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i 

86–968 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–78] 

UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY AND 

DEFENSE POSTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 11, 2014 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEXANDER GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

AARON FALK, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, February 11, 2014, United States Security Policy and Defense Posture in the Middle East ....................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, February 11, 2014 ................................................................................... 37 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2014 

UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY AND DEFENSE POSTURE IN THE 

MIDDLE EAST 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Pandolfe, VADM Frank C., USN, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy 

(J–5), Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense ................................................. 8 

Patterson, Ambassador Anne W., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................................................................ 3 

Slotkin, Elissa, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense .................................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 41 

Pandolfe, VADM Frank C. ............................................................................... 65 

Patterson, Ambassador Anne W. ..................................................................... 44 

Slotkin, Elissa ................................................................................................... 57 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 42 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Hanabusa ................................................................................................... 73 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. McKeon ....................................................................................................... 77 

(1) 

UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY AND DEFENSE 

POSTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 11, 2014. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Good morning, 

ladies and gentlemen. We appreciate all of you being here today. 

The committee meets to receive testimony on United States security policy and defense posture in the Middle East. 

And I just want to point out before we begin that there will be 

no disruptions at the hearing. We appreciate you all cooperating for 

that to make sure that everything goes well. 

Our witnesses today include Ambassador Anne Patterson; Ms. 

Elissa—Elissa, I have got a granddaughter, Elissa—Slotkin; and 

Vice Admiral Frank Pandolfe. 

Thank you all for joining us here today. 

The committee has conducted several classified briefings and 

open hearings with outside experts on this topic area. However, 

today is an opportunity to build upon that knowledge in an open 

forum with senior policy and military leaders in our government. 

The Middle East is in the midst of a particularly tumultuous period, from the Arab Awakening to the evolution of Al Qaeda, to the 

deadly conflict in Syria, to Iran’s continued pursuit of nuclear 

weapons. We are witnessing a level of volatility in the Middle East 

that poses a serious threat to U.S. security and to our interests in 

the region. 

While our allies and partners seek strong U.S. leadership and engagement in the region, they instead see signs of disengagement. 

Our withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, the administration’s 

rebalance to other regions and its dealmaking with Iran help shape 

this view. There is widespread uncertainty about U.S. commitment 

in the Middle East. 

As noted by former U.N. [United Nations] Ambassador to Iraq 

James Jeffrey in a recent op-ed, and I quote, ‘‘As often happens in 

this region, the administration is sounding an uncertain tone. The 

result has been an extraordinary collapse of U.S. credibility in the 

region, despite many commendable administration steps,’’ end 
2 

quote. These comments illustrate a lack of certainty about U.S. policy in the region. 

Equally important is our military posture in the region, how we 

combat evolving threats, deter Iran, degrade Al Qaeda, and assure 

our allies and partners. We also must ensure our military posture 

and its associated capabilities are not traded for interim deals with 

regimes that have a history of noncompliance. 

We look forward to your testimony on the administration’s policy 

and posture in the Middle East and how they comprehensively support U.S. national security interests. 

Now I will turn to Ranking Member Smith for his statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to our exceptionally well qualified group of witnesses. 

Look forward to your testimony and discussion on this important 

region. 

It is a complex and difficult region, perhaps as complex as it has 

ever been for us with the Arab Awakening; our, you know, presence 

in Iraq and then withdrawal from Iraq and now the difficulties that 

are there; Syrian civil war; transition governments in Egypt, Tunisia, and a whole lot of other places; and an ongoing effort, once 

again, to try to reach and resolve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. I 

cannot imagine a more difficult set of challenges. 

And I think our commitment to the region is clear. I will disagree 

with the chairman on that. I mean, our efforts to negotiate with 

Iran are an effort to resolve what is an incredibly difficult tension. 

We do not want Iran to have a nuclear weapon. And if we are going 

to prevent them from doing that, we need to actively engage, which 

I believe that we are. 

I also, you know, very much support Secretary Kerry’s efforts to, 

once again, try to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, which is a 

major source of tension in the region and significant uncertainty 

for Israeli allies. 

I think we are committed and engaged in the region. The problem is it is a very difficult region. And the thing I am most interested in is how do we work in that region, understanding that we 

cannot control it? And I think that is the problem with some of the 

analysis out there as if the U.S. simply woke up one day and decided to be more engaged, everyone would listen to us and, you 

know, solve all of their problems. You know, one of our problems 

and challenges in the region is understandably that region wants 

to be autonomous. They do not want to think that the U.S. is the 

one that is going to show up and solve their problems. 

And also to be perfectly honest, we have some credibility issues 

in that region. You know, people, you know, you saw in Egypt, you 

know, both sides were claiming that the reason that Egyptians 

should support them is because the U.S. was supporting the other 

side. You know, that lack of credibility undermines our ability to 
3 

simply show up, have a presence, and fix problems. It creates a 

very complex diplomatic set of circumstances. 

So I am very interested to hear from our witnesses how we manage that, how we do stay involved, because I think it is critical that 

we do, but stay involved in a way that is positive and helpful and 

understanding the limitations on our ability to simply show up and 

solve these problems in a region that ultimately is going to have 

to solve its own problems. How do we balance those challenges? 

You know, I think the administration is having a clear message, 

and it is trying to do that, but it is a difficult, complicated region. 

So I look forward to your testimony explaining how we can navigate those very, very challenging set of circumstances that exist in 

the Middle East. And I thank you for being here, and I look forward to your testimony and the questions that follow. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 42.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ambassador Patterson. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ANNE W. PATTERSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador, you are going to have to just pretend like you are—— 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. A rock star and swallow that microphone. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. It really only picks it up if you are right—— 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Close to it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, members of 

the committee. I am honored to appear before you today with my 

colleagues from the Defense Department. Together with the Intelligence Community, we work to protect our country from terrorist 

attacks and to promote American national security objectives. 

The Middle East today is undergoing historic changes. Across the 

region, we are seeing unprecedented political ferment and in some 

cases upheaval as people demand change. There are deep demographic and economic forces that add urgency to this situation, but 

it is clear that the forces of change are knocking down some of the 

longstanding pillars that have supported regional stability. Regrettably, there are no easy solutions. 

The rapid pace of events in the region also threatens to open long 

dormant divisions within societies, among class, sect, religion, and 

ethnicity. These developments feed revolutionary sentiment and set 

the conditions for extremism that is rejected by the vast majority 

of people across the region and poses a threat to the United States. 

The United States is and will remain firmly engaged in the Middle East. Our relationships in the region make the United States 

an essential player in the search for diplomatic solutions. The region’s people want effective governments that respect universal 

rights, presenting us with opportunities to show the way. Our posi-
4 

tion in the global economy can help both ourselves and the region 

through broader trade and investment. Secretary of State Kerry 

has undertaken extraordinary efforts to address the region’s pressing and interrelated challenges and leading efforts to prevent Iran 

from obtaining a nuclear weapon, to end the civil war in Syria, and 

to help reach a final status agreement between the Israelis and 

Palestinians. 

Mr. Chairman, I know this committee shares our deep concern 

about Iran’s nuclear program. The United States is firmly committed to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Talks 

on a comprehensive solution will begin in Vienna next week. Meanwhile, we can continue to enforce vigorously the existing sanctions 

put in place by the United States and many in the international 

community. 

We are also well aware that Iran continues to promote regional 

instability through both Iranian and proxy fighters. Iran’s support 

for Hezbollah has done much to destabilize Lebanon, promote tensions along Israel’s northern border, and help keep the Assad regime in power. Iran is also working to undermine Yemen’s peaceful 

transition and Bahrain’s stability. Our negotiations with Iran on 

the nuclear issue will not stop us from taking decisive steps with 

our partners in the Gulf, in Europe, and elsewhere, to end these 

and other dangerous activities. 

In Iraq, Mr. Chairman, Iraq has been experiencing escalating 

levels of violence. The two-way flow of extremists between Iraq and 

Syria has allowed high-profile attacks in Iraq, mostly led by fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL, formerly 

known as Al Qaeda in Iraq. Taking advantage of Iraq’s fragility 

and government weakness, ISIL began shifting resources from 

Syria to Iraq last year, consistent with its broader ambitions. By 

last summer, they were launching between 30 and 40 suicide 

bombings monthly. In January, ISIL attacked and occupied Ramadi 

and Fallujah. Working with local leaders, the government has 

largely freed Ramadi of ISIL and its plans to clear Fallujah—and 

it plans to clear Fallujah using mostly tribal forces. 

I would like to thank the Congress for supporting the much needed military equipment we have been able to provide to Iraq. The 

government needs a professional and well-equipped army to engage 

extremist groups before they enter the cities. 

The growing violence has had a devastating effect on Iraq’s people. To repair the damage, Iraq’s political leaders must work together urgently across religious and ethnic divides on essential political reforms in advance of April 30th national elections. 

Mr. Chairman, 3 years ago in Syria, a series of peaceful protests 

against the Assad regime were met with violence and repression. 

The ensuing civil war has caused enormous destruction and terrible hardships for the Syrian people. It has also had serious consequences for Syria’s neighbors, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, as 

well as Iraq. 

The United States has responded to this crisis by providing more 

than $1.7 billion in a humanitarian assistance, the largest of any 

nation, for people affected by the conflict inside Syria and across 

the region. The Assad regime has responded with obstruction and 

delay, preventing aid from reaching more than 250,000 civilians. 
5 

Although there has been modest progress in Homs, civilians remain trapped in the cities of East Ghouta and Mouadamiya. The 

conflict has become a magnet for extremists from around the world 

trying to hijack the Syrians’ aspirations. We assess there are nearly 26,000 extremist fighters in Syria, including more than 7,000 

foreign fighters from up to 50 countries. Many are affiliated with 

designated terrorist groups, such as the Al-Nusra Front and ISIL, 

openly competing with the moderate Syrian opposition and the 

regime. 

The United States has worked to build an international consensus for ending this conflict. Although the Geneva II process has 

begun, supported by over 40 nations and international organizations, it initiates a process that can only end with the Assad regime’s departure. Our team is in Geneva today seeking progress on 

discussions toward a transition process and steps to ensure humanitarian access to the civilians trapped by the conflict. 

We are working closely with international partners to support 

the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW] 

to meet the ambitious June 30th target date for the elimination of 

Syria’s chemical weapons program. The OPCW has destroyed all of 

Syria’s chemical weapons production and mixing equipment, and 

the U.S. and others are working with them to destroy remaining 

chemical weapons and precursors. We are concerned about the Syrian government’s slow pace and are working with the international 

community to press them to fulfill their international obligations. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States will remain engaged in resolving some of the region’s major international political crises. We will 

use our influence to press for political reforms and democratic governments that respects universal rights, enabling societies to 

change and adapt, and we will press for economic reforms and seek 

to expand trade and investment to provide jobs, opportunities and 

hope that will benefit people in the region and the United States. 

Progress in these three areas can help turn the extraordinary creativity and energy of people in this region toward the building of 

a better future. It will take years of work, but our national security 

depends upon it. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Patterson can be found 

in the Appendix on page 44.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Slotkin. 

STATEMENT OF ELISSA SLOTKIN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Thank you very much. Can you hear me? Does this 

work? Yeah. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right into it. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Right into it. Okay. 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith and other distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to 

speak to you on both our multilateral and bilateral defense relationships in the Middle East and how these partnerships fit into 

our broader regional policy. 
6 

In broad terms, our strategy involves cooperating with regional 

partners and the international community in order to help foster 

a Middle East that is stable, peaceful, and prosperous and that, 

over time, succeeds in fulfilling the aspirations of its own people. 

The people in the region want a greater say in national affairs. 

They want broadening of human opportunity, and they want recognition of the rights and dignity of every individual. 

The continuing ripples of the Arab Spring and the political transitions taking place in the Middle East offer the United States both 

opportunities and challenges as we work to address our core interests. Those interests are combating Al Qaeda and affiliated movements; confronting external aggression directed at our allies and 

partners; ensuring the free flow of energy to the rest of the world; 

and preventing the development, proliferation, and use of weapons 

of mass destruction. 

Given the intersection of these four core interests, the greater 

Middle East remains a region of vital strategic importance to the 

United States. This is a point the administration has made repeatedly, including in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, which affirms that, quote, ‘‘The United States will continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied military presence in and support of partner nations in and around the region,’’ end quote. 

At the core of this commitment are four critical tools that the Defense Department uses to achieve U.S. goals in the region: our 

force posture, our bilateral relationships, our growing multilateral 

relationships, and our military exercises across the region. I will 

briefly talk about each of these in turn. 

