NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

BRANDI K., DAVID C., Appellants,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, D.C., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 21-0023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD 532153

The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rueter, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Czop Law Firm PLLC, Higley

By Steven Czop

Counsel for Appellant, Brandi K. 

John L. Popilek, Scottsdale

Counsel for Appellant, David C.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Emily M. Stokes

Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety

FILED 7-8-2021
BRANDI K., DAVID C. v. DCS, D.C.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge David B. Gass and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Brandi K. (“Mother”) and David C. (“Father”) appeal the 

termination of their parental rights to their son, D.C., born in November 

2018. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) learned about D.C. 

when Mother tested positive for amphetamines at his birth. DCS took 

temporary custody of D.C. and petitioned the juvenile court to find him 

dependent as to Mother and Father on grounds of substance abuse, lack of 

housing, and unemployment. The parents did not contest the dependency. 

Mother admitted she had a history of substance abuse, including using 

methamphetamine two weeks before D.C.’s birth. During the dependency 

case she missed several tests, but always tested negative. Around January 

2020, DCS helped the parents acquire a housing voucher, but they chose to 

move into a sober living facility. 

¶3 In March 2020, DCS moved for termination of their parental 

rights, citing grounds of prolonged substance abuse, six months’ time-incare, and fifteen months’ time-in-care. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (8)(b–c). The 

termination hearing was originally scheduled for September 24, 2020, but 

was continued when the court granted DCS’s motion to continue, filed 

three days before the hearing. 

¶4 Father did not appear at the telephonic termination hearing

set for January 5, 2021. His counsel told the court: 

I didn’t learn that my client was in treatment until I tried to 

get ahold of him just the other day. The person I spoke to . . . 

told me that she would get a message to him . . . and I never

have heard from him. So, he’s not here today because he is in 

treatment. . . . I’m requesting that we continue as to my client. 
BRANDI K., DAVID C. v. DCS, D.C.

Decision of the Court

3

DCS objected to the continuance, and the court denied the motion, stating 

there was no evidence Father was incapable of calling in. 

¶5 The DCS case manager, Colleen Teague, acknowledged 

Mother’s accomplishments in achieving sobriety and completing services, 

as well as consistent visitation with D.C. However, Teague expressed two 

remaining concerns: (1) Mother was still in a relationship with Father, who 

had not demonstrated sobriety; and (2) she still resided in the sober living 

facility, which DCS did not consider to be stable housing for D.C. Teague

explained that Mother lacked financial stability, and she expressed concern 

whether she could maintain sobriety outside of a controlled environment. 

As to Father, Teague noted his history of substance abuse, explaining he 

tested positive over 20 times for marijuana, opiates, methamphetamines,

and amphetamines between September 2019 and May 2020. 

¶6 Mother claimed she had been sober since her last positive test 

in December 2018, though DCS noted it could only document eight months 

of sobriety. After several unsuccessful attempts, Mother completed 

substance abuse treatment in August 2020. Throughout the dependency 

case, Mother lived and worked at the sober living facility, where she 

received payment in the form of a credit toward her rent. She testified she 

had kicked Father out of the facility in December 2020 after a relapse. 

Addressing Father’s failure to appear, Mother said he had been in treatment 

since December 19, following his relapse, and he was currently at an 

inpatient treatment center. She admitted she had not informed DCS of his 

status, and when asked whether she had told Father to call into the hearing, 

she replied: “He was in class today.” 

¶7 The juvenile court issued a comprehensive ruling terminating 

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. First, the court found Father lacked 

good cause for his failure to appear, which was treated as a waiver of his 

rights and an admission of the allegations. It noted no evidence showed

Father could not have attended the trial while participating in rehabilitative 

services. Second, the court found DCS had proven all three grounds for 

termination as to Father, citing his long history of substance abuse, failure 

to participate in services, and lack of stability. Third, the court found DCS 

had proven the fifteen months’ time-in-care ground as to Mother, citing her 

relationship with Father and her continued residence at the sober living 

facility. Finally, the court found termination was in D.C.’s best interests 

because he was adoptable and the parents had failed to make the necessary 

behavioral changes. Mother and Father separately appealed the court’s 

ruling. 
BRANDI K., DAVID C. v. DCS, D.C.

