FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D18-3147

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HOLLY ELIZABETH CAUDLE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County.

John F. Simon, Judge.

August 16, 2019

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

KELSEY and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur; B.L. THOMAS, J. concurs 

with opinion.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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2

B.L. Thomas, J., concurring.

Appellant, Holly Elizabeth Caudle, appeals the denial of her 

postconviction motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 3.850. Because each of the grounds asserted for relief is 

either meritless or refuted by portions of the record that were 

attached to the order, I concur with the affirmance.

Appellant was charged as a Principal to Home Invasion 

Robbery with a Deadly Weapon in violation of sections 777.011 and 

812.135, Florida Statutes, and Child Abuse by Intentional Act that 

Could Reasonably be Expected to Result in Physical or Mental 

Injury in violation of section 827.03, Florida Statutes. Appellant 

signed a Sentence Recommendation in which she pleaded no 

contest to these charges without an agreement as to the sentence. 

The trial court adjudicated her guilty based on her plea and 

sentenced her to concurrent terms of 20 years’ imprisonment for 

the robbery charge and five years’ imprisonment for the child 

abuse charge.

In her timely postconviction motion, Appellant raised seven 

grounds for relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. She 

also claimed that the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors resulted 

in a fundamentally unfair trial. 

Appellant alleged that counsel told her that he was going to 

have her sentenced as a youthful offender with a 364-day jail 

sentence and 5 years’ probation or community control. This advice, 

according to Appellant, fell below the standard of effective 

assistance of counsel because she was not eligible for sentencing 

as a youthful offender and she did not receive the promised 

sentence. Appellant asserted that she would not have pleaded no 

contest and would have insisted on going to trial had she been 

properly advised. 

The postconviction court denied relief on this ground because 

Appellant was not misadvised regarding her eligibility to be 

sentenced as a youthful offender and the plea colloquy refuted her 

claim that she was coerced into entering the plea with a promise 

that she would be given a specific sentence.
3

The trial court properly denied relief on this claim. While 

youthful offender sentencing does not apply to any person found to 

be guilty of a capital or life felony, see § 958.04(l)(c), Fla. Stat. 

(2014), Appellant was not convicted of a capital or life felony. See 

Stewart v. State, 201 So. 3d 1258, 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016); 

Williams v. State, 405 So. 2d 436, 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) 

(explaining that a life felony is limited to that class of felonies for 

which one may be punished “by a term of imprisonment for life or 

for a term of years not less than 30” (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted)). Rather, Appellant was convicted of child abuse, 

a third-degree felony, and home invasion robbery with a deadly 

weapon, a first-degree felony punishable by a term of 

imprisonment not exceeding life. Further, the sentencing court 

considered imposing a youthful offender sentence in this case but 

rejected such sentencing in light of Appellant’s co-defendants’ 

sentences, the nature of the charges, and the surrounding 

circumstances of this case. Accordingly, counsel did not misadvise 

Appellant that she could receive a youthful offender sentence. 

Appellant’s sworn testimony wherein she stated that she was not 

promised a specific sentence and she understood that she could be 

sentenced for a term of years up to life imprisonment refutes her 

claim that she was induced into pleading by a promise of a specific 

sentence. 

Appellant’s second claim alleged that her plea was 

involuntary because she did not have enough time to discuss the 

case with counsel and the plea was based on counsel’s promise to 

have her sentenced as a youthful offender, even though counsel 

knew there was no evidence that she was principal to the home 

invasion robbery. Appellant asserted that counsel should have 

advised her to go to trial and not to enter a plea because there was 

no evidence that she had any knowledge of what her co-defendants 

intended to do before they did it. The trial court denied relief on 

this claim because it was refuted by the record. 

The trial court properly denied relief on this claim for the 

reasons discussed under the first claim and because this claim is 

refuted by the record. Although counsel tried to reduce Appellant’s 

apparent culpability by arguing that the evidence did not show 

that she had knowledge of her co-defendant’s intentions, such 

knowledge may be inferred from the factual basis for the plea. The 
4

factual basis is provided in the Sentence Recommendation 

Appellant signed, which included the fact that Appellant set up a 

meeting with the victim; Appellant, along with her co-defendants, 

unlawfully entered the victim’s home; and, while inside, codefendants struck the victim and stole several items including 

money, handguns, shotguns, and an assault rifle. Appellant also 

failed to show that she was prejudiced by the limited amount of 

time she had to discuss her case with counsel or how additional 

time would have made a difference. 

