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THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL:

DEEPENING RIFTS AND EMERGING CHALLENGES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 22, 2014

Serial No. 113–155

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

David Andrew Weinberg, Ph.D., senior fellow, Foundation for Defense of 

Democracies .......................................................................................................... 6

Mr. Simon Henderson, Baker fellow and director, Gulf and Energy Policy 

Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ............................... 28

The Honorable Stephen A. Seche, senior analyst, Dentons US LLP (former 

Ambassador of the United States to Yemen) ..................................................... 35

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

David Andrew Weinberg, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................... 8

Mr. Simon Henderson: Prepared statement .......................................................... 30

The Honorable Stephen A. Seche: Prepared statement ........................................ 37

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 56

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 58

(1)

THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL: 

DEEPENING RIFTS AND EMERGING 

CHALLENGES 

THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. After 

recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch as soon as he 

comes in for 5 minutes each for our opening statements I will then 

recognize other members—thank you so much, gentlemen, for being 

here—seeking recognition for 1 minute. 

We will then hear from our witnesses and without objection, gentlemen, the witnesses’ prepared statements will be made a part of 

the record. 

Members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for 

the record subject to the length limitation in the rules. The Chair 

now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

Since the start of the Arab Spring, the dynamics of the political 

landscape in the Middle East and North Africa have undergone 

dramatic changes. Uprisings in many countries have led to a 

change in leadership, shifting the nature of what was already a 

fragile political insecurity balance in the region. 

Despite similar cultures, political systems and security concerns, 

the only real points of concurrence amongst the member states of 

the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were on the need to maintain 

strong security ties with the United States and on the threat posed 

by Iran. 

This shift in dynamics has also added a strain on the relationship within the GCC, particularly as the nation’s hotly disputed 

policy approaches to the conflict in Syria, the stability of Egypt and 

the Iranian nuclear issue. 

Some of these rifts were made very public earlier this year as the 

United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain all recalled their 

ambassadors to Qatar over the Qatari support for the Muslim 

Brotherhood. 

And while the GCC has reportedly smoothed over this feud, the 

fundamental differences are, clearly, too great to overcome and will 

2

certainly boil over in the near future. But the differences between 

the GCC member states regarding these issues haven’t just 

strained relations within the council. 

They have greatly impacted our bilateral relations with each 

country. The administration’s indecision in Syria and its misguided 

approach to the Iran nuclear issue have driven a deep wedge between us and some of our traditional regional allies and could potentially permanently damage those relationships which would 

then pose challenges to our national security interests. 

While some of these nations leave much to be desired in many 

aspects, ranging from their human rights records to their efforts in 

fighting local terrorist financing and the United States must continue to press those countries in addressing those issues, the members of the GCC are for now still key U.S. allies to many national 

and mutual security threats. 

It would be in the best security interest for the United States as 

well as the GCC members to develop and advance an integrated 

defense capability so that we can counter any threats in the region 

including an Iran that continues to advance its ballistic missile capabilities and still has the potential to create a nuclear weapon. 

But it is not just the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran that threatens 

us and our partners in the region but it is also Iran’s role as the 

largest state sponsor of terror that must be defended against. 

Iran actively seeks to wage proxy wars and attacks against the 

United States, against our ally, the democratic Jewish state of 

Israel, and our U.S. national security interest in the region as well 

as attacks against several Middle East countries themselves. 

That is why I believe that the GCC countries must refrain from 

reaching closer ties with Iran, hold the line against this terrorist 

regime and abandon any ambition to deepen economic alliances 

with Tehran. 

Just this week it was announced that the emir of Kuwait would 

be visiting Iran at the end of the month and Saudi Arabia extended 

an invitation to the Iranian foreign minister to visit. 

None of us here need to be reminded of the foiled plot by the Iranians to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. right here 

in Washington, DC, to understand the lengths to which Tehran will 

go to try to shift the balance of power in the region in its favor. 

If we abandon our partners in the Gulf by continuing to pursue 

a bad nuclear deal with Iran that will leave intact its entire nuclear infrastructure and allow it to continue to enrich uranium, we 

will not only lose what little trust we have with the GCC states but 

we may open the door to an all-out arms race in the Middle East. 

After all, it was the United States who put pressure on all of 

these governments to support our efforts in sanctioning the Iranian 

regime and now they perceive the administration’s zeal to reach a 

deal with Tehran as the U.S. selling them out to the Iranians, 

which will force their hands to cut their own deal with the regime 

in Iran. 

This could up the scales in the region and cause irreparable 

harm to U.S. national security interest and may even make the extremist problem worse if our partners lose faith in us and stop cooperating with us to counter this threat. 

3

The administration must do more to work with these partners to 

earn their trust back and it must abandon its current nuclear policy with Iran or run the risk of turning the entire region against 

us. 

With that, I am so pleased to yield to the ranking member, my 

good friend, Mr. Deutch, of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am 

pleased that we are holding today’s hearing to examine a region 

that plays such a critical role in the United States policy and security more broadly throughout the Middle East. 

In recent months, much has been made over the perceived rift 

between the GCC states and the United States, notably over the 

P5+1 negotiations with Iran, our policy in Syria and events in 

Egypt. 

I believe the U.S. and the Gulf share the same goals—a nuclearfree Iran, an end to Syrian conflict that does not leave Assad or 

dangerous terrorists in power and a stable prosperous Egypt. 

It should be clear to our Gulf partners that this Congress and 

this administration value the strong relationship. Secretary Kerry 

and other senior State Department officials have continued to brief 

the Gulf States on Iran negotiations. 

Secretary Hagel recently convened a meeting of defense ministers, the first time all six defense ministers have been together 

with the Secretary since 2008, and President Obama himself traveled to Saudi Arabia in March to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to 

the region. 

But just as our Gulf friends seek assurances from us, so do we 

from them. It is understandable that Gulf countries would have 

concerns over a potential nuclear deal with Iran. I have concerns 

over a potential nuclear deal with Iran and they are the ones living 

in Iran’s neighborhood. 

Iran’s penchant for meddling in Gulf States by stirring unrest in 

Shi’ite communities by supporting Hezbollah’s activities in the region have exacerbated thousands of years of religious tensions and 

regional power struggles. 

This has only been compounded in recent years by the Iranian 

regime’s unwavering support for Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Now, I 

recognize that there are those allies who were perhaps caught off 

guard by Western engagement with Iran. 

But it is just as concerning to the United States that Tehran and 

the Gulf seem to be warming relations despite this perceived anger 

at the P5+1 for pursuing nuclear negotiations. 

The emir of Kuwait will visit Iran May 31st. Reports last week 

indicated the Saudi foreign minister has invited his Iranian counterpart to visit Riyadh. All of this creates the unfortunate perception that despite our very real and serious mutual concern over a 

nuclear-armed Iran, our Gulf friends simply wish to see the United 

States solve the problem for them. 

And while we appreciate the tremendous economic support the 

Gulf has provided Egypt to help restore economic stability, the U.S. 

will still continue to ensure that we support an Egyptian Government that respects human rights and puts the country on a path 

toward real democracy. 

4

Over the past decade, we have increased security cooperation to 

unprecedented levels and the United States continues to balance 

these individual bilateral relationships and security needs with our 

cooperation and engagement with the GCC as a whole. 

