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S. HRG. 113–334 

STRENGTHENING PRIVACY RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY: OVERSIGHT OF FISA SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 31, 2013 

Serial No. J–113–25 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

CHUCK SCHUMER, New York 

DICK DURBIN, Illinois 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

MAZIE HIRONO, Hawaii 

CHUCK GRASSLEY, Iowa, Ranking Member 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

MICHAEL S. LEE, Utah 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

KRISTINE LUCIUS, Chief Staff Director 

KOLAN DAVIS, Republican Chief Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page 

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 1 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47 

Grassley, Hon. Chuck, a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa ............................ 3 

WITNESSES 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 45 

Cole, Hon. James M., Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC [with adjunct testimony from John C. Inglis, Deputy Director, National Security Agency, Washington, DC; Robert S. Litt, General 

Counsel, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Washington, DC; 

and Sean M. Joyce, Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

Washington, DC] .................................................................................................. 5 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 49 

Inglis, John C., Deputy Director, National Security Agency, Washington, DC, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 54 

Carr, Hon. James G., Senior Judge, U.S. District Court for the Northern 

District of Ohio, Toledo, Ohio .............................................................................. 34 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 60 

Jaffer, Jameel, Deputy Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, New York .............................................................................. 36 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 62 

Baker, Stewart A., Partner, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Washington, DC ............. 37 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 85 

QUESTIONS 

Questions submitted by Senator Leahy for James M. Cole ................................. 101 

Questions submitted by Senator Leahy for John C. Inglis .................................. 102 

Questions submitted by Senator Leahy for Jameel Jaffer ................................... 104 

Questions submitted by Senator Grassley for James M. Cole ............................. 105 

Questions submitted by Senator Grassley for John C. Inglis .............................. 107 

Questions submitted by Senator Grassley for Robert S. Litt ............................... 109 

Questions submitted by Senator Grassley for Sean M. Joyce .............................. 111 

Questions submitted by Senator Grassley for James G. Carr ............................. 114 

Questions submitted by Senator Grassley for Jameel Jaffer ............................... 115 

Questions submitted by Senator Grassley for Stewart Baker ............................. 118 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of James M. Cole to questions submitted by Senators Leahy and 

Grassley [NOTE: Some responses of James M. Cole are classified and 

therefore not printed as a part of this hearing.] ............................................... 121 

Responses of John C. Inglis to questions submitted by Senators Leahy and 

Grassley [NOTE: The responses of John C. Inglis are classified and therefore not printed as a part of this hearing.] ........................................................ 125 

Responses of Robert S. Litt to questions submitted by Senator Grassley .......... 126 

Responses of Sean M. Joyce to questions submitted by Senator Grassley ......... 127 

Responses of James G. Carr to questions submitted by Senator Grassley ......... 131 

Responses of Jameel Jaffer to questions submitted by Senators Leahy and 

Grassley ................................................................................................................ 137 

Responses of Stewart Baker to questions submitted by Senator Grassley ......... 149 
Page

IV 

MISCELLANEOUS SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Op Ed, ‘‘A Better Secret Court’’, New York Times, James G. Carr, July 

22, 2013 ................................................................................................................. 159 

Walton, Reggie B., Presiding Judge, U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Court, Washington, DC, July 29, 2013, letter ................................................... 162 

Group Coalition letter, July 30, 2013 ..................................................................... 192 

Joint transparency letter, July 16, 2013 ................................................................ 196 

Zwillinger, Marc J., Founder, ZwillGen PLLC, statement ................................... 199 

The Constitution Project, Virginia E. Sloan, President, July 30, 2013, letter .... 206 

U.S. Department of Justice, February 2, 2011, letter .......................................... 208 

U.S. Department of Justice, December 14, 2009, letter ....................................... 210 
(1) 

STRENGTHENING PRIVACY RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY: OVERSIGHT OF FISA 

SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 31, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m., in Room SH– 

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman 

of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Leahy, Feinstein, Durbin, Whitehouse, 

Klobuchar, Franken, Blumenthal, Grassley, Sessions, Cornyn, Lee, 

and Flake. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Chairman LEAHY. Good morning. Today, the Judiciary Committee will scrutinize Government surveillance programs conducted 

under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA. In the 

years since September 11th, Congress has repeatedly expanded the 

scope of FISA and has given the Government sweeping new powers 

to collect information on law-abiding Americans, and we must carefully consider now whether those laws may have gone too far. 

Last month, many Americans learned for the first time that one 

of these authorities—Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act—has 

for years been secretly interpreted—secretly interpreted—to authorize the collection of Americans’ phone records on an unprecedented scale. Information was also leaked about Section 702 of 

FISA, which authorizes the NSA to collect the communications of 

foreigners overseas. 

Now, first, let me make it very clear. I do not condone the way 

these and other highly classified programs were disclosed, and I am 

concerned about the potential damage to our intelligence-gathering 

capabilities and national security. It is appropriate to hold people 

accountable for allowing such a massive leak to occur. We need to 

examine how to prevent this type of breach in the future. 

In the wake of these leaks, the President said that this is an opportunity to have an open and thoughtful debate about these 

issues. And I welcome that statement because this is a debate that 

several of us on this Committee in both parties have been trying 

to have for years. Like so many others, I will get the classified 

briefings, but then, of course, you cannot talk about them. There 

are a lot of these things that should be and can be discussed. And 
2 

if we are going to have the debate that the President called for, the 

executive branch has to be a full partner. We need straightforward 

answers, and I am concerned that we are not getting them. 

Just recently, the Director of National Intelligence acknowledged 

that he provided false testimony about the NSA surveillance programs during a Senate hearing in March, and his office had to remove a fact sheet from its website after concerns were raised about 

its accuracy. And I appreciate that it is difficult to talk about classified programs in public settings, but the American people expect 

and deserve honest answers. 

It also has been far too difficult to get a straight answer about 

the effectiveness of the Section 215 phone records program. Whether this program is a critical national security tool is a key question 

for Congress as we consider possible changes to the law. Some supporters of this program have repeatedly conflated the efficacy of the 

Section 215 bulk metadata collection program with that of Section 

702 of FISA, even though they are entirely different. Now, I do not 

think that is a coincidence when we have people in Government 

make that comparison, but it needs to stop. I think the patience 

of the American people is beginning to wear thin, but what has to 

be of more concern in a democracy is the trust of the American people is wearing thin. 

I asked General Alexander—and I understand he cannot be here 

today because he is at a convention in Las Vegas, I guess for hackers. But I asked General Alexander about the effectiveness of the 

Section 215 phone records program at an Appropriations Committee hearing last month, and he agreed to provide a classified list 

of terrorist events that Section 215 helped to prevent, and I have 

reviewed that list. Although I agree that it speaks to the value of 

the overseas content collection implemented under Section 702, it 

does not do the same for Section 215. The list simply does not reflect dozens or even several terrorist plots that Section 215 helped 

thwart or prevent—let alone 54, as some have suggested. 

These facts matter. This bulk collection program has massive privacy implications. The phone records of all of us in this room—all 

of us in this room—reside in an NSA database. I have said repeatedly that just because we have the ability to collect huge amounts 

of data does not mean that we should be doing so. In fact, it has 

been reported that the bulk collection of Internet metadata was 

shut down because it failed to produce meaningful intelligence. We 

need to take an equally close look at the phone records program. 

If this program is not effective, it has to end. And so far I am not 

convinced by what I have seen. 

I am sure that we will hear from witnesses today who will say 

that these programs are critical in helping to identify and connect 

the so-called dots. But there are always going to be dots to collect, 

analyze, and try to connect. The Government is already collecting 

data on millions of innocent Americans on a daily basis based on 

a secret legal interpretation of a statute that does not on its face 

appear to authorize this kind of bulk collection. So what is going 

to be next? And when is enough enough? 

I think Congress has to carefully consider the powerful surveillance tools that we grant to the Government. We have to ensure 

that there is stringent oversight, accountability, and transparency. 
3 

This debate should not be limited to those surveillance programs 

about which information was leaked. That is why I have introduced 

a bill that addresses not only Section 215 and Section 702, but also 

national security letters, roving wiretaps, and other authorities 

under the PATRIOT Act. As we have seen in the case of ECPA reform, the protection of Americans’ privacy is not a partisan issue. 

I thank Senator Lee of Utah and others for their support of my 

FISA bill, and I hope other Senators will join that effort. 

So I look forward to the testimony of the Government witnesses. 

I am particularly grateful for the participation of Judge Carr, a 

current member of the judiciary and a former judge of the FISA 

Court. I hope this will give us an opportunity for an open debate 

about the law, the policy, and the FISA Court process that led us 

to this position. 

I yield first, of course, to Senator Grassley, and then we will call 

on the first panel with James Cole. We will put General Inglis’ 

statement in the record. It did not arrive in time to be given, so 

his statement will be made part of the record and he will answer 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Inglis appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Grassley. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK GRASSLEY, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF IOWA 

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this 

hearing, and I think it is very important that Congress do its oversight work, which this hearing is part of. But it is even more important, the more secret a program, the more oversight that Congress has. And as you said, probably more about this program 

could be told to the public, and the more that could be told, maybe 

more understanding and less questioning on the part of the public. 

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provides the statutory 

framework for electronic surveillance in the context of the foreign 

intelligence gathering. Investigating threats to our national security gives rise to a tension between the protections of citizens’ privacy rights and the Government’s legitimate national security interests. Congress through this legislation has sought—and I hope 

successfully—to strike a balance in this sensitive area, but whether 

it is the right balance, of course, is one of the reasons we are having this hearing. 

The reports in the media have raised important questions regarding exactly what information about American citizens is being 

collected by the Government, whether the programs are being conducted as Congress intended, and whether there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that they cannot be abused by this or any future 

administration. In short, the reports have raised questions about 

whether the proper balance has been struck. 

We need to look no further than the recent IRS scandal to see 

what can happen when an unchecked executive branch bureaucracy with immense power targets political opponents. These actions 

trampled many citizens’ most basic rights to fully participate in our 

democratic process. This kind of abuse cannot be permitted to occur 
4 

in our national security agencies as well, and maybe even more importantly. 

Oversight by Congress will play an important role as we move 

forward in evaluating the wisdom and value of the intelligence programs. However, Congress needs accurate information in order to 

conduct oversight responsibilities that the Constitution demands 

that we do under our checks and balances of Government. That is 

why it was especially disturbing to see that the Director of National Intelligence was forced to apologize for inaccurate statements he made last March before the Senate Intelligence Committee. Those statements concerned one of the very important programs that we will be hearing about this very day. Nothing can excuse this kind of behavior from a senior administration official of 

any administration, especially on matters of such grave importance. 

We have a constitutional duty to protect Americans’ privacy. 

That is a given. We also have an equal constitutional responsibility 

to ensure that the Government provides a strong national defense. 

That is a given. Intelligence gathering is, of course, a necessary 

and vital part of that defense. We have a duty to ensure that the 

men and women of our military, our intelligence, and our counterterrorism communities have the tools that they need to get the job 

done. 

I understand officials contend that the programs authorized 

under FISA that we will discuss today are critical tools that have 

assisted them in disrupting attacks both here and abroad. To the 

extent that possible in this unclassified setting, I look forward to 

hearing how these programs have made our Nation safer. 

I want to emphasize that this is an equally important part of the 

balance that we have to strike. And as we consider whether reform 

of these intelligence programs is necessary or desirable, we must 

also make sure that we do not overreact and repeat the mistakes 

of the past. 

We know that before 9/11 there was a wall erected under the 

Clinton administration between intelligence gathering and law enforcement. That wall contributed to our failure to be able to connect the dots and prevent 9/11. None of the reforms that we consider should effectively rebuild that wall. 

Additionally, while the intelligence and the law enforcement communities need to share information in a lawful way, any reform we 

consider should not confuse the differences between these two contacts. 

For example, no reform should be based on the misguided legal 

theory that foreign terrorists on foreign soil are entitled to the 

same constitutional rights that Americans expect here at home. 

Finally, increased transparency is a worthy goal in general, and 

as I suggested before, whenever we can talk about these programs, 

I think there are less questions out there in the minds of people, 

and we have probably created some public relations problems for 

us and for this program and for our national security community 

because maybe we have not made enough information available. I 

say that understanding that we cannot tell our enemies what tools 

we use. 
5 

But if we consider any reform that may bring more transparency 

to the FISA process, we should keep in mind then that every piece 

of information we make available to the public will be read by a 

determined adversary, and that adversary has already demonstrated the capacity to kill thousands of Americans even on our 

own soil. 

I welcome the panel witnesses and look forward to engaging 

them as we seek to strike the difficult and sensitive balance between privacy and security. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much. 

Our first witness will be James Cole. He first joined the Department of Justice in 1979. He served for 13 years in the Criminal Division, later becoming the Deputy Chief of the Division’s Public Integrity Section. He went into private practice, sworn in as Deputy 

Attorney General on January 3, 2011. Of course, Mr. Cole is no 

stranger to this Committee. 

Please go ahead, sir. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES M. COLE, DEPUTY 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. COLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and 

Members of the Committee, for inviting us here today to speak 

about the 215 business records program and Section 702 of FISA. 

With these programs and other intelligence activities, we are constantly seeking to achieve the right balance between the protection 

of national security and the protection of privacy and civil liberties. 

We believe these two programs have achieved the right balance. 