Decision of the Court

4

DISCUSSION

A. Mother’s Appeal

¶8 To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must find (1) 

one of the statutory grounds articulated in A.R.S. § 8–533(B), by clear and 

convincing evidence; and (2) that termination is in the child’s best interests, 

by a preponderance of the evidence. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, 

¶ 22 (2005). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining 

the court’s ruling and will affirm if supported by reasonable evidence. 

Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009). We 

do not reweigh the evidence presented because “the resolution of 

conflicting evidence is ‘uniquely the province of the juvenile court’ . . . even 

when ‘sharply disputed’ facts exist.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 

Ariz. 146, 151, ¶ 18 (2018) (citations omitted). 

1. Statutory Ground 

¶9 When seeking termination based on out-of-home placement 

for a cumulative period of fifteen months or longer, DCS must prove (1) it 

made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services, (2) the 

child was in an out-of-home placement for at least fifteen months, (3) 

Mother was unable to remedy the circumstances that caused D.C. to be in 

such placement, and (4) a substantial likelihood existed that Mother would 

not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control 

in the near future. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). Mother argues the court lacked 

reasonable evidence to find she failed to remedy the circumstances leading 

to D.C.’s placement and could not parent D.C. in the near future. 

¶10 The juvenile court found that Mother was unable to remedy 

the circumstances leading to D.C.’s placement, including the “instability 

that is attendant with substance abuse.” The court noted that Mother 

remained with and ultimately married Father in 2020, despite his 

continuing struggle with substance abuse and her awareness that she 

would be held to his level of progress. The court found that Mother 

“fail[ed] to recognize the threat that Father’s substance abuse poses to 

[D.C.]” and she continued to reside in the sober living home, rather than 

trying to secure housing. The court stated the facility was “not a proper 

environment for a young child” due to the “continuous turnover” of the 

residents and possible exposure to substance abuse. 

¶11 Second, the court found that Mother would be unable to 

parent D.C. in the near future, questioning the permanence of her 

newfound sobriety. The court explained that Mother had not yet 
BRANDI K., DAVID C. v. DCS, D.C.

Decision of the Court

5

demonstrated sobriety outside of the structured environment of the sober 

living facility and had no plans to move out. The court reiterated its 

concerns about Mother’s relationship with Father, and it noted Mother had 

been unemployed for over ten years. 

¶12 Mother argues she could remain in the sober living facility 

and DCS did not make a showing that D.C. would not be allowed to live 

there. But DCS presented evidence the facility would not be appropriate 

housing for a child, even if children are allowed to live there. Teague 

testified that DCS had concerns about transient individuals moving in and 

out of the facility and the child’s possible exposure to substance abuse. She 

also explained that DCS does not consider the facility to be “stable 

housing,” which usually means the parent has their name on a lease. 

¶13 In addition, Mother contends her willingness to expel Father 

from the sober living facility after he relapsed shows she can protect D.C.

from Father’s substance abuse. But DCS presented evidence to the 

contrary. Teague testified that Mother had been informed she would be 

held to Father’s level of progress so long as they were a couple and living 

together. Teague explained her concerns about Mother’s ability to maintain 

her sobriety if exposed to Father’s substance abuse, and opined that Mother 

does not understand the impact of Father’s substance abuse on D.C. 

Because we do not reweigh the evidence on appeal, Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 

151, ¶ 18, reasonable evidence supports termination based on fifteen 

months’ time-in-care. 

2. Best Interests

¶14 “Termination is in the child’s best interests if either: (1) the 

child will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be harmed if 

severance is denied.” Id. at 150, ¶ 13. “[W]hen a current placement meets 

the child’s needs, and the child’s prospective adoption is otherwise legally 

possible and likely,” a court may find termination of parental rights is in 

the child’s best interests. Id. at 151, ¶ 14 (quotation and citation omitted).