We continue to cooperate on vital counter terrorism issues including preventing Hezbollah from acting in the region. Bold actions from our Gulf partners like declaring Hezbollah as a terrorist 

organization sends an important message to Iran and to its proxies 

but we need to see the same cooperation when it comes to countering all violent extremism, Sunni or Shi’ite. 

GCC countries rely heavily on the United States for their defense 

needs and we have strategic assets and defense agreements in 

every GCC country whether it is the Fifth Fleet stationed in Bahrain, Al Dhafra Joint Air Base in UAE, the Al Udeid based in 

Qatar, the over 13,000 troops in Kuwait. 

These strategic relationships are critical to the ability of the 

United States—to U.S. security interests and the ability to safeguard those interests in the region. But as with any friendship, 

there will be times when we disagree. 

This certainly doesn’t mean that the U.S. has abandoned our interests in the Gulf and any suggestions to that end are simply 

false. But the United States must and will continue to speak out 

against human rights abuses of all kinds. 

We cannot turn a blind eye to the unequal treatment of women, 

discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities or foreign 

workers or violent suppression of dissent no matter where in the 

world it occurs and we will continue to speak out against those elements in or out of government that support any form of terrorism 

or extremist elements. 

Disagreements among GCC countries have also posed a challenge 

to addressing regional crises. It is no secret that the Gulf has been 

split over its approach to Syria and to the rise of the Muslim 

Brotherhood. 

Concerned over their own stability, Saudi Arabia and the UAE 

didn’t appreciate Qatari support for the Muslim Brotherhood. With 

respect to Syria, our Gulf friends must use their resources to collectively strengthen and support vetted moderate opposition groups. 

Continuing to fracture the opposition will never result in a political solution that forces Assad out. I appreciate Kuwait fulfilling its 

humanitarian funding pledges and the UAE-built refugee camp in 

Jordan. 

But I would also urge all of our friends to use all of their great 

resources to fund the desperately lacking humanitarian response to 

the crisis in Syria. For the time being, things appear to be on the 

mend following the agreement reached in Riyadh last month with 

Qatar. 

However, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE have yet to return 

their ambassadors to DOHA. I hope our panelists will address 

whether this band-aid can hold. As I stated earlier, just as our Gulf 

allies seek assurances from us, we seek assurances from them. 

Our partners should be assured that if an acceptable deal is ever 

reached with Iran it won’t be a free pass to Iran to continue its 

dangerous and destabilizing behavior throughout the Middle East 

and throughout the world. And we should be assured that our 

5

friends will not continue to support dangerous actors throughout 

the region. 

To our witnesses, thank you for being here. I hope your testimonies will shed light on a couple of key issues. How deep is the 

mistrust between the U.S. and GCC over Iran? 

Can the GCC overcome its own internal disagreements to act in 

a manner that preserves regional security and perhaps, most 

broadly and most importantly, does the GCC view its long-term relationship with the United States as critical to regional stability as 

we do? 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and yield back. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. Good comments. At this 

time, the Chair recognizes Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Deutch, for holding today’s hearing about this very important issue 

and I would like to extend my gratitude to the witnesses for being 

with us today and for the testimony they are about to provide. 

For decades the United States has maintained important strategic relationships with member states of the Gulf Cooperation 

Council. These relationships are more vital today than ever and ensuring peace and stability are very worthy goals in any part of the 

world. 

But I remind the committee that nearly 20 percent of oil traded 

on any given day must pass through the Strait of Hormuz. 

GCC leaders have correctly identified Iran as a threat to stability 

and peace in the Gulf but a lack of a unified approach to address 

this threat is particularly disturbing. 

GCC leaders watch the events unfolding in Syria and Egypt but 

have all decided on different policies. This is an important region 

and it cannot be overstated how vital it is that we understand the 

intentions, goals and aspirations of GCC member states. 

So I look forward to hearing our panelists today providing clarification on how GCC member states work collectively, how they 

pursue their individual national interests and how United States 

strategic interests are affected by those decisions. 

And I thank you and I yield back. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, sir. 

First, I am pleased to welcome Dr. David Weinberg, who is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies where he 

focuses on the Gulf countries as well as energy, counter terrorism 

and human rights issues. 

Dr. Weinberg previously served as a professional staff member 

on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and has done research for 

the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom and the 

State Department’s policy planning staff under the Bush administration. 

Perhaps I should note here that one of our colleagues—he is not 

here this morning, Mr. Connolly—was also a staffer and so apparently you got smart and left and he stayed. 

So, second, we want to welcome Mr. Simon Henderson, who is 

the Baker Fellow and director on the Gulf and Energy Policy program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, former 

journalist at the BBC and the Financial Times. 

6

Mr. Henderson has also worked as a consultant advising corporations and governments in the Arabian Gulf. And last but certainly 

not least, we welcome Ambassador Stephen Seche—am I saying 

that correctly? Seche—okay, thank you—who is a senior analyst at 

Dentons, an international law firm with extensive ties to the Middle East. 

Ambassador Seche spent 35 years as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer serving as the United States representative to Yemen from 

2007 to 2010. Prior to his current position, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the Department of State. 

He has also served as Charge d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in 

Damascus, Syria and as director of the Office for Egypt and Levant 

Affairs in Washington, DC. 

Gentlemen, welcome, and Dr. Weinberg, we will start with you. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID ANDREW WEINBERG, PH.D., SENIOR 

FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. WEINBERG. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you on behalf of 

the Foundation for Defense of Democracies for the opportunity to 

discuss tensions in America’s security relationship with members of 

the Gulf Cooperation Council. 

There is a pervasive sense among the GCC that America has 

abandoned its regional allies. This concern is primarily vis-a`-vis 

Iran, their main regional enemy, but it has been exacerbated by 

several of the following factors. 

In the last few years, the Gulf States have seen America becoming less dependent upon foreign oil and they wonder if this might 

reduce Washington’s commitment to their security. 

In 2011, the Gulf States witnessed America supporting popular 

revolutions in places like Egypt and they wonder if we might abandon them like we did Mubarak or support the Muslim Brotherhood 

against established regimes. 

GCC states also blame Washington for letting Syria’s Assad regime slaughter tens of thousands of Sunni civilians. They read 

America’s decision not to enforce its red line on chemical weapons 

as an indication that our resolve may be lacking across the board. 

Although our military maintains approximately 35,000 personnel 

in this region, these factors have caused the Gulf States to question 

the value of U.S. security guarantees against such threats as Iran. 

There is real truth to the claims by regional officials that they 

face ongoing acts of terrorism and subversion by Iran’s Islamic 

Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

Officials have intercepted shiploads of sophisticated weapons evidently headed from the IRGC to radical Shi’ite militias that threaten Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Bahrain. 

The Saudis in particular have been targeted in terrorist attacks 

by Iran’s global network including the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing and, as Chairman Ros-Lehtinen noted, a 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador here in Washington. 

Alleged Iranian espionage rings have recently been disrupted in 

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and terrorist cells in Bahrain 

7

receiving IRGC training have reportedly built hundreds of improvised explosive devices. 

Like Israel, the GCC will never trust the terms of an accord over 

Iran’s nuclear program until they see Tehran stopping its interventions in their neighborhood. In short, such activities are the prism 

through which they view Iran’s broader intentions and relatedly 

America’s commitment to come to their defense. 

