S. Hrg. 113–296 

THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AT 

10 YEARS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

A PROGRESS REPORT ON MANAGEMENT, MARCH 21, 2013 

HARNESSING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO PROTECT NATIONAL 

SECURITY AND ENHANCE GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY, JULY 17, 2013 

EXAMINING CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENTS AND ADDRESSING 

EMERGING THREATS, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
DHS AT 10 YEARS — 2013 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

80–224 PDF 2014

S. Hrg. 113–296 

THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AT 

10 YEARS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

A PROGRESS REPORT ON MANAGEMENT, MARCH 21, 2013 

HARNESSING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO PROTECT NATIONAL 

SECURITY AND ENHANCE GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY, JULY 17, 2013 

EXAMINING CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENTS AND ADDRESSING 

EMERGING THREATS, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

JEFF CHIESA, New Jersey 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Deputy Staff Director 

MARY BETH SCHULTZ, Chief Counsel for Homeland Security 

TROY H. CRIBB, Chief Counsel for Governmental Affairs 

SUSAN B. CORBIN, DHS Detailee 

CARLY COVIEO, Professional Staff Member 

KAYLEE M. MYHRE, AAAS Fellow 

CARLA D. COTWIGHT-WILLIAMS, AAAS Fellow 

JASON M. YANUSSI, Senior Professional Staff Member 

HARLAN C. GEER, Senior Professional Staff Member 

BLAS NUN ̃ EZ-NETO, Senior Professional Staff Member 

KEITH B. ASHDOWN, Minority Staff Director 

CHRISTOPHER J. BARKLEY, Minority Deputy Staff Director 

DANIEL P. LIPS, Minority Director for Homeland Security 

MONICA C. SANDERS, Minority Senior Counsel 

KATHRYN M. EDELMAN, Minority Senior Investigator 

WILLIAM H. W. MCKENNA, Investigative Counsel 

MARK K. HARRIS, Minority U.S. Coast Guard Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

LAUREN M. CORCORAN, Hearing Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Carper.......................................................................................... 1, 265, 437 

Senator Coburn......................................................................................... 4, 276, 440 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 5 

Senator Heitkamp ............................................................................................ 20 

Senator Ayotte .................................................................................................. 22 

Senator Baldwin ............................................................................................... 25 

Senator Chiesa .................................................................................................. 462 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Carper........................................................................................ 45, 307, 483 

Senator Coburn ................................................................................................. 48, 486 

Senator Chiesa .................................................................................................. 490 

Closing statement: 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 485 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 2013 

Hon. Eugene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office; accompanied by Cathleen A. Berrick, 

Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice ........................................ 7 

Hon. Jane Holl Lute, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ......................................................................................................................... 10 

Hon. Elaine C. Duke, Former Under Secretary for Management, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ................................................................................. 34 

Hon. Richard L. Skinner, Former Inspector General, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security ............................................................................................... 35 

Shawn Reese, Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security 

Policy, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress .......................... 38 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Dodaro, Hon. Eugene L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50 

Duke, Hon. Elaine C.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 34 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 113 

Lute, Hon. Jane Holl: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 99 

Reese, Shawn: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 38 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 127 

Skinner, Hon. Richard L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 35 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 119 

APPENDIX 

Responses for post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Dodaro ........................................................................................................ 136 

Ms. Lute ............................................................................................................ 142 

Ms. Duke ........................................................................................................... 260 

Mr. Skinner ....................................................................................................... 262 
Page

IV 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 17, 2013 

Hon. Tara J. O’Toole, M.D., MPH, Under Secretary for Science and Technology, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ................................................ 268 

David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 273 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Maurer, David C.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 273 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 326 

O’Toole, Hon. Tara J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 268 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 309 

APPENDIX 

Responses for post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Ms. O’Toole ........................................................................................................ 337 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 

Hon. Tom Ridge, President and Chief Executive Officer, Ridge Global, and 

Former Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................. 442 

Hon. Jane Harman, A Former Representative in Congress from the State 

of California .......................................................................................................... 445 

Thad W. Allen, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired), and Former Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard ................................................................................ 448 

Hon. Stewart A. Baker, Former Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ................................................................................. 451 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Allen, Thad W.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 448 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 505 

Baker, Hon. Stewart A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 451 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 515 

Harman, Hon. Jane: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 445 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 501 

Ridge, Hon. Tom: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 442 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 492 

APPENDIX 

Additional information from Mr. Allen .................................................................. 523 

Responses for post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Ridge ........................................................................................................... 553 
(1) 

THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY AT TEN YEARS: A PROGRESS 

REPORT ON MANAGEMENT 

THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 2013 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R. Carper, 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Carper, Baldwin, Heitkamp, Coburn, Johnson, 

and Ayotte. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CARPER 

Chairman CARPER. The hearing will come to order. To all of our 

guests and our witnesses, welcome. It is good to see you all. 

At the beginning of each Congress, as we all know, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issues something called a list of 

High-Risk Government Operations that leave our government and 

our taxpayers exposed to waste, fraud, or abuse, or which pose 

management challenges that threaten crucial government services. 

I have always considered this list as a to-do list for Congress, particularly for this Committee, and GAO’s updated high-risk list will 

heavily influence our Committee’s governmental affairs agenda for 

this Congress. 

We also just marked, as you know, the 10th anniversary of the 

date on which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officially opened its doors. We plan to mark this milestone throughout 

the year by holding a series of hearings intended to take stock of 

how far the Department has come in maturing, how well it is doing 

in executing its core missions, and how we can help them do even 

better. 

Our goal here, and this is one suggested by Senator Coburn, is 

we do a series of hearings from top to bottom, A to Z, after which 

we would work on reauthorization for the department. We have 

never done that in 10 years. It is time. 

This hearing fits into both of those categories: One, our DHS 

oversight responsibilities; and second, the high-risk list. 

From a government affairs perspective, the Department of Homeland Security’s management challenges appear, again, on GAO’s 

high-risk list, although GAO readily acknowledges that progress is 

being made. Like other agencies across the Federal Government, 
2 

the Department has grappled in recent years with a number of 

issues related to acquisition, to financial management, and to 

human capital, among others. Unlike some of those other agencies, 

though, DHS is moving the needle. 

As we all know, sound and effective management practices are, 

of course, critical to the Department’s ability to carry out all of its 

Homeland Security responsibilities, whether we are talking about 

cybersecurity, border protection, disaster response, or any of its 

other many missions. As we look back on the past decade, I think 

it is important to remember the circumstances in which the Department was stood up. The Homeland Security Act passed by Congress to create the Department was signed into law November 25, 

2002. The Department opened its doors on March 1, 2003. So in 

just over 4 months, some 22 different agencies from across the government, with different cultures and different management practices and philosophies, were merged into a brand new department. 

In those early days at the Department, the focus of both the Administration and Congress was on moving quickly to prevent another 9/11-type attack on our homeland. Management took a back 

seat to those efforts. Former Department of Homeland Security Inspector General Richard Skinner, who is here today again as a witness, confirmed this fact when he testified before our Committee 

last year. The management foundation of the Department really 

got shortchanged in those early days. It has taken years to dig out 

of the hole that the initial lack of a strong management foundation 

left. 

That said, I want to give credit where credit is due. GAO’s most 

recent report confirms that there has been considerable progress at 

the Department in integrating the components that were folded 

into it and in strengthening the Department-level management 

that overlays those components. The latest high-risk report includes a fair amount of good news because GAO acknowledges this 

progress and has narrowed the areas that remain on the high-risk 

list. 

The Department also deserves credit for its detailed, aggressive 

plan to address all of GAO’s concerns in its high-risk report, which 

I believe is unique among all the agencies on the high-risk list. I 

want to briefly review some of the major improvements to management at the Department of Homeland Security, and in doing so, I 

would agree with GAO that committed leadership at DHS has been 

critical to driving progress in these areas. 

The Department is on the doorstep of having a clean financial 

audit for the first time. Last year, the Department was able to get 

its financial systems in good enough order to attempt a full financial audit. That was a major milestone. That leaves the important 

goal of now passing a financial audit. And I know that the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and their team are prepared to make 

the final push to earn a completely clean audit. If they are successful, it will be a major achievement. 

Some of you heard me talk about a friend of mine. You would 

ask him how he is doing and he says, ‘‘Compared to what? ’’ Well, 

compared to the Department of Defense (DOD)—we love them, but 

they were stood up, what, 65 years ago and they are not auditable. 

They have not passed a clean financial audit. And here we are, an 
3 

agency 10 years, also very complex, knocking on the door. So it will 

set a good example if you can get this done for our brothers and 

sisters over at DOD. Now, I know they are committed, especially 

the Secretary is committed to getting this done for them, too. 

When the Department was stood up 10 years ago, there was no 

framework for accountability. There was also no guidance on which 

responsibilities lay with headquarters, and which responsibilities 

lay with the various components that make up the Department. 

Whenever that kind of Wild West environment exists in government, there is sure to be a lot of wasteful spending and inefficiency, and there was. 

Now, the Department has made clear who is in charge of what. 

This new, more disciplined environment will better enable the Department to control costs at the various components and better ensure that all of them operate as a more cohesive, effective, and accountable agency. 

The Department used to have an abysmal record when it came 

to awarding contracts without competition, but the Departmental 

leadership has been aggressive in turning that record around. Just 

last month, the report from the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

showed that the spending on non-competitive contracts in fiscal 

year 2012 fell by almost 89 percent from fiscal year 2008 levels. 

That means about $3 billion in contract dollars that were previously spent without competition are now being spent in a manner 

that gets better value for taxpayers’ dollars. And the Department, 

as the governmentwide procurement data shows, actually has a 

better record on competing contracts now than most other major 

Federal agencies. 

The Department has also revamped its process for identifying 

technological solutions at the border. The Department has moved 

away from the SBInet model, which was a mega-contract to a single company to build a virtual fence across the Southern border. It 

was an effort that went forward without the necessary work to 

identify what the Border Patrol really needed. As a result, it quickly became cost prohibitive and did not ever deliver the capabilities 

that were promised. The Department now is implementing a more 

rigorous process to identify needs, sector by sector across the border, and where possible, use commercially available technology off 

the shelf to drive down costs and enable our Border Patrol agents 

to become ever more effective. 

In the area of information technology, the Department is now at 

the forefront of the Federal Government’s efforts to consolidate 

data centers and move services to the cloud. These efforts save 

money and enable the Department and its employees to achieve 

better results. 

Finally, there is no doubt that the response to Superstorm 

Sandy—we had a hearing here just yesterday on this—but that response to Superstorm Sandy shows how much the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has improved since Hurricane 

Katrina struck the Gulf region in 2005. Simply put, this improvement would not have been possible without better management. 

For example, when Hurricane Katrina hit, FEMA did not have the 

necessary contracts in place to get needed assistance to victims in 

a timely manner. When Hurricane Sandy hit 7 years later, FEMA 
4 

was prepared, and as a result, there is a dramatic reduction in nobid contracts compared to the Hurricane Katrina response. 

These are all significant achievements and our witnesses will discuss for us today other examples. But I do not want to whitewash 

the serious remaining challenges with DHS management that remain on the high-risk list. The Department still has work to do— 

we know that—as both the Comptroller General and Deputy Secretary Lute will discuss. As I like to say, the road to improvement 

is always under construction, and my colleagues have heard me say 

a million times, everything I do, I know I could do better. The same 

is true for all of us. The same is true for this Department. 

For example, this Department still does not have a comprehensive financial management system that gives the Secretary realtime visibility over the spending of 22 department components. 

Workforce morale at DHS remains the lowest of all major departments. I do not think that is going to be the case for much longer, 

though. Many major acquisitions have exceeded cost estimates or 

fall short of promised performance. 

This hearing also provides a timely opportunity to discuss the 

possible impact of the fiscal year 2013 full-year Continuing Resolution (CR) on the Department. I am concerned about the $20 million 

cut that DHS management and the Secretary’s office would take 

under the bill and I want to hear from our witnesses today about 

the likely impact of those cuts. I am also concerned that the level 

of funding for consolidation of the Department at St. Elizabeths is 

insufficient to support the next phase, which could bring the leadership and operations center to one location and realize efficiency 

and effectiveness. 

Both the Administration and Congress need to work together to 

resolve these remaining high-risk areas, and we will. I welcome our 

witnesses today. We look forward to working with you and the 

dedicated people that you lead so that in 2 years, when GAO releases its high-risk list, and we are sitting here talking about 

GAO’s high-risk list and the management challenges facing the Department of Homeland Security, we hope they are off that list, 

making our Nation more secure, and putting our finances in better 

shape, as well. 

And now, Dr. Coburn, the floor is yours, and then I am going to 

call on Senator Johnson. He has to leave here. He is not going to 

be here to ask any questions, but I want him to just make a brief 

statement. He is so good about attending our hearings, so I am 

going to ask you to say something before you leave. Thank you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN 

Senator COBURN. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would like for my 

opening statement to be made part of the record, the written one. 

Chairman CARPER. Without objection. 

Senator COBURN. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) recently put out a memo by Shawn Reese about the definition of 

what homeland security is, and any organization that does not 

know what it is really all about is going to flounder in certain 

areas. The concern I have had is that we have taken what was intended to be Homeland Security and made it an all-hazards risk 

prevention agency, which is an impossibility. You cannot eliminate 
5 

all risk, nor even if we could, we could not afford to. So I look forward to all of your comments today and a frank discussion. 

Senator Carper and I, over the next 4 years, will oversee every 

nook and corner of Homeland Security for the transparency that 

needs to be there and also to see the improvement, and I appreciate his cooperation and his leadership in doing so. I think it is 

healthy for you all. It is certainly healthy for the Congress. We 

make a lot of decisions a lot of times without the input that we 

need to have from the agencies, and getting to know what you do 

and how you do it and to understand that better can help us as 

we direct funds. 

So I am thankful for your work and I am thankful for your dedicated service and look forward to hearing your comments. 

Chairman CARPER. Thank you, sir. Senator Johnson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I was not prepared, but I will 

take the opportunity, first of all, to certainly voice my gratitude for 

both the Chairman and Senator Coburn in terms of the way you 

are going to be conducting this Committee in the future. 

I think it is a really good sign that we are going to try and reauthorize this Department. The Department of Homeland Security 

should be playing a pretty vital role in the security of this Nation. 

We are facing incredibly serious threats. 

I have always been concerned since I came here a couple years 

ago, was it really the right move? I mean, you take, what is it, 22 

different agencies and try and combine them into one with the 

added layer of bureaucracy. I am not sure that is really the most 

efficient business model. 

If I had time to ask questions, the one question I have always 

had is, it is about a $50 billion a year agency. The Defense Department is about a $600 billion a year agency. Wal-Mart and 

ExxonMobil are about $450 billion a year companies. They get audited every year. A $50 billion company, it starts up, it gets audited every year. It does not seem to have much of a problem doing 

so. So I have always been scratching my head wondering why cannot the Department of Defense, why cannot the Department of 

Homeland Security pass an audit? 

So I guess I would look to private business practices and take a 

look at what is different in government that prevents that type of 

accountability, because the only way that the Department of Homeland Security is going to be able to fulfill its very important mission is through a very accountable, a very efficient, a very effective 

management style. And I do not know how you can obtain that accountability if you cannot pass a basic audit that private industry 

businesses that size do all the time. 

And, by the way, if the management of those companies do not 

pass an audit now under Sarbanes-Oxley, I mean, they go to jail 

or they certainly face criminal charges. So I think we need to bring 

that type of dedication, those types of private sector disciplines to 

government to make sure that we are auditable, that we are efficient, and that we are effective. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
6 

Chairman CARPER. That is a great point. When you jammed together 22 different agencies 10 years ago, different cultures, different financial systems, different accounting systems, it is not 

easy. And 65 years later, the Department of Defense is still struggling with it. 

I think there are really two keys, and one of those we will talk 

about here today, is leadership. It is leadership from the Department of Defense and Leon Panetta, now Chuck Hagel, saying, we 

have to get this done. We are going to make this a priority. And 

in this case, Secretary Napolitano and Deputy Secretary Lute. 

And the other thing is our responsibility. We are working with 

GAO, saying, this is a priority. And we are going to keep holding 

these hearings. We are going to do our job on oversight until we 

finally achieve this. 

And to their credit in this Department, they are coming along 

and it is good. It is like turning an aircraft carrier, but they are 

coming. That aircraft carrier is a big one over at DOD. They are 

turning that one, too, and in a couple of years, hopefully we will 

be singing their praises, as well. 

Senator JOHNSON. Again, my point was not to be critical—— 

Chairman CARPER. I understand. 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. But, again, just really being encouraging in the direction we have to go. Again, I am highly encouraged with what this Committee has set out to do here and I 

think this is the right path that we are on. So, again, I just want 

to be encouraging. 

Chairman CARPER. Senator Johnson here comes out of the private sector, as Tom does, who has done any number of things in 

his life, but he understands full well the value of being able to 

measure things. What we cannot measure, we cannot manage. And 

thank you for the role that you play on this Committee. You are 

just a very good addition to this Committee. 

All right. Having said that, let me just briefly introduce our witnesses. The first panel includes not two but three very impressive 

public servants: Jane Holl Lute, who is Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and Gene Dodaro, Comptroller 

General. Accompanying Mr. Dodaro is Cathleen Berrick of GAO. 

She is not here to testify, but she is here to field the really tough 

questions so that when he is stymied and does not know what to 

say—which has never happened before in my time here—she can 

jump in and help out. We appreciate both of you taking the time 

to be with us to talk about GAO’s high-risk update and the 

progress made by the Department, and we look forward to continuing to work with both of you and your folks. 

I think, Deputy Secretary Lute, ordinarily, as a matter of protocol, the Committee would ask you to be our lead-off hitter, but 

if you are willing to do this, I think it might make sense for Mr. 

Dodaro to set the stage for us by providing us with a little bit of 

a broad overview and some context of the high-risk series and the 

summary of how the High-Risk List relates to the specific subject 

of our hearing, the management of the Department of Homeland 

Security. 
7 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Dodaro appears in the Appendix on page 50. 

If you are comfortable with that, we will just ask him to lead off 

and you can try to move him around the bases, all right. Mr. 

Dodaro, you are recognized. Thank you. Thank you all. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. EUGENE L. DODARO,1 COMPTROLLER 

GENERAL, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; ACCOMPANIED BY CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, MANAGING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. DODARO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Dr. Coburn, Senator Johnson. It is a pleasure to be here 

today to talk about GAO’s high-risk update. 

As you point out, we have been doing this the beginning of each 

new Congress since 1990. This past year, we provided the update 

just recently. I am very pleased that this Committee has already 

held hearings on two areas under the high-risk list, on the Postal 

Service financial condition and on the cybersecurity area, and is 

considering legislation which is necessary to get those items off the 

list. In many cases, it is the agency’s actions that are required, but 

in a number of areas that are high risk, it is really also up to the 

Congress to pass legislation. 

Now, we have reported this year notable progress in most of the 

areas—there are 30 of them—on the high-risk list, and this is a 

very good 2-year interim report by historical standards. So there is 

a lot of effort going into these areas. 

And I would credit this because the Congress has passed several 

pieces of legislation that are important to getting areas off that list. 

The agencies have worked hard. And the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) has worked with GAO and the agencies to convene meetings to focus on the high-risk areas. 

In two of the areas, we noted enough progress that we removed 

them from the list. One is interagency contracting. We put it on in 

2005, and this is a good practice for agencies if implemented properly. But we found they were doing it, not within scope. The roles 

and responsibilities were not clear. Probably the most notable example is when interrogators were hired for Iraq off of a General 

Services Administration (GSA) information technology (IT) contract. And so there clearly needed to be some changes. 

Now, at congressional direction, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) was changed and improved to require a best procurement approach, which required documentation of the decision, and 

written agreements on spelling out roles and responsibilities. Also 

at Congress’ urging and direction, there was a requirement added 

for a business case to be developed and approved at senior levels 

within the Department before new interagency contracts could be 

put in place. And then Congress also asked for a series of audits 

by the Department of Defense IG, and that Inspector General 

found less problems over time. 

So we are satisfied that the mechanisms are in place. There is 

demonstrated progress. And we have removed them from the list. 

The other area is the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Business 

Systems Modernization (BSM). We put that on the list in 1995. IRS 
8 

was mired in technical and management weaknesses with that system. Over the years, they have made steady improvement. Congress has required an annual expenditure plan from IRS, which 

GAO was required to review. 

And IRS finally has made measurable progress. They have installed the first module of their new system, which allows for daily 

updating of taxpayer accounts. This is a huge change. It enables 

refunds to get out faster. It enables them to send notices faster and 

to field questions and helps in enforcement areas. 

They also have instituted about 80 percent of all the best practices for IT investment management and 100 percent of those best 

practices for project management, which is a notable achievement. 

They have also been rated, their Software Acquisition Department, 

at a Computer Maturity Model 3 Level by the Software Engineering Institute Standards, which by industry standards is a very good 

mark. 

Now, for both of these areas, a point that you made, Mr. Chairman, in your opening statements, Senator Coburn, Senator Johnson, all of you touched upon the importance of congressional oversight. These two areas have had sustained congressional oversight 

over that period of time and good leadership by the agencies, which 

are the two key ingredients. Virtually every area we have taken off 

the list, and we have taken a third of them off over the years, have 

been attributable to those two key ingredients being in place. 

Now, while they are off the list, they are not out of sight. We continue to monitor what is going on to make sure that the progress 

is sustained. 

We also evolved one of the areas this year, which is modernizing 

the financial regulatory system for the United States to include the 

financial management problems at the Federal Housing Administration. They are below the capital requirement needed. They took 

on a lot more risky loans during the recessionary period where the 

private sector backed out of the mortgage market. So we wanted 

to highlight those changes. 

But also, as Congress resolves the conservatorships of Fannie 

Mae and Freddie Mac, you need to take into account the implications for the Federal Housing Administration and it really needs to 

be an integrated decision as those efforts are resolved as to what 

the proper Federal role should be in the Federal housing mortgage 

market. 

Now, we added two new areas to the list this year, as well. The 

first was limiting the Federal Government’s fiscal exposure by better managing climate change risk. I am very concerned about this 

area and the financial risk. The Federal Government owns hundreds of thousands of properties, many Defense installations along 

the coastal areas. The Federal Government owns 29 percent of the 

land in the United States in terms of managing it and dealing with 

erosion and other issues. 

The Federal Government runs two of the largest insurance programs. One is the Flood Insurance Program, and the Flood Insurance Program already owes the Treasury Department over $20 billion, and has not made a principal payment back on that debt since 

2010. The levels have just been raised to allow them to borrow additional money to help out in Hurricane Sandy. Congress has 
9 

passed some legislation recently, but it needs to be implemented effectively. 

And also the disaster aid that is provided. The criteria for providing disaster aid really has not been changed since it was established in 1980. Right now, it is $1.35 per person per State. It was 

not adjusted for inflation for a 13-year period of time. We estimated 

if it had been adjusted for inflation, the Federal Government would 

not have been involved in 25 percent of the disaster declarations 

put in place over time. 

We also do not budget for major disasters, which is a real problem, particularly given our precarious financial situation right now. 

The only thing that is budgeted for are 5-year historical averages 

of disasters under $500 million. So virtually, of the tens of billions 

of dollars that have been appropriated over the years, in the last 

decade over about $140 billion, well over 80 percent of that, almost 

89 percent of it, has come through supplemental appropriations 

which were not budgeted for. 

So we have many ideas for improvements in these areas. It is 

very important. 

It is also related to the last area that we added to the high-risk 

list, which is a gap in environmental satellites. The polar orbiting 

satellites, in particular, provide global coverage of the surface of 

the earth twice a day, morning, afternoon and evening orbits, and 

this data feeds the weather prediction models for 3-, 4-, and 7-day 

forecasts. Because of procurement and management problems over 

the years, there is a gap that could be anywhere from 17 to 53 

months where we may not have this information. It is critical. If 

we had not had the satellite data in Superstorm Sandy, one credible organization predicted that storm to go out to sea and not hit 

New Jersey. So there would not have been adequate warnings for 

the residents. 

So we have encouraged National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and DOD to put contingency plans in place, 

but they need to be properly executed and this is an area for congressional oversight, to make sure that these gaps do not create 

real problems that could lead to loss of life, property, and other economic damages over time. 

Now, we also narrowed the areas for three of the high-risk areas, 

including the Department of Homeland Security. We found that, 

over the years, the department has made good progress in its initial implementation. For example, they have created the National 

Response Framework for addressing disaster assistance. They have 

hired, produced, and have in place workforces. They have stood up 

new agencies, like the National Cybersecurity Communications Integration Center. So we felt comfortable narrowing them to the 

management challenges that they have. 

And for most of the management challenges—you have highlighted some of the major progress that has been made, so there 

has been some progress, but there really needs to be additional 

progress. DHS needs to get a clean audit opinion for 2 years to get 

off the high-risk list. They need to have financial systems in place. 

Major acquisitions are still overrunning costs and are not being delivered on time with the expected type of product that is needed to 

execute the mission. And there are many other areas. 
10 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Lute appears in the Appendix on page 99. 

Now, we identified 31 specific actions that needed to be addressed to come off the list. The Department has fully addressed 

six; two, mostly addressed; 16, partially; and seven, they have initiated action. So that provides a scorecard. They have an excellent 

roadmap now. They just need to execute it. 

And we are committed—I think we have had a very good, constructive dialogue and partnership with DHS to provide clarity. 

They have stepped up, have plans in place, know how to do it, and 

if they execute those plans, I think they will continue to make excellent progress. 

So I thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I will be 

happy to answer questions once the Deputy Secretary provides her 

statement. 

Chairman CARPER. Thanks very much for that overview and for 

some of the specifics on the Department and for being, really, a 

good partner with us as we try to help DHS do the work that they 

already do even better. 

All right. Secretary Lute, you are on. Welcome. Glad to see you. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JANE HOLL LUTE,1 DEPUTY SECRETARY, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. LUTE. Thank you very much, Chairman Carper, Ranking 

Member Coburn—good to see you again—distinguished Members of 

the Committee. I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before 

you today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security and our 

progress over the past 10 years. 

Our 10-year anniversary provides an important opportunity to 

consider how DHS has evolved to fulfill its original purposes and 

reflect on further work that has to be done to realize full potential. 

Now, I do not know, Dr. Coburn, Shawn Reese, but if he were 

sitting here, I would tell him he is behind in his reading. I am not 

a politician. I am not a diplomat. I spent a long time as a soldier 

and I am an operator. I run things. And I describe the mission of 

Homeland Security in simple terms. Our job is—as part of the Federal Government—to help create a safe, secure, resilient place 

where the American way of life can thrive. 

And in order to meet that job, in order to fulfill that mission, we 

focus on five main things: Preventing terrorism and enhancing security; securing and managing our borders; administering and enforcing our immigration laws; ensuring the Nation’s cybersecurity; 

and building national resilience. 

We do not do any of this alone. While DHS plays an important 

role, we view homeland security as a whole community effort and, 

therefore, rely heavily on many partners throughout the homeland 

security enterprise, at the State, local, Tribal, Territorial level, 

across the rest of the Federal Government, in the private sector, 

and among the American people. 

In turn, our partners, and including Congress and this Committee, which we have appreciated over the course of our lifetime. 

It is the reason the Department is 10 years old and not 1 year old 

for the tenth time. There is a big difference. We have made 
11 

progress over the course of these past 10 years and we intend to 

continue making progress. 

But this Committee, in fact, the American people, have a right 

to expect that we can do three things. They have a right to expect 

that we can execute the missions that I just outlined for you. They 

have a right to expect that we can run ourselves. And they have 

a right to expect that we can account for the resources that have 

been entrusted to us, and we expect no less of ourselves. 

DHS is, in its nature, composition, and purpose, an operational 

department. Yes, we have policymaking responsibilities. Yes, we 

have regulatory responsibilities. But we have operational responsibilities, as well. Every single day, tens of thousands of Homeland 

Security professionals provide essential services to the American 

public, from securing our borders, to processing immigration benefits, responding to disasters, patrolling the Nation’s waters, safeguarding our air travel, and in countless other ways. 

To carry out this mission, we must be able to recruit, hire, and 

retain qualified staff; budget, account, and oversee billions in financial resources; procure complex systems and services; collect, sort, 

and share data; maintain 24-hour communications and situational 

awareness; ensure appropriate security and safety for these operations; and effectively manage the hundreds of facilities and locations where our personnel are deployed. 

We do these things in Homeland Security every day and we do 

it for the American public. To do these things, we know we have 

to be well staffed, well trained, and well led. 

And to meet these requirements, we have worked constantly to 

improve our hiring processes, our acquisition and procurement 

processes, data management and financial systems. As a result, for 

example, of the effort we have made to improve our management 

operations across the board, for the first time since the creation of 

the Department in 2003, DHS has earned a qualified audit opinion 

on all five of its balance sheets. And I project this year, Mr. Chairman, that we will have a clean audit opinion. Perhaps we will be 

able to achieve a clean audit opinion for 2 years, for 2012 and for 

2013. That is our aim. 

I do not need to tell this Committee what an—— 

Chairman CARPER. I want to repeat myself. From your lips to 

God’s ears. That would be great. 

Ms. LUTE. Thank you. I do not need to tell you what an extraordinary achievement this has been, but I would like to acknowledge 

my colleagues from across the Department who have worked tirelessly to make this a reality under the leadership of Rafael Borras, 

our Under Secretary for Management, and Peggy Sherry, our Chief 

Financial Officer (CFO). 

The lights are on in many buildings around Washington, DC, and 

across the country very late into the night so that this can be 

achieved, and we are proud of our people who have done this. We 

will continue our fierce commitment to sound management practices and expect that DHS will receive that unqualified audit opinion. 

We know that Congress and GAO understand the importance of 

effective management. When GAO placed the implementation and 

transformation of DHS on its high-risk list in 2003, it cited three 
12 

principal reasons for doing so. First, the sheer size of the task with 

respect to numbers and the complexity of transforming 22 agencies 

into one coherent Department. Second, the fact that many of these 

agencies were coming to DHS with preexisting conditions, preexisting GAO findings and other challenges to overcome. And third, 

because of the potential for catastrophic consequences should this 

effort to strengthen the security and safety of this country fail. 

The undertaking has been massive and there have been many 

challenges, but there have also been many advantages, beginning 

with the men and women of the Department and their unwavering 

professionalism and commitment to the mission of homeland security. Similarly, in the early years, the leadership of DHS worked 

to build a sensible foundation from which to grow, and Congress 

has been indispensable to our progress, as has our important partnership with GAO, with whom we tend on nearly all matters to 

find overwhelming agreement. 

With this help, we have made considerable progress in all key 

areas of management and take some measurement of satisfaction 

in the significant narrowing of the high-risk area in GAO’s recent 

report. The close working relationship we have built with GAO is 

founded on principles of engagement, responsiveness, and mutual 

respect, and we are grateful for the level of coordination and professionalism that GAO displays to us in our work together. We 

know that their partnership has been important to the achievements we have made. 

Today, we are more integrated and unified as a Department and 

we are able to leverage both expertise and experience to achieve 

our mission. There are things that are done today that were not 

possible before the Department was created. Two examples will illustrate this point and are indicative of the kind of Department we 

have become with your help. 

First, the Homeland Security Surge Capacity Force was created 

legislatively in 2006, requiring the creation of a volunteer force 

made up of DHS employees who could deploy in the event of a catastrophic disaster to support survivors. On November 1, 2012, in the 

immediate aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, we activated the Surge 

Capacity Force for the first time. Within just a few days, nearly 

1,200 employees from Homeland Security from across the Department—the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Coast Guard, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Secret Service, and DHS headquarters—deployed to 

New York and New Jersey in support of FEMA’s response and recovery effort. 

These individuals communicated directly with disaster survivors 

regarding power restoration, emergency services, food and shelter 

options, and how to register for disaster assistance. They slept on 

ships docked offshore so that they would be close to the people they 

serve and not take up limited hotel space. They empowered those 

who had been disempowered by the storm. They were at their best 

for people who had been through the worst. 

The second example of the things that we can do today in the 

Department that we could not do 10 years ago is cybersecurity. 

People did not even talk about it in the terms they talk about it 
13 

now. But by bringing the components and offices of Homeland Security together, we have been able to formulate a coherent strategy 

to defend the Federal networks in dot-gov, engage a broad community of expertise, from law enforcement to the private sector, the 

intelligence community, as well, to strengthen the protection and 

resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure, both cyber and 

physical. 

The point of these two anecdotes is not just that we have helped 

communities bounce back from disaster or that we have architected 

from the ground up a responsible approach to cybersecurity. The 

point is that the very best of what this Department is about comes 

from the work that we do together and from the individuals who 

have transformed the Department from 22 separate agencies into 

one cohesive and mission-driven unit whose purpose is to help create a safe, secure, resilient place where our way of life can thrive. 

From a management perspective, as well, we continue to streamline and strengthen ourselves. The Secretary’s efficiency reviews, 

begun 4 years ago, have led to DHS employees identifying 45 specific projects and initiatives that have yielded more than $4 billion 

in savings and cost avoidances, savings that have been reinvested 

into our critical missions. 

Elsewhere, as you have noted, Mr. Chairman, we have consolidated data centers, overhauled our procurement and acquisition 

systems, written the Federal Government’s first ever guidelines on 

financial assistance, created clear and measurable performance objectives, have built a statistical compendium of all of our operations 

in Homeland Security to give us visibility into the kinds of indicators and metrics that indicate successful performance, and we have 

become auditable. 

We know our work is not done. We know that nothing stands 

still. Threats continue to evolve. Technology will continue to advance. And operational demands will continue to grow. We are 

deeply connected to this dynamic world and we are committed to 

doing our very best to ensure that this country remains a safe, secure, resilient place where the American way of life can thrive. We 

count on our continued partnership with Congress to help us hit 

the mark the American people expect and deserve. 

And I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you today and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman CARPER. We have all heard the old saying, that is my 

story and I am sticking with it. That is a good story to tell and it 

is a great story to build on. 

We have been joined by Senator Ayotte and Senator Heitkamp 

and Senator Baldwin, all new to this Committee, Senator Ayotte 

not new to the Senate. But we are delighted that you are here 

today to hear this testimony and to join us in asking questions. 

I have prevailed on Senator Johnson just to wait for a couple 

minutes. He needs to go someplace else. But he asked a very good 

question sort of earlier. I do not know if you want to ask the same 

question or something else before you head out, that would be 

great. 

Senator JOHNSON. Maybe two quick questions. This one is pretty 

broad. 

Deputy Secretary Lute, how long have you been with the agency? 
14 

Ms. LUTE. Four years. 

Senator JOHNSON. Four years. Having been there now and understanding the complexity of having 22 different agencies—again, 

this is all hindsight, Monday morning quarterbacking—are there 

any of those agencies that you think might have been restructured 

better someplace else and maybe should not be part of the Department? Is there any restructuring that you would, again, just in 

hindsight, or do you think things are pretty well comprised here? 

Ms. LUTE. Thank you, Senator. I have been running organizations for a long time. I do not have too many organizational theologies. You can always do things differently and make improvements. But I think if you ask any of the 22 agencies, the legacies 

and the offices that have come together, can they find themselves 

in that mission statement of creating a safe, secure, resilient place, 

yes, they can. Can they find themselves in any of the five missions—preventing terrorism, borders, immigration, cybersecurity, 

and building national resilience? Yes, they can. So, largely, for the 

most part, they are in the right place. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. Then just getting back to the audit, can 

you just describe the major reason why that has not been achievable in the last 10 years? I mean, is it the incompatibility of accounting systems between 22 different agencies? I mean, what has 

prevented just a complete audit? 

Ms. LUTE. Well, we have made progress over every year. I mean, 

I would tell you at the moment, we are focused on property. I think 

we will be able to resolve it for 2012 and certainly going forward. 

Senator JOHNSON. So it is really just the complexity of individual 

issues as opposed—and being able to account for that 29 percent 

of all land that the Federal Government operates and that is now 

under your jurisdiction? 

Ms. LUTE. It is a tremendous challenge. It is not that we do not 

know what to do. It is not that we do not have the tools to do it. 

It is a tremendous challenge. And it is not that we lack the commitment or the help and support of our partners. We have all of 

those things. We will get this done. 

Senator JOHNSON. So it is just the number of things you have to 

account for and trying to get it all—— 

Ms. LUTE. It is a big job. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman CARPER. Senator Johnson, thanks for sticking with us 

to ask those questions. Good questions. 

Let me just start off with a question, if I could, for the Deputy 

Secretary. Let me focus for a couple of minutes on the next steps 

the Department is going to be taking to improve the management 

of the Department. GAO recommends that the Department track 

and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of 

the management improvements that have already been made. Let 

me just ask, how will you do that, and also, what type of reports 

will be available to this Committee so that we can monitor the 

progress that is occurring and meet our responsibilities for providing good oversight? 

Ms. LUTE. Thank you, Chairman. So, we have done several 

things. One is to launch the Management Health Initiative, which 
15 

is really designed to create a dashboard for that at-a-glance look 

at critical systems and performances. 

In addition, as I mentioned, we have for the first time begun to 

compile a statistical compendium to give us visibility into all of the 

resources that we have in the Department and how they are applied against those mission sets. So building this kind of business 

intelligence and understanding of our operation is fundamental to 

be able to report in a cogent and authoritative way on the accomplishments and the achievements that we have made. So we look 

forward to working with this Committee to get that right and to 

establish regularized reporting to give you the visibility we have. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Good. 

We all know that management matters and good management is 

the platform on which agencies, frankly, businesses, execute their 

missions. I hope that is one of the missions that comes out of this 

hearing, that good management matters, and I am convinced that 

we have good management. 

I also am encouraged we have some continuity in that management, and with, I think, Secretary Napolitano—nobody is perfect. 

She is not. God knows, I am not. But I think she is a very good 

administrator and very committed. I think you are, too. I think the 

fact that she is going to be staying around for, hopefully, four more 

years, my hope is you are going to be staying around for at least 

that long, and that leaves in place a very good management team. 

I think over your right shoulder is Rafael Borras. Is that the 

man? Rafael is the Under Secretary of Management, and a lot of 

what we are talking about here is actually an effort that he has 

led. You mentioned that and we want to acknowledge him and the 

team that he works with, so thanks so much. 

But, Deputy Secretary Lute, would you provide us with just a 

couple of maybe concrete examples of in the past where weak management has really undermined the performance of the Department, and conversely, where good management has enabled the 

Department to better carry out its mission. So a couple of good examples of where bad management undermined the Department 

and its mission and maybe one or two where it is just the opposite 

has been true. 

Ms. LUTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, if you will allow me, 

you will not hear me say the Secretary is not perfect. [Laughter.] 

She is a terrific boss and a terrific leader for the—— 

Chairman CARPER. Well, I will say the Chairman here is not perfect, though. 

Ms. LUTE. But I will—— 

Chairman CARPER. And I have known the Secretary for a long 

time. 

Ms. LUTE. I know. 

Chairman CARPER. As good as she is, she is not perfect, either. 

You can always do better. Tell her I said that. 

Ms. LUTE. And I will accept her imperfections. 

Leadership and management are things that I have paid a lot of 

attention to over the course of nearly 35 years of working in the 

public sector, in the military, in the international civil service, and 

in the not-for-profit sector, as well. What management needs to do 

very clearly is provide people purpose and pride. You do not run 
16 

organizations through derogation and putting people down. You 

have to say very clearly, what is our job here. 

