alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO



18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,



AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO



SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of NEON Systems, Inc, (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Mark J. Cresswell, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. (S)1350, as adopted pursuant to (S)906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



August 13, 2003



|                                             
|---------------------------------------------
|/s/    MARK J. CRESSWELL                     
|                                             
|Mark J. Cresswell principal executive officer
#### § 61.317 Is my sport pilot certificate issued with aircraft category and class ratings?

Your sport pilot certificate does not list aircraft category and class ratings. When you successfully pass the practical test for a sport pilot certificate, regardless of the light-sport aircraft privileges you seek, the FAA will issue you a sport pilot certificate without any category and class ratings. The FAA will provide you with a logbook endorsement for the category and class of aircraft in which you are authorized to act as pilot in command.

[Doc. No. FAA-2001-11133, 69 FR 44869, July 27, 2004, as amended by Amdt. 61-125, 75 FR 5222, Feb. 1, 2010; Amdt. 61-125A, 75 FR 15610, Mar. 30, 2010]
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 7**  **417**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. LARRY DONNELL WILLIAMS, a/k/a “L” , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina , at Statesville
. Richard L. Voorhees , District Judge. ( 5:04

- cr - 00045

- RLV

- DCK

- 1 )

Submitted : December 20, 2012 Decided: December 27, 2012

Before KING and DUNCAN , Circuit Judges , and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge
.
Affirm ed by un published per curiam opinion
. Larry Donnell Williams , Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina , for Appellee
. Unpublished op inions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Larry Donnell Williams appeals the district court ’ s order s denying his motion for reduction of sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) and his motion for reconsideration
. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district
court. United States v. Williams , No. 5:04

- cr - 00045

- RLV

- DCK

- 1 (W.D.N.C. June 26 & Aug. 20 , 2012) . We dispense with oral argument b ecause the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# EUR-Lex - 31996D0002 - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 31996D0002

**96/2/EC: Commission Decision of 12 December 1995 amending Decision 94/85/EC drawing up a list of third countries from which the Member States authorize imports of fresh poultrymeat (Text with EEA relevance) **

*
Official Journal L 001 , 03/01/1996 P. 0006 - 0006 *

COMMISSION DECISION of 12 December 1995 amending Decision 94/85/EC drawing up a list of third countries from which the Member States authorize imports of fresh poultrymeat (Text with EEA relevance) (96/2/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 91/494/EEC of 26 June 1991 on animal health conditions governing intra-Community trade in and imports from third countries of fresh poultrymeat (1), as last amended by Directive 93/121/EC (2), and in particular Article 9 (1), second sentence, thereof,

Whereas Commission Decision 94/85/EC (3), as last amended by Decision 95/181/EC (4), established a list of third countries from which importation of fresh poultrymeat is authorized;

Whereas further written assurances have been received from Malta; whereas examination of these assurances has shown that this country satisfies the requirements of the Community;

Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

In the Annex to Commission Decision 94/85/EC the following line is inserted in accordance with the alphabetic order of the ISO-code:

'>TABLE>

`.

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 12 December 1995.

For the Commission

Franz FISCHLER

Member of the Commission

(1) OJ No L 268, 24. 9. 1991, p. 35.

(2) OJ No L 340, 31. 12. 1993, p. 39.

(3) OJ No L 44, 17. 2. 1994, p. 31.

(4) OJ No L 119, 30. 5. 1995, p. 34.
§ 65.73 Ratings. ( a ) The following ratings are issued under this subpart: ( 1 ) Airframe.
( 2 ) Powerplant.
( b ) A mechanic certificate with an aircraft or aircraft engine rating, or both, that was issued before, and was valid on, June 15, 1952, is equal to a mechanic certificate with an airframe or powerplant rating, or both, as the case may be, and may be exchanged for such a corresponding certificate and rating or ratings.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-6560

ANTONIO JOSEPH RICHARDSON,

Petitioner – Appellant,

v.

STATE; WARDEN BROAD RIVER CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,

Respondents – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District 

Judge. (0:09-cv-00336-JFA)

Submitted: January 12, 2011 Decided: January 28, 2011

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Antonio Joseph Richardson, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John 

Zelenka, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Alphonso Simon, Jr., 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, 

South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Antonio Joseph Richardson seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006)

petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice 

or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. We have independently reviewed the record 

and conclude that Richardson has not made the requisite showing. 

