THE EVOLUTION OF LOS ZETAS IN MEXICO

AND CENTRAL AMERICA: SADISM AS AN 

INSTRUMENT OF CARTEL WARFARE

George W. Grayson

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

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Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

THE EVOLUTION OF LOS ZETAS 

IN MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA:

SADISM AS AN 

INSTRUMENT OF CARTEL WARFARE

George W. Grayson

April 2014

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ISBN 1-58487-611-5
v

FOREWORD

Los Zetas, which appeared on the scene in the late1990s, have raised the bar for cruelty among Mexican 

Mafiosi. Traditionally, the country’s narcotics cartels 

maximized earnings by working hand-in-glove with 

police, military officers, intelligence agencies, union 

leaders, and office holders affiliated with the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which dominated the 

political landscape from 1929 to 2000. An informal set 

of rules benefited both the drug capos and their allies 

in government posts. On the one hand, officials raked 

in generous payments from the malefactors for turning a blind eye to—or employing the Federal Judicial 

Police and other agencies to facilitate—the growing, 

storage, processing, and export of marijuana, cocaine, 

heroin, and methamphetamines. 

In return for this treatment, the kingpins were expected to keep their substances away from children, 

leave civilians (and especially Americans) alone, and 

limit their arsenals to weapons less powerful than 

those possessed by the armed forces. Meanwhile, 

the kingpins only executed enemies in remote areas 

(preferably north of the Rio Grande), obtained permission from rival big shots before crossing their turfs, 

and demonstrated respect for mayors, governors, and 

other prominent figures. Office holders often rubbed 

elbows with well-known crooks. Nevertheless, should 

honchos ignore the guidelines or otherwise embarrass the PRI regime, the government would retaliate 

with shadowy hit squads, executing the rule breakers 

or consigning them to long prison terms. It should be 

noted, however, that while incarceration is unpleasant, the “deluxe” prisoners often enjoyed comfortable 

accommodations and access to vintage wines, female 
vi

visitors, television sets, and other perquisites denied 

the average inmate. 

Although never functioning with precision, the ad 

hoc pact system lasted until the late-1970s or even the 

early-1980s. A series of inept presidents eroded the 

PRI’s sway over society, giving rise to a more transparent society; the 1994 North American Free Trade 

Agreement multiplied trilateral trade in legal and illegal substances; and the success of the U.S. efforts to 

stanch the influx of Colombian cocaine into Florida 

forced the Medellín and Cali cartels to use Central 

America and Mexico as their major thoroughfare to 

American consumers. What had once been a multimillion dollar enterprise became a multi-billion dollar 

venture—a change that further undermined the PRIgovernment-narco unofficial understanding.

A key figure in this breakdown was Juan García Ábrego, the intrepid chieftain of the Gulf Cartel, 

centered in Matamoros south of Brownsville, Texas, 

who pioneered an arrangement with the Colombians 

whereby Mexican criminals would no longer simply 

transport cocaine from Central America to the American “big nose,” as one pundit expressed it, but take 

the drugs at the Guatemalan border and assume the 

risk (and earnings) for transporting the cargo through, 

around, or over Mexico into the United States. President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) spearheaded the arrest of Juan García Ábrego in 1995, and leadership of 

the Gulf Cartel wound up in the hands of Osiel “The 

Friend Killer” Cárdenas Guillén. Osiel’s enemies had 

soared with the paranoid new boss’s ascent, and he 

plied with money, drugs, and better living conditions members of the Airborne Special Forces Groups 

(GAFEs) to encourage them to desert the army and 
vii

become his Praetorian Guard against friends and 

foes he believed were plotting his coup de grâce. These 

hardened, trained killers were Los Zetas, whose name 

derived from either the police signal used to identify 

them or the blue zeta color of their uniforms.

Despite Los Zetas’ ruthless commitment to The 

Friend Killer’s protection, the military relied on an 

informant to apprehend Cárdenas in March 2003. 

At first, the paramilitaries worked in tandem with 

the new, but inept, honchos of the Gulf Cartel. Yet, 

gradually Los Zetas charted their own course until 

they broke with the Gulf syndicate in early-2010. A 

medley of factors accelerated the schism: (1) the readiness of Los Zetas to enter situational alliances with the 

Beltrán Leyva Organization, enemies of the mighty 

Sinaloa Cartel; (2) the botched attempt of the Zeta’s 

second-in-command to import cocaine from Colombia, and, above all, (3) Los Zetas’ diabolical cruelty, 

embellished by their social media’s dissemination 

of beheading, castrations, and unspeakable torture. 

Briefly speaking, Los Zetas have rewritten the rules of 

the game to the point that anything goes. Regrettably, 

other syndicates like the La Familia Michoacán, the 

Knights Templars, and even the Sinaloa Cartel have 

copied some of their abominations, giving rise to what 

Grayson calls the “Zetanization” of Mexico’s ineffective drug war.

The author, who has written numerous books and 

articles on Mexico’s underworld, breaks new ground in 

arguing that the concerted use of sadism has advanced 

the agenda of a relatively small fist of cutthroats who, 

despite the elimination of key chiefs, have penetrated 

a score of Mexican states, inflicted their hideous brand 

of warfare on Central America, and managed to con-
trol Nuevo Laredo, the largest commercial portal joining Mexico to its northern neighbor.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

viii
ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

GEORGE W. GRAYSON is the Class of 1938 Professor 

of Government Emeritus at the College of William & 

Mary, and has made more than 200 research trips to 

Latin America. In addition, he is a senior associate at 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies, an 

associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a board member at the Center for Immigration 

Studies, a life member of the National Association for 

the Advancement of Colored People, and a frequent 

lecturer at the at the U.S. Department of State. He has 

served as an official observer at six Mexican presidential and gubernatorial elections. He served in the 

Virginia state legislature for 27 years. He comments 

frequently on National Public Radio and its affiliated stations. Besides preparing two dozen books and 

monographs for Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, Dr. Grayson has authored The Cartels: the Story of Mexico’s Most Dangerous Criminal Organizations 

and Their Impact on U.S. Security (Praeger, 2013); The 

Impact of President Felipe Calderón’s War on Drugs on the 

Armed Forces: The Prospects for Mexico’s “Militarization” 

and Bilateral Relations (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, 2012); The Executioner’s Men: Inside 

Los Zetas, Rouge Soldiers, Criminal Entrepreneurs, and 

the Shadow State They Created (co-authored with Sam 

Logan, Transaction Publishers, 2012); Threat Posed by 

Mounting Vigilantism in Mexico (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011); La Familia Drug 

Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security (Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010); Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? (Transaction Publishers, 2010); Mexico’s Struggle With Drugs and Thugs 

(Foreign Policy Association, 2009); Mexican Messiah: 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (Penn State University 

Press, 2007); Mesías Mexicano (Random House-Mondadori, 2006); Mexico: the Changing of the Guard (Foreign 

Policy Association, 2001); Strange Bedfellows: NATO 

Marches East (University Press of America, 1999); Mexico: From Corporatism to Pluralism? (Harcourt Brace, 

1998); Oil and Mexican Foreign Policy (University of 

Pittsburgh Press, 1988); The North American Free Trade 

Agreement: Regional Community and the New World Order (University Press of America, The Miller Center, 

University of Virginia, 1995); The United States and 

Mexico: Patterns of Influence (Praeger, 1984); and The 

Politics of Mexican Oil (University of Pittsburgh Press, 

1980). His articles have appeared in the Commonwealh 

Magazine, Harvard International Review, ForeignPolicy.

com, Foreign Policy, Orbis, World Affairs, The Baltimore 

Sun, The Christian Science Monitor, the Houston Chronicle, The Globe and Mail, the Los Angeles Times, Newsday, 

Reforma (Mexico City), U-T San Diego, The Washington 

Post, The Washington Times, and The Wall Street Journal. 

Dr. Grayson holds a Juris Doctorate from the College 

of William & Mary and a Ph.D. from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns 

Hopkins University. 

x
xi

SUMMARY

The United States has diplomatic relations with 194 

independent nations. Of these, none is more important 

to America than Mexico in terms of trade, investment, 

tourism, natural resources, migration, energy, and security. In recent years, narco-violence has afflicted our 

neighbor to the south—with more than 50,000 drugrelated murders since 2007 and some 26,000 men, 

women, and children missing. President Enrique Peña 

Nieto has tried to divert national attention from the 

bloodshed through reforms in energy, education, antihunger, health care, and other areas. Even though the 

death rate has declined since the chief executive took 

office on December 1, 2012, other crimes continue to 

plague his nation. Members of the business community report continual extortion demands; national oil 

company Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) suffers widespread theft of oil, gas, explosives, and solvents (with 

which to prepare methamphetamines); hundreds of 

Central American migrants have shown up in mass 

graves; and the public identifies the police with corruption and villainy. A common fear of the elite and 

growing middle class is kidnapping. In 2012, Mexico 

recorded 105,000 cases; in 2013, the country led the 

world in abductions, surpassing such volatile nations 

as Afghanistan, Colombia, and Iraq.

Los Zetas, who deserted from the army’s special 

forces in the late-1990s, not only traffic in drugs, murder, kidnap, and raid PEMEX installations, but also 

involve themselves in extortion, human smuggling, 

torture, money laundering, prostitution, arson, prison 

breakouts, murder for hire, and other felonies. While 

consisting of only a few hundred hard core members, 

these paramilitaries have gained a reputation for the 
sadistic treatment of foes and friends—a legacy of 

their two top leaders, Heriberto “The Executioner” 

Lazcano Lazcano and Miguel Ángel “El 40” Treviño 

Morales, who thrived on beheadings, castrations, 

“stewing” their prey in gasoline-filled vats, and other 

heinous acts. They make sophisticated use of social 

media and public hangings to display their savagery 

and cow adversaries. 

The reputation for the unspeakable infliction of 

pain has enabled these desperados to commit atrocities in a score of Mexican states, even as they expend 

their presence, often in league with local gangs and 

crime families, in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, 

and other nations of the Americas. From their bastion in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, across the border from 

Laredo, Texas, they also acquire weapons, entrée to 

legal businesses, and teenage recruits. According to 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the fiends have 

contracted with such outfits as the Texas Mexican 

Mafia prison gang, the Houston’s Tango Blast, and 

the McAllen, Texas-based Los Piojos to collect debts, 

acquire vehicles, carry out hits, and sign up thugs 

to fight their foes in the Matamoros-centered Gulf 

Cartel for which Los Zetas originally served as a 

Praetorian Guard. 

Washington policymakers, who overwhelmingly 

concentrate on Asia and the Mideast, would be well 

advised to focus on the acute dangers that lie principally south of the Rio Grande, but whose deadly avatars are spilling into our nation.

xii
1

THE EVOLUTION OF LOS ZETAS 

IN MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA:

SADISM AS AN 

INSTRUMENT OF CARTEL WARFARE

INTRODUCTION

Drug-related violence in the border town of Nuevo 

Laredo, the crown jewel for U.S.-Mexican commerce, 

left the bustling, crime-afflicted city of 350,000 without a police chief. Alejandro Domínguez Coello, a 

print-shop owner and Chamber of Commerce president, accepted the post on the morning of June 8, 2005. 

“I’m not beholden to anyone. My commitment is to 

the citizenry,” stated the 56-year-old father of three. 

Six hours later, he took the wheel of his Ford F-150 

pickup. A vehicle pulled up next to him, and the crack 

of an AR-15 rifle sounded as 30 bullets ripped through 

his white shirt, splashing blood over his chin and chest. 

Los Zetas paramilitaries were sending a message: We 

control the streets of Nuevo Laredo. “They are openly 

defying the Mexican state,” said Mexico City political 

scientist Jorge Chabat. “They are showing that they 

can kill anybody at any time. It’s chilling.”1

As a result of such carnage, virtually every other 

drug trafficking organization (DTO) in Mexico, the 

more professional law enforcement units, Mexican 

and U.S. security agencies, and the armed forces are 

committed to exterminating Los Zetas, who sprang to 

life in the late-1990s. Osiel “The Friend Killer” Cárdenas Guillén, who aspired to lead the then-mighty 

Gulf Cartel based in Matamoros across from McAllen, 

Texas, feared assassination to the point of paranoia. 

Hooked on cocaine and haunted by internal demons, 

the 31-year-old Friend Killer became convinced that 
2

assassins were plotting his demise. Osiel yearned 

to rise from a run-of-the-mill boss to a feared capo. 

Along the way, his climb to the top of the Gulf Cartel 

brought with it enemies—gangs and individuals who 

had suffered apace with his ascent—and accentuated 

his fear of a sudden, ignominious death. Often on a 

whim, he ordered triggermen to hunt down and execute real and imagined foes. His obsession with being 

sent to his grave prematurely often “paralyzed” him, 

according to an astute biographer.2

Burdened by the weight of this angst, Osiel had 

earlier approached military personnel, seeking protection. One of his first contacts was with Lieutenant 

Antonio Javier Quevedo Guerrero, a former member 

of the 21st Cavalry Regiment in Nuevo León. After 

Quevedo’s capture on March 29, 2001, Osiel increasingly relied on Lieutenant Arturo Guzmán Decena, 

who had developed skills in explosives, counterinsurgency, and tracking down and apprehending enemies 

during his military career.3

The delusional boss told Guzmán Decena that 

he wanted the best men possible. The lieutenant informed the kingpin that they were only in the army 

and proceeded to help him enlist 31 defectors from 

the elite Airborne Special Forces Groups, known as 

GAFEs. The khaki-clothed Benedict Arnolds were seduced by higher salaries—referred to as a “cañonazo 

de dólares” or cannon ball of dollars—compared to the 

pittance they earned in uniform. Moreover, prominently placed “narco-banners” promised that they 

would no longer have to eat “Maruchan,” a packaged 

noodle soup, which makes Spam seem like foie gras. 

Still not satisfied with their prowess, Osiel ordered 

the recruits, then numbering approximately 50, to undergo 2 months of rigorous training in Nuevo León to 

broaden their skills. 
3

Osiel gave each recruit $3,000, called la polla (a pullet or young hen), with which the newcomer could 

procure cocaine, cross into the United States, find 

buyers for his merchandise, and then attempt to enlist 

them as vendors. This artifice acquainted the novices 

with the petty drug market, broadened their influence 

into south Texas, and amplified the cartel’s distribution network. The military turncoats could reinvest 

their profits in acquiring more cocaine and multiply 

their earnings, according to “Rafael,” a protected witness. It was said that Heriberto “The Executioner”/“El 

Lazca” Lazcano Lazcano, who was destined to head 

the mercenaries, purchased 18 kilograms of the white 

powder.4 Guzmán Decena also offered opportunities 

for rapid advancement. By 2011, after more than a 

year of fierce fighting with their former masters in the 

Gulf Cartel, new Zetas could reach the position of hitman in a few months, a process that once took several 

years, at best. Years later, the capture or killing of several dozen senior Zetas made it possible to rise from 

skilled shooter to plaza boss more rapidly. 

The Gulf Cartel lost a key operative when the 

army detained Rubén “El Cacahuate”/”The Peanut,” 

the syndicate’s treasurer, on November 21, 2002. Four 

months later, a greater calamity befell the organization. An informer, Second Lieutenant Alejandro Lucio 

“Z-2,” revealed Osiel’s whereabouts, and not even Los 

Zetas could prevent their boss’s apprehension in midMarch 2003. 

After authorities arrested Cárdenas Guillén on 

March 14, 2003, Lazcano, renowned as a vicious 

fighter and strategist, became an ever-more important 

player, reorganizing Los Zetas into regional cells composed of specialized cadres (estacas), lookouts or “falcons,” and auditors, who kept tabs on finances where 
4

the group held sway. He also sought instruction from 

deserters from the Guatemalan special forces known 

as Kaibiles. These “killing machines” are subjected to 

excruciatingly harsh training in their jungle camps. 

They must learn to eat “anything that moves,” bite the 

heads off live chickens, and kill puppies after bonding 

with them. The unit’s motto is: “If I advance, follow 

me. If I stop, urge me on. If I retreat, kill me.”5

Osiel’s arrest left his brother, Ezequiel “Tony Tormenta,” Eduardo “El Coss” Costilla Sánchez, and 

Gregorio “El Goyo” Saucedo Gamboa disoriented 

and divided over strategy. Meanwhile, the Sinaloa 

Cartel, led by the redoubtable Joaquín “El Chapo” 

Guzmán Loera and the Beltrán Leyva Organization 

(BLO) sought to take advantage of the power vacuum 

by invading Gulf Cartel areas in the north. Los Zetas 

distinguished themselves in repulsing the onslaught, 

and, according to a captured paramilitary, by July 

17, 2006, Lazcano had taken control of the outfit. Although not a product of the military as he claimed, 

Miguel Ángel “El 40” Treviño Morales became No. 

2 in the ranks of the upstarts. Los Zetas gradually 

turned with a vengeance against their master. They 

entered into situational alliances with the rival BLO, a 

Sinaloa-founded cartel that had severed ties with the 

Sinaloa Cartel.

As indicated in Appendix I, the Zeta-Gulf fissure 

gradually widened, but the break did not occur until 

early-2010; nevertheless, “El Goyo” Saucedo (arrested 

on April 29, 2009), “Tony Tormenta” (killed on November 5, 2010), and “El Coss” (captured on September 12, 2010) were businessmen who regarded the 

grotesque practices relished by Lazcano and Treviño 

Morales as bad for their sales of cocaine, marijuana, 

and heroin. Never more than a few hundred cadres, 
5

Los Zetas have suffered scores of losses. The fallen 

include “The Executioner,” whom the navy’s marines 

killed on June 17, 2011, while he was casually dressed 

and nonchalantly watching a baseball game in Saltillo, Coahuila, apparently without the platoon of body 

guards that surrounded him on trips to other parts of 

the country. On July 15, 2013, the marines captured El 

40 outside of Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, the citadel 

of his support. Such setbacks aside, the rogues carry 

out their venal activities in 21 of 32 Mexican states, 

have penetrated Central America, and continue to attract recruits. Unconfirmed reports indicate that they 

are even using West Africa as a springboard to the 

European market. This monograph argues that, while 

the key leaders were important, the success enjoyed 

by the demonic commandos springs from their readiness to use the most heinous forms of violence against 

their foes. 

