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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

28 Nebraska Appellate Reports

SPRING CREEK HOME v. SHURIGAR

Cite as 28 Neb. App. 785

Spring Creek Home, LLC, a Nebraska limited 

liability company, appellee, v. Rhoda 

Shurigar, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed September 1, 2020. No. A-19-584.

1. Contracts: Judgments: Appeal and Error. The meaning of a contract 

is a question of law, in connection with which an appellate court has an 

obligation to reach its conclusions independently of the determinations 

made by the court below.

2. Contracts: Public Policy: Judgments: Appeal and Error. The determination of whether a contract violates public policy presents a question 

of law, and an appellate court independently reviews questions of law 

decided by a lower court.

3. Damages: Appeal and Error. The amount of damages to be awarded is 

a determination solely for the fact finder, and its action in this respect 

will not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported by evidence and bears 

a reasonable relationship to elements of damages proved.

4. Contracts. In interpreting a contract, a court must first determine, as a 

matter of law, whether the contract is ambiguous.

5. Contracts: Words and Phrases. A contract is ambiguous when a word, 

phrase, or provision in the contract has, or is susceptible of, at least two 

reasonable but conflicting interpretations or meanings. A contract written in clear and unambiguous language is not subject to interpretation or 

construction and must be enforced according to its terms.

6. Contracts. Contracts are to be construed according to the sense and 

meaning of the terms which the parties have used, and if they are clear 

and unambiguous, their terms are to be taken and understood in their 

plain, ordinary, and popular sense.

7. ____. When the terms of the contract are clear, a court may not resort 

to rules of construction, and the terms are to be accorded their plain and 

ordinary meaning as the ordinary or reasonable person would understand them.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

09/01/2020 09:07 AM CDT
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Cite as 28 Neb. App. 785

8. ____. A contract must receive a reasonable construction, and a court 

must construe it as a whole and, if possible, give effect to every part of 

the contract.

9. ____. Whatever the construction of a particular clause of a contract, 

standing alone, may be, it must be read in connection with other clauses.

10. ____. When there is a question about the meaning of a contract’s language, the contract will be construed against the party preparing it.

11. Contracts: Intent. A court should avoid interpreting contract provisions 

in a manner that leads to unreasonable or absurd results that are obviously inconsistent with the parties’ intent.

Appeal from the District Court for Webster County: Stephen 

R. Illingworth, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further 

proceedings.

Richard Calkins, of Calkins Law Office, for appellant.

Gregory D. Barton, of Barton Law, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.

Moore, Chief Judge, and Riedmann and Arterburn, 

Judges.

Arterburn, Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Rhoda Shurigar appeals from an order of the district court 

for Webster County that found her personally liable to Spring 

Creek Home, LLC, for unpaid care expenses incurred by a man 

for whom she served as a court-appointed guardian. She argues 

on appeal that the court erred in its interpretation of the contract, that its decision contravenes public policy, and that damages were not sufficiently proved. For the reasons that follow, 

we reverse the order of the district court and remand the cause 

for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

On October 2, 2017, Spring Creek Home filed a complaint alleging that Shurigar had breached a “Resident Service 

Agreement” (Agreement) she had signed on her ward’s behalf 

and was therefore personally responsible for the unpaid 
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Cite as 28 Neb. App. 785

charges incurred. Attached to the complaint was a copy of the 

Agreement, which was signed by Shurigar. It named Timothy 

Tierney as the “Resident” and Shurigar as the “Responsible 

Party.” Also attached to the complaint were a monthly services statement and other documents demonstrating the amount 

of damages claimed. Shurigar filed an answer on November 

6, 2017.

Shurigar filed a motion to dismiss on March 2, 2018. 

Meanwhile, Spring Creek Home filed a motion for summary 

judgment and notice of hearing on March 21. On May 7, a 

hearing on Spring Creek Home’s motion for summary judgment was held, but Shurigar failed to appear. In its order, the 

court stated that Shurigar had reasonable advance notice of the 

hearing. The court found that the evidence was undisputed that 

the Agreement named Shurigar a “‘responsible party’” and 

that she was personally liable for any breach of the Agreement. 

The court found that there was no genuine issue of material 

fact as to Shurigar’s failure to pay Spring Creek Home charges 

of $9,923.97 and entered a judgment of that amount in Spring 

Creek Home’s favor.

