THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN LANDPOWER:

DOES FORWARD PRESENCE STILL MATTER?

THE CASE OF THE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

John R. Deni

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

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iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN LANDPOWER:

DOES FORWARD PRESENCE STILL MATTER?

THE CASE OF THE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

John R. Deni

June 2014

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The author wishes to thank the anonymous interview subjects on the Army Staff and at U.S. Army Pacific who gave generously of their time. Additionally, the author is indebted to

Dr. David Lai and Colonel Mark Hinds of the Strategic Studies 

Institute (SSI), Dr. Maryanne Kelton of Flinders University, Dr. 

Carlyle Thayer of the University of New South Wales, and Dr. 

Nicholas Khoo of the University of Otago for their very helpful 

comments on an earlier draft of this monograph.

ISBN 1-58487-618-2
v

FOREWORD

The U.S. Army performs a number of critical missions across the vast Indo-Asia-Pacific region. These 

include underwriting deterrence, building coalition 

capability, strengthening institutional capacity among 

partner defense establishments, maintaining interoperability, promoting military professionalism, building operational access, and conducting humanitarian 

assistance missions. For many, it may come as a surprise to know that almost all of the many Army activities and events that support these missions outside of 

Northeast Asia are conducted with U.S. Army forces 

based in the 50 states, often Alaska and Washington 

State. The roughly 22,000 U.S. Army Soldiers based 

in South Korea and Japan are focused largely on deterring North Korea from large-scale aggression, and 

assuring South Korea and other countries of the steadfastness of Washington’s alliance commitment. 

The costs associated with supporting the increasingly important array of Army military-to-military 

activities across the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater with 

forces based in the 50 states present the Army with a 

significant dilemma—namely, trying to play its vital 

role in America’s broad strategy toward the theater 

while conducting a post-war drawdown in an era of 

constrained fiscal resources. In this monograph, Dr. 

John R. Deni describes, analyzes, and explains the potential benefits and risks associated with a potential 

solution to that broad dilemma—a reconfigured Army 

presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. According 

to Dr. Deni, the time has come for the U.S. Army to 

reexamine long-held assumptions and move beyond 

outmoded paradigms, in part by adjusting the Army’s 

presence in East Asia. In this companion study to his 
vi

recent monograph examining the future of the Army 

presence in Europe, Dr. Deni provides evidence to 

support his conclusion that a reconfigured Army forward presence in the Pacific theater could increase the 

effectiveness of Army efforts, while also providing efficiency gains over time. In doing so, Dr. Deni makes 

an important contribution to the debate over the future 

role, mission, and structure of the Army in the IndoAsia-Pacific theater and to the manner in which strategic Landpower supports broad U.S. national security 

goals. For this reason, the Strategic Studies Institute is 

pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to 

the ongoing national discussion on the role of the U.S. 

Army and the manner in which it can best serve the 

Nation today and in the future.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JOHN R. DENI joined the Strategic Studies Institute 

in November 2011 as a Research Professor of Joint, 

Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational 

Security Studies. He previously worked for 8 years as 

a political advisor for senior U.S. military commanders in Europe. Prior to that, he spent 2 years as a strategic planner specializing in the military-to-military relationship between the United States and its European 

allies. While working for the U.S. military in Europe, 

Dr. Deni was also an adjunct lecturer at Heidelberg 

University’s Institute for Political Science. There, he 

taught graduate and undergraduate courses on U.S. 

foreign and security policy, North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO), European security, and alliance theory and practice. Before working in Germany, 

he spent 7 years in Washington, DC, as a consultant 

specializing in national security issues for the U.S. 

Departments of Defense, Energy, and State and has 

spoken at conferences and symposia throughout Europe and North America. Dr. Deni recently authored 

the book, Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century, as well as several journal articles. He has published op-eds in major newspapers such as the Los Angeles Times and the 

Baltimore Sun. Dr. Deni completed his undergraduate 

degree in history and international relations at the 

College of William & Mary and holds an M.A. in U.S. 

foreign policy at American University in Washington, 

DC, and a Ph.D. in international affairs from George 

Washington University.

ix

SUMMARY

The time has come for a reappraisal of the U.S. 

Army’s forward presence in East Asia, given the significantly changed strategic context and the extraordinarily high, recurring costs of deploying U.S. Army 

forces from the 50 states for increasingly important security cooperation activities across the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. For economic, political, diplomatic, and 

military reasons, the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater continues to grow in importance to the United States. As 

part of a broad, interagency, multifaceted approach, 

the U.S. military plays a critical role in the rebalancing 

effort now underway. The U.S. Army in particular has 

a special role to play in bolstering the defense of allies 

and the deterrence of aggression, promoting regional 

security and stability, and ameliorating the growing 

U.S.-China security dilemma.

In particular, military security cooperation programs are becoming increasingly important for achieving U.S. security goals. These military-to-military programs and activities are designed to shape the security 

environment; prevent conflict through deterrence, assurance, and transparency; and build operational and 

tactical interoperability. As wartime requirements 

decrease in the coming year following the end of extensive American involvement in Afghanistan and as 

the U.S. military undergoes a dramatic yet historically 

typical post-war drawdown, security cooperation 

activities will comprise the primary way in which a 

leaner U.S. military contributes to broad American 

national security objectives in the next decade. 

However, the U.S. Army today remains hamstrung in its efforts to contribute to those broader security goals in the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. A dated 
x

basing paradigm limits the utility to be gained from 

the roughly 22,000 U.S. Army Soldiers based in East 

Asia, and the extraordinarily high transportation costs 

associated with sending other U.S.-based Army forces 

to conduct security cooperation activities across the 

vast Indo-Asia-Pacific region limits what the Army 

can accomplish. If reconfigured, the forward-based 

Army presence in East Asia could help achieve U.S. 

objectives more effectively and more efficiently. Effectiveness would be increased through more regular, 

longer duration engagement with critical allies and 

partners, including Australia, India, the Philippines, 

Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, while 

still maintaining deterrence through punishment on 

the Korean Peninsula. Efficiency would grow by reducing the recurring transportation costs associated 

with today’s practice of sending U.S.-based units to 

conduct most exercises and training events across the 

Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

Changing the U.S. Army’s forward posture in East 

Asia involves overcoming several hurdles. These include the challenge of reassuring South Korea and Japan of the U.S. commitment to their security, even as 

the number of U.S. Soldiers based in those countries 

decreases; the difficulty of negotiating status of forces agreements and/or cost mitigation arrangements 

with potential new host nations like Australia or the 

Philippines; budgetary challenges in terms of funding any necessary initial infrastructure investments; 

and the need to allay Chinese fears of containment 

and encirclement. However, these challenges are not 

necessarily insurmountable. For instance, countries 

across the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater, including some 

that have long viewed the United States with suspicion, are coming to value increasingly the offshore 
xi

balancing role Washington can play vis-à-vis China. 

Additionally, the one-time infrastructure investment 

costs associated with any new U.S. forward presence 

in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region are likely to be offset 

over a matter of years by savings gained from reduced 

transportation costs. Finally, Washington can work to 

explain to Beijing how a transparently reconfigured 

U.S. presence in East Asia actually benefits China by 

acting as a pacifier for the more aggressive impulses of 

American allies and partners in the region, and by reassuring leaders in those same countries that as China 

rises, the United States will remain a steadfast partner. 

There are no guarantees that the United States will 

succeed in overcoming all of the potential difficulties 

associated with a reconfigured Army presence in the 

Indo-Asia-Pacific region, but to avoid trying would 

severely limit the effectiveness and the efficiency of 

the Army’s contribution to broader U.S. national 

security goals.

1

THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN LANDPOWER:

DOES FORWARD PRESENCE STILL MATTER?

THE CASE OF THE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

Introduction.

With the January 2012 release of the Defense Strategic Guidance, the U.S. military has increased the attention it pays to the Pacific theater. Officially titled 

Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, what has come to be known as the Defense Strategic Guidance directed the U.S. military to 

“rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.”1

 Despite 

being heralded by some as a dramatic “pivot,” some 

data points indicate that Washington’s rebalancing is 

actually part of an ongoing evolution versus a revolution in U.S. policy. For example, several changes to the 

U.S. military posture in the Pacific—such as the U.S. 

Marine Corps’ plan to relocate thousands of Marines 

from Okinawa to Guam—have been underway for 

some time.

Other changes have been far more recent though, 

such as the effort on the part of the U.S. Marine Corps 

to establish a rotational presence at an Australian 

training facility in Darwin, and appear directly connected to the guidance issued in January 2012. In any 

event, all of the U.S. military services have taken their 

cue from the civilian political leadership in Washington, strengthening, initiating, and/or reinvigorating 

efforts to engage allies, partners, and others throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. 

Among the military services, the U.S. Army has 

been particularly active. This may come as a surprise 

to outside observers, especially given the sense in the 

United States that the Pacific theater, outside the con-
2

text of the Korean Peninsula, is largely the purview of 

the U.S. Navy and/or the Air Force. There is certainly 

some logic to that perception, considering the vast distances involved in traversing the theater, which make 

the mobility platform-intensive Navy and Air Force 

perhaps better suited to engaging allies, partners, and 

others throughout the region. In part, this perception has been reinforced by the services themselves, 

as well as the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). For 

instance, in its 55-year history, U.S. Pacific Command 

(USPACOM), based in Hawaii, has never been led by 

an Army four-star general.2

Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom that the 

Indo-Asia-Pacific theater is solely or even mostly the 

purview of the U.S. Navy or Air Force is somewhat 

outdated. The Army has been and continues to be a 

major player in the theater as well, judging from not 

simply Army-led operations during the Korean and 

Vietnam Wars or ongoing Army-led ballistic missile 

defense operations in Japan and Guam, but especially 

in the military-to-military activities undertaken by the 

Army throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region over 

the last several decades. These activities have proven 

critical to building the land force capabilities of countries in South, Southeast, and East Asia and Oceania to 

promote their own security against internal and external threats, to deal with the aftermath of humanitarian 

disasters by building institutional capacity, to increase 

professionalism and respect for civilian authorities 

within partner militaries, to develop operational and 

tactical interoperability for military operations ranging from peacekeeping to high intensity combat, to 

further information sharing, to assure treaty allies, 

and to achieve other shared objectives. For example, 

the U.S. Army Pacific—based in Hawaii—conducts 
3

roughly 200 partnership and engagement activities 

annually, including 26 major exercises to build partner capacity and maintain varying levels of partner 

nation interoperability for bilateral and multilateral 

coalition operations.

Some of the effects achieved by these partnership 

and engagement activities, such as treaty ally assurance, can be accomplished by U.S. naval and air forces 

as well. Other effects, such as building capacity to handle humanitarian response crises beyond the littoral, 

are accomplished more effectively through Army-toArmy interaction and training. Moreover, land forces 

in the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater have outsized influence in their respective defense establishments—21 of 

27 major partners’ defense chiefs are Army officers.

