alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Commonwealth *versus*John Getchell.

While a convict in the State prison was liable to additional punishment, undet *St.*1827, *c.*118, in consequence of having been twice convicted and *sentenced to*confinement, the *St.*1832, *c.*73, was passed, by which a convict was liable to additional punishment only in case he had been twice *discharged*from imprisonment, but before the prisoner was released from imprisonment upon his second sentence, this statute was repealed. It was *held,*(the statute of 1827 not being repealed,) that the statute of 1832, operated to suspend, so long as it remained in force, but not to discharge, the prisoner’s liability to additional punishment.

This was an appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court, rendered in February 1835, upon an information praying that the defendant, who was a convict in the State piison. might be sentenced to additional punishment. The informa tion stated, that in February 1827, the prisoner was indicted and convicted of forgery and sentenced to hard labor in the State prison for five years, and that he was discharged in February 1830, part of the sentence being remitted ; and that in April 1831, he was indicted and convicted of forgery, and sentenced to hard labor in the State prison for four years. The prisoner demurred to the information, but the Municipal Court overruled the demurrer, and sentenced him to an additional punishment by confinement to hard labor for two years.

*Leland,*for the defendant.

Austin, Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.

Wilde J.

delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case the defendant has been but twice convicted, and but once discharged. He would not, therefore, under the statute of 1832, c. 73, be liable to an additional punishment. We *453apprehend that the act was not intended to have such an effect; but the language of the statute is express, and it will admit of but one construction. That statute, however, has been repealed by the statute of 1833, c. 85, and the question is, whether the suspension of the liability of the .defendant, while the former statute continued in force, is a legal discharge of his liability at the time of his second conviction. And we are of opinion that it is not. The offence for which he was a second time convicted, was committed, and ne was also convicted, before the passage of the statute of 1832.

If the crime had been committed, or if the defendant had been convicted, during the time that the statute of 1832 was in force, the repealing statute of 1833 might be considered as an *ex post facto*law in regard to him. But as the conviction took place in 1831, and he was then liable to the additional punishment, the act of 1832 operated only as a suspension of his liability, and not in nature of a pardon. That act having been repealed, his liability remains as it was at the time of his conviction.

*Demurrer overruled.*
#### THOMPSON v STATE OF FLORIDA

Case No. 88-3498-AC-A (County Court Case No. 88-78121-BX)

Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Brevard County

June 27, 1989

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Claire S. Myers, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Office of the State Attorney, for appellee.

Before RICHARDSON, MOXLEY, JAMIESON, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

EDWARD J. RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge.

The record reflects a “policy” of the Trial Court to impose the statutory minimum mandatory sentence to those who elect to plead guilty to driving under the influence (DUI). Only aggravating circumstances, such as personal injury and/or property damage, would cause the Trial Court to deviate from this sentencing policy. The imposition of the minimum sentence, after a jury trial, would be contrary to the Trial Court’s normal policy.

The Appellant’s choice of plea should *not*play any part in the determination of his sentence. *Gillman v State,*373 So.2d 935 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Each criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to *13demand a jury trial. Any court-imposed penalty to those who elect to be tried by a jury is patently unconstitutional. A criminal defendant should not be subjected to a more severe sentence because he elected to plead not guilty and demand trial by jury. *Baker v U.S.,*412 F. 2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1969); *Hankerson v State,*326 So.2d 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); *Davis v State,*277 So.2d 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).

In the instant case, the Trial Court imposed a more severe sentence than the statutory minimum mandatory. No aggravating circumstances were shown to exist. The Trial Court did not recite any reasons for the imposition of the more severe sentence save and except the aforesaid sentencing “policy.” Clearly the Trial Court considered the Appellant’s plea of not-guilty in the imposition of its sentence. Such a procedure or policy is contrary to the dictates of *Gillman v State,*supra.