Thus, if Washington is truly serious about reassuring its GCC allies, the government should insist on opening a new negotiation 

forum alongside the nuclear file for pressuring Iran to stop its radical regional activities and we should bring our Gulf allies to this 

table. 

Because there is a significant trust deficit on both sides of this 

alliance, the time has also come to appoint a special envoy who can 

regain the trust of the GCC’s rulers. Meanwhile, the State Department should release the recent report it commissioned with taxpayer money documenting incitement in official Saudi textbooks 

and revoke the kingdom’s indefinite waiver under the International 

Religious Freedom Act. 

On terrorism finance, U.S. officials should continue to press Kuwait and Qatar to stop providing a permissive jurisdiction for alQaeda fundraising. If DOHA and Kuwait City keep turning a blind 

eye, U.S. designations should possibly be broadened to include responsible foreign officials. 

Washington should encourage Bahrain’s dialogue process and 

praise the crown prince and king for restarting that process in January. However, we should condemn abuses and violence when they 

take place, insist on security sector accountability and impose consequences for one or both sides, depending on their conduct, if negotiations fail to produce a deal before elections later this year. 

The United States should speak out at the highest levels for 

women’s rights in the region, advocating for them to be permitted 

to drive in Saudi Arabia but also raising concerns about that country’s oppressive and infantilising male guardianship system. 

Similarly, Washington should stand up more consistently for 

rights defenders under siege who often face long prison sentences 

for arbitrary charges such as offending the ruler or disrupting public order. 

Finally, the United States should help our Gulf allies address 

their skyrocketing energy consumption while ensuring our own 

lasting energy security. This requires the use of hydraulic fracturing at home when it is economically and environmentally viable, 

a national strategy for fuel choice in the transportation sector and 

increases in renewable energy to move away from fossil fuels in the 

longer term. 

Esteemed Members of Congress, I thank you for this opportunity 

to address you on the Gulf today and I eagerly look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weinberg follows:]

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Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Dr. Weinberg. 

Mr. Henderson. 

STATEMENT OF MR. SIMON HENDERSON, BAKER FELLOW AND 

DIRECTOR, GULF AND ENERGY POLICY PROGRAM, THE 

WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today about such a critical and timely issue. 

Despite the prosperity of the GCC member states—Saudi Arabia, 

Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman—I 

cannot recall a time when disunity in the alliance has been so obvious, prospects for reconciliation so poor and implications for the 

Middle East region and perhaps the rest of the world so bad. 

The GCC states have three features that distinguish them from 

most of the Arab world. They are on what they perceive as the 

front line of Sunni Islam adhered to by most of the Arab world 

against Shi’ite Islam, which has been led since the 1979 Islamic 

revolution by non-Arab Persian Iran. 

They are all also oil-based economies and, although not democratic, their political systems are paternalistic rather than dictatorial. The GCC has been a bulwark against instability since it was 

established in 1981, less than a year after the start of the Iran-Iraq 

War. 

While the battles of that war raged, the GCC member states 

were collectively able to avoid being dragged into the conflict. They 

established themselves as a third power bloc in the region without 

having to align themselves too openly with fellow Arab leader Saddam Hussein against the threat of destabilization initiated by 

Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution. 

The recent events in the last few years of the so-called Arab 

Spring have had an impact on these countries and which have only 

been nation states for a few decades. Now their immediate political 

future, given an almost nuclear Iran, is uncertain. 

To make matters worse, the trend line of their greatest asset, 

their hydrocarbons, is bad. In 10 or, more likely, 20 years an energy glut, comparatively speaking, is predicted for North America—

that is, Canada, the U.S. and Mexico, considered collectively—

which will likely hammer oil and natural gas prices. 

So even if the GCC’s member states collectively have more than 

30 percent of the world’s oil and more than 20 percent of the 

world’s natural gas, lower prices would probably spell disaster for 

their relatively undiversified economies. 

Further to this, there has opened in the last few months a wide 

schism essentially between Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE 

against Qatar, with the other two states of Kuwait and Oman 

standing on the sidelines. 

Apparently there had been a row about this last year, which was 

unreported, but had led to a peace agreement in late November 

2013. 

But this year, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE decided Qatar 

was not living up to its side of the bargain and announced the 

withdrawal of their ambassadors. It is hard for me to see a situation whereby this can be reconciled immediately and this is someVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:52 Jul 08, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\052214\88021 SHIRL
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thing which it is very important for the United States to work on 

particularly because it is not a one-off from this year and last year. 

But the division between Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain on 

one side and the rest of the GCC on the other mirrors pretty exactly what happened in 2011 when Saudi Arabian and UAE forces 

entered into Bahrain to help provide some calm in the disturbances 

there. 

An additional danger for the United States is the age of the rulers, particularly of Saudi Arabia where King Abdullah is in ill 

health and there appears to be what might well be a family feud 

going on in the house of Saud. 

I therefore recommend that the U.S. links with the GCC states 

and need to be worked on and a special envoy should be appointed 

and the U.S. should seek to engage as an honest broker in helping 

to overcome their disagreements. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Henderson follows:]

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Mr. WEBER. Ambassador Seche, you are up. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEPHEN A. SECHE, SENIOR 

ANALYST, DENTONS US LLP (FORMER AMBASSADOR OF THE 

UNITED STATES TO YEMEN) 

Ambassador SECHE. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am very pleased to 

be able to take part in today’s hearing, which offers a timely opportunity to assess U.S. relations with the Arab Gulf States and the 

nature of the relationships these nations maintain with each other. 

As Ranking Member Deutch has already noted, much has been 

made in recent months of the rift between Washington and some 

of our key Gulf allies over U.S. policies in the region. We know well 

what these policies are and each of the speakers this morning has 

identified them—in short, Syria, Iran and Egypt. 

These developments prompt two questions. Are the differences on 

these issues real and are they capable of inflicting permanent damage to our relationships with key Gulf partners. The answer to the 

first question is yes. 

Gulf anxiety about U.S. policies in the region is genuine and 

needs to be addressed. As for the extent of damage these differences can inflict, I think the answer has got to be very little if 

we tend to our relationships carefully, explain ourselves clearly and 

leave no doubt that our commitment to Gulf security and stability 

is as strong today as it has been since FDR met with Abdulaziz Ibn 

Saud nearly 70 years ago. 

If the administration can be faulted, I believe it is failing to respond promptly to the clear signals of impatience and concern 

issued by our GCC partners, particularly the Saudis, and for too 

often seeming to think that a public statement of support delivered 

by an administration spokesman standing in a briefing room in 

Washington will be sufficient to put Gulf anxieties to rest. 

That said, I also believe that the administration has made up for 

its slow start by assembling an impressive list of senior-level visitors to the region including the President himself and the Secretaries of Commerce, State and Defense. 

In fact, as has been noted, Defense Secretary Hagel has just convened a meeting of Gulf defense chiefs in Jeddah. This kind of personal diplomacy is essential and must be sustained. Secretary 

Hagel’s message is that U.S. engagement with the Gulf States is 

intended to support and facilitate, not replace, stronger multilateral ties within the Gulf Cooperation Council. 

This, in my judgement, is absolutely the right direction for the 

U.S. to take. Our GCC allies expect to be treated like mature reliable partners. Let them therefore overcome internal differences and 

work together to ensure their collective security. 

