The United States Army War College

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CENTER for

STRATEGIC

LEADERSHIP and

DEVELOPMENT

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service 

at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application 

of Landpower.

The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates 

who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently, 

it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders 

and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage 

in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving 

national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national 

security and strategic research and analysis to influence 

policy debate and bridge the gap between military 

and academia.

The Center for Strategic Leadership and Development 

contributes to the education of world class senior 

leaders, develops expert knowledge, and provides 

solutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national 

security community.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

provides subject matter expertise, technical review, 

and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability 

operations concepts and doctrines.

The Senior Leader Development and Resiliency program 

supports the United States Army War College’s lines of 

effort to educate strategic leaders and provide well-being 

education and support by developing self-awareness 

through leader feedback and leader resiliency.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic 

leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom 

grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and 

by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in 

the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional 

expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security, 

resource management, and responsible command.

The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, 

conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use 

to support the U.S. Army, educate an international 

audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

U.S. Army War College

Senior Leader Development and Resiliency

SLDR
STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related 

to national security and military strategy with emphasis on 

geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct 

strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined 

 employment of military forces;

• Regional strategic appraisals;

• The nature of land warfare;

• Matters affecting the Army’s future;

• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,

• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern 

topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of 

Defense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics 

of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings 

of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip 

reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.

The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the 

Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army 

participation in national security policy formulation.

i

iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

ISLAMISM AND SECURITY 

IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Leslie S. Lebl

May 2014

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full 

academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified 

information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent 

official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to 

offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
iv

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn 

Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War 

College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free 

of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may 

also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing 

an order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quoted 

or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate 

credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. 

Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: 

www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War 

College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update 

the national security community on the research of our analysts,

recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides 

a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you 

are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the 

SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ISBN 1-58487-622-0
v

FOREWORD

Many observers viewed the military mission of the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission 

to Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia), launched in late1995, as a test of the international community’s ability 

to keep the peace in the post-Cold War world. This 

task proved difficult: The many obstacles to restoring 

stability and growth in Bosnia have been thoroughly 

dissected over the years, from the challenges of transition governments to the difficulties of interethnic 

reconciliation.

One factor, however, has received but scant attention: the role of Islamism, the political ideology based 

on a religion that motivates the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda, and many other radical groups. This 

monograph will examine the impact of Islamism on 

Bosnian security, tracing developments during the 9 

years of NATO peacekeeping, as well as the ensuing 

years. It will also examine the ties between so-called 

“nonviolent” and “violent” Islamism—ties that have 

already surfaced in other countries where NATO or 

the U.S. military is engaged. As a consequence, the 

monograph offers a framework to analyze the potential constraints that Islamism can place on present-day 

and future military missions in Muslim countries.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

LESLIE S. LEBL is a Fellow of the American Center 

for Democracy and a Principal of Lebl Associates. A 

former Foreign Service Officer, she now writes, lectures, and consults on political and security matters. 

During her Foreign Service career, Ms. Lebl served 

as Political Advisor to the Commander of Stabilization Forces (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the late1990s, first in the American sector in Tuzla and then 

at SFOR headquarters in Sarajevo. Her most recent 

publications include articles in Orbis on the European 

Union, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and on radical Islam in 

Europe. A monograph, Advancing U.S. Interests with 

the European Union, was published by the Atlantic 

Council of the United States. Other publications include analyses of European defense policy for the Cato 

Institute and of U.S.-EU cooperation in combating terrorism for Policy Review. Ms. Lebl holds a B.A. in history from Swarthmore College and an M.A. in foreign 

affairs from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 

International Studies.

ix

SUMMARY

Bosnia-Herzegovina, once thought to be on the 

way to joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), is instead 

falling behind, mired in political bickering, economic 

stalemate, and governmental dysfunction. In this difficult situation, Islamism poses a significant threat to 

Bosnia’s fragile domestic stability. Although the levels of Islamist terrorism and separatist movements 

are comparable to those elsewhere in Europe, they are 

particularly troublesome in Bosnia for two reasons. 

First, senior political and religious Bosniak (Muslim) 

leaders have long-standing ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist terrorism, including al-Qaeda and 

Iran, that they are very reluctant to abandon. Second, 

Islamism contributes significantly to Bosnia’s dysfunction as a country. Calls to re-impose traditional 

Islamic law, or sharia, arouse opposition from Bosnian 

Serbs and Croats, as does the nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire and Islamic Caliphate shared by key Bosniak leaders, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 

(OIC), and the Turkish government. 

Some analysts think that Bosnia’s slide can be reversed by mounting another NATO military mission, 

while others want the United States to accelerate its 

NATO membership. The U.S. Army should be prepared to explain why the previous NATO mission was 

successful, and why, in contrast, another one would 

be much more difficult. The European Command and 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense should alert 

Washington policymakers to the danger to NATO 

policymaking and day-to-day operations arising 

from the Islamist ties of some Bosniak leaders and 

representatives.

1

ISLAMISM AND SECURITY 

IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

BOSNIA IN TROUBLE 

Eighteen years after the fighting ended in BosniaHerzegovina (Bosnia), its territorial integrity and internal stability are not yet assured. Most observers 

had assumed that membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European 

Union (EU) would cement Bosnian security. Although 

other Balkan countries have successfully joined those 

two organizations,1

 Bosnia is unlikely to follow them 

any time soon. Instead, reforms that appeared to pave 

the way for membership have stalled. The unity of 

the state is in doubt; its governmental structure is 

unworkable, and its economy is failing.

The Bosnian governmental structure set up under 

the Dayton Peace Accords included a weak central 

state, two entities (the Bosniak-Croat Federation and 

the Serb Republic), and a separate jurisdiction for the 

disputed town of Brčko. With the Federation further 

divided into 10 relatively autonomous cantons—

roughly reflecting the territorial divisions between 

Bosniaks and Croats—not only is the result top-heavy 

and unwieldy, but the structure encourages disputes 

and tensions framed in terms of ethnicity. Most observers, with the exception of the U.S. Government, 

have concluded that the cumbersome mechanism of 

two entities and a weak central state agreed to at Dayton in 1995 simply does not work.2

If Bosnia’s economy were thriving, these tensions 

would probably recede. But basic requirements for 

such a thriving economy, such as large-scale energy 

projects, are frequently blocked by the lack of inter-
2

entity cooperation.3 In addition, the economic liberalization required for growth would deprive the 

multiple layers of officialdom of substantial income, 

whether from controlling state-owned companies inherited from the communist past or revenues from 

the welter of existing regulations and administrative 

requirements. 

Strong leadership might overcome this inertia, but 

strong leadership is exactly what is lacking. Meanwhile, corruption remains widespread,4

 and the average Bosnian faces high unemployment, reaching 57 

percent among young people.5

 Poverty is mitigated by 

extensive state subsidies that further weigh down the 

economy and by black market jobs.

Former Serbian president Slobodan Milošević and 

former Croatian president Franjo Tudjman famously 

divided up Bosnia on a napkin in 1991.6 They failed to 

achieve their goal during the subsequent war, but the 

division of Bosnia from within has advanced apace. 

The poor economy has contributed to this process, 

but so has the deliberate policy of alienation pursued 

by all three ethnic groups. An entire generation of 

Bosnians has gone through an ethnically segregated 

educational system in which each group is taught its 

own version of religion, geography, history, and language.7

 Those divisions are then perpetuated by politicians who exploit ethnic fears and tensions. 

Unsurprisingly, the inter-ethnic reconciliation 

hoped for at Dayton has not come to pass. Rather, 

an overwhelming majority of Bosnian Serbs support 

the secession of the Serb Republic. A large number 

of Croats have already left the country; they are estimated now to account for only 10 percent of Bosnia’s 

population, as compared with 17 percent in 1991.8

 Of 

those Croats still in country, over 40 percent want to 
3

carve a third, Croat, entity out of the Federation,9 despite the fact that the Dayton quota system currently 

grants them outsize influence (one-third of the statelevel positions and half of those in the Federation 

government). 

As Bosnian analysts Anes Alic and Vildana Skocajic put it, the majority of Bosnians “do not feel that this 

is their ‘homeland’.”10 This puts an alarming spin on 

other, already-disturbing data: some 87 percent feel 

the country is going in the wrong direction,11 and 77 

percent of young people say they would leave Bosnia 

if they could.12 Such negative perceptions are also typical of a country in demographic decline, as Bosnia is 

today.13 It may be only mid-ranked on the list of failed 

states, but it is clearly in trouble.14

Neither NATO nor the EU can solve these problems, despite their best efforts. NATO provided first 

the Implementation Force (IFOR) and then its successor, Stabilization Force (SFOR), to maintain stability 

for 9 years after the war. Today, it maintains a military 

headquarters in Sarajevo to assist Bosnia with reforms 

and commitments related to NATO accession. 

Bosnia has met all NATO membership requirements except for the registration of all the defense facilities deemed necessary for future defense as properties of the central state.15 The Serb Republic has refused 

to transfer its properties, and its President, Milorad 

Dodik, has called for Bosnia to demilitarize rather than 

join NATO.16 Clearly, the obstacles to NATO accession are political and can be removed only by the Bosnians themselves. Even if they are overcome, NATO 

has no means to solve Bosnia’s serious social and 

economic problems. 

EU accession, which requires extensive economic, 

social, and political reforms, is often viewed by U.S. 
4

policymakers as the critical means to achieve EuroAtlantic integration. One could argue that the EU is 

an unlikely tool for streamlining governments and reducing the public sector, promoting entrepreneurship 

rather than redistribution, and resolving cultural tensions among different groups. Nevertheless, the EU 

has prodded Bosnia, inter alia, to strengthen its central state institutions, reform its public administration 

and judicial system, combat corruption, and develop 

a market economy, but with only limited success. Today, EU officials appear to have concluded that there 

is not much they can do to solve Bosnia’s problems, 

given Bosnian politicians’ lack of vision and internecine disputes.17 The EU official in charge of accession 

has warned that, if the present situation persists, Bosnia’s application could be “frozen.”18

If Bosnia was a just another EU candidate country, 

such an assessment would probably attract little attention. But in this case, it is significant, given the huge EU 

effort to rebuild Bosnia. The EU replaced SFOR with 

its own military operation, European Union Force 

(EUFOR); it replaced the United Nations (UN) police 

mission with the European Union Police Mission, and 

for a time it combined the position of EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina with that of the 

UN’s Office of the High Representative (OHR). in an 

effort to coordinate and direct the civilian international community’s involvement in Bosnia. The failure of 

such an ambitious effort explains why Europeans now 

say that it is primarily up to the Bosnians, not outsiders, to fix Bosnia’s problems.19
5

ISLAMISM: MUSLIM BROTHERS, TERRORISTS, 

AND WAHHABIS 

In this precarious environment, the growth of Islamism is particularly worrisome. Islamism contrasts 

strongly with the more-moderate form of Islam traditionally practiced in Bosnia. A 20th century political 

ideology based on a religion, Islamism’s ultimate goal 

is to replace Western law with traditional Islamic law, 

or sharia, worldwide. Not only would this undermine 

Western democracy by rejecting the laws designed 

by democratically elected representatives, but sharia’s 

fundamental principles—such as inequality before the 

law (more on this topic later in the text)—are antithetical to Western law. This transformation to Islamism 

would be accomplished by means of a global Caliphate, or Islamic empire, headed by a person who is both a 

political and religious leader. 

Most Western observers dismiss warnings about 

the dangers of Islamism as crude Serb or Croat propaganda intended to undermine the Bosnian state. In 

so doing, they usually note that Islamism is unlikely 

to become a significant force because most Bosniaks 

continue to adhere to their traditionally moderate and 

relatively secular version of Islam. However, evidence 

drawn primarily from Bosniak and Western sources 

reveals a more-nuanced and alarming picture. To understand this picture, it is first necessary to identify 

the main types of Islamism influencing Bosnia today.