On May 17, 2018, Shurigar filed a motion to set aside 

default judgment and application for new trial and an affidavit 

in support thereof. She stated that proper notice was not given 

to her for the May 7 hearing. The court determined that even 

though Spring Creek Home appeared to have sent notice by 

first-class mail as claimed, there was a question as to whether 

Shurigar actually received the notice. Moreover, after reviewing the parties’ briefs and affidavits, the court determined that 

Shurigar may have a meritorious defense and that the interests of justice demanded that the case be heard on its merits. 

Accordingly, on October 4, the court sustained Shurigar’s 

motion to set aside the summary judgment and motion for a 

new trial.

The court held a trial on March 27, 2019. A copy of the 

Agreement was admitted into evidence as exhibit 4. At the top 

of page 1, the Agreement identifies the parties:
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SPRING CREEK HOME v. SHURIGAR

Cite as 28 Neb. App. 785

Spring Creek Home, LLC

Resident Service Agreement

This agreement is between: Date: May 20, 2015

Spring Creek Home, LLC

602 Michigan Ave.

Inavale, NE 68952 Resident

 Timothy Tierney

Casey Snell, Administrator Rhoda Shurigar

Facility Representative Responsible Party

Hereafter known as the Hereafter known as the

“Facility” “Resident”

Later on page 1, under “General Provisions,” it states:

A. The Agreement between the Facility and the 

Resident shall consist of this Resident Service Agreement 

. . . and any other documents signed by the Facility and 

the Resident or the Responsible Party.

B. This Agreement is binding on the Facility, the 

Resident, and the Resident’s heirs, personal representatives, and the like.

On page 2, under the heading “Financial Agreement,” the 

Agreement states, “C. The Responsible Party shall pay all 

charges that have been incurred by the Resident that are not 

included in the monthly rental.” We will enumerate other pertinent provisions of the Agreement as needed in our analysis of 

the case.

Michaelle Strickland, the chief executive officer of Spring 

Creek Home, testified that she had drafted the Agreement. 

She described Spring Creek Home as a residential facility that 

provided services for people who were diagnosed with severe 

chronic mental illnesses. She said that most residents were 

“dual eligible” for government benefits, meaning they received 

both Medicaid and Medicare benefits. Like those of many 

residents, Tierney’s benefits had been paid directly to Spring 

Creek Home since he became a resident in May 2015—according to Shurigar. Strickland testified that Tierney had also been 

receiving benefits under the State’s “Aid to Aged, Blind and 
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Cite as 28 Neb. App. 785

Disabled” (AABD) program, but that those benefits terminated 

in January 2017.

Casey Snell, who began as the administrator at Spring Creek 

Home in 2012, testified that she personalized their template 

agreement for Tierney. She signed page 8 of the Agreement 

as “Facility Representative.” Snell discussed Tierney’s pastdue account and testified that she often worked with residents 

whose accounts fell behind because it took time for them 

to recover funds in conjunction with State agencies. As an 

example, she testified that Spring Creek Home had received a 

$3,000 payment in a single month, which was much more than 

usual, because it was for past-due benefits owed to Tierney 

under the AABD program.

Shurigar testified that she worked as a professional legal 

guardian and conservator as appointed by the courts. She 

was appointed Tierney’s temporary guardian on May 4, 2015, 

and appointed his full and permanent guardian on September 

14. However, she was never appointed Tierney’s conservator. 

Tierney had been found to be mentally incapacitated due to 

his mental health and substance abuse issues. Shurigar testified 

that she intentionally chose Spring Creek Home for Tierney 

because of its isolation and lack of nearby bars or liquor 

stores. Additionally, he was known to flee the places he lived. 

Shurigar called the decision to move Tierney into Spring Creek 

Home “absolutely strategic” as it made it easier to control his 

behavior and remove “temptations” from him.

Shurigar said that Spring Creek Home housed many other 

residents for whom she served as their guardian. She therefore 

had an existing relationship with Snell and testified that, if 

Snell was busy or out of town, Snell sometimes got paperwork 

to her after a resident had already moved into Spring Creek 

Home. Shurigar testified that she did not remember whether 

Snell and she signed the Agreement before or after Tierney had 

actually moved into Spring Creek Home but said that it was 

close in time.