The court considers the “totality of the circumstances existing at the time of 

the severance.” Id. at 150, ¶ 13.

¶15 Mother argues that DCS failed to describe the benefit or 

detriment of termination under the totality of the circumstances. We 

disagree. 

¶16 Teague testified that D.C. is currently placed in a licensed 

foster home that is meeting his needs, and that if “for some reason this 
BRANDI K., DAVID C. v. DCS, D.C.

Decision of the Court

6

placement falls through,” D.C. is “otherwise adoptable.” Teague also 

opined that D.C. would be harmed if he reunified with his parents because 

they have no home to which D.C. could return, Mother’s current 

environment would potentially subject him to substance abuse, and he 

would have no financial security. And the juvenile court expressly stated 

it considered the “totality of the circumstances,” including Mother’s efforts

towards reunification and her bond with D.C. It explained D.C. would 

benefit from severance because he is in an adoptive placement and requires 

permanency. The court also found that D.C. would be harmed if it denied 

severance because his parents had not made the necessary behavioral 

changes and he would be living in an unstable environment. Because 

reasonable evidence supports these findings, the court did not err in finding 

that termination was in D.C.’s best interests. 

B. Father’s Appeal

¶17 Father argues the juvenile court erred by (1) finding he lacked 

good cause for missing the termination hearing and (2) denying his request 

for a continuance. He does not contest the grounds for termination. We 

review a court’s finding of whether good cause exists for failure to appear 

for an abuse of discretion. Adrian E. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 215 Ariz. 96, 

101, ¶ 15 (App. 2007). We will reverse only if the ruling was “manifestly 

unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable 

reasons.” Id. We review the grant or denial of a continuance for an abuse 

of discretion. In re MH2003-000240, 206 Ariz. 367, 369, ¶ 10 (App. 2003).

¶18 Here, the juvenile court found that Father’s failure to appear 

at the termination hearing was without good cause. A.R.S. § 8-863(C); Ariz. 

R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(D)(2). To prove otherwise, Father was required to show that 

“(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect exists and (2) a 

meritorious defense to the claims exists.” Christy A. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 217 Ariz. 299, 304, ¶ 16 (App. 2007); see also Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 247 Ariz. 84, 89, ¶ 19 (2019). Father has not argued his failure to 

appear was a mistake, a surprise, or inadvertent. In addition, he has not 

argued excusable neglect or a meritorious defense to the motion for 

termination. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion. 

¶19 Even assuming Father has implicitly asserted such matters by 

stating he failed to attend the hearing because he was in an inpatient 

treatment program for his substance abuse, the court acted within its 

discretion in finding Father’s absence was without good cause. Father does 

not argue he lacked notice of the hearing or claim he did not know his 

failure to appear could result in termination. As DCS notes, Father did not 
BRANDI K., DAVID C. v. DCS, D.C.

Decision of the Court

7

claim he was unable to attend the termination hearing telephonically, and 

he had called into all prior hearings going back to March 2020. Father 

suggests that many inpatient facilities do not permit outgoing calls, but he 

does not argue or present evidence he was prohibited from doing so. 

¶20 Father also argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in 

denying his request to continue the hearing, especially because the court 

had previously granted a continuance for DCS. A parent may request to 

continue a termination hearing if the request is “in writing” and “state[s] 

with specificity the reasons for the continuance.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 46(A), 

(F). The court will grant the motion upon a showing of good cause and will 

consider the child’s best interests. Id.; James A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 

Ariz. 319, 322, ¶ 14 (App. 2018). Father waited until the hearing to request 

a continuance. By contrast, DCS requested a continuance before the earlier 

hearing, explained why it was necessary, and noted that none of the other 

parties objected. Given the stark differences between the two motions, the 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s request for 

continuance. 

CONCLUSION

¶21 Because neither parent has shown the juvenile court erred in 

terminating their parental rights, we affirm.