What explains Los Zetas leaders’ behavior, which 

is characterized by aggressive, manipulative, and demeaning behavior aimed towards others? Abusiveness 

and violence are common in the sadists’ social relationships, because the sadist lacks concern for people and 

derives pleasure from harming or humiliating others 

just for pleasure, according to the mental health community, which has labeled such traits as sadistic personality disorder (SPD). Professionals differentiate an 

individual with SPD from those who are aggressively 

antisocial inasmuch as the latter typically do not hurt 

others for pleasure.6 The comportment of Lazcano and 

Treviño Morales provides a textbook example of the 

SPD criteria,7 which are set forth in Appendix II. A scientific study of their acute misanthropy may appear 

in the future if psychiatrists, psychologists, and other 

scientists can gain access to the men’s large families 
6

and learn the conditions that surrounded their upbringings. It is known that the late Lazcano was born 

on December 25, 1974, in Apan, a ramshackle village 

in Hidalgo famous for producing pulque, an alcoholic 

beverage made from the fermented sap of the maguey 

plant. He joined the army at age 17, gained promotion 

to corporal in the infantry in 1993, and was selected 

for the GAFEs, from which he resigned on March 27, 

1998. He acquired several nicknames, including “El 

Verdugo” or the “The Executioner,” because folklore 

held that he thrived on feeding some of his victims to 

his private collection of lions and tigers.8

Treviño Morales was raised in a poor, dysfunctional family of at least six brothers and six sisters in 

Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, but the year of his birth is 

uncertain—with 1970 being the most frequently used 

(1973, 1976, and 1980 appear in different documents).9

The skinny young “Miguelito” spent his formative 

years in Dallas, learned English, and did odd jobs for 

affluent families, cutting lawns, cleaning chimneys, 

and washing cars, including one owned by a regional 

drug dealer who would become a mentor, according 

to a U.S. Government source. 

He abhorred Mexico’s de facto caste system, which 

injected a poisonous sense of inferiority into its disadvantaged citizens. “He always had a chip on his shoulder, which explains his explosive personality,” a U.S. 

law enforcement official said. “He really believed that 

in Mexico you gain power, respect with brute force.”10

A hitman for Los Zetas later said that El 40 could not 

sleep at night unless he killed. Treviño Morales loved 

to hunt, whether his prey was deer or people.11

He joined the unscrupulous Los Tejas gang in Nuevo Laredo, spent time in a Dallas jail, and served as a 

federal policeman in Matamoros before casting his lot 
7

with the Gulf Cartel leader. He has a broad network of 

relatives in the United States—some of whom were involved in criminal pursuits.12 Not to be considered an 

American, El 40 had Hecho en México (Made in Mexico) 

tattooed on the back of his neck; the figure of a spitting 

cobra slithered down his forearm.13

A less convincing explanation of Los Zetas’ macabre exploits is that they were emulating pre-Colombian human sacrifices by the Mayan and Aztec 

civilizations. Some of the cadres allegedly seek the 

good offices of Santísima Muerte (The Holy Death), 

who takes the form of a grim reaper image squeezing 

a scythe with her bony hand. “The narco-traffickers 

have always been very religious; they are no atheists,” 

according to University of Nuevo León psychologist 

José María Infante. “She (Santísima Muerte) is a figure 

who accords with their activities where life and death 

are closely intertwined,” he added.14 Instruction in 

decapitations by the Kaibiles, Guatemala’s elite jungle 

squad, may have led Los Zetas to adopt chopping off 

heads as an important stratagem.15 Mexico’s former 

Public Security Minister Genaro García Luna insisted 

that the inspiration for this horrendous tactic was alQaeda in Iran, which circulated via the Internet the 

execution of an Iraqi prisoner.16 In contrast to his depiction as a demon, El 40 told authorities that he was 

a farmer with a common-law wife and four children 

who earned only 40,000 pesos ($3,200) per month.17

Without knowing the origin of their unspeakable 

brutality, 10 factors illuminate how fiendishness advances the organization’s objectives: (1) branding; 

(2) diversifying criminal activities; (3) maximizing 

extortion and ransom payments; (4) gaining publicity; (5) entering ad hoc alliances; (6) infusing an esprit 

de corps; (7) successfully recruiting newcomers and 
8

lofting to leadership spots these young cadres—often 

unknown to authorities—who understand that the 

path to success lies in beheadings, castrations, and immersing foes in vats of boiling grease; (8) discouraging 

desertions from their ranks; (9) intimidating the weak 

to commit crimes in a cost-effective manner; and (10) 

unlike other cartels, using women, known as panteras, 

or panthers, to seduce or kill key politicians, police, 

and military personnel who can assist Los Zetas. Brief 

segments will describe activities of the miscreants in 

the United States, the obstacles they face, and possible 

steps to combat them. 

BRANDING 

In 2009, Treviño Morales convened a meeting of 

crooked police in Nuevo Laredo, a drug-smuggling 

mecca across the border from Laredo, Texas. No sooner had these law enforcement officers, who constituted 

70 to 80 percent of the municipality’s force, slouched 

into their seats when El 40 warned against betraying 

Los Zetas, Mexico’s most potent drug syndicate after 

the Sinaloa Cartel. 

Following this harangue, a brace of thick-necked 

hoodlums dragged into the dimly lit room a distraught female officer whom El 40 condemned as a 

government informant. Rather than allowing her to 

utter a single syllable in her defense, the thugs tied her 

hands and prevented her from moving. Treviño Morales stepped forward, grabbed a two-by-four, and, 

after a couple of practice swings as if he were batting 

clean-up, methodically began to beat her, beginning 

with her tear-stained face. Once released, the alleged 

traitor’s remains consisted of body fluids, viscera, and 

splintered bones so mangled, bruised, and bloodied 
9

that it was impossible to recognize that she had a few 

minutes earlier been a sentient human being. The 

stunned and frightened onlookers got the point. 

Los Zetas again acted beyond the pale in the aftermath of the deadly assault on Arturo Beltrán Leyva 

on December 16, 2009, with whom they were allied. 

The only marine killed in the protracted firefight was 

Third Petty Officer Melquisedet Angulo Córdova, who 

had been buried with honors. The following week, 

Los Zetas furtively drove to the young man’s home in 

Paraíso, Tabasco, and slaughtered his mother, sister, 

brother, and aunt.18 Not even the Sicilian Mafia exacts 

revenge against the families of fallen military men. 

Between April 6 and June 7, 2011, Los Zetas halted 

several buses that were bound for the border towns 

of Reynosa and Matamoros, abducted the passengers, 

and killed some 193 people in what became known as 

the “Second San Fernando Massacre.” There are few 

journalists in San Fernando; however, unconfirmed 

reports indicate that the captors forced their prey into 

gladiatorial blood combat, compelling them to fight 

to the death with other hostages, complete with hammers, knives, machetes, and clubs, “to find (potential) 

recruits who were willing to kill for their lives.”19

In view of such abominations, the White House labeled Los Zetas “a unique and extraordinary threat to 

the stability of international economies and political 

systems,” comparable to the Camorra secret network 

in southern Italy, the Yakuza mob in Japan, and the 

Brothers’ Circle of Eastern Europe.20 The author was 

cautioned not to even utter the word “Zeta” aloud 

when walking with a friend in the picturesque streets 

of Xalapa, Veracruz, a state infested by these bandits. 

If these paramilitaries seek protection payment from, 

say, an auto dealer, he knows that failure to comply 
10

with their demand will lead to the bombing of his 

showroom and, very likely, the abduction and fearsome death of a loved one. Among other villainies, 

they have mastered the preparation of a “guiso” or 

“stew.” The recipe is simple: a child or adult is sliced 

and diced, his or her blood-soaked body plunged into 

a pig cooker or rusty 55-gallon oil drum, and doused 

with gasoline. In some cases, the extent of the destruction caused by this “cook-out” obviates taking reliable 

DNA samples.21

Authorities managed to identify the charred remains of Rodolfo Rincón Taracena, whom the killers 

abducted in 2007. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, the seasoned reporter’s offense was 

to have exposed criminals targeting slot-machine patrons at “narco-tiendas” or small stores selling drugs 

in Villahermosa, Tabasco’s capital. The alleged malefactors belonged to a Zeta cell headed by José Akal 

Sosa.22 Other acts of brutality include:

• On May 13, 2012, Mexican policemen discovered 49 headless, footless, and handless bodies 

in Cadereyta, contiguous to Monterrey, on a 

highway to the U.S. frontier. Although Los Zetas denied committing the atrocity, the culprits 

sprayed the message “Z 100%” on a wall near 

where the bodies were found.23 A week later, 

authorities arrested Daniel de Jesús “El Loco” 

Helizondo Ramírez, who said that Treviño Morales had ordered him to get rid of the corpses 

in Cadereyta.24

• On February 19, 2012, Los Zetas staged the Apodaca prison riot, where 44 Gulf Cartel inmates 

were killed and 37 Zetas escaped;25

• On January 4, 2012, Los Zetas ignited the Altamira prison brawl in which 31 Gulf Cartel 

inmates perished;26
11

• On August 25, 2011, a fist of Los Zetas entered 

the Casino Royale in Monterrey, ordered everyone out of the building, splashed accelerant on the ground floor, and set the structure 

ablaze. Fifty-three people died. A police officer, 

who may have been an accomplice, identified 

the paramilitaries as the culprits. In retaliation, 

Zeta gunmen shot the officer’s stepfather, stepmother, and brother.27

• On May 15, 2011, authorities discovered the 

bodies of 27 Guatemalan farmers executed by 

Los Zetas, who were pursuing the campesinos’ 

boss;28

• In August 24, 2010, Los Zetas seized 72 Central American and South Americans in San 

Fernando, a busy crossroads in Tamaulipas 

state, 85 miles south of the U.S. border. They 

bound and blindfolded their abductees before 

shooting them. Mexico’s security spokesman 

Alejandro Poiré Romero said the massacre 

took place because the migrants either refused 

to join the cartel or could not pay an extortion fee. Responding to a tip from a survivor, 

military personnel found the corpses in a ranch 

building;29

• On July 29, 2009, at 5 a.m., two cars stopped in 

front of the residence of the head of the police 

in Veracruz, in south-central Mexico. Eight or 

nine hoodlums jumped from the vehicles and 

began to fire assault rifles and 40 mm grenade 

launchers. Within 5 minutes, they had blasted 

their way into the house, executing Chief Jesús 

Antonio Romero, his wife, their son, and a 

police officer. Then they torched the home, 

incinerating the remaining three children, all 

girls;30 and,
12

• On June 22, 2004, Lazcano masterminded the 

slaying of the crusading editor of the Tijuanabased weekly newspaper, Zeta (no relationship 

to the criminals), Francisco Javier Ortiz Franco 

in front of his two children, ages eight and ten. 

“We consider this a challenge to authority, but 

also a challenge to Baja California society,” stated Governor Eugenio Elorduy Walther. “This 

is the results (sic) of the efforts that have been 

undertaken against organized crime.”31

Guisos, castrations, butchery, skinnings, incinerations, beheadings, and other gruesome practices serve 

several purposes. They infuse fear in enemies, who 

often shy from confrontations with these ghoulish 

desperados; they bolster their chances to extort money 

from their targets; they gain widespread media attention that generates an ambience of fear and distrust; 

they dissuade all but the most valiant journalists from 

covering their deeds; and they send messages to rival 

cartels. With respect to the last point, security expert 

Alejandro Hope said: “They are fighting to defend 

their reputation for brutality and the image of control 

in the territories they claim.”32

Such savagery has not always been part of life in 

Nuevo Laredo or in other criminal enclaves such as 

Reynosa, Matamoros, Tampico, and Ciudad Victoria 

in the South Carolina-sized state of Tamaulipas. Decades of neglect, economic malaise, rampant official 

corruption, and the effect of enormous criminal wealth 

on an impoverished populace have weakened the 

government’s presence and power in the northeastern 

shoulder of the country, one of the most dangerous 

regions in Latin America. (See Map 1.)
13

Map 1. Tamaulipas.

Entry into Guatemala.

The Zeta brand facilitated their 2007 entrée into 

Guatemala via the jungle-swathed El Petén, a sparsely 

populated department, contiguous to Mexico, which 

is endowed with Tikal and other fabulous Mayan 

ruins. (See Map 2.) Under the leadership of El 40, 

they made common cause with prominent, wealthy 

smuggler Horst Walther “The Tiger” Overdick, who 

spawned contacts in the nation’s labyrinthine underworld from his headquarters in Alta Verapaz.33 They 

helped their ally assassinate his strongest adversary, 

Juan “Juancho” León, who had been stealing from 

Overdick, even as he charged Overdick fees to cross 

Juancho’s domains.34 In Cobán, the capital of Alta 

Verapaz, they confronted the local strongman, Otto 

Salguero. On May 16, 2011, they traveled to his Los 
14

Cocos ranch near the town of Caserio La Bomba in El 

Petén and relatively close to the Mexico border. There, 

they encountered some 29 of Salguero’s field workers, including two children and two women, most of 

whom were decapitated and their heads flung helterskelter across the pastures. Local authorities believe 

that they took the leg of one of their victims and used 

it to daub a sanguinary message on a wall, reading: 

“Where is Otto Salguero? You (Salguero) are going 

to experience what you find here.” President Álvaro 

Colom Caballeros (2008-12) arrived at the scene of the 

carnage, supposedly to direct the investigation. He 

declared a state of siege, closed local schools for a day, 

and detained one suspect.35

Map 2. Guatemala.

Los Zetas then returned to Cobán, grabbed the son 

of local official Allan Stowlinsky Vidaurre, and cut him 

into small pieces. The word was unambiguous: “We 
15

control Guatemala.”36 If not a failed state, Guatemala 

is “a very challenged state with serious institutional 

deficiencies”37 that evinces even more corruption than 

Mexico. Exhibit A of this status springs from the May 

19, 2013, action by the nation’s Constitutional Court 

to annul the 80-year sentence for genocide and other 

crimes against humanity of former retired General 

José Efraín Ríos Montt. A staunch anti-communist, 

U.S. Cold War ally, Pentecostal minister, and de facto 

president (in the early-1980s), he ruthlessly repressed 

guerrillas during the country’s lengthy civil war (1960 

to 1996) that took some 200,000 lives, mostly Mayans. 

A coup d’état brought him to the presidency for 2 years 

(1982-83), during which time he was convicted of ordering the deaths of 1,771 members of the Ixil Maya 

ethnic group.38

Los Zetas established bases in Poptún and Sayaxché in El Petén. Poptún, a zone honeycombed with 

small roads and clandestine landing strips, borders 

Belize and is a haven for recruiting cadres. It is also the 

location of a Kaibiles’ training camp referred to as El 

Infierno (The Hell). Mexican authorities contend that 

alumni of this facility have aligned with Los Zetas and 

operate in Mexican territory.39 Sayaxché, which is relatively close to Mexico and provides ideal smuggling 

corridors, will eventually connect Alta Veracruz with 

the nation’s west coast by means of the Franja Transversal del Norte (Figure 1, Northern Border Crossing) 

superhighway now under construction by Israeli contractors. This 221-mile thoroughfare, funded by the 

Central American Economic Integration Bank at a cost 

of $240 million, will link the departments of Huehuetenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, and Izabal, winding 

up in Honduras. 
16

Figure 1. Route of Franja Transversal 

del Norte Superhighway.

The inability to attract sufficient investment facilitated the entry into Central America of criminal elements. The so-called Mexican border with Guatemala 

resembles a sieve blasted by shotgun pellets, and Los 

Zetas and the Sinaloa Cartel take advantage of some 

300 pedestrian crossings to penetrate their southern 

neighbor. In 2010, Mexico had only 125 immigration 

officials to cover their country’s 620-mile frontier be1. Alta Verapaz 9. Guatemala 17. San Marcos

2. Baja Veracruz 10. Huehuetenango 18. Santa Rosa

3. Chimaltenango 11. Izabal 19. Solola

4. Chiquimula 12. Jalapa 20. Suchitepéquez

5. Petén 13. Jutiapa 21. Totonicapán

6. El Progreso 14. Quetzaltenango 22. Zacapa

7. El Quiché 15. Retalhuleu

8. Escuintla 16. Sacatepéquez

Source: “Guatemala: Northern Highway Will Start in October,” available from www.

centralamericadata.com/en/article/home/Guatemala_Northern_Highway_Will_Start_

in_October.

5

10

17

14

15

21

7

19

20

8

3

2

1

11

22

4

13 18

9

6

16 12
17

tween the two nations, and leaked U.S. cables indicated that aircraft traveling from Guatemala to Mexico at 

night had a 100 percent success rate.40 Its ambassador 

to Mexico, Fernando Andrade Díaz Durán, lamented 

that “The Guatemalan government is extremely concerned because during the last 3 or 4 years, Los Zetas 

have consolidated their presence in all of our country.”41 President Otto Pérez Molina aspires to hold 

joint maneuvers with Mexico and the United States, 

which could include posting a brigade at the frontier, 

especially in San Marcos department.42 Similarly, Colombia’s chief executive Juan Manuel Santos has ordered the Colombian National Police (PNC) to investigate whether Los Zetas are active in his country.

Los Zetas are also ensconced in Zacapa, the capital of an eastern department by the same name and 

a thoroughfare for importing drugs and other contraband from Honduras and El Salvador. Their presence 

in several Central American nations aside, Los Zetas 

have endured their trials and tribulations. In May 

2011, President Álvaro Colom announced the capture of ex-Kabil Hugo Álvaro Gómez Vásquez, a Zeta 

chieftain who reportedly spearheaded the murder of 

27 peasants at the Los Cocos ranch; Otto Pérez Molina, 

elected president in 2011 and promising to brandish 

an “iron fist” against organized crime, announced the 

“extremely important” arrest of Overdick on property that he owns outside Guatemala City. Not only 

was the accused suspected of facilitating the Mexican 

paramilitaries’ move into the north of his country, but 

he was also wanted in the United States on charges 

of conspiracy to smuggle cocaine.43 In March 2012, 

Guatemala’s government announced the capture of 

Gustavo Adolfo “Comandante Chapoy” Colindres, 

believed to be a notable local Zeta operator. In Feb-
18

ruary 2013, the nation’s security forces apprehended 

16 of their countrymen who belonged to La Bomba, a 

murderous gang linked to Los Zetas. Interior Minister Mauricio López Bonilla explained that 14 people 

were detained in the southern department of Escuintla and two others in the contiguous department of 

Guatemala.44

In mid-2013, Los Zetas suffered another blow when 

authorities seized Eduardo “Guayo” Villatoro Cano 

in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas. One of the kingpins in 

Huehuetenango, Guayo headed a gang that was believed to work with the Mexican cartel. The hunt for 

Villatoro, which involved hundreds of pursuers, followed the July 2013 slaying of eight policemen and the 

kidnapping of a PNC agent in the Quetzaltenango’s 

Salcajá municipality.45

An additional frustration for Los Zetas took place 

in early-October 2013 when Guatemalan official Eddy 

Byron Juárez announced the incarceration of El Yankee, a key Zeta leader in his country.46 Meanwhile, further to the south in late-2009, bicycle-riding shooters 

assassinated retired General Julián Arístides González, 

the Honduran Army’s anti-drug czar who was traveling without body guards after dropping his daughter 

off at school. “Almost all the big Mexican organizations are carving out territory here. And when they 

run into each other, they will fight over it,” González 

told Time magazine before his demise. Officials said 

they had offered the drug czar bodyguards, but he 

turned them down. “I would say to him, ‘Are you not 

going to have security?’,” his wife said at his funeral. 