Islamists are usually divided into two categories: 

the violent Islamist who pursues holy war, or jihad, 

openly, and his nonviolent counterpart who publicly 

eschews it—except against Israel or Western forces 

fighting in Muslim countries. However, the links between violent and nonviolent Islamism, while often 
6

denied, are increasingly obvious. This is particularly 

true in countries like Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Syria, where the Muslim Brotherhood—the best-known 

group in the nonviolent category—now contends 

openly for power. The evidence from Bosnia presented later in this text also shows a blurred line between 

violence and nonviolence. 

Instead, it is more useful to distinguish among 

three main groups of Islamists in Bosnia: those linked 

to the Muslim Brotherhood, a group whose members participate in democratic institutions and often 

publicly espouse Western values; those engaged in 

terrorist activity, or jihad; and so-called Wahhabis, adherents of Saudi fundamentalism who reject Western 

institutions. Some Wahhabis are linked to terrorist 

activity, while others are not. There are tensions and 

disputes among the three groups, but they all agree on 

the goal of replacing Western law with sharia. And all 

three groups have connections to the Bosniak political 

and religious elite. 

The Muslim Brotherhood.

Islamism first appeared in Bosnia in 1941 when 

Alija Izetbegović and others formed the Young 

Muslims, a group patterned after the Muslim Brotherhood. Izetbegović’s famous political tract from the 

early-1970s, the Islamic Declaration, contained many 

Islamist concepts, confirming his personal attraction 

to the ideology. 

This ancient history suddenly sprang to life when 

Izetbegović founded a political party with former 

Young Muslims as its inner core, outmaneuvered his 

more-moderate rivals, and became president of Bosnia in 1990. He filled that position during and after the 
7

Bosnian war, from 1990-96, and then became a member of the joint presidency (which rotates between a 

Serb, a Croat, and a Bosniak) from 1996-2000. He died 

in 2003, but his legacy lives on, as his long-time associate, Haris Silajdzić, and son, Bakir, follow in his 

footsteps, both as presidents of Bosnia and as Islamist 

sympathizers.

Brotherhood ties today are very important to another senior Bosniak, Mustafa Cerić. Cerić served for 

years as Grand Mufti of Sarajevo and the head of the 

official Islamic Community. In addition, he is considered to be a leading Bosniak political figure in his 

own right.

Thus, while little is said or written about Muslim 

Brotherhood activities in Bosnia, the most senior Bosniak leaders—viewed by Westerners as representing 

moderate, relatively secular Muslims—are, in fact, 

closely connected to, or deeply sympathetic with, that 

organization. Their views and their relationships steer 

Bosnia toward Islamism and the Muslim world, while 

alienating Bosniaks from Bosnian Serbs and Croats, 

their fellow citizens.

Terrorists.

Islamism received a tremendous boost with the arrival of Islamic fighters, or mujahideen, to fight on the 

Bosniak side during the 1992-95 war. Their military 

value has been disputed, but the accompanying financial and military support from Saudi Arabia and Iran 

was vital to the Bosniak war effort. While those two 

countries are rivals, they arrived at an accommodation in Bosnia to support the mujahideen. Saudi Arabia 

focused on financing and logistical supplies, and Iran 

on importing the fighters and on military aid.20
8

The war in Bosnia definitely gave al-Qaeda a huge 

boost, both in terms of organization and recruitment,21

and helped radicalize European Muslims. Many of 

them were revolted by graphic videos of suffering 

Bosniaks, and some traveled to Bosnia to provide aid 

or fight and so came into contact with foreign jihadists. 

Many jihadists later directed their fighting skills against 

European and American targets. Since the war ended 

in 1995, Bosnian veterans from various countries have 

figured in terrorist activities in countries around the 

globe, among them France, Indonesia, Iraq, Malaysia, 

Morocco, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, the 

United Kingdom, the United States, and Yemen.22

The best-known initiatives to combat Islamist terrorism were the 1996 IFOR raid on an Iranian-run terrorist training camp in Pogorelica and numerous steps 

taken after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 

(9/11), on the United States. At that time, SFOR interrupted terrorist plots aimed at NATO and other Western targets and raided the Saudi High Commission 

and other Saudi charities that were funding terrorist 

organizations. 

By 2004, terrorism expert Evan Kohlmann, in 

a book warning about the Afghan-Bosnian terrorist connection, concluded that al-Qaeda had largely 

failed to take root in Bosnia. He noted the progress 

made in shutting down various terrorist operations 

and expressed the opinion that al-Qaeda had failed 

because moderate Bosniaks rejected its extremist ideology.23 However, Kohlmann may have spoken too 

soon. Box 1 shows a continuum from 1996 through 

2006 in which Bosnia served as an active link in the 

al-Qaeda network. 
9

Box 1

The “Bosnian Connection” in International 

Islamist Terror.

• Starting in 1996, senior mujahideen leaders 

such as Abu el-Ma’ali and Abu Sulaimann 

al-Makki, then living as “civilians” in Bocinja Donja, oversaw plots in France, Italy, 

and Jordan designed to avenge the deaths 

of other leaders.

• In 2008, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Sarajevo reportedly uncovered evidence that senior Bosniak politician 

Hasan Čengić signed off on a money transfer intended to finance the attacks of 9/11.

• Karim Said Atmani, the document forger 

for the group plotting the 2000 Millenium 

plot bombing, was a frequent visitor to Bosnia. He obtained his first Bosnian passport 

in 1995 and subsequently was allowed to 

stay without a valid passport after he was 

deported by Canada in 1998.

• In late-October 2001, Algerians with Bosnian citizenship were arrested by the Bosnian authorities on charges of plotting to fly 

small aircraft from Visoko and crash them 

into SFOR bases in Tuzla and Bratunac.

• The 2005 plot to bomb the funeral of Pope 

John Paul II in Croatia reportedly originated in Gornja Maoča. The plot involved 

smuggling rocket launchers, explosives, 

and detonators into Italy.
10

Nor were the Iranians routed after the 1996 raid in 

Pogorelica. Today, both the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and National Security (VEVAK) and the Islamic 

Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) have a presence 

in Bosnia. Of the two, the IRGC reportedly has the 

better, more-extensive network.24 After the July 2012 

terrorist attack at the Burgas airport in Bulgaria, international attention focused on possible threats from 

Hezbollah elsewhere in the Balkans. An Israeli expert, 

cited by Christopher Deliso, concluded that Bosnia 

posed the biggest danger in the region because “There 

remain pro-Iranian elements in the government, and 

• Also in 2005, Bosnian police raided an apartment connected to a group seeking to blow 

up the British Embassy in Sarajevo, seizing 

explosives, rifles, other arms, and a video 

pledging vengeance for jihadists killed in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. One of those arrested, a Swedish citizen of Bosnian origin, ran 

a website on behalf of Abu Musab Zarqawi, 

head of al-Qaeda in Iraq.

• In 2006, a group of Bosnians and Macedonians linked to al-Qaeda were arrested in 

northern Italy after smuggling some 1,800 

guns into that country from Istanbul.

Sources: Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The 

Afghan-Bosnian Network, New York, Berg, 2004, pp. 176, 199, 

201-209; Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation public TV, May 5, 2008; 

The Washington Post, March 11, 2000; Channel 4 News, January 17, 2002; ISN, November 17, 2008; The Washington Post, 

December 1, 2005; and Christopher Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West, 

Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007, p. 26.
11

Iran is active through the embassy in Sarajevo and 

charities.”25

Today, Islamist terrorism persists in Bosnia, whether involving al-Qaeda, Iran, or home-grown sources, 

but assessments of the threat it poses vary. Many 

Western analysts largely have dismissed this terrorism as not being a major issue. The 2013 Congressional Research Service report on Bosnia, for example, 

makes only a brief mention of terrorism,26 and recent 

State Department and EU terrorism reports suggest 

that the level of terrorism in Bosnia is no greater than 

elsewhere in Europe.27

On the other hand, a leading Bosnian law enforcement official said that the only reason there have not 

been more terrorist attacks was that “We’ve had more 

luck than brains.”28 The actual number of individuals 

involved is not trivial; Almir Džuvo, the director of 

the Intelligence and Security Agency of BiH (OSA), 

estimated in July 2010 that there were 3,000 potential 

terrorists in Bosnia, out of a population of just under 

four million people.29

Two conclusions can be drawn from these assessments. First, the level of terrorist activity in Bosnia 

does appear comparable to levels elsewhere in Europe—although, if the Bosnian official cited above is 

right, any optimism should be guarded at best. Second, just because the terrorist threat is not unusual 

does not mean it is not necessarily unimportant. Comparisons with Western Europe can be misleading, as 

terrorism is much more dangerous to a fragile state 

than to a robust democracy.
12

Wahhabis. 

One mujahideen leader predicted in 1996 that 

“[f]oreign fighters will not be a problem for Bosnia. 

They will move on. But we planted a seed here and 

you will have more and more Bosnian Muslims practicing traditional Islam.”30 The most obvious sign of 

this trend are the so-called Wahhabis, adherents of the 

fundamentalist Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia.

Estimates of the numbers of Wahhabis or members 

of similar sects vary widely. Observers were surprised 

by the crowd of more than 3,000 people, half of them 

Bosnians, who attended the funeral of a Wahhabist 

leader in 2007,31 as well as by a 2013 conference in Tuzla that drew 500 participants, mostly young men.32

Given that an estimated 4,000 people gather each Friday to hear radical sermons preached at the Saudibacked King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo,33 the number 

of Wahhabis could be quite high. But the most likely 

figure is that given by Federation police (not the police 

of the Serb Republic), who estimated in 2009 that there 

were up to 5,000 practicing Bosnian Wahhabis.34

Unsurprisingly, the Wahhabis recruit followers 

from the least privileged classes: 

Bosnian Wahhabis largely target youth with few economic opportunities and [the] downtrodden, both 

from rural areas. They keenly take advantage of poverty, lack of education and poor social services, offering young people and refugees a variety of opportunities, including jobs, income and fellowship. There 

have been cases in which new members are paid several hundred euros per month for their loyalty. There 

is also evidence that members are paid for convincing their wives to wear the hijab in public, among 

other things.35
13

The Saudi role in this process is extensive. The 

Saudis financed an extensive mosque-building program after the war, of which the $30-million King 

Fahd Mosque36 is only the most visible and influential, 

and built a parallel religious educational structure to 

that offered by the official Islamic Community.37 The 

Saudis are also believed to fund various Wahhabi 

groups, to educate young Bosnians in Saudi Arabia, 

and to send operatives to Bosnia who typically marry 

Bosnian women and blend into local society.38

As the Wahhabi movement has gained momentum, militants have engaged in violent clashes with 

traditional Bosniaks and sought to impose their standards of behavior on the public. Young and charismatic Wahhabi preachers travel through Western Europe 

and the Balkans, lecturing and giving sermons; they 

maintain popular websites full of jihadist propaganda 

and incitement to terror. One prominent preacher is 

known for a pro-jihadist, anti-American song that he 

performs at weddings and other social events:

American and other adversaries should know

That now the Muslims

Are one like the Taliban

Listen, brothers,

Believers of the world

With dynamite on their chest

Lead the path to dzennet (heaven).39

Some Bosniaks have always been anti-American, 

but the vast majority were openly grateful to the United States for intervening to stop the war and then to 

keep the peace. No recent polls appear to have measured how these views may have changed. It is, however, unrealistic to expect young people born during 
14

or after the war to share that sense of gratitude, or indeed, to expect older people to continue to feel gratitude as the political system imposed at Dayton fails to 

deliver results.