First, our force posture: The most tangible sign of U.S. commitment that we can make to the security of the region is the physical 

presence of the men and women in uniform as well as the presence 

of advanced military equipment. Anyone, friend or foe, who looks 

at our presence in the Middle East will come to only one conclusion: our commitment to the Middle East is in no way eroding. We 

have ground, air, and naval presence of more than 35,000 U.S. 

forces in and around the immediate vicinity of the Gulf. We routinely maintain a naval presence of more than 40 ships, including 

a carrier strike group, and conduct a range of freedom of navigation operations. These operations have included approximately 50 

transits of the Strait of Hormuz over the past 6 months. Taken together, the U.S. has the ability to project power in the region, deter 

our adversaries, and reassure our allies and partners. 

Another critical tool, and one I cannot overstate, are bilateral relationships in the region. The Middle East is home to some of the 

most important bilateral security relationships we have anywhere 

in the world, and that starts, of course, with Israel. The U.S.- 

Israeli defense relationship remains stronger than ever. In addition 

to the State-led and DOD-executed [Department of Defense] Foreign Military Finance Program, DOD contributes to Israeli security 

by maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge and authorizing 

the sale of advanced technology to Israel. The U.S. is providing 

$3.1 billion in foreign military financing to Israel this year as part 

of a 10-year, $30 billion commitment to Israel. We are in near daily 

contact with our Israeli counterparts. 
7 

Another bilateral security relationship that is important to 

achieving U.S. goals in the region is our relationship with Egypt. 

The U.S.-Egypt relationship is one of our most significant and enduring defense relationships in the region. For more than 30 years, 

it has served to further our countries’ joint security interests. Our 

bilateral partnership facilitates cooperation on counterterrorism, 

eases U.S. military access and critical overflight privileges, helps 

improve the security of Israel, and contributes to the security of 

our embassy and consulate. As we recalibrate the relationship in 

the wake of the Arab Spring, it by no means diminishes the importance that Egypt plays in the region. 

Another important bilateral relationship that we continue to 

work on is with the government of Iraq. Since 2011, we have normalized our security cooperation with Iraq by forming the Office of 

Security Cooperation under the U.S. embassy and reducing its size 

from more than 700 uniformed military personnel to 108 personnel 

today. 

We have been tracking the uptick in violence and the situation 

in Anbar, obviously, very closely. We, along with our State Department colleagues and others in the U.S. Government, have been 

urging the government of Iraq that the only long-term way to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL, is through robust cooperation with Sunni leaders, and we continue to encourage 

Prime Minister Maliki to address Sunni grievances. Iraq will only 

be secure when all Iraqis are included in the political, economic, 

and social life of the country. 

Our bilateral relationships are critical, but our policy in the Middle East also depends on our growing multilateral ties. Our recent 

multilateral initiative was the President’s determination to make 

the Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, eligible to be furnished with 

U.S. defense articles and services as a single entity, a designation 

similar to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] or the African Union. This designation will help us work with our Gulf Cooperation Council member states to enhance critical capabilities, 

including items for ballistic missile defense, maritime security, and 

counterterrorism. 

Of course, multilateral relationships are especially important in 

contexts where our national security depends on very broad diplomatic support. The United States continues to support the U.N.- 

Arab League Joint Special Representative Brahimi and the opposition in their efforts to find a negotiated political solution to the 

Syrian crisis and the creation of a transitional governing body 

within the framework of the Geneva communique. 

We will also continue to closely watch the multilateral effort to 

ensure the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal. The 

Department of Defense has dispatched the naval vessel, Cape Ray, 

to receive Syrian chemicals and ultimately dispose of them ahead 

of the June deadline. 

Another difficult regional situation that we have sought to address through multilateral engagement is the often destabilizing 

behavior of the government of Iran. Let me once again reiterate 

what this administration has said repeatedly: We will not allow 

Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. Our strategy of pressure and engagement, a strategy made possible by strong multilateral sanc-
8 

tions, has created a window for diplomacy, and the Joint Plan of 

Action was an important first step. We are now focused on testing 

the prospects for our comprehensive nuclear deal, based on 

verifiable actions that convince us and the international community that Iran is not trying to obtain a nuclear bomb. The Department fully supports these diplomatic efforts while continuing to 

focus intently on ensuring that the President has all options available should negotiations falter or Iran not abide by its commitments. 

Finally, the Department’s military exercises help us advance security relationships in the Middle East, both bilateral and multilateral. I will allow my colleague, Vice Admiral Pandolfe, to provide 

more detail, but let me assure you, we are exercising with our partners in the air, on the ground, and at sea, improving experience in 

interoperability and working together on common security challenges. 

Thank you, members of the committee, for this opportunity to 

discuss the primary tools we are using to advance our security priorities in the region. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Slotkin can be found in the Appendix on page 57.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF VADM FRANK C. PANDOLFE, USN, DIRECTOR 

FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY (J–5), JOINT STAFF, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Good morning, Chairman McKeon, Ranking 

Member Smith, and distinguished committee members. Thank you 

for this opportunity to update you regarding how our military 

forces are supporting U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East. Our 

vital interests in that unsettled part of the world are significant, 

and we are committed to working with the states of the region to 

strengthen security, enhance deterrence, and prevent war. 

The U.S. seeks to increase regional stability, decrease violent extremism, and counter the proliferation and the use of weapons of 

mass destruction against our Nation, our allies, and our partners. 

We cannot do these things alone. Rather, to accomplish these goals, 

we work together every day with other agencies of our government, 

with forward station State Department professionals, and with 

partner countries in the region. 

All of these missions require us to maintain significant combat 

power forward and to continually interact with our partners by way 

of operations, training, and investing in military-to-military relationships. Let me share a few examples. 

Regarding operations, our forces in the Middle East operate continuously on the land, in the air, and on the sea, routinely conducting freedom of navigation operations, forward deployments, 

and port visits. They enhance stability and safeguard access to the 

global commons. U.S. military forces in the area are significant, 

with thousands of personnel deployed throughout the region, especially in and around the Arabian Gulf and in Afghanistan. Included 

in these numbers are U.S. soldiers and marines with armor, artillery, and attack helicopters; highly trained special operations 
9 

forces; our most advanced aircraft; advanced surveillance assets; a 

wide array of missile defense capabilities, including ballistic missile 

defense ships and Patriot batteries; and a large naval presence, including a carrier strike group, mine-sweeping capabilities, and an 

afloat forward staging base. 

Additionally, as mentioned, we conduct numerous exercises to increase the proficiency and the interoperability of our partners 

across all mission areas, including war fighting, counterterrorism, 

maritime security, and peacekeeping. U.S. CENTCOM’s [Central 

Command] extensive exercise program includes, on average, 35 significant exercises each quarter. In 2013, our training efforts included Exercise Eagle Resolve, which was hosted by Qatar and included forces from 12 nations. Exercise Eager Lion in Jordan involved 8,000 personnel from 19 nations, and the International Mine 

Countermeasures Exercise in Bahrain included 40 nations and 35 

ships. These are just a few of the hundreds of engagements conducted by all services with foreign partners each year. 

In conjunction with the Department of State, our military also 

maintains an aggressive schedule of leader interactions to strengthen relationships. These help us better understand regional perspectives on common security issues while fostering cooperation. For 

example, Chairman Dempsey participated in the Middle East 

Chiefs of Defense Conference in Jordan last August. Also 

CENTCOM Commander, General Austin, and his service component commanders continuously engage their regional counterparts, 

such as at the Regional Air Defense Chiefs Conference in November 2013. Engagements such as these allow us to listen to partner 

nation concerns, assure them of support, and demonstrate U.S. 

commitment to the region. 

We complement operations, exercises, and key leader engagement with efforts aimed at strengthening partner capacity. A key 

aspect of these initiatives are foreign military sales and foreign 

military financing programs, including more than $75 billion in 

U.S. arms sales to Gulf Cooperation Council states since 2007. We 

are also co-developing advanced ballistic missile defense capabilities with Israel. Additionally, International Military Education and 

Training is a key investment we are making to build enduring relationships with partner nations, civilian and military leaders. We 

have trained over 3,000 officers through this program from this region over the last 13 years. 

Finally, we are working with partners throughout the region to 

help them better defend critical assets, including in the physical 

sense and in the cyber world, including military sites and key 

infrastructure. 

Ladies and gentlemen, your military’s men and women are forward deployed every day in the Middle East in support of our national defense. We are proud of their efforts and their sacrifice. 

Thank you for this opportunity to speak to your committee this 

morning, and please accept my gratitude for all you have done for 

us. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Pandolfe can be found in the 

Appendix on page 65.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 
10 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, there is a tremendous 

level of volatility in the Middle East. Last week, we received testimony that Al Qaeda is a growing threat, particularly in Iraq and 

Syria, and you have referred to that. 

Given the failure to achieve a status of forces agreement [SOFA] 

with Iraq, which could have provided for residual U.S. presence in 

the region, the rise of Al Qaeda and the associated instability in 

that region, what lessons can we learn from the experience and 

how we should transition in Afghanistan? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Okay. Well, obviously, we watch the events going 

on in Iraq right now very closely. Anyone like myself who served 

there feels—the only reaction is to feel emotionally when you see 

what is going on in Anbar. 

I do think that the idea that if we had negotiated a follow-on settlement with the Iraqis and had a SOFA and a remaining force, the 

idea that that force would be able to prevent what is going on is— 

I am not sure that that would be possible. You know, at the height 

of the American presence in Iraq, the height of the surge, 170,000 

troops, we had levels of violence that we are seeing right now in 

Anbar, so I am not sure that a remaining force of 10,000 would 

have been able to prevent this. 

More importantly, I do think that our overall goals in the region 

are to support partners and allies as they manage their own 

threats, manage threats within their borders. That is our goal in 

many states in the region, and Iraq being one of them. That is why 

some of the accelerated weapons transfers that you have been seeing have been going on. We have been pushing very hard to get the 

Iraqis what they need to take on those threats, learn the lessons 

that they need to learn to manage those issues within their own 

territory. 

In terms of what it teaches us for Afghanistan, I am not sure the 

situation is analogous. Back when we were negotiating the original 

SOFA in 2008, it barely passed the Iraqi parliament on the very 

last day of the session with a slim margin, and whereas in Afghanistan, you have real support for an enduring presence in the country, both from the loya jirga members, from the members of their 

parliament, from the average person on the street. 

When it came to negotiating a follow-on agreement in 2011 with 

the Iraqis, the President, our President and Prime Minister Maliki 

had conversations as two sovereigns, and the prime minister did 

not believe that he could get a follow-on agreement through his 

parliament. We respected that decision. And if we couldn’t get the 

protections and immunities that we needed, we weren’t going to 

stay. So I don’t think there are direct lessons we can learn for Afghanistan from the Iraq experience, particularly because of the 

public support in Afghanistan for an enduring presence. 

The CHAIRMAN. To what extent is the Department of Defense 

consulted prior to the United States entering into the interim 

agreement with Iran regarding its nuclear program? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I am sorry. I misunderstood. The Department of 

Defense was consulted and involved in the conversations before the 

agreement was publicized. We were involved in a robust series of 

interagency conversations. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 
11 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think one of the challenges of the Middle East is balancing our 

various interests there in terms of, you know, we certainly want 

stability, and we want to build relationships and have friends. At 

the same time, we are promoting democracy, we are—this is going 

into conflict in a number of places, in Egypt most notably, and I 

think, you know, part of the problem is we set this expectation that 

we are going to only support democratic and free governments, but 

it is really not possible. So when you look at Egypt, when you look 

at Saudi Arabia, when you look at Bahrain and you have some of 

those challenges where, you know, supporting a government that 

is not as free and open as we would like them to be is in our best 

interests in terms of maintaining relationship and stability, I think 

part of the problem with the credibility of our message is people 

don’t see how we balance those two. We seem to constantly be moving back and forth between the two interests in a way that is confusing for the region. 

Now, it is very difficult to balance, but I am just curious how you 

would say we should go about messaging that and working. And 

you can get specific in terms of how we should handle Egypt and 

Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, any of those. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Mr. Smith, this is always a very difficult balancing effort, as you outline. Let me talk for a minute 

about Egypt. Egypt is a country of 80 million people of enormous 

strategic importance to the United States and to Israel. We have 

a longstanding defense relationship with Egypt. We are very concerned about the upsurge in terrorism and insurgency in the Sinai, 

which is increasingly becoming an ungoverned space, but that said, 

we are also very concerned about the direction of the government, 

the arrest of journalists, the crackdown on secular activists. So we 

do have to balance these interests, and our hope is that we can balance them in an intelligent and effective way by encouraging the 

government to move toward the democratic process. They seem to 

be—they had a referendum. They are going to have elections soon, 

but we have to preserve our national security interests, and we 

have to preserve our relationship with the Egyptian military, because that is the bulwark of Camp David and in many respects the 

bulwark of regional peace, so we try to balance these as best we 

can. 