Among the many tools the U.S. Army wields in 

implementing its part of the broader USPACOM 

theater strategy are those U.S. Army forces based 

in Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington State—in total, 

roughly 65,000 Active-Duty Soldiers—who frequently 

engage allies, partners, and others throughout the 

theater. This monograph will focus on the role of the

forward-based U.S. Army forces in the Indo-AsiaPacific region—that is, those outside the 50 states. Forward-based forces are a powerful tool in the pursuit of 

both national military and national security goals for 

several reasons:

• They are a visible U.S. presence in East, South,

and Southeast Asia and Oceania;

• They make tangible the many bilateral U.S. security commitments throughout the Indo-AsiaPacific region;

• They help ensure operational and other forms

of access both where they are based and 

beyond;
4

• They help promote interoperability with some

of America’s most capable military allies and 

most likely coalition partners; and,

• They help build capability among lesser able 

states for both regional and local stability and 

security.

However, as with the outdated notion of the Pacific theater as a Navy- or Air Force-only theater, the Army’s forward posture in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region 

reflects a bygone era. In many respects, the forward 

posture orientation of the Army today—centered on 

South Korea and, to a lesser degree, Japan—remains 

rooted in a rationale that has seen little wholesale reassessment since the end of the Cold War. The Army’s 

presence in South Korea is based on the threat that 

North Korea has posed in one form or another since 

the end of the Korean War and on the U.S. concomitant treaty obligations to South Korea. The same is 

largely true of the Army presence in Japan, which is 

primarily oriented toward logistical support of forces 

in South Korea but also grounded in a treaty commitment. If the Army’s posture in the Indo-Asia-Pacific 

region were a blank slate today, it is not entirely clear 

whether it would be in America’s interests to base its 

forces as they currently are. Certainly American treaty 

commitments to Japan and South Korea remain as 

vital today as they were 60 years ago. But given the 

changing strategic context and the role of the Army 

in fulfilling American strategy—subjects this monograph will examine further—it is conceivable that the 

existing Army posture is not as effective or as efficient 

as it might be and is instead a victim of inertia.

Changing that posture would not be easy politically, without up-front costs, or without risk. However, 
5

with the return of America’s soft power following the 

low point of George W. Bush’s first term, and with rising regional anxiety over Beijing’s increasingly overt 

ability and willingness to translate its economic power into political muscle, the time may be ripe for a reexamination and a reconceptualization of the Army’s 

forward presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. 

This monograph is certainly not the first to address 

the necessity of assessing and possibly reconceptualizing the U.S. military posture in the Indo-Asia-Pacific 

region. For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies recently completed a study on the 

subject of American forward presence in the Pacific 

theater, the American Enterprise Institute published 

a study on transforming the U.S. strategy in Asia that 

counted modifications to U.S. forward presence among 

its recommendations, and RAND published a report 

on the strategic choices facing Washington in terms 

of overseas presence.3

 However, those efforts did not 

address specifically or thoroughly the role played by 

the U.S. Army in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, focusing largely on the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine 

Corps. Older, similar strategies and proposals lacked 

modern budget austerity contextualization.4 Hence, a 

reassessment of the U.S. Army’s posture during an era 

of austerity and budget sequestration seems necessary 

and appropriate.

An analysis of the Army’s posture in the Pacific 

theater must begin by first addressing the changed 

strategic context, in order to discern the key factors 

that justify a reexamination of how the Army’s forward presence might be wielded in fulfilling U.S. 

strategy. Next, this monograph will assess the manner 

in which the United States has responded to the evolving context, with key changes in its strategy, including 
6

emphasizing standoff capability, cutting the total size 

of the military, and “rebalancing” toward the IndoAsia-Pacific region. One important manifestation of 

that rebalancing is the role that the Army’s forwardbased forces have or could have in securing American 

interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Finally, the 

monograph will examine whether and how changes 

in the Army’s forward posture may make those forces more effective and/or more efficient in achieving 

American ends and furthering American interests.

Change and Continuity in the Strategic Context.

The international environment facing the United 

States has changed significantly and in a variety of 

ways over the last 10-15 years. Three aspects of the 

current international security context are most salient 

in Washington. First, and perhaps most obviously, the 

United States now exists in an era of constrained fiscal 

resources. Argue as some may over whether the Pentagon’s budget is bloated following over a decade of 

war—and there is some evidence that parts of it are5—

the fact remains that DoD may have to implement 

some of most significant across-the-board spending 

cuts in recent memory.

The sequester agreement that was part of the 2011 

debt ceiling deal is the most immediate budgetary 

challenge facing the Department. The 2013 furlough 

of civilian employees impacted virtually every DoD 

function, from maintenance to training to strategic 

analysis to intelligence assessment. What is perhaps 

worse, though, from a national security perspective, is 

the impact on readiness. In early-2013, former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta argued that:
7

the Department of Defense is again facing what I believe and what the service chiefs believe and what 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe is the 

most serious readiness crisis that this country is [going 

to] confront in over a decade.6

In late-March 2013, the DoD announced it would 

end training for all Army units except those preparing to deploy to Afghanistan. It also announced that 

the Navy would stand down four wings—the equivalent of roughly 240 aircraft—and that the Air Force 

would curtail training for nondeployed squadrons.7

Taken together, this adds up to a military that is not 

as prepared as it should be to defend the interests and 

security of the United States and its allies around the 

world.8

In addition to readiness, current operations also 

face restrictions. Already the Pentagon has announced 

that it will only deploy one carrier strike force in the 

Persian Gulf, vice two. In late-February 2013, the U.S. 

Navy also announced it would cancel or defer six deployments.9

 Sequestration may also prevent the Army 

from deploying follow-on rotations to Afghanistan, 

thereby prolonging the deployments of units already 

in the field.10

Beyond the immediate challenges posed by sequestration, all indications are that the defense budget 

is headed downward over the next decade. From the 

peak of fiscal year (FY) 2010—when the defense budget was at its highest point in constant dollars since 

World War II—the defense budget now faces steady 

cuts for the foreseeable future. In previous drawdowns, such as those following the Korean War, the 

Vietnam War, and the Cold War, defense spending 

was cut an average of 33 percent in constant dollars.11
8

The Barack Obama administration’s own projections 

that accompanied the FY2014 budget submission bear 

out a continuation of this trend, as shown in Figure 

1.12 Regardless of whether one views that positively 

or negatively from a normative perspective, the fact 

is that American national security will face increased 

risk. That risk may be completely acceptable and manageable, or it may not—much will depend on how the 

United States wields strategy to mediate between risk 

and cost.

Figure 1. U.S. Defense Spending 

in Constant Millions of U.S. Dollars.

The second-most important aspect of the current 

strategic context is a reluctance among senior U.S. 

leaders to engage in any further land force-intensive 

operations in Asia or to take on any national security 

challenge that may require a major reconstruction effort. After a decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

this sense among senior policy- and decisionmakers 
9

reflects public opinion, which long ago began to turn 

against both wars and, in some ways, reflects the return of the “Vietnam syndrome” of the late-1970s and 

early-1980s. 

Regardless of the argument that the wars and Iraq 

and Afghanistan were chronically under-resourced, 

it has become conventional wisdom in Washington, 

DC, that large land wars, particularly in Asia but also 

the Middle East or Africa, ought to be avoided.13 For 

the national security community, and especially the 

defense community, this preference among senior 

decision- and policymakers was manifested through 

the Defense Strategic Guidance published in January 

2012. That document made it clear that the ActiveDuty U.S. military force should be, “able to secure 

territory and populations and facilitate a transition to 

stable governance on a small scale for a limited period.”14 Not surprisingly, the military services have 

adjusted accordingly, particularly as they each engage 

in planning for the post-International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) drawdown of military forces. For 

example, the Army has eliminated large-scale stability 

operations as one of the many criteria used to size and 

structure itself.

Despite the fact that eschewing major counterinsurgency and/or reconstruction efforts overseas, 

especially in Asia, may be good politics, it is unclear 

to many in the epistemic community whether it is a 

realistic policy.15 Many of those experts are far less 

sanguine regarding the U.S. ability to pick its enemies 

and its fights effectively, thereby limiting the conflicts 

America gets involved in to just those that Washington prefers.16 Events in Syria over the last 3 years—

and the U.S. reluctance to become involved in any 

extensive way—exemplify the challenges Washington 
10

will continue to face in trying to balance the pursuit 

of its interests against the recent baggage of Iraq and 

Afghanistan, at least until a new administration takes 

office in January 2017 and perhaps longer.

More specifically, even as the United States ends 

large-scale involvement on the ground in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, maritime-based tensions continue to rise 

in various locales across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. 

While it may be expedient and perhaps accurate to 

assume that the U.S. Navy would play the lead role 

at least initially in any American involvement in such 

a conflict, it is equally certain that as days give way 

to weeks and months, the United States may be compelled to commit ground forces. Theater and point air 

and ballistic missile defense, security force assistance, 

ground surveillance, cyber and network security, and 

theater sustainment and logistical support are just 

some of the extensive Army capabilities—in many 

cases, already in theater—that might be reasonably 

called upon in the event of a maritime dispute that 

lasts longer than several days.

Third, there is a growing perception that Asia is increasing in importance when it comes to regions of the 

world vital to the U.S. economy and hence the American way of life. For example, Asian economies clearly 

are growing at a faster rate than those elsewhere in the 

world, even with the recent economic slowdown.17

In terms of trade, the picture is somewhat more 

mixed, at least at first glance. For instance, in 2012, 

the top 15 U.S. trading partners (imports and exports 

combined) were Canada, China, Mexico, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), South Korea, Brazil, 

Saudi Arabia, France, Taiwan, the Netherlands, India, 

Venezuela, and Italy.18 From a regional perspective, 

and excluding contiguous neighbors, five of these 
11

countries are in East or South Asia, and five are in 

Europe—a relatively even split. In 2006, by contrast, 

six were from East or South Asia, and five were from 

Europe. In 2001, six were from East or South Asia, and 

six were from Europe.19 Finally, in 1990, six were from 

East or South Asia, and six were from Europe.20 Considered together, this hardly paints a picture of East 

and South Asia gradually, yet methodically, displacing Europe in terms of importance in trade relations.

A closer examination of the volume of trade reveals that Asia is growing in importance to the U.S. 

economy. In 2001, the dollar value of U.S. trade with 

the six East or South Asian countries in the top 15 was 

just over one and a half times that of trade with the top 

European countries; in 2006, the value of trade with 

Asia was nearly twice that of trade with Europe; and 

in 2012, the value of trade with Asia was more than 

twice that of trade with Europe. 

More specifically, there is also significant evidence 

that the Indian Ocean has grown in relative importance in terms of global trade.21 Given the volume of 

world trade that passes through it each day, the Indian Ocean has become arguably, “the world’s most 

important energy and international trade maritime 

route.”22 In Australia, Washington’s closest ally in the 

Indo-Asia-Pacific, leaders in Canberra, Australia, see 

the Indian Ocean as a region of greater importance 

than even the Pacific or Atlantic Oceans: 

Driven by Asia’s economic rise, the Indian Ocean is 

surpassing the Atlantic and Pacific as the world’s busiest and most strategically significant trade corridor. 