For the reasons stated herein, the sentence imposed by the Trial Court is hereby vacated and this cause is remanded to the Trial Court for re-sentencing. REVERSED AND REMANDED. MOXLEY, J. Dean, JAMIESON, Frances A., RICHARDSON, Edward J., Judges concur.
RADIO FREQUENCY SPECTRUM 

TRANSMITTER 

Operating FrequenCy:5.728 GHz-5.85 GHZ 

Communication Distance (open area) : CE: 300m; FCC: 500m 

ReceiverSensitivfry (1°'ePER) :-93dBmotdaUtn 

Transmitter Povier:CE: 25mw; FCC: 125mw 

Working Voftage:80 mAC 6V 

BatteryA AA Batteries
#### Anon.

ALBANY,

January, 1838.

Where the plaintiff1 declares on the money counts, and serves with the deck, ration a copy of a promissory note, with notice that the same will be given in evidence on the trial, a plea showing a good defence to the note without answering or attempting to answer the counts in the declaration is Bad, notwithstanding it be averred that the suit is brought for the recovery of the note alone, and not for the recovery of any other or different demand ; the plea to be good must be an answer to the counts and not merely an answer to the note.

Under the statute authorizing the holder of a bill of exchange or promissory note to include - all or any of the parties to a bill or note in one action, and to declare upon the *•money counts*alone, Statutes, sess. of 1832, p. 489, it has *227been holden by the court, in joint actions against the maker , , - . , - , and endorser ol a promissory note, where a copy ot the note was served with the declaration: 1. that a plea must be to the count, not to the note, and that a plea *in bar of the note*was no answer to the declaration, the copy of the note being served only to enable the plaintiff to give the original in evidence under the money counts, and forming no part of the declaration: and 2. that such plea to the note was bad, although it averred that the only cause of action which the plaintiff had against the defendants was the note a copy of which was served with the declaration.*

*

 Whilst preparing these sheets for the press, a case is just decided (January term, 1839,) in conformity to the above general propositions: it is the case of *Caldwell*v. *Davis and four others.*The declaration is on the money counts ; a copy of a promissory note is attached made by Davis and endorsed by the other defendants, with a notice that on the trial of the cause the plaintiff will give in evidence under the foregoing declaration a promissory note in the words and figures following, to wit, (setting forth a promissory note *verbatim,*with the names of the maker and endorsers.) One of the defendants put in a special plea *actio non,*because the suit is brought to recover the amount of a promissory note (describing the note, a copy of which is attached to the declaration) and not for the recovery of any other or different demand. The defendant then alleges that the note was endorsed for the accommodation of the maker for a specific purpose, and that the maker misappropria ted it, and that it was received by the plaintiff with notice of the facts, concluding with a verification and prayer of judgment. The plaintiff replied and the defendant demurred to the replication. On the cause coming on to argument the court adjudged the plea to be bad, and gave judgment for the plaintiff.
Editorial Note on Part 183
Editorial Note: For miscellaneous amendments to cross references in this part 183, see Amdt. 183-1, 31 FR 9211, July 6, 1966.

§ 183.55 Limitations. ( a ) If any change occurs that may affect an ODA Unit's qualifications or ability to perform a function (such as a change in the location of facilities, resources, personnel or the organizational structure), no Unit member may perform that function until the Administrator is notified of the change, and the change is approved and appropriately documented as required by the procedures manual.
( b ) No ODA Unit member may issue a certificate, authorization, or other approval until any findings reserved for the Administrator have been made.
( c ) An ODA Holder is subject to any other limitations as specified by the Administrator.
USGS HomeContact USGSSearch USGS

Open-File Report 2013-1020

Pubs Warehouse

----

## **High-Resolution Geophysical Data Collected Aboard the U.S. Geological Survey Research Vessel *Rafael* to Supplement Existing Datasets From Buzzards Bay and Vineyard Sound, Massachusetts**

AccessibilityFOIAPrivacyPolicies and Notices

U.S. Department of the Interior |            U.S. Geological Survey                                                URL: http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1020/ofr2013-1020_title_page.html            Page Contact Information: GS Pubs Web Contact                        Page Last Modified: Friday, March 28, 2014, 02:08:18 PM
#### Charles Mueller, Respondent, *v.*Ellsworth Fosby, Appellant.

Argued December 4, 1936;

decided December 31, 1936.

*493
      *Kenneth J. Dugan*and *P. C. Dugan*for appellant.