It should not be construed as America walking away from its 

commitments to the security of the Gulf. We will maintain our forward military presence which includes 35,000 service men and 

women, our Navy’s Fifth Fleet, advanced fighter aircraft and a 

wide array of missile defense capabilities. 

Nevertheless, internal divisions and rivalries within the GCC 

conspire against the kind of unified planning the administration 

has been encouraging. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia and the 

36

UAE, generally supported by Kuwait, are the most concerned about 

Muslim Brotherhood and Iranian intentions while Qatar and Oman 

define their interest somewhat differently and are less eager to accept Saudi dominance. Washington must be cognizant of these tensions and acknowledge that they are genuine and deep rooted while 

not accepting these differences as an excuse for the GCC states 

failing to take meaningful steps toward a coherent regional defense 

posture. 

With regard to our own policy differences with our Gulf partners, 

I would like to briefly address the two that I consider to be the 

principal sources of tension—nuclear negotiations with Iran and 

our policy toward the civil war in Syria. 

It is clear that the P5+1 negotiations have prompted Gulf States’ 

fears that at the end of the day Tehran will be permitted to maintain some enrichment capacity and continue its destabilizing activities in the region. A couple of points on this. 

First, if a deal can be struck, and I think that is still a very big 

if, the outcome will do much more to impede Tehran’s acquisition 

of a nuclear weapon than the alternative, a limited military strike 

with much less potential for negative consequences around the 

world. 

On the question of Iranian destabilizing behavior in the region, 

Secretary Hagel made it very clear that the P5 negotiations will 

under no circumstances trade away regional security for concessions on Iran’s nuclear program. 

Perhaps if the nuclear talks succeed a second expanded round 

can be convened immediately on the subject of Iran’s relations with 

its neighbors, bringing the GCC to the table with P5+1. 

Syria is a more difficult issue and an affront to our collective conscience and increasingly home to a metastasizing violent extremist 

movement. Gulf States are unhappy because President Obama has 

declined to join them in supporting the armed opposition with lethal assistance and for failing to enforce his own red line when evidence of chemical weapons used by the Assad regime became clear. 

While we certainly have an interest in seeing Hezbollah’s wings 

clipped in the Levant, I also believe as we address the situation in 

Syria we need to be very careful to avoid becoming a party to a 

campaign that has as much to do with sectarian dominance as it 

does good governance. 

My bottom line is this. For all their public displays of unhappiness with the United States, our Gulf partners know well that no 

other nation can or will ensure their security as we have done for 

the past 70 years. 

Our strategic interest in the Gulf will endure and with them our 

continued investment in the region’s stability. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Seche follows:]

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Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Ambassador Seche. 

I am going to forego my chance to ask questions for just a minute 

and I am going to defer to the ranking member here. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I would just like 

to focus on Iran. There have been suggestions that there should be 

a parallel track dealing with Iran’s meddling in the region and support for terror. 

Ambassador, you talked about a follow-up round of negotiations 

dealing with Iran’s relations with its neighbors. Is there any ideal 

resolution to the Iranian nuclear question that the Gulf States believe can be reached through this current round of negotiations? 

Dr. Weinberg, we will start with you. 

Mr. WEINBERG. Sure. I think the comparison with Israel is illustrative to some extent here. I think the Israelis are primarily concerned about the nuclear issue as an existential threat when it 

comes to Iran. 

I think with the Gulf States they are also extremely concerned 

about the nuclear issue but the ways in which they view the nuclear issue are in part affected by how they view Iran’s intentions 

related to regional subversion activities. 

And so I think as long as Iran continues to pursue these sorts 

of activities and the United States is not making it an issue on the 

negotiating track, I think they are going to have questions about 

how effectively and committedly the United States can enforce a 

nuclear deal with Iran. 

So I think having a dialogue with the Gulf States on this issue—

on the nuclear issue is extremely essential to make sure that there 

aren’t significant surprises on the negotiating track. 

They were very upset, for instance, when they discovered that 

the United States had been engaged in conversations with Oman 

in this regard. If the United States had perhaps maybe informed 

them that private talks were going on without giving a specific location so it couldn’t be leaked and exposed fully that might have 

been more productive. 

But looking forward to the future, having senior officials involved 

in the nuclear file, such as Under Secretary of State for Political 

Affairs Wendy Sherman, go and brief officials in Riyadh and Abu 

Dhabi, for instance, is very constructive and very productive. 

But when it comes to trusting the nuclear deal, I cannot emphasize enough how important the IRGC element of it is for reassuring 

the trust that the Gulf States have in us. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Right, which I understand. So when we have seen, 

though, as I referred to earlier, you know, with all have the Gulf 

States engaging with Iran, are they just following our lead? Is it 

about proximity to Iran if the nuclear deal falls apart—they don’t 

want to be left in a stalemate or a worse position? What is the calculation? 

Ambassador, let me just ask you what is the calculation between 

voicing displeasure with U.S. policy but simultaneously seeming to 

pursue closer relations with what has been referred to throughout 

here as their number-one enemy? 

Ambassador SECHE. Sir, I think it is important to realize that 

each of the GCC countries maintains diplomatic relations with 

41

Iran. They all have Embassies in Tehran. They all deal with Iran 

in one level or another. 

They will continue to do so for their own self-interest. They are 

unhappy with the fact that we have maintained what appears to 

be a process that was going to relegitimize Iran and its ability to 

influence events in the region. 

However, they have also asked us not to negotiate——

Mr. DEUTCH. I am sorry. They are concerned about our efforts to 

relegitimize Iran even as they continue to engage in diplomatic relations and seemingly have undertaken efforts to increase those relations with Iran just over the past few months. 

Ambassador SECHE. Yes, sir, and there is a contradiction clearly 

inherent in this approach of theirs. But on the other hand, I am 

not sure the logic enters into an emotional argument they make 

which is the fact that unleashed Iranian influence will, again, become a juggernaut that is going to really destabilize their interest. 

Now, our position in the U.S. Government or the U.S. Government’s position is that, frankly, the best way to ensure that Iran’s 

behavior is normalized is to bring it to the table, ensure its reentrance back into the community of international nations as a legitimate power that has to have relations that are maintained as 

other nations do in the region. 

Mr. DEUTCH. All right. Mr. Henderson. 

Mr. HENDERSON. Yes. Thank you. The GCC states realize——

Mr. DEUTCH. Is your microphone on? 

Mr. HENDERSON. I beg your pardon. The GCC states realize they 

live in that neighborhood. The United States doesn’t. So they have 

to make their compromises all the way through with the other 

countries in their neighborhood, including Iran at this particular 

point. 

Their fear is that the diplomacy on the nuclear issue will not 

only recognize Iran as a quasi nuclear state if you allow it to hold 

on to enrichment technology, this is a better deal than the UAE 

had to negotiate with the United States in going for nuclear power 

plants. 

And they also fear that such a diplomatic agreement would 

anoint Iran as the hegemonic power in the Gulf area. They fear 

that this would lead to what I would call the Finlandization of the 

Gulf, comparing it with the state of Finland alongside the Soviet 

Union during the Cold War when at that time Finland was what 

I would—had to adopt a strategy of what I would call coerced diplomacy. 