While Wahhabi violence and proselytization are 

quite visible, these Islamists are even better known 

for their separatist enclaves, which function as “nogo-zones.” The inhabitants of these enclaves reject 

the authority of the Bosnian government and instead 

impose a strict interpretation of sharia. The first such 

enclave was in the village of Bocinja Donja, formerly a 

Bosnian Serb village, where the Bosniak government 

settled former mujahideen after the war.

The mujahideen married Bosnian women and so 

acquired Bosnian citizenship. The village provided 

them a safe haven in which to maintain their terrorist contacts under the guise of simple farmers. In the 

1990s, the hostility of the inhabitants of Bocinja Donja 

to outsiders, including SFOR, was palpable, undermining their claims of innocence. Eventually the enclave was closed down, and the village returned to 

its original owners. Now the best-known enclave is in 

Gornja Maoča, a remote village where native Bosnians 

reside along with foreign-born former mujahideen. 

While the Bosnian Serbs continue to insist that 

these enclaves pose a significant security risk, Bosniak policy has been bifurcated. One the one hand, 

there has been pressure to isolate and marginalize 

the Wahhabis, in the hope of making any problems 

go away. Analyst Stephen Schwartz speculates that 

Bosniak political leaders have “pursued a strategy 

of trying to confine the Wahhabi agitators to remote 

locations, rather than settling the problem by consequential legal proceedings.”40 Not all Bosniak officials 

are willing to settle for this approach, however. The 
15

authorities have made numerous arrests, including 

a massive 2010 raid on Gornja Maoča and the arrests 

of two of the enclave’s leaders following the 2011 attack on the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo. Up to now, 

though, they have failed to obtain an indictment, let 

alone a conviction. As a result, a cloud of mystery 

is likely to cloak Gornja Maoča and other similar 

enclaves for some time to come, making it difficult 

to determine the degree of danger they pose to Bosnia’s internal security or their potential links to international terrorism. 

Some observers caution that many Wahhabis are 

peaceful and should not be classified as terrorists, for 

fear of driving them into the arms of groups espousing violence.41 The Islamic Community, the official 

Muslim religious organization in Bosnia, has refused 

to condemn the Wahhabis and attacks those who 

criticize them. But the Bosniak public remains unpersuaded; when last asked, 71 percent rejected Wahhabism, suggesting that this form of Islam remains for 

them both distinct from traditional Bosnian Islam and 

unwelcome.42

The Wahhabis do not yet appear to have gained 

control of any significant governmental or official religious offices. Nor, although actual numbers are hard 

to estimate, have they created no-go zones in urban 

areas, as has happened in Western Europe. This lack 

of progress is most likely due to visceral opposition 

from local Bosniaks. Attempts to take over mosques 

have ended in violence; in one instance, a resident 

commented: “They should shave their beards and use 

deodorant instead of coming here like dogs. For me, 

they are wolf-dogs, they will attack our children. I 

have female children and do not dare to send them to 

[the religious school] at all.”43 These locals’ contempt 

of the Wahhabis is unmistakable.
16

Yet, current descriptions of the Federation suggest it is much more radicalized than was the case in 

the late-1990s. Given that the trend is pointing in the 

wrong direction, it would be foolish to regard Wahhabism as purely marginal, especially when an expert 

like Sarajevo professor Rešid Hafizović describes it as 

a “potentially deadly virus” for Bosnian Muslims.44

When times are hard and the future is bleak, such 

movements can gain momentum quickly.

ISLAMIST TIES OF SENIOR BOSNIAK LEADERS

Islamists are active not only in Bosnia, but throughout Western Europe and the United States. One factor that makes them a greater danger in Bosnia than 

elsewhere, though, is their close connection to Bosniak 

leaders, in particularly three men (Bakir Izetbegović, 

Haris Silajdžić, and Alija Izetbegović). These men 

have occupied the Bosniak chair of the central state’s 

rotating presidency since its establishment. The danger of the Islamists in Bosnia has also been increased 

by their closeness to Mustafa Cerić, the mufti who 

until recently headed Bosnia’s official Islamic Community. 

Those men, along with their associates and subordinates, have pursued policies inimical to the views 

and goals of moderate Muslims, and those of Bosnian 

Serbs and Croats. They have supported Islamist terrorism and Wahhabism, encouraged alienation between Bosniaks and other Bosnians, and sought closer 

ties with Islamist countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran. 

Bakir Izetbegović.

The most prominent Bosniak official today is Bakir 

Izetbegović, the current Bosniak member of the Presi-
17

dency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.45 Bakir served during the war as personal assistant and advisor to his 

father, Alija Izetbegović, who was then President of 

Bosnia. After the war, from 1999 to 2003, Bakir was a 

member of the managing board of the humanitarian 

Islamic charity, Merhamet. Like other Islamic charities, Merhamet used its humanitarian work as a cover 

during the war to deliver weapons to Bosnia.46

 It is unlikely that Izetbegović, as a personal assistant to the President, would have been unaware of 

these activities. Nor could he have been unaware of 

the initiative to bring mujahideen into Bosnia. In fact, 

Dževad Galijašević, a former Party of Democratic Action (SDA) official, in 2008, accused Izetbegović of being one of the chief protectors of the mujahideen who 

remained in Bosnia after the war.47

Bakir, who for years directed the Construction Bureau of Sarajevo Canton, was involved in the construction of the King Fahd Mosque and reportedly arranged 

for the land on which the complex was built, previously owned by Serbs, to be donated to the Saudis.48 This 

mosque, the largest house of worship for Muslims in 

the Balkans, is also known for its key role as the center 

of Wahhabi influence and power in Bosnia.49 As such, 

it represents the antithesis of the moderate Islam traditionally practiced in Bosnia. Izetbegović’s connection to the mosque suggests that he does not share the 

antipathy of many of his fellow Bosniaks for the type 

of Islam that it propagates.

Another indication of Bakir’s ideological orientation comes from his involvement in a secular initiative to advance the observance of sharia, a key Islamist 

goal and one that is vehemently opposed by moderate Bosniaks. He was responsible for coordinating the 

construction of the Bosna Bank International (BBI) 
18

Center in Sarajevo, described as “the only commercial 

shopping mall in Bosnia and Herzegovina that has 

prohibited sales of pork and alcohol.”50 The BBI Center 

was built by the BBI, the only bank in Bosnia to offer 

sharia-compliant finance.51 Among the principal goals 

of sharia-compliant finance is enhancing the appeal of 

an Islamic political order. Another is to generate funds 

that can be used to advance Islamist goals.52

Finally, Bakir Izetbegović is known for his sympathies toward Iran. During his tenure in the BiH 

presidency, bilateral ties between Bosnia and Iran 

have expanded, including in trade and investment.53

Izetbegović called for even closer Iranian-Bosnian ties 

during a meeting with then Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in February 2013 in Cairo, Egypt, 

on the margins of an Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meeting.54 While a small country like Bosnia 

naturally seeks to maintain good ties with powerful 

countries, these initiatives stand out, coming as they 

did at a time when the UN, the United States, and the 

EU have put sanctions in place to isolate the regime 

in Tehran.

Some of those connections are particularly controversial. The Sarajevo weekly Slobodna Bosna reported 

that, according to the Iranian opposition, the Iranian 

Ibn Sina Institute in Sarajevo, described as a scientific 

research institute, is, in fact, the IRGC’s headquarters 

in the Balkans. The magazine also questioned the 

bona fides of some 200 Iranian “businessmen” who 

entered Bosnia in the first half of 2012, noting that they 

appeared to lack business contacts.55

The controversy only grows when official Iranians 

are alleged to have connections to Islamist terrorism. 

In the spring of 2013, Bakir became embroiled in a dispute with Bosniak political rival Fahrudin Radončić, 
19

a former businessman who is currently the state-level 

minister of security.56 Bakir reportedly intervened 

to oppose expelling two Iranian diplomats whom 

Radončić had accused of improper activities and declared personae non grata.

57 The diplomats eventually 

left, and a third was expelled in June 2013.58 Two of 

the three had reportedly made contact with the Wahhabist leader in Gornja Maoča.59 While no one has alleged any direct contact between Izetbegović and the 

Iranian diplomats, or between him and the enclave of 

Gornja Maoča, the reports do raise questions about 

whether Bosnia’s most senior Bosniak politician is 

opening the door to Iranian intelligence services and 

terrorist operatives. 

Haris Silajdzić.

Izetbegović’s predecessor in the tri-presidency was 

Haris Silajdzić. A prominent SDA politician, Silajdzić 

was a former close associate of Alija Izetbegović and 

a senior member of his wartime cabinet, serving first 

as foreign minister and then as prime minister. During that time, he also oversaw directly the effort to 

bring mujahideen to Bosnia.60 Silajdzić was an effective 

spokesman for the Bosniak cause, making the case 

that his side was Western, secular, and democratic. 

However, his true convictions apparently lay with the 

mujahideen: In July 1995, he declared an Islamic holy 

war on Sarajevo TV and invited all Islamic states to 

fight on the side of Bosnia’s Muslims.61

After the war, Silajdzić’s political career took several twists and turns. He continued to hold high government positions, but in 1997, he left the SDA to form 

the Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He resigned his 
20

government and party positions abruptly on September 21, 2001, reportedly because of his radical connections,62 but remerged 5 years later to win the election 

to the tri-presidency.

In 2006, Silajdzić ran on a platform to abolish 

the Federation and the Serb Republic entities and 

strengthen the central Bosnian state—an unacceptable 

proposal for any official of the Serb Republic. In office, he engaged in a very public and polarizing dispute with Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik, thereby 

contributing to the radicalization of Bosnian society. 

In the opinion of analyst Steven Oluic, Silajdzić took 

Bosnian society and politics back to the painful days 

of 1995. It is also noteworthy that the Iranian government not only expressed pleasure at his election 

but pledged him its continuing support.63 In 2008, 

Silajdzić was among those identified by Galijašević as 

one of the chief Bosnian protectors of the mujahideen

since the war.

64 Looking at all these factors, there can 

be little doubt of Silajdžić’s Islamist convictions, despite his ability to appeal to Western audiences as a 

secularist democrat supposedly committed to multinationalism.65

Alija Izetbegović. 

Neither of those men, however, has had as lasting an impact on Bosnian politics and society as Alija 

Izetbegović, Bakir’s father. Izetbegović, the man affectionately called “Dedo” (Grandpa) by many Bosniaks,66 was Bosnia’s president during the war and 

then the first Bosniak member of the tri-presidency. 

Throughout, he became the embodiment and symbol of embattled Muslims. Many U.S. policymakers 

considered him a leading proponent of multiethnic 
21

democracy and tolerance. Yet, Izetbegović left numerous signs pointing to his Islamist ideology. Even 

more importantly, he succeeded in forming an Islamist cadre of insiders, including Haris Silajdzić and 

Bakir Izetbegović, which remains highly influential 

today and has done much to shape Bosnia’s post-war 

history.

Izetbegović’s Islamist ideology is laid out in his famous political manifesto, The Islamic Declaration,

67 for 

which, during the 1980s, he was sentenced to 5 years 

in prison.68 Some excerpts, shown in Box 2, provide 

disturbing insights into his thinking.

Box 2

The Islamic Declaration on Islamic Government 

and Society.

• . . . the Islamic order posits two fundamental assumptions: an Islamic society and 

Islamic governance. . . . An Islamic society 

without an Islamic authority is incomplete 

and without power; Islamic governance 

without an Islamic society is either utopia 

or violence (p. 26).

• There can be neither peace nor coexistence 

between the Islamic religion and nonIslamic social and political institutions 

(p. 30). 