And what we have tried to do in the Department of Homeland 

Security—four years ago, I stood in a door jamb of one of my colleagues and said, we need to narrate the purpose of this Department in very clear terms. We need to conduct a bottom-up review 

of what we are doing and balance that examination against what 

we said is important to do. We need to get off the GAO high-risk 

list and we need to become auditable. So those are the kinds of examples, I think, and we have made progress in every single one of 

those, in every single one of those areas, if I can be allowed. 

When you are creating a new department and a new enterprise— 

I have done this several times now in the public sector—this narration of purpose is really essential so people understand how what 

they have been doing now contributes to the purpose that they are 

being asked to perform. It is easy sometimes, particularly at the 

operational level, to be absorbed in the day to day. It takes a great 

deal of effort to sit back, develop perspective and a strategic understanding of how those discrete individual operational efforts add up 

to an overarching purpose. 

So narrating that purpose of Homeland Security, clarifying the 

five mission areas, as we have done, orienting people in the direction of, are you performing these missions? Are you contributing to 

running ourselves? Are you contributing to our public accountability? If whatever you are doing is not in one of those three buckets, stop doing it. 

So it is a particular leadership challenge when you are doing 

startups, one that I think that we have met, together with those 

who have gone before us, in establishing this Department. 

Chairman CARPER. One more for you, if I could. Secretary Lute, 

we are in a tough fiscal environment. We are working on it. We 

passed a Continuing Resolution to fund the government for the rest 

of the fiscal year, not perfect, but it is better than stop and go, the 

fiscal cliff, lurching from emergency to emergency. But it is still a 

tough environment that we are going to be operating in for the 

foreseeable future. 

Let me just ask, do you think you will be able to sustain and improve upon the vital management progress that has been made in 

the past 5 years? The Senate version of the Fiscal Year Continuing 

Resolution that we passed yesterday in the Senate cuts about $17 

million from the Department’s management functions. Tell us, 

what could be the practical impact of a reduction of that nature? 

For example, does this put in jeopardy the Department’s ability to 

do rigorous reviews of the component’s acquisitions that GAO recommends? 

Ms. LUTE. Thank you, Chairman. You do not run an operational 

department without the ability to hire, retain, and manage people, 

without the ability to acquire and procure goods and services, without the ability to run your financial systems from an accountability 

point of view. All of those will be affected by cuts. Things may take 

longer. There may be aspects of things that we do not get to as 

thoroughly as we would like under other circumstances. Our job is 

to limit any negative effects and prioritize. That is part of the leadership job. 
17 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Dr. Coburn, please proceed. 

Senator COBURN. Secretary Lute, I know I appreciate your work. 

I hope you will have somebody stay around here to hear Mr. 

Reese’s paper, and I think it is unfortunate you have not read it. 

It was published January 8. The fact is, there are some significant 

criticisms that you need to be aware of rather than to dismiss 

them, especially since it sounds like you or your staff have not read 

his scholarship. So I hope you will leave somebody here after you 

testify to hear his testimony about what his research shows and his 

fair criticisms and then give us an answer to it. 

Ms. LUTE. I did read his paper. 

Senator COBURN. You did? And so you think it is totally off base? 

Ms. LUTE. I disagree with what he finds. I do think we know 

what our purpose is. I do think we know how to orient our missions 

to that purpose. 

Senator COBURN. OK. That is fair. 

A number of recommendations were made by the 9/11 Commission. That is a fairly remote Commission now. One is the status of 

TSA’s effort on explosives. I would just like an update of where we 

are and where you are going to be on that requirement. 

The other requirement that they had is on the U.S. Visitor and 

Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program. GAO 

found that there were 825,000 pieces of data that are not matched 

to the correct fingerprints. They might be fraudulent, and right 

now, there is no way to determine whether or not they are fraudulent. So if you could—and you do not have to answer these now. 

I do not expect you to know that detail and understand that. 

But, to me, those represent two of the areas where we have had 

substantive recommendations by the 9/11 Commission that we 

have not achieved the goal, and both of them are significantly important to the missions of your organization. So I would hope that 

you would respond to me on that. 

Since 2004, your agency has disbursed $35 billion in grants. 

What do you know about the effectiveness and the accomplishments of those grants? 

Ms. LUTE. Thank you, Dr. Coburn. We do not have the kind of 

granular visibility into the accomplishments that we want to have. 

We do know that we have created a great deal of capability across 

the country in those grants, and we do know that there is a need 

for a comprehensive approach to a financial assistance that the 

Federal Government, in our case DHS, provides. 

We have written that approach to financial assistance. We have 

taken a look at everything, from understanding requirements in 

the grant-making area, how to build and work with the communities at the State level and local level in constructing well-written 

grant proposals. We have looked at the accountability and our ratio 

of personnel to oversight. We have a lot to do, but we have begun 

to make progress through that financial assistance work under the 

direction of our CFO, Peggy Sherry. 

Senator COBURN. Do you think FEMA, at the very least, should 

track what grants are spent on? 

Ms. LUTE. Yes, sir, I do. 

Senator COBURN. OK. And are you? 

Ms. LUTE. Not as well as we would like, but we are improving. 
18 

Senator COBURN. OK. GAO found that fewer than 10 percent of 

DHS’s acquisition programs fully comply with the new acquisition 

policy. And I know this is a work in process, so I am not actually 

being critical when I make that note. I know that your intent and 

goal is to accomplish that. They also found that only one-third of 

the programs that should have had approved acquisition baselines 

actually do. The baselines actually are probably the most important 

tool for managing individual programs and conducting congressional oversight. 

Having said that, what steps are you taking to hold components 

accountable for complying with the DHS acquisition policy? I know 

you have made the policy. Now, where is the management accountability to make sure the agencies are holding within that acquisition policy? 

Ms. LUTE. Well, as you noted, we have drawn all of our programs 

under Management Directive 102. Each of the programs submit to 

a regular review by the Acquisition Review Board (ARB). Decisions 

are taken. We will not progress if we are not satisfied the questions 

and accountability are in line. We have instituted a lifecycle management cost model, as well, which we are imposing. And we have 

shut programs down that were not performing. 

So we have begun to change the culture. I think we have gone 

a very long way. It is unthinkable that we would undertake a 

major acquisition without a careful review under our directives procedures of what our requirements are and exposing those requirements to regular oversight through the ARB process. 

Senator COBURN. How about the acquisitions that were started 

before you started? 

Ms. LUTE. Some of them—— 

Senator COBURN. What are you doing with those? 

Ms. LUTE. Some of them have proven problematic, and all of 

them, we are incorporating into the new process. 

Senator COBURN. Would you submit to the Committee the ones 

that you have terminated and the ones that are problems? 

Ms. LUTE. Yes. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you. My first training was as an accountant and as an auditor, and I can tell you, the experience when 

I talk to Marine captains and colonels today, they are so thankful 

that the Marine Corps is just about to pass an audit, because what 

it has actually done is made their job easier and their decisionmaking easier because they now have visibility on the key parameters which would judge the outcome of a decision or direct them 

to make a new decision. 

Are your people ready to use accounting information to make 

management decisions and all the way through all 22 agencies? 

Ms. LUTE. That is a great question, Dr. Coburn. The answer is, 

absolutely. And if I can just call out the men and women of the 

Coast Guard as the first—— 

Senator COBURN. Yes, I know. 

Ms. LUTE [continuing]. As the first uniformed service—— 

Senator COBURN. You bet, the first one to do it. 

Ms. LUTE [continuing]. The first to achieve auditable status. This 

is something that we have and the Commandant has and the leadership across the Coast Guard has pushed down, you are exactly 
19 

right, down to the lowest level possible. The American people have 

a right to expect that we can account for the resources that have 

been given to us, and when you can do it, it is very powerful from 

a leadership point of view. 

Senator COBURN. OK. Let me ask you one other question. You 

have accomplished and actually performed on about 60 percent of 

the GAO recommendations. I do not expect you to say they are 

right in every indication. I understand that sometimes they miss 

it. But there are 40 percent of their recommendations that you 

really have not acted on. What is the plan? Are some of those recommendations that you actually disagree with, or are they just 

ones that are harder to implement, and is there a push from senior 

management at DHS to actually accomplish and meet those recommended accomplishments? 

Ms. LUTE. There absolutely is a push, I think as Mr. Dodaro 

mentioned. This is not the first time he and I and Cathy are sitting 

together at a table. We have known each other for 4 years because 

we made a commitment early on to get this right. 

There are a few things we do not agree with, but we have an 

overwhelming bandwidth of agreement between us, what needs to 

be done. And also—— 

Senator COBURN. Let me just interrupt. Will you send me and 

the Committee—what you do not agree with? 

Ms. LUTE. Whatever material we have that we can share 

with—— 

Senator COBURN. Yes, where you say, here are their recommendations. Here is where we think they are wrong. Send that 

to us, because we actually read GAO reports in my office, and—— 

Ms. LUTE. Mine, too. 

Senator COBURN [continuing]. And we would love to have the 

other side of the issue—— 

Ms. LUTE. OK. 

Senator COBURN [continuing]. Of where you think they disagree, 

since the final arbiter is the U.S. Congress in terms of making the 

judgment on some of these things and whether some mandate is 

going to be put in an appropriation bill to make you do something 

that you actually disagree with and have a good reason for saying, 

‘‘We think GAO got it wrong.’’ So if you would send those to us, 

I would appreciate it. And I am sorry for interrupting you. 

Ms. LUTE. No, sir. And as I was just going to conclude, he also 

mentioned that he has seen from us detailed plans for working 

through the findings that they have given us. And it is the only 

way I know as an operator. What do we need to do to know that 

we are done, and we will do it. 

Senator COBURN. Yes. OK. Thank you. 

I am over my time. Are we having a second round? 

Chairman CARPER. I hope so. It may be abbreviated, but we will 

have one. 

What you just said about agreeing with most of the recommendations but not all, and Mike Enzi, a Member of this Committee, has 

shared with us any number of times something he calls the 80/20 

rule, which describes how he and Ted Kennedy were able to get so 

much done when they were leading the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. The 80/20 rule means this. He says, 
20 

‘‘Ted and I agreed on 80 percent of the stuff. We disagreed on 20 

percent of the issues. We decided to focus on the 80 percent that 

we agreed on, set the other 20 percent aside to look at another 

day,’’ and that is how they were able to get a lot done. And I think 

that maybe kind of describes what you are doing here, and whatever you are doing is, I think, working, and let us just keep it up. 

Senator Ayotte is next, and she stepped out for a moment. We 

are going to go to Senator Heitkamp, and if Senator Ayotte does 

not return immediately, then Senator Baldwin. Thank you. Senator 

Heitkamp, you are recognized. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HEITKAMP 

Senator HEITKAMP. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you for appearing today. 

I actually do know Janet pretty well and she is not perfect. Tell 

her I said that. [Laughter.] 

We were Attorney Generals (AGs) together. 

During my time in public life, I have been a tax auditor, tax commissioner. I have been an Attorney General. So this is an area that 

I think I have kind of two perspectives on, how difficult it is to do 

security, how difficult it is to wake up every day and realize primarily your mission is to protect this country and protect people. 

But the only way we can do it is when we are held accountable for 

how we do it. 

And we are in a time of pretty tough budget questions, and when 

we have 10 years where we are not able to pass audits, it gets increasingly difficult to justify to the American public that we are 

doing the right thing here. Now, I am new to this and I can tell 

you—maybe if I sat through 10 hearings like this on a GAO 

audit—I would be a little tougher. But I want to give you an example of why the American public gets frustrated. 

Recently in North Dakota, TSA removed three scanners, fullbody scanners, to move to other locations to replace scanners that 

you had to replace because they did not pass privacy measures. 

Now, Minot, North Dakota, is a place of great economic growth. In 

fact, their airport is experiencing a 49 percent increase in passengers. We have more airlines flying in there. The airport is 

understaffed. But yet you removed their scanner, causing the people of Minot to think, OK, here we go again. They cannot seem to 

get it right in Washington. They cannot seem to get procurement 

right. We see it every day. 

Obviously, we are extraordinarily grateful in North Dakota for 

all the help that we have received from FEMA. Minot is grateful 

for all the help, and, I think, all the true compassion and caring 

that the people experienced. But at the end of the day, yes, people 

can like the Federal employees who show up, and yes, you guys can 

sleep on ships and demonstrate your willingness to be accountable, 

but people want their dollars spent in an accountable and efficient 

manner, their tax dollars. 

And when we see repeated problems and a lack of what we have 

been hearing today. Sixty percent, you can agree with. You are 

moving on 60 percent. But, yet, there have been a lot of years to 

make this happen. And I can tell you as an agency head, if I had 

come back year after year with an audit and not having responded 
21 

to concerns and questions, I probably would not have gotten an appropriation the next time and the legislature would have probably 

taken away my responsibility. 

And so I just have a couple questions about my scanners, and I 

know that it is, in the grand scheme of things, this is not the big 

issue, but it illustrates concerns that we have about defending and 

representing the Federal Government when we go home. 

And so I have been told by John Sanders that the agency is developing an acquisition program for the next generation of scanners 

that are going to replace the systems that were transferred out of 

our airports. This is a critical acquisition program which will impact the safety and the security of my constituents. What steps are 

DHS and TSA management taking to ensure that the acquisition 

problems identified by GAO, such as a lack of a plan to manage 

the risk and measure performance, are not repeated? And that we 

are not going to see—I have to tell you, I was pretty tough when 

I talked with John because I said, look, if the next thing is that 

you move those same scanners back into North Dakota, I will have 

400 constituent letters about the waste of time. I said, you have to 

figure out how you can do this in a way that does not disrupt. And 

the notice was way too short, so there was not an ability to adapt. 

And so I use this as an illustration of the frustration, and want 

to be supportive and want to learn more about what the challenges 

are of meeting these acquisition policies. But I also want you to 

know that I am concerned deeply about irregularities. I am concerned deeply about inefficiencies and about a 10-year audit where 

the response is, ‘‘We are working on it. We are hoping we will get 

there.’’ 

Ms. LUTE. So, Senator, when I was in the Army, one of the Chief 

of Staffs of the Army, Gordon Sullivan—I am a great admirer of 

his—used to have a saying, ‘‘Hope is not a method.’’ 

Senator HEITKAMP. Yes. 

Ms. LUTE. We are not hoping to get to a clean audit opinion. We 

were not hoping to get to a qualified audit opinion. We were going 

to get there, and we are there. We are at a qualified audit opinion. 

We are auditable in less than 10 years of existence of a $60 billion 

agency with half-a-million people. 

So I share your determination that the accountability and the 

auditability and the answerability continues and has to improve. 

We will do that. 

Senator HEITKAMP. But if I can just make a point, and it is not 

to be belligerent, but it illustrates, if a bank consistently told the 

bank regulator after 10 years, ‘‘We are working on it. We have a 

strategy, we think,’’ they would not have been given 10 years to hit 

the mark. They would not have been given 10 years. 

Ms. LUTE. I worked in a bank when I was younger. I will not 

pretend to answer for it now. But what I can tell you is that we 

take a backseat to no one in our determination to achieve what we 

said we were going to do, which was a clean audit opinion, and sustain that, and I believe we will hit that mark. I know we will, because I know the effort that is going into this. 

In terms of the acquisition, I would be happy to share with you 

our detailed Management Directive covering the acquisition process 
22 

to which now all programs must adhere, and it is a rigorous process that examines from requirements to ultimate disposition. 

Senator HEITKAMP. And if I can just—not to belabor it—every organization has a policy. The question is whether they have the will 

to implement the policy, and so we will wait and we will see. But 

these numbers at this point are not numbers that I can defend in 

North Dakota. 

Ms. LUTE. What I could say, we also have a proven track record 

over the past 4 years of actually holding the meetings, canceling 

programs, improving the accountability and the understanding and 

the oversight within the Department of our acquisition programs, 

and we would be happy to lay all of this out for you in as much 

detail as you would find useful. 

Senator HEITKAMP. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. Senator Heitkamp, if you have not taken advantage of this, or any other Members of our Committee, I know 

Senator Coburn has, but Deputy Secretary Lute was good enough 

to spend a couple of hours with me and members of my team and 

it was just enormously helpful in understanding where they were 

when she started and where the Secretary started and how far 

they have come and what more they need to do. Hearings are good. 

Roundtables are good. But that is even better, and I would just 

urge you to take advantage of that. If we can be helpful in maybe 

pulling together a small group of Senators to have that kind of conversation with their staffs, I think everybody would be better for 

it, all right. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE 

Senator Ayotte, thanks for being with us yesterday. Thanks for 

being back again today. You are recognized. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here today and wanted 

to followup on, I think, some questions that you were already asked 

by Senator Coburn and may have been touched on by Senator 

Heitkamp, as well, and that is the grant programs and acquisition 

programs. 

The December 2012 GAO report found that, in fact, there were— 

unfortunately, the major acquisition programs are continuing to 

cost more, take longer, deliver less capacity, and GAO identified 42 

particular programs with cost growth or schedule problems, 16 of 

which saw increased costs, from $19.7 billion in 2008 to $52 billion 

in 2011. And according to that December GAO report, this was due 

to the Department’s lack of adherence to knowledge-based program 

management practices, and I know that Dr. Coburn touched on 

that, but where are we on this and how do we—basically, as Senator Coburn said, if we cannot measure effectiveness for these and 

we are continuing to see cost overgrowth in a challenging fiscal climate, how do we justify to our constituents that we should be 

spending money on these programs? 

So can you explain, where we are on that, and also, I would love 

to get some comment from you, Ms. Berrick, on that issue. 

Ms. LUTE. Thank you, Senator. We agree that we can do better, 

and as Dr. Coburn and I discussed, this is something we are very 

seized with. 
23 

One of the things that we did was put in place the National Preparedness Goals. What do communities need to do? How much of 

X, Y, or Z do they need to have? How do they know that from a 

set of judgments regarding what constitutes community preparedness that they are getting close to that? So articulating those preparedness goals was an important first step. 

Evaluating the capacity that has been created over the past 10 

years, with a sizable investment by the Federal Government in 

that capacity, is something that we are intending to do, as well. 

And then measuring performance objectives. And we have begun 

the performance objective process with ourselves. In 2009, we had 

over 182 performance objectives, some of which, quite frankly, were 

impenetrable. They were really difficult to understand and they 

were not at all straightforward. We looked at every single one of 

them. We have broken them down. We have cut them by more than 

half. And we have put them in plain language so that we know if 

we do these things, these are recognizable steps in the direction of 

preparedness, safety, and security. 

Senator AYOTTE. Can I share an experience I had when I was Attorney General? When the Homeland money first came in, to the 

State level, at least, the experience I had in our State, good intentioned people, but a lot of specific requirements on the Homeland 

money that maybe allowed a local agency to buy an All Terrain Vehicle (ATV) or a particular piece of equipment, but as I saw it, no 

connection to the overall plan to homeland security. Where are we 

on that with the State dollars that have flowed down and what I 

have seen sort of from a State perspective is a lot of piecemeal 

equipment here and there, but I could not connect it to the overall 

protection of either the State or the country. 

Ms. LUTE. Again, that was part of the purpose of laying out these 

National Preparedness Goals, so that we could see not just what 

the States were doing, but that the States could, further on down, 

see what was going on at the local level. 

Senator AYOTTE. And that it was all coordinated to some greater 

plan to protect the homeland? 

Ms. LUTE. So that it would be better coordinated to address the 

risks in a prioritized way. 

Senator AYOTTE. OK. Well, I appreciate that, and this is something that I—obviously, I am new to this Committee, but want to 

hear more about, and I would certainly like to hear your perspective, Ms. Berrick. 

Ms. BERRICK. Sure. I think Senator Heitkamp really captured 

the State of DHS’s acquisitions well, which is they have a good policy in place. The key is really execution moving forward. 

In addition to some of the statistics you mentioned, our review 

that we issued late in 2012 identified that most of DHS’s major acquisition programs lack key documentation. That is really fundamental to managing those acquisition programs. And, in fact, half 

of the programs did not have any of that documentation, and that 

includes new programs and also older programs, as well, that predated the new Acquisition Directive. 

DHS has a number of really promising initiatives that they are 

pursuing right now that will strengthen their acquisition function. 
24 

The status is they are in the very early stages, and I can give you 

a couple of examples. 

One is they have recently developed a requirements validation 

function which basically looks at the requirements for new systems 

and looks across the Department and coordinates that and makes 

sure that they are developing one DHS solution to meet all of their 

needs. We think that is very positive, but it is still in the very early 

stages. They are just starting to meet as they move forward. So we 

are going to be watching that moving forward. 

Another promising development is they developed a dashboard to 

oversee cost, schedule, and performance for their acquisitions, 

again, very promising. But that also is in the early stages. And, in 

fact, due to data issues, managers cannot really rely upon that system right now to make decisions. 

Regarding DHS’s progress related to acquisitions, they are absolutely moving in the right direction. The key will be executing on 

their policy, which is a good policy, and then assessing the results 

as they move forward. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. I also wanted to ask about just 

looking at the 2013 high-risk list, where are the issues that fall 

under, really, primarily DHS that GAO issued? And, of course, I 

think the one that jumps out at me, as I am aware we have had 

a pretty lengthy hearing on the cyber challenges, but the establishing effective mechanisms for sharing and managing terrorismrelated information to protect homeland security. I mean, this is 

the key issue post-9/11. Where are we? If it is still on the high-risk 

list, what have we done that is well that you can talk about here, 

and where are the major challenges that remain? 

Ms. BERRICK. The first—— 

Senator AYOTTE. Obviously, if there are things you cannot share 

here, I understand that. 

Ms. BERRICK. There has been significant progress in standing up 

the information sharing environment, which is really the government’s structure to manage this issue because it goes beyond DHS. 

It affects a lot of Federal agencies that have key leadership roles 

in this area. So there have been good oversight structures. The 

White House has established a Policy Committee that oversees efforts in this area. They also established a strategy with pretty good 

metrics. 

The key, really, right now is for the five major departments that 

have key responsibilities in this area, including DHS, to execute 

their information sharing initiatives and to coordinate with one another. DHS has made very good progress in this area. They have 

prioritized their information sharing initiatives. A key challenge 

that they are facing is—as other departments are, as well—is really resourcing those initiatives. We think they still have work to do 

in leveraging efforts of other departments and also identifying 

what their resource needs are for all of the various initiatives 

which are still underway. 

Another big challenge in the information sharing area is really 

the IT issue of connecting systems to enable departments to share 

information. There have been some frameworks put in place, but 

the agencies are really in the early stages of that. So very good 

progress in standing up a governance structure. The key right now 
25 

will be for the departments that have key responsibilities to move 

forward and coordinate their initiatives, such as the IT initiatives, 

and work together to address these challenges. 

Senator AYOTTE. Secretary. 

Ms. LUTE. I would just add one thing to what Cathy has said, 

in addition to all of that. Maybe two things. 

One is, sorting through the rules of information sharing is an important aspect of this, as well—U.S. persons, non-U.S. persons, law 

enforcement sensitive information, et cetera. We have been working through that with all of our counterpart agencies and we think 

we are making progress, but it is something that we have to and 

do pay attention to. 

The other thing that we have begun to come to grips with, and 

I would say that this is a tremendous challenge, is the so-called big 

data challenge. We have an initiative—we have several initiatives 

sort of, again, that are across the Department of Homeland Security. I call them the DHS Commons—common vetting, common 

aviation, common redress and traveler assistance and customer 

service. 

In the common vetting, what we know is we interact daily with 

the global movement of people and goods. TSA moves two million 

people a day. A million people cross our borders. We have a tremendous amount of data. How can we minimize the collection of 

that data so as to not pose an undue burden on the traveling public, for example, and how do we share it in an expedited way, subject to rules, with appropriate limits of use, protections for privacy, 

civil rights, and civil liberties that people have a right to expect? 

We are making progress on all of those fronts, in addition to what 

Cathy said. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you all. I know my time is over-expired, 

so thank you for that latitude, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CARPER. It was worth stretching it out. All right. 

Thank you very much. Thanks for being here again. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BALDWIN 

Senator Baldwin, welcome. Great to see you. Please proceed. 

Senator BALDWIN. I want to also thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for holding this up and down review of the Department of Homeland Security. Clearly, what was accomplished back 

in 2003 was no easy task, and I certainly recognize the incredible 

progress made in the 10-years since the Department’s creation. But 

since we are here today, I want to focus in on a couple of the areas 

in which the Department can improve or have been pointed out. 

Fortunately for me, Senator Ayotte’s last question was the first 

question I was going to ask about in terms of the recommendations 

in the GAO High-Risk Report on information sharing across agencies, so I feel like you have tackled that. 

But I want to also look at another area. Mr. Dodaro, in your testimony, you discuss the inclusion of a new high-risk area in 2013, 

limiting the Federal Government’s fiscal exposure by better managing climate change risks. And our country has certainly seen an 

increase in weather-related events that have contributed to significant loss of life and property, and it seems to me that each year, 

the weather-related events become more and more damaging and 
26 

the level of involvement of the Federal Government has only increased. 

One of the recommendations in your testimony is for DHS to improve the criteria for assessing a jurisdiction’s capability to respond 

to and recover from a disaster without Federal assistance and to 

better apply lessons from past experiences when developing disaster cost estimates. 

A few weeks ago, I was meeting with a county executive from one 

of the larger counties in the State of Wisconsin and we briefly discussed the need for FEMA and other Federal agencies to be more 

involved in ensuring that our local communities are prepared for 

the worst. And so I am wondering if both of you could comment on 

what DHS action items have occurred and will occur in the near 

future to assist local communities in preparing for the worst. 

Mr. DODARO. First, the criteria issue is a very important one. 

The criteria was established, and it is qualitative criteria, but they 

use some quantitative measures. One is the per capita cost, per 

person in each State, and it started out as a dollar in the 1980s 

per person per State as sort of a threshold of whether or not the 

total costs of responding to the disaster would go over that. Then 

the Federal Government would get involved. That was not indexed 

for inflation for a 13-year period of time, from 1986 to 1999. Our 

calculations show that if it had been indexed for inflation, the Federal Government would not have been involved in about 25 percent 

of the disasters that occurred during the time period we reviewed. 

And FEMA did agree with our recommendation to reassess the 

criteria and said that they were going to do that. It is a complicated task to be able to do it, but it is very important because 

of the incentives that it provides at the State and local level to 

make their own plans for preparedness and to identify where accountability lies. Particularly with State and local governments 

having zoning responsibilities, they have a lot to say in terms of 

where there infrastructure is located. 

Now, the other responsibility that FEMA has is to come up, ultimately, with criteria to determine readiness at the State and local 

level, and this goes to the grants question, as well, that was raised 

earlier. With all the grants that have been provided, at what point, 

even with what Jane mentioned regarding their goals that will be 

established, at what point are States capable of responding to these 

situations? FEMA is still working on that issue and has not really 

resolved that issue, as well. 

So there are two issues. One is the criteria for whether the Federal Government intervenes or not, and I think it needs to be reassessed. FEMA has agreed. But it will be a while before they come 

up with the criteria. But Congress should ask. And second is when 

FEMA comes up with a criteria for determining readiness of the capabilities at the State and local level. Both are needed to have good 

benchmarks in that area. 

Senator COBURN. Would the Senator yield for just a moment? Let 

me make a comment about Oklahoma. I think Oklahoma received 

11 disaster declarations based on the per capita damage ratio, and 

it is supposed to be a combination of overwhelming local resources 

and the per capita damage ratio. If you just looked at when we 

were overwhelmed, it was one of those. 
27 

Now, we are happy to take the money. I know our Governor is 

and our State Legislature. But I will put us back into perspective. 

We are going to spend a trillion dollars more this year than we 

have and there comes a point in time where local responsibility has 

to take over and be responsible for their legitimate functions for a 

couple of reasons. 

One is, we can never solve all, have them totally prepared, even 

if we were the great benevolent figure that we are. 

And No. 2 is, financially, we cannot afford to do what we have 

said we are going to do now. And so we have to change this indicator, at least change it for inflation, because it is a tremendous 

advantage to a small State. We have less than four million people. 

It is not hard to get $4 million worth of damage from a tornado 

in Oklahoma. How much responsibility should Oklahomans bear 

for that? I would say the vast majority of it, not the Federal Government. 

So I think your point is well made, and I am sorry I interrupted 

you and we will add more time to you. But we have to start putting 

this into perspective. 

Mr. DODARO. I agree with you, Senator. I think a good interim 

measure would be to index it for inflation for the entire period of 

time, because FEMA has indicated it is going to take time to come 

up with new criteria and go through a vetting process. But there 

could be some interim changes that they could consider. 

Chairman CARPER. Senator Baldwin, would you just hold your 

thought for just a moment. None of this counts against your time. 

In fact, we will give you more time. 

My understanding, just correct me if I am wrong, is about the 

last dozen or so years, I think this number has been indexed to the 

rate of inflation, I think. But for the first 12 or so years that it was 

in existence, it was not. And so I think that is the issue here, and 

the question is, what kind of catch-up do we do for those first dozen 

or so years. 

OK. Senator Baldwin, you are on. Thank you for bearing with us. 

Senator BALDWIN. No problem. 

Deputy Secretary Lute, I do not know if you have any comments 

on this question also. 

Ms. LUTE. So, I would only say two things. It is not 60/40. Gene 

and I agreed it is probably 95/5. We agree on most things that need 

to be done and improved, and it is really on that basis of common 

perspective that we proceed. 

And I guess the only thing I would add reflects a little bit on the 

point Dr. Coburn was making, which is in the tragic tornado that 

went through Joplin, Missouri, not long ago, it was an extraordinary demonstration of local capacity and mutual aid from the 

local community. No Federal search and rescue resources were deployed to that area. It is a small, teeny example, but exactly the 

kind of point, I think, that you are raising and making, and that 

is where we are headed. 

Senator BALDWIN. The other question I had, my home State of 

Wisconsin has a number of ports of entry throughout the State that 

Customs and Border Protection oversees. And I am curious as to 

whether there are any major recommendations that directly involve 

Customs and Border Protection and whether such recommenda-
28 

tions focus on security at ports of entry, if you could both comment 

on that and provide context to whether there are current issues 

with security at our ports of entry. 

Mr. DODARO. Yes, Senator. I will ask Cathy to elaborate on it, 

but regarding maritime ports, the one I know of is the Transportation Worker Identification Card (TWIC) issue, which we have 

written about in a couple of reports, and the status of that card. 

Part of the problem was not having the card readers available yet. 

So that has been one problem. But I will ask Cathy to elaborate 

on others. 

Ms. BERRICK. In addition, I would mention, as was already discussed, the US-VISIT exit system, which is a mandate that DHS 

has to develop a biometric exit capability to track foreign nationals 

leaving the United States. They have a biometric entry system. But 

that is a key area outstanding that they are working on. 

Also, another area is determining the appropriate mix of technology and infrastructure to secure different sectors along the 

Southwest border. As was mentioned, SBInet was canceled and 

DHS’s new approach is to determine the appropriate mix across the 

sectors rather than have a one-size-fits-all solution, and that work 

is still in progress and GAO has ongoing work looking at it. 

We have also made recommendations related to training for CBP 

agents and the need to have recurring training and refresher training after agents have been hired. 

Those are some key ones, and we have a number of others that 

we would be happy to discuss with you. 

Ms. LUTE. I think what I would just say in response, all of these 

are known to us and things that we are working on. As Cathy said, 

there is no one-size-fits-all for the ports of entry at the border and 

there is no single-point solution, just technology, or just more personnel, or just better process. You need to integrate all of these 

things in a sensible approach at the border, as we have been demonstrating. 

With respect to training, I could not agree more, and I am fond 

of saying sometimes that in the Federal Government, people talk 

about investment. Really, the only place you invest is in people. 

That is where you get the return. We spend a lot of money. We 

place some bets. Is this going to work or not? But the real investment is when you invest in people and that is in training. 

And we have taken steps, particularly on leadership training. We 

have created—it did not exist before—a comprehensive leadership 

training program for the Department of Homeland Security so 

young, entry-level professionals coming in as a Homeland Security 

person can see themselves all the way through and understand 

that as they progress in their career, there is a progression in expectations of the responsibilities they will assume. Certainly, this 

applies here, as well. 

Senator BALDWIN. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. One of the recurring themes of our hearing 

yesterday—on the oversight of the Hurricane Sandy response—one 

of the recurring themes was shared responsibility. We are not in 

this by ourselves. It is not just the Federal Government. It is not 

just State or local government. It is just government. We are all 

in this together, so that is good. 
29 

Mr. Dodaro, if you could, a question for you. I am going to try 

to keep this under 4 minutes. If you could help me with that, that 

would be good. But if you had to provide us with maybe the top 

two or three areas that you think would yield the greatest results 

in further improving the management of the Department of Homeland Security, what might those two or three areas be? 

Mr. DODARO. I think the first area, the one area that I would 

focus on, is the acquisition management area, because—— 

Chairman CARPER. Is your microphone on? Just start over. 

Mr. DODARO. I am sorry. 

Chairman CARPER. We want to hear every word. 

Mr. DODARO. OK. I will ask Cathy to provide input too. I will 

give the first one, and that is acquisition management. I think the 

acquisition management area is so critical to procuring the types 

of systems, whether it is scanners, IT solutions, or other solutions, 

that are critical to implement the Department’s missions. And I 

think that is very important, whether you are talking about immigration, Customs and Border Patrol, or other areas. That is where 

I would focus. That is an area where we have seen well-established 

departments, long-established departments—Defense, National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Department of Energy—with acquisition management still on the high-risk list. So 

that is a tough issue to resolve and it is all about implementation 

and having the proper discipline in place. 

Chairman CARPER. Thank you. 

Ms. BERRICK. And just to provide some context, GAO has issued 

over 1,300 products looking at different aspects of DHS’s programs 

and operations and made over 1,800 recommendations. A key 

theme we identified, looking across all those products that has impacted the Department’s efforts trace back to the management of 

the Department, just to put this in context. So we have identified 

this as a cross-cutting issue. 

And while all the management areas are important, I agree that 

acquisition along with IT are the two areas that have the most direct effect on the Department’s ability to implement their missions—secure the border, secure air travel. IT is very similar to acquisition. 

DHS’s focus really needs to be on moving forward on the initiatives that they are pursuing, and ensure that they are following 

their existing policy, not just in acquisition and IT but across all 

the management functions. DHS has good policies in place. The key 

is really execution, moving forward on these initiatives that they 

are starting, and monitoring their progress moving forward. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Thanks. 

My last question. On our second panel today, Elaine Duke, who 

is here today already, served as the Under Secretary of Management at the Department, and former Inspector General Richard 

Skinner, are both going to caution us on this Committee that it is 

important not to be short-sighted with the budget for management. 

The Fiscal Year 2013 Continuing Resolution passed by the Senate 

yesterday would cut $17 billion from management at the Department of Homeland Security. What area or areas of progress in addressing management are the most at risk if there are funding reductions, and what will be the impact in the next 5 to 10 years? 
30 

Mr. DODARO. We have already received a request from the Congress to look at the impact of sequesters on Federal departments 

and agencies, so we will be looking at that issue, including in terms 

of how they have prepared for this issue, because a lot depends on 

what kind of decisions that they have made in terms of what impact it is going to have, and once we complete that work, we would 

be happy to provide it to this Committee. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Fair enough. Dr. Coburn. 

Senator COBURN. You said $17 billion? 

Senator CARPER. I said $17 billion. I think I misspoke. It is $17 

million. 

Senator COBURN. General Dodaro, the DHS employee morale survey this year went down. Why do you think it did? 

Mr. DODARO. Well, I think there are two reasons. If you look at 

all the Federal departments and agencies, it went down, I mean, 

overall, with few exceptions. 

Senator COBURN. OK. 

Mr. DODARO. So I think it is part of the environment and the uncertainty associated with the environment. 

Beyond that, I am really not sure, and one of the things that we 

have recommended to the Department is that they do a root cause 

analysis to try to figure out what is driving the decrease in scores. 

Senator COBURN. It is a pretty depressing place up here, is it 

not? [Laughter.] 

Mr. DODARO. Well, this is a tough issue. I know from running the 

GAO, we have employee feedback surveys, too. Fortunately, we are 

one of the top-ranked ones, but we did not get there by accident. 

We worked on this over the years. It is very difficult to figure out 

what motivates people and what you really need to do to address 

their concerns. But you have to keep trying really hard to find out 

what some of the root causes are to be able to do that. We have 

made that recommendation to DHS. They have agreed to do that. 

And I think that will provide some insights as to the reasoning. 

You really have to study this. 

Senator COBURN. Yes. 

Mr. DODARO. If you leap to conclusions about things, you can actually make things worse. 

Senator COBURN. Yes, right. 

Secretary Lute, do you think it is any worse in DHS than it is 

anywhere else in the government? 

Ms. LUTE. I will not speak for anywhere else in the government, 

Dr. Coburn, but it is unacceptably low to me, certainly to the Secretary. I have been around a lot of workforces for a long time, and 

as Gene said, across the Federal Government, it is down. Across 

the country, the public mood ebbs and flows. There have been pay 

freezes. There have been other things going on. 

Senator COBURN. Tough times. 

Ms. LUTE. But there also have—I think—and this Committee has 

been very helpful in this regard and helping the American public 

understand that their red, white, and blue-collar workforce shows 

up to work for them every single day. And you do not run an organization with denigration and derogation and dismissiveness. You 

run it with purposefulness and pride. And you run it most effec-
31 

tively when you put that purpose and that pride in the hands of 

your workforce and you lift them up. Our job is to lift them up. 

So one of the things that I also know is that your front-line supervisor matters a lot to you. Do our front-line supervisors have 

the tools they need to do their job? We are trying to give them that 

with this emphasis on a leadership training program, and other 

things, as well. 

People want to show up. They want to connect to the meaning 

that brought them to public service. They want the tools they need 

to do their job. They want to add value and they want to feel valued. That is what we are going to do. 

Senator COBURN. Secretary Lute, let me ask you one last question. We will submit a lot of questions for the record, which we routinely do, and I appreciate you all being timely on the response. 

Homeland Security Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

(PSI) and my office did a study on urban area security initiatives 

this last year and published it, and we got a lot of blow-back, but 

it is $8 billion out of the $35 billion that you spent in the last few 

years on grants. And Senator Ayotte was here. New Hampshire 

spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on a BearCat for a pumpkin 

festival. What Senator Heitkamp said, it is pretty hard to explain 

to people why we are releasing people from detention who are undocumented aliens when we are spending two or three-hundredthousand on a piece of equipment that is going to rarely, if ever, 

be used for its original intended purpose. 

What level of specificity are you putting into the grant requirements? We are spending American taxpayers’ money to help them 

get prepared, and then they see all these areas where we are 

spending, whether it is snow cone machines or underwater robots 

for a city that does not have a lake or whatever it is? How are we 

changing that? 

Ms. LUTE. And I agree with you, Dr. Coburn. That has to change. 

In part, we are changing that through the identification from 

FEMA of the National Preparedness Goals. What do you need to 

be able to do? What capabilities are required for that, and how do 

you measure your performance going forward? 

Senator COBURN. And how much of it is the State and local responsibility? 

Ms. LUTE. It is. As you know, a great deal of it is. But also, this 

serves as guidelines for them as it further cascades down. 

In addition to that, we have written this financial assistance policy which now is comprehensive. It looks at requirements. It looks 

at grant writing. It looks at accountability. It looks at grant oversight over the course of time, disposition and ultimate reporting. 

We know we can do better on this and we are committed to doing 

it. And, again, the proof is in, not just writing the policy, but following through. 

