UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT

District of District of Columbia

------------------------------------------------------- : CL O UD F OUNDATI O N, I N C. et. al. :

: CASE NO. 1:09-CV-01651 Plaintiff, : : vs. : OPI N I O N & ORDER : [ Resolving Doc. Nos. 72 and 76 ] KEN SAL A Z AR, e t. al. : : D efendant. : :

------------------------------------------------------- J AMES S. GW I

N, UNI T ED STATES DI STRI CT J UDGE: I n this challeng e to federal manag ement of wild horses on the Pry or Mountain W ild Horse Rang e in southern Montana and northern Wy oming , both parties move for summary judg ment. F or the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judg ment and G RANTS Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judg ment. I. Background A. F actual Background This action concerns the g overnment’s treatment o f w i l d h o r se populations on the Pry or Mountain W ild H orse Rang e. T h e rang e spans 3 9 ,650 acres and is located in Carbona County , Montana, and B ig H orn County , W y oming

. 1 / The Secretary of the I nterior established the rang e in

1 / B L M Do c.1 , B L M- 0 0 0 0 0 2
.

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. 1968, 2 / but the rang e has since been ex panded to include lands within th e C u ster National F orest, admi n i s t e r ed by the F orest Service of the Department of Ag riculture, a nd the B ig horn National Recreation Area, administered by the National Park Service of the Department of the I nterior. 3 / I n 1971, three y e a

rs after the desig nation of the Pry or Mountain W ild Horse Rang e, Cong r ess passed the W ild F ree Roaming Horses and B urros A ct (“W ild Horses Act”). The W ild Horses Act tasked the B ureau of L and Manag ement (“B L M”) in the Department of the I nterior and the F orest Service in the Department of Ag riculture to care for and manag e wild h o r s e s o n lands in their respective jurisdictions. 4 / I n 1 9 8 4 , t h e B L M i s s u e d a h e rd manag ement area plan ( “HMAP”) establishing an a ppropriate manag ement level (“AML ”) at 121 w i l d h o r s e s ( plus o r minus five percent). 5 / I n 1992, the B L M modified the 1984 HMAP and established a n AML of 95 (plus or minus 10 percent ) o r 8 5 t o 105 wild horses. 6 /

The 1992 HMAP g overned wild horse manag ement until 2009. I n 2 0 08, B L M, with the assistance o f the F orest Service and the National Park Serv i c e , evaluated the rang e to determine if manag ement objectives were being met. 7 / The evaluation found that, as a result of graz ing and droug ht, certain areas of the rang e were overused. 8 / As a result, the evaluation recommended B L M manag e the rang e for 92 to 117 horses. 9 / Afterwards, B L M, with the assistance of F orest Service an d t h e N ational Park Service,

2 / Id

. 3 / Id

. 4 / 1 6 U.S.C. § § 1 3 3 2 , 1 3 3 3
. 5 / B L M Do c.1 , B L M- 0 0 0 0 0 2
. 6 / Id

. 7 / Id

. 8 / Id

. 9 / Id

.

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. prepared a draft HMAP and preliminary environmental assessment, which proposed to increase the A M L t o 9 0 t o 1 20 h orses. 1 0 / B L M afforded the p ublic 3 0 day s to submit comments, relevan t information, and recommendations. 1 1 / After r eviewing public comm e nt s , t h e B L M a n d t h e F orest Service issued the Pry or Mountain W ild Horse Rang e H erd Manag ement Area Plan and Environmental Assessment (“2009 HMAP” )

. 1 2 / Among o ther thing s, t h e 2 0 0 9 H MAP established an AML of 90-120 horses and provided for the repair, maintenance, and slig ht ex tension of the northern boundary fence. 1 3 / Plaintiffs appealed the B L M’s 2009 HMAP decision to the I nterior B oard of L and Appeals (“I B LA”) 1 4 /

as well as to the United States F orest Service. 1 5 / B. P rocedural Background On Aug ust 28, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a C o m p laint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief challeng ing B L M’s early

