to stick with “opacity.” But it is up to the United States 

to decide how to deal with our half—whether to continue the U.S. Government’s taboo on discussing Israel’s nuclear weapons. Whatever reasons there may be 

to continue to do so, they do not include obligations 

flowing from the 1969 Nixon-Meir deal.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12

1. This chapter was previously published in Henry Sokolski, 

ed., The Next Arms Race, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College, 2012.

2. As early as 1960, President Dwight Eisenhower met with 

his top Cabinet officials and military leaders to discuss the problems raised by information that the Israelis, in Secretary of State 

Christian Herter’s words, were “operating a plutonium production plant.” Defense Secretary Thomas Gates said, “Our information is that the plant is not for peaceful uses.” The President made 

clear that the issue went beyond the Middle East. He said, “We 

are now faced with the question of what to do as further countries 

become atomic producers.” He told the group the United States 

needed to tell the Israelis that we wanted the IAEA to inspect 

the plant “as a matter of course.” See General A. J. Goodpastor, 

Memorandum regarding a December 9, 1960, conference with the 

President, January 12, 1961.

3. Consider, for example, the Obama administration’s hostile reaction to the proposal, coming out of the 2010 NPT Review 

Conference, for a 2012 meeting to discuss a nuclear-free Middle 

East, a goal the United States claims to support. Although the 

U.S. delegation had voted for the entire document—presumably 

to avoid an embarrassing conference failure—the Obama White 
337

House immediately thereafter attacked the language of the meeting proposal.

4. Helen Thomas, at the President’s first televised news conference, February 9, 2009.

5. Israel was not the only country whose nuclear weapons 

program was eased by ad hoc considerations that overwhelmed 

U.S. support for the NPT. This also happened in U.S. interactions 

with India and Pakistan over their nuclear programs, and, at one 

point, even with North Korea. In fact, U.S. policy toward India’s 

nuclear program is surely a close second to that toward Israel’s 

nuclear program in its glaring inconsistencies with stated nonproliferation policy. Israel was, however, the first country to face 

down U.S. nonproliferation policy—immediately after the signing of the Treaty—which created a precedent for U.S. acquiescence in NPT holdouts that was later exploited by other countries.

6. Avner Cohen, The Worst Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with 

the Bomb, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. See also 

the article by William Burr and Avner Cohen in the May 2006 

issue of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: “As long as Israel kept 

the bomb in the basement—which meant keeping the program 

under full secrecy, making no test, declaration, or any other visible act of displaying capability or otherwise transforming its status—the United States could live with Israel’s ‘non-introduction’ 

pledge. . . .”

7. Nixon’s memoirs contain no index entry for the NPT and 

apparently no reference to the Treaty in the book. See Richard 

Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, New York, Grosset & 

Dunlop, 1978. Kissinger’s memoirs make two glancing references, 

one to the 1968 signing by Johnson, and the second to German 

concerns about discriminatory treatment under the Treaty. See 

Henry Kissinger, White House Years, Boston, MA: Little, Brown 

and Co., 1979.

8. After deciding to back the Treaty, Nixon instructed U.S. 

diplomats not to push it too hard, and especially not to lean on the 

Germans. See also Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in 

Power, New York: HarperCollins 2007, p. 136: 
338

In [early] 1969, Nixon . . . urged the Senate to approve a 

nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) signed by Johnson. 

Nixon’s commitment to an NPT carried no political or economic costs. His internal directive supporting ratification 

emphasized that adherence to the treaty neither created 

new commitments abroad nor broadened existing ones. 

Nor would the treaty cause any international difficulties for 

the United States, since Nixon had no intention to pressure 

other countries to follow America’s lead.

9. An indication of this comes through in a 1966 cable from 

Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the U.S. Ambassador in Israel. 

Rusk described his conversation with the Israeli Ambassador, 

who repeated what was by then the formulaic “[Israel] would not 

be first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Near East.” Rusk told 

him, “Nothing would be more disastrous” for Israel than to get 

nuclear weapons, and he urged the Israelis to accept international 

inspection. Rusk noted, “If Israel is holding open the nuclear option, it should forget U.S. support. We would not be with you. . . .” 

Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, 

Washington, DC, July 28, 1966.

10. A formulation usually attributed to Shimon Peres, who 

improvised it in response to an unexpected question from President John Kennedy.

11. Memorandum of Conversation, “Negotiations with Israel—F-4 and Advanced Weapons, November 12, 1968,” approved 

by Paul Warnke.

12. In his memoirs, Rabin comments on getting involved in 

U.S. campaign politics:

Sensitive souls may find the notion of setting a Democratic 

president against his Republican successor distasteful. If so, 

they will only be demonstrating their ignorance of the ways 

and means of American politics. It is not enough to say that 

in pursuing his country’s welfare an ambassador to Washington is entitled to take advantage of the ongoing rivalry 

between the two parties. The fact is that for his efforts to 

bear fruit, he is obliged to do so; and any ambassador who is 

either unwilling or unable to maneuver through America’s 

political landscape to advance his country’s interests would 

do well to return home.
339

Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, Berkeley, CA: University of 

California Press, 1979, p. 142.

13. It is hard to know what Johnson really thought about Israel getting the bomb. He seemed to genuinely care about the NPT 

and getting Israel to sign it. But there seems to have been another 

side, too, as indicated by a story told by Arnold Kramish. In 1967, 

Kramish had somehow gotten an invitation to visit Dimona. Before leaving, he called U.S. Ambassador Walworth Barbour in TelAviv. “Oh, no,” Barbour shouted. “If you learn anything about 

Dimona, I’d have to tell the President, and then he would have 

to do something, and he doesn’t want to.” T. C. Reed and Danny 

Stillman, The Nuclear Express: a Political Examination of the Bomb 

and its Proliferation, Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2009, p. 119.

14. Letter, Paul Warnke to Yitzhak Rabin, November 27, 1968. 

This arguably still conformed to Johnson’s instructions, in the 

sense that the Israelis were not asked to agree beforehand with 

the U.S. interpretation.

15. The arrangement was first worked out during the Kennedy administration, but it soon deteriorated. In an account provided by former Ambassador Barbour:

. . . We had considerable difficulty making arrangements for 

periodic visits which was a window-dressing exercise. The 

Israelis tried to be as forthcoming, or to appear as forthcoming as possible, at the same time without revealing anything 

to us. This wining them and dining them and taking them 

down there with, under great secrecy, sometimes even 

meeting them at the airport when they arrived, and taking them off the plane, and over around the back, and then 

clearing them through customs with Russian names and so 

forth [Laughs], it was all a very unrealistic exercise which 

went on for many, many years and then finally just petered 

out when even the United States realized it wasn’t getting 

anywhere. And it became ridiculous.

See May 22, 1981, interview, Kennedy Library Oral History Project. One is left with the impression that the State Department, 

which coordinated the “visits” (specifically, not inspections), was 

not especially keen on having the experts learn anything. They 

apparently did not receive intelligence briefings.
340

16. This refers to the suspicion that Israel stole highly enriched uranium from the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation (NUMEC) fuel plant in Apollo, PA, whose owners had 

close Israeli ties. A 1965 inventory found that a loss of about 100 

kilograms (kg) could not be explained after accounting for all possible industrial loss pathways. By the time of Kissinger’s memorandum, a further 150-kg remained missing. By then, the CIA had 

concluded that the material ended up in Israel’s bomb program. 

In the early part of the Nixon administration, all the top national 

security officials, including Kissinger and the President himself, 

were involved in one way or another in the NUMEC case. See Victor Gilinsky and Roger Mattson, “Revisiting the NUMEC Affair,” 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2010, p. 61.

17. National Security Study Memorandum No. 40, “Israeli 

Nuclear Weapons Program—Issues and Courses of Action,” Rodger P. Davies State/NEA to Dr. Kissinger, undated but evidently 

mid-1969, formerly Top Secret (“sanitized”).

18. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, p. 176: “The White House considered tying arms shipments to Israeli promises not to go nuclear, but concerns about domestic political opposition deterred 

it from making the connection.” Kissinger barely mentioned the 

concern about opposition from domestic Jewish groups, even 

though that was obviously a major factor. This omission is not 

surprising, since Nixon had earlier instructed his national security staff not to mention domestic political considerations, so as 

to maintain an illusory separation. See Richard Reeves, President 

Nixon Alone in the White House, New York: Simon & Shuster, 2001, 

p. 42, which describes a February 22, 1969, Nixon memo to Rogers 

and Kissinger regarding Middle East papers from State and the 

National Security Council: “In the future, I want no references to 

domestic political considerations to be included in any 

papers. . . .” It is a reminder to be cautious in relying on the written record. One is dealing with people who operate on several 

levels and who use their writings for multiple purposes.

19. Henry Kissinger, Memorandum for the President, “Israeli 

Nuclear Program.” The copy in the Nixon Library is undated, but 

it refers to a Tab A dated July 19, 1969. Emphasis added.
341

(1) Israel’s secret possession of nuclear weapons would increase the potential danger in the Middle East, and we do 

not desire complicity in it. (2) In this case, public knowledge is almost as dangerous as possession itself. This is 

what might spark a Soviet nuclear guarantee for the Arabs, 

tighten the Soviet hold on the Arabs, and increase the danger of our involvement. Indeed, the Soviets might have an 

incentive not to know. 

20. Kissinger did not attend Nixon’s private meeting with 

Meir and, hard as it is to believe, he seems not to have immediately taken in the change in policy. In an October 8, 1969, memorandum to the President, he reports on, among other things, Rabin’s 

answer regarding the prospects for Israeli NPT adherence that the 

next Israeli government will decide after the upcoming elections. 

Kissinger commented: “This formulation strikes me as unacceptably weak. It seems to me that signature of the NPT with its loopholes and escape clause would not jeopardize Israel’s potential 

nuclear capability or diminish Arab recognition of its conventional military superiority.” He recommended that Nixon press Meir 

to make a “vigorous personal effort” to gain Cabinet support for 

an Israeli signature and ratification. This was 2 weeks after the 

Nixon-Meir private meeting. Perhaps the meeting left the NPT 

issue up in the air, with Nixon leaving it to Meir to decide.

21. The last “visit” took place in July 1969. The Israelis rushed 

the U.S. team, as usual. Meir refused a later U.S. request from U.S. 

Ambassador Barbour for an extra day-long visit. As much as the 

Israelis controlled the visits, they involved a lot of preparation, 

and there was always the chance of a slip-up that revealed too 

much. In reality, the Israelis did not have much to worry about—

the Americans apparently never sent anyone who knew Hebrew, 

and they were used to getting the runaround.

22. Kissinger seems to allude to this in his memoirs: “It would 

be too much to claim that Mrs. Meir agreed; more accurate to 

say she acquiesced in a formulation whose meaning only the future would reveal.” Kissinger, White House Years, p. 371, emphasis added. Nixon does not mention the September 1969 meeting 

in his memoirs. Meir was obviously the cleverest of the lot. Of 

course, it is possible that she may have been reluctant to agree not 

to test warheads.
342

23. Statement by Richard Nixon, The New York Times, September 9, 1968.

24. Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, pp. 131, 133.

25. Memorandum for Henry Kissinger from the President, 

March 17, 1970. In his memoirs, Nixon quotes at length from this 

memorandum, so it seems to reflect his considered views.

26. Nixon quotes at length from it in his memoirs and describes the background as follows:

At the beginning of March I decided to postpone our delivery of Phantom jets to Israel. I had heard that the Soviets had 

come under renewed pressures from their Arab clients to 

surpass the new American deliveries to Israel, and I hoped 

that since Israel was already in a strong military position, I 

could slow down the arms race without tipping the fragile 

military balance in the region. I also believed that American 

influence in the Middle East increasingly depended on our 

renewing diplomatic relationships with Egypt and Syria, 

and this decision would help promote that goal. . . . One of 

the main problems I faced in this regard was the unyielding 

and shortsighted pro-Israeli attitude in large and influential 

segments of the American Jewish community, Congress, 

the media, and in intellectual and cultural circles. . . . There 

was a wave of criticism in the media and in Congress when 

my decision to postpone the Phantom deliveries was announced. . . . I was annoyed that a number of the senators 

who were urging that we send more military aid to save 

Israel were opposing our efforts to save South Vietnam 

from Communist domination. I dictated a memorandum to 

Kissinger describing my feelings. . . .

27. Ultimately, of course, the Israelis got the planes. Another 

angle on the plane delivery decision is presented in a recent biography of John Mitchell, Nixon’s Attorney General: 

Max Fisher, the late Jewish industrialist, philanthropist, and 

pro-Israel lobbyist, remembered pleading with Kissinger in 

1970 to speed up American delivery of a few dozen Phantom 

fighter jets for which Israel had paid, but, owing to pressure 
343

from Arab states, never received. Completion of the deal 

would mark a decisive shift in American policy towards Israel: from neutrality to the guarantee of military supremacy 

Nixon had advocated as a candidate. . . . Who could convince the President? ‘Go see John Mitchell,’ Kissinger said . . . 

Fisher did as he was told—and got what he wanted.

See James Rosen, The Strong Man: John Mitchell and the Secrets of

Watergate, New York: Doubleday, 2008, p. 127.

28. Although earlier in the memorandum, he says he is not 

motivated by the “Jewish vote.”

29. Ibid.

30. See Eli Lake: “Exclusive: Obama Agrees to Keep Israel’s 

Nukes Secret,” The Washington Times, October 2, 2009: “President 

Obama has reaffirmed a 4-decade-old secret understanding that 

has allowed Israel to keep a nuclear arsenal without opening it to 

international inspections. . . .”

31. In any case, the United States is not obligated to observe 

an informal private agreement of which there is no written record.

32. Kissinger wrote to Nixon in an October 7, 1969, memorandum: “During your private conversation with Golda Meir, you 

emphasized that our primary concern was that the Israelis make 

no visible introduction of nuclear weapons or undertake a nuclear 

test program.”

33. President Jimmy Carter’s Science Advisor Frank Press 

commissioned a panel of academic scientists who devised an ingenious alternative scientific explanation about how the satellite 

might have been fooled. But every expert intelligence body in the 

government regarded the satellite signal as a valid indication of 

a test. Incidentally, such a test was also a violation of the Limited 

Test Ban Treaty, to which Israel is a party. Reed and Stillman, The 

Nuclear Express, p. 180.

345

CHAPTER 13

THE 1979 SOUTH ATLANTIC FLASH: 

THE CASE FOR AN ISRAELI NUCLEAR TEST

Leonard Weiss

INTRODUCTION: THE VELA SATELLITE

In the wake of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, 

the United States launched a series of satellites under 

the name Vela1

 (Vela is a constellation in the southern 

hemisphere sometimes called “the sails” because of 

its configuration). The Vela satellites were designed 

to monitor compliance with the treaty by detecting 

clandestine nuclear tests either in space or in the atmosphere. The first such satellite was launched in 

1963 and the last in 1969. They operated by measuring 

x-rays, neutrons, and gamma rays, and, in the case 

of the more advanced units, emissions of light using 

two photodiode sensors called bhangmeters (a name 

derived from the Hindi word for cannabis). These satellites had a nominal life of 7 years, after which the 

burden of detection was to be shifted to a new series of 

satellites under the Defense Support Program (DSP) 

with infrared detectors designed to detect missile 

launches as well as nuclear tests. The Vela satellites, 

however, kept operating long past the end of their 

nominal design life; one of them, designated Vela 

6911, detected an event on September 22, 1979, that 

has become a subject of intense interest ever since.
346

THE MYSTERIOUS FLASH

What Vela 6911 detected was a light pattern that 

had the characteristic “double hump” shape associated with a nuclear explosion.2

 As a function of time, 

the observed light pattern of a nuclear test rises to an 

initial peak of luminosity with a subsequent decline 

due to the fireball being obscured by the shock wave 

(a thin layer of highly compressed air). As the shock 

wave cools, it becomes less opaque and the fireball 

is then increasingly visible, with luminosity rising to 

a second peak before declining monotonically (see 

Figures 13-1 and 13-2).3

Figure 13-1. Light Pattern for a 19-kiloton

 Nuclear Test.
347

Figure 13-2. Light Pattern Detected by 

Two Bhangmeters of a Vela Satellite for a Known 

Nuclear Test 

(Signals Above a Fixed Threshold Are Shown).

Ordinarily, both bhangmeters on the satellite 

would have recorded exactly the same signal with an 

amplitude or phase difference, depending on the spatial orientation of the satellite with respect to the point 

of origin of the blast. However, one of the bhangmeters, possibly because of a malfunction, did not repro-
348

duce precisely the record of the other.4 This has been a 

key element in the argument of the increasingly small 

community of interested parties who believe that no 

test took place.

In any case, the U.S. Government acted quickly 

and began searching for data from sources other than 

the Vela that could corroborate the event as a nuclear 

test. This included data from the bhangmeters on the 

DSP satellites and from the Ionospheric Observatory at Arecibo, Puerto Rico, which might detect an 

ionospheric wave resulting from an atmospheric test. 

Aircraft were dispatched to try to obtain evidence of 

radioactive debris in the atmosphere in the vicinity of 

what was calculated to be the site of the event. In addition, the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), which had 

played an important part in establishing a nuclear test 

detection system early in the Cold War era, prepared 

to analyze any data that would be collected by naval 

ships dispatched to try to collect radiological evidence 

in the ocean; NRL’s task included collecting and analyzing hydro-acoustic and ocean wave data that might 

also provide evidence of a nuclear test.5

The results of these efforts were mixed; the DSP 

satellites recorded no flash6 and no radioactive debris 

was found, but a researcher at Arecibo recorded an 

ionospheric wave traveling in an anomalous direction that could have been the result of a nuclear test.7

The NRL analysis of its hydro-acoustic and wave data 

took time to prepare and, in the end, convinced its 

scientific director that a nuclear test had taken place.8

However, the data and analysis are still classified.9

The lack of an immediate and definitive corroboration 

that a nuclear event had taken place led to rampant 

speculation about the event. The initial assessment of 

the National Security Council (NSC) in October 1979 
349

was that the intelligence community had “high confidence” that the event was a nuclear test.10 A later NSC 

report altered this conclusion to one of “a position of 

agnosticism.”11

A PROBLEM FOR THE CARTER 

ADMINISTRATION: WHO DID IT?

In the meantime, the Jimmy Carter administration 

had to think about the political ramifications of a test, 

if indeed one had taken place. One problem was that a 

clandestine test not definitively labeled as such meant 

that the system for detection could be claimed to be 

insufficiently reliable, calling into question the ability to detect any Soviet cheating on the Limited Test 

Ban Treaty, and therefore undermining the value of 

the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 

II Treaty that had been signed in June 1979 and was 

awaiting a Senate vote on ratification. Carter had made 

nonproliferation and disarmament a key element of 

his presidency and was expected to run for reelection 

in 1980, touting his successes in that arena. A Soviet 

clandestine test was unlikely, but if the “mysterious 

flash” was not a Soviet test, who else would have and 

could have done it?

Initial speculation centered on South Africa12 because of the calculated geographic location of the 

event and the knowledge that South Africa was developing nuclear weapons. In addition, a Washington 

Post story revealed that U.S. intelligence had tracked 

a secret South African alert to some of its naval forces 

a few days prior to the Vela event and an associated 

movement of some of its ships in the calculated vicinity at the ostensible time of the event.13 A January 

1980 intelligence report sent to the Arms Control and 
350

Disarmament Agency said South Africa was the most 

likely perpetrator. But the South African program 

was actually insufficiently advanced at that point to 

conduct a small clandestine test, a conclusion that 

was verified later by the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA), among others.14

Attention then turned to Israel, which presented 

the Carter administration with additional political 

concerns. The Camp David Accords between Israel 

and Egypt had been brokered earlier that year by 

President Carter and were going to be an important 

element of Carter’s reelection campaign. Assistant 

Secretary of State Hodding Carter described the State 

Department attitude as one of “sheer panic” upon receipt of the news of the Vela incident and that Israel 

might be involved.15 The State Department had taken 

a hard line toward Pakistan in 1977 and 1979, cutting 

off economic and military assistance as a result of Pakistan’s nuclear enrichment and reprocessing imports, 

which had violated the Symington and Glenn amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, even though 

Pakistan was still years away from the ability to test 

a nuclear device. Under the circumstances, the U.S. 

Government would be hard pressed to ignore an evident Israeli test, especially since Israel had signed the 

Limited Test Ban Treaty. To do so would have negative repercussions in the Arab world and possibly 

blunt progress toward peace in the Middle East, but 

to take any punitive action against Israel would upset 

the Jewish diaspora in the United States, an important 

constituency for Carter and the Democratic Party.

THE RUINA PANEL

To relieve the political pressure created by the Vela 

event, the Carter administration seized upon the dis-
351

crepancy between the Vela bhangmeters and speculation that the meters could have recorded a combination of natural phenomena (e.g., lightning plus a 

meteor strike) that might mimic a nuclear test to parry 

the growing opinion in intelligence circles that the 

Vela event was a nuclear test.

The White House asked Frank Press, the President’s science advisor and Director of the Office of 

Science and Technology Policy, to convene a panel 

of scientific experts to review the available data and 

determine whether the “double flash” was the result 

of a nuclear test, a natural phenomenological event, 

or a satellite malfunction. An MIT electrical engineering professor and long-time consultant to the government on defense matters named Jack Ruina was made 

chairman of the panel, which included scientific luminaries Luis Alvarez, Richard Garwin, Wolfgang Panofsky, Richard Muller, Alan Peterson, William Donn, 

Riccardo Giacconi, and F. William Sarles.

The panel was specifically tasked to ignore all 

political questions concerning the event such as who 

might be in a position to conduct such a test if it was 

nuclear.16 CBS News reported that the administration withheld intelligence data from the Ruina panel, 

showing that Israel and South Africa were cooperating on the development of missiles that could carry 

nuclear warheads.17 This guaranteed that Israel would 

not be mentioned in the report if the conclusion was 

that a nuclear test had occurred. Thus, while the Carter administration did not create false intelligence data 

to reach a desired conclusion, it hoped to create an 

alternative explanation of the data at hand that could 

enable it to ignore or counter the conclusion of most of 

the government’s intelligence analysts.
352

One possibility was the effect of sunlight glinting 

off the debris of a micrometeoroid that had struck the 

Vela satellite. Studies had been performed by Mission 

Research Corporation (MRC) and Sandia National 

Laboratory suggesting several meteoroid shape and 

trajectory models that could explain the waveform observed by the Vela bhangmeters. In addition, there was 

considerable data from an experiment on the spacecraft Pioneer 10 that might shed light on what kind of 

optical signals might be detected from meteoroid collisions. In December 1979, Stanford Research International (SRI) was tasked with assessing the probability 

that the Vela signal was caused by a sunlight-meteoroid interaction, and examined both the Pioneer 10 data 

and whether the circumstances postulated in the MRC 

and Sandia models would actually come about, taking 

account of the number of sensor observations over the 

life of the bhangmeters. The SRI report concluded that 

the Pioneer 10 data contained insufficient information 

to make a definitive judgment about the Vela signal’s 

origin but that the aforementioned models would require more than one meteorite strike with a particular 

set of characteristics to result in the Vela signal of September 22, 1979, and that the probability of this happening was of the order of one in 100 billion.18 Their 

calculation was reviewed and affirmed in the context 

of other data in a 1980 Defense Intelligence Agency 

(DIA) study.19

THE RUINA PANEL’S REPORT

The Ruina panel’s report was classified and officially presented on May 23, 1980. An unclassified 

version was released on September 23, 1980.20 The report focused on the differences in the measurements 

obtained by the two bhangmeters and concluded that 
353

the signal was probably not that of a nuclear explosion, though it could have been. The panel offered an 

alternative explanation of the signal, suggesting the 

possibility that it could have come from sunlight glinting off the debris of a micrometeoroid that had struck 

the Vela satellite. As already indicated, the probability 

of a micrometeoroid causing the bhangmeter signals 

of September 22, 1979, was estimated as one in 100 

billion. A personal explanation of the Ruina panel’s 

conclusion was provided by Luis Alvarez in his 1987 

memoir,21 in which he states that he asked DIA to 

provide a selection of the Vela records that indicated 

events that were nuclear explosions or were unclear 

as to their origin but had some signal characteristics 

associated with a nuclear explosive event.

The latter were called “zoo animals” or “zoo 

events” in reference to the “zoo-ons” that physicists 

like Alvarez called the unexplainable tracks in a 

bubble chamber experiment. In his memoir, Alvarez 

seems to claim that only one bhangmeter recorded 

the September 22 “flash” and, on that basis, suggests 

that the flash was a zoo event. But the panel’s report 

and other accounts of the flash refer to differences in 

the two bhangmeters recorded intensities rather than 

a complete nondetection. In a private conversation I 

once had with Richard Garwin, he spoke merely of 

“phase differences” between the recorded signals of 

the bhangmeters, not a failure to detect. More recently, 

the light signals seen by Vela 6911 on September 22, 

1979, have become publicly available (see Figure 13-

3), showing detection by both bhangmeters. What Alvarez was probably referring to was not the bhangmeters but a third optical sensor that was used normally 

to locate the geographic origin of an event but was no 

longer operating on Vela 6911. A paper by Carey Sublette22 in the Nuclear Weapon Archive lays out other 
354

flaws in Alvarez’s defense of the Ruina panel’s report, 

which had concluded that the Vela signal more likely 

represented a zoo event than a nuclear explosion.

Figure 13-3. Bhangmeter Light Patterns for Event

Detected by a Vela Satellite on September 22, 1979.

THE NRL REPORT

It is interesting to compare the U.S. Government’s 

treatment of the Ruina panel’s report with other classified documents that suggested more definitively 
355

that the Vela event was a nuclear test. In the late-fall of 

1981, I interviewed Alan Berman, the former scientific 

director of the NRL, who had retired from the laboratory and was then the Director of the Marine Laboratory of the University of Miami. I had known Berman 

for more than a decade as a result of my part-time 

consulting and research position at NRL. Berman was 

unanimously viewed at the NRL as a superb scientist 

and administrator who would never color a scientific 

data-based conclusion because of political or ideological considerations. My interview with him took place 

about 18 months after a 300-page NRL report that laid 

out the laboratory’s analysis of the hydro acoustic and 

other data collected following the Vela event had been 

completed in the summer of 1980. According to one 

account, the report concluded that the event was most 

likely a nuclear test and was accompanied by a large 

underwater signal resembling signals given by previous nuclear explosions conducted by France in the 

Pacific in the 1970s.23

Berman had said that pulses of underwater sound 

detected by Navy sensors at two locations following 

the blast were the strongest corroborative evidence 

that a nuclear explosion had taken place. Regarding that evidence, he said this evidence was “strong 

enough to make the case in its own right.”24 The Navy 

sensors showed that the explosion’s signal was reflected off the Antarctic shelf and the reflection was 

also detected, allowing a calculated estimate of the 

event’s location in the vicinity of Prince Edward and 

Marion Islands.

The White House ignored the NRL report and 

referenced only the Ruina panel’s report whenever 

publicly queried. Berman had vociferously objected 

when the Ruina panel’s report was released prior to 
356

the completion of the NRL report, and he was still 

furious when I interviewed him in his office. On two 

other occasions in late-1980 following the delivery of 

the NRL report, he had contacted the White House 

with new information indicating additional support 

for the conclusion that a nuclear test had taken place, 

and offering to undertake a broader analysis of the 

information. But his offer was ignored or rebuffed.25

One of these contacts was by means of a letter to John 

Marcum, then a senior advisor to the White House on 

technology and arms control.26 Marcum was one of 

the officials helping the administration deflect attention from the growing consensus in the intelligence 

community that the Vela signal was nuclear in origin.

FURTHER EVIDENCE OF A NUCLEAR TEST: 

A PERSONAL MEMOIR

Based on what I learned in a number of briefings, 

I reached the conclusion that the September 22 event 

was a nuclear test, and I was not shy in offering that 

opinion during discussions within the government on 

nonproliferation issues. But I said nothing publicly. 

The first news story about the Vela detection occurred 

on October 25, 1979, when John Scali, then working 

for ABC News, broke the story of the flash after being briefed by contacts at the Pentagon. But Scali did 

not claim that the event was a nuclear test. Others, 

however, did.

One of the most outspoken proponents of the notion that a nuclear test had taken place was Major 

General George J. Keegan, former head of Air Force 

Intelligence. Keegan had a long military career before 

retiring in January 1977. He received much notoriety for claiming that the Soviet Union had achieved 
357

a breakthrough in the development of directed energy weapons, specifically in the area of particle beam 

weapons, and that this constituted a serious shift in 

the balance of strategic power between the two superpowers. Although both President Carter and Defense 

Secretary Harold Brown issued public statements refuting Keegan’s claim, the administration responded 

to political pressure from Congress on the issue and 

significantly expanded the American directed energy 

program. Later it became clear that Keegan had misidentified a nuclear rocket facility in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as a particle beam facility.27 Keegan took a significant hit to his reputation 

over this error, and he became persona non grata within 

the Carter administration, whose personnel began referring to his claims as “Keegan’s Follies.” Thus, when 

Keegan publicly stated his opinion that the Vela event 

was a nuclear test, the Carter administration lost no 

time in pointing out how wrong he was in the past on 

the directed energy weapons issue.

This was brought home to me personally when, at 

a nonproliferation briefing given by Carter administration personnel, I was taken aside and told that if I 

persisted in stating my belief that a nuclear test had 

taken place on September 22, my reputation would 

take a hit, and I would suffer the same fate as Keegan. 