Senator COBURN. All right. Thank you very much. Thank you all 

for being here. I appreciate your dedicated service. 

Chairman CARPER. As do I. 

Before we release you, I just want to mention a couple of things. 

One—I think Tom has heard me say this before—people say to me 

from time to time in Delaware and across the country, I do not 

mind paying taxes. Some people say, I do not even mind paying 
32 

more taxes. I just do not want you to waste my money. I just do 

not want you to waste our money. 

This Committee is dedicated, committed to—not just the two of 

us, but I think everybody on this Committee is determined to be 

a good partner, provide oversight, but be a good partner with you, 

both of you, the three of you, to making sure that we waste a whole 

lot less. Our goal is to be perfect, but the road to improvement is 

always under construction. I am encouraged that this road to improvement is under construction, for sure. We are making some 

progress. 

The other thing, on morale, it troubles me. I want people who 

work here with us on this Committee and our staffs, our colleagues, I want morale to be good. And one of the most interesting 

things I have heard lately about morale, what people like about 

their work, it is people like different things about their jobs. They 

like getting paid. They like having vacations. They like having benefits, pensions, so forth, health care. But what people most like 

about their work is that they feel that it is important and they feel 

like they are making progress. That is the most important thing. 

They feel the work, that their work is important, and they feel like 

they are making progress. 

Clearly, the work that you and the team that you and Secretary 

Napolitano do, the work you do is hugely important for our country. And not everybody knows this, but pretty soon it will be a secret no more. You are making progress. GAO, who we look to for 

enormous help on this, has verified that. Can more progress be 

made? Sure, it can. And I think with the attitude that you bring 

to it and the oversight we will provide and the help that hopefully 

we can provide, we will provide even more. 

We did not get into the issue in terms of management success 

and morale, as to whether or not it makes sense to try to put more 

resources behind consolidating your operations in one location. We 

did not talk at all about St. Elizabeths. We are going to have some 

follow-up questions. But I think that is an important issue and we 

are not doing a very good job. At this time of scarce resources, it 

is hard to come up with the money, but what we do come up with, 

it is important that you use it in a cost-effective way and help us 

in working with the appropriators to make sure that the dollars 

that are available for this are being put in the right place to help 

to better manage the Department, better do your work, and, really, 

in a sense, enhance morale. 

All right. Anything else, Tom? 

Senator COBURN. I do not think so. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Thank you all very much. 

And I want to say, I do not know, Ms. Berrick, if you could stay 

with us and sit through—just remain at the table and we will add 

another nameplate if you could remain with us, just to be—I do not 

know that we will call on you, but we may, and it would just be 

helpful if you could be here. 

Ms. BERRICK. Sure. 

Chairman CARPER. Secretary Lute—— 

Ms. LUTE. Yes, sir. 

Chairman CARPER. Good job. 

Mr. Dodaro, as always, thank you. 
33 

Mr. DODARO. Thank you. [Pause.] 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Welcome. It is great to see all of 

you and have you join us at this witness table. You are not strangers to us and we are mindful of your years of service to our country, and your continued service. I am going to provide brief introductions and then we will turn you loose to testify and then respond to our questions. 

Our first witness on this panel is Elaine Duke. Ms. Duke had a 

28-year career with the Federal Government culminating in 2008 

with her nomination by President Bush and Senate confirmation to 

be the Department of Homeland Security’s Under Secretary for 

Management. She is the principal of Elaine Duke and Associates 

and provides acquisition and business consulting services. Welcome. In addition, I understand that you are an Adjunct Professor 

of Acquisition for American University and a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute. 

Again, we are grateful for all your service and very grateful that 

you can be here today. 

Our second witness is Richard Skinner. After 42 years of Federal 

service, having started at the age of 12, Mr. Skinner retired in 

early 2011. He was the first Senate-confirmed Inspector General of 

the Department of Homeland Security. Prior to his July 28, 2005, 

confirmation, he held the position of Deputy Inspector General 

starting on March 1, 2003, the date the Department was created. 

Prior to his arrival at DHS, Mr. Skinner was with the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, where he served as the Acting Inspector General and Deputy Inspector General. In 1998, he received the President’s Meritorious Executive Rank Award for sustained superior accomplishment in the management of programs of 

the U.S. Government and for noteworthy achievement of quality 

and efficiency in the public service. That is a high honor. 

Our third witness is Shawn Reese, Analyst of Homeland Security 

Policy at the Congressional Research Service. Mr. Reese has written numerous reports to Congress on Federal, State, and local 

homeland security policy issues. He has testified numerous times 

on homeland security and counterterrorism issues before House 

Committees. Mr. Reese is a 2011 graduate of the Department of 

Defense’s National War College and a former U.S. Army officer. We 

are happy to welcome you. Thanks for joining us. 

And, Cathleen, thank you for sticking around. 

Ms. Duke, you are recognized. Your full statement will be made 

part of the record. You are welcome to summarize it. I will ask you 

to try to stick close to 5 minutes, if you could. If you go a little bit 

over, that is OK. If you go way over, I will have to rein you in. All 

right. Thanks. Please proceed. 
34 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Duke appears in the Appendix on page 113. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. ELAINE C. DUKE,1 FORMER UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. DUKE. Thank you, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member 

Coburn, and Members of the Committee. I am very pleased to be 

here today. Management integration at DHS and the GAO highrisk list was important to me when I was at the Department and 

it continues to be of importance to me even after I have retired 

from Federal service. 

I would like to talk about three phases of DHS management integration briefly, the past, present, and future. 

In the past, first, we went through what I will call a building 

block stage. Some have the misperception that DHS was actually 

kind of formed as a blank slate, but really, it came together as 22 

different agencies with many disparate and different systems, cultures, missions, all united by legislation. And each of the agencies 

brought with it both the good and the challenges of the legacy 

agencies. And so in bringing them together and achieving management integration, we had to start first by undoing to bring together 

in a more effective manner. 

For example, when DHS was formed, about 90 percent of the 

major programs, and those are over a billion dollars in acquisition 

costs, were not run by a program manager with the skills and experience to run it. Now—and one of the building blocks we put in 

place was to develop a certification program for program managers 

and other acquisition professionals to appropriately run this program. And as a result of that initial building block, now, over 75 

percent of the major programs are currently run by a program 

manager. 

Now, I will briefly address some of the present initiatives to further enhance management integration, and these focus a lot on integrating some of the building blocks that were put together in the 

first 3 to 5 years of the Department. It has expanded and it is preparing to expand the Acquisition Certification Program to the other 

career fields that are critical for success, most notably cost estimating, logistics, test and evaluation. 

It has put in place Component Acquisition Executives (CAE). It 

is a position, but it is key to continued accountability and authority 

of driving good acquisition throughout the operating components. 

And it has also raised the level of acquisition oversight to direct report to the Under Secretary for Management, Mr. Rafael Borras, 

in the Program Accountability and Risk Management Office 

(PARM). 

DHS has made significant accomplishments toward management 

integration. It has strengthened the authorities of the six business 

chiefs, which was critical in driving integration through DHS. And 

it has strengthened the functional integration between those chiefs 

and the operating components. It has chartered two federally funded research and development centers to assist in driving these objectives through DHS, the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis 

Institute and MITRE. 
35 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Skinner appears in the Appendix on page 119. 

As a result of the continued efforts of DHS leadership and management personnel, we are beginning in the Department to show 

sustained and demonstrated improvements. It first started at the 

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) as the Blueprint for Acquisition Reform. 

DHS has applied the best acquisition practices throughout the Department. It has taken back systems integration responsibilities in 

key programs such as Coast Guard Deepwater and CBP SBInet. It 

has used the acquisition review process to redirect programs that 

are breaching cost, schedule and performance measurements. It 

has made significant improvements on its financial audits, as was 

discussed in the first panel. Another example is the consolidation 

of data centers, closing 18 already with six more slotted for closure 

this fiscal year. 

Finally, I will give my recommendations for the future. DHS has 

developed an Integrated Investment Life Cycle Model (IILCM), and 

this model is critical and ideal for the next phase of management 

integration. It does two important things. First, it develops much 

needed management structure around policy and joint requirements. Second, it seeks to integrate and flow the decisionmaking 

of the various building blocks that were put in place in the first 

10 years of the Department of Homeland Security. The integration 

of policy, joint capabilities and requirements, resources and acquisition under the Integrated Investment Life Cycle Model is critical 

for the continued maturation and integration of DHS management. 

I believe there are several key things that DHS, GAO, supported 

by this Committee and other Committees of Congress, must do to 

support DHS in its continued seek for management integration: focusing on effectiveness and efficiency, continuing to form the capital and resources necessary for the integration, supporting the 

IILCM, and appropriately recognizing the employees that have continued to make the results that have been accomplished to date, as 

Deputy Secretary Lute talked about a little earlier. We must not 

underestimate the recognition of these outside parties. 

I am looking forward to answering your questions this morning 

as we proceed with this panel. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. Thank you, Ms. Duke. 

Mr. Skinner, please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. RICHARD L. SKINNER,1 FORMER INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. SKINNER. Good morning. I believe it is still morning. [Laughter.] 

Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Coburn, it is truly an honor 

to be here today and I appreciate this opportunity. 

The Department’s management support function was, when I 

was the IG, and you said earlier, one of the major problems when 

the Department first came together. It had to dig itself out of a 

hole. It inherited billions and billions of dollars’ worth of programs, 

all with material weaknesses and inherent weaknesses. Yet, the 

management support staff that was transferred to the Department 

was not sufficient to support those programs. They have been 

digging themselves out of a hole for years. 
36 

Management support, and it has been repeated all morning, is in 

fact, the platform on which all of the DHS programs and operations 

are built, and they are critical to the success of the Homeland Security mission. And if the Homeland Security programs are in fact 

weak, so in turn, will be the programs which they are supporting. 

Elaine and others have already hit on this, but I think it is really 

important to understand that when the Department was stood up, 

that this was one of the largest reorganizations in the past 50, 60 

years, since DOD. That, in and of itself, created problems. And the 

fact that the environment in which we were living in those days, 

right after 9/11, also I think, contributed to this oversight. Everyone was mission focused, not management support focused. And as 

a result, I think that has delayed the building of the management 

support operations that we are still grappling with today. 

The Department, and this goes back to all three Secretaries, 

Ridge, Chertoff, and now Napolitano, all recognized this as important. But I think the real progress that we are starting to see has 

occurred in the past 5 to 6 years, and it is moving at a snail’s pace, 

but it is moving. The barometer is going up, and I think that is 

a very healthy indication of where the Department is headed. 

Financial management, everyone has talked about that and everyone is very proud of the fact that DHS has received a qualified 

opinion on the balance sheet for fiscal year 2011 and reduced its 

material weaknesses. I would like to emphasize that obtaining an 

auditable financial statement is not the end goal. That is just one 

of the benefits that you receive from having a good, sound financial 

management system. 

The Department right now is operating—their systems are being 

operated with band-aids. In order to get that clean opinion, it takes 

a Herculean effort by staff burning midnight oil, and it is going to 

do that year-in and year-out until it modernizes its financial management systems. Yes, it can tell you where it is at a point in time, 

September 30, but can it tell you where it is at on a daily basis? 

That is what a good financial management system should be doing. 

We still need to invest in modernizing DHS’ financial management 

system. 

The other area is information technology. That continues to be 

one of the Department’s biggest challenges, in my opinion. We have 

to keep in mind, DHS inherited over 2,000 IT systems back in 

2003. I think they have reduced that down to well below 700. It 

took almost 2 years just to inventory the IT systems. When we did 

that, when the Department accomplished that, finished their inventory, we found that the systems were archaic, stovepiped, unreliable, and many simply had no real value. Things are starting to 

change now. Things are starting to meld. But DHS is still in a very 

delicate stage, early stage of creating a good integrated IT system. 

Acquisition management, this is the one area, and it is the one 

area everyone has been harping on for a long time and everyone 

has been highly critical of it, but during my tenure there and my 

observations over the last 2 years, it is the one area, in my opinion, 

that has improved the most, thanks in large part to my co-panelist 

right here, Elaine Duke, and the leadership that they have given 

to acquisition management. If you could understand how bad 

things were in 2003, I think we would appreciate how good things 
37 

are today. As bad as they are, it is improving. We must stay on 

that task. 

And finally, grants management. That is something else that 

concerns me and continues to concern me as a citizen because of 

the waste that we are experiencing. I looked at the IG’s semi-annual report, or the past two semi-annual reports. The OIG conducted about 50 audits and identified well over $300 million in 

questioned costs. That is just unacceptable. There is something inherently wrong. We need to correct that. 

The other thing that bothers me, always, when I was the IG and 

when I was with FEMA, is our inability to measure the impact 

those grant funds are having on our Nation’s security. It is something, I think, that needs to be addressed. We need to do a better 

job of monitoring. We need to do a better job of measuring our performance. 

In conclusion, I would just like to say that 10 years after its creation, the Department has in place the strongest management 

team imaginable. The Under Secretary for Management, the Chief 

Information Officer (CIO), the CFO, the Chief Procurement Officer 

(CPO), all have proven they possess the knowledge and skills to get 

the job done. Moreover, they have the support of the Secretary and 

Deputy Secretary. However, if DHS is going to progress, it is very 

important, I believe, that the Congress continue to support these 

initiatives. They are fragile—not only because they are in the early 

developmental stages, but because in today’s budget environment. 

I understand that the first place you want to cut is the management support, not your operational or your mission objectives. We 

will be penny wise and pound foolish if we do not continue to invest 

in DHS’ management support functions. We will be talking about 

this 5 years from now, 10 years from now, if we turn our back on 

the progress that has already been made. 

I realize my time is up. I am sorry. I will be happy to answer 

any questions, Mr. Chairman, that you or Senator Coburn may 

have. 

Chairman CARPER. He will be right back. 

A lot of wisdom in what both of our first two witnesses have said, 

especially what you said there at the end. We have passed in the 

Senate and we expect the House to adopt today a budget resolution 

that carries through the end of September, for the next 6 months. 

It reduces for the balance of this year, I think, the management 

function at DHS by about $16 million. And that is not good. We 

know that. We know that is not good. As you said earlier, there are 

some choices that need to be made. 

We have the opportunity to take up today, tomorrow, maybe over 

the weekend, a budget resolution for the next 10 years and we will 

have an opportunity to revisit this particular issue, the kind of resources that we are putting toward the management function of 

DHS. My hope is that we will do a better job and maybe have some 

more resources and maybe be able to make some smarter decisions 

than we did in this instance. 

But having said that, let me just yield to our third witness, 

Shawn Reese. Mr. Reese, we welcome you. Thank you. 
38 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Reese appears in the Appendix on page 127. 

TESTIMONY OF SHAWN REESE,1 ANALYST IN EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

Mr. REESE. Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Coburn, Members of the Committee, on behalf of the Congressional Research 

Service, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

When I wrote my report, the first edition, a year ago, I had no 

idea that it would be getting as much attention as it has in the 

past year, so I am glad to see that my work for Congress is paying 

off. 

I will discuss the absence of a national comprehensive homeland 

security concept and the lack of homeland security mission priorities, not just within the Department, but nationally as a whole, 

and how these issues may affect DHS’s integration and management of its missions. 

Arguably, a comprehensive homeland security concept that 

prioritizes national homeland security missions is needed. This is 

more than an issue of what words describe homeland security. It 

is instead an issue of how policymakers understand or comprehend 

what homeland security is and how it is accomplished. 

My written statement addresses this in detail and discusses the 

absence of both a standard homeland security concept and a single 

national homeland security strategy. I will now briefly discuss 

these issues. 

In the past 10 years, Congress has appropriated approximately 

$710 billion for the Nation’s homeland security. That includes entities, not just the Department of Homeland Security, and that is 

based on OMB’s estimate. However, homeland security missions 

are not funded across the board using clearly defined national riskbased priorities. Funding allocations are most effective when priorities are set, clearly defined, and well understood. 

In August 2007, Congress required the DHS Secretary to conduct 

a Quadrennial Review of Homeland Security with the enactment of 

implementing the 9/11 Commission’s Recommendations Act. This 

review was to be a comprehensive examination of the Nation’s 

homeland security strategy, including recommendations regarding 

long-term strategy and the Nation’s priorities and guidance on the 

programs, assets, capabilities, budgets, policies, and authorities of 

the Department. The 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 

(QHSR) was criticized for not meeting these requirements. Given 

that DHS is in the midst of developing their 2014 Quadrennial Review, now might be an ideal time to review the concept of homeland security, its definition, and how that concept and definition affect DHS appropriations and the identification of priorities. 

Obviously, the concept of homeland security is evolving and national DHS-specific homeland security missions are being funded. 

However, the manner in which future Homeland Security appropriations will be allocated is still a point of potential contention if 

there continues to be no comprehensive concept or list of national 

homeland security priorities. 
39 

Policy makers continue to debate and consider the evolving concept of homeland security. Today, DHS has issued several missionspecific strategies, such as the National Response Framework. 

There has not been a distinct National Homeland Security Strategy 

since 2007. It may even be argued that the concept of homeland security as a separate policy area from national security is waning. 

Evidence for this may be found in the current Administration’s 

combining of the national and Homeland Security staffs and the inclusion of Homeland Security guidance in the 2010 National Security Strategy. 

Finally, OMB has questioned the value of requiring Federal departments and agencies to identify homeland security funding with 

their 2014 budget requests. 

To specifically address the issues of funding national and DHS 

homeland security missions in DHS management, Congress may 

wish to consider three options. First, Congress could require either 

DHS or the combined national and Homeland Security staff to develop and issue a distinct homeland security strategy. That would 

prioritize missions. 

Second, Congress could require refinement of national security 

strategy that would include not only national guidance on homeland security policy, but also include a prioritization of national 

homeland security missions. 

Finally, Congress may focus strictly on DHS’s forthcoming Quadrennial Review and ensure that DHS prioritizes its homeland security responsibilities. 

In closing, it is important to note that Congress does appropriate 

funding for DHS missions. However, there is no single, comprehensive concept of homeland security and no single national homeland 

security strategy at this time. This may hamper the effectiveness 

of congressional authorizations, appropriation, and oversight functions. It may also hamper or restrict DHS and other Federal entities’ ability to successfully execute homeland security missions. 

I will conclude my testimony here. Once again, thank you for the 

privilege to appear before you. 

Chairman CARPER. Thank you. Thanks for the time and energy 

you have put into this and for being with us today. 

I want us to start off by asking each of you here for the—I think 

each of you were here for the testimony of the first panel, is that 

correct? 

Ms. DUKE. Yes. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. And you heard what they had to 

say, and questions and answers and back and forth. Just reflect on 

what you heard. Maybe you think you should underline or emphasize something for us or you might want to question something, but 

just react to the first panel, what was said. 

Mr. SKINNER. First, I think the first panel was on target and I 

agree, particularly with the Comptroller General Gene Dodaro, 

with regards to what is important. Acquisition management is very 

important. Over 40 percent of DHS’s budget is being spent on contracts every year. I believe that will probably continue because it 

has to rely on the private sector and the technology that they can 

bring to the table in supporting DHS. 
40 

DHS is going to continue to be wasteful if it does not have a 

strong acquisition management strategy in place that not only uses 

knowledge-based programs and theories, but also that holds people 

accountable, and that is, I think, the two things that were missing 

in the first panel, is accountability and transparency. We need to 

be able to show people on a real-time basis where our money is 

going. We cannot do that now with the financial management systems that we have in place. We can do it once a year, but we cannot do it on a continuing basis. 

The other thing that I heard today, especially from Deputy Secretary Lute, was the commitment and dedication to improving the 

department’s management support functions. And I truly believe 

there is a dedication and a commitment there to move forward, to 

move that meter forward. To stop pedaling right now, we are just 

going to fall over. They need support. They need oversight. And 

that can come from Congress. And I think it is very important that 

Congress stay on top of not just the mission-related functions, but 

also DHS’ management support functions and to support them. 

Now, I understand the budget situation, we all do, that we are 

facing today. It is going to take longer. We cannot do it all. Everyone expects it to be done tomorrow. It is not going to be done tomorrow. DHS needs to develop a strategic plan that clearly sets 

forth where it is going to be this time next year, where it is going 

to be 3 years from now. 

One of the things that distressed me this morning was the focus 

on having an auditable financial statement 3 years from now. That 

is fine, but that does not mean it will have a good financial management system, and that is what concerns me. The focus on obtaining a clean opinion now is the end game. Victory will be declared if it can get auditable financial statements. DHS should not 

stop there. IT should be focusing on improving its financial management capabilities, and as a result, it will get auditable financial 

statements. 

Chairman CARPER. Good. I think they understand that. I think 

Secretary Lute understands that. It is an excellent point. It is actually just some good advice for us as well as for the folks who are 

sitting at the table today. Thanks. 

Ms. Duke, please. 

Ms. DUKE. I would like to first of all, reiterate what Deputy Secretary Lute said at the end of her statement about the value of the 

employees. It seems to be a little in vogue right now to really criticize Federal employees—— 

Chairman CARPER. Not just right now. It has happened too often. 

Few things make me less happy than when I hear people describing Federal employees, or State employees, or local employees, as 

nameless, faceless bureaucrats. It demeans them. It demeans the 

importance of them as human beings and the work that they are 

doing. I find it very troubling. 

Ms. DUKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You made my point better 

than I would, so I will go on to No. 2. 

Sometimes we talk about management and mission as if they are 

two separate things, and mission is nothing more than the foundation enabler of mission, and we cannot deal with the two of them 

separately. And so I think it is important as we move forward, es-
41 

pecially as we are in this fiscally constrained environment, to not 

talk about them separately, because management delivers the people, the resources, the budget to deliver a mission and you cannot 

separate the two. 

And the last thing I would like to point out is we really are driving toward a strategy. DHS is looking at management integration 

in a very strategic way. But it is important, I think, as we go along 

the way to not just measure the utopic State, the end State, but 

to measure tactical measures as we move along. What specifically 

are we doing to bring us toward that end goal? And I think that 

it is going to be important now to make sure we do take some of 

those tactical steps and not stop. And some of the innovations do 

require investments in capital investments to go forward, and I 

think we should be thinking collectively of how we can innovate to 

keep those going. 

One of the ideas that we might want to consider is a share-insavings type approach, which is where industry provides an infusion of capital and the Federal Government does not have to fund 

investment so that we can continue to move some of these management initiatives forward, like data center consolidation, like information sharing, like DHS headquarters. 

Chairman CARPER. Thank you. 

Mr. Reese, just very briefly respond, if you would. Any, just, 

quick reactions to what you heard from the first panel? 

Mr. REESE. Sir, just I think that DHS has very much identified 

what its missions operationally are and it has identified the goals 

within each of those missions, and that is the word ‘‘operation’’ 

used so much this morning, I think that is—— 

Chairman CARPER. Excellent. Thank you for saying that. 

A quick point, if I could, for Mr. Skinner. I believe you are the 

first Senate-confirmed Inspector General at the Department of 

Homeland Security, if I am not mistaken. That is right, is it not? 

Mr. SKINNER. That is correct. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Senator Coburn and I have been joined 

by every Member of this Committee in sending a letter to the 

President last month saying, Mr. President, there are about six or 

so departments that do not have a permanent, confirmed Inspector 

General. We have an obligation, I think. The President has an obligation to nominate, to vet, ensure that they vet good people, whether it is for IGs or cabinet secretaries or under cabinet secretaries. 

The Senate has an obligation to, in a timely way, make sure that 

those folks are well qualified and move those nominations. We are 

not doing our job. In fact, we have not done our job well there for 

a number of years. 

Talk to us just very briefly, and I will yield to Dr. Coburn, why 

is it important to have, in those half-dozen or so Federal agencies, 

why is it important to have Inspector Generals that are confirmed 

by the Senate? Nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate? Why is it important? 

Mr. SKINNER. I think it is extremely important, and I think we 

are seeing the results of not having the Senate-confirmed Inspector 

Generals in place right now across the board, not only at DHS but 

in other agencies. 

One, I think it has an impact on staff morale. 
42 

Two, I think that serving in an acting capacity, you are not going 

to move the agency forward. I think oversight is extremely important, particularly in an organization such as DHS, but across the 

government, and it provides accountability. It helps provide transparency. It helps put funds to better use. And it helps identify 

where funds are being wasted or fraudulently spent. 

By having acting people in place, what you are doing is running 

in place. You are not moving the organization forward, and you are 

not taking those steps necessary, as a confirmed IG would, to provide the independent oversight, I think, that is absolutely critical 

to the success of any organization. 

Chairman CARPER. Good. Thank you for those comments. Dr. 

Coburn. 

Senator COBURN. Sitting and thinking about our hearing today, 

the one word I had not heard, which should have been in 

everybody’s testimony, is ‘‘risk-based.’’ I mean, Homeland Security 

has to be about where the risks are. Now, we did not hear it from 

the GAO and we did not hear it from Secretary Lute. And what we 

have seen, and Tom will disagree with this to a certain extent, but 

most of the grant programs come out of here as a honey pot based 

on parochial preference rather than risk. Some of them, we divide. 

Fifty percent of it goes to risk-based. But everybody else gets their 

cut and share. 

How important is it, that Homeland Security ought to be about 

risk? Everything ought to be about risk. Where are the risks? 

Where do we impact the risks? Where do we intercede in the risk? 

And how do we put resources where the greatest risk is? What are 

your thoughts about that? 

Ms. DUKE. I agree with you, Dr. Coburn. I think DHS’s recent 

move to move their Risk Office into the Office of Policy was critical, 

and I think that, in theory, that is to drive risk into the policymaking, and I think that is critical to going forward. 

I also think that some of the moves on, for instance, securing the 

border and transportation security and doing a risk-based multilayer threat look is critical in moving forward, from both a mission 

effectiveness and an efficiency standpoint. And I think the Department is starting to take looks at that and needs to move quite a 

bit forward. And, hopefully, the second QHSR is another opportunity, a point in time, where that can be emphasized even more. 

Mr. SKINNER. Maybe the term ‘‘risk’’ was not used in explicit 

terms, but I think it was implied, particularly with Deputy Secretary Lute and the way they are approaching their strategic plans. 

Yes. It is risk-based. And you see this in all of their programs. In 

our grant programs, instead of just sending out money across the 

board, we should be establishing standards for the recipients and 

the applicants for these funds. Identify your risk, identify your 

vulnerabilities, and identify your capabilities to address those 

risks? We are unable to do that right now, and I think we could 

do a much better job in guiding billions of dollars that we will probably continue to spend to support State and local governments’ preparedness capabilities. Where are our risks? 

Mr. REESE. I would just take a quick look, and I would think also 

the gap exists between how the Federal Government as a whole 

looks at risk-based in homeland security and the nexus of where 
43 

that mix is with national security, because the Department understands its missions, but those are missions that have either been 

inherent because of the organization or how the Department has 

developed since then, and risk-based evaluation, I am sure, goes 

into that. But I think we still have an imbalance, or there is a 

missing component between how we look at national homeland security risk and how we address it and what the Department does. 

Senator COBURN. Ms. Berrick. 

Ms. BERRICK. If I could just add, Senator, risk-based decisionmaking and incorporating risk into planning, programming, and 

budgeting has been a key theme of GAO’s work. In fact, the 1,300 

reports I talked about that GAO has issued on DHS’s programs 

and operations, the need for DHS to better incorporate risk into its 

decisionmaking, both at a strategic and a tactical level, really was 

a key theme throughout all of our work, right. 

And at the tactical level, for example, talking about the QHSR, 

DHS did not apply risk in prioritizing what its QHSR priorities 

were. At a more tactical level, just to give you an example, for a 

program, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) 

program, which I know you are very interested in, we recently testified that in identifying which facilities should be in the higherrisk tier, DHS did not consider all elements of risk in making that 

decision. They were not considering all elements of threat, consequence, or vulnerability. 

So it is extremely important, securing the border, aviation security, across DHS’s range of missions, I think, overall, they have 

made the most progress in assessing risk. I think where they need 

to go is to build in—— 

Senator COBURN. The application of that assessment. 

Ms. BERRICK [continuing]. The application of the risk. 

Senator COBURN. Yes. Do not get me started on CFATS. So far, 

we have not accomplished much. 

I am going to have questions for each of you. I would appreciate 

very much if you would be prompt in the response. 

I would also note—my Chairman is not in here—that we have 

had key Homeland Security people and hearings in this Committee 

already at a level far faster than what we have seen in the past 

and we intend on continuing to do that. Learning from people who 

testify before us and critical management personnel in the government is what our job is. It is about oversight, asking the right 

questions, learning the right things, holding people accountable, 

just like we are talking about in DHS, having accountable results 

for a management plan. 

So I am proud that Senator Carper has held this hearing and the 

others that we have held and the hundreds that we are going to 

hold over the next couple of years. I appreciate you being here, and 

you will get the Questions for the Record (QFRs) from us in due 

time. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. As Dr. Coburn says, I just do not hold hearings. We hold them. We try to work together to put together ideas 

for hearings. This was really his idea, this kind of top-to-bottom review, and I think it is a good idea and this has been a very good 

hearing. We appreciate your being here. 
44 

Cathleen, you were good enough to stay overtime. Anything else 

you want to add? We will give you the last word, if you want it. 

Is there anything else you want to say? 

Ms. BERRICK. Just that it is my pleasure being here and GAO 

looks forward to supporting the Committee on its future oversight 

efforts. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. Dr. Coburn had asked Jane Lute to have 

somebody stay from her team and I think we have somebody right 

behind Mr. Skinner waving his hand, and we thank you for being 

here. Please convey to her the relevant things that you heard here. 

The last thing I will say is this: on this management issue which 

we are really focused on today, somebody said, penny wise and 

pound foolish, and I really think that what we are doing with our 

short-term CR is that. 

I would like to say, leadership is key for any organization I have 

ever been a part of. I do not care if it was the military. I do not 

care if it was educational. I do not care if it was government or 

business. Leadership is the key to everything. And we have good 

leadership in this Department. Now we need to make sure they 

have the tools to build on the good track record that has been laid 

over the last 10 years, especially the last 5 years. 

You have helped us in your testimony today. You have helped us 

a whole lot in what you have done with your life before today. And 

I leave encouraged that—I am mixing metaphors here, but in 

terms of changing the course of the aircraft carrier, you can stay 

with it. You can turn an aircraft carrier. And I think we are turning this aircraft carrier in very good ways. We have a shared responsibility to make sure we continue to make progress. Dr. 

Coburn and I are determined that we are going to do what we can 

from our perches and my hope and expectation is everyone on this 

panel and the one that preceded it will do the same. 

Thank you all. And with that, this hearing is adjourned. But before I do that, the hearing record will remain open for 15 days, 

until April 5, for the submission of statements and questions for 

the record. If you are asked questions, which you probably will be, 

if you would respond to those in a timely way, we would be most 

grateful. 

Thank you so much. That is it. 

[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 
(45) 

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(265) 

HARNESSING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO 

PROTECT NATIONAL SECURITY AND 

ENHANCE GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 17, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R. Carper, 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Carper, Pryor, McCaskill, and Coburn. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CARPER 

Chairman CARPER. Good morning, everyone. The hearing will 

come to order. 

Welcome, one and all. Secretary O’Toole, Mr. Maurer, happy to 

see you. Is there a baseball player in the American league, a catcher named Maurer? 

Mr. MAURER. Yes, there is, although he spells his last name incorrectly. 

Chairman CARPER. Yes. 

Mr. MAURER. He drops that first ‘‘r.’’ 

Chairman CARPER. Yes, he only has one ‘‘r.’’ [Laughter.] 

Even without that second ‘‘r,’’ he still is a great player. 

Mr. MAURER. Oh, he is an amazing ballplayer, absolutely. 

Chairman CARPER. Yes. What was the final score last night of 

the All-Star Game, do you have any idea? 

Mr. MAURER. It was three-nothing. 

Chairman CARPER. Was it National League or American League? 

Mr. MAURER. American League. 

Chairman CARPER. I thought it was the American. I was in a 

meeting this morning—I am an American League fan, a huge Tigers fan, and the Tigers had about six players last night plus the 

manager—and I think Rivera, the Yankees pitcher, was on the 

front page of the New York Times and won Most Valuable Player 

(MVP) at the age of 42, I think. Pretty amazing. It said under the 

picture—great picture of him coming out and taking the curtain 

call—that the American League won, three-to-nothing. 

And I went to a meeting this morning and I was very proud as 

an American League fan to tell everybody how we had won, and 

even though a Yankee—I am not a big Yankees fan—had been the 

MVP, what a good night it was for baseball and for folks on our 
266 

side of the aisle. And everybody said, no, the National League won. 

So thank you. [Laughter.] 

Thank you for setting the record straight. We worry here about 

nuclear options and trying to make sure the place does not have 

a meltdown, but the really important stuff is going on in baseball 

stadiums around the country, including guys named Mauer. So we 

welcome both of you. 

On a more serious note, earlier this year, as we all know, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) turned 10 years old, not a 

baby anymore, not a toddler, not an infant, but a young strapping 

10-year-old. To mark that anniversary, Dr. Coburn, and I announced that this Committee would hold a series of hearings examining whether the Department of Homeland Security is effectively 

and efficiently accomplishing its core missions. 

Today’s hearing is the second in a series. Actually, it is, I think, 

more than the second in a series, but it is one of a series of hearings that is going to focus on the role of the Science and Technology 

(S&T) Directorate. 

The threats, as we all know, to our national security evolve constantly. So, too, then, must the strategies and technologies we use 

to combat them. 

I am an old Navy guy, about 23 years as a Naval Flight Officer 

(NFO), and I have often said, as have others before me, that the 

military are pretty good at fighting the last war. We are not as 

good at anticipating what the next one is. That is where the 

Science and Technology Directorate comes in, to help us to fight 

the next war and the next. The threat that we face today is a 

whole lot different than the one we faced when I was on active 

duty as a Reserve Naval Flight Officer. 

The work performed by the men and women at the Directorate 

cut across all the various components and missions of the Department, and that work involves the harnessing of cutting-edge technology and research and development (R&D) projects from the private sector, from universities, national labs, to deploy what I call 

force multipliers that can make us more effective in the effort we 

have embarked on after September 11, 2001, to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks and natural disasters. 

In essence, the Science and Technology Directorate functions as 

a problem solver when it is at its best. For example, the Science 

and Technology Directorate works closely with the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) and the Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA), to develop a better x-ray system for 

checked baggage. As a result of that work, a 10-percent reduction 

in false alarms rate is expected. This is projected to save millions 

of dollars in efficiencies each year through the reallocation of staffing costs. 

As another example, the Directorate examined agent operations 

at two stations along the Southwestern border in Texas that processed, and apprehended illegal immigrants. They recommended improvements to their operations that enable the two border stations 

to significantly reduce their processing time, saving up to 2 hours 

per illegal immigrant processed. This enabled an additional officer 

to remain in the field rather than be stuck in the office processing 

paperwork. 
267 

In its early days, the Directorate was the subject of criticism as 

it carved out its own role in the Department. It focused, then, on 

basic research, which in some instances could not be quickly put 

to use. Today, we are told that the Directorate has proven itself to 

be more effective, more often than it has been at least in the past, 

and it has a laser focus on development of critically needed products that can be used immediately. 

As we all know, the fiscal environment in our Federal Government has been very challenging over the past couple of years, and 

this underscores the urgent need for agencies across government to 

spend our taxpayer dollars more wisely. The Science and Technology Directorate can and has been a key part of the Department 

of Homeland Security’s efforts in that regard. It is critical that it 

continue, that this Directorate continue to work aggressively and 

effectively with the components of the Department and with first 

responders to find solutions that allow the Department of Homeland Security and its partners across the country to operate more 

effectively and more efficiently. 

We thank the witnesses for coming today. We look forward to 

your testimony, especially about how we can continue to use the 

Science and Technology Directorate to get better results for less 

money. That is the recurring theme of this Committee and the 

oversight work that we do. It is something that I am determined 

to use my Chairmanship of this Committee, in partnership with 

Dr. Coburn and our colleagues here, to push throughout our Federal Government. 

And when Dr. Coburn arrives—we have a vote underway and I 

got there right at the beginning of the vote. He is probably voting 

and will come here and join us shortly, and when he does, he is 

welcome to make any comments that he wishes to do at that time. 

And with that having been done, let me just briefly introduce our 

witnesses. This is a small panel, so I will be fairly brief. 

Our first witness is Dr. Tara O’Toole, Under Secretary for 

Science and Technology at the Department of Homeland Security 

since November 2009. Prior to this appointment, Dr. O’Toole served 

as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Director of the Center for 

Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center and was 

a Professor of Medicine and Public Health at the University—are 

they the Panthers? University of Pittsburgh Panthers. You did not 

go to school there. You were not a Panther in college, were you? 

Where did you go to school? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I went to Vassar College. 

Chairman CARPER. Vassar, OK. There we go. All right. 

In addition, Dr. O’Toole previously served as Assistant Secretary 

of Energy for Environment, Safety, and Health at the Department 

of Energy (DOE). When did you serve in that capacity? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Ninety-three to 1997. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. We thank you for joining us today and 

for your leadership at the Department. We look forward to your 

testimony. 

Our next witness is Mr. David Maurer, Director of the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s (GAOs) Homeland Security and 

Justice Team. Mr. Maurer began his career with the Government 

Accountability Office in the 1990s and worked in several key areas, 
268 

1The prepared statement of Ms. O’Toole appears in the Appendix on page 309. 

such as GAO’s International Affairs and Trade Team, where he led 

the review of the United States’ effort to combat several international issues, including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. 

We thank you for joining us, Mr. Maurer. We really thank our 

friends at GAO, great partners with us, and we relish our partnership and hope we can continue to have it for a long time. 

Your full statements will be made part of the record. You are 

welcome to abbreviate if you like. Sometimes we say, use our 

guidelines. It should be about a 5-minute statement. If you go a little bit beyond that, that is OK. If you go way beyond that, we will 

have to rein you in, all right. If it is noon and you are still giving 

your opening statement, that is probably too long. [Laughter.] 

Welcome. We are glad you are all here. Please proceed. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Shall I go first, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman CARPER. We had a flip of the coin earlier and you 

lost—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I won? 

Chairman CARPER [continuing]. So you get to go first. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. TARA J. O’TOOLE, M.D.,1 MPH, UNDER 

SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Dr. O’TOOLE. OK. Well, first of all, thank you very much for this 

opportunity to talk about the Directorate of Science and Technology 

in the Department of Homeland Security and where we have come 

from and what we are doing now and how we make the operational 

missions of Homeland Security and the work of first responders 

more effective, more efficient, and safer. 

What I am going to do is give a very brief history of the Department and then talk about how we do our work today and illustrate 

that work with a few examples of projects that we have engaged 

in. 

From the beginning in 2003, Congress charged S&T with very 

broad and ambitious responsibilities for conducting R&D, for overseeing testing and evaluation of DHS missions in the first responder community. The Directorate is also responsible for assessing biological, chemical, and emerging threats to the United States 

and with operation of five National Laboratories. S&T also manages nine university-based Centers of Excellence (COEs), which collectively represent consortia of over 275—— 

Chairman CARPER. Let me just interrupt. I said earlier roughly 

5 minutes for your opening statement. Feel free to go as long as 

10 minutes, OK. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Thank you very much. 

So, nine COEs, 275 colleges. We also have international agreements with 13 countries bilaterally, and all of this greatly augments our ability to engage out into the dynamic global R&D community. 

Senator. Shall I pause and let Senator Coburn make his remarks? 

Senator COBURN. I do not have any remarks. 
269 

Dr. O’TOOLE. OK. 