In Bahrain, as you know, there have been a number of discussions, certainly concerns about the human rights situation. We 

have had many discussions with the government about that, but it 

is also the home of the 5th Fleet and the center of a very important 

national security interest in the region. We balance them as best 

we can. And—— 

Mr. SMITH. Could we, on that—if I may. Sorry to interrupt. I 

think part of the problem with the messaging is when we come out, 

you know, in favor of, you know, a democratic government or opposed to a government because it is not democratic, our language 

is very strong that this is a core U.S. principle that we will not 

veer from, and yet everyone in the region knows that we veer from 

it with great frequency. And I am not saying that is wrong. I mean, 

you have to make choices; I mean, we cannot imagine perfect gov-
12 

ernments all around the world. But do you think we sometimes 

overstate the fact that, you know, come hell or high water, we are 

going to support democratic governments and then there are just 

so many obvious examples when we haven’t, and is there a way to 

better balance that message in terms of how people in the region 

hear it and perceive it? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Certainly, Mr. Smith, after my experience in Egypt, I think our messaging needs work. I would be hardpressed to say, though, that we should not emphasize our longterm interest in a democratic transition, because that is critically 

important. 

Mr. SMITH. Absolutely. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I mean, they are absolutely—the only 

way these countries can become stable and prosperous is to move 

down the democratic path, but, yes, sometimes our messaging is a 

little in-adroit in all these circumstances. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. On Syria, in particular, first of all, can 

you give us your latest assessment of the situation on ground in 

terms of the extremist groups, Al-Nusra and ISIS [Islamic State of 

Iraq and Syria]. You know, they seemed to be ascendant for quite 

some time; slight setbacks a couple weeks ago. How much—where 

are they at in terms of how dominant they are in the insurgency 

at this point? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, Mr. Smith, they are increasingly 

important on the battlefield. As I mentioned, there are 7,000 foreign fighters from a large number of countries, including from a 

large number of Western countries, which means they have Western passports and potentially access to Western countries, but I 

certainly would not want to rule out the potential for the moderate 

opposition. Those people are out there fighting and dying every 

day, but certainly it is of great concern to us that ISIL, Al-Nusra 

Front and others are—have a seemingly more active role in the 

battlefield. 

There are Islamic groups that we would not call extremists that 

are being funded by some of our allies. They, too, have a prominent 

role in the fighting, but yes, it is of great concern to us. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Anybody else? 

Thank you very much. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Patterson, I want to get back to this subject of credibility that the chairman raised a little bit earlier. And part of what 

really bothers me is Ms. Slotkin’s answer to the chairman’s first 

question. She said essentially that, Well, we—there was a lot of violence in Anbar when—before the surge and so there is really no 

lesson to be learned there, because our troops wouldn’t have made 

any difference anyway. But what—well, first, of course, there was 

a tremendous amount of sacrifice that was—of our folks as well as 

Iraqis required to change the situation in Anbar. 

Secondly, the hope was that some sort of continued engagement 

and advisory would increase their capability and keep them focused 

on the real enemy, the terrorists, not devolve into sectarian sorts 

of struggles. And so I want to get—and the fact that we are not 
13 

there, I kind of wonder does that not affect the—the way the other 

countries see us as whether we are a reliable partner or not. 

Now, that is just kind of preliminary. You, obviously, served next 

door to Afghanistan. That is something that you have a lot of 

knowledge and experience about. I would like to hear your view 

about lessons from Iraq that may apply to Afghanistan and the 

larger question of U.S. credibility in the Middle East, whether we 

are a reliable partner or not. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I do think—let me say I do think we are 

a reliable partner, and I think that our presence is very extensive. 

Let me just take, for instance, the example of Iraq and what we 

have done recently. We have made an extraordinary effort with the 

help of this committee and other committees in the Congress to 

give them the weaponry and the, frankly, the intelligence support 

that they need to meet this renewed threat from ISIL. And it was 

critically important that we provided Hellfire missiles, because 

they had attempted to go after these camps in the desert with thinskinned helicopters and with—by ground, and had been unable to 

do so, so our armament came in at a critical point to enable them 

to go after some of these terrorists. 

We also have tried to step up training, we are planning to step 

up training. We have an enormous foreign military sales and foreign military financing program with Iraq. So I think it is very difficult to say that we have abandoned the Iraqis, because I think 

we are very intensely engaged there. 

And as to your broader question, sir, yes, I think we are going 

to need to be involved in these countries, whether it is Afghanistan 

or Pakistan or Iraq or Egypt, for decades to come, and not just in 

the military sense. The key element in all these countries is going 

to be job creation for the enormous number of young men that are 

coming into the labor force and basically have no prospects are a 

built-in element of instability. So, yes, generally speaking, whether 

it is by troops or through assistance or through our investment programs or any number of other mechanisms, we are going to have 

to be in these countries in force for decades to come. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I would just say I hope that the situation 

in Afghanistan does not have to get as bad and deteriorate as much 

as it had—as it did in Iraq before we re-engaged. It got—well, secondly, I hear what you are saying and you all are all, you know, 

stating your opinion about our credibility, but I will just say what 

I hear from a variety of countries and U.S. people who visit those 

countries is they have real doubts about the U.S. position, whether 

we are a reliable ally; part of it is the negotiations with Iran, part 

of it is the pivot to Asia, part of it is our unclear policy with Egypt 

and Syria. And my fear is that doubts about our credibility increase the dangers in that region, and nothing would cause that to 

be in greater doubt than for us to abandon Afghanistan in the 

same way we did in Iraq. 

So thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being with us today. 
14 

Admiral, if I could just start with you for a second, because I— 

we talked about the Pacific pivot certainly in this committee, and 

I am wondering—you also spoke certainly about a number of exercises in the region and I appreciate that, but I wonder how you assess our security goals, how they would be affected if our Navy was 

reduced in the total number of ships, including an aircraft carrier, 

of course, and also some of the LCS [littoral combat ship] fleet. Is 

that—where does that fit into the discussion? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Well, when the service chiefs come up, they 

attest to the requirements of their services, as derived from analytical analysis, which includes contingency planning, and the Chief 

of Naval Operations has testified to the size of the Navy that he 

feels is most appropriate and asked for funding for that fleet. We 

are concerned with the size of the Navy today, and we ask for your 

support to try to meet the Chief of Naval Operations’ requirements. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Do you pick up from our partners in the region that 

the discussion of the Pacific shift, pivot, is of concern to them? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. I don’t think it is of tremendous concern. I 

think we have to—we have to explain the context, which is that in 

a rising Asia economically, it is important that we stay engaged in 

that theater, and that much of the rebalance we are talking about 

is the flow of forces that had been surged into Iraq and Afghanistan now returning to their normal bases in Hawaii and Washington State and Okinawa. 

It is by no means a disengagement from the Middle East. We 

have made that very, very clear. We retain extraordinary forces in 

the Middle East, not just quantitatively, but qualitatively, and we 

are fully prepared to meet our security commitments. 

As mentioned in my statements and others, our leadership continually passes this message personally to the leadership in that 

area, and I think they understand that and they do believe that we 

will be there for a long time to come in the numbers and the capabilities needed. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

Madam Ambassador and Ms. Slotkin, actually, it remains a big 

deal, I think, to all of us that you are here testifying together. 

There was a long time before sometimes that occurred, and I wonder if you could share with us, in the midst of so many issues, crises, obviously, in the Middle East, how your Departments are 

prioritizing, synchronizing means to achieve a unity of effort. What 

can you point to that is really different? And I wonder in that discussion if you could also focus on the actual threats to the United 

States. We know that there are continual crises within the region, 

but focus on the threats to the United States particularly. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you. We have, in answer to your 

first question, extremely close collaboration with DOD. Frankly, it 

is as close as I have seen it in many respects in my 40-year career. 

For instance, when General Austin went out to the Gulf a few 

weeks ago, essentially to reassure our allies, Brett McGurk, who is 

very knowledgeable about Iraq, went with him. We have many 

such joint efforts and many meetings and collaboration on issues 

like our military assistance to Egypt and every other country. 

There is an extraordinary degree of collaboration, if I might say so, 
15 

a very amiable relationship, which also wasn’t always the case, but 

is certainly the case now. 

And on threats to the United States, I think when General Clapper testified last week, I think there is, of course, growing concern 

about the global reach of some of the groups that are operating in 

Syria right now, and the movement of some of the more hardened 

terrorists from the tribal areas of Pakistan into Syria who might 

potentially pose a threat to the United States. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Ms. Slotkin, would you—— 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. I couldn’t agree more. Certainly, as someone 

who worked on the Middle East, in terms of the cooperation among 

the interagency, I would characterize my experience in the previous 

administration as pretty adversarial. Now, maybe between agencies, maybe that was because I was working on Iraq, and it was 

particularly political, but it is the tone of the conversation I think 

has fundamentally changed, and while we meet with our interagency colleagues on a daily basis, it is the tone to me that is the 

most important change, not just the frequency of meetings. We 

work on everything together, so I think that that is a positive 

thing. 

In terms of the threats, obviously, we look at the threats coming 

out of Syria, Al-Nusra Front and the terrorists and extremist 

groups that are powerful there. And I think one of the positive examples of interagency collaboration has been our approach to dealing with containment of that threat in particular, so we have, in 

the past, I would say, year really upped our game with Jordan, 

what we are doing in Jordan. So in addition to the Patriots and the 

F–16s we have there, we have a military presence that supports increased border activity, helping the Jordanians train to manage 

threats to their borders. The same thing with Lebanon. We have 

a robust program with the Lebanese armed forces, but recently 

with the help, frankly, of the Congress, have moved ahead on some 

border security, additional border security programs dealing 

with—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. SLOTKIN [continuing]. The Lebanese—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The lady’s time has expired. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Pardon. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you for being here. I would like to continue this 

question that the chairman began and Mr. Thornberry had about 

credibility. 

And, Ms. Slotkin, it seems like I heard you say that—if I didn’t 

misunderstand, that we will not allow Iran to get a nuclear weapon, and you said that without any qualification at all. Is that correct? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Correct. That is our current policy, yes. 

Mr. FORBES. Let me ask you this, then, because we do have some 

credibility problems. In fact, when you just made the mention of 

the previous administration was more adversarial, to some of us, 

we feel like maybe the Department of Defense was standing up a 

little bit more to State, and sometimes you are not adversarial if 
16 

you are just saying, Okay, we will go along with what you want 

to do. 

But I look, and this administration could not stop a single employee of a nongovernment contractor from stealing and distributing to the world some of the most vital military secrets of this 

Nation, secrets that many members of this committee wouldn’t 

have even had security clearance to look at. And yet you sit there 

and tell us, without qualification, that we will not allow Iran to get 

a nuclear weapon. Isn’t it true that we may not even know when 

they are close to having a nuclear weapon? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. So what I would say is the President has stated 

over and over again—— 

Mr. FORBES. I understand what the President has stated. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Okay. So, to your issue first of credibility, so this 

strategy is—— 

Mr. FORBES. No, no. If you don’t mind, you have stated there unequivocally that we will not allow them to get a nuclear weapon, 

and yet you have heard and we have seen what has happened, 

even within the protection of our own information. How can you 

guarantee this committee that you are even going to know when 

Iran is close to having a nuclear weapon? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, particularly in an unclassified forum, the most 

I will say is General Clapper was up on the Hill talking about the 

Intelligence Community assessment, and we believe that should 

Iran make the decision to pursue a nuclear weapon, that we—it 

would take at least a year for them to do that. We can talk additionally in a classified forum, but for this forum, you know, the 

DNI [Director of National Intelligence] has said this clearly. Obviously the Department of Defense supports that assessment. That is 

our best estimation based on the intelligence we have. 

Mr. FORBES. And I don’t have a problem saying it is our best 

guess, best estimation. It is when you come in here and say that 

the tack you are taking, unequivocally we are going to keep Iran 

from getting a nuclear weapon, I think that puts in jeopardy your 

credibility for being able to say that, because if we guess wrong, 

if the President guesses wrong in the direction he is going, we may 

not even know that until it is too late. 

But, Admiral, let me shift, if I can, to you. One of the things that 

I would like to ask you, Admiral, what regional initiatives both unilaterally and multilaterally are being undertaken to deal with 

growing Iranian anti-access/area denial [A2/AD] capabilities? How 

can the U.S. stiffen Gulf State resolve to resist Iranian belligerence 

in the event of a conflict to maintain U.S. access to forward bases, 

and what lessons or synergies can be gleaned from our attempts to 

preserve American power projection in the Asia-Pacific to assist our 

efforts in the Persian Gulf area? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. So there are a number of initiatives to address the A2/AD threat that Iran poses in the Gulf and to its 

neighbors. So—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, could you pull that mike up, sir? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. I am sorry. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. There are a number of initiatives that we 

are working to help counter the Iranian A2/AD threat. Among 
17 

them are working with the Israelis on ballistic missile defense programs, including their suite of weapons, which are coming along 

very well, and integrating the Gulf States into a more comprehensive air and missile defense architecture. This was discussed by 

Secretary Hagel recently in his overseas speech in Manama. We 

are working to train forces in a number of countries for border security and for counterterrorism to get at the—in the terrorist 

threat sponsored by the Iranian threat network. 