“He replied to me: ‘My security is God walking beside 

me’.”47 The Sinaloa Cartel also has formidable presence in the country.
19

Honduras is also a strategic transit point where the 

Mexicans challenge their Colombian, Peruvian, and 

Venezuelan suppliers over prices and deliveries. San 

Pedro Sula boasts one of the highest per capita homicide rates in the world, as presented in Appendix V. It 

wrestled this dubious distinction from Ciudad Juárez. 

San Pedro Sula came in first in 2013, with Acapulco 

finishing second, according to Brazilian scholar Jorge 

Wertheim.48 Honduran Police Director José Luis Muñoz Licona reported record confiscation of drugs, with 

Los Zetas believed to be the principal traffickers, representing a monumental adversary that “no nation can 

take on by itself.”49 Muñoz’s bona fides are suspect, as 

he backed President Porfirio Lobo Sosa’s firing of anticartel crusader Oscar Álvarez, the nation’s security 

minister. Not only did Álvarez work well with U.S. 

agencies, but he also publicly demanded that Muñoz 

Licona fire 10 policemen that he asserted were acting 

as “air traffic control men” for drug-bearing aircraft.50

A ray of good news pierced the black clouds in 

April 30, 2013, when Rómulo Emiliani, Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pedro Sula, and Adam Blackwell, the 

ambassador of the Organization of American States for 

security affairs, brokered a limited truce between the 

Mara Salvatruchas (MS-13) and their nemesis, the 18th 

Street gang. The accord crystalized after the two men 

visited Honduran prisons over a period of 8 months. 

Marco, spokesman for the MS-13, promised that 

the delinquents would stop recruiting as part of the 

pact but would continue to extort small businesses, 

bus and taxi drivers, or everyday citizens. “Let’s go 

step by step,” Marco said. “First zero crime and zero 

violence, stop the violence. And to stop the violence 

that’s hurting human beings, we will talk about ways 

to find alternatives.” The two gang leaders who talked 
20

with journalists emphasized that so many young men 

go into the gangs because there are no legitimate jobs 

or opportunities, and they emphasized the need for 

work. He called on the government, one of poorest in 

the Americas, to “help us so our young people learn a 

trade and don’t turn out like us,” Marco said. “I want 

my son to be a doctor or a cameraman, not a gangster.”51 Still, the U.S. State Department reports that as 

much as 87 percent of all cocaine smuggling flights 

departing South America first land in Honduras.52

Salvadoran officials say that a similar arrangement 

between the antagonists that began in March 2012 

lowered the number of violent deaths about 52 percent in 14 months. Skepticism exists with respect to 

the gambit in Honduras. “The dynamic of violence in 

the country goes beyond gangs and reflects the existence of multiple actors that are difficult to pinpoint,” 

said Julieta Castellanos, the National University of 

Honduras rector whose son and a friend were slain 

in 2011, allegedly by Honduran police and not gang 

members.53 Still, El Salvador is known in Mexican narco-war parlance as “El Caminito” (the little highway), 

not least because of a convenient U.S.-funded motorway built to encourage trade, which it does, markedly 

in cocaine. The use of the dollar as currency, combined 

with the receipt of upwards of $4 billion from Salvadorans living in the United States, makes the Massachusetts-sized nation a money-laundering Eden. The 

late-2013 discovery of 44 dismembered, bullet-ridden, 

half-naked victims of the MS-13 and Barrio 18 gangs 

in a mass grave 12 miles west of San Salvador dashed 

hopes for a peaceful resolution of the local conflict.
21

In 2012, Salvadoran authorities happened upon 

$15 million in cash, buried in barrels in what was 

believed to be a Zetas training camp. This trove was 

thought to be only a fraction of their hidden loot. In 

early-2011, an investigation by Tracy Wilkinson, Los 

Angeles Times Mexico bureau chief, uncovered a major drug trail from Honduras into El Salvador, with 

cocaine repackaged near Dulce Nombre de María in 

El Salvador’s northern province of Chalatenango, 

“then trucked across Chalatenango and Santa Ana 

provinces to Guatemala, virtually unhindered” for 

transport northward. Businessmen and mayors act as 

money launderers for the cartels and are on their payrolls. Then-Defense Minister David Munguia Payés 

cautioned that Los Zetas and other Mexican traffickers were “moving their strategic rear guard to Central 

America.”54 At least one small community appears to 

have benefited from the commerce in narcotics. “Dulce 

Nombre de María, once a sleepy, dusty town, is now 

a sparkling burg,” wrote Wilkinson. “The gazebo in 

the main square is painted in salmon and lavender 

and decorated with Corinthian columns. Grounds are 

well manicured, free of beggars and stray dogs. The 

ice cream vendor wears Ralph Lauren.”55

In late-August 2012, Mexican narco-financial manipulations became a cause celébré in Nicaragua after 

its National Police stopped six vans, all emblazoned 

with the logo of the Mexican media giant TELEVISA, 

at the Las Manos border crossing with Nicaragua. The 

18 Mexican passengers brandished press credentials, 

top-of-the-line cameras, microphones, cables, a satellite dish, and paper adorned with corporate letterhead. Yet, no volcano had erupted; no hurricane had 

been spotted; and no election was on tap. Why was 

the largest Spanish language network in the world 
22

sending a convoy through Nicaragua? During a 2-day 

investigation, the law enforcement officers discovered 

that the foreigners were criminals, not journalists, and 

they had $9.2 million stuffed in black gym bags under 

the floorboards of three vehicles. The Southern Pulse

newsletter asserted that the suspects had links to Los 

Zetas, who continually vie with the Sinaloa Cartel 

for north-south corridors. In any case, observers concluded that the funds were destined for Costa Rica to 

pay for a shipment of cocaine. Raquel “La Licenciada” 

Alatorre Correa, leader of the phony journalists, had 

crossed into Costa Rica 15 times since 2006, although it 

was unclear whether she had used convoys then. “We 

were not investigating them,” said Costa Rican vice 

minister of security Celso Gamboa Sánchez. “We were 

not very shrewd.”56 So even picturesque Costa Rica, 

bereft of an army, a paradise for environmentalists, 

and known as the “Switzerland of Central America,” 

appears on the cartels’ radar screens.

To curb organized crime in Central America, Guatemalan President Pérez Molina announced, after a 

meeting with Pope Benedict XVI in the Vatican, that 

Guatemalan, Mexican, and U.S. forces would fortify 

the Mexican-Guatemalan border. Among other steps, 

he would dispatch police and army motorized units to 

focus on the frontier between San Marcos department 

and Chiapas. He did not comment on the roles that 

Mexico and the United States would play in trying 

to deter movement across what is more a surveyor’s 

line than a clear border.57 Although any joint action at 

the frontier remained vague, InfoSurHoy reported that 

Dominican Republic, U.S., and Guatemalan counternarcotics forces seized more than 998 kilograms of cocaine worth upward of U.S.$90 million in the eastern 

Pacific in early-March 2013. The newspaper referred 
23

to “The interdiction [as] . . . another success scored 

under Operation Martillo, a regional counter-narcotics mission that brings together U.S., Latin American 

and European countries to cut the flow of illicit drugs 

through Central America.”58

In late-2013, it was alleged that pressure on DTOs 

in Latin America had spurred Los Zetas, the Sinaloa 

Cartel, and other narco-traffickers to establish maritime drug routes to ports in 16 West African nations 

and, from there, ship their products to Europe by vehicles and small airplanes.59 The Sinaloa Cartel has a 

vastly larger international footprint.

DIVERSIFICATION 

Osiel Cárdenas gave Los Zetas small amounts of 

drugs to sell but never enmeshed them in the narcotics business, much less introduced them to either his 

major Andean suppliers or prime distributors in the 

United States. The 11.7-ton container load of cocaine 

captured in Altamira, Tamaulipas, on October 5, 2007, 

was intended for El 40. Although eight of his heavily 

armed cohorts were apprehended, Treviño Morales 

fled when he realized that law enforcement officials 

were on the scene. The commandos also move marijuana, harvested mainly in Tamaulipas, and limited 

quantities of cocaine and heroin to the north. 

In addition to drug commerce, Los Zetas was involved in many other activities. As presented in Appendix III, these include extortion, murder for hire, 

kidnapping, human smuggling, dealing in contraband, petroleum theft, money laundering, prostitution, arson, sale of body parts, car bombing, automobile and truck hijacking, loan-sharking, paying small 

farmers to grow poppies, running protection rackets, 
24

taxing rivals who want to cross their territory (derecho 

de plaza), gunrunning, and stealing gasoline from the 

aging pipelines of PEMEX, the state oil monopoly. Petroleum specialists, probably from PEMEX’s incredibly corrupt union, aid and abet the so-called oil and 

rustling—a crime that involved 2,167 thefts in 3 years, 

at a cost of 5,125 million pesos (U.S.$427 million dollars) between 2007 and mid-2012. Although the Gulf 

Cartel may be involved, the principal culprits are 

Los Zetas. These cutthroats have also acquired from 

complicit PEMEX personnel large quantities of explosives, as well as such strong solvents as xylene and 

toluene, which are destined for hydraulic fracking but 

which the malefactors use to cook methamphetamine 

consumed in the United States. The largest robberies 

have taken place in PEMEX installations in Villahermosa, Ciudad del Carmen, Veracruz, Poza Rica, and 

Reynosa. The energy reform, approved in 2013, may 

exacerbate this headache when the volume of detonation materials and specialized chemicals increases as 

outside companies make direct investments in the nation’s hydrocarbon field.

Coal has become another attractive energy commodity. These robberies are creating a “Parallel PEMEX,” in the words of an astute journalist.60 Los Zetas 

have a stronghold in Coahuila, a state abounding in 

Zetas that produces 95 percent of the 15 million tons 

of coal extracted each year. The newspaper Reforma

reported that the cartel mines or buys 10,000 tons per 

year. At $50 per ton, the business may generate $22 to 

$25 million annually.61

Not only do they capture and abuse adults caught 

in their web, Los Zetas also apprehend young girls and 

boys, whom they exploit sexually or require to work 

for them. “With minors . . . (they engage) in sexual 
25

exploitation, forced labor, slave-like practices, forced 

marriages, fraudulent adoptions, and the harvesting 

of (body) organs,” according to El Salvadoran prosecutor for illegal trafficking Smirna Salazar de Calles. 

When young women have babies, they are taken to 

Guatemala to be sold.62

Before the takedown of The Executioner and El 

40, Ralph Reyes, Drug Enforcement Administration 

(DEA) chief for Mexico and Central America, said 

that Los Zetas were imposing de facto taxes on major corporations. And, while still engaging in atrocities, the cartel has evolved from a militaristic chain 

of command to “a business structure, with quarterly 

meetings, business ledgers, even votes on key assassinations.”63 Loss of key personnel has shattered this 

corporate configuration.

MAXIMIZING EXTORTION AND 

RANSOM PAYMENTS

Their penchant for obscene cruelty invests Los Zetas with “cartel cred” or credibility in the underworld. 

For example, failure to make a ransom payment means 

that the evil doers will return your loved one either 

without body parts or tortured beyond recognition. A 

few years ago, Los Zetas exhibited more rational procedures. In 2008, they seized an affluent attorney near 

the port of Veracruz and held him for 3 days while 

his son and partners raised the $300,000 demanded for 

his release. State leaders who learned of the transaction beseeched the lawyer and his family to keep mum 

about the incident, lest its revelation cast negative 

publicity on Veracruz, whose governor—like so many 

of his colleagues—aspired to become Mexico’s president one day. Even worse, the state executive alleg-
26

edly was closely associated with Los Zetas, according 

to former members of his administration who are now 

ensconced in a witness protection program. President 

Calderón even accused outgoing governor Fidel Herrera Beltrán of “leaving the state in the hands of Los 

Zetas. . . .”64 Rumors filled the air that the former state 

executive would receive an ambassadorship, possibly 

to Greece. Senator Fernando Yunes Márquez, a member of Mexico’s National Action Party, expressed opposition to such an appointment on the grounds that 

the former governor, who had saddled his state with a 

debt of 50 billion pesos ($4 billion), was under investigation by U.S. authorities for having received millions 

of pesos from Los Zetas.65

Kidnapping cases invariably involve a certain degree of bargaining, even with Los Zetas. In what currency do you want the danegeld? Where do we drop 

off the money? When do we get our family member 

back? In the course of these interactions, the brother 

of the abductee asked: How do we know that once our 

family member is returned, you will not kidnap him 

or a sibling next week? Los Zetas’ interlocutor assured 

his counterpart that not only would they pledge not 

to capture another member of the family or a close 

friend, but they would also guarantee that no other 

cartel would take advantage of him. The problem with 

the “warranty” concept lies in changes in plaza bosses. A new, inexperienced chief is unlikely to adhere to 

such a code of conduct.

GAINING NOTORIETY

In their ability to attract attention, Los Zetas put 

Madison Avenue to shame. Occasionally one victim 

was decapitated, which used to make national head-
27

lines. Now a single beheading may only make local 

news. To ensure broad print and electronic media coverage, these agents of Satan behead multiple enemies 

and arrange their bodies in a way convenient for TV 

camera operators and newspaper photographers. In 

December 2008, Los Zetas captured and executed eight 

army officers and enlisted men in Guerrero, a violencetorn, impoverished southern state where “triple sovereignty” exists among the inept elected government, 

narco-criminals, and the violent, anarchistic National 

Coordination of Educational Workers (CNTE) known 

as La Coordinadora—with self-defense groups often 

lashing out at foes. Pictures of the decapitated cadavers lying side-by-side flashed around the world on 

television and YouTube. 

In February 2009, the paramilitaries killed retired 

Brigadier General Mauro Enrique Tello Quiñones, 

whom the mayor of Cancún had hired to form a special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team to fight such 

criminals. They smashed his arms and legs before 

driving him into the jungle and executing him.66

Los Zetas don’t hesitate to execute the celebrities 

who offend them. Artists who cater to one criminal 

group risk revenge from its enemies. A case in point 

is Valentín “El Gallo de Oro” Elizalde. The scoundrels 

gunned down the “Golden Rooster,” along with his 

manager and driver, in an ambush that followed a 

late-November 2006 concert in Reynosa. The assassins 

presumably struck because the 27-year old superstar 

had sung A mis Enemigos (To My Enemies), which supposedly represented an anti-Zeta taunt paid for by El 

Chapo Guzmán and his Sinaloa Cartel. A video showing the execution of a Zeta and the corpse of Tijuana 

Cartel leader Ramón Arellano Félix accompanied the 

music.67 Elements of the Mexican Army and the At-
28

torney General’s Office arrested Raúl “El Flander I” 

Hernández Barrón, one of the original Zetas, for the 

murder. His brother, Víctor Manuel “El Flander II” 

had been captured with Osiel on March 14, 2003, in 

Matamoros. Also suspected in the killing of Elizalde was another Zeta, Raúl Alberto “El Alvín” Trejo 

Benavides. 

The Arizona Daily Star reported the death of Sergio Gómez, 34, founder of the popular group K-Paz 

de la Sierra, which featured fast-paced drums and 

brass horns. A Chicago resident, Gómez disregarded 

warnings not to perform in his native state of Michoacán before being abducted and murdered. The same 

week, gangsters shot and killed Zayda Peña of Zayda 

y Los Culpables (Zayda and the Guilty) in a hospital in 

Matamoros.68 Samuel González Ruiz, former chief of a 

federal organized crime unit, said: 

The cartels don’t care about how they are seen by the 

public, they are worried about showing their absolute 

control of their territory, and they will impose their 

control at all costs . . . (killing a singer) is like planting 

the flag of their cartel in the ground.69

González Ruiz also explained how different kinds 

of murders convey messages to opponents. He claims 

that a bullet to the temple signifies that the victim belonged to a rival gang, while a gunshot to the back of 

the head may indicate that the target was a traitor.70

Narco-lore has it that castrating a man and sewing his 

genitals in his mouth indicates that he informed on 

the ogres. 

Mayhem, such as killing 72 northbound migrants 

with sledgehammers in Tamaulipas in 2010, thrusts 

Los Zetas into the limelight. They disseminate their 

propaganda via narco-banners draped at urban inter-
29

sections, broadcasts on their partially disabled radio 

network, and presentations on social media. Like other criminal bands, they are likely to scrutinize Google, 

Facebook, Twitter, and Craig’s List entries to facilitate 

the seizure of victims.71

Occasionally, though, they try to ingratiate themselves to the public and throw their adversaries off 

stride. Mexicans celebrate “Children’s Day” on April 

30. Before this event in 2011, the paramilitaries appeared in a parade in Ciudad Victoria, the capital of 

Tamaulipas, publicizing a free party at the municipal 

stadium, complete with gifts for children. Youngsters 

and parents flocked to the ballpark and joyfully received free food, soft drinks, candy, remote-controlled 

cars, and upscale bicycles. Before the end of the festivities, organizers unfurled a banner that advised parents 

to love their children and spend time with them—under the signature of Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano and 

the Zeta Company.72 Los Zetas also took advantage 

of the slow reaction of the Tamaulipas government 

to the devastation caused by October 2013 Hurricane 

Ingrid. Near schools in badly afflicted neighborhoods 

of Ciudad Victoria, the opportunistic desperados purportedly distributed canned and non-perishable food 

packed in bags marked with the letter Z. The Gulf 

Cartel, which is engaged in a no-holds-barred battle 

with the paramilitaries for supremacy in the area, 

undertook similar actions.73

SITUATIONAL ALLIANCES

Los Zetas go out of their way to preserve their 

independence, which allows them to react quickly 

to changing circumstances. The Casino Royale fire 

in Monterrey marked a tectonic shift in the drive to 
30

eradicate Los Zetas—with a possible “Showdown at 

the OK Corral” erupting in southern Tamaulipas and 

northern Veracruz. The culprits suffered scores of casualties, but they caught authorities and the Sinaloa 

Cartel off guard when they moved into Sinaloa and 

Jalisco. In return for Los Zetas’ sharing their diabolical modus operandi, the Beltrán Leyva Organization has 

provided money and facilitated their access to Sinaloa, 

El Chapo’s home base. The BLO also helped them 

make common cause with the Mazatlecos, a gang in 

Mazatlán, Sinaloa. They have followed the same exchange with La Resistencia, a violent gang that has 

given them access to Jalisco. El Chapo’s confidant, Ignacio “El Nacho” Coronel Villarreal, had dominated 

the state and, above all, its capital, Guadalajara. He 

was known as the “King of Crystal” for spearheading 

crystal methamphetamine output and trafficking until 

the army killed him on July 29, 2010. Now Los Zetas, 

aligned with La Resistencia, are important players in 

Mexico’s third largest city, known as the “Pearl of the 

West” by residents and a money-laundering paradise 

for narco-traffickers. 