Chairman CARPER. Yes, he does. [Laughter.] 

And we will hear them later, I hope. All right. Please proceed. 

Thanks. Welcome, Tom. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. The first Under Secretary of Science and Technology, Dr. Charles McQueary, undertook the heroic task of standing up the Directorate even as the Department itself was getting 

underway. When he began, S&T was housed in another government building where meetings were held in the cafeteria and staff 

had to share chairs. 

Understandably, the R&D efforts of that era were less connected 

to the immediate operational needs of the Department, which was 

just getting underway, than is the case today, and there was a 

much stronger emphasis on basic scientific research. 

The second Under Secretary, Admiral James Cohen, did the 

country a great service by emphasizing the importance of linking 

S&T’s research more directly to the customers, that is, the DHS 

operational components and first responders, and he moved the Directorate toward more applied research. 

As you said, I became Under Secretary in November 2009. Although only 6 years had passed since Congress created the Department and the Directorate, it was clear very quickly that the Homeland Security missions confront a constantly evolving landscape of 

adaptive adversaries, evolving threats, critical infrastructure 

vulnerabilities, and growing operational challenges. 

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought us Improvised 

Explosive Devices (IEDs) using homemade explosives, requiring different detection strategies. Cybersecurity has become a top concern, as has the need to cope with huge amounts of data in order 

to find and intercept the illicit cargo or discover would-be terrorists 

within the global airline system. 

My first year at DHS included the H1N1 influenza pandemic, the 

Haitian earthquake, the airline bombing by Abdulmutallab, and 

the Deepwater oil spill. We were also in the middle of the economic 

downturn. 

Moreover, the Department now faces the need to cope with inexorable increases in commerce and travel in a setting of flat or declining Federal budgets. So to maintain service and security and 

the flow of trade essential to our economic well-being, we have to 

find better, more efficient ways of carrying out DHS missions. 

New technologies, better analytical approaches are critical to successfully countering new and enduring threats and to meeting 

these growing operational demands. Science, technology, and analytics are the keys to doing more with less. 

To better address such challenges, S&T has over the past 5 years 

made significant changes in the way we do research and development. Let me briefly describe how S&T does its work today. 

To deliver new technologies or knowledge products to DHS components and the first responders with significant operational impact, that is, create new capabilities or improvements in effectiveness and efficiency or safety, S&T had to transition new products 

to use in the field over much shorter timeframes than the typical 

decade or more of R&D efforts. And because of the wide spectrum 

of Homeland Security missions and our limited budgets, we had to 
270 

achieve a very high return on those R&D investments that we did 

make. 

To achieve these three goals—high operational impact, rapid 

transition to use, and high return on investment—we reshaped our 

R&D efforts in three major ways. 

First, we now focus the majority of our R&D work on late-stage 

development and we actively seek technologies in which others 

have already invested and which S&T can adapt, evolve, or apply 

to DHS and first responder needs. This approach speeds transition 

and drives down cost to S&T. Every S&T project we do must undergo what we call technology foraging, which is a culture, not a 

thing, but involves a review of existing technologies or research 

that may be a full or partial solution or contribute in some way to 

the project under contemplation. Technology foraging and very 

strong R&D collaborations with other R&D organizations in Federal agencies and universities, in the private sector and abroad, 

have become part of the way we do our work, and it already had 

an impact on our ability to deliver a high return on investment. 

Now, we also realize that not all problems are amenable to technology solutions. Process changes and systems integration can also 

improve performance and increase efficiency. We have established 

a group within S&T to apply our scientific and engineering expertise to help components conduct operational analysis, integrate system engineering principles, and to provide assistance with complex 

acquisitions, all of which increases efficiencies in mission execution. 

The second thing we did is to develop closer, much more robust 

partnerships with our customers in the DHS components and the 

first responder communities to ensure that our R&D efforts reflect, 

first of all, priority needs—if we develop something that works, 

they will buy it and use it—and, secondly, to make sure we understand the problem we are trying to solve in all of its operational 

complexity. 

Third, we established the R&D Portfolio Review Process as the 

main mechanism of evaluating and selecting projects and ensuring 

they are aligned with our top priorities. The Portfolio Review process that we used was originally developed by industry and is now 

widely used in the private sector and by some Department of Defense (DOD) laboratories. It establishes our top goals—as I mentioned, operational impact, transition to use, scientific feasibility, et 

cetera—as metrics against which all R&D projects are weighed. 

Each R&D project is treated as a separate investment and evaluated by panels of outside experts, senior people from the component 

partners we are trying to serve, and S&T leadership. 

Over 3 years, we have driven our R&D portfolio toward our top 

priorities. We have had three Portfolio Reviews thus far between 

2010 and 2012, and the percent of projects likely to transition to 

use in the field within 2 to 5 years has gone from 25 to 49 percent. 

The percent of—— 

Chairman CARPER. Just repeat that again, just that whole last 

sentence. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. The percent of R&D projects judged likely to transition to use in 2 to 5 years has gone from 25 to 49 percent. The percent of investment targeting, what is judged to be high impact, 

high feasibility outcomes, has gone from 38 to 45 percent. And the 
271 

percent of projects benefiting from non-S&T funds has gone from 

12 percent to 55 percent. This is cash coming from either the components or industrial partners. An additional 35 percent of these 

projects receive in-kind support that is at least 10 percent or more 

of the project costs. So, 92 percent of our projects are receiving 

some kind of support from the customers, which I think is a vote 

of confidence that we are doing useful work. 

One might ask why those numbers are not even higher, but R&D 

is inherently risky and this performance actually places us in 

benchmark status compared to other R&D organizations evaluated 

by this process. 

I would like to illustrate our work with a few examples to give 

you a sense of the Directorate’s impact on Homeland Security and 

the first responder community. 

First of all, we have developed a commercially available multiband radio. You will recall that one of the top priorities of the 

9/11 Commission was this problem of lack of interoperability 

amongst first responders. The fire department, the police department, they were using different radio bands and they could not 

talk to each other. 

S&T took technology that had been invested in and, to some extent, developed by DOD. We used our money to help industry develop a commercially viable unit that was small enough and light 

enough and cheap enough to be comparable to legacy systems. And 

then we hooked the manufacturers up with our partnerships with 

first responders in the field and we did field testing of the prototype units. 

What resulted is the development of a robust commercial multiband radio market and competition from multiple vendors. There 

are three radios on the market today and they have been bought 

by the Marine Corps, by the Department of the Interior (DOI), by 

State and local responders in multiple States, and by the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP). So this is a success. 

Another example in another area is our Resilient Electric Grid 

(REG) Project, which is aimed at addressing a critical vulnerability 

that we saw highlighted in Hurricane Sandy and many other times 

in the past few years. That is, how do we keep the grid operating? 

The grid today is separated into isolated subsections called substations to prevent rolling power failure from taking down an entire region. Especially in dense urban areas, this technological 

characteristic prevents power sharing during emergencies. You 

cannot ship power from one substation to the other. So it prolongs 

outages and leads to slow and costly restoration. 

What we have done is partner with DOE and with industry, who 

co-paid on this project, to develop a superconducting power cable 

that allows you to connect different substations and overcomes the 

previous technical limitations. This permits faster and more efficient restoration of power in emergencies. This technology is now 

in operational demonstration by Con Edison in New York City, in 

Yonkers, and we are exploring a scale-up partnership with NSTAR 

in Boston, which they would pay 60 percent of, to lower the cable 

production cost and move toward wider implementation. 

Moving to cybersecurity, yet another critical infrastructure that 

is vulnerable to breakdown and attack, S&T won a very prestigious 
272 

prize for creating the Domain Name System Security Extensions 

(DNSSEC) protocol. This is one of several S&T cyber projects that 

is aiming at reducing the vulnerabilities of the Internet itself, and 

what it does is it makes it much harder for criminals to hijack the 

message you are sending to your bank, thinking that you are going 

to get your own money out, and instead having it diverted to the 

criminals’ site. More than 30 percent of all the top-level domains— 

dot-us, dot-uk, dot-com, et cetera—now utilize this protocol, and it 

has been mandated that all second generation domain names will 

use it, as well. 

You spoke of our work with TSA, Mr. Chairman. We all know 

that there is a need to improve passenger comfort in the flying 

public. But due to increases—— 

Chairman CARPER. Let me interrupt just for a moment. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Sure. 

Chairman CARPER. You have been speaking for almost 15 minutes, and frankly, I think it is fascinating. But I want to make sure 

we hear from Dr. Maurer and have a chance to have a good conversation—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I apologize. My things say 4 minutes remaining. 

Chairman CARPER. Go ahead. Just wrap it up in about the next 

minute, summarize, and then we will—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Of course. 

Chairman CARPER [continuing]. Do the rest. Thank you. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. OK. I apologize. I have 4 minutes remaining here, 

but sure. I will wrap it up. 

I could go on and on with projects, but I think you get a sense 

of the breadth of work that we do and the direction that we are 

trying to take. I hope these few examples of our work illustrate 

what we are trying to accomplish. 

I am very honored to be Under Secretary and to work with the 

extraordinary colleagues in S&T, and I am happy to answer your 

questions. 

Chairman CARPER. Are any of your colleagues here today? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes. 

Chairman CARPER. If they are, would you raise your hand? All 

right. Repeat after me—— [Laughter.] 

We have been joined by our colleague, Senator Pryor from Arkansas. Tom, I was giving Mark a hard time. He only serves on six 

Committees. I serve on three. I am not sure how many Dr. Coburn 

serves on, but I do not know anybody who serves on six Committees, so he is a busy guy. But I have been giving him a hard time 

about being the prodigal—not the prodigal son, but the prodigal 

brother, and I am happy to welcome him back into the fold today. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. Great to see you, Mark. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Mr. Maurer, you are on. 
273 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Maurer appears in the Appendix on page 326. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID C. MAURER,1 DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. MAURER. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CARPER. Would you tell me again who won the AllStar Game last night? 

Mr. MAURER. It was the American League, three-to-nothing. 

Chairman CARPER. Thanks so much. [Laughter.] 

Mr. MAURER. GAO is glad to serve the public and the Congress. 

I am pleased to be here this morning, Chairman Carper, Dr. 

Coburn, Senator Pryor, to discuss the findings from some of our recent work looking at research and development at the Department 

of Homeland Security. 

But before I talk about our work, I think it is important to stress 

a couple points about why R&D is important and why it really 

matters, and first and foremost is the fact that R&D is really the 

bridge between the scientific and engineering expertise that exists 

within the United States and the ability to address a wide variety 

of homeland security threats. To put it simply, good R&D helps 

make the country safer. So it is important that it is managed and 

implemented effectively and efficiently. 

The second reason why R&D matters is because the government 

and the country at large is facing some pretty significant fiscal constraints right now, and depending on how you add it up, DHS 

spends well over a billion dollars a year annually on R&D activities, and it is really important that the taxpayers are getting the 

most out of every single one of those dollars. 

It is also important to emphasize that good R&D is difficult to 

do. There is always a balancing act. You want to actually have 

some R&D projects fail because you want to push the boundaries 

of science. At the same time, you want to have enough R&D activity that transitions into real world use by operators—people are 

using it in the field someday to help secure the country. So appropriate management will find a way to balance the need to fail as 

well as the need to succeed. 

Within DHS, the Science and Technology Directorate has the 

lead responsibility for overseeing and coordinating R&D activities 

across all of DHS as well as playing a leading role in coordinating 

with its other Federal partners on homeland security R&D. I think 

it is also important to underscore the fact that from GAO’s perspective, we have seen that S&T has made really important progress 

over the last few years, and some of the points that Under Secretary O’Toole has pointed out, I think, are important to underscore, as well. 

I think the reorganization that S&T undertook a few years ago 

was helpful. The fact that S&T now has a strategic plan that it is 

operating from. The Portfolio Review is helping provide a more 

strategic perspective on R&D investments within the Department. 

But I think, most critically, the fact that S&T is focused on working more closely with the various components within DHS is helping produce better R&D outcomes and also pursuing the broader 
274 

goal of developing a ‘‘One DHS’’ vision for the Department. That is 

all very good. 

At the same time, I am also from GAO, so clearly, we want to 

talk about some of the challenges and the work remaining, because, clearly, there are some significant challenges on the R&D 

front. 

In our recently issued report, we focused on three issues. The 

first was, how is R&D actually defined at the Department? The second is, how much resources are devoted to R&D activities within 

DHS? And the third is, how is the Department overseeing and coordinating R&D? 

On the first issue, we found that DHS currently does not have 

a standard definition for R&D across all of the Department and 

that is a significant problem. We looked at other large agencies or 

departments that handle R&D work and they do have R&D definitions that are tailored to their specific missions. So, for example, 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), DOD, and 

other organizations that spend a great deal more on R&D have developed a common definition. And that is important because having 

a common definition for such a large organization as DHS will help 

enable gaining better strategic visibility over R&D activities and 

also, frankly, allow the components to understand what some other 

activities—whether some fall into the R&D realm and whether 

some fall under the acquisition realm. 

Now, we will be the first to recognize that coming up with this 

definition at DHS is not going to be an easy thing to do. There is 

a wide array of missions and there is this whole spectrum of R&D 

and acquisition and there is a broad gray area. But we think it is 

important to do going forward. 

This lack of definition partially explains our second finding, 

which is, it is really unclear at this point how much DHS actually 

spends on R&D activities. When you look at the budget information 

that DHS provides annually through the budget process, you will 

see line items for the Science and Technology Directorate, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and the Coast Guard, and 

there is money there for R&D activities. 

In our work, we found that there were also R&D activities being 

implemented across a variety of other components. And, in fact, in 

fiscal year 2011, we identified an additional $255 million in R&D 

activity that was not captured in the sort of standard R&D roll-up 

provided to the Congress. We feel that is a concern because it is 

hard to be strategic, it is hard to have a good perspective over what 

you are spending your money on if you do not have good visibility 

of who is doing what. So we think that is an issue that needs to 

be addressed. 

This lack of visibility also underscores our third finding, that 

DHS needs to improve the overall coordination and oversight of 

R&D activities, and that is at the Department level, not necessarily 

just at S&T. We found specific to S&T that it has improved its coordination with components. There have been a variety of mechanisms, a variety of forums that S&T has implemented in partnership with various operational components with DHS. This helped 

improve coordination. But it is a big task and we found that R&D 

is inherently fragmented across DHS. It is going on in a number 
275 

of different components. Some of it is being conducted under the 

aegis of acquisition programs. It does not have good visibility. We 

think it is important to gain that visibility. 

So as part of our work, we looked at the potential for overlap and 

duplication among R&D projects within the Department. Our concern was that if there was not visibility over all the different activities and all the money, there could be unintentional duplication of 

effort. 

We found 35 instances involving $66 million of different R&D 

projects where there was overlap, and what that means is that different parts of the Department were working on similar aspects of 

R&D without necessarily being informed of one another’s ongoing 

efforts. That is overlap. Now, when—— 

Chairman CARPER. A quick question. 

Mr. MAURER. Yes. 

Chairman CARPER. Was GAO just looking within the Department 

for overlap and duplication, or did you look outside the Department 

for overlap and duplication? 

Mr. MAURER. For this review, we looked just within the Department of Homeland Security. We reviewed thousands of different 

contracts. Now, we dug in very deeply into those contracts to see 

if there was actual duplication. Duplication is when two different 

parts of DHS were working on exactly the same thing. We did not 

find any examples of duplication, but we found overlap. 

So, for example, we found cases where two different components 

were working on five separate contracts to review similar aspects 

of explosive detection technology. That is not necessarily bad if it 

is done by design. I will be the first to say, I want as many scientists as possible looking at explosive detection technology and 

looking at biothreats and other things. The problem occurs when 

it is not done strategically and when it is not done intentionally, 

and when that happens, it raises a potential risk of unnecessary 

duplication, and that is a problem because you can end up essentially wasting money. 

The reason why this has happened is because DHS lacks policies 

to have this effective oversight, to have this effective coordination 

across the entire Department, and we think that, going forward, 

there are a few things that S&T and, more broadly, the Department needs to address. 

We think, first and foremost, there needs to be a common definition of R&D that enables S&T and the other operational components to understand what is research and development and what 

is not. 

Second, there needs to be at the Department level defined processes and roles to enhance coordination, building on some of the 

successes that S&T has been able to engender in its own efforts to 

coordinate. We think it should be moved up to a higher level, to 

the Department level. 

Finally, there needs to be improved tracking of the individual 

R&D projects, in other words, improved information on who is 

doing what and at what cost. And again, there needs to be this 

strategic visibility. 

Right now in DHS’s Acquisition Directive, there is a placeholder 

for research and development and it literally says, ‘‘to be deter-
276 

mined.’’ We think it is important for that ‘‘to be determined’’ to be 

translated into actual policies and procedures. 

The good news on that front is when we issued our report last 

fall, the Department in its official comments agreed with our recommendations, agreed with our findings, and they have started to 

take action to address those. So that is encouraging, but it is still 

very much a work in progress and we are looking forward to having the Department complete its efforts, implement our recommendations, and, therefore, better position themselves to deliver 

even improved and more enhanced results on the R&D front. We 

think that is important, not just for the sake of DHS or the GAO, 

but it is important for the country to get better national security 

and homeland security outcomes from the R&D investments. 

That concludes my remarks today. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman CARPER. Great. Thanks so much. 

The person who actually suggested to me initially that we do 

these series of hearings on Department of Homeland Security oversight was Dr. Coburn, with the eye toward eventually moving toward reauthorization of the Department. We have never done that 

in its 10 years of existence, so this is, as I said earlier, a part of 

a series of hearings. I am going to yield to him for questions and 

then to Senator Pryor and then I will follow Senator Pryor. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN 

Senator COBURN. Welcome. I would tell you, I have sat at hundreds of these hearings and that is the best performance analysis 

by the GAO of any Department I have ever heard. Most of the criticisms you just heard were not of S&T. They were overbranching 

Homeland Security and the R&D outside of S&T. That is what we 

really just heard. So I want to compliment Dr. O’Toole. I think she 

has done a great job so far. 

I am concerned. One of the areas that, Dr. O’Toole, I want to ask 

you about, one of the things that you have been good at has been 

acquisition support, and I see in the President’s budget cutting that 

almost a quarter. I know that is a decision that may have been 

made above your level, but to me—and Mr. Maurer, if you would 

comment on that, as well—I see that putting some of the progress 

we have made at risk if, in fact, we allow that to go through. Would 

you care to comment on that? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Sure. We have two budget lines in S&T. One is our 

management budget line and the other is what is called the Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations (RDA&O). This 

is part of GAO’s problem. So the acquisition support that you are 

talking about, where we take our systems engineers and our operational analysts and our scientists and we try and help the components structure requirements at the very beginning of an acquisition that are going to get us what we need, on time, under budget, 

and so making sure we understand the entire life cycle cost, is not 

getting cut. It is this RDA&O budget number that is misleading in 

what it talks about. 

So, the kind of assistance that you are talking about and for 

which we set up a separate group is still intact and, in fact, growing. The demands exceed our grasp. We have 11 people in that sec-
277 

tion and we have to pick and choose what we are going to work 

on. But—— 

Senator COBURN. But that component—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE [continuing]. That is ongoing. 

Senator COBURN [continuing]. Is not being cut. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Correct. 

Senator COBURN. OK. Thank you. 

Let us talk about electromagnetic pulse, both natural and intended—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. OK. 

Senator COBURN [continuing]. And the new transformers that are 

available. Where is the work there and what are we seeing happening right now? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. S&T is not doing any work on Electromagnetic 

Pulse (EMP). We are very aware of the threats to the grid from, 

as you say, all kinds of potential deliberate attacks, as well as natural events. The grid is the primary responsibility of the Department of Energy and they are doing work on this in collaboration, 

I believe, with DOD. But we do not have any R&D directed work 

on that. 

We have a very strong collaboration with DOE on the project 

that I talked about and several others, so we are generally aware 

of their work, but we would dive in much more deeply if we were 

actually investing in that area. 

Senator COBURN. And you do utilize the services of some of the 

labs—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes. 

Senator COBURN [continuing]. In your research. You coordinate 

with that. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes. 

Senator COBURN. Do you look at a review of everything they are 

looking at to see what they may be doing that might help you? In 

other words, rather than specifically, we need help here, do you 

ever do an inventory of what they are doing to see how that might 

prove as an augmentation to what you are doing? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. So, we have talked about this a lot. It is very difficult to do inventories of DOD or DOE National Labs work because they are large inventories and constantly shifting. That is 

what happens. 

Senator COBURN. Yes. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. R&D is a constantly dynamic beast. 

What we have done is asked the labs to give us their inventories 

of what they are investing in and for them to tell us who we should 

be working with on one project versus another. And we have made 

progress in that regard with the labs. 

So, for example, Pacific Northwest Lab is very adept at process 

control systems in cybersecurity. Other labs are much more focused 

on big data issues. And we have learned through professional association who does what and how well. But the answer to your question is no. 

Senator COBURN. OK. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. We do it project by project. 

Senator COBURN. So your Directorate basically manages a billion 

dollars a year in—— 
278 

Dr. O’TOOLE. In a good year. 

Senator COBURN. In a good year. Hopefully, we can have some 

more of those. But there is about a quarter of a billion in R&D, 

guesstimate, outside of S&T, is that your understanding? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. That is certainly the GAO finding. First of all, half 

of our budget is R&D and the rest is the university programs, et 

cetera, et cetera. The dilemma in DHS is that because we are so 

operationally focused, there is, as David said, this large gray area 

which the components do not now regard as R&D. If you think 

about the spectrum of R&D, it starts with trying to understand 

fundamental phenomena and then you gradually apply it. You 

make a technology. You prototype it. Once you get it out into the 

field and it is working and you are using it, you are still tweaking 

it in virtually all cases. Think of any technology you own. 

And what the components are doing is what they call tweaking— 

they do not call it tweaking. David calls it research. They call it 

operational performance improvements. So in these overlapping experiments or R&D efforts that he talked about between TSA and 

DHS, I mean, S&T, what we were trying to do was test brand new 

technologies, in this case, mass spectrometry, to see if it could actually detect these homemade explosives. 

What TSA was trying to do, sort of to make a leap forward in 

the way we deal with Hazardous Materials Endorsements (HMEs), 

what TSA was trying to do is improve the efficiency in the way 

they operate the scanning machines and the trace explosive detection that is already deployed in the field. So they do not regard 

that as R&D. They think that is operational. And figuring out a 

definition that accommodates both parties, that truly captures 

R&D without inhibiting the agility of the components to make 

operational improvements, is the dilemma. 

Senator COBURN. Dr. O’Toole, in your estimate, what percentage 

of this money that is operational improvement—is there other R&D 

going on in Homeland Security that is outside of your control? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes. I mean, the components are sending money to 

the DOE labs and the DOE labs definitely do R&D. 

Senator COBURN. Right. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I cannot answer the percentage. I do not know. I 

do not have any analytical basis for saying. What we would like to 

do is form strong partnerships with all the components as we are 

doing. I think a Portfolio Review, for example, is a much more powerful mechanism for identifying research and development than are 

budget lines—— 

Senator COBURN. Right. 

Dr. O’TOOLE [continuing]. That say, this is R&D. And we have 

persuaded the Coast Guard, for example, to use this Portfolio Review. They really liked it. Actually, they improved it. We are going 

to adopt their innovations. And the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is now looking at it, as well. It takes a lot of work 

to do a Portfolio Review. It is a big investment. But that would be 

something that we are trying to encourage the components to 

adopt, and that will, I think, pick up and identify that work which 

we would all agree is R&D and should be captured. 

Senator COBURN. Do you think the leadership at DHS buys into 

that, in other words, this Portfolio Review, so that we are actually 
279 

using some of the techniques that you have put in at S&T—where 

you have not had a partnership component unit working with you? 

In other words, do you see that transitioning to the point where we 

are going to have buy-in throughout all the components of DHS? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. The Secretary is very much in favor of it and has 

said so. I think we will get there. Some components are much more 

willing than others. There is a spirit of, let us collaborate anywhere 

we can to save money and gain efficiencies abroad in the Department that I think is quite powerful. 

Senator COBURN. All right. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. Senator Pryor. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And you are correct. 

We were together over the weekend and someone was remarking 

that I am on six Committees, and I could see your jaw drop and 

you said, ‘‘Six Committees? No wonder you never come to Homeland Security.’’ [Laughter.] 

So, anyway, I am back. Thank you. It is great to be here, and 

I probably am on too much and doing too much, but thank you so 

much. 

Let me say thank you both for your leadership on this issue. This 

is important. You are doing good work. It is nuts and bolts. It is 

probably not going to grab a whole lot of headlines, but it is important for the government to do this and important for us to have 

that oversight. 

Secretary O’Toole, let me start with you. Last September, GAO 

recommended that DHS develop policies and guidance for defining, 

reporting, and coordinating R&D activities across the Department. 

I am curious just generally about the status of that. I know you 

talked some about that, but I would like just a brief status report 

on that and what you need to do to continue to implement those 

recommendations. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. So, we have accepted all the recommendations. We 

have researched the different definitions of R&D around the government and have offered a suggestion of one that we think will 

work for DHS without impeding agile improvements by the components. 

The Under Secretary of Management is preparing a second evolution of our fundamental Management Directive which would set 

up an integrated approach to how we do all work across DHS and 

would establish a lot more transparency and visibility into what everybody is doing in a manner that would be available to all of the 

components, including S&T. It would also give S&T a prominent 

role at the front end of any acquisition, which would be very important. Now, we come in just before we buy something and we do 

operational testing and evaluation (OT&E). We could save everyone 

a lot of grief and money if we had more expertise engaged at the 

front end. 

Third, S&T has established a process whereby we are going to 

collect information on what the different components are working 

on with the DOE labs. 

Senator PRYOR. So, in terms of the GAO recommendations, are 

you halfway through? Are you three-quarters of the way through? 

Have you implemented all of them? I mean, tell me where you are 

in trying to—— 
280 

Dr. O’TOOLE. We are more than halfway. We are about done with 

the definition. The problem is that the definition will still come up 

against these different kinds of budget lines that will have to be 

worked through different Committees and may not be that illuminating in the end. 

The Integrated Investment Life Cycle Model (IILCM) is hopefully 

going to be established in the next several months and we will 

have an annual S&T delineation of DOE work this year. 

Senator PRYOR. And is that the kind of thing where you get the 

GAO report and then you just go to work implementing it, or is 

there contact with GAO about how they think you should do it and 

for them to sort of help you make good decisions there? Do you 

have any contact with GAO on this? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Well, we have certainly talked with Mr. Maurer 

and his team extensively about the report before and after they 

issued it. It is pretty straightforward. The dilemma is how you 

apply this definition across budget lines that we do not control. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Mr. Maurer, do you have a comment? 

Mr. MAURER. Yes, absolutely. We typically, after we issue a report, we let the report and the recommendations stand on their 

own, but we often work with the departments and agencies we 

make recommendations to and basically assess their actions and 

we make an independent judgment of whether or not we think 

those actions are sufficient to close a recommendation. 

I think, as of right now, we are encouraged by the progress that 

the DHS is making and we certainly leave it to them to work out 

all the details, because that is appropriate. But at the same time, 

we view those recommendations as open and not fully implemented 

at this point. 

Senator PRYOR. But you feel like they are making progress? 

Mr. MAURER. Absolutely. 

Senator PRYOR. And do you feel like that you can measure that 

progress and, at some point in the future, say, hopefully this year, 

you will be able to say they have been able to do all this, or will 

there be ongoing problems? 

Mr. MAURER. Well, I think that depends on what is actually implemented at the Department. Typically, what we want to see is 

not just a creation of a plan. We also want to see that plan implemented and put into practice. That has been one of the major challenges facing the Department, not just on the R&D front, but there 

have been a number of plans and directives to improve overall 

management of the Department, which, when you read the words 

on paper, are very encouraging and very positive, but you want to 

see those changes actually implemented and involve changes in the 

day-to-day operation of the Department and, hopefully, leading to 

cultural, organizational change within DHS. 

Senator PRYOR. Secretary O’Toole, let me change gears, if I may, 

and ask you about the sequester and the management challenges 

that presents. So, I guess, just if you have some specific examples 

of ways that the sequester is making things difficult for you at 

DHS and maybe DHS Department-wide and how you would like to 

see all that resolved. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. R&D is particularly disrupted by budgets that go 

up and down, because when you invest in an R&D project, it does 
281 

not bear fruit for several years. So not only does sequester threaten 

to cut funds for projects that are not yet completed, so you lose all 

your sunk costs, it makes it very difficult for us to decide what 

projects to begin. We have not begun any new projects for a while 

now because of budget uncertainties. What you really want is 

steady funding in R&D. Money that goes up and down is very difficult to deal with. 

So, for example, in our Portfolio Review, one of the things that 

it produces is a picture of all the potential investments across all 

of these different areas and the scores associated with those investments. And you have to decide, what are you going to invest in, 

given your piggybank? With the sequester, we are holding off on 

some very good projects that we would like to begin, or having to 

choose between two projects and we can only do one. 

Over time, this kind of uncertainty wears away at the morale 

and the quality of staff, frankly. If you ask any R&D director what 

their biggest problem is, it is recruiting and retaining talent. In 

R&D, when your budget goes down, you do not just pedal harder 

and work longer hours. Your project goes away. Your work goes 

away. 

So if we have too long a period of this kind of uncertainty, I 

think it will impair our ability to recruit and retain staff. That is 

No. 1. Two, it makes it very difficult to make really wise investments in new projects. And, three, it ultimately leads us to end 

projects that might have borne fruit before they ripen. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CARPER. Boy, you ask really good questions. You have 

had a chance to practice and prepare, so it was good. 

One of the things I loved to do when I was Governor—I still love 

to do it—is I love to do customer calls, and my guess is Dr. Coburn 

and Senator Pryor also do this back home, where we visit companies all over my State and we ask—our delegation does this, we do 

it with our Governor, Jack Markell—and we ask businesses, how 

are you doing? How are we doing and what can we do, we in government, our delegation, and when I was in Governor, in that role, 

what can we do to help you? We think that is part of creating a 

nurturing environment for job creation and job preservation, to ask 

our customers, in that case businesses large and small, how we can 

be helpful. 

One of the things that I oftentimes ask—I usually ask it at the 

end of the hearing—what can we do to help you do your jobs better? I think you provided part of that answer already in what you 

just said. And one of the things Dr. Coburn and, frankly, Senator 

Pryor and I work on a lot is trying to develop bipartisan support 

for a comprehensive deficit reduction plan that includes entitlement reform, includes some revenues, and includes just a real focus 

on changing the culture of government, from spendthrifts and more 

to one of thrift where actually we look at everything we do and ask, 

how do we get a better result for less money? 

But I am reminded—Tom and I were talking about this the other 

day in terms of weapons systems procurement—if the funding goes 

up and down, up and down, and we have a fixed contract, a fixedprice contract with, whether it is Lockheed or anybody else, it is 

pretty hard to—when they are talking about modernizing C–5 air-
282 

craft or any other weapons system project—it is pretty hard to get 

what we need at a good price. 

And the point that you make about the need for some certainty, 

some predictability with respect to funding is very well taken. I 

take that to heart. 

Let me just ask you, in terms of asking our customer, doing customer calls, talk to us about who your customers are. Talk to us 

about how you communicate with your customers. 

One of the trips I took earlier this year was up along the Canadian border. I was joined by Senator Levin of Michigan, to take a 

look at border security on the Northern border. And one of the 

memorable conversations I had up there, we spent some time in 

helicopters. We spent a lot of time on land with the Border Patrol 

folks, the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) people. But we 

also spent time with the maritime folks in small swift boats, fast 

boats, along the Great Lakes. 

And we were talking to the fellow who was in charge of one of 

the units up there that included a bunch of the boats, maritime 

folks. He said he is very much interested in R&D. Interesting. He 

has had some jobs within the Department, pieces of the Department, that actually gave him the opportunity to be involved in 

R&D. But what I heard from him is he was not really convinced 

that the, say, the Directorate, the folks at the top of the Directorate, were as interested as they might be, ought to be, in terms 

of asking folks on the front line, what do you need? 

In one of my old jobs, I was a Naval Flight Officer for many 

years in Navy P–3 aircraft and our job was to hunt for Red October, track Russian subs in all the oceans of the world—Soviet subs, 

actually—stuff like that. We would from time to time be asked by 

the Navy and also by Lockheed, who was the developer of our 

planes, builder of our planes, what do you need? What is working? 

What is not working? 

I was on the Amtrak Board of Governors as Governor and we 

were always asking our customers, what do you need, because 

what we thought they were looking for and needing maybe was not 

what they did. 

But who are your customers? How do you find out what they 

need? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. So, our customers are the DHS components in all 

their variety and multitudes, hundreds of thousands of people, and 

the first responder community spread out over 73,000 jurisdictions 

and also a heterogeneous set of communities. 

I have been up to the Northern border and the Great Lakes and 

talked to those people. We are working hard up there. It is hard 

to touch every person, but our outreach to the components is quite 

extensive. We have people deployed to Customs and Border Protection from S&T. We do not do a project without extensive engagement with the operators, whomever they may be, but the front line 

people. 

In the particular situation that you are talking about, for example, they are using on the Great Lakes and across the Northern 

border a system of sensing integration that we developed in Los 

Angeles-Longbeach for the Coast Guard, and the CBP saw it, liked 

it, and moved it up to the Northern border. 
283 

At Ambassador Bridge in Detroit, where a lot of the Northern 

border truck and car traffic comes over, we just finished an Apex 

project that was trying out these smart locks which help to make 

CBP much more efficient, also help to make the vendors, particularly the car manufacturers, much more efficient, and improve 

their throughput and security. 

So we are very opportunistic in the projects that we take on. We 

cannot do everything. So if somebody comes to us—if a component 

comes to us and says, we have a problem, we will respond to that. 

We will not now invest unless the head of that component or his 

or her No. 2 says, this is a big problem for us. We want S&T to 

invest here and we will agree in writing on the objective and the 

approach to that project. And we do this every year. We check to 

make sure that we are doing the right thing. 

We have learned that the projects that succeed are those in 

which we have a partnering team that includes the operators, but 

also the people with the authority to commit money on the other 

side following that project throughout its gestation period. We do 

not say, OK, we are going to do this for you and walk away for 2 

years and come back with a gizmo anymore. We will not do that. 

And if, after 2 years of S&T investment, the component is not 

willing to invest their own money in furthering their project, or at 

least establishing an acquisition line so that they can pick it up in 

another year or two if it succeeds, we stop. So we stopped the Secure Transit Corridor that we were working at the Ambassador 

Bridge because CBP told us, we would rather you spend your resources on air entry and exit. 

Chairman CARPER. That was a reassuring answer. I would like 

to say, as Dr. Coburn and our staff says I often say, everything I 

do, I know I can do better. And I would just urge the folks that 

work for you just to make sure that on a daily basis, on an ongoing 

basis, that they bring to work the spirit of asking, what do you 

need? How can we help? Just make sure that they are continuing 

to improve that communication and asking that question and responding to the answers. 

I am going to slip out and take a quick phone call, and when we 

come back, I want to go from the Northern border to the Southern 

border. I spent a fair amount of time, as did Dr. Coburn, along our 

border with Mexico. As you know, we spent a lot of time in the 

Senate in the last month on legislation trying to figure out, among 

other things, how to make our borders more secure in a cost-effective way. 

I want to come back and talk about force multipliers and the 

ports of entry. We have this huge throughput of traffic you have 

alluded to. Also, how do we use force multipliers to get better results for less money or the same amount of money with all these 

Border Patrol people we have, and there is a proposal to add a 

whole lot more to them. And we ought to figure out, what are we 

doing that makes a lot of sense, but what, in terms of what you 

are hearing from your customers down on the Southern border, 

that we can do, things like Enforcement Link to Mobile Operations 

(ELMO) that we hear about that you have probably been involved 

in, the handheld device for the CBP people. I just want to delve 
284 

into that and look forward to pursuing that and have some questions, too, for you, Mr. Maurer. Thanks very much. Dr. Coburn. 

Senator COBURN. Well, thanks. As Senator Carper said—— 

Chairman CARPER. You can just hold off for now and we will 

come back. I was telegraphing my pitch. 

Senator COBURN. No. Well, she had said something before that, 

but that is OK. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Thanks. 

Senator COBURN.[Presiding.] Tell me the benefits in the way that 

you work with DARPA. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. We have become very avid transition partners for 

DARPA. They work, as you know, on the leading edge of technology 

and we have on numerous occasions—I will give you some examples—worked with them to pick up their technology and apply it 

to DHS needs. 

We just held a Joint Industry Day with DARPA and TSA that 

is oriented around these new approaches to aviation safety. We are 

using DARPA’s $25 million investment in compressive sensing, 

which is a way, mathematically, of getting more information out of 

a signal as part of this new checkpoint that I described. 

We have used a big DARPA investment in a classified system for 

gathering and making sense of data that we are going to declassify 

and use to try and maintain a better situational awareness of the 

marine environment, which, as you know, is plagued by these submersible, semi-submersibles, and small boats that we have a hard 

time seeing and tracking. 

We have benefited from DARPA’s investment in a composite material-based box—they call them Hard Unit Load Device (HULDs), 

H-U-L-D—which is intended to house cargo being shipped in airplanes and to contain an explosion if some cargo in that box explodes. They developed a prototype. We have tested it, tweaked it 

a little bit. It is probably too heavy and expensive for what we 

need, but it has been a very good experience. 

We have used DARPA’s algorithms for identifying explosives in 

our applications, and I could go on and on. But we have formed 

very close liaisons with them almost across the board of disciplines. 

Senator COBURN. And you feel comfortable you are not duplicating but you are, rather, extending their research—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes. 

Senator COBURN [continuing]. In terms of—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Very comfortable. 

Senator COBURN. All right. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. We do not do what DARPA does. 

Senator COBURN. Yes. You have these Centers of Excellence at 

the university level, which I assume you think you are getting good 

value from. Do you think you are always getting good value? Do 

you have good control over the expenditure of that money? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. We are getting more and more value out of the 

Centers of Excellence. There are initial stand-up transactional 

costs. It takes about a year, from what we can tell thus far, for a 

new COE to really get rolling. And the more they engage with 

DHS, the more successful they are. So last year, for instance, the 

Centers for Excellence combined got more money from the DHS 
285 

components than they did from their S&T grants, which is a sign 

of confidence. 

But, yes, I think they are a very good value, and as I said, as 

they mature, they become more so out of time. 

We are also making a lot of efforts to get our own program managers from the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (HSARPA) more familiar with and engaged in what the 

universities are doing so we can go out when we do technology foraging—that is actually the first thing that we do. Is there anything 

our COEs have that we could use? 

Senator COBURN. OK. I will submit questions for the record, and 

I do not know whether this came from S&T funding or from the 

component funding, but there are a couple of studies that were released from the COEs that I cannot find a connection to Homeland 

Security from, and one is from the University of Hawaii and another from the University of Arizona, that I do not see how it has 

any application to what you are doing, but I will not go into that 

now. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. OK. 

Senator COBURN. But I will send you a letter on it and have you 

look at it. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. OK. 

Senator COBURN. One of my criticisms in grants is, too often, especially at Homeland Security, we do not have the followup. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Mm-hmm. 

Senator COBURN. Here is what the grant was supposedly for. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Mm-hmm. 

Senator COBURN. Did they actually spend the money on the 

grant? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Mm-hmm. 

Senator COBURN. Did the grant give us something of value? 

Could we have done a better job in detailing down and honing 

down on what the grant was for? Do those people receiving grants 

know you are going to be checking on them—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes. 