• . . . the Islamic movement should and can 

start to take over power as soon as it is 

morally and numerically strong enough 

to be able to overturn not only the existing 

non-Islamic government, but also to build 

up a new Islamic one. . . . (p. 56). 
22

Simply put, Muslims living in a non-Muslim majority country should play by the rules of that country—until they are strong enough to overthrow the 

system and install an Islamic government. Nothing 

in the Declaration suggested any compromise toward 

this goal. 

Most Westerners ignored the Declaration or dismissed its contents on the assumption that it had been 

attacked by the Yugoslav government simply because 

it was an anti-communist tract. But the Declaration was 

much more than that—and it was politically relevant 

after the fall of Yugoslavia. It was published in 1990 

(before that, it was distributed secretly only)69 and 

later distributed to the troops of the Bosniak army.70

Since then, the Declaration has figured prominently 

in Bosniak-Serb political disputes. Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzić and Milorad Dodik have both 

testified before the International Criminal Tribunal 

for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, The 

Czech Republic, that Izetbegović intended to build an 

Islamic state in Bosnia based on the concepts set out in 

the Declaration.

71

Accusations of Izetbegović’s continued commitment to the ideology of the Declaration were consistent 

with his marked preference for the Islamist regime in 

Iran. That preference first surfaced in 1983, when he 

was accused of seeking Iranian support for his cause.72

Izetbegović visited Iran in May 1991 as president of 

Bosnia and obtained assurances of Iranian support a 

year prior to the outbreak of hostilities.73 His heavy reliance on Iran during the war presumably reinforced 

his view of the Iranian Islamist regime as a genuine 

ally. This positive view of Iran, as shown previously, 

appears to be shared by his son, Bakir.
23

Ideology is, of course, of little impact without an 

organization to implement it. Izetbegović created such 

an organization in the late-1980s: the SDA. Although 

the SDA gave the impression of being a moderate 

Muslim party in order to win Bosniak votes and garner Western sympathy, its inner core was comprised 

of former Young Muslims.74 The Young Muslims was 

the conspiratorial group, patterned after the Muslim 

Brotherhood, which Izetbegović had joined in 1941. 

It based its operations and program on Islamism,75

and one of its main principles was the unification 

of the Muslim world through the creation of a large 

Muslim state.76

Although the Yugoslav government did its best 

to stamp out the group, it survived underground for 

decades. Some of its leading members (Hasan Čengić, 

Omer Behmen, Edhem Bičakčić, Huso Zivalj, and 

Ismet Kasumagic), imprisoned with Izetbegović in 

1983, were assigned the most sensitive and important 

tasks during the war. Hasan Čengić, for example, sat 

on the board of directors of the Third World Relief 

Agency (TWRA). TWRA was the principal conduit 

for sending money (much of it from Iran) and arms 

to Bosnia.77 Omer Behmen handled SDA personnel 

matters78 before working the other end of the pipeline as ambassador to Iran. Muhammed Sacirbey, 

Izetbegović’s wartime ambassador to the UN, was the 

son of Nedžib Šaeirbegović who had been imprisoned 

with Izetbegović after World War II.79 Nedžib was appointed ambassador-at-large to Islamic countries.80

Several Young Muslims continued their political 

careers in the post-war period: Zivalj became Bosnia’s 

ambassador to the UN, and Bičakčić became prime 

minister of the Federation. After the war, Čengić 

served as Federation deputy defense minister until the 
24

United States forced his dismissal.81 Behmen focused 

on ideology, working actively with Islamist youth organizations and educational institutions on a so-called 

“third offensive” of the Young Muslims movement.82

The fortunes of most of these individuals have 

attracted little attention from U.S. policymakers, but 

the same cannot be said for the activity that first drew 

Western attention to Izetbegović’s Islamist connections: his decision to bring mujahideen to Bosnia. His 

personal connections reached the very top of al-Qaeda: during the war Osama Bin Laden, who had been 

issued a Bosnian passport, reportedly met Izetbegović 

in his Sarajevo office.83

After the war, all foreign fighters were required to 

leave Bosnia under the terms of the Dayton Peace Accords. Despite the best efforts of IFOR and the U.S. 

Government, many still remained in the country—

and Izetbegović protected them. He openly supported 

supposedly disbanded mujahideen military units,84

while numerous murders and other acts of violence, 

particularly against Bosnian Croats living in the Federation, were carried out by those same mujahideen

and their Bosnian accomplices.85

These were not just random acts of violence in a 

lawless post-war period. Rather, the SDA was using 

the mujahideen “as powerful leverage in a struggle 

to maintain an ethnic majority in previously mixed 

regions of Central Bosnia and Sarajevo. . . .”86 In the 

process, Bosnia itself became the victim: Independent 

Bosniak journalist Senad Avdić reportedly accused 

the party of turning the country into “a European 

dump for all kinds of scum, murderers, terrorists, 

and adventurers of all sorts who have earned the 

status of equal citizens of this country with ‘selam’ 

and ‘tekbir’.”87
25

During the same period, more than 200 Iranian 

agents reportedly infiltrated Bosniak political and social circles as well as the U.S. “Train and Equip” military program, collaborating closely with a pro-Iranian 

faction within the Bosniak intelligence service. These 

agents aimed to gather information, sow dissension 

between Bosniak and Croat participants in “Train and 

Equip,” and turn Bosniak leaders against the West. 

It is highly unlikely that Izetbegović was unaware of 

this activity, as the Bosniak intelligence service at that 

time reported directly to him.88

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 

a number of terrorists were apprehended, and the 

charities funding them were closed. Then moderate 

political parties won a national election, and Munir 

Alibabić, a senior Bosniak security expert known for 

opposing al-Qaeda and the Iranian influence, was 

appointed head of the Federation Intelligence and 

Security Service.89

In May 2002, Alibabić arrested five senior Bosniak 

officials connected to the SDA on suspicion of terrorism and espionage. The officials were allegedly linked 

to the murders of Croats, bomb blasts at Catholic 

sites, and two high-profile assassinations. The SDA 

protested; all were released in October 2002, and no 

indictment was ever brought.90 Instead, Alibabić was 

dismissed by OHR’s High Representative Paddy Ashdown for mishandling intelligence information.91

The SDA soon returned to power, making revelations of its misdeeds even more unlikely, while at 

the same time, the accusations fester and suspicions 

remain regarding their Islamist sympathies. As one 

analyst wrote, “There are countless examples of local 

authorities in Bosnia failing to act properly against Islamic extremism. The majority of these criminal cases 

have not been resolved and when the terrorists are 
26

identified the trials take years.”92 The SDA top leadership may be innocent of the charges leveled against it, 

but it has made no effort to clear the air. 

Much about Izetbegović’s wartime activities might 

have become known had he lived longer: At the time 

of his death in 2003, the ICTY was investigating him 

for alleged war crimes. However, after he died, the 

ICTY closed its investigation, thus shutting off a major 

avenue of inquiry that might have illuminated some 

of these murky postwar terrorist activities.

Mustafa Cerić.

Much of the support for Bosniak nationalist parties and policies comes from former Grand Mufti of 

Sarajevo Mustafa Cerić. For years, he led the Islamic 

Community, the official Muslim organization in Bosnia. Despite his position in a religious hierarchy, Cerić 

“has been and is playing an increasingly important 

political role among Bosniaks, that often surpasses 

that of any politician,” according to a Bosnian human 

rights advocate.93 Like Silajdzić, Cerić set himself up 

in opposition to Dodik, continuing wartime rhetoric 

by portraying Bosniaks as victims in mortal danger 

from the Serbs. 

Feted in Western Europe as a moderate Muslim, 

Cerić enjoys a different reputation at home, where he 

is known as “homo duplex,” the man with two faces. 

This nickname arises from numerous indications that 

he is anything but “moderate”—a judgment based on 

his ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, his view regarding the imposition of sharia, and his positions on Wahhabism. These range from refusing to condemn it to 

hurling accusations of Islamophobia at anyone who 

criticizes it.
27

Cerić’s current ties to the Muslim Brotherhood 

arise from his membership in two pan-European organizations: the European Council for Research and 

Fatwa, a Brotherhood-linked group chaired by Sheikh 

Yousef al-Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of the Brotherhood, and the UK-based “Radical Middle Way,” 

which includes a wide range of scholars associated 

with the global Muslim Brotherhood.94

On several occasions, Cerić has publicly advocated 

positions consistent with Brotherhood ideology. For 

example, in 2006, he issued the document, “A Declaration of European Muslims,” in which he declared 

European Muslims (including Bosniaks) fully committed to the values of democracy and human rights 

but called, among other things, for the partial implementation of sharia.

95 Several years later he argued, in 

a speech in Berlin, Germany, that implementing sharia

would not be contrary to Bosnia’s constitution—a position that would probably surprise most Bosniaks.96

Over the years, Cerić has refused to condemn 

Wahhabism. His position stands in stark contrast to 

that of representatives and leaders of the Islamic Community in Montenegro, who did not hesitate to condemn Wahhabist activities.97 Cerić has implied that 

his stance simply reflects his relative weakness. The 

King Fahd Mosque and many other religious institutions funded by the Saudis who spread Wahhabism 

are not under the control of the Islamic Community. 

When asked if Saudi funding was deleterious, Cerić 

replied that Bosnia was in no position to turn down 

money from Saudi Arabia, which, after all, was an ally 

of the West.98

But Cerić goes far beyond what would be required 

if he were simply bowing to a stronger player. He attacks critics of Wahhabism for being “Islamophobes” 

(a well-known, if poorly-defined, term coined by the 
28

Muslim Brotherhood), and has led the way in developing the concept of “good” versus “bad” Bosniaks. 

As the Embassy in Sarajevo reported in a 2009 classified cable released by Wikileaks: 

‘Good Bosniaks,’ according to this sentiment, are those 

who espouse conservative political and religious ideals. More moderate and secular ideals are, by implication, held by ‘bad Bosniaks.’ Statements from the 

Islamic Community, particularly its leader, [Grand 

Mufti] Cerić, that label those who criticize Islamic 

Community as ‘Islamophobic’ have sharpened this 

polarization among Bosniaks.99

Indeed, in 2010 and 2011, the Islamic Community 

issued reports on Islamophobia, cataloguing all the 

statements and actions that it believes express intolerance, hate, and hostility against Islam and Muslims. 

The definition deliberately obscures any differences 

among Muslims.100

In 2012, Cerić was replaced as Grand Mufti by 

Hussein Effendi Kavazović, the mufti of Tuzla who is 

considered close to Cerić.101 The well-known observer 

group, International Crisis Group (ICG), recently suggested that “[t]he Islamic community’s best contribution would be to help craft a vision for Bosnia that 

Croats and Serbs can share.”102 The Islamic Community, after years of Cerić’s leadership, has a long way 

to go to address the Islamism in its midst. Until that 

happens, the Community is unlikely to produce a unifying vision that all Bosnians can support. 

In fact, the long-term impact of the Islamism of 

these men and their colleagues, subordinates, and 

supporters will most likely be extremely detrimental to the future of the country. Bosniak terror expert 

Dževad Galijašević describes the danger vividly:
29

Active Islamism is pushing one’s own nation in the 

whirlpool of problems of other Islamic countries. It is 

getting Bosnian Muslims interested in events in the 

Arab world, in the Iranian revolution, in the Islamic 

Republic of Pakistan. It is bringing Bosnia closer to 

Palestine. It is turning Muslims’ true historical brothers, Serbs and Croats, into eternal and irreconcilable 

enemies, and turning Arabs into the only and actual 

brothers who look, behave, and talk differently and 

have a completely different view of the family, the 

state, and themselves.103

The following section examines in more detail the 

way in which Islamism promotes alienation among 

Bosnian ethnic groups.