So when you look at the array of capabilities from conventional 

ballistic missile all the way down to sea denial and then into the— 

in the asymmetric or terrorist world, we are sponsoring programs 

to strengthen our friends and partners, as mentioned by Ms. 

Slotkin, both bilaterally and increasingly multilaterally, to put 

down a clear marker that these nations are united in their concern 

about and their intention to push back against Iranian attempts at 

intimidation. 

For our own Nation, we are—— 

Mr. FORBES. And, Admiral, my time is up. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. I am sorry, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. But maybe I can chat with you a little bit more at 

a later time, but thank you so much for that information. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today. Let 

me—I have several questions that I would like to get to. Let me 

start with one with respect to ISIL. 

Last week, we saw an unprecedented move from Al Qaeda’s leadership to disassociate themselves from ISIL. What does this latest 

move mean for the strategy of core Al Qaeda going forward and 

specifically for their influence and abilities within the geopolitical 

landscape of the Middle East? And has this announcement affected 

our approach to fighting Al Qaeda? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Obviously, we watched Zawahiri’s announcement 

with great interest in the government since it was the first time 

we have seen an affiliate actually have a break with Al Qaeda central. I think we are still trying to assess exactly what it means in 

terms of your question on impact on sort of regional policy, and I 

think one of the fundamental questions we have is, is this a sign 

of strength or a sign of weakness for Al Qaeda core? 

Certainly, I think our early initial—our early assessments indicate that it means that Al Qaeda core is very interested in what 

happens in Syria. Right? So ISIL had been accused by Al Qaeda 

core of insubordination, and ISIL has obviously become very powerful in Iraq in addition to Syria. 

One possibility that we are still exploring is that the Al Qaeda 

core is more interested in Syria than anything else in the region 

and has put their emphasis on Al-Nusra Front because of the importance of Syria. We are still trying to assess what it means for 

our policies, and we watch it very, very closely. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And with respect to the ISIL demonstrating insubordination, as Zawahiri called it, what was the center of that 

insubordination? What is it that they are referring to? 
18 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think, again, in an unclassified forum, they had 

good old-fashioned command and control problems—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. 

Ms. SLOTKIN [continuing]. Listening to the boss. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay, thanks. 

Turning to Egypt, what are the United States policy objectives 

with regards to Egypt over the short and the long term, and let’s 

start with that. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you. 

The policy objectives are to promote a democratic transition, and 

Egypt has had a referendum. Again, it was not problem-free, but 

there are elections, and then to promote our national security interests which involve our longstanding relationship with the Egyptian 

military which goes back many decades and to do everything possible we can to help the Egyptians reduce some of the terrorists 

and insurgency in the Sinai. 

We are working with the Egyptian military. We have continued 

counterterrorism cooperation, we have continued sustainment, we 

have continued training to help them meet these new threats. So 

we have really multifaceted objectives in Egypt. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And right now, how do you assess how stable the 

Egyptian economy is and are their foreign currency reserves and 

the external assistance they receive, are they adequate to meet 

their needs? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Almost certainly not, Congressman. 

They have gotten an influx of foreign exchange from the Gulf countries to the tune of somewhere around $10 billion and that has 

shored them up, but Egypt has been very hard hit by the decline 

in tourism and the freezing essentially of investment flows, and it 

is essential that Egypt undertake some economic reforms and get 

some political stability so it can realize really the enormous economic future that it has before them. But the situation is rather 

dire at the moment. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And worst case, what could we reasonably expect 

with regards to the governance situation in the country if the 

Egyptian economy collapses? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, certainly in my view their economic problems were key in these periodic upheavals, and again 

the huge unemployment, particularly among young men. If they 

don’t solve their economic problems and they don’t find jobs for all 

these people coming into the labor force, we are going to continue 

to see political instability and street demonstration and threats to 

the governments that are unable to meet the goals of their people. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And what is at stake right now with respect to 

the next round of Egyptian elections and are there any possible 

outcomes likely to lead to the denigration in the security situation? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, the security situation has deteriorated recently with the increase in activity of a Ansar Beit alMaqdis. It is a group that has only been active in the Sinai. So 

there has been some considerable deterioration. We are hopeful 

that the referendum, the presidential elections, and now the parliamentary elections will bring some political stability to Egypt that 

will then allow the economy to get back on its feet. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 
19 

The gentleman’s time expired. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses for being here and your long service to our country. 

Ms. Slotkin, I too was struck by the declarative statement that 

you made that Iran will not get a nuclear weapon. This administration has at least from a domestic standpoint, has got some pretty 

famous declarative statements out there that haven’t really worked 

all that well. You had nothing to do with that and I got that. So 

if they snuck up on us and got one, would you also interpret that 

to say we would not let them keep it? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes. So I think the President has been very clear 

on this that—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. His credibility is not real good with us; what is 

your thinking on this? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. So I think what is frankly underwriting the current work on diplomacy on this issue is the Department of Defense’s strong posture in the region and our ability to act from that 

posture against—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Ms. SLOTKIN [continuing]. All contingencies, and, frankly, 

our—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. But your recommendation is that we would 

not let them keep a weapon. If you are committed to them not getting one, and I assume you are, you made the statement—— 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Of course. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Your recommendation is we would not let them 

keep it either, right? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. All options are on the table. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. The President has said that and the Department 

of Defense is—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right, let me pivot to Russia and the influence 

they are having in Egypt, Syria, and other places. Madam Ambassador, what are your thoughts. Are they being helpful in the region, hurtful, and what do you think Putin is trying to do? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, Congressman, it is a mix. I mean 

they have been helpful in the P5+1 [U.N. Security Council permanent members plus Germany] negotiations with Iran, they have 

been helpful in the quartet, they have been helpful in the removal 

of Syria’s chemical weapons, and my own view is, for instance, 

their so-called inroads into Egypt are much exaggerated. I mean we 

have a very robust and longstanding relationship with Egypt on 

the military side. There is some residual Russian equipment and 

there were some trips there by Russian officials, but again, I don’t 

think it they can begin to compete with our relationship with the 

Egyptian military. 

Mr. CONAWAY. And your assessment that keeping Assad in power 

in Syria is in Russia’s best interest? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. That is a difficult question, Congressman. I think the Russians are conflicted and, well, I think they are 

very concerned about the terrorist—the growth in terrorism in 

Syria which threatens their own country. There are a number of 

Chechens there. And this is a subject of constant interaction with 
20 

the Secretary and other officials with the Russian government. We 

are trying to work very closely with them. We have managed to do 

so on chemical weapons, and we are trying to work very closely 

with them on humanitarian access and on the broader picture. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. Madam Ambassador, I was also piqued 

by your comment that the United States would have some role in 

creating jobs in these countries. Again, the administration that 

serves us right now has got a very poor track record of creating 

jobs here in America for our youth and young men and women trying to come into this workforce. Do you really see us—as that being 

one of our core roles, is to create jobs in these countries? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Actually I do. You know, we can act as 

catalyst on job creation. It is not the U.S. Government that creates 

jobs, it is American companies and foreign investors that create 

jobs and the local people that create jobs. But we can do things like 

promote programs on entrepreneurship, like promote innovation, 

like promote high schools in technology and science. There are 

things we can do through our assistance programs that can facilitate that. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, I do think we have a role. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So, could we morph some of the domestic policies 

this administration has been unsuccessful with over the last 5 

years to use as the guideposts in your part of the world? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, I just mentioned, Congressman, a 

few of the projects I think we can do and have done successfully 

in this part of the world to facilitate investment. It is the private 

sector and it needs to play a greater role. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay, well, I appreciate that clarification. It is the 

private sector. Madam Ambassador, I was whacking at you a little 

bit. I honor your service. You have been in the worst parts of the 

world for a long time, so, please don’t—I am trying not to be disrespectful, but you have got a bad hand to play. But you have been 

in a bad part of the world for a long part of your career and I really 

respect that immensely. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think if we listen to the comments of my brothers and some sisters on the other side of the aisle we will come to the conclusion 

that the Obama administration is responsible for every problem 

that America has, both domestically and internationally, and it is 

a shame I think that we have now come to politicization of our foreign policy partisanship on that issue. 

The issues that we deal with on this committee are much too 

complex and serious than to devolve into partisanship on this committee, and I think our history as a nation has brought us to this 

point, and that has not been a partisan issue, and it is going to 

take all of us to work towards a more peaceful and prosperous 

world. I don’t think there is anybody out here that doesn’t want 

peace and prosperity, and that is what we should be fighting for, 

that is what we should be employing our hard power to produce 
21 

when it is necessary, and we should also be focusing so much on 

our soft power that can actually produce the peaceful result. 

And I think that there has been a lot of success that this administration can claim in terms of peaceful progress, and I won’t go 

over all of them, from reaching an agreement with Iran for a 6- 

month period to navigating an agreement to prevent them from becoming a nuclear weapons power, to the removal of—or the march 

towards the removal of chemical weapons from Syria, the extraction of our forces from the unfortunate war in Iraq, and unfortunately for them and for us, they did not enable us to sign a status 

of forces agreement over there so we had to come on out, and the 

same thing will happen in Afghanistan if they don’t agree to the 

very reasonable terms of a status of forces agreement. 

So I would like to ask though about Egypt and the fact that 

there are at least 23 journalists who have been arrested and 

charged with terrorism or support of terrorism due to the fact that 

they have been reporting on the Muslim Brotherhood. I would like 

for you to speak on, Ambassador Patterson, our efforts, if any, to 

produce the freedom for those journalists. Indeed, if Egypt is to become a nation with democratic ideals, it should certainly start with 

freedom of the press which is closely linked to freedom of association and freedom of speech. 

Can you give us, Ambassador Patterson, some idea on America’s 

way forward in ensuring that those journalists can be freed? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, thank you, Congressman. 

We entirely agree with your assessment that freedom of the 

press is absolutely key because it surfaces all the other issues. Let 

me assure you, Congressman, that the administration has pressed 

hard on this issue. 

It has been the subject of Secretary Kerry’s conversations with 

Egyptian leaders, it has been the subject of Secretary Hagel’s conversation was his counterparts in Egypt, and we will continue to 

press on these issues and urge that these journalists be released. 

A number of them are non-Egyptian. Some of them are very distinguished in their field. It is hard to believe they were reporting unfairly, and even if they had been that is most certainly not a 

grounds for their arrest. 

But it is a very high priority for us, as is encouraging the Egyptian government to enable freedom of association, and they have 

some recent laws which have curtailed that as well. These are worrisome trends, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. The gentleman’s time has 

expired. 

Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is for either for Secretary Slotkin or Ambassador Patterson. 

I am concerned that in Iran we have not known everything that 

was going on until sometimes years after the fact—years after the 

fact. The secret facility at Qom, for instance, we didn’t know about 

that for years. 

So Secretary Slotkin, when you say it would be a year from when 

they would try to start breaking out and develop a nuclear weapon 

from their current status, and yet I know that we have allies and 

others like our Israeli allies and others who think it would be as 
22 

little as 2 months, but whatever it is, whether it is closer to 2 

months or closer to 12 months, is the U.S. military prepared to act 

in that limited window and use force if that is what it would take 

to keep Iran from actually deploying a nuclear weapon? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. So just starting from the top, first on the interim deal, first of all the joint plan of action allows for the IAEA 

[International Atomic Energy Agency] to verify Iran’s compliance 

with the deal. I understand you are talking about there if there are 

things that are not on the table, but certainly the IAEA has a role 

until verifying compliance now. Any comprehensive agreement that 

we ever negotiate will emphasize verifiable means, right? We will 

have to have solid proof, we will not rely on just trusting the Iranians. And then, importantly, we remain confident that we could 

tell if Iran was making a dash towards a weapon and we believe 

should that decision be made, it would take at least a year. 

I stand by that, and I think in an unclassified forum that is as 

far as I will go. If for some reason negotiations broke down, if we 

didn’t get a comprehensive deal, the President said all options are 

on the table, and the Department of Defense is prepared to take 

any action that the President deems—— 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, let me follow up on that for either you or 

the Ambassador, and this has already been alluded to by Mr. 

Thornberry and Mr. Forbes and others. But the credibility issue, I 

see that the lack of action in Syria, whether or not it would have 

been right for the U.S. to step in and use force to punish the use 

of chemical weapons upon his own people by Bashar Assad, the fact 

is that the Iranians are viewing that as a lack of credibility and 

a sign of weakness. 