One-third of the world’s bulk cargo and around twothirds of world oil shipments now pass through the 

Indian Ocean.23
12

China recognizes the growing importance of the 

Indian Ocean as well, which explains in part its reported search for a series of friendly ports to potentially extend its influence in the region, and its efforts 

to develop pipelines across Southeast Asia for growing energy demand in southwest China.24 These and 

other data points and analyses from both private and 

public sources appear to support the notion that there 

is a steady if gradual shift in relative wealth and economic power toward East and South Asia that is likely 

to endure.25

In summary, the United States confronts a strategic context in which resources for national security 

will remain significantly constrained. With fewer resources at hand, there will be even greater emphasis 

on preventing conflict and shaping regional and global security environments as efficiently as possible, all 

in an effort to keep major conflicts and/or massive 

reconstruction and stability operations at bay. At the 

same time, the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific-Asia region will compel the United States to reallocate resources from other areas or within the region to 

make the most efficient use of limited tools in shaping 

and preventing. 

Shifting the Strategy.

Given these and other changes in the strategic context that the United States finds itself in, Washington 

has responded by shifting its military strategy in a variety of ways. First, it has begun to emphasize standoff 

military capability. This has been exemplified by the 

new Air-Sea Battle concept and the increased role of 

drones in U.S. military operations. Additionally, the 

United States has shown itself increasingly willing 
13

to employ—in the right circumstances—an approach 

that some critics of the Obama administration have 

derided as “leading from behind.” This model—exemplified by U.S. actions in support of several North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies involved 

in the Libyan civil war of 2011—seems a prudent use 

of American forces and assets, applicable to certain 

situations where the interests of U.S. allies are vital 

and American interests are less so.

Second, DoD has begun a significant drawdown 

of military personnel.26 From a wartime high of over 

560,000 Active-Duty Soldiers, the Army will reduce 

its end strength to below 490,000 over the next several years. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps is planning 

on dropping from roughly 205,000 Active-Duty Marines to roughly 182,000. Some argue the cuts should 

be even deeper.27 In any case, military leaders hope 

end strength cuts will result in significant budgetary 

savings and allow them to protect training and modernization funds.28 At the same time, military leaders 

also argue that even though U.S. forces may decline 

to roughly pre-September 11, 2001 (9/11) levels, the 

capabilities of tomorrow’s military will be far greater 

than that of the 1990s, given the combat experience of 

the last decade.29

Third, Washington has begun reemphasizing the 

importance of Asia in its foreign and defense policies. 

For the DoD, this was most dramatically and most recently expressed in the January 2012 Defense Strategic 

Guidance mentioned earlier. Since that time, many 

have interpreted America’s “pivot to the Pacific” as 

a means of containing China with a ring of military 

alignments, similar in some ways to how the United 

States sought to contain the Soviet Union through an 

array of security alliances and agreements—NATO, 
14

the Central Treaty Organization, and the Southeast 

Asia Treaty Organization, for example.30

However, U.S. policymakers and senior leaders 

have gone to great lengths to downplay the role of any 

containment element in Washington’s rebalancing 

strategy. “Our new strategy and rebalancing in Asia is 

. . . not about containing China,” said General Martin 

Dempsey, the senior U.S. military officer.31 More recently, Secretary of State John Kerry appeared to back 

away from the concept slightly, at least in its military 

manifestations: “I’m not convinced that increased military ramp-up [in the Asia-Pacific] is critical yet. . . . 

That’s something I’d want to look at very carefully.”32

Just 2 weeks later, former U.S. National Security Advisor Jim Jones characterized the phrase “pivot to Asia” 

as, “the words we regret most.”33

Regardless, the “pivot,” or rather the rebalancing, 

is not entirely a new phenomenon. It reflects an evolutionary change—not a revolutionary one—that has 

been underway for 2 decades as the United States devotes increasing attention to matters in East and South 

Asia and focuses less on the more limited security 

challenges in Europe and Latin America. Nonetheless, 

the Army has responded with additional measures 

since January 2012, beyond those that have been underway over the last 20 years. For example, the Army 

has removed the 25th Infantry Division, based in Hawaii, from the pool of forces available for worldwide 

deployment, which should enable the division to focus more on engaging partner militaries in the Pacific 

theater. Additionally, the Army has elevated the rank 

of the USPACOM commander, who is based in Hawaii, from a three-star general officer to a four-star 

general officer.
15

Another important element of America’s evolving 

policy toward the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater is the U.S. 

forward military presence. Whether the United States 

is rebalancing to engage China or to confront it—

among other objectives forward-based military forces 

can help to achieve—forward presence of U.S. forces 

plays a vital role. For example, forward presence could 

be used to contain China through both an intensification of existing bilateral security agreements between 

the United States and key partners and allies or the 

initiation of similar arrangements with new partners 

in the region. Alternatively, forward presence could 

also be used to engage China bilaterally and multilaterally, seeking to build confidence through transparency and the development of mutual understanding 

much in the way the United States used confidence 

and security-building measures of the 1980s and 1990s 

with the former Soviet Union.34 Actually a third option exists as well—that forward presence could be 

used simultaneously to achieve both of these objectives through a sort of “two-track” approach involving both carrots and sticks.

Because forward presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific 

region plays such an important role, it too has been 

subject to reexamination within the DoD in recent 

months and years. The unfolding results of this reexamination have included some changes in the U.S. 

force posture in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. To a limited degree, these changes have entailed adding more

to what is already a robust presence in the theater. For 

example, the recently concluded basing agreement 

with the Philippines to make use of facilities at Subic 

Bay and Clark Air Base will provide the U.S. military 

with an additional location to operate from, as well as 

a means to engage more actively the Filipino military 
16

and develop its capacity to promote security and stability in the region.

In other cases, the changes to posture entail shifting assets from others theaters to the Indo-Asia-Pacific 

region. For example, the U.S. Navy will shift its fleet 

presence from the current 50-50 split between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, to a roughly 60-40 split 

favoring the Pacific. The U.S. Navy will also deploy 

rotationally between two and four littoral combat 

ships to Singapore. 

Similarly, even though the U.S. Marine Corps is 

reducing end strength overall, it is shifting more of its 

remaining resources to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. 

In 2012, it conducted the first of what are likely to become increasingly larger annual training rotation deployments to Darwin, Australia, through 2016.35 The 

first two rotations in 2012 and 2013 included between 

200 and 250 Marines, while the 2014 rotation is slated 

to consist of 1,150 Marines. Eventually, the Marine 

Corps reportedly plans to send up to 2,500 Marines, 

as well as fixed and rotary wing aircraft.36 Elsewhere 

in Australia, the U.S. Air Force may make greater use 

of Australian Air Force bases, and the U.S. Navy may 

conduct more port calls on an Australian naval base 

outside of Perth.37

Meanwhile, the Army presence in the Western 

Pacific remains seemingly a captive of inertia based 

on a Cold War paradigm, with Army forces in the region still concentrated in South Korea and, to a lesser 

degree, Japan. Given strategic and regional dynamics 

during the Cold War, it made sense to base U.S. Army 

forces in these locations—after all, the contingency that 

would most likely require the application of American Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region was a 

North Korean invasion of the South. From a practical 
17

perspective, there were few other countries interested 

in permanently hosting U.S. forces in the region. 

However, having so many U.S. Army forces tied 

to missions supporting security and stability on the 

Korean Peninsula has meant that the Army has had 

to look elsewhere to source the increasingly important “shaping” and “preventing” activities across the 

region. It is likely that missions to shape the security 

environment and prevent conflict will comprise the 

majority of the U.S. military’s post-ISAF activities in 

the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater over the next decade. 

Unfortunately, for the U.S. Army to provide personnel and equipment for those missions from locations 

other than South Korea or Japan is neither an efficient 

nor effective use of limited resources. For instance, the 

cost of transporting personnel from Hawaii, Washington State, or Alaska to exercises and training events in 

the Indo-Asia-Pacific region is extraordinarily expensive, certainly more so than sending personnel from 

South Korea or Japan, even though that is not an option in most instances today. By one estimate, to send 

a Stryker battalion’s worth of personnel plus a company’s worth of their equipment from Washington State 

or Alaska to the Philippines for an exercise or training 

event costs roughly double—somewhere between $3 

million and $5 million, depending on the amount of 

advance notice possible—what it would cost to send 

the same from South Korea.38 Transportation costs 

consume so much of U.S. Army Pacific’s available 

security cooperation budget that they are unable to 

send Stryker Brigade Combat Teams into the IndoAsia-Pacific region for exercises or training in any significantly meaningful way. Certainly entire brigade 

combat teams are not necessary for many, if not most, 

of the security cooperation activities conducted by 
18

U.S. Army Forces, US Pacific Command (USARPAC) 

around the theater, but especially in cases where advanced operational and tactical interoperability across 

the range of military operations with America’s closest treaty allies is the objective, this necessarily limits 

the ability of the U.S. Army to contribute to overall 

American security objectives.

From one perspective, a U.S. Army posture focused on South Korea and Japan may appear to still 

make sense, considering recent North Korean saber rattling as well as Pyongyang’s renunciation of 

the 1953 armistice agreement that essentially ended 

the Korean War.39 However, given the significantly 

changed strategic context outlined previously and 

the extraordinarily high, recurring costs of deploying 

U.S. Army forces from the 50 states for security cooperation activities around the theater, it may be time to 

reexamine the basis for the Army’s presence in East 

Asia. As argued later in this monograph, the United 

States may need to consider recasting that presence 

if it might help to achieve U.S. objectives more effectively and more efficiently without gravely undermining the American commitment to the defense of South 

Korea and Japan or dramatically worsening relations 

with China. 

The Challenges of Adjusting U.S. Overseas Posture.

Certainly changing that presence may not be politically easy, inexpensive, or risk-free. For example, creating forward presence where one does not yet exist 

is a process usually accompanied by intense, lengthy 

political negotiations with prospective host nations. 

However, there is evidence that implies countries of 

the Indo-Asia-Pacific region may be more amenable 
19

to some U.S. military presence today than they have 

been in some time, even if only rotational in nature. 

This is because the U.S. ability to be viewed as the security partner of first resort has not been as great as it 

is today since the opening days of the Cold War, when 

perceptions of an ideologically and militarily aggressive Soviet Union pushed many in Europe, Asia, and 

elsewhere—particularly those not occupied by Soviet 

forces—to seek alignment with America.40

Witness, for example, the apparently complete 

turnaround in attitudes within the Philippines. In the 

immediate aftermath of the Cold War, political leaders in Manila essentially ejected the United States 

from military facilities at Subic Bay and Clark Air 

Base, which were among the largest overseas American bases worldwide. Today however, officials in the 

Philippines are actively pursuing an American military presence, largely as a means of hedging against 

growing Chinese influence in the South China Sea, 

also known as the West Philippine Sea. More specifically, the Chinese government has sent warships to escort large flotillas of fishing boats into the South China 

Sea to strengthen its claims within the area it has identified by the so-called “nine-dash line,” as depicted in 

Figure 2.41 Beijing has also accused the Philippines of 

“illegal occupation” of some of the Spratly Islands.42

Unable to counter Chinese military power alone and 

therefore interested in relying on the United States 

as an off-shore balancer, the Philippines has pursued closer military relations with the United States 

through basing agreements and an increased program 

of exercises and training events.43
20

Source: The Perry-Castañeda Library Collection, Austin, TX: 

University of Texas at Austin.