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
3

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED
§ 63.59 Retesting after failure. ( a ) An applicant for a flight navigator certificate who fails a written or practical test for that certificate may apply for retesting— ( 1 ) After 30 days after the date he failed that test; or
( 2 ) Before the 30 days have expired if the applicant presents a signed statement from a certificated flight navigator, certificated ground instructor, or any other qualified person approved by the Administrator, certifying that that person has given the applicant additional instruction in each of the subjects failed and that person considers the applicant ready for retesting.
( b ) A statement from a certificated flight navigator, or from an operations official of an approved navigator course, is acceptable, for the purposes of paragraph (a)(2) of this section, for the written test and for the flight test. A statement from a person approved by the Administrator is acceptable for the written tests. A statement from a supervising or check navigator with the United States Armed Forces is acceptable for the written test and for the practical test.
( c ) If the applicant failed the flight test, the additional instruction must have been administered in flight.
[Doc. No. 1179, 27 FR 7970, Aug. 10, 1962, as amended by Amdt. 63-19, 43 FR 22640, May 25, 1978]
Editorial Note on Part 302
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 302 appear at 84 FR 15935, Apr. 16, 2019.

§ 302.601 Applicability. ( a ) This subpart contains the specific rules that apply to a complaint filed by one or more air carriers or foreign air carriers (“carriers”), pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 47129(a), for a determination of the reasonableness of a fee increase or a newly established fee for aeronautical uses that is imposed upon the carrier by the owner or operator of an airport. This subpart also applies to requests by the owner or operator of an airport for such a determination. An airport owner or operator is considered to have imposed a fee on a carrier when it has taken all steps necessary under its procedures to establish the fee, whether or not the fee is being collected or carriers are currently required to pay it.
( b ) This subpart does not apply to— ( 1 ) A fee imposed pursuant to a written agreement with a carrier using the facilities of an airport;
( 2 ) A fee imposed pursuant to a financing agreement or covenant entered into prior to August 23, 1994, or
( 3 ) Any other existing fee not in dispute as of August 23, 1994.
( c ) Except as modified by this subpart, the provisions of subpart A of this part apply.
#### § 27.475 Tires and shock absorbers.

Unless otherwise prescribed, for each specified landing condition, the tires must be assumed to be in their static position and the shock absorbers to be in their most critical position.
#### § 417.215 Straight-up time analysis.

A flight safety analysis must establish the straight-up time for a launch for use as a flight termination rule. Section 417.113(c) contains requirements for flight termination rules. The analysis must establish the straight-up time as the latest time after liftoff, assuming a launch vehicle malfunctioned and flew in a vertical or near vertical direction above the launch point, at which activation of the launch vehicle's flight termination system or breakup of the launch vehicle would not cause hazardous debris or critical overpressure to affect any populated or other protected area.
#### In the matter of Joseph Vargas, proceeded against as a *non-resident*debtor.

Proceedings against absconding, concealed and non-resident debtors *abate*by the death of the attaching creditor intermediate the issuing of the attachment and the appointment of trustees.

The *attaching creditor*died intermediate the issuing of the attachment and the appointment of trustees. The commissioner, notwithstanding, appointed trustees. No new creditors had come in to avail themselves of the attachment. A motion was made to set aside the appointment of trustees and all subsequent proceedings, on the ground that by the death of the attaching creditor the proceedings abated.

*D. D. Field,*for the motion.

/. *Rhoades,*contra.

*By the Court,*

Co wen, J.

The act on this subject has made no provision for the continuation of the proceedings after the death of the attaching creditor, and they must therefore be considered to have abated by his death. Had other creditors come in and) claimed the benefit of the attachment, a different case would have been presented.

Motion granted.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Lucille Z. Alexander, Respondent, against Movietonews, Inc., et al., Appellants. State Industrial Board, Respondent.

Argued January 6, 1937;

decided January 26, 1937.

*512
      *F.*A. *W. Ireland Joy*appellants.