First of all, both programs are conducted under public statutes 

passed and later reauthorized by Congress. Neither is a program 

that has been hidden away or off the books. In fact, all three 

branches of Government play a significant role in the oversight of 

these programs. The judiciary—through the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Court—plays a role in authorizing the programs and 

overseeing compliance; the executive branch conducts extensive internal reviews to ensure compliance; and Congress passes the laws, 

oversees our implementation of those laws, and determines whether or not the current laws should be reauthorized and in what 

form. 

Let me explain how this has worked in the context of the 215 

program. The 215 program involves the collection of metadata from 

telephone calls. These are telephone records maintained by the 

phone companies. They include the number the call was dialed 

from, the number the call was dialed to, the date and time of the 

call, and the length of the call. The records do not include the 

names or other personal identifying information, they do not include cell site or other location information, and they do not include 

the content of any phone calls. These are the kinds of records that 

under longstanding Supreme Court precedent are not protected by 

the Fourth Amendment. 

The short court order that you have seen published in the newspapers only allows the Government to acquire the phone records; 

it does not allow the Government to access or use them. The terms 
6 

under which the Government may access or use the records is covered by another, more detailed court order that the DNI declassified and released today. That other court order, called the ‘‘primary order,’’ provides that the Government can only search the 

data if it has a ‘‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’’ that the phone 

number being searched is associated with certain terrorist organizations. The order also imposes numerous other restrictions on 

NSA to ensure that only properly trained analysts may access the 

data and that they can only access it when the reasonable, 

articulable suspicion predicate has been met and documented. The 

documentation of the analyst’s justification is important so that it 

can be reviewed by supervisors before the search and audited afterwards to ensure compliance. 

In the criminal context, the Government could obtain the same 

types of records with a grand jury subpoena, without going to the 

court. But here, we go to the court every 90 days to seek the court’s 

authorization to collect the records. In fact, since 2006, the court 

has authorized the program on 34 separate occasions by 14 different judges. As part of that renewal process, we inform the court 

whether there have been any compliance problems, and if there 

have been, the court will take a very hard look and make sure we 

have corrected those problems. As we have explained before, the 11 

judges on the FISA Court are far from a rubber stamp; instead, 

they review all of our pleadings thoroughly, they question us, and 

they do not approve an order until they are satisfied that we have 

met all statutory and constitutional requirements. 

In addition to the judiciary, Congress also plays a significant role 

in this program. The classified details of this program have been 

extensively briefed to both the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees and their staffs on numerous occasions. If there are any significant issues that arise with the 215 program, we would report 

those to the two Committees right away. Any significant interpretations by the FISA Court would likewise be reported to the Committees under our statutory obligations, including opinions of any 

significant interpretation, along with any of the court orders that 

go with that. 

In addition, Congress plays a role in reauthorizing the provision 

under which the Government carries out this program and has 

done so since 2006. Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act has been renewed several times since the program was initiated—including 

most recently for an additional 4 years in 2011. In connection with 

those recent renewals, the Government provided a classified briefing paper to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees to be 

made available to all Members of Congress. The briefing paper and 

a second updated version of it set out the operation of the programs 

in detail, explained that the Government and the FISA Court had 

interpreted the Section 215 authorization to authorize the bulk collection of telephone metadata, and stated that the Government 

was, in fact, collecting such information. The DNI also declassified 

and released those two papers today. 

We also made offers to brief any member on the 215 program, 

and the availability of the paper and the opportunity for oral briefings were communicated through ‘‘Dear Colleague’’ letters issued 

by the Chairs of the Intelligence Committees to all Members of 
7 

Congress. Thus, although we could not talk publicly about the program at the time—since it was properly classified—the executive 

branch took all reasonably available steps to ensure that Members 

of Congress were appropriately informed about the programs when 

they renewed it. 

I understand that there have been recent proposals to amend 

Section 215 authority to limit the bulk collection of telephone 

metadata. As the President has said, we welcome a public debate 

about how best to safeguard both our national security and the privacy of our citizens. Indeed, we will be considering in the coming 

days and weeks further steps to declassify information and help facilitate that debate, just as we have done this morning in releasing 

the primary order and the congressional briefing papers. In the 

meantime, however, we look forward to working with the Congress 

to determine in a careful and deliberate way what tools can best 

be structured and secured to secure the Nation and at the same 

time protect our privacy and civil liberties. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cole appears as a submission for 

the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. I think we can—the debate you speak of is 

starting now. The administration did declassify a FISC order. Of 

course, it does not contain any real legal analysis or discussion of 

the 215 relevance standard, so that will be part of our questions. 

But first I want to ask Deputy Director Inglis a question before we 

even go into the legality and usefulness of this. 

We had a huge security breach, I think we will all agree, committed by Edward Snowden. And a few years ago, Bradley Manning downloaded hundreds of thousands of classified and sensitive 

documents and passed them on to WikiLeaks. 

Now, if two data breaches of this magnitude had occurred in the 

private sector, somebody would have been held accountable by now. 

There is a lot of material kept in the private sector, trade secrets 

and so on. If they allowed this kind of leaking going on, in most 

companies somebody would be held accountable. 

Who at the NSA has taken responsibility for allowing this incredibly damaging security breach to occur? 

Mr. INGLIS. Well, sir, that accountability must be considered at 

at least two levels: one, at the individual level, we have to take a 

hard look to see whether individuals exercised their responsibilities 

appropriately, whether they exercised due diligence in the exercise 

of those responsibilities—— 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, obviously there was not. I mean, if a 29- 

year-old school dropout could come in and take out massive, massive amounts of data, it is obvious there were not adequate controls. Has anybody been fired? 

Mr. INGLIS. No, sir, not yet. 

Chairman LEAHY. Has anybody been admonished? 

Mr. INGLIS. Sir, those investigations are underway. When those 

investigations are complete, we will have a full accounting within 

the executive branch and to the Congress of individual and systemic accountability. I think that at the end of the day we will 

have to look to see whether people exercised the responsibilities ap-
8 

propriately, whether they essentially exercised the trust that is accorded to them. 

In our system we extend top secret SCI, special compartmented 

intelligence clearances to a range of people and expect that they 

will then exercise that trust as the American people intended. And 

we will make a full accounting of that. 

Chairman LEAHY. I remember President Reagan made up a 

statement, which many of us use, about trust, but verify. Don’t you 

have—I realize you have to act with a certain amount of trust, but 

don’t you have people double-checking what somebody is doing? 

Mr. INGLIS. We do, sir. And—— 

Chairman LEAHY. Who double-checked Mr. Snowden? 

Mr. INGLIS. Well, there are checks at multiple levels. There are 

checks in terms of what an individual might be doing at any moment in time. There are—— 

Chairman LEAHY. They obviously failed. 

Mr. INGLIS. In this case, I think we can say that they failed, but 

we do not yet know where. 

Chairman LEAHY. You ‘‘think’’ you can say they failed. I mean, 

he is sitting over at the airport in Russia with millions of items. 

Mr. INGLIS. I would say that with the benefit of what we now 

know, they did fail. 

Chairman LEAHY. Okay. 

Mr. INGLIS. But we do not yet know where precisely they failed, 

and we may find that they failed at multiple points in the system, 

either in the exercise of individual responsibility or in the design 

of the system in the first place. 

Chairman LEAHY. Has anybody offered—been asked to resign or 

offered to resign because of this failure? 

Mr. INGLIS. No one has offered to resign. Everyone is working 

hard to understand what happened and to put in place the necessary mechanisms to—— 

Chairman LEAHY. How soon will we know who screwed up? 

Mr. INGLIS. I think that we will know over weeks and months 

precisely what happened and who should then be held accountable, 

and we will hold them accountable. 

Chairman LEAHY. Are you taking any steps now to make sure 

such a screw-up does not happen again? 

Mr. INGLIS. We are, sir. We have instituted a range of mechanisms, not simply one, to ensure that we would understand and immediately be able to catch someone who tried to repeat precisely 

what Mr. Snowden did. But we also have to be creative and 

thoughtful enough to understand that there are many other ways 

somebody might try to beat the system. 

Chairman LEAHY. You can understand why some people would 

use that old expression, ‘‘locking the door after the horse has been 

stolen.’’ 

Mr. INGLIS. I can, sir. 

Chairman LEAHY. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate your candor. 

And I realize General Alexander is in Las Vegas, but I will ask you 

this question: Last month, he promised to provide me with specific 

examples of terrorism cases where Section 215 phone records collections had been used. I was led to believe by his answer that 

there were dozens of cases where Section 215 authority has been 
9 

critical to the discovery and disruption of terrorist plots. I have 

now reviewed all the classified material that the NSA sent, and I 

am far from convinced. The document is classified, but what was 

said in open testimony is that Section 215 helped to thwart or prevent 54 terrorist plots. Not by any stretch can you get 54 terrorist 

plots. 

In how many cases was Section 215 bulk phone records collection 

critical to preventing a terrorist plot? 

Mr. INGLIS. Sir, I might answer in open session and then offer 

to provide follow-up details in a classified session. 

I would say that the administration has disclosed that there were 

54 plots that were disrupted over the life of these two programs—— 

Chairman LEAHY. Section 215 was critical to preventing—— 

Mr. INGLIS. No, sir. And of those—— 

Chairman LEAHY [continuing]. Fifty-four plots? 

Mr. INGLIS. And of those plots, 13 of those had a homeland 

nexus. The others had essentially plots that would have come to 

fruition in Europe, Asia, other places around the world. 

Chairman LEAHY. How many of those—— 

Mr. INGLIS. Of the 13—— 

Mr. INGLIS. Of the 13—— 

Chairman LEAHY. How many of those 13 were plots to harm 

Americans? 

Mr. INGLIS. Of the 13 that would have had a homeland nexus, 

in 12 of those 215 made a contribution. The question you have 

asked, though, is more precise in the sense of is there a ‘‘but for’’ 

case to be made, that but for 215 those plots would have been disrupted. That is a very difficult question to answer insomuch as that 

is not necessarily how these programs work. That is actually not 

how these programs work. 

What happens is that you essentially have a range of tools at 

your disposal. One or more of these tools might tip you to a plot. 

Others of these tools might then give you an exposure as to what 

the nature of that plot is. And, finally, the exercise of multiple instruments of power, to include law enforcement power, ultimately 

completes the picture and allows you to interdict that plot. 

There is an example amongst those 13 that comes close to a ‘‘but 

for’’ example, and that is the case of Basaaly Moalin. 

Chairman LEAHY. I have read that. I have read the material on 

that. It would be safe to say there are not 54 ‘‘but fors’’? 

Mr. INGLIS. It is safe to say that, sir. 

Chairman LEAHY. That is not right—— 

Mr. INGLIS. This capability, the 215 collection of metadata, is focused on the homeland. It is focused on detecting plots that cross 

the foreign to homeland domain. 

Chairman LEAHY. But it was not—— 

Mr. INGLIS. Given that only 13 of those plots—— 

Chairman LEAHY. But it was not a ‘‘but for’’ in 54 cases? 

Mr. INGLIS. It was not, sir. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Mr. INGLIS. Given that only 13 of those plots had a homeland 

nexus, it, therefore, only had its principal opportunity to make a 

contribution in 13 or less. In fact, it made a contribution to a plot 
10 

that was disrupted overseas. I think that shows that this actually 

is looking not simply at the homeland, but it is looking at the foreign-homeland nexus. 

Chairman LEAHY. And I hope we are not mixing up 215 with 

other sections. 

Mr. INGLIS. We try hard not to do that, sir. They are distinguished but complementary tools. 

Mr. JOYCE. Mr. Chairman, if I might add some insight to the 

value of 215? 

Chairman LEAHY. My time is up, but go ahead. If that is okay 

with you? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Can’t they make statements? 

Chairman LEAHY. Go ahead, Mr. Joyce. No, they are just here to 

help. 

Go ahead, Mr. Joyce. 

Mr. JOYCE. I just want to add, as you mentioned before, you 

know, how many dots do we need? I think we need to frame this 

by understanding who the adversary is and what they are trying 

to do. And they are trying to harm America. They are trying to 

strike America. And what we need is we need all these tools. 

So you mentioned the value of 702 versus the value of business 

records 215. They are different. And I make the analogy like a 

baseball team. You have your most valuable player, but you also 

have the players that hit singles every day. 

Chairman LEAHY. Mr. Joyce—— 

Mr. JOYCE. I just want to relate to the homeland plots. So in 

Najibullah Zazi, in the plot to bomb the New York subway system, 

business record 215 played a role. It identified specifically a number we did not previously know of—— 

Chairman LEAHY. It was a critical role? 

Mr. JOYCE. What I am saying, it plays a different—— 

Chairman LEAHY. Wasn’t it some undercover work that took 

place in there? 

Mr. JOYCE. Yes, there was some undercover work. But what I am 

saying, each tool plays a different role, Mr. Chairman. I am not 

saying that it is—— 

Chairman LEAHY. Wasn’t the FBI—— 

Mr. JOYCE [continuing]. The most important tool—— 

Chairman LEAHY. Wasn’t the FBI already aware of the individual in contact with Zazi? 

Mr. JOYCE. Yes, we were, but we were not aware of that specific 

telephone number, which NSA provided us. 

Chairman LEAHY. The only reason I go down this, you know, if 

we did everything, for example, we could have more security if we 

strip-searched everybody who came into every building in America. 