September planned g ather of wild horses on the rang e. 1 6 / On Aug ust 31, 2009, Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restra i n i n g order to enjoin the g ather. 1 7 / On September 2, 2009, the Court denied the motion. 1 8 / On September 8, 2009, the planned g ather concluded. 1 9 / On Aug ust 25, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint. 2 0 / On October 21,

1 0 / Id

. at B L M- 0 00 0 03
. 1 1 / Id

. 1 2 / Id

. 1 3 / Id

. 1 4 / B L M Do c. 9
. 1 5 / FS- E1
. 1 6 / Do c. 1
. 1 7 / Do c. 3
. 1 8 / Do c. 1 2
. 1 9 / Do c. 1 6

- 2
. 2 0 / Do c. 3 6
.

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. 2010, the g overnment moved for partial judg ment on the Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. The g overnment a lternatively a sked to transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana. 2 1 /

The Court denied both motions. 2 2 / On May 27, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judg ment. 2 3 / On J uly 1 , 2011, Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judg ment. 2 4 / II. Legal Standards A. Sum m ary Judgm ent Under F eder a l R ule of Civil Procedure 56, we must g rant summary judg ment when “the pleading s, depositions, answers to interrog atories, and admissions on file, t o ge ther with the affidavits, if any , show that there is no g enuine issue as to a ny material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judg ment as a matter of law.” 2 5 / Once the moving party has done so, the non-moving party must set forth facts in the record—not its alleg ations or denials in pleading s—showing a triable issue. 2 6 / The ex istence of some doubt as to the material facts is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judg ment. 2 7 / However, the Cour t will view the facts and a ll reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the non-moving party
. 2 8 /

2 1 / Do c. 4 6
. 2 2 / Do c. 5 3
. 2 3 / Do c. 7 2
. 2 4 / Do c. 7 6
. 2 5 / An d erso n v. Lib erty Lo b b

y, In c. , 4 7 7 U.S. 2 4 2 , 2 4 7 , 1 0 6 S. Ct. 2 50 5 , 2 5 1 0 , 9 1 L . Ed . 2 d2 0 2 (1 9 8 6). 2 6 /S ee F ed . R. Civ . P . 5 6 (e) ; Ma tsu sh ita Elec. In du s. Co . v. Zen ith Ra dio Co r p . , 4 7 5 U.S. 5 7 4 , 5 8 7 (1 9 8 6 )

. 2 7 / Ma t su sh ita , 5 7 5 U.S. at 5 8 6
. 2 8 / Th o m a s v. Co h en , 4 5 3 F.3 d6 5 7, 6 0 0 (6 th Cir. 2 0 0 4)

.

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. B. Agency Action Plaintiffs challeng e a ctions taken by the B L M and the F orest Service under the W ild Horses Act a nd the National Environmental Policy Act. B ecause neither statute creates a private rig ht of action, thi s C o urt conducts review of ag ency compliance under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 2 9 / Under the APA, “[ a] g e ncy action made reviewab l e b y statute and final ag ency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.” 3 0 / A court may set aside final a g ency a ction if it is “arbitrary , capricious, an abuse of disc re t i o n , o r o therwise not in accordance with law.” 3 1 / Re v i e w under the arbitrary and capricious standard is “narrow,” and the court must not “substitute its judg ment f

or that of the ag ency .” 3 2 / Reviewing courts must be “ex tremely deferential” when the ag ency

is making predictions within the ag ency ’s a rea of special ex

pertise. 3 3 / An ag ency rule is arbitrary and c apricious if “the ag ency has relied on f actors which Cong ress h as not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an ex planation for its decision that runs c o unter to the evidence before the a g ency , o r is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of ag ency ex pertise.” 3 4 /

2 9 / Th eo d o re Ro o sevelt Co n serva tio n Pa rtn ersh ip v. S a la za r ( " TRCP "

) , 61 6 F.3 d 4 9 7, 5 0 7

– 0 8 (D.C.Cir.2 0 1 0 )

. 3 0 / 5 U.S.C. § 7 0 4
. 3 1 / 5 U.S.C. § 7 0 6 (2 )(A ). 3 2 / Mo to r Veh icle Mfrs. Ass'n o f U.S., In c. v. Sta te Fa rm Mu t. Au to
. In s. Co

. , 4 63 U .S. 2 9 , 4 3 , 1 0 3 S. Ct. 2 8 5 6 , 2 8 6 6, 7 7 L . Ed . 2 d4 4 3 (1 9 8 3 ).