Nonetheless, in my role as Staff Director of the Senate 

Subcommittee on Energy and Nuclear Proliferation, I 

continued to make numerous requests to see the classified data from Vela 6911, but without success. I felt I 

was being stonewalled. All this simply reinforced my 

belief that the Vela event was a nuclear test and that 

the Ruina panel was engaged in an exercise designed 

by the White House to give it the ability to point to an 

alternative scenario—albeit one that had a low probability of occurrence.
358

But any small doubt I might still have harbored 

about the origin of the double flash was erased by an 

event that took place in the office of Senator John H. 

Glenn of Ohio on March 6, 1981. At the time, I was 

working as Glenn’s chief advisor on nonproliferation 

issues as well as in my formal position on the Senate 

subcommittee, of which Senator Glenn was the Ranking Member (he lost the chairmanship when the Republicans took over the Senate in the wake of the 1980 

election in which Ronald Reagan beat Jimmy Carter). 

I received a call to my office that morning from a wellknown CBS News reporter named Robert Pierpoint. 

Pierpoint said that CBS was doing a story on the “mysterious flash,” and that he had heard that I had some 

“interesting” opinions about it. He asked if I would 

be willing to say those things on camera for possible 

broadcast on the CBS Evening News show anchored 

by Walter Cronkite. Perhaps naively, I agreed and 

gave Pierpoint permission to bring a camera crew to 

my office, which he did a few hours later. While they 

were setting up their equipment, the phone rang, and 

my secretary announced that Senator Glenn was on 

the phone. The first thing he said to me after I said 

hello was to tell me that a phone call had been made 

to his office by the White House, and that (much to 

my astonishment) the White House had heard that I 

was going to give an on-camera interview about the 

Vela event. He asked if that was true, and I said that 

not only was it true, but the camera crew was in my 

office as we spoke. Senator Glenn responded by saying that the White House was very upset and that I 

needed to come to his office immediately to discuss 

this. I excused myself and told Pierpoint I needed to 

talk to Glenn for a few minutes.
359

It took about 3 minutes to walk to Glenn’s office, 

and when I entered his inner office, he was there with 

his press secretary and erstwhile campaign manager, 

Steve Avakian. They looked grim. Glenn began by 

telling me again how upset the White House was 

about the proposed interview, and he asked me what 

I intended to say. When I said that “I intend to say 

that the ‘mysterious flash’ was a nuclear test,” he responded sharply, “No! You can’t say that!” He then 

reiterated how upset the White House was and how 

damaging the political fallout could be if I went ahead. 

Glenn said the White House told him that my interview could result in a serious foreign policy problem 

for the United States. Then he uttered a cryptic comment about how his political enemies would “make 

hay” over this were I to cause a problem. 

Needless to say, I was stunned by all this. I had 

given interviews before on other issues and had never 

before been given an order to say or not say something. 

But I was not about to risk losing my job, so I said I 

would go back to my office and call off the interview. 

At this, Avakian jumped in and, with Glenn’s evident 

approval, said “No! You have to go ahead with the 

interview but you can’t say there was a nuclear test!” 

As I started walking out, I asked who had made the 

call to Glenn. They said it was John Marcum, the same 

person whom Alan Berman had written to in an attempt to get the White House to pay attention to the 

NRL report and the laboratory’s capabilities in analyzing any new data. Marcum was now representing 

the Reagan administration in trying to scuttle unwanted comments and conclusions about the Vela event. 

Clearly, concerns about Carter’s presidential fortunes 

in September 1979 were not the only reason for White 

House panic over the “flash.” It was now a bipartisan panic, and that meant to me not only that the 
360

“flash” was a nuclear test but also that Israel was the 

likely perpetrator.

I left Glenn’s office with my head swimming. How 

was I going to do an interview on the Vela event without lying and without saying explicitly that I believed 

it was a nuclear test? I decided the least I could do 

was to indicate my disdain for the alternative scenario 

contained in the report of the Ruina panel. I said that 

“I was surprised at the zeal which some people were 

bringing to the question of proving that this was not 

a nuclear event,” and used the White House locution 

that, “If this was a nuclear event, it would present a 

serious political problem for the United States.” I concluded by saying, “I don’t think it is possible to lay 

this event to rest with a report that indicates that a 

group of people feel that the probability of it not being 

a nuclear event is perhaps more than half, and on that 

basis, we all should forget about it and go to sleep.”

The comment about the event being a political problem for the United States was code for the problems 

that would be created by naming Israel as the culprit. 

I was upset that I had to resort to verbal subterfuge to 

get my point across, but I was relieved that Pierpoint 

did not accuse me of bait-and-switch. In fact, the interview was broadcast that night and was the last segment of Cronkite’s farewell broadcast as anchor before he personally signed off. But my experience that 

day in the Glenn office and the representations made 

of the panicky White House phone calls were the last 

bits of evidence for me, if any were needed, that Vela 

6911 had recorded a nuclear test, and the most likely 

perpetrator was Israel, probably with South African 

support. To underscore the unique nature of my interaction with Glenn in this case, I worked for him for 

another 20 years, gave many interviews, and never 

was told again what I could or could not say.
361

It was perhaps a coincidence that about 3 weeks after the CBS broadcast, I was finally allowed to see the 

Vela satellite data I had been seeking for months. I examined the graphed “flash” data along with the group 

of “zoo events” referred to by Luis Alvarez. Perhaps 

I should not have been surprised at that point, but, 

notwithstanding the phase differences between the 

bhangmeters on Vela 6911, the plot of the data showed 

the two humps of the classic curve associated with the 

light intensity from a nuclear explosion (See Figure 

13-3). Moreover, there was not a single “zoo animal” 

that came close to the classic shape in duration and 

amplitude (see Figures 13-4A and 13-4B). Finding an 

alternative explanation other than a nuclear test for 

the “flash” of September 22, 1979, required some serious stretching of the mind by the individuals on the 

Ruina panel.

FURTHER EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE 

CONCLUSION THAT THE “FLASH” WAS AN

ISRAELI TEST

In 1991, Seymour Hersh published The Samson Option, which described the history of the Israeli nuclear 

weapons program up to that time. Hersh reported 

that former Israeli government officials told him 

that Vela 6911 recorded an Israeli test of a low-yield 

nuclear artillery shell, and that the test was the third 

in a series conducted over the Indian Ocean. Hersh 

wrote that the test was preceded by a visit to the site 

by two Israeli ships and that elements of the South 

African Navy were observers. He also describes the 

panic among White House and State Department officials upon learning of the Vela event. But Hersh ascribes the panic mainly to the Carter administration’s 
362

Figure 13-4A. “Zoo Event.”
363

Figure 13-4B. “Zoo Event.”
364

concerns about the fate of the SALT II treaty and the 

political ammunition a clandestine test would give to 

Republican opponents. My own experience showed 

that the Reagan White House was equally concerned 

over the prospect of a confirmed clandestine Israeli 

nuclear test at a time when the United States was ostensibly trying to hold the line on proliferation activities in Pakistan and Congress was considering legislation prohibiting military assistance to Pakistan in the 

event of a Pakistani nuclear test. Hersh also quotes a 

number of prominent members of the Nuclear Intelligence Panel who had examined the Vela data and 

concluded it was a nuclear test but were ordered not 

to discuss it publicly. In particular, the chairman of 

the panel, Donald Kerr, who had been acting director of defense programs at the Department of Energy, 

told Hersh, “We had no doubt it was a bomb.”28

On April 20, 1997, an article in the Israeli newspaper, Ha’aretz, quoted South African Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad as confirming that the Vela 

event was a nuclear test. The article said that Israel 

had helped South Africa develop its bomb designs in 

return for 500 tons of uranium and other assistance. 

Although Pahad later claimed his statement had been 

taken out of context, the Ha’aretz article was referenced in a July 11, 1997, Los Alamos Laboratory newsletter under the headline, “Blast from the past: Lab 

scientists receive vindication.” This referred to earlier 

work by the laboratory, concluding that a nuclear test 

had taken place on September 22, 1979. Dave Simons 

of the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Research 

and Development division said, “The whole federal 

laboratory community came to the conclusion that the 

data indicated a bomb,” and that “we were quite thoroughly convinced of our interpretation.”29 Although 
365

the power of the article has been diminished somewhat by Pahad’s partial retraction, the latter did not 

result in any retraction by laboratory scientists that a 

nuclear test took place.

That the Vela event was the result of a cooperative 

effort by Israel and the apartheid regime of South Africa has been claimed or suggested many times,30 such 

an effort would have been the logical result of an arms 

trade relationship between the two countries that included the transfer of advanced military technology 

and nuclear materials. It has been reported that, at 

one point in 1975, Israel offered to sell Jericho missiles 

to South Africa that could carry nuclear warheads, 

and it may even have offered to sell the warheads 

themselves.31

A U.S. GOVERNMENT COVER-UP AT THE TOP?

As of this time, the conclusion that the Vela event 

was a nuclear test is shared by the directors of the U.S. 

nuclear weapons laboratories, senior officials at the 

DIA, and many members of the scientific community.32

Others in the intelligence community—such as the 

Director of Central Intelligence’s Nuclear Intelligence 

Panel; many scientists and analysts at the Los Alamos, 

Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories; and at 

SRI International, DIA, Mission Research Corporation, 

and the Aerospace Corporation—subscribe to the conclusion that the event was “most probably” a nuclear 

test.33 Yet, despite this considerable body of expert 

opinion, the U.S. Government under both Democratic 

and Republican administrations still has not admitted 

that a nuclear test took place.

In his recently published book with diary entries, 

former President Jimmy Carter briefly, but revealing-
366

ly, writes about the September 22, 1979, “flash.” In the 

entry dated on the day of the flash, he writes, “There 

was indication of a nuclear explosion in the region of 

south Africa -- either South Africa, Israel using a ship 

at sea, or nothing.”34 In another diary entry dated October 26, Carter writes, “At the foreign affairs breakfast 

we went over the South African nuclear explosion. We 

still don’t know who did it.”35 It is no coincidence that 

this entry occurred the day after ABC reporter John 

Scali revealed publicly the existence of the Vela event. 

Five months later, on February 27, 1980, Carter writes, 

“We have a growing belief among our scientists that 

the Israelis did indeed conduct a nuclear test explosion in the ocean near the southern end of Africa.”36

That Israel is immediately mentioned in the first entry 

by Carter about a possible nuclear test near South Africa is not a surprise. The intelligence agencies were 

watching the military relationship between Israel and 

South Africa, and Carter was specifically aware of 

the Israeli nuclear weapons program and where they 

might have obtained weapons materials. 

In a cryptic reference to the Nuclear Materials and 

Equipment Corporation (NUMEC) affair,37 his diary 

entry of August 2, 1979, reads as follows: “The question of lost uranium in the 1960s that may or may not 

have gone to Israel is a matter we have been discussing. It’s going to be a public issue shortly when ERDA 

[the Energy Research and Development Agency] 

makes its report.”38 It is clear from these entries that 

Israel was a prime suspect in the Vela event from the 

beginning, and the appearance of these entries in his 

book strongly suggests that Carter believes the flash 

was indeed an Israeli nuclear test. But he did not say 

anything approaching that when he was President. 

The public path of ambiguity taken by Carter as Presi-
367

dent on the Vela event has been trod by every President since then, enabled by the refusal to declassify 

relevant data and documents.

Keeping important evidentiary data secret makes 

it difficult for outside independent investigators to 

evaluate critically and definitively the conclusions 

of the Ruina panel and the 300-page NRL analysis, 

among other things. One of the likely reasons that the 

U.S. Government is withholding the declassification 

of relevant documents is to assist Israel to maintain 

its policy of opacity in nuclear affairs, a policy which 

had its origin during the Lyndon Johnson presidency 

and was reinforced in a bargain made with the United States during the Richard Nixon presidency.39 Its 

abandonment, accompanied by the admission that 

Israel violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty, would 

create some serious political fallout for both countries. 

But it is hard to argue that helping Israel in this way 

contributes to U.S. national security at a time when 

the U.S. demands openness in the nuclear activities 

of Iran, North Korea, Syria, and all other countries 

who may be engaged in clandestine weapon-related 

nuclear activities.

FINAL COMMENT

This raises a general policy question. The Iraq War 

has shown the harm that can result from the politicization of intelligence in order to support a desired 

policy outcome whose support by the public would 

otherwise be problematic. In the case of the Vela 

event, U.S. administrations on both sides of the political fence have sought to ignore or demote the value 

of legitimately collected and analyzed intelligence information in order to reduce or eliminate pressure to 
368

take an action with unpredictable or negative political 

repercussions. Obfuscating or denigrating hard intelligence data in order to avoid a political problem can 

be as dangerous to national security and democracy 

as inventing bogus intelligence in order to smooth the 

way into a war. Both tactics are designed to mislead 

the public and are therefore antithetical to democratic 

governance. It is time for the U.S. Government to open 

up its files on the Vela event and end a charade that 

has persisted for over 30 years.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 13

1. See Sidney Singer, “The Vela Satellite Program for the Detection of High Altitude Nuclear Detonations,” Proceedings of the 

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers [IEEE], Vol. 53, No. 

12, December 1965, pp. 1935-1948, available from ieeexplore.ieee.

org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=1446400. 

2. See Jeffery Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, New York: W. W. 

Norton and Co., 2006, p. 285. See also Carey Sublette, “Report on 

the 1979 Vela Incident,” available from nuclearweaponarchive.org/

Safrica/Vela.html.

3. See Guy Barasch, “Light Flash Produced by an Atmospheric Nuclear Explosion,” Report LASL 79-84, Los Alamos, NM: Los 

Alamos National Laboratory, November 1979, available from 

www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/lanl/docs4/00362363.pdf.

4. Dale S. Sappenfeld, David H. Sowle, and Trella H. McCartor, “Possible Origins of Event 747 Optical Data,” Prepared 

for Air Force Tactical Operations Center, Patrick AFB, Mission Research Corporation, Santa Barbara, CA, August 1, 1980, 

p. 8, available from foia.abovetopsecret.com/VELA_SATELLITE/

THE_VELA_INCIDENT/REPORTS/POSSIBLE_ORIGINS_OF_

EVENT_747_AUG_1980.pdf.

5. See David Albright and Corey Gay, “A Flash from the 

Past,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 6, November/De-
369

cember 1997, p. 17, available from books.google.com/books?id=vgwA

AAAAMBAJ&pg=PA15&lpg=PA15&dq=Albright,+vela,+flash&sour

ce=bl&ots=XP0fvSvR46&sig=xHyRNQdS2MiMoPP_ZLLm7Z6GG5

I&hl=en&ei=3OqPTfWkJY24sQOCkczzCA&sa=X&oi=book_result&c

t=result&resnum=2&ved=0CBwQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=Albright

%2C%20vela%2C%20flash&f=false.

6. Henry G. Horak, “Vela Event Alert 747,” Los Alamos, NM: 

Los Alamos National Laboratory, May 1980, available from foia.

abovetopsecret.com/VELA_SATELLITE/THE_VELA_INCIDENT/

REPORTS/LA_8364_MS_MAY_1980.pdf.

7. See David Albright, “The Flash in the Atlantic,” Bulletin of 

the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 50, No. 4, July/August 1994, p. 42. 

8. Eliot Marshall, “Navy Lab Concludes the Vela Saw a 

Bomb,” Science, Vol. 209, No. 4460, August 29, 1980, pp. 996-997, 

available from www.sciencemag.org/content/209/4460/996.extract.

9. Albright and Gay, p. 17.

10. National Security Council (NSC) Memo dated October 22, 

1979, PDF file, p. 2, available from foia.abovetopsecret.com/VELA_

SATELLITE/THE_VELA_INCIDENT/NATIONAL_SECURITY_

COUNCIL/NATIONAL_SECURITY_COUNCIL_OCT_22_

1979.pdf.

11. National Security Council Memo dated Jan. 7, 1980, PDF 

file, p. 2, available from foia.abovetopsecret.com/VELA_SATELLITE/

THE_VELA_INCIDENT/NATIONAL_SECURITY_COUNCIL/

NATIONAL_SECURITY_COUNCIL_JAN_7_1980.pdf.

12. NSC Memo dated October 22, 1979.

13. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, “The 22 September 1979 Event,” January 21, 1980, p. 8, approved for release 

June 2004, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/

NSAEBB190/03.pdf. See also Thomas O’Toole, “New Light Cast 

on Sky Flash Mystery,” The Washington Post, January 30, 1980. 

See also Thomas O’Toole and Milton Benjamin, “Officials Hotly 

Debate Whether African Event was Atom Blast,” The Washington 

Post, January 17, 1980.
370

14. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, p. 11.

15. Seymour Hersh, The Samson Option, New York: Random 

House, 1991, p. 274.

16. Ibid., p. 277.

17. See CBS Evening News, West Coast Edition, Walter 

Cronkite’s last day (March 6, 1981). Part 4 of 5, available from 

www.youtube.com/watch?v=piLAsh6GRE0.

18. George Oetzel and Steven Johnson, “Vela Meteoroid 

Evaluation,” T/8503/T/PMP, SRI International, January 29, 1980, 

p. 42, available from foia.abovetopsecret.com/VELA_SATELLITE/

THE_VELA_INCIDENT/REPORTS/SPECIAL_TECHNICAL_

REPORT_2%20JAN_29_1980.pdf.

19. John Mansfield and Houston Hawkins, “The South Atlantic Mystery Flash: Nuclear or Not,” Defense Technical Intelligence Report, Washington, DC: DIA, June 26, 1980, summarized 

in “The Vela Incident: Nuclear Test or Meteoroid,” Jeffery Richelson, ed., National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, No. 190, 

May 5, 2006, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/

NSAEBB190/index.htm. See also Richelson, p. 305.

20. Ad Hoc Panel Report on the September 22 Event, 

May 23, 1980, available from foia.abovetopsecret.com/VELA_

SATELLITE/THE_VELA_INCIDENT/REPORTS/AD_HOC_

REPORT_SEPT_23_1980.pdf.

21. Luis Alvarez, Alvarez: Adventures of a Physicist, New York: 

Basic Books, 1987, Chap. 42.

22. Sublette, pp. 6-7.

23. Marshall, pp. 206-207. 

24. Quoted by CBS News.

25. Sasha Polakow-Suransky, The Unspoken Alliance: Israel’s 

Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa, New York: Pantheon Books, 2010, p. 140.
371

26. Richelson, p. 310.

27. John Pike, “The Death-Beam Gap,” e-Prints, October 1992, 

available from www.fas.org/spp/eprint/keegan.htm.

28. Hersh, p. 281.

29. Daily Newsbulletin, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 

Friday, July 11, 1997, available from nuclearweaponarchive.org/

Safrica/071197.html.

30. Richelson, p. 313.

31. Polakow-Suransky, p. 83.

32. Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman, The Nuclear Express: 

A Political History of the Bomb, Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 

2009, p. 177.

33. Ibid.

34. Jimmy Carter, White House Diary, New York: Norton and 

Co., 2010, p. 357.

35. Ibid., p. 365.

36. Ibid., p. 405.

37. See Victor Gilinsky and Roger Mattson, “Revisiting the 

NUMEC Affair,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 66, No. 2, 

March/April 2010, pp. 61-75.

38. Carter, p. 405.

39. See Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, New York: 

Columbia University Press, 1998.

373

CHAPTER 14

THE NONUSE AND ABUSE OF NUCLEAR 

PROLIFERATION INTELLIGENCE 

IN THE CASES OF NORTH KOREA AND IRAN

Robert Zarate

INTRODUCTION

When it comes to stopping the spread of nuclear 

weapons to additional nations, much attention has focused on the so-called supply side problem of nuclear 

proliferation-related intelligence. Here, the main challenge is to provide policymakers with accurate and 

timely information about the accumulating moves of 

foreign governments to acquire nuclear weapons-making capability, so that they can respond appropriately 

with diplomacy, economic sanctions, interdiction, covert actions, military force, or other tools of statecraft.1

Less attention, however, has focused on what might 

be called the demand side problem of proliferation 

intelligence. Here, the main challenge is that policymakers sometimes may prefer not to receive information about a foreign government’s nuclear proliferation-related provocations, lest they be required to 

respond in ways that would complicate or fundamentally contradict their preferred policies. “Intelligence 

is important in dealing with proliferation, but only 

if you want it,” former Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner Victor Gilinsky keenly observed, adding: 

it is also true that sometimes—contrary to the usual 

assumption—major players don’t want to get reliable information at all because it would force them 

to act, or otherwise face uncomfortable political 

consequences.2
374

To illustrate why the demand side problem of proliferation intelligence is not a hypothetical one, this 

chapter identifies and examines key instances of the 

nonuse or abuse of proliferation intelligence by U.S. 

policymakers with regard to North Korea’s and Iran’s 

respective nuclear programs. Whereas North Korea 

succeeded in building and detonating a nuclear explosive device in October 2006 after repeatedly violating 

its international nonproliferation obligations, Iran—

which, in many ways, is following North Korea’s 

model for nuclear misbehavior—continues to violate 

its international obligations as it steadily improves its 

capability to build a nuclear explosive device on ever 

shorter notice. 

Although the U.S. Government has declassified 

more proliferation-related intelligence on the North 

Korean case than on the Iranian case, it is nonetheless possible to arrive at some tentative and general 

conclusions regarding the demand side problem of 

proliferation intelligence in both of cases. To be sure, 

U.S. policymakers—in both Democratic and Republican presidential administrations—have consistently 

described North Korea’s and Iran’s respective nuclear 

programs over the last few decades as grave threats 

to American and allied security. That said, they sometimes declined to react decisively to worrisome nuclear provocations by North Korea and Iran, especially 

early on, because doing so would have required decisions that were too difficult, risky, or politically inconvenient. In certain instances, policymakers appeared 

not only to overrate their preferred policy palliatives 

towards North Korean and Iranian nuclear misbehavior, but also to be disinclined to receive or further 

pursue intelligence, suggesting that these proliferation cases had worsened or failed to be adequately ad-
375

dressed, on occasion even suppressing the sharing of 

relevant intelligence or denying its existence.

FAILURES OF INTELLIGENCE DEMAND 

IN THE NORTH KOREAN CASE

Despite roughly 2 decades of U.S.-led international 

efforts to stop the Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea (DPRK) from getting nuclear weapons-making 

capability, Pyongyang succeeded in detonating its 

first nuclear explosive device in October 2006. This 

outcome was made possible, in no small part, by the 

failures of policymakers to use available intelligence 

or demand new intelligence on the North Korean 

nuclear program that would have compelled a refinement of or fundamental revision to their policies. 

Much of the record of intelligence related to the 

DPRK’s march to nuclear weapons-making capability has not been declassified by the U.S. Government. 

However, a review of the available declassified record 

suggests that the most egregious nonuse or abuse of 

nuclear proliferation-related intelligence occurred 

during the mid-1990s, when policymakers apparently 

prioritized preserving the so-called Agreed Framework—America’s controversial nuclear “grand bargain” with North Korea—over fully reckoning with 

what appears to be the U.S. intelligence community’s 

classified judgment in the mid-1990s that Pyongyang 

already had produced “one, possibly two, nuclear 

weapons.”3

A closer examination of the successive failures of 

intelligence demand in the DPRK’s nuclear case is instructive, and it can help contemporary policymakers 

to avoid a North Korean-like outcome in the ongoing Iranian case and to adopt early on more effective 
376

nonproliferation and counterproliferation strategies 

in future cases.

Failing to Get the DPRK to Accept 

Nuclear Inspections.

Upon learning of North Korea’s undeclared nuclear activities in the mid-1980s, the Ronald Reagan administration sought to persuade Pyongyang to join the 

Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

(NPT) and sign the NPT-required “full-scope” nuclear 

safeguards agreement with the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA). Although they achieved the 

first objective, they did not achieve the second. Given how Pyongyang’s conclusion of an NPT-required 

IAEA safeguards agreement could have helped to 

fill some of the U.S. intelligence community’s admitted gaps in understanding of the DPRK’s nuclear 

program during this period, policymakers arguably 

should have treated North Korea’s repeated refusal to 

conclude this safeguards agreement as a much graver 

violation then they did.

According to the declassified record, the U.S. intelligence community first learned in the early- to 

mid-1980s that North Korea was engaging in undeclared nuclear activities relevant to nuclear weapons 

making.4

 In particular, Pyongyang quietly had begun 

the construction of two nuclear reactors capable of 

producing weapons-grade plutonium at Yongbyon—

namely, a 5-megawatt electric (MWe) research reactor 

in 1980, and a 50-MWe Magnox power reactor in the 

mid-1980s that was not connected to the country’s electrical grid. However, the declassified record suggests 

that the intelligence community understood very little 

about the full extent of North Korea’s nuclear efforts 
377

during this period, using carefully worded caveats to 

avoid strong conclusions about whether Pyongyang 

had a weapons program. For example, the Directorate of Intelligence in the Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA) wrote in a May 1983 report: “We have very little 

information on North Korea’s ability to conduct the 

non-nuclear research, particularly that involving high 

explosives, required for a nuclear weapons research 

program,” adding:

In considering whether to embark on a venture 

as costly, hazardous, and politically sensitive as a 

nuclear weapons program, P’yongyang would face 

complex calculation of benefits versus costs as well 

as uncertainty regarding the effect of such a program 

on its ultimate goal of reunifying the peninsula on its 

own terms.5

Even though the United States and the Soviet 

Union were locked at the time in a heated Cold War 

strategic rivalry, the Reagan administration was able 

to respond to the DPRK’s nuclear provocations by 

working with Moscow, which had no small amount of 

influence on Pyongyang and shared a common interest in getting North Korea to join the NPT. Although 

the DPRK agreed to accede to the NPT in December 

1985—apparently as a quid pro quo for a Soviet promise to build a nuclear power plant—it failed to meet 

its NPT obligation to conclude, within the first 18 

months of signing the treaty, a full-scope safeguards 

agreement with the IAEA. A complicating factor 

was that the IAEA reportedly provided the North 

Koreans with an outdated version of the safeguards 

agreement and thus gave them another 18 months to 

conclude the pact, but Pyongyang failed to meet this 

revised deadline.6
378

An IAEA safeguards agreement would have required the DPRK to make a full declaration of all its 

nuclear material and related equipment and activities, 

and also legally authorized the IAEA’s nuclear inspectors to verify the correctness and completeness of its 

declarations. Implementation of IAEA safeguards in 

North Korea could therefore have given U.S policymakers, lawmakers, and the intelligence community 

critical information for better assessing the DPRK’s 

program’s weapons potential, especially in light of the 

intelligence community’s admitted knowledge gaps. 

Indeed, the declassified record shows that the intelligence community expressed repeated concern 

about Pyongyang’s failure to conclude an IAEA safeguards agreement. For example, the CIA’s Director 

of Intelligence issued a May 1988 report that stated 

there is “no evidence that North Korea is pursuing a 

nuclear weapons option, but we cannot rule out that 

possibility,” adding: 

the possibility that P’yongyang is developing a reprocessing capability [that would enable it to extract 

weapons-usable plutonium from spent nuclear fuel] 

and its footdragging on implementing NPT provisions, suggest close scrutiny of the North’s nuclear 

effort is order.

It is crucial to note that the 1988 report also 

stated that the South Korean government “believes P’yongyang is developing a nuclear weapon 

capability—a concern that Seoul has raised publicly.”7

Despite internal debates, however, the Reagan administration appears to have treated North Korea’s 

NPT violation as relatively routine, perhaps due in 

part to competing priorities in foreign policy, such 

as America’s larger Cold War rivalry with Moscow. 
379

Indeed, rather than raise the ante with economic sanctions or other forms of high-profile international pressure, U.S. policymakers relied on quieter multilateral 

diplomacy in the hopes of eventually changing Pyongyang’s behavior. In the meantime, the DPRK had already begun to produce and accumulate plutoniumladen spent nuclear fuel via its 5-MWe nuclear reactor, 

which had started operations in the mid-1980s. Moreover, as it continued construction of its 50-MWe nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, it also began to build a new 

200-MWe plutonium-producing reactor at Taechon in 

January 1989. What’s especially troubling—especially 

in retrospect—is that North Korea likely undertook 

additional efforts during this period not only to experiment with the non-nuclear components necessary 

for the construction of a nuclear explosive device, 

but also to develop and perhaps even use reprocessing technologies to begin separating weapons-usable 

plutonium from its growing stockpile of spent nuclear 

fuel. At any rate, the DPRK’s weapons-relevant nuclear activities would metastasize in the next decade.

The Agreed Framework: Giving Up Our Ends to 

Preserve Our Means.

Under President George H. W. Bush, the United 

States eventually achieved the Reagan administration’s goal of getting North Korea to conclude its 

NPT-required full-scope IAEA safeguards agreement 

in early-1992. Yet disturbing discrepancies in the 

DPRK’s subsequent declaration of nuclear materials 

to the IAEA—and the weapons-related worries surrounding its suspected covert reprocessing activities—

led the Bush administration and later the Bill Clinton 

administration to escalate diplomatically the contro-
380

versy. What is problematic, though, is that when the 

North Koreans publicly said that international pressure—in particular, the imposition of economic sanctions—against it would amount to a “declaration of 

war,” the Clinton administration apparently blinked. 