We are not going to do that. We would have more security if we 

closed our borders completely to everybody. We are not going to do 

that. If we put a wiretap on everybody’s cell phone in America, if 

we search everybody’s home—but there are certain things, certain 

areas of our own privacy that we Americans expect. And at some 

point you have to know where the balance is. But I have gone into 

other people’s time. Senator Grassley. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Would you, Mr. Chairman, clarify for me the 

process? We have had the testimony now, so we—— 
11 

Chairman LEAHY. Yes. 

Senator GRASSLEY [continuing]. Ask questions of all the people? 

Chairman LEAHY. That is right—well, we were going to have 

questions of Mr. Cole and Mr. Inglis, but Mr. Litt and Mr. Joyce 

are here to be able to add if anything is necessary. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Sure. Okay. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator GRASSLEY. I will start out with Mr. Cole, and my questions are kind of to emphasize, to inform, and to even be repetitive, 

because I think the public needs a greater understanding of what 

we are up to here. 

There are two legal authorities that we are discussing here: one, 

Section 702 authority. That one I am going to lay aside. The other 

authority is Section 215. Many Americans are concerned about the 

scope there. They fear that the Government is spying on them and 

prying into their personal lives. I ask questions to make absolutely 

sure that I understand the scope of 215. 

The first question: What information does the Government collect 

under this program? And specifically is anyone’s name, address, Social Security number, or location collected? 

Mr. COLE. Senator Grassley, first, to answer the second part, 

name, address, location, Social Security number is not collected 

under the 215 program at all. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. 

Mr. COLE. Never has been, never will be. 

Second, the nature of the collection is really very dependent on 

this reasonable, articulable suspicion. While a lot of metadata does 

exist in a database, it cannot be accessed unless you go through the 

procedures of documenting that there is reasonable, articulable 

suspicion that the phone number you want to ask about is associated with terrorists. Unless you get that step made, you cannot 

enter that database and make a query and access any of those 

data. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. Again, for emphasis, is the Government listening in on any American phone calls through this program? And let me say that I just heard within the last week on 

some news media that somebody is declaring that any bureaucrat 

someplace in some intelligence agency can pick up the phone and 

listen to the conversation. 

Mr. COLE. Nobody is listening to anybody’s conversations 

through this program, and through this program nobody could. No 

information like that is being collected through this program. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Litt, Section 215 contains a requirement 

that records collected under the program provision be ‘‘relevant to 

an authorized investigation.’’ As a legal matter, how can you justify 

the assertion that phone records of millions of Americans who have 

nothing to do with terrorism are relevant to an authorized investigation under Section 215? 

Mr. LITT. So I would begin by noting that a number of judges repeatedly over the years have found that these records are, in fact, 

relevant. The reason is that the standard of relevance that we are 

talking about here is not the kind of relevance that you think about 

in the Perry Mason sense of a criminal trial. It is a much broader 

standard of relevance, and in a number of circumstances in the 
12 

law, such as grand jury subpoenas or civil discovery, it is a wellaccepted concept that if you need to get a large group of records 

in order to find a smaller group of records that actually provides 

the information you need to move forward, the larger group of 

records can be relevant. That is particularly true in this case because of the kinds of controls that the Deputy Attorney General 

mentioned, the fact that the queries are limited, the access to the 

data is limited, and for that reason the FISA Court has repeatedly 

found that these records are relevant. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Is there any legal precedent that supports 

such a broad definition of relevance to an investigation? 

Mr. LITT. I would actually defer that to the Deputy Attorney 

General. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. 

Mr. COLE. Well, the legal precedent comes from the history of all 

the orders that have been issued, the courts having looked at this 

under the FISA law and under the provisions of 215 and making 

sure that under the provisions and the ability to get these records 

relevant to a criminal—or, rather, a foreign intelligence—investigation, they have gone through, the law that Mr. Litt has described 

on, as I said, I believe 34 different occasions to do this analysis. So 

that legal precedent is there. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. Mr. Joyce, one part of the balance that 

we have to strike protecting privacy of Americans, the other part 

national security. Thankfully, until the Boston bombing we had 

prevented large-scale terrorist attacks on American soil. I have a 

few questions about how valuable the role of Section 215 and 702 

programs have played in predicting our national security, two questions, and then I will have to stop and go to our colleagues. 

Can you describe any specific situations where Section 215 and 

Section 702 authorities helped disrupt a terrorist attack or identify 

individuals planning to attack, the number of times? And then, second, if you did not have the authority to collect phone records in 

the way that they are now under Section 215, how would you have 

effected those investigations? 

Mr. JOYCE. So your first question, Senator, as far as a specific 

example of when we have utilized both of these programs is one I 

first mentioned, the first al Qaeda-directed plot since 9/11 in September 2009 when Najibullah Zazi and others conspired to plot to 

bomb the New York subway system. We initially found out about 

Zazi through an NSA 702 coverage, and he was actually talking to 

an al Qaeda courier who was—he was asking for his help to perfect 

an explosives recipe. So but for that, we would not have known 

about the plot. We followed that up with legal process and then 

had FISA coverage on him and others as we fully investigated the 

plot. 

Business records 215 was also involved, as I had previously mentioned, where we also through legal process were submitting legal 

process for telephone numbers and other e-mail addresses, other 

selectors, but NSA also provided another number we were unaware 

of a co-conspirator, Adis Medunjanin. So that is an instance where 

a very serious plot to attack America on U.S. soil that we used both 

these programs. 
13 

But I say, as Chairman Leahy mentioned, there is a difference 

in the utility of the programs. But what I say to you is that each 

and every program and tool is valuable. There were gaps prior to 

9/11, and what we have collectively tried to do, the members of the 

committee, other members of the other oversight committees, the 

executive branch, and the intelligence community, is we have tried 

to close those gaps and close those seams. And the business record 

215 is one of those programs that we have closed those seams. 

So I respectfully say to the Chairman that the utility of that specific program initially is not as valuable. I say you are right. But 

what I say is it plays a crucial role in closing the gaps and seams 

that we fought hard to gain after the 9/11 attacks. 

As you mentioned, another instance when we used the business 

record 215 program, as Chairman Leahy mentioned, Basaaly 

Moalin. So initially the FBI opened a case in 2003 based on a tip. 

We investigated that tip. We found no nexus to terrorism and 

closed the case. 

In 2007, the NSA advised us through the business record 215 

program that a number in San Diego was in contact with an AlShabaab, an al Qaeda East Africa member in Somalia. We served 

legal process to identify that unidentified phone number. We identified Basaaly Moalin. Through further investigation we identified 

additional co-conspirators, and Moalin and three other individuals 

have been convicted and some pled guilty to material support to 

terrorism. 

So I go back to we need to remember what happened in 9/11, and 

everyone in this room remembers where they were and what happened—— 

Chairman LEAHY. Mr. Joyce, you are stating the obvious there. 

Be specific to it because we are going to have votes on the floor, 

and it is going to take us out of here. We would like to keep somewhat close to the time. 

Mr. JOYCE. All I will say, Mr. Chairman, is, respectfully, you 

mentioned about the dots. We must have the dots to connect the 

dots. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. One of the advantages of this 

Committee, the members on both sides of the aisle bring a lot of 

different abilities and various areas of expertise. 

The next witness is the Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Am I a witness here? 

Chairman LEAHY. The next witness? The next questioner is the 

Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Feinstein, and 

it is a great advantage to us to have her on this Committee. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, thank you very much. Thank you very 

much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to begin by putting a couple of letters in the record. 

These have just been declassified. The first is a letter to myself and 

Senator Chambliss on February 2, 2011, before this program came 

up before the Senate, explaining it, making the information available. The second is that same letter to the House, so we have before 2010 and 2011. I would also—— 

Chairman LEAHY. Without objection, they will be made part of 

the record. 
14 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

[The letters appear as a submission for the record.] 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I would also like to—I just realized that I believe Mr. Inglis’ statement makes public for the first time a fact, 

and it is an important fact. It is on page 4 of his letter, and what 

he points out I think Mr. Cole described, that the query, which is 

the search of the database, can only be done on reasonable, 

articulable suspicion and only 22 people have access to that, 

trained and vetted analysts at the NSA. 

If the numbers are run and it looks like there is a problem, the 

report is made to the FBI. And the FBI looks at it, and if they 

want to collect content, they must get a probable cause warrant 

from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 

Let me quote: ‘‘. . . in 2012, based on those fewer than 300 selectors’’—that is, queries, which actually were 288 for Americans—‘‘we 

provided a total of 12 reports to FBI, which altogether ‘tipped’ less 

than 500 numbers.’’ 

So what you are saying, if I understand it, Mr. Inglis, is that, 

maximum, there were 12 probable cause warrants. Is that correct? 

Mr. INGLIS. I think in truth, any one of the numbers that were 

tipped could have led the FBI to develop probable cause on more 

than 12. But there were only 12 reports provided to the FBI across 

2012, and there were less than 500 numbers in those reports collectively that were tipped to the FBI in 2012. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Let me ask Mr. Joyce this question. Can you 

tell us how many orders—how many probable cause warrants were 

issued by the FBI in 2012? 

Mr. JOYCE. I cannot off the top of my head, Senator. I can get 

you those numbers, though, following the hearing. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, I think we would appreciate that. I 

think—— 

Mr. JOYCE. I would just add, though, you make a very good point. 

Whether it is the 702 program or the business record 215, once 

that information is passed to us involving anyone in the United 

States, we must go to the FISC, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and show probable cause on the FISC warrant basically to provide content or whatever as far as overhears for that 

specific individual. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Good. 

[The information referred to appears as a submission for the 

record.] 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Now, the NSA has produced and declassified 

a chart, which I would like to make available to all members. It 

has the 54 total events. It includes Section 702 authority and Section 215 authority, which essentially work together. And it shows 

the events disrupted based on a combination of these two programs: 13 in the homeland, 25 in Europe, 5 in Africa, and 11 in 

Asia. 

Now, I remember, I was on the Intelligence Committee before 9/ 

11, and I remember how little information we had. And the great 

criticism of the Government because of these stovepipes, the inability to share intelligence, the inability to collect intelligence, we had 

no program that could have possibly caught two people in San 

Diego before the event took place. 
15 

I support this program. I think based on what I know, they will 

come after us, and I think we need to prevent an attack wherever 

we can from happening. That does not mean that we cannot make 

some changes. 

Yesterday at the Intelligence Committee, I outlined some 

changes that we might consider as part of our authorization bill, 

and let me quickly run through them: the number of American 

phone numbers submitted as queries on a regular basis annually 

from the database; the number of referrals made to the FBI each 

year based on those queries, and how many times the FBI obtains 

probable cause warrants to collect the content of a call, which we 

now know is very few times, relatively; the number of times that 

a company—this is at their request from the high-tech companies— 

that any company is required to provide data pursuant to FISA’s 

business records provision. 

As you know, the companies who provide information are seeking 

to be able to speak more publicly about this, and I think we should. 

There are some changes we can make to the business records section. We are looking at reducing the 5-year retention period that 

NSA keeps phone records in its database down to 2 or 3 years. It 

is my understanding that the usefulness of it tails off as the years 

go on. We have to determine that point and then consider it. 

And requiring the NSA to send to the FISA Court for its review 

the records of each query of the database as soon as it is practicable so the Court can determine the propriety of the query under 

the law. 

These are things that can be done to increase transparency, but 

not to stop the program. I believe based on what I have seen—and 

I read intelligence regularly—that we would place this Nation in 

jeopardy if we eliminated these two programs. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LITT. Mr. Chairman, may I just offer a brief response to 

that? 

Chairman LEAHY. Just a moment, and then I will. Would you 

also include reporting how often NSA or anybody else goes into an 

individual’s browsing history or their e-mails or social media activity? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Sure, right. And we could do that in the private sector, too, how often this happens. 

Chairman LEAHY. I was just looking at this article in the Guardian today, which may or may not be accurate. 

Mr. Litt, you wanted to say something? 

Mr. LITT. Yes, thank you. I just wanted to say that I think that 

this administration is more or less in the same place that Senator 

Feinstein is. We are open to reevaluating this program in ways 

that can perhaps provide greater confidence and public trust that 

this is, in fact, a program that achieves both privacy protections 

and national security. And, in fact, the White House has directed 

the Director of National Intelligence to make recommendations in 

that area. So we will be looking forward to working with your Committee and this Committee to see whether there are changes that 

can be made that are consistent with preserving the essence of the 

program and yet provide greater public confidence. 
16 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. Senator Cornyn? Again, speaking 

of the diversity we have, Senator Cornyn, of course, is the Deputy 

Republican Leader, and we appreciate the amount of time he 

spends in this Committee. 

Senator CORNYN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing, and thanks to each of the witnesses for your service to our 

country. 

Those of us who have been here for a little while and through 

the evolution of these programs have, I think, learned more than 

the public generally knows about how they operate, and I think 

that has helped give us confidence in what is occurring. But I am 

also sensitive to Senator Feinstein, the distinguished Chair of the 

Senate Intelligence Committee, some of her observations—and Mr. 

Litt I think reiterated that, too—about the importance of maintaining public confidence in classified programs, which is a tough thing 

to do. 

But I think I am also reminded of the fact that, since 2007, we 

have 43 new members of the U.S. Senate, and so there have been 

some people who have come to the Senate in recent years who perhaps have not been able to observe through their regular work 

some of the development of these programs, and so I think a hearing like this and the other hearings that you have participated in 

that I have attended have been very important to giving everyone 

a foundation of information where they can have confidence on behalf of the people we represent. 