Appellant next argued that counsel was ineffective for failing 

to depose her three co-defendants, who would have supported 

Appellant’s theory of the case that she was not complicit in the 

home invasion robbery. Specifically, Appellant asserted that her 

co-defendants would have attested to their initial statements to 

the effect that Appellant merely needed a ride to the victim’s 

residence. The trial court denied relief on this ground because 

Appellant waived her right to have trial counsel investigate or put 

forth a defense when she pleaded.

The trial court properly denied relief on this claim. See Clift v. 

State, 43 So. 3d 778, 779 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“By entering a plea 

to the charges, Appellant waived his right to have counsel 

investigate or put forward a defense....”) To the extent Appellant 

challenged counsel’s effectiveness at sentencing, the claim was 

properly denied because Appellant testified that she was satisfied 

with counsel’s representation and, as alleged, the co-defendants’ 

statements do not tend to show that Appellant was not complicit 

in the scheme to rob the victim. Even had counsel deposed them 

and they attested to their initial statements, the deposition 

testimony would not have shown Appellant was not a principal or 

cast doubt on her guilt or culpability.

Appellant argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

advise her that she could withdraw her plea. By the time Appellant 

learned that she could have withdrawn her plea, her appeal had 

been filed and it was too late. Had she known she could withdraw 

her plea, Appellant claimed that she could have filed a motion 

detailing counsel’s promises, there would have been an evidentiary 

hearing, and she would have been allowed to withdraw her plea 

and proceed to trial or she could have raised the issue in her direct 
5

appeal. The trial court denied relief because counsel did not have 

a duty to advise Appellant that she could move to withdraw the 

plea. Further, had Appellant moved to withdraw the plea, the 

motion would have been denied.

The trial court properly denied relief on this claim. The only 

basis suggested in the postconviction motion that could support a 

motion to withdraw the plea was Appellant’s allegation that 

counsel promised her a specific sentence as a youthful offender. As 

explained earlier, counsel was not ineffective in advising Appellant 

that she was eligible for youthful offender sentencing and her 

claim is otherwise refuted by the record. Therefore, any motion to 

withdraw her plea on these grounds would not have been granted. 

Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to inform 

Appellant of her right to file a motion to withdraw plea. 

Appellant argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

have her psychologically evaluated. She asserted that she had 

been diagnosed with ADHD and was Manic Depressive with 

Bipolar Disorder and Anxiety and had been prescribed various 

medications for these ailments. She had attempted suicide twice 

when she was 12-13 years old and was admitted to a crisis 

stabilization unit on both occasions. She suffers from Battered 

Women’s Syndrome. Appellant had been taking medication until a 

week before the instant crime, when her medication ran out. 

Appellant attempted to explain these problems to counsel, but he 

did not pursue this issue or have her evaluated. Had he done so, 

the evaluation would have shown why she reacted as she did, and 

that she was a bystander and not a participant in this case. The 

trial court denied relief on this ground because Appellant waived 

her right to have counsel investigate and put forth a defense, and 

Appellant did not establish that counsel was ineffective or that she 

was prejudiced. 

The trial court properly denied relief on this claim. Except for 

a narrow exception applicable to claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel for failing to raise a defendant’s actual incompetency, 

“neither a procedural nor a substantive competency claim of trial 

court error may be raised in a postconviction motion.” Thompson 

v. State, 88 So. 3d 312, 316 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). See generally 

Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672, 676 (Fla. 2014) (noting claim 
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regarding competency was procedurally barred where it was not 

raised on direct appeal). “To satisfy the deficiency prong based on 

counsel’s handling of a competency issue, the postconviction 

movant must allege specific facts showing that a reasonably 

competent attorney would have questioned competence to 

proceed.” Thompson, 88 So. 3d at 319. “The question is ‘whether 

the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with counsel 

with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether 

the defendant has a rational, as well as factual, understanding of 

the pending proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 

3.211(a)(1)). “‘[N]either low intelligence, mental deficiency, nor 

bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior can be equated with 

mental incompetence to stand trial.’” Id. (quoting Medina v. 

Singletary, 59 F. 3d 1095, 1107 (11th Cir. 1995)). Here, Appellant’s 

allegations fail to show that there was any reason to question her 

competency to proceed to trial or to enter a plea. See id. at 320 

(finding similar allegations that the appellant had a history of 

mental disorders and suicide attempts, had been admitted to a 

mental hospital for evaluation, and was borderline retarded was 

insufficient to raise a legitimate doubt as to competency or to 

require an evidentiary hearing before denying post-conviction 

relief). Cf. Turem v. State, 220 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) 

(reversing for record attachments or an evidentiary hearing on 

claim that counsel failed to investigate appellant’s competency 

where appellant alleged, inter alia, that he did not understand the 

consequences of his plea, he was suffering from delusions and 

hearing voices at the time of his plea, and he had a lengthy and 

documented history of mental illness). 