Instead, U.S. policymakers doubled-down on the 

diplomatic track, eventually concluding the so-called 

Agreed Framework, a controversial grand bargain 

with Pyongyang that aimed, above all, at de-escalating the North Korean crisis. Although senior officials 

in the Clinton administration cited the Agreed Framework as a means to achieving the goal of halting the 

DPRK’s march to nuclear weapons-making capability, 

it appears that they came to see preserving the grand 

bargain as an end in of itself, even in the face of intelligence reports suggesting egregious North Korean 

nuclear violations of the agreement.

In 1989, the incoming Bush administration undertook a sustained effort to get Pyongyang to agree to 

put its nuclear facilities under IAEA inspections. Towards that end, U.S. policymakers wrangled, on the 

one hand, with North Korea’s rising demand for the 

establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula (which would require U.S. withdrawal of forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons), and on the 

other, with reassuring South Korea, Japan, and other 

allies of their security. At the same time, American 

diplomats also worked behind the scenes to persuade 

the IAEA’s 35-nation Board of Governors to posture 

itself for increased diplomatic pressure on the DPRK. 

Although the effort had its share of controversies, it 

nonetheless produced certain results. On September 

27, 1991, with Cold War tensions with Moscow at a 

low (indeed, the Soviet Union would dissolve in lateDecember 1991), President George H. W. Bush an-
381

nounced that the United States would withdraw all 

land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from 

South Korea. In December 1991, Seoul and Pyongyang 

concluded a joint declaration to establish a nuclearweapons-free Korean Peninsula, which entered into 

force in February 1992, and stipulated that “South and 

North Korea shall not possess nuclear reprocessing 

and uranium enrichment facilities.” After subsequent 

delays, the DPRK finally signed its full-scope IAEA 

safeguards agreement on January 30, 1992, and ratified it on April 9, 1992.

Although the Bush administration arguably 

paid a steep price to persuade Pyongyang merely to 

conclude its NPT-required IAEA safeguards agreement, the U.S. intelligence community’s increasingly 

grave assessments of the DPRK’s nuclear program 

during this period reflected the need for urgent actions. For example, the CIA reported in a March 1989 

special analysis:

North Korea may be willing to risk the international 

censure that a nuclear weapons program would bring 

in order to maintain a decided military advantage 

over the South, the keystone of the North’s national 

security policy. Pyongyang may believe that nuclear 

weapons are crucial to preserving that edge.8

But in the years following, evidence emerged that 

North Korea had escalated activities relevant to an actual nuclear weapons program. For instance, the CIA 

reported in February 1992: 

P’yongyang recently conducted its first high-explosive 

test since 1988. . . . The activity [related to reprocessing] at Yongbyon suggests the North may be trying to 

complete its nuclear weapons program before inspec-
382

tions begin; it may also have no intention of allowing 

inspections.9

The report added that these developments “suggest P’yongyang is moving forward with its nuclear 

weapons programs.”10 Thus, while the U.S. intelligence community had strong suspicions that the 

North Koreans had already engaged in some level 

of reprocessing activities, policymakers in the Bush 

administration apparently declined to publicly raise 

this point, for a public confrontation might have also 

forced them to question the validity of the North 

and South’s December 1991 joint declaration. Right 

or wrong, it appears that the Bush administration—

which was becoming consumed with the aftermath of 

Operation DESERT STORM and other foreign policy 

priorities—concluded that pushing for IAEA nuclear 

inspections offered perhaps the best way to exert international pressure on Pyongyang in a manner that 

could build multilateral consensus. Yet, to the extent 

that policymakers believed that North Korea’s efforts 

constituted an actual nuclear weapons program, they 

arguably should have treated Pyongyang’s nuclear 

provocations as a much graver threat than they did.

The Bush administration—and then the Clinton 

administration, at least in its first 2 years—thus relied 

mainly on the IAEA inspections process to raise the 

stakes over the DPRK’s controversial nuclear program. Indeed, tensions mounted after the IAEA found 

disturbing discrepancies in North Korea’s May 1992 

initial declaration of nuclear materials. Questions 

emerged about whether Pyongyang had correctly and 

completely declared its nuclear material inventories 

and related activities—in particular, whether it had 

used so-called hot cells supplied by the Soviets in the 
383

1960s to separate plutonium from its growing stockpile of spent nuclear fuel. After the DPRK repeatedly 

denied IAEA inspectors access to two suspected nuclear-related sites at Yongbyon during a series of visits 

in mid- to late-1992 then-IAEA Director General Hans 

Blix formally requested Pyongyang to allow more 

intrusive “special inspections” on February 11, 1993. 

In addition, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a 

resolution on February 24, 1993, urging North Korea 

to accept special inspections within 1 month. Pyongyang defiantly responded by announcing its intention to withdraw from the NPT on March 12, 1993. 

The IAEA Board of Governors subsequently found 

the DPRK to be in noncompliance with its obligations 

under the NPT-required IAEA safeguards agreement, 

and referred its case to the United Nations (UN) Security Council in April 1993. Led by the United States, 

the UN Security Council passed a May 1993 resolution 

that called upon North Korea to reconsider its intention to withdraw from the NPT and comply with its 

IAEA safeguards agreement. However, the UN Security Council resolution did not impose any actual 

sanctions to pressure a change in Pyongyang’s nuclear 

misbehavior.

Over the next year, the United States and IAEA 

continued to engage North Korea diplomatically, hoping to convince it to change course. However, after the 

DPRK began removing spent nuclear fuel rods from its 

5-MWe reactor at Yongbyon in early- to mid-1994, the 

U.S. State Department attempted to draw a “red line” 

by threatening that any removal of the spent fuel from 

the fuel rods themselves would lead the United States 

to actively seek sanctions in the UN Security Council. 

Nonetheless, Pyongyang responded by withdrawing from the IAEA in June 1994 and issuing boister-
384

ous counterthreats. For example, North Korea’s First 

Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju definitely declared: 

“Sanctions would equal a declaration of war. All the 

people in our country and our military are gearing up 

now to respond to the sanctions.”11

Rather than press the UN Security Council to impose sanctions, the Clinton administration elected to 

negotiate a so-called grand bargain with Pyongyang 

in an apparent effort, above all, to diffuse the crisis. 

In October 1994, U.S. and North Korean diplomats 

concluded the so-called Agreed Framework, which 

obliged the DPRK to suspend construction of its 50-

MWe and 200-MWe nuclear reactors in return for 

heavy fuel oil and allegedly “proliferation-resistant” 

light water reactors (LWRs) with a total 2,000-MWe capacity. One of the Agreed Framework’s key problems, 

however, was that it explicitly suspended the IAEA’s 

routine and ad hoc nuclear inspections pursuant to 

North Korea’s full-scope IAEA safeguards agreement 

and did not authorize the resumption of inspections 

until after “conclusion of the supply contract for the 

provision of the LWR project.” The suspension of 

IAEA nuclear inspections had the immediate effect of 

reducing the Agency’s access to the DPRK’s overall 

nuclear program, and—critically—the flow of information about the country’s activities. Another key 

problem was that the grand bargain required Pyongyang to come into full compliance with its NPT and 

IAEA obligations—including enabling inspectors to 

verify the correctness and completeness of its nuclear 

declarations—but only after a “significant portion of 

the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of 

key nuclear components.” Such provisions effectively 

created the time and space necessary for North Korean nuclear violations to accumulate.
385

Although the stated objective of the Agreed Framework was to prevent the DPRK from getting nuclear 

weapons, the Clinton administration apparently came 

to view preserving the grand bargain as an end in and 

of itself, even in the face of growing evidence that 

Pyongyang had egregiously violated the agreement. 

To take one example from the mid- to late-1990s, senior policymakers sought to downplay intelligence 

that North Korea had potentially violated the Agreed 

Framework by pursuing a covert program to enrich 

uranium. In testimony before various congressional 

committees in 1997 and 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright repeatedly claimed that the Agreed 

Framework had definitively halted the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. However, with lawmakers repeatedly confronting the Clinton administration about 

emerging intelligence of Pyongyang’s procurement 

and development activities related to uranium enrichment, she reluctantly conceded to the House Committee on International Relations in February 1999: “. . . 

we have suspicions that North Korea has engaged in 

construction activities that could constitute a violation 

of its commitment to freeze its nuclear-related facilities under the Agreed Framework.”12

More troubling, policymakers in the Clinton administration may have failed to reckon fully with the 

implications of what appear to be troubling judgments 

in the mid-1990s by elements of the U.S. intelligence 

community that North Korea had already built a nuclear weapon—a conclusion that would have undermined a key premise of the Agreed Framework, if it 

had a public airing at the time. In December 2001, the 

National Intelligence Council revealed in Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 

2015, an unclassified summary of a National Intelli-
386

gence Estimate (NIE), that the intelligence community had already concluded in the mid-1990s, apparently after the Agreed Framework had been signed, 

that Pyongyang had built as many as two nuclear 

weapons:

The Intelligence Community judged in the mid-1990s

that North Korea had produced one, possibly two, 

nuclear weapons, although the North has frozen 

plutonium production activities at Yongbyon in 

accordance with the Agreed Framework of 1994 

(emphasis added).13

In November 2002, the CIA subsequently provided to Congress an unclassified estimate on North 

Korea’s nuclear program that repeated and elaborated 

the claim made by the December 2001 NIE summary: 

The U.S. has been concerned about North Korea’s desire for nuclear weapons and has assessed since the early 

1990s that the North has one or possibly two weapons 

using plutonium it produced prior to 1992 (emphasis 

added).14

If it is indeed true that the intelligence community 

arrived at this conclusion in the mid-1990s, then policymakers in the Clinton administration should have 

not only tasked the intelligence community to determine whether the DPRK at the time was continuing 

to engage in a covert nuclear program—including 

the development of uranium enrichment capabilities—in violation of the Agreed Framework, but also 

questioned the wisdom of continuing with the Agreed 

Framework. But they apparently chose not to do either 

one. As Henry Sokolski, who served as the Pentagon’s 

Deputy for Nonproliferation under President George 

H. W. Bush, explained in a November 2002 article: 
387

If North Korea already had built one or more weapons and was hiding them in violation of the 1994 

deal, wouldn’t it be reasonable to assume that 

North Korea was still conducting a covert nuclear weapons program? The answer from the intelligence community: Probably, but since no one had yet 

asked the community formally to review the matter in 

a national intelligence estimate, it had no definitive view

(emphasis added).15

Sokolski added: 

Why was there no such request? Almost certainly because Clinton officials knew what the answer would 

be—yes—and that that would spell the end of their 

1994 deal.16

Another complicating factor may have been that 

the Clinton administration did not want to endanger 

the May 1995 review conference for the NPT, in which 

treaty signatories were scheduled to vote on the pact’s 

indefinite extension. What is troublesome, however, is 

that during this same period, the mid- to late-1990s, A. 

Q. Khan, the Pakistani engineer who headed a rogue 

international nuclear proliferation network, repeatedly visited North Korea and allegedly provided it 

with components and designs related to uranium centrifuges, as well as other nuclear assistance.17

Legacy: Pyongyang’s Final Sprint to the Bomb.

In the early years of the 21st century, the Agreed 

Framework began to fall apart. After President George 

W. Bush identified North Korea as a member of the socalled Axis of Evil in a post-September 11, 2011, State 

of the Union speech, U.S. diplomats confronted their 
388

North Korean counterparts with evidence of an undeclared uranium enrichment program in September 

2002. Bristling at the Bush administration’s more confrontational approach, Pyongyang began to reactivate 

dormant nuclear facilities and then withdrew from 

the NPT in January 2003.

Over the next 3 years, however, policymakers in 

the Bush administration changed course and pursued a multilateral diplomatic process with the DPRK 

through the so-called Six-Party Talks process that also 

brought Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea to the 

table. Although the Six-Party Talks may have enjoyed 

temporary—albeit limited—gains, if any questions 

lingered over the overall success of North Korea’s long 

march to nuclear weapons-making capability, they 

were dispelled when Pyongyang detonated underground its first nuclear explosive device on October 9, 

2006. It then exploded underground another nuclear 

device on May 25, 2009. Moreover, as DPRK officials 

revealed to former Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Director Siegfried Hecker and other nuclear specialists 

visiting the country in November 2010, North Korea 

had built a 2,000-centrifuge uranium enrichment facility with a surprising level of technical sophistication.18

Equally troubling, Pyongyang was also now internationally spreading nuclear weapons-related technologies. To take a key example, a surprise Israeli air strike 

on a secret Syrian nuclear facility at the al-Kibar site 

near Deir Alzour in September 2007 led to subsequent 

public revelations by the U.S. intelligence community 

that North Koreans had actively assisted the Assad 

regime in building a nuclear reactor designed to produce weapons-grade plutonium.19 Having successfully tested a long-range missile with direct relevance 

to intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability 
389

on December 12, 2012, Pyongyang detonated its third 

nuclear explosive device on February 12, 2013, raising tensions on the Korean Peninsula and throughout 

the region.

In sum, after North Korea’s nuclear weapons program was discovered by the U.S. Government in the 

early- to mid-1980s, it metastasized in the 1990s and 

became a full-blown proliferation nightmare in the 

2000s. What is worrisome is that the available record 

of declassified intelligence about the North Korean 

nuclear case appears to suggest that policymakers in 

both Democratic and Republican presidential administrations—when confronted with intelligence indicators that potentially endangered their preferred policy 

palliatives towards Pyongyang—did not always want 

to know.

FAILURES OF INTELLIGENCE DEMAND 

IN THE IRANIAN CASE

Although the United States has helped lead international efforts to stop the Islamic Republic of Iran from 

developing the capability to build a nuclear weapon 

on increasingly short notice since 2003, Tehran has 

consistently refused to yield. Now Israeli officials—

whose country Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has threatened to “wipe off the map”—have 

warned that Iran’s nuclear program is about to enter 

a so-called zone of immunity, a state of technological progress in which not even a military strike may 

prevent, with much confidence, the current Iranian 

regime from eventually building a nuclear weapon. 

Nonetheless, President Obama has repeatedly stated 

his belief that “there is still time and space to pursue a 

diplomatic solution.”
390

Here, it is important to recall once again that the 

available record of declassified intelligence on Iran’s 

nuclear program is currently much more limited than 

the available record on North Korea’s program. As a 

result, conclusions about the nonuse or abuse of proliferation intelligence in the Iranian case will be inherently more tentative than in the North Korea case. That 

said, what is troubling is how so-called realist foreign 

policy analysts are now urging the United States to 

“handle” Iran’s accelerating march to nuclear weapons-making capability “like North Korea”—which is 

to say, to try to negotiate a grand bargain, if nothing 

else, to decrease tensions, but also to be prepared to 

accept a nuclear-armed Iran.20 Such advice is wrongheaded, and a closer examination of key failures of intelligence demand with regard to the Iranian nuclear 

program can help policymakers refine and revise their 

nonproliferation and counterproliferation strategies, 

and hopefully avoid a North Korea-like outcome in 

Iran’s case.

Halting the Shah’s March to Nuclear 

Weapons-Making Capability.

In the early-1970s, Iran’s Shah Mohammad Rez 

Pahlavi announced plans to initiate a civil nuclear 

program in his country. Towards that end, he not only 

struck power reactor deals with French and West German nuclear suppliers, but also offered to buy nuclear 

reactors from the United States. Despite warnings 

from elements of the U.S. intelligence community that 

the Shah’s pro-Western government might use a civil 

nuclear program to pursue specific technologies and 

eventually acquire a nuclear weapons-making capability, the Gerald Ford administration initially worked 
391

to conclude a bilateral agreement for civil nuclear 

cooperation that would “accommodate Iranian demands” for some level of access to weapons-relevant 

nuclear fuel-making technologies like reprocessing to 

separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. However, when President Ford announced sweeping changes to America’s nuclear export and nonproliferation 

policies in October 1976, his announcement effectively 

foreclosed U.S. efforts to provide Iran with access to reprocessing. Although President Jimmy Carter apparently momentarily reversed his predecessor’s decision 

on providing Tehran with access to reprocessing, the 

possibility of any U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with 

Iran ended with the Shah’s overthrow in the country’s 

1979 Islamic Revolution.

In 1974, as the Shah started to ramp up efforts to 

building a civil nuclear program, America’s nuclear 

export and nonproliferation policies were being 

rocked by Smiling Buddha, India’s May 18th detonation of a nuclear bomb. What disturbed policymakers 

and lawmakers in Washington, DC, was that New 

Delhi had obtained the plutonium for the bomb using 

a reactor that Canada had built for India to use “for 

peaceful purposes only” and heavy water to moderate 

the reactor that the United States had supplied, again 

expressly “for peaceful purposes.”21 Nonetheless, officials in New Delhi attempted to use semantics to 

explain away their nuclear test, describing the bomb 

as a so-called peaceful nuclear explosive device that 

had not violated their understanding of the terms of 

the nuclear cooperation agreements with the United 

States and Canada.22

According to declassified records, the U.S. intelligence community worried about the Shah’s longterm nuclear intentions in the aftermath of India’s 
392

nuclear test. Some intelligence analyses appeared to 

take little comfort that Iran had signed the NPT in July 

1968 and concluded an NPT-required full-scope IAEA 

safeguards agreement in May 1974. For example, the 

CIA’s Director of Central Intelligence issued Prospects 

for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a Special 

National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) dated August 

1974, that cautioned:

Iran’s much publicized nuclear power intentions are 

entirely in the planning state. . . . There is no doubt, 

however, of the Shah’s ambition to make Iran a power 

to be reckoned with. If he is alive in the mid-1980s, 

if Iran has a full-fledged nuclear power industry and 

all the facilities necessary for nuclear weapons, and if 

other countries have proceeded with weapons development, we have no doubt that Iran will follow suit. 

Iran’s course will be strongly influenced by Indian 

nuclear programs.23

Nonetheless, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 

concurrently serving at the time as the National Security Advisor, apparently prioritized the perceived 

benefits of a U.S.-Iranian nuclear cooperation agreement over the intelligence community’s statements of 

the risks and pushed ahead with efforts to negotiate a 

deal with Tehran. But as the declassified record shows, 

the Ford administration internally debated how to respond to the Shah’s communicated desire to reprocess 

spent nuclear fuel, or at least have some access to reprocessing technology. On April 22, 1975, Kissinger 

issued a National Security Decision Memorandum 

(NSDM) stating that Washington’s negotiations for a 

nuclear agreement with Tehran should seek: “. . . to 

require U.S. approval for reprocessing U.S. supplied 

fuel, while indicating that the establishment of a mul-
393

tinational reprocessing plant would be an important 

factor favoring such approval.” But the NSDM added: 

As a fall back, we could inform the Government of 

Iran that we shall be prepared to provide our approval for reprocessing of U.S. material in a multinational 

plant in Iran if the country supplying the reprocessing 

technology or equipment is a full and active participate in the plant, and holding open the possibility of 

U.S. participation. The standard provisions requiring 

mutual agreement as to safeguardability shall apply. 

An expression of U.S. willingness to explore cooperation in establishing such a facility at an appropriate 

time should Iran so desire, may be made.24

Another option was to “buy back” spent nuclear 

fuel from the Iranians at market prices. Over the next 1 

1/2 years, Washington and Tehran exchanged various 

draft agreements and wrangled over the reprocessing 

issue, but they found little common ground as negotiations intermittently stalled.

Nonetheless, by October 1976, President Ford effectively had foreclosed the possibility of any U.S. 

assistance in helping Iran to access to reprocessing 

technologies when he announced a major shift in 

America’s nuclear nonproliferation and energy policies. In particular, Ford stated that the United States 

would defer the pursuit of activities to reprocess spent 

fuel, fabricate plutonium-based nuclear fuels, and export plutonium-based fuels and related technologies:

I have decided that the United States should no longer regard reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a necessary and inevitable step 

in the nuclear fuel cycle, and that we should pursue 

reprocessing and recycling in the future only if they 

are found to be consistent with our international 

objectives.25
394

One key motivating factor behind the President’s 

decision was that the White House had assembled in 

mid-1976 an interagency panel—led by then Deputy 

Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA) Robert Fri, and composed of 

representatives from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Office of Budget and Management, the State Department, and other agencies—

to examine U.S. nuclear energy and export policy. The 

panel’s still-classified study, known as the Fri Study, 

apparently offered both majority and minority recommendations on policy changes that fundamentally 

informed President Ford’s decision to prioritize nonproliferation while deferring the domestic and international promotion of reprocessing and plutoniumbased nuclear fuels.

President Carter made the Ford administration 

deferral policy “indefinite” in April 1977 but nonetheless apparently moved to reverse the Ford administration’s decision to prevent Iran from getting reprocessing during a one-on-one meeting with the Shah in 

December 1977. Drawing on firsthand interviews with 

aides to President Carter, nuclear nonproliferation expert Henry Sokolski wrote in March 2005:

In an effort to show support for the Shah, President 

Carter visited Iran in late December 1977. At the time, 

it was U.S. policy to export U.S. reactors but not to 

share reprocessing or enrichment technology with any 

state, Iran included. Yet, when he met with the Shah, 

Carter, to the amazement of his aides, cast U.S. nuclear 

policy aside and orally assured the Shah that he could 

have anything nuclear he wanted from the United 

States, including reprocessing, if he liked.26
395

That said, the possibility of any substantive U.S. 

civil nuclear cooperation with Tehran ended with the 

fall of the Shah in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Indeed, 

the new theocratic regime in Tehran would temporarily put Iran’s push for a civil nuclear program on 

the backburner, but it would not abandon its nuclear 

efforts completely.

Failing to Reckon with Iran’s Chinese 

Nuclear Connection.

Consumed by the Iran-Iraq War (September 1980 

to August 1988)—the bloody conflict in which Saddam 

Hussein’s Ba’athist regime used chemical weapons 

against Iran and both countries attacked each other’s 

nuclear facilities—the Iranian regime did not prioritize 

efforts related to acquiring a nuclear weapons-making 

capability for much of the 1980s.27 However, after the 

war’s conclusion, Iran initiated a tenacious and often 

covert campaign to gain access to nuclear materials, 

technologies, and know-how, seeking help from entities in China, Russia, and elsewhere, to acquire elements necessary for developing the capability to make 

a nuclear weapon on ever-shorter notice. 

In response, policymakers in the Clinton administration—who claimed to be gravely concerned about 

Iranian nuclear proliferation activities—attempted to 

pressure both Moscow and Beijing to curb their permissive nuclear policies towards Iran by dangling 

before each the possibility of concluding a muchcoveted bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreement 

with the United States. Although it appears that the 

U.S. intelligence community was deeply concerned 

about Chinese and Russian assistance to Iran’s nuclear 

programs, the Clinton administration decided to treat 
396

the two countries differently, pushing to fully implement a U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreement with 

China, while holding off on even negotiating a similar 

agreement with Russia.

While the U.S. Government has not yet declassified 

much intelligence from the 1990s related to Sino-Iranian and Russo-Iranian civil nuclear relations, various 

unclassified reports to Congress help to give a sense 

of the intelligence community’s worries about such relationships during the period. For example, a September 1996 report by the Congressional Research Service 

(CRS) noted concerns that “[s]ince the 1980s, China 

has agreed to provide nuclear technology to Iran . . 

.,” adding: “There is concern about Iran’s nuclear collaboration with Pakistan, long a recipient of Chinese 

assistance.”28 Of note, the CRS report elaborated on 

aspects of Sino-Iranian nuclear collaboration that the 

intelligence community found problematic such as: 

Secret Cooperation. U.S. and European intelligence 

reportedly found that, since 1988, 15 Iranian nuclear 

engineers from Iran’s nuclear research center at Esfahan have been secretly trained in China; that a secret 

Iranian-Chinese nuclear cooperation agreement dates 

from after 1985; and that China transferred designs 

and technology for reactor construction and other 

projects at Esfahan. . . .29

and:

Other Controversial Deals. The China National Nuclear 

Energy Industry Corporation reportedly plans to sell 

Iran a facility to convert uranium ore into uranium 

hexafluoride gas, which could be enriched to weapons-grade material. U.S. policy is complicated by the 

fact that Westinghouse Electric Corporation wants to 

sell equipment to the Chinese company. According to 
397

intelligence reports, the deal is proceeding with Chinese nuclear experts going to Iran to build the new 

uranium conversion plant near Esfahan.30

Indeed, only a few months earlier, Congressman 

John Spratt, Jr., (D-South Carolina) had publicly 

warned about China’s alleged cooperation with Iran 

on a uranium conversion facility during a June 1996 

floor speech: “China is assisting Iran in building a 

uranium hexafluoride [HEX] facility which converts 

uranium into a gaseous form so it can be diffused to 

produce highly enriched uranium.”31 But perhaps 

most alarmingly, the CIA’s Nonproliferation Center 

subsequently issued a July 1997 report bluntly stating 

that “China [in the latter half of 1996] was the single 

most important supplier of equipment and technology 

for weapons of mass destruction [WMD]” worldwide 

(emphasis added).32

The intelligence community in the 1990s also had 

strong concerns about Russo-Iranian nuclear cooperation. According to news reports from the middle of 

the decade, the Clinton administration—concerned 

that Russian assistance to Iran might come to entail 

uranium enrichment or other nuclear fuel-making 

technologies—took the unprecedented step of directly sharing U.S. intelligence findings on Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program with the Kremlin, 

in the hopes of persuading Russia to end all nuclear 

assistance to Iran.33 Although it appears that Moscow 

subsequently refrained from direct assistance to Iranian efforts to gain nuclear fuel-making technologies, 

the Director of Central of Intelligence (DCI) nonetheless warned Congress in an unclassified September 

1997 report:
398

Russian entities continued to market and support 

a variety of nuclear-related projects in Iran in 1997, 

ranging from the sale of laboratory equipment for 

nuclear research institutes to the construction of a 

1,000-megawatt nuclear power reactor in Bushehr, 

Iran, that will be subject to . . . IAEA safeguards. 

These projects, along with other nuclear-related purchases from abroad, helped to build Iran’s nuclear 

technology infrastructure, which in turn would be 

useful in supporting nuclear weapons research and 

development.34

However, the DCI’s report tentatively added: 

Russia has committed to observe certain limits on its 

nuclear cooperation with Iran. For example, President 

[Boris] Yel’tsin has stated publicly that Russia will not 

provide militarily useful nuclear technology to Iran.

The Clinton administration decided to take markedly different approaches when it came to linking the 

possibility of U.S. civil nuclear cooperation to changes 

in Russia’s and China’s respective behaviors towards 

Iran’s nuclear program. On the one hand, President 

Clinton—following President Bush’s policy precedent—declined even to negotiate with the Kremlin for 

an agreement to permit bilateral civil nuclear cooperation until Russia had ended all nuclear, advanced 

conventional military, and missile assistance to Iran.35

One particular sticking point was Moscow’s decision to try to complete the construction of Iran’s light 

water reactor at Bushehr.

On the other hand, the President decided to positively respond to Beijing’s request that Washington 

fully implement the controversial U.S.-Chinese civil 

nuclear cooperation agreement. After the Reagan administration had negotiated and signed the bilateral 
399

agreement in July 1985, Congress passed a joint resolution (Public Law 99-183) that technically allowed 

the agreement to enter into force, but conditioned 

its full implementation—e.g., the issuance of export 

licenses—on the President legally certifying, among 

other things, that China’s peaceful use of U.S. nuclear 

exports can and will be effectively verified and that 

Beijing’s provision of further details about its nuclear 

nonproliferation policies and practices conformed 

with Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits nuclear exports to countries that proliferate.

To lay the political groundwork for implementing 

the U.S.-Chinese civil nuclear cooperation agreement 

forward, senior policymakers in the Clinton administration began to tout reversals in China’s historically 

troubling nuclear policies—in particular, its nuclear 

practices towards Iran. For example, State Department 

official Robert Einhorn told lawmakers in September 

1997 that China had cancelled its controversial project 

to build a uranium conversion plant in Iran, although 

he conceded that the Chinese still had provided the 

Iranians with blueprints to build the problematic facility.36 (Worse, the IAEA would subsequently reveal 

in a June 2003 report that China had also secretly 

exported in 1991 roughly one metric ton of uranium 

hexafluoride to Iran.37 In the mid-2000s, Iran would reportedly use some of this gaseous uranium feedstock 

in its uranium enrichment centrifuges.) Moreover, 

the Clinton administration leaked the contents of a 

“secret” letter that Foreign Minister Qian Qichen had 

given to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on the 

eve of a U.S.-China summit in Washington in October 

1997, in which Beijing had promised not to start new 

nuclear projects in Iran, but only after first completing 

a small nuclear research reactor and a facility to fabri-
400

cate zirconium cladding for encasing nuclear reactor 

fuel rods.38

In January 1998, President Clinton issued the required certifications to clear the final legal hurdles to 

formally begin the congressional review period for the 

controversial U.S.-Chinese civil nuclear cooperation 

agreement.39 Although individual lawmakers moved 

to push a joint resolution of disapproval to block the 

U.S.-Chinese agreement’s implementation, Congress 

as a whole did not act on the proposed joint resolution 

before the legislative branch’s review period ended. 

As a result, the door to the nuclear deal’s full implementation opened.