But I would like to ask, maybe starting with Mr. Cole and go 

down the line, to get your reaction to the criticism made of the operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court made by 

former Intelligence Surveillance Court Judge James Robertson. 

And this really has to do with the nature of essentially ex parte 

proceedings before the Court. I know that when it comes to individualized, particularized warrants, it is common in our system to 

have essentially ex parte proceedings. But here, when the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Court is authorizing a program, according 

to Judge Robertson, under this expanded jurisdiction, it has turned 

the Court into something of an administrative agency. And, of 

course, talking again about public confidence in the oversight of the 

Court, which I think is an important part of maintaining that confidence, whether you think there might be some advantage, as Senator Blumenthal and I have discussed informally, having more of 

an adversarial process. My experience and I trust your experience 

with the adversarial process in our courts is it usually produces 

more information that allows the judge to make a better decision. 

And I would just like to get your reaction, Mr. Cole, and perhaps 

go down the line. 

Mr. COLE. Thank you, Senator. First of all, I can tell you from 

the practice we have before the FISA Court that it is far more than 

just another administrative agency. They push back hard, and they 

make sure that they are the guardians of the law and the Constitution. 

The topic of having an adversary—that is one that we are in the 

process of discussing and I know is being discussed in the Senate 

and in the House, and it is one of those areas that I think is part 

of the debate that we should be having on how best to do this. 
17 

There are obviously issues we will have to work through as to 

clearances and classifications and who would be there and what 

their role would be and things of that nature if there is going to 

be a practical way to do it. But those are the kinds of discussions 

I think we do need to have. 

As you pointed out, it is not the usual course, and in the criminal 

law context we have many search warrants, Title III surveillance 

warrants that come in, that are not done in an adversary way. But 

this is certainly part of what we would like to be talking about and 

see if this has some utility. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you. 

Mr. Inglis, do you have anything to add? 

Mr. INGLIS. My background is largely operational, not in the 

training of the law, but that said, I am more than mindful of the 

absolute obligation to ensure that these things are done fully consistent with the Constitution. We welcome any and all hard questions. Whether that comes from an adversarial process or the process we enjoy, we think that we should be held accountable to answer those questions and ensure that the authorities that we are 

granted supports the whole of the Constitution, not just the defense 

of national security but the defense of civil liberties. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you. 

Mr. Litt. 

Mr. LITT. The only point that I would like to make from the perspective of the intelligence community is to note that we already— 

this is an unusual process to have the Court involved in an essentially executive branch activity, conduct of foreign intelligence. I do 

not know of any other nation in the world that has the degree of 

judicial supervision of intelligence activities that this country has 

already. And I think that to some extent people have a—make a 

mistaken analogy when they hear the term ‘‘court’’ and they think 

of this as an adversary proceeding, like a criminal trial or a civil 

trial. The question is: What is the best way to ensure that our intelligence programs are conducted in compliance with the law and 

with adequate protection for people’s privacy and civil liberties? 

And if it would help to have some sort of adversary process built 

into that, I think that would be entirely appropriate. But we should 

not be trying to make this mimic a criminal trial because it is a 

very different process. 

Senator CORNYN. Mr. Joyce, do you have anything to add? 

Mr. JOYCE. No. My background is operational, so I would defer 

to my lead attorney, the Deputy Attorney General. 

Senator CORNYN. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

I hope, Mr. Litt, you are not saying that we have something that 

is very unusual, that we have something that can collect data on 

U.S. citizens, that you are not saying the Court should not be involved. 

Mr. LITT. No, no. I am not saying that. 

Chairman LEAHY. I just want to make sure. 

Mr. LITT. I am not saying that at all. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Klobuchar. 
18 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to our witnesses. As a former prosecutor, I have long 

believed that our laws must strike the right balance between protecting our civil liberties and protecting our national security. 

I think most Americans, I will say, did not expect the sweeping 

nature of the surveillance programs, and for that reason I think 

this opportunity to reexamine these programs to see if there are 

ways we can ensure that they are more transparent and accountable without sacrificing the benefits they provide to national security is very important. And I just got this order, the Court order, 

Mr. Cole, that was just hot off the presses here. And could you— 

you said in your earlier testimony, you talked about the metadata, 

which I assume is just the collected data we have been hearing 

about on domestic phone calls, which is not the phone conversation 

itself. And then you go down to a Category 2, which must be when 

you are investigating parts of that metadata, which is based on 

this order; and then Category 3—this is how I am thinking of it 

in terms of circles—would be when you would actually get a court 

order to start investigating a person. Is that a fair way to look at 

this? 

Mr. COLE. I think that is a very good way of looking at it—and 

the word you used I think is important here, the surveillance that 

is being done— because the only thing we are actually involved in 

surveiling are these much smaller groups that we have reasonable, 

articulable suspicion for. We are not surveiling everything that is 

in the database. You have to go through some very specific requirements that are contained in that order before you can surveil. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. In this order—and you said it would be— 

there has to be a reasonable suspicion that it is a terrorist. That 

is what you said earlier? 

Mr. COLE. Reasonable suspicion that is relevant to an investigation of certain terrorist organizations. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Okay. And so is there a percentage of that 

data that, you know, you look at when you get to the big metadata, 

then you go down to the next category, what percentage of the 

metadata is the next category that is based on this order? 

Mr. COLE. I think it is hard to really quantify. I have heard numbers anywhere from 0.0001 percent of that metadata. It is a very, 

very tiny fraction of the metadata that actually is accessed and—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And then when you go down to the part 

there where you are actually investigating someone or you get a 

special court order to look into it, what percentage is that? 

Mr. COLE. That is then even smaller, because we then have to 

have probable cause to believe that those people are falling within 

the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Okay. So given how small this is, is there 

no way of limiting the breadth of the data and information collected under the program that would not have adverse effects on 

our ability to effectively monitor national security threats? 

Mr. COLE. Well, this is what we are looking at right now and trying to work through. As Chairman Feinstein had noted, she has 

made some recommendations. We are in the process of looking 

through that process to see if there are other ways to go about 

doing this where we still preserve the effectiveness of the operation 
19 

and try to limit whatever kind of privacy and civil liberties intrusions that come from that. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Very good. And I know one idea that General Alexander suggested is that he is open to the idea of telecommunications companies holding the records rather than having 

the NSA collect them, although we know we still have that issue 

of telephone immunity anyway, as long as the Government could 

get access. 

Mr. Inglis, do you want to testify about that and answer that? 

Do you think that is a viable alternative? It seems to me that we 

may have to do more than that. 

Mr. INGLIS. So I think there are multiple implementations that 

could work. I think that we need to score all of those implementations against a set of criteria, which would include at the top that 

they do provide protections for privacy and civil liberties, but they 

also need to have sufficient breadth to your question, that if you 

ask a question of this database, let us say you have the situation 

we had with Basaaly Moalin, we have a number from East Africa 

al Qaeda that we have reasonable suspicion is associated with a 

plot against the homeland, you want to check to see whether there 

is, in fact, a connection into the homeland. You need sufficient 

breadth in the database that you are about to query to have confidence that if you come away with no response, that you can take 

that as confidence there is not a plot; or that if you get a response, 

you have found it, whether it is in any particular location in the 

world. So the breadth is important. 

But I think that we can take a look at whether this is stored at 

the provider so long as you have some confidence you can do this 

in a timely way. We need to sometimes disrupt an operation that 

is in play, that is in progress, and so seconds, hours matter. 

There might be other situations where you have the time to perhaps take more time, but we will have to think our way through 

whether the providers can meet that standard. I think there are 

technical architectures where they can. 

Finally, to the question that Senator Feinstein has asked, a very 

thoughtful question, do we need to hold these records for 5 years? 

Our experience has shown that intelligence, writ large, tends to 

have a significant tail-off at 5 years, but there is a knee in the 

curve that might live at 2 years or 3 years. We need to base it upon 

data with a rearward look, take a hard look at that and determine 

how long these things really are necessary and beyond that how 

long they are valuable. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And one quick question at the end here, 

Mr. Cole. Now that this Court order has been declassified, is there 

effort underway to declassify some of the legal rationale behind it? 

Mr. COLE. We are still working on trying to declassify a number 

of things in this area. We are trying to get as much as we can out, 

obviously balancing the national security concerns with those released. But our goal is to try and get out as much information as 

we can to provide transparency on this. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you all very, very much. Let me ask 

this, Mr. Litt. With regard to Mr. Joyce’s comments about a certain 
20 

case that they were able to interdict and stop, dealing with the 

subway matter, he said that the collection of data under this program played a role in the successful culmination of that case. 

Just fundamentally, you were Deputy Attorney General under 

Janet Reno for 6 years in the Department of Justice. You were a 

member of the ABA’s Criminal Justice Committee. You have studied these issues and are required to make sure that laws are followed. But is this what was done in that case? Does it violate the 

Constitution in any way as defined by U.S. case law and the words 

of the Constitution itself? 

Mr. LITT. So, first, I thank you for the promotion, but I never actually served as Deputy Attorney General. I had a couple of positions in the Department, but—— 

Senator SESSIONS. You were Deputy Assistant—— 

Mr. LITT. Deputy Assistant Attorney General. 

Senator SESSIONS. We have to get all these Assistant Deputies 

and Deputy Assistants straight. Excuse me. 

Chairman LEAHY. I think we can all agree he is highly qualified. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, you are experienced in these matters, 

and I just want to raise a certain point, if you will give me a brief 

answer on that. 

Mr. LITT. I think the answer is quite clear under the controlling 

case law that a collection of this kind of telephone metadata from 

the telephone companies is not a violation of anyone’s constitutional rights. 

Senator SESSIONS. And when I was a federal prosecutor—and, 

Mr. Cole, you were a prosecutor—virtually every complex case resulted in a subpoena to phone companies to get people’s phone 

records. Is that correct? 

Mr. COLE. I would say the vast majority involved getting phone 

records in a case. 

Senator SESSIONS. And when you do that, you obtain their name, 

a lot of details about the call, but not the contents of the case. 

Mr. COLE. That is right. Many times you can get subscriber information—who owns the phone, what their billing address is, 

things of that nature—which we do not get under this program. 

Senator SESSIONS. So this haystack of information that you have 

is only numbers. It does not even have the name of the person connected to that number, the subscriber of that number. Is that correct? 

Mr. COLE. That is correct. If we find a chain that we think is important, we then have to do another investigation to find out who 

actually belongs to those numbers. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, Chairman Leahy and others—and we 

talked when the PATRIOT Act passed, we went into great, great 

detail about all these issues. And I would say that balancing the 

constitutional rights of danger versus constitutional rights is not 

the right way to phrase this. I believe everything in the PATRIOT 

Act that we passed was consistent in principle to the very things 

that have been done by law enforcement for years and decades in 

terms of the ability to issue subpoenas and obtain records. Maybe 

a few new applications of it to new technologies, but essentially the 

principles were maintained. Would you agree, Mr. Cole? 
21 

Mr. COLE. Yes, Senator. As I said at the beginning, I think we 

have struck the balance properly here, but there is always room for 

discussion and getting people’s input. And times sometimes do 

change, and it is good to come back and revisit these things and 

make sure we have the balance right. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I agree with that. I think the questions 

that have been raised require us to look at that. 

Now, the data, this haystack of phone numbers, there is no ability to go back and listen to any of those conversations that occurred 

at a previous time, is there? 

Mr. COLE. No. We do not even capture through this any conversations, so there is no ability, no possibility of listening to conversations through what we get in this program. 

Senator SESSIONS. And, Mr. Litt, as an intel lawyer here, if you 

have the ability to tap a terrorist’s phone call in Europe or Yemen, 

let us say, and that person calls to the United States, by definition 

of a lawful wiretap you listen to the persons that the individual 

calls. Is that right? So, I mean, a wiretap by definition is to listen 

to the conversations that the bad guy has with whoever he calls? 

Mr. LITT. That is correct, and under FISA the Court requires us 

to have minimization procedures to ensure that we do not retain 

or disseminate communications of Americans unless those are valid 

foreign intelligence or evidence of a crime. 

Senator SESSIONS. But if you want to tap a terrorist you have 

identified in the United States, you have to have a warrant with 

probable cause, do you not? 

Mr. LITT. That is correct. 

Senator SESSIONS. And so if you identify a person by surveiling 

a foreign terrorist, you identify phone calls to the United States, 

you would still have to have information sufficient to get a court 

to give you a Title III warrant to listen to that person’s phone 

calls? 

Mr. LITT. It could be a Title III warrant. It could be an individual 

warrant under Title I of FISA. But either way there is a probable 

cause standard that has to be met. 

Senator SESSIONS. And it requires Court approval. 

Mr. LITT. Yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I know this Committee has 

worked hard on this. We tried to make sure that every provision 

in the Act was consistent with our constitutional and legal heritage. But we will listen to the concerns that are being raised, and 

if we made a mistake, I am willing to change it. But I am inclined 

to think all of these actions are consistent with the Constitution 

and laws of the United States. 

Chairman LEAHY. One of the reasons we are having the hearing 

is that there are going to be some proposals for changes in the law, 

and I want to make sure that we have as much information as possible for it. 

Senator Franken. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to 

thank all the witnesses here, Mr. Cole, Mr. Inglis, Mr. Litt, and 

Mr. Joyce, for your service to the country. 