When Shurigar became Tierney’s guardian, he was not 

receiving benefits under the State’s AABD program, but she 
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SPRING CREEK HOME v. SHURIGAR

Cite as 28 Neb. App. 785

said that she filed an application on his behalf as soon as he 

was placed at Spring Creek Home. He was approved, and 

Shurigar said that she reapplied for the benefits annually, 

which renewals were due on June 1 each year. Shurigar said 

that she was unaware that the State had terminated Tierney’s 

benefits under the AABD program until Snell emailed her. She 

did reapply for AABD benefits after being informed by Snell 

of their termination. She subsequently decided to become the 

payee for Tierney’s benefits and pay the provider. She decided 

to seek a new placement for Tierney after becoming concerned 

that Tierney was being billed for items for which he was not 

supposed to be billed.

Shurigar testified that she never signed a guaranty to be 

financially responsible for Tierney. She said that she would not 

have signed the Agreement if she thought Spring Creek Home 

were going to hold her personally responsible for Tierney’s 

debts, and she said that under the Agreement, she did not 

believe she was financially responsible for Tierney. Shurigar 

testified that she provided her legal guardianship papers to 

Spring Creek Home before she signed the Agreement and that 

she signed the Agreement as Tierney’s legal guardian.

The court entered judgment on May 23, 2019. The court 

recited portions of the Agreement and found that its plain 

terms were not ambiguous: “It is clear that . . . Shurigar is 

lumped into the category of a resident at the beginning of the 

contract.” The court found that Shurigar, as a professional 

guardian, ought to have read the Agreement but clearly had not 

because it unambiguously made her liable for nonpayment. The 

court further found that the contract was not contrary to law 

or public policy because it bound only Shurigar and did not 

require guardians in all cases to be personally responsible for 

the debts of their wards. Accordingly, the court entered judgment on behalf of Spring Creek Home and against Shurigar in 

the amount of $11,836.13.

Shurigar appeals from the district court’s judgment.
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SPRING CREEK HOME v. SHURIGAR

Cite as 28 Neb. App. 785

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Shurigar assigns, consolidated and restated, that the district 

court erred in its interpretation of the parties’ Agreement, in 

its determination that the Agreement was not against public 

policy, and in its calculation of the amount of damages.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] The meaning of a contract is a question of law, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to 

reach its conclusions independently of the determinations made 

by the court below. Meyer Natural Foods v. Greater Omaha 

Packing Co., 302 Neb. 509, 925 N.W.2d 39 (2019).

[2] The determination of whether a contract violates public policy presents a question of law, and an appellate court 

independently reviews questions of law decided by a lower 

court. Mays v. Midnite Dreams, 300 Neb. 485, 915 N.W.2d 

71 (2018).

[3] The amount of damages to be awarded is a determination solely for the fact finder, and its action in this respect will 

not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported by evidence and 

bears a reasonable relationship to elements of damages proved. 

U.S. Pipeline v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 303 Neb. 444, 930 

N.W.2d 460 (2019).

ANALYSIS

[4,5] In interpreting a contract, a court must first determine, 

as a matter of law, whether the contract is ambiguous. City of 

Sidney v. Municipal Energy Agency of Neb., 301 Neb. 147, 917 

N.W.2d 826 (2018). A contract is ambiguous when a word, 

phrase, or provision in the contract has, or is susceptible of, 

at least two reasonable but conflicting interpretations or meanings. Id. A contract written in clear and unambiguous language 

is not subject to interpretation or construction and must be 

enforced according to its terms. Id.

[6,7] Contracts are to be construed according to the sense 

and meaning of the terms which the parties have used, and if 

they are clear and unambiguous, their terms are to be taken 
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and understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense. See 

Gage County v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 304 Neb. 926, 937 

N.W.2d 863 (2020). When the terms of the contract are clear, a 

court may not resort to rules of construction, and the terms are 

to be accorded their plain and ordinary meaning as the ordinary 

or reasonable person would understand them. Id.