*Herbert W. Haldenstein*and *Theodore W. Adler*for claimant-respondent.

*John J. Bennett, Jr., Attorney-General (Leon Freedman*of counsel), for State Industrial Board, respondent.

Order affirmed, with costs; no opinion. (See 273 N. Y. 599.)

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., O’Brien, Hubbs, Loughran and Rippey, JJ. Taking no part: Lehman and Finch, JJ.
#### § 10.43 Wage and Hour Division investigation.

The Administrator may investigate possible violations of the Executive Order or this part either as the result of a complaint or at any time on his or her own initiative. As part of the investigation, the Administrator may conduct interviews with the relevant contractor, as well as the contractor's workers at the worksite during normal work hours; inspect the relevant contractor's records (including contract documents and payrolls, if applicable); make copies and transcriptions of such records; and require the production of any documentary or other evidence the Administrator deems necessary to determine whether a violation, including conduct warranting imposition of debarment, has occurred. Federal agencies and contractors shall cooperate with any authorized representative of the Department of Labor in the inspection of records, in interviews with workers, and in all aspects of investigations.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 86 (Wednesday, May 3, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 25714]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-10993]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. ER00-2234-000]


East Central Area Reliability Council, et al.; Notice of Filing

April 28, 2000.
    Take notice that on April 18, 2000, the East Central Area 
Reliability Council (ECAR), on behalf of Allegheny Power, American 
Electric Power Co., Big Rivers Electric Corp., Cinergy Corp., Consumers 
Energy Co., The Dayton Power and Light Co., the Detroit Edison Co., 
Duquesne Light Co., East Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc., FirstEnergy 
Corp., Hoosier Energy REC, Indianapolis Power and Light Co., LG&E 
Energy Corp., Northern Indiana Public Service Co., Ohio Valley Electric 
Corp., and Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co., submitted for filing 
an Inadvertent Settlement Tariff that is intended to obligate each 
party to make payment and to entitle each party to receive compensation 
for Inadvertent Interchange from each other party pursuant to ECAR's 
Inadvertent Settlement Procedure.
    ECAR requests the Inadvertent Settlement Tariff to go into effect 
by June 1, 2000 for the 2000 peak summer season.
    ECAR states that all parties were served and that the filing is 
also available on their web site (www.ecar.org).
    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest such filing should 
file a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20426, 
in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). All such motions 
and protests should be filed on or before May 9, 2000. Protests will be 
considered by the Commission to determine the appropriate action to be 
taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the 
proceedings. Any person wishing to become a party must file a motion to 
intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and 
are available for public inspection. This filing may also be viewed on 
the Internet at http://www.ferc.fed.us/online/rims.htm (call 202-208-
2222 for assistance).

Linwood A. Watson, Jr.,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 00-10993 Filed 5-2-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
§ 91.1011 Operational control responsibilities and delegation. ( a ) Each owner in operational control of a program flight is ultimately responsible for safe operations and for complying with all applicable requirements of this chapter, including those related to airworthiness and operations in connection with the flight. Each owner may delegate some or all of the performance of the tasks associated with carrying out this responsibility to the program manager, and may rely on the program manager for aviation expertise and program management services. When the owner delegates performance of tasks to the program manager or relies on the program manager's expertise, the owner and the program manager are jointly and individually responsible for compliance.
( b ) The management specifications, authorizations, and approvals required by this subpart are issued to, and in the sole name of, the program manager on behalf of the fractional owners collectively. The management specifications, authorizations, and approvals will not be affected by any change in ownership of a program aircraft, as long as the aircraft remains a program aircraft in the identified program.
#### BREWER v STATE

Ohio Appeals, 4th Dist, Gallia Co

No. 133.

Decided October 17, 1929

Mr. R. M. Switzer, Gallipolis, for Brewer. Mr. Harry M. Miller, Gallipolis, for State.

BY THE COURT

It is contended that this record should not have been admitted for the reason that no testimony followed its admission that the plaintiff in error is and was the same person charged and found guilty in the case aforesaid. The only evidence connecting plaintiff in error with the case before the justice is his answer to the following question submitted to him on his direct examination:

> “Q Will you please state whether or not you ever plead guilty before justice of the peace Allshouse in Gallipolis Township, Gallia County, Ohio, April 1,1925, to receiving intoxicating liquors or any other charge?