Senator COBURN [continuing]. For compliance? In other words, 

creating an expectation as, we are going to give you a grant. It has 

to be serious. It is not about fulfilling some professor’s need for 

some extra money for his research. Rather, here is a need the government has and we are going to check on you. And, by the way, 

if you are not doing it, we are going to pull the money. 

Because where we do that in the government, and it is not many 

places, we get much more value for what we send out because you 

change the culture. The culture becomes an expectation, if you get 

a Homeland Security S&T grant, you had better by dinghy be on 

the ball after it and you had better perform. Otherwise, you are not 

going to get the grant, and you might get that one pulled back. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I agree. We do not pull back money, but we give 

more money if you are performing. We review each COE twice a 

year with a Federal Steering Committee. And these are very desirable grants. If you have not performed, you are certainly not going 

to get the second round of grants. But there is definite incentive 

to performing well and that is measured by how you help DHS. 
286 

Senator COBURN. OK. Mr. Maurer, during your review, I presume you spoke with several of the components of DHS and their 

evaluation. What is their perception of S&T? 

Mr. MAURER. That is right, Dr. Coburn. We spoke with a number 

of different operational components at DHS and our report, obviously, was issued back in September, so all of this audit work was 

done about a year and a half ago or so. At that time, we spoke with 

representatives from six different components. 

We heard, frankly, a range of views. Some components were very 

complimentary of how closely they were working with S&T and 

they really applauded S&T’s efforts to have a tighter link between 

operational needs and the R&D support and the other support that 

S&T can provide. 

There were other components, or representatives from other components, that were, frankly, unclear of the linkages and they were 

not sure that what S&T was providing was in direct alignment 

with their overall operational needs and they felt that there was 

a need for enhanced coordination and collaboration. 

Senator COBURN. Was that communication at the leadership 

level of those components or was it at sub-levels of that component? 

Mr. MAURER. We were talking to people at the sub-levels, at the 

working level. 

Senator COBURN. Yes, because I think the important point Dr. 

O’Toole made is we will work with you if you buy in. But if you 

are not going to buy in, we are not going to be there. And so I wonder, can you ferret out any of that for me in terms of the agencies 

where they were actually doing work and yet you still had a negative comment? 

Mr. MAURER. Generally speaking, the components where there 

was a more positive feedback from S&T had the tighter links at 

that senior level and it had trickled down through the organization. 

Some of the areas where there were some concerns, it may have 

been a combination of sort of legacy and longer-term things, where 

the change had not percolated down into the trenches yet. 

Senator COBURN. Yes. 

Mr. MAURER. And I think that is actually not atypical within 

DHS, to be quite honest. I mean, there are good things happening 

within the Department, but you are really talking about changing 

the direction of an aircraft carrier. It takes a while for it to get all 

the way down. 

Senator COBURN. All right. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, let me have one other—— 

Chairman CARPER. [Presiding.] No, please, go ahead. 

Senator COBURN. One other question, if I might. 

Chairman CARPER. Sure. 

Senator COBURN. The National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility 

(NBAF) in Kansas, you got that under control? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes. 

Senator COBURN. Going to come in on time, under budget? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Under budget—— 

Senator COBURN. On budget? How about on budget? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. On budget, yes. I think we can do that. This has 

been a very extensively studied construction project. It is a unique 

facility, very highly engineered. But the country needs this labora-
287 

tory to protect its agriculture industry, and I think we have great 

partners in Kansas. They really want to build this for their own 

reasons, which I think are sound. So everybody’s interests are 

aligned. 

Senator COBURN. OK. It is a big project, as you know. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Huge, yes. 

Senator COBURN. It is bigger than your whole budget. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes. 

Senator COBURN. So I would love updates on that as you get 

through. If you get in trouble, I would like to know earlier rather 

than later. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I agree. I will say, we did bring the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), which is 

the human BioSafety Level–IV (BSL-IV) lab, in on budget. 

Senator COBURN. OK. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Thanks, Dr. Coburn. 

We have been joined by Senator McCaskill. There is nobody more 

vigilant than the two people sitting to my right in terms of trying 

to make sure there is a culture around here that focuses on better 

results for less money, and Senator McCaskill chairs a Subcommittee that focuses a lot on this and we are happy that she is 

here. It is all yours. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Senator Carper. 

I believe that you have spent $334 million to produce an antibiotic, Raxi, dosage in preparation for and anticipation of an antibiotic-resistant anthrax, is that correct? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. No, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. How much has been spent? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. We have not spent any money on production of 

antibiotics. That would be the Health and Human Services (HHS) 

responsibility. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. But the Federal Government has spent 

this money. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. That is possible. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You do not know? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. No. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You have no idea how much has been spent 

for vaccinations for an anthrax attack? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. That is not my realm of responsibility, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So you do not know about Raxi? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I know of the drug—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Dr. O’TOOLE [continuing]. But I do not have any direct oversight 

or engagement or responsibility with that issue. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, is it not your job to determine overall 

homeland security as it relates to science and technology? Is that 

not your job? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. My job is to manage the R&D investments on behalf of DHS. The realm of R&D that we do is set forth in the Statutory Act. We have very specific responsibilities in biodefense—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. So if you do not have testing capability in 

terms of health, then you would not be in charge of having, instead 

of GenWatch, instead of having BioWatch, having blood testing 
288 

done on individual responders to determine whether or not there 

has been some kind of terrorist bioattack? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. No. We do not do that work. The bio—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. That would be HHS responsibility? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Testing first responders—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes. 

Dr. O’TOOLE [continuing]. For exposure? Yes. That would be 

the—developing those tests, developing a diagnostic test is something that we are very interested in, but we would not—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. But have you not advocated for that? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I have advocated for a strategy that emphasizes the 

development of clinical diagnostics, because I think in a big bioattack or a pandemic, particularly if resources such as treatments 

are scarce, it will be very important to be able to specifically define 

who is infected and who is not. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. I am a little confused, then. So you are 

involved in the strategy of clinical diagnostics when it comes to 

testing first responders in terms of blood tests that would give us 

some indication as to whether or not there had been an attack, but 

you have nothing to do with Raxi, any strategy or any opinion 

about whether Raxi has been a good investment for the Federal 

Government. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. The medical countermeasure investments, which 

are defined as vaccines and antivirals and antibiotics, are under 

the purview of HHS and DOD for its own troops. DHS does not engage in research and development related to medical countermeasures. We have had a historical mission involved in trying to 

detect bioattacks and attain situational awareness over an attack 

once it occurs, which is the realm in which I think diagnostics 

would be important. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, let me just ask for your opinion then, 

even though it is not your—maybe you are going to say you do not 

have an opinion, which I would find shocking. Do you think it is 

a good idea that we have spent $5,100 per dose and spent over 

$334 million for an antidote when there has never even been a test 

that has proven that antidote will work, and that all of these doses 

will expire and be worthless to us in 2015, and the person who had 

been recommending this everywhere he went in a professional capacity was on the board of directors of the only company that developed the drug and made more than a million dollars from that 

company during the period of time he was recommending this 

strategy, not only to HHS, but also to your predecessors and I believe you have had meetings with Mr. Danzig. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I have known Mr. Danzig for over 20 years. I think 

he is a dedicated public servant. He works as a member of a panel 

for a contractor of ours on what is called the BioNet Assessment, 

which is an Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)–10 

mandated panel that is supposed to look at our progress in biodefense periodically and report back. I have never heard him in 

any meeting on biodefense—and I have been in a lot, particularly 

prior to my job here, which has kind of moved me out of that 

realm, frankly—I have never heard him advocate that drug. 

But let me answer your first question. 
289 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, Secretary O’Toole, it is in writing. I 

would recommend you Google him. There is article after article 

about the importance of doing this. You are not going to sit there 

and tell me that Mr. Danzig has not advocated buying this vaccination, this treatment. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. What I said was I have never heard him advocate 

it. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. In terms of—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. But you know he has been advocating it—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I believe you—— 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. Far and wide for years. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I believe you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. OK. In terms of—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. But you do not need to believe me. You 

know it, do you not? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Pardon me? 

Senator MCCASKILL. You know this, do you not? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. No, not from personal experience or information, I 

do not. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So you have not read about this? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. No, I have not. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You are telling me that in your capacity of 

responsibility and leadership at the Department of Homeland Security, you have no idea that there has been a serious allegation of 

conflict of interest—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Oh, no. I am well aware of the serious allegation 

of conflict of interest, but I do not believe everything I read, and 

I do know Richard and I had personal experiences with him. 

Let me go back to your first question, though, which is a very 

serious strategic point about what are we doing to protect the country against biodefense, OK. This is a very complicated area technically, OK, and in my view, which you have asked for so I will 

offer it—I am a little out of my area of responsibility here—it has 

not gotten sufficient congressional attention and oversight. It is 

very difficult to figure out, particularly in medical realms, when 

you are talking about drugs and vaccines, where there is a very 

long, complicated runway between the idea and the success, it is 

very difficult to figure out what to invest in. 

The added complication for biological weapons-related diseases is 

that we cannot ethically test a lot of this stuff in humans, which 

is the dilemma that you raise, Senator, regarding this pharmaceutical. So we need to have a very careful strategy of investment. 

This is big money that we are talking about, as you point out. 

That is not a lot of money per dose for your average biological, but 

it is a lot of money, particularly since we have to deal with many 

different potential agents and we are trying to protect the country, 

not just one, two, or a thousand patients. So there are very difficult 

decisions to be made, almost Hobbesian choices in some cases, 

about which medical countermeasure to invest in and what are the 

principles upon which we will be investing. 

And in my opinion, I think that deserves more attention from 

Congress than it has gotten. I think we are investing a lot of 
290 

money. I think we are under-investing and I would like to see us 

take a more strategic approach. We have to buy down this cost 

with new technologies. It is a very difficult set of markets to move, 

very complicated. But I do think it would be a good thing to spend 

more of the Congress’s attention on biodefense. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I am reading your responsibilities and it 

says, finally, some of the Under Secretary’s responsibilities and authorities are primarily coordinative. These include collaborating 

with the Secretary of Agriculture, the Attorney General, and the 

Secretary of Health and Human Services in designating and regulating biological select agents. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Mm-hmm. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And that is why I am a little surprised at 

your initial reaction that this is not anything that you have anything to do with and your assertions that you are not really aware 

of any of the—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Well—— 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. Highly, frankly, questionable 

expenses that we have embraced without—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Well, you are hitting on an important seam. Biodefense is one of these issues which is very important to national 

security but is not a top priority of any one agency. It is an inherently interagency set of responsibilities that is distributed over 

many different agencies. 

It primarily resides in HHS. What S&T does in DHS is we examine potential threat agents and we do analyses of these threats and 

then we determine if they really look like they could be made into 

a biological weapon. At that point, we hand off that information, 

which is called a Material Threat Determination, to HHS. They do 

their own analysis as to whether or not it is a highly consequential 

public health problem, and on the basis of those data, they decide 

whether and in what way to invest in medical countermeasures. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I have a number of more questions about 

BioWatch, but I know my time is up and you all may want to go, 

because we have billions in BioWatch and it is almost as bad as 

Raxi. 

Chairman CARPER. Well, you are going to get another chance. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. So do not go away. Thanks for those questions. Thanks for the answers. That was a good tutorial for me. 

I telegraphed my pitch earlier, I think just about the time Senator McCaskill was getting here, and I want to go to the Southern 

border. Talk to us a little bit about force multipliers. One of the 

things that some of us have been concerned about the—I supported 

the immigration reform bill. I did so. I was not convinced that we 

really need to add 20,000 Border Patrol officers down on the border 

given how many we have there. We spend more money for border 

security right now than we spend in all other Federal law enforcement activities combined, so that is a lot of money. 

I am convinced that we need more people in what we call the 

ports of entry, those lands ports. We have huge amounts of vehicular traffic, truck traffic, a lot of trade going back and forth. I saw 

some really interesting and impressive technology, a handheld de-
291 

vice called the ELMO used at the ports of entry by our Customs 

and Border Protection officers. 

And one of the things that I want you to talk a little bit about 

is what are some fruits of our R&D activities that have been deployed along our Southern border with Mexico that we can point 

to and say, this is working and this is where we got the idea. 

Where did the idea come from? Maybe it came from your customers 

down on the border, the people who work there for us. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Mm-hmm. 

Chairman CARPER. And maybe give us some insight into some of 

the activities that you are working on that we hope will help make 

the men and women we have on the border, 20,000 Border Patrol, 

21,000 Border Patrol and thousands of others at the land ports. 

Talk to us about that—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Mm-hmm. 

Chairman CARPER [continuing]. What we have that is deployed, 

how you all worked in it, and some projects that you are working 

on that will enable us to be even more effective. 

I guess the implicit question is, what do we need to be doing here 

to support those activities so that those thousands, tens of thousands of people we deployed on the border can be more effective. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. We are doing a lot of work on the border. The 

Southern border is not a consistent entity. The kinds of technologies that will work in Arizona are different from what we need 

in Texas, for example, where there is a lot more vegetation and a 

river to cross and a very fast vanishing point once you get across. 

You can get in a car, be on a highway, and be gone very quickly. 

We have done, as I said, a recent operational analysis that shows 

that we can change procedures at no cost in a way that would reduce the time CBP agents spend processing aliens whom they pick 

up and get them back out to the border. We have made suggestions 

of other process changes that would cost some money, because they 

involve changes to computer systems, that would push those efficiencies further. 

We think of the border in terms of air surveillance, ground surveillance. On the Southern border, underground surveillance is 

very important because we are seeing more and more tunnel activity. One of the projects that we have underway in collaboration 

with DOD and some of the intelligence agencies is to figure out 

how we can guide Border Patrol agents in using the proper technology to find tunnels. It turns out that different technologies work 

differently depending upon the soil conditions. So we are creating 

a compendium of what works where and how to maximize your 

likelihood of finding tunnels. 

We have also instrumented some of the public infrastructure tunnels, the sewer drains and so forth, that people use as conduits so 

that we have more awareness of people coming through there and 

can more efficiently deploy Border agents when there actually is 

activity and not having them stand at the entry of the tunnel day 

and night. 

We have deployed ground-based radars and something called a 

trip wire on the Southern border. The trip wire is buried and it follows the contours of the land. One of the problems with the cameras and radars is it cannot see into the gullies. The trip wire costs 
292 

about a tenth as much as the fence to deploy, has a very low false 

positive rate, allows you to determine whether it is an animal or 

a person or a vehicle that has tripped the wire, and has been very 

effective so far. It is in operational field testing now on the Southern border. 

We have also done a lot of work in marine surveillance and have 

a major program underway with Air and Marine Operations Center 

(AMOC) to—— 

Chairman CARPER. I am sorry, with whom? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. AMOC, the Air and Marine—— 

Chairman CARPER. OK, thanks. 

Dr. O’TOOLE [continuing]. And the CBP which uses DOD technology to gather more data from different sensors. We are taking 

existing sensors and repurposing them. So, for example, we are 

taking a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA) weather buoy, changing the radar signal a little bit to give 

us notice of small dark boats in the area. 

So we are taking more data. We are putting it into this open 

mongoose system that fuses the data, aggregates it and analyzes 

it and then spreads it out to the people who need to use it in the 

Port Authorities and so forth. That program is now deployed in 

pilot at AMOC and will become progressively more functional over 

the next 6 months or so. 

We have also taken the mobile surveillance systems, which are 

the cameras and radar on trucks that CBP relies upon, particularly 

in Arizona, and we have upgraded them so that you have a wider 

field of view, a better resolution. We have improved the software 

so that they are still operable in bad weather, in windy weather, 

and we have made them easier to use and lowered the maintenance and operational cost. They, too, are now under operational 

testing at CBP. 

Chairman CARPER. Senator McCaskill, we could almost have a 

hearing—this is fascinating stuff for me. I spent a fair amount of 

time down on the border with Senator John McCain and Secretary 

Napolitano, Congressman McCaul who heads up the Homeland Security Committee over in the House. This is really actually very 

helpful information in terms of us passing a comprehensive immigration reform bill that actually tries to strengthen further our border security. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. We—— 

Chairman CARPER. Let me just mention—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Of course. 

Chairman CARPER. I want to yield to Senator McCaskill, but we 

will come back and maybe have another round. 

I feel bad for Mr. Maurer just sitting here. He is just sitting here 

listening to your testimony, rolling his eyes—no, he is not rolling 

his eyes. [Laughter.] 

Mr. MAURER. No. I have my game face on. I am staying focused. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman CARPER. Do you want to jump in here? 

Mr. MAURER. Yes, sure. 

Chairman CARPER. Before you do, and then I need to yield to 

Senator McCaskill, this guy named Tony Wayne—Senator 

McCaskill probably knows him—he was the No. 2 person, Deputy 
293 

Chief of Mission (DCM), over in Kabul in Afghanistan when Karl 

Eikenberry was our Ambassador there. He is now our U.S. Ambassador to Mexico. And I talked with him on the phone last month 

just to get some input on border security, what we ought to do 

more of or less of. 

And one of the things we talked about were tethered dirigibles, 

lighter than air assets, and we talked about what we have deployed 

in Kabul in lighter than air surveillance and we have down in 

Kandahar and other places and he says it has been very effective 

in that part of the world. And we talked a little bit about using 

tethered dirigibles. 

If the wind is over 15 knots, you cannot fly a drone. We only 

have four drones in Arizona. We only fly two of them at any point 

in time. They fly 5 days a week, 16 hours a day. The rest of the 

time, they are not around. They are around, but they are not being 

used. The C–206 aircraft that we basically send—we have 18 of 

them. We send people out with binoculars to look at the border, not 

very smart, but there is a lot of technology. But when we come 

back, I want to ask you about tethered lighter than air. 

Mr. Maurer, just jump in here and then I am going to yield to 

Senator McCaskill. 

Mr. MAURER. Just really quickly, two points on the Southern border. One is we currently have ongoing work for the House Science 

Committee looking at R&D efforts on the border maritime realm at 

DHS. That report will be forthcoming in September, so be looking 

for that. I think that could help in deliberations. 

The second point I would like to make is as the Congress considers what to do on comprehensive immigration reform it underscores, really, the importance of having a strong management foundation at the Department, because if we are really going to be hiring 20,000 more additional Border Patrol agents, that is a tremendous human capital challenge. You are also going to have to put 

information technology (IT) in the hands of these people. They are 

also going to have to have financial management systems to track 

the costs. And you are going to require new technologies and put 

them in their hands so they can do an effective job. So, really, it 

is the management foundation that enables that mission, and that 

is why we placed a lot of emphasis in terms of our oversight and 

our work on the management front and I think that is one thing 

to always keep a good focus on. 

Chairman CARPER. That is a great point. Let me just ask our 

staffs, both the Democrat and Republican staff here, just to make 

sure we come back to Mr. Maurer on that. If we are fortunate 

enough to get into conference on immigration reform, it is a huge 

amount of money we are going to spend in the Senate-passed 

version. I am not convinced all of it is wisely. Let us just make sure 

that we are coming back to the points that he made, OK. Thanks 

very much. Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

You have clarified what I think you see a role in terms of stockpiling vaccination or treatment for bioagents that could be used as 

a weapon against Americans. Are you going to recommend or have 

any opinion as to whether or not we should buy additional doses 

of Raxi, since it is all going to be worthless in 24 months? 
294 

Dr. O’TOOLE. So, S&T participates—in some cases, I am the participant—in what is called the Executive Steering Committee at 

HHS that reviews these decisions periodically. I raised—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, were you part of that when they made 

the decision to purchase it, but you had no idea how much it was? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I do not think I was part of the decision, but I 

raised concerns on the point of the strategic intent of what we were 

doing. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mm-hmm. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Anthrax is of great concern as an agent because we 

have seen it used. The U.S. built anthrax weapons. We know the 

Russians did, as well, in their time, as did the British. And there 

are few technical barriers to doing so. So, it is the kind of weapon 

that you could imagine terrorists getting their hands on. 

The other problem with bio—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Although there are technical barriers to 

making lethal—according to the documentation I have read from 

scientists, there are barriers to making lethal doses of antibioticresistant anthrax. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes. That is true. But—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. But that is what we are buying the anti- dotes for at $5,100 a dose. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. There are technical barriers to making multi-drugresistant anthrax. There are no technical barriers to making an anthrax that is resistant to the primary drugs in our stockpile. Some 

of this is getting into classified information, so I apologize. But 

multi-drug-resistant anthrax, I think, is not likely to be a terrorist 

weapon. 

And I was part of a discussion in DHS in which we did not think 

it was wise to proceed with an R&D project to develop an antidote, 

if you will, a drug product against or a vaccine against multi-drugresistant anthrax. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I guess I am back to my question. Will you 

be recommending that we buy more doses of Raxi that we have 

spent $334 million on that will be worthless in 24 months? Yes or 

no? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. No. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. BioWatch—how much have we spent 

on BioWatch? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. How much has S&T spent on BioWatch? 

Senator MCCASKILL. How much has DHS spent on BioWatch? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Billions of dollars. I do not know the exact—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. And how much of that was spent before you 

took your position? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. S&T has spent no money on BioWatch since I took 

my position. 

Senator MCCASKILL. How much had DHS spent before you took 

your position? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I do not know that figure. I can get it for you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I want to clarify for the record, it has been 

your stated position that you do not support or do not believe we 

should go to the next generation of BioWatch? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. My stated position before I became Under Secretary was that investing in Gen-3 BioWatch while not also invest-
295 

ing in more traditional approaches to public health surveillance 

was a mistake. 

Since I have become Under Secretary, I have advised the Department that the performance of the Gen–3 candidates that the Office 

of Health Affairs (OHA) has tested thus far is not such that under 

DHS’s own acquisition procedures would warrant further investment until performance can be improved. And those recommendations, which were mirrored by the Homeland Security Studies and 

Analysis Institute (HSSAIs) evaluation, which the Secretary requested, were a large part—not the only, but a large part of the 

basis for the Acquisition Review Board’s (ARB) decision to put a 

hold on further acquisition of Gen-3, on proceeding with the Gen3 acquisition. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And is there any effort at this point to proceed with acquisition of assays or anything in order for us to do 

blood testing on first responders or testing of blood donors or anything of that nature? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. As part of BioWatch, you mean? 

Senator MCCASKILL. In lieu of BioWatch. What has been advocated, and once again by Mr. Danzig, is that we develop what 

would be a very expensive, obviously, very expensive process of 

doing blood testing of, I guess, first responders that would volunteer to have their blood tested on a regular basis and/or others 

have suggested blood donors. It has been written up in some of the 

medical journals that they do not think that would be effective. 

Is there any discussion in the groups that you sit on, in the 

places you collaborate, or in the executive committees you stand on, 

to substitute for Third Generation BioWatch a blood testing protocol that would somehow, in lieu of BioWatch, give us notice that 

there is some kind of bioweapon being unleashed somewhere in 

America? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Not for substitution for environmental sensors. We 

are going to need environmental sensors and we need to improve 

what we have. Whether that is Gen–3 BioWatch is one set of questions. I do not think it is, but that is a technical question that we 

have to determine empirically. 

The overall problem is that what we want is very early notice of 

a bioattack, if possible, before people become sick with symptoms, 

because by then, it is, as far as we know, very difficult to rescue 

them. That is certainly the case with anthrax, for example. 

Ten years ago—even the Defense Science Board suggested that 

we should be investing in rapid, cheap diagnostic tests that would 

be part of a panel of blood tests that people coming in for clinical 

care would get. So, for example, if you have an upper respiratory 

infection, it would be good for your doctor to know if that is viral 

or bacterial in origin because the latter requires antibiotics, the 

former does not. It would have all kinds of good consequences beyond that individual patient’s well-being. 

If we had a cheap enough diagnostic that when you ran that test 

you also, by the way, checked for anthrax, tularemia, or the other 

bioweapons agents that we thought might be used, at almost no 

extra cost, it would give us a way, if we deployed that, for example, 

in a sample of hospitals around the country, to achieve very specific 

and actionable early warning. 
296 

We have reached a point technologically where these kinds of 

very fast and simple tests are almost within reach. There are very 

few market forces pressing diagnostics forward, and one of the 

problems is how do we actually have the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approve these multianalyte tests that look for more 

than one bug at a time. 

But we do need a way to get beyond the current process of diagnosis, which is to take blood from a sick person, someone who is 

already sick, culture that blood, which itself takes 24 to 48 hours, 

and then go looking for the bug, which you often cannot find even 

if it is there. So you are now 2, 3 days into the bioattack and you 

do no good for that individual patient, who is probably dying by 

now, and it does not give you the kind of early warning we are 

looking for to protect the population with vaccination or whatever. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Dr. O’Toole, I am trying to make the point 

here that we spent billions on a tool to tell us if we were having 

a bioattack and now there seems to be consensus that we have 

wasted it, because we are not going to use it anymore. We are not 

going to buildupon it. Because if we do not do Third Generation, 

obviously, we are saying that it is not going to be effective for what 

we are trying to do. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I do not think that the money spent on BioWatch 

as deployed has been wasted, OK. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I think it is possible to improve BioWatch as deployed in ways other than investing in Gen–3. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me move on to a couple of other things. 

What is the ratio of contractors to employees at S&T? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. It is about one-to-one. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So you only have one contractor—so the 

vast majority of your budget, half of it is spent on employees and 

half of it is spent on contractors? Are you not passing through most 

of the money to people—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. No. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. Who have contracts with you to 

do research? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Our Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) budget is 

spent on Federal employees. Our contractors are different from a 

lot of Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance (SETA) contractors. We contract, for example, with scientists to help us on 

projects—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. I am very aware of who you contract with, 

and I am on the Armed Services Committee and have spent years 

on contracting and R&D. So I understand that the vast majority 

of the money that we appropriate to you is not spent on your employees, correct? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What percentage of the money we appropriate to your Department is spent on employees as opposed to 

other contractors? They may be scientists, but they have a contract 

with us. They have an R&D contract with us. They have a develop-
297 

ment contract with us. They have all kinds of contracts that are 

being managed, ostensibly, by your division. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Sure. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Well, I can get that for you. The problem is that 

I have my M&A budget, which tells me what we are spending on 

Federal employees, and then what you are calling contractor costs 

are embedded in our project costs, so I do not have an overall sum 

of that number. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What percentage of your employees are actually doing research as opposed to overseeing research done by 

others? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. The only employees in S&T who are actually doing 

research are those who work in our five laboratories. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So I know I am over, and I can finish 

on the next round—— 

Chairman CARPER. Yes, you are. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. Because this will involve Mr. 

Maurer, because I want him to talk about some of the documentation for acquisition and how lacking it is, especially when you realize this is primarily a pass-through organization. 

Chairman CARPER. Mr. Maurer—do you want him to respond at 

this point in time or do you want to just—we will have one more 

round. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, this is me studying your reports, so 

maybe you can speak to it. We obviously have acquisition documentation that has not even been completed and you are in the 

sustainment phase. It does not do you much good to figure out that 

the acquisition is not needed if you are already supporting it in a 

sustainment phase, and I studied your report and would like you 

to speak to the fact that since, primarily, this is a pass-through organization, a core competency is going to be the documentation at 

the onset of these projects, before we ever begin paying for these 

projects. Could you speak to that, Mr. Maurer? 

Chairman CARPER. I would like for you to go ahead and respond 

to that question. I would ask you to do it fairly briefly, if you could. 

If you need more time, we will just come back for one final round. 

Mr. MAURER. I will keep it short and sweet. You hit on a key 

point and a key challenge of acquisition at DHS, not just on 

BioWatch, but many others. DHS historically, since they developed 

acquisition guides, have had a good policy. They have not always 

followed that policy. They have gotten the cart before the horse in 

many acquisition projects, and not just BioWatch, and it is exactly 

the point you pointed out, which is that they have not clearly defined the requirements up front and/or they have not clearly demonstrated that the project or the program is going to work as advertised in real world conditions before spending a lot of money trying to deploy it, and that has been a problem that has plagued the 

Department for years. 

They are starting to take action to address that. They are trying 

to revamp their approach to acquisition, and I think that is encouraging, but they still have a long way to go. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CARPER. That was short and sweet. Thank you. 
298 

Mr. MAURER. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. I am going to go back, if I can, to—I just wish 

Senator McCaskill were more passionate about this stuff. [Laughter.] 

Senator MCCASKILL. Sorry. I know I am obnoxious. I apologize, 

Dr. O’Toole. 

Chairman CARPER. Actually, she is on her good behavior today. 

Senator MCCASKILL. But it came out of your mouth. There has 

not been enough oversight here, and I do not want you to be scared 

because I do have someplace I have to be in a few minutes, but I 

could go on a long time on this Department. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. That is great, because I have someplace 

I need to be in a few minutes, too. [Laughter.] 

Let us go back a little bit to tethered dirigibles, the kind of technology that Tony Wayne, our Ambassador to Mexico, was talking 

with us about when he saw it firsthand over in Afghanistan. This 

may be outside your lane or outside your wheelhouse, but in terms 

of the kind of technology we could put on tethered dirigibles to do 

surveillance work along the borders on days that the drones are 

not flying, that they cannot get into the controlled airspace of the 

Department of Defense, any idea? We have all these assets over in 

Afghanistan. The question is, do we want to leave them there or 

can we bring them back here? Could we redeploy them along the 

border? Any thoughts along those lines? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes. S&T has actually—— 

Chairman CARPER. And, Mr. Maurer, if you have any thoughts 

along those lines, we would welcome those, too. 

Go ahead, please. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. S&T has actually tested the DOD Aerostats on behalf of CBP to see how they perform. They are great. There is a 

lot that you can do with them. They do not perform well in weather 

which is fairly frequent on the border. 

The trouble with the Aerostats is they are very expensive. They 

are very expensive to operate and maintain. So we are going to 

have to make decisions—— 

Chairman CARPER. That is interesting. You would think with an 

Aerostat, you put in your tether, you put it up in the air, and it 

stays up for days as opposed to having to have an aircraft, either 

manned or unmanned. Even the drones are unmanned, but you 

have huge costs to support them. That is interesting that they 

would be that expensive. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes. I mean, look, we are going to need a suite of 

technologies on the border and S&T is very eager to participate in 

these decisions. Going back to your how can we help you question, 

we would like to be engaged. We think there should be some kind 

of steering committee that ponders these difficult decisions and 

ways investments in one technology or another and—— 

Chairman CARPER. Well, we are going to be needing to use some 

steering here, so try to figure out how—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Well, and there are going to be very difficult decisions to make, as Senator McCaskill is pointing out. These are 

complex technologies, complex situations, and a lot of judgment will 

have to be brought to bear. 
299 

But the Aerostats are great. They are not the answer. There is 

a lot of very cool technology out there, and putting together a package that is efficacious and cost effective and can actually be maintained over time is going to be the challenge. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Thanks. 

I want to turn, if I could, to—Mr. Maurer, anything you wanted 

to add to that now? 

Mr. MAURER. Just really briefly. 

Chairman CARPER. Please. 

Mr. MAURER. We issued a report in the last year or two specifically on Aerostats and I will get that directed to your staff. 

Chairman CARPER. Give us just a little tease on it, a little—— 

Mr. MAURER. Well, I did not actually do it myself, but we looked 

across the different Aerostat technology. I think a lot of it was focused on DOD, but it may be useful for your purposes and oversight on this Committee, as well. 

Chairman CARPER. I would just ask our staff, let us just make 

sure we followup on that offer. Thank you. 

If I could, one question and then I am probably going to go back 

to yield the floor to Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I just have one more. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. But let us talk a little bit about 

cybersecurity R&D duplication. I think the distinction you made 

between overlap and duplication was a good one and very instructive for us. But for Dr. O’Toole, let me just ask, one very important 

issue to this Committee and I think certainly to the Senate and to 

the Congress and to the President and our country is that of 

cybersecurity. And in such a fast-paced and evolving environment 

like ours, cybersecurity research and development is really important, as you know, as we try to stay out ahead of the bad guys. 

At the same time, a whole lot of agencies have a mission that 

touches on cybersecurity, a big one, but one of several. How does 

S&T coordinate with some of these other Federal agencies, and 

maybe even non-Federal agencies, but especially the Federal agencies and with the private sector to avoid duplication of cyber research and development efforts? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Cybersecurity is coordinated by law by the HighPerformance Computing Act of 1991 out of the Office of Science 

and Technology at the White House. It is under the aegis of what 

is called Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD), the National Coordinating Office for Networking and IT R&D. So this NITRD is broader than just 

cybersecurity, but it has a senior steering group devoted to 

cybersecurity R&D coordination and also several interagency working groups devoted to cybersecurity. 

Our Director of our Division of Cybersecurity in S&T co-chairs 

the Non-Classified Cybersecurity Working Group. We do not do 

classified cybersecurity work. And they meet very regularly. There 

are many working groups on big data. There are various aspects 

of cybersecurity. We are also participants in the Classified Steering 

Committee on Cybersecurity. 

And the collaboration and cooperation is quite intense. This is an 

area of R&D that is very coordinated in the U.S. Government. We 

have a very good handle on who is doing what, and people are 
300 

eager to stay in their lane, to collaborate with others in order to 

get the most out of resources. We are collaborating, as I said, with 

DOE, for example, on electric grid cybersecurity. And they meet 

monthly to talk about particular topics and everybody presents 

what they are doing. So who is doing what is made quite transparent. 

To your question about how do we cooperate with the private sector, the U.S. Government’s investment in cybersecurity is coordinated through the Industrial Coordinating Councils, also managed 

out of the White House. So we are very involved in S&T in the Financial Sector Coordinating Council, in the Electric Grid Council, 

and also, we have a consortium of the big five oil and gas companies with whom we are working on a variety of cyber projects that 

they choose. They decide what the biggest vulnerabilities are and 

then we help them with fixes and we help them to disseminate 

those fixes. 

Chairman CARPER. Take just 1 minute, and then I am going to 

yield to Senator McCaskill and run out and take a quick phone 

call, but how do you track the performance of your cyber R&D programs? And maybe just give one or two quick examples, but just 

be very brief, please. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Cyber moves very fast. You can get a fix out there 

and it will be overtaken by the adversary months later. So this is 

very complicated. 

We basically measure progress by whether our solution has been 

picked up. We have had McAfee and Microsoft, for example, buy 

and incorporate cybersecurity solutions that we developed by supporting small companies. We also track how widely it is being used. 

In that one case, a $5 million investment in collaboration with 

DARPA, actually, resulted in half-a-billion computers being 

equipped with this particular malware protection. 

And we also get feedback from the venture capital community, 

which is extremely active in this area now, on the quality of our 

fixes. They are very interested in what we invest in because we, 

have a reputation of doing good work. But it is hard to judge efficacy in this field and we do it by, does it get commercialized? Does 

it get picked up? And how widely dispersed is the fix? 

Chairman CARPER. OK, thanks. 

I am going to yield to Senator McCaskill and I will be right back, 

so—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. I have a—and I will not be long, so should 

I dismiss the witnesses when I am finished? No. Ask them to stay? 

OK. I did not get what he said. [Laughter.] 

You are on your own. I am going to just ask you a couple of questions and you are on your own. 

I do understand that this is difficult, what you are tasked with 

doing, because you are being tasked to do cutting-edge research 

and technology to protect America. And I am not convinced that we 

are doing cutting edge. I think that there are component parts in 

DHS that are doing—and the GAO report, in fact, cited that, that 

we have research going on in component parts. 

I also am aware, Dr. O’Toole, that, for some reason, fair or unfair, your agency ranks at the very bottom in terms of best places 

to work. It is very bad, your rankings, from the people who work 
301 

there. And I do not want you to—if you want to, you can respond 

today, but I would, as part of my questions for the record, there 

will be a number of specific questions about various projects, about 

when is the next risk assessment, how quickly are we pulling the 

plug. 

I do not want to be critical that you are pulling the plug on Gen3 for BioWatch because I think part of the problem is plugs have 

not been pulled and we have wasted an awful lot of money. And, 

believe me, you have a way to go before you get to your big brother, 

the Pentagon, in terms of money that has been wasted, and the entire government in terms of IT. 

But I would like you to maybe in answers to these questions try 

to give a thoughtful response as to why the people who work in 

your Department rank your Department so low in terms of a place 

to work and to address the risk assessment and the fact that it is 

not occurring every 2 years and that means that we are getting 

down the line on things that are being done without really evaluating on an ongoing basis whether or not we are throwing good 

money after bad. 

I think your agency because of the responsibilities you have, has 

a much higher risk than many others in terms of good money being 

thrown after bad. And I am worried, because of a lack of documentation on projects, the fact that some of your recommendations 

that you are giving to some of your components, you did all that 

work on transit workers and then TSA just ignored you. Basically, 

we spent a lot of money developing technology for TSA and they 

said, never mind, we do not want it, and did not pay any attention 

to you. 

So there is something not right here, and I want to try to spend 

some time and energy—and be fair to you—to respond, because I 

do not think we have done enough oversight in this area. But I 

have kind of gotten into it now and I find it fascinating and interesting and that is really bad news for you because it means I am 

not going to go away until we get some more specific answers to 

these. 

So if you would like to respond about your—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I would. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. Issues here, but it will also be 

part of the questions I will give you for the record. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Good. I would appreciate that, Senator. 

First of all, I would like to offer to come and talk to you at length 

about these issues and particularly how S&T is trying to—and I 

think we have succeeded to a great extent—evolve a very efficient 

approach to R&D and how we are trying to partner with the components who do the acquisitions, and as you say, tighten up the 

front end of acquisitions when we devise the requirements that are 

going to guide what it is that we invest in. We do not want to find 

out at the tail end, as we are about to procure something, that we 

made a mistake and we are not getting what we need. But I would 

welcome the opportunity to talk about this or anything else you 

would like in person and at length. 

In terms of morale, this has been a source of enormous distress 

to me and to the Secretary, and actually to the entire DHS leadership, and we have discussed it for hours on end. I am happy to give 
302 

you my view of what I think is going on, which I am sure is imperfect. We in S&T did followup surveys after the first abysmal congressional survey to try and get to the bottom of what is wrong and 

there are many facets to this. 

First of all, it would be useful if Congress made the survey every 

2 years rather than every year, because what happens is just as 

we start to put in place the fixes, the results of the previous survey, the next one comes out. So it feels like there is never any 

progress. 

DHS employees are there for the mission. They say this again 

and again and they say it in the survey. I think it is very disheartening to have your agency constantly, almost without exception, 

bashed in the media and criticized. And God knows, as you say, we 

have this huge mission that is very difficult—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Welcome to our world. Amen. Touche. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. O’TOOLE. That is one thing, because these people are public 

servants. They are not in it for the money. 

Second, one of the things that they told us in our survey was 

that they felt they did not have enough recognition for what they 

did do, so we put in place a whole series of, not rewards, but recognition ceremonies for progress that we had made and extra efforts that people had did, all of which has gone away in sequestration. We cannot have reward ceremonies. We cannot give bonuses. 

The 3-year freeze in salaries is beginning to really hurt. I mean, 

people are hesitating to buy houses and have second children because of this. So, over time, even though these people are not in 

their jobs to make money, that long-term pay freeze is very important. 

For us, one of the big impediments to doing our work, to getting 

out and meeting our customers and collaborating with others, is 

this rather draconian freeze on travel and conferences. Particularly 

for R&D, conferences are how we do work. And when you have to 

hire contractors in order to manage the paperwork involved in requesting permission to travel, something is wrong. 