*Ernest B. Morris*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

. Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Htjbbs, Crouch, Loughran and Finch, JJ.
§ 417.229 Far-field overpressure blast effects analysis. ( a ) *General.* A flight safety analysis must establish flight commit criteria that protect the public from any hazard associated with far field blast overpressure effects due to potential explosions during launch vehicle flight and demonstrate compliance with the public risk criterion of § 417.107(b).
( b ) *Analysis constraints.* The analysis must account for: ( 1 ) The potential for distant focus overpressure or overpressure enhancement given current meteorological conditions and terrain characteristics;
( 2 ) The potential for broken windows due to peak incident overpressures below 1.0 psi and related casualties;
( 3 ) The explosive capability of the launch vehicle at impact and at altitude and potential explosions resulting from debris impacts, including the potential for mixing of liquid propellants;
( 4 ) Characteristics of the launch vehicle flight and the surroundings that would affect the population's susceptibility to injury, such as, shelter types and time of day of the proposed launch;
( 5 ) Characteristics of the potentially affected windows, including their size, location, orientation, glazing material, and condition; and
( 6 ) The hazard characteristics of the potential glass shards, such as falling from upper building stories or being propelled into or out of a shelter toward potentially occupied spaces.
1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

In re: 

THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND 

MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, 

as representative of 

THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO et 

al., 

Debtors. 

PROMESA Title III. 

Case No. 17 BK 3283-LTS 

(Jointly Administered) 

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE AND REQUEST FOR NOTICE 

TO THE HONORABLE BANKRUPTCY COURT: 

COMES NOW the undersigned counsel for and on behalf of creditor CORPORACION 

DE SERVICIOS DE SALUD Y MEDICINA AVANZADA for all purposes in connection with 

this case. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 2002, 3017, and 9010(b) the undersigned hereby 

requests service of all notices, applications, motions, orders, pleadings, reports, plans and 

disclosure statements filed or served in this case, and requests that the name and address of the 

undersigned be added to all mailing matrices in this case. Service may be made and directed as 

follows: 

 Iyen A. Acosta 

Reno & Cavanaugh, PLLC 

455 Massachusetts Avenue, NW 

Suite 400 

Washington, DC 20001 

Telephone: (202) 349-2470 

Facsimile: (202) 349-2471 

Email: iacosta@renocavanaugh.com 

This notice of appearance and request for notices is submitted for the limited purpose of 

receiving copies of notices, pleadings, judgments, and orders in this case. By submitting this 

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:3147 Filed:05/24/18 Entered:05/24/18 19:20:52 Desc: Main

Document Page 1 of 3
2 

notice of appearance and request for notices, CORPORACION DE SERVICIOS DE SALUD Y 

MEDICINA AVANZADA is not consenting to or submitting to the jurisdiction of the 

Bankruptcy Court for any purpose and expressly reserve the right to contest the jurisdiction of 

the Bankruptcy Court and/or to demand a jury trial in any matter or proceeding to which 

CORPORACION DE SERVICIOS DE SALUD Y MEDICINA AVANZADA may be a party. 

Respectfully submitted, 

 /s/ María Celeste Rodríguez Miranda 

María Celeste Rodríguez Miranda 

D.P.R. Bar No. 213113 

Bufete Rodríguez Miranda, C.S.P. 

P.O. Box 365072 

San Juan, PR 00936-5072 

(787) 408-0808 (tel) 

mcrm100@msn.com 

/s/Iyen A. Acosta 

Iyen A. Acosta* 

Reno & Cavanaugh, PLLC 

455 Massachusetts Avenue, NW 

Suite 400 

Washington, DC 20001 

(202) 349-2470 (office) 

(202) 349-2471 (fax) 

iacosta@renocavanaugh.com 

*Admitted pro hac vice 

Attorneys for Corporacion de Servicios de 

Salud y Medicina Avanzada 

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:3147 Filed:05/24/18 Entered:05/24/18 19:20:52 Desc: Main

Document Page 2 of 3
3 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 I hereby certify that on May 24, 2018, a copy of the foregoing was filed electronically. 

Notice of this filing will be sent by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system to all parties 

indicated on the electronic filing receipt. Parties may access this filing through the Court’s 

electronic filing system. 