What is troubling about this episode is that, even 

though key elements of the intelligence community 

had singled out China as a worse WMD proliferator 

than Russia, it appears that the Clinton administration 

prioritized geopolitics and the U.S. nuclear industry’s 

desire to sell nuclear goods and services to the Chinese over a principled policy on nuclear nonproliferation. By failing to hold China’s proliferation activities 

towards Iran to a similar standard as Russia’s proliferation activities, policymakers certainly gave up a 

point of powerful leverage on Beijing’s nuclear behavior—one that conceivably could have been used to get 

China not only to divulge the full measure of its assistance to Iran, but also to take an even tougher stand 

on Iranian efforts to get nuclear weapons-making capability, especially as these efforts metastasized in the 

next decade.

Legacy: Continuing Struggle to Halt Iran’s 

March to the Bomb.

The controversy over the Iranian nuclear program 

turned into a bona fide crisis in August 2002, when the 
401

IAEA learned that Iran had engaged in a host of undeclared nuclear activities relevant to a weapons program for nearly 2 decades. Iran, as a signatory to the 

NPT, had obligated itself to make correct and complete 

declarations of its nuclear material and related activities to IAEA inspectors. As a result, then-IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported in June 2003 

that Iran had “failed to meet its obligations” under its 

NPT-required nuclear transparency and inspections 

agreement with the IAEA, and he urged Iran to fully 

cooperate with nuclear inspectors so they could provide credible assurances regarding the [current and 

future] absence of undeclared nuclear activities.

Yet despite nearly a decade’s worth of U.S.-led international efforts to use diplomacy and pressure to 

change Iranian behavior, the regime in Tehran to this 

day has refused to take IAEA-required actions that 

would help allay international worries about its nuclear program; they instead pursued technical capabilities that have shrunk the amount of time that it needs 

to make its first nuclear weapon.40 What is troubling 

is the extent to which China and Russia have acted 

to slow or halt Western efforts to get the UN Security 

Council to impose sanctions on Iran’s ongoing noncompliance with its international nuclear nonproliferation obligations, especially in recent years. But just as 

President Clinton conceded a point of leverage on Beijing’s nonproliferation policy by fully implementing 

the U.S.-Chinese civil nuclear cooperation agreement 

in March 1998, so President Obama conceded leverage 

on Moscow’s nonproliferation policy by successfully 

concluding the controversial U.S.-Russian civil nuclear cooperation agreement in January 2011.

Given that the U.S. Government so far has declassified very little intelligence related to Iranian nuclear 
402

proliferation efforts during the 2000s, a thorough examination of any nonuse or abuse of proliferation intelligence on Iran during this period remains beyond 

the scope of this chapter. However, given U.S. decisionmaking with regard to assisting the Shah’s nuclear 

program or holding accountable major supplier states 

relevant to the Islamic Republic’s nuclear efforts, it appears that policymakers have often struggled to strike 

a principled balance between the objective of nuclear 

nonproliferation vis-à-vis Iran, and the desire to satisfy other competing geopolitical or national aims.

CONCLUSION

Over the last few decades, U.S. policymakers tried 

to use a mixture of policies short of military action—

including diplomatic negotiations, economic sanctions, interdictions, and covert actions—to deal with 

North Korean and Iranian efforts to develop nuclear 

weapons-making capabilities. However, U.S. policies 

ultimately did not stop the DPRK from building its 

first nuclear explosive device, and detonating it in 

October 2006. Observers today rightly worry whether 

Iran can be persuaded or prevented from following 

North Korea’s nuclear precedent.

As this chapter’s examination of the nonuse and 

abuse of proliferation intelligence in the cases of Iran 

and North Korea suggests, despite a long tradition of 

official statements about how nuclear proliferation 

poses the gravest danger to the United States and its 

allies, U.S. policymakers in both Democratic and Republican presidential administrations sometimes have 

tended to subordinate nuclear nonproliferation policy 

to other international or domestic concerns—even in 

the face of proliferation intelligence that counseled 
403

otherwise. In turn, this tendency has served at times 

to frustrate, if not also undermine, the very aims of 

nuclear nonproliferation policy. What is worrisome is 

that it was often when proliferation problems metastasized and became far less manageable that risks of 

subordinating nuclear nonproliferation policy came 

to be more fully appreciated.

The failures of intelligence demand in the North 

Korean and Iranian nuclear proliferation cases raise 

a significant and thorny issue—namely, if policymakers will not be more hardnosed and act on timely intelligence early on, when a proliferation case is still 

manageable and easier to respond to, then might they 

be even less likely to take meaningful yet more difficult actions later, when the case becomes much less 

manageable and much more dangerous? The answer 

appears to a tentative and regrettable “yes.” However, 

there is ground for modest hope. Indeed, if policymakers in the Executive Branch, as well as lawmakers in Congress who oversee them and other interested parties, soberly examine and attempt to apply 

the lessons learned of these and other past instances 

when the demand-side problem of proliferation intelligence negatively affected U.S. policymaking, then 

they potentially can put themselves in a better a position to deal more effectively with current and future 

proliferation cases.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 14

1. For example, see Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 

Final Report, March 31, 2005, available from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_report.pdf. 
404

2. Victor Gilinsky, “Sometimes We Don’t Want to Know: 

Kissinger and Nixon Finesse Israel’s Bomb,” draft paper, August 

4, 2011, available from www.npolicy.org/article_file/Sometimes_We_

Do_not_Want_to_Know__Kissinger_and_Nixon_Finesse_Israeli_

Bomb_-_Gilinsky.pdf.

3. For more on this, see endnotes 12-15.

4. For example, see Central Intelligence Agency (hereinafter “CIA”), North Korea: Nuclear Reactor, possibly from the National Intelligence Daily, July 9, 1982, (formerly SECRET) declassified, available from www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000453456/

DOC_0000453456.pdf; and CIA, North Korea’s Nuclear Efforts, April 

28, 1987, (formerly SECRET) declassified, available from www.

foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000835118/DOC_0000835118.pdf.

5. CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, A 10-Year Projection of 

Possible Events of Nuclear Proliferation Concern, May 1983, (formerly SECRET) declassified, available from www.foia.cia.gov/docs/

DOC_0000835123/DOC_0000835123.pdf. 

6. Author’s conversations with former officials in the U.S. 

Government and the IAEA.

7. CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, North Korea’s Expanding Nuclear Efforts, May 3, 1988, (formerly SECRET) declassified, available from www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000835120/

DOC_0000835120.pdf. 

8. CIA, Special Analysis: “North Korea: Nuclear Program of Proliferation Concern,” March 22, 1989, (formerly SECRET) declassified, available from www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000835122/

DOC_0000835122.pdf. 

9. CIA, North Korea: Increased Nuclear-Related Activity, February 1, 1992, (formerly TOP SECRET) declassified, available from 

www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0001085723/DOC_0001085723.pdf. 

10. Ibid. 

11. For examples of North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister 

Kang Sok Ju’s statements likening the imposition of sanctions to a 
405

war declaration or war itself, see Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, 

and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, August 

2005, pp. 55, 222.

12. Quoted from transcript of the House Committee on International Relations, “Hearing on the FY 2000 Budget,” February 

25, 1999, via Congressional Quarterly Transcripts.

13. U.S. National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, Unclassified Summary of an NIE, December 2001, UNCLASSIFIED, 

a reproduction of which is available from www.fas.org/irp/nic/

bmthreat-2015.htm. In a 2003 essay, Jonathan D. Pollack wrangles 

with the implications of the December 2001 NIE summary: 

If the report was claiming that U.S. intelligence analysts had 

concluded that North Korea had produced these weapons 

in the mid-1990s, it reflected either reinterpretation of old 

data or the inclusion of new information in older estimates. 

If the authors were claiming that the CIA had made this 

determination in the mid-1990s, then the claim is patently 

false, or all intelligence assessments published in the 1990s 

were false, in as much as the December 2001 claim contradicts all intelligence assessments published during the latter 

half of the 1990s.

See Pollack, “The United States, North Korea, and the End of the 

Agreed Framework,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 56, No. 3, 

Summer 2003. Quoted by Joshua Pollack, “N. Korea: Deadly in 

a Snowball Fight,” Arms Control Wonk weblog, February 7, 2010, 

available from pollack.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2615/n-koreadeadly-in-a-snowball-fight.

14. CIA, Untitled Estimate of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Potential Provided to Congress, November 19, 2002, UNCLASSIFIED, 

a reproduction of which is available from www.fas.org/nuke/guide/

dprk/nuke/cia111902.html. 

15. Henry Sokolski, “Fool Us Once . . . The North Koreans 

Get Ready to Shake Us Down Again,” The Weekly Standard, Vol. 

8, No. 9, November 11, 2002, available from www.weeklystandard.

com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/001/851znpbr.asp?nopager=1. 
406

16. Ibid.

17. For example, see David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Taking Stock: North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Program,” Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, October 8, 2010, available from isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/

documents/ISIS_DPRK_UEP.pdf. 

18. See Siegfried S. Hecker, “A Return Trip to North Korea’s 

Yongbyon Nuclear Complex,” Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, November 

20, 2010, available from iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/23035/HeckerYongbyon.pdf. See also Henry Sokolski, “Getting Serious about North 

Korea’s Nukes,” National Review Online, November 23, 2010, 

available from www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/253792. 

19. For example, see “Background Briefing with Senior U.S. 

Officials on Syria’s Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea’s 

Involvement,” Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, April 24, 2008, available from www.dni.gov/

interviews/20080424_interview.pdf. 

20. For example, see Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, “The Flawed Logic of Striking Iran,” Foreign Affairs, January 17, 2012, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137036/

alexandre-debs-and-nuno-p-monteiro/the-flawed-logic-of-striking-iran. 

See also Will Marshall, “Yes, We Can Contain Iran,” Foreign 

Policy, March 16, 2012, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/16/yes_we_can_contain_iran?page=full; and Kenneth 

Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, July/

August 2012, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137731/

kenneth-n-waltz/why-iran-should-get-the-bomb. 

21. See Agreement on the Canada-India Colombo Plan Atomic 

Reactor Project, New Delhi, India, April 28, 1956, a reproduction 

of which is available from www.nci.org/06nci/04/Canada-India%20

CIRUS%20agreement.htm; and U.S.-India CIRUS Agreement, March 

16, 1956, a reproduction of which is available from www.nci.

org/06nci/04/US-India%20CIRUS%20agreement.htm. 
407

22. For a penetrating case study of how diplomatic confusion over the terms of U.S.-India nuclear cooperation during the 

1950s and 1960s not only unwittingly furthered the Indian nuclear weapons program, but also facilitated New Delhi’s construction and shocking test of a nuclear explosive device, see Roberta 

Wohlstetter, The Buddha Smiles: Absent-Minded Peaceful Aid and the 

Indian Bomb, PH-78-04-370-23, final report prepared for the U.S. 

Energy Research and Development Administration in partial fulfillment of E (49-1)-3747, Los Angeles, CA: PAN Heuristics, November 15, 1976, revised November 1977, available from www.

robertawohlstetter.com/writings/BuddhaSmiles. 

23. Director of Central Intelligence, Special National Intelligence 

Estimate: Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, SNIE 

4-1-74, August 23, 1974, (formerly TOP SECRET) declassified, 

available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB240/

snie.pdf.

24. Henry A. Kissinger, U.S.-Iran Nuclear Cooperation, National Security Decision Memorandum 292, National Security Council, April 22, 1975, (formerly SECRET) declassified, available from 

www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc05d.pdf.

25. President Gerald Ford, “Statement of the President on Nuclear Policy,” Office of the White House Press Secretary, October 

28, 1976, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid

=6561&st=&st1=#axzz1usYpla7k.

26. Henry Sokolski, “The Washington Post Bombs Nuclear History: Did Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz try 

to stoke Iran’s nuclear ambition in the ‘70s?” The Weekly Standard, 

March 28, 2005, available from www.weeklystandard.com/Content/

Public/Articles/000/000/005/417gusvl.asp?nopager=1.

27. For a discussion of Iran’s 1980 attack on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor and Iraq’s series of attacks on Iran’s Bushehr nuclear 

reactor and other nuclear facilities between 1984 and 1988, see

Sarah E. Kreps and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Attacking the Atom: 

Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?” Journal of 

Strategic Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2, April 2011, especially pp. 176-177.
408

28. Shirley A. Kan, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction: Background and Analysis, Report 96-767, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated September 13, 

1996, p. 29.

29. Ibid., pp. 29-30.

30. Ibid., p. 32.

31. Congressman John Spratt, Jr., “Defense Against Weapons 

of Mass Destruction Act of 1996,” Congressional Record, June 27, 

1996, p. E1192, available from www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1996-

06-27/pdf/CREC-1996-06-27-pt1-PgE1192-3.pdf#page=1. 

32. CIA, The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of 

Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Washington, DC: Nonproliferation Center, July 1997, p. 5.

33. For example, see Stephen Greenhouse, “U.S. Gives Russia Secret Data on Iran to Discourage Atom Deal,” The New York 

Times, April 3, 1995, p. A9; Stephen Erlanger, “Russia Says Sale 

of Atom Reactors to Iran is Still On,” The New York Times, April 4, 

1995, p. A1; Stephen Greenhouse, “U.S. Keeps On Urging Russia 

On Iran Deal,” The New York Times, April 9, 1995, p. 1; Eric Schmitt, 

“Republicans Warn Russia That Deal With Iran Threatens Aid,” 

The New York Times, May 8, 1995, p. A7; and Michael R. Gordon, 

“Russia Plans to Sell Reactors to Iran Despite U.S. Protests,” The 

New York Times, March 7, 1998, p. 3.

34. Director of Central Intelligence, Report of ProliferationRelated Acquisition in 1997, unclassified report to Congress pursuant to Section 721 of the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal 

Year 1997, September 17, 1998, available from www.cia.gov/library/

reports/archived-reports-1/acq1997.html

35. Stephen Greenhouse, “Russia and China Pressed Not to 

Sell A-Plants to Iran,” The New York Times, January 25, 1995, p. A6.

36. John Pomfret, “U.S. May Certify China on Curbing Nuclear Exports,” The Washington Post, September 18, 1997, p. A28.
409

37. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2003/40, 

Vienna, Austria, IAEA, June 6, 2003, available from www.iaea.org/

Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf. 

38. R. Jeffrey Smith, “China’s Pledge to End Iran Nuclear Aid 

Yields U.S. Help; Clinton Says He’ll Allow U.S. Exports of Technology; Scrutiny and Debate Are Expected,” The Washington Post, 

October 30, 1997, p. A15.

39. Besides issuing the certification required by the 1985 joint 

resolution on the U.S-China civil nuclear cooperation agreement, President Clinton issued a second certification that waived

sanctions that blocked the implementation of the U.S.-Chinese 

nuclear deal—sanctions which Congress imposed after the Tiananmen Crackdown through Section 902 of the Foreign Relations 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (P.L. 101-246). 

40. For discussions about how Iran has used Western-led 

diplomacy to improve its capability to make a nuclear weapon 

on ever-shorter notice, see “FPI Fact Sheet: The False Promise 

of Negotiations over Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Foreign Policy 

Initiative, Washington, DC, April 12, 2012, available from www.

foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpi-fact-sheet-false-promise-negotiationsover-iran%E2%80%99s-nuclear-program; and Gregory S. Jones, 

Iran’s Rapid Enrichment Progress Moves It Ever Closer to a Nuclear 

Weapons Capability: Centrifuge Enrichment and the IAEA May 25, 

2012 Safeguards Update, Washington, DC: Nonproliferation Policy 

Education Center, June 6, 2012, available from www.npolicy.org/

article_file/Iran_Rapid_Enrichment_Progress.pdf. 

411

CHAPTER 15

FACING THE REALITY OF IRAN 

AS A DE FACTO NUCLEAR STATE

Gregory S. Jones

This chapter was produced for the Nonproliferation 

Policy Education Center (NPEC). Though the author 

is also a part-time adjunct staff member at the RAND 

Corporation, this chapter is not related to any RAND 

project, and RAND bears no responsibility for any of 

the analysis and views expressed in it. The original 

version of this chapter was published by NPEC on 

March 22, 2012, under the title, “Facing the Reality of 

Iran as a De Facto Nuclear State: Centrifuge Enrichment and the IAEA February 24, 2012 Safeguards Update,” available from npolicy.org/article_file/Facing_the_

Reality_of_Iran_as_a_De_Facto_Nuclear_State.pdf.

In various papers since 2008, this author has outlined how Iran’s growing centrifuge enrichment program could provide it with the ability to produce 

highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons.1

On February 24, 2012, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its latest safeguards update. This update shows not only that Iran’s centrifuge 

enrichment effort has continued to be unimpeded by 

Western counteraction, but that it has undergone a significant expansion. In particular, Iran has made good 

on its announcement of June 2011 that it would triple 

its production of 19.7 percent enriched uranium by beginning enrichment operations at the well-protected 

Fordow facility. At its main enrichment facility at Natanz, Iran increased its production of 3.5 percent enriched uranium by an additional 15 percent, meaning 
412

it has doubled production since 2009—this is in stark 

contrast to the popular perception that cyber attacks 

have crippled Iran’s enrichment effort. I estimate that 

Iran could produce enough HEU for a nuclear weapon in 1 1/2 months to 3 2/3 months, and might be able 

to produce enough HEU for three nuclear weapons in 

just 6 months if it were to decide to do so quickly (see 

Appendix 15-I).

Iran’s rapid progress has changed the perception 

of the problem of its nuclear program, even for those 

who disagree with my current assessments. It is now 

obvious that even if my assessments are not true at 

this moment, they soon will be. For example, Olli Heinonen, a Senior Fellow at the Harvard Belfer Center 

and former deputy director general of the IAEA, has 

estimated that if Iran were to make an all-out effort 

now, it could produce enough HEU for a nuclear 

weapon in just 6 months. However, due to Iran’s rapid 

progress in producing 20 percent enriched uranium, 

by the end of 2012, Heinonen estimates that Iran could 

produce enough HEU in just 1 month.2

It was in fall 2011 that David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) 

was promoting the cheery notion that sanctions had 

capped Iran’s nuclear program and that with its increasingly unreliable centrifuges, Iran’s enriched uranium production had reached its maximum and was 

beginning to decline. Clearly this is not the case, and 

no longer is there any pretense that direct sanctions on 

Iran’s nuclear program will stop Iran from being able 

to produce the HEU for nuclear weapons.

This does not mean that most analysts (including 

those in the U.S. Government) are willing to accept 

my view stated in September 2011 that Iran, in fact, 

was so close to having a nuclear weapon that it is al-
413

ready a de facto nuclear weapons state.3 Rather, the 

focus has shifted to the nonnuclear components that 

would be needed to detonate Iran’s HEU and implausible claims that it will take Iran 1 to 3 years to develop 

a “deliverable” nuclear weapon. In addition, most 

observers still cling to the hope that somehow Iran 

can be stopped from acquiring nuclear weapons. The 

methods that they foresee for stopping Iran are some 

form of military strike, the effects of sanctions, diplomacy, or some combination of these elements. As we 

will see, none of these methods holds much promise.

NONNUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPONENTS

As I have pointed out in prior writings,4

 the viewpoint that it will take Iran years to develop the nonnuclear components required for a nuclear weapon 

is hard to square with the actual historical experience 

of the nuclear weapons states. It is well-known that 

for past nuclear weapons programs, the key impediment was the acquisition of fissile material (HEU or 

plutonium) for the weapon. The production of the 

nonnuclear components needed to detonate the fissile 

material was relatively easy, and the development of 

these components was usually done in parallel to the 

more costly and time-consuming effort to produce fissile material. After all, the nonnuclear components of 

a nuclear weapon rely on conventional high-explosive 

technology, and any country advanced enough to acquire nuclear weapons has a military large enough to 

have substantial high-explosive expertise. 

In 1944, the United States was able to develop an 

implosion-type nuclear weapon (the type that Iran 

would produce) in just 11 months, and this should 

be considered an upper bound on the time that Iran 
414

would require. Though today Iran would not have the 

talent and resources available to the Manhattan Project, it would be starting from a far better position than 

did the United States. In 1944, no one knew whether 

or how the implosion method could work. Today, it is 

not only well-known that such weapons work, there 

are also descriptions of such weapons and pictures 

showing their general construction. Additionally, 

knowledge of explosives, as well as computing power, 

is far superior today than it was 68 years ago when the 

United States undertook this effort.

Moreover, Iran would not be starting from scratch. 

As the IAEA described last November, prior to 2004, 

Iran was assisted in developing “a multipoint initiation system that can be used to initiate effectively and 

simultaneously a high explosive charge over its surface” by “a foreign expert” who “worked for much of 

his career with this technology in the nuclear weapon 

programme of the country of his origin.”5

 According 

to press reports, this “foreign expert” is a Russian 

named Vyacheslav Danilenko. The IAEA has been 

told by nuclear-weapon states that the specific multipoint initiation concept is used in some known nuclear 

explosive devices. 

This “multipoint initiation system” will allow Iran 

to manufacture sophisticated nuclear weapons. Iran is 

now in a position to build nuclear weapons that are significantly lighter and have a smaller diameter than the 

cruder nuclear weapons that are typical of countries’ 

early efforts. In 2003, Iran had already conducted at 

least one full-scale test of its multipoint initiation system with the hemispheric shape required for a nuclear 

weapon and sized to be used as a missile warhead. 

Furthermore, since that time, Iran has continued to 

test this system, but it is now using scaled down ver-
415

sions and employing a cylindrical geometry. Such geometry is not directly applicable to a nuclear weapon, 

but according to the IAEA, such tests would still allow 

Iran to improve and optimize the multipoint initiation 

design. As a result, I estimate that Iran could develop 

the nonnuclear components for a nuclear weapon in 

just 2 to 6 months.

A common mistake is to assume that Iran’s production of HEU and its production of the nonnuclear 

components for its nuclear weapons would need to 

occur in series. However, it is clear from the published 

accounts of the U.S, British, and Chinese nuclear weapons programs that this development tends to occur in 

parallel instead. William Penney, who led the British 

effort to develop nuclear weapons, outlined the process. According to the official British history:

He said that the manufacture of an atomic bomb of 

present design fell naturally into two parts: firstly the 

production of the active material and secondly the 

ordnance part, that is, the manufacture and assembly 

of the components causing the explosion of the active 

material. The second part of the work could be begun 

and completed without the need to use fissile material 

at any stage.6

Therefore, not only can the production of the fissile material and the nonnuclear components of a 

nuclear weapon occur in parallel, the production of 

the nonnuclear components can occur first. This fact 

was demonstrated by the U.S. experience in World 

War II. The nonnuclear components of the Hiroshima, 

Japan, nuclear weapon were on the cruiser Indianapolis and sailing across the Pacific Ocean, while some of 

the HEU components for the weapon were still being 

manufactured. The fact that the IAEA has provided 
416

information showing that Iran is currently developing the nonnuclear components for nuclear weapons, 

even though Iran does not yet have any HEU, further 

reinforces this point.

Though some have indicated that Iran might be 

able to develop a nuclear weapon in a year or less, they 

estimate that it could take Iran 2 to 3 years to develop 

a “deliverable” nuclear weapon, i.e., one that could 

be fitted as a warhead to a ballistic missile. There are 

several problems with this estimate. First, Iran does 

not need to use ballistic missiles to deliver its nuclear 

weapons. Vehicle delivery of bombs (up to now all 

conventional) has become quite common in the region, and many such attacks have been carried out 

on U.S. forces. Vehicle delivery of a nuclear weapon 

against U.S. forces could have a devastating effect and 

would have the advantage of making it more difficult 

to attribute the source of the attack.

Second, Iran already possesses and has tested a 

multipoint initiation system that has been sized for a 

ballistic missile warhead. Therefore Iran’s first nuclear weapon will probably already be small and light 

enough to fit on a ballistic missile. One should note, 

however, that given the antimissile systems of Israel 

and the United States, it is not clear that ballistic missiles will be Iran’s preferred nuclear weapon delivery 

mode, even if it has the capability.

Recent U.S. Government statements on how quickly Iran could build a nuclear weapon, should it decide 

to do so, have also indicated that the time required has 

been declining. But given the now widely-held assessment that Iran can produce enough HEU for a nuclear 

weapon in a matter of months, the U.S. Government 

assessments are still surprisingly long and are inconsistent as well. Media reporting, in particular that of 
417

CBS News, has further complicated the situation. On 

December 19, 2011, CBS News broadcast an interview 

with then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta conducted by Scott Pelley:7

Pelley: So are you saying that Iran can have a nuclear 

weapon in 2012?

Panetta: It would probably be about a year before they 

can do it. Perhaps a little less. But one proviso, Scott, 

is if they have a hidden facility somewhere in Iran that 

may be enriching fuel.

Pelley: So that they can develop a weapon even more 

quickly . . .

Panetta: On a faster track . . .

Pelley: Than we believe . . .

Panetta: That’s correct.

This interview caused quite a stir, since it was the 

first time that someone from the U.S. Government had 

given a public statement to the effect that Iran could 

produce a nuclear weapon in less than 1 year. Prior 

to that time, there was the belief that Iran was at least 

several years away. But a month later, Panetta seemed 

to be saying something different in an interview 

that CBS News broadcast on “60 Minutes” on January 29, 2012. Again, the interview was conducted by 

Scott Pelley.8

Narration by Pelley: “We were surprised to hear how 

far he thinks Iran has come.”
418

Panetta: The consensus is that, if they decided to do it, 

it would probably take them about a year to be able to 

produce a bomb and then possibly another 1 to 2 years 

in order to put it on a deliverable vehicle of some sort 

in order to deliver that weapon.

At first glance, in this second interview, it seems 

that Panetta is just backtracking, as well as making the 

rather dubious assumption that Iran would first produce a nuclear weapon and only then start to work on a 

means of delivery. But the reality is more complicated. 

When one watches the video of these interviews,9 it 

becomes clear that this is the same interview that has 

simply been edited differently. I find it disconcerting 

how easily the same interview can be edited to provide a quite different sense of how quickly Iran could 

produce a nuclear weapon and disappointing that a 

news organization as distinguished as CBS should 

have done so. It would be of great value for CBS to 

publish an unedited version of this interview so that 

Panetta’s real view of this matter could be determined.

James Clapper, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, has presented the assessment of the U.S. intelligence community to a congressional hearing on 

January 31, 2012. In part, this statement said:

We assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, in part by developing various 

nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce 

such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not 

know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build 

nuclear weapons. . . . Iran’s technical advancement, 

particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthens our 

assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and 

industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear 

weapons, making the central issue its political will 

to do so. These advancements contribute to our judg-
419

ment that Iran is technically capable of producing 

enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon, if it 

so chooses.10

A few comments are in order. The first sentence 

contradicts itself since, if Iran is developing various 

nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce 

nuclear weapons, it is doing significantly more than 

just “keeping open” the option to develop nuclear 

weapons. Rather, Iran is either further developing the 

option or exercising it.

Absent any concrete time estimates, many of these 

statements are devoid of meaning. After all, any country (Belize, for example) has the “scientific, technical, 

and industrial capacity” eventually to produce nuclear weapons. For Belize, the time required would be 

many decades, but for Iran, it is presumably a good 

deal shorter. With the repeated use of the word “eventually,” this intelligence assessment gives the impression that Iran is many years away, but when pressed 

on this issue at congressional hearings in February, 

Clapper said that Tehran could produce a nuclear 

weapon in 1 or 2 years.11 Not only is this estimate 

much more immediate than the term “eventually” implies, it is not consistent with Panetta’s estimate of 1 

year (or perhaps less than 1 year).

Panetta’s statement has also placed a great deal of 

reliance on a semantic distinction that, upon further 

examination, turns out to have no significance. This 

relates to the question of whether Iran is developing a 

nuclear weapons capability or a nuclear weapon. On 

January 8, 2012, he said:

Are they [Iran] trying to develop a nuclear weapon? 

No. But we know that they’re trying to develop a nuclear capability. And that’s what concerns us. And our 
420

red line to Iran is to not develop a nuclear weapon. 

That’s a red line for us.12

But what is the difference? To build a nuclear 

weapon, Iran (or any country) needs sufficient fissile material (in Iran’s case, HEU) and the nonnuclear 

components to detonate the fissile material. Iran is 

developing both of these elements. How is this not developing a nuclear weapon?

In addition, as was discussed previously, any

country is “nuclear capable” in the sense that, given 

enough time, it can build a nuclear weapon. Yet most 

discussions (and not just those of U.S. Government officials) use “nuclear capable” without reference to any 

time element and thus render the term meaningless.

A related factor is the oft repeated statement that 

Iran has yet to decide to build a nuclear weapon. The 

implication seems to be that Iran cannot be building 

a nuclear weapon if it has not decided to do so. But 

many current nuclear states had nuclear weapons programs before there was a specific decision to build a 

nuclear weapon, and these programs helped enable 

the decision to build nuclear weapons by allowing 

countries to get close to acquiring nuclear weapons 

before any explicit decision was required. As I have 

written before:

Though Iran’s leadership may have not yet specifically decided to develop nuclear weapons, the U.K., 

France, India and Nazi Germany at one time all had 

nuclear weapons programs before their governments 

had decided specifically to produce nuclear weapons. 

The U.K., France and India all went on to make such 

a decision and have produced nuclear weapons. This 

underscores the point that as Iran moves closer to having a nuclear weapons capability, it becomes increas-
421

ing likely that Iran will make the decision to produce 

nuclear weapons.13

MILITARY STRIKE ON IRAN

The possibility of an Israeli military strike to “take 

out” Iran’s enrichment facilities has been much in the 

news lately. Though not explicit, there seems to be 

a general view that this would be a one-time strike, 

similar to the ones that Israel carried out on nuclear 

reactors in Iraq in 1981 and in Syria in 2007. Concerns 

have been raised about the progress of the Iranian 

program and whether, with the partial move of its 

centrifuge enrichment activities to the underground 

site near Qom, Iran may be entering a “zone of immunity,” whereby the Iranian centrifuge enrichment 

program can no longer be successfully attacked in a 

single strike.