So in the interest of more efficiency, in the interest—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Wait a minute. You have 439 people that 

work for you and you have to hire a contractor to do travel documents? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Yes, to do it more efficiently, because I do not want 

to use Ph.D.s to fill out travel documents. We put together a very 

efficient process—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. So all the people that are overseeing contracts and paperwork are Ph.D.s that work for you? What percentage of the people who work for you are Ph.D.s? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. No, the people who are overseeing contracts do not 

work for me. They work for the Office of Management. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. We can talk about this at length—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes, we need to, because—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I should not have gotten you started. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You should not have told me you were hiring contractors to handle travel documents. That was not something—— 
303 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Well, no, it is—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Now I have another set of questions I need 

to ask. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. But I am saving money and I can prove it. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I would like to see that. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. OK. I can prove it. I am saving money doing it that 

way. 

Anyway, what has happened is people, as I am sure you do, feel 

very beleaguered. One big problem is the Civil Service Reward and 

Advancement Program. People say it is not fair. It is not. It is not. 

It is very broken. I mean, I am trying to run this organization and 

I have very little capacity to hire or fire. Imagine running an organization of this size and not being able to hire the skill set you 

need or fire people who are not performing. But that is the case 

across the Federal Government and people feel that very much is 

unfair. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I appreciate your answer. I think 

what I would like you to give some thought to is this is a comparative survey and a lot of the problems that you indicated just now 

are across the Federal Government. So that would not be the answer as to why you are 292 out of 292, because 250 have those 

problems and 10 have those problems. So that is what I would like 

you to reflect on, and we can visit—— 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I will—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. And I really appreciate you being here, and 

I hope you understand that all of this oversight is because it is 

needed and it is part of our job, and I hope that I was not too 

rough on you, but I was taken aback when you first kind of did not 

want to talk about Raxi and what it was and I think, clearly, in 

your job, I expected you to want to talk about it. 

So we will visit in person and continue and I will get questions 

to you. 

Thank you both very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CARPER. Thanks very much, Senator McCaskill. 

Thank you for your passion that you bring to this work. 

Sometimes I offer our witnesses an opportunity to give a short 

closing statement. Since we are running overtime right now, I am 

going to ask you to do that. You have just, sort of, given one, Dr. 

O’Toole, and I am just going to ask Mr. Maurer if you would like 

to make just a short concluding statement, just if you want to reiterate some things, emphasize some things, underline some things, 

feel free. If something new has come to mind you think you ought 

to leave it before us, this is a good time to do that. 

Mr. MAURER. Sure. Absolutely. I think the key takeaway from 

our discussion earlier from the GAO perspective is that it is important for DHS to define R&D. It is important for DHS to be able 

to know who is doing R&D within the Department, to have effective coordination mechanisms in place, to be able to make the necessary strategic tradeoffs, to make the wise decisions and make the 

most effective use of taxpayer dollars. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Thanks. 

Dr. O’Toole, just one last quick comment from you, if you want. 
304 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Just I appreciate the opportunity to be here and I 

hope the Committee will be an advocate for using science and technology to make DHS more effective, efficient, and safer. 

Chairman CARPER. I think it is safe to say that we will be. I hope 

you will not leave here discouraged. I hope you will leave here encouraged, both of you. 

I said to our staffs on both sides here, I said, I came into this 

hearing sort of uncertain as to how productive it was going to be, 

how constructive it was going to be. I think it has been, for me, 

very helpful and really encouraging. I am encouraged by your leadership, Dr. O’Toole, very encouraged. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. And we have a lot of witnesses who come before us—I would say this to Mr. Maurer—we have a lot of witnesses from GAO. You are just two very excellent witnesses. For 

those who you work with and whom you lead, I want you to take 

back my appreciation for the work that is being done. 

Our staffs have heard me tell, probably more than they want to 

remember, the story of my driving to the train station. I go back 

and forth on the train most nights to Delaware. I drive into the 

train station early in the morning, listen to National Public Radio 

(NPR), and before I got to the train station to catch my train to 

come down here, and hearing about a year ago an international 

study done to ask the following question. What is it that gives people joy or satisfaction in their work? What makes people really satisfied in their work? What is it? 

And some people said they—from all over the world, thousands— 

they like getting paid. [Laughter.] 

Some people said they liked having fringe benefits, sick leave, vacation, pension, whatever. Some people said they like the folks they 

work with. Some people said they like the environment, the space 

in which they work. 

But do you know what most people said? Most people, the thing 

that gave them real satisfaction about their work is that they 

found that the work they were doing was important. They felt it 

was important. And the second half of that is they felt like they 

were making progress. Put those two together. That is what most 

people said. 

And I think the same is true here. We had a near meltdown in 

the Senate, as you may know. The old nuclear option fortunately 

defused and I think we have just a renewed spirit of cooperation 

and collegiality. I hope it extends beyond this week, and I am encouraged that it will. 

But just to take back to the folks you work with and lead that 

the work you are doing is important and I believe we are making 

progress, and God knows we need to. 

I have a beautiful closing statement that was prepared for me. 

I just have one quote here I am going to just throw out before I 

close, and it is Carl Sagan who once said, ‘‘science is a way of 

thinking much more than it is a body of knowledge.’’ That is pretty 

good. 

Part of our challenge is to figure out how to use science, good 

science, to help protect our country and the people here, and I am 
305 

encouraged we are doing a lot of smart stuff, and clearly, we can 

do more of that. 

I have a couple questions I am going to submit for the record, 

and I know Senator McCaskill and, I presume, Dr. Coburn and 

other colleagues will, too. The hearing record is going to remain 

open for about 15 days—I think that is until August 1—at 5 p.m. 

for the submission of statements and questions for the record. 

I want to thank our staffs, both our Minority and Majority staffs, 

for their work in preparing for this hearing. They do not just happen by themselves, but they have done good work. You all have 

done very good work here today. 

And with that, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you. 

Dr. O’TOOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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(437) 

EXAMINING CHALLENGES AND 

ACHIEVEMENTS AND ADDRESSING 

EMERGING THREATS 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R. Carper, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Carper, Pryor, Baldwin, Coburn, Johnson, 

Ayotte, and Chiesa. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CARPER 

Chairman CARPER. Well, welcome one and all to this important 

hearing. 

Today marks the 12th anniversary of September 11, 2001. Coming down on the train today, Dr. Coburn and colleagues, I was reminded that 12 years ago exactly to this day, to the hour, to the 

minute, what was going on in our lives. So it is a very poignant 

day, a sad day, but a day that is not without hope. But it is a day 

for reflection—not only a day that we lost a lot of our fellow Americans, but a day that brought with it a sense of unity that we do 

not often see in this town and in this country in the wake of a terrible tragedy. 

There is going to be a moment of silence a bit later, I think observed here in the Capitol. I am going to ask us just to start this 

hearing with a moment of silence, and then I will introduce our 

witnesses and make some statements and begin. But if you will 

just pause now for a moment of silence, please. 

[Moment of silence.] 

Thank you. 

One of the things that our chaplain—some of you know our chaplain, Barry Black, a retired Navy Admiral. He always encourages 

us to pray for wisdom, each and every one of us in our own way, 

and that is probably a good thing for us to remember on this day. 

This anniversary also provides us with an important opportunity 

to think about all the efforts we have taken to secure our country 

since that fateful day, as well as the challenges that lie ahead. 

With us today we have just a remarkable group of witnesses that 

will share their thoughts, their counsel, on what we have accomplished since September 11, 2001, and the future of homeland secu-
438 

rity. We are just honored that each of you are here and delighted 

that you would come, and thank you so much for joining us and 

really for your service, your extraordinary service, to our country. 

This year, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) turned 

10 years old. And while I am sure we can all agree that the Department can do a better job in certain areas, we should not forget 

about the remarkable progress that has been made in keeping 

Americans safer since Tom Ridge helped to open the door of that 

new Department those many years ago. There is no doubt, in my 

view, that we are safer today than we were 10 years ago in spite 

of greater threats to our Nation and to our well-being. 

I want to take a couple minutes to highlight some of the more 

significant accomplishments, if I could. 

We have enhanced aviation security through a more risk-based, 

intelligence-driven system that begins screening passengers against 

national security databases roughly 4 days before they ever board 

an aircraft. 

We have improved our preparedness for and our ability to respond to disasters while cutting red tape at the Federal level. 

We saw the fruits of these efforts in the response following the 

Boston Marathon bombings and also the natural disasters that 

struck my part of the country, including Hurricane Sandy. 

We have increased the security of our Nation’s borders with historic levels of manpower and resources. 

And we have built up cybersecurity capabilities to work with the 

private sector and Federal Government agencies in preparing for, 

responding to, and mitigating against the ever-growing number of 

cyber attacks. 

But is there still room for more improvement? And I would just 

say you bet there is. One of my favorite sayings is, ‘‘The road to 

improvement is always under construction.’’ And that is true in 

this venue as well. One way the Department can improve is by 

doing a better job of preparing for tomorrow’s threats today. 

We do a pretty good job in this country at fighting the last war 

and preparing for the last type of attack, but to secure our homeland we must do an even better job at anticipating the next kind 

of attack that we will face. Ten years ago, for example, relatively 

few people were even talking about or thinking about 

cybersecurity. Some were, but a lot were not. Today we can hardly 

go a day without reading about a cyber attack or hearing about a 

cyber attack in the news, oftentimes many attacks. 

To respond to the challenge of ever-changing threats, we need a 

Department of Homeland Security that is flexible and ready to 

adapt when necessary. And sometimes we just need to use some 

common sense. If a program is not working, we should not just 

keep throwing good money after bad. Rather, we must work smarter with our limited resources and find ways to get even better results for less money or for the same amount of money. 

That is why Dr. Coburn and I are holding this hearing and a series of others. Actually, at the beginning of this year, he suggested 

that we focus on reauthorization. We have never done a reauthorization of the Department of Homeland Security. He suggested that 

maybe a good way to do that would be to do a year-long series of 

hearings that are relevant to the Department and its functions and 
439 

looking forward. And this is one of those hearings, and a really important one. 

We are doing this top-to-bottom review of the Department so we 

can learn from instances where the Department succeeded and 

where it came up short. And this information will help us to better 

focus our scarce resources on what works. 

As the Committee conducts this review process, we will be looking to ensure that the Department is making smarter acquisition 

decisions, developing an even more agile and capable workforce, 

and improving its financial management systems. This review will 

also look at how we can strengthen the defenses of our homeland 

against very sophisticated and highly agile threats. 

One of the most important things we can do to improve homeland security is to come together to pass cybersecurity legislation, 

either in pieces or together as a comprehensive policy, a comprehensive approach for our country. The threat is too great and 

the consequences of inaction are too severe to do nothing. Enacting 

a thoughtful, comprehensive cybersecurity policy has not been easy, 

as we know. But we have a shared responsibility—both Democrats 

and Republicans, House and Senate, government and industry—to 

get this legislation across the goal line and into the end zone hopefully this year. 

We already saw many of the different parties come together to 

pass comprehensive immigration reform in the Senate a few 

months ago. 

I do not agree with everything in that bill, and I know my colleague here, Dr. Coburn, and I suspect Senator Johnson do not 

agree with everything either. But I believe the approach that we 

have taken in the Senate is vastly preferable to our current immigration system, the failings of which undermine both our national 

and economic security. It is my hope that the House will pass its 

own version of immigration reform so we can go to conference, 

make it even better, and pass the kind of historic piece of legislation that our country needs. 

So as we remember 9/11 and discuss the challenges that lie 

ahead, we must seek to recapture that spirit of unity that prevailed 

12 years ago today, and we need that if we are going to succeed 

in making not just the Department of Homeland Security stronger 

over the next 10 years but our Nation stronger going forward into 

the future. 

So I look forward to working with Dr. Coburn and with our colleagues, even Senator Johnson over here, who is so good at coming 

to our hearings. He is always faithful in attendance and asks good 

questions. And we look forward to working with the Administration, with our witnesses, and a whole lot of other folks that are 

going to help us figure out how to do this job of shared responsibility better. 

So with that having been said, let me turn it over to Dr. Coburn 

for any comments he wants to make. Thank you. 
440 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN 

Senator COBURN. Thank you, Senator Carper. I have a statement 

that I will place in the record. 

I have a lot of concerns with Homeland Security. One of the editorials that was in the New York Times today talked about the lack 

of focus on multiple committees—the focus on multiple committees 

instead of single committees of jurisdiction, and I know it is difficult for Homeland Security to answer all the questions from the 

88 different committees and subcommittees that they have to answer to. And that is one of the things that we ought to be about 

changing because our frustrations are we cannot ever get answers. 

And I am sure it is not always intentional that we do not get answers. Sometimes it is, but it is because we are asking so much information all the time where the people who actually have responsibility at Homeland Security cannot do their job because they are 

busy answering questions of Members of Congress. So the disorganization. 

The other concern I have with Homeland Security is it has 

turned into an all-hazards agency, which was never its intent. And 

it has abandoned risk-based policies to put money where risk is 

rather than money where risk is not. And the politicians in Washington have very much accounted for that. 

In my opening statement that I will put in the record, there are 

a large number of areas where we are incompetent, whether it is 

in terms of either metrics or effectiveness, and we have not held 

the hearings that are necessary to straighten that out. 

I would welcome all of our panelists. Thank you for your service 

in multiple areas for our country. And I hope that you can give us 

some wisdom—I have been through your testimonies. I hope that 

you can give us some wisdom how to streamline and not undermine 

the goal and the long-term changes that need to be made in Homeland Security to get us back to a risk-based agency instead of a 

grab bag of political benefits agency. 

The final point I would make is that transparency is important, 

and the difficult job you had, Governor Ridge, in terms of bringing 

all these agencies together. We have had good Homeland Security 

Directors and Secretaries, but the idea that you can effectively 

manage this—and we have all the data to say that we are not effectively managing it. And so my hope today out of this hearing is 

that we will hear some great ideas on how you change the structure. 

And the final point I would make is we have 15 of the top 17 

positions at Homeland Security open, and to my knowledge, we 

only have two nominees pending in that area. And I may be wrong. 

That is my guess. I think we have two. 

So leadership matters, and having people in positions instead of 

acting people in positions is very different in terms of accomplishing the goals that need to be accomplished at Homeland Security. 

So I welcome you, thank you, and look forward to your testimony. 

Chairman CARPER. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Coburn. 

Before I introduce our witnesses, I will just note, if I could, that 

at 11 o’clock there is going to be a gathering of Members of Con-
441 

gress and former Members of Congress, I think on the east steps 

of the Capitol, for an observance. And my hope is that we would 

work right up to just before that time, and hopefully we will be in 

a position to conclude, to adjourn; and if not, I may ask to adjourn 

fairly briefly but come back in about half an hour. Hopefully we 

can be done. I know at least one of you has a tight schedule herself. 

All right. I want to just briefly introduce our first, or not so briefly, the first witness. Tom Ridge and I came to the House together 

in 1983, 30 years ago today. We were both in our mid-twenties, 

maybe early twenties. But we both served in the Vietnam War together, he with real distinction, as just a hero, and very modest 

about it. But we ended up on the Banking Committee together, and 

I think in the 102nd Congress, I think we ended up leading—on 

the Banking Committee, we had a Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, and people said to me in the past years, ‘‘Tom, what did 

you accomplish in those 2 years that you and Tom Ridge led that 

Committee?’’ I said, ‘‘We laid the foundation for the longest-running economic expansion in the history of the country.’’ And we 

stepped down from our responsibilities in 1993 and we were on our 

way to 8 glorious years. He went on after that to become Governor 

of Pennsylvania, our neighbor to the north, and the first Secretary 

of the Department of Homeland Security. 

Since stepping down as Governor, he has not only led the Department, but he has also served as chairman of the National Security Task Force at the Chamber of Commerce and on boards of the 

Institute of Defense Analysis, the Center for Studies of the Presidency and Congress, and chairman of the National Organization on 

Disability. Meanwhile, he travels the world as head of his firm, 

Ridge Global, and any number of other entities. Somewhere along 

the line, he found time to convince a woman named Michele to 

marry him, and they have two wonderful kids that we have been 

privileged to know, Leslie and Tommy. 

We are delighted to see you and thank you for your friendship 

and thank you for your extraordinary service to our country. 

Next I want to welcome Jane Harman, former Congresswoman 

from California’s 36th District. During her tenure in the House of 

Representatives, Congresswoman Harman distinguished herself as 

one of the top national security voices in the House, serving on the 

House Armed Services Committee and the Intelligence and Homeland Security Committees. She was also one of the principal authors of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2004. Congresswoman Harman now serves as the Director of the 

Woodrow Wilson Center. She is also a member of the External Advisory Board for the Department of Defense (DOD), State, and the 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and does a million other things. 

So it is great to see you. We welcome you warmly. 

Our next witness is in his civvies today, with facial hair, and I 

was kidding him earlier. I would not have recognized you had I not 

known it was you and that you were coming today. But it is great 

to see you. You are a hero in this country, a hero in the Coast 

Guard, and in the Department of Homeland Security. I have enormous respect and affection for you, as you know. Thank you for all 

that service. I wish you well as, I understand, the executive vice 

president at Booz Allen Hamilton, and we are happy for you for 
442 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Ridge appears in the Appendix on page 492. 

that opportunity, well deserved. But in the Coast Guard, Admiral 

Allen led the effort to respond to and recover from Hurricane 

Katrina after the first couple of weeks of the initial response as 

well as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. And for that service and 

a million other things that you have done and continue to do, we 

welcome you. I want to thank your family for allowing you to serve 

our country and share you with all of us. 

The final witness is Stewart Baker batting cleanup, former Assistant Secretary for Policy at the Department of Homeland Security, a partner—are you partner now?—at Steptoe & Johnson here 

in D.C. I understand you have a book out. You are the author of 

a book. I love this title: ‘‘Skating on Stilts: Why We Aren’t Stopping 

Tomorrow’s Terrorism.’’ Good luck with that. 

In his position, Mr. Baker established the Department’s Policy 

Office. He led successful negotiations with foreign governments 

over data sharing, privacy, and visas, and established a secure 

visa-free travel plan. What years did you serve in the Bush Administration? 

Mr. BAKER. 2005 to 2009. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Thank you for that. And I want to again 

thank all of you for being here. Your entire statements will be 

made part of the record, so feel free to testify. We are going to lead 

off, I believe, with Governor Ridge, and I just want to say to Senator Chiesa, nice to see you. Welcome. Always a pleasure. He is the 

Senator from New Jersey whom you may or may not know. He is 

a great addition to this Committee and to this body. 

Governor. Congressman. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. TOM RIDGE,1 PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, RIDGE GLOBAL, AND FORMER 

SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. RIDGE. Thank you very much. Good morning to my former 

colleague and my friend, Tom Carper. It is a great pleasure to appear before you and Senator Coburn. 

As they say, let me associate myself with the gentleman’s remarks with regard to a risk-based approach, with regard to consolidating the incredible labyrinth of the jurisdictional maze that the 

Secretary and his or her Department have to continually respond 

to up here on the Hill. It was one of the recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission, and 10 years later, that one and the other recommendation they made was with regard to a broadband public 

safety network. That is 10 years in the making. There is some legislation. We are a long way from execution. So I really appreciate 

your words in those regards. And to the other Members of the 

Committee, it is a great pleasure for me to spend this morning 

with you on this very historic and very important day. 

I appear before you in my wonderful personal capacity as a private citizen as well as the chairman of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s National Security Task Force. The task force is responsible 

for the development and implementation of the Chamber’s homeland and national security policies. Frankly, it is a voice for businesses across America. It certainly informs my perspective on 
443 

many issues, but it does not dictate it because my work there is 

strictly voluntary. I am neither a lobbyist nor a paid advocate, but 

we do have certain views that we share, and I am happy to advocate when we share them. 

I welcome the opportunity to appear here to examine ways in 

which we can secure America’s future. Since we have limited time, 

I would ask permission to revise and extend my remarks. 

Before I begin I want to, on this anniversary, acknowledge the 

families that lost loved ones on September 11th. We all know 

where we were. I had the opportunity to visit Shanksville a couple 

of hours after the plane went down. 

So the reason we are here is to work together and to do our best 

to ensure that such events do not happen again and that other 

families do not have to suffer like the families of our 9/11 heroes. 

With your indulgence, I would like to make a few general observations first and then focus on what I believe is a cross-cutting 

issue that both DHS and the broader Federal Government has 

faced in the past and has the potential to complicate our security 

forevermore. 

First of all, briefly, it is becoming clear that members of this 

body intend to pass some form of immigration reform. I think that 

is relevant to homeland security. DHS components can be expected 

to play a significant role in implementing these reforms. My position is that the time has come to grant status to those who wish 

to enter to our country legally, to work lawfully, to pay taxes, and 

deal with the issue that we have talked about for 10 years, and 

that is, the undocumented individuals who are here. I think it can 

be done. I hope this Congress does it. But I also think Congress has 

to balance this responsibility with providing adequate resources to 

the Department of Homeland Security in order to affect the outcomes that the broader American public want to achieve. We can 

talk about reaching consensus in Washington, but unless any reforms are resourced appropriately, DHS components will be saddled with an impossible mission in the critical area of border security. 

I am not going to discuss my deep and abiding concern about the 

number of critical senior-level vacancies at DHS. It has been addressed. It is disconcerting that an agency, if it is perceived by our 

government, the U.S. Government, to be as important as I believe 

it is, to have 15 vacancies, or whatever the number is, at any time. 

And yet these vacancies have lasted for quite some time. You are 

aware of it. I just urge the administration to fill the vacancies 

quickly and the Senate in a judicious manner and timely manner 

to exercise the advice and consent responsibilities and fill these positions. 

Let me spend the rest of my time discussing the challenges of information sharing, which I think goes to the heart of Homeland Security’s responsibility. We do not generate intelligence. We are assigned from the get-go the enabling legislation to share it and provide whatever defensive measures we need to protect America. 

Information sharing is an issue that has been with us since September 11, 2001, and cuts across a range of challenges that have 

and will continue to confront the dedicated men and women of Department of Homeland Security. We all know the nature of the ter-
444 

rorist threat has changed. As we have seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and today in Syria, our enemy is no longer just al Qaeda, but likeminded organizations and nation states that are willing to ally 

themselves in order to harm their common enemy—the United 

States. In my opinion, this will require the intelligence community 

to renew its commitment to work more closely with one another 

than ever before. Congress in its oversight role should ensure that 

DHS specifically remains plugged into the Federal intelligence 

community horizontal across the board. For if intelligence indicates 

a physical or cybersecurity threat against the homeland, DHS by 

enabling legislation is the agency required to work with our partners along the vertical—required to work with the State and locals, 

required to work with the private sector. That is embedded in the 

enabling legislation. Further, we should ensure that the great 

progress that has been made for information sharing with our 

State and local partners—such as the establishment of fusion centers—continues to be nurtured. 

No discussion of the DHS threat environment or about information sharing can be complete without discussing cybersecurity in 

greater detail. There is no part of our national economy, infrastructure, or social fabric that is not in some way connected to the Internet backbone—our critical power and communications, transportation, product supply chains, and financial systems. And DHS 

owns many of these sector-specific relationships. 

Let us face it. The cyber threat is not new or emerging. In fact, 

when I was Secretary, in 2003, a full decade ago, the first U.S. National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace was released. Greater awareness of this threat may be emerging, but the threat itself has been 

with us and will be with us for the rest of our lives. As the first 

Secretary of Homeland Security, I have a particular perspective on 

this issue. 

We learned after September 11, 2001, and we learned after Hurricane Katrina and we keep learning after all these incidents that 

information and coordination sharing could have been better, and 

some people refer to a digital cyber Pearl Harbor. Well, at least in 

that instance, historians say that we did not have notice of the 

emerging threat. Well, I do not think this is the cyber Pearl Harbor, because we have notice, and it is not an emerging threat. It 

is a constant and ever-changing dynamic threat. So I am more inclined to say that it may end up being a cyber Hurricane Katrina 

where we had notice but we were not as prepared as we should 

have been until Thad Allen got there and cut through the Gordian 

knot of problems and began to address the situation that he confronted on the ground. 

I have several more pages of testimony. I see my time is running 

out. But I hope we get to this area in the question and answer 

(Q&A). At the end of the day, the sharing of information between 

the U.S. Government and the private sector specifically—and I can 

refer to the enabling legislation that says that is where DHS has 

a very significant legislative role—is absolutely critical, and not in 

a prescriptive form. It cannot be in a prescriptive form. We cannot 

mandate regulations. There are plenty of standards out there, and, 

frankly, the President’s Executive Order (EO) asking the National 

Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to set the standards 
445 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Harman appears in the Appendix on page 501. 

is something that we all welcome and we engage, but we hope we 

give it a chance to work and assure that the private sector is involved and engaged, because it is that kind of collaboration that is 

absolutely essential. And you are never going to defeat the cyber 

enemy, whether it is a nation state, organized crime, any organization, by having the private sector check the compliance box. We did 

all that Congress wanted us to do. That is not enough. That is inadequate. It is grossly ineffective. There has to be timely and continual information sharing horizontally within the Federal Government, particularly to DHS, and then vertically down to the State 

and locals, and particularly to the private sector. After all, the Federal Government relies on the private sector in order to function. 

So as I said before, we have some lessons to be learned about the 

inadequacy of what the Federal Government is doing to protect its 

own information. I think it would be helpful not only when we repair that, but we also make sure that we facilitate the day-to-day 

engagement and sharing of information with the private sector. 

I thank my colleagues who are on the panel, distinguished patriots as well, for the opportunity to appear with them, and I thank 

the Chairman and the Committee for the opportunity to share 

these remarks with you this morning. 

Chairman CARPER. Thank you for those remarks very much. 

Congresswoman Harman, please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. JANE HARMAN,1 A FORMER 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE 

OF CALIFORNIA 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I think every Member of this Committee knows, I have great affection for this Committee. I worked very closely with your prior management during 

8 years on the House Homeland Committee and another 8 years, 

some of them overlapping, on the House Intelligence Committee. 

Later today, at the invitation of Colorado Governor John 

Hickenlooper, I am flying to Denver where Senator Lieberman and 

I are appearing on a 9/11 panel in Denver this evening. 

Chairman CARPER. Well, I hope you will give them our best. 

Ms. HARMAN. I shall. And as my youngest daughter would say, 

your former Ranking Member, Susan Collins, is one of my 

‘‘besties.’’ And we stay close friends, and we all worked together on 

the intelligence reform law of 2004. 

I also have great affection for all of us testifying before you 

today, worked very closely with everyone on this panel on homeland topics, and we continue to stick together, which I think is a 

good thing. 

Twelve years ago today, as the towers were falling and the Pentagon fire was burning, I was walking toward the U.S. Capitol. My 

destination was the Intelligence Committee rooms in the Capitol 

dome—the place most consider was the intended target of the 

plane that went down in Shanksville. My staff called to alert me 

that the Capitol had just been closed, as were the House and Senate office buildings. So most of Congress, including me, milled 
446 

around on the lawn in front of the Capitol. There was no evacuation plan. We had no roadmap for a response. 

Part of the solution which some of us recommended was to create 

a dedicated homeland security function, and that function we 

thought should be in the White House, and Tom Ridge became its 

first coordinator. 

Along the way, the White House proposed a much more ambitious concept, and in order to get this function as part of law, we 

embraced that concept, and then there became the Department of 

Homeland Security. 

Now in its tenth year, I am proud of my role as one of the Department’s ‘‘founding mothers,’’ and I think we should acknowledge 

today the thousands of DHS employees who serve us daily around 

the country and the world. As we speak, Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents are in mega ports like the port of Dubai, and 

they are screening U.S.-bound cargo for dangerous weapons and 

materials. Specially trained homeland security investigation agents 

are in diplomatic posts everywhere in the world, and they are reviewing suspicious visas, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screeners are daily depriving al Qaeda and other terror groups of the ability to turn more aircraft into weapons—a tactic we know they are continuing to attempt. 

Today, as Tom Ridge said, DHS remains a work in progress, but 

the efforts of its people are its backbone—and our backbone. We 

have a safer country because of them. 

A year ago, I testified here, and I noted some of the things that 

were going well at DHS. But I also noted challenges, and they include: An anemic intelligence function, something Tom Ridge just 

touched on; the need for DHS to focus more on its relationships 

with critical infrastructure owners and operators, something that is 

now happening because the cyber threat is increasing; and as mentioned by you, Mr. Chairman, the failure of Congress to reorganize 

its committee structure. 

Today, as you mentioned, there is a very good op-ed in the New 

York Times—I actually buy the print edition, called ‘‘Homeland 

Confusion’’ but Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton, our good friends, and 

Lee preceded me as the president and Chief Executive Officer 

(CEO) at the Wilson Center, and we served as colleagues many 

decades ago in the House. 

I do not want to touch on all of this, but let me just briefly scope 

the bad news and the good news since last year. 

The bad news: We failed to thwart the Boston Marathon bombing; an exponential increase in cyber attacks; Edward Snowden; 

and the fact that the bomb maker, Ibrahim al Asiri, who belongs 

to al Qaeda, is still alive in the boonies of Yemen, despite our good 

efforts to retire his service. 

But there is significant good news. One is information sharing is 

improving. I know there is much to continue. 

Second, resilience. We showed resilience after Boston in particular, after the Boston Marathon bombing, and common sense is 

emerging in the way we approach homeland security. And to Senator Coburn’s point, I think there is more support, and there 

should be, for a risk-based approach. 
447 

Collaboration with the private sector on cyber, that is happening, 

and credit should go to—I guess she has just retired—the Secretary 

of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano for personally working on 

this issue. 

And we are getting ahead of privacy concerns. 

Let me just touch on these very briefly because my time is running out, too. 

Information sharing, Tom Ridge talked about it, but the Committee should take credit for the fact—and so should the Department—that homeland security grant money was critical. According 

to the Boston Police Department (PD), it helped make sure that the 

city was trained to share information rapidly during the emergency. DHS also participated in something called the Multi-Agency 

Coordination Center (MACC), that was operational before and during the marathon. And the MACC was critical in coordinating communications once the bombs exploded. 

Resilience—a very important factor in our country’s ability not to 

be terrorized. It is not that we will not have future attempts and 

maybe even successful attempts at attacks. But if we fail to be terrorized, the terrorists lose. And DHS, again, and this Committee 

distributed almost $11 million to Boston, just to pick Boston, 

through its Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). The money was 

used in part to upgrade over 5,000 portable radios for first responders, install a communication system inside the tunnels of the Boston T, and conduct two citywide disaster simulations in coordination with DHS. This is a very good news story. 

Similarly, in Hurricane Sandy, which went fairly well, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) activated in advance 

a National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), which was critical in terms of preventing more damage and speeding the recovery. 

Collaboration with the private sector on cyber. 

DHS will never ‘‘own’’ the cyber mission, but it is responsible for 

a central piece, which is critical infrastructure protection. And in 

the past year, DHS has tracked and responded to nearly—get this 

number—200,000 cyber incidents, a 68-percent increase from the 

year before. We will never get ahead of this problem if there is not 

a total lash-up with the private sector. And as Janet Napolitano 

and some of her team explained at the Wilson Center about 6 

weeks ago, that is exactly what is happening. Kudos to the Department. 

Finally, getting ahead of privacy concerns. The Department itself 

has a Privacy and Civil Liberties Office. That office has trained 

many in the fusion centers—68 out of 78 fusion centers have received some training. There is enormous complaint out in the 

boonies about the invasion of privacy, and it is important that we 

do two things: One is protect the American people, and two is protect the American people’s privacy. It is not a zero-sum game. It 

can be handled with proper training. 

And, finally, the Administration has fully populated the Privacy 

and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), which was created 

by the 2004 law and which was never functioning until May, and 

that should be helpful, too. 
448 

1The prepared statement of Admiral Allen appears in the Appendix on page 505. 

Let me just conclude by saying DHS will continue to face difficult 

challenges, including al Qaeda’s enormous ability to evolve, the rise 

of lone wolf-terrorists, the constant increase in the type and sophistication of cyber attacks, especially the risk of exploits in software, 

and privacy issues. But most attempts to attack us since September 11, 2001, have been thwarted, for which thousands of selfless DHS people deserve our thanks, and so do our former Secretaries of Homeland Security, starting with Governor Ridge over 

here, and so do Members of this Committee. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CARPER. Congresswoman, thank you so much. 

Admiral Allen, please proceed. Your whole statement will, again, 

be made part of the record. Feel free to summarize as you see fit. 

TESTIMONY OF THAD W. ALLEN,1 ADMIRAL, U.S. COAST GUARD 

(RETIRED), AND FORMER COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Senator Coburn, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to testify this morning. 

Like Secretary Ridge, for the record, I am testifying in my personal capacity today and am not representing any particular entity. 

I would note, however, that the op-ed piece that was published this 

morning by Lee Hamilton and Tom Kean was the result of an 

Aspen-sponsored task force on congressional oversight of the Department of Homeland Security, and I am a member of that task 

force, for disclosure. 

I am also pleased to be here with comrades Jane Harman and 

Stewart Baker. These are people that I have worked with over the 

years and I hold with great respect and consider them friends and 

role models. I am glad to be here with them. 

As you mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, it is hard not to sit 

here this morning and not recall the events of 12 years ago and 

what has transpired in the interim. I was the Coast Guard Atlantic 

Commander on 9/11, and what happened that day was something 

I thought I would never see in my career, and that was a Coast 

Guard cutter stationed off the tip of Manhattan with its guns uncovered. It was a chilling site. We closed the port of New York. We 

closed the Potomac River north of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge and 

then used Coast Guard vessels to resupply Ground Zero because 

there was such a problem getting vehicles in and out. So this was 

a consequential event for the Coast Guard as well, and I, like the 

members of the panel here, pass on our best regards to the families 

that were impacted by that terrible event. 

I have testified before this Committee on several occasions since 

my retirement, and in each of the testimonies, including today, I 

have done a little bit of a retrospective on where the Department 

is at. I am not going to go into that today. I would say that I was 

the Chief of Staff of the Coast Guard when the Department was 

established and led the transition out of the Department of 

Transporation (DOT) into the Department of Homeland Security, 

and I have spoken over the years on many occasions about the conditions under which the Department was formed, which was bu-
449 

reaucratic light speed, just a little over 3 months. And the issues 

associated with trying to bring all that together, including—it was 

in the middle of an appropriations year. It was between sessions 

of Congress. I think Secretary Ridge was confirmed the day before 

he became the Secretary, if I remember correctly. 

Mr. RIDGE. Correct. 

Admiral ALLEN. That is a lot of stuff going on at the same time, 

but I think we have to move beyond the aggregation of entities that 

came into the Department and the conditions under which the Department was created and kind of get beyond that. You can talk 

about that as a means for why the Department kind of is the way 

it is. But I think 10 years later we have to actually sit down and 

say what is going on here and where do we need to go. 

So I would like to associate myself with the remarks that were 

made by Secretary Ridge and Jane Harman. They have talked 

about the what. I would like to talk a little bit about the how, because ultimately we need to know, moving into the future, how we 

are going to attack these problems and what is the best way to do 

that. And the central part of all of us and a recurring theme you 

are hearing is information sharing, because information sharing is 

the precursor to unity of effort and more integrated operations in 

the Department of Homeland Security, not only in mission execution but in mission support, all the back-room operations that actually enable folks to put boarding teams on, to have TSA inspectors 

screen people, and that is financial operations, human resource 

(H.R.) operations and so forth. So I would like to talk in general 

about the border, resiliency, counterterrorism, law enforcement, 

and cybersecurity, as has been previously referred to. 

Regarding the border, there is a lot of talk right now about the 

southwest border in relation to comprehensive immigration reform. 

And while we move forward and define what the policy is going to 

be and what we are going to do in relation to the number of illegal 

immigrants that are in the country right now, I think we need to 

remember that we have a border that is very complex and goes 

well beyond what I would call a geographically and physically described border. It is a functional border that also includes the analysis of data and the movement of cargo that are never touched by 

human hands but are virtually carried out and we have to carry 

out our functions as a sovereign government in a global commons 

in a variety of ways, including air, land, sea, and cyber domains. 

So when we look at border security, I would just urge the Committee to try and understand that it is a combination of functions 

and it is a system of systems. And it cannot be reduced to oversimplistic fixes like fences or more Border Patrol agents. We have to 

figure out what is the nature of the problem and what is the best 

way to deal with it with all the tools we have available, including 

the aggregation of data on all border functions into a fused picture 

that senior leaders can take a look at. And I am talking about all 

the different license plate reader programs, passenger information, 

information on private arrivals of aircraft and vessels and so forth, 

bringing that together and putting that where there can be coherent analysis done against it. 

I think sharing and fusing of sensor information across all domains is incredibly important. We need to build an architecture 
450 

that allows us to do that so we can understand the current conditions and the threats and how to react to them on the border. 

We need to visualize that knowledge for our leaders so that they 

can understand what we would call a common operating picture, 

and that in turn can be discussed with folks here in the Congress 

regarding oversight. 

And I think we need to look at, along the southwest border, not 

every part of the border is the same, and boots on the ground and 

fences are not the way to control the border. We need to look at 

areas where, say, there is no traffic, and conversations that I have 

had with some folks in the Department, we are actually using satellite imagery and going back and taking several runs at a time. 

And if there are no movements, you can pretty much say that is 

a low-risk area and start concentrating on where you think there 

is a risk involved there. I think in that way we could probably do 

a better job of looking at how we are managing the border. 

Congresswoman Harman talked about national resiliency. I 

think this is extraordinarily important. And I think it is important 

because we need to start looking at resiliency as something that resides way beyond natural disasters and what FEMA does for a living inside the Department. 

I am in favor of regionally based risk assessments that focus on 

the most likely and consequential events that occur, either natural 

or the man-built environments, and that includes understanding 

what population densities and critical infrastructure do and what 

kind of risk they present. And we need to figure out how to reduce 

those risks, including looking at building codes, land use, going beyond current floodplain legislation and regulations associated with 

that and try and look at the behaviors that need to be influenced 

to change how we think and act at a local level. 

I think we need to improve our incident management doctrine. 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)–5 is a general 

framework for the Secretary to manage incidents, but, frankly, 

when you have these large, complex incidents, it is very hard to 

support one Cabinet to another in an overarching way to understand incident management, especially in complex hybrid events, I 

think is extremely important. 

If you look at the possibility that we could have a combination 

of events that starts with a cyber attack, then gets into industrial 

control systems that produces a consequential kinetic effect, all of 

a sudden you have FEMA, the National Protection and Programs 

Directive (NPPD), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

through the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force 

(NCIJTF) there because it is a potential crime scene, and then you 

have the overall incident management, we do not have a coherent 

doctrine how to move forward on that. 

And, finally, we need an integrated national operations for 

Homeland Security. The National Response Coordination Center at 

FEMA is an excellent operation for what they do. The Coast Guard 

has an operations center. One of the big challenges in the absence 

of being able to consolidate on a campus at St. Elizabeths is the 

inability to create a coordinated operations center with every component there to be able to coordinate in direct operations. 
451 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Baker appears in the Appendix on page 515. 

I have some other points, but I see my time is out, so I will submit that for the record. I will be glad to answer any questions you 

may have. 

Chairman CARPER. Thanks. You crammed a lot into 51⁄2 minutes. 

Thank you. That was a lot of wisdom. 

Mr. Baker, please proceed. Welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. STEWART A. BAKER,1 FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BAKER. Thank you, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member 

Coburn, and Members of the Committee. It really is an honor to 

be here with Members of the Committee and members of the panel. 

All of us made promises to ourselves and to the country 12 years 

ago and it is a pleasure to be here to have an opportunity to continue and rededicate myself with the rest of the panel to those 

promises. 