ESPRIT DE CORPS

After a withering gun battle, the Mexican marines, 

an arm of the navy, killed Lazcano in Progreso, Coahuila, in a pre-dawn raid on October 7, 2012. What 

ensued is worthy of a best-selling “Who done it?” 

After forensic experts examined Lazcano’s corpse, the 

marines, believing they had gunned down a common 

criminal, left the capo’s remains in a private funeral 

home in Sabinas, Coahuila, 80 miles from the U.S. 

border. A day after the takedown, a gang of masked, 

heavily armed hoods burst into the parlor, overpow-
31

ered the staff, shoved Lazcano’s decaying body into 

a hearse, and forced the owner to drive to a yet-tobe-discovered venue. What explains this gruesome 

deed? As ruthless as they are, veteran Zetas sometimes adhere to the tradition, begun by the U.S. Marines in 1775, of never leaving a fallen brother behind, 

especially if he is a big shot in their hierarchy. 

In what became known as the “Invasion of the Body 

Snatchers,” in early-March 2007, Zeta gunmen broke 

into a cemetery in Poza Rica, Veracruz, used hammers 

to smash open the gravestone of their comrade, Roberto Carlos Carmona, and carried off the casket containing his cadaver. Gunmen had perforated Carmona 

with bullets during a clandestine, high stakes horse 

race in Villarín, near the port of Veracruz.74

Los Zetas find other ways to honor their dead. 

Three months after the army killed Arturo Guzmán 

Decena, the lieutenant who recruited many of the 

original deserters, a funeral wreath and four flower 

arrangements appeared at his gravesite with the inscription: “We will always keep you in our hearts: 

from your family, Los Zetas.” It has been reported 

that, like the pharaohs of ancient Egypt, Lazcano had 

an elaborate sarcophagus built for him in his hometown, Apan, Hidalgo, near the site where Los Zetas 

remodeled an aging chapel. An illuminated, giant 

silver cross welcomes visitors to the brick sepulcher, 

which is adorned with stained glass windows and is 

Christian in character. He had a chapel constructed 

nearby in honor of his mother.75 Some observers questioned whether the Zeta boss had been taken down. 

The Mexican navy indicated that a fingerprint match 

revealed that Lazcano had been killed. To squelch 

rumors that El Lazca was alive and well, his family 

agreed to have the body of his father and other relatives exhumed from a cemetery in Pachuca to carry out 
32

a DNA analysis. Although it was announced that the 

tests corroborated earlier findings, unidentified DEA 

officials still voiced misgivings about the capo’s demise based on the discrepancy between the height of 

corpse that went missing (5’3”) and the U.S. agency’s 

records (5’8”). Local forensics experts also questioned 

the adequacy of the DNA results.76

In addition, Los Zetas spearhead prison breakouts 

to free their comrades. An especially brazen escape 

happened in Zacatecas on May 16, 2009, and all of it 

is available for public viewing on YouTube. Before 

dawn, 30 or more heavily armed thugs believed to be 

Zetas, riding in trucks adorned with Federal Investigative Agency (which had replaced the Mexican Federal 

Judicial police) police logos, stormed into the Cieneguillas penitentiary as one of their helicopters whirred 

overhead. In the blitzkrieg assault, they extricated 53 

prisoners, including Zetas, Beltrán Leyva crime family members, and other narco-felons. State and federal 

authorities immediately began apprehending escapees even as they investigated the director and his 50 

subordinates to determine who fostered the escape. 

One of several recaptured was Osvaldo “The Vampire” García Delgado, a kidnapping specialist whose 

Los Cotorros gang coordinates activities with Los Zetas in the state of Hidalgo.

In October 2009, Los Zetas precipitated a riot in the 

Topo Chico prison in Nuevo León that the state police 

had to put down. Some 100 Zetas virtually controlled 

the 400 other inmates in the facility through extortion 

and by requiring them to pay bribes for protection. Before the uprising, PRI Governor Natividad González 

Parás had brushed off friction in the penitentiary as: 

“A squabble between one group of friends against another group of friends over personal problems.”77
33

The military defectors even have their favorite 

corrido, (“La Escolta Suicida,” or The Suicide Escort),

which emphasizes pride in defending their “patron”:78

As in other facilities, Los Zetas practice virtual selfgovernance in the federal prison in Apodaca, Nuevo 

León (Cereso), where they attack members of the Gulf 

Cartel and other foes. 

Just as city governments may sponsor book fairs, 

concerts, film fests, and other cultural activities, Los 

Zetas take a profound interest in the entertainment 

events—generally in a negative light. They follow narcocorridos, the ballads sung by vocalists and played 

by bands that not only venerate drug lords but also 

provide a form of popular “musical newspaper.” 

Until recently, Zeta leaders, like corporate chief executive officers, threw annual end-of-the-year parties 

for their plaza chiefs and senior personnel around the 

country. These bacchanalias featured culinary delicacies, free-flowing drugs, a harem of high-end prostitutes, drunken song fests, the conferral of bonuses, 

the possible reassignment of plaza bosses and sicarios, 

and crates of alcoholic beverages. Whether the revelers drank “Los Zetas” brandy, which comes in a Zshaped bottle and is sold in Cancún, Solidaridad, and 

other municipalities in Quintana Roo, is not known.79

Some Zetas wore uniforms with the markings of their 

We are 20 the group of Los Zetas Somos 20 el grupo de Los Zetas/ 

United as a family/ unidos como familia/

We are 20 the force/ los 20 somos la fuerza/ 

With diplomas of suicide/ con diplomas de suicida/ 

Aware that in each action/ conscientes de que en cada 

acción/

We can lose our life. . . podemos perder la vida. . . .
34

organization; others rejoiced in being awarded medals for their achievements.

SUCCESS IN RECRUITING AND 

PROMOTING NEW CADRES

Unemployment haunts Mexico. The official joblessness stood at 4.73 percent in February 2014—down 

from 4.86 percent in April 2012.80 If true, this number 

would be the lowest of all members of the Organization of Economic Development and Cooperation 

members. The problem is that the figure is pure fiction 

inasmuch as the government considers an individual 

to be employed if he works several hours during an 

entire week. Below are the criteria, roughly translated 

from the law, on what constitutes employment: 

Persons who during the reference week did any kind 

of economic activity, being in any of the following situations: Working at least an hour or a day, to produce 

goods and/or services independently or subordinate, 

with or without pay. Temporarily absent from work 

without interrupting their employment relationship 

with the economic unit. Includes primary sector employees engaged in production for own consumption 

(except firewood collection). 81

More important is the informal economy in a 

country where, amid the growth of a middle class, 

poverty stalks one-third of its 116.2 million citizens. 

As a result, 35 percent82 or more of men, women, and 

children provide services as day workers; wash car 

windows at urban intersections of urban streets; hawk 

baseball hats, videos, books, sunglasses, gaudy jewelry, and other items (many of which are contraband) 

from folding tables and blankets along the streets of 

cities and towns; and engage in other pursuits. Econo-
35

mists can only estimate these “off the books” transactions. Los Zetas often coerce these hucksters to serve 

as lookouts, while their teenage children may become 

low-level recruits. Scholar John J. Bailey has astutely 

emphasized the linkage between the underground 

economy and organized crime.83 Figure 2 indicates the 

percentage of the population doing informal work in 

the 15 states with the lowest number of full-time jobs.

Figure 2. Percentage of Workforce

in Underground Economy and Los Zetas’

Presence in 15 States with High Joblessness.

State Percent Workforce in 

Underground Economy Level of Presence of Los Zetas

Oaxaca 80.5 Medium-low

Guerrero 79.2 Low

Chiapas 78.1 Medium-low

Hidalgo 74.3 High

Puebla 74.2 Medium-low

Tlaxcala 73.4 Low

Michoacán 71.6 Low (Except in Lázaro Cárdenas)

Veracruz 67.3 Medium 

Morelos 66.5 Low

Zacatecas 65.8 High

Yucatán 64.9 Low 

Nayarit 64.1 Low

Campeche 62.5 Medium-low

Guanajuato 62.5 Medium

Tabasco 61.2 Medium 

Source: Jorge Ramos, “Agobian informales a los estados pobres; 15 entidades superan la 

media nacional,” Excélsior, May 14, 2013; based on calculations of the Instituto Nacional de 

Estadística y Geografía (National Institute of Statistics and Geography); the states in which 

Los Zetas have the strongest presence are Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, San Luis Potosí, parts 

of Veracruz, and Coahuila (especially Piedras Negras).
36

If youngsters can make several hundred dollars 

a month, they are willing to cast their lot with the 

underworld. The paramilitaries also appeal to their 

cultural preferences. El 40’s favorite musical group 

is Sinaloan-based Banda El Recodo, founded in 1938, 

which plays banda and ranchera songs that emphasize 

love, patriotism, nature, and the achievements of Los 

Zetas.84 He realizes that young people resonate more 

to hip hop than to the traditional corridos. As a result, Los Zetas encourage the playing of a new genre 

of music, which is very similar to the gangsta rap from 

the 1990s. In Reynosa and Matamoros, musicians like 

Cano&Blunt, Grupo Nektar (whose leader is believed 

to be an operative of the CDG, the letters connoting 

the Gulf Cartel’s alliance with the Sinaloa Cartel), and 

Lyric Dog sing about cartel lieutenants, the organizations’ weapons, money, women, and power. 

At the same time, there is panache to either working with or being inducted into the leanest, meanest, 

and most despised criminal outfit in the Americas. The 

prospect of having a few grams of cocaine, expensive 

leather boots, access to a fast car, a pistol tucked in 

your waistband, and the admiration of young women 

makes young people—the “Ni-Nis” mentioned previously—adhere to the belief that it is better to live like 

a king for 5 years than to be a burro all your life. Los 

Zetas exhibit a cockiness or swag less obvious in other 

syndicates that, on average, have older members. An 

example involves Rosalio Reta, a young American, 

whom Los Zetas trained for 6 months in Mexico. He 

committed his first murder at age 13. During his interrogation, he told the police: “I loved doing it. Killing 

that first person, I loved it. I thought I was Superman.” 

U.S. officials have said there are many more youngsters like him.85 As a result, Los Zetas attract teenagers, 
37

which they often use as cannon fodder in confrontations with the hostile cartels, the military, and civilian 

law enforcement agencies. 

DISCOURAGING DESERTIONS 

There is an adage that “you have to kill to become 

a Zeta, and you must die to leave Los Zetas.” Truth be 

told, militants have defected from the paramilitaries, 

leaving behind, of course, their money, cell phones, 

weapons, and other possessions. A Zeta may succeed 

in leaving, but his family risks beastly punishment or 

death. Such retribution is possible because of the records kept by the organization. Figure 3 epitomizes 

the meticulous bookkeeping precision practiced by 

one plaza in 1 month. 

Figure 3. January-September 2007 Expenditures

 by Los Zetas’ Monterrey Plaza.

Almost as bad as fleeing the cartel is emulating 

its activities. Los Zetas are quick to take revenge on 

copycats. Above all, they do not want amateurs taking 

a slice of their market. In addition, the ersatz Zetas, 

Expenditures Amount (In Dollars) Percentage of Total 

Administration of 

Lookouts

 18,400 2.85

Security 1,100 .17

Gifts 50,000 7.73

Raffles (Five Rolex 

Watches)

 25,000 3.86

Payoffs to Police 552,350 85.39

TOTAL 646,850 100.00

Source: Confidential.
38

also called “McZetas,” may not carry out threats, thus 

diminishing the credibility of the genuine organization. In October 2007, Zeta imposters demanded first 

$1 million and then one million pesos from a restaurant 

owner. Although the pretenders shot up the façade of 

his home, no one was injured and the family quickly 

moved to another state.86 In May 2008, a 35-year-old 

man was found in Monterrey. He had been tortured, 

an ice pick plunged through his throat—with a note 

dangling in his stone cold hand: “This is one of those 

who carried out extortions by telephone trying to pass 

for ‘Z’.”87

In February 2009, the goons executed two “false 

Zetas” in Reynosa, leaving behind a handwritten 

note saying, “This is what will happen to those who 

attempt to pass themselves off as Zetas.”88 Although 

the chances are zero that they will modify their image, 

real Zetas do not suffer gladly amateurs who try to 

grab for a slice of their market. Some Zeta plaza bosses 

will leave a family alone after it cooperates and pays 

the ransom or extortion money demanded. In contrast, phony Zetas may take repeated actions against 

the same business or household. 

Ersatz Zetas threatened to capture the Spanish 

musical group Delorean, which flew to Mexico City in 

early-October 2013 to take part in an electronic music 

and film festival. An anonymous caller said that Los 

Zetas would kill the performers if they refused to fork 

over five million pesos (approximately $385,000). This 

gambit turned out to be a “virtual kidnapping,” which 

may have been attempted by prison inmates who have 

access to cell phones and telephone directories. 
39

Several days later, the Anti-Kidnapping Unit of 

Spain’s Guardia Civil rushed to Mexico to protect a 

Catalonian businessman who, as it turned out, was 

also the victim of a virtual kidnapping, this time in 

Querétaro, 137 miles north of the capital. The operation took only 20 hours and frustrated the payment of 

more than $80,000 demanded by the imposters.89

A gang of kidnappers who falsely called themselves Zetas to collect payola in Nuevo Laredo landed 

behind bars and were promptly murdered. A municipal official said the killings were “most likely carried 

out on orders from the Zetas.” He added that: “The 

Zetas don’t like their names used in vain, plus they 

want to tell society, ‘Hey, we’ve changed. We’re not 

kidnappers or extortionists. We’re one of you’.”90

COST EFFECTIVENESS 

Los Zetas rely on newspaper sellers, street vendors, prostitutes, taxicab drivers, vagrants, and other 

denizens of city streets, parks, and alleys to serve as 

couriers and lookouts, which makes even more eyes 

available to signal threats to their overlords. In addition to spotting the paramilitary’s opponents, small 

merchants may also have to pay few pesos a day for 

their own protection. Criminals also retain bank tellers, who inform Los Zetas and other cartels about the 

balances, credit card numbers, ATM accounts, and 

withdrawals of their clients.91 The American Express 

headquarters on Mexico City’s Avenida Patiotismo 

resembles an armed citadel because of the sizeable financial transactions that take place there. 

El 40 believed that small-time drug sellers who 

worked for his organization had skimmed cash they 

were supposed to turn over to a collection agent. Ac-
40

companied by several thugs, the Zeta honcho barged 

into the boarding house where the vendors lived. The 

intruders lined the men up against the wall. Then, the 

Zeta strongman ferociously wielded a two-by-four, 

pummeling the first alleged cheat to death. The second experienced an even gorier fate. Treviño Morales 

slashed his throat with a razor-sharp butcher’s knife, 

plunged his hand through the victim’s bloody thorax, 

and yanked out his heart. Los Zetas demand every 

peso they believe owed to them. “Now Lazcano was a 

brutal task master and extremely violent,” said Mike 

Vigil, former DEA chief of international operations. 

“However, Miguel Treviño is 100 percent more violent that Lazcano ever was.”92

To save resources, Los Zetas contract out work 

to such lethal gangs as the Barrio Azteca, the Texas 

syndicate, MS-13, and the remnants of the Carrillo 

Fuentes and Beltrán Leyva organizations. They also 

collaborate with smaller drug trafficking groups in 

Guatemala, Colombia, and Venezuela.93 Invaluable 

confederates in Guatemala are Los Chulamicos, who 

provide weapons, intelligence, safe houses, shooters, and vehicles, and work in concert with the bodyguards of Horst Overdick. 

In view of the paramilitaries’ blood lust, it is unclear whether they take advantage of paid hitmen in 

the Hidalgo municipalities of Jacala and Huejutla in 

central-eastern Mexico, where killing for hire constitutes a long-standing service industry. The Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports that Los Tolles 

serve as debt collectors for Los Zetas in Acapulco and 

facilitate cocaine distribution in Atlanta and other 

U.S. cities.94 Los Zetas save money by requiring their 

employees to turn in expense vouchers to a financial 

operator, often a woman, who also receives the daily 
41

income. Subject to unannounced audits, she bypasses 

plaza bosses and dispatches the resources to Omar “El 

42” Treviño Morales, who assumed leadership of the 

syndicate after his brother’s capture. In addition, low 

level sicarios stay in fleabag hotels for the sake of economy; they may also sleep in their vans to save money 

and hide from authorities. In late-October 2011, the 

navy captured Carmen del Consuelo “Claudia” Sáenz 

Márquez in Córdoba, Veracruz. Under the supervision 

of regional leader Raúl Lucio “El Lucky” Hernández 

Lechuga, whom authorities arrested 2 months later, 

the 29-year-old blond and her 10 assistants allegedly 

supervised Zeta finances in Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Tabasco, 

Quintana Roo, and Veracruz.95 She received earnings 

from drug sales, oil thefts, extortion, kidnapping, contraband deals, and other crimes. Claudia used these 

funds to pay the salaries of regional chiefs, plaza bosses, gunmen, lookouts, and accountants. Furthermore, 

she purchased communications equipment, bribed officials, and paid off providers of technical services.96

FEMALE KILLERS 

Sexism pervades Los Zetas, as it does throughout 

organized crime and other Mexican institutions. El 

Lazca and El 40 were attracted to busty blonds, some 

of whom reportedly came from Eastern Europe. Still, 

with few exceptions, women who have reached leadership roles did so after husbands, brothers, or boyfriends disappeared from the scene. As mentioned 

earlier, the paramilitaries have a female unit known as 

the Panteras.97 The task of these Panthers is to negotiate deals with police, politicians, military officers, and 

others who can assist the deadly outfit. These distaff 

criminals alter their makeup and the color and style of 
42

their hair according to their assignments. They show 

no compunction about committing grisly executions. 

Should sex, alcohol, drugs, and pillow talk not elicit 

the desired outcome, these women may kill the unsuspecting mark. First identified at a party thrown 

by Lazcano in December 2006, the initial leader of 

the group—Ashly “La Comandante Bombón”/”The 

Candy Commander” Narro López—was captured 

in Cancún on February 9, 2009, in connection with 

the murder of General Tello Quiñones. Panthers are 

concentrated in Tamaulipas, Coahuila, and Nuevo 

León—with jefas in most states. 