I want to be clear at the outset. I think that these programs protect our country and have saved lives. But I do think there is a 
22 

critical problem at the center of this debate, and that is the lack 

of transparency around these programs. The Government has to 

give proper weight to both keeping America safe from terrorists 

and protecting Americans’ privacy. But when almost everything 

about these programs is secret and when the companies involved 

are under strict gag orders, the American public has no way of 

knowing whether we are getting that balance right. I think that is 

bad for privacy and bad for democracy. 

Tomorrow I am introducing a bill to address this, to fix this. It 

will force the Government to disclose how many Americans have 

had their information collected under key authorities in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and it will give force—it will 

also force the Government to disclose how many Americans have 

had their information actually reviewed by federal agents. 

My bill would also allow private companies to disclose aggregate 

figures about the number of FISA orders that they are receiving 

and the number of their users that these orders have affected. 

Two weeks ago, a broad coalition of 63 Internet companies and 

bipartisan civil liberties groups sent a letter to the President asking for the reforms that my bill would make law. I am proud to say 

that I am introducing my bill with the support of Chairman Leahy, 

Senator Blumenthal, and a number of other Senators who are not 

on the Judiciary Committee. From what I just heard from Senator 

Feinstein, there may be some overlaps in our approaches, and I 

would be happy to work with her. 

I would like to focus my questions on the subject of transparency. 

Mr. Litt, in the weeks after Mr. Snowden’s leaks, the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence decided to declassify the fact that, 

in 2012, only 300 queries were run on the database of telephone 

records compiled under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. Can you 

tell me why the ODNI decided to declassify that fact? 

Mr. LITT. So, first, to be clear, what was declassified was the fact 

that there were fewer than 300 telephone numbers approved for 

queries. There can be more than one query based on the same telephone number if, for example, over time you want to check and see 

whether there have been any additional communications. So the 

number that was declassified was the number of selectors as to 

which reasonable, articulable suspicion had been established so 

that they could be the basis for a query. 

Senator FRANKEN. Why did you decide to declassify the fact, and 

then? 

Mr. LITT. You know, what we are doing is we are looking at all 

of the information surrounding these programs, at what has already been revealed, because fundamentally these programs were 

classified in toto to begin with because of the feeling that revealing 

our capabilities would give our adversaries an edge in how to avoid 

those capabilities. Once the fact of the program became public, we 

began to look at all the details surrounding the program, such as 

the orders that we have released today and the number you mentioned there, and we are making an assessment as to each one of 

them as to whether it is in the public interest to release that particular fact that has previously been classified. 

Senator FRANKEN. I think that I do not want the public to take 

our word for it always, and I think there is a balance here, and 
23 

transparency is part of that balance. And I do not want a situation 

where the Government is transparent only when it is convenient 

for the Government. About an hour ago, ODNI declassified a FISA 

Court order under Section 215. That is a good thing. But ODNI has 

known for weeks that this hearing was coming, and yet ODNI releases material just a few minutes before the hearing began. 

You know, again, it is a step forward, but you get the feeling, 

when it is ad hoc transparency, that is not—that does not engender 

trust, I do not think. 

Mr. LITT. I could not agree with you more. I think we have an 

obligation to go through and look at the bad as well as the good 

and declassify what can be declassified without danger. We did actually have a discussion yesterday within the executive branch 

about whether we should release these documents this morning or 

not, because it is generally not a good idea to release things on the 

morning of a hearing. And I think we came to the conclusion that 

once we have made the determination that the documents should 

be declassified, there was no justification for holding them up any 

longer. And so that was—— 

Senator FRANKEN. Did you just start thinking about that decision 

like yesterday? 

Mr. LITT. No, but it—— 

Senator FRANKEN. When did you—I mean, you have known this 

for a long time. You might have been—you might have thought 

about this weeks ago and said, you know, maybe not the day of. 

Mr. LITT. We have been thinking about this for some time, and 

we have been processing these as quickly as we can. You will note 

that the documents that were released contain some redactions of 

information that remains classified. 

Senator FRANKEN. Of course. 

Mr. LITT. It is a rather time-consuming interagency process to 

reach consensus on what can safely be released. 

Senator FRANKEN. Well, my time is up, but I think we should 

create a strong permanent set of public reporting requirements 

that will empower the public to reach their own conclusions about 

the merits of these programs, and that is what the bill I am working on would accomplish. Again, I would love to work with Senator 

Feinstein and, Mr. Litt, I would love if you would work with me 

to make sure we get the reporting requirements right as we move 

forward with the bill. Would you do that? 

Mr. LITT. Absolutely. We would be glad to do that, sir. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Incidentally, we are going to go next to Senator Flake, but I do want to compliment all four of the witnesses 

who are here for their candor, and I might want to single out General Inglis—or ‘‘Mr. Inglis’’ I guess you go by now. And I have been 

advised and I understand from others that you have always been 

very direct, very clear, very straightforward. Often that is in classified sessions, but you have been the same way in open session, and 

I appreciate that. 

Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, and 

I am sorry I was not here to hear your testimony. I know that you 
24 

have all noted in your written testimony that there are significant 

checks in the FISA system. Do you believe that there are insufficient checks to outweigh the concerns that some have about the appointment of an independent counsel? If you have touched on this 

in earlier questions, I apologize, but, General Cole, you mentioned 

that with regard to an independent counsel, do you think that 

there—in the second panel, Mr. Baker raises some issues and problems with independent counsel. Can you give me your thoughts on 

whether you think that is needed or not? 

Mr. COLE. Certainly, Senator. This is a topic that is being discussed both in the administration and in the Congress as one avenue that might be available. Traditionally, when you issue search 

warrants, when you issue wiretaps and things like that, in the 

criminal law you do not have an adversary process that takes 

place. There is not somebody on the other side. So there is a legal 

tradition that the way we have been doing it is certainly one that 

we have done in other contexts. 

We also have the Court that is involved, and that is unusual, as 

Mr. Litt had pointed out, particularly in a foreign intelligence context, to have the courts involved at all. 

But this is something that I think we are open to having discussions about as to what the utility would be, what the role would 

be, how it would work. The devil can many times be in the details, 

but we think all of these things are worth discussing to figure out 

how to make this the best program it can be. 

Senator FLAKE. If there were an independent counsel involved, 

can you foresee problems in terms of timeliness to have a lawyer 

staff cleared in time to review the sensitive information? If anybody 

else wants to address that as well. 

Mr. COLE. I will just start. It may be a little bit, but the Court 

pushes back a lot itself, and there is an enormous process that 

takes place with the Court itself to make sure that we have satisfied all the requirements under the law and under the Constitution. So if there is somebody on the other side doing it, I would 

imagine they would be doing the same thing on roughly the same 

schedule. 

Mr. LITT. If I can just add to that, there is a letter that the Chief 

Judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has written to 

the Chairman that I think is available on the Internet that outlines 

in some detail the procedures that the Court follows and I think 

gives a good sense for the care and thoroughness that the FISA 

Court exercises today. 

Senator FLAKE. There has been some criticism in that the process that we have for the selection of these judges may lead to more 

Republican judges being appointed than Democratic—or more Republicans appointing judges than Democrats appointing judges. Do 

you sense or see any difference in your experience, all of you, 

with—is that an issue that somebody ought to be concerned about? 

Or have you seen any difference in decisions rendered? 

Mr. COLE. From my experience I have not seen any decisions of 

the judges or judges in there being guided by the law and not necessarily by politics. But that is certainly a topic we would leave to 

the sound discretion of the Congress. 
25 

Senator FLAKE. Any other thoughts from anybody else? Do you 

see any problems with that process, selection of judges? Mr. Litt. 

Mr. LITT. No, I was just going to say it is very hard to tell how 

another judge would have rendered a decision because you only 

have the one judge rendering the decision. 

Senator FLAKE. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Durbin. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am a liberal arts lawyer. I took some math courses, but it has 

been a long time ago, so I am going to ask the panelists, maybe 

Mr. Litt, Mr. Inglis, or whoever, to help me do some math here. 

In 2012, there were 300 queries that resulted in a search of 

records, and we are told that there were three hops. In other 

words, if I was the subject matter of this search and I called Senator Feinstein, they would accumulate all of the records of my telephone calls to her and others, and then all of the records of Senator 

Feinstein’s telephone calls, which may have included Chairman 

Leahy, and now you have included all of his records as well. 

Mr. Jaffer of the ACLU will testify, at least speculate later, that 

if I had an average of 40 contacts, that would mean that for my 

name, my query, you would accumulate 2 million phone records— 

2 million for that one inquiry. Now multiply that in the year 2012 

by 300. So we are talking about 600 million phone records. Now 

multiply that times 7 years. 

So what has been described as a discrete program to go after people who would cause us harm, when you look at the reach of this 

program, it envelops a substantial number of Americans. 

So can somebody help me with the math here, if I have missed 

something along the way or perhaps should minimize that number? 

Mr. INGLIS. Sir, if I could start, and apologizing for the format, 

the unclassified format, I will be discreet in my remarks but happy 

to follow up in any detail that you would prefer, either here or at 

NSA. 

First and foremost, the analysts are charged to provide information that is truly useful to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 

so in that regard they try to be judicious about choosing when to 

do a second hop or under the Court’s authorization a third hop. 

Those are not always exercised. They do not always exercise a second hop for all numbers that might be pointed to by the first hop. 

And so while theoretically 40 times 40 times 40 gets you to a large 

number, that is not typically what takes place. 

If an analyst were to see, for example, at the second hop that 

there are very significant numbers associated with one of those 

numbers, they would have to come to some deduction as to what 

that means. That could be that what you have kind of glommed 

onto is a pizza delivery man. You do not want to pursue that. That 

is not useful. 

If on that second hop you see that that has hopped to a foreign 

number already known to the intelligence community because it is 

a known terrorist, you would want to make the third hop to understand what is beyond that. 

Senator DURBIN. I understand that part of it where you are trying not to waste the time or resources of our Government in protecting our Nation? 
26 

Mr. INGLIS. Yes, sir. 

Senator DURBIN. But the potential reach of this, when we say 

300, goes way beyond 300. 

Mr. INGLIS. So I think that is a very important question. We 

have to compare the theory to the practice. We try to be very, very 

judicious in the use of this very narrowly focused authority. And 

so the reason that we declassified the numbers is to show that we 

are, in fact, judicious. Less than 300 times did we approve a query 

for selection—or a selector for query in 2012, and provided less 

than 500 numbers in 12 reports to the FBI in all of 2012. 

Mr. LITT. If I can just add one thing to that, it is important to 

remember that all that we are getting out of this is numbers—nobody’s name, nobody’s address, the content of no communications. 

These are all—this is nothing but a tool to try to identify telephone 

numbers that warrant further inquiry. 

Senator DURBIN. I understand that. And here is the point, that 

I have offered an amendment before this Committee which garnered a grand total of four votes a few years ago on this very subject because most of the members were not aware of this program, 

the 215 program and its detail. I knew a little bit more than some, 

but obviously did not know as much as I am learning today. And 

there was a genuine concern today expressed. At that time because 

of the limited knowledge of the members, I got four votes. 

So here is the question I get down to, and it is asked over and 

over again. If my cell phone is in area code 217, which it is, and 

I am a suspect, I certainly think it is appropriate and I encourage 

our Government to find out who I am talking to. That is important. 

I still cannot get to the point of requiring every person with a 217 

area code to have their records collected in terms of their telephone 

conversations. 

Now multiply that times every area code across America, and 

look at the potential reach. It seems to me that what is being described as a narrow program is really a very broad program in 

terms of the metadata collection on the front end. What I would 

like to ask—people have said, I have heard it from members of this 

panel, you know, we have saved lives with this. The 215 program 

has saved lives, stopped terrorism. Good. That is what we want our 

Government to do. 

Could you have also saved the same number of lives and had the 

same impact if, knowing my telephone number as a suspect, you 

could search my records as opposed to collecting everyone’s records 

in my area code? 

Mr. INGLIS. So if I could go back to a case in point, perhaps that 

might be the best way to tease this out. I think that is a great 

question. The Basaaly Moalin case, what we knew at the time 

when we made that query was we knew a number that we had reasonable suspicion was affiliated with a terrorist group plotting 

against the homeland. That number was in Somalia. It was associated with Al-Shabaab. We had reasonable suspicion it was associated with something in the United States. We had no idea what 

it might have been associated with, and so we need to do a query. 

We did not know whether it would be associated with a 217 area 

code or a 303 area code, what of the grand set of possibilities was 

it associated with. 
27 

In order to find the needle that matched up against that number, 

we needed the haystack. That is what the premise is in this case. 

And in that point, if just before somebody had made that query you 

had said this is going to connect to a number in San Diego, that 

would have been as surprising as if you had said that number is 

connected to someplace in Yemen. 

Senator DURBIN. But, Mr. Inglis, I guess what it gets down to is 

this: Once establishing that number with Al-Shabaab, this operative from Al-Shabaab, you could certainly go after that person’s 

telephone records and all of the contacts that that person has 

made. The basic question we are faced with is: Do you need to collect 5 years’ worth of data on everyone in America and their telephone records so that the haystack, which is pretty big—— 

Mr. INGLIS. That is a fair question. So the question would be: Is 

it enough to look prospectively, in the future, right, at that particular number? It may well be that the plotting you are looking 

for occurred in the past. And if you do not have that person’s 

records in the past, then you cannot determine—— 

Senator DURBIN. And a point that has been raised repeatedly, if 

we required the phone companies to retain the records for 5 

years—— 

Mr. INGLIS. That is a very fair point, and that is possible. 