Unfortunately, in yesterday’s Washington Post David Ignatius 

also wrote an article about the Finland aspect of diplomacy in relation to Ukraine and quoting an unspecified State Department document which actually turned on its—to my mind, turned on the 

head—its head the definition of what Finlandization is all about. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate it and I am out of time. Thanks, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. And the Chair now recognizes Steve 

Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes. I was actually not here before the other gentlemen so I would be happy to——

Mr. WEBER. Adam, do you want to jump in? 

42

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, I appreciate it and thank you all. Let me 

just first off say thank you to the witnesses for being here. I very 

much appreciate the focus on this issue, which I don’t think has 

gotten enough attention. 

Our alliance with the Gulf States has been very instrumental in 

us promoting peace and security across the region and I think, you 

know, the administration’s unfortunate use of the term pivot has 

caused us as much damage as anything—the idea of pivoting away 

from the Middle East, which I think is a very epic mistake, and 

a pivot away from the Gulf even though in many cases that doesn’t 

seem like the case. 

What has actually been shocking to me is as we look at what is 

going on in Iraq and Syria, Iran, Egypt and all over, I am hearing 

from our allies, you know, where is America—what has happened 

to American leadership. 

If you look at Europe, you see as America backs away from interests in Europe something has to fill that void. It is Russia. You 

look at Asia—it is China. And you look at the Middle East and you 

see two things—chaos, terrorism and Iran filling the lack of American leadership. 

Mr. Henderson, you mentioned the 1–2–3 agreement with the 

United Arab Emirates and a similar situation exists in South 

Korea. America holds this commitment of a nuclear-free Korean 

Peninsula even though we know that in North Korea they have nuclear weapons. But we like to hold the idea that we are committed 

to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. 

We said that we are committed to a nuclear-free Middle East region so the UAE very graciously agreed to no enrichment. And so 

you find out that our allies get no enrichment and our enemies potentially get the right to enrich uranium. 

So it begs the question to our allies, okay, being close to the 

United States gets you what versus being far from the United 

States and a thorn in its side gets you what. 

And so it is very concerning, and you look at Syria. 

There is a hundred and—at least 150,000 people who have died 

in Syria. You have a President that put out a red line as America 

has held to for generations that the use of chemical weapons will 

have no place in a civilized world, and his backing off and failure 

to enforce the red line in Syria has led me in my discussions—I 

think many members of the committee here who have talked with 

diplomats and heads of states of other countries—to say that was 

one of the biggest, most terrible turning points in America’s foreign 

policy. That is the point at which your enemies no longer feared 

you and your allies no longer trust you. 

So I have just a few questions. Mr. Henderson, you talked a little 

bit about the coercion and you also talked about coerced neutrality. 

How could the neutrality of the GCC states hurt our ability to stop 

Iran from attaining its nuclear weapon and at what point do you 

think our allies would take on this position and this calculation? 

Mr. HENDERSON. It is an excellent question and what I see as 

likely to happen amongst the GCC states, particularly the cases of 

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, is that they will go their own way and 

quite what that way is isn’t terribly clear but there are signals on 

what that way is. 

43

At the end of the last month, Saudi Arabia held a huge military 

exercise culminating in a parade at a military base in the north of 

the country which had over 130,000 men on parade. 

It was the largest exercise and largest parade they have ever had 

and the Saudis also took the opportunity to display at that parade 

two of the Chinese East Wind missiles, which are usually referred 

to in American terms as medium range or long range. 

And the important thing is that they can get from Saudi Arabia 

to Tehran and this was a clear signal to Tehran that Saudi Arabia 

is unhappy with the situation. It was also or should have been a 

clear signal to Washington, DC, that Saudi Arabia was unhappy 

with the situation. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, I was just going to say, because my time 

is running out and I know many people have questions, if this was 

a—this is a very bipartisan committee. 

That is one of the reasons I love serving on this committee. If 

this was a Republican administration I would be screaming just as 

loudly about the decline of American leadership around the globe. 

I had one more question but I don’t have time to ask it. But I 

do want to make the point again that I made, which is I think the 

failure of the United States of America to enforce the red line in 

Syria, and today, even when we hear about more chlorine gas attacks and barrel bomb attacks and everything has been one of the 

biggest foreign policy blunders not just of this administration but 

probably over the last couple of decades. 

Mr. Chabot, thank you, and Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Kinzinger. Now the Chair recognizes 

Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am pleased to 

follow on the questions of my colleague from Illinois. 

Mr. Henderson, you used the terminology the GCC states live in 

the neighborhood and the United States doesn’t and that the sense 

that we may be turning away or pivoting from that is raising levels 

of concern. 

I know you touched a bit on this in your testimonies but can you 

be a little more specific of what we can do to reinforce and demonstrate our commitment to the region, the fact that we understand it is a crucial strategically important region and also in the 

same vein things we might do differently or stop doing to reinforce 

the confidence in the region? 

Mr. HENDERSON. Thank you. I am tempted to say to try to wind 

the clock back. I recognize I cannot do that. But one of the significant mistakes to my mind of what the administration has done 

has, at least from a GCC point of view, is they—the GCC thinks 

Washington, DC, misunderstood the Arab Spring and thought the 

so-called Arab Spring was a great thing and this was the way forward. 

The GCC states considered that Iran was the major threat. They 

regarded their own political systems, which I have described as patriarchal rather than dictatorial, as being, in a sense, post-Arab 

Spring anyway. They have already got that improved level of politics. 

One can debate that but you can sense what I mean. And they 

were furious that U.S. support for President Mubarak in Egypt 

44

flipped from firm support to he must go within 3 weeks, leaving 

them thinking, hell, if that happens in Egypt what is going to happen with us if the pressure mounts on us. 

A further anxiety from a GCC perspective, certainly from Saudi 

Arabia, probably Bahrain and the Emirates, is that they saw the 

overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Damascus as being important not only for its own purposes because he was a dreadful 

dictator but also because this would give a strategic setback to Syria’s main ally, Iran. 

And the absence of that overthrow and, indeed, the sense that 

Bashar is in there for the way ahead has infuriated the GCC and 

feels that that strategic setback hasn’t been delivered and in fact 

it’s been a strategic plus for Iran. 

So what do they do now or what can we do is we have to give 

the GCC a sense that we better understand their position. In fact, 

I don’t actually believe the Obama administration recognizes that 

they are at fault in their understanding. 

The logic of their diplomacy on the Iran nuclear issue is sort of 

self-fulfilling, and as I have said before I think this needs to be corrected because you are heading into a situation whereby there will 

be a neutralized Gulf but it won’t be neutral in the favor of the 

United States or, indeed, the West. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Right, and I will share that what you are saying 

and the sense from the Gulf States is consistent with everything 

I have heard talking to people who have relations in Chicago, 

where I am from. 

There is that great concern. It is not new and it is not, I don’t 

feel, being addressed sufficiently to do that. Dr. Weinberg, it looks 

like you wanted to say something as well. 

Mr. WEINBERG. If I could just jump in quickly. I think some constructive things the United States can do or is doing include on 

Secretary Hagel’s visit he presented concrete specific steps for increasing military partnerships in areas such as maritime security, 

missile security. 

I think that is a constructive measure. I think the extent to 

which the United States is willing to contemplate a partially increased role related to Syria will see the Gulf States willing to appreciate that but also foot some of the bill. 