Appellant argued that counsel was ineffective for persuading 

her to enter an open plea and improperly coerced her plea by 

promising that she would be sentenced as a youthful offender and 

receive a 364-day jail sentence followed by 5-years of supervision. 

Appellant claims that she was easily manipulated and exhibited 

poor judgment due to her diminished capacity as a 20-year old. 

Further, the trial court should have inquired into her mindset 

when it sentenced her. The trial court denied relief on this ground 

because Appellant was not misadvised regarding her eligibility to 

be sentenced as a youthful offender and the plea colloquy refuted 

her claim that she was coerced into entering the plea with a 

promise that she would be given a specific sentence. 
7

The trial court properly denied relief on this ground for the 

reasons discussed earlier. The trial court considered and rejected 

sentencing Appellant as a youthful offender pursuant to the 

Florida Youthful Offender Act, Chapter 958, Florida Statutes. The 

trial court’s exercise of its discretion to reject Appellant’s request 

for a youthful offender sentence is not reversible error. See

McKinney v. State, 27 So. 3d 160, 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (noting 

trial court is not obligated to impose a youthful offender sentence 

unless it believes such a sentence appropriate). Appellant’s 

reliance on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and similar 

cases to assert that she is entitled to further consideration of her 

age in the sentencing process is misplaced. In Miller, the United

States Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to 

sentence defendants who were under the age of 18 when they

committed murder to mandatory life sentences without the 

possibility of parole. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465. Appellant cites no 

authority for extending Miller to require defense counsel to 

interact with youthful-offender clients any differently than other 

defendants or to require a trial court to inquire as to a defendant’s 

state of mind during sentencing. Even if additional precautions 

were required when dealing with defendants who were under the 

age of 18, such precautions would not apply to Appellant, who was 

20 years old at the time of these offenses. 

Appellant argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge the information because no deadly weapon was used in 

the home invasion robbery even though her co-defendants stole 

and transported the victim’s weapons. She asserted that this theft 

and transport was insufficient to charge a deadly weapon was 

carried during the home invasion robbery and counsel should have 

moved to dismiss the information. Appellant claimed she was 

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to do so because she entered a plea 

where the evidence did not support the enhancement and the issue 

was not preserved for appellate review. Had counsel filed a motion 

to dismiss, the motion would have been granted and the charge 

would have been reduced so that Appellant would have been 

eligible to be sentenced as a youthful offender. The trial court 

denied relief on this ground because Appellant entered a plea 

waiving her right to have counsel investigate or put forth a 

defense, and Appellant admitted to a factual basis for the charges 
8

by acknowledging that her co-defendants became armed during 

the robbery when they stole the victim’s guns.

The trial court properly denied relief on this claim. See Clift v. 

State, 43 So. 3d 778, 779 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“By entering a plea 

to the charges, Appellant waived his right to have counsel 

investigate or put forward a defense....”). Additionally, the claim is 

refuted by the record, which includes the stipulated fact that 

Appellant’s co-defendants stole the victim’s guns. See § 

812.135(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014) (“If in the course of committing the 

home-invasion robbery the person carries a firearm or other deadly 

weapon, the person commits a felony of the first degree...”); see,

e.g., Ridgeway v. State, 128 So. 3d 935 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) 

(affirming conviction for robbery with a deadly weapon because 

fleeing with knife was sufficient to establish that defendant was 

armed during robbery of the knife); State v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 194 

(Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (reversing trial court order that reduced charge 

of armed robbery to grand theft of a firearm because defendant 

carried the stolen firearm while in flight, which was sufficient for 

purposes of carrying a firearm in the course of committing the 

robbery). Because Appellant’s co-defendants stole several firearms 

from the victim, counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to 

dismiss the charge of principle to home-invasion robbery with a 

deadly weapon. 

Finally, Appellant argued that the cumulative effect of 

counsel’s errors resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial and 

deprived her of her right to due process. The trial court denied 

relief because Appellant’s other claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel were without merit. 

The trial court properly denied relief on this claim. A claim of 

cumulative error must fail where the individual claims of error are 

either procedurally barred or meritless. Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 

510, 520 (Fla. 2008); Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 22 (Fla. 2003). 

As the Appellant’s individual claims are meritless for the reasons 

discussed in this opinion, this claim is also meritless. 

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Holly Elizabeth Caudle, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.