3 3 / Nu clea r En erg

y In st., In c. v. En vtl. Pro t. Ag en cy , 3 7 3 F.3 d1 2 5 1 , 1 2 8 9 (D.C. Cir. 2 0 0 4 ). 3 4 /S ta te Fa rm , 4 6 3 U.S. 2 9 , 4 3 (1 9 8 3 ). -5-Case No. 1:09-CV-01651

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. III. Analysis A. Wild Horse Act Claim s 1. F inal Agency Action Defendants say the Court should g ive judg ment to the B L M on Plaintiffs’ W ild Horses Act claims. I n support o f this, Defendant B L M argues that Plaintiffs d o not challeng e a ny “final ag ency action.” 3 5 / Defendants say the final ag ency action in the current case is the I B L A decision, not the 2009 HMAP decision, and Plaintiffs have only asserted v arious challeng es to the 2009 H M AP. 3 6 / I n response, Plaintiffs say the 2009 HMAP is a sufficient final ag ency a ction b ecause Plaintiffs were not required to appeal to the I nterior B oard of L a

nd Appeals. 3 7 / Under the A PA, “[ a] g ency action[ s] made reviewable by statute a nd final ag ency actions[ s] for w hich there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.” 3 8 / The B L M is part of the Department of the I nterior. The Department of the I nterior regulations states that I B LA decisions a

r e final ag ency actions. “The B oard [ of L a nd Appeals] d e cides finally for the Department [ of I nterior] appeals to the h ead of the D epartment f rom decisions rendered by D epartmental officials relating to
. . . [ t] he use and disposition of public lands

. . . ” 3 9 / “A dec i s i o n of the B oard shall constitute f

inal ag ency action and be effective upon the da t e o f issuance, unless the decision itself provides otherwise.” 4 0 /

3 5 / Do c. 7 6

- 1 at 1 9
. 3 6 / Id

. at 2 0
. 3 7 / Do c. 7 7 at 3
. 3 8 / 5 U.S.C. § 7 0 4
. 3 9 / 4 3 C.F.R. § 4 .1 (b )(3 )(i). 4 0 / 4 3 C.F.R. § 4 .4 0 3
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. The Court finds t h a t the I B L A decision is the final administrative action, not the 2009 HMAP. Althoug h Plaintiffs say no statute or rule required Plaintiffs to appeal the 2009 HMAP to the I B L A, an optional appeal of a resulting determination to an a ppellate administrative body renders the initial administrator’s d ecision nonfinal for judicial review under the APA. 4 1 / Thus, Plaintiffs should have challeng ed the I B L A decision as the final ag ency action in the c urrent case. However, t h e C ourt denies the Plaintiffs request for leave to amend their Second A mended Complaint t o challeng e the I B L A decision 4 2 / because amendment would b e futile. Even if Plaintiffs did challeng e the I B L A decision, they would not survive summary judg ment for the below reasons. 2. Range Expansion Claim Defendants say Plaintiffs failed to ex haust their administrative remedies by not raising their rang e ex pansion claim in their I B L A and United States F orest Service appeals. 4 3 / We require parties to ex haust their administrative remed i e s b e fo r e seeking relief from federal courts. 4 4 / Ex haustion protects administrative ag ency authority a nd p romotes judicial e fficiency

. 4 5 / R eg ulations of the Department of the Interior require p laintiffs to ex haust their administrative remedies by petitioning the B L M and appealing its decision to the I B L A. 4 6 / Similarly , the federal statute and regulations of