As I noted before, the importance of potentially appointing an 

envoy to regain trust with the GCC States could be constructive as 

well as keeping the focus on the IRGC. But, additionally, as these 

Gulf States engage to some extent with Iran, as Ranking Member 

Deutch drew particular attention to, I think it is important for the 

United States, just as they insist from us on an eye into what is 

going on in the nuclear talks, I think we should insist from them 

to know what they are talking about with Iran. 

I think this is important to prevent buck passing and freelancing 

on the part of some of these Gulf States but also to ensure that 

there are no surprises that we are confronted with. 

For instance, after the Khobar bombing that occurred in Saudi 

Arabia and has been tied to Iranian intelligence, the United States 

felt that we had extreme difficulty getting access to some of the 

suspects in this crime in Saudi Arabia and it seemed as though, 

in retrospect, that the Saudi authorities had cut their own separate 

45

deal with Iran on some security issues at the time in a limited tactical way and they were slow rolling the investigation. 

So in order to prevent something like that, I think it is important 

for the United States to insist on a clear eye on what is actually 

going on in these dialogue talks as some of the Gulf States 

tactically engage with Iran. Thank you. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. I see I am over time so thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. I wish we could go more into the no deal better 

than a bad deal. It is a crucial issue with Iran—the textbooks. I 

thank the witnesses for being here and I yield back. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Can any of you gentlemen think of a time when there was tranquility in the Gulf? No, I don’t—I can’t. I have been thinking about 

maybe when the Ottoman Empire dominated the whole region but 

even then there was Lawrence of Arabia and all sorts of House of 

Saud fighting the Turks at that time. Mr. Henderson, you were 

going to say that there was a time period? 

Mr. HENDERSON. Well, you are asking a historical question and 

history is a matter of personal opinion. But there was a tranquility 

in the Gulf in the sense of no war at the time when the Shah of 

Iran was the leader of Iran and his demise in the 1979 Islamic revolution is year zero in my calculation. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Of course, you realize the shah did—became 

the shah after he—we overthrew a democratically-elected President—a guy named Mossadegh, I seem to remember his name was. 

Mr. HENDERSON. Well, actually he was the shah before and 

Mossadegh, who was elected, actually tried to undermine the shah, 

which is the historical spin on that one. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. We Americans sort of like that idea of 

getting the king out of our lives sometimes, you know. 

Mr. HENDERSON. Well, you have got six kings or quasi kings in 

the GCC states. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. HENDERSON. And it is a challenge to have good relations 

with GCC states if you take that point of view. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me—let me ask another historical question. Now, about that time the Ba’athist movement was basically 

emerging as a force in that part of the world and at the same time 

you had—historically my read back there was that is about the 

same time as well as the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Can we say that there was a competition in that time period between whether or not that region would go with the Ba’athists because there were Ba’athist Parties in all of these countries, I believe, versus radical Islam and radical Islam as one? 

Mr. HENDERSON. Dr. Weinberg has, I think, a degree in—a Ph.D. 

in history and so perhaps he would want to come in on this one. 

But essentially the events of the 1950s, which was the rise of the 

Ba’ath Party, were a struggle between old style monarchial regimes. 

That was the end of Egypt. Jordan’s throne was under threat. 

Iraq’s ruling royal got dragged through the streets. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. He was assassinated. Right. 

46

Mr. HENDERSON. But it was also the time when the Muslim 

Brotherhood developed as an underground movement. But the 

main struggle at that time was—in the 1950s was between nationalists, who were essentially secular, and communists. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. I am actually thinking more of the ideological fight that goes on and in the end I believe determines what 

direction history will take. I have just—you know, we are in for 

some big changes in the world and one of the big changes is the 

United States is going to become oil and gas independent. 

In fact, we will start exporting oil and gas within a decade. This 

would tend to eliminate that mandatory tie that we have had to 

being involved in the Gulf. I notice now and for your testimonies 

today that it has been noted that China is now becoming a major 

weapons supplier to the Gulf—rockets and missiles to various elements. 

Do you expect China to emerge now in some sort of relationship 

with radical Islam as we see it in Iran as well as, I might add, 

Saudi Arabia is governed by what I would consider a radical Islamic philosophy? 

Mr. HENDERSON. The China role is an interesting question but 

it is watch this space—you know, find out what the hell is going 

on in Beijing. I wouldn’t have thought that China will head in the 

direction of identifying itself with the radical Islam. 

It has problems with the Uyghurs, who are Islamists in western 

China, and I can’t imagine that Beijing thinks that this is the way 

forward. China’s history in the Gulf area has a cynical aspect to 

it. 

During the 1980 to ’88 Iran-Iraq war, China was supplying ammunition to both sides, presumably because they made more money 

that way, but as much as this notion of increasing American energy independence becomes an important factor, I don’t think it 

makes it simple for the United States to withdraw from the Gulf 

area because energy is very much a universal world, particularly 

related to price. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 

for giving me a chance to ask questions and I just would end my 

part of the—the world is changing at a very fast rate and I would 

believe that our situation with oil and gas will have major repercussions as to how much the American people are willing to commit 

to being involved in a arena of turmoil in the Gulf. I am sorry. I 

don’t have much time—any time left. Thank you very much. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, sir. The Chair recognizes Lois Frankel. 

I understand that we are probably going to call votes here just any 

minute. So the gentlelady from Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you very much. Mr. Chair, first, I would 

like to welcome Edona Krasniqi from Kosovo, whose specialty is 

child protection and she is here as a Hope Fellow to learn how to 

improve her and advance her advocacy. 

So welcome. Thank you for being here. I hope you have a good 

stay here in the United States. 

Mr. WEBER. Could you have her stand up? Is she back over here? 

Ms. FRANKEL. Yes. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Welcome. 

47

Ms. FRANKEL. Welcome. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I 

wanted to ask a couple questions on this nuclear—the potential of 

a nuclear Iran. First is if Iran should get a nuclear weapon would 

you expect there would be a proliferation and which of the Gulf 

countries do you think would be next to try to obtain a weapon? 

Mr. HENDERSON. Saudi Arabia would go to Pakistan tomorrow 

and ask for one and Pakistan would probably give them more than 

one. 

Ambassador SECHE. I would certainly concur with Mr. Henderson’s view that the Saudis are quite inclined to act and quickly in 

the event that Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon. 

I think that is also why Saudi Arabia can understand that the 

nuclear P5+1 negotiations are the best alternative to keeping that 

from happening. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Apparently, Iran’s President Rouhani was quoted 

today saying that a deal over Iran’s nuclear program is ‘‘very likely 

by July 20 deadline.’’

Do you know or do you have an opinion as to whether his version 

of the deal he is talking about would be one that Saudi Arabia and 

the GCC can live with? 

Mr. HENDERSON. I fear that President Rouhani’s version of a deal 

is something which Washington, DC, can live with. I am almost 

certain that the GCC cannot live with it and particularly Saudi 

Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, probably Kuwait as well. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Right. And could you just expand on that? 

Mr. HENDERSON. Because these countries feel that too many concessions are being made to Iran and their interests aren’t being 

taken into account and it will leave Iran with its nuclear technology and nuclear industry intact, which will give it a quasi nuclear weapons status of a country which has always professed that 

it has no interest in nuclear weapons but most people have never 

believed that statement. 