Women also serve in other areas of Los Zetas’ deteriorating structure. On September 11, 2011, the navy 

apprehended Verónica Mireya Moreno Carreón, 35, 

also known as “La Vero” or “La Flaka.” The ex-police 

officer assumed the commandos’ leadership in San 

Nicolás de Los Garza, a city in the Monterrey metropolitan area, after the August arrest of her supposed 

lover, Raúl “El Sureño”/”The Southerner” García 

Rodríguez. The captors found in her car a 38-caliber 

revolver, six cell phones, and dozens of envelopes 

containing cocaine and marijuana.98

Rosa Nelly “La Pato” Rodríguez Martínez was an 

especially vicious distaff Zeta leader in the Monterrey 

area. A police officer from 2002 to 2008, she took a maternity leave and went over to the dark side. Not only 

did she hustle drugs in 30 small establishments, but 

also she allegedly executed five young “chapulines” 

or “grass-hoppers” who attempted to defect from the 

organization. She was caught with four presumed 

members of her cell, including her 31-year-old sister, Ana “La Güera”/”Blondie” Rodríguez Martínez. 

Their belongings included an AK-47 rifle, six boxes 

of munitions, 35 grams of marijuana, and 150 psychotropic tablets.99
43

In October 2011, authorities took into custody Nancy “La Flaca” Quintanar Manríquez, 25, in Ecatepec, a 

huge city contiguous to the Federal District. Her technique was to drop into bars and nightclubs, extract information from Zeta enemies, and have them killed by 

hitmen such as Julio Caesar “Mosco” Sosa Asencio, 30, 

who was arrested with her. She is credited with having participated in at least a dozen homicides.100 Also 

detained in October 2011 was her 31-year-old sister, 

Carmen del Consuelo “Claudia” Sáenz. 

When arrested in June 2011 after a ferocious firefight involving the paramilitaries in Guadalajara, 

16-year-old Maria Celeste proudly told reporters 

that “I am a shooter at the service of Los Zetas.” She 

claimed to have received training in the use of AK-15s, 

AR-15s, and other firearms. A teenager like María Celeste earned $305 a week for protecting the cartel’s turf 

and upwards of $1,525 for killing rival mobsters.101

On August 21, 2013, the army took into custody 

Helga Ruth Vázquez Ruiz, a National Action Party 

member of the Ciudad Victoria city council. A search 

of a residence belonging to the 44-year-old lawyer 

turned up 20 million pesos in funds apparently belonging to Los Zetas. The feisty politician, who had 

a history of clashing with party leaders, claimed that 

she was the object of political persecution.102

In the words of Professor Jorge Chabat, a researcher at the prestigious Center of Investigation and Economic Education: “Narco-trafficking is no longer exclusively for men. Women now take part directly in 

crimes and also assume (leadership roles).” They work 

as plaza bosses, mediators, shooters, administrators, 

and interlocutors. The upshot is that they constitute 

5 percent of the country’s 221,000 inmates in federal 

prisons—up from 3 percent in 2006.103
44

The presence of women in the Zeta camp is a mixed 

blessing. In 2004, El 40 purchased an automobile for 

his girlfriend, San Juana Ericka Sánchez, from a dealership where Salvador Alfonso “La Ardilla” Martínez 

Escobedo worked. The couple broke up, and La Ardilla, who was believed to have authored the massacre of hundreds of migrants in San Fernando, wed 

Sánchez in 2005. The marriage outraged the insanely 

jealous El 40, who attended the ceremony where he 

danced inappropriately with the bride. Their cheekto-cheek, alcohol-induced flirting infuriated the bridegroom and impelled a nasty rupture between Treviño 

Morales and one of Las Zetas’ ranking regional leaders, who was arrested on October 8, 2012.104

The hot-tempered El 40 had run-ins with other 

Zetas that ultimately resulted in his downfall. In addition to La Ardilla, he crossed swords with Iván “El 

50”/“El Talibán” Velázquez Caballero, who managed 

an important network in San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas, 

Coahuila, Aguascalientes, and Guanajuato. A protected witness said that Treviño Morales, who ousted his 

brother, Daniel “El Dany”/“El Talibán 2” Velázquez 

Caballero, from the Durango plaza in November 2008, 

sought to drive El Talibán from his lucrative holdings. 

El Talibán reportedly accused El 40 of being a “Judas 

of Los Zetas” and killed 14 of Treviño Morales’ triggermen in San Luis Potosí on August 9, 2012. Within 

48 hours, 73 murders took place in San Luis Potosí, 

Zacatecas, and Monterrey. Iván escaped from these 

massacres, only to be captured by the marines on 

September 26, 2012.

105

Morris Panner, a former Assistant U.S. Attorney who is a senior adviser at the Center for International Criminal Justice at Harvard Law School, 

learned from informants the breadth of the networks 
45

of the Mexican cartels. “Mexican organized crime 

groups have morphed from drug trafficking organizations into something new and far more dangerous,” 

Mr. Panner said:

“The Zetas now are active in extortion, human trafficking, money laundering, and increasingly, anything 

a violent criminal organization can do to make money, whether in Mexico, Guatemala or, it appears, the 

U.S.”106

Zeta Incursions into the United States. 

• Activities in Southeast and Midwest. On October 2, 2008, the FBI’s Knoxville Criminal Investigative Division indicated that Los Zetas 

were carrying out extortion, kidnapping, and 

drug trafficking in the Midwest and Southeast, 

with emphasis on East Tennessee, Georgia, 

and Oklahoma. A detainee told agents that the 

focus was often on non-Americans who owed 

money to Zeta leaders, as well as competitors 

of the paramilitaries’ human smuggling undertakings. The same source indicated that Gaspar 

González Alcantar and Martín “Zeta 21” were 

involved in these activities.107

• Falcon Dam Incident. On September 30, 2010, 

David Michael Hartley, a U.S. citizen, was presumably shot by Zetas during a trip to the Mexican side of the binational reservoir. Los Zetas 

may have mistaken him for a spy of the rival 

Gulf Cartel, according to the report by STRATFOR, an Austin-based think tank specializing in 

intelligence and international affairs. Harley’s 

body has never been discovered, and Mexico’s 

chief investigator for the case, Rolando Flores 
46

Villegas was decapitated—his head delivered 

in a suitcase to a military post near the Texas 

border.108

• Recruitment of Gang-Bangers. Los Zetas seek 

out children/teenagers inside the United States 

to accomplish their goals. On April 2006, Laredo detective Roberto Garcia arrested teenager Gabriel Cardona, whom Los Zetas had 

recruited as a triggerman and all-purpose thug. 

He stabbed and tortured his victims and put 

their blood in a glass to toast Santísima Muerte, 

whose tattoo he sported. He and fellow Texan 

Rosalio “Bart” Reta, also an American citizen 

and Santísima Muerte devotee, lived in safe 

houses in upper-class Laredo. They waited for 

El 40 or another top Zeta to summon them to 

action. They worked on both sides of the frontier, allegedly receiving two kilos of cocaine 

and $10,000 for each assassination. A well-executed hit might yield a bonus of a top-of-theline Mercedes. The amazing fact about Rosalio 

Reta is that, after 6 months of military training 

in Mexico, he was sent across the border to target rival drug gangs. He was only 13 years old 

when he delivered his first coup de grâce.109

• Killing Americans in Mexico. On February 15, 

2011, Los Zetas shot to death Jaime J. Zapata, 

a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) agent who was driving an armored SUV 

with diplomatic license tags on a Federal Highway 57 in San Luis Potosí, a state infested with 

Los Zetas. His companion, agent Victor Avila, 

escaped with a gunshot wound. On March 13, 

2010, a U.S. employee of the American consulate in Ciudad Juárez, her husband, and 
47

a Mexican linked to the consulate died when 

drug gang members fired on their cars near 

the Santa Fe International Bridge in Ciudad 

Juárez after they left a children’s party in El 

Paso, Texas. Authorities did not tie Los Zetas 

to this tragedy.110 However, Zeta Héctor Raúl 

“El Tori” Luna Luna confessed to participating in the grenade attack on the U.S. Consulate 

General in Monterrey on October 12, 2008. He 

claimed to have been acting under the orders of 

Sigifredo “El Canicón”/”The Marble” Najera 

Talamantes, who was already under arrest.111

Between October 2002 and December 2012, 684 

American citizens died in Mexico—40 percent 

of American violent deaths worldwide in this 

period. Some of casualties may have been connected with drug activities; most experienced 

what the Pentagon euphemistically calls “collateral damage.”112

• Horse Buying and Breeding. In May 2012, authorities apprehended José, the younger brother of Miguel Ángel Treviño, who had acquired 

some 379 quarter horses with drug earnings. 

Tremor Enterprises LLC served as the front 

for the purchases, which were made with cash 

and the use of false names. Most of the horses, 

which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) auctioned off, were stabled at a ranch near Lexington, Oklahoma, just south of Oklahoma City. 

In a show of chutzpah, some of the animals 

carried names related to the narcotics trade, 

like Coronita Cartel or the Small Crown Cartel. “This case is a prime example of the ability 

of Mexican drug cartels to establish footholds 

in legitimate U.S. industries and highlights the 
48

serious threat money laundering causes to our 

financial system,” according to Richard Weber, the chief of the IRS criminal investigation 

unit.113

• Training camp in Texas? The FBI reported 

that Los Zetas were training on a ranch in a remote part of Texas. The instruction centered on 

“neutralizing” U.S. competitors. The FBI also 

claimed that the brigands protected shipments 

of cocaine and heroin bound for Houston, 

where it was packaged and dispatched to destinations in Alabama, Georgia, and Michigan.114

• Arms Purchases. In early-July 2011, authorities 

captured Zeta founder Jesús “El Mamito” Rejón 

Aguilar, who told Mexico’s Federal Police that 

his cartel acquired “all of its weapons” in the 

United States. It once relied on border crossing 

points, but now its allies in the United States 

send them across the Rio Grande. He said it 

was easier for the rival Matamoros-based Gulf 

Cartel to bring arms through check points in 

car trunks, possibly because they have a pact 

with authorities.115

• Narco-Corridos. On April 25, 2013, singer Jesús 

“Chuy” Quintanilla, best known for his ballads 

extolling the bravado of Los Zetas, was shot 

two or more times in the head. Farmworkers 

picking grapefruit found the corpse floating in 

a pool of his own blood north of Mission, Texas. His songs not only showed “respect” for Los 

Zetas, but he also had dedicated one to ranking 

Zeta plaza boss “El Hummer” González Durán, 

who was captured in November 2008 in Reynosa. Authorities are unsure whether dissident 

Zetas committed the assassination or gunmen 

for the Gulf Cartel.116
49

• Sanctuary Cities. Mayors of U.S. border cities point with pride to relatively low levels of 

violence in their municipalities compared with 

the bloodshed across the Rio Grande. The professionalism of law enforcement agencies is 

undoubtedly higher, the culture different, and 

the economy better in the United States. The 

relative safety in, say, El Paso, means that public officials may work in Ciudad Juárez during 

the day but cross the river at night to stay in 

safe lodging. Los Zetas and other cartels also 

use El Paso and other American twin cities as 

sanctuaries where they can house their families and pursue youngsters for their exploits. 

In the 1970s and 1980s, several Mexican cities 

were like no-fly zones; that is, there was a tacit 

agreement among criminal organizations not 

to attack each other or each other’s families in 

these locales; examples were Guadalajara, Morelia, Monterrey, and Mexico City. Now, only 

Mexico City, Querétaro, and possibly Mérida, 

bear the characteristics of safe havens.

The late-May 2013 kidnapping of 11 teenagers and 

young adults from the Heaven After nightclub, a few 

blocks from the U.S. embassy, has raised concerns 

about safety in the Zona Rosa tourist center and nearby neighborhoods. The abductions took place in the 

aftermath of the May 9 murder of Malcolm Shabazz, 

Malcolm X’s grandson, in nightclub in the vicinity of 

Garibaldi Plaza, a seedy area where tourists come to 

hear mariachi music. More than likely, the criminals 

belonged to gangs, not cartels, which frequent the 

dangerous Tepito market area.117 In late-December 

2013, 10 Zetas raided four residences, including that 
50

of controversial journalist Anabel Hernández in Naucalpan, a mega-city contiguous to the Mexican federal 

district (DF). The unpredictability of violence in the 

nation amplifies the attractiveness of American border 

communities. Appendix IV provides a comparison of 

homicides in the twin cities.

Possible Steps Against Los Zetas and 

Prospects for the Paramilitaries.

• Although the concept sounded attractive 

during the PRI candidate’s successful presidential race, the creation of a 40,000-member 

Gendamería Nacional modeled on the eponymous French institution remains in limbo. The 

use of the military, especially the navy and 

marines, will be indispensable until the Peña 

Nieto government configures a new strategy. 

The Mexicans should be encouraged to look for 

crime fighting assistance from countries other 

than the United States. As described earlier in 

the monograph, agents of the Spanish Guardia 

Nacional required only 20 hours to protect a 

Catalonian businessmen from being victimized 

by a virtual kidnapping in Querétaro.

• Calderón employed the broadsword; that is, 

sending large contingents of military personnel and Federal Police to go against cartels and 

their cells. As discussed, the kingpin strategy 

proved counterproductive. The current administration must rely more on the scalpel, which 

means eavesdropping, voice detection, DNA 

profiling, fingerprint analysis, aerial surveillance, and infiltrating Los Zetas and other cartels—with attractive female informants being 

especially effective.
51

• In the same vein, it is imperative for U.S. 

Armed Forces and intelligence agencies to hack 

into Los Zetas’ sophisticated communications 

networks, sharing information exclusively with 

vetted Mexican authorities and only if Mexican 

authorities once again allow their U.S. counterparts access to intelligence gathering fusion 

centers. Meanwhile, appropriate U.S. agencies 

should offer to share anti-hacking technology with the Mexican government in view of 

the widespread sale of databases by the nation’s largest banks (Banamex, BBV, Bancomer, 

HSBC, Santander, American Express) and the 

Federal Electoral Institute (Instituto Nacional 

Electoral). In May 2012, Mexico’s extremely 

professional transparency institute (Instituto 

Federal de Acceso a la Información y Protección 

de Datos) urged the Mexican Attorney General 

(Procuraduría General de la República or PGR)to 

investigate the security of personal information 

about citizens.118

• Another approach involves even closer cooperation in thwarting money laundering through 

actions of Mexico’s Finance Ministry’s Financial 

Intelligence Unit (Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera [UIF]) and the U.S. Treasury Department’s 

Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC). With a 

staff of 100 to 120, UIF issues excellent reports 

about irregular, unorthodox, and possibly illegal activities by banks, casas de cambio (exchange houses), and other financial institutions. 

For instance, this agency turned over evidence 

to the Attorney General’s Office about the obscenely large amount of resources manipulated 

by Elba Esther “La Maestra” Gordillo, head of 
52

the venal 1.2-million member Sindicato Nacional 

de Trabajadores de la Educacion (SNTE) Teachers’ Union. The PGR charged the woman, once 

referred to as “Jimmy Hoffa in a skirt,” with 

embezzling $200 million in union funds.119 Still, 

the Financial Action Group of South America, 

created to combat money laundering, indicates 

that UIF’s studies are underutilized by Mexican 

authorities.120

• The National Banking and Stock Commission 

(Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores), which 

oversees money laundering, must continue to 

broaden its reach to banks outside major cities, making unannounced inspections of their 

records. In addition, working through Mexico’s 

astute ambassador in Washington, Eduardo 

Medina Mora, and the highly experienced financial attaché, José Martín García, the appropriate U.S. officials might suggest considering 

a modest amendment to Mexico’s money-laundering statute,121 published on October 17, 

2012, which allows hotels, resorts, nightclubs, 

and other border tourism centers to deposit up 

to $14,000 in cash per month. This limit should 

be lowered if substantial money laundering appears to be taking place in the particular city or 

municipality.

• To combat money laundering, U.S. authorities 

should follow the activities of the late Treviño 

Morales favorite performers such as Banda El 

Recodo, which plays on both sides of the border 

and receives payments as high as $250,000.122

• As was the case with Osiel Cárdenas Guillén, 

the erstwhile leader of the Gulf Cartel who is 

now serving an abbreviated sentence for in-
53

formation provided about Los Zetas, U.S. and 

Mexican authorities should be prepared to 

negotiate fewer years behind bars for extradited Zetas—such as aging founders—who are 

prepared to furnish details about the leadership, organization, resources, allies, and other 

elements of the paramilitaries and other crime 

syndicates.

• The continued use of unmanned aerial vehicles 

or drones, which helped track down installations of La Familia Michoacána, is imperative. 

Global Hawk drones can survey areas as large 

as 40,000 square miles.123 However, in view of 

the robust nationalism exhibited by the Institutional Revolutionary Party, U.S. agencies must 

treat the Mexicans with kid gloves in the deployment of spy planes.

• One of Peña Nieto’s biggest challenges is the 

nation’s 31 governors, who rule their states 

like feudal barons—either shutting their eyes 

to criminality or actively reaping rewards from 

drug trafficking. Corruption is endemic, and 

these state executives are not going to turn into 

candidates for sainthood. Yet, the president 

and Finance Secretary Luis Videgaray Caso 

can use the budget as a carrot or stick to gain 

cooperation against the underworld. This tool 

is especially important because states received 

upwards of 90 percent of their funds from 

Congress. If the state executives prove intransigent, the president can eschew making muchcoveted visits to their bailiwicks and refuse to 

recommend their states to foreign investors.
54

• An important element in reducing the tsunami 

of violence that washed over Ciudad Juárez 

was the involvement of the business community, religious leaders, the U.S. Government 

through the Mérida Initiative, local officials, 

and nongovernmental organizations in what 

was known as Todos Somos Juárez. This venture 

gave rise to the lighting of soccer fields, the creation of youth baseball leagues, the formation 

of musical groups, and scores of activities for 

citizens, especially young people. By the beginning of 2013, the murder rate had fallen 90 

percent from its high point in late-2010. Such a 

civic venture could help reduce the influence 

of Los Zetas in the commercial portal of Nuevo 

Laredo, where murders shot up 92.5 percent 

from the 2012 level, even as kidnappings have 

soared.124

• Cartels take advantage of lax juvenile laws in 

Mexico and the United States. States should 

be encouraged to prosecute family members 

whose children are involved in commercial 

drug trafficking. The age should also be lowered for the prosecution of youthful offenders 

who knowingly aid and abet the drug trade for 

criminal organizations.125

• PEMEX must enhance its deployment of 

drones, satellites, and trucks with detector devices to impede the robbery of hydrocarbons 

from pipelines.126 Sales of oil and natural gas 

account for one-third of the nation’s budget at a 

time that, without substantial new investment, 

Mexico will become a net hydrocarbon importer by 2020, according to respected analysts.127 In 

addition to hydrocarbon thefts, Los Zetas (and 
55

the Gulf Cartel, to a lesser extent) are stealing 

large quantities of explosives from PEMEX, 

as well as such potent solvents as xylene and 

toluene to help cook methamphetamines. The 

rogues often substitute water for the chemicals, 

which—when used in hydraulic fracking—permanently damage the rock formations at the 

bottom of a well and decrease the additional 

oil and gas that can be extracted. Authorities 

should examine raw materials recovered from 

Zeta sites to determine the proprietary chemical compounds used in its production process.