[8-11] A contract must receive a reasonable construction, 

and a court must construe it as a whole and, if possible, give 

effect to every part of the contract. Labenz v. Labenz, 291 

Neb. 455, 866 N.W.2d 88 (2015). Whatever the construction 

of a particular clause of a contract, standing alone, may be, it 

must be read in connection with other clauses. Id. When there 

is a question about the meaning of a contract’s language, the 

contract will be construed against the party preparing it. Id. A 

court should avoid interpreting contract provisions in a manner 

that leads to unreasonable or absurd results that are obviously 

inconsistent with the parties’ intent. St. John v. Gering Public 

Schools, 302 Neb. 269, 923 N.W.2d 68 (2019).

The parties acknowledge that Spring Creek Home is due 

some amount that was incurred through Tierney’s residency, 

but they disagree regarding who bears contractual responsibility for the payment of that debt. Shurigar contends that the district court erred in determining that the contract was unambiguous, and she argues in her brief that, based on the admission 

of parol evidence, she is not liable for Tierney’s debts under 

a correct interpretation of the contract. Spring Creek Home 

argues and the district court agreed that the Agreement is 

unambiguous and that its plain terms make Shurigar personally 

liable for the outstanding debt. We conclude that the Agreement 

is unambiguous but that, under its plain terms, Shurigar is not 

personally responsible for the debt related to Tierney.

In support of its arguments, Spring Creek Home first highlights the top of page 1 of the Agreement, which identifies 

the parties. It argues that Tierney and Shurigar are defined, 

jointly, as “Resident.” While we believe the Agreement’s plain 

terms axiomatically define only Tierney as resident, we are 

mindful that, if any question exists as to the meaning of the 
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SPRING CREEK HOME v. SHURIGAR

Cite as 28 Neb. App. 785

contract’s language, we are to construe it against the drafter, 

which here is Spring Creek Home.

Before proceeding with our analysis, we note several other 

portions of the Agreement we find pertinent to resolution of 

the issue before us. On page 2, under the heading “Termination 

of Agreement,” seven reasons for termination are enumerated, 

including, “5. Resident develops a medical or other problem 

which requires complex nursing care or which is not stable or 

predictable, if the services cannot be provided by an appropriately licensed agency or private duty staff.”

On page 5, under the heading “Resident Responsibilities,” 

the Agreement states, “8. . . . Responsible Party is defined 

as the Resident, the Resident’s designee, someone holding 

a healthcare power of attorney for the Resident, or is the 

Guardian or Conservator for the Resident.” Also on page 5, 

under the heading “Facility Responsibilities,” the Agreement 

enumerates 12 responsibilities that the facility agrees to perform, including, “12. Record the Resident’s weight at least on 

a quarterly basis.”

On page 6 of the Agreement, under the heading “Admission 

and Discharge Policies,” it states:

2. No Resident may be admitted without a Resident 

evaluation and the Resident must agree to a physician’s 

physical evaluation, examination within the first 30 days 

of admission. The Resident must also agree to other 

reevaluations as necessary in the opinion of the attending 

physician, Facility staff, or the Administrator.

3. A Resident whose condition is medically complex, 

unstable, or unpredictable may be admitted to or may 

remain in the facility only if the Resident or Responsible 

Party assumes responsibility for arranging for the 

Resident’s care through an appropriately Licensed agency 

or appropriately licensed personnel.

Later on page 6, under the heading “Medication Administration,” 

a box was marked to indicate that the Resident “will not 

administer his/her own medications” unless a competency test 

is first administered by a licensed professional.
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The heading of page 7 is “Spring Creek Home, LLC RSA 

Attachment.” Under the heading “Resident Goals,” nine goals 

are enumerated, including, for example, “5. Attend [Alcoholics 

Anonymous] at least once per month if needed.” Five enumerated privileges are listed under the heading “Resident 

Privileges if Goals are achieved,” including, “1. Pop on Fridays 

and special occasions.” Two signature lines were given on 

page 7 of the Agreement: one labeled “Resident Signature” and 

the other labeled “Signature of Responsible Party.” Shurigar 

signed on the latter. Shurigar also signed page 8 on the line for 

“Responsible Party,” not “Resident.”

It is not a reasonable construction for both Tierney and 

Shurigar to be jointly defined as Resident. The face of page 1 

of the Agreement clearly identifies Shurigar as “Responsible 

Party” while identifying Tierney as “Resident.” Moreover, only 

Tierney fits the common definition of the word “resident” as 

he, not Shurigar, resided in Spring Creek Home.