What indications do we have that the Iranians are really taking 

seriously the threat that the U.S. would act militarily? I think that 

the credibility gap has widened considerably and is a very troubling thing. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Congressman, I think one issue that we 

sort of overlooked here is their economy is in shreds. The sanctions 

have been extraordinarily effective in reducing their access to international financial institutions and reducing their petroleum production. So that has clearly gotten their attention and brought 

them to the table to negotiate. 

Mr. LAMBORN. But has that been undone now to a large extent? 

I hear there is what is called a gold rush of European countries 

and the private sector going into Iran and now saying that they are 

open for business. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Congressman, let me stress that Iran is 

not open for business and the American government will do everything it possibly can to enforce these sanctions on any company 

that would be so unwise as to engage in business with Iran right 

now. Yes, they are going, and I hope they are giving the message 

to Iran that if we were able to do business with you, there would 

be advantages. That is putting more pressure on them. 

But please rest assured that the sanctions have been effective, 

gotten them to the table. I don’t think the credibility issue, again 

it seems that economically Iran is in a very weak position right 

now. So I think the issue of credibility, I do think, yes, some people 

would complain about that, but I think we are engaged militarily, 
23 

we have gotten Iran to the table, we have an enormously robust 

presence in the Gulf and elsewhere in the region, so it is hard for 

me to see that our credibility has eroded. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Admiral, let me ask one really fast question of 

you. 

We have sold arms, advanced arms, to some of the countries in 

the region outside of Israel. Are we able to make sure that they 

comply with the restrictions on the use of those advanced weaponry 

and arms? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Yes. First of all, before we agree to those 

arms sales, it goes through a very thorough vetting process to 

make sure that the qualitative military edge considerations are 

fully acknowledged and accepted in terms of ensuring there is a 

strategic balance that is properly maintained. Then we do have 

end-user agreement specifics in the agreements which allow us to 

make sure that the weapons are being employed to the role and 

mission that they were intended. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, you testified about the Eagle Resolve as well as Eager 

Lion and there is a reference to 12 and 19 countries respectively 

that have participated in that. Can you give me an idea of who 

these countries are? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. I would have to go back to CENTCOM to get 

the specific list, ma’am. I will be happy to forward them to you. 

Generally, I am most familiar actually with the third example 

which is the International Mine Countermeasure exercise. And 

that involved a lot of nations from the region, it also involved 

NATO allies, and I believe there was even some nations from the 

Far East. But I can get you the specific lists of which nations participated in each exercise. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Well, do you know off the top of your head which 

countries from the Middle East participated in these exercises? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Generally they are the Gulf States, and I 

would have to check whether Saudi Arabia participated or not. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So if you could forward that to me, to the committee and the committee will forward it, I would really appreciate 

it. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Yes, ma’am. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 73.] 

Ms. HANABUSA. Madam Ambassador, in reading your testimony, 

of course that is where we have the reference to ISIL as well as 

there is also the ‘‘L’’ is Levant or however you may pronounce it. 

And I also see that reference in terms of Syria, and I understand 

it is some kind of a geographical reference. But why is it now appearing in like ISIL and the reference to Syria. Is there any significance in the use of that word? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, yes, because I think they have 

changed or rather expanded their focus to include Syria and—to include Syria. So it is not just Iraq anymore. 
24 

Ms. HANABUSA. But doesn’t it also geographically include Israel 

and other countries? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So what is the significance of now referring to 

the context, like Iraq, for example, to have itself referred to with 

Levant at the end? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, I think it refers to their aspirations to expand throughout the region. And let me say that is one 

reason we are working very intensely with Syria’s neighbors, Jordan and Lebanon, in particular, the King is here this week and I 

am sure he will be talking to members of the committee, to shore 

up their counterterrorism capabilities and to improve the control of 

their borders. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So is it a correct statement to say that by the 

inclusion of this word that they are sort of asserting a different jurisdiction? Because my understanding is that it includes Cyprus, 

Palestine territories, the Palestinian territories, Israel, Jordan, 

Lebanon, and Syria, for example, that that is traditionally what it 

was. So are they somehow by calling themselves ISIL, Syria and 

Levant, saying this is really the region that we control or should 

control? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I think that would be right, Congresswoman, that they have a vision of greater expansion. Yes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So how does that play in with Israel being part 

of that, that area that they perceive to be within their territorial 

expansion? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, let me stress that as far as I am 

aware, we have not seen any activity by this group in Israel, although Israel, of course, is the subject of security threats from elsewhere in the region. But I certainly—so let me just say that I 

would go back to what Ms. Slotkin said, that Israel’s security is one 

of our highest national priorities and we will do everything possible 

we can to work with the Israelis to shore up their defenses and to 

share intelligence, I wanted to go back to that, to share intelligence 

on the broad range of threats in the region. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So do we as a country, when we agree to refer 

to Iraq, for example, ISIL, or we allow them to continue or we defer 

or we give them the credibility of using it in terms of their description of who they are now, are we somehow encouraging it or conceding just simply by the fact that, for example, it is found in your 

testimony, it is found in other references; are we giving some 

ground by doing that versus saying no, you are not going to refer 

to yourself that way? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I wouldn’t think so, Congresswoman. I 

would think we were just sort of recognizing the facts of the matter 

on that. They are a more expansive organization than they have 

been in the past and I think we are merely recognizing that fact. 

Ms. HANABUSA. But it is not an organization that everyone who 

is a member of is conceding that their membership within that 

group? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. No, certainly the countries involved. 

But the organization itself has a more aspirational—it is spreading, 

I think, to be blunt about it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 
25 

Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Patterson, you made the statement that we are 

going to be in these countries in force for decades to come a little 

while ago. Can you tell me specifically which countries you are 

talking about and what type of force you are talking about in that 

statement? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, Congressman, I think it is not 

just military force, it is also economic force. I mean, we took down 

our flag in Afghanistan in 1989 and literally moved out. There was 

a lot going on elsewhere in the world, but it is not just our military 

force that matters, it is our investors, it is our educators, it is our 

assistance programs, and we are going to require very robust engagement by all elements of U.S. national power in these countries 

to stabilize them. 

Mr. SCOTT. Which countries specifically are you talking about? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. We can speak about almost any one of 

them, but let me take Egypt because I recently left Egypt. We are 

going to require—we are going to have to have American investment there, we are going to have to have a robust trade relationship, we are going to have to increase educational exchanges. There 

are only 3,000 Egyptian students in the United States. I think that 

is an embarrassment. So we want more educational activity, just 

for an example. 

So there are many ways we can engage with these countries that 

go beyond our military presence and in the long run are frankly 

just as important. 

Mr. SCOTT. I guess when we talk about these other countries, it 

is not that I question your abilities or the Secretary, or our abilities 

as a country to help things as much as I question our capacity and 

the capacity of the United States economy. If every dollar that we 

spend in interest on the national debt is a dollar that is going to 

come out of discretionary spending. 

And so I guess my next question would be for Secretary Slotkin. 

The DOD, we are involved in a lot of countries and a lot of conflicts, you are taking a lot of cuts in the Department of Defense. 

Do you think that you have the capacity based on the budget that 

you have today to carry out the mission for decades to come? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I do. I mean, I would say to the Ambassador’s point 

that the bilateral relationships that we have are the cornerstones 

of our approach in the region, and frankly the investment we make 

up in front in training their military, their security forces, and 

military education and civ-mil relations pays big dividends for us 

later on in preventing conflict, preventing spill-out of extremist 

groups, you name it. 

So I feel like the relatively small amount of money frankly that 

we spend on some of the programs the Ambassador is talking about 

that we do in non-conflict situations prevents the significantly more 

expensive operations, combat situations that we are still dealing 

with. 

So I do think that we are positioning. Frankly, you know, it 

won’t be long enough until we have released our QDR [Quadrennial 

Defense Review] and you will see an enhanced focus on the impor-
26 

tance of partnership and training ahead of a problem, building 

partner capacity ahead of a problem. 

Mr. SCOTT. Admiral, if I am correct in reading the Treasury’s reports and where our money is going, we are spending more money 

in interest on the national debt than we are in military pay for our 

men and women in uniform. The projections are that those interest 

payments are going to continue to escalate at a fairly rapid pace. 

Any dollar that is paid in interest comes out of discretionary spending. Obviously the DOD gets about 50 percent of that. 

Again, do you have the equipment, the men, and the men that 

you need to protect this Nation? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Yes, sir. Today absolutely we do, and, as 

mentioned, particularly in this area, in the Asia-Pacific we are focusing our best resources. As we move forward we are going to 

have to be very careful to ensure that we maintain the capabilities 

and capacity that we need by making wise choices with investments. 

Mr. SCOTT. I would respectfully submit that the lack of investment right now in equipment and technology and the things that 

we are going to need to fight the battles that we are going to be 

in going forward, that maybe we should concentrate more on the 

United States than some of these countries. 

And quite honestly, Ambassador, if a country doesn’t respect a 

person’s religious freedom, if the leadership of a country doesn’t 

trust their own people with religious freedom, then I don’t see why 

we should think that we can trust the leadership of that country. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing and the witnesses for being here this morning. 

We have heard, you know, a lot of talk in the back and forth 

about lessons learned and whether or not in particularly the case 

of Iraq and as far as our credibility whether or not Iraq was abandoned. I think that was one of the statements that was made here. 

You know, one of the lessons that I certainly think we should reflect on was the statement by Secretary Gates, who is hardly an 

apologist for this administration as we have seen in recent weeks, 

that any Secretary of Defense who advises a U.S. President to get 

involved in a ground war in the Middle East ought to have their 

head examined. 

And so, you know, Ms. Slotkin, when the questions were posed 

to you earlier about Iraq and whether or not our credibility has 

somehow been damaged because of events that flowed since 2011, 

I mean you were intimately involved based on your re ́sume ́ with 

the transition that took place. 

And again, just to reiterate the point, because we had a number 

of hearings in this committee about the status of forces agreement 

negotiations. Again, the reason why the final outcome occurred was 

because of this issue of immunity of prosecution for our troops staying there. 

So, in other words, if a soldier from Norwich, Connecticut, without an immunity provision, you know, got picked up by the Iraqi 

military police or even civilian police, basically they were com-
27 

pletely exposed to the criminal justice system or the military justice system of that country, which was unacceptable to both the 

Bush administrations and the Obama administration. 

I mean is that a correct accounting of the back and forth that 

took place? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think it is correct to say that regardless of administration, there are certain basic SOFA provisions, and trying our 

own people in our own courts is a basic tenet of any SOFA negotiation around the world. 

The Bush administration wasn’t going to let our soldiers be exposed to the Iraqi courts and neither was the Obama administration. I don’t believe that was the only issue. We certainly had a 

very complicated recent past with Iraqis, but that certainly was 

one issue. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Certainly in this committee, and I recall those 

hearings well, I mean that was a very bright line as far as any 

agreement moving forward. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. It was the single most difficult part of the original 

SOFA to negotiate. I was on the original team and it came down 

to the last couple of months and it was the single most controversial issue of the original SOFA signed back in 2008. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And, again, as far as the other side of that negotiation, again it was a pretty adamant provision of the Iraqi negotiators, that they insisted on it, and in fact I believe there was even 

a vote in the Iraqi parliament that took place again sort of reiterating that position. I may not have that totally correct. But the 

bottom line is that it is important for people to remember that this 

didn’t happen in a vacuum. That kind of comes with the territory 

when you are doing bilateral negotiations and you are fostering democracy and some of these things. Their position, you know, affects 

the outcome of negotiations. 

And Ambassador, you I know have a history in Afghanistan. I 

mean this issue of immunity from prosecution actually is not a 

stumbling block right now. I mean that is something that at least 

press reports suggest, the two sides have actually agreed on that. 

There is other issues that are hindering a completion of the agreement. But, again, just as an example, it is sort of a contrast, I 

mean how important that is. 

Well, again, maybe, Ms. Slotkin, you can—— 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. I mean this is a fundamental difference between where we were with Iraq in 2011 and where we are now 

with Afghanistan is that the people of Afghanistan, the parliamentarians of Afghanistan, the members of the loya jirga, they support 

an enduring presence. 

And we just didn’t have the same facts on the ground in 2011 

in Iraq for a whole variety of reasons. And I think that you are 

right, we largely have the contours of an agreement, we just need 

the political will to get it signed, and we urge President Karzai to 

sign it as soon as possible. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Great. Thank you. 

Ambassador, you have mentioned the efforts in Syria to remove 

the chemical weapons and again there has been some progress with 

the production facilities. You know, there was an interesting report 

that we had about the U.S. Navy’s participation in this process 
28 

that they have actually got a container ship ready to go, the USS 

Ray. 