• The corruption of teachers’ unions such as 

SNTE and CNTE produces unemployed, uneducated youngsters—the so-called “Ni-Nis”—

whom Los Zetas and other syndicates welcome 

into their ranks. Mexico’s 2013 educational reform is unlikely, at least in the short- to medium-term, to break the hammerlock that venal 

teacher organizations have on public education. The United States should condition aid for 

community development on the introduction 

of vouchers to Mexican parents, so they can decide the schools in which they wish to enroll 

their children.

• In off-the-record conversations, private contractors working with Mexican security agencies deplore the mismanagement, waste, and 

corruption infusing the Attorney General’s 

Office and other law enforcement arms of the 

Mexican government. U.S. legislators and officials who oversee the disbursement of monies 

should demand regular, unannounced audits 

by independent firms of Mexican beneficiaries 

of this assistance.
56

• Los Zetas and other cartels have penetrated the 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the 

Border Patrol. It is imperative that personnel 

and sister agencies undergo thorough background and polygraph tests before they assume 

their responsibilities along the border and that 

periodic checks take place if and when they 

are hired.

• The fall of Lazcano and Treviño Morales 

proved a sharp thorn in the side but not a lethal 

dagger to the heart of Los Zetas. The marauders have managed to dominate Nuevo Laredo 

amid attacks by the Sinaloa and Gulf Cartels, as 

well as by the Federal Police, the armed forces, 

and U.S. agencies. The commandos are bereft of 

the command and control structure they once 

enjoyed, to the point that expert Ioan Grillo 

depicts many of new leaders as directing selffinancing “orphan cells” that operate on a freelance basis. In late-December 2013, Mexico’s 

Attorney General’s Office averred that of the 69 

capos brought down by the Peña Nieto regime, 

Los Zetas sustained the most arrests (23) and 

killings (4). Still, venality allows the miscreants also to rank high among cartels in terms 

of spilling blood, accomplishing kidnappings, 

and garnering money. They may be masters of 

sadism, but they are not effective businessmen. 

For instance, as early as 2008, El Lazca reportedly began to share, and later delegate, the 

designation and oversight of plaza bosses to El 

40, who had developed his own contacts with 

Colombian cocaine suppliers. The latter practiced meritocracy and set rigid earnings objectives. When operators fell short of these goals, 
57

the latter-day Simon Legree unceremoniously 

embarrassed, demoted, or replaced them. Such 

clashes suggest the wisdom for U.S. and Mexican officials funneling, sub rosa, intelligence 

about intramural conflicts to the Gulf and 

Sinaloa cartels to exacerbate ruptures among 

the paramilitaries.

• Unlike their business-oriented rivals, Los Zetas 

have not acquired real estate and other assets 

to give them alternative sources of revenue. 

This argues for an increased budget for OFAC, 

which has done a first-rate job of not only seizing Zeta-owned properties in El Norte, but 

also helping to discovering triangular linkages 

among the cartel’s illegal activities in the United 

States. A case in point was the money laundering that involved Francisco Antonio Colorado 

Cessa, head of ADT Petroservicios, S.A., who 

was a PEMEX contractor at the same time he 

was heavily doing the bidding of Los Zetas.128

• U.S. officials dealing with DTOs that operate in 

Mexico and the United States must remember 

that the Mexican officials—even more so than 

their foreign counterparts—are prone to believe that amending the Mexican Constitution, 

enacting a statute, or signing a pact means that 

a problem is solved. In fact, formal rituals frequently trump serious changes in behavior.129
58

ENDNOTES 

1. Quoted in “Border-town Killing Sends Message,” Los Angeles Times, June 10, 2005, in George W. Grayson, “Los Zetas: The 

Ruthless Army Spawned by a Mexican Drug Cartel,” E-Notes, 

Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 2008. 

2. Ricardo Ravelo, Osiel: Vida y tragedia de un capo (Osiel: 

Life and Tragedy of a Capo), Mexico City, Mexico: Grijalbo, 

2009, pp. 172-175. 

3. Ibid.

4. “Invierten’ sicarios en cartel” (“Triggermen ‘Invest’ in Cartel”), El Nuevo Heraldo, March 1, 2010.

5. Tracy A. Bailey, “Ranger Graduates Kaibil School,” 

ShadowSpear Special Operations, December 18, 2012, available from 

www.shadowspear.com/2012/12/army-ranger-graduates-kaibil-school/.

6. ”Sadistic Personality Disorder Criteria,” Psychnet-UK, 

March 2013, available from www.psychnet-uk.com/x_new_site/

personality_psychology/a_diagnostic_criteria/criteria_personality_

sadistic.html.

7. See George W. Grayson and Samuel Logan, The Executioner’s Men: Los Zetas, Rogue Soldiers, Criminal Entrepreneurs, and the 

Shadow State They Created, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2012.

8. Tracy Wilkinson, “Top Drug Cartel Leader in Mexico Possibly Killed in Firefight, Officials Say,” Los Angeles Times, October 

8, 2012. 

9. “Requiere Estados Unidos al ‘Z-40’” (“The United States 

Request ‘Z-40,’”), Reforma, July 16, 2013. 

10. Dianne Solís and Alfredo Corchado, “Top Leader of Mexico’s Zeta Group Has Dallas Roots,” Dallas News, April 13, 2013, 

updated July 17, 2013. 
59

11. The comments of Rosalio Reta appear in Jason Buch, “Trevino Morales had Nasty Itch for Killing, ex-Gang Member Says,” 

San Antonio Express-News, July 17, 2013. 

12. “New Cartel Leader Violent ‘to the Point of Sadism’,” 

ABC Radio News, October 12, 2012. For the names and ages of his 

siblings and mother, see Anabel Hernández, “Life, Times, and 

Tragedies of the Treviño Clan,” Borderland Beat, October 27, 2012 

(this article was translated from the October 27, 2012, edition of 

Proceso).

13. “Asegura Z-40 ser un agricultor” (“Z-40 Asserts that He 

Was a Farmer”), Reforma, October 14, 2013. 

14. “El culto de Santísima Muerte, un boom en México” (“The 

Cult of the Holy Death Is Booming in Mexico”), Terra, available 

from www.terra.com/arte/articulo/html/art9442.htm.

15. Will Grant, “Mexico Violence: Fear and Intimidation,” 

BBC News (Latin America and Caribbean), May 14, 2012.

16. Ioan Grillo, “Behind Mexico’s Wave of Beheadings,” Time 

magazine (World Ed.), September 8, 2008. 

17. “Asegura Z-40 ser un agricultor.” 

18. Roberto Barboza Sosa, “Zetas y policías asesinos de familia de marino” (“Zetas and Police Assassinate Family of Marine”), 

El Universal, December 23, 2009. 

19. Dane Schiller, “Mexican Crook: Gangsters Arrange Fights 

to Death of Entertainment,” Houston Chronicle, June 11, 2011; and 

“Invasion of the Body Snatchers,” Reuters, March 9, 2007.

20. Stephen Braun, “President Obama Levels Executive Order at Zetas, Yakuza, Camorra and the Brothers’ Circle” (video), 

Huffington Post, July 25, 2011; and J. Jaime Hernández, “Obama: 

‘Zetas,’ global threat,” El Universal, July 26, 2011. 

21. “Mexico’s Violent Zetas Cartel sees New Leader Emerge,” 

Fox News Latino, August 23, 2012. 
60

22. “Mexican Journalist Dismembered, Burned, Officials Say,” 

CNN World, March 1, 2010. 

23. Jo Tuckman, “Mexican Drug Cartel Massacres Have Method in Their Brutal Madness,” The Guardian, May 14, 2012. 

24. “The Eerie Logic of the Zetas Cartel’s Most Infamous Actions,” ABC News Univisión, October 10, 2012. 

25. “Official: Guards Aided Zetas Prison Break,” CBS News, 

February 20, 2012. 

26. “Police Detain 20 in Mexican Prison Riot,” Fox News, 

January 5, 2012.

27. Nick Valencia, “Police: Killing of 3 Look Like Revenge for 

Mexico Casino Massacre,” CNNWorld, September 15, 2011. 

28. Ken Ellingwood and Alex Renderos, “Massacre Leaves 27 

Dead in Northern Guatemala,” Los Angeles Times, May 15, 2011. 

29. Dudley Althaus, “Seven Arrested in Mexico Massacre,” 

Houston Chronicle, September 8, 2010.

30. Michael Ware, “Los Zetas Called Mexico’s Most Dangerous Drug Cartel,” CNN.com/world, August 6, 2009.

31. Anna Cearley and Sandra Dibble, “Tijuana Newspaper 

Editor Shot to Death,” UT-San Diego, June 23, 2004. 

32. Quoted in Tuckman, “Mexican Drug Cartel Massacres 

Have Method in Their Brutal Madness.” 

33. “El capturado Z-40 organizó a los Zetas en Guatemala” 

(“The Captured Z-40 Organized Los Zetas in Guatemala”), El 

Universal, July 18, 2013.

34. Ibid. 

35. Moisés Castillo, “Guatemala Hunts for Killers of 27 on 

Ranch,” UT-San Diego, May 17, 2011. 
61

36. Steven Dudley, “Guatemala: cuando llegaron ‘Los Zetas’” 

(“Guatemala: When ‘Los Zetas’ Arrived”), Proceso, September 

22, 2011. 

37. James Derham, American ambassador to Guatemala, 

2005-2008; e-mail to author, June 2, 2013. 

38. Sam Logan, “Guatemala: Ríos Montt’s 80-year Sentence 

Annulled,” Southern Pulse, May 28, 2013; and “Guatemala’s Rio 

Montt Found Guilty of Genocide,” BBC News (Latin America and 

Caribbean), May 10, 2013. 

39. “Álvaro Colom anucia captura de lider de Los Zetas en 

Guatemala” (“Álvaro Colom Announces Capture of Zeta Leader 

in Guatemala”), El Universal, May 18, 2011.

40. Pablo Ordaz, “Narcos y contrabandistas toman la frontera 

sur de México” (“Narco-traffickers and Contraband Smugglers 

Take Mexico’s Southern Frontier”), El País (International), December 11, 2010. 

41. “Crecen Zetas en frontera sur” (“Los Zetas Grow in Southern Border”), Reforma, February 17, 2013.

42. Irene Savio, “Anuncia Guatemala operativo con México” (“Guatemala Announces Operation with Mexico”), Reforma, 

February 17, 2013.

43. “Guatemala Drugs: Zetas Cartel Suspect Overdick Arrested,” BBC News (Latin America and Caribbean), April 3, 2012. 

44. “Capturan a 16 guatemaltecos supuestamente vinculados 

con Los Zetas” (“16 Guatemalans Supposedly Linked to Los Zetas 

Captured”), EFE, February 07, 2013. 

45. “How Salcaja Massacre Tests Guatemala’s Resolve,” In 

SightCrime, September 17, 2013. 

46. “Confirman captura de presunto jefe de los Zetas” (“Arrest of Presumed Zeta Chieftain”), Publinews, October 12, 2013. 

47. Mariela Rosario, “Honduran Drug Czar Murdered,” Latina, December 21, 2009.
62

48. Jorge Werthein, “Cuáles son las 20 ciudades más violentas 

del mundo” (“What are the World’s 20 Most Violent Cities”), November 30, 2013, available from jorgewerthein.blogspot.com/2013/11/

cuales-son-las-20-ciudades-mas_30.html.

49. Quoted in Iris Amador, “Los Zetas Sows Fear While Expanding Reach Throughout Central America,” Diálogo, October 

17, 2011. 

50. Geoffrey Ramsey, “Honduran Security Minister Steps 

Down, Deepening Security Crisis,” Christian Science Monitor (Latin America), September 13, 2011. 

51. The quotations in this section appeared in Alberto Arce, 

“Honduran Gangs Declare Truce, Ask Talks with Gov’t,” Associated Press, May 28, 2013.

52. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs (INCSR), “2013 INCSR: Country Reports—Honduras 

through Mexico,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 

March 5, 2013.

53. Alberto Arce, “Honduran Gangs Declare Truce, Ask Talks 

with Gov’t,” Associated Press, May 28, 2013.

54. Tracy Wilkinson, “El Salvador Becomes Drug Traffickers’ 

‘Little Pathway’,” Los Angeles Times, March 22, 2011. 

55. Ibid.

56. Quoted in Adriana Gómez Lincón, “Big Cash Seizure Puts 

Light on Nicaragua Drug Role,” Associated Press, August 31, 2012.

57. Irene Savio, “Anuncia Guatemala operative con México” 

(“Guatemalan Operation with Mexico Announced”), Reforma, 

February 17, 2013. 

58. Ezra Fieser, “Operation Martillo: More than 600 Pounds of 

Cocaine Seized,” Infosur Hoy, January 22, 2013.

59. The countries mentioned are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape 

Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
63

Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, and Sierra Leone; see Julieta Pelcastre, “Los Zetas Smuggles Drugs to 

Europe through West Africa,” Inforsurhoy.com, October 11, 2013. 

While the international role of Los Zetas is dubious, U.S. security 

experts agree that the Sinaloa Cartel has a much more extensive 

web of global connections.

60. Noé Cruz Serrano, “Robo financie un paralelo’”

(“Robberies Have Financed a ‘Parallel PEMEX’”) El Universal, 

July 31, 2009. 

61. “El carbón, nuevo lucrativo negocio para el cartel mexicano de Los Zetas” (“Coal, a New Lucrative Business for Los Zetas 

Cartel”), El Universal, November 25, 2012. 

62. José Meléndez, “Opera narco mexicano trata infantil” 

(“Mexican Narcos Smuggle Young Children”), El Universal, May 

5, 2013.

63. Quoted in Ware, “Los Zetas Called Mexico’s Most Dangerous Drug Cartel.”

64. “Veracruz se dejó en manos de los zetas, acusa Calderón” 

(“Calderón Accused (the former governor) of Leaving Veracruz in 

the Hands of Los Zetas”), October 15, 2011, available from www.

coatzadigital.net/2011/10/veracruz-se-dejo-en-manos-de-los-zetas.html. 

65. “Perfilan a embajada a Fidel Herrera” (“Fidel Herrera Is 

Touted for an Embassy”), Reforma, August 30, 2013; and “Piden 

no dar aval a Fidel” (“Asks that Fidel Doesn’t Receive Endorsement”), Reforma, October 16, 2013. 

66. William Booth, “Warrior in Drug Fight Soon Becomes a 

Victim,” Washington Post, February 9, 2009.

67. Noemi Gutiérrez, “Afirman que por una canción mataron 

a Valentín” (“For a Song They Killed Valentín”), El Universal, November 27, 2006. 

68. “Singer Shot, Killed While Hospitalized in Mexico, U-T 

San Diego, December 4, 2007. 
64

69. Quoted in Jeremy Schwartz, “Musician Killings Highlight 

Unrelenting Violence in Mexico,” Banderas News, December 2007.

70. Grant, “Mexico Violence: Fear and Intimidation.”

71. “Secuestadores en México usan Google para seleccionar 

a víctimas” (“Kidnappers in Mexico Use Google to Choose Victims”), International Business News, February 15, 2011; “Secuestros 

Facilitados por Facebook” (“Kidnappings Facilitated by Facebook”), Aunam Noticias: Agencia Estudiantil de Noticias Universarias, October 5, 2012; Ildefonso Ortiz, “Gulf Cartel Member Sentenced for Recruiting Human Smugglers Online, The Monitor, July 

15, 2013. 

72. “Where is the Head of the Zetas Heriberto ‘The Lazca’ 

Lazcano?” March 18, 2012, available from usopenborders.

com/2012/03/where-is-the-head-of-the-zetas-heriberto-the-lazcalazcano/.

73. “‘Los Zetas’ reparten despensas en Tamaulipas” (“The 

Zetas Distribute Provisions in Tamaulipas”), Proceso, October 

10, 2013. 

74. “Invasion of the Body Snatchers.” 

75. Ibid.

76. Tim Padgett and Ioan Grillo, “Mexico Says ‘The Executioner’ is Dead—But Where’s the Body?” Time magazine (World 

Ed.), October 10, 2012; and “Ponen en duda muerte de capo” 

(“Doubts Remain about the Capo’s Death”), Reforma, September 

6, 2013.

77. Arturo Rodríguez García, “Los Zetas, génesis de los conflictos en Topo Chico” (“Los Zetas, Genesis of Conflicts in Topo 

Chico”), Proceso, October 8, 2009.

78. “Ex militares sirven de sicarios a cárteles mexicanos” 

(“Ex military men serve as hitmen for Mexican Cartels”), SeguRed.com, July 25, 2006, available from www.segured.com/index.

php?od=9&link=7765. 
65

79. “Lanza Brandy de los ‘Zetas’” (“Brandy ‘Los Zetas’ is 

Launched”), RadiQuintana Roo, March 23, 2009. 

80. “El desempleo en México sube en septiembre de 2013” 

(“Mexican Unemployment Rose in September 2013”), Informador.

com.mx, October 18, 2013. 

81. “Economía informal ‘arropa’ a mexicanos” (“The Underground Economy Covers the Economy”), CNNExpansión, available from www.cnnexapnsion.com/economia/2012/02/24/Mexicomenos-desempleo-mas-informales; and www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/

glosario/Default.aspx?ClvGlo=EHENOE&s=est&c=10842.

82. Isabel Mayoral Jiménez,”Salario promedio, lejos de 6,000 

pesos” (“Average Salary Far from 6,000 Pesos”), CNNExpansión: 

Super Empresas 2012, February 24, 2011.

83. Israel Rodríguez, “Bailey: ‘mito urbano’, que narcos 

traigan al país 29 mil mdd” (“Bailey: ‘Urban Myth,’ that Narcos 

Bring 29 Billion Dollars into Country”), La Jornada, September 

27, 2013. 

84. “‘Zetas’ usaron a El Recodo para lavar dinero en EU, 

revela FBI” (“The FBI Reveals that ‘Zetas’ Use El Recodo Band 

to Launder Money in the US”), Doris Gómora, El Universal, May 

3, 2013. 

85. Ware, “Los Zetas Called Mexico’s Most Dangerous Drug 

Cartel.” 

86. “Falsos zetas se dedican a la extorsión” (“False Zetas Concentrate on Extortion”), Consejo para la ley y los Derechos Humanos, 

A.C., October 25, 2007.

87. “Dan ‘Zetas’ narcoconsejo” (“Los Zetas Give Narco-Advice”), Reforma, May 4, 2008. 