Senator DURBIN. It would not be in the grasp of the Government, 

but accessed by the Government. 

Mr. INGLIS. I agree, sir. 

Senator DURBIN. Which serves the same purpose, does it not? 

Mr. INGLIS. I agree. But under the current legal framing, the 

phone companies are not required to retain that for the benefit of 

the Government. 

Senator DURBIN. How hard would that be? 

Mr. INGLIS. I think it would require a legal change. I do not 

think that is hard. 

Senator DURBIN. I do not think so either. 

Mr. INGLIS. I think that you can get there from here. You have 

to then think about the rest of the attributes that are necessary to 

make this a useful venture. 

Senator DURBIN. Senator Feinstein said: ‘‘Ask him about the expense.’’ 

Mr. INGLIS. I would say in a classified session I could give you 

chapter and verse on the expense. The expenses are different depending upon whether you choose the current implementation or 

you choose an implementation where you leave it at the providers. 

The Government, if it requires the providers to retain those 

records, should bear that expense. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Lee. 

Senator LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I understand it, the NSA’s collection of metadata, the kind of 

metadata that we have been discussing today, is accomplished pursuant to Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. Now, Section 

215(b)(2)(A) of the PATRIOT Act places an important limitation on 

that collection in that it limits the Government’s ability to collect 

that metadata to circumstances where the data in question is ‘‘relevant to an authorized investigation.’’ 
28 

At some point—you know, relevance is a concept that is difficult 

to define in the abstract. It is a somewhat fluid concept, and it is 

one of those things that some jurist might say, ‘‘I know it when I 

see it, but I struggle to define it.’’ 

Yet regardless of how difficult it might be to define in the abstract what relevance is, don’t you think we have left the station 

of relevance long before we get to the point of collecting metadata 

on potentially 300 million Americans and their cell phone usage? 

How can one get one’s mind around the concept of that volume of 

information, metadata or otherwise, all being relevant to an ongoing investigation? 

Mr. COLE. Well, Senator, Mr. Litt—and he can chime in—had 

noted a little bit earlier how broad, as you noted yourself, the concept of relevance is in civil discovery, in many different kinds of 

legal contexts. It can be things that will lead you to things that you 

need as a concept for relevance. 

Senator LEE. Right. I understand Mr. Litt’s very broad conception of relevance, and as he recently explained in his comments at 

the Brookings Institution. But I assure you, as a recovering lawyer 

myself, there is no context in civil discovery or otherwise in which 

one may define ‘‘relevance’’ broadly enough to take in information 

regarding each and every single American who owns a telephone. 

Mr. COLE. The answer I would give to that, Senator, is that we 

are not really accessing or getting into all of that metadata that is 

stored in that database. We do not actually get to roam around in 

it. We do not get to look at it to our heart’s content and then say, 

well, this is relevant and that is relevant, so let us take that. 

You have to look at it in the context of the primary order which 

was declassified and issued today that says the only way you can 

access it is if you have reasonable, articulable suspicion that the 

number you are going to query off of is, in fact, related to specific 

terrorist groups. And that has to be documented. And if you do not 

have that, you cannot get into this. 

So the surveillance concept I think is very important here. You 

cannot surveil this without that gate being checked through. 

Senator LEE. And that gate is not controlled by a warrant. I 

mean, if you want to access that, you do not have to go to court 

to get a warrant to access that. Those are controlled by internal 

procedures, correct? 

Mr. COLE. That is correct. But they are controlled by the Court 

order, and they are controlled by compliance audits that are done 

both by the executive branch and the Court looking at how it is implemented on a periodic basis. 

Senator LEE. Okay. Mr. Litt, do you have something to add? 

Mr. LITT. Yes, just very briefly. I just want to make clear that 

the standard of relevance that I articulated in the speech is not 

mine alone. This is one that has been approved by the judges of 

the FISA Court and was known to members of this Committee and 

the Intelligence Committee at the time that the Section 215 authority was renewed. 

Senator LEE. Well, I understand that. I understand that, and 

that has been part of the problem we have had, is that until recently most people did not have any idea about those, and we have 

significant constraints that limited our ability to explain why some 
29 

of us had concerns with the PATRIOT Act, why some of us on both 

sides of the aisle voted against reauthorizing the PATRIOT Act. We 

were unable to speak about this publicly because we have secret 

procedures being undertaken pursuant to secret law, and it has 

been a bit of a problem. 

Now, what would you say, then, getting back to you, Mr. Cole, 

to my constituents? I understand what you are saying, that, ‘‘We 

are collecting all of it but we are not looking at it. We are collecting 

it, but we are closing our eyes, so do not worry about it.’’ What 

would you say to my constituents who say, ‘‘I do not want the Government having that information. It is not the Government’s information.’’ It still does not make it relevant under the law. It still 

does not meet what many of my constituents believe to be well 

within their reasonable expectation of privacy for the Government 

to collect that much information, potentially information about 300 

million Americans. 

Mr. COLE. Well, I would say two things. First of all, we have had 

34 separate times a court say that it does meet the standard of relevance, to have it all and then have the restrictions. But the further thing that I would say, which I think is very important, is 

what we are doing here today, which is it is worth having a debate 

about is there a better way to do it. It is worth having a debate 

about where we are going to strike that balance between security 

for the Nation and making sure that people’s privacy and civil liberty rights are being honored. And that is a tough balance to find, 

but it is a balance worth talking about, and it is the process that 

we are welcoming and engaging in right now. 

Senator LEE. Okay. Thank you. I see my time has expired. I just 

want to comment that I appreciate your insight on this. I do think 

it is worth discussing publicly, and I think it is also something that 

we need to consider from a constitutional standpoint. We have been 

relying on a 34-year-old Supreme Court case, Smith v. Maryland, to get at this idea that metadata is somehow beyond the reach of 

the Fourth Amendment. But we have to remember that Smith did 

not involve collection on hundreds of millions of Americans. It involved collection on a single target. It involved collection in a manner that is completely archaic by today’s standards and that by today’s standards would involve a minuscule amount of information. 

I think at some point when you collect that much data on that 

many people—whether it is that much data on one person, that 

might create some problem. That much data on hundreds of millions of people creates an even bigger problem and one that I think 

was not considered by the Supreme Court of the United States in 

Maryland v. Smith—— 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator LEE [continuing]. One that we need to revisit. Thank 

you, Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Lee. 

Senator Whitehouse, again, showing the expertise here, you 

served both on this Committee and the Intelligence Committee. I 

appreciate you being here. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. Cole, you just said it is worth having a debate on these 

issues, and I think you are right about that. But I also hope that 
30 

the executive branch takes a lesson from this experience about the 

value of classification or what I would consider overclassification. 

I have seen this over and over now. When we were fighting with 

the Bush administration about the torture program, the executive 

branch got to tell its side of the story because the executive branch 

were the declassifiers, and we were stuck with facts that we knew 

that blew up the argument that was being made by the executive 

branch, but that we could not articulate because they were classified. 

We have seen it on cyber where so much of the American public 

is unaware of the cyber threat that we are facing. Now, thankfully, 

we are becoming more aware, but for a long time we were just in 

the dark about what was going on because in the private sector 

companies did not want to talk about it for fear of aggravating 

their regulators, their consumers, their clients, even giving their 

competitors advantage, and the Government just wildly overclassified everything. 

Now we have, I think, a terrific article that Senator Feinstein 

wrote. We have, I think, very good testimony by Bob Mueller. We 

have a lot of good information out there that helps the American 

public understand these programs. But it all came out late. It all 

came out in response to a leaker. There was no organized plan for 

how we rationally declassify this so that the American people can 

participate in the debate. 

I think there is an executive branch reaction toward classification. I think that reaction is in part because of the advantage it 

gives the executive branch relative to the legislative branch, which 

cannot declassify. And I think over and over again we have found 

that, looking back, we are worse off for that effort in the first instance. 

So I would really urge you to take a look at this and, you know, 

when this thing burst, there is this old saying—I am not going to 

get it exactly right, but there is something about the rumor is all 

the way across town before the truth could even get its boots on. 

You have lived that experience in the last couple of months. I hope 

this has an effect on you, because this is a recurring problem and 

we really need to be balancing much more carefully the value of declassification against the value of classification. 

I think you guys are terribly one-sided in favor of classification, 

and then something like this comes and, pow, you are still trying 

to get your boots on because you never took the appropriate steps 

to put news out about this program that would have avoided, I 

think, a lot of this. And I would like to have you have a chance 

to react to that. 

Mr. COLE. I think you make very valid points, Senator 

Whitehouse, that these are all topics that we need to debate. They 

are not easy topics because they involve, again, that same balancing—the same balancing that we are trying to do between national security and civil liberties. And what kinds of programs we 

put into place to gain intelligence information is the same kind of 

debate we need to have about what is classified and what is not 

classified and what secrets we let out. 

If it was easy, we would be having these left and right. I do not 

think, at least from what I have seen, that the executive branch 
31 

is doing it to disadvantage the legislative branch, but I think that 

may be—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. But it does have that effect. 

Mr. COLE. It may have that effect, and I would concede that. I 

think it is done because people are cautious, and it is easier to 

overclassify than to underclassify. It is safer to overclassify than to 

underclassify. And now we are having to get into the hard work of 

finding just where that line is, and that is a difficult job to do. But 

it is worth doing. 

Mr. LITT. Senator, could I just add—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. So something like this happens or the torture program gets exposed or we have a significant cyber attack, 

or something happens that shows that that short-term decision 

that it was easier to classify was actually the wrong decision. 

Mr. LITT. I just want to add on this—and I know you are familiar 

with what I am about to say, but we are having a public debate 

now, but that public debate is not without cost. The information 

that has been leaked is going to do damage to our ability to protect 

the Nation. We are going to lose capabilities. People are paying attention to this. 

The way that typically the Congress, both through the legislation 

it passes and through its own internal rules, has historically 

sought to achieve the balance between appropriate oversight of intelligence activities and the need to protect sources and methods is 

through primarily the Intelligence Committees but also some other 

committees of Congress—this Committee, the Armed Services Committee, the Appropriations Committees. And typically that is the 

forum that has been used to strike this balance. It may be—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I get that, and my time has expired, so let 

me just jump in and say we all get that. My point is that the American public is an important part of this debate, and we would probably be better off if there was not such a strong instinct in favor 

of classifying and keeping things classified and we developed information for the American public in a way that minimized that intelligence collection loss and allowed us to have this debate. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join 

in thanking the Chairman for this hearing and for his legislative 

proposal, which I have joined, and to each of you for your extraordinary contribution to our Nation but also to the thousands of others in the intelligence community and special operations who have 

thwarted and stopped terrorist threats to this country and which 

all too often I believe have been ignored because the efforts to stop 

them have been so successful, and the debate, as Mr. Cole has 

termed it, is one that is very appropriate in a free society that is 

trying to protect itself from terrorism by using search and surveillance, which have a role, and what we are grappling to do here is 

to define how to reconcile the secrecy of search and surveillance, 

which necessarily have to be so, with privacy and civil liberties and 

all the other constitutional guarantees that make us unique among 

the nations in the world and, in fact, the greatest Nation in the 

history of the world. 
32 

You know, I have been a litigator for close to 40 years. I have 

never doubted that the scores of judges that I have litigated before 

have a commitment to rights of privacy and all the constitutional 

rights. And I have no doubt about the FISA judges pushing back 

and having a commitment to the rule of law. But in appearance, 

this system is failing, and failing fast, to maintain the trust and 

credibility of the American people who want to be protected from 

terrorist threats, but at the same time also protected from the degradation of their constitutional rights. 

So I am introducing a bill that would change the appointment 

and selection procedure so that the appearance and the reality of 

diversity of view and aggressive protection of constitutional rights 

is maintained and enhanced. And I will be introducing that bill tomorrow that would involve the circuit court judges on our courts 

of appeals, chief judges, in the appointment process, with the continued involvement of the Chief Justice, and change also the FISA 

Court of Reviews selection process. 

I have found in my years that one of a judge’s worst nightmares 

is incompetent counsel, and the reason is, especially in a criminal 

trial, that incompetent counsel or lack of counsel for the defendant 

means that the record on appeal is weaker, that the test and clash 

of litigation is diminished in quality, and that is the basic principle 

that I think should be involved in some way in the FISA Court as 

well. 

And so a second bill that I am proposing is for a special advocate 

to be involved not necessarily in the ex parte proceedings on every 

single warrant or surveillance or search, but at some point where 

there are significant issues of law so that different sides are presented, challenges are made, and the judge or panel has the benefit 

of that contention that is at the core of our court process. Our 

courts not only insist on but thrive on the clash and testing of different points of view. Whether it is debate on a legal issue or crossexamination, that is at the essence of our litigation process. 

So I think in appearance, if not reality, the current design of the 

FISA Court stacks the deck against the protection of our civil liberties and can be improved and enhanced without sacrificing either 

speed or security, because those special advocates can be cleared 

beforehand for security purposes, they can be involved after the 

fact, if necessary, on appeal in effect to the FISA Court of Review 

or to the U.S. Supreme Court. And I hope—and this is to lead to 

the question—I hope, Mr. Cole and Mr. Litt, that you will join in 

this process of trying to improve the current FISA Court structure. 

And I would like to know whether there is active consideration of 

changes in the selection procedure and the involvement of potentially a special advocate or independent counsel of some kind in 

this process. 