There have been a lot of achievements in those 12 years, and 

DHS has contributed to many of them. It has many successes that 

we have heard about from other panel members that could not 

have been possible without the Department. It also has had some 

failings that I think you are talking about addressing quite directly. Reauthorizing legislation is an excellent idea. The idea of reducing the number of committees that provide disjointed oversight 

to portions of the Department would be an excellent approach, as 

would be building the equivalent of the Defense Department’s Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

We have had three great leaders of the Department who, when 

they are focused on a problem, have the entire Department sing 

like a chorus. But when they have had problems that they cannot 

spend 1 day a week on or one meeting a week on, the components 

tend to drift off. And there is no institutional mechanism for keeping the Department in tune when the Secretary is pulled off or the 

Deputy Secretary is pulled off in another direction. So finding ways 

to build the Office of Policy, the Office of Management, into effective managers of many of those second-tier issues would be very 

valuable. 

I want to talk mainly about an issue where I think the most opportunity for progress is offered, and that is in cyber. This is a terrible crisis. We are not solving it. We are falling behind. Many of 

the ideas that have been proposed are rather divisive, but it seems 

to me that there are at least three issues where the Department 

of Homeland Security could contribute to and that may form a 

basis for less divisive solutions. 

What seems clear to me is that, while we are falling farther behind, we also have more information about the people who are attacking us than we actually expected to have 5 years ago. We know 

what their girlfriends look like. We know what blogs they write. 

They are no more able to secure their communications than we 

have been able to secure our networks, and that offers some opportunity for actually bringing deterrence to bear, not simply defense. 

We cannot defend ourselves out of this cyber crisis. That is like 
452 

telling people that we are going to solve the street crime problem 

by making pedestrians buy better body armor. That is not the solution. We have to find a way to actually capture and deter and punish the people who are attacking us. 

How do we do that? Law enforcement is very familiar with the 

idea of deterring and punishing attackers, but prosecuting the people who are attacking us, many of them overseas, many of them 

associated with governments, is probably not the most effective 

measure. What we need is new ways of bringing sanctions to bear 

on the people that we can actually identify, and DHS can lead that. 

If we used the law enforcement capabilities that the Department 

has at the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), at the Secret Service, integrated them in a smaller group, maybe on an experimental basis with NPPD and its defensive capabilities and its 

understanding of the attacks, we could gather much more intelligence about these people and then bring to bear new forms of 

sanctions—again, something DHS could take the lead in developing. Many of the companies that support these hackers by hiring 

them after they have finished their service for government, the universities that train them—need and want visas to come to the 

United States. I do not know why we are giving them visas if we 

know who they are. We should impose sanctions of that sort or, 

frankly, sanctions of the sort that Treasury uses today to deal with 

conflict diamond merchants or the Russian officials who oppressed 

the human rights of Mr. Magnitsky. 

We face attacks on the human rights of advocates right in the 

United States, cyber attacks on Tibetan activists and the like. We 

should be treating attacks on human rights that occur in the 

United States every bit as seriously as we treat the Russian Government’s abuses inside Russia. And, again, DHS could be authorized to go looking for ways to bring those sanctions to bear. 

And then, finally, with respect to the private sector, it seems to 

me the private sector knows more about the attackers inside their 

networks than government will ever know. They are more motivated to find their attackers and to pursue those attackers, who 

often end up as their competitors. What is being stolen is competitive information. It is fed to competitors, and those competitors are 

operating in our markets. If we can gather intelligence and close 

the loop to find the beneficiaries of cyberspying, we can bring to 

bear criminal and other penalties on the beneficiaries of these attacks. 

That is not something we are doing now because there is not 

enough integration between the people who have the resources and 

the incentive to do that, the individual companies who are under 

attack, and the law enforcement agencies that are totally swamped 

by the nature of the task. If we experimented with giving the companies that are under attack more authority to investigate their 

attackers under the guidance and supervision of the government, 

we could make more cases and impose more sanctions on the people who are attacking us. 

So those are three pretty concrete ideas. There are plenty more 

in my testimony, which I ask that you read into the record. Thank 

you. 
453 

Chairman CARPER. Your full testimony will be made a part of the 

record. Thank you very much for your testimony today. 

I want to return to a comment of Dr. Coburn’s. Several of you, 

as well as, I think, Governor Ridge, and the issue—I call it ‘‘executive branch Swiss cheese.’’ It is not just DHS. It is not just the Department of Homeland Security. We have too many vacancies 

throughout the Federal Government. The Administration I think 

has released just in the last couple of days an extensive list of 

nominees. We welcome that. A lot of them are in the Department 

of State. One or two are in this Department. We are still looking 

for an Inspector General (IG). We need someone to fill that position 

in this Department, and a bunch of other IG positions that are vacant. This is a shared responsibility. The Administration has a responsibility to vet and give us names of excellent people, capable, 

honorable people, hard-working people. We have an obligation to 

hold hearings, to vet those nominees, and, to the extent that we 

feel they will do a good job, to move them promptly. And the Administration needs to do their job. We need to do our job. And we 

will keep focused on that. 

Governor Ridge, we’re wearing different uniforms, him in the 

Army, me in the Navy. There was a popular movie called ‘‘Five 

Easy Pieces.’’ Some of you are old enough to remember the Jack 

Nicholson movie. A great movie. And I think comprehensive 

cybersecurity policy is not five easy pieces, but maybe six. And I 

just want to mention them, and then I want to ask a question of 

each of you about one of those. 

One of the pieces is critical infrastructure, how we best protect 

our critical infrastructure. That is a shared responsibility, as we 

know. 

Another piece is information sharing. I think almost every one of 

you has touched on that in your testimony. 

A third we call the Federal Information Security Management 

Act (FISMA), but it is really protecting the Federal Government’s 

networks. 

A fourth piece is workforce. Governor Ridge and I have talked 

about this recently and Dr. Coburn and I have talked about this 

a lot. How do we make sure that DHS is able to attract and retain 

the kind of people that they need to do their job in this arena. 

Research and development (R&D) would be a fifth piece. 

And another one that falls outside of our jurisdiction but an important one is data breach. How do we respond to data breaches? 

What are the expectations of those who breach data? That affects 

a lot of people’s lives. 

So those are sort of the six not so easy pieces that we are dealing 

with. 

Over the past couple of years, the Department of Homeland Security has been playing an important role in protecting our Federal 

networks and working to try to secure our critical infrastructure. 

Unlike the specific statutory authority that defines the Federal Bureau of Investigations or the National Security Agency’s (NSA) 

work in this arena, the Department of Homeland Security’s authority comes really from a patchwork of Presidential Directives. It 

comes from policy memos. It comes from vaguely written laws. 
454 

In fact, one way I have heard it described is this: As far as cyber 

capabilities go, if the NSA has a Doberman, if the FBI has a German Shepherd, then DHS has a Chihuahua. Nothing against Chihuahuas, but they need a bigger dog because this is a big fight. 

And we want to make sure that we figure out what to do and give 

them that capability. 

While I would say that DHS is much further along in developing 

cyber capabilities than some people give the Department credit for, 

I do think that we ought to provide the Department with clear statutory authority to carry on their current activities so that it can 

be compared to something a lot stronger, a lot more formidable 

than a Chihuahua. 

Let me just ask each of you, do you believe that it is important 

for the Congress to empower the Department, this Department, 

with clear and explicit statutory authority to carry out its current 

cyber activities? These activities include working voluntarily with 

the private sector to protect against, to prepare for, and recover 

from cyber attacks. And would a better defined statutory mission 

of the current cyber activities—help to strengthen the Department’s cyber capabilities? Governor Ridge, do you want to lead it 

off, please? 

Mr. RIDGE. Senator, I think the enabling legislation that created 

the Department of Homeland Security, embraced in a strong bipartisan way by the House and the Senate, basically set up conceptually that very idea that DHS would really be at the epicenter of 

engagement down to the State and locals as well as the private sector. So, No. 1, I think it is certainly consistent with the original intent of Congress in terms of the role that DHS plays. 

Second, I think any gray that exists in the alignment of DHS’ relationship with the private sector particularly, probably creates a 

great deal of confusion. Right now I know the private sector is reluctant to cooperate, for many reasons even to share information 

because of the absence of liability protection or those sorts. I realize 

you are not asking that, but I think if there is a gray area that 

can be cleaned up and there is a direct line of responsibility—and, 

by the way, you also have the opportunity then to hold them accountable for not doing the job consistent with what Senator 

Coburn said. You have been assigned some tasks. We do not think 

you are providing those very well. You can hold them accountable 

that way. 

Third, I would only say, however, that it will be important to do 

two things. One, I think it will be important to resource the Department appropriately. The men and women in DHS right now 

that are working on cyber, and government generally, let us face 

it, there are probably a lot more potential lucrative opportunities 

out there in the private sector. So we have some real patriots. R’s 

and D’s, Independents, it is immaterial. They are working hard on 

cybersecurity matters because they believe it is their contribution 

to their family’s security and their country’s security as well. But 

we are probably going to need to take a look at some kind of compensation adjustment to keep some of the best and brightest with 

us for some time. So, one, I think it is consistent with the enabling 

legislation. 
455 

Two, I think clarity would enhance the kind of voluntary collaboration that I think is absolutely critical between the private sector 

and the Federal Government vis-a-vis DHS. And then if it is going 

to be the mandate, I think they need to be properly resourced. 

Chairman CARPER. Good. Thanks very much. 

Again, the same question, if I could, for Congresswoman Harman. Would a better defined statutory mission of DHS’ current 

cyber activities help to strengthen the Department’s cyber capabilities? 

Ms. HARMAN. My answer is absolutely yes. The Administration 

did issue an Executive Order last year, which is somewhat helpful, 

but it will take legislation, and Secretary Ridge outlined a lot of 

the issues. There has been a difference of opinion among people up 

here about how robust DHS’ authorities have to be. But the bottom-line problem is that the private sector does not trust DHS. 

That has been overcome to some extent by the really impressive efforts that Secretary Napolitano has made in the recent months to 

reach out for industry, and now there literally is a floor in the DHS 

headquarters where the private sector and appropriate DHS representatives are working together on cyber threats. So that is a 

good start. 

I just want to add a robust endorsement to your point about 

Swiss cheese. There are a couple of nominations that have been 

made by this Administration, and one of the nominees I know very 

well. She has been nominated for Under Secretary for NPPD, 

which is in charge of the cyber function, and I just mention her to 

all of you. Her name is Suzanne Spaulding. I hired her to be the 

staff director of the Minority on the House Intelligence Committee 

and worked with her for years. And before that, she was the Executive Director of the National Commission on Terrorism (NCT) on 

which I served, which was then chaired by L. Paul Bremer, Jerry 

Bremer, whom many of you know, a bipartisan commission that 

predicted a major attack on U.S. soil, one of three commissions that 

was not paid a lot of attention to. But we need nominees, and I 

would recommend, if anyone cares, the guy to my left as the new 

Secretary of Homeland Security. 

Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. I will not ask if anyone wants to move that 

the nominations be closed. [Laughter.] 

But we could do a lot worse. I do not know that we could do a 

whole lot better. But there is no shortage of, I think, really good 

candidates. We just need for the Administration to pick one and 

send us a great name. For Suzanne Spaulding, I think we have a 

hearing—I believe, Dr. Coburn, we have a hearing for her next 

week, and my hope is that we will be able to move that nomination 

quickly. She is an impressive candidate. 

Admiral Allen, same question. 

Admiral ALLEN. That is a tough statement to follow, but I will 

try. I think there are three things we have to look at. I do not 

think you can look at just the DHS authorities in isolation. And if 

I could just enumerate them, because I think it is really important. 

The first one is the current status of FISMA, which is basically 

a regulatory compliance tool to try and ensure that proper information security is being carried out in the government. There is a 
456 

major step being taken right now to go move away from a compliance checklist mentality to continuous mitigation and measurement at the gateways so we actually know what is going on. That 

will be enhanced shortly by a dashboard which will pull that information up and allow it to be shared across the agencies. That is 

a phenomenal step forward, but it has been largely done through 

the congressional and appropriations process where money was 

provided to actually go out and solicit for that work to be done. So 

I think we need to move forward and figure out how we are going 

to transition from FISMA, which is a compliance program, to continuous monitoring of our circuits and how to move that information around. 

Second, as Jane mentioned, the Executive Order (EO) on 

cybersecurity and infrastructure protection has laid out a number 

of very important steps, including a voluntary framework for the 

private sector that is being developed by NIST right now in cooperation with all the parties. But we need to go beyond the EO, 

as Secretary Ridge said, and start looking at the issues regarding 

liability and what are the prohibitions that keep the private sector 

from being involved. 

So you have the FISMA revision; you have the EO on cyber, 

which is going to take legislation to completely solve that, and I 

think both of the other panelists have said that. And then, finally, 

what are the authorities and the jurisdictions that DHS would 

need to do that? If we put all three of those together, I think you 

have the complete package, and I think legislation is needed. But 

it should not be separate from legislation that addresses the issues 

with the private sector as well. 

Chairman CARPER. Good. Thank you for those comments. 

Last, Mr. Baker, would a better defined statutory mission of the 

current cyber activities at DHS help to strengthen that Department’s cyber capabilities? 

Mr. BAKER. Yes, I think in a couple of ways. 

First, the technology is always evolving, and yet the law that we 

are operating under is 10 years old at least. In many cases authorities were simply transferred. And FISMA is a great example. 

FISMA envisioned doing security checks that would occur on paper 

and take months to accomplish. Yet the Department is now actually rolling out technology that will perform much of the FISMA 

checks in 3 days. And it is important to revise the law so it takes 

account of those capabilities and all of the other security measures 

that are being developed in this area. 

I would certainly support the idea that working with the appropriators is the best way to do this. Having a single unified appropriations process for the Department is the saving grace for the Department, and the more that can be done, the better. 

Similarly, the second point that I will close on is that in many 

cases the authorizing legislation needs to make clear that, while 

the National Security Agency has a big dog, it is an important participant—I used to work there, am very supportive of it, but everyone in the country needs to be reassured that when we are talking 

about cybersecurity, it is DHS that is setting the policy and dealing 

with the data, not the National Security Agency. 
457 

So what I would say is maybe DHS does not need so much a bigger dog as a leash, and authorizing legislation can provide that 

kind of reassurance to the American people. 

Chairman CARPER. Thank you all for those responses. 

I consulted with Dr. Coburn. We are talking about how do we 

better honor the loss of all those lives 12 years ago this morning. 

Do we honor it by recessing and going to join some of our colleagues on the steps of the Capitol for an observance? Or do we 

really better honor their lives and their loss by continuing to do our 

work here today? And we believe that the best way to honor them 

is for us to continue doing that. We are going to continue going 

through the 11 o’clock hour, and that will give us a chance to really 

drill down on some of these important issues. 

With that having been said, let me just yield to Dr. Coburn. 

Thank you. 

Senator COBURN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of 

points based on what I have heard here today. The Homeland Security budget is twice what it was when you had it, and everybody 

knows we are resource poor right now. And the question is: How 

do you put metrics on what Homeland Security is doing? 

I would suggest, No. 1, there are 45 open areas from the Office 

of the Inspector General (OIG) that have not been addressed by the 

Department of Homeland Security on recommendations that they 

essentially agree with but they have not acted on. I do not know 

if that is a priority problem or a resource problem. But that list is 

growing. 

The second thing, on FISMA, Bobbie Stempfley is a great leader 

at Homeland Security. If we had a hundred Bobbie Stempfleys, we 

could all sleep great at night. But the fact is FISMA is going backward, according to the last Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) report, not forward. So I am very hopeful, based on what 

you said, Admiral, on what we are going to see and what you said, 

Mr. Baker, in terms of improving that. 

The other point I would make is I asked the Congressional Research Service (CRS) to give us what statutory authorities Homeland Security has, and they have most of the authorities they need 

for everything. As a matter of fact, when Secretary Ridge was Secretary, he had them start all these things under these authorities. 

So we need to ferret out what we actually really need to do to give 

increased authority. 

The things that I am concerned about is I do not—first of all, we 

cannot afford to duplicate things that we are doing at NSA. And 

we heard from all of you, every time we have seen a problem since 

September 11, 2001, it is because of either a stovepipe or an individual judgment that was made in the wrong direction. Even with 

Boston, if you go to the intel on all that, what we know was we 

had some errors made by individuals or by process rather than 

have flat, good, horizontal communication that was real time. 

So Tom Carper and I do not disagree about what the goals are. 

The question is or the disagreement is: How do you get there and 

how do you hold people accountable? 

So information sharing is the key for us to be flexible and highly 

responsive when it comes to threats for our country, and how we 

do that is important. 
458 

And I think, Jane, you said something that I think is really important. The confidence level by the public and the private sector 

in terms of DHS’ capability to handle all this is a key hurdle we 

have to get over. And what we have to do is we have to walk before 

we run. And we have been crawling, and now I think we are walking, and I would attribute some of that to the most recent Secretary, but also to Bobbie Stempfley and her crew and some of the 

other things that are going on there. 

The other thing is privacy is a big deal. We have seen that. But 

we had a lot of problems at fusion centers with privacy. We put out 

a report that showed that, and they responded. They were starting 

to respond before that. But there is no privacy policy associated 

with the drones with DHS right now. We have an open letter that 

has not been answered. What are you doing about it? And yet there 

was no consideration of privacy as they made the policy for the use 

of drones. So there are big problems for us to address. 

I guess what I would ask is—and, by the way, I do need to make 

a correction. The President has nominated four positions out of the 

15, not two, so I stand corrected on that: Office of General Counsel, 

NPPD, Customs and Border Protection, and Mr. Mayorkas. 

So I guess the question I would ask is: How do we incentivize 

to make sure we have real-time sharing across all the branches, 

one? No. 2, how do we reform Congress’ oversight of DHS to where 

we limit the committees? Tell me how we do that so that we can 

make them react in a positive way and not spend so much time up 

here on the Hill but have good, clear communication and single authority coming out? We have most of the authority for Homeland 

Security, but that is not true in terms of a lot of other subcommittees. So your comments on those, and I would like each of you to 

address that, if you could. 

Mr. RIDGE. Well, I would be happy to volunteer to begin the conversation. I must tell you, Senator, that I think your frustration 

with the growth of the Department in terms of personnel and dollars is something that I share a little bit. More is not necessarily 

better. 

I remember my first year as Secretary. A well-intentioned Congress on both sides of the aisle wanted to give me more money, and 

I said, ‘‘Before you give me more money, I think I better take a look 

at it and see if we are doing an effective job with the money we 

already have.’’ And I thank you and Senator Carper for bringing 

that mind-set. 

Someone told me that we have gone from 180,000 basically to 

240,000. I do not know what the number is, but, I mean, I just 

have no idea where the additional bodies are needed, notwithstanding some increase in personnel down at the border, CBP and 

ICE, like that. 

So I must tell you, I think at the epicenter of all the concerns 

you have addressed is the failure of this institution of the Congress 

of the United States to consolidate jurisdictions so that there are 

no end runs to protect vested interests that have been existing in 

silos for a long time. And I think the only answer to that is the 

will of this body to effect a change. Unless you can consolidate jurisdictional responsibilities so that a small group of Republicans 

and Democrats in both chambers have exclusive jurisdiction or 
459 

nearly exclusive jurisdiction, you are going to see through the process—because we all know that it is a little byzantine, it is—everybody has allies on all these other committees, both on authorization 

and appropriation levels. We really need to do that. And I think if 

you can consolidate that responsibility, I think you can affect the 

kind of change that you are talking about. 

It is amazing to me that the Congress would ask two of America’s great public servants—Lee Hamilton and Tom Kean—to spend 

about a year and a half or 2 years, take all that testimony, and 

say, ‘‘We as a Congress want to know how we can help this new 

Department mature and how we can make our country safer,’’ and 

two of the most obvious and needed recommendations made 10 

years ago, consolidate jurisdiction on the Hill and private sector, a 

public safety broadband network so that police and fire and emergency responders can handle future crises and all that, and we are 

not there. 

Senator COBURN. The third one is risk based rather than all hazards. 

Mr. RIDGE. Exactly, and the third one is risk based. I mean, 

clearly—but I must say, they are starting to do it at TSA. I mean, 

I like the pre-clear program. I know John Pistole has done a great 

job. They are moving in that direction. But I am going to say to 

my friends on both sides of the aisle here, quit arguing about a failsafe border security platform; you will never make an absolutely 

secure border. What we want to do is reduce the risk. So we have 

to risk-manage the border, we have to risk-manage commercial 

aviation, we have to risk-manage everything across the board. But 

I think at the end of the day, Senator, if you are looking to achieve 

the outcomes that I think are generally shared on both sides of the 

aisle, the commitment is that strong, then I think the Republican 

and Democrat leaders in both chambers have to sit down before the 

next Congress and say, ‘‘Enough is enough.’’ 

One final anecdote, and I say this with the greatest respect for 

my 12 years here on the Hill. I cannot tell you the number of times 

we have been walking over to a vote, and we would be leaving a 

committee or subcommittee hearing, and there would be lament 

among the members: ‘‘Geez, we got five or six committee hearings 

and subcommittee hearings today, and we have to run from here 

to there.’’ And everybody decries the pressure on legislators to do 

their job effectively and all these committees and subcommittees, 

but nobody wants to relinquish the seat on the committee or subcommittee. It may not be voluntarily relinquished, but if the leaders in both chambers say, ‘‘As of this Congress this is done, we are 

making these changes, Homeland Security does not report to 100, 

it reports to 5 or 10,’’ it will be done. 

So I think the answer to that is you have to get the leaders in 

both chambers and both parties to agree, because I think it is at 

the epicenter of solving the problems that you have just addressed. 

A strong letter to follow. 

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me apologize in advance. I have 

to leave at 11 because I serve on a foreign policy board to the State 

Department, which has been rescheduled three times, but it is 

today, and the meeting with—— 
460 

Chairman CARPER. We understand. We are just delighted you— 

we will make the next 17 minutes count. 

Ms. HARMAN [continuing]. At 11:30 on my way to the airport. All 

right. So I apologize. 

Let me just address reorganizing Congress, which I think is absolutely essential and will be very difficult to do. I was in the painful conversations with—I am not sure if it was the Democratic 

Caucus; Maybe Senator Baldwin remembers back in the day— 

about the need for more jurisdiction for the House Homeland Committee, and the pitch was made and people nodded, and then someone from the House Commerce Committee stood up and said, ‘‘Oh, 

no, but this notion of an interoperable emergency broadband network is central to our jurisdiction.’’ And so, of course, read: No 

change. And people in this institution on both sides earn their 

power through their committee positions. And giving up power in 

this institution is not something people will do voluntarily. 

So I agree with Tom Ridge that the leadership will have to basically require it. However, the leaders earn their power through the 

loyalty of their members, and making members shrink their own 

power is not really helpful to leaders holding power. So I do not 

know how the thing changes, but until it changes, we will not have 

the robust homeland function that we should have. 

Just one other comment, as I kind of implied, 10 years ago, the 

concept for the Homeland Department was more ambitious than 

maybe some of us would have wished. It was the White House’s 

proposal to put 22 departments and agencies together. Some of us 

had thought about a more modest function directed by the Homeland Coordinator in the White House, a job Tom Ridge originally 

had. But we took it because the Administration was behind it. 

So it is a daunting task to make this thing work. At this point 

I do not think we should rearrange the deck chair in the Administration. But if there is a way—and maybe the members here have 

more power than members that I observed back in the day. If there 

is a way to reorganize Congress to give this Committee and the 

House Committee more power, I think our country will be safer for 

it. 

Chairman CARPER. Admiral Allen, do you want to—— 

Admiral ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CARPER. And then Mr. Baker. Go ahead. 

Admiral ALLEN. As I stated earlier, I spent several days out at 

the Sunnylands Estate at the Annenberg Foundationsite in Rancho 

Mirage with Lee Hamilton and Tom Kean as part of the Aspen 

task force that produced the report that was sent out today. My 

proposal would be that be submitted and attached to the record because there is a detailed discussion of that rather than take the 

Committee’s time here. 

I would say that I would not have served on that task force if 

I did not subscribe to the concept that we need to make this simpler. 

The Coast Guard’s authorizing committee is Transportaion and 

Infrastructure (T&I), and there is a subcommittee for the Coast 

Guard there. I spent 4 years as the Commandant of the Coast 

Guard without an authorization bill. There were significant issues 

that we needed to deal with, anywhere from fishing vessel safety 
461 

1The report to which Mr. Allen refers can be found on page 523. 

to unregulated small boats that never were able to be addressed, 

and then if they were, committees would assert jurisdiction that 

had to be sent over to those committees for review. Very time-consuming. And if you look at some of the issues we have not been 

able to address—and a lot of those areas are addressed in the 

Aspen report1—I would direct the Committee just to take a look because I think there are a lot of issues on the record that have been 

raised. The issue of security for general aviation aircraft is another 

one moving forward. 

The only other point I would add in response to Senator Coburn’s 

comments on risk based, if you look at what we are trying to do 

right now with flood insurance, it is very instructive, because we 

have a problem right now, and those that bear the risk do not pay 

for the risk. We have an extraordinary amount of liabilities that 

have been built up trying to pay off the flood insurance claims for 

Hurricane Katrina that still exist today, and there is no clear way 

to how those books are going to be balanced moving forward. 

On the other hand, if you start to let those flood insurance fees 

rise, you have issues with local communities. And what you really 

need to do in the long run, in my view, is get out ahead of all this 

by starting to change behaviors on building codes, land use, and 

zoning out there, which is a much more strategic way to deal with 

this. But you cannot do that if you have four or five committees asserting jurisdiction over the problem. 

Mr. BAKER. I fully support the idea of reducing the number of 

authorizing and oversight committees. Let me, though, talk about 

two ways that we can address Senator Coburn’s concerns about the 

budget and some of the other issues. 

It seems to me that proper authorizing legislation can set the 

framework for actually saving money in the budget, and I will give 

you two examples. In fact, you raised one. The question of duplicating NSA’s capabilities, it makes no sense for DHS to try to do 

that. NSA has built capabilities over 50 years, carrying out a mission that has been funded in ways that DHS’s mission will never 

be funded. They have enormous capabilities. 

At the same time, both the American people and I think the Department of Homeland Security want some reassurance that if they 

lean on DHS to use those capabilities, they will not discover that 

policies are being made de facto, privacy policy in particular, by the 

people that they are leaning on. And so language that could create 

a set of authorizing legislation that sets aside DHS’ authorities and 

leaves it in control of its area, drawing on NSA for talent and for 

tools and technologies that it already uses, you will end up saving 

money by relying on existing capabilities and creating at the same 

time reassurances for people about how that reliance will work. 

The same thing, it seems to me, is true if you can build a planning process, a budgeting process that uses integration, Office of 

Secretary of Defense type capabilities, to say how can we reduce 

the budget effectively, how can we eliminate redundancies by looking at the authorizing language? And if we do that, we will be 

building the capabilities at what I described as the second tier so 

that the Secretary does not have to sit down and get out the eye-
462 

shade and start asking about the 14th line on individual components’ budgets, but that is being done by a centralized staff that 

is trying to eliminate redundancies. So by creating the right kind 

of authorization for those central staffs, you set the framework for 

reducing the budget. 

And, last, tied to that, it seems to me that until the day comes 

when we have eliminated many of the authorizing issues, one of 

the things that this Committee can do is build a relationship with 

the appropriators so that when the appropriators are asked about 

legislation that arguably is authorizing on appropriations, they 

know that this Committee has looked at those ideas, has thought 

about them, has vetted language, creating authorization language 

that may in a pinch end up in an appropriations bill, is worth considering in at least the short run until we get to the promised land. 

Chairman CARPER. Good. Thanks. I apologize to Senator Baldwin 

and Senator Chiesa, and Senator Ayotte has just left, too, to attend 

the observance. We have gone well beyond our 5 minutes, as you 

know, and I thank you for your patience. I just thought it was really important for us to allow this panel to answer these questions 

in the kind of thoughtful way that they have done, We spend so 

much of our lives here just going from one place to the other and 

in and out, as some of you know, and this was just a very helpful 

series of questions and responses. 

Senator Johnson, if he comes back, is next. Senator Chiesa is 

going to be recognized next, then Senator Baldwin. Senator Pryor 

was here. I think he has made the same decision that Senator 

Ayotte has made. But this is just an excellent hearing, and I am 

just very pleased with the way it is going. Jane, after Jeff asks his 

question, we will give you maybe the first rights, the first shot at 

that, if you want, and I know you have to leave. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHIESA 

Senator CHIESA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to this 

panel for being here today. 

Mr. Chairman, I join everybody in remembering the families, 

many from my State, who were so tragically impacted by the 

events of 9/11. We all remember where we were that day, certainly 

in New Jersey, watching this go on. 

I have prepared some remarks that I would ask you to make part 

of the record rather than reading them here today. 

Chairman CARPER. Without objection. 

Senator CHIESA. Thank you. 

The most recent events that we have seen that really get to the 

issue we are talking about today are the bombing at the Boston 

Marathon. And at the time—and I have raised this issue before 

when we had Commissioner Davis here and others to talk about 

those events, and I was serving as Attorney General at the time, 

and I remember in real time being in my office and learning that 

there were contacts, potential contacts to what was going on there 

in my State. And I remember—our State police and everybody just 

did an unbelievable job and turned that around in a way that 

makes everybody proud. It really does. And I understand that we 

want to work hard so that we do not have the event actually occur. 
463 

So I have the same question, and, Congresswoman Harman, I 

would invite you to answer first because of your time constraint. 

Do you think we currently have the appropriate climate among the 

people that are responsible for having, developing, and sharing the 

information necessary so that information is flowing appropriately, 

to get to Secretary Ridge’s point, we are not overly siloed? Because 

of all the things we are talking about, be it from a cyber perspective, be it from a terrorism perspective, be it from whatever these 

perspectives are, it is all about making sure the information is getting where it needs to get. And I would ask each of you to talk to 

us about your thoughts on the current climate of the way that information is shared among the people responsible for sharing it? 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, thank you, Senator. I would give us, as I just 

said, an F for reorganizing Congress. I think it is really sad that 

Congress has a 19th century structure to deal with 21st century 

evolving threats against our country. But on information sharing, 

I would give us a B, and that is not an A, and I am looking at Tom 

Ridge. I do not think—— 

Mr. RIDGE. Did you say B or D? 

Ms. HARMAN. B. It is not an A, but the challenge was to break 

down silos and to create opportunities for people to actually know 

each other, which is one of the ways you build trust and enable information sharing. 

Yes, there were mistakes in the Boston Marathon case. The Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) list did not get to 

the right folks, and the FBI did not followup, and a little of this 

and a little of that. However, once the event occurred, Boston—the 

surrounding police departments, the State of Massachusetts, and 

all of our Federal law enforcement agencies and Homeland came 

together in almost a seamless way; and using video, including people’s handheld phones, they were able to piece together the identity 

of the folks and to close in on them quickly. So that is why I say 

it is a B. After action we were an A; before action we were probably 

a C. But this is improving. 

I just want to mention something that we have not talked about 

but it is something I know a lot about based on my role on the Advisory Committee to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and 

some of these other intelligence places that I stay connected to, and 

that is that information—the dark side of information sharing is 

that it enables a Snowden or others to get too much information 

and to use it for nefarious purposes. So our goal has to be to build 

the trust, to build the horizontal arrangements, but then also to 

put in safeguards so that people with bad motives inside our system or outside our system cannot abuse it. And I do not think we 

mentioned that, and I do think it is part of the challenge going forward. 

Senator CHIESA. Thank you. Secretary Ridge. 

Mr. RIDGE. Well, I had the great pleasure of working with Congresswoman Harman back then. I think she is grading on a higher 

curve than I would by giving everybody a B. I am not going to give 

them a grade, but I want to address something that I found and 

I still find troubling, and it goes to the perception that DHS has 

not done its job. 
464 

I remember doing some TV after the Detroit bomber, and DHS 

was criticized for letting the individual on the plane. And I think 

Secretary Napolitano has taken some heat, and I had to remind everybody that DHS does not gather information. They rely on the 

alphabet agencies to provide it. And if the State Department did 

not give the information to DHS and Customs and Border Protection and give them reason not to put the person on the plane, then 

DHS should not be held accountable. But it seems from time to 

time they are. 

I think back to Fort Hood. There has been public revelation that 

the FBI in two different venues were aware that Hasan was e-mailing the radical cleric in Yemen, and DHS takes a little hit on that. 

Why didn’t they do more? Well, frankly, that was not in DHS’ spot. 

Somebody has to ask a couple of the other agencies why they did 

not do more. 

Now let me go to your question with regard to Boston. I do not 

think that the FBI is on a speed-dial arrangement with the Kremlin, and I would like to know personally how often the Kremlin 

picks up the phone and says, ‘‘We think you have a couple terrorists in your midst.’’ So I do not know how thorough the examination of that revelation was within the FBI. I am not faulting the 

FBI. I just do not know whether or not the Federal Government 

generally, including the FBI, took Russia, Russian intelligence, 

communication as seriously as it should have. There may have 

been other agencies that should have been involved. 

I think the response, as Congresswoman Harman said, to that 

incident was phenomenal. DHS did not get the credit—I mean, 

there were grants that went out; a training program went out. All 

that was done under DHS. But that is triage after the incident, 

and that is why information sharing is so critically important. 

Let me just take this a little step further. Let us assume that 

you break down the silos and there is more and better information 

sharing conceptually. I think somebody has to take a look at classification. The easiest way for an agency, I do not care what the 

agency is, to deny access to—and I am concerned about State and 

locals and private sector—is to say it is top secret, top secret sensitive compartmented information (SCI). Well, nobody wants to 

touch it. So I think somebody has to take a look at classification. 

I have seen a lot of things that were classified top secret that I 

know you could have shared with folks that would not do harm to 

sources and methods. And so I think classification is very important, particularly if we are serious about information sharing down 

to the State and locals and the private sector. 

Finally, I think Attorney Generals have to know more information about what is going on in their State. I am just one of those 

folks—you cannot secure the country from inside the Beltway, and 

at some point in time, Federal agencies, the alphabet agencies, 

have to entrust and trust high-level law enforcement members in 

all 50 States and territories with information about what is going 

on in their respective States. I venture a guess that you have no 

idea, as all the investigations did not when you were Attorney General, into potential terrorism activity in your State. 

I think it is a huge mistake. People say, well, somebody may reveal that information that was shared. Well, then, there would be 
465 

consequences. But I just think we need to expand the network with 

fellow Americans who have responsibilities for safety and security 

in this country. We have to start to trust them. You cannot just 

keep all that information in here. 

So that is my response to that inquiry, and I do think we need 

to take a look at classification because it is overly classified, which 

is reason not to share, and safety and security is the ultimate concern. You have to trust fellow Americans outside this city to help 

keep the country safe and secure. 

Senator CHIESA. Thank you, Secretary, and I know that my experience was—— 

Chairman CARPER. Congresswoman Harman, as you leave, thank 

you very much. Godspeed. 

Senator CHIESA. Mr. Chairman, I know I am out of time. We had 

the opportunity to be briefed, and every Attorney General’s jurisdiction is a little bit different. Mine included a lot of those things. 

But I think to get to your point, others have made these relationships. The first time you are talking cannot be after an event. 

Right? And talking before and having some trust and having seen 

somebody is invaluable once the event starts so that there is no 

hesitation, because that information has to get to the decisionmakers and to the rescuers and to whomever else is involved. So 

I appreciate your thoughts on that. 

Mr. Chairman, I am over my time, and I do not want to hold up 

Senator Baldwin, but at some point I would love to hear from the 

other panelists, too. 

Chairman CARPER. Senator Baldwin, are you OK if the other 

panelists respond to his question? Are you OK with that? Let us 

just do that. We have a good flow. Thanks. 

Senator CHIESA. Thank you. 

Admiral ALLEN. Rather than repeat some of the points, which I 

think are very valid, that Jane and the Secretary have made, let 

me take a little bit of a different spin on this. When you look at 

counterterrorism and the great expansion of transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking, we know there are growing linkages there. Whether you are a terrorist or you are a criminal, you 

have to do a couple of things that are visible. You have to talk, you 

have to move, and you have to spend money. And every agency operates basically on a case doctrine and how you manage it, and in 

that case there are usually confidential informants, and there are 

sources and methods. That usually is the route of classification, as 

Secretary Ridge referred to, because they are trying to protect that. 

The problem is that our law enforcement structure in this country has evolved over the last century against business lines of the 

bad guys—drugs, alcohol, tobacco, firearms, counterfeiting, intellectual property, all managed by a law enforcement agency that manages as a case. 

The fact of the matter is we are dealing with networks, illicit 

networks, that generate cash however they need to to perpetuate 

their regime. And what you need to do is attack the network with 

a network. And I think the greatest case for information sharing 

and the greatest case for more and better integration, not only in 

the Department of Homeland Security but domestically and internationally, is to move to a way to look at these challenges as net-
466 

work challenges and how do we move across dealing with their 

business lines, which means you are only taking down one franchise. You are not dealing with the root of the problem, which is 

how the network managed itself, threat financing, how the money 

moves, how they move, and how they communicate. That is the No. 

1 cause for action on information sharing in my view. 

Mr. BAKER. Three thoughts on this, one that I offer only tentatively because I do not know all the details. But I do remember 

that when the older Tsarnaev brother came back from Russia, he 

entered the United States, we had the chance to interrogate him; 

we had the chance to look at his electronics as he crossed the border. We did not do it. My impression is we did not do it because 

at that point the FBI had closed its case. And one of the questions 

I wonder about is whether DHS and CBP have deferred too much 

to the FBI. We have an independent responsibility to protect the 

United States, and the fact that the FBI closed its case is not necessarily a reason not to ask questions of somebody who has gotten 

the kinds of intelligence reports that Tsarnaev earned. 

Second, one of the things—— 

Senator COBURN. Let me correct the facts on that. Your statement is in error. 

Mr. BAKER. All right. 

Senator COBURN. The information was sent to the Joint Terrorism Task Force in Boston, but it was not relayed to Customs 

and Border Patrol at Kennedy. 

Mr. BAKER. OK. So then there clearly were failures of information sharing that cost us something, and something significant. 

Second, we learned after Boston how valuable cameras can be. 

They are not valuable in stopping crimes. They are valuable in 

catching the people who carry them out. That is also true—we 

learned that in the Tube bombings in London. And yet for a variety 

of reasons, including privacy campaigns, a lot of cameras have not 

yet been installed inside the city centers. We do not actually need 

them hooked up, we do not actually need to be watching them, but 

they need to be recording so that if something bad happens, we can 

go back and figure out what events led up to that. We should be 

encouraging the installation of those cameras, and if people have 

privacy worries, we should just have them continually write over 

their hard drives as opposed to send the data anywhere. 

And, third, on the information-sharing point, I thought that Jane 

Harman was exactly right. Information sharing creates risks. It 

creates the risk of Snowdens or Mannings. But on the network 

Snowdens and Mannings look a lot like Chinese hackers who have 

also compromised computers on the networks and are gathering 

suspicious amounts of data, and the same tools that help us to provide better cybersecurity will also provide better audits of who is 

on the network, what they are doing, and will protect privacy as 

well because we will be able to tell who has accessed information 

improperly. 

And so one of the things that this Committee could do, that DHS 

could do, is to make it a little clearer to the State and local entities 

that get grants, that they can use that money for cybersecurity 

audit technology that will allow them to meet all of those requirements. 
467 

Senator CHIESA. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CARPER. You bet. Thank you. 

