UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ In re: JERRY GRANT, Debtor.

-------------------- JUNE CLABAUGH, Appellant,

v. JERRY GRANT, Appellee. No. 16-6062 (BAP No. 15-035-WO) (Bankruptcy Appellate Panel)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before MATHESON , McKAY , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ June Clabaugh appeals from a decisi on of the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) that affirmed th e bankruptcy court’s order avoiding her judicial lien on debtor Je rry Grant’s home because it impaired his homestead exemption. We have jurisdiction un der 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) and affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This or der and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of la w of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### September 20, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - I. BACKGROUND Ms. Clabaugh inherited valuable coin s and heirlooms worth as much as $2 million from her father and placed them in a safe depos it box. The bank lost the ownership records and, in at tempting to locate the owner, used information in the box to contact Mr. Grant. Mr. Grant fals ely told the bank he was the personal representative of Ms. Claba ugh’s father’s estate. He to ok possession of the box’s contents and says he so ld them for $488.00. Ms. Clabaugh sued the bank and Mr . Grant when she discovered what happened. She settled with the bank an d obtained a $1.25 million judgment against
Mr. Grant for conversion. See Clabaugh v. Grant ( In re First Am. Bank & Trust ), 347 P.3d 1044, 1049-51. (Okla. Civ. App. 2014) (affirming conversion judgment and damage award, reversing fraud judgment), cert. denied (Mar. 30, 2015). Ms. Clabaugh recorded her judgment, which by ope ration of state law attached a judicial lien on Mr. Grant’s real estate , including his residence. Mr. Grant declared bankruptcy and lis ted his residence as his homestead exemption. Oklahoma’s Constitution and la ws permit a person’s principal residence to be exempt from attach ment or forced sale for payment of debts. See Jones, Givens, Gotcher & Bogan, P.C. v. Berger , 46 P.3d 698, 701 (Okla. 2002) (citing Okla. Const. art. 12, § 2; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 31, § 1(A)). Ms. Clabaugh initially objected to the homestead exemption, ar guing Mr. Grant used the property as a business, but later withdrew her objection.- 3 - Mr. Grant then moved under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A) to avoid Ms. Clabaugh’s judicial lien on his home. The Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to avoid a judicial lien if it impa irs an exemption the debtor is entitled to claim, such as a homestead exemption permitted by state law. See id . The bankruptcy court granted the motion over Ms. Clabaugh’s objections. The court found that Mr. Grant met all of § 522(f)(1)(A)’s requirements because Ms. Clabaugh’s claim was based on a judicial lien, it impaired hi s homestead exemption, and he possessed the residential property at the time the lien attached. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot , 500 U.S. 291, 295- 96 (1991) (listing requirement s to avoid a judicial lien under § 522(f)(1)(A)). The bankruptcy court later ruled that Mr. Grant’s debt to Ms. Clabaugh was nondischargeable because he had willfully and maliciously injured her property by conversion. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (debts aris ing from “willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity” are nondischargeable). Ms. Clabaugh appealed the § 522(f)(1)(A ) avoidance order to the BAP, which affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court lacked authority under the Bankruptcy Code to deny Mr. Grant’s § 522(f)(1)(A) motion. She now appeals to this court.
II. DISCUSSION Despite what happened to Ms. Clab augh and her success in obtaining the conversion judgment against Mr. Grant, we are bound by Supr eme Court precedent and the Bankruptcy Code to affirm. “I n an appeal from a final decision of a bankruptcy court, we independ ently review the bankruptcy court’s decision, applying- 4 - the same standard as the bankruptcy a ppellate panel or di strict court.” In re Millennium Multiple Emp’r Welfare Benefit Plan , 772 F.3d 634, 638 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitt ed). We review the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions de novo and its fa ctual findings for clear error. Id . at 639. Ms. Clabaugh’s first two appellate ar guments challenge the validity of Mr. Grant’s homestead exemption, claiming Mr. Grant is ineligib le because he is single. She did not raise this objection to the homestead exemption in the bankruptcy court; indeed, after withdrawing her obj ection contending Mr. Grant used the property as a business, she e xpressly told the court she wa s not contesting the validity of Mr. Grant’s homestead exemption. Ap lt. App. at 388, 390. Because Ms. Clabaugh intentionally relinquished her objections to the homestead exemption before the bankruptcy court, her first tw o arguments are waived, and we will not consider them. Paycom Payroll, LLC v. Richison , 758 F.3d 1198, 1203 (10th Cir. 2014). Ms. Clabaugh’s third, fourth, fifth, a nd sixth arguments all contend that the bankruptcy court has the equitable power to deny Mr. Grant’s right to avoid the judgment lien on his home under § 522(f)(1)(A) because Mr. Grant is a dishonest debtor who is concealing his assets from the court, including her coins and heirlooms, and because hi s debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6). Ms. Clabaugh does not dispute that Mr. Gran t meets all of the statutory requirements for avoiding her judicial lien under § 522(f)(1)(A), and she cites no statutory provision in the Bankruptcy Code that w ould limit this exemp tion. Rather, she- 5 - argues the court has the inhere nt equitable power to deny th is exemption. She relies
upon Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts , 549 U.S. 365 (2007), which held that a bankruptcy court has the equita ble power under 11 U.S.C. § 105 to deny a Chapter 7 debtor’s right to convert to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy if the debtor is an atypical dishonest debtor who acted in ba d faith. 549 U.S. at 371, 374-75. She contends Mr. Grant acted in bad faith a nd cites cases holding that equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy. But as the both the bankruptcy court a nd the BAP explained here, the Supreme Court’s decision in Law v. Siegel , 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014), refined Marrama ’s holding, and unanimously rejected her arguments. Siegel held the Bankruptcy Code does not confer “a general, equitable power in bankruptcy courts to deny exemptions based on a debtor’s bad-faith conduct.” 134 S. Ct. at 1196; id. at 1197 (“ Marrama most certainly did not endorse, even in dict um, the view that equi table considerations permit a bankruptcy court to contravene express provisions of the [Bankruptcy] Code.”). The debtor in Siegel created a fictitious and fraudulent lien on his home to eliminate any equity and maximize his homes tead exemption. The bankruptcy court granted the trustee’s motion to surcharge the debtor’s exemption to offset the exorbitant litigation costs of uncovering the debtor’s fraud. The Supreme Court held that the bankruptcy court exceeded its inherent equitable powers in doing so, however, because it contra vened the specific provisions of § 522 regarding the debtor’s valid homestead exemption. Id . at 1195-96.- 6 - Siegel recognized that a bankruptcy cour t has broad equitable powers under § 105 “to issue any order . . . necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code” and has “inherent power to sanction abusive litigation practices.” 134 S. Ct. at 1194 (ellipsis and in ternal quotation mark s omitted). But it also said any equitable powers possessed by “the bankruptcy co urts must and can only be exercised within the conf ines of the Bankruptcy Code,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), a nd “§ 522 does not give cour ts discretion to grant or withhold exemptions based on whatever co nsiderations they deem appropriate,” id. at 1196. “[T]he court may not refuse to honor the [§ 522 ] exemption absent a valid statutory basis for doing so,” nor may it a dd exceptions not found in the statute. Id