Mr. COLE. Senator, I think at this point there is active consideration of a range of issues just to get at the kinds of things you are 

talking about, to make sure that the process works as well as it 

can, to balance both of those important issues of national security 

and civil liberties and privacy, and to make sure that it is transparent enough so that we maintain credibility with the American 

people about this program. 
33 

It is a difficult issue, as we have discussed today for several 

hours, to find the right balance. But, yes, it is definitely something 

under consideration and active discussion in the administration. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Mr. Cole, I have a question. As I understand 

it, the Government believes that every single domestic phone 

record is relevant to terrorism investigation and can be obtained 

using Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. And I understand the FISA 

Court agrees with that interpretation, but you then place restrictions on how it can be used once you have collected it. But I do not 

understand what limits there might be under this theory. Couldn’t 

you invoke under this—couldn’t you invoke Section 215 to obtain 

virtually all available commercial data? If Americans’ phone 

records are relevant, how about our credit card records, what sites 

we go on on the Internet, what we may bookmark, our medical 

records, if we have it on the computer, or firearms records, we keep 

a list of what firearms we hold? Are all those things available? 

Mr. COLE. Well, I think there are two important points here, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Number one is that the only way the Court finds these relevant 

is in the context of the restrictions and in the context of what it 

is you are looking for. So you have to take all of those features of 

this phone record process into account of how can it be done, how 

reasonably can it be done, what is the need for speed, what is the 

need to integrate all the different records that are coming together, 

and finds only when you look at that entire mix that this kind of 

program, with these restrictions—— 

Chairman LEAHY. I understand—— 

Mr. COLE. To your question, you would have to make that same 

showing for those other kinds of records as to the need for that 

breadth and the need for those restrictions. 

Chairman LEAHY. But if our phone records are relevant, why 

wouldn’t our credit card records be—wouldn’t you like to know if 

somebody is buying the fertilizer used in bombs? 

Mr. COLE. I may not need to collect everybody’s credit card 

records in order to do that because, again, these are—we are not 

collecting all their phone records so that we can wander through 

them. And it is only the phone records that are being used to look 

at the connections. If somebody is buying things that could be used 

to make bombs, of course, we would like to know that, but we may 

not need to do it in this fashion. 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, Director Clapper said NSA would notify 

Congress before obtaining cell phone location information under 

this program. Is there any legal impediment to you expanding the 

program for cell phone location? 

Mr. COLE. I do not believe there would be a legal impediment, 

and yesterday the Fifth Circuit issued a ruling that goes to that 

issue. But the legal impediments are not the only issues that you 

take into account here. 

Chairman LEAHY. I understand. Well, I want to put several 

items in the hearing record: 

Written testimony from Mark Zwillinger who represented Yahoo! 

in its challenge to a directive received under the PROTECT Amer-
34 

ica Act; he is one of the few non-Government lawyers to appear before the FISA Court, so that is important insight; 

A letter from Judge Reggie Walton, presiding judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, responding to questions from 

Senator Grassley and myself; 

A letter from a coalition of communications companies and advocacy groups regarding transparency; 

A letter from a coalition of privacy and civil liberties groups recommending staff—a letter from the Constitution Project supporting 

S. 1215, the FISA Accountability and Privacy Protection Act. 

Those will all be placed in the record. 

[The information referred to appears as a submission for the 

record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. If there are no further questions for this panel, 

and if there are not, I would thank all four of you. I know you have 

spent a lot of time preparing for this. I thank you all for being 

here. I know you have a lot of other things you should be doing and 

can be doing, but thank you for taking this time. 

We will start on the next panel. If we are interrupted by a vote, 

we will then stop until 12:30 when Senator Blumenthal has offered 

to come back and preside, but we would call up Judge Carr, James 

Carr, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio; Jameel 

Jaffer, the deputy legal director, American Civil Liberties Union; 

and Stewart Baker, a partner at Steptoe & Johnson. I thank you 

all very much. 

[Pause.] 

Chairman LEAHY. I thank the witnesses who are here, and I 

apologize in advance if we end up having to recess for a period of 

time and come back. But, Judge Carr, why don’t we begin with you, 

and thank you for coming here. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES G. CARR, SENIOR 

JUDGE, U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, TOLEDO, OHIO 

Judge CARR. Thank you, Senator. It is my pleasure to be here. 

I served on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court from 2002 

to 2008. I have been a United States district judge since 1994 and 

before that a magistrate judge since 1979. I am the author of a 

two-volume treatise on the law of electronic surveillance, which I 

suspect played a role in the decision to appoint me to the Court. 

I want to make clear, as I hope I did in my brief prepared remarks, that I am here solely on my own behalf. I am not here on 

behalf of the Judicial Conference, the Administrative Office, the judiciary generally, or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 

And actually I think why I am here today is because by coincidence 

I happened to have an op-ed piece published a week ago in the New 

York Times in which I made a proposal that I am glad to be able 

to make in front of this Committee in a somewhat more public 

fashion. 

Chairman LEAHY. And that op-ed piece will be made part of the 

record. 

Judge CARR. Thank you. 

[The op-ed appears as a submission for the record.] 
35 

Judge CARR. Very simply put, what I propose is that Congress 

amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act simply to give, 

sort of officially give the discretion to the individual judges of the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, or if they sit en banc, the 

ability to appoint a security-cleared attorney to represent the interests of the public and interject to some extent the adversary process at the level of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 

I listened with interest to Senator Blumenthal’s suggestion about 

an advocate who would become engaged at the level of the Court 

of Review. Speaking, again, solely on my own behalf, the origin of 

this thought comes from my experience as a member of that Court 

for that period. 

There were a couple of occasions—I cannot count them but fewer 

than the fingers on one hand, I am sure—in which I felt as a district judge that it would have been useful, when the Government 

proposed some new program some new method or means of acquisition, that it would have been useful to have somebody speak in opposition to the request and to hear the other side. That would, it 

seems to me, accomplish two things, and if that discretion were 

available to members of the Court, particularly when issues arose 

under Rule 11 of the current Rules of Procedure, which require 

that the Government notify the judge when something new or 

novel is being proposed. That is what they did when we were there, 

and that was always very useful. But in any event, I think my proposal would have two very beneficial consequences. 

One, as I believe Senator Blumenthal already alluded to, it 

would provide us with the opportunity as judges to reach more informed decisions, because we would have heard two points of view. 

That is what we do day in and day out in our chambers and in our 

courtrooms. We are accustomed to that, and we are comfortable 

with that. 

Second, it would create a mechanism which I think is very important for in instances when the Government prevails, in which 

the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judge approves the new 

and novel request, because there was a lawyer engaged at the outset, that lawyer could seek review before the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Court of Review and in turn before the U.S. Supreme 

Court. 

Today, of course, only the Government can appeal, and the Government has done so I believe on a couple of occasions. I am familiar with one. But there was nobody there on behalf of the other 

side, as it were. And as I say, I think that my proposal is fairly 

simple, straightforward, economical, and I think it would be very 

useful. 

Thank you for hearing me out, and I welcome your questions as 

to what I have to say. 

[The prepared statement of Judge Carr appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, Judge. And I should 

note you were on the FISA Court from 2002 to 2008. 

Judge CARR. Right. 

Chairman LEAHY. I believe Chief Justice Rehnquist, a part-time 

Vermonter, rest his soul, was the one who appointed you. 
36 

Jameel Jaffer is the deputy legal director at the American Civil 

Liberties Union, director of the ACLU’s Center for Democracy, currently counsel to the plaintiffs in ACLU v. Clapper, challenging the 

NSA’s phone records program. He has litigated several cases concerning the PATRIOT Act and FISA Amendments Act. 

Please go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF JAMEEL JAFFER, DEPUTY LEGAL DIRECTOR, 

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, NEW 

YORK, NEW YORK 

Mr. JAFFER. Thanks. Thank you for the invitation to testify. 

Over the last 2 months, it has become clear that the NSA is engaged in far-reaching, intrusive, and unlawful surveillance of 

Americans’ telephone calls and electronic communications. The surveillance programs we are talking about this morning are the product of both defects in the law and defects in the current oversight 

system. FISA affords the Government sweeping power to monitor 

the communications of innocent people. Excessive secrecy has made 

congressional oversight difficult and public oversight impossible. 

Intelligence officials have repeatedly misled the public, Congress, 

and the courts about the nature and scope of the Government’s surveillance activities. The ordinary federal courts have improperly 

used procedural doctrines to place the NSA’s activities beyond the 

reach of the Constitution. And structural features of the FISA 

Court have prevented that Court from serving as an effective 

guardian of individual rights. 

Surveillance supposedly undertaken to protect our democracy 

now presents a threat to it. It is not simply that this surveillance 

has dramatic implications for individual privacy, though plainly it 

does. Pervasive surveillance is also poisonous for free speech and 

free association. People who know the Government could be monitoring their every move, their every phone call, or their every 

Google search will comport themselves differently. They will hesitate before visiting controversial websites. They will hesitate before 

joining controversial advocacy groups. And they will hesitate before 

exercising rights that the Constitution guarantees. 

Now, individually those hesitations may appear to be inconsequential, but the accumulation of those hesitations over time will 

alter the nature of our democracy. It will alter citizens’ relationship 

to one another, and it will alter their relationship to their Government. That much is clear from the history of many other countries. 

And it is what the Church Committee warned of more than 30 

years ago. That warning should have even more resonance today 

because in recent decades the intelligence agencies’ resources have 

grown, statutory and constitutional limitations have been steadily 

eroded, and the technology of surveillance has become exponentially more powerful. 

Because the problem Congress confronts today has many roots, 

there is no single solution to it. But should take certain steps right 

away. 

First, it should amend FISA to prohibit ‘‘dragnet’’ monitoring of 

Americans’ communications. Amendments of that kind should be 

made to the FISA Amendments Act, to FISA’s so-called business 
37 

records provision—that is, Section 215—and to the national security letter authorities. 

Second, Congress should end the unnecessary and corrosive secrecy that has obstructed congressional and public oversight. It 

should require the Government to publish basic statistical information about the Government’s use of foreign intelligence authorities. 

It should ensure that the gag orders associated with national security letters are limited in scope and duration and imposed only 

when absolutely necessary. And it should require the publication of 

FISA Court opinions that evaluate the meaning, scope, or constitutionality of the foreign intelligence laws. 

Finally, Congress should ensure that the Government’s surveillance activities are subject to meaningful judicial review. It should 

clarify by statute the circumstances in which individuals can challenge Government surveillance in ordinary federal courts. It should 

provide for open and adversarial proceedings in the FISC, in the 

FISA Court, when the Government’s surveillance applications raise 

those kinds of novel issues of statutory or constitutional interpretation. And it should enact legislation to ensure that the state secrets 

privilege is not used to place the Government’s surveillance activities beyond the reach of the courts. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jaffer appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Baker, you are a partner, I understand, in the law firm of 

Steptoe & Johnson, but you were originally general counsel of the 

National Security Agency. You were the first Assistant Secretary 

for Policy at the Department of Homeland Security. We are happy 

to have you here, sir. Please go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF STEWART A. BAKER, PARTNER, STEPTOE & 

JOHNSON LLP, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to appear 

before you and the other members of the Committee again. Just 

two points about this program I think are important to begin with. 

First, the kind of information that is being gathered here—phone 

numbers, phone records, billing records, in essence—is the sort of 

information for which a million subpoenas a year are served by law 

enforcement on phone companies today. This is not data that is 

kept out of the hands of Government by existing procedures and 

not the kind of data that has been abused in obvious ways since 

they have been doing this since the beginning of billing records almost a century ago. So this is not extraordinarily sensitive information. 

And neither is this an unchecked program. I think, having looked 

at the order that was declassified this morning and having heard 

the procedures that have been described in the past, it is pretty 

clear that the people who are reviewing these records are subject 

to more scrutiny, more checks, more discipline than any of the 

other law enforcement agencies that have subpoenaed a million 

records from the phone companies each year. 

The problem, obviously, from the discussion here is that the Government gathered the information and put it in a database first, 
38 

and that is an unusual step. The question is: What could we do 

other than that? If we leave this with the phone companies and try 

to gather the information from the phone companies, first, they will 

get rid of this information when they choose to, when it is no 

longer of interest to them, which would be in a matter of months. 

We have no guarantee it will be there when we need it. We have 

no ability to search across the records of each of those phone companies to do the kind of analysis that we need to do to find the 

folks that have been found with this program. 

And, finally, I suppose we could pay them to put it in a format 

and keep it for a period of time that we thought was necessary to 

run this program, but then you have created a database that every 

divorce lawyer in America is going to say, ‘‘Well, that is AT&T’s 

data. I am just going to subpoena it.’’ This is not something that 

we really want to do. Who is going to search it? Is the phone company going to search it? Are we going to ask China Mobile to do 

searches for national security targets on the data that they are 

storing? Or are we going to give the Government access to the servers? Which is, of course, what caused the flap over the 702 program 

in the first place. 

So I think there are real problems with leaving this in the hands 

of the private companies, and that is why as a practical matter the 

Government chose the route that it did. 

The other problem obviously is that this has been kept secret, 

and I have to say the fact is—and I have spent a lifetime doing 

this—you cannot do intelligence in public because the targets are 

the most interested in how you do it and what the limitations you 

have imposed on yourself may be. And, therefore, disclosing the 

limitations, arguing about exactly how we are going to do this reveals to the people we are trying to gather intelligence on, who in 

many cases are trying to kill us, exactly what it is that we are trying to do. So there is a big cost to doing this in public and to having the kinds of disclosures that we are having. 