Figure 2. South China Sea, 

with the so-called “Nine-Dash Line.”

In fact, Manilla is not alone in pursuing such policies. Chinese actions in the South China Sea—as well 

as historical animosity between the Vietnamese and 

Chinese—have also been used to explain Vietnam’s 

rapprochement with the United States in recent years.44

Although reactions to China’s growing ambition are 

not uniform across the region, the combination of domestic politics, changes in the power dynamics of the 

international system, and historical baggage together 

have led countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, 
21

Malaysia, and Indonesia to seek closer ties with the 

United States, while simultaneously balancing their 

desire for regional and national autonomy.45 This represents a window of opportunity for the United States, 

which could leverage regional interest in closer ties to 

alter and/or expand U.S. forward-based posture in 

the theater to more efficiently and effectively promote 

U.S. interests across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

Even if political barriers can be overcome and negotiations successfully concluded—as appears to be 

the case in the Philippines—the budgetary hurdles 

may prove insurmountable in this era of fiscal austerity, given the up-front costs for even rudimentary facilities and then recurring variable and fixed costs associated with forward presence. For instance, the case 

of U.S. efforts to create and maintain forward operating sites46 in Romania and Bulgaria sheds light on the 

up-front, one-time costs to establish new facilities, as 

well as the recurring costs of maintaining such facilities. In this example, the United States spent roughly 

$110 million to develop basic training and life support 

facilities at existing Romanian and Bulgarian military 

bases, which together are capable of hosting an American brigade combat team.47 Since most U.S. forces 

use those facilities for exercises and training only on 

a periodic or rotational basis, most of the variable recurring costs are funded through exercise and training 

programs. Otherwise, the majority of fixed recurring 

operating costs are those associated with the so-called 

“warm basing” of the site in Romania and the “cold 

basing” of the site in Bulgaria, which entails maintaining the facilities between rotational deployments and 

managing any requirements generated by ongoing 

U.S. humanitarian and civic assistance missions. The 

warm/cold basing costs for the sites in Romania and 

Bulgaria are roughly $11 million per year.48
22

This provides a useful data point for having a sense 

of what changes to overseas posture can cost in terms 

of both one-time costs and recurring variable and 

fixed costs. Of course, costs in Bulgaria and Romania 

are very likely to differ from those in East Asia for any 

number of reasons, and so a more broadly based study 

of overseas presence costs can also help inform any 

assessment of one-time and recurring costs, as well 

as potential cost mitigation strategies for the United 

States. Such a cost study, recently directed by the U.S. 

Congress and completed by RAND, was designed to 

assess the relative costs and benefits between overseas 

permanent and rotational basing on the one hand and 

U.S. basing on the other. The RAND study found, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the largest single cost driver 

in switching from the current posture to an alternative 

posture was the cost of new construction.49 In arriving at this conclusion, the study authors assumed that 

the “alternative” would involve relocating forces from 

outside the United States to facilities inside the United 

States, but given the other conclusions reached by 

the study authors discussed here it seems reasonable 

to assume that the same would apply to a relocation 

from one overseas location to another overseas location as well. In terms of cost mitigation strategies, if 

the United States were to shift Army forces within the 

Indo-Asia-Pacific theater on either a permanent or rotational basis, it would be well-served by concentrating only on those locations with the most advanced 

pre-existing life support and training facilities, thereby minimizing the costs of any necessary upgrades.

Regarding whether an alternative rotational presence might be cheaper to maintain than an alternative 

permanent presence, somewhat counterintuitively to 

those unfamiliar with overseas presence issues, the 
23

study found that, “rotational presence is not necessarily less expensive than permanent presence.”50 More 

specifically, the study concluded that costs associated 

with rotational basing depend on the frequency and 

duration of deployments.51 Higher frequency deployments of shorter duration generated more cost, travel 

costs in particular, than lower frequency deployments 

of longer duration. Hence, if the United States cannot 

sustain the costs associated with permanent overseas 

presence, a rotational presence of long-duration deployments of many months, or even a year, would 

likely prove less expensive, and hence more sustainable from both budgetary and political perspectives, 

than short-term deployments of only several weeks or 

a few months.

Of the costs associated with long-duration, less 

frequent rotational deployments overseas, the congressionally mandated study also found that personnel-related costs, such as food, housing, and special 

allowances, were the most significant drivers. The 

United States may be able to mitigate some of these 

major costs by negotiating for prospective host nations 

to assume or at least share housing and food costs. Alternatively, special personnel pay allowances seem an 

unlikely candidate for cost-sharing arrangements.

When it comes to negotiations over cost sharing, 

the United States probably will not be able to replicate 

the direct support arrangements that are in place today with Japan, which has helped to offset by roughly 

75 percent the costs of permanently basing U.S. forces 

there.52 Nonetheless, even here the new strategic context may prove a benefit to the United States, forcing 

a new strategic calculus on countries in the Indo-AsiaPacific region and potentially making them more 

amenable to co-funding, defraying, or otherwise off-
24

setting the costs of an American military presence. For 

example, Germany provides tax and customs relief for 

U.S. forces, rent-free property for U.S. basing, thousands of acres of rent-free military training land, and 

other contributions that have offset roughly one-third 

of U.S. basing costs.53 Further south, Spain has provided similar indirect support that has offset more than 

half of U.S. basing costs.54 Similar offsetting, indirect 

support arrangements in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region 

would go far in reducing U.S. forward presence costs, 

while enabling prospective host nations to avoid the 

appearance of outsourcing national defense by providing direct payments for U.S. forces.

Finally, in addition to the hurdles described previously, changing the Army’s forward posture may have 

the unintended consequence of engendering a sense 

of encirclement or alienation among the Chinese. The 

roots of China’s strategic distrust of the United States 

extend at least to the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949—since then, the Chinese have 

largely maintained wariness toward America. U.S. 

efforts to shift more attention toward the Indo-AsiaPacific region, including as promulgated through the 

January 2012 Defense Planning Guidance, appear to 

be reinforcing those Chinese sentiments.55 For example, Washington’s strengthening of security ties with 

countries such as India and Vietnam—two countries 

that have fought border wars with China and that 

have not been traditional U.S. allies or even partners 

in most instances—have caused many in Beijing to 

believe that the United States is bent on containing 

China. More broadly, Chinese leaders have come to 

view American policies, attitudes, and misperceptions as the chief cause of strategic mistrust between 

the two countries.56 Even U.S. efforts to promote 
25

democracy and human rights are interpreted in Beijing 

as nothing more than Trojan horses for the expansion 

of American power abroad, often at China’s expense.57

Hence, although the United States has arguably done 

more than any other country to contribute to China’s 

ongoing modernization, America’s rebalancing risks 

feeding China’s sense of encirclement, undermining 

regional stability, and decreasing the possibility of cooperation between Beijing and Washington.58

However, Beijing may also come to understand 

that a different distribution of the Army presence in 

the Pacific theater—or even an increase in that presence—may actually benefit China in two distinct 

ways. First, a redistributed American Army forward 

presence may act as a pacifier for some of the more aggressive tendencies of U.S. allies in the region. For instance, given recent changes in the security dynamics 

of the region, the Philippines announced in mid-2013 

that it is spending $1.8 billion to expand and modernize its military aggressively in order to counter Chinese influence.59 A redistributed U.S. Army presence 

in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region might better enable 

military and security ties between the United States 

and its allies, such as the Philippines, thereby expanding American influence and social access and enabling 

the United States to better play the role of strategic 

pacifier with those allies and partners. This would be 

similar in some ways to how the former Soviet Union 

came to agree with the U.S. proposal to keep a unified 

Germany in NATO following the end of the Cold War. 

The Soviet Union came to see that it would be more 

secure with a unified Germany under the American 

security umbrella rather than a neutral Germany untethered from NATO and free to exercise its power in 

a more unilateral fashion.60
26

Second, a redistributed U.S. Army presence in 

the Pacific may make American allies throughout the 

theater more comfortable with a rising China, which, 

of course, would benefit Beijing as well. The presence of U.S. Army forces represents a tangible sign of 

American commitment on the ground to allied security. Building and maintaining the confidence of U.S. 

allies in the steadfastness of the American commitment to their security can benefit China by potentially 

mitigating some of the worst fears in the Philippines, 

Thailand, Australia, and elsewhere over China’s rise. 

This is similar in some ways to how Germany has 

supported continued American military presence in 

central Europe. Such support from Berlin is not based 

simply on the local impact of American dollars being 

spent in rural areas of Germany, where U.S. military 

facilities tend to be located, but also on a shrewd German understanding of how U.S. troop presence in 

Germany helps reassure Poland, the Czech Republic, 

France, and others regarding a growing, unified Germany as the most powerful country in Europe. Hence, 

in the contemporary Pacific context, it is plausible that 

China might actually, although perhaps not overtly, 

acquiesce to a changed disposition of Army forces in 

the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.61

Convincing Chinese officials of the potentially 

beneficial aspects of a redistributed or increased U.S. 

Army presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific will not be 

easy—some in Beijing suspect Washington is, in fact, 

actively fomenting aggressive behavior on the part of 

U.S. allies in the region.62 But there is already some 

limited evidence that China might welcome a pacifying role played by the United States vis-à-vis aggressive tendencies of American allies. For instance, an 

editorial in China Daily, which tends to reflect official 
27

opinion in China, noted that with regard to the dispute 

with the Philippines over competing island claims: 

The joint defense between the United States and the 

Philippines . . . will be a favorable factor to stabilize 

the situation in the South China Sea as long as the 

United States insists on joint defense and opposes to 

joint infringement and external expansion by its ally.63

Elsewhere, some Chinese scholars and officials 

seem open to the notion of recrafting the great power 

relationship between China and the United States.64

Part of that redefinition could include a recognition 

within China of the important role the United States 

can play in helping to ameliorate security dilemmas 

in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Nonetheless, whether Washington can succeed in convincing the government in 

Beijing of this—or whether the United States is willing 

to take other steps that China believes are necessary 

for amelioration of the security dilemma—remains 

to be seen. Regardless, whether Washington seeks 

to challenge and contain China, or to engage her, or 

even to do both, it is worth investigating whether the 

U.S. Army can contribute more effectively and more 

efficiently to American national security by moving 

beyond the Cold War paradigm that has led to an emphasis on the Korean Peninsula.

The Rationale for a Reassessment.

American military forces are forward-based for 

several reasons. First and foremost, the United States 

bases military forces abroad to defend vital U.S. interests by safeguarding the security of its most important 

allies. Examples might include the American presence 

in Germany during the Cold War or the American 
28

presence in South Korea today. Additionally, U.S. 

forces may be based overseas to be an ocean closer to 

critical lines of communication necessary for American security or that of its allies. The U.S. presence in 

Iceland during the Cold War was an example of this, 

promoting Washington’s ability to secure and defend 

the North Atlantic approaches to both North America 

and Europe.