4 1 / Na t'l Pa r ks & Co n serva tio n Ass'n v. Bu rea u o f La n d Mgmt ., 6 0 6 F.3 d 1 0 5 8 , 1 0 6 4 (9 th Cir. 2 01 0 ) (q u o tin g Acu ra o f Bellevu e v. Reich , 9 0 F.3 d 1 4 0 3 , 1 4 0 7 (9 th Cir.1 9 9 6) )(n o tin g ; Oreg on Na tu r a l D esert Ass'n v. McDa n iel , 7 5 1 F. Su p p . 2 d 1 1 4 5 , 1 1 5 1 (D. Or. 2 0 1 0 ) (n o tin g th e IB L A m erits d ecisio n becam e t h e f i n al ag en cy actio n an d ren d ered th e u n d erly in g B L M d ecisio n

n o n - f in al). 4 2 / Do c. 7 6

- 1 at 5 n . 2
. 4 3 / Do c. 7 6

- 1 at 2 0
. 4 4 / Mo bile Exp lo ra t io n & Pro d u cin g U.S., In c. v. Ba b b i tt , 9 1 3 F. Su p p . 5 , 1 0 (D.D.C. 19 9 5) (citin g McCa rth y v. Ma d ig a n , 5 0 3 U.S. 1 4 0 , 1 45 , 1 1 2 S. Ct. 1 0 81 , 1 0 8 6 , 1 1 7 L . Ed . 2 d2 9 1 (1 9 92 ) ).

4 5 / Id

. 4 6 / 4 3 C.F.R. § 4 .4 1 0
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. the Department of Ag

riculture require plaintiffs to ex haust their administrative remedies. 4 7 / The Court finds that Plaintiffs sufficiently ex hausted their administrative remedies as to their rang e ex pansion argument. I n both the I B L A and United States F o rest Service administrative appeal process, the Plaintiffs said that the 2009 HM AP w r o n gl y failed to consider rang e ex pansion o nto Forest Service lands outside the boundary of the rang e and said the f a ilure to ex pand the r a n ge violated the W ild Horses Act. Specifically , in the administrative hearing s, Plaintiffs stated that the B L M a nd F orest Service failure to consider ex p anding the rang e into National F orest violated “[ the N ational Environmental Policy A ct] NEPA, B L M’s own statutory mandate under [ the W ild F ree-Roaming Horse and B urros Act] 16 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (“.

. . all manag ement activities shall be at the minimal feasible level

. .

. ”) and B L M’s c orresponding regulation at 43 C.F
. R. §4710.4 (“

. . . Manag ement s h a l l b e a t the minimum level necessary to obtain the objectives in approved land use plans a nd herd manag ement area plans.”).” 4 8 /

Plaintiffs sufficiently

ex hausted their administrative remedies. Althoug h Plaintiffs preserved the rig ht t o c h a lleng e the failure to ex pand the rang e, Court finds the 2009 HMAP’s decision not to ex p and the rang e w a s not arbitrary and capricious. Rang e
ex p ansion is not the ty

pe o f decision that can b e made i n a H M A P
. R a ther, a s the F orest Service
ex p lained, “[ d] e sig nation of a wild horse territory is a ‘land use’ decision, appropriately addressed at the F orest Plan scale, rather than the scale for the HMAP revision.” 4 9 / I n f act, the Plaintiffs took

4 7 / 3 6 C.F.R. § § 2 1 5 .1 4
. 4 8 / FS- E1 , FS- 0 0 1 9 3 9 ; B L M Do c. 1 0 , B L M- 0 0 0 2 4 0
. 4 9 / FS E1 3 , FS- 0 0 20 2 2
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. this in both their F orest Service and B L M a ppeals. 5 0 / Rang e ex pansion onto National F orest Sy stem lands raises numerous conflicts with other F orest Plan manag ement g o als. The F orest Service must also c onsider the ecolog ical integ rity o f the L ost W a t er Cany o n Research National Area and L ost W ater Canyon Recommended W ilderness and must consider competition for forag e between wild horses and other livestock. 5 1 / The F orest Service n eeded to balance competing g oals. W ith these
c o mpeting interests, the F orest Service’s 2009 HMAP decision not to ex pand the rang e was n o t arbitrary and capricious. 3. 2009 HMAP AML P laintiffs say the 2009 HMAP did not establish a horse level population that coul d e n s u r e g enetic viability