/s/Iyen A. Acosta 

Iyen A. Acosta 

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:3147 Filed:05/24/18 Entered:05/24/18 19:20:52 Desc: Main

Document Page 3 of 3
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

Inconnection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of theCompany for the period ended September 30, 2005, I, Gary D. Gall,President, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuantto 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:

 

(1)           such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Qof the Company for the period ended September 30, 2005, fully complieswith the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)           the information contained in suchQuarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended September 30,2005, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of Western Sierra Bancorp.

 

 

Dated:  November 7, 2005

 
|   | /s/ Gary D. Gall                       |   |
|--------|----------------------------------------|--------|
|   | President  and Chief Executive Officer |   |
|        |                                        |        |  |  |

 

----
#### Marguerite HARSHMAN, Administratrix of the Estate of Ray E. Harshman, Deceased, Appellant v. BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY, a Corporation.

No. 13155.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued May 12, 1960.

Decided May 17, 1960.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania; Joseph P. Willson, Judge.

Hymen Schlesinger, Pittsburgh, Pa. (John A. DeMay, McArdle, Harrington & McLaughlin, Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellant.

Bruce R. Martin, Pittsburgh, Pa. (E. V. Buckley, Mercer & Buckley, Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.

Before GOODRICH, McLAUGHLIN and STALEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Ray E. Harshman, in his lifetime, suffered an accident while in the employ of the defendant railroad company. He has since died from causes unconnected with the accident and this action has been continued by his administratrix. The merits of the plaintiff’s case were thoroughly discussed at a pre-trial hearing. At its *332conclusion and upon receipt of a supplementary memorandum from the plaintiff, the trial judge caused judgment to be entered in favor of the defendant. The basis of the court’s action was that, assuming the plaintiff could prove all the facts which she alleged she was prepared to prove and assuming further that the plaintiff’s position on the admissibility of certain statements was decided in favor of the plaintiff, still no claim on which recovery could be had was shown. We think the trial judge was right in his conclusion. We do not, therefore, need to go into the always difficult question of when hearsay statements may be received as part of the res gestae.

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
#### [515] Anon.

When the subject-matter of a motion arises at so late a period that notice cannot be given for the first day of a special term, it may be given for a subsequent day at the peril of the party. (5 *Cowen,*81.)
Exhibit 24.3


                               KEYSPAN CORPORATION

                                POWER OF ATTORNEY



     WHEREAS,  KeySpan  Corporation,  a New York  corporation  (the  "Company"),
intends to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, an Annual Report on Form 10-K as prescribed by
said Commission  pursuant to said Act and the rules and regulations  promulgated
thereunder.

     NOW,  THEREFORE,  in my capacity as a director of the Company,  I do hereby
appoint RONALD S. JENDRAS,  GERALD LUTERMAN,  JOHN J. BISHAR, JR. and MICHAEL J.
TAUNTON,  and each of them  severally,  as my  attorneys-in-fact  with  power to
execute  in my name and  place,  and in my  capacity  as a  director  of KeySpan
Corporation,  said Report,  any amendment to said Report and any other documents
required in connection  therewith,  and to file the same with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have executed this power of attorney  this 6th day of
March, 2003.




                                                   /s/Donald H. Elliott
                                                   --------------------
                                                   Donald H. Elliott
#### § 214.2 Terms of service.

Charter air transportation under this part shall be performed in accordance with the provisions of part 212 of this chapter.

(Secs. 204, 402, Pub. L. 85-726, as amended, 72 Stat. 743, 757; 49 U.S.C. 1324, 1371)

[ER-1223, 46 FR 28379, May 26, 1981]
#### Ella Gaylor, Respondent, *v.*William Burroughs, Defendant, and William B. McGuire, Appellant.

Argued March 3, 1937;

decided March 23, 1937.

*607
      *Christian S. Lorentzen*and *John E. Connelly, Jr.,*for appellant.

*John A. Rullo*and *Sydney J. Schwartz*for respondent.