Forward presence also contributes directly to 

building and maintaining interoperability with America’s most likely, most capable coalition partners, and 

to building and maintaining more limited but no less 

important capabilities among other, less capable partners. Examples of this include the U.S. presence in Europe today, which is critical to maintaining interoperability with highly capable allies such as France, 

Germany, Israel, Italy, and the United Kingdom, and 

to building the capability of militaries in southeastern Europe, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa to 

promote stability and security internally and in their 

immediate vicinities.

Finally, forward-based U.S. forces provide logistical support to American and allied forces elsewhere. 

Examples of this can be seen in elements of the U.S. 

presence in Germany and Japan today. During the last 

decade or more of war, the American presence in and 

around Kaiserslautern in southwestern Germany—

home to Ramstein Air Base and the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center—has been critical to sustaining 

operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Likewise, in 

the Pacific theater, U.S. Army forces in Japan provide 

logistical support to forces in South Korea.

The United States has maintained forward-based 

military forces in East Asia since the early-20th century for many of the reasons cited previously. How-
29

ever, the origins of today’s U.S. troop presence in East 

Asia are found in the broader Cold War era effort to 

provide a bulwark against systemic, if not existential, 

communist aggression. For the Army, this was most 

evident on the Korean Peninsula and in Southeast 

Asia, where American Landpower faced significant 

tests during the Korean War and the Vietnam War.

On the Korean Peninsula today, the deterrent role 

of the U.S. Army remains important. The presence of 

over 19,000 Soldiers in South Korea provides a tangible manifestation of U.S. support for South Korea, 

which would be important in any immediate response 

to a North Korean invasion and would act as a tripwire, compelling an even greater U.S. response in the 

event of large scale hostilities initiated by Pyongyang. 

Nonetheless, it appears as if the United States is 

preparing to take something of a backseat in the defense of the Korean Peninsula. As part of the Strategic 

Alliance 2015 agreement signed in July 2010, the South 

Korean military is soon to comprise the “supported” 

force, with the U.S. military playing a backup or supporting role. The United States will transfer wartime 

operational control from the American-led U.S.-South 

Korean Combined Forces Command—which will be 

disestablished—to the South Korean Joint Chiefs of 

Staff by the end of 2015, which will give South Korea 

primary responsibility for leading a response to any 

North Korean incursion while maintaining the U.S. 

commitment to South Korea’s defense. Although this 

date may slip somewhat due to concerns over whether and when South Korean forces will be ready, the 

underlying plan to transfer control has not been questioned by the United States or South Korea.

Additionally, U.S. forces will consolidate and relocate from bases around Seoul to more centralized loca-
30

tions south of the city—this will “improve efficiency, 

reduce costs, and enhance force protection by placing 

most service members and equipment outside the effective range of North Korean artillery.”65

Figure 3. U.S. Military Plan for Consolidation 

and Relocation in South Korea.66

For their part, the South Koreans appear to be committed to the task of assuming wartime operational 

control of their own forces, declaring their intent to 

strike back at the North if attacked.67 Moreover, U.S. 

Forces Korea—the American military command in 

South Korea—characterizes the South Korean military as “one of the most progressive and efficient defense organizations in the world.”68 At the same time, 

and in part due to demographic challenges, the South 

Korean military is in the process of reform designed 

to increase the qualitative capabilities of the armed 

forces at the expense of quantity—as part of Seoul’s 
31

Defense Reform Plan 2020, the Active-Duty military 

force will be cut by roughly 27 percent from 655,000 

troops to roughly 500,000, but the defense budget will 

increase so as to modernize equipment and develop a 

more professional military force.69

The relocation of U.S. forces from the inter-Korean border to south of Seoul should help increase the 

odds of their survivability in the event of any North 

Korean attack, as well as reduce the costs of keeping 

U.S. forces in South Korea. However, with Americans 

no longer on the front lines, literally and figuratively 

given the impending South Korean assumption of 

wartime operational control, this begs the question of 

whether and to what degree the U.S. Army presence 

in South Korea deters the North. Although difficult to 

assess given the opacity of the North Korean regime, 

it would appear at first glance that the deterrent value 

of U.S. Army forces relocated south of Seoul and no 

longer in operational lead would be more limited than 

a generation ago, when U.S. Army forces were more 

numerous in South Korea,70 more closely located near 

the demilitarized zone, and in the lead role. Nevertheless, upon further examination, it seems that although 

U.S. forces may contribute less today to deterrence by 

denial, they certainly or at least evidently still contribute to deterrence by punishment.

71 This appears to be 

the case because despite the reconfigured, relocated 

U.S. Army forces in South Korea, the North Koreans 

have not initiated a major attack. Certainly, there have 

been hundreds, even thousands, of North Korean violations of the armistice since 1953, most of them minor, but the long-feared artillery barrage of Seoul and 

subsequent massive armored and infantry invasion 

of the South has not occurred. The regime in Pyongyang evidently appears assured that the remaining, 
32

reconfigured U.S. forces in the South continue to play 

at least a “tripwire” role—in other words, the North 

Korean regime seems convinced that there would 

be an overwhelming American response to major 

aggression. 

Nonetheless, what remains unclear is what size of 

a tripwire is necessary. If U.S. Army forces in South 

Korea are to play any role beyond that of tripwire, 

the most useful role to play would likely be one the 

South Koreans cannot perform themselves or cannot 

perform very well. However, and as noted previously, 

the South Korean military is perhaps more capable 

and full-spectrum than at any time in its history and 

likely to become more so, thanks to ongoing reform 

efforts. Regardless, and perhaps most importantly for 

stability and security in Northeast Asia, any further 

reconfiguration of the American presence in South 

Korea must be accompanied by overt or explicit signaling, statements, and other actions by the United 

States of its resolve to remain steadfast in its alliance 

with the South and to punish any major aggression 

from the North.

Meanwhile, in Japan, which hosts the second largest concentration of U.S. Army forces in theater—

roughly 2,600 Soldiers—the government in Tokyo appears uninterested in taking up any mantle of global 

ambition. Indeed, Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) 

remain hobbled by what some analysts call “anachronistic constraints,”72 which prevent them from engaging more energetically overseas. For this reason, 

interoperability between U.S. Army and Japanese 

Ground SDF has been limited. Some have blamed this 

on a contrast in focus, with the U.S. Army emphasizing wars in Southwest and Central Asia, while Japanese land forces have concentrated on peacekeeping 
33

operations and disaster relief operations.73 More 

broadly though, Japan’s Ground SDF has never emphasized deployability or expeditionary, amphibious 

capabilities for reasons largely cultural and constitutional.74

The U.S. Army’s mission in Japan today is to operate port facilities and a series of logistics installations 

throughout Honshu and Okinawa. Key units based 

there include a combat sustainment and support battalion, an aviation battalion consisting of UH-60 helicopters and UC-35 fixed-wing aircraft, a signal battalion, an ordnance battalion, and a military police 

detachment. Meanwhile, 15,300 Marines, 12,700 Airmen, and 3,400 Sailors are also based in Japan.75 If the 

U.S. Army mission in South Korea were modified and 

the resulting forward presence there re-vamped in accordance with the modified mission, the Army may 

find decreasing utility for its forces in Japan and might 

consider turning over residual logistical functions to 

the Navy, which has a far larger presence in Japan and 

some of the very same logistical capabilities there.76

What Might a Reconfigured Army Presence 

in Asia Look Like?

If the U.S. Army’s mission in Northeast Asia were 

modified so as to enable the Army to achieve its objectives with fewer Soldiers in both South Korea and 

Japan, it is conceivable that the Army could make a 

greater contribution to theater-wide U.S. national 

military and national security objectives.77 It is even 

conceivable that such a contribution might be made 

more efficiently and more effectively than is presently 

the case. 
34

The strategy of the USARPAC—the Army component command within the larger USPACOM—

centers on achieving five related objectives across 

the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.78 The first of these—the 

highest priority—centers on assuring treaty allies of 

the steadfastness of the U.S. defense commitment 

and on maintaining and expanding operational and 

tactical interoperability. Of the six treaty allies in the 

Indo-Asia-Pacific theater, South Korea is arguably the 

only one where the physical presence of U.S. Army 

Soldiers makes a tangible, necessary difference in the 

deterrence of aggression against that treaty ally. None 

of the others—Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and 

Thailand—face the same type of threat for which a U.S. 

Army physical presence forms a necessary policy tool 

in terms of “assurance,” although as argued later in 

this monograph, the imperative to maintain interoperability for the most complex military operations 

across the region and beyond with a country such as 

Australia may form the basis for a reconsideration of 

this conventional wisdom.

Whether the U.S. Army presence in South Korea—

the tripwire that enables deterrence by punishment—

needs to remain as high as 19,000 Soldiers while still 

assuring Seoul and South Korea’s neighbors of the 

American commitment is open to debate. Arguably, 

that presence could be reduced to center on air and 

missile defense units and military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance units—two functional areas 

that even the increasingly capable South Korean military would likely garner great value from continuing 

to host and interact with—while still providing South 

Korea with treaty-based assurance and the ability to 

conduct bilateral exercises and training events. Additionally, shifting U.S. Army resources from South Ko-
35

rea and Japan to elsewhere would likely increase their 

operational resilience by dispersing them around the 

Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. At present, most of the U.S. 

Army’s “eggs” are in two baskets, South Korea and 

Japan, arguably the highest threat zones throughout 

the entire theater. This places them at great risk of 

strategic failure in the face of increasing threats from 

precision-guided munitions. Finally, a reduction in 

the Army presence in South Korea would have the 

added benefit of reducing administrative and logistical costs to the Army. Because most U.S. troops serve 

in South Korea on 1-year tours of duty, unaccompanied by family members or other dependents, roughly 

600 to 700 U.S. servicemen and servicewomen arrive 

or leave South Korea each month.