Ms. FRANKEL. So which specific concessions are they opposed to? 

Mr. HENDERSON. They don’t want Iran to have—well, I don’t 

think they want Iran to have any centrifuges and the idea that 

there is a small number of centrifuges which is a reasonable number—they can’t believe it is a reasonable number. 

And they fear also that the deal will not require Iran to come 

clean on what they have done in the past and which is called possible military dimensions in the jargon of their program. 

And with—if Iran doesn’t come clean on that part it is naive and 

essentially allows them to retain the military nuclear weapons program both in structure and in personnel. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And oh, Madam Chair, you 

are back. Good to see you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. Frankel. It is a delight to see 

you. 

Ms. FRANKEL. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. And now we are so 

pleased to recognize Mr. Chabot and thank you, Mr. Weber, for 

doing a wonderful job. Thank you. Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Kinzinger had asked—actually made kind of a—some statements, most of which I agreed with, and then asked some questions 

48

and so I will leave out most of the statements that I would make 

because I agree with him about sort of the power vacuum around 

the world, at least the perception of one by the United States. 

And I will just note that when there is a power vacuum when 

the U.S. is less engaged around the world bad actors have a tendency to fill in there and we are seeing that in South China Sea 

with China and the Middle East with Iran and now in Europe, particularly in Ukraine with Russia and Putin acting up. 

And my question would be this, first of all, and I got here a little 

late so this may have already been—you may have already talked 

about this. But Saudi Arabia sort of shocked, I think, the administration and the world to some degree when they turned down, you 

know, membership on the Security Council of the U.N. and a lot 

of people thought it was kind of a slap in the face at the U.S. for 

not backing the Gulf States up and our traditional allies in the region. Would anyone like to comment on that, what they think 

about that particular issue? 

Ambassador SECHE. Perhaps I will begin and then turn to my 

colleagues. But I do think there was a strong signal sent by the 

Saudis last fall of their unhappiness and this was one of the issues 

that I think we moved slowly to respond to. We saw the——

Mr. CHABOT. An unhappiness with what in particular? 

Ambassador SECHE. Well, fundamentally, with our lack of involvement in Syria and supporting the opposition. 

Mr. CHABOT. The United States lack of involvement. The United 

States lack of involvement. 

Ambassador SECHE. United States involvement in supporting the 

armed opposition. I think P5+1. I also think that our support for 

the popular revolt in Egypt. 

All of these combined to create a serious sense of unease and the 

Saudis were simply demonstrating the extent to which that unease 

had captured them and I think that we needed at that point to 

send someone immediately to Riyadh and sit down and have a face 

to face, and we did not. 

And I think, again, we were slow to react but I think we finally 

began to understand the depth of this unhappiness and the fact 

that it was beginning to tear at the fabric of the relations that we 

have and we consider to be so important. 

Mr. CHABOT. And with respect to—you mentioned Egypt—there 

is also a perception in that region of the world, particularly in 

Egypt but I think throughout the Gulf States, that not only is less 

resolve and less commitment and less involvement and less engagement from the United States but there is even a perception that 

not only did we not support sort of the government but that we are 

pro-Muslim Brotherhood. 

I mean, I am not saying that is true but I am saying is that not 

kind of the perception amongst a lot of folks—public opinion in that 

part of the world? 

Ambassador SECHE. Well, there is a perception but I think the 

perception may be somewhat missing the point. The fact of the 

matter is the Muslim Brotherhood government came to power in 

Egypt by virtue of what everyone agrees was probably the most 

open and fair election in Egyptian history. 

49

No one was content with the fact that a Muslim Brotherhood 

government started to turn against the very democratic process 

that put it in power and I think this demonstrates the immaturity 

to some extent of these movements. 

They are able to use the democratic process to their advantage 

but are still so afraid of it that they begin to consolidate power in 

very anti-democratic ways once they have an opportunity to do so. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Would any of the other—yes, Dr. Weinberg. 

Mr. WEINBERG. If I could jump in there. I think with regard to 

your first question first, it is also important to note that the Saudi 

leadership gave up an opportunity to address the U.N. General Assembly this fall, which is an extremely unusual choice. 

Related to that decision and the U.N. Security Council seat decision, the Saudi official line pointed to a whole range of silly points 

like oh, well, we are mainly upset about the Palestinian issue or 

we are mainly upset about Rohingya Muslims in Burma—issues on 

which the Saudi leadership had been doing basically nothing in the 

months before that. 

I mean, these are not silly issues per se in foreign policy but 

they—you know, they weren’t a core element of Saudi initiatives at 

the time. I think it is worth noting that they came within mere 

days of President Obama’s telephone call with President Rouhani 

in Iran. 

So I think Iran was a part of that, I think Syria was a part of 

that and I think frustration with the U.N. apparatus and the international community for not doing more had something to do with 

that. But I think also another element is King Abdullah’s temper 

in Saudi Arabia. 

I think we saw this also in the withdrawal of the Saudi Ambassador from DOHA in Qatar and I think it points again to the importance of personal relations in this region where power is so centralized with a few individuals. The fact that President Obama 

went to Saudi Arabia in March to look the king face to face I think 

was a very positive development. 

However, I think the fact that they spent all of about 2 hours together is a sign of how frayed those relationships are, pointing to 

the importance of having somebody out there, perhaps an envoy, to 

rebuild trust with these leaders. 

With regard to the Muslim Brotherhood, as you noted, I think 

there is deep, deep mistrust of the Muslim Brotherhood from the 

leaderships in the United Arab Emirates and in Saudi Arabia. 

I actually just came back from Abu Dhabi and Dubai and I heard 

people describing their views of the Muslim Brotherhood compared 

to the Comintern, Hitler and Mussolini. I think there is real fear 

that this organization in the long term could pose a threat to established regimes there. 

But at the same time, Qatar does not in any way seem prepared 

to revisit their extensive broad-reaching sponsorship of the Muslim 

Brotherhood throughout the broader Middle East. And so I think 

it is reasonable for the United States to expect this GCC spat to 

linger on and I think we need to adapt to that. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. Weber. 

50

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Madam Chair. A question for all of you 

all. Well, I have got all kinds of questions but they will call voting. 

Does the GCC endure if through this should the United States 

come in and say look, okay, we understand your view our foreign 

policy as faltering but we would like to come back in a very comprehensive way now, strong, come out and say look, we would like 

you all to renounce all forms of terrorism and list the terrorist organizations and then we will kick back in, and it will take an administration, quite frankly, in my opinion that would say no more 

negotiations on Iran getting nuclear weapons, and we will talk a 

little bit about that in a minute, Mr. Ambassador. 

But if the United States came in and said we want you all to become more cohesive, stronger than ever but here is the steps it is 

going to take, is that a viable option for us to put on the table to 

try to really get them to renounce terrorism, list the terrorist organizations and to get on the same page? Or is that just pie in the 

sky? 

Ambassador SECHE. Yes. If I may, sir, I think it is going to be 

very difficult at this point to see the very disparate interests of 

Saudi Arabia and the UAE come to terms with Qatar’s behavior. 

I think there is a sense that Qatar, even having had agreed to 

some sense of a modus vivendi with their neighbors, is probably 

still not persuaded. 