Last thought, and I have heard Senator Blumenthal’s proposal 

and Judge Carr’s proposal. I have to express some doubts about the 

idea of appointing a counsel from outside the Government to represent—I do not know—well, that is the first question. Who or 

what is this person supposed to be representing? Are they representing the terrorists? Are they representing the Court? Are they 

representing some abstract interest in civil liberties? Or are we just 

going to let them decide? 

You know, we got rid of the independent counsel law precisely 

because we were uneasy about having private parties just make up 

their own public policy without any check from political decisionmakers or without any client. And I fear we are getting into the 

same situation if we start appointing counsel to represent something in the context of these cases. 

I will stop there and be glad to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Baker appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, and we are going to wrap up because the vote is going to start. But, Judge Carr, what about that? 

Your proposal was not to have counsel in every single case but 

where there were special legal issues raised. Is that correct? 
39 

Judge CARR. Absolutely. It would be a probably very infrequently 

invoked opportunity that I am asking you to put in the hands of 

the individual judges when they encounter new and novel questions. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Judge CARR. And if I may speak to the issue of who is the client, 

obviously there is no client in the conventional sense. This is, admittedly, an unorthodox procedure. In the op-ed and my remarks, 

I tried to indicate why it is important, even though we do not have 

it in Title III applications or search warrants. 

I think ultimately that the individual represents—that lawyer 

that I am talking about, precleared by security, set to go—would 

represent the interests of the public generally in seeing to it that 

the balance between constitutional rights, the Fourth Amendment, 

and the President’s authority to conduct our foreign affairs is maintained and upheld and not tilted one way or the other. And to some 

extent, I would hope that if this process were in place, it would enhance public confidence in the results reached, regardless of what 

they were, and particularly those when they favored the Government, because the public would know somebody was in there 

speaking on its behalf generally and broadly but in opposition to 

the Government’s request. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much. 

Senator Blumenthal, I am going to turn it over to you, and then 

when the vote starts, we can recess. I thank you very much. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I 

think that the proposal that I will be making in my legislation is 

very similar to the suggestion you have made, and I want to thank, 

Judge Carr, for the thought that you and Judge Robertson have devoted to this subject and the very insightful ideas that you have 

suggested. And there are other instances, as we all know as lawyers, where the court essentially appoints counsel from time to 

time in both civil and criminal proceedings to represent, in essence, 

the public interest or some perhaps non-identifiable individual who 

might at some point in the future have an interest in the proceedings. And, indeed, in this instance what I proposed is an Office 

of Special Advocate whose attorneys would be precleared and 

whose security credentials would be on a part with, in effect, the 

prosecutors or the Government, and on those novel or significant 

issues of law that arise from time to time could represent in essence an opposing point of view, a different side, as Judge Robertson has put it. The basic idea is that judges are accustomed to 

hearing two sides of an argument, as you have articulated so well. 

So I think some of the practical objections are easily addressed, 

and what I would like to ask you is whether there are, in fact, significant and novel issues of law that do arise from time to time 

where you think either before the FISA Court or on review ultimately the development of the law would be enhanced by having 

an opposing point of view represented. 

Judge CARR. I do, and I think to some extent you can look at 

Rule 11 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Rules of Procedure, which requires the Government to call the judge’s attention 

to something that is new and novel. So you already have in place 

sort of a flagging mechanism, and that actually codified the way 
40 

things worked in any event when I was a member of the Court. 

The Government really was an honest broker and said, ‘‘Judge, 

looking at paragraph 73 to 78, that is something you have not seen 

before.’’ And there were times when that happened, when simply 

to hear another side, I wished or hoped or desired that there is 

somebody else picking up and giving me a different view. 

Let me say, Senator, I find your proposal interesting and very 

worthwhile. I would only suggest bring it down to the level of the 

FISC itself. In other words, do not wait for an appeal because that 

way you will have a fully developed record, the agencies would 

have been laid out, the judge would have reached hopefully a reasoned and informed decision, and written an opinion with reasons 

that then whoever is unhappy with it can be taken for appellate 

review. That is the way it works normally. That is the way it 

should work in the foreign intelligence surveillance context. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And to some extent, you have already anticipated my proposal because it would, in fact, enable representation of two sides in the FISA Court as well as the Court of Review 

because, as you well know, a record is essential often to determining an issue of law simply to clarify what factual issues are at 

stake. 

And I think the important point for people to understand—and 

this really goes to perhaps some of the objections to the proposal. 

In the criminal context, when a warrant is issued, it is almost always ex parte—— 

Judge CARR. Always. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Always ex parte, except sometimes in a 

grand jury if in very exceptional cases opposing counsel is present. 

But then at some point, the question of admissibility arises to the 

evidence that is garnered as a result of the warrant or surveillance 

or other means of activity by the Government. And at that point 

there is a public hearing. 

Judge CARR. And also keep in mind, certainly with an ordinary 

search, the subject learns immediately, comes home, the door has 

been broken, knocked down. But if indicted, he can file a motion 

to suppress. Even if not indicted, the subject can file a motion 

under Rule 41 for return of property: Give me my money back, give 

me my whatever it is back. But there are mechanisms that are 

available to question and to raise and to challenge the legitimacy 

of what the Government has done. And that is why I proposed— 

that is one of the purposes of my proposal, is to enable the opportunity to test the legitimacy of what the Government has done. 

Day in and day out, something I want to emphasize, the applications that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court reviews, they 

are fact based. They have a very low standard of probable cause, 

and properly so, because as another witness mentioned, or one of 

the Senators, this represents what I consider to be a brilliant—the 

FISA represents a brilliant compromise reached by the legislative 

branch in a constitutionally uncertain area. I mean, where in Article II does it say that a court has anything to do with the President’s conduct of foreign affairs? On the other hand, the Fourth 

Amendment applies to the President. And nobody knows how far 

either of those reach, and that is why the FISA is so useful and 

I think effective. 
41 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And this proposal, while it might lend 

itself to greater transparency, would still keep secret the FISA 

Court proceeding at a stage when secrecy is paramount for the 

search and surveillance activity. It would simply enable—and I 

think you have used the key word—the ‘‘testing’’ of the Government’s claim that the surveillance or search is both legal and necessary. 

Judge CARR. Well, actually, if I can say, Senator, we do not consider—I am speaking in the past tense. I did not consider and I do 

not think the judges do consider the necessity for the surveillance. 

I think that is quite clear under the Act. We look at only probable 

cause, agent of a foreign government, active on behalf of foreign 

terrorist-based organization, that is it. We do not second-guess and 

say, gee, how come you are spending money on this instead of that? 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Mr. Baker, let me ask you, does any of 

this discussion between Judge Carr and myself allay some of your 

concerns? 

Mr. BAKER. Some of the concerns, yes. Obviously if you have got 

a full audience, full office ready to go and you are focused on the 

Court of Review where the issues are teed up, it is easier to justify 

having a special counsel appointed. 

I do have to say that I question the assumption that creating this 

office will make people feel better about the functioning of the 

Court and the national security apparatus in general because it 

will necessarily be secret. And I have watched as the General 

Counsel of the National Security Agency tried to act as an advocate 

for the public interest, as the Inspector General of the National Security Agency was put forward as an advocate for the national interest. As the Office of Intelligence at the Justice Department said, 

‘‘We will represent the public interest. We are not in bed with the 

intelligence community. We will ride herd on them.’’ And yet every 

time there is a fuss—well, and even the clerks who serve the FISA 

Court act as a kind of institutional second voice, and none of that 

matters at the end of the day when a scandal of this sort blows up. 

So I question whether people will not simply say, ‘‘Oh, well, sure, 

this person was representing the public interest, but he got his security clearance from the Government, he might be paid, his staff 

is paid by the Government. It is really just a sham.’’ So I fear that 

this will not have the effect that you are hoping it will. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, hopefully it will improve and enhance the process, which, at the end of the day, gives people the 

trust and credibility in the system. And maybe I should ask that 

question of Mr. Jaffer. Would you and others with your very commendable and admirable commitment to civil rights and civil liberties be somewhat reassured—I am not saying that you would 

give it a gold star necessarily, but would it provide some reassurance? 

Mr. JAFFER. Absolutely. I do think it would provide some reassurance. I think it is important that there be some form of adversarial process, especially when these issues raise questions of constitutional interpretation or statutory interpretation that are new. 

And I think that one of the important roles for the special advocate 

is to press for transparency where transparency is appropriate and 
42 

possible. So I think it would be a very significant improvement to 

the system. 

Now, I do not think it is enough. I think it has to be paired with 

some other reforms, including reforms relating to transparency and 

a narrowing of the substantive standards that the FISA Court is 

applying. But I absolutely do think that this would be a step in the 

right direction. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And I would agree with you that some 

greater degree of transparency on the orders and opinions so that 

the public has some greater access to rulings of law at the very 

least, with sensitivity to the need for redacting details that security 

may require, as well as—I do not know whether you were here earlier, but I have a proposal to change the method of selecting the 

members of the FISA Court that would, in essence, give the chief 

judges of the courts of appeal a role in designating the individuals 

so that the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court would not be 

the sole source of those appointees. 

But I think moving in this direction would not only be good for 

the credibility of the Court, but good for the ultimate justice of the 

outcome and protecting rights and liberties. 

Mr. JAFFER. Just on the transparency point, Mr. Baker said earlier that we cannot expect the Government to do intelligence in 

public, and I think that is a fair point. But I think it is crucial to 

remember the distinction between law and policy on one hand and 

sources and methods on the other. The public has a right to know 

what the Government’s policies are and what the legal basis is for 

those policies. And that is all anyone is asking for. Nobody is suggesting that the factual basis for the Government surveillance 

should be disclosed or that the surveillance targets’ names should 

be disclosed while the Government is engaged in the surveillance. 

The debate is not about that. The debate is about, should the public know what the Government’s policies are? And I think in a democracy that should not really be a debate at all. 

Judge CARR. Senator, if I may, I was appointed, in effect, by the 

chief judge of our circuit, Boris Martin. The way it worked with me 

is I was one of the judges appointed to the four positions created 

in the PATRIOT Act. Judge Martin had been well aware of my interest because of the work I had done in publication with regard 

to electronic surveillance generally. It is my understanding the 

Chief Justice called upon Ralph Mecham to reach out to propose 

somebody. It happened to be the Sixth Circuit’s turn apparently, 

and Judge Martin called me and said, ‘‘Jim, I got this call from 

Ralph Mecham. I am forwarding your name.’’ 

So at least when I was appointed 10 or more years ago, it seems 

to me that might be codifying the practice. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. It may be, Judge Carr, but we have no 

idea, do we? 

Judge CARR. Right. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Because the process is so secretive and 

the effort to formalize what happens behind closed doors or behind 

the veils of the Chief Justice’s office may enhance some confidence, 

at least cannot hurt. 

Judge CARR. Well, also, one other point on the issue. A role for 

the advocate, however you want to call it, in urging that portions 
43 

or complete opinions both of the FISC and the Court of Review become public, I think that individual could—I had not thought about 

that, but I think that individual could also perform that role in 

urging the Government to be diligent and thorough and see to it 

that, to the extent that anything can be disclosed, that it is. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Unfortunately, I have got to—I am probably the only Senator at this point who has not voted, and I have 

to apologetically excuse myself to do so. I think I have authority 

to close this hearing. 

The record will remain open for 1 week. I want to thank each 

of you for being here. Your testimony has been remarkably helpful 

and effective, and I will be calling on you again in the course of 

my work on this issue personally. I am sorry that more of my colleagues were not here to hear you themselves, but I am sure they 

will review the record of what you had to say. 

So thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:22 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.] 

(45) 

A P P E N D I X 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK LEAHY
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES M. COLE
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN C. INGLIS
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES G. CARR
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMEEL JAFFER
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEWART BAKER
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LEAHY FOR JAMES M. COLE
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LEAHY FOR JOHN C. INGLIS
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LEAHY FOR JAMEEL JAFFER
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GRASSLEY FOR JAMES M. COLE
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GRASSLEY FOR JOHN C. INGLIS
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GRASSLEY FOR ROBERT S. LITT
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GRASSLEY FOR SEAN M. JOYCE
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GRASSLEY FOR JAMES G. CARR
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GRASSLEY FOR JAMEEL JAFFER
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GRASSLEY FOR STEWART BAKER
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RESPONSES OF JAMES M. COLE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATORS LEAHY AND

GRASSLEY

[NOTE: SOME RESPONSES OF JAMES M. COLE ARE CLASSIFIED AND THEREFORE NOT

PRINTED AS A PART OF THIS HEARING.] 
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RESPONSES OF JOHN C. INGLIS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATORS LEAHY AND

GRASSLEY

[NOTE: THE RESPONSES OF JOHN C. INGLIS ARE CLASSIFIED AND THEREFORE NOT

PRINTED AS A PART OF THIS HEARING.] 
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RESPONSES OF ROBERT S. LITT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GRASSLEY
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RESPONSES OF SEAN M. JOYCE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GRASSLEY
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RESPONSES OF JAMES G. CARR TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GRASSLEY
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RESPONSES OF JAMEEL JAFFER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATORS LEAHY AND

GRASSLEY
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RESPONSES OF STEWART BAKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GRASSLEY
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MISCELLANEOUS SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
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Æ