79 Indeed, the current commander of U.S. Forces Korea, General James 

Thurman, has asked the Army and other U.S. military 

services to investigate how they might collectively 

mitigate the negative effects created by the high turnover rate.80

If the number of U.S. Soldiers in South Korea were 

reduced—as well as the number of U.S. Soldiers in 

Japan—and repositioned elsewhere in the theater on 

a permanent or long-duration rotational basis, those 

U.S. forces could be utilized to achieve USARPAC’s 

theater-wide objectives far more cheaply than flying 

in personnel and equipment from Hawaii, Alaska, or 

the continental United States. After “assure,” the next 

highest priority for USARPAC is to promote the ability of key partners to assume greater responsibility for 

security and stability in their region and beyond. This 

essentially entails developing among key partners 

their ability to lead and participate in multinational 

crisis response operations across the range of military 

operations, with or without U.S. forces. 
36

If such operations are to occur in conjunction with 

U.S. forces, then interoperability is critical—namely, 

the ability of allied or partner military forces and those 

of the United States to operate side by side or embedded with each other in military operations. America’s 

most important ally in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region in 

this regard is Australia, with good reason. In repeated 

instances, the Australian government has proven itself willing and able to deploy and sustain Australian 

military forces for operations with U.S. forces. Afghanistan provided the most recent evidence of this, 

and there is no reason to think this will change any 

time soon, despite a period of budget austerity on both 

sides of the Pacific.81 The commonality of world outlook; the shared values; and the professional, capable, 

expeditionary nature of the Australian military make 

Australia one of America’s most likely, most capable 

future coalition partners.82

Most recently, U.S. Army and Australian forces 

worked together in Uruzghan province in Afghanistan, building interoperability on the ground in the 

process. With the ISAF mission in Afghanistan winding down over the next 1 1/2 years and with Australian forces poised to end their mission in Afghanistan 

by late-2013, there is no Army presence in Australia 

today or planned for tomorrow that might be used to 

maintain interoperability with this critical ally. Moreover, the ABCA program—designed to promote interoperability between the armies of America, Britain, 

Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—has languished 

in recent years due to a lack of available forces, funding cuts, and episodic senior-level attention within the 

Army.83 When U.S. Army forces are sent to exercise 

with Australian counterparts—for instance, as part of 

the Talisman Saber exercise series, held for 3 weeks 
37

every other year—they are typically deployed at significant cost from the United States, particularly the 

25th Infantry Division based in both Hawaii and Alaska, as well as Army units based in Washington State. 

Although the United States lacks the same kind of 

strategic interoperability imperative with India that it 

has with Australia, it remains nonetheless important 

to Washington to promote the ability of India to exercise regional, if not global, leadership in promoting 

security and stability. Deepening defense and security 

cooperation with India is therefore of critical importance to Washington, particularly as ISAF and the large 

American presence in Central Asia comes to an end.84

In fact, former Secretary of Defense Panetta called defense cooperation with India “a lynchpin” of the U.S. 

strategy to rebalance to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.85

To this end, the U.S. Army has responded by intensifying its relationship with the Indian Army, focusing 

specifically on building capabilities for peacekeeping 

operations. In 2004, the two armies began conducting 

an annual training event dubbed “Yudh Abhyas,” the 

first such engagements since 1962. In 2009, the series 

expanded from what were relatively small annual 

exchanges focused on command post activities—that 

year, roughly 250 U.S. Soldiers based in Hawaii traveled to India, with 17 Stryker vehicles, to take part in 

live-fire and field training exercises over 2 1/2 weeks. 

In 2010, roughly 150 Indian soldiers traveled to Joint 

Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska for 2 weeks 

to participate in Yudh Abhyas 2010. In March 2012, 

170 U.S. Soldiers based in Hawaii, Alaska, and Japan 

traveled to an Indian Army training area in Rajasthan 

for 2 weeks to conduct Yudh Abhyas 2011-12, a livefire event and a field training exercise built around a 

peacekeeping operation scenario. The 2011-12 itera-
38

tion was noteworthy for the deployment of three U.S. 

tanks to India to participate in the event. In May 2013, 

roughly 200 Indian soldiers traveled to Ft. Bragg, NC, 

to participate in Yudh Abhyas 2013 for 2 weeks, which 

included a combined airborne operation.

If some of the U.S. Army forces in South Korea and 

Japan were repositioned closer to Southeast Asia, security cooperation events designed to maintain strategic, operational, and tactical interoperability with the 

Australian Army for the full range of military operations and to build operational and tactical interoperability with the Indian Army for a more limited set of 

operations, including peacekeeping, potentially could 

be executed more easily, cheaply, and frequently—

transportation costs alone would be cut at least in 

half, compared to sending forces from the 50 states to 

participate in such events.86 At the same time, those 

U.S. Army forces could more easily and cheaply also 

accomplish the third USARPAC objective—enhancing critical capabilities among partners so that those 

partners can address internal security challenges and 

participate in regional peacekeeping, humanitarian 

assistance, and disaster relief operations.

Enhancing the capabilities of partner militaries in 

this way is an objective pursued by USARPAC across 

the entire Indo-Asia-Pacific region, including China 

specifically. Obviously, some countries are more 

willing than others to participate in the kinds of security cooperation events that help to achieve these 

objectives, such as small-scale bilateral exercises and 

subject matter expert exchanges. Nevertheless, as evidenced by the cost data discussed earlier in this monograph, the cost of engaging willing partners to achieve 

U.S. objectives would likely be lower if the Army had 

forward-based forces repositioned closer to Southeast 
39

Asia, as well as those remaining in Northeast Asia, 

vice deploying forces from Hawaii, Alaska, or the continental United States.

Repositioning U.S. Army forces toward Southeast 

Asia would also enable USARPAC to achieve its fourth 

and fifth priorities more effectively in the Indo-AsiaPacific theater—opening new relationships and sustaining traditional, less intensive relationships—but 

the efficiency gains would likely be more limited than 

those described previously. These last two objectives 

are pursued largely through senior-leader engagements and small group exchanges, usually involving 

limited numbers of personnel and little to no military 

equipment.

Nonetheless, it seems that there may indeed be efficiencies to be gained and costs to be reduced through 

a repositioning of some U.S. Army forces toward 

Southeast Asia. When it comes to specific locations 

where U.S. Army forces might be relocated to from 

South Korea and/or Japan, or whether such a repositioned forward presence might be permanent or rotational, the options depend first on the objectives to be 

achieved. For instance, the Army’s experience both in 

Europe and South Korea has shown that, in order to 

maintain ground forces strategic, operational, and tactical interoperability across the full range of military 

operations, permanent forward presence is preferable 

to rotational presence.87

Given Australia’s role as the closest, most interoperable, most capable ally in the theater today and the 

fact that Australia is likely to remain America’s most 

capable, most likely future coalition partner, it seems 

logical to consider a permanent U.S. Army presence 

there, or at least long-duration rotational deployments. As noted previously, the Marines have already 
40

begun short-term rotational deployments to an Australian military training facility near Darwin, on the 

northern coast of Australia. The U.S. Army needs to be 

interoperable with the Australians, too, particularly as 

the Marine Corps returns from essentially functioning 

as America’s second land force in Iraq and Afghanistan to being the light, forced-entry military component, which is their comparative advantage. So far, 

public opinion surveys in Australia reveal growing 

support for the Marines’ rotational presence—in 2011, 

55 percent of Australians were either strongly in favor 

or somewhat in favor of the U.S. presence in Darwin, 

whereas in 2013, that figure had risen to 61 percent.88

A mid-sized city of 130,000 people with a history 

of hosting military service members, Darwin represents a potential location for an initially small presence of U.S. Soldiers—ideally permanent, but perhaps 

consisting of medium- to longer-term rotational deployments at first. Such a presence could be usefully 

modeled on the Bulgaria/Romania example cited earlier, which would focus on extensive interoperability 

training with nearby Australian forces but also include 

shorter-duration training and exercise deployments 

from the warm base in Australia to Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and 

elsewhere. With an English-speaking population and 

a Western culture, Australia provides a potentially attractive host nation environment, as the U.S. Marine 

Corps is now learning. The Australian Army’s Robertson Barracks—20 minutes’ drive from the center of 

Darwin—plays host to a light-armored brigade, which 

trains at the Bradshaw Field Training Area, roughly 

600 kilometers southwest. The Bradshaw Field Training Area is a 2.1 million acre training site, which is 

the largest in Australia and roughly three times the 
41

size of the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA. 

Bradshaw Field includes a joint and combined Australian-U.S. training center, as well as an airstrip capable of handling C-17 Globemasters. However, other 

infrastructure at Bradshaw Field is quite limited, and 

excessive precipitation during the rainy season makes 

it difficult to fully utilize the training area from lateNovember until early-April.

Whether a cost-sharing agreement could be 

reached with Australia for a permanent or long-duration rotational presence at Robertson Barracks or 

Bradshaw Field, of course, remains to be seen. However, with an arrangement similar to what U.S. forces 

enjoy in Germany—including no-cost lease of land, no 

taxes, no customs duties, and cost-free access to existing military training grounds—the Australian government thereby could indirectly carry roughly 30 percent of the cost of basing U.S. Soldiers there. From the 

U.S. Army’s perspective, the roughly $21 million that 

is spent on theater security cooperation events across 

the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater every year—the vast majority of which is spent on transportation of personnel 

and equipment participating in roughly 14 exercises 

annually—could be spread among many more events 

if the transportation-related cost of participation were 

cut by 50-75 percent.

A second possible location for a more robust U.S. 

Army presence may be the Philippines. At present, 

though, media reports indicate the Filipino government has agreed only to a rotational presence of U.S. 

ships, aircraft, and troops for training events, exercises, and disaster and relief operations, with the potential of pre-positioning military equipment as well.89

In any case, an initial rotational presence of increasingly longer durations may provide a starting point 
42

for consideration of other, varied U.S. Army forward 

presence options in the longer-term.90

Given its central location in the Indo-Asia-Pacific 

region, relative at least to Australia and certainly to 

South Korea, transportation costs associated with a 

robust security cooperation program—increasingly 

critical to American national security as described in 

the strategic context section previously—would most 

likely be far less than they are today. Moreover, response times to potential crisis locations across the 

increasingly critical lines of communication from the 

Indian Ocean to the Pacific would be shorter. Additionally, space for an increased American presence—

whether permanent or rotational—exists in the form 

of what remains of the shuttered Subic Bay naval facility and Clark Air Base, which were the largest overseas American military facilities in the world during 

the Cold War period. Given the pressure Chinese actions in the South China Sea are generating in Manila, 

the government there may be amenable to some costsharing arrangement in what has been described as a 

“renaissance” period in U.S.-Filipino relations.91

A third potential location for an increased Army 

presence in Southeast Asia may be Thailand. The 

U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield is currently the 

only facility in Southeast Asia capable of supporting 

large-scale logistical operations.92 Although the United States maintains significant military, intelligence, 

and law enforcement ties with Thailand, it is unclear 

whether the government in Bangkok today has the 

same strategic outlook and interests as the United 

States. Hence, its “reliability as a partner and its ability to be a regional leader” are uncertain.”93 More specifically, the 2006 military coup has complicated U.S. 

relations with Thailand, and the country is therefore 
43

a less attractive partner for a permanent or even rotational U.S. Army presence.94

Regardless of the specific location—Thailand, the 

Philippines, Australia, or elsewhere—Washington 

would need to carefully manage the presence, activities, and numbers of permanent or rotationally deployed U.S. Army forces. American military activities 

overtly aimed against China or Chinese interests would 

likely magnify the sense among potential host nations 

that they are choosing between the United States and 

China, a position that is anathema for most countries 

of the region. Clear benefits to local populations—for 

example, in terms of contracts with local businesses, 

employment of local nationals, and engagement with 

and support for local civic organizations—would go 

far in solidifying positive perceptions of any new 

American military presence in Southeast Asia. 

Conclusion.