Mr. WEBER. So if they were alienated that the rest of them actually came to that table and Qatar thought they were going to be 

left out—pressure on them? 

Ambassador SECHE. Qatar has enjoyed very much its role as the 

maverick in the Gulf and I think it sees itself as now punching way 

above its weight and having an opportunity to exercise influence 

and it does, certainly through Al Jazeera, certainly through its 

enormous wealth that it has and they demonstrated around the 

world that it can buy its way into a lot of countries and societies. 

So I am not sure how easily, and I think the Gulf States may 

be trying to test a young emir recently empowered to see if he has 

the mettle that his father had or if he will cave under that kind 

of pressure. 

Mr. WEBER. Also, let me follow up on that, Ambassador. You said 

in earlier comments that Iran needed to be back in the international neighborhood. But I was curious when you said that. Is 

that devoid of any nuclear capability? You didn’t really qualify 

that, but they needed to be made a player again. Explain that. 

Ambassador SECHE. Well, I certainly think the terms for that 

would have to be that Iran does give up any opportunity to develop 

a nuclear weapon, that there is a success——

Mr. WEBER. Including enrichment? 

Ambassador SECHE. Well, I don’t think they will give up enrichment. I think Iran is absolutely intent upon maintaining——

Mr. WEBER. We are too far down that path is what you are saying. 

Ambassador SECHE. Right. And I think there is probably an inherent unfairness in the fact that this is going to, if it succeeds, 

allow Iran to have some enrichment capacity and others have noted 

that the UAE, for example, forsake that option. 

51

But I do believe that this deal—it is not this deal or a better 

deal. It is this deal or no deal, and this is the one moment we have 

a chance to put something on the table that will guarantee if it is 

done properly and if it is airtight and very verifiable——

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Ambassador SECHE [continuing]. That there will not be a nuclear 

weapon. 

Mr. WEBER. Now a question for all three and I have got 2 minutes left. Arab Spring—is that going to reemerge, revive or are we 

going to see that in the GCC? What is the likelihood? 

Mr. HENDERSON. Because of the different political systems and 

the inbuilt notion of consensus in the albeit quasi monarchy systems they have, I don’t think you are going to see the Arab Spring 

in the sense that you saw it in Tunisia where there was a dictator 

or Egypt where there was a dictator or even Yemen. 

But what I am watching and what I expect we will see is that 

the degree to which the people of the GCC countries, the citizens 

of the GCC countries which are essentially over subsidized and 

cosseted are accept—continue to accept the system despite its benefits——

Mr. WEBER. Not as unhappy as some of the others. 

Mr. HENDERSON. They are very conscious of the fact they live in 

a region where there is—things are happening. When it is turmoil 

they don’t like it. 

But when they want to tweet and they want to do social networking and all this sort of thing these are things which the old 

style governments aren’t—don’t have built-in mechanisms to know 

how to cope with. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Final question, and I think as you, Ambassador, said, Hagel is going over there negotiating, you said, maybe 

an enhanced role for the United States in Syria. Explain. 

Ambassador SECHE. Well, I don’t know that I said that but I do 

believe the United States is reexamining our role in Syria at the 

moment and I think that there is enough pressure building——

Mr. WEBER. Maybe it was Dr. Weinberg. An enhanced role in 

Syria—Chuck Hagel—military role and what does that look like. 

Mr. WEINBERG. I don’t think that was specifically tied to Secretary of Defense Hagel’s visit to the region, which I think was 

mainly focused on defense partnerships in the Gulf region per se. 

But I do think the U.S. administration has acknowledged that 

there is some need for a reevaluation of its policy in Syria. Now, 

as to whether that involves a fundamental reevaluation of some of 

the shortcomings of that policy or whether it is incremental, I think 

has yet to be seen. 

But there is some reason to believe that the administration may 

be increasing its program for training members of the Syrian opposition that are vetted and moderate and, for instance, there was a 

recent David Ignatius column which suggested that Qatar has been 

paying the difference for the increase in this training program. 

Mr. WEBER. I saw that. 

Mr. WEINBERG. And that the Saudis are providing U.S.-made 

anti-tank TOW missiles to vetted members of the Syrian opposition. So I think to the extent to which the United States is willing 

to explore increasing its support to the right people in Syria, I 

52

think there is hunger in the Gulf States for that and I think they 

will support us in that and appreciate it in our broader relationship. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Weber. 

Mr. WEBER. Madam Chair, thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. The U.S. has over 35,000 service 

men and women in the Gulf nations, giving us a rather robust military presence, and we have an important intelligence presence in 

the region as well, making our relations with these countries strategically important. 

What does the administration need to do in order to repair, to 

expand, to strengthen those relationships in order to ensure our 

national security interests are being best served and also to 

strengthen our relationships with the GCC countries that want a 

closer relationship with us in the United States? 

Mr. HENDERSON. I think the United States has to better explain 

what it means to have these military forces and in the Gulf area 

and because the notion of using force, which is after all what a 

military is all about, has—seems to have been redefined by Washington, DC, in recent years. 

It is not as if you have to go to war but you have to at least give 

the impression you will actually use the military and from a GCC 

perspective they, while grateful for the U.S. military there, they 

are uncertain whether the strength of this military, the deterrence 

of this military, is recognized any longer by troublemakers such as 

Iran. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And I know that you want to comment but 

let me just give this question out. If the United States and the 

P5+1 reach an agreement with Iran that still allows Iran to enrich 

its own uranium, what does our relationship with the GCC countries look like the next day? 

Mr. WEINBERG. Well, I think several of the members on this 

panel have highlighted the potential risk of Saudi Arabia pursuing 

a nuclear weapon if they believe that Iran’s nuclear program is not 

going to be suitably restricted. 

I think Mr. Henderson here was a little modest in that he didn’t 

mention that he is published. He has personally been told by A.Q. 

Khan, the father of the Pakistani nuclear program who also was 

linked to nuclear weapons information sharing and sales to several 

rogue countries, has visited Saudi Arabia dozens of times, so he 

claims, and I think the linkages between the Pakistani and Saudi 

military establishments including in this arena are extremely close 

and need to be a cause of concern. 

When it comes to the UAE’s perspective, I think there will be 

considerable resentment about the fact that they signed an agreement forgoing the opportunity to enrich when Iran, on the other 

side of the Gulf, retains it. 

So I think it comes down to the fact that as, I think, Congressman Schneider noted and I noted in my written testimony, a bad 

deal is worse than no deal. Even with the administration——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Let me just go over here. We are 

out of time. 

53

Ambassador SECHE. If I may for a moment, ma’am, I don’t believe that a deal—a P5+1 deal with Tehran it allows them to have 

minimal enrichment—10,000 to 12,000 centrifuges—a breakout 

time of 4 to 6 months is going to send the Saudis to Pakistan to 

acquire a nuclear weapon. 

I believe they would do that—if Iran gets a nuclear weapon they 

would respond in kind. But I also believe they know that the alternative, which is a limited military strike, is going to have unintended consequences across the region that are going to be far 

more dangerous to the well being of the Gulf States than a deal 

which is verifiable and comprehensive with the Iranians. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, and I know that we 

have lots more to say and there is zero time remaining on the clock 

for our votes. Thank you, gentlemen, for excellent testimony. 

Thank you to all of our members and to the audience. 

And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 10:49 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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