In fact, attacking centrifuge enrichment facilities 

is quite different from attacking single nuclear reactors, and Iran’s enrichment program is already well 

into a zone of immunity with regard to a single air 

strike. Iran has between 32 and 52 cascades operating 

in parallel at its main enrichment facility at Natanz.14

An air strike on Natanz that scored multiple bomb hits 

would shut down the entire facility, but the majority 

of the cascades would be undamaged and unable to 

operate only due to damage to piping and the loss of 

utilities. It would only take a few months of repairs 

before these undamaged cascades were back in operation. Even for the cascades that suffered bomb hits, the 

majority of the centrifuges would still be undamaged. 

Iran could pull out the undamaged centrifuges and 

use them to build new cascades. It would only take 4 

to 6 months before Iran would have returned to closeto-full production.
422

Iran’s current stockpiles of about 3,000 kilograms 

of 3.5 percent enriched uranium and 67 kilograms of 

19.7 percent enriched uranium are also a problem. 

These stockpiles represent years of centrifuge plant 

operation, but they would be very difficult to destroy 

by air attack. The combined volume of these two stockpiles is less than one cubic yard, making it easy to hide 

or protect.

It is small wonder that U.S. officials, when discussing possible attacks on Iran’s centrifuge enrichment 

program, have begun to talk of bombing campaigns 

rather than single strikes.15 By bombing Iran’s facilities every few months, it would be possible to keep 

Iran’s enrichment facilities shut down. Such a campaign would also have the advantage in that the question of whether U.S. large bunker-buster bombs can 

actually penetrate and hit Iran’s underground enrichment facility near Qom would largely become moot: 

No matter how deep and well protected a bunker is, it 

is always possible to collapse the entrance tunnels and 

cutoff the utilities from the outside.

There are two problems with such an air bombing 

campaign. First, Iran could respond by dispersing its 

centrifuges. Indeed, centrifuge enrichment with its 

many parallel cascades would be ideal for such dispersal. The United States would be able to find and 

bomb some of these dispersed enrichment sites, but 

many would continue in operation undetected. Second, such a prolonged bombing campaign would run 

a serious risk of turning into a large-scale war with 

Iran. Though no doubt the United States would eventually win such a war, I think that, given the financially exhausted and war-weary condition of the United 

States, such a war would be ill-advised.
423

SANCTIONS

A key element of U.S. policy is to impose increasingly severe sanctions on Iran. The latest round of 

sanctions is designed to affect Iran’s overall economy 

significantly by making it more and more difficult 

for Iran to export its oil. However, these sanctions 

are not authorized by the United Nations (UN) but 

rather imposed unilaterally by the U.S. and the European Union (EU). The reason for this is that, despite 

the IAEA’s revelations last November of Iran’s efforts 

to develop the nonnuclear components for a nuclear 

weapon, both Russia and China have refused to support any additional sanctions against Iran. Indeed, 

both countries have continued trading with Iran, and 

China continues to purchase oil from Iran.

Nor are China and Russia the only countries that 

have not adopted these sanctions. India, with its important economy, has actually increased its purchases 

of Iranian oil, as has South Korea. India has gone so 

far as to change its tax code to facilitate a method of 

payment that involves using rupees rather than dollars. Pakistan and Turkey have also continued trading with Iran. Pakistan has even proposed deals based 

on a straight barter arrangement. Japan has cut back 

on its oil purchases but is expected to ask the United 

States for an exemption from a requirement to eliminate all Iranian oil purchases.

With all of these important economies not complying with the sanctions on Iran, it is unclear that the 

sanctions will be enough to compel Iran to change its 

current policies. Even if they can, the real problem is 

that Iran can resolve all of its outstanding issues with 

the IAEA, and still, due to the laxity of IAEA safeguards, maintain its drive towards the production of 

nuclear weapons.
424

DIPLOMACY

Many have continued to hope that negotiations 

with Iran could provide a means to prevent it from 

obtaining nuclear weapons. But no one has outlined 

how any realistic agreement with Iran can achieve this 

goal. President Obama has said that the United States 

will not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. But as 

I have written elsewhere, Iran has no need actually to 

produce a nuclear weapon unless it wants to test or 

use such a weapon.16 Therefore, it is likely to be many 

years before Iran does so. The real issue in the near 

term is not preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear 

weapons, but rather stopping Iran from moving ever 

closer to being able to build nuclear weapons. Similarly, President Obama has said that Iran must “make a 

decision to forsake nuclear weapons,” but since many 

U.S. Government officials have said that Iran has not 

yet made a decision to produce nuclear weapons, the 

Iranians can argue that they have already complied 

with this requirement.

Iran has outstanding issues with the IAEA regarding its nuclear weapons development program. But 

most of these issues relate to events from 2003 and before. Though domestically it would be politically difficult for Iran, if it were to admit to these prior transgressions, it would be able to end its disputes with the 

IAEA while not having to give up any of its current 

centrifuge enrichment program. Indeed, given the laxity of IAEA safeguards, Iran could go on to produce 

HEU with the blessings of the IAEA.

Most of those who believe that Iran’s nuclear 

weapons program can be stopped diplomatically 

have suggested that, in order to reach an agreement, 
425

Iran should be allowed to keep its centrifuge uranium 

enrichment program. Those who hold this view realize that this poses a risk of allowing Iran to obtain the 

HEU needed for nuclear weapons, but they believe 

that with the proper controls, this risk can be obviated. 

In particular, it is often suggested that Iran be limited 

to producing uranium with an enrichment level of less 

than 5 percent and reduce its stockpile of 19.7 percent 

enriched uranium to zero by exporting all of this material, and that Iran’s future enrichment program be 

limited to that which can be justified by its peaceful 

nuclear needs. However, Iran’s current enrichment 

facilities are very small compared to those needed for 

most peaceful nuclear activities (such as providing 

fuel for a single nuclear power reactor), and such an 

agreement would provide Iran with the justification 

for greatly expanding its current enrichment facilities. 

These greatly expanded facilities would provide Iran 

easy access to the HEU needed for nuclear weapons.

For example, even if Iran produced only 4.1 percent enriched uranium and expanded its enrichment 

capacity by a factor of 20, it would only produce 

about 15 metric tons of enriched uranium per year. 

This amount would still be less than that needed to 

fuel a single large power reactor, yet, using batch 

recycling, these enrichment facilities could produce 

enough HEU for a nuclear weapon in just 2 weeks or 

enough HEU for five weapons in just 5 weeks (see Appendix 15-II). One might argue that, using its own resources, it would take Iran a very long time to expand 

its enrichment facilities by a factor of 20, but such a 

diplomatic agreement would serve the function of 

legitimizing Iran’s enrichment activities. This would 

lead to the removal of sanctions that are designed to 

prevent Iran from importing the materials needed 
426

to build additional centrifuges and, in addition, Iran 

might receive assistance to expand its enrichment facilities (from China or Pakistan, for instance) as part of 

normal nuclear commerce.

As it is, Iran appears to be laying the groundwork 

to make such an agreement impossible and to present the P5+117 with a lose-lose situation. In the middle 

of February 2012, Iran announced a set of three advances in its nuclear program: It had manufactured 

and installed a fuel element using 20 percent enriched 

uranium into the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), increased the number of centrifuges operating at Natanz 

from 6,000 to 9,000, and successfully developed more 

advanced and efficient centrifuges than the type Iran 

currently uses. This announcement was generally met 

with derisive comments to the effect that these advances were not special, and the Iranian Government 

was playing to its domestic audience.

At the same time, Iran indicated it was interested 

in restarting negotiations with the P5+1 regarding its 

nuclear program. Some observers were puzzled by 

this seemingly schizoid behavior. Others were so eager for negotiations that they did not care about any 

contradictory indications, including Iran’s assault on 

the British Embassy in November 2011. However, 

very few seem to have recognized the significance of 

the two events when considered together.

By announcing its nuclear advances, Iran is throwing down markers for negotiations. By loading a 20 

percent fuel element into its research reactor, Iran can 

now argue it has a legitimate need to produce such 

enriched uranium and that it will not stop its production. By claiming to have 9,000 centrifuges in operation, Iran is establishing a base below which it will refuse to go. By claiming to have finished developing 
427

advanced centrifuges, Iran is putting itself in a position to be able to significantly upgrade and expand its 

current uranium enrichment capacity.

This, then, is the P5+1’s no-win situation. It can 

refuse to allow Iran to keep its centrifuge enrichment 

facilities, in which case Iran can break off the talks, 

claiming that the P5+1 are being unreasonable, and 

then use this claim to help break sanctions by playing 

to on-the-fence countries such as India. Or, if the P5+1 

should be so foolish as to agree to allow Iran to keep 

its current enrichment facilities, then Iran will have 

legitimized these facilities and its ability to quickly 

produce the HEU for nuclear weapons whenever it 

decides to do so.

The only negotiated solution that would prevent 

Iran from being able to quickly produce HEU would 

be for Iran to permanently shut down its enrichment 

facilities and export its stockpiles of enriched uranium. 

By saying that the P5+1 must accept continued Iranian 

uranium enrichment, advocates of a negotiated solution are essentially admitting that no satisfactory negotiated solution is possible.

NONPROLIFERATION AFTER IRAN

If Iran is already a de facto nuclear weapons state, 

where should the United States go from here with regards to its nonproliferation policy? The key will be 

to learn from our failure with Iran and prevent additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. This 

will require a two-pronged approach.

First, as President Obama has indicated, Iran’s de 

facto nuclear status will motivate a number of other 

countries to try to emulate Iran’s success. The United 

States needs to take decisive action to head off these 
428

efforts on a county by country basis as soon as the 

first steps towards acquiring the fissile material for 

nuclear weapons are detected. Taking early action 

runs counter to normal government instinct, which is 

to try to “kick the can down the road” and avoid taking any unpleasant actions unless it has to. The lack of 

early action has been a hallmark of U.S. nonproliferation policy since the Reagan administration and has 

allowed Pakistan, India, North Korea, and now 

Iran to acquire the fissile material required for 

nuclear weapons.

Yet as we saw with Libya, early action can be quite 

effective. Many believe that Muammar Gaddafi made 

a mistake by giving up a nuclear weapons program, 

but he had no choice. His effort was discovered early, 

before Libya had even begun to enrich uranium, and 

Gaddafi had no other option.

Second, there needs to be a change to the IAEA’s 

safeguards regime to prevent countries from acquiring the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons 

with the IAEA’s approval. Some in the U.S. Congress 

have called for military action against Iran if it starts to 

enrich uranium to levels greater than 20 percent, but 

under current IAEA rules, such Iranian actions would 

be perfectly acceptable as long as Iran declared the 

activity to the IAEA. Similarly, the IAEA permits nonnuclear weapons states to produce pure compounds 

of plutonium by reprocessing spent fuel. Informally, 

the IAEA does require that the country carrying out 

these activities provide some rationale as to how these 

activities are related to some peaceful nuclear activity, 

but the rationale does not have to be very plausible. 

For example, a country can say that it is stockpiling 

the plutonium for use in a breeder reactor, even if it is 

now more than 40 years since such reactors were first 
429

supposed to come into operation, and that such reactors are still decades away.

Much of providing the proper rationale involves 

learning to play the game properly. As discussed previously, Iran got itself into trouble by conducting clandestine nuclear activities prior to 2004. More recently, 

Iran did a better job and explained that its production of 20 percent enriched uranium was required to 

produce research reactor fuel. This activity, which is 

generally agreed to be carrying Iran close to the possession of the fissile material for a nuclear weapon, 

has not caused the IAEA to say that Iran is violating 

safeguards even though Iran is currently producing 

more 20 percent enriched uranium in 1 month than 

the research reactor uses in 1 year.

The U.S. Government has recognized this problem, 

and in its Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the 

United Arab Emirates (UAE), it requires that the UAE 

not possess facilities that can be used for uranium 

enrichment or the reprocessing of spent fuel, which 

could produce plutonium, HEU, or U-233 (another 

material that can be used to produce nuclear weapons). However, the U.S. administration has discovered the drawback of attempting to handle this problem though bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. 

In the face of competition from Russia and France, 

the United States has proposed nuclear cooperation 

agreements with Vietnam and Jordan that lack these 

provisions on enriching and reprocessing. Only if the 

issue is approached by the IAEA will there be uniform 

standards without commercial pressures undercutting nonproliferation.

Furthermore, even the standards for the UAE are 

not enough. Non-nuclear weapons states need to be 

prohibited from possessing any materials or facilities 
430

that can quickly provide fissile material for nuclear 

weapons. This includes prohibiting not only enrichment and reprocessing facilities, but also HEU, plutonium, or U-233 that has either been separated from 

spent fuel and/or HEU, plutonium, or U-233 contained 

in unirradiated reactor fuel (such as HEU fuel for 

research reactors or mixed oxide fuel for 

power reactors).

The IAEA does not have the legal authority to prohibit countries from possessing such materials or facilities, but it does have the responsibility to safeguard 

these materials and facilities. As I have discussed elsewhere,18 IAEA safeguards are supposed to be more 

than just an accounting system; they should provide 

“timely warning” of diversions of nuclear materials. 

However, the IAEA cannot safeguard these facilities 

and materials in a timely warning sense. The IAEA 

needs to admit this fact and make clear that any such 

facilities and materials in non-nuclear weapons states 

are not being effectively safeguarded. This issue is 

significantly larger than just Iran and, at a minimum, 

includes Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, and Brazil. It will be up to these countries to explain why 

they need to continue to possess these materials and 

facilities since they cannot effectively be safeguarded. 

Given the state of nuclear power in a post-Fukushima 

world, this could be difficult.

The United States needs to urge the IAEA to be clear 

about what materials and facilities it can effectively 

safeguard and which it cannot. At the same time, the 

United States needs to take early action to ensure that 

any countries that attempt to follow Iran’s successful 

path are prevented from gaining access to the fissile 

material required for nuclear weapons. Otherwise, the 

number of nuclear-armed countries will continue to 
431

grow until the catastrophe of nuclear use occurs. Just 

one nuclear weapon detonated in a city could kill hundreds of thousands of people—roughly 100 times as 

many as were killed on September 11, 2001.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 15

1. The author’s most recent report is Gregory S. Jones, “Iran’s 

Enriched Uranium Stocks Can Produce Enough HEU for 3 to 5 

Nuclear Weapons,” September 10, 2013, available from nuclearpolicy101.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Iran-Enrichment-Update-09-2013.pdf.

2. Olli Heinonen, “The 20 Percent Solution,” Foreign Policy, 

January 11, 2012. 

3. Gregory S. Jones, “No More Hypotheticals: Iran Already Is 

a Nuclear State, New Republic, September 9, 2011, available from 

www.tnr.com/article/environment-and-energy/94715/jones-nucleariran-ahmadinejad.

4. Gregory S. Jones, “Iran’s Efforts to Develop Nuclear Weapons Explicated, Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment Continues Unimpeded, The IAEA’s November 8, 2011, Safeguards Update,” 

December, 6, 2011, pp. 10-13, available from npolicy.org/article.

php?aid=1124&rid=4; and Gregory S. Jones, “An In-Depth Examination of Iran’s Centrifuge Enrichment Program and Its Efforts to 

Acquire Nuclear Weapons?” August 9, 2011, pp. 23-25, available 

from npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1092&rid=4.

5. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and 

relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2011/65, November 8, 2011, Annex, pp. 8-9.

6. Emphasis added. At the time, the memo was so highly classified that Penney had to type it himself. See Margaret Gowing, 

assisted by Lorna Arnold, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and 

Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, Vol. I, Policy Making, New York: St. 

Martin’s Press, 1974, p. 180.
432

7. Leon Panetta, interview by Scott Pelley, 60 Minutes, CBS 

News, December 19, 2011, transcript available from www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57345322/panetta-iran-will-not-beallowed-nukes.

8. Leon Panetta, interview by Scott Pelley, 60 Minutes, CBS 

News, January 29, 2012, transcript available from www.cbsnews.

com/8301-18560_162-57367997/the-defense-secretary-an-interviewwith-leon-panetta/?tag=contentMain;cbsCarousel.

9. Available at the same locations as the transcripts.

10. James R. Clapper, “Unclassified Statement for the Record 

on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence 

Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” 

January 31, 2012, pp. 5-6.

11. Associated Press, “Panetta says Iran enriching uranium 

but no decision yet on proceeding with a nuclear weapon,” The 

The Washington Post, February 16, 2012. 

12. “Face the Nation transcript: January 8, 2012,” Face 

the Nation, CBS News, January 8, 2012, available from www.

cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57354647/face-the-nation-transcriptjanuary-8-2012. 

13. Jones, “An In-Depth Examination of Iran’s Centrifuge Enrichment Program and Its Efforts to Acquire Nuclear 

Weapons,” p. 35.

14. Iran has declared to the IAEA that it has 52 cascades in 

operation, but its enriched uranium production is only equivalent 

to about 32 cascades operating at full capacity.

15. Joby Warrick, “Iran’s Underground Nuclear Sites Not Immune to U.S. Bunker-Busters, Experts Say,” The Washington Post, 

February 29, 2012.
433

16. Jones, “No More Hypotheticals: Iran Already Is a Nuclear 

State”: 

That’s not to say that I expect Iran to divert nuclear material 

from IAEA safeguards anytime soon. After all, why should 

it? It can continue to move ever closer to the HEU required 

for a nuclear weapon with the blessing of the IAEA. Iran 

would only need to divert nuclear material from safeguards 

when it would want to test or use a nuclear weapon. Recall 

that the U.S. was unable to certify that Pakistan did not have 

nuclear weapons in 1990, but it was only in 1998 that it actually tested a bomb. Similarly, though it could be many years 

before Iran becomes an overt nuclear power, it needs to be 

treated as a de facto nuclear power simply by virtue of being 

so close to having a weapon. 

17. The United States, UK, France, Russia, China, and 

Germany.

18. Jones, “An In-Depth Examination of Iran’s Centrifuge 

Enrichment Program and Its Efforts to Acquire Nuclear 

Weapons,” pp. 16-23.

435

CHAPTER 15

APPENDIX I

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE 

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

FEBRUARY 24, 2012, SAFEGUARDS REPORT AND 

METHODS WHEREBY IRAN COULD PRODUCE 

HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM FOR

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IRANIAN CENTRIFUGE 

ENRICHMENT OF URANIUM

Iran has three known centrifuge enrichment facilities. It’s main facility is the Fuel Enrichment Plant 

(FEP) at Natanz. The basic unit of Iran’s centrifuge enrichment effort is a cascade that originally consisted of 

164 centrifuges, but Iran has now modified the majority of the cascades by increasing the number of centrifuges to 174 (all centrifuges installed up to now have 

been of the IR-1 type). Each cascade is designed to enrich natural uranium to 3.5 percent enriched uranium. 

As of February 19, 2012, Iran had installed a total of 

54 cascades, 30 of which each contain 174 centrifuges, 

with the remaining 24 cascades each containing 164 

centrifuges. This results in a total of 9,156 centrifuges. 

Of these 54 cascades, 52 (containing 8,808 centrifuges) 

were declared by Iran as being fed with uranium hexafluoride and, therefore, were producing 3.5 percent 

enriched uranium, though the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) has indicated that not all of 

these 8,808 centrifuges may be operational.1

 Indeed, 

given the amount of enriched uranium that was actually being produced at the FEP, it seems likely that 

Iran’s declaration was simply a negotiating ploy so as 

to be able to claim it has this number of centrifuges in 
436

operation and that the real number of centrifuges in 

operation was significantly less.

Iran began producing 3.5 percent enriched uranium at the FEP in February 2007, and as of February 

4, 2012, Iran had produced a total of 3,685 kilograms 

(kg) in the form of 5,451-kg of uranium hexafluoride. 

Since 666-kg of this enriched uranium has already 

been processed into 19.7 percent enriched uranium 

(see the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant [PFEP] and Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant [FFEP]), and a further 21-

kg was converted into uranium dioxide for use as fuel 

in the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), Iran’s current 

stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched uranium is 2,998-kg. 

Iran’s current production rate of 3.5 percent enriched 

uranium is about 115-kg per month.2

 This production 

rate represents about a 15 percent increase from 2011, 

when the production rate was about a steady 100-kg 

per month, and represents a doubling of the rate since 

2009 (see Table 15-AI1). From the production rate of 

3.5 percent enriched uranium, it is easy to calculate 

that the FEP has a separative capacity of about 5,000 

separative work units (SWU) per year.3

Iran also has the PFEP at Natanz, which is used to 

test a number of more advanced centrifuge designs. 

These are usually configured as single centrifuges or 

small 10- or 20-centrifuge test cascades. However, 

Iran has installed a cascade of 164 IR-2m centrifuges, 

and, although this cascade appears ready to begin to 

produce enriched uranium, it has yet to do so. Iran 

has also installed 58 IR-4 centrifuges in a separate 

cascade but has not yet begun feeding them with 

uranium hexafluoride.
437

Table 15-AI1. Average Iranian Production Rate

of 3.5 Percent Enriched Uranium

Late-2008 to Early-2012.

In addition, there are two full cascades, each with 

164 IR-1 type centrifuges, at the PFEP. These two cascades are interconnected and are being used to process 3.5 percent enriched uranium into 19.7 percent 

enriched uranium. In February 2010, Iran began producing 19.7 percent enriched uranium at the PFEP using one cascade. It added the second cascade in July 

2010. As of February 11, 2012, Iran had produced 64.5-

kg of 19.7 percent enriched uranium (in the form of 

95.4-kg of uranium hexafluoride) at this facility. Iran’s 

production rate of 19.7 percent enriched uranium at 

the PFEP has been fairly steady over the past year and 

is currently about 3.05-kg per month. The centrifuges at this facility are each producing about 0.9 SWU 

per year.

IAEA Reporting Interval Average 3.5 Percent Enriched Uranium Production Rate 

(Kilograms Uranium per Month)

11/17/08-1/31/09 52

2/1/09-5/31/09 53

6/1/09-7/31/09 57

8/1/09-10/31/09 57

11/22/09-1/29/10 78

1/30/10-5/1/10 81

5/2/10-8/6/10 80

8/7/10-10/17/10 95

10/18/10-2/5/11 88

2/6/11-5/14/11 105

5/15/11-8/13/11 99

8/14/11-11/1/11 97

11/2/11-2/4/12 115
438

Finally, Iran has constructed an enrichment facility near Qom. Known as the FFEP, Iran clandestinely 

started to construct this plant in violation of its IAEA 

safeguards. Iran only revealed the existence of this 

plant in September 2009, when it believed that the 

West had discovered the plant.

Iran has installed two sets of two interconnected 

cascades at the FFEP (each cascade contains 174 centrifuges, IR-1 type) in order to produce 19.7 percent 

enriched uranium from 3.5 percent enriched uranium 

as is being done at the PFEP. The first of these two 

sets began production on December 14, 2011, and the 

second set began operation on January 25, 2012. As of 

February 17, 2012, Iran had produced 9.3-kg of 19.7 

percent enriched uranium (in the form of 13.8-kg of 

uranium hexafluoride) at this facility. This facility is 

producing 19.7 percent enriched uranium at the rate 

of 6.45-kg per month. As with the centrifuges at the 

PFEP, the individual centrifuges at the FFEP are producing about 0.9 SWU per year.

With the start of these two sets of interconnected 

cascades at the FFEP, Iran made good on its announcement of June 2011 that it would triple its production 

rate of 19.7 percent enriched uranium. Currently, Iran 

is producing a total of about 9.5-kg of 19.7 percent enriched uranium per month. As of mid-February 2013, 

Iran had produced a total of about 74-kg of 19.7 percent enriched uranium. Since Iran has converted about 

7-kg of this uranium into a uranium oxide compound 

for use as fuel in the TRR, Iran’s current stockpile of 

19.7 percent enriched uranium is about 67-kg.

Iran has installed the piping and centrifuge casings 

for an additional 2,088 centrifuges (12 cascades) at the 

FFEP. Iran has informed the IAEA that these additional cascades, when completed, will be used to produce 
439

either 3.5 percent or 19.7 percent enriched uranium 

without specifying how many cascades will be producing what type of enriched uranium. This opens the 

possibility that Iran could further increase its rate of 

19.7 percent enriched uranium. Given Iran’s current 

production rate of 3.5 percent enriched uranium at the 

FEP, Iran could run two additional sets of two interconnected cascades to produce 19.7 percent enriched 

uranium without the need to drawdown its stockpile 

of 3.5 percent enriched uranium. If Iran were to construct and start to operate these two additional sets 

of cascades, its overall production rate of 19.7 percent 

enriched uranium would be about 16-kg per month.

IRANIAN OPTIONS FOR PRODUCING 

HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM

Given that it currently has an enrichment capacity of 5,000 SWU per year at the FEP and stockpiles 

of about 3,000-kg of 3.5 percent enriched uranium 

and 67-kg of 19.7 percent enriched uranium, Iran 

has a number of options for producing the 20-kg 

of highly enriched uranium (HEU) required for a 

nuclear weapon.

The most straightforward method Iran could use 

to produce HEU would be batch recycling at the FEP. 

In this process, no major modifications are made to 

the FEP but rather enriched uranium is successively 

run though the FEP in batches until the desired enrichment is achieved. In the past, I have calculated that 

Iran could use a two-step process to produce HEU. In 

the first step, 3.5 percent enriched uranium would be 

enriched to 19.7 percent enriched uranium. Iran has 

already demonstrated this step by producing 19.7 percent enriched uranium at the PFEP and FFEP. In the 

second step, 19.7 percent enriched uranium would be 
440

enriched to 90 percent enriched uranium. My calculations for this second step rely on work by Alexander 

Glaser, which demonstrated that, by reducing the 

flow through the cascade, it was possible to achieve 

the production of 90 percent enriched uranium from 

19.7 percent enriched uranium in one step without a 

significant loss of separative capacity.4

 This process is 

illustrated for Iran’s current situation in Table 15-AI2.

(The Second Step is Based on Glaser’s Analysis.)

Table 15-AI2. Time, Product, and Feed 

Requirements for the Production of 20-Kg of 

HEU by Batch Recycling at the FEP 

(5,000 SWU Per Year Total).

Two steps are required. In the first step, Iran needs 

to produce 158.2-kg of 19.7 percent enriched uranium 

(including 5-kg for the plant inventory in the second 

step). However, since it has already produced 67-kg of 

19.7 percent enriched uranium, Iran needs only to produce an additional 91.2-kg. This step requires 1,080-

kg of 3.5 percent enriched uranium as feed, but Iran’s 

current stockpile well exceeds this figure. In the second step, the 19.7 percent enriched uranium is further 

enriched to the 90 percent level suitable for a nuclear 

weapon. Using Iran’s currently operating centrifugCycle Product Enrichment and 

Quantity

Feed Enrichment 

and Quantity

Time for Cycle 

(Days)

First 19.7 percent

91.2-kg

3.5 percent

1,080-kg 32

Second 90.0 percent

20-kg

19.7 percent

153.2-kg* 11

Total 47**

* Includes 67-kg of 19.7 percent enriched uranium that Iran has already stockpiled.

**Includes 4 days to account for equilibrium and cascade fill time.
441

es at the FEP, the batch recycling would take about 

1 and 1/2 months.

As stated previously, this calculation depends on 

Glaser’s published calculations of the effectiveness of 

reduced cascade flow so that uranium can be enriched 

from 19.7 percent to 90 percent in one step. I am not 

the only analyst who has relied on Glaser’s work, as 

both Levi5

 and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)6

 have based their calculations on 

Glaser’s calculations. However, as I wrote in my last 

paper, questions have been raised about the validity 

of Glaser’s work, and I have had to examine methods 

whereby Iran could produce the 20-kg of HEU required for a nuclear weapon without relying on his 

calculations.7

Iran could still produce HEU by batch recycling 

at the FEP, but the process would require three steps. 

Each pass would produce the feed required for the 

next cycle, which would include the plant inventory 

(in this case, 2-kg for each cycle). Iran would need 

to produce sufficient 19.7 percent enriched uranium 

from 3.5 percent enriched feed, then further enrich 

this 19.7 percent enriched uranium to 55.4 percent 

enriched uranium, and finally enrich the 55.4 percent 

enriched uranium to 86.3 percent enriched uranium. I 

have increased the amount of HEU required from 20-

kg to 21-kg to keep the quantity of U-235 in the product about the same.

The results for the first step can be found using 

separative work calculations, but for the other two 

steps, an SWU calculation would not produce accurate results. Since the plant at Natanz is designed to 

produce 3.5 percent product from natural uranium, its 

cascade is more tapered than is optimal for the upper stages of an enrichment plant designed to produce 

HEU. As a result, some of the SWU output of the plant 
442

cannot be utilized during the latter cycles of the batch 

production process. The plant is restricted by the flow 

at the product end of the cascade. Therefore, the time 

required per cycle is determined by the amount of 

product required and the amount of product the plant 

can produce per day, not by an SWU calculation.