. 5 2 / B L M officials receive sig nificant d iscretion to choose the wild horse and burro populations the rang e can support. 5 3 / This B L M discretion ex tends to choosing the targ et wild horse and burro populations. 5 4 / Here, in the 2009 HMAP, the B L M set the targ et horse and burro population at 90-120. I n setting this targ et population, the B L M considered “g enetic diversity and o ther aspects of the health of the wild horse population.” 5 5 / The B L M also ag reed that it w ould manag e t h e p o p u l a t ion to preserve g enetic traits, blood lines and ensure max imum g enetic v ariation within a small population

5 0 / FS E1 , FS- 00 1 92 7 ; B L M Do c. 9 , B L M- 00 0 18 4
. 5 1 / FS A 1 , FS- 0 0 0 0 2 2 ; S

ee a lso FS E1 3 , FS- 0 0 2 0 2 2 (d iscu ssin g p o ten tial co n f licts w ith ran g e ex p an sio n ). 5 2 / Do c. 7 2

- 1 at 2 6
. 5 3 / In Def. o f An ima ls v. U.S

. Dep 't o

f In terio r , 9 0 9 F. Su

pp . 2 d 1 1 7 8 , 1 1 9 1 (E.D. C al. 2 0 1 2 ) (statin g “ B L M h as co n sid erab l e discretio n o n h o w to carry out th e d irectiv es o f th e A ct”); Am. Ho r s e P ro t
. Ass'n , In c. v. W

a tt , 6 94 F.2 d 1 3 1 0, 1 3 1 8 (D.C. Cir. 19 82 ) (statin g “ B L M’ s f in d in g o f w i ld h o rse o v erp o p u l atio n s sh o u ld n o t b e o v ertu rn ed q u ick ly ”); Am. Ho rse Pro t
. Ass'n v. Frizzell , 40 3 F.Su p p . 1 2 0 6 , 1 21 7 (D.Nev .1 9 7 5 ) (statin g BL M m u s t b e af f o rd ed a “ h ig h d eg ree o f d i s cretio n ary

au th o rity ” inm an ag in g h erd s ). 5 4 / Fu n d fo r An ima ls, In c. v. U.S . Bu rea u o f La n d Mgmt ., 4 6 0 F.3 d1 3, 1 6 (D.C. Cir. 2 0 0 6 ). 5 5 / B L M Do c. 1 , B L M- 0 0 0 0 0 8
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. while maintaining healthy rang elands. 5 6 / Specifically , the B L M ag reed the “[ w] ild horses would be manag e d for a

n even sex ratio as well as ag e classes” and “emphasis would be placed on retention and increasing the number of 5-10 y ear-old animals a s the core b reeding population.” 5 7 / I n choosing this population level, the B L M necessarily faced competing

claims. L arg er horse and burro levels impair the sustainable e colog y for other animals. Ag ainst the competing claims for using this land, Court finds that the ag ency used reasoned decision making when it picked the targ et horse a nd burro population and its actions were not arbitrary and capricious. 4. Repair, Maintenance, and Slight Extension of the Northern Boundary F ence P l a intiffs say the F orest Service’s decision to repair, maintain, a nd slig htly ex t e n d t h e Northern B oundary F ence violates the W ild Horses Act because the c hang e to the fence reduces the movements of the w ild horses to and from areas they have used historically used. 5 8 / The Plaintiffs mostly dispute the location of the fence. The Plaintiffs’ challeng e to the rang e’s boundary w as already decided in Cloud Foundation, Inc. v. Kempthorne on statute o f limitations g rounds. 5 9 / T he repaired fence merely demarcates the location of the northern boundary of the rang e chosen in prior land use planningdecisions (1984 for B L M and 1987 for F o rest Service). 6 0 / I n any event, the Court f i n ds that the F orest Service thoroug h ly ex plained its decision to repair, maintain, a

nd slig htly ex tend the Northern B oundary F ence. The F orest Service determined that ex tending and realig ning the fence w o u l d “ reduce long -term maintenance needs, provide an