Order affirmed, with costs. Question certified answered in the negative. No opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Loughran, Finch and Rippey, JJ.
§ 67.209 Neurologic. Neurologic standards for a second-class airman medical certificate are: ( a ) No established medical history or clinical diagnosis of any of the following: ( 1 ) Epilepsy;
( 2 ) A disturbance of consciousness without satisfactory medical explanation of the cause; or
( 3 ) A transient loss of control of nervous system function(s) without satisfactory medical explanation of the cause;
( b ) No other seizure disorder, disturbance of consciousness, or neurologic condition that the Federal Air Surgeon, based on the case history and appropriate, qualified medical judgment relating to the condition involved, finds— ( 1 ) Makes the person unable to safely perform the duties or exercise the privileges of the airman certificate applied for or held; or
( 2 ) May reasonably be expected, for the maximum duration of the airman medical certificate applied for or held, to make the person unable to perform those duties or exercise those privileges.
SAT Report

PMN Number: P-09-0542

SAT Date: 8/14/2009

Print Date: 3/17/2010

Related cases:

Health related cases: 

Ecotox related cases: 

Concern levels:

Type of Concern: Health Eco Comments

Level of Concern: 1-2 3

 Persistence Bioaccum Toxicity Comments

 1 1 1

Exposure Based Review:

Health:

Ecotox: No

Routes of exposure: Health: Dermal Inhalation 

Ecotox: All releases to water

Fate: ;

Keywords:

 Keywords: SENS-S; IRR-S,E; AQUATOX

Summary of Assessment:

 Fate:

Fate Summary: P-09-0542

FATE: 

Liquid with MP < 25 EC (E)

log Kow = 4.09 (E); 

S = 28.6 mg/L at 25 EC (E)

VP = 5.9E-2 torr at 25 EC (E)

BP = 235 EC (E)

H = 4.66E-4 (E)

log Koc = 2.57 (E)

log Fish BCF = 2.36 (E)

log Fish BAF = 1.952 (E) 

POTW removal (%) = 90 via sorption and biodeg; OECD 301B(Mod Sturm CO2 ev):

 91.7%/28d; OECD 301F(Mano Resp): 65%/28d.

Time for complete ultimate aerobic biodeg = wk
Sorption to soils/sediments = moderate - strong

Volatilization half-life from a standard river = 3 hrs

Volatilization half-life from a standard lake = 6 da

Atmospheric Oxidation Half-life = 2.0 hr via OH radical

Atmospheric Oxidation Half-life = 2.1 hr via ozone

PBT Potential: P1B1

*CEB FATE: Migration to ground water = negl due to biodeg

 Health:

 Health Summary: Expect moderate absorption via all routes (pchem). 

Concern for dermal sensitization and dermal and eye irritation based on submitted test data for

an analogue.

 Test Data: Summary data for analogues: 

Antimicrobial activity; rat oral LD50 = 5000 mg/kg; rabbit dermal LD0 = 5000 mg/kg; no skin 

irritation in humans at 10% ai; slight but persistent skin irritation in rabbits, erythema and dry 

flaky skin persisted to day 13 or 14; (+) for skin sensitization in guinea pigs using the 

Magnusson-Kligman assay at >10% ai, (-) at 1 - 5% ai; no skin sensitization in humans at 10% ai

rat oral LD0 = 25 g/kg; no skin sensitization in humans at 2% ai

 Ecotox:

Test 

Organism

Test 

Type

Test End 

Point

Predicted Measured Comments

fish 96-h LC50 1.6

daphnid 48-h LC50 2.5

green algal 96-h EC50 0.86

fish _ chronic value 0.087

daphnid chronic value 0.93

algal _ chronic value 0.43

Sewage Sludge 3-h EC50 _

Sewage Sludge _ Chronic Value _

Ecotox Values Comments: Predictions are based on SARs for esters; SAR chemical class = 

ester; MW 184; liquid with unknown mp (M); log Kow = 4.09 (EPI); S = 28.6 mg/L at 20 °C 

(P); pH7; effective concentrations based on 100% active ingredients and mean measured 

concentrations; hardness <150.0 mg/L as CaCO3; and TOC <2.0 mg/L;

Factors Values Comments

Assessment Factor 10

Concentration of Concern 

(ppb)

9

SARs esters

SAR Class ester
Ecotox Factors Comments: 

 SAT Chair: L Keifer 564-8916