> A I did not.”

*664In a way Brewer’s answer to this question might be interpreted as a tacit admission that he w,as the person named in the case before the iustice. • On the other hand, however, his answer might well harmonize with the presumption that he was not the defendant on trial in said case and for that reason did not plead guilty as the record shows. At any rate, we are bound to give the accused the benefit of the doubt and hold that on the question of his identity as the defendant named in the prior case the evidence is not sufficient. This conclusion does not require a reversal of the judgment but merely a modification thereof.

So much of the judgment as recites that the accused was guilty as charged in the affidavit of the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor is affirmed, but so much of the judgment as recites that the accused was guilty of a second offense is vacated. And as the accused was entitled to be sentenced as tho for a first offense and as it appears that he was sentenced as for a second offense the case is remanded to the trial court for resentence. In so doing this court does not mean that' it be implied that the new sentence be more or less severe than the original sentence. The only purpose of this is to give the accused the record to which he is entitled.

Judgment modified and case remanded for resentence only.

Middleton, P. J„ Mauck and Blosser, JJ., Concur.
Editorial Note on Part 45
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 45 appear at 74 FR 53394, Oct. 16, 2009.

§ 45.33 Sale of aircraft; removal of marks. When an aircraft that is registered in the United States is sold, the holder of the Certificate of Aircraft Registration must remove, before its delivery to the purchaser, all United States marks from the aircraft, unless the purchaser is— ( a ) A citizen of the United States;
( b ) An individual citizen of a foreign country who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States; or
( c ) When the aircraft is to be based and primarily used in the United States, a corporation (other than a corporation which is a citizen of the United States) lawfully organized and doing business under the laws of the United States or any State thereof.
[Amdt. 45-11, 44 FR 61938, Oct. 29, 1979]
#### Leonard J. McMULLEN, Appellant, v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee.

No. 16544.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

May 9, 1960.

*835Leonard J. McMullen, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.

Chase, Rotchford, Downen, & Drukker, Louis E. Abbott, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.

Before STEPHENS, CHAMBERS and MERRILL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

In this diversity action, summary judgment was entered against McMullen because he failed to submit himself to a physical examination pursuant to an order obtained by Travelers. He appeals.

McMullen’s suit was on an insurance contract of Travelers in connection with his claim of total disability. Issues were joined on liability, the main one being: Is McMullen disabled?

Travelers’ order for McMullen to submit to the examination was obtained under Rule 35(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. After persistent refusal by McMullen, an order was obtained under Rule 37(b) (2) (i), which found the facts (without any proof) in accordance with the claim or contentions of Travelers as to McMullen’s physical condition. Such findings, if properly made, being dispositive of the whole action, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Travelers.

That there was a continued, persistent refusal is evident. The reasons for the refusal are not entirely clear. McMullen expresses fear of bodily harm. We doubt if any fear was justified. He did not object to the doctor designated as incompetent. Certainly no order for examination, though not limited as to scope, carries with it the broad authority to cut off appellant-plaintiff’s leg, as he contends.

Then McMullen contends that such an order violates his “rights.”

The determination of a fact issue is a search for the truth, and he who raises the issue just has to submit to a physical examination when it is relevant to ascertaining the truth of the issue.

While a more normal method of disposing of the case would be a dismissal with (or without) prejudice, or the rendering of judgment by default against the disobedient party, as provided in Rule 37(b) (2) (iii), still the exact procedure of finding the facts against him who refuses is provided by Rule 37(b) (2) (i), supra. Once achieved, the entry of summary judgment would appear to have been eminently proper.

We surmise that the customary use of Rule 37(b) (2) (i) would be found in the case where a court desired as a sanction to deprive a party of one issue, among several, leaving others open. But the rule is not limited to non-dispositive issues.

McMullen insists he was still entitled to a jury trial on all issues, including his physical condition. The right to a jury trial depends on having an issue to go to a jury. By his own act or inaction, McMullen lost his. And we can find no abuse of discretion, even though the court may have done in two steps what could have been done in one.

Judgment affirmed.