The results (see Table 15-AI3) show that this method of batch recycling would take just under 5 months, 

in contrast to the 1 1/2 months required in Table 15-

AI2. In addition, Iran would need to start with 3,840-

kg of 3.5 percent enriched uranium, much more than 

the 1,080-kg required by the calculations in Table 

15-AI2 and significantly more than the 3,000-kg that 

Iran currently possesses. At current production rates, 

it would take about 7 months before Iran would possess enough 3.5 percent enriched uranium to start the 

batch recycling process.

(Does Not Rely on Glaser’s Analysis).

Table 15-AI3. Time, Product, and Feed

Requirements or the Production of HEU by Batch 

Recycling at the FEP (5,000 SWU Per Year Total).

Cycle Product Enrichment and 

Quantity

Feed Enrichment 

and Quantity

Time for Cycle 

(Days)

First 19.7 percent

325-kg

3.5 percent

3,840-kg 114

Second 55.4 percent

68.4-kg

19.7 percent

390-kg* 18

Third 86.3 percent

21-kg

55.4 percent

66.4-kg 6

Total 144**

* Includes 67-kg of 19.7 percent enriched uranium that Iran has already stockpiled.

**Includes 6 days to account for equilibrium and cascade fill time.
443

Iran, however, has additional options for producing the HEU required for a nuclear weapon. As stated 

earlier, in addition to the FEP, Iran is producing 19.7 

percent enriched uranium at the PFEP and recently 

tripled its production of 19.7 percent enriched uranium by starting two sets of two interconnected cascades at the FFEP. Iran can use its 19.7 percent production capacity to carry out the final step of the three 

step batch recycling process. The results are shown in 

Table 15-AI4.

As in the previous case, the times for the second 

and third steps are determined by the cascade product 

production rate and not by SWU calculations. The total time required is about 3 2/3 months, which is over 

a month shorter than the prior case where all three 

batch recycling steps were carried out at the FEP. In 

addition, this method has the advantage of reducing 

the required amount of 3.5 percent enriched uranium 

feed from 3,840-kg to 1,640-kg, which is smaller than 

Iran’s current 3,000-kg stockpile and therefore could 

be carried out today, if Iran so desired.
444

(Does Not Rely on Glaser’s Analysis).

Table 15-AI4. Time, Product, and Feed 

Requirements for the Production of HEU by Batch 

Recycling at the FEP (5,000 SWU Per Year Total).

Final step at PFEP and FFEP.

If Glaser’s calculations are incorrect, the only 

way that Iran could currently produce the HEU for 

a nuclear weapon in just 2 months would be to use 

batch recycling at the FEP, combined with a clandestine “topping” enrichment plant. Since Iran continues 

to refuse to implement the Additional Protocol to its 

safeguards agreement, the IAEA would find it very 

difficult to locate a clandestine enrichment plant—a 

fact that the IAEA confirmed.8 While this has been a 

theoretical possibility since 2007, its salience increased 

with the discovery in September 2009 that Iran was 

actually building such a clandestine enrichment plant 

(the FFEP near Qom).

In this case, the clandestine enrichment plant 

could be designed as an ideal cascade to enrich 19.7 

percent enriched uranium to the 90 percent enriched 

uranium needed for a nuclear weapon. By starting 

from 19.7 percent enriched uranium, this clandestine 

Cycle and 

Enrichment Plant

Product Enrichment and 

Quantity

Feed Enrichment 

and Quantity

Time for Cycle 

(Days)

First

FEP

19.7 percent

139-kg

3.5 percent

1,640-kg 37

Second

FEP

55.4 percent

39.2-kg

19.7 percent

223-kg 10

Third

PFEP & FFEP**

89.4 percent

20-kg

55.4 percent

39.0-kg 64

Total 111**

* Includes 67-kg of 19.7 percent enriched uranium that Iran has already stockpiled, and 19 

kilograms of 19.7 percent enriched uranium from the tails of the PFEP and FFEP.

**Plant 

***Includes 6 days to account for equilibrium and cascade fill time.
445

enrichment plant need only contain about 1,400 IR-1 

type centrifuges to be able to produce the 20-kg of 

HEU required for a nuclear weapon in just 2 months. 

Furthermore, since Iran already has a stockpile of 19.7 

percent enriched uranium, the production of the 19.7 

percent enriched uranium at the FEP and the 90 percent enriched uranium at the clandestine enrichment 

plant could be carried out simultaneously.

The results of this process are shown in Table 15-

AI5. As can be seen, the production of the 19.7 percent 

enriched uranium needed (including 0.5-kg for the 

plant inventory at the clandestine plant) to produce 

20-kg of HEU at the clandestine enrichment plant 

now requires only 325-kg of 3.5 percent enriched feed. 

Since the cycle time at the FEP is shorter than that at 

the clandestine enrichment plant and the cycles are 

carried out simultaneously, the time required at the 

FEP has no impact on the overall time required to 

produce the HEU.

(Does Not Rely on Glaser’s Analysis).

Table 15-AI5. Time, Product, and Feed 

Requirements for the Production of HEU by Batch 

Recyclingat the FEP (5,000 SWU Per Year Total).

Cycle and Enrichment 

Plant

Product Enrichment and 

Quantity

Feed Enrichment 

and Quantity

Time for Cycle 

(Days)

First

FEP

19.7 percent

27.5-kg

3.5 percent

325-kg 12**

Second

Clandestine

90.0 percent

20-kg

19.7 percent

106.8-kg* 63**

Total 63***

* Includes 67-kg of 19.7 percent enriched uranium that Iran has already stockpiled. Processing the tails of the clandestine plant at the PFEP and FFEP produces an additional 12.8-kg of 

19.7 percent enriched uranium.

** Includes 2 days to account for equilibrium and cascade fill time.

***Cycle times are not additive since cycles are simultaneous.
446

Final Step at 1,400-Centrifuge Clandestine Plant 

(0.9 SWU per Centrifuge-Year). Cycles Carried 

Out Simultaneously.

Further, since Iran would have a substantial quantity of 3.5 percent enriched uranium left over (about 

2,700-kg), it could continue the process and produce 

additional HEU. An additional 20-kg of HEU would 

require 1,109-kg of 3.5 percent enriched uranium feed, 

so with its current stockpile, Iran could produce a total of about 68-kg of HEU, which is enough for about 

three nuclear weapons. Since the clandestine enrichment plant has been sized to produce about 10-kg of 

HEU per month, Iran could produce enough HEU for 

a nuclear weapon at successive 2-month intervals.

Batch recycling of enriched uranium isn’t the only 

pathway for Iran to produce the fissile material required for nuclear weapons, though it is the process 

that allows Iran to produce HEU most quickly. Iran 

could produce HEU at a clandestine enrichment plant 

designed to produce 90 percent enriched uranium 

from natural uranium feed.

A clandestine enrichment plant containing 3,800 

centrifuges (0.9 SWU per centrifuge-year) could produce around 20-kg of HEU (the amount required for 

one nuclear weapon) each year using natural uranium 

as feed. Since this option does not require any overt 

breakout from safeguards, the relatively slow rate of 

HEU production would not necessarily be of any concern to Iran. Such production could be going on right 

now, and the West might well not know. A clandestine 

enrichment plant would need a source of uranium, 

but Iran is producing uranium at a mine near Bandar 

Abbas.9

 Since Iran has refused to implement the Ad-
447

ditional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards, this uranium 

mining is unsafeguarded, and the whereabouts of the 

uranium that Iran has produced there is unknown. A 

significant drawback to this stand-alone clandestine 

enrichment plant is that it requires many more centrifuges than would the 1,400-centrifuge clandestine 

plant discussed earlier. It is not clear whether Iran 

could provide this number of centrifuges to a clandestine plant, and the larger any clandestine enrichment 

plant is the more likely it is that it will be discovered.

Iran, then, has a number of methods whereby it 

could produce the HEU required for a nuclear weapon. If Glaser’s previously published calculations are 

correct, then batch recycling at the FEP alone could 

produce enough HEU for a weapon in just 1 1/2 

months. If Glaser’s calculations are incorrect, then 

the most threatening cases are those involving clandestine enrichment plants. If Iran were to produce 

19.7 percent enriched uranium at the FEP and simultaneously enrich 19.7 percent enriched uranium to 

HEU at a clandestine enrichment plant, then it could 

produce a weapon’s worth of HEU in 2 months and 

enough HEU for three weapons in 6 months. Alternatively, Iran might build a stand-alone clandestine 

plant to enrich natural uranium to HEU. Such a plant 

would only produce enough HEU for one weapon 

a year, but, since the plant could go undetected for 

many years, Iran could produce a sizable stockpile 

before detection.

If Glaser’s calculations are incorrect, and one does 

not want to posit the existence of a clandestine enrichment plant, then the fastest way Iran could produce 

HEU would be to carry out batch recycling at the FEP 

and the final enrichment step at the PFEP and FFEP. 

In this fashion, Iran could produce sufficient HEU for 
448

a weapon in about 3 2/3 months, which is longer than 

the 1 1/2 months that would be required if Glaser’s 

calculations are correct. Clearly, it would be helpful 

to resolve the uncertainties regarding Glaser’s calculations. However, even if these uncertainties are not 

resolved, it is obvious that clandestine Iranian enrichment facilities pose a serious threat.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 15 - APPENDIX I

1. “Not all of the centrifuges in the cascades that were being 

fed with UF6 may have been working.” IAEA, Implementation of 

the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security 

Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2012/9, February 24, 2012, p. 3.

2. To avoid problems with the fact that the length of a month is 

variable, we have adopted a uniform month length of 30.44 days.

3. Assuming 0.4 percent tails. A separative work unit (SWU) 

is a measure of the amount of enrichment a facility can perform. 

The SWU needed to produce a given amount of enriched uranium 

product can be calculated if the U-235 concentration in the product, feed, and tails are known.

4. Alexander Glaser, “Characteristics of the Gas Centrifuge 

for Uranium Enrichment and Their Relevance for Nuclear Weapon Proliferation,” Science and Global Security, Vol. 16, No. 1-2, 2008, 

pp. 1-25. In particular, see Table 3 on p. 16.

5. Michael A. Levi, “Drawing the Line on Iranian Enrichment,” Survival, Vol. 53, No. 4, August-September 2011, 

pp. 180-181.

6. Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities, A Net Assessment, an IISS Strategic Dossier, London, UK: The International 

Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2011, p. 73.

7. Gregory S. Jones, “Iran’s Efforts to Develop Nuclear 

Weapons Explicated, Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment Contin-
449

ues Unimpeded, The IAEA’s November 8, 2011 Safeguards Update,” December, 6, 2011, p. 5, available from npolicy.org/article.

php?aid=1124&rid=4.

8. IAEA, GOV/2012/9, pp. 10-11. 

While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared 

by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing 

the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in 

Iran is in peaceful activities. 

9. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and 

relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2011/7, February 25, 2011, p. 9.

451

CHAPTER 15

APPENDIX II

LIMITING IRAN TO PRODUCING AND 

STOCKPILING LESS THAN 5 PERCENT 

ENRICHED URANIUM 

DOES NOT PREVENT EASY ACCESS TO 

HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM

As was discussed in the text, many who propose 

a diplomatic solution with Iran have suggested that 

it should be allowed to continue to enrich uranium 

as long as this activity is subject to proper controls. 

In particular, they propose that Iran should not enrich uranium to more than 5 percent and that its current stockpile of nearly 20 percent enriched uranium 

should be removed from Iran. Further, they propose 

that the size of Iran’s enrichment effort be determined 

by the needs of its peaceful nuclear program. 

But Iran’s current enrichment effort is quite small 

compared to those needed for most peaceful nuclear 

activities, such as providing fuel for a single nuclear 

power reactor. A diplomatic solution could provide 

Iran with the justification for greatly expanding its 

current enrichment facilities as well as removing sanctions. Under these circumstances, Iran might receive 

assistance to expand its enrichment facilities (from 

say China or Pakistan) as part of normal nuclear commerce. These greatly expanded facilities would provide Iran easy access to the highly enriched uranium 

(HEU) needed for nuclear weapons.

For example, even if Iran produced only 4.1 percent enriched uranium1

 and expanded its enrichment 

capacity by a factor of 20 (100,000 SWU/year), it 
452

would only produce about 15 metric tons of enriched 

uranium per year. This amount would still be less 

than that needed to fuel a single large power reactor, 

yet, using batch recycling, these enrichment facilities 

could produce enough HEU for a nuclear weapon in 

just 2 weeks. This process is shown in Table 15-AII1.

(Does Not Rely on Glaser’s Analysis).

Table 15-AII1. Time, Product, and Feed 

Requirements for the Production of 20-Kg of HEU 

by Batch Recycling at a Centrifuge Enrichment 

Plant Designed to Produce 4.1 Percent Enriched 

Uranium (100,000 SWU Per Year Total).

In the first step, 4.1 percent enriched uranium is 

processed into 20.2 percent enriched uranium. In the 

second step, this uranium is processed into 60.2 percent enriched uranium, and the third step completes 

the process by producing the 20-kg of 90 percent enriched uranium needed for a nuclear weapon. Each 

step produces not only the material needed to be processed in the next step, but also the material needed 

for the plant inventory, which in this case is 30-kg 

per step.

Cycle Product Enrichment and 

Quantity

Feed Enrichment 

and Quantity

Time for Cycle 

(Days)

First 20.2 percent

304 kg

4.1 percent

1,990 kg 7.5

Second 60.2 percent

69.5 kg

20.2 percent

274 kg 1.7

Third 90.0 percent

20 kg

60.2 percent

39.5 kg 0.5

Total 16*

* Includes 6 days to account for equilibrium and cascade fill time.
453

Instead of just producing enough HEU for one 

nuclear weapon, Iran could produce enough HEU 

for five nuclear weapons (100-kg) in a single batch 

recycling campaign. This process would take about 

5 weeks and is shown in Table 15-AII2. This process 

would require starting with 6,090-kg of 4.1 percent enriched uranium, but since the plant will be producing 

about 15,000-kg per year, it would not be hard for Iran 

to stockpile this quantity of enriched uranium.

(Does Not Rely on Glaser’s Analysis).

Table 15-AII2. Time, Product, and Feed 

Requirements for the Production of 100-Kg of HEU 

by Batch Recycling at a Centrifuge Enrichment 

Plant Designed to Produce 4.1 Percent Enriched 

Uranium (100,000 SWU Per Year Total).

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 15, APPENDIX II

1. With tails of 0.2 percent.

Cycle Product Enrichment and 

Quantity

Feed Enrichment 

and Quantity

Time for Cycle 

(Days)

First 20.2 percent

929-kg

4.1 percent

6,090-kg 23

Second 60.2 percent

228-kg

20.2 percent

899-kg 5.6

Third 90.0 percent

100-kg

60.2 percent

198-kg 2.5

Total 37*

* Includes 6 days to account for equilibrium and cascade fill time.

455

PART V:

SERIOUS RULES FOR 

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

457

CHAPTER 16

SERIOUS RULES FOR NUCLEAR POWER 

WITHOUT PROLIFERATION

Henry Sokolski 

Victor Gilinsky

In this chapter, we try to step back from the day-today struggles in Washington, DC, over nuclear nonproliferation policy to ask what measures we would 

need to have in place to be reasonably confident that 

expanding nuclear power globally will not increase 

the number of nuclear weapons-armed states. We 

recognize that, since the start of the Atoms for Peace 

Program in the mid-1950s, the United States has supported worldwide use of nuclear power. It also has opposed the spread of nuclear weapons and supported 

measures to control the nuclear weapons proliferation 

risks inherent in spreading nuclear technology for 

civilian purposes. The principal administrative elements of this nonproliferation effort are the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the associated inspection activities of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA), as well as various national and international export controls.

In practice, the success of our policies promoting 

the global use of nuclear energy have raced ahead of 

the means available to control the associated nuclear 

weapons proliferation risks, leaving a broad security 

gap. What passes for U.S. nuclear nonproliferation 

policy—the perennial pushing and pulling over the 

details of nuclear export controls and agreements—

does not begin to address that broad gap.
458

Unless the members of the NPT agree to deal with 

its fundament deficiencies by interpreting the treaty in 

a way that sharply limits access to fuels that are also 

nuclear explosive materials and agree to universal enforcement of that interpretation, increased worldwide 

nuclear energy use will carry with it the inevitable risk 

of the further nuclear weapons proliferation.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION 

AND NUCLEAR POWER: WHAT’S THE WORRY?

In any effort to assess our current nonproliferation policies, we must remind ourselves why we still 

resist the spread of nuclear weapons. In fact, it has 

become fashionable in some industry and academic 

circles to discount the dangers on the grounds that, 

chiefly, proliferation has proceeded more slowly than 

once feared. 

The usual reference is to U.S. President John F. 

Kennedy’s 1962 statement that 15 to 25 countries 

could obtain nuclear weapons. But this was a warning, not a prediction, and a useful one that led to nonproliferation efforts that slowed the process. In view 

of our experiences with countries falsely claiming to 

be conducting “peaceful” nuclear programs and later 

using their facilities for illicit activities or conducting 

clandestine bomb activities—in India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, and Syria—it 

is time to heed these warnings again.

There is also a school of thought that, even if some 

more countries obtained nuclear weapons, it would 

not make much difference because they would just 

serve as deterrents.1

 There is a troubling disconnect 

between this cheerful theorizing—which is not without an element of self-interest—and any awareness of 
459

the devastating possibility of nuclear war. Just because 

the weapons are supposed to be for deterrence does 

not mean they will not be used. Such use is, after all, 

implied in the threat that underlies deterrence. And 

if they are used, they are likely to change profoundly 

the way the world is organized, with unpredictable 

but likely unhappy consequences.2

 A few years ago, 

former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote: 

If one imagines a world of tens of nations with nuclear 

weapons and major powers trying to balance their 

own deterrent equations, plus the deterrent equations 

of the subsystems, deterrence calculation would become impossibly complicated. To assume that, in such 

a world, nuclear catastrophe could be avoided would 

be unrealistic.3

Happily, we have not reached this state. No such 

weapons have exploded in anger since World War II, 

and it has been a long time since people have seen the 

results of atmospheric tests. But this has also meant 

there is not the gut-level consciousness about proliferation dangers that there is about the dangers of 

nuclear accidents. Whereas everyone agrees that expanded use of nuclear power has to be predicated on 

tough safety rules, there is no corresponding agreement when it comes to rules to protect against nuclear 

weapons spread, especially when it comes to restrictions on nuclear power programs. 

One often hears from nuclear industry sources that 

“civilian” nuclear programs are not a proliferation 

worry because they are an unlikely source of nuclear 

explosive materials for would-be bomb makers. They 

argue that, just as current nuclear weapons states relied on dedicated military programs, so would any 

future would-be weapons country.4
460

Our view is different. Leaving aside the correctness 

of the assumptions about past weapons programs, the 

past is not a good guide to the future because conditions have changed fundamentally. Today all nonweapon states are members of the NPT. If one of these 

countries should decide to obtain weapons, it would 

have to withdraw or cheat, both courses risking a 

military response until the would-be bomb maker had 

weapons comfortably in hand. This would put a very 

high premium on traversing the period of vulnerability as quickly as possible. Kissinger made this point 

in the previously cited 2006 Trilateral Commission 

report: “A policy of using preventive force against 

aspiring nuclear powers, however, creates incentives 

for them to acquire nuclear weapons as rapidly as 

possible. . . .”5

That means drawing on bomb material and knowhow where it is most quickly obtainable, which would 

mean tapping a nuclear power program if there is one, 

unless, of course, there are strict measures in place to 

prevent that happening. If there is any doubt about 

this conclusion, consider the following counterhistorical: Suppose each of the major World War II belligerents already had civilian nuclear power programs 

before the war started. Would they not have tapped 

them rather than start anew to develop independent 

nuclear weapons programs? The answer suggests 

why strict nonproliferation measures are important.

THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION 

TREATY’S DEFICIENCIES

In this regard, no one believes that we have adequate preventive antiproliferation measures in place 

today. Otherwise, we would not be discussing end-
461

lessly various international fuel supply schemes to 

mitigate the risks that national uranium enrichment 

and fuel reprocessing might be used to produce 

nuclear explosives. Everyone understands that the 

NPT as it has been interpreted up to now has basic 

deficiencies:

• The treaty allows withdrawal on 3 months’ 

notice.

• It does not delineate the limits on permissible 

“peaceful” technology, with respect to fuels 

that are immediately usable to make nuclear 

explosives.

• It sharply restricts IAEA inspections.

• The treaty lacks an established enforcement 

system, so that each violation requires an improvised response.

• The treaty’s universality is undermined by India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan, which 

remain as examples of what a country can get 

away with doing.

The advance of technology since the treaty went 

into force has exacerbated these problems by lowering the technological barriers between civilian nuclear 

activities and nuclear weapons. The prime example 

is the spread of centrifuge enrichment technology, 

which can be used to produce low enriched uranium 

to fuel power reactors but also can bring states within 

weeks of acquiring weapons-grade uranium to make a 

bomb. More generally, worldwide advances in materials, manufacturing, and computing skills put weapons design and manufacture within reach of a larger 

group of countries.
462

NUCLEAR POWER EXPANSION REMAINS 

GOAL OF MAJOR NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS AND 

OF THE IAEA

Despite these acknowledged basic inadequacies of 

current anti-proliferation protections, the U.S. Government has supported worldwide use of nuclear 

power since U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace Program and continues to do so today. 

The rationale, however, has evolved.

In proposing the program, Eisenhower said that 

starting with small projects had: 

the great virtue that it can be undertaken without irritations and mutual suspicions incident to any attempt 

to set up a completely acceptable system of worldwide inspection and control.6

In time, however, the projects got bigger and much 

more significant from the point of view of international security. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the IAEA 

inspection system did not keep up. This arguably mattered less when the two Cold War camps expected to 

keep their client states in line mainly through their 

own intelligence and intervention. But now we really 

do need the “completely acceptable system of worldwide inspection and control” that President Eisenhower spoke about, especially if there is to be a major 

expansion in use of nuclear power plants.

At the moment, a major, global nuclear expansion is not in play, mainly because of unfavorable 

economics and, since the March 11, 2011, Fukushima, Japan, accident, also because of increased safety 

concerns.7

 Nevertheless, such expansion remains the 

goal, or at least the expectation, of key nuclear export-
463

ers—the United States included—and of the IAEA in 

Vienna, Austria.

U.S. President Barack Obama has consistently 

supported an expanded role for nuclear power both 

abroad and at home. In a March 2012 speech at Hankuk University, South Korea, almost exactly a year 

after Fukushima, the President said the world needed 

nuclear power.8

 He predicted that “nuclear energy 

will only become more important,” and that remains 

the operational assumption in the U.S. Government.9

The IAEA also announced optimism about nuclear 

power expansion post-Fukushima. At the 2012 IAEA 

General Conference, Director General Yukiya Amano 

said he expected “a steady rise in the number of nuclear power plants in the world in the next 20 years.” 

His low case for 2030 projected a nuclear power capacity increase of about a quarter, and his high case 

projected a doubling of current capacity.10 The projections are significant as expressions of the Agency’s 

sentiments and those of the national nuclear bureaucracies it represents. However unrealistic, these projections find their way into official and semi-official 

nuclear establishment reports and bolster support for 

nuclear power. 

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE 

CLIMATE ARGUMENT FOR NUCLEAR POWER

In his January 28, 2013, inaugural address, Obama 

reiterated his support for building “a new generation 

of safe, clean nuclear power plants in this country.” 

In this he is following in his predecessors’ footsteps.11

But his rationale—that nuclear power is necessary to 

deal with climate change—is significantly different, 

and it has far-reaching security implications. 
464

Since we are talking about a global rather than a 

local effect, the climate benefit of nuclear power installations only accrues if there are very many of them. 

In resting the case for nuclear power on the need for 

them to deal with global warming, the proponents 

are therefore saying that we must build a very large 

number of nuclear plants. The experts say it would 

take well over 1,000 plants just to make a dent on the 

climate problem.12 But an increase of that size would 

likely involve nuclear power programs in dozens more 

countries, including many in the rougher parts of the 

world—most of the Middle Eastern countries have already expressed interest in building nuclear plants—a 

worrisome prospect from a security point of view. 

The putative climate imperative for nuclear power 

has made it easy for U.S. nuclear officials to argue 

that, yes, they would like to see effective antiproliferation protection, but at the end of the day, we have to 

settle for what we can get because we must have lots 

of nuclear power to deal with climate change, no matter what. However, that is exactly the case where that 

antiproliferation protection is needed most. 

More important, there are environmentally acceptable energy alternatives to nuclear power, including 

ones superior for coping with climate change. An obvious example is natural gas, which allows faster and 

cheaper reductions in carbon.13 We certainly do not 

accept the notion that the world is locked into eventually relying on large numbers of nuclear power plants 

to cope with global warming.

PUTTING SECURITY FIRST

For this reason, we believe it would make more 

sense to reverse the current policy priorities under 

which “nuclear” trumps protection, and instead in-
465

sist on adequate protection against proliferation as a 

condition for nuclear trade. We would try to persuade 

others to accept that standard. If prospective customers are unwilling to agree to such protection, our answer is to stop encouraging nuclear expansion until 

such protection is available.

We certainly do not buy the rationalization that 

the United States has to sell into the international 

nuclear market, even if the agreements covering the 

trade are not as tight as we would like, because if we 

do not, others will, and ”you have to play the game if 

you want to participate in setting the rules.” We think 

the United States would be more convincing by setting a principled example. Nor do we go along with 

that ultimate cop-out—that technology controls are 

not important because proliferation is really a political, and not a technical problem. It is obviously both, 

and an essential aspect of nonproliferation is to keep 

it difficult, both technically and politically, for countries to join the weapons game, so difficult that we can 

reasonably exclude the possibility that civilian nuclear 

programs will contribute to weapons development. 

We are very much aware of the positions of the 

majority of countries on NPT issues and their negative 

reactions to further restrictions and even existing restrictions on access to nuclear technology.14 It is clear 

they are in no mood to accept a major tightening of 

the rules, and we are under no illusion that the United 

States can by itself impose such a major tightening. 

But we can start to talk about the issues in a more 

straightforward manner than we have been doing, 

and we can seek to persuade the international community of the value to all countries of effective antiproliferation protection.
466

In fact, we have been moving in the opposite direction by promoting the “three-pillars” interpretation of the NPT, which hobbles our nonproliferation 

efforts.15 This reinterpretation of the treaty puts sharing of nuclear technology on a par with nonproliferation. It is easy to see why U.S. diplomats find this path 

of least resistance appealing—technology sharing 

is easy and pleasant for all parties, while imposing 

nonproliferation restrictions is just the opposite. The 

trouble is, taking this approach leads to a markedly 

weakened NPT. 

The argument is made that acceptance of the threepillars formulation is necessary to give the United 

States the bona fides to conduct nonproliferation policy, and, anyhow, it is so firmly entrenched that there 

is no point in talking about it. The result is a kind of 

zero-sum game in which the nonproliferation obligations of the majority of members are held hostage to 

technology sharing by the main nuclear states. The 

loose interpretation of the latter by the hopeful recipients has been especially problematic and is what creates the proliferation problem in the first place. 

That is not all. By putting the technology sharing 

obligation on a par with nonproliferation, the threepillars formulation singles out nuclear energy as the 

internationally politically anointed energy source, 

irrespective of its real economic value. This reflects 

energy-of-the-future thinking of the 1960s, but makes 

no sense today.

Unfortunately, Obama’s comments on the foundations of the NPT have not been helpful. On the treaty’s 

40th anniversary in 2010, the President described it as 

standing on “three pillars—disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses.”16 We need to get back to 

viewing the NPT, as primarily about the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
467

FIVE PRINCIPLES FOR STRENGTHENING 

THE NPT REGIME

We propose here to examine what effective antiproliferation protection would entail. We express this 

in terms of five principles addressed to the main deficiencies of the NPT. So far as we can tell, nowhere 

in the nonproliferation literature is there a clear statement of a policy goal. There is an abundance, in fact a 

superabundance, of discussions of the value or attainability of this or that agreement provision or requirement, but nowhere do we find a statement of what it is 

we want in the way of protection.17 In effect, the principles we detail here are an outline of what it takes to 

have an international environment in which nuclear 

power can thrive without providing an easy target for 

would-be bomb makers. 

1. Make Withdrawals from the NPT Effectively 

Impossible. 

We need to make it much more difficult—in fact, 

essentially impossible—to exercise the NPT’s withdrawal provision. This is vital, not least because the 

member states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA 

remain in force so long as the states remain parties to 

the treaty.18 The U.S. position is that safeguards continue in perpetuity, but it is unclear what would actually happen if another state announced its withdrawal.

The international responses to North Korea’s 1993 

withdrawal threats and ultimate 2003 withdrawal announcement were deficient in that, however much everyone deplored North Korea’s action, no one made 

the case at the time that a country cannot, while in 
468

a state of violation, legally leave the NPT. It was a 

question of legitimacy, which, while intangible, remains important in international affairs, even to the 

North Koreans. 

There seems finally to be general agreement on 

this point—that a country in violation of the NPT cannot relieve itself of its responsibilities by announcing 

withdrawal, and that the international reaction to a 

similar case would be more forceful.19 Nevertheless, 

ambiguity still remains over whether North Korea is 

still obligated by its NPT membership. Obama’s statement deploring North Korea’s February 12, 2013, nuclear explosion did not so much as mention the NPT. 