. The Court noted that bankruptcy courts re tain “authority to respond to debtor misconduct with meaningful sanctions[,]” including aut hority to deny a dishonest debtor discharge, id . at 1198, but made clear that “f ederal law provides no authority for bankruptcy courts to deny an exempti on on a ground not specified in the Code,” id . at 1197 (emphasis omitted). Ms. Clabaugh attempts to distinguish her case from Siegel , arguing that (1) Mr. Grant is a more ex treme, atypical dishonest de btor than the debtor in Siegel ; (2) the debtor in Siegel had not been found guilty of co nversion; and (3) the trustee in Siegel failed to file a timely objection to the homestead exemption. Although Siegel involved different misconduct than Mr. Grant’ s, its broad holding is dispositive of this case. However persua sive Ms. Clabaugh’s equita ble arguments may be, we agree with the BAP that, under Siegel , the bankruptcy court c ould not exercise its- 7 - equitable powers to deny Mr. Grant’s § 522(f)(1)(A) avoidance mo tion because there is no statutory basis to do so. 134 S. Ct. at 1196-97; see also Ellmann v. Baker (In re Baker) , 791 F.3d 677, 683 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[U]nder Siegel , bankruptcy courts do not have authority to use their equitable powers to disallow exemptions or amendments to exemptions due to bad faith or misconduct.”). Finally, Ms. Clabaugh’s remaining ar guments assert Mr. Grant should be denied a discharge under § 523(a)(6). The bankruptcy court already ruled in Ms. Clabaugh’s favor that Mr . Grant’s debt is nondischarg able under § 523(a)(6), so these arguments are moot.
III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons and for substant ially the same reas ons stated by the BAP in its order dated Febr uary 4, 2016, we affirm.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge