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w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2015/320NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 1 4

- 3571

___________ LYNN A. VAN TASSEL, an adult individual,

Appellant

v. HON, JUDGE THOMAS M. PICCIONE, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, Lawrence County, PA, in his official and individual capacities; JAMES R. JENDRYSKI, Chief Probation Officer, the Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole Department, in his official and i ndividual capacities; BRIAN COVERT, Warden of Lawrence County Jail, in his official and individual Capacities; CLYDE JONES, Trooper Pennsylvania State Police, in his official and individual capacities; COL. FRANK NOONAN, Commissioner of Pennsylvania State Police, in his official and individual capacities; JOSHUA LAMANCUSA, Lawrence County District Attorney, in his official and individual capacities

____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western D istrict of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2

- 13

- cv - 01672 ) District Judge: H onorable Nora B. Fischer

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 25, 2015 Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN and GREENBERG , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : April 1, 2015 )

___________ OPINION *

___________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full C ourt and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

PER CUR IAM Appellant, Lynn A. Van Tassel, filed suit in federal court against Judge Thomas Piccione and a number of county officials involved in proceedings against her for civil contempt and in enforcing the contempt order against her in her state court divorce case
. Appellant seeks review of the District Court’s order dismissing her complaint. 1 Because we conclude that dismissal was appropriate, we will affirm.
I.
T he parties are familiar with the facts and proceedings to date and we will only set forth the basic fact s necessary to our analysis here. In addition, much of the factual background for Appellant’s current claims is set forth at length at Van Tassel v.
Lawrence C ou nty Domestic Relations Sections , 390 F. App’x 201 (3d Cir. 2010) , and Van Tassel v. Hodge , 565 F. App’x 135 (3d Cir.) , cert. denied , 135 S. Ct. 478 (2014 )

. Appellant was held in civil contempt for violating a n order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County, Pennsylvania . The trial judge found that Appellant had disregarded a prev ious contempt order requiring her to pay part of her husband’s attorney ’s fees in their divorce proceedings. The judge imposed a sanction of ninety days in prison in addition to other legal and monetary sanctions. Appellant was arrested on a bench warran t issued in connection with the contempt order and was released on bail with house arrest followed by electronic monitoring as she awaited further proceedings. A

1 Appellant listed only the Dist rict Court’s denial of her motion to reconsider in her notice of appeal. However, her arguments are directed at the substance of the District Court’s dismissal of her complaint. See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass ’ n , 503 F.3d 217, 225 n.6 (3d C ir. 2007)

.3

miscellaneous criminal docket entry related to the electronic monitoring was created in Appel lant’s name. Appellant, acting through counsel, brought the miscellaneous docket entry to the judge’s attention , and it was expunged approximately three months later. Appellant filed suit in federal District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
t he judge, probation and parole officials, jail officials, state police officials, and the local prosecutor. She alleged violations of her F irst, F ourth, and F ifth A mendment rights and brought various claims against the appellees based in state law. The g ravamen of her complaint is that it was illegal for the state court to grant her bail and order electronic monitoring in civil contempt proceedings and that she was damaged by the criminal docket entry in her name that was created when she was placed on el ectronic monitoring

. Appellees filed motions to dismiss, which the District Court granted. Appellant moved the District Court to reconsider and appealed the denial of that motion.
II. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise pl enary review over the District Court’s dismiss al of the complaint for failure to state a claim and over the District Court’s application of the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine

. See Allah v. Seiverling , 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) ; Turner v. Crawford Square A partments III, L.P. , 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006)

. “Although for the purposes of this motion to dismiss we must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual alleg ation.” Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The question of immunity is a purely legal issue, which we review de4

novo. Figueroa v. Blackburn , 208 F.3d 435, 439 (3d Cir. 2000). W e review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s order denyin g Appellant’s motion for reconsideration. S ee Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki , 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). We may affirm a District Court's judgment on any grounds supported by the record. Hughes v. Long , 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001). The Dis trict Court properly dismissed Appellant’s claims

. As we explained in Appellant’s earlier appeal on the same basic set of facts, 2 t he District Court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine because Appellant ’ s claims are essentially an appeal from a state court judgment

. See Great W

. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP , 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010) ; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Insofar as Appellant’s claims of conspiracy or collusion c ould be read to fall outside Rooker

- Feldman , the District Court properly dis posed of them on other grounds

. The District Court listed a number of alternative reasons for dismissing each of Appellant’s claims, including immunity and fa i lure to state a clai m upon which relief could be granted. “A judicial officer in the performance of his duties has absolute

2 As noted, Appellant has already raised the issues on which she bases her complaint. We affirmed dismissal of that case based on the application of the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine. See Van Tassel v. Hodge , 565 F. App’x 135, 138 (3d Cir.) , cert. d enied , 135 S. Ct. 478 (2014). Although the District C ourt did not address preclusion, “‘res judicata may be invoked against a plaintiff who has previously asserted essentially the same claim against different defendants where there is a close or significa nt relationship between successive defendants , ” Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp. , 929 F.2d 960, 966 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Gambocz v. Yelencsics , 468 F.2d 837, 841 (3d Cir. 1972)), and t he doctrine bars not only claims that were brought in a previous action but also claims that could have been brought. See In re Mullarkey , 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008).5

immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.” Azubuko v. Royal , 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). This holds true eve n if the action “was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump v. Sparkman , 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). The District Court correctly determined that the state court judge was entitled to absolute immunity

. With respect to t he remaining defendants, the District Court properly determined that Appellant had failed to state a claim. Appellant listed

non - judicial defendants in her complaint but failed to allege facts upon which liability could be based for each of those defendan ts. 3 See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson , 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) ( liability in a civil rights action must be predicated upon personal
i nvolvement )

. Her non - specific allegations that those defendants conspired generally, “corrupted the judicial process” or “violat ed her rights” are legal conclusions insufficient to state a claim and to which this Court does not owe deference on a motion to dismiss.
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The District Court properly dismissed all of Appellant’s f ederal claims. The District Court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellant’s state law claims. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original juri sdiction.”

3 Although a pro se complainant should normally be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal with prejudice, a District Court is not required to permit a futile amendment. Alston v. Parker , 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). Appellant has attempted to litigate these claims in multiple courts through multiple litigations and has yet to articulate any set of facts on which these defenda nts could be held liable. She did not set forth facts to support an effective amendment in her opposition to their motions to dismiss or in her motion f or reconsideration , nor did she set forth any such facts in her briefs on appeal.6

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Once t he District Court properly dismissed Appellant’s federal claims , it then properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all her state law claims

. Finally, t he District Court properly denied App ellant’s motion to reconsider. For the District Court to reconsider its decision, Appellant would have had to show (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) new evidence not available when the court entered its original order ; or (3) that recons ideration was necessary to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou

- Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros , 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). Appellant’s motion for reconsideration essentially reiterated her o riginal arguments and did not meet the standard for reconsideration of the District Court’s judgment

.