In a period of declining defense budgets and 

decreasing military end strength, the U.S. military 

cannot afford to continue to add tasks to its already 

lengthy to-do list. Likewise, “doing more with less” is 

a recipe for strategic and tactical failure. In the specific 

context of America’s rebalance to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, characterized previously as an unfolding 

evolution in American security policy, it appears increasingly evident that, to achieve all of its objectives, 

the United States must reexamine long-held assumptions and policy choices. Without doing so, the costs 

of maintaining increased outreach to and engagement 

with Indo-Asia-Pacific countries outside of Northeast 

Asia will soon become unsustainable. The tyranny of 

distance in the Pacific theater and the costs associated 
44

with sending a company of Soldiers from Hawaii, 

Alaska, or Washington State to Australia make this 

point all the more stark for the land-based U.S. Army.

The Army’s enduring presence in Northeast Asia 

appears to be one of those long-held policy choices 

ripe for a reassessment. The preceding pages do not 

suggest completely abandoning a forward presence in 

Northeast Asia—to the contrary, deterrence through 

punishment remains a key, vital element in U.S. policy 

toward the erratic regime in Pyongyang, made tangible by the presence of American boots on the ground 

in South Korea. Nonetheless, it seems plausible that a 

reconfigured U.S. Army presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region would enable the United States to achieve 

its objectives in the theater more effectively and more 

efficiently, reducing costs to the military, while simultaneously expanding the array of objectives the 

forward-based forces can help to achieve. 

Specifically, by reorienting some of its existing forward presence from Northeast Asia toward Southeast 

Asia, the U.S. Army could make its efforts at promoting, enhancing, opening, and sustaining key relationships cheaper and easier to fulfill. At the same time, 

the U.S. Army could continue to play its critical role 

in assuring treaty allies and partners throughout the 

entire theater of the steadfastness of America’s commitments.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, commonly known as the 

Defense Strategic Guidance, Washington, DC: DoD, January

2012, p. 2.
45

2. In contrast, U.S. European Command has been led by 

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps officers; U.S. Central Command by Army, Navy, and Marine Corps officers; and 

U.S. Southern Command by Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 

Corps officers.

3. “U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An 

Independent Assessment,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, August 2012; Thomas G. Mahnken et 

al., “Asia in the Balance: Transforming U.S. Military Strategy in 

Asia,” Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, June 2012; 

and Lynn E. Davis et al., “U.S. Overseas Military Presence: What 

Are the Strategic Choices?” Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012. See 

also the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report, which 

called for increased U.S. Navy presence in the Western Pacific for 

the U.S. Air Force to develop contingency basing plans in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial 

Defense Review, Washington, DC: DoD, September 30, 2001, available from www.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf.

4. See for example, U.S. Department of Defense, Strengthening 

U.S. Global Defense Posture Report To Congress, Washington, DC: 

DoD, September 2004. 

5. Gordon Adams, “Fiscal Cliff Notes,” Foreign Policy, 

November 6, 2012, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/

articles/2012/11/06/fiscal_cliff_notes?page=0,0. Adams cites acquisition policy, military overhead or “the back office,” and personnel 

policy as three areas most in need of scrutiny.

6. Leon E. Panetta, speech delivered at Georgetown University, February 6, 2013, available from www.defense.gov/Speeches/

Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1747.

7. Marcus Weisgerber, “Pentagon Projects $35B O&M 

Shortfall,” Defense News, March 5, 2013, available from www.defensenews.com/article/20130305/DEFREG02/303050015/PentagonProjects-35B-O-M-Shortfall?odyssey=nav|head.

8. Cheryl Pellerin, “DOD Comptroller: Sequestration devastates U.S. military readiness,” American Forces Press Service, May 

10, 2013, available from www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123348049; 
46

Seth Robson and Jon Rabiroff, “Cuts would affect readiness in Pacific, military leaders say,” Stars and Stripes, February 28, 2013, 

available from www.stripes.com/news/sequestration/cuts-wouldaffect-readiness-in-pacific-military-leaders-say-1.210012.

9. Jeanette Steele, “SD Destroyer, Frigate Won’t Deploy,” 

The San Diego Union-Tribune, March 6, 2013, available from www.

utsandiego.com/news/2013/mar/06/preble-rentz-sequestration/.

10. Interview with a senior field grade officer on the Army 

staff, February 20, 2013.

11. U.S. Air Force, March 17, 2012, as cited in Peter W. Singer, “Separating Sequestration Facts from Fiction,” Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, September 23, 2012, available from www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2012/9/

sequestration%20singer/sequestration%20singer.pdf.

12. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 

“National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2014,” Washington, DC: Office of the Comptroller, May 2013, available from 

comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2014/FY14_Green_Book.pdf.

13. Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates famously noted in 

February 2011, “In my opinion, any future defense secretary who 

advises the president to again send a big American land army into 

Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined.’” Thom Shanker, “Warning Against Wars Like Iraq and 

Afghanistan,” The New York Times, February 25, 2011, available 

from www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/world/26gates.html.

14. U.S. Department of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” commonly known 

as the Defense Strategic Guidance, January 2012, p. 4. Emphasis 

added.

15. Additionally, there is some evidence of an ongoing debate within the U.S. military over its role in so-called “Phase 0” 

operations—those that are meant to shape the security environment and prevent conflict before it can happen, such as security 

cooperation events.
47

16. See, for example, James Dobbins, “Learning Curve: ‘Never 

Again’ is the wrong lesson to draw from the Iraq war,” Foreign 

Policy, March 13, 2013, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/13/learning_curve; and Daniel Byman and Renanah 

Miles, “A Modest Post-Assad Plan” The National Interest, November-December 2012, available from nationalinterest.org/article/modest-post-assad-plan-7624?page=3. 

17. See, for example, “Developing East Asia slows, but continues to lead global growth at 7.1% in 2013,” World Bank press 

release, October 13, 2013; Lucas Kawa, “The 20 Fastest Growing 

Economies In The World,” Business Insider, October 24, 2012; and 

“World Economic Outlook Update,” International Monetary Fund, 

July 9, 2013.

18. “Top Trading Partners—Total Trade, Exports, Imports, 

Year-to-Date December 2012,” Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, available from www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1212yr.html.

19. “Top 25 U.S. International Merchandise Trade Partners 

by Value: 1970—2001,” Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, available from apps.bts.gov/publications/us_international_trade_and_freight_transportation_trends/2003/html/table_

05.html.

20. Ibid.

21. For example, see Donald L. Berlin, “Neglected no longer: 

strategic rivalry in the Indian Ocean,” The Harvard International 

Review, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 26-31; Robert D. Kaplan, “Center stage 

for the twenty-first century,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 2, pp. 

16-32; David Michel and Russell Sticklor, “Indian Ocean Rising: 

Maritime and Security Policy Challenges,” David Michel and 

Russell Sticklor, eds., Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and 

Policy Challenges, Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2012, pp. 

9-22; and the prepared statement of Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, 

commander of U.S. Pacific Command, before the House Armed 

Services Committee on March 5, 2013, available from docs.house.

gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20130305/100393/HHRG-113-AS00-WstateLocklearUSNA-20130305.pdf.
48

22. Christian Bouchard and William Crumplin, “Neglected 

no longer: the Indian Ocean at the forefront of world geopolitics 

and global geostrategy,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 6, 

No. 1, June 2010, pp. 26- 51.

23. Australian Government, “Australia in the Asian Century,” October 2012, p. 74, available from asiancentury.dpmc.gov.au/.

24. Declan Walsh, “Chinese Company Will Run Strategic 

Pakistani Port,” The New York Times, January 31, 2013, available 

from www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/world/asia/chinese-firm-will-runstrategic-pakistani-port-at-gwadar.html?_r=0. Jamil Anderlini and 

Gwen Robinson, “China-Myanmar pipeline to open in May,” 

Financial Times, January 21, 2013, available from www.ft.com/

cms/s/0/faf733ae-63b6-11e2-af8c-00144feab49a.html#axzz2Oku66wep.

25. See, for example, “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed 

World,” Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council p. 7, available from www.dni.gov/files/documents/Global%20Trends_2025%20

Report.pdf; Clyde Prestowitz, Three Billion New Capitalists: The Great 

Shift of Wealth and Power to the East, New York, NY: Basic Books, 

2005; Raymond J. Ahearn, “Rising Economic Powers and the Global Economy: Trends and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report, Washington, DC: Congressional Research 

Service, August 22, 2011; and “Global wealth shifting to Asia, says 

former World Bank chief,” ABC Radio Australia, March 23, 2012, 

available from abcasiapacificnews.com/stories/201203/3461603.htm.

26. Special Operations Forces are a major exception to this. 

They are slated to grow in the coming years.

27. David W. Barno, Nora Bensahel, and Travis Sharp argue 

that the Army should consist of anywhere from 482,000 to 430,000 

Active-Duty Soldiers, depending on the particular strategy chosen and the amount of budget savings desired. See “Hard Choices: Responsible Defense in an Age of Austerity,” Washington, 

DC: Center for a New American Security, October 2011, available from www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_HardChoices_BarnoBensahelSharp_0.pdf. More recently, Gary Roughead 

and Kori Schake argue that an Army Active Duty end strength of 

290,000, consistent with a strategy that shifts emphasis away from 

long ground wars and toward rapid response and greater reliance 
49

on allies, should be considered. See “National Defense in a Time 

of Change,” Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, February 2013, available from www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/

papers/2013/02/us%20national%20defense%20changes/thp_rougheaddiscpaper.pdf.

28. Lance M. Bacon, “Cutting 31,000 more soldiers: How small 

will the Army get?” Army Times, March 5, 2013.

29. Chris Carroll, “Army, Air Force chiefs defend cuts in 

end strength,” Stars and Stripes, January 27, 2012, available from 

www.stripes.com/news/army-air-force-chiefs-defend-cuts-in-endstrength-1.166957.

30. Respectively, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 

the South East Asia Treaty Organization, and the Central Treaty 

Organization.

31. James Kitfield, “Is Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ Really a Hedge 

Against China?” The Atlantic, June 8, 2012, available from www.

theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/is-obamas-pivot-to-asiareally-a-hedge-against-china/258279/.

32. As quoted in Howard LaFranchi, “US ‘pivot to Asia’: 

Is John Kerry retooling it?” Christian Science Monitor, February 

20, 2013, available from www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2013/0220/US-pivot-to-Asia-Is-John-Kerry-retooling-it.

33. “US re-focussing its Asia ‘pivot’,” Bangkok Post, March 5, 

2013, available from www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/338860/usstill-intent-on-new-asia-focus-state-department.

34. For more on how the U.S. Army might contribute to security and confidence building measures with China, see John R. 

Deni, “Strategic Landpower and the U.S. Army Role in the IndoAsia-Pacific,” Parameters, Vol. 43, No. 3, Autumn 2013.

35. Matt Siegel, “As Part of Pact, U.S. Marines Arrive in 

Australia, in China’s Strategic Backyard,” The New York Times, 

April 4, 2012, available from www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/world/

asia/us-marines-arrive-darwin-australia.html; Gidget Fuentes, “Marines pave way for larger force in Australia,” Marine Corps Times, 
50

October 16, 2012, available from www.marinecorpstimes.com/

news/2012/10/marine-australia-darwin-success-101612/.

36. Such a large rotation is only likely in the final year—2016—

of the initial 5-year agreement.