It would have been helpful if the President had said 

that North Korea’s NPT withdrawal was not valid and 

that it stands in continued violation of the treaty for 

current actions as well as past ones.20

But even this, in our view, would not go far 

enough. A country should not be allowed to gather 

the production tools for making a bomb while a member and then free itself of its treaty responsibilities 

by withdrawing, even if it is in good standing at the 

time. What this means is that a country should not be 

allowed to leave the treaty legally with technology 

it obtained as a member, because it did so with the 

forbearance of other members on the assumption that 

it was doing so for peaceful uses. This should apply 

whether the technology was imported or developed 

indigenously.

The position that NPT safeguards apply in perpetuity, even if it gained universal acceptance, would 

not entirely deal with this issue. In practice, there is 

no way to erase the advantages that a country bent 

on nuclear weapons gains from its nuclear power program, an advantage that lies in part in equipment and 
469

materials, but perhaps most importantly in the training of scientific and technical personnel. 

It would be useful to introduce these NPT arguments into the current discussions that have arisen in 

Japan and South Korea over the advisability of obtaining nuclear weapons.21 The voices for weapons certainly have become much louder after the February 

12, 2013, North Korean nuclear test.

2. Limit NPT Members’ Access to and Production 

of Nuclear Weapons-Usable Materials.

The NPT cannot be a vehicle for legally coming 

overly close to a weapons capability. There has to 

be a technological safety margin between genuinely 

peaceful and potentially military applications to make 

it impossible to surprise the world with a bomb. As a 

consequence, the “inalienable right” language in the 

treaty has to be interpreted in terms of the treaty’s 

overriding objective, and thus there have to be restrictions on the kinds of technology that are acceptable for 

nonmilitary use. Nuclear power needs to develop in a 

way that does not provide easy access to nuclear explosive materials. Where to draw the line is now coming to a head in the context of Iran’s nuclear program.

In the early days of nuclear power—the 1950s and 

1960s—technology control was not on the international agenda. Enthusiasm for plutonium as the fuel of the 

future in fast breeder reactors overrode any official 

concern about its weapons potential. Under Atoms for 

Peace, the United States shared its reprocessing technology with all countries, as it was seen as an essential 

part of nuclear power programs.22 This complacency 

about easy access to plutonium was jolted by India’s 

1974 nuclear explosion, which led the principal ex-
470

porters to organize the Nuclear Suppliers Group to 

exercise some control over the spread of what were 

euphemistically called “sensitive” nuclear technologies. The resort to euphemisms is itself telling. Neither 

the United States nor the other exporters ever publicly 

addressed the tensions in the NPT between prohibitions on bombs and liberal promises of technology—

between the NPT Article IV’s “inalienable right of all 

the Parties” to “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” 

and the qualification that this activity must be “in 

conformity with Articles I and II,” which prohibit acquisition of nuclear weapons. The conflict remains to 

be resolved. That, after all, is what the struggle over 

Iran’s enrichment program is about. 

The well-known root problem is that separated 

plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) can 

be converted to weapons use too quickly for international inspection to provide protection against 

that possibility.23 The IAEA refers to its inspections 

and related protection systems as “safeguards.” This 

introduced some confusion because the IAEA uses 

“safeguards” as a term of art for all the inspections 

it conducts, whether or not the inspections in question actually achieve their purpose of providing the 

timely warning needed to safeguard against military 

diversions. 

It is therefore important that the IAEA’s basic NPT 

safeguards document states the purpose of IAEA safeguards is to deter diversion by the threat of early detection.24 If sufficient early detection cannot be counted 

on—as it realistically cannot for the nuclear explosive 

materials plutonium and HEU—there is no deterrence 

related to inspection, and therefore no effective safeguarding in terms of the INFCIRC/153 standard. In 

our view, the commercial use of materials that cannot 

be safeguarded in this sense should not be permitted.
471

The same concerns, once removed, apply to the 

enrichment and reprocessing facilities capable of producing nuclear explosives. As the Strategic Plan for the 

Bush administration’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program put it, “. . . there is no technology 

‘silver bullet’ that can be built into an enrichment plant or 

reprocessing plant that can prevent a country from diverting these commercial fuel cycle facilities to non-peaceful 

use.”25 This explains why we do not want to have them 

there in the first place.

Reprocessing Plutonium and Recycling Spent Fuel.

In principle, plutonium recycling should be easier 

to deal with because it is widely recognized that there 

is no economic case for plutonium reprocessing or 

recycling spent fuel.26 The fast breeder programs that 

were the original incentives for separating plutonium 

have almost all receded into the indefinite future.27

Nor are recent claims valid that reprocessing and recycling facilitate waste disposal. That has not, however, 

prevented national laboratories and nuclear fuel firms 

from clinging to plutonium technology as a link to the 

original dream of an all-nuclear future, regardless of 

its current impracticality. To make it pay, the industrial supporters are counting on heavy subsidies—following the principle that, to make money, you do not 

need an economic product, you just need someone to 

pay for it. 

The last refuge for plutonium recycling supporters is the claim that it serves arms control purposes 

by consuming plutonium, thus reducing long-term 

risks. 28 It does so, however, by separating plutonium 

and exposing it, in a number of fuel cycle stages, to 

considerably increased near-term risks. In view of the 
472

dangers and lack of economic benefits of reprocessing 

plutonium and recycling spent fuel, it makes sense to 

ban them altogether. 

Such a ban would be no more than what U.S. 

President Gerald Ford proposed in 1976.29 While the 

nuclear community never wholly accepted the view, 

for many years, these fuel activities were restrained by 

the unfavorable economics. But in 2007, the recycling 

adherents convinced the George Bush administration 

to launch the GNEP, a futuristic reprocessing and recycle crash program. The advertised purpose was to 

“solve” the nuclear waste and proliferation problems 

simultaneously by having the United States and other 

major nuclear supplier countries provide a full range 

of fuel services. In reality, it was a poorly thought out 

scheme, based on technology that did not exist, to rekindle the nuclear dream of a fast reactor future.30 The 

Obama administration cut back the Bush program but 

kept much of it going, and when the President spoke 

in South Korea in 2012, he called for “an international commitment to unlocking the fuel cycle of the 

future.”31 It is not surprising that nuclear bureaucracies in other countries, and especially South Korea, 

have been emboldened in expressing their interest in 

plutonium technology. 

A key pending policy issue concerns the so-called 

Gold Standard for civilian nuclear cooperation between the United States and other countries. This is 

the standard established in the 2009 agreement with 

the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that permits reactor 

sales but rules out nuclear fuel activities. Unfortunately, the Obama administration has been ambiguous about whether it will apply this standard to all 

such agreements.32 Without an American commitment to it, there is no chance for the standard to gain 

international acceptance.
473

We should be clear that to restrict fuel cycle activities to a small number of countries would mean 

not only that states that have not yet gotten into these 

activities would forego doing so, but also that some 

states already involved in such activities would have 

to give them up. While giving up reprocessing facilities would not involve economic penalties, as reprocessing is uneconomic and broadly understood to be 

so, that does not mean that it would be an easy thing. 

Uranium Enrichment.

Gaining agreement for restricting enrichment is 

an even more difficult proposition, as enrichment 

is a necessary part of the nuclear fuel cycle. It is really centrifuge enrichment that is the main concern, 

rather than enrichment per se, because it lends itself 

to small-scale operation, and so is relatively accessible 

for many countries. 

A number of countries already have enrichment 

facilities or development programs.33 An aura has 

developed around enrichment that goes beyond any 

economic rationale, one that ultimately relates to the 

connection with nuclear weapons. That is not necessarily what the operators have in mind, but we can be 

sure they are aware of the weapons potential, and, at 

minimum, the political leverage this provides. 

One way or another, to gain broad agreement on 

limiting access to this technology, there would have to 

be a reasonably common rule for all (the “inalienable 

right” phrase in Article IV of the NPT is immediately 

followed by the words “without discrimination”). 

To grasp the magnitude of the change that would be 

required from the current ad hoc approach, consider 

that to be consistent, the effort to restrict Iran’s enrich-
474

ment program would have to be matched by an effort 

to restrict Brazil’s roughly comparable program. But 

that is part of what it would take to restrict enrichment activities to a small number of countries in order 

for nuclear power to operate with a reasonable safety 

margin from the point of view of proliferation. The 

technology has spread beyond the point where grandfathering the existing enrichment programs is a workable solution. That would be a recipe for a creeping 

retreat to an increasingly unstable state of affairs—a 

“Perils of Pauline” world in which many countries 

are a short step from nuclear weapons, one they could 

likely take before their neighbors or the international 

community could react.

Coming up with a satisfactory answer on how to 

limit access to this technology is a vexing problem. 

One possible approach would be to assess a safeguards fee to compensate for the very considerable 

IAEA effort involved in monitoring centrifuge facilities. If, as seems likely, the monitoring effort involved 

would not be much less for smaller plants, a large fee 

would discourage small operations and thus restrict 

the number. 

3. Expand Inspections. 

The IAEA’s inspections, when first instituted, were 

infrequent and specifically limited to listed facilities, 

and the inspectors approached their tasks wearing 

blinders. The IAEA inspection system is a very different one today, especially after the upgrades that followed the first Gulf War, which revealed the ineffectiveness of the original system. Nevertheless, there are 

intrinsic limitations on what can be achieved through 

inspections alone.34 The most recent addition, the so-
475

called Additional Protocol (AP), further expands the 

agency’s inspection rights.35 It marks an important advance. But the AP remains voluntary, and a number 

of countries have yet to accept it. Also, to encourage 

acceptance of this protocol, the IAEA agreed to reduce 

the frequency of routine inspections for countries that 

accepted the AP, so that, for example, the inspection 

goal for reactor spent fuel inspections would be once 

a year instead of once a quarter.

To be effective, the IAEA’s inspection system has 

not only to provide timely assessments at known facilities within a country, but also to be able to rule out 

the existence of clandestine facilities.36 The reason for 

concern about clandestine facilities is that reprocessing 

and centrifuge enrichment lend themselves to smallscale operation. Such facilities may be insignificant 

in commercial terms, but they can be very significant 

in military terms. This means, for example, that the 

commonly-held view that light water reactors (LWRs) 

by themselves are a safe proposition (in terms of proliferation) is correct only if we can rule out clandestine 

reprocessing, not only contemporaneously, but also in 

the future.37

Ironically, this was pointed out in 1977 by an Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory group that opposed antiproliferation restrictions. Specifically, they wanted to 

show that a country that wished to produce plutonium 

for bombs could easily get around a ban on commercial reprocessing. To drive the point home, the Oak 

Ridge team made public a design for a small reprocessing plant that a country with a minimal industrial 

base could build quickly and secretly to obtain enough 

plutonium for dozens of bombs.38 The memorandum describing the design included equipment lists, 

process sheets, and drawings. 
476

The Oak Ridge experts said that most equipment 

would be available from local industries such as wineries or dairies or could be fabricated in a small shop. 

The described “quick and dirty” plant is not something anyone can put together in a garage. But it is entirely credible that experienced reprocessing experts 

could do it. 

Although this was not the objective of the Oak 

Ridge exercise, it also put in doubt the assumed benign character of nuclear power plants in the absence 

of commercial reprocessing. If a country with LWRs 

but no commercial reprocessing could quickly build 

a small “quick and dirty” plant to obtain enough plutonium for bombs, then power reactors in the wrong 

places could be much more dangerous propositions 

than previously thought. 

Especially to deal with the problem of clandestine 

plants, two former IAEA Deputy Directors General 

have urged that the IAEA make greater use of “special inspection” rights it already has under the comprehensive NPT safeguards agreements. For historical and bureaucratic reasons, the threshold within the 

Agency for invoking such inspections rights is exceedingly high. The Agency’s right to conduct a special 

inspection has only been invoked once in adversarial 

circumstances (North Korea in 1993).39

Finally, a problem that is not immediate but is 

bound to arise in the future concerns the NPT safeguards exclusion for materials used in “nonprohibited military applications,” which principally means 

naval reactor fuel. This is a potential gaping loophole 

that, at a minimum, needs to be narrowed, and perhaps eliminated altogether—just as “peaceful nuclear 

explosives” were, in effect, read out of the NPT.
477

4. Ensure Enforcement. 

In the initial years of the NPT, there was an implicit assumption that each of the two Cold War blocs 

would police its sphere. The United States did that, for 

example, in the mid-1970s, when it forced Taiwan and 

South Korea to dismantle their clandestine nuclear 

weapons efforts. But now the NPT needs an established enforcement mechanism to deal with treaty violation in a predictable way. At present, each violation 

calls for improvization by the powerful states. While 

the logic of “safeguards” over plutonium and HEU 

is that the international system will react to evidence 

of violations rapidly, the natural response time of the 

international system is more often measured in years. 

It is vital that future would-be bomb makers be 

disabused of any notion that they could evade tough 

international sanctions. What is needed—as Pierre 

Goldschmidt, former IAEA Deputy Director General 

for Safeguards, recommended—is a country-neutral, 

reasonably predictable, more-or-less automatic sanction regime that puts all countries on notice in advance of NPT violation, including violations of any 

IAEA safeguards agreements.40 Improving the ability 

to detect possible violations will not deter violators 

if they know that little will be done quickly enough 

to stop their bomb making. A permanent secretariat attached to the treaty would help make such a 

process work.

The record of U.S.-led ad hoc enforcement is decidedly mixed. The trouble is that political considerations 

inevitably intrude: sometimes to deflect U.S. interest 

from pursuing enforcement of nuclear agreements, 

sometimes even to look the other way.
478

President Obama had this to say about enforcement in his 2009 Prague, Czech Republic, speech: 

We need real and immediate consequences for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the 

treaty without cause. . . . We must go forward with no 

illusions. Some countries will break the rules. That’s 

why we need a structure in place that ensures when 

any nation does, they will face consequences.

More recently, the President’s NPT ambassador 

stated: 

There is no greater threat to the integrity and vitality 

of the treaty than the unresolved cases of noncompliance. Because of the corrosive effect of noncompliance 

on international confidence in the NPT, we must redouble our efforts to encourage full compliance with 

treaty obligations.41

The present situation in which a violator does not, 

by any means, face immediate sanction significantly 

undercuts the disincentives to violations. What would 

actually happen in any particular instance would depend on who were the violator’s friends and enemies, 

and what else is going on to distract the world from 

the violation. 

Iran has been sanctioned (in a long, drawn out 

process) not because it has been charged with specific 

NPT treaty violations, but rather because it is seen as 

a potential violator of IAEA safeguards requirements 

that threatens the interests of other powerful states, 

mainly Israel and the United States. By contrast, 

North Korea’s flagrant 1992 violation in refusing required IAEA inspections evoked an entirely different 

response, mainly because the United States feared a 
479

North Korean withdrawal from the NPT would undermine the then-upcoming 1995 NPT review conference. Investigation of its violation was postponed, 

and, in return for not operating its small indigenous 

plutonium production reactors, North Korea was offered two large LWRs worth about $5 billion. The deal 

eventually broke down, but the precedent remains 

that, in the right circumstances, blackmail can work. 

It also undermines worldwide respect for the NPT 

when enforcement is farmed out to a nonmember, as 

was the case when the United States acquiesced in Israel’s 2007 bombing of Syria’s clandestine reactor, instead of bringing Syria’s violation before the IAEA.42

The point applies as well to cooperation with Israel in 

sabotaging Iran’s nuclear program.

One cannot talk about NPT enforcement today 

without addressing the U.S. reaction to the February 

12, 2013, North Korean nuclear test. As observed earlier, Obama’s statement, calling for “swift and credible” action in response to violation of United Nations 

(UN) Security Council resolutions, did not mention 

the NPT.43 It leaves the impression the government 

regards the NPT as of marginal significance.

5. Bring Nonmembers into the NPT Process. 

The most difficult NPT-related issue concerns what 

to do about the three NPT holdouts—India, Israel, and 

Pakistan—and the member-in-violation, North Korea. 

Under the NPT, there are only two classes of countries: the five nuclear weapon states, and nonweapons 

states, which includes the three holdouts.44 Although 

discriminatory, the original intent of only recognizing 

five nuclear states was to make sure that number did 

not grow larger. To now create a new class of members, in addition to these five, that would have nucle-
480

ar weapons would therefore undermine the treaty’s 

original intent. 

However implausible or even impossible it may 

now seem, it is probable that the only way that all 

states can be brought under the NPT system is if all 

reduce their nuclear weapons to zero. All nuclear 

weapons states have to participate in weapons reductions. The United States and Russia have made substantial reductions, but the continuation of that process is predicated on all nuclear states participating in 

further weapons reductions. Without such reductions, 

it does not seem likely that the non-nuclear NPT members would agree to necessary restrictive measures on 

the use of nuclear energy. Ultimately, the weapons 

reduction will have to include India, Israel, and Pakistan, and, of course, North Korea. 

We would universalize the treaty—that is, regard 

it as applicable to all states, including the three holdouts, which would then be in noncompliance.45 Of 

course, as a legal matter, you cannot force a country to 

join a treaty. But as a practical matter, if the 190 NPT 

members so decided, they could treat the three holdouts, and, of course, North Korea, as countries in noncompliance, with the appropriate disadvantages that 

would follow from that decision. 

To take a positive view, if these countries agreed to 

join in the weapons reductions process under adequate 

monitoring, and so could be considered on their way 

toward compliance, any adverse treatment as a consequence of their noncompliance could be moderated. 

We are under no illusions about the current practicability of this proposal. But we are also convinced that 

it is an essential element of an effective system to bar 

proliferation.It simply makes no sense to accept President Obama’s goal of zero nuclear weapons but, at the 
481

same time, dismiss any notion of applying that goal to 

India, Israel, and Pakistan. As Obama said in Prague: 

“This goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not 

in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence.” 

Yet he set a goal. In the same way, we are trying to set 

a goal for nonproliferation. 

WHAT NOW?

To sum up, it is our view that for a nonproliferation 

system that is reasonably able to cope with the kind 

of nuclear expansion implicit in U.S. nuclear energy 

policy, there need to be firm measures: (1) to prevent 

NPT withdrawals, (2) to restrict access to nuclear explosive materials, (3) to ensure adequate IAEA inspections, (4) to guarantee enforcement, and (5) to deal 

with NPT holdouts. We obviously are nowhere close 

to this standard, and, in fact, NPT members presently 

resist change in the direction of meeting it.

The official U.S. response to this unsatisfactory 

state of affairs has been to focus on incremental measures, ones on which some progress could be made 

through relatively low-level negotiations.46 Even the 

nonproliferation academics and nongovernmental 

organization analysts reach no further, and in fact 

dismiss anything beyond this incremental approach 

as unrealistic or positively harmful. Not surprisingly, 

the nuclear power community regards any suggestion 

to go beyond the working-at-the-margins approach 

as dangerous, if not tantamount to “anti-nuclear,” 

even when it comes to reining in enrichment and 

reprocessing.47

Along this line of thinking, to gain the necessary 

bona fides for tightening antiproliferation protection, 

the United States needs to encourage worldwide nu-
482

clear expansion and to involve itself heavily in selling 

nuclear technology. There is in this, of course, more 

than a touch of self-interest, as there has always been 

in such advice going back to Atoms for Peace. Historically, nuclear sales have invariably come before 

protection against their misuse. 

To keep active on nonproliferation and yet avoid 

roiling the diplomatic waters, diplomats and academics spend a great deal of time discussing inoffensive—

and ineffectual—schemes, such as fuel banks and multinational fuel centers.48 Fuel banks, seemingly simple 

and catchy, so beloved by diplomats, are a nonsolution to a nonproblem. 

There is a competitive international fuel market, 

and no country, other than one obviously bent on 

weapons, has to worry about getting fuel. In fact, 

no country, including one obviously seeking weapons, has had to shut reactors because it was denied 

nuclear fuel. 

As to banking fuel, it is utterly impractical to store 

fuel assemblies for individual reactors as these vary 

significantly in their technical specifications. One 

could bank low enriched uranium (LEU), but even 

that poses problems, as the reactors’ fuel enrichment 

levels vary. In any case, a country could much more 

easily bank its own LEU. 

Multinational facilities would make some sense if 

they were coupled with a requirement for participants 

to forego indigenous fuel cycle facilities. But the usual 

arguments for the multinational projects have been 

that they would reduce the participants’ incentives to 

pursue their own, which is not the same thing.49

Another escape from dealing with proliferation is 

to embrace nuclear terrorism (as opposed to weapons acquisition by states) as the immediate primary 

problem, which is convenient because there is not a 
483

lot of push back when it comes to opposing nuclear 

terrorism.50

The truth is that the incremental, least-commondenominator approach is never going to get us to 

where we need to be, and serious people responsible 

for security know it. To cope with proliferation hazards in the face of weak international controls over 

nuclear programs, the world seems to be slipping—

witness the case of Iran—into relying on greatly increased national intelligence operations backed up in 

the last instance by bombing and even assassinations. 

It is difficult to imagine that this is a workable solution 

for the long term. 

Nor is it workable to continue in the mode where 

nonproliferation is seen as an American obsession, and 

the role of the diplomats in the great majority of countries is to extract what they can from the United States 

for each incremental concession. They have to see it 

as their problem, too. To begin the process of change 

to a sounder long-term approach, the United States, 

the major nuclear countries, and the IAEA need to begin by speaking clearly about the risks of proliferation 

that attach to a major expansion of nuclear power use 

and what it takes to check them.George Orwell taught 

us that euphemisms and bureaucratic boilerplate can 

corrupt, and that they are used to make it easier to 

defend what otherwise cannot be defended in public. 

We have to stop pretending that reprocessing and 

enrichment facilities can be “safeguarded” by international inspections and that they are only a problem if 

they are located in countries currently on the “rogue” 

list. We also have to end the charade that protection 

will come from multinational facilities, or fuel banks, 

or futuristic reprocessing schemes. We have to agree 

to abide by common standards. Finally, we have to 
484

stop downplaying the NPT by describing it as standing on “three pillars,” of which nonproliferation is 

only one pillar. The results might surprise us. There 

is a lot of persuasive power in sensible thought expressed clearly.

We conclude on this optimistic note even while 

recognizing that countries are increasingly finding 

pretexts for narrowing the anti-proliferation safety 

margins, and major states, like the United States, are 

finding rationalizations for yielding to friendly states. 

For this chapter, our working assumption is that this 

process has not gone so far that it cannot be reversed. 

To be sure, it would require the President to make doing so and engaging other leaders a top priority, as 

then-President Eisenhower did in launching Atoms 

for Peace. 

We do not, however, discount the possibility that 

our critics are right in saying that there is no longer 

any prospect for gaining the level of proliferation 

protection we outlined here, so there is no realistic 

prospect of closing the policy gap between nuclear 

advocacy and anti-proliferation protection. In that 

case, the answer is not, as they say, to fall in with the 

nuclear crowd in the hope of merely making minor 

adjustments in its rules—but to think about closing 

the policy gap from the other end.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 16

1. For an example from the nuclear industry, see Steven Kidd, 

“Nuclear Proliferation Risk—Is It Vastly Overrated?” Nuclear Engineering International, July 23, 2010, available from www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?storyCode=2056931. Mr. Kidd argues that: 

It is likely that more countries will foolishly choose to acquire nuclear weapons. If they are really determined to 
485

do so, there is little really that the world can do to prevent 

them—the main effort has to be in dissuading them from 

this course of action. How many countries will have nuclear 

weapons by 2030 is hard to say, but there could well be a 

total of 15 by then.

Mr. Kidd then cites the work of Professor John Mueller who argues that this increase, in itself, will neither prevent nor cause 

wars, but will impose “substantial costs on the countries concerned.” Kidd works for the World Nuclear Association, and 

Mueller is a professor of international relations at Ohio State 

University. 

2. For more on these points, see the thinking of the Chairman 

of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, François Heisbourg, “How Bad Would the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons 

Be?” Chap. 2 in this volume.

3. See Henry Kissinger, “Foreword,” Nuclear Proliferation: Risk 

and Responsibility, Trilateral Commission, 2006, available from 

www.scribd.com/doc/30082942/60-Nuclear-Proliferation-Risk-andResponsibility-2006.

4. See, e.g., Kidd; and “Assessing the Proliferation Risks of Civilian Nuclear Programs,” Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: 

In the Shadow of Iran, London, UK: International Institute for International Studies (IISS), 2008, pp. 141-50, available from www.iiss.

org/en/publications/strategic%20dossiers/issues/nuclear-programmesin-the-middle-east--in-the-shadow-of-iran-5993.

5. See Nuclear Proliferation: Risk and Responsibility.

6. See Dwight Eisenhower, “Atoms for Peace Speech before UN 

General Assembly,” New York, December 8, 1953, available from 

www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/atoms_

for_peace/Binder13.pdf.

7. Economics and safety are tied together. The “regulatory 

costs” that critics of the regulatory systems complain about are 

mainly the costs of providing adequate safety. There is no getting 

around the fact that nuclear power is intrinsically dangerous and 

that it takes great care in design, construction, and operation to 
486

keep it within safe bounds, all of which are expensive. The safety 

of light water reactors (LWRs) is difficult to assess, as the technology is especially complex. The oxide fuel melts in hours if cooling 

stops. In the end, it may not prove to be the best power reactor 

choice. A struggle is now underway in Japan, with the newly empowered safety regulators imposing conditions that the industry 

claims will make it too expensive to restart Japan’s reactors. See 

e.g., www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/02/02/national/nra-safety-rulesmay-keep-reactors-offline-for-years/#.UQ7OA0qjdY4. As to alternatives to current designs, the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) and 

industry are touting small modular reactors, basically ordinary 

reactors in smaller sizes. If they are small enough, their nuclear 

systems could be assembled in a factory—hence modular. Being 

smaller, SMRs would cost less to build than larger cousins but 

are unlikely to produce electricity that would cost less per kilowatt. You also have to wonder if smaller reactors are such a good 

idea, why they were not proposed earlier. Gaining economies of 

scale through factory construction would only work if very large 

numbers were sold, for which there is little prospect. There are 

efforts to breathe life into other formerly rejected designs such 

as the Integrated Fast Reactor, but they are unlikely to get off the 

ground. What is needed for safety is a reactor whose fuel will not 

melt in an accident. To assure significant proliferation resistance 

and economic competitiveness, meeting other additional, yet-tobe-achieved cost and technical attributes would also be desirable. 

8. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama at Hankuk University,” Seoul, Republic of Korea, March 12, 2012,” available from www.whitehouse.gov/

the-press-office/2012/03/26/remarks-president-obama-hankuk-university. Meanwhile, his former energy secretary, Steven Chu, consistently championed this argument in support of loan guarantees 

for nuclear power plant construction. Chu wrote on his personal 

Facebook page: “If we want to make a serious dent in carbon dioxide emissions -- not to mention having cleaner air and cleaner 

water -- then nuclear power has to be on the table.” See Dr. Chu’s 

Facebook entry, available from www.facebook.com/notes/steven-chu/

why-we-need-more-nuclear-power/336162546856.

9. Earlier in President Obama’s 2009 Prague speech, he said: 

“We must harness the power of nuclear energy on behalf of our 

efforts to combat climate change, and to advance peace oppor-
487

tunity for all people.” Meanwhile, his remarks at Hankuk University emphasized “a renewed commitment to harnessing the 

power of the atom not for war, but for peaceful purposes.” President Obama also praised the Koreans for showing “the progress 

and prosperity that can be achieved when nations embrace peaceful nuclear energy,” thus glorifying the role of nuclear power in 

promoting economic development. See The White House, Office 

of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama,” Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, available from 

www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-BarackObama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.

10. See Yukiya Amano, “Introductory Statement to Board 

of Governors,” Vienna, Austria, September 10, 2012, available 

from www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2012/amsp2012n011.html. 

At this gathering, Director General Amano noted that: 

it remains clear from the Agency’s latest projections that 

nuclear power will remain an important option for many 

countries, despite the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Our 

new low projection is for nuclear power capacity to grow 

by nearly 25 percent from current levels to 456 gigawatts by 

2030. Our high projection is 740 gigawatts, which is twice 

current levels.

11. See “President Obama’s Second Inaugural Address (Transcript), The Washington Post, January 21, 2013, available at articles.

washingtonpost.com/2013-01-21/politics/36473487_1_presidentobama-vice-president-biden-free-market.

12. See, e.g., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), The 

Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisplinary MIT Study, Cambridge, 

MA: MIT Press, 2009, available from web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/

nuclearpower-full.pdf. The study analyzes a future of 1,000-Gwe 

of nuclear power in 2050 on grounds that “such a deployment 

would avoid . . . about 25% of the increment in carbon emissions 

otherwise expected in a business-as-usual scenario.” For additional analysis, see Sharon Squassoni, “The Reality of Nuclear 

Expansion,” testimony given before The House Select Committee for Energy Independence and Global Warming, Washington, 

DC, March 12, 2008, available from carnegieendowment.org/files/

squassoni_testimony_20080312.pdf.
488

13. Duke Energy’s announced closing of its Crystal River nuclear power plant in view of cheaper gas power is a straw in the 

wind not only for future U.S. plants, but also for existing ones. 