And again, I was wondering if you could just sort of talk about 

the fact that, again, we have to get the pace moving, but the fact 

is, is that our military is doing an outstanding job in terms of getting this, in my opinion, great accomplishment completed. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, Congressman. This is really an important advance. It was the biggest threat to the most number of 

Syrians, and, importantly, it was the biggest threat to Syria’s 

neighbors as well. So it was very important to address this issue. 

The removal has stalled and we are doing everything we can to 

push the Syrians to remove the weapons as soon as possible. It has 

been a great example of international cooperation. But it is important to realize too that the machines which actually make the materials, mix the materials, have already been removed, so Syria’s 

capacity to actually deploy a chemical weapon is very, very greatly 

reduced. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Cook. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I have got a number of questions so I might cut off the speakers 

and I will apologize in advance. 

Admiral, first of all, real quick on MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles] and the situation in Fallujah, Anbar Province, and everything else, that it is not just the helicopters, it is 

also the fact that IEDs [improvised explosive devices] are a big 

problem. We had a committee hearing that said they are going to 

chop up a number of them that are coming out of Afghanistan. I 

wonder if this might be one of the carrots that we could use with 

the Maliki government. I don’t trust his government, particularly 

the relations with Iran. If you could briefly comment on that. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. My understanding is that we are not cutting 

up the MRAPs as was previously discussed. 

Mr. COOK. That policy has changed? 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Yes, I will go back and check on that, but my 

understanding is that has changed. 

Mr. COOK. Because we—— 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Yes. 

Mr. COOK [continuing]. Were briefed, and it wasn’t that long 

ago—— 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COOK [continuing]. And I am there as, you know, a dumb 

grunt—— 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Right. 

Mr. COOK [continuing]. That always took his equipment out saying, what in God’s—we spent all this money and everything like 

that and okay—— 

Admiral PANDOLFE. I believe we have revisited that, and let me 

go back and double-check that for you. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Regarding the Iraqis, we are responding to 

the lists of capabilities that they have given us. They have told us 
29 

what they think they need to recapture the areas that are contested. 

Mr. COOK. Particularly Fallujah? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COOK. And when they have tried, they have really gotten 

whacked pretty bad, haven’t they? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. I don’t want to comment on what their—— 

Mr. COOK. Okay. 

Admiral PANDOLFE [continuing]. Operational plans are. But they 

have given us a list of the capabilities they feel they need and we 

are moving swiftly to provide those. 

Mr. COOK. Okay, could I switch to the Ambassadors real quick, 

on the Kurds. We haven’t heard much about the Kurds. I know 

they have the pipeline, things are looking better, obviously tremendous in regards to their economy. But I am afraid that they might 

get thrown under the bus again as they have in the past. 

What is the policy towards the Kurds and the fact that oftentimes they get left in the dust real quickly? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Well, again, I think the Kurds now more than ever 

are integrated into the State of Iraq. And while I think given their 

history there will always be concerns about them being quote ‘‘left 

in the dust’’ as you say, they are a part of the senior leadership 

of the government. They have come to some important agreements 

with the central government. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. And their relationship with Turkey has obviously improved since we had the terrorists—— 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Significantly. I mean, if you would have told me as 

an Iraq expert a decade ago that they would have had the relations 

that they have with Turkey, I would have frankly laughed. I mean 

it is pretty—— 

Mr. COOK. I agree 100 percent. 

Moving on real quick, a couple of Gulf States that I have real 

problems with and I won’t mention, in terms of money going to Al 

Qaeda, and it is kind of wink-wink, nod-nod, or there has been reports of that, and these states are in our military—you know, it is 

as if they get a free ride on that. Is that true? And I am talking 

about one in particular and you might—— 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, no, sir, it is not true. There have 

been huge efforts over the years by our Treasury Department and 

others—— 

Mr. COOK. Maybe with the government, but they allow certain 

elements—I have got to move quickly, I am sorry. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Let me be quick. They don’t allow it. 

They do try to shut it down. We try and shut it down. 

Mr. COOK. But are there are citizens in that country that do funnel money to Al Qaeda? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. They manage to fund these groups in 

places like Pakistan and Syria, of course. They are trying to restrain it, but, of course, it hasn’t been 100 percent. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. Going back to—I just want to make a real 

quick comment in regards to Iran. I am sorry, and I appreciate 

your service and everything and the Intel Community. Hey, I am 

a grunt, infantry. You know, you never, ever, ever, trust the intel 

because it is the grunts, my Marines that had to go in there and 
30 

get the job done. And what happens? You get killed. And the best 

example going back was the Marine barracks in Lebanon. 

And remember that group, Hezbollah, and who were they associated with? Iran. You talk to most of the military, at least the ones, 

the one country that keeps them awake at night is Iran, Iran, Iran. 

And to say we got a year, I don’t believe it. 

So, at least from one Congressman, I don’t share that optimism. 

I have been to Israel. They are scared to death of what is happening there and it will be too late. And you are right, I don’t think 

we can stop it unless we do have a good line in the sand that we 

are going to enforce. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. If I could follow up, this has been explored a great 

deal. I just want to follow up on a couple points about Iran and 

what we do about them. I mean, if our position is we just can’t 

know, no matter what we do, we can’t know, you know I guess isn’t 

the only policy choice at that point to just declare war and get it 

over with? I mean, I am just not understanding where it is that 

the folks on this side of the aisle think that we ought to go with 

this. 

Now, I will for a brief moment explain where it is that we are 

going with this that makes sense, and that is the sanctions were 

brought about to force Iran to the conclusion that building a nuclear weapon was not in their best interests. 

In fact, you make a pretty powerful argument that the worst 

thing that Iran has done over the course of the last decade is pursue a nuclear weapon, because they were up to all manner of different malfeasance short of nuclear weapon, but some of that was 

tough to establish, it was tough to get our allies on board. But 

when they started pursuing a nuclear weapon our allies understood, gosh, even Russia understood, this was not a very good 

thing, so we were able to put crippling and crushing sanctions on 

them in a bipartisan way that brought Iran to the conclusion that 

they better talk. 

And all of our intel shows us that they have not made the decision to build a nuclear weapon. In fact, someone said to me, well 

there is no evidence that that is true. I said I first heard that Iran 

was 6 months from getting a nuclear weapon in 2005. So what evidence is there that they have not decided to build one? They don’t 

have one, all right? They were 6 months from it in 2005. If they 

wanted it, they would have it. They have not decided to build that 

weapon because they are not sure it is in their best interest to do 

so. So our policy is to keep the crippling sanctions on them. 

And one of the things that was said that just really disturbed me 

was the notion that Iran is open for business as a result of this 6- 

month deal. Pay some attention to what is actually in the deal. All 

that is in there in terms of sanctions relief is to release a small 

amount of Iranian money that we have been holding. We are holding well over $100 billion, and I believe we are releasing somewhere between 4 and 6 billion. All of the other sanctions on their 

oil industry, on their financial services industry, all of those other 
31 

sanctions are kept in place and are not going to be removed until 

we get a final agreement. 

So if our position is, oh, goodness gracious, we can’t possibly 

know, they might build it we can’t trust them, then have the guts 

to say not just that we should have the option on the table, but 

that you are in favor of us bombing Iran right now today because 

we can’t know. 

I think that is wrong. I think it is a crazy policy, it is the wrong 

way to go, because we do know a great deal about what they are 

up to. The sanctions policy is our best hope to prevent them from 

getting a nuclear weapon. So these questions are pushing us in a 

direction that makes no logical sense. That is more of a statement 

than a question, obviously. 

But help me out here, Ms. Slotkin. Is that not fairly accurate? 

And also it is clear, our policy is if everything else fails, we will 

use military force, but given the consequences of that we would 

dearly love to stop everything else from failing. So lay that out a 

little bit more clearly for us, because I think there is a clear policy 

here this committee is missing. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Thank you, sir. I think that is accurate. That is 

certainly the way we see it. I mean I think it is not crazy to have 

questions of trust with the Iranians. 

Mr. SMITH. Sure. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. That is a natural normal reaction to events that 

happened, God, for the past 30 years, with today being the anniversary, frankly. 

Mr. SMITH. I think, if I may, our policy reflects that lack of trust. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Exactly. And I think that is why the interim agreement that is on the table right now is not about trust and just taking them at their word, it is about verification. 

And my only point is if we were able to do it with the Soviet 

Union, right, if we were able to negotiate with others in our past 

who had every reason not to trust, with the right verification 

standards in place, I think we are able to make progress and we 

need to allow diplomacy a chance to succeed. Certainly from the 

Defense Department’s perspective, I would always rather have diplomacy be the order of the day than be forced to take military action. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I don’t know that I would use Russia as an example of negotiating because we know that they have broken treaties. 

And I think probably one of the things that leads us to the lack 

of trust is why do they have to do this work under a mountain? 

Why don’t they just open it up? If they are just doing nuclear energy for energy, why do they have to bury it where it is away from 

sight? Where is the transparency? 

Mr. SMITH. Again, Mr. Chairman—— 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Mr. Chairman—— 

The CHAIRMAN. We know that there are over 10 nations that use 

nuclear power but don’t do the enriching that they are doing. So 

you know, there are some very solid reasons for distrusting them. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, as I said, the cornerstone of our policy 

is we don’t trust them, okay? We are not arguing—nobody is argu-
32 

ing in terms of how we negotiate this deal that we ought to just 

close our eyes and trust them. That is why we have the sanctions. 

That is why we have the back and forth. 

Yes, absolutely Iran has been underhanded in this. What they 

want, they want to be able to build a bomb without having international repercussions. That is what they want. And they have 

been sort of dancing around for a decade trying to figure out how 

to do that, and it has been our job and the international community’s job to say you can’t. You know, if you go down this road the 

price you will pay will be steep. So, no, we don’t trust them at all 

and we shouldn’t. 

The CHAIRMAN. And I think where we recently with this interim 

deal where we have the problem is the things I mentioned, and the 

thing that we put the sanctions on that brought them to the table, 

if we had kept those sanctions a little bit longer we may have gotten them to give up the enrichment, if that was what we really 

wanted. 

Mr. SMITH. We haven’t given up the sanctions. That is the whole 

point. What do you mean if we kept them a little longer? We have 

not given them up. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we did. You just said we gave them up $4 

billion to $6 billion. In other words—— 

Mr. SMITH. And a whole raft of other sanctions are very firmly 

in place that are continuing to cripple their economy. 

Let’s ask Ms. Slotkin for her opinion. Is their economy any less 

crippled because we released a small amount of money? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. No. Let me try—Mr. Chairman, one element that I think, it is not just our intelligence we are depending 

on, although I think it is pretty good in this instance. It is also the 

enhanced inspections by the IAEA that were a critical element of 

this interim agreement. They are going to be in some of these facilities every single day and others on a much more regular basis. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. You know, this is already done and we are 

not going to undo it. We have had the same briefings and we just 

look at it a little bit differently, and I don’t think it is because, 

Democrat or Republican. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Can I just add one—I am sorry, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. No. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Okay. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me get to the members who have been sitting here very patiently to ask their questions. 

Dr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you all 

being here today. If I can, we will go back to Iraq for a second. 

You know, I think obviously the people of Fallujah and Anbar 

Province are not happy to see Al Qaeda back in Iraq, and you made 

some mention, Ms. Slotkin, that Al Qaeda probably would have resurged there in some way with or without our presence. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. My point was Al Qaeda frankly was at its strongest 

right as we had the largest single number of troops in the country 

at a time, so 170,000 troops back in you know 2007 and we have 

got the highest rate of attack that we saw from Al Qaeda during 

the course of the war. 
33 

Dr. WENSTRUP. And I can appreciate that. I was there 2005 to 

2006 you know leading up to that buildup and understand the effort that that takes. But I am just concerned that you may feel, 

and correct me if I am wrong, that a U.S. presence would have no 

deterrence. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think the presence we were always talking about 

would be a train-advise presence, largely based out of Baghdad, 

right. The numbers we were talking about at the time were something around 10,000. So that is obviously not going to be able to 

have a geographic spread the way 170,000 troops had at the height 

of the surge. So I think while we would have been able to advise 

and assist in probably a more robust way, we had already turned 

over lead to the operations to the Iraqis a year and a half, 2 years 

before then. 

So I don’t think that we—our presence would have been the deterrent. I think we would have been able to provide more expertise 

and more training than we are currently doing. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. You know, I tend to think our presence can be 

a deterrent. When I traveled to the Kurdish area, for example, they 

were pretty pleased there has been an American presence in their 

area since 1991, and I think that they probably, correct me if I am 

wrong, I don’t know what kind of say they had at the table during 

the discussions on the SOFA, but I think they would have been 

more than happy to have an American presence in the Kurdish region of Iraq. 