37. Matt Siegel, “As Part of Pact, U.S. Marines Arrive in Australia, in China’s Strategic Backyard,” The New York Times, April 

4, 2012, available from www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/world/asia/usmarines-arrive-darwin-australia.html.

38. Interview with civilian officials from U.S. Army Pacific, 

October 11, 2013.

39. Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Declares 1953 War Truce 

Nullified,” The New York Times, March 11, 2013, available from 

www.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/world/asia/north-korea-says-it-has-nullified-1953-korean-war-armistice.html?_r=0.

40. A different subject for a different study, but suffice it to 

say that this monograph assumes it is in Washington’s interests to 

have other countries seeking to gain American favor.

41. Carl Munoz, “The Philippines re-opens military bases to 

US forces,” The Hill, June 6, 2012, available from thehill.com/blogs/

defcon-hill/operations/231257-philippines-re-opens-military-bases-tous-forces-; Alexis Romero, “US-Phl agree on close defense cooperation,” The Philippine Star, March 19, 2013, available from www.

philstar.com/headlines/2013/03/19/921621/us-phl-agree-close-defensecooperation.

42. Nikko Dizon, “PH: US, allies may use military bases,” 

Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 28, 2013, available from globalnation.

inquirer.net/78885/ph-us-allies-may-use-military-bases.

43. Manuel Mogato, “Manila plans air, naval bases at Subic 

with access for U.S., officials say,” Reuters, June 27, 2013, available from www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/27/us-philippines-usaidUSBRE95Q0C120130627; see also “New Philippine base will 

send message to China—Expert,” ABS-CBNnews.com, June 

27, 2013, available from www.abs-cbnnews.com/focus/06/27/13/

new-philippine-base-will-send-message-china-expert.
51

44. Richard Weitz, “Nervous Neighbors: China Finds a Sphere 

of Influence,” World Affairs Journal, March/April 2011. Weitz 

writes, “Unsurprisingly, it has been the Vietnamese who have 

most eagerly sought to work with their former adversary to balance the regional colossus.” See also Nayan Chanda, “The slow 

rapprochement,” The American Review, November 2012, available 

from americanreviewmag.com/stories/The-slow-rapprochement. Admittedly though, there is not universal agreement on the forces 

motivating the Vietnamese government today. See Carlyle Thayer, “Strategic Posture Review: Vietnam,” World Politics Review, 

January 15, 2013, pp. 1-11; as well as Carlyle Thayer, “Vietnam’s 

Strategic Outlook,” Security Outlook of the Asia Pacific Countries and 

Its Implications for the Defense Sector, NIDS Joint Research Series 

No. 7, The NIDS International Workshop on Asia Pacific Security, 

Tokyo, Japan: The National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, 

2013, pp. 69-88.

45. Il Hyun Cho and Seo-Hyun Park, “The Rise of China and 

Varying Sentiments in Southeast Asia toward Great Powers,” 

Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 7, Issue 2, Summer 2013.

46. Previously referred to as Task Force East, the U.S. forward 

operating sites in Romania and Bulgaria have collectively been 

called the Black Sea - Area Support Team (BS-AST) since 2011.

47. Seth Robson, “New bases in Bulgaria, Romania cost U.S. 

over $100M,” Stars and Stripes, October 17, 2009, available from 

www.stripes.com/news/new-bases-in-bulgaria-romania-cost-u-s-over100m-1.95658.

48. This figure is an estimate, based on validated requirements. The $11M figure covers warm basing of the Temporary 

Food Event facility in Romania at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base—

meaning it is able to support an announced unit mission within 

30 days of notification—and the cold basing of the TFE facility in 

Bulgaria at Novo Selo—meaning it is able to support to an announced unit mission within 60-90 days of notification.

49. Michael Lostumbo et al., Overseas Basing of U.S. Military 

Forces An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits, Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 2013, p. 177.
52

50. Ibid., p. 176.

51. Ibid.

52. U.S. Department of Defense, Statistical Compendium On Allied Contributions To The Common Defense, Washington, DC: DoD, 

2004, p. B-21.

53. Ibid., p. B-7.

54. Ibid., p. B-16.

55. Ely Ratner, “Rebalancing to Asia with an Insecure China,” 

The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 2013, pp. 21-38.

56. Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.-China 

Strategic Distrust, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 

2012, p. 7; Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, “How China 

Sees America: The Sum of Beijing’s Fears,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, 

No. 5, September/October 2012, pp. 32-47.

57. Lieberthal and Jisi, p. 11.

58. Nathan and Scobell, pp. 32-47; Robert S. Ross, “The Problem With the Pivot: Obama’s New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and 

Counterproductive,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 6, November/

December 2012, pp. 70-82.

59. Cecil Morella, “Philippines boosts military to resist ‘bullies’,” Agence France-Presse, May 21, 2013, available from www.

google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jeDtBpfWgBRcqS1PdWv2-

M2vRCQg?docId=CNG.2083e68bf6225d54f1ac44ad4d6d7e4c.291.

60. James A. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, 

and Peace, 1989-1992, New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1995.

61. The analogy to Germany is not perfect, as obviously there 

are no U.S. troops stationed in China. However, U.S. troops’ presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific clearly has a reassuring affect upon 

American allies. This should not be lost on Chinese leadership.

62. Ratner, p. 23.
53

63. “A neutral US helpful to stability in S China Sea,” China Daily USA, May 7, 2012, available from usa.chinadaily.com.cn/

opinion/2012-05/07/content_15226749.htm.

64. Ratner, p. 28.

65. Peter Lavoy, testimony delivered before the House Armed 

Services Committee, Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, March 28, 2012, available from armedservices.house.gov/index.

cfm/files/serve?File_id=4fa3e4af-2edf-4152-adf9-97a6fbc0176e.

66. “The New Korea,” U.S. Forces Korea, October 2010, p. 

27, available from www.usfk.mil/usfk/Uploads/120/USFK_SD_

SPREAD_10MB.pdf.

67. Jack Kim and Louis Charbonneau, “South Korea says to 

strike back at North if attacked,” Reuters, March 6, 2013, available from www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/us-korea-north-idUSBRE92508720130306.

68. “The New Korea.”

69. Bruce W. Bennet, A Brief Analysis of the Republic of Korea’s 

Defense Reform Plan, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006. South Korea is also wrestling with the long-term implications of an aging 

population and one of the world’s lowest birth rates.

70. As part of then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s 

Global Posture Review, the United States reduced its total troop 

presence in South Korea from 35,000 troops to 28,000 by withdrawing one U.S. Army brigade combat team and two attack helicopter battalions.

71. Deterrence by punishment works by assuring the aggressor that he will have to endure unacceptable costs in the event of 

aggression. Deterrence by denial works by assuring the aggressor 

that defenses are so effective, aggression in the first place would 

be futile. Even though the United States is in the process of moving most of its forces south of the demilitarized zone, it is unlikely 

in the extreme that a massive North Korea invasion of the South 

would not entail at least some American casualties, even if the 

South Korean military bore the brunt of the attack.
54

72. Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, “The U.S.-

Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia,” Washington, DC: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2012, 

p. 2, available from csis.org/files/publication/120810_Armitage_US

JapanAlliance_Web.pdf.

73. Ibid., p. 12.

74. Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan, Ballistic Missile Defence 

and Remilitarisation,” Space Policy, Vol. 29, Issue 2, May 2013, p. 

129; Richard J. Samuels, “Japan’s Goldilocks Strategy,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 4, Autumn 2006, p. 115.

75. These figures do not include the nearly 6,600 Sailors and 

nearly 2,000 Marines afloat in the region. See www.globalsecurity.

org/military/library/report/2011/hst1103.pdf.

76. Nevertheless, the U.S. Army is assigned as Department 

of Defense Executive Agent for several functions worldwide, including mortuary affairs, chemical and biological defense, and 

military postal services. In some cases, such as postal services, the 

Army has primary responsibility for management; in others, such 

as mortuary affairs, the Army is responsible for support to Army 

units and backup general support to the other military services, as 

required. For a list of all Army executive agent mission areas, see 

www.oaa.army.mil/AEA_functions.aspx.

77. For budgetary reasons related to the strategic context outlined previously, the addition of more Soldiers to the theater, in 

addition to those currently forward based in the region, is not 

considered here.

78. United States Army Pacific, “Partnering in the Pacific Theater: Assuring Security and Stability Through Strong Army Partnerships,” Schofield Barracks, HI: USARPAC, April 26, 2012.

79. Karen Parrish, “South Korea Mission Strategically Important, Officials Say,” American Forces Press Service, March 28, 2012, 

available from www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67742.

80. Jim Garamone, “Commander Seeks Enhanced Deterrent on Korean Peninsula,” American Forces Press Service, June 
55

12, 2012, available from www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.

aspx?ID=116710.

81. In fact, the Australians appear interested in even closer 

cooperation with the U.S. Army—witness the assignment of a 

two-star Australian general as a deputy commander within U.S. 

Army Pacific. Audrey Mcavoy, “Aussie 2-star gets senior post at 

USARPAC,” Associated Press, Monday, August 20, 2012.

82. Key U.S. national security documents, such as the 2010 

QDR report, spell out explicitly the necessity of building coalitions to achieve common objectives. Meanwhile, the Lowy Institute, an independent public policy think tank based in Sydney, 

found that 82 percent of Australians support the alliance with 

the United States. See Alex Oliver, Australia and the World: Public 

Opinion and Foreign Policy, Sydney, Australia: The Lowy Institute 

for International Policy, 2013, available from www.lowyinstitute.

org/publications/lowy-institute-poll-2013.

83. John R. Deni, “Whose Responsibility is Interoperability?” 

Small Wars Journal, June 26, 2013, available from smallwarsjournal.

com/jrnl/art/whose-responsibility-is-interoperability.

84. Leon Panetta, Remarks at the Institute for Defence Studies 

and Analyses in New Delhi, India, June 6, 2012, available from 

www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5054.

85. Ibid.

86. Interview with civilian officials from U.S. Army Pacific, 

October 11, 2013.

87. See, for example, John R. Deni, The Future of American 

Landpower: Does Forward Presence Still Matter? The Case of the 

Army in Europe,” Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, October 9, 2012, available from www.strategic

studiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1130; Lostumbo 

et al., p. 95.

88. Oliver, p. 8.
56

89. Manuel Mogato, “U.S. military to boost Philippines presence; China tells army to be prepared,” Reuters, December 12, 

2012, available from www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/12/us-philippines-usa-idUSBRE8BB0LL20121212.

90. Section 25 of the Constitution of the Philippines requires 

that all foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty approved by the 

Filipino Senate and, when required by the Filipino Congress, ratified by a majority of citizens in a national referendum.

91. Mogato, “U.S. military to boost Philippines presence; 

China tells army to be prepared.”

92. Shawn W. Crispin, “When allies drift apart,” Asia Times 

Online, February 14, 2009, available from www.atimes.com/atimes/

Southeast_Asia/KB14Ae01.html.

93. Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ben Dolven, “Thailand: 

Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

June 5, 2012.

94. Crispin, “When allies drift apart.”
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