Modern “fracking” extraction methods for natural gas also pose 

environmental problems that have to be balanced against the advantages of using this fuel, but the point is that we have a choice and 

are not locked into depending on nuclear power. On these points, 

see “Exelon Cuts Nuclear Expansion Projects Amid Low Natgas 

Prices,” Reuters, February 7, 2013, available from www.reuters.

com/article/idUSL1N0B76ZW20130207?irpc=932; “Duke Energy

to Close Troubled Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant,” Associated 

Press, February 5, 2013, available from www.wtsp.com/news/topstories/article/296225/250/Crystal-River-nuke-plant-to-close; and Rebecca Smith, “Can Gas Undo Nuclear Power?” Wall Street Journal, 

January 29, 2013, available from online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424

127887323644904578272111885235812.html.

14. For an excellent review of the main points of contention 

within the NPT regime and the issues that have made reform so 

difficult, see Steven E. Miller, Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform 

& the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, Cambridge, MA: American 

Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2012, available from www.amacad.

org/pdfs/nonproliferation.pdf.

15. At the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review 

Conference, U.S. Ambassador Susan F. Burk, the Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation, stated: 

It is imperative, therefore, that all NPT Parties recommit 

themselves to ensuring the health and vitality of this essential international agreement by advancing each of the 

Treaty’s three pillars together. The Treaty and the regime cannot thrive unless each pillar thrives. All Parties must accept responsibility for taking appropriate steps to contribute to the 

achievement of each of the Treaty’s fundamental objectives, 

whether collectively or individually. (Emphasis added.) 

See Statement by Ambassador Susan F. Burk, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Department 

of State, General Debate, First Sess. of the Preparatory Committee, as prepared on April 30, 2012, available from vienna.usmission.

gov/43014.html. The problem here is one of emphasis. The NPT, 
489

of course, includes these other elements, which were added as 

conditions for the acceptance of the first, but the treaty is fundamentally about nonproliferation. The IAEA goes even further in 

promoting the notion that nonproliferation is not the key goal of 

the NPT. Vilmos Cserveny, Assistant Director General for External Relations and Policy Coordination, said at the NPT Preparatory Committee, New York, May 4, 2009: “The NPT consists of 

three equally important pillars—nuclear non-proliferation; peaceful nuclear cooperation; and nuclear disarmament—and the 

premise that progress in any one pillar strengthens the integrity 

of the whole.” (Emphasis added.) He went on to say the IAEA’s 

work is based on these three pillars. See IAEA, “Road to Disarmament, IAEA Safeguards: A Fundamental Pillar of the NPT Regime,” excerpt from Vilmost Cserveny’s statement at the General 

Debate of the NPT Preparatory Committee, New York, May 4, 

2009, available from www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/

Bull511/51103570609.html.

16. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by President Obama on the 40th Anniversary of the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty,” March 5, 2010, available from www.

whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-obama-40th-anniversary-nuclear-nonproliferation-treaty.

17. An arguable exception is President Ford’s 1976 nuclear policy statement in which he proposed reliance on a “once-through” 

fuel cycle, thus eliminating reliance on plutonium until there was 

adequate international control to cope with proliferation risks. At 

that time, misuse of plutonium was seen as the main proliferation 

worry. HEU was not yet a principal concern. Unfortunately, the international nuclear community, with a heavy assist from our own 

nuclear bureaucracy, rejected this once-through standard because 

it seemed to bar the way to the Holy Grail of nuclear power—the 

plutonium-fueled fast breeder. In practice, commercial reprocessing required enormous subsidies. Although the United States has 

the right to control the reprocessing of nuclear fuel covered by 

agreements for cooperation (except with Euratom), it has since 

given blanket approval to Japan and, more recently, India. On the 

occasion of signing the 2006 U.S.-India nuclear agreement, President George W. Bush said, “You can advocate nuclear power, in 

order to take the pressure off of our own economy, for example, 

without advocating technological development of reprocessing,
490

 . . .” See U.S. Department of State Archive, “Remarks by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India,” New 

Delhi, India, March 2, 2006, available from 2001-2009.state.gov/p/

sca/rls/rm/2006/62426.htm. The issue of reprocessing approvals is 

now coming to a head in the renegotiation of the nuclear cooperation agreement with South Korea. The Koreans, of course, want 

to be treated on a par with the Japanese, and it will be difficult to 

refuse them. This is the natural consequence of a compartmentalized approach to proliferation policy as a sequence of special 

cases, and not looking ahead at the obvious consequences. We 

can only climb back up this slippery slope by applying rules in a 

consistent and fair manner.

18. See IAEA, The Structure And Content Of Agreements Between The Agency And States Required In Connection With The Treaty 

On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA INFCIRC/153, 

par. 26, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, available from www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf: “The Agreement 

should provide for it to remain in force as long as the State is party 

to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”

19. See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, 

“Third P-5 conference: Implementing the NPT,” a joint statement 

issued by China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United 

States of America, June 27-29, 2012, Washington, DC, available 

from www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/06/194292.htm. This statement 

included the following: 

As a further follow-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 

the P5 shared their views on how to discourage abuse of the 

NPT withdrawal provision (Article X), and how to respond 

to notifications made consistent with the provisions of that 

article. The discussion included modalities under which 

NPT States Party could respond collectively and individually to a notification of withdrawal, including through arrangements regarding the disposition of equipment and 

materials acquired or derived under safeguards during NPT 

membership. The P5 agreed that states remain responsible 

under international law for violations of the Treaty committed prior to withdrawal.

 It would have been more supportive of the NPT if the statement 

said such withdrawal while in violation was invalid.
491

20. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 

“Statement by the President on North Korean Announcement of Nuclear Test,” February 12, 2013, available from

translations.state.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/02/20130212142430.

html#ixzz2L0EWdcwt.

21. See, e.g., Steve Herman, “Rising Voices in S. Korea, Japan 

Advocate Nuclear Weapons,” Voice of America, February 15, 2013, 

available from www.voanews.com/content/rising-voices-in-southkorea-japan-advocate-nuclear-weapons/1604309.html; and Howard 

LaFranchi, “N. Korea Nuclear Test: Will It Spoil Obama’s Disarmament Plans?” The Christian Science Monitor, February 15, 2013, 

available from www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2013/0215/N.-Korea-nuclear-test-Will-it-spoil-Obama-s-disarmament-plans.

22. In the 1950s and 1960s, there were still a good many power 

reactors using natural uranium fuel. Enrichment was an essential 

part of the fuel cycle for programs based on U.S.-type LWRs, both 

pressurized water reactors which were gaining in popularity. The 

United States withheld enrichment data to protect the effective 

enrichment monopoly it had in the West because of the huge capacity it had built up to supply HEU for weapons. At the same 

time the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) permitted the 

export of research reactors fueled with HEU and large quantities 

of HEU to fuel them. Until the late-1960s, the AEC did not even 

bother to verify the amounts shipped abroad by private firms. Up 

to 1996, the United States exported over 25 tons of HEU. On this 

point, see the Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Civilian HEU: United 

States” available from www.nti.org/analysis/articles/civilian-heuunited-states.

23. Aside from military explosive and naval propulsion applications, HEU fuel is used principally in research reactors. These 

can be fueled with lower enrichment fuels, albeit with some diminution in performance at higher power reactors. On the whole, 

the operators of these reactors, including those at universities, 

have dragged their feet about converting to lower enrichment 

fuel. Two prominent examples are the research reactors at MIT 

and Munich Technical University, which, despite it being U.S. 

and German government policy to convert such reactors, have 

managed to wrest delay after delay. Overall, about 50 research 
492

reactors around the world have converted to lower enrichment 

fuel as a result of three decades of international effort (started at 

the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) to reduce HEU use, but 

this has resulted in only about a one-quarter reduction in annual 

HEU use by research reactors, which previously was about a ton 

per year. See Ole Reistad and Styrkaar Hustveit, “HEU Fuel Cycle 

Inventories and Progress On Global Minimization,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, July, 2008, pp. 265-287. Reducing 

civilian HEU use to zero has got to be an important component of 

any nonproliferation policy.

24. INFCIRC/153, para. 28: “. . . the objective of safeguards is 

the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture 

of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for 

purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk 

of early detection.”

25. See DoE, Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Strategic Plan, 

January 2007 (Italics in original), pp. 3-10, available from www.fas.

org/programs/ssp/_docs/GNEPStratPlanJan07.pdf. It is often forgotten, even by the DoE, that the sophisticated reprocessing schemes 

proposed under GNEP—schemes that, in principle, always kept 

plutonium mixed with other materials—were intended as antiterrorism rather than antiproliferation protection. The program’s 

strategic plan, however, acknowledged that there was no way to 

make reprocessing proliferation-proof.

26. Even the reprocessing vendors do not make a resource 

case for plutonium. Mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for LWRs costs several times what uranium fuel costs. In fact, recycling in LWRs 

never made any economic sense. It has been forgotten that the 

whole notion of thermal recycle was invented in the 1970s because the AEC’s fast breeder reactor project was falling behind, 

and the agency needed a rationale for keeping its reprocessing 

efforts going “until the breeder caught up.” It was never expected 

to be economic. By the time the breeder project collapsed, MOX 

acquired its own support group and took on a life of its own, leaping from one rationale to another.

27. At the start of nuclear power programs, it was generally 

believed that as uranium was scarce, LWRs would be a transition-
493

al generation that produced enough plutonium to fuel the ultimate in nuclear power plants, the fast breeders (so-called because 

they used fast neutrons and produced more plutonium in a surrounding uranium “blanket” than they consumed in the core). In 

practice, prototype fast breeders turned out to have problems and 

were too expensive to pursue. The Bush administration tried to 

revive the concept in the form of fast “burners,” plutonium-fueled 

reactors without the surrounding blanket. This did not make any 

sense, either.

28. DoE made an agreement with Russia for each country to 

recycle 34 tons of “surplus” weapons plutonium. It has become 

a boondoggle. DoE contractor Shaw Areva MOX Services is constructing a mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility at DoE’s Savannah 

River Site in South Carolina, in principle to use weapons plutonium to produce power reactor fuel that, once heavily irradiated 

in a commercial power reactor, would contain plutonium that 

was less useful for weapons. It looks as if DoE’s real purpose is 

to use the rubric of arms control to get plutonium recycle underway. The plant is one of the largest construction projects in the 

southeastern United States. The out-of-control costs are said to 

have multiplied to $7 billion. The plant has no customers lined up 

for the MOX fuel it is supposed to produce, which has attracted 

the attention of federal budget cutters but does not seem to have 

diminished the project’s appeal for DoE. See Sammy Fretwell, 

“Critics Fear $7 Billion SRS Boondoggle” The State, January 27, 

2013, available from www.thestate.com/2013/01/27/2606562/criticsfear-7-billion-srs-boondoggle.html#.URBjPUqjdY4. See also “Budget 

Cutters Eye Nuclear Reprocessing Plant” Roll Call, February 5, 

2013, available from www.taxpayer.net/media-center/article/budgetcutters-eye-nuclear-reprocessing-plant: 

It isn’t expected to be completed by its 2016 target date, 

and the Department of Energy has found little interest 

from commercial power plant operators in buying the 

fuel, which would require costly reactor modifications 

. . . [Former Rep. David L.] Hobson, [R-Ohio] described 

the project as a jobs program for South Carolina. In addition to the 2,600 employees now working on it, the 

completed facility will require permanent workers to 

operate it for up to two decades. 
494

29. See Gerald Ford, “Statement on Nuclear Policy,” October 28, 1976, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.

php?pid=6561: “I have concluded that the reprocessing and recycling of plutonium should not proceed unless there is sound 

reason to conclude that the world community can effectively 

overcome the associated risks of proliferation.” There is also a 

precedent for banning an entire technology in the context of the 

NPT—so-called peaceful nuclear explosives were read out of the 

NPT even though there is an entire NPT article (Article V) devoted to them. On this later point, see Robert Zarate, “The NPT, 

IAEA Safeguards and Peaceful Nuclear Energy: An ‘Inalienable 

Right’ but Precisely to What?” Henry Sokolski, ed., Falling Behind: 

International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008, pp. 252-255, available from www.npolicy.org/userfiles/image/Peaceful%20Nuclear%20

Energy,%20an%20Inalienable%20Right%20to%20What_pdf.pdf.

30. For a discussion on the program’s technical flaws see “A 

Minority Opinion of Gilinsky and Macfarlane,” Review of DoE’s 

Nuclear Energy Research and Development Program, Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2008, available from www.nap.

edu/openbook.php?record_id=11998&page=73.

31. See President Obama’s remarks at Hankuk University, 

March 26, 2012. DoE undoubtedly inserted the seemingly innocuous words into the speech. To the nuclear bureaucracies around 

the world, they spell plutonium recycle.

32. See, e.g., Elaine Grossman, “U.S. May Land Key Asian 

Nuclear Trade Deals in 2013,” Global Security Newswire, January 

11, 2013, available at www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-could-secure-keyasian-nuclear-trade-deals-2013; “Obama Team Reveals Nuclear 

Trade, Nonproliferation Decision on Capitol Hill,” Global Security 

Newswire, January 11, 2012, available from www.nti.org/gsn/article/

obama-team-reveals-nuclear-trade-nonproliferation-decision-capitolhill; and “U.S. Envoy takes Issue with Nonproliferation Lingo for 

Nuclear Trade Pacts,” Global Security Newswire, August 10, 2012, 

available from www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-envoy-takes-issue-nonproliferation-lingo-nuclear-trade-pacts.
495

33. Wikipedia lists Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan, the Netherlands, North Korea, Pakistan, the 

UK, and the United States in the first category, and South Africa 

and Australia (and probably Israel) in the second. See “Enriched 

uranium,” Wikipedia, available from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enriched_uranium.

34. It is useful to keep in mind the verdict of the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal Report: “A system of inspection superimposed on 

an otherwise uncontrolled exploitation of atomic energy by national 

governments will not be an adequate safeguard. . . . If nations 

or their citizens carry on intrinsically dangerous [nuclear] activities it seems to us that the chances for safeguarding the future 

are hopeless.” In other words, the allowed activities have got to 

be restricted to those that can be safeguarded, in the dictionary 

sense, by inspection. See Report on International Control of Atomic 

Energy, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 

16, 1946, pp. 21-22, available from www.learnworld.com/ZNW/LWText.Acheson-Lilienthal.html.

35. See Model Protocol Additional to The Agreement(s) Between 

State(s) And The International Atomic Energy Agency For The Application Of Safeguards, INFCIRC/540, Vienna, Austria: IAEA, 1997, 

available from www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/

infcirc540c.pdf.

36. Clandestine facilities are an obvious concern in North Korea and Iran. Iran failed to notify the IAEA of a planned enrichment facility, as it had promised to do in 2003. It later retreated 

from this promise. Whether this amounts to a violation of Iran’s 

obligations or a deficiency in the IAEA system depends on legal 

issues that remain unclear. The IAEA has not released relevant 

documents and correspondence. See Board of Governors of the 

IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant 

Provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,GOV/2012/50, available from www.iaea.org/

Publications/Documents/Board/2012/gov2012-50.pdf.

37. For a detailed analysis of this proposition, see Victor Gilinsky, Harmond Hubbard, and Marvin Miller, A Fresh Examination 

of the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors, Washington, DC: 

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2008, available from 
496

www.npolicy.org/article_file/A_Fresh_Examination_of_the_Proliferation_Resistance_of_Light_Water_Reactors.pdf. It is worth keeping in 

mind that many states’ view of the fuel cycle is still tied to the use 

of LWRs with oxide fuel. It is not at all clear—for both safety and 

proliferation reasons and perhaps economic reasons, as well—

that this is best way to extract nuclear energy. Other new types of 

reactors with different fuels, especially fuels that do not melt as 

easily, may make moot many of the issues that concern us today, 

possibly including reprocessing.

38. See D. L. Ferguson to F. L Culler, “Simple Quick Reprocessing Plant,” Inter-Laboratory Correspondence, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, August 30, 1977, available from www.npolicy.

org/article_file/Simple_Quick_Processing_Plant_Culler.pdf.

39. North Korea refused to allow it. In 1992, Romania invited 

a special inspection. See John Carlson and Russell Leslie, “Special Inspections Revisited,” paper presented at INMM 2005 Symposium, Phoenix, AZ, July 2005, available from www.dfat.gov.au/

asno/publications/inmm2005_special_inspections.pdf: 

[I]t is obvious that special inspections cannot become regular

occurrences, and cannot substitute for complementary access, it can be questioned whether the very high threshold 

assumed in the 1992 board deliberations is consistent with 

contemporary expectations for the safeguards system and 

for the level of cooperation that states extend to the agency.

40. See Pierre Goldschmidt, “Looking beyond Iran and North 

Korea for Safeguarding the Foundations of Nuclear Nonproliferation,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 3, 2011, available from carnegieendowment.

org/2011/11/03/looking-beyond-iran-and-north-korea-for-safeguarding-foundations-of-nuclear-nonproliferation/8ktn.

41. See U.S. Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna, Austria, “Statement by Ambassador Susan F. Burk, Special 

Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation, 

Department of State, General Debate, First Session of the Preparatory Committee , as prepared, April 30, 2012,” available from 

vienna.usmission.gov/43014.html.
497

42. See Elliott Abrams, “Bombing the Syrian Reactor: the 

Untold Story,” Commentary, February 2013, available from www.

commentarymagazine.com/article/bombing-the-syrian-reactor-theuntold-story. In Abrams’s account, President Bush was initially inclined to bring the case before the IAEA but was persuaded to let 

the Israelis bomb the reactor.

43. See President Obama’s statement on the North Korean 

nuclear test, February 12, 2013.

44. There is no possibility under the NPT to expand the number of weapons states “For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear 

weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 

1967.” NPT, Article X.

45. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry, in reaction to the February 

12 North Korean explosion, emphasized the necessity of the “internationalization” of the NPT. See Egypt State Information Service, “Egypt Stresses Necessity of NPT Internationalization,” February 15, 2013, available from allafrica.com/stories/201302170072.

html. Egypt obviously has Israel in mind here, but that does not 

detract from the idea.

46. This outlook is captured in 2008 report of the State 

Department’s International Security Advisory Board: 

We concluded that the current international climate is quite 

unpropitious for gaining support from non-nuclear weapon 

states to accept stricter measures against proliferation . . . 

we believe that incremental measures, rather than revolutionary or comprehensive changes, will be far more likely to 

succeed in the near term.

The report is from an earlier administration, but it captures the 

sense of current approaches as well. See U.S. State Department International Security Advisory Board, Report on Proliferation Implications of the Global Expansion of Civil Nuclear Power, Washington, 

DC: Department of State, April 7, 2008, available from 2001-2009.

state.gov/documents/organization/105587.pdf.
498

47. See, for example, Fred McGoldrick, Nuclear Trade Controls: 

Minding the Gaps, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 22, 2013, available from csis.org/files/

publication/130122_McGoldrick_NuclearTradeControls_Web.pdf: 

Finally, the U.S. has to avoid overreach in instituting new 

nuclear export controls. Recent well-intentioned efforts by 

some in Congress and the Executive Branch to pressure other 

states to forswear enrichment and reprocessing capabilities 

could seriously damage the prospects for U.S. nuclear exports and deprive the United States of the nonproliferation 

influence that comes with nuclear cooperation. Some have 

suggested other steps that would cause similar, if not more 

severe, damage to U.S. influence in international nuclear affairs. Suppliers are not going to require such extreme export 

conditions, and most consumer states are likely to reject U.S. 

demands they believe deny them their rights or legitimate 

peaceful commercial opportunities.

McGoldrick refers the reader to an earlier version of this paper for 

examples of “overreach” that would cause severe damage to U.S. 

influence (a former Los Alamos director went further to heatedly 

label that paper as deliberately anti-nuclear). McGoldrick basically proposes tidying up the nonproliferation controls but doing 

nothing to upset any other countries, especially developing countries. He accepts that we have to offer positive incentives if we ask 

them to forego “sensitive” technologies. There is no larger sense 

here, or in the many similar reports, that the United States could, 

or should try to, persuade other countries of the common security advantage in agreeing to a higher level of protection against 

bomb making.

48. In this 2012 South Korea speech, the President said, “. . . 

we’re creating new fuel banks, to help countries realize the energy 

they seek without increasing the nuclear dangers that we fear.” 

49. See Alan Hanson, “Nuclear Fuel Banks: Are They a Reality,” presentation at the Monterey Institute, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, CA, December 12, 2011, available from 

www.youtube.com/watch?v=EYmT6ftCPhg.
499

50. This includes a strained effort to include “dirty bombs” in 

the category of serious threats. Consider Director General Amano’s October 17, 2012, speech at Chatham House, London, UK, in 

which he said: “One of the key risks we face is that terrorists could 

detonate a so-called dirty bomb, using conventional explosives 

and a quantity of nuclear or other radioactive material, to contaminate a major city.” On proliferation, Director-General Amano 

dealt with Iran and North Korea, but said nothing about tightening antiproliferation protections overall.

501

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

RICHARD CLEARY is a student at Columbia Law 

School, where he is a Kent Scholar and an editor of 

the Columbia Law Review. In 2013, he was named the 

Charles L. Brieant Jr. fellow in the U.S. District Court 

for the Southern District of New York. Prior to law 

school, Mr. Cleary was a research assistant in the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American 

Enterprise Institute (AEI). He has interned for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and in the personal 

office of Senator Richard Lugar. Mr. Cleary holds a 

B.A., summa cum laude, from Washington and Lee University and an M.Phil. in international relations from 

Trinity College, University of Cambridge. His M.Phil. 

dissertation examined the influence of Mohamed ElBaradei as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the Iraq and Iran cases, 

and his undergraduate thesis considered the use of 

civilian nuclear energy in French diplomacy.

MATTHEW FUHRMANN is an assistant professor 

of political science at Texas A&M University. He is a 

former Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council 

on Foreign Relations and research fellow at the Belfer 

Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. Dr. Fuhrmann is the author of Atomic 

Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Instability. His research has been published in a 

number of journals, including the American Journal of 

Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, International Organization, International Security, Journal of 

Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, and Journal of Politics, among others. He has published opinion 

pieces in outlets such as the Christian Science Monitor, 

Slate, and USA Today.
502

VICTOR GILINSKY is an independent consultant on 

matters primarily related to nuclear energy. He was a 

two-term commissioner of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission from 1975-84, and before that Head of 

the Rand Corporation Physical Sciences Department. 

He is a member of the American Physical Society and 

the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. 

Dr. Gilinsky holds a bachelor’s of engineering physics 

degree from Cornell University and a Ph.D. in physics 

from the California Institute of Technology, where he 

received the Distinguished Alumni Award. 

PIERRE GOLDSCHMIDT is a nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace. From 1999 to 2005, he was deputy Director General and head of the Department of Safeguards at the 

IAEA. Before joining the IAEA, Dr. Goldschmidt was 

director general of SYNATOM, which manages the 

fuel supply and spent fuel of Belgian nuclear plants 

and was a member of the directory of the French 

uranium-enrichment company EURODIF. He is also a 

member of the European Nuclear Society’s High Scientific Council and has headed numerous European 

and international committees on nuclear energy. He is 

the author of over 100 publications and has received 

a number of cultural and scientific awards, including 

the 2008 Joseph A. Burton Forum Award of the American Physical Society. He was nominated Chevalier of 

the French Legion of Honor and was knighted by the 

King of Belgium.

OLLI HEINONEN is a Senior Fellow at the Belfer 

Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. Dr. Heinonen served 27 years at the 
503

IAEA, where he was the Deputy Director General 

and head of the Department of Safeguards, director 

of various operational divisions, and an inspector. His 

assignments included leading teams of investigators 

to examine nuclear programs of concern around the 

world, leading the Agency’s efforts to identify and 

dismantle proliferation networks, and overseeing efforts to monitor and contain Iran’s nuclear program. 

Prior to joining the IAEA, Dr. Heinonen was a senior 

research officer at the Technical Center of Finland’s 

Reactor Laboratory and co-authored patents on radioactive waste solidification. He is the author of several 

articles, books, chapters of books, various IAEA publications, and has been published in numerous scholarly and popular periodicals around the world.

FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG is Chairman of the Council 

of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and of the 

London-based International Institute for Strategic 

Studies (IISS). He is a special advisor at the Parisbased Fondation pour la Recherché Stratégique. He 

has also sat on a number of national and international 

blue-ribbon bodies, including the French Defence 

and National Security White Paper, the International 

Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, the International Commission on the Balkans, and the European Union Commission’s group of 

personalities on security research and development. 

Mr. Heisbourg has written extensively on defense and 

security issues and is a frequent contributor to both 

specialist and mainstream media on such matters.

GREGORY S. JONES is a senior researcher at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Arlington, 

VA, and an adjunct staff member at the RAND Cor-
504

poration. Mr. Jones has been a defense policy analyst 

for the last 40 years. A major emphasis of his work 

has been on the study of the potential for terrorists 

and hostile countries to acquire and use nuclear, 

chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, and 

the formulation of policies and actions to control and 

counter these weapons. Since 2008, Mr. Jones has analyzed Iran’s centrifuge uranium enrichment program 

and charted Iran’s inexorable movement towards a 

nuclear weapons capability.

R. SCOTT KEMP is an assistant professor of nuclear 

science and engineering at the Massachusetts Institute 

of Technology, a research scholar with the Program 

on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, and an affiliate of Harvard University’s Program 

on Managing the Atom. From 2010-11, he served as 

Science Advisor in the Office of the Special Advisor 

to the Secretary for Nonproliferation and Arms Control where he was the State Department’s resident 

centrifuge expert and was responsible for developing 

packages for negotiating with Iran. Dr. Kemp is also 

a member of the American Physical Society’s Panel 

on Public Affairs. His work has been used in studies 

by the National Academies of Sciences, the American 

Physical Society, and the JASON advisory group. Prior to coming to Princeton, Dr. Kemp was a Fulbright 

Fellow in London and a member of the research staff 

at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

MATTHEW KROENIG is an assistant professor of 

government and foreign service and international 

relations field chair at Georgetown University and a 

nonresident senior fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council. 
505

From July 2010 to July 2011, he was a Special Advisor 

in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship; and he worked as a strategist in the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense in 2005. Dr. Kroenig has held 

fellowships from the Council on Foreign Relations, 

the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard 

University, the Center for International Security and 

Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute 

on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University 

of California. He is a life member of the Council on 

Foreign Relations.

PATRICK S. ROBERTS is an associate professor in the 

Center for Public Administration and Policy in the 

School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia 

Tech in Alexandria, Virginia. He is the Associate Chair 

and Program Director CPAP, Northern Virginia. He 

holds a Ph.D. in government from the University of 

Virginia, and he spent 2 years as a post-doctoral fellow, one at the Center for International Security and 

Cooperation at Stanford University and another at 

the Program for Constitutional Government at Harvard University. He spent 2010-11 as the Ghaemian 

Scholar-in-Residence at the University of Heidelberg’s 

Center for American Studies in Germany. Mr. Roberts 

is the author of Disasters and the American State: How 

Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Public Prepare for the 

Unexpected (Cambridge, 2013). 

HENRY SOKOLSKI is Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Arlington, 

VA, and adjunct professor at the Institute of World 

Politics in Washington, DC. He previously served as 
506

a military legislative aide and special assistant for 

nuclear energy affairs in the U.S. Senate, as Deputy 

for Nonproliferation Policy in the Pentagon, and as a 

member of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Senior 

Advisory Group. Mr. Sokolski also was appointed by 

Congress to serve on the Deutch Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD) Commission and the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism and has authored and edited numerous books 

on proliferation, including Best of Intentions: America’s 

Campaign against Strategic Weapons Proliferation.

SUSAN VOSS is the President and co-founder of 

the Global Nuclear Network Analysis, LLC, a small, 

woman-owned engineering firm in Los Alamos, NM. 

She was previously employed at Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (LANL), where she worked on projects related to nuclear power, the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear 

nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and arms controls for the Departments of State, Energy, Defense, 

and Homeland Security. Prior to her career at LANL, 

she worked for the Air Force Weapons Laboratory 

in Albuquerque on space nuclear power. Ms. Voss is 

currently a consultant to the Hyperion Power Generation Company’s small nuclear reactor design team, 

focusing on advanced nuclear fuel design and safety. 

She holds a master’s in nuclear engineering from the 

University of New Mexico.

LEONARD WEISS is an affiliated scholar at Stanford 

University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a national advisory board member of 

the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in 

Washington, DC. He worked for over 2 decades for 

Senator John Glenn as the staff director of both the 
507

Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Nuclear Proliferation and the Committee on Governmental Affairs. 

He was the chief architect of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 and led investigations of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs. Dr. Weiss has 

published numerous articles for the Bulletin of Atomic 

Scientists, Arms Control Today, and The Nonproliferation 

Review. He holds tenured professorships at Brown 

University and the University of Maryland.

ROBERT ZARATE is policy director at the Foreign 

Policy Initiative (FPI) in Washington, DC. Before joining FPI, he served as legislative assistant for foreign 

affairs to U.S. Representative Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE) 

and as a legislative fellow for the majority staff in the 

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Nonproliferation, and Trade. He was previously a research scholar at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, an independent consultant on nuclear issues, a reporter for Wired News, and a policy analyst at 

Steptoe & Johnson LLP. He also served on the Project 

on Nuclear Initiatives Working Group on U.S.-China 

Nuclear Issues convened by the Center for Security 

and International Studies. Mr. Zarate co-edited Nuclear Heuristics: Selected Writings of Albert and Roberta 

Wohlstetter and has published essays and articles in 

periodicals such as Time, The Weekly Standard, National 

Review, and U.S. News and World Report.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

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Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Editor

Mr. Henry Sokolski

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil
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