Reading the Agreement as a whole and giving meaning to 

each of its parts further demonstrates that the Agreement’s 

plain terms unambiguously identifies Tierney, not Shurigar, as 

the resident. On page 2, for example, if Shurigar is the resident, 

then the Agreement would terminate if Shurigar developed a 

medical or other problem which requires complex nursing care. 

If Shurigar is the resident, then, according to page 5 of the 

Agreement, she would be contractually entitled to be weighed 

by Spring Creek Home on a quarterly basis. Additionally, page 

6 would require that Shurigar, like Tierney, receive a physical within 30 days of admission to Spring Creek Home, and 

page 6 also would preclude Shurigar from administering her 

own medications. Page 7 would obligate Shurigar to attend 

Alcoholics Anonymous meetings if necessary and obligate 

Spring Creek Home to reward Shurigar with a “[p]op on 

Fridays” for her attendance. These examples demonstrate that 

the Agreement itself does not contemplate that the responsible 

party is the resident.

Spring Creek Home also argues that “under the plain terms 

of the [Agreement], the ‘responsible party’ is the ‘resident’ and
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the resident’s ‘Guardian.’” Brief for appellee at 12 (emphasis in original). Specifically, Spring Creek Home’s argument 

is based on its reading of language from page 5 of the 

Agreement: “Responsible Party is defined as the Resident, the 

Resident’s designee, someone holding a healthcare power of 

attorney for the Resident, or is the Guardian or Conservator 

for the Resident.” Spring Creek Home’s argument fails because 

it reads “and” where the Agreement says “or.” By using “or,” 

the sentence at issue provides a number of possible definitions, 

only one of which may be chosen. Reducing the sentence to 

the choice at issue in our circumstances, the plain terms of 

the language on page 5 provide that “Responsible Party is 

defined as the Resident . . . or is the Guardian.” (Emphasis 

supplied.) It is clear from the Agreement that Shurigar was the 

responsible party, which was defined as the guardian, while 

Tierney was the resident. Additionally, we note that both pages 

1 and 5 of the Agreement refer to both the resident and the 

responsible party as distinct entities within the same sentence, 

indicating that they are not one and the same, but instead are 

separate identities.

The Agreement at issue in this case is unambiguous as it is 

not susceptible to two reasonable interpretations or meanings. 

Numerous other examples exist in the Agreement wherein the 

term resident can only be applied to the actual resident, not 

the responsible party. And, as we have pointed out, Shurigar 

signed only the lines of the Agreement designated for the 

responsible party. Were the resident and responsible party one 

and the same, there would be no need for two lines. When the 

Agreement is read and construed as a whole document, it is 

clear that the term “resident” means Tierney alone. The term 

“resident” does not encompass Shurigar. The plain and ordinary meaning of the Agreement, read in its entirety, compels 

this result. To read the term “resident” more broadly than referring to Tierney alone would lead to an unreasonable or absurd 

result. Therefore, since Shurigar is not the resident, she cannot be held personally responsible for charges the agreement 

requires the resident to pay.
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Our inquiry does not end here, however. There are two provisions of the agreement which purport to require the responsible 

party to pay certain charges. Both are found under the heading 

“Financial Agreement” and are located on page 2. Paragraph 

C provides: “The Responsible Party shall pay all charges that 

have been incurred by the Resident that are not included in 

the monthly rental.” Paragraph E provides: “The Responsible 

Party shall agree to pay a penalty charge of $20.00 for each 

month the rent is not paid by the 10th of the month due.”

We state no opinion as to whether these provisions make 

the responsible party personally responsible for the enumerated charges. These provisions were not contemplated by the 

district court in reaching its conclusion. Therefore, we remand 

the cause to the district court for further consideration. First, 

the district court must determine whether any of the charges 

incurred during Tierney’s residency fall within the description 

of paragraphs C or E. If the court determines that charges exist 

which fall within either of those descriptions, the court must 

determine whether the evidence was sufficient to determine 

the dollar amount due. If the evidence was sufficient, the court 

must then determine whether the agreement makes Shurigar 

personally responsible for the payment.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the district court. We remand the cause to the district court for further 

determination consistent with the directions herein.

Reversed and remanded for 

further proceedings.