Did they have a say at the table during this conversation? I 

agree with what Mr. Courtney was bringing up about, you know, 

concern for our troops and protection for our troops. I understand 

that part completely. But I find it hard to believe that they would 

not have wanted our presence there. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Certainly different groups, and Iraq is made up of 

a large number of different groups, had different views on whether 

there should be a presence, a follow-on presence after 2011. There 

were Kurdish members of the original SOFA negotiating party. 

There were Kurdish members of parliament that voted on the 

SOFA when it passed back in 2008. And I think largely the Kurdish population tends to be pretty pro-American and would have 

supported us staying. 

I don’t think that speaks for everyone in the Kurdish territories, 

but I think there are also plenty of groups around the country, 

Shia, Sunni, and others who were supportive. They voted to keep 

us there. So the Kurds certainly weren’t the only ones at the time 

who supported it. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. With what is going on now, do you think they 

have any regrets? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think you know, as we were talking about, if you 

go to Erbil, I am not sure where you were in the Kurdish areas, 

if go there, there are just cranes everywhere. They are—— 

Dr. WENSTRUP. I was at Sulaymaniyah. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Okay. So construction boomed, their economy is 

doing exceptionally well, they are signing important deals with 

their neighbors. They still have a senior role in the government. So 

I think that the Kurdish areas are doing particularly well and I 

think that is without us signing a follow-on agreement in 2011. 
34 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Admiral, I have a question. Strategically, what 

benefit do you think it would have had if we had a stronger presence in Iraq at this time? For the entire region, not just for Iraq? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Well, I don’t want to speculate on what 

might have happened in Iraq. What I would like to focus on is Afghanistan and that we have, as Ms. Slotkin has underlined and 

Ambassador Patterson, we believe that the signing of a BSA [bilateral security agreement] there which reflects the will of their people and the international community, quite frankly, will allow us 

to maintain the presence, when I say ‘‘we’’ I mean the NATO presence, to help that nation continue toward a better future. 

So looking forward it is our hope that Afghanistan, the president 

of Afghanistan does sign the BSA to allow the international community to remain in that country, both for defense purposes and 

to Ambassador Patterson’s point for developmental purposes, because the international community presence will facilitate the flow 

of funds for both defense and for development. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

this panel for being here. 

I also really did enjoy the conversation between our ranking 

member and the chairman. I kind of liked that free-flowing dialogue. It is good. 

You know I hear a lot about obviously trust as it relates to Iran. 

I was in Iraq in 2011 and had two sons in combat in Iraq in 2011 

as they were transitioning out and I do remember that one night 

I was there an IRAM [improvised rocket-assisted missile] attack 

took place and killed a number of our troops. For those who don’t 

know what an IRAM is, that is an Iranian warhead. The only place 

you can get an Iranian warhead is from Iran. And I worry about 

where we are in Afghanistan now just because Iran likes to play 

everywhere, and we see that across the board. 

I think what a lot of folks are worried about, and particularly 

with Iran, you hear all kinds of estimates, so I get all the briefings, 

I sit on the IETC [Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats 

and Capabilities], is the fact that once if they are successful in obtaining a nuclear weapon, we are going to be in the same position 

that we are today with North Korea. There are a whole lot of reasons how they got it, and we are going to be facing the same dilemma that we have today in North Korea but you know with a 

different state actor. And I guess that is why a number of us are 

concerned that we are going to make the same mistakes in this 

particular issue with Iran and particularly with our good friend 

and ally, with Israel, that could face the brunt of it. 

I just don’t know. We hear about sanctions. I heard the ranking 

member talk about sanctions. You know the Senate was just talking about increasing sanctions on Iran and I think they have 

paused that because of a lot of lobbying by the President in regards 

to not doing that. But why do you think that they were so, on both 

sides of the aisle in a bipartisan way, why do you think that they 

wanted to increase sanctions on Iran if they think that this is the 

right direction where we are going today with Iran in regards to 

them saying that they really don’t want a nuclear weapon? Why do 
35 

you think the Senate was taking that position? Do you have any 

idea? I am sure it is not just to block or, you know, cause problems 

for the President, because it was the Democrats who were pushing 

that. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, no, sir. I mean, I think as we 

have said, there is an enormous suspicion based on years of empirical data about Iran’s intention. But let me stress that this nuclear—that Iran’s ability to acquire a nuclear weapon is an existential threat to us and it is an existential threat to critically Iran’s 

neighbors. So that has got to be our first priority. 

And these sanctions, these crippling sanctions, the reduction of 

their capacity, their currency totally tanked, has enabled us to get 

to the table and try to negotiate this and to cap and to freeze their 

paths to a nuclear weapon while these negotiations are underway. 

Mr. NUGENT. I mean, they are in control of this. I mean they 

could easily reverse this in regards to sanctions if they did what? 

What could they do today to reverse that? Is there something they 

could do today to reverse those sanctions? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, yes, because they could negotiate 

an agreement. There is an interim agreement and we have begun 

to negotiate. They could—there is, yes, a whole—— 

Mr. NUGENT. Couldn’t they just walk away from what they are 

doing and still do the development they wanted to from a peaceful 

side, but could they not reverse this very simply if they wanted to, 

if they really didn’t have a goal of creating a nuclear weapon? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, if they walked away from the negotiations? I am not quite sure I follow you, sir. 

Mr. NUGENT. No, what I am saying could they not get the international partners and the United States to reverse their decision 

on those crippling sanctions if they did one thing, and clearly did 

the things that would be required to walk away from a nuclear 

weapon? Because that is really the name, is the reason we have 

these sanctions. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, sure they can lift the sanctions if 

they move in that direction, and that is what this negotiation is all 

about. It is an international negotiation with a number of countries, and there is a lot of U.N. Security Council resolutions that 

are at play too. So yes, as the negotiations go on, of course we hope 

that they will walk away from it. 

Mr. NUGENT. And I will be honest with you, I am the last one 

that would want to see military action because I happen to have 

three sons that currently serve, and they are the brunt of—when 

we sit here and talk about military action, there is really a human 

face behind that and I want to make sure that before we do something that we, you know, allow the sanctions to work, but also 

allow diplomacy to work. 

But at the end of the day, the Iranians have control. They control 

their fate in regards to what they do and the course of action that 

they have taken and are taking. And so while I appreciate everything that you do, I think that until they decide that they want to 

get out from underneath these sanctions, it is going to continue, because they have underlying reasons to do that. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. I appreciate your 

time. 
36 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. No other 

questions, this hearing will stand adjourned. Thank you very much 

for your presence here. 

[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 11, 2014 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Eagle Resolve Participating Countries: Bahrain, France, Iraq, 

Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 

United Kingdom, and the United States. 

Eager Lion Participating Countries: Bahrain, Canada, Czech Republic, Egypt, 

France, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 

United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Yemen. [See page 23.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 11, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON 

Mr. MCKEON. Does it remain U.S. policy that all options, including military force, 

remain on the table to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. This Administration views the prospect of a nucleararmed Iran as unacceptable and is committed to preventing Iran from developing 

a nuclear weapon. The President has been consistent: the United States is committed to using all the necessary elements of American power to prevent Iran from 

acquiring a nuclear weapon. Although we continue to believe that there is time and 

space for a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear program, as the President has said, 

all options remain on the table. 

Mr. MCKEON. What are we doing to demonstrate to Iran that we are ready and 

willing to use force if necessary? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. This Administration has made non-proliferation one of 

its top priorities. We view the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as unacceptable and 

are committed to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. We have implemented the strongest, most comprehensive sanctions regime to date against the Iranian government. 

The United States is committed to using all the necessary elements of American 

power to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Although we continue to 

believe that there is time and space for a diplomatic solution, as the President has 

said, all options remain on the table. 

Mr. MCKEON. Iran is in a position where it could break out and produce enough 

highly enriched uranium for a weapon in less than two months. Is the U.S. military 

prepared to act in such a narrow timeframe to respond to an Iranian breakout attempt? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I am not going to speculate about military action or discuss military planning. President Obama has pledged repeatedly that all options remain on the table. 

Mr. MCKEON. What impact did the lack of U.S. military action in Syria have on 

Iran’s view of the credibility of the U.S. threat of force to stop its nuclear quest? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. When the President stated his willingness to order a 

limited strike against the Asad regime in response to the brazen use of chemical 

weapons, he did not do so lightly. The purpose of such a strike, as the President 

said, would have been to deter and degrade the regime’s ability to use chemical 

weapons. 

The threat of force in Syria remains credible because it is in the security interest 

of the United States and the world to meaningfully enforce the international prohibition against use of chemical weapons. The President has made it clear that all 

options remain on the table. However, as the President said, he preferred a diplomatic resolution to this issue and we are implementing the agreement reached in 

Geneva in September. This diplomatic resolution will meet our objectives by ensuring that the regime can never again deploy these terrible weapons. 

Likewise, the Administration seeks a diplomatic resolution to the concerns of 

Iran’s nuclear program. The Administration is committed to the nonproliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction and views the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as unacceptable and remains committed to preventing Iran from developing a nuclear 

weapon. 

The United States is committed to using all the necessary elements of American 

power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Although we continue to 

believe that there is time and space for a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear program, as the President has said, all options remain on the table. 

Mr. MCKEON. What steps are the United States taking to mitigate the impact of 

unfolding Middle East events on Israel’s QME? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. The United States is committed to helping Israel maintain its QME, defined as Israel’s ability to counter and defeat credible military 

threats from any individual state, coalition of states or non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damage or casualties. This policy was written into law in 2008, but 

it has long been a fundamental tenet of U.S. policy and a cornerstone of the U.S.- 

Israel security relationship. 

The Administration is regularly assessing the capabilities of the region’s militaries and non-state actors to ensure Israel maintains its qualitative military edge 

(QME). We are also taking full advantage of the consultative and political mechanisms currently in place to respond to and act on Israel’s concerns. 
78 

In addition to fulfilling the requirements of the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008, 

the United States protects Israel’s QME in a number of important ways. 1) Israel 

is the leading recipient of Foreign Military Financing (FMF). In FY 2013, which 

marked the fifth year of a 10-year, $30 billion MOU, Israel received $2.94 billion 

in FMF, slightly less than the $3.1 billion request level due to sequestration. We 

requested the full $3.1 billion in FY 2014; 2) Israel is the only country authorized 

to use one-quarter of its FMF funding for domestic defense procurement, which provides significant flexibility in meeting immediate procurement needs and supporting 

the Israeli defense industry; 3) Israel has privileged access to advanced U.S. military equipment, such as the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter and, more recently, the MV– 

22 Osprey; 4) the United States is cooperating with Israel, using DOD appropriated 

funding, to develop a comprehensive air and missile defense system that protects 

Israel against ballistic and cruise missile threats; and 5) the United States has provided additional funding outside of State’s annual FMF request to support the expansion and acceleration of the Israeli-developed Iron Dome short-range rocket defense system. In FY 2011, Congress provided an additional $205 million for the procurement of additional Iron Dome systems. We provided an additional $70 million 

in FY2012 for Iron Dome systems and another $195 million in FY 2013 and $220M 

in FY 2014. The Administration has requested $175.9M for FY 2015. 

Mr. MCKEON. How is the United States ensuring that arms sales to the region 

do not undermine Israel’s QME? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. The Administration has sought to enhance security cooperation with and between U.S. partners in the Middle East. The United States 

is engaged in extensive efforts to ensure its partners have credible military capabilities to respond to potential regional threats. An essential part of this approach is 

providing our partners access, when appropriate, to military technologies critical to 

their national defense. These sales will also allow U.S. security partners to bear a 

greater share of the burden for regional security. 

Enhancing the capabilities of our Arab partners does not come at the expense of 

Israel’s security. This administration is committed to strengthening security cooperation with Israel and safeguarding its qualitative military edge (QME). We do 

not proceed with the release of U.S. defense articles or services that could pose a 

risk to our allies and partners or compromise regional security in the Middle East. 

Israel remains, by a significant margin, the leading recipient of foreign military 

financing and the Israel Defense Forces enjoy privileged access to the most advanced U.S. military equipment, such as the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter and the V– 

22 Osprey. 

Mr. MCKEON. Do you share Director Clapper’s concern about the threat foreign 

fighters in Syria pose to the United States or our allies like Israel? How are we addressing this potential threat? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. The U.S. government is extremely concerned by the 

threat posed by foreign fighter travel to Syria and potential implications for broader 

regional stability as a result. Furthermore, we are worried about the potential for 

these fighters, some of whom have connections with al-Qa’ida elements, to plan for 

and conduct attacks outside Syria, particularly against U.S. and other Western interests. 

We have been in close consultation with our partners in Europe and the Middle 

East on this matter. Effective coordination and collaboration with these partners is 

crucial in mitigating foreign fighter flows. Our discussions with partners are focusing on enhancing information sharing, border security measures to deny departure 

or entry of known or suspected extremist travelers, effective watchlisting, law enforcement cooperation, and measures to counter violent extremist messages and recruitment. We plan to intensify this engagement over the coming months. 