ISLAMISM AND INTER-ETHNIC TENSIONS

Analysts often blame the failure to build a Bosnian 

state on the Serbs and Croats. Certainly, members of 

both ethnic groups have contributed to that failure, 

in part by their own actions and in part because of 

the external “pull” from a neighboring state. Croatia offers Bosnian Croats refuge in a country that is 

becoming Western, joining NATO and the EU, and 

achieving prosperity—unlike Bosnia—and some Croats have already left. Bosnian Serbs have not been 

so lucky: Serbia and the vision of Greater Serbia are 

languishing in the political, economic, and social 

doldrums. Yet, Serbia was once an economic powerhouse, and even today Bosnian Serbs dream about 

reuniting the Serb Republic with it, regardless of any 

practical difficulties. 

It is wrong, however, to disregard the “push” factors (aside from the poor economy) that also exert a 

powerful influence on Bosnian Serbs and Croats. One 
30

very important factor is embedded in Balkan history 

during the period when the Ottoman Empire enforced 

sharia. Sharia covers all aspects of life, not just religious 

doctrine and practice, and applies to non-Muslims as 

well as to Muslims. It grants Islam a privileged, protected status, and conflicts directly with Western concepts such as freedom of speech and religion and universal human rights. There is no equality before the 

law; for example, men have more rights than women, 

and Muslims have more rights than non-Muslims. 

Non-Muslims are not allowed to rule over Muslims.104

Under the Ottomans, in accordance with sharia, 

non-Muslims were “tolerated;” that is, they were allowed to maintain their religious communities and 

laws but enjoyed fewer rights than Muslims in a system now referred to as dhimmitude. The presence of 

non-Muslims was tolerated as long as they played by 

the rules. Failure to do so meant that they were no longer protected and could be killed.105

Bosnian Serbs and Croats have not forgotten this 

system of dhimmitude. When Bosniak politicians talk 

about tolerance, Serbs and Croats suspect that they really mean a political system in which Muslims dominate. Similarly, Serbs and Croats dismiss Bosniak 

leaders’ affirmations of their commitment to multiethnicity, since under sharia, “multiethnic” means 

that many different ethnicities co-exist peacefully—

but only under Muslim domination and according to 

strict rules. 

These tensions would exist to some degree, regardless of which political ideology was dominant among 

Bosniaks. As historian Aleksa Djilas described the 

problem in 1992:
31

Muslims imagined Bosnia as an independent state 

in which they would predominate. Although it was 

only Muslim extremists who thought non-Muslims 

should be expelled from Bosnia, most Muslim leaders believed only a Muslim should be allowed full 

citizenship. Religious Muslims based their demand 

for supremacy on the traditional belief that the rule 

of non-Muslims over Muslims was blasphemous. But 

most Muslims were typical nationalists. They wanted 

more for their group. . . .106

Islamists do, in fact, hold more extreme views 

than do traditional Muslims regarding the treatment 

of non-Muslims. The results are obvious in numerous 

countries today where the Muslim Brotherhood, along 

with other Islamist groups, has contributed greatly to 

the destruction of property, torture, murder, and mass 

migration of non-Muslims from lands where they had 

lived for over 1,400 years. 

In his Islamic Declaration,

107 Alija Izetbegović, took 

a less extreme position regarding non-Muslims, but 

one that nevertheless provides no comfort to Bosnian 

Serbs and Croats. The Declaration’s message is simple: 

Muslims should play by the democratic rules until 

they are strong enough to impose an Islamic state. 

Once there is an Islamic state, non-Muslims may remain, but only in a subordinate status. If Christians 

abandoned their religious organization, Izetbegović 

was prepared to offer them “understanding and cooperation.” (See Box 3.)
32

Box 3

The Islamic Declaration on Living 

with Non-Muslims.

Muslims in a non-Islamic state:

• Muslim minorities within a non-Islamic 

community, provided they are guaranteed 

freedom to practice their religion, to live 

and develop normally, are loyal and must 

fulfill all their commitments to that community, except those which harm Islam 

and Muslims (p. 50).

• The position of Muslim minorities in nonIslamic communities will always in reality 

depend on the strength of the international 

Islamic community and the esteem in 

which it is held (p. 50).

Non-Muslim minorities in an Islamic state:

• The non-Muslim minorities within an 

Islamic state, provided they are loyal, enjoy religious freedom and all protection 

(p. 50).

• [W]e differentiate between Christ’s teaching and the church. The former we regard 

as the pronunciation of God, deformed on 

some points, and the latter as an organization, which . . . has become not only nonIslamic, but anti-Christian. (p. 68)

• If Christians so wish, the future may offer 

an example of understanding and cooperation between two great religions for the 

well-being of people and mankind (p. 68).
33

The influence that Islamists hold in Bosnia is also 

key with regard to their publicly stated goal of establishing a global Caliphate. The Caliphate last existed 

under the Ottoman Empire. While talking about it may 

baffle or bemuse Westerners, the reference is all too 

clear to inhabitants of the Balkans. This Islamist goal 

is dangerous because it also appeals to non-Islamist 

Muslims and because it is shared by two increasingly 

important foreign players: Turkey and the OIC. 

The importance of Bosnia to Turkey has been abundantly clear ever since Turkey joined the UN wartime 

peacekeeping mission there in the 1990s. The Turkish 

military remained in its headquarters in Zenica after 

the cessation of hostilities and joined the IFOR/SFOR 

mission. The military transitioned seamlessly to the 

EUFOR Althea follow-on mission, where Turkey is 

now the second largest troop-contributing nation.108

In recent years, Turkey has used its relative economic strength to build influence in the Balkans. Its 

trade with those countries has increased, as has its 

investment in Bosnia. On the cultural side, Turkish 

companies have built the largest university campus 

in the Balkans in Ilidža, a suburb of Sarajevo.109 These 

developments are all the more visible, given the absence of increased investment from Europe or the 

United States. Turkish diplomats have also been very 

active in seeking to promote reconciliation among the 

Balkan countries. 

Regional conciliation and economic development 

are laudable goals, and even cultural ties with Turkey 

are welcomed by many ethnic groups.110 The nostalgia 

of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and 

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu for the Ottoman 

Empire, however, is more likely to raise the hackles 

of non-Muslims.111 A good example of this is the con-
34

troversy provoked by remarks that Davutoğlu made 

at a 2009 Sarajevo conference on “Ottoman Heritage 

and Muslim Communities in the Balkans Today.” His 

speech was ambiguous: He proclaimed that “[n]ow is 

the time for reunification” in the form of “reestablishing ownership in the region, through reestablishing 

multicultural coexistence, and through establishing a 

new economic zone.”112 He did not specify what he 

meant by “reunification,” nor who the new owner 

would be, but he clearly meant Turkey to dominate. 

For those Bosnians who put Davutoğlu’s remarks in 

a historical context, his call for “multicultural coexistence” was likely to be interpreted as a reference to the 

Ottoman system of dhimmitude. Nor was it much more 

helpful to place the remarks in a modern context, given that Christians feel increasingly endangered in an 

even-more “Islamist” Turkey.113

Turkish “neo-Ottomanism” in itself is unlikely to 

become a credible threat to Bosnians, since the American Embassy in Ankara described Turkey as having 

“Rolls Royce ambitions, but Rover resources.”114 But 

the topic itself remains sensitive. Were the Bosniak 

leadership genuinely committed to reconciling Bosnia’s ethnic groups, it would presumably find some 

diplomatic way to cushion or rebut such statements.

In addition to its bilateral ties to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, Bosnia has observer status at the OIC, 

the international organization representing 56 Muslim 

countries and the Palestinian Authority. Saudi Arabia 

provides the most funding for the OIC; Iran, Pakistan, 

Malaysia, Indonesia, and Turkey are other leading 

members. While not an Islamist organization, the OIC 

is dedicated to advancing Islam throughout the world 

and to supporting Muslim minorities in non-Islamic 

countries. It shares the vision of a global Caliphate 

that implements sharia and, indeed, claims to be its 
35

present embodiment.115 From time to time, OIC members may be at odds with the Muslim Brotherhood, 

but both organizations nevertheless cooperate to promote mutual objectives. 

During an April 2013 visit to Sarajevo, OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu urged Bosnia 

to upgrade to full membership. Bakir Izetbegović 

suggested that full membership would be useful to 

Bosnia by giving it access to OIC development funding.116 Were this to occur, Bosnia would presumably 

have to adopt any existing OIC agreements or conventions, including the 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human 

Rights.117 The Cairo Declaration rules out any rights 

incompatible with the Koran. That principle negates 

much of Western human rights, such as equality for 

religious minorities and freedom of speech, including 

the right to criticize Islam. 

The OIC reinforces the tenets of the Cairo Declaration by means of annual reports on Islamophobia in 

Western countries, similar to the reports on Bosnia 

prepared by the Islamic Community. Bosnian OIC 

membership would probably give added impetus to 

this exercise, making it ever more difficult to criticize 

Islamist policies or groups. The OIC could be expected 

to show an active interest in Bosnian internal developments, as it recently resuscitated its Bosnia Contact 

Group from the early-1990s.118 There is little chance 

that the OIC would remain neutral regarding disputes 

between Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs and Croats. 

Given all these factors, Bakir Izetbegović’s comments in favor of full OIC membership were hardly 

designed to improve inter-ethnic relations. Bosnian Serbs and Croats may exaggerate the threat of 

Islamism or potential Islamic dominance, but the 

Bosniak leadership certainly provides them with 

plenty of ammunition. 
36

POTENTIAL SOURCES OF VIOLENCE

Many observers worry that the situation in Bosnia could spiral downward into violence, and call for 

Western intervention, whether political or military, to 

ward off such a development. This section reviews potential sources of destabilizing violence as a prelude to 

discussing Western options.

Few observers think that renewed inter-ethnic tension could lead to the level of violence that occurred 

in the early-1990s. Partly, this is because, as detailed 

previously, the impetus in Serbia or Croatia to fuel a 

civil war or to intervene directly is greatly reduced 

from what it was 2 decades ago.

Moreover, Bosnian military forces have undergone significant change. In 2006, the armies of the 

three “former warring factions” were melded into a 

unified Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

(AFBiH) under a central ministry of defense, and radically downsized. The force has a mandated strength 

of 10,000 professional soldiers, with a reserve of 5,000, 

and 1,000 civilian employees. According to a 2011 

study, actual troops are estimated to be only 8,500, of 

which an estimated 2,000 troops are required to guard 

defense sites containing arms and munitions. The 

reserves are inactive. Lack of funding constrains the 

army’s efforts to meet NATO standards and to contribute troops to NATO missions.119

The AFBiH, although small in size, is courted in today’s highly politicized environment. The 2011 study 

reported “numerous incidents . . . of political leaders 

addressing AFBiH officers and troops with nationalist 

statements at events with nationalist symbols, including politicians from neighboring states.”120 However, 
37

few think that the ethnically integrated command 

structure is likely to do anything rash. Rather, “[t]he 

general fear is not that the AFBiH will generate instability, but rather that it could fall victim to deepening 

political instability.”121

During and after the war, the separate secret police 

structures of the three ethnic groups were responsible 

for much mayhem and havoc. Today, they have, at 

least formally, been dismantled and their functions 

taken over since 2004 by the OSA. The OSA is charged 

with intelligence gathering to protect the security, territorial integrity, and constitutional order of Bosnia.122

OSA has been praised for its professional conduct 

and political independence.123 Unfortunately, it must 

share its responsibility for pursuing organized crime 

with the regular police forces and the judiciary, who 

remain more vulnerable to political pressure and corruption.124 In the polarized atmosphere of recent years, 

there is little chance this will change. OSA must also 

share its duty to combat terrorism with many other 

agencies. While Bosnia has made overall progress in 

this area, occasional lapses such as the mysterious disappearance from prison of the well-known terrorist 

Karay Kamel bin Ali, aka Abu Hamza, still occur.125

If Bosnia’s neighbors and its armed forces appear 

unlikely to initiate ethnic violence, that does not mean 

there is no threat. The authors of the 2011 security 

study cited previously, worry about the possibility of 

lower-level violence, which will most likely coalesce 

along ethnic lines. People who could be drawn into 

such violence include members of various domestic 

groups like football hooligans, special forces, and intelligence veterans now employed by private security 

companies, or individuals in the police forces and 

judiciary—two key institutions in which reforms to 
38

establish professionalism and impartiality remain incomplete.126 Such violence, while short of war, could 

nevertheless be devastating to regular, law-abiding 

Bosnians. 