88. César Peralta González, “Ejecutan a falsos ‘Zetas’ en 

Reynosa, tenían un narcomensaje” (The Execution of False ‘Zetas’ 

in Reynosa Sends a Narco-Message”), Milenio, February 28, 2009.
66

89. “Sufren cuatro españoles plagio virtual en México” (“Four 

Spaniards Endure Virtual Kidnapping in Mexico”), Reforma, October 9, 2013; and “‘Pensó que iban a pegarle un tiro’” (“‘I Thought 

that Shots Would Be Fired”’), Reforma, October 12, 2013. 

90. Quoted in Alfredo Corchado, “Mexico’s Zetas Gang Buys 

Businesses along Border in Move to Increase Legitimacy,” Dallas 

Morning News, December 7, 2009.

91. Jorge Volpi, “La Vida en México” (“The Life in Mexico”), 

Reforma, May 26, 2013. 

92. Jason Buch, “Zetas Next Boss May be Worse than the One 

Just Killed,” My San Antonio.com, October 10, 2012. 

93. John P. Sullivan and Samuel Logan, “Los Zetas: Massacres, Assassinations and Infantry Tactics,” Homeland 1, November 

24, 2010.

94. Víctor Solís, “‘Zetas’ ganan terreno en el sureste de EU” 

(“‘Zetas’ Gain Ground in the U.S. Southeast”), El Universal, July 

16, 2011. 

95. Ximena Moretti, “Zetas utilizan mujeres como sicarios” 

(“Zetas use women as gunmen”), Agora, April 23, 2012.

96. “Cae operadora financiera del crimen organizado” (“Financial Operator of Organized Crime Captured”), Diario de Xalapa, October 28, 2011. 

97. “Reclutan Zetas a mujeres” (“Los Zetas Recruit Women”), 

El Norte, March 27, 2009. 

98. “Detienen el Norte de México a jefa de plaza de ‘Los Zetas’” (“‘Zeta’ Female Plaza Boss Arrested in the North of Mexico”), 

El Universal (Caracas), September 11, 2011; and Rodolfo Santana, 

“Sostenía relación jefe de cártel con ‘El Sureño’” (“Cartel Chief 

Involved in a Relationship with ‘El Sureño’”), Info 7, September 

13, 2011, available from info7.mx/a/noticia/292226.

99. Moretti, “Zetas utilizan mujeres como sicarios.”
67

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid. 

102. “Cae regidora de Victoria en casa Zeta” (“Member of 

Victoria City Council Arrested in Zeta House”), Reforma, August 

26, 2013. 

103. Moretti, “Zetas utilizan mujeres como sicarios.” 

104. “Se carean por una mujer” (“Confrontation over a Woman”), Reforma, October 14, 2013; and Krupskaia Alís, “México captura a ‘la Ardilla’, presunto jefe regional de los Zetas” (“Mexico 

Captures ‘la Ardilla,’ presumed regional chief of Los Zetas”) CNN 

Español, October 8, 2012. 

105. Luis Prados, “Lucha a muerte en los Zetas” (“Fight to the 

Death in the Zetas”), El Pais (International), September 16, 2012; 

Henry Orrego, “Mexico captures Zetas cartel Capo ‘El Taliban’: 

navy,” Agence France Presse, September 27, 2012.

106. Quoted in Ginger Thompson, “U.S. Agencies Infiltrating 

Drug Cartels Across Mexico,” New York Times, October 24, 2011.

107. Federal Bureau of Investigations, “Los Zetas Expanding 

Reach into Southeast and Midwest United States,” FBI Intelligence 

Bulletin, October 2, 2008.

108. Lynn Brezosky, “Lake Killing Blamed on Blunder,” October 13, 2010, available from www.mysanantonio.com; and www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2214848/David-Hartley-death-Mexican-cartel-leader-known-Commander-Squirrel arrested.html#ixzz2TfTzPAsE.

109. “The Black Kiss: Zetas Groomed Texas Teens as Sicarios 

at 13,” Borderland Beat, July 5, 2012.

110 “3 people Associated with U.S. Consulate Killed in Mexico,” CNN World, March 15, 2010.

111. Esprit Smith, “Drug Cartel Leader Captured in Northern 

Mexico,” CNNWorld, June 10, 2010.
68

112. “Matan en País a más estadounidenses” (“More Americans Killed in the Country”), Reforma, May 19, 2013. According to 

the U.S. State Department, the number of U.S. citizens murdered 

in Mexico dropped from 113 in 2011 and 71 in 2012. See Jared 

Taylor, “Tamaulipas’ Murder Rate up 90 Percent, Kidnappings 

Double, U.S. State Department Says,” The Monitor, July 13, 2013.

113. “Zetas Racing Horses Will Be Auctioned Off,” Fox News 

Latino, October 9, 2012.

114. Dane Schiller, “Los Zetas entrenan en un rancho que 

mantienen en Texas, según el FBI” (“The Zetas Train in a Ranch 

They Maintain in Texas, according to the FBI”) Houston Chronicle

(Spanish edition), May 27, 2009.

115. “Armamento de ‘Los Zetas’ se compra en EU, dice fundador del grupo crimina,” (“Criminal Group’s Founder Says that 

‘Los Zetas’ Buy Weapons in the U.S.”), CNNMéxico, July 5, 2011.

116. Ildefonso Ortiz, “Slain Singer Chuy Quintanilla Gained 

Fame for Drug War Ballads,” The Monitor (McAllen, Texas), April 

26, 2013; and “Suena en la red el corrido de El Hummer” (“One 

Hears on the Network a Ballad to El Hummer”), El Universal, November 8, 2008.

117. Richard Fausset, “A Kidnapping Mystery in Mexico 

City,” Los Angeles Times, May 31, 2013.

118. “Conocía PGR tráfico de datos” (“The PGR Knew about 

the Traffic in Data”), Reforma, June 4, 2013.

119. Santiago Wills and Esteban Roman, “What Elba Esther 

Gordillo’s Arrest Means for Mexico’s Other Power Players,” ABC 

News, March 1, 2013.

120. Leonor Flores, “SHCP detecta nuevas formas de lavar 

dinero” (“SHCP Detects New Forms to Launder Money”), El 

Economista, January 19, 2012.

121. For an analysis of the Ley para la Prevención e Identificación de Operaciones con Recursos de Procedencia Ilícita (Law 

for the Prevention and Identification of Operations with Resources from Illicit Activities), see David Henry Foulkes, “Con la ley 
69

de prevención de lavado de dinero todos los contadores estarán 

regulados” (“All Accountants Will be Regulated Under the New 

Anti-Money Laundering Law”), Diario Jurídico México, January 

3, 2013.

122. “El Recodo Was Paid $250,000 to Play at Parties for Los 

Zetas,” Borderland Beat, May 7, 2013; Gómora, “‘Zetas’ usaron a 

El Recodo para lavar dinero en EU, revela FBI” (“’Zetas’ Use El 

Recodo Band to Launder Money in the US, the FBI Reveals”), El 

Universal, May 3, 2013.

123. Adriana Gómez Licón, “Drones Help Fight Mexico Drug 

Cartels,” El Paso Times, March 17, 2011.

124. Christopher Wilson, “Todos Somos Nuevo Laredo? How 

Mexico’s PRI Can Make Nuevo Laredo into Juárez” Washington, 

DC: Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center, August 7, 2013.

125. Rosario Mosso Castro and Christian Torres Cruz, “The 

Growing Use of Juvenile Hit Men by Mexican Drug Lords,” Mexidata.Info, June 3, 2013.

126. Adriana Varillas, “Reporta Pemex aumentó en robo de 

gasolina y diesel” (“Pemex Reports an Increase in the Theft of 

Gasoline and Diesel”), El Universal, June 6, 2013.

127. Nathaniel Parish Flannery, “Investor Insight: Why 

The Time May Be Right For Energy Reform In Mexico,” Forbes, 

October 28, 2013.

128. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets 

Control, “Treasury Targets Los Zetas Linked Oil Services Company,” August 2012.

129. A highly regarded Mexican intellectual, university administrator, and former federal deputy makes this point splendidly. See Agustín Basave Benítez, Mexicanidad y esquizofrenia: Los 

dos rostros del mexiJano (The Mexican Identify: The Two Faces of the 

Mexican), Mexico City, Mexico: Editorial Océano, 2010.

71

APPENDIX I

 EVOLUTION OF THE GULF CARTEL 

AND LOS ZETAS

Date Event Consequence

1992–95

Jorge Eduardo “El Coss” Sánchez 

was a local police officer in Matamoros, the base of the Gulf Cartel

He learned the drug business at the grassroots level

January 14, 1996

Gulf capo Juan Ábrego García, 

nephew of infamous bootlegger 

Don Juan Nepomuceno Guerra 

(1915–2001), captured outside of 

Monterrey

Even though a minor player, 

El Coss befriended Osiel 

“The Friend Killer” Cárdenas 

Guillén and seized the reins 

of the cartel

March 14, 2003 Army captured Osiel Cárdenas 

Guillén, head of the Gulf Cartel Top leader captured

March 14, 2003 Jorge Eduardo “El Coss” Costilla 

Sánchez assumed leadership

New leader assumes leadership

2004–10

A troika evolved that was composed of El Coss, Antonio “Tony 

Tormenta” Cárdenas Guillén, and 

Zeta leader Heriberto”Z-3” Lazcano 

Lazcano

Even as the Gulf Cartel 

repelled efforts by El Chapo 

and his allies to invade the 

north, frictions multiplied 

among troika members

2005 

Friction increased as Los Zetas 

indulged in grotesque cruelty and 

formed situational alliances with 

the Beltrán Leyva Organization 

(BLO), a rival cartel 

The brutality was at odds 

with the profit orientation of 

the Gulf and Sinaloa Cartels

January 20, 2007 Mexico extradited Osiel Cárdenas 

to the United States 

Cooperation with U.S. 

authorities

February 24, 2010

A federal judge sentenced Osiel 

Cárdenas to 25 years in prison; 

he provided information to U.S. 

agents in exchange for a lighter 

term*

Zeta leader believed that 

Osiel had disclosed information about their tactics, 

leadership, and organization

January 18, 2010

El Coss ordered Samuel “Metro 3” 

Flores Borrego to kill Sergio “Concord” Peña Mendoza, a confidant 

of “El 40”

Animus evolves to warfare 

between the Gulf Cartel and 

Los Zetas
72

November 5, 2010 Navy killed Tony Tormenta after a 

fierce gun battle in Matamoros

Three of his bodyguards, 

known as “Los Escorpianos,” were also killed, as 

were two members of the 

navy’s Special Forces and a 

reporter 

November 5, 2010 

Osiel’s brother Mario Cárdenas 

Guillén reluctantly assumed leadership

Another brother of Osiel 

comes to the fore

March 2011 Mario Cárdenas Guillén relinquished the reins of the cartel

Changing of the guard in the 

Gulf Cartel

March 2011 

Rafael “El Junior” Cárdenas Vela, 

nephew of Osiel and former head 

of Matamoros plaza, took over

New leader takes over

September 2, 2011

Tortured and bound bodies of 

Flores Borrego and Eloy Lerma 

García, a high ranking local police 

officer, are found 13 miles south of 

Reynosa

Los Zetas got revenge for 

the death of Metro 3

October 11, 2011

Body of César “Gama” Dávila 

García, Tony Tormenta’s personal 

accountant was found in an abandoned house in Reynosa

Another event in intramural 

battle for control of the 

cartel 

October 20, 2011 

ICE captured Rafael “El Junior” 

Cárdenas Vela in Port Isabel, 

Texas; wearing pink shorts and 

loafers, he was heading toward his 

South Padre Island residence

El Junior’s testimony helped 

convict Juan Roberto 

Rincón-Rincón, the Gulf’s 

plaza boss in Rio Bravo, 

Tamaulipas; Cárdenas Vela 

was living in the United 

States to escape revenge by 

Gulf Cartel rivals

October 26, 2011

U.S. Border Patrol arrested Juan 

Roberto “Comandante Primo” 

Rincón-Rincón in Santa Maria, 

Texas 

Former regional Gulf Cartel 

commander who said that 

one smuggler working for 

him moved 500 kilograms 

of cocaine into the United 

States each week
73

October 26, 2011

U.S. Border Patrol arrested José 

Luis “Comandante Wicho” Zuñiga 

Hernández in Santa Maria, Texas, 

after he fled a gun battle in Río 

Bravo, Mexico

Comandante Wicho was 

arrested along with Rincón 

as the men tried to escape 

rivals in the Gulf Cartel, Los 

Rojas; indicted in lateSeptember 2012, along with 

Luis Iván “Machín” Nino 

Duenes and Armando “Comandante Mando” Arizmendi Hernández, for conspiracy 

to traffic drugs

October 26, 2011

Navy apprehended Carmen

del Consuelo “Claudia” Sáenz 

Márquez in Córdoba, Veracruz

Major financial operator 

in the states of Hidalgo, 

Oaxaca, Tabasco, Quintana 

Roo, and Veracruz

December 12, 2011 Navy captured Raúl Lucio “El 

Lucky” Hernández Lechuga

Key Zeta regional boss 

in Veracruz, Puebla, and 

southern Mexico

May 9, 2012

Gilberto Lerma Plata, former 

Tamaulipas police chief and cousin 

of ex-governor Manuel Cavazos 

Lerma and current senator, arrested in McAllen for smuggling 

drugs into south Texas for the Gulf 

Cartel

Confessed to charges and 

sentenced

June 9, 2012

Fernando Herrera Zurita, who 

used aliases, including Erick “El 

Orejón” Cárdenas Guíza, captured 

by marines on Veracruz-Xalapa 

highway; PGR said suspect coordinated drug and arms traffic 

from Guatemala to Tamaulipas and 

Nuevo León 

The elimination of a skilled 

operator 

July 26, 2012

Marines detailed Mauricio Guizar 

Cárdenas in DF; alleged leader of 

Los etas in Chiapas, Campeche, 

Quintana Roo, and Veracruz 

Fall of an important regional 

leader 

September 3, 2012 Marines captured Mario Cárdenas 

Guillén in Altamira, Tamaulipas

Another setback to the 

cartel’s ebbing strength 

September 7, 2012

Marines apprehended Juan Carlos 

“El Peluches” Morales; presumed 

Zeta chief in Piedras Negras, 

Coahuila 

The fall of an ally of Lazcano
74

September 11, 2012 

Marines arrested Juan Gabriel 

“Sierra” Montes Sermeño in Guadalajara

Leader of Gulf Cartel’s 

strike team known as the 

Kalimanes; captured with 

bodyguard Eusebio Horta 

Arguellos

September 12, 2012 Marines arrested “El Coss” in 

Tampico 

Cartel weakened even more; 

Homero Cárdenas,** a 

family member, became 

the leader of the Los Rojas 

(pro–Cárdenas Guillén) wing 

of the Gulf Cartel; Mario 

Armando “El Pelón”/“X-20” 

Ramírez Treviño took charge 

of Los Metros” (pro- Coss) 

faction of the Gulf Cartel. He 

controled Reynosa through 

a wrestler, José Alejandro 

“El Simple” Leal, but often 

stayed a few miles away in 

Río Bravo, Tamaulipas 

September 26, 2012 

Marines arrested Iván “El Talibán” 

Velázquez Caballero in San Luis 

Potosí

Chief of Zeta faction opposing “El 40” as power-hungry 

and a “Judas”; alleged that 

he defected to the Gulf Cartel to which he previously 

belonged; extradited to the 

U.S. on November 23, 2013

October 5, 2012 

Marines and state authorities 

appended Carlos “El Carlangas” 

Carmona; led a Zeta group in 

southern Veracruz municipalities of 

Ángel R. Cabada, Lerdo de Tejada, 

Cosamaloapan, Rodríguez Clara, 

Isla, San Andrés Tuxtla, Santiago 

Tuxtla, Catemaco, and Coatzacoalcos; also arrested were 2 male and 

2 female Zetas, who carried highpowered weapons and drugs.

A success for navy/marines

October 6, 2012 

Marines captured Salvador “La 

Ardilla” Martínez Escobedo in 

Nuevo Laredo

Enemy of “El 40” and key 

leader in Coahuila, Tamaulipas, and Nuevo León
75

October 7, 2012 

Marines captured Zeta leader 

Heriberto Lazcano in Progreso, 

Coahuila

Comrades stole his body 

from the funeral home; fingerprint matches and DNA 

tests supposedly confirmed 

his identity, even though the 

DEA has expressed doubts 

about his death

November 2012 

U.S. Homeland Security agents 

apprehended gun traffickers Juan 

Ricardo Martínez Cárdenas and 

Daniel Blanco Avila in Roma, Texas 

To avoid the Gulf Cartel, 

these men smuggled guns 

from Miguel Alemán, Tamaulipas, to Roma, Texas, 

before bringing them back 

to Miguel Alemán; Los Zetas 

paid them $1,200 every 2 

weeks

December 2012 

Marines arrested Francisco Dair 

Montalvo Recio in Nuevo Laredo. 

“Rocky,” was the accountant in 

Nuevo Laredo and was found with 

upwards of $5 million in pesos and 

dollars. Also captured were three 

accomplices.

Montalvo Recio supplied 

naval intelligence with 

invaluable information about 

the movements of Zeta chief 

“El 40, who was taken into 

custody on July 15, 2013, 

near Nuevo Laredo

January 15, 2013 Authorities found the corpse of 

Héctor “Metro 4” Delgado

Ruthless enforcer for Gulf 

Cartel

January 24, 2013 

Jose Luis “El Wicho” Zuñiga 

Hernández sentenced to 7 years in 

prison

Put behind bars a Gulf 

Cartel operative captured 

by the U.S. Border Patrol in 

October 2011 and known for 

arms smuggling, kidnapping, and immigration 

violations

March 10, 2013 Armed forces killed Miguel “El 

Gringo” Villarreal in Reynosa

He challenged El Pelón 

Ramírez Treviño for leadership of the Gulf Cartel

May 8, 2013 

Marines apprehended Alfonso 

Zamudio Quijada, the presumed 

accountant of Los Zetas in Monclova, Coahuila

A financial blow inasmuch 

as the suspect was in possession of an AK-47 assault 

rifle, ammunition, some 

$300,000 in cash, and 500 

plastic bags containing a 

white, powdery substance 

resembling cocaine
76

July 15, 2013 Marines captured El 40 Treviño 

Morales near Nuevo Laredo 

Severe blow to Los Zetas, 

which lost its most sadistic 

chief

August 17, 2013 Army captured El Pelón Ramírez 

Treviño in Río Bravo 

Will require El Chapo*** to 

exert more pressure on the 

factions of the Gulf Cartel to 

maintain their fragile unity

November 21, 2013 

State and navy tactical groups captured Jorge “El Ruso” Uvaldo del 

Fierro Varela, along with 3 other 

Zetas and 13 Federal Police, who 

allegedly protected them in Saltillo 

where El Ruso was a key operative 

A setback to Los Zetas in a 

Coahuila, a northern state 

where they retain a significant presence

April 2014

Authorities captured El Simple—

a move that sparked violence in 

Reynosa, which took the life of a 

Federal Police Officer (April 1); 30 

killed in gun battles in Tampico 

(Easter Week)

The Reynosa firefight 

included Los Metros and 

“Los Ciclones,” who were 

investigating the alleged 

death of Homero Cárdenas 

Guillén; internecine fighting 

surges in Gulf

* The 7 years that he had served in Mexico reduced his 25-year term, which could be shortened 

even more for continued cooperation.