Senator Baldwin, thank you for your patience here today. You 

can take as much time as you want. 

Senator BALDWIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, 

for holding this hearing, and I want to thank all of our panelists, 

including Congresswoman Harman in absentia, for your service to 

our country. I appreciate each of your sharing your analysis and 

appraisal of where we have come in these last 10 years and where 

we still have to go. 

I want to focus my questions on the larger issue of cybersecurity 

and the incredible increase in cyber attacks that we are experiencing. And I would like, if you could—and I will start with you, 

Mr. Baker—to sort of talk about any distinctions that we should 

appropriately make with regard to economic cyber attacks versus 

the threat of cyber terrorism where the goal might be to take out 

part of the power grid, for example. And I would like to have you 

focus—you ended your testimony a little bit with the private sector 

being in a position where they have more intel on their potential 

competitors, but I think you were talking about economic cyber attacks in that arena. So the question I have is: What can we do better with existing authorities? 

And then the second question that I would like to hear from all 

of you about is, you know, I do not know how long the journey will 

be until Congress actually passes legislation on this topic to supplement the Executive Order and to respond to many of the issues 

that have been raised. But there have been lots of comments 

about—and, Secretary Ridge, you talked about do not make this 

prescriptive, do not make this regulatory. Again, I wonder whether 

there is a distinction we need to make when we are talking about 

critical infrastructure because the people of America depend upon 

that critical infrastructure for daily life, and it may be private, but 

it is to the public benefit without question. And should there not 

be some additional obligation, some prescription, if you will, because of the level of importance of that critical infrastructure? 

If you do not mind, Mr. Baker, I would like to start with your 

reflections on those questions. 

Mr. BAKER. So there are two big worries in cyber. One is what 

you might call economic espionage or espionage generally, in which 

all of the attacks are aimed at stealing information. And we have 

seen enormous amounts of attacks aimed at practically everybody 

who might be of interest to any foreign government with any capabilities in this area, and probably everybody on this panel and certainly everybody on this Committee has been attacked in an effort 

to gather that information. So that is a serious pandemic problem 

right now. 

Second, sabotage or cyber war or cyber terrorism designed to 

break systems is a very serious possibility. I am not so sure about 

terrorism. I do not think it has been very healthy for al Qaeda 

leaders to use the Internet in the past. But state-aided terrorism 

is a concern. If we actually did attack Syria, I think you would 

have to worry that Iran or Hezbollah or some organization assisted 

by them would engage in cyber attacks on the United States de-
468 

signed to cause failures in financial or industrial control systems, 

and those could be very serious. 

All of those attacks tend to actually use the same basic techniques. You break into a standard commercial network, and then 

you try to hop to an industrial control network that you can break 

and cause serious damage. And so stopping the espionage attacks, 

making it much more expensive to break into systems to steal secrets, is probably our first and highest priority. 

First, companies know a lot about who is in their network. I represent a lot of them, and the experts that they hire say, ‘‘Oh, yes, 

this is a unit of the People’s Liberation Army or some criminal 

gang. We know, by the things they are doing, the code they are 

leaving behind, who it is, and we can tell you what their tactics are 

going to be for the next 24 hours or 48 hours. We can tell you what 

they are trying to steal and why.’’ 

So companies know a lot just from looking at the activity on their 

network, information that may not be available to law enforcement. 

What they cannot do is go to the command and control servers that 

are being used to steal the information or to the attackers headquarters computers. For that you often need law enforcement authorities. But law enforcement does not have all of the background 

information. So we need to find a way to use existing law enforcement authorities and the existing resources and information that 

individual companies have to actually track those guys back home 

and then begin looking for reasonably creative penalties that can 

be applied. Again, using existing authorities, we can deny visas for 

any good reason. The President and Congress can impose financial 

sanctions on individuals who have committed this kind of crime. 

We have lots of authorities we have not yet used. 

Admiral ALLEN. I think the progress that has been made with 

the Executive Order that was signed by the President regarding 

cybersecurity and infrastructure protection has taken a major step 

forward. I think, though, as was mentioned earlier, until you start 

dealing with the issues about proprietary data, antitrust issues, 

and liability, there is going to be a hesitancy of the private sector 

to want to fully get on board with that. 

Now, I think the conversation that has been started in the last 

2 weeks with the release of the draft voluntary framework by NIST 

is going to advance that discussion further. There are some critics 

that have said that is too general and not detailed enough to be 

effective. My position would be that you need to start out with the 

1.0 version and go to the 2.0 version, and having that conversation 

and moving forward and involving the private sector in that is really what is needed. 

But if you look at this problem, this is a classic case of macroeconomics. What is the inherent governmental role here? What 

should the private sector be doing? And I think that there is not 

a consensus in the country about what those roles are. Are the 

markets going to clear security? Or is the government going to provide there will be a command and control regulatory system? 

I think to figure out a way, No. 1, to share the information that 

is currently held classified within the government and get that out 

to the people that need it; on the other hand, when they are attacked, to get that information out of them so it can be used when 
469 

they are concerned about regulatory oversight of potential civil or 

criminal penalties associated with that. 

I will just say this: There are a lot of people out there that are 

trying to work this problem. I have had the opportunity over the 

last couple years to work with an organization in Pittsburgh called 

the National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance. It is a 501(c)(3) 

organization that was developed with the local folks at the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon and the local FBI 

office, and they actually have kind of developed a way to create 

what I would call a metaphorical Switzerland where they are collocated in the same place, so it is capable of just walking across the 

hall and exchanging information, understanding the protocols, 

building trust and so forth. But we are going to have to figure out 

a way for both of those parties to come into an area where they 

are free of risk, organizational risk, to provide that information and 

exchange it. If we cannot do that, it does not matter what the role 

of the government is or what the role of the private sector is. It 

is not going to work. And of all the conversations I have had in the 

last 2 or 3 years regarding this very complex problem, the National 

Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance has come closer to trying to 

figure out exactly how that works in the organization I have run 

into, and I would suggest the Committee may want to reach out 

and talk to them. 

Mr. RIDGE. Senator, I think—— 

Senator COBURN. Turn your microphone on. 

Mr. RIDGE. I believe quite a bit of progress has been made since 

the establishment of the Department with regard to addressing 

cybersecurity, although I think we all have to honestly admit in 

2003, when the enabling legislation was created, there was no one, 

I do not think, that was as totally concerned about—some may 

have been—the emerging threat of cyber incursions as we all are 

today. It has accelerated. It is pretty remarkable if you think that 

we commercialized the Internet in 1992 or 1993, and now it is the 

backbone of absolutely everything we do. And so the sensitivity and 

concern with regard to distinguishing between what is an economic 

event and what is actually a more defense-directed or offense-directed security incursion is a legitimate one. We know who the actors are. You have nation States. You have terrorists. You have 

hackers employed by nation States and terrorists. You have organized crime. There are multiple challenges in dealing with this. 

Even if we can attribute, if we can actually attribute who the 

attacker was and make a determination of the consequences, what 

do we do about it? What do we do about it? I mean, that again 

speaks, I think, to the kind of collaboration that focuses on information sharing in a true public-private partnership with the private sector rather than compliance, because with due respect to my 

profession, as an attorney, I do not see compliance lawyers as being 

the best means of assuring that we have enhanced our security in 

this country, because a regulation means there will be a block, it 

will be a check block, and you will check, and they said, OK, you 

did what the Federal Government wanted to do. And, frankly, the 

technology available today, offensive and defensive, as we speak, is 

changing, and it will be different tomorrow and the years ahead. 
470 

So I think the best insurance right now is to take, frankly, the 

embrace of—I think it is Pat Gallagher running NIST, who I think 

testified perhaps in this Committee previously about, look, let us 

continue down this path of setting voluntary standards that both 

the Federal Government and the private sector agree upon, and let 

us see how well they do about taking those standards and devising 

the kind of defensive infrastructure that they need before we start 

thinking about regulations, because I am afraid we will never be— 

I am going to say this: Congress 4 or 5 years ago appropriately 

gave to DHS chemical facility antiterrorism standards and regs. I 

think we are 3 or 4 years later; there are a lot of people working 

really hard on it. But that delegation of authority does not mean 

it was executed in the appropriate way. And I am simply saying, 

for the time being I think we ought to let this—I think President 

Obama set it up with his Executive Order. I think we ought to let 

that come to fruition before we even think about standards—before 

we think about regulations. 

I might add the three or four critical sectors—and I think you 

were alluding to them in your comment—you have financial services, you have energy, you have transportation. I must say from my 

experience these sectors have spent and will continue to spend 

hundreds of billions of dollars, sometimes on their own, sometimes 

in cooperation, in collaboration with Homeland Security. But we 

have evolved a long way. I remember we created a Computer 

Emergency Response Team at Carnegie Mellon because this was an 

emerging problem back in 2001 and 2002. Now it is a fact of life. 

We are going to be dealing with forevermore. Forevermore. And so 

I do not think we are ever going to have a regulatory compliance 

scheme that is going to be able to keep up with the dynamic environment. 

So my recommendation based on the purpose of this hearing, 

even though I think your question is a very important one, I think 

we need to let the NIST standards play out and really push for far 

more collaboration between the public and private sector. 

One anecdote. My company deals with some significant private 

sector companies that deal with the cyber issue, and one of them, 

which is a multinational corporation, walked into one of the alphabet agencies and said, ‘‘We have been hacked into,’’ and the alphabet agency said, ‘‘We know.’’ And they said, ‘‘Well, we are a taxpaying group of folks. Did you ever think it might be helpful if we 

sat down and worked together on it?’’ 

So I think, again, focusing on collaboration and sharing rather 

than compliance is the best approach for the time being. 

Chairman CARPER. Do you want some more time? 

Senator BALDWIN. No. Thanks. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. We made good use of that. 

As we start a second round, I want to preface—let me just say, 

you mentioned Pat Gallagher, who did testify here before our Committee earlier this year—from NIST, and he said—every now and 

then witnesses show great wisdom. And in his testimony before us, 

I think he said, and I will paraphrase, he said, ‘‘We will know we 

are on the right track when good cybersecurity policy and good 

business policy are one.’’ That is what he said. I thought that was 
471 

pretty good advice. We have gotten a lot of good advice here today 

as well. 

Let me also preface my next question by saying that here we are, 

it is the anniversary of 9/11. Here we are, maybe days before the 

United States could launch limited Cruise missile attacks at some 

targets in Syria. Here we are, knowing that we are under attack 

on the cyber front 24/7. And we have an Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, and we have an Acting Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security. And that just cries out for the Administration and 

for us to do our jobs, to make sure we have in place the kind of 

confirmed leadership that we need, capable confirmed leadership. 

OK. That having been said, let me turn to a topic that I just 

mentioned, that is on our minds, and that is the potential for military action, limited military action, in Syria unless that country relinquishes its chemical warfare supply and dismantles their capability to create more chemical weapons. 

The prospect of our using military force is a serious matter. It 

weighs on us all, certainly the President who came and visited our 

caucuses yesterday in the Senate, both Democrat and Republican. 

I want to ask, as we prepare to make whatever decisions we need 

to make in the days ahead in conjunction with the President, I 

think it is important for us to get answers to a few more questions, 

and I would like to ask this seasoned panel of national security experts for some of your thoughts. 

If the President does choose to take limited military action 

against the Assad regime, what impact do you think that might 

have on homeland security? What should DHS be doing to prepare 

for some potential consequences that would flow from U.S. action, 

even on a limited basis, against Syria? Mr. Baker, if you would like 

to lead off, that would be great. 

Mr. BAKER. Sure, I will be glad to. We absolutely need to prepare 

here. By taking on Syria, we are also taking on Hezbollah and 

Iran, their backers in that regime. And if they choose to make the 

United States regret the sanctions it imposes, they have very substantial capabilities. Hezbollah has its own cruise missiles. And a 

terrorist organization with that kind of capability certainly can develop and use cyber attacks or can send people to the United States 

to carry out attacks. 

So we would have to go on a pretty substantial alert basis. They 

would be biting off a lot. They are already on alert against Israel 

and fighting in Syria themselves, so they may decide that it is not 

prudent to attack, but hope is not a strategy for us. We need to be 

worried about our defensive capabilities. For the first time, we 

would face the risk that we will have a cyber attack aimed at getting us to quit engaging in military action. 

Iran is widely blamed for a series of attacks on our financial institutions that have been visibly punch-pulling exercises in which 

the attackers announce how long the attack will last and what day 

it will happen. Obviously they could do more and cause more damage. And, again, Iran, having blamed us for Stuxnet, is going to be 

less constrained about using that kind of weapon against the 

United States on behalf of an ally like Syria. So we will have to 

up our game both physically and virtually. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Thank you. Admiral Allen. 
472 

Admiral ALLEN. Let me start with a caveat. It has been several 

years since I sat in a tank. I am not up to speed on operational 

briefings, so I am just going to talk in generalities. I would not 

want to speak for anybody or make any comments that would not 

be appropriate in this situation. 

In regard to cyber threats related to any untoward act—and it 

could be generated by this—one of the problems we are dealing 

with right now is we are trying to evolve these structures, and we 

have talked about them extensively here today. It is tough to talk 

about how you would deal with one of these things when the answer is what you talk about you need to do and you have not done 

yet. 

But let me focus on something called advanced persistent threat, 

which is something that is discussed both domestically and internationally, and it relates a little bit to what Stewart was talking 

about. There are footprints that are left regarding behaviors that 

go on out there that are indications of something that is going to 

occur. And one of the reasons the changes that need to be made 

in the cybersecurity posture in this country have been made and 

continue to be looked at in the Executive Order, the NIST standards, and everything else is that we need to move to continuous 

monitoring, and then after that we need to move to continually be 

able to look at the precursor or the context that is being set for an 

attack, and we do know what those are, and a lot of it has to do 

with basically analyzing social media, because people talk about 

this. 

So in regards to any threat situation, and this one specifically, 

I think there ought to be a fine-tuning of our sensors out there related to what is being talked about in social media and what types 

of activities are taking place. After 9/11, we used to talk about 

chatter. Well, we have a much better capability now with—we have 

a mismatch in computation, spectrum, and bandwidth management 

in this country. We do not utilize enough against these problems. 

I think in this case we will be looking at advanced persistent 

threat because if they are going to do anything immediately, they 

already have had to put the mechanism in place to do it. 

Chairman CARPER. Thank you. Governor Ridge. 

Mr. RIDGE. Senator, I appreciate the question, and I must tell 

you, based on a personal relationship, because you and I have had 

many long conversations over the years about topics of national interest, I am going to resist the opportunity to tell you how I think 

we got into this mess and how I think we ought to get out of it 

and answer your question exactly. 

It reminds me of the National Security Council coming over to 

what was then a small core staff between the time I was sworn in 

as Secretary and the intervening 6 weeks before we opened the 

door on March 1, 2003, the first day of the Department of Homeland Security. A couple members of the National Security staff 

came over and said, very confidential at the time, ‘‘We are probably 

going into Iraq. We know you do not have a Department, but 

maybe you should think about potential blowback in this country 

and what we can do about it to minimize the effect.’’ 

So, one, I think your question is very appropriate and play the 

‘‘what if’’ and then figure out how we respond if the ‘‘if’’ occurs. 
473 

I think we have learned a lot since Liberty Shield. I think, frankly, the State and locals are far better prepared. We know defense 

readiness condition (DEFCON)—even the much maligned and occasionally referred to color-coded threat warning system, which I will 

carry with me for the rest of my life, at least we know now there 

are certain levels of security that are embedded in the Federal Government and even within some of the State and locals and the private sector, No. 1. 

No. 2, I think the most likely pushback would be in the cyber 

realm, and to that end, again, it is a great place for me to suggest 

that this is precisely where the Federal Government should be 

sharing the precursors that it may know or the addresses that it 

has seen as it relates to the digital incursions that we have been 

hit with from the Syrian Army, perhaps the Hezbollah and the like. 

This is a classic example where we probably, in this instance, are 

more familiar with the electronic incursions directed at us from 

Russia, from Syria, et cetera, and at precisely the time that that 

information should be shared with not just State and locals but 

with the private sector. 

So, long term, I think we are far better prepared to respond to 

an attack because—I do think the word has been used—we are far 

more resilient today than we were 12 years ago. But this is an excellent opportunity for the Federal Government to share some of 

the information that I am sure they have that the private sector 

would like to check that information against what they see occurring on the grid, with the data systems, the financial institutions, 

and transportation, et cetera, to see perhaps if they are missing 

something and can be better prepared if there is an electronic attack or digital attack if we go into Syria. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Thank you all for those very 

thoughtful responses. Governor Ridge mentioned how he will take 

with him to his grave the leadership that he provided with respect 

to the color-coding alert. I am not so sure if there is some way to 

work that into your tombstone and the narrative of your life. 

I was kidding my wife recently. She said, ‘‘Why do you spend so 

much time on postal reform?’’ Dr. Coburn and I, along with our 

staffs, spent an inordinate amount of time this year trying to reach 

an agreement on bipartisan legislation. But she was kidding me 

about something about postal, and postal reform on my tombstone. 

And I thought out loud and said, ‘‘Well, maybe what would be appropriate would be just these words: ‘Return to Sender.’ ’’ 

Mr. RIDGE. Again, it is a classic example of something that the 

Congress is going to have to deal with. I believe—look, we know 

that Russia and China have cyber attacks as part of their public 

warfighting strategy. We know this is a condition of not only military and diplomatic but business activity, international activity for 

the rest of the world. But, again, it is a place where you need the 

private sector and the public sector to sit down and really cooperate and determine if there is an attack, what are the consequences 

and who is responsible for returning it to sender? I mean, all this 

has to be worked out, and, again, I think that just calls for collaboration, cooperation, communication, and it does not require for a 

regulatory scheme where you check the compliance box and everybody feels that they are safe after that. 
474 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Thanks so much. Dr. Coburn. 

Senator COBURN. I think Governor Ridge agrees with this. I 

would love to have the other panelists’ thoughts. We spend billions 

on grants every year. Is it your opinion that those grants ought to 

be risk based rather than parochial based? 

Mr. RIDGE. Absolutely. 

Senator COBURN. Admiral. 

Admiral ALLEN. Senator Coburn, following the attacks of 9/11— 

I was the Atlantic Area Commander, as I said earlier—I was concerned about the posture of our ports on the east coast, and I put 

a team together that developed a port security risk assessment 

model that now is called the Maritime Security Risk Assessment 

Model by which we look at impacts, trading off what you are protecting in a port based on risk and consequence. 

I remember having a conversation with Secretary Chertoff about 

implementing that at the secretarial level across the Department 

to inform the grant programs, and early on we had a pretty significant impact in doing that because there was a lot of logic attached 

to what we did, until Secretary Chertoff ran into the buzz saw 

which is called New York City. And we are all still stinging from 

that adventure a couple years ago. 

I unequivocally agree with you it ought to be risk based. It ought 

to be conditions based, based on the adherence of local communities 

to standards like the National Incident Management System 

(NIMS). It ought to be, in my view, linked to how they are making 

decisions on land use and reducing risk. I think there is every argument in the world to do that in a constrained budget environment. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you. 

Mr. RIDGE. Senator, may I make just one quick comment if I 

may? 

Senator COBURN. Sure. 

Mr. RIDGE. Because, again, I do not want to go back to the reorganization of Congress, but it just conjures up a couple conversations I had when we were trying to move it to risk based. And I 

could not agree with you more than my colleagues. Every dime 

going out the door ought to be risk based. But I think the Department of Homeland Security, of all the agencies in the Federal Government, is probably more susceptible to political meddling and interference and impact than any others. 

I will give you a perfect example. Once we got into the second 

year of the Urban Security Initiatives, action initiatives, we had 

the FBI talk about and the intel community really assess based on 

the prior year’s intelligence gathering and try to come up with a 

risk assessment model vis-a-vis the cities that were potentially impacted, just given the volume and the credibility of the traffic. 

Long story short, from 1 year to the next, we took several cities 

off because on a risk-based analysis of the preceding year, they 

were no longer on the priority list. And the hue and cry from Congress, those who represented those communities, was not deafening, but it was fairly loud—not that we listened to it, but the fact 

of the matter is that it ought to be risk based, and I think you are 

on to something very important. But the whole system should be 

risk based. 
475 

Senator COBURN. One of the things the President proposed that 

I agreed with—I was kind of a loner on this Committee—is combining all these grants together to where you really have an efficient, effective grant program where you set metrics, there is transparency to it, you are following up, and if they are not following 

what the grant was for, you jerk the money. So that we actually 

saved money by consolidating the grant programs, and then we had 

more money to actually go where the greatest risk is. And then we 

followed up to make sure there is compliance with what the grant 

was for. 

They got a pretty good cold shoulder here in Congress on that, 

and I got a cold shoulder when our Committee marked up while 

we were still doing things on the basis of parochial rather than risk 

based. As a matter of fact, that is in the law. Rather than risk 

based, we are doing it on a parochial basis. 

Any recommendations on how we can accomplish that? I do not 

know whether you agree with the President’s recommendation of 

consolidating these grants and then using them on a risk-based 

process. Any recommendations, one, on how we would do that; and, 

two, whether or not we should do it? 

Mr. RIDGE. Again, without knowing specifically the recommendation, it is just very consistent with my thinking as to—after 10 

years of maturity and 10 years of growth, sometimes I think 

growth has not meant we have become more efficient or effective. 

It just seems to me that homeland security is all about risk management and resiliency, and the dollars out the door to be based 

on some kind of assessment, and it would be well to bring that philosophy to everything they do as well as the approach in terms of 

appropriating dollars for these grant programs. 

You might want to allow for—and I am going to speak and be 

very interested in my friend and colleague Thad Allen. I am not 

sure we have done quite enough with regard to maritime risks, 

port risks. So you may want to divide that aggregate, some might 

be into two or three verticals whereby you identify the greatest 

risks, one of which could be the maritime industry, and move on 

from there. But I know there is a duplication of programs and oversight, and I do not think it is needed and everything out the door 

to be risk-managed at this point. 

Senator COBURN. Admiral Allen. 

Admiral ALLEN. Yes, Senator, early on there was a port security 

grant program as well, and just one vignette associated with that. 

Then I would like to attack the larger issue that you raised. 

I was prone to support requests for grants in areas where I saw 

that there was not only a recognition of risk but a commonality of 

purpose and regional approaches. And we saw some areas—one of 

them is Houston—where they came together and they created a regional entity by which they consolidated all their requirements that 

came in for a grant program. I think whenever you can do that, 

that kind of behavior ought to be encouraged. 

Whatever you put in place—and this is going to be a lousy metaphor, but it is the only one I can come up with on the seat of my 

pants here—it is almost going to have to have an ironclad wall 

around it that allows it to be executed like the Base Realignment 
476 

and Closure (BRAC) program, an up-or-down vote, this is what we 

decided; it is executed or it is not executed. 

Mr. RIDGE. Yes, I like that. 

Admiral ALLEN. And I do not know how you structure that in 

law, but you are almost going to have to have a way where, once 

we decide how it is going to be done, the criteria are established 

and the decisions are made that it is irrevocable, it is either up or 

down, and it cannot be picked apart. 

The issues, I saw Secretary Chertoff just get wire-brushed up 

here, ran into the political buzz saw in New York after even trying 

to diminish the funding, and it is not to say that New York does 

not have problems, but that was a very difficult time for us at the 

Department. 

Mr. BAKER. I think Admiral Allen raises a point that is worth 

thinking about in terms of how much of your personal credibility 

and time you would invest in that, because even after you have 

built a pretty good risk system for grants, politics will not disappear, and that risk system, whatever it is, could get distorted by 

the kinds of politics that Secretary Chertoff encountered, and others have. 

And so you may at the end of the day end up with a less mechanical system, but not one in which the politics have been eliminated. 

And at that point, it is possible you will ask yourself, ‘‘How much 

did I really achieve by introducing this risk concept?’’ I believe in 

it, but in practice, I am not sure that it works out as well as one 

imagines. 

Senator COBURN. Well, thank you. My comment on that is you 

need a backbone, the person that is running the agency, and take 

the heat, but do what is right for the country. When we have a 

Bearcat garden, a pumpkin festival in Keene, New Hampshire, and 

you say what could those dollars have done to either protect us on 

cybersecurity, advance our intelligence, what else could we have 

done? So we are not using any cost/benefit analysis. What we are 

doing is parochial—dividing up the pie, and we are at a point 

where, first of all, this country cannot afford to do that anymore. 

We do not have the pleasure of doing that. 

And so I think the next Homeland Security Secretary, that is 

going to be one of the qualifications I am looking for: Are you ready 

to take on the fight to do what is best for the country, not what 

is best for the politicians? 

Thank you. 

Mr. RIDGE. I think it would make the next Secretary and future 

Secretaries—you are right, a backbone will be essential. But it 

would be nice to have the institution that applies so much pressure, changing their jurisdiction, so, you know, the fact that you 

can apply pressure institution-wide is because they are answerable 

institution-wide. You start reducing that to a reasonable, necessary 

oversight and collaborative process, it will be a heck of a lot of 

pressure if the decisions—the legislative decisions that the Secretary is obliged to follow is reduced rather substantially and, 

therefore, held accountable to Senators Carper and Coburn. 

Admiral ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, could I make one quick comment? 

Chairman CARPER. Sure. 
477 

Admiral ALLEN. There are a lot of different grants out there. I 

am specifically going to refer—because I saw Senator Coburn on 

television making very strong statements after the tornadoes in 

Moore, Oklahoma. And this gets back to an earlier statement by 

Jane Harman. In the passage of the emergency supplemental following Hurricane Sandy, there were some very deft and artful 

amendments to the Stafford Act that got inserted into that bill that 

created more leeway and flexibility for local governments to deal 

with things like debris removal, where there was an economic incentive for them to do what was best for them, but also preserved 

those funds and allowed them for another use. 

So I think there may be some utility in looking at what we were 

able to do, and I realize that was a really unusual way to amend 

the Stafford Act, but I think there may be some insight there to 

be gained on how you can empower local communities with flexibility so there is an economic incentive for them to do what is right 

and build off a concept like that, sir. And I congratulate everybody 

on that piece of legislation, by the way. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Thanks. 

I believe it was back in March, Dr. Coburn and I held a hearing 

in this room to examine the progress that has been made and some 

of the challenges that still remain within the management of the 

Department of Homeland Security. I am sure that all of you are 

aware of the latest high-risk report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that found the Department had made considerable progress in integrating its components, moving toward actually having auditable financials and, we hope, an unqualified audit 

soon. But the overall management of the Department remains on 

GAO’s high-risk list, and I have been really impressed by the efforts of the Department’s leadership to address these management 

issues. 

With the changing of the guard, the impending changing of the 

guard at the top of the Department, there are still a bunch of questions about how the Department can sustain and buildupon the 

work of Secretary Napolitano and also, I should hasten to add, 

Deputy Secretary Jane Holl Lute. 

What do you view as the most urgent steps that the Department 

should take to develop strong management institutions and practices? That is the question. What do you view as the most urgent 

steps that the Department should take to develop strong management institutions and practices, to further develop those practices? 

And are there any legislative steps that come to mind that those 

of us who serve on this Committee and our colleagues ought to take 

to strengthen the tools and institutions that the Secretary needs to 

manage the Department? 

And a last quick question. Admiral Allen, you were there, I 

think, when we cut the ribbon on the new Coast Guard headquarters at St. Elizabeths. Were you there? 

Admiral ALLEN. I was not, sir. I was on travel that day. 

Chairman CARPER. That was a special day. I wish you could have 

joined us. But how does the consolidation of DHS’ headquarters at 

St. Elizabeths play into management improvements? Those three 

questions, if you all could take a swing at those, three strikes, 

three pitches. Just make sure your—— 
478 

Mr. RIDGE [continuing]. Those fast balls, Senator. I am familiar 

with the report, not the contents of the report, with regard to management. I have often said that the Department of Homeland Security from the get-go had two responsibilities that it had to deal 

with simultaneously: one, build a safety and security platform to 

deal with risk and resiliency; the other was the business line integration. It is a business. It is a budget that has doubled. You have 

a couple hundred thousand employees, and one of the ways—one 

of the regrets—and it is something that you could not do anything 

about—is if you were going to merge 20-plus agencies with multiple 

missions, with multiple procurement requirements and budget requirements, et cetera, in the private sector, you would at least have 

had a year or so by the time you got all the Federal and State regulatory approvals, because Homeland Security was and still is 

about mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, and startups. And the 

management around those things for the past 10 years apparently, 

according to the GAO, has not dramatically improved. 

I frankly do not have an answer. I think that we have had some 

really good people there trying to get those things done. But absent 

buy-in from some of the management changes and the restructuring that they might recommend, and that is, buy-in by the Congress of the United States, it is pretty difficult to make reforms. 

I think that it is not just endemic to Homeland Security. I just 

truly believe that there are still silos within that agency that will 

require—that have to be merged, and it can only be done with legislative oversight and direction. 

I like the notion of consolidating. I hope you find money to build 

out St. Elizabeths, because as Secretary, when we would have periodic meetings with the leaders of the basically five or six really 

muscular agencies—they talk about 20 departments and bureaus, 

but basically there were five or six that provided most of the employees, and the rest were just bits and pieces from the other units 

of government. And to try to pull your leadership together a couple 

of times a week, taking them from their offices and bringing them 

over to the Nebraska Avenue Complex (NAC) and sitting down for 

2 or 3 hours a couple times a week was not a good use of their time 

or ours. We had the opportunity to develop the kind of day-to-day 

working relationship that I think Congress wanted when it put 

these agencies together. It was a tremendous opportunity for disparate pieces of Homeland Security, and it has been demonstrated 

tactically with Customs and Border Protection working with the 

Coast Guard, working with ICE. The collaboration is important. 

But I think you get better management if you have the chief leaders of the entity interacting on a day-to-day basis rather than 

piecemeal. 

I also think you get better management and efficiency if the restructuring that has been recommended by some of us from the 

outside and the Department of Homeland Security is put into law. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Thank you. Admiral Allen. 

Admiral ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, this is an area I have a great 

passion about, so do not feel bad about cutting me off here. Let me 

hit a couple of these issues. 

One of the things that happened when the Department was created was we aggregated the authorities and the jurisdictions from 
479 

the legacy departments. But one of the things that has been insidious for over 10 years now—and I know this from talking with staff 

on the Appropriations Committees—is that we took the appropriations structures from the legacy departments—Treasury, Justice, 

and so forth—and just moved them to a single committee. There 

is no comparability in the Department right now between components on what is a personnel cost, an operating cost, and a capital 

cost. And because of that, you cannot compare and tradeoff between components on where you want to make investments. 

I have said in several hearings, both here and before the House, 

that in my view you have to get down to blocking and tackling if 

you are going to take on the management issues in the Department, and the first area should be to standardize the appropriations structure and how the budget is presented to the Congress in 

terms of the justifications so there is comparability. The Congress 

cannot make good decisions unless there is more transparency and 

comparability across the Department. That leads to financial management and the ability to have better insight on how you are 

spending your money. 

They got a qualified opinion on their audit this last year. That 

was a major breakthrough. The Coast Guard got a qualified opinion, the first military service to ever do that. That should be taken 

as the floor, the minimum expectation. It needs to move forward. 

But you are starting to talk about the integration of IT systems, 

financial systems. There are three major financial platforms that 

are used in the Department right now. There is going to be a look 

this next year at shared services and maybe a better way to do 

this. 

I think all that has to come on the table, and we have to look 

at really trying to integrate this enterprise and make it run efficiently like you would if you were running a corporation. 

Now, regarding St. Elizabeths, I have to kind of sit on my hands 

here. I was the Commandant when we made the decision to move, 

and all I said was: ‘‘I can support this; I am behind it. I just don’t 

want to go there without the Secretary.’’ And I will leave it at that. 

There are issues with the Federal buildings funds. There are 

issues with how this whole project has been funded, issues with the 

District of Columbia planning entities. But the overriding imperative to have a central operations center from which the Secretary 

can operate and make decisions, as Secretary Ridge said, is a primary need in this Department. It is my written testimony. I will 

not belabor the fact here. A National Operations Center at a unified Department, operations and situational awareness, absolute 

imperative moving forward. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Thank you. I think you can control 

those passions pretty well. Thank you. Mr. Baker. 

Mr. BAKER. I would certainly agree with Admiral Allen on St. 

Elizabeths. They say in Washington that where you stand depends 

on where you sit, and I do think that if DHS components sit together, they are likely to stand together much better than they do 

today. And so to the extent that we can get everybody in one place, 

we are much better off. 

I, too, am a little reluctant to make suggestions for changing the 

details of management in a Department that I left a few years ago. 
480 

I think that there are probably some opportunities with respect to 

the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) to turn that 

from an exercise in which we look at some very interesting and difficult issues into something that turns our budget into a multiyear, thoughtful priority-driven exercise rather than something in 

which we ask how much money do we have and what can we cut. 

And to the extent that authorizing legislation can move the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review in the direction of actually influencing budget decisions, I think that would be an enormously effective way of dealing with the looming crisis we have with respect 

to appropriations for everybody, and making sure that the cuts are 

much smarter than they otherwise would be. 

Chairman CARPER. Thank you. 

Before we wrap it up, let me just telegraph my final pitch, and 

that is, sometimes when we have a hearing like this, I like to invite 

our witnesses just to give a brief closing statement, just a couple 

of thoughts that you want to kind of pull together, just underline 

a few things and leave those for us. I would welcome, I think we 

would welcome that. 

Let me just yield to Dr. Coburn for any last comments? OK. 

Mr. Baker, do you want to give us a closing thought or two before 

we wrap it up? 

Mr. BAKER. Yes. Nothing has made me prouder or caused me 

more frustration than my service at the Department of Homeland 

Security. I am deeply fond of the institution, and I believe that it 

is making a major contribution to the security of all Americans. It 

has changed our approach to the border in ways that nothing else 

could have, and that has paid dividends in almost every terrorist 

incident that has been planned or launched against us since 9/11. 

We need the Department, but we need it to be better, and we 

need it to be more organized, more consolidated, more coordinated. 

That is the biggest challenge that the Department faces. We have 

gotten by with three great leaders, but we cannot count on personality-driven unification forever. We need to institutionalize it. 

It is a big challenge, especially with the oversight authority that 

exists, but it is a challenge that you have the support, I am sure, 

of everyone on this panel in your effort to accomplish. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Thank you, sir. Admiral Allen. 

Admiral ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, in regard to some of the mission 

areas that we have talked about today—cybersecurity, immigration 

reform, and so forth—a lot of that is going to necessarily involve 

the Congress to do that. I sit on the Advisory Board of the Comptroller General, so I am aware of the risk areas. Gene Dodaro and 

I have talked about this before. 

I believe when it comes to the internal management of the Department of Homeland Security, there are adequate authorities in 

the Secretary, administrative space to operate. I think there needs 

to be a serious discussion about conditions of employment and a 

management agenda related to mission support activities and functional integration in the Department for the next leadership team 

moving in. And those ought to be clear and distinct, and they ought 

to be enforceable in the budget. And they ought to be laid out with 

metrics attached, as Senator Coburn would probably want. 
481 

I do not believe any legislation is needed to take care of the management improvements that the Department could implement immediately. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Thank you. Governor Ridge. 

Mr. RIDGE. When you look back on those days when there was 

considerable debate in this town as to whether or not we actually 

needed a Department of Homeland Security, I remember my 

friends on my side of the aisle said we are creating a brand-new 

bureaucracy of 180,000 people. And I hopefully reminded them and 

they believed me that they were not new jobs; we were just going 

to consolidate units of government that historically had missions 

related to protecting our borders and gaining knowledge about the 

people and the goods that come across our borders. 

Long needed in the 21st century world when the interdependency 

of the marketplace, the interdependency of information sharing for 

law enforcement purposes, and the interdependency of countries 

with regard to security is a part of our daily lives and how we are 

going to live. We are interdependent. 

But I think the Congress did the wise thing. I do think they 

brought together the right agencies. I think the Department has 

evolved and matured, but I am reminded of Sean O’Keefe’s phone 

call to me after I was announced as being the President’s nominee 

to be the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. He 

said, ‘‘Tom, a couple of decades ago, we saw’’—there was a smaller 

aggregation of responsibilities that created National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration (NASA), and he said, ‘‘Decades later I 

still see the vestiges of culture in silos in this entity and in this 

organization.’’ 

So, one, I do not think we should be surprised that we have not 

made as much progress as we all think we need. We are not as efficient as we need to be. We are not as risk-managed and risk-based 

as we need to be. I do not think anything is wrong with the management structure. I do think there needs to be efforts to oversee 

the oversight of that structure to hold both the Congress and the 

Department far more accountable for the outcomes we want. 

At the end of the day, I think you have touched on some very 

important issues, and I am proud to have spent some time with 

these panelists. It is about information sharing. It is about resiliency. It is about risk-managed approach. 

I would hope you can resolve these issues. I realize that, again, 

ironically enough, the issues that I just raised are not necessarily 

all within the exclusive purview of this Committee, which speaks 

to one of the challenges I think the Congress has. But at the end 

of the day, I am proud to have been the first Secretary. I think 

they have made marvelous progress. I would like to see some of it 

accelerated. I am just not convinced because it got bigger it has 

gotten better. I do not think it has. And that has nothing to do 

with the well-meaning intentions of the people who go to work 

there every single day to make you and me safer and more secure. 

It just does not have the kind of collaboration and oversight with 

the Congress that I think is absolutely essential. 

At the end of the day, the mission is the same at the Department 

of Homeland Security. Make our country safe and secure. Do it in 

a way that is consistent with the Constitution and the rule of law. 
482 

1The closing statement of Senator Carper appears in the Appendix on page 485. 

And the big challenge associated with that has been with us since 

2003. But with the Snowden revelations and the vast impact of the 

digital world and the cyber world, that challenge to maintain that 

privacy of individuals and the protection of these rights under the 

Constitution becomes more complicated for this Committee and for 

the Congress of the United States. And I look forward to future invitations to share my point of view with all of you who are committed to making a stronger and better Department. And I thank 

you very much. 

Chairman CARPER. It is we who thank you. We thank you for 

this day. We thank you for your preparation for this day and for 

this conversation, and for your continued service to our country. I 

have a closing statement I am going to submit for the record.1

And I will just say this: I think some remarkable progress has 

been made in the 10 years that has passed. Thank you for that initial leadership, Tom, as this Department was launched, and to Admiral Allen and Mr. Baker for your great leadership as well. This 

is as much progress as may have been made. There is clearly more 

to do. It is not a time to rest on our laurels. 

I like to say that everything I do, I know I can do better, and 

clearly the same is true in terms of protecting our homeland. 

So we leave here knowing that on this very special day we have 

learned a lot of lessons, and I think we have taken a lot of the appropriate steps to better secure our Nation. But obviously there is 

a whole lot more that we can do. 

Dr. Coburn gave me a really good idea earlier this year, and that 

is that we should do a top-to-bottom review of the Department and 

try to figure out how we go about reauthorizing the Department. 

He said this is an appropriate time to start that process. And what 

you have done today in laying out for us really a banquet of knowledge, just a font of great ideas, this is enormously helpful to us in 

this process. So we thank you for all that. It is great to see you. 

I want to thank our staffs for pulling this hearing together. You 

have all done a great job, and we are grateful to each of you. 

With that having been said, the hearing record will remain open 

for 15 days until, I think, September 26th at 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and any questions for the record. 

With that, again, our thanks and our thoughts and prayers for 

those whose lives we remember today. God bless. Thanks. 

We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the Committee was adjourned.] 
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