THE U.S. POLICY ENVIRONMENT

For most Americans, the Balkans faded from view 

a decade ago, and Bosnia is a long-forgotten, remote 

place of no particular interest. At the time, however, 

the Bill Clinton administration and much of the foreign policy elite feted making and keeping the peace 

in Bosnia as a significant foreign policy achievement. 

The George H. W. Bush administration, initially skeptical, maintained the SFOR mission and then terminated it successfully. This success contrasts with the 

disillusionment over subsequent U.S. missions in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. 

Indeed, there was reason to celebrate. Conditions 

in Bosnia remained largely peaceful throughout the 9 

years of IFOR/SFOR deployment: SFOR retained its 

authority, kept casualties to a minimum, and helped 

bring about significant defense and military reforms. 

When SFOR departed in 2004, the handover to EUFOR 

was not only orderly and peaceful, but welcomed by 

the EU. It was not until 2 years after SFOR’s departure 

that Bosnia’s political environment began to unravel.

Geopolitically, there is much to be said for seeking to ensure that Bosnia retains its territorial integrity 

and Western orientation—that, like most other European countries, it joins both NATO and the EU. Yet, 

today, these desired outcomes are far from assured. 

Calls for a third, Croat entity or other forms of Croat 

separatism threaten the current fragile political balance within the Federation. Russia has courted the 
39

Bosnian Serbs as they call for secession and/or a referendum on NATO accession,127 and the OIC has done 

the same with the Bosniaks. Were Bosnia to split into 

three parts, the Bosniak rump state would come under 

strong pressure to join the OIC and could, in so doing, 

set a decidedly non-Western course.

The Europeans are as mindful of these risks as are 

the Americans, but the EU’s recent experiences have 

made them very pessimistic about what outsiders can 

do if Bosnians refuse to help themselves. In addition, 

the EU is preoccupied with urgent problems of its 

own, such as the recurring euro crisis. 

Nor is the EU equipped to resolve Bosnia’s interethnic tensions. On such issues, fuzzy rhetoric prevails, 

not constructive policies or actions. For example, EU 

Council President Herman Van Rompuy, in response 

to a complaint by Bosnian Croat Cardinal Vinko Puljić 

that Bosnian Muslim discrimination was driving out 

Catholics, countered that a “European perspective” 

(e.g., EU membership) “is the only way to overcome 

the crisis.”128 Exactly how this transformation would 

work is unclear, especially since the European Commission, in its 2012 annual report on Bosnia, devoted 

one short paragraph out of 60 pages to the issue of 

religious discrimination—and offered a high-level interfaith meeting as a remedy.129

Puljić had linked the tension between Muslims and 

Catholics to the growth of Islamism, arguing that “[t]

ime is running out as there is a worrisome rise in radicalism.” Yet, the Bosnian government has done more 

than its EU counterparts to combat Islamism. No EU 

government has conducted a raid like the one in 2010 

on the Wahhabist village of Gornja Maoča, despite 

the growth in various West European cities of similar, 

sharia-implementing enclaves. 
40

Instead, EU governments categorize these areas as 

no-go zones and advise non-Muslims to avoid them. 

They appear to have no plan for keeping sharia zones 

from undermining the democratic rule of law in their 

countries or from incubating or protecting terrorists. 

Expecting the EU to solve Bosnia’s current problems 

tied to Islamism is simply unrealistic. 

MILITARY OPTIONS

Given the deteriorating conditions in Bosnia, some 

have called for the United States to reassert leadership 

there before violence breaks out again. Two proposals 

by experts on Bosnia are worth examining: first, for 

a new military mission, and second, for accelerated 

Bosnian entry into NATO.

A New Military Mission. 

Janusz Bugajski of the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that ground forces must be 

deployed to avert violence. Unlike IFOR/SFOR, European nations should assume primary responsibility, 

while the United States provides “strong diplomatic, 

political, and logistical support.” The exercise would 

be backed by “a firmer trans-Atlantic strategic commitment to bringing all countries in the region into 

both NATO and the EU.”130

Bugajski’s proposal assumes that an international 

military force would not only forestall violence, but 

return Bosnia to a path of reform that would allow 

it to join NATO and the EU. However, hopes that a 

military mission could restart reforms appear to be 

based on a misreading of the past. SFOR and NATO’s 

follow-on military headquarters in Sarajevo were, in-
41

deed, instrumental in pushing for a unified Bosnian 

military, one of the major post-Dayton achievements. 

SFOR, however, had the authority to weigh in on defense sector reforms because military oversight fell 

within its purview under Annex 1A of the Dayton 

Peace Accords. 

It is by no means clear why another military mission would succeed in putting Bosnia back on track 

to join either organization. The stumbling block to 

NATO accession is purely political: The Bosnian Serbs 

are not only refusing to transfer military facilities to 

the central state but have called NATO membership 

itself into question. It would be suicidal for an international military mission to inject itself into this dispute. 

Nor could such a mission help promote EU accession, a far-more-complex and demanding process 

than NATO accession—covering everything from agriculture to finance to transport—and in which a military mission would have neither authority nor expertise. A military mission by itself is highly unlikely to 

somehow cajole or force Bosnians back onto the path 

of reform and nation-building. Although a military 

mission is unlikely to advance either NATO or EU accession, it could still appear attractive if an outbreak 

of violence were to threaten the gains made in Bosnia since Dayton. Again, the comparison with IFOR/

SFOR could prove misleading on several counts. 

First, IFOR/SFOR relied heavily on European 

troop contributors. Yet, the European experiences in 

Bosnia since SFOR’s departure in 2004 have not been 

positive. The EU-led EUFOR in Sarajevo has not fared 

well; it began with 7,000 troops in December 2004 and 

has since been reduced to a troop level of 600.131 This 

reduction reflects its drop in effectiveness. According 

to Azinovic et al, most observers believe that EUFOR’s 
42

visibility is its only contribution; that its ability to deter politically directed violence is very limited.132

In part, this decline is the result of troop requirements for other missions, as EU military forces are 

also required for NATO, UN, and national military 

missions. But it has also occurred because the EU political establishment has failed to support EUFOR. For 

example, in March 2011, the EU Political and Security 

Committee (PSC), charged with political control and 

strategic guidance for the mission,133 simply did not 

respond when told that EUFOR needed three times 

the existing force requirement.134 EUFOR’s composition reflects this lack of political commitment: West 

European countries have already pulled out, leaving 

Austria, Turkey, Hungary, and Bulgaria as the main 

troop contributors. 

Second, after several painful experiences, SFOR 

determined that the best units for dealing with lowlevel violence were paramilitary police or gendarmes 

(which the United States does not have). These units 

specialize in subduing civilian crowds like football 

hooligans and are much better equipped than regular soldiers to deal with “rent-a-mobs” that include 

women and children, or with other low-level threats 

encountered in Bosnia. Yet, the EUFOR withdrawals 

included European gendarmerie forces; today only 

some Turkish gendarmes remain in EUFOR.135 Their 

use against Serb or Croat crowds is probably limited.

Third, the United States cannot expect to project 

much influence by means of over-the-horizon forces. 

NATO now provides EUFOR such support; yet that 

alone is insufficient to boost EUFOR capabilities. Given European “Bosnia fatigue,” the inescapable conclusion is that any new mission would most likely have 

to include U.S. ground troops, of which Army units 

would be the principal component. 
43

Were U.S. policymakers at some point to contemplate a mission involving U.S. forces, they would need 

to factor in the increased danger from Islamism, particularly Islamist terrorism. For much of the 9 years of 

IFOR/SFOR operations in Bosnia, the mujahideen were 

forced into hiding. Izetbegović protected them, but his 

room for maneuvering was limited both by U.S. policy 

and by widespread pro-Americanism and anti-Wahhabism among Bosniaks. 

Nevertheless, IFOR/SFOR enjoyed only limited 

success in combating terrorism—unsurprisingly, as it 

was tasked primarily with maintaining a safe and secure environment. The list of high-profile international plots hatched during and after SFOR’s tenure (see 

Box 1) shows the difficulty a military force with only 

limited counterterrorist capabilities has in deterring 

such activity, especially when local officials shield the 

terrorists from outside pressure. 

Today’s NATO presence is no better equipped to 

deal with a terrorist threat. Counterterrorism is not 

even among the top three missions of the current 

NATO headquarters in Sarajevo.136 Nor would preparing Bosnia for NATO membership help, as the accession requirements revolve primarily around issues of 

democratic legitimacy and defense-sector capabilities. 

In addition, Islamist anti-Americanism has now 

had a chance to put down roots. How deep those roots 

are is hard to determine, but the possibility of jihadist violence against U.S. or Western troops is probably 

greater than it was previously. Some terrorists would 

likely be homegrown and able to blend more easily 

into the native population. Any new mission would 

have to factor this enhanced threat into its planning. 

Shortly before the Dayton Peace Accords and the 

start of IFOR, General Charles G. Boyd, USAF (Ret.), 
44

former deputy commander of the European Command, argued that the United States should give equal 

weight to the fears and aspirations of Serbs as well as 

to those of Muslims and Croats. He further argued 

that military action alone would not bring about a lasting peace.137 Eighteen years later, his analysis remains 

relevant. Political disputes are at the base of Bosnia’s 

problems, some of which reflect the destabilizing and 

deleterious impact of Islamism. Without a policy that 

addresses such problems, no military mission is likely 

to succeed. 

Accelerated NATO Membership. 

Balkan expert Edward P. Joseph wants the United 

States to refocus on achieving Bosnian membership in 

NATO rather than the EU, as it is more obtainable. He 

predicts that accelerated NATO membership would 

transform the political climate in Bosnia, ending any 

debate over changes to its territorial integrity.138 In a 

similar vein, military expert Steven Oluic writes that 

“Bosnia’s ability to resist extremism and radical Islam 

depends on continued Western engagement in the 

region and the recent phenomena of moderate Bosniaks challenging the radical Islamists and their ideologies.”139 Unfortunately, if the West pushes Bosnian 

Serbs to transfer military facilities to the central state 

without acknowledging or countering their concerns 

about Islamism or Muslim dominance, this move is 

unlikely to succeed and may only increase opposition 

to NATO. 

Bosnia’s eventual NATO membership would raise 

other issues, not only because part of the Bosniak political elite has ties to Islamist groups like the Muslim 

Brotherhood, but also because Bosnia is openly culti-
45

vating closer ties with Iran at a time when the Western 

world is united in applying sanctions to that country. 

It is also difficult to predict how Bosnia and other 

Balkan countries with large Muslim populations and 

growing Islamist influence will react to future NATO 

crisis operations in Muslim countries.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

This monograph has laid out in detail arguments 

against a new military mission in Bosnia. Nevertheless, should U.S. policymakers consider the possibility, the OSD and the JCS should point out the fact that 

such a mission is unlikely to solve Bosnia’s political 

problems or expedite NATO/EU membership but 

would instead face serious difficulties. Their analysis 

could draw on the extensive experience acquired by 

the U.S. Army during 9 years of IFOR/SFOR deployment in the country, as well as on the expertise gained 

by participation in the NATO headquarters unit 

in Sarajevo. 