5 6 / Id

. 5 7 / Id

. 5 8 / Do c. 7 2

- 1 at 2 1
. 5 9 / Th e Clo u d Fo u n d

., In c. v. Kemp th o r

n e , CV 0 6 1 1 1 B L G RFC, 2 0 0 7 WL 1 87 6 48 6 (D. Mo n t. J un e 2 7 , 2 0 0 7 ). 6 0 / FS E1 3 , FS- 0 0 20 1 9
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. effective b arrier, and minimiz e confli c t s w i t h o ther leg itimate uses on adjacent National F orest Sy stem land.” 6 1 / F urther, the F orest S e r v i c e f ound that the “proposed maintenance, minor realig nment, a

n d ex tension would also reduce or halt the need for h andling (moving ) of horses back onto the PW W H R associated with an ineffective north boundary .” 6 2 / I n addition, the F orest Service found that the fence repair and ex tension would have “no e f fect
on the free roaming ability fo the herd within the territory .” 6 3 / T h e F orest Service found that while the fence leng thening would cut off one 25-acre parcel to the rang e, it would add 25 acres with the fence realig nment out of the deep snow area. 6 4 / I n sum, the F orest Service fully ex plained the need to repair, maintain, and slig htly ex tend the fence. I

ts actions were not arbitrary and capricious. B. National Environm ental P olicy Act Claim s Plaintiffs also say Defendants ig nored their National Environmental Policy Act oblig ations when Defendants used a c a t e go r ical ex clusion in disposing wild horses it r emoves from the Pry or Mountain W ild Horse Rang e. 6 5 / A categ orical e x clusion is used when a g overnment ag ency decides certain conduct does “not i n d i v i d u a lly o r cumulatively have a sig nificant effect on the human environment.” 6 6 / Once an a g ency invokes a categ orical ex clusion, it is free from further oblig ations
un d er the National Environmental Policy Act. W ith a categ orical ex clusion, neither an environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement is required.” 6 7 /

6 1 / Id

. at FS- 0 0 2 0 2 2
. 6 2 / Id

. at FS- 0 0 2 0 2 3
. 6 3 / Id

. 6 4 / Id

. 6 5 / Do c. 3 6 at 2 2
. 6 6 / 4 0 C.F.R. 1 5 0 8 .4
. 6 7 / Id

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. 1. New Claim s Raised in Sum m ary Judgm ent Brief ing Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint challeng es B L M’s complia n c e with the National Environmental Policy Act in c onnection with the processing and disposition of “Pry or wild horses it removes from the rang e.” 6 8 / Despite narrow scope of Count Two, Plaintiffs’ summary judg ment motion ex pands their c laim to challeng e the 2009 HM AP ’ s compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act 6 9 / and the dis p osition of wild h orses removed from other federally

manag e d rang es. 7 0 / Def

e n d a n t s are entitled to f

a ir notice of claims advanced in litig ation. New claims cannot be pled in summary judg ment briefs. 7 1 / Thus, the Courts rejects these unpled claims and only addresses the claims raised in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. 2. Mootness Under the Constitution, a live controversy must ex ist at all stag es of judicial review. 7 2 / To the
ex tent Plaintiffs c h a l leng e the B L M’s use o f a c ateg orical ex clusion for it’s the 2009 g ather disposition, the claim is moot. B oth the g ather and subsequent disposition at an adoption event are complete. 7 3 / To the ex tent Plaintiffs challeng e the categ o rical ex clusion of future B L M horse g athers from the National Environmental Policy Act’s requirements, the C o u rt finds the challeng e falls within the “capable of repetition y et evading review” ex ception to the mootness doctrine because it