** Homero Cárdenas, believed to be a cousin of Mario Cárdenas Guillén, is reportedly in line to take 

over the reins of the cartel; other allies of “El Pelón” included “Metro 4,” Alfonso “Metro 7” Flores 

Borrego, and ex-Zeta Cruz Galindo Mellado, who realigned with the Gulf Cartel.

*** El Chapo, who sided with Los Metros, reportedly dispatched members of the Guadalajara-based 

Jalisco New Generation Cartel put an end to the intramural feuding; the drug lord was captured on 

February 22, 2014. 

Sources: “Mexico Zeta Drug Gang Leader “El Lucky” Arrested,” BBC News Latin America and 

Caribbean, December 12, 2011. This appendix relies heavily on articles by the border’s top criminal 

reporter, Ildefonso Oritz, at The Monitor (McAllen, TX); “Gulf Cartel Commander Asks for Jury Trial 

in Brownsville,” September 19, 2012; “Siempre a salto de mata” (“Always in Dribs and Drabs”), 

Reforma, October 9, 2012; “Detainee: Zetas Smuggle Guns into US to Avoid Gulf Cartel” The Monitor, November 30, 2012; “Few Details Known about Quiet Fall of Feared Gulf Cartel Kingpin,” January 

27, 2013; “Gulf Cartel, Zetas Mark 3rd Anniversary of Bloody Rivalry,” February 6, 2013; Jared 

Taylor, “Former Tamps: Police Chief, Cousin of Ex-Governor, Admits to Gulf Cartel Ties,” The Monitor, March 3, 2013; Doris Gómera, “Ex-Comandante admite que fue cómplice del cártel del golfo” 

(“Ex-Commander Admits that He Was an Accomplice of the Gulf Cartel”), El Universal, March 5, 

2013; Havana Pura, “Accountant El Rocky Snithced on Z-40,” Borderland Beat, July 27, 2013; Mark 

Reagan, “‘El Wicho,’ Other Cartel Figures Make Court Appearance,” Brownsville Herald, October 18, 

2013; “Capturan a zeta con 13 federales; era jefe de plaza en Saltillo” (“Zeta Plaza Boss in Saltillo 

Captured with 13 Federal Police”), Excélsior, November 24, 2013; and “Los Golpes al crimen” 

(“Blows against Crime”), Reforma, December 2013. A version of this appendix appears in George 

W. Grayson, The Cartels: The Story of Mexico’s Most Dangerous Criminal Organizations and Their 

Impact on U.S. Security (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014). 
77

APPENDIX II

SADISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER CRITERIA

• Maladaptive patterns of motivated behavior, 

usually evident for at least several years.

• Enduring, pervasive, maladaptive patterns of 

behavior which are usually recognized before 

or during adolescence.

• It is long-standing and its onset can be traced to 

adolescence or early adulthood but is not due to 

drugs (or abuse of medication) or to a medical 

condition such as a head injury.

• The behavior pattern is inflexible across all personal and social situations and significantly impairs social or occupational functioning.

• Has used physical cruelty or violence for the 

purpose of establishing dominance in a relationship (not merely to achieve some noninterpersonal goal, such as striking someone in order to 

rob him or her).

• Humiliates or demeans people in the presence 

of others.

• Has treated or disciplined someone under his 

or her control usually harshly, e.g., a child, student, prisoner, or patient.

• Is amused by, or takes pleasure in, the psychological or physical suffering of others (including 

animals).

• Has lied for the purpose of harming or inflicting 

pain on others (including animals).

• Gets other people to do what he wants by frightening them through intimidation or even terror.
78

• Restricts the autonomy of people with whom he 

or she has a close relationship, e.g., will not let 

spouse leave the house unaccompanied or permit teenage daughter to attend social functions.

• Is fascinated by violence, weapons, martial arts, 

injury, or torture.

Source: “Sadistic Personality Disorder Criteria,” PsychNetUK, March 2013. 
79

APPENDIX III

CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OF LOS ZETAS

Illegal Activities Examples

Drug Smuggling Marijuana and some cocaine, and methamphetamines, and heroin.

Extortion 

Even when behind bars, Los Zetas, who 

have detailed information about a family, demand money to prevent the kidnapping of a loved one. 

Kidnapping

Illegal immigrants passing through 

Mexico; cells in most plazas dedicated 

to this crime.

Human Smuggling

The Mexican Human Rights Commission reported that in the first 6 months 

of 2009, 9,758 illegal aliens crossing 

into Mexico were kidnapped and 13 assassinated. Of these victims, 91 reported complicity by “agents of the state,” 

usually functionaries of the Mexican 

Migration Institute (INM). 

Contraband

U.S. officials and representatives of film 

studios and software manufacturers 

claim that Los Zetas and other cartels 

take a big cut out of the hundreds of 

millions of dollars in bootleg disks sold 

each year in Mexico.

Selling Babies 

Los Zetas impregnate captured Central 

American immigrants whose babies 

they sell, often in Guatemala.

Petroleum Rustling 

PEMEX suffered 1,267 thefts in 3 

years, at a cost of 5,125 million pesos (U.S.$427 million) between 2007 

and mid-2012. These quantities are 

creating a virtual “Parallel PEMEX.”
80

Sale of Body Parts

A Zeta commander allegedly kidnapped 

100 illegal Guatemalans working in a 

shirt factory in Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz: 

According to an escapee, the women 

were turned into prostitutes; the older 

men were forced to become lookouts 

or small-time drug sellers; and the bodies of some of the healthier young men 

were harvested for kidneys and other 

body parts.

Money Laundering

Invested in quarter horses in the United 

States; however, unlike business-oriented cartels, they have not purchased 

real estate and other assets in Mexico. 

Prostitution 

Cuban prostitutes in Cancún; “buying” 

Central American women from an Immigrant smuggler and exploiting them 

as prostitutes in Reynosa bars and hotels.

Selling the Right to Cross its Territory 

(Derecho de Piso)

Threatened gas producers in Burgos 

basin in Tamaulipas and Nuevo León 

with death if they did not pay for the 

right to operate.

Murder for Hire

Los Zetas allegedly paid Eduardo 

González "El Lalito" Trejo (or Eduardo 

Trejo Ponce), 40,000 pesos to murder 

Víctor Hugo Moneda, ex-commander of 

the DF's Judicial Police.

Selling Protection To the BLO and to Cuban gangs in 

Cancún.

Theft of Automobiles and Trucks

Especially along the borders of Tamaulipas and Nuevo León with the United 

States

Paying Small Farmers to Grow Poppies 

and Move Contraband into Mexico Notably in Guatemala.
81

Arson 

Just after Christmas 2010, in a battle 

with the Sinaloa Cartel, Zetas set fire to 

houses in Tierras Coloradas, Durango, 

leaving homeless 150 Tepehuan Indians 

who speak Spanish as a second language and have no electricity or running 

water; the victims had already fled into 

the woods, sleeping under trees or hiding in caves after a raid by feared drug 

gangs on December 26; residents suffered cold winter weather, and the crops 

of farmers who refused to cooperate 

were burned.

Street Blocks, Which Give Them Access 

to Their Targets

Notably in Monterrey and Reynosa 

where they use ponchallantas (small, 

sharp metallic stars that blow out tires).

Public Works Concessions

Mayors, especially in small municipalities, are coerced into awarding construction contracts to Los Zetas, who 

turn over the project to a contractor for 

35 percent of the payment for the job. 

Masquerade as Police or Military Officials

Catches targets off guard; helps them 

gain entrance to jails, rehabilitation centers, and other venues where they have 

a mission.

Car Bombings 

May constitute “tipping point” between 

criminality and terrorism, according to 

Group Savant CEO Gary J. Hale.

Tunneling 

The Sinaloa Cartel has access to engineers, contractors, and other experts 

to excavate sophisticated, cross-border 

tunnels; however, Los Zetas have plotted the digging of shorter passageways 

such as the one that facilitated the escape of 129 inmates from a prison 

(Cereso) in Piedras Negras, Coahuila, in 

mid-September 2012. 
82

Sources: William & Mary outstanding law student Lindsey C. Nicolai; and 

Lisa J. Campbell, “Los Zetas,” in Robert J. Bunker, ed., Narcos Over the 

Border: Gangs, Cartels and Mercenaries, New York: Routledge, 2011, pp. 

70-71; “Los Zetas, tras ejecución del comandante Monteda”(“Los Zetas 

after the Execution of Commander Monteda”), Milenio.com, March 18, 

2009; Noé Cruz Serrano, “Robo financió un ‘Pemex paralelo’” (“Robberies Finance a Parallel PEMEX”), El Universal, July 31, 2009; “Cancún: las 

cubanas secuestradas, en red de prostitución de los Zetas” (“Cancún: Kidnapped Cuban Women Form Los Zetas Prostitution Network”), Cubadebate, September 17, 2009; Alfredo Corchado, “Mexico’s Zetas Gang Buys 

Businesses along Border in Move to Increase Legitimacy,” Dallas Morning 

News, December 7, 2009; “Cobran zetas ‘derecho de piso’ a gaseras en 

el norte del pais” (“Zetas Charge ‘Crossing Fees’ to Gas Producers in the 

North of the Country”), Noticias Durango Hoy, February 16, 2011; Antonio 

Baranda, “Perfeccionan reos táctica de extorsión” (“Criminals Perfect Extortion Tactics”), Reforma.com, June 1, 2010; Mica Rosenberg, “Mexico’s 

Refugees: a Hidden Cost of Drugs War,” Reuters, February 17, 2011; “’Zetas’ incendian pueblo en Durango” (“’Zetas’ Burn Village in Durango”), El 

Economista, February 18, 2011; Samuel Logan, “Networked Intelligence: 

Southern Pulse,” May 10, 2011, "Petroleum Rustling," Verónica Sánchez, 

“Registrar desde 2009 liga entre INM-narco” (“Recognized since 2009 a 

Link between INM and Narcos”), Reforma, May 11, 2011; William Booth, 

“Mexico’s Thriving Piracy Business Funds Cartels,” The Washington Post, 

May 30, 2011; Anne-Marie O’Connor, “Mexico’s ‘Inferno’ of Exploitation,” 

The Washington Post, July 28, 2011; Chivis Martinez, “Piedras Negras: 

Zetas Likely Behind New Prison Break,” Border Beat, September 19, 2012; 

“Entra crimen obra pública” (“Crime Enters Public Works”), Reforma, October 14, 2012; and Alberto Tinoco Guadarrama, “La violencia and inseguridad en Tamaulipas” (“The Violence and Insecurity in Tamaulipas”), 

Noticieros Televisa, January 22, 2013; Raúl Benítez Manaut, “Organized 

Crime as the Highest Threat to Mexican National Security and Democracy,” Tony Payan, Kathleen Staudt, and Z. Anthony Kruszewski, eds., A 

War That Can’t Be Won: Binational Perspectives on the War on Drugs, 

Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2013, pp. 149-173. 

This appendix is a revised and updated version of “Table 4: Diversification of Los Zetas’ Criminal Activities,” in George W. Grayson and Samuel 

Logan, The Executioner’s Men: Los Zetas, Rogue Soldiers, Criminal Entrepreneurs, and the Shadow State They Created, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2012, pp. 51-53. 
83

APPENDIX IV

COMPARISON OF MURDERS IN TWIN CITIES

ALONG THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER

U.S. Cities Murders per 

100,000 people

Total 

Murders

Mexican 

Cities

Murders 

(Homicidios 

Dolosos) per 

100,000 people

Total Murders

Brownsville 1.66 (2012)

0.55 (2011)

3.96 (2010)

2.3 (2009)

2.2 (2008)

 3 (2012)

 1 (2011)

 7 (2010)

 4 (2009)

 4 (2008)

Matamoros N/A (2012) 

17.03 (2011)

 N/A (2010)

 N/A (2009)

 N/A (2008)

 N/A (2012)

 72 (Jan-Sep 

2011) 

 N/A (2010)

 N/A (2009)

 N/A (2008)

El Paso 3.39 (2012)

2.40 (2011)

 .77 (2010)

2.00 (2009)

2.77 (2008)

22 (2012)

16 (2011) 

 5 (2010)

13 (2009)

18 (2008)

Ciudad 

Juárez

 49.6 (2012)

 48.3 (2011)

223 (2010) 

189 (2009)

130 (2008)

750 (2012)

1,976 (2011)

3,622 (2010)

2,643 (2009) 

1,587 (2008) 

Laredo 4.09 (2012)

4.60 (2011)

3.99 (2010)

8.43 (2009)

4.44 (2008)

10 (2012)

11 (2011) 

 9 (2010) 

19 (2009) 

10 (2008)

Nuevo 

Laredo

72.85 (2012) 

N/A (2011)

N/A (2010)

N/A (2009)

N/A (2008)

288 (2012) 

 144 (Jan 

2011)

N/A (2010)

N/A (2009)

N/A (2008)

Mc Allen .07 (2012)

3.00 (2011)

3.64 (2010) 

2.91 (2009)

6.74 (2008)

 1 (2012)

 4 (2011)

 5 (2010)

 4 (2009)

 9 (2008)

Reynosa N/A (2012)

 9.68. (2011)

 41.1 (2010)

 N/A (2009)

 N/A (2008)

N/A (2012)

 51 (Jan 2011)

 217 (2010)

N/A (2009)

N/A (2008)

San Diego .04 (2012)

 .03 (2011)

 .02 (2010)

 .03 (2009)

 .04 (2008)

 47 (2012)

 38 (2011) 

 29 (2010) 

 41 (2009)

 55 (2008) 

Tijuana 15.58 (Jan-June 

2013) 

 20.29 (2012) 

 36.05 (2011)

 52.50 (2010)

 40.76 (2009) 

 51.81 (2008)

278 (Jan-June 

2013)

362 (2012)

469 (2011)

826 (2010)

664 (2009) 

844 (2008) 

Sources: Sean Gaffney, “Juárez, la ciudad más violenta del mundo” (Juárez, The Most Violent City 

in the World”), El Economista, August 26, 2009; “McAllen: One of the Most Secure Places to Live, 

Study Finds,” The Monitor, December 23, 2009; SIA Informe: “Ciudades latinoamericanas entre los 

más violentas del mundo (“Latin American Cities among the Most Violent in the World”), February 10, 
84

2011; McAllen Police Department, Crime Records Office, City of McAllen Crime 

Report 2010, 2011, 2012: Laredo Police Department, 2010 Annual Report; San 

Diego Historical Crime Rates per 1,000 Population, 1950-2010, available from 

www.sandiego.gov/police/pdf/crimerates.pdf; “El Paso See Double Digit Decrease 

in Murders, Other Major Crimes,” KVIA.com, November 5, 2010; City of San Diego, San Diego Police Department, “Actual Crimes, 1950-2012”; “Crime rate in 

Brownsville, Texas (TX): murders, rapes, robberies, assaults, burglaries, thefts, 

auto thefts, arson, law enforcement employees, police officers, crime map,” www.

city-data.com/crime/crime-Brownsville-Texas.html#ixzz2TxICvnOX; and Maria 

Garcia “Juárez Murder Rate Decreases 45% in 2011,” ABC7 (El Paso), based on 

figures provides by Molly Molloy, Librarian, New Mexico State University (Las Cruces); Alidad Vassigh, “Latin American cities are the most dangerous in the world,” 

City Mayors Security 28, October 12, 2012, available from www.citymayors.com/

security/latin-american-murder-cities.html; Procuraduría General de la República, 

“Total Fallecimientos por presunta rivalad delincuencial: Enero-Septiembre 2011” 

(“Total Deaths from Presumed Criminal Rivalries, January-September 2011), December 2012; Luis Gerardo Andrade, “Baja homicidios un 23% durante 2012 en 

Tijuana” (“Homicides Fall 23% during 2012 in Tijuana”), Frontera.com, January 

1, 2013; and Jared Taylor, “Tamaulipas’ Murder Rate up 90 Percent, Kidnappings 

Double, U.S. State Department Says,” The Monitor, July 13, 2012. 
85

APPENDIX V

MOST MURDER-RIDDEN CITIES 

IN THE AMERICAS

(NUMBER OF MURDERS PER

100,000 INHABITANTS PER ANNUM)

Rank City Country Population Murder Rate 

(2011)

Murder Rate 

(2010)

1 San Pedro Sula Honduras 719,447 158.87 125 (2010)

2 Ciudad Juárez Mexico 1,335,890 147.77 229 (2010)

3 Maceió Brazil 1,156,278 135.26 n/a

4 Acapulco Mexico 804,412 127.92 51.4 (2010)

5 Capital District Honduras 1,126,534 99.69 108 (2010)

6 Caracas Venezuela 3,205,463 98.71 118 (2010)

7 Torreón (metropolitan) Mexico 1,128,152 87.75 68.4 (2010)

8 Chihuahua Mexico 831,693 82.96 113 (2010)

9 Durango Mexico 593,389 79.88 78.3 (2010)

10 Belém Brazil 2,100,319 78.04 n/a

11 Cali Colombia 2,207,994 77.90 87.4 (2010)

12 Guatemala City Guatemala 3,014,060 74.58 106 (2010)

13 Culiacán Mexico 871,620 74.46 87.8 (2010)

14 Medellín Colombia 2,309,446 70.32 87.4 (2010)

15 Mazatlán Mexico 445,343 68.94 88.1 (2010)

16 Tepic (metropolitan) Mexico 439,362 68.05 79.9 (2010)

17 Vitória Brazil 1,685,384 67.82 76.1 (2010)

18 Veracruz Mexico 697,414 59.94 n/a

19 Ciudad Guayana Venezuela 940,477 58.91 68.8 (2010)

20 San Salvador El Salvador 2,290,790 58.63 82.9 (2010)

21 New Orleans USA 343,829 57.88 69 (2009)

22 Salvador Brazil 3,574,804 56.98 n/a

23 Cúcuta Colombia 597,385 56.08 56.1 (2010)
86

24 Barquisemeto Venezuela 1,120,718 55.41 n/a

25 San Juan Puerto Rico 427,789 52.60 n/a

Source: Alidad Vassigh, “Latin American cities are the most dangerous in the world,” City Mayors 

Security 28, October 12, 2012, available from www.citymayors.com/security/latin-american-murdercities.html.
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