Mr. MCKEON. What is the United States doing to stop the flow of foreign fighters 

to Syria? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. We have been in close consultation on this matter with 

our partners in Europe and the Middle East, particularly over the past year. Effective coordination and collaboration with these partners is crucial in mitigating foreign fighter flows. To that end, the State Department has been leading U.S. interagency outreach with key partners in Europe and the Middle East. Our discussions 

are focusing on enhancing information sharing, border security, and law enforcement cooperation, in addition to efforts to counter violent extremist messages and 

recruitment. 

Mr. MCKEON. What challenges do you foresee in Lebanon given the increasing incidents of violence across the country? How can the United States minimize the 

threat of violence aimed at Israel from its northern border? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. U.S. policy in Lebanon is focused on bolstering Lebanon’s stability and sovereignty and countering extremist influences, both foreign 
79 

and domestic. Lebanon has faced a rising tempo of terrorist attacks in the last six 

months that have killed and wounded hundreds of civilians across the country. 

These attacks are directly related to the spillover of the Syria crisis into Lebanon. 

Another challenge is that Lebanon currently hosts almost a million refugees from 

Syria, and more enter Lebanon every day. These refugees, who live in communities 

across the country, strain the basic infrastructure of the nation as well as tax local 

municipalities’ abilities to scale up services to meet rising needs. 

Increasing sectarian violence and a steady influx of refugees from Syria threatens 

Lebanon’s stability. It is imperative that we continue our assistance to and partnership with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF); our 

long-standing, community-based USAID programming; our strong support for moderate leaders, such as President Michel Sleiman; our continuous engagement with 

mainstream political actors, including March 14 leaders; and our whole-of-government approach to countering Hizballah activity around the world. 

Our security assistance to the LAF and ISF is intended to develop functioning, 

non-sectarian state institutions that gain respect from all Lebanese citizens in order 

to show the Lebanese people that they do not need militias for protection or to advance their political aims. Sustained U.S. support, particularly in the face of increasing domestic and regional tensions, has maintained and improved the LAF’s 

capabilities as a national security force. A stronger LAF would contribute to stability on Lebanon’s border with Israel, help mitigate the spillover effects of the violence in Syria, and serve as an increasingly effective counterweight to Hizballah. 

Working closely with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the 

LAF’s performance in southern Lebanon has added to stability along the Blue Line 

with Israel. UN Security Council Resolution 1701 calls upon Lebanon to disarm Lebanon’s militias—a goal we support through our training and equipping of the LAF 

and the ISF as the sole legitimate defense forces in Lebanon. Part of UNIFIL’s mission is to keep the Blue Line secure, and it also trains with the LAF to increase 

its capability to monitor the border and provide security. The LAF is not yet fully 

able to provide security throughout the entire area under UNIFIL’s mandate, but 

with our assistance, further UNIFIL training, and other international support, the 

LAF’s capabilities are improving. 

Mr. MCKEON. Does it remain U.S. policy that all options, including military force, 

remain on the table to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes. Although diplomacy remains the preferred means to resolve 

international concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program, all options—including military option—remain on the table to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. 

Mr. MCKEON. What are we doing to demonstrate to Iran that we are ready and 

willing to use force if necessary? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Iran is well aware of our force presence and the significant capabilities of the U.S. military in the region. We have about 35,000 forces deployed in and 

immediately around the Gulf region. We have over 40 ships in the broader Middle 

East region, to include a carrier strike group. We also have deployed an array of 

missile defense capabilities, advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 

assets, as well as some of our most sophisticated aircraft. Our assets conducted approximately 50 transits through the Strait of Hormuz just during the last six 

months of 2013. Finally, our forces and personnel conducted and participated in 

over 50 multilateral and bilateral training exercises in the broader Middle East region last year. All of these serve as a constant reminder that the United States is 

ready and willing to use force to advance its core interests. 

Mr. MCKEON. Iran is in a position where it could break out and produce enough 

highly enriched uranium for a weapon in less than two months. Is the U.S. military 

prepared to act in such a narrow timeframe to respond to an Iranian breakout attempt? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Given this is an open forum, let me say simply that I am confident 

the U.S. military is ready and able to respond quickly and decisively to a variety 

of contingencies around the world, including one involving Iran, if necessary. 

Mr. MCKEON. What impact did the lack of U.S. military action in Syria have on 

Iran’s view of the credibility of the U.S. threat of force to stop its nuclear quest? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. The Intelligence Community is best positioned to answer this question. However, it was the credible threat of military force that helped bring about 

the diplomatic resolution on chemical weapons elimination in Syria. Our preference 

is to resolve issues through diplomacy, but the United States is prepared to execute 

military action should it become necessary. 

Mr. MCKEON. What steps are the United States taking to mitigate the impact of 

unfolding Middle East events on Israel’s QME? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. As Secretary Hagel has said, ‘‘Our commitment to Israel’s security 

is ironclad and unyielding.’’ In the midst of the uncertainty and instability that has 
80 

plagued the Middle East in recent years, the Department of Defense has worked 

diligently to ensure that Israel’s qualitative military edge is maintained. In addition 

to providing $3.1 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) each year—the most 

FMF provided to any country in history—the United States has made sure that 

Israel has access to the most advanced military capabilities possible, including the 

F–35 and the V–22 Osprey. Access to these types of advanced capabilities, combined 

with an unprecedented level of FMF to purchase them, will ensure that Israel’s 

qualitative military edge is maintained for the next generation. 

Mr. MCKEON. How is the United States ensuring that arms sales to the region 

do not undermine Israel’s QME? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. The cornerstone of the U.S. security assurance to Israel is the 

United States’ support to Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME). Israel must have 

the ability to defeat any adversary—anytime, anywhere. As you know, the importance of ensuring Israel’s QME is not just based on shared values and interests, but 

is also based on U.S. law. This law provides that any proposed sale or export of defense articles or services to the Middle East will include a determination that the 

sale or export will not adversely affect Israel’s QME. Working with the Department 

of State, the Department of Defense will continue to ensure that, in accordance with 

this law, arms sales to the Middle East will not undermine Israel’s QME. 

Mr. MCKEON. Do you share Director Clapper’s concern about the threat foreign 

fighters in Syria pose to the United States or our allies like Israel? How are we addressing this potential threat? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I agree this issue is of concern, both to the United States and our 

partners in the region, including Israel. We are monitoring this issue closely and 

working with partners in the Middle East to address this threat. We are providing 

assistance to Lebanon and Jordan to strengthen their ability to secure their borders, 

including, for example, by providing equipment and training to supplement the Jordan Border Security Program. We are also working with Turkey and Iraq to determine how to stem the flow of foreign fighters into the region. 

In addition, DOD will continue to support the efforts of other U.S. departments 

and agencies to strengthen elements of the moderate Syrian opposition so they can 

better degrade terrorists’ ability to attack the homeland and U.S. interests abroad. 

Mr. MCKEON. What is the United States doing to stop the flow of foreign fighters 

to Syria? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. We are working with our partners in the region and our European 

allies, many of whom share our concerns on this issue, to develop the most effective 

options to stem the flow of fighters into and out of Syria. 

To that end, we are supporting Syria’s neighbors in enhancing their border security, and have provided assistance to both Lebanon and Jordan; we are working 

with Turkey and Iraq to determine how we can more effectively help those nations 

deal with foreign fighters crossing their borders. We are also closely coordinating 

with Israel to make sure Israel can defend itself against violent extremist threats 

in Syria. 

The Department is working with our interagency and international partners to organize our efforts to monitor the activities and movements of extremists in the region, and enable U.S. and international efforts to disrupt foreign fighter flows and 

potential extremist attacks. The whole of the U.S. government is coordinating closely on measures we can take to support this top priority as well as Ambassador 

Brafke, who was recently named as State’s Senior Advisor for Partner Engagement 

on Syria Foreign Fighters. 

Mr. MCKEON. What challenges do you foresee in Lebanon given the increasing incidents of violence across the country? How can the United States minimize the 

threat of violence aimed at Israel from its northern border? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Unfortunately, as long as the violence in Syria continues, we expect 

that Lebanon will continue to suffer from spillover violence and humanitarian-related pressures. Terrorist attacks in Lebanon are on the rise. The Lebanese Armed 

Forces (LAF) have taken a variety of measures to maintain stability in Lebanon and 

to counter the destabilizing effects of the Syrian conflict on Lebanon’s security. The 

Lebanese Armed Forces’ willingness to exercise its role in Lebanon has made it a 

target as well. 

Our continued engagement with and assistance to the LAF are extremely important at this time of increased challenges to Lebanon’s stability. We remain concerned with Iran’s destabilizing activities in Lebanon and its partnership with 

Hizballah. We view the Lebanese Armed Forces’ emergence as the sole legitimate 

defense force as a critical component of Lebanon’s long-term stability and development. The Lebanese Armed Forces has proved to be a reliable partner in Lebanon, 

and continuing to make it a stronger, more effective institution will help to ensure 

that Lebanon remains stable and capable of protecting its borders, thereby reducing 
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the risk of attacks on Israel from terrorist elements that may seek to use Lebanon 

as a launching pad for violence. 

Mr. MCKEON. Iran is in a position where it could break out and produce enough 

highly enriched uranium for a weapon in less than two months. Is the U.S. military 

prepared to act in such a narrow timeframe to respond to an Iranian breakout attempt? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. DNI assesses that Iran will need up to one year or longer to 

produce a testable nuclear weapon from the point of decision to do so. Thus, as discussed in the hearing, we continue to maintain a strong military posture in the Gulf 

region. 

Mr. MCKEON. What impact did the lack of U.S. military action in Syria have on 

Iran’s view of the credibility of the U.S. threat of force to stop its nuclear quest? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has assessed that 

Iran is trying to balance the conflicting objectives of improving its nuclear capabilities with avoiding severe repercussions, such as a military strike or sanctions. The 

DNI does not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons. 

Mr. MCKEON. What steps are the United States taking to mitigate the impact of 

unfolding Middle East events on Israel’s QME [qualitative military edge]? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. DOD is able to mitigate the impact of unfolding Middle East 

events on Israel’s QME through the sale of advanced technology to Israel, participation in combined training and exercises, and support for active missile defense efforts in Israel. 

Annual Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants of $3.1 billion support Israel’s 

QME. FMF, along with national funds and U.S. missile defense appropriations to 

Israel, represent over $18 billion in Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial 

Contract purchases. To maintain QME, the U.S. delivered the C–130J to replace 

Israel’s aging C–130E fleet and has agreed to provide advanced systems such as the 

F–35 and V–22 along with attack helicopters, Patriot Air Defense Systems, and advanced fighter aircraft radar systems. In addition, Israel benefits from the $1.4 billion War Reserve Stock Allies-Israel program that includes Patriot missiles, bombs, 

and other weapons in country for use in a contingency. 

Many exercises offer DOD the opportunity to work with Israeli counterparts. 

These include Juniper Cobra, Austere Challenge, Reliant Mermaid, Noble Dina, 

Noble Shirley, Blue Flag and other BMD and command and control exercises. These 

exercises address emerging challenges and increase our combined capabilities, interoperability, and readiness. 

DOD also supports Israel’s multi-layered missile and rocket defense. By the end 

of FY 2014, the United States will have provided over $700 million for production 

of Iron Dome batteries in addition to the $3.1 billion Israel receives in FMF. In FY 

2015, DOD plans to provide an additional $176 million for Iron Dome. 

Mr. MCKEON. Do you share Director Clapper’s concern about the threat foreign 

fighters in Syria pose to the United States or our allies like Israel? How are we addressing this potential threat? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. I share Director Clapper’s concern over the foreign fighter 

threat in Syria. Some foreign fighters are joining units with known links to terrorist 

organizations. DOD continues to pursue a strategy of capacity-building, security assistance, and intelligence-sharing with our international partners to aid in combating violent extremist threats emanating from Syria. 

Mr. MCKEON. What is the United States doing to stop the flow of foreign fighters 

to Syria? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. The DOD pursues a strategy of capacity building, security assistance, and intelligence sharing with international partners to disrupt the flow of 

foreign fighters to Syria. Example capacity building programs include the Jordan 

Border Security Project to improve ground surveillance and communication and utilization of Section 1206 Global Train and Equip funding to improve Lebanon border 

security. 

Security assistance comes in the form of Foreign Military Financing to Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon that totaled $826 million in FY 2013. In January, DOD expedited 

a $203 million Government of Iraq request to purchase arms and ammunition to facilitate response to extremist attacks throughout the country. 

Expanded intelligence sharing with Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey also aids DOD’s 

strategy to address the foreign fighter flow to Syria. This approach involves coordination across the interagency. 

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