6 8 / Do c. 3 6 at 2 2
. 6 9 / Do c. 72

- 1 at 3 0 ( “B y f ailin g to co n sid er o th er altern ativ es th at satisf y t h e m an d ates o f th e W FHB A , th e HMA P f ails to m eet th e m in im

um req u irem en t s o f

NEP A .”) 7 0 / Id

. at 2 9

- 30
. (“ A s a m atter o f co urse, B L M ap plies a CE f or th e p o st- rem o v al t

reatm ent o f a ll w ild h o rses an d b urro s it rem ov es f

ro m th e p u b lic lan d s . . .”). 7 1 / Ta ylo r v. Mills , 89 2 F. Su

p p . 2 d 1 2 4 , 1 3 7 (D.D.C. 2 0 1 2 ) (statin g “ p lain tif f is n o t p erm i tted to raise n ew claim s at th e sum

m ary j u dg m en t stag e, w

h ere th o se claim s w ere n o t p l ead edinth e co m p lain t”). 7 2 /U.S. Co n st. art. III, § 1
. 7 3 / Fu n d f o r An i ma l s, In c. v. U.S

. Bu rea u o

f La n d M gmt ., 4 6 0 F.3 d 1 3 , 2 2 (D.C. Cir. 2 0 0 6 ) (h o ld in g th at claim s reg ard in g co m

p letedg ath er w ere m o o t). -12-Case No. 1:09-CV-01651

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. “seeks declaratory

relief as to an ong oing policy

. 7 4 / The horse g ather claim is not moot. 3. F inal Agency Action A s ex plained above, under the APA, courts can only review final ag ency a ction. 7 5 / “F inal ag en cy a c t ions” are actions which ( 1) “ mark the consummation of the ag ency ' s decisionmaking p r o c ess” a

n d ( 2) “by which rig hts or oblig ations have been d etermined, or from which le ga l consequences will flow.” 7 6 / Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s c halleng e to B L M’s future u se o f a categ orical ex clusion does not c halleng e final a g ency action. Plaintiffs claim amounts to a c halleng e to a “declaration in its Department Manual” that B L M will use c ateg orical ex clusions in future horse g athers. 7 7 / Rather than an action that “ mark[ s] the consummation of the ag ency ’s decisionmaking process,” 7 8 / it is a g eneral recommendation f or the ag ency . Any

actual future decision to use a categ orical ex clusion will be shaped by a number of f actors and circumstances unique to that specific future horse g ather. I n fact the B L M Manual states: before any action described in the following list of C X s is used, the list of " e x traordinary circumstances

.. must be reviewed for applicability

. I f a CX does not pass the " ex traordinary circumstances" test, the proposed action a naly sis defaults to either an EA or a

n EI S. W hen no " ex traordinary circumstances" apply , the f ollowing activities do not require the preparation of an EA or EI S. 7 9 /
B a sed on the foreg oing , before deciding to use a categ orical ex clusion on future horse g athers, the

7 4 / Do c. 3 5 at 6
. 7 5 / 5 U.S.C. § 7 0 4
. 7 6 / Ben nett v. S

p ea r , 5 2 0 U.S. 1 5 4 , 1 7 8 (1 9 9 7). 7 7 / Do c. 7 2

- 1 at 3 2
. 7 8 / Id

. 7 9 / B L M Do c. 7 3 , B L M- 0 0 4 2 6 9
. -13-Case No. 1:09-CV-01651

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. B L M will consider a v ariety o f ecolog ical factors. Only after r eviewing B L M’s reasoning behind an invocation of a c a t ego r ical ex clusion c an a court determine if a violation of the National Environmental Policy Act has occurred. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not cha l l e n ged final ag ency action. IV. Conclusion
F or the r easons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judg ment and G RANTS Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judg ment. I T I S SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 19, 2013 s/ J ames S. Gwin J AMES S. GW I

N UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT J UDGE

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