The analysis could include:

• The reasons a military mission would be unlikely to advance Bosnia’s accession to NATO. 

In particular, NATO could hurt the process by 

putting pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to give 

more power to a central state they fear will be 

dominated by Muslims.

• A reminder that IFOR/SFOR and NATO success in unifying the armies of the three ethnic 

groups and in creating a central ministry of 

defense occurred in a sector where they had expertise and exercised authority. A new military 

mission would be unlikely to repeat that success in nonmilitary sectors.
46

• The difficult experience of our European Allies 

under the EUFOR and their decision to disengage from Bosnia make it unlikely that they 

would be willing to provide troops for a new 

mission.

• The threat of low-level violence and the limited 

ability of U.S. military troops to combat it make 

European gendarme forces critical. Yet, those 

troops are unlikely to be available.

• Security-related developments in the country 

have deteriorated since SFOR’s departure. Anti-Americanism has grown as poorer Bosnians 

are radicalized by Wahhabis or other Islamist 

groups, while homegrown Bosnian terrorists 

as well as former mujahideen may threaten U.S. 

personnel or facilities.

With regard to the expedited entry of Bosnia into 

NATO, OSD and JCS should ensure that policymakers focus on broader political issues that to date have 

received insufficient attention, particularly:

• The danger of pushing for a central state that 

Bosnian Serbs will never accept if they see it as 

a vehicle to reduce them to the status of secondclass citizens in a Muslim-dominated state.

• The danger of sharing classified information 

and decisionmaking with Bosnian politicians 

and representatives with ties to the Muslim 

Brotherhood and Iran.

To prepare for such a debate, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Army Europe 

(USAREUR) may wish to retrieve any available inhouse expertise and institutional memory on Bosnia, 

particularly among those who have served or are serv-
47

ing in those commands, as well as those who served 

on OSD’s Balkans Task Force. 

Unfortunately, the U.S. military presence in Europe is a shadow of what it was during the IFOR/

SFOR mission, and many such individuals have dispersed or been engaged for years in missions in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, or elsewhere. However, civilian analysts 

and political advisers, including individuals who 

served in the NATO headquarters in Sarajevo, may 

have valuable in-country experience to contribute. In 

addition, consulting present and past EUFOR participants could prove useful.

ENDNOTES

1. Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Slovenia have 

joined NATO, while Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia are members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 

Council. Of these, only Serbia has not indicated a desire to join 

NATO. Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Slovenia have joined the 

EU, and Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia have been accepted as candidates. Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina are potential 

candidates.

2. The United States “remain[s] committed to the Dayton 

principles of one sovereign and functional Bosnia and Herzegovina comprised of two vibrant entities and Brcko District and based 

on the equality of three constituent peoples and others.” See sarajevo.usembassy.gov/speech_20130703.html.

3. Lana Pasic, “Sources of Energy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Implications for Energy Security,” Balkananalysis.com, 

May 9, 2011.

4. Boris Divjak and Michael Pugh, “The Political Economy of 

Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, No. 3, June 2008, pp. 373-386.
48

5. “Improving Opportunities for Young People in Bosnia Herzegovina,” World Bank website, February 14, 2013.

6. “Ante Markovic’s testimony,” Novi List, October 24, 2003.

7. Ajdin Kamber, “Segregated Bosnian Schools Reinforce Ethnic Division,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, May 3, 2011.

8. Morton Abramowitz and James Hooper, “The Death of the 

Bosnian State,” The National Interest, July 20, 2011. The next census was held in October 2013. The State Department’s 2012 report 

on religious freedom cites a higher number, 15 percent, based on 

information from Bosnian statistical authorities. See www.ecoi.net/

local_link/247588/357813_en.html.

9. “Focus on Bosnia Herzegovina,” Gallup Balkan Monitor, 

GMB Focus on #04, November 2010.

10. Anes Alic and Vildana Skocajic, “Understanding Bosnia, 

Part One,” ISN Security Watch, February 26, 2009.

11. “Public Opinion Poll, Bosnia and Herzegovina, BiH, August 2010,” Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute, p. 5.

12. “Independent Evaluation of the National Youth Policy in 

Bosnia-Herzegovina,” UN, Sarajevo, April 29, 2005.

13. Index Mundi puts Bosnia’s estimated 2012 total fertility 

rate at 1.24 children born to each woman of childbearing age; a 

rate of 2.1 is required to maintain a population. See www.indexmundi.com/bosnia_and_herzegovina/demographics_profile.html.

14. See The Failed States Index 2013, available from ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable.

15. “NATO’s Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 

NATO website, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_

49127.htm.

16. Steven Woehrel, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Current Issues and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, (CRS) Report 

R40479, Washington, DC: CRS, January 24, 2013.
49

17. “Bosnia and Herzegovina 2012 Progress Report,” European Commission SWD (2012) 335 Final, Brussels, Belgium, October 

10, 2012, pp. 4-5. 

18. “Bosnia’s Human Rights Record Hinders EU talks.” 

EurAktiv.com, May 24, 2013.

19. See, for example, the European Commission’s belabored 

analysis: “[a] shared vision among the political representatives on 

the overall direction and future of the country and its institutional 

set-up for the qualitative step forward on the country’s EU path 

remain absent.” Quoted in “Commission Proposes Candidate 

Statue for Albania,” EurAktiv.com, October 11, 2012.

20. Christopher Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat 

of Radical Islam to Europe and the West, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007, p. 8.

21. Evan Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The AfghanBosnian Network, Oxford, UK: Berg, 2004, pp. xii-xiii.

22. John R. Schindler, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa’ida, and the 

Rise of Global Jihad, St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2007, pp. 295-309.

23. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe, pp. 224-225.

24. Suzana Mijatovic, “Tajna Diplomatska Ofanziva Iranaca u 

BiH,” Slobodna Bosna, October 25, 2012.

25. Christopher Deliso, “Israeli Security Concerns and the 

Balkans,” Balkananalysis.com, March 31, 2013, p. 14.

26. Woehrel, “Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

27. “Country Reports on Terrorism,” Washington, DC: US 

Department of State, May 20, 2013; and “EU Terrorism Situation 

and Trend Report, Te-Sat,” European Police Agency, 2013.

28. Quoted in Vlado Azinović, Kurt Bassuener, and Bodo 

Weber, “Assessing the Potential for Renewed Ethnic Violence in 

Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Security Risk Analysis,” Berlin, Germany: Atlantic Initiative and Democratization Policy Council, 

October 2011, p. 69.
50

29. Azinović, Bassuener, and Weber, “A Security Risk 

Analysis,” pp. 65-66.

30. Quoted in Vildana Skocajic and Anes Alic, “Understanding Bosnia, Part Four,” ISN Security Watch, March 12, 2009.

31. Anes Alic, “Wahhabism: from Vienna to Bosnia,” ISN, 

April 6, 2007.

32. Robert Coalson and Maja Nikolic, “Radical Islamists Seek 

to Exploit Frustration in Bosnia,” RFE/RL, March 1, 2013.

33. Walter Mayr, “Islamists Gain Ground in Sarajevo,” Islamist Watch, February 25, 2009.

34. Skocajic and Alic, “Understanding Bosnia, Part Four.” 

35. Ibid.

36. Sylvia Poggioli, “Radical Islam Uses Balkan Poor To Wield 

Influence,” NPR, October 25, 2010.

37. See Steven Oluic, “Radical Islam on Europe’s Frontier—

Bosnia & Herzegovina,” National Security and the Future, Vol. 1-2, 

No. 9, 2008, p. 42; and Ioannis Michaletos, “An Outlook of Radical 

Islamism in Bosnia.” Pakistan Christian Post, July 2, 2012.

38. “Saudis Tied to Domineering Wahabi Presence in Bosnia,” 

WorldTribune.com, March 27, 2007.

39. Nenad Pejic, “Wahhabist Militancy in Bosnia Profits from 

Local and International Inaction,” The Jamestown Foundation, 

Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 9, Issue 42, November 17, 2011.

40. Schwartz, “Bosnia Re-arrests Top Wahhabi Plotter.”

41. Juan Carlos Antunez Moreno, Foreign Influences in Islam in 

Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995, The Islam in South East Europe 

Forum (ISEEF), Sarajevo, Bosnia, 2010.
51

42. “Vast Majority of Bosnian Federation TV Viewers See 

Wahhabism as a Threat,” BBC, December 10, 2006.

43. Quoted in Stephen Schwartz, “Bosnia Cracks Down on 

Wahhabism,” The Weekly Standard, February 18, 2010.

44. Quoted in Boris Kanzleiter, “Wahhabi Rules: Extremism 

Comes to Bosnia,” World Politics Review, May 2, 2007.

45. See official Izetbegović biography, available from 

www.predsjednistvobih.ba/biogr/?cid=8148,1,1.

46. Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate, p. 7.

47. Soldo, “Muslim Politician Says Bosnian Al-Qa’idah Can 

‘Destabilize Europe’,” Vecernij list, December 11, 2007, translated 

by BBC Monitoring International Reports, December 14, 2007.

48. S. Dusanic, “Bakir Izetbegovic Gave Land to Saudi Committee as Present,” Glas Srpske, May 29, 2008, translated by BBC 

Montoring Europe, Political, May 29, 2008.

49. Walter Mayr, “The Prophet’s Fifth Column: Islamists Gain 

Ground in Sarajevo,” Der Spiegel, February 25, 2009. 

50. Berina Mulabegovic, “Who is Bakir Izetbegovic?” Globalia 

Magazine, May 12, 2010.

51. “Bosna Bank International Holds Annual Board Meeting 

in Dubai,” available from www.ameinfo.com, December 19, 2012. 

BBI shareholders include the Islamic Development Bank, the 

Dubai Islamic Bank, and the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank.

52. Timur Kuran, Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

2004, p. 6.

53. The two signed several memoranda of understanding on 

economic cooperation in 2010. The following year saw strengthened scientific and research ties between Iran and Bosnian universities, while in 2012, they pledged to expand economic ties. 

See “Iran, Bosnia Sign MoUs on Economic Cooperation,” Fars 

News Agency, May 1, 2010; “Iran, Bosnia Universities to Strength-
52

en Scientific, Research Ties,” IRNA, December 3, 2011; and “Iran, 

Bosnia Urge Enhancement of Bilateral Relations,” PressTV, April 

10, 2012.

54. “Izetbegovic Meets Ahmadinejad in Cairo,” BiH Dayton 

Project, February 8, 2013, available from www.bihdaytonproject.

com/?p=1793.

55. Mijatovic, “Tajna Diplomska Ofanziva Iranaca u BiH,” 

Slobodna Bosna, October 25, 2012.

56. Radončić was originally close to Alija Izetbegović. He has 

used nationalist rhetoric and donations to the Islamic Community 

to advance his political career. See “Bosnia—Good Bosniaks, Bad 

Bosniaks, Good Muslims, Bad Muslims,” State Department cable 

Sarajevo 103, January 27, 2009, provided courtesy of Wikileaks.

57. The report of Izetbegovic’s involvement appeared in an 

investigation by the Bosnian Serb newspaper, Glas Srbske, according to Benjamin Weinthal, “Bosnia Tells Iranian Spies to Leave 

to No Avail,” The Jerusalem Post, May 9, 2013. Also see Benjamin 

Weinthal, “Bosnia Expels Two Iranian Diplomats,” The Jerusalem 

Post, April 28, 2013; and Weinthal, “Bosnia Expels Alleged Iranian 

Spies,” The Jerusalem Post, May 19, 2013.

58. “Bosnia Expels Third Iranian Diplomat,” Iran Daily Brief, 

June 28, 2013, available from www.irandailybrief.com/2013/06/28/

bosnia-expels-third-iranian-diplomat/.

59. Mijatovic, “Tajna Diplomska Ofanziva Iranaca u BiH.” 

60. Oluic, “Radical Islam on Europe’s Frontier,” p. 46.

61. Schindler, Unholy Terror, p. 200.

62. “Haris Silajdzic: The Unexposed Zealot,” Toronto, Ontario, Canada: The Centre for Peace in the Balkans, October 2002.

63. Oluic, “Radical Islam on Europe’s Frontier,” p. 47.

64. Soldo, “Muslim Politician Says Bosnian Al-Qa’idah Can 

‘Destabilize Europe’,” Vecernij list, December 11, 2007, translated 

by BBC Monitoring International Reports, December 14, 2007.
53

65. For example, Cornell University stated that “Silajdzic today represents the forces for an integrated, secular and multinational Bosnia. He continues to demand the right of return of refugees and displaced persons and is a proponent of multiethnicity, 

political pluralism and parliamentary democracy in the country.” 

See news.cornell.edu/stories/1997/09/co-prime-minister-bosnia-andherzegovina-will-visit-cornell-and-deliver-bartels.

66. “Obituary: Alija Izetbegovic,” BBC News, October 19, 2003.

67. Alija Izetbegović, The Islamic Declaration: A Programme 

for the Islamization of Muslims and the Muslim People, Sarajevo, 

Bosnia, 1990. 

68. “Verdict of the Federal Court,” Kps—108/84, available from 

www.slobodanpraljak.com/MATERIJALI/RATNI%20DOKUMENTI

/islamska%20deklaracija/VERDICT_OF_THE_FEDERAL_

COURT.pdf.

69. The Declaration was actually reissued not by Izetbegović, 

but by a Serbian company owned by notorious Bosnian Serb leader, Vojislav Seselj. See Schindler, Unholy Terror, p. 63.

70. Schindler, Unholy Terror, p. 200.

71. See “Karadzic Talks Izetbegovic in Cross-Examination,” 

Balkaninsight.com, April 26, 2010; and Rachel Erwin, “Bosnian 

Serb Leader Says Karadzic Was Peacemaker,” Washington, DC: 

Institute for War and Peace Reporting, April 12, 2013.

72. See Schindler, Unholy Terror, pp. 32-45. The actual indictment does not name Iran. See “Verdict of the Federal Court.”

73. Schindler, Unholy Terror, p. 54. See also “Bosnian Threatens Poison Gas Against Serb Forces,” The New York Times, October 

31, 1992.

74. Ibid. p. 52. 

75. See the obituary by Enes Karic, “Alija Izetbegovic, President of Bosnia,” Sarajevo, Bosnia, available from www.muslim-lawyers.net/news/index.php3?aktion=show&number=243.
54

76. “Alija Izetbegovic: His Background and Philosophies,” 

London, UK: Balkan Research Centre, December 1992.

77. J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Alms for Jihad: 

Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 140-143.

78. Schindler, Unholy Terror, p. 52.

79. In this first trial, Izetbegović was convicted of terrorist activities related to the Young Muslims.

80. Schindler, Unholy Terror, pp. 107-108.

81. “Bosnia Fire Official with Ties to Iran,” Los Angeles Times, 

November 20, 1996.

82. Nidzara Ahmetasevic, Adnan Butorovic, and Mirsad 

Fazlic, “Fishers of Children’s Souls: Third Offensive of Young 

Muslims,” Slobodna Bosna, January 30, 2003, English translation, 

May 10, 2004.

83. See testimony by Eve-Ann Prentice at the Milosević trial at 

the ICTY, available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUDznadBOZU.

84. Schindler, Unholy Terror, p. 254.

85. Ibid., pp. 263-266. See also Azinović, Bassuener, and Weber, “A Security Risk Analysis,” p. 65; and Ivo Lučić, “Bosnia and 

Herzegovina and Terrorism,” National Security and the Future, Vol. 

2, No. 3-4, Autumn/Winter 2001.

86. Azinović, Bassuener, and Weber, “A Security Risk Analysis,” p. 65.

87. Quoted in Schindler, Unholy Terror, p. 263, sourced to an 

article in Slobodna Bosna, September 13, 2001. “Salam” is a greeting, while “tekbir” means the phrase “Allahu akbar.”

88. Mike O’Connor, “Spies for Iranians Are Said to Gain a 

Hold in Bosnia,” The New York Times, November 28, 1997.
55

89. He reportedly said that the Bosniak secret police “had 

been infected by al-Qa-ida . . . there was virtually a cell of that 

organization there.” See quote in Schindler, Unholy Terror, p. 240.

90. Ena Latin, “Sarajevo Trial May Lift Lid on Assassinations,” Washington, DC: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 

May 22, 2002; and “Ex-Bosnian Officials Arrested for Terrorism 

and Espionage Walk Free,” AFP, October 1, 2002.

91. See OHR decision, available from www.ohr.int/decisions/

removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=28446. Ashdown fired him for 

failure to handle intelligence information properly.

92. Nenad Pejic, “Wahhabist Militancy in Bosnia Profits from 

Local and International Inaction,” The Jamestown Foundation 

Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 9, Issue 42, November 17, 2011.

93. Quoted in Stefano Giantin, “A Bosnian Plea: ‘Italians, 

Don’t Give Peace Prize to Cerić,” eurasiareview.com, February 

27, 2012.

94. “Grand Mufti Ceric Awarded Italian Foundation Peace 

Prize,” The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report, March 26, 2012.

95. See text of “A Declaration of European Muslims,” available from www.rferl.org/content/article/1066751.html. 

96. “Bosnian Grand Mufti Says Islamic Law Compatible With Constitution, Will Visit Iran,” Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report, 

June 8, 2009.

97. Kenneth Morrison, “Wahhabism in the Balkans,” Balkan 

Series 08/06, Swindon, Wiltshire, UK: Defence Academy of the 

United Kingdom, Advanced Research and Assessment Group, 

February 2008, p. 9.

98. Patrick Moore, “Leader of Bosnia’s Islamic Community 

Speaks Out,” RFE/RL, April 23, 2004.

99. “Bosnia—Rising toward Trouble,” Embassy Sarajevo, 

Bosnia, February 16, 2009, provided courtesy of Wikileaks.
56

100. See, for example, “The Second Report on Islamophobia, 

January—December 2011,” Islamic Community of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, Sarajevo, March 2012.

101. “Bosnians Elect New Grand Mufti; Mustafa Ceric Replaced After 19 Years,” The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report, 

September 25, 2012.

102. “Bosnia’s Dangerous Tango: Islam and Nationalism,” 

Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, February 26, 

2013, p. 1.

103. Quoted in Soldo, “Muslim Politician.”

104. Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller: A 

Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law, Beltsville, MD: Amana publications, 1994, o.25.3, p. 640. Exceptions to this rule occurred in 

Islamic empires, but the individuals who occupied such positions 

were always vulnerable to attack.

105. Ibid., pp. 607-609.

106. Aleksa Djilas, “The Nation that Wasn’t,” Nader Mousavizadeh, ed., The Black Book of Bosnia, New York: HarperCollins 

Publishers 1996, p. 25.

107. Alija Izetbegović, The Islamic Declaration: A Programme 

for the Islamization of Muslims and the Muslim Peoples, Sarajevo, 

Bosnia, 1990.

108. Available from EUFOR website, www.euforbih.org/. In 

fact, Turkey has offered to make up shortfalls in EUFOR staffing 

but had been rebuffed by the EU, apparently for fear that EUFOR 

would effectively become a “TurkFor.” See Azinović, Bassuener, 

and Weber, “A Security Risk Analysis,” p. 72.

109. Anes Alic, “Turkey’s Growing Influence in the Balkans,” 

oilprice.com, June 9, 2010.

110. Dusan Stojanovic, “Turkey Uses Economic Clout to Gain 

Balkan Foothold,” The Seattle Times, March 13, 2011.
57

111. This nostalgia, shared by the Muslim Brotherhood, found 

its way into Izetbegović’s Declaration, in which he mourned the 

replacement of the Ottoman Empire by a secular Turkish regime 

whose new generation “had lost the remembrance of its past.” See 

Izetbegović, Islamic Declaration, p. 14.

112. Esad Hećimović, “Šta Turska hoće na Balkanu?” Dani, 

October 23, 2009. See English translation of excerpts at grayfalcon.

blogspot.com.

113. John Eibner, “Turkey’s Christians Under Siege,” Middle 

East Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, Spring 2011.

114. “What Lies Beneath Ankara’s New Foreign Policy,” State 

Department cable Ankara 87, November 29, 2010, provided courtesy of Wikileaks.

115. Patrick Goodenough, “OIC Fulfills Function of Caliphate, Embodies ‘Islamic Solidarity,’ Says OIC Chief,” CNS News, 

May 10, 2010.

116. Kenan Efendic, “OIC Invites Bosnia to Become Full Member,” Balkan Insight, April 16, 2013.

117. Available from www.oicun.org/articles/54/1/CairoDeclaration-on-Human-Rights-in-Islam/1.html.

118. “Turkey Trying to Keep Its Influence in Bosnia,” State 

Department cable Ankara 1651, November 17, 2009, provided 

courtesy of Wikileaks.

119. Azinović, Bassuener, and Weber, “A Security Risk 

Analysis,” pp. 31-34.

120. Ibid., p. 33. 

121. Ibid., p. 34., italics in original.

122. See OSA website, available from www.osa-oba.gov.ba/

osaobaeng.htm.
58

123. Azinović, Bassuener, and Weber, “A Security Risk Analysis,” p. 44.

124. Ibid., pp. 39-52.

125. Mark Lowen, “Major Criminal Flees Bosnia Jail,” BBC, 

July 29, 2009. Abu Hamza, a former member of Egyptian Gama’a 

al-Islamiyya, first arrived in Bosnia in 1992. See Anes Alic, “The 

Ringleaders of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Wahhabi Movement,” 

The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus, Vol. 4, Issue 6, March 

23, 2007.

126. Azinović, Basseuner, and Weber, “A Security Risk 

Analysis,” pp. 4-8.

127. Ratka Babic, “Bosnia Serbs Will Call Referendum on 

NATO,” Balkan Insight, February 12, 2013.

128. Stefan J. Bos, “Report: ‘Christians Flee Bosnia Amid Discrimination, Islamization,” BosNewsLife, October 12, 2012.

129. “Bosnia and Herzegovina 2012 Progress Report,” p. 17. 

130. Janusz Bugajski, Return of the Balkans: Challenges to European Integration and U.S. Disengagement, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 2013, pp. 156-158.

131. EUFOR Fact Sheet, available from www.euforbih.org/index.

php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=134.

132. Azinović, Bassuener, and Weber, “A Security Risk 

Analysis,” p. 72.

133. See European Union External Action website, available 

from www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/.

134. Azinović, Bassuener, and Weber, “A Security Risk 

Analysis,” p. 72.

135. Ibid.
59

136. The top three missions are: assisting Bosnian authorities with reforms and commitments related to the Partnership for 

Peace and closer integration with NATO; providing logistic and 

other support to EUFOR; and supporting ICTY on a case-by-case 

basis. See “NATO’s Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 

available from www.nato.int.

137. Charles G. Boyd, “Making Peace with the Guilty: The 

Truth about Bosnia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 50, September/

October 1995, pp. 22-38.

138. Edward P. Joseph, “Bosnia-Herzegovina,” The Western 

Balkans Policy Review 2010, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, pp. 63-64.

139. Oluic, “Radical Islam on Europe’s Frontier,” p. 48.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Ms. Leslie S. Lebl

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil