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S. Hrg. 113–294 

CONTRACT MANAGEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT 

OF ENERGY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND CONTRACTING 

OVERSIGHT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 27, 2013 

Available via http://www.fdsys.gov 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

KEITH B. ASHDOWN, Minority Staff Director 

TRINA D. SHIFFMAN, Chief Clerk 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

MARGARET DAUM, Staff Director 

RACHEL WEAVER, Minority Staff Director 

LAUREN CORCORAN, Chief Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statement: Page 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 1 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 3 

Senator Begich .................................................................................................. 16 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, JUNE 27, 2013 

Hon. Gregory H. Friedman, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Energy ..... 4 

Hon. Joseph F. Bader, Board Member, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board ..................................................................................................................... 6 

J.E. ‘‘Jack’’ Surash, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Acquisition and Project Management, Office of Environmental Management, U.S. Department of 

Energey ................................................................................................................. 8 

Michael Graham, Principal Vice President, Bechtel National, Inc. .................... 26 

Michael McKelvy, President and Division Chief Executive, Government, Environment and Infrastructure Division, CH2M HILL .......................................... 28 

Frank Sheppard, Jr., Vice President and Deputy Project Manager, Parsons 

Corporation ........................................................................................................... 30 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Bader, Hon. Joseph F.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47 

Friedman, Hon. Gregory H.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 39 

Graham, Michael: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 26 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 73 

McKelvy, Michael: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 28 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 78 

Sheppard, Frank Jr.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 30 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 83 

Surash, Jack J.E.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 66 

APPENDIX 

Statement submitted for the Record by Bechtel National Inc. ............................ 89 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Friedman .................................................................................................... 90 

Mr. Bader .......................................................................................................... 95 

Mr. Surash ........................................................................................................ 117 

Mr. Graham ...................................................................................................... 158 

Mr. McKelvy ...................................................................................................... 160 

Mr. Sheppard .................................................................................................... 165 

(1) 

CONTRACT MANAGEMENT BY THE 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

THURSDAY, JUNE 27, 2013 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room 

342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claire McCaskill, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators McCaskill, Begich and Johnson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL 

Senator MCCASKILL. Good morning. This hearing will now come 

to order. 

Today’s hearing will focus on contract management by the Department of Energy (DOE). This is an area of contract management 

that has not received enough attention from Congress. I expect that 

this will only be the first in a series of hearings by this Subcommittee that will look at how other agencies are managing taxpayer dollars. 

This hearing will focus on the Department’s Office of Environmental Management (EM). The Office of Environmental Management is responsible for cleaning up the nuclear waste that is a legacy of America’s nuclear weapons work in World War II and the 

Cold War. No one questions the need to do this work, but when 

hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars are at stake, we need to 

make sure that those dollars are not just being squandered. EM’s environmental cleanup is currently estimated to cost $270 

billion and to continue beyond 2087. Since 1990, EM has received 

nearly $150 billion to carry out its mission, and all the work of 

cleanup—managing the sites, developing the technology, building 

the facilities and processing the waste—is done by contractors. 

This heavy reliance on contracting is troubling because the Department of Energy’s contract management has been on the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) High Risk List since 1990— 

the year the list began. 

In 2003, over a decade ago, GAO identified the Department’s 

choice of contract type, use of competition, measurement of contractor performance, cost overruns and schedule delays as major 

problems for the Department’s contracts. Today, 10 years later, little has changed. 
2 

EM relies on cost-based contracts for most of its environmental 

remediation work. This is an improvement over the large management and operations contracts the Department used to use. 

However, the government bears the risk for all cost overruns on 

a cost-based contract, making these vehicles very risky for the government. The cost overruns on just one project—the waste treatment plant at Hanford—now total almost $10 billion since the contract was awarded. 

Using cost based contracts is especially risky for EM because up 

until just a few months ago EM did not even have a requirement 

that there be a cost estimate. There is still no requirement that the 

estimate be well documented or accurate. As one GAO official told 

the Subcommittee staff last month, ‘‘You can just write a number 

on a piece of paper, and that would meet the requirement.’’ 

EM also has failed to adequately consider safety during the design phase of the planning process. When these issues are finally 

discussed, these projects are already in the construction phase, 

which then requires extensive contract modifications and billions 

more in dollars to be spent. 

For example, the cost of a Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) 

at the Savannah River site has increased from an original cost estimate of $340 million to $1.2 billion in part because of numerous 

modifications that had to be made to the design. 

EM also relies on the same contractors for all of its projects. 

These contractors even refer to themselves as ‘‘competimates,’’ 

meaning that they may be competitors for one project but joint venture teammates on another. This lack of competition does not do 

the taxpayer any favors. 

The real beneficiaries of these large cleanup contracts are the 

contractors. From 2002 to 2012, the Department awarded its major 

contractors nearly $4 billion in award and incentive fees. The contractors received these fees despite poor performance and, in some 

cases, received fees even before the required work had been completed. 

For example, from 2009 to 2012, the Department paid Bechtel, 

the contractor on the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant (WTP), $24.2 

million of its $38.6 million incentive fee based in part on Bechtel’s 

adherence to cost and schedule targets and its resolution of technical challenges associated with waste mixing. 

In 2012, after these monies had been paid, GAO found that the 

project was at ‘‘serious risk’’ for cost overruns and schedule delays, 

and the Department concluded that the waste-mixing technical 

challenges had not been, in fact, resolved. 

Unfortunately, for the taxpayer, for EM’s large contracts, cost 

overruns, schedule delays and technical failures are the rule, not 

the exception. We need to find a better way to do this because we 

cannot just afford the status quo anymore. 

I hope we can have a constructive dialogue today with both the 

government witnesses and the contractors on the second panel on 

how to improve contract management at EM. The cleanup of nuclear sites has to happen, but the contracts to manage the cleanup 

can be done better and smarter. 

I thank the witnesses for being here today, and I look forward 

to their testimony. 
3 

Senator Johnson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I think it is easy in a situation like this to come into a hearing 

with a bias one way or the other. In a situation like this, where 

we have an incredibly complex problem, we are seeing these huge 

cost overruns, and we are seeing hundreds of billions of dollars 

spent by the Federal Government, there has to be some bad actor 

here. 

You can have a bias that, of course, has to run to the contractor 

side, or you can have the bias that, well, boy, the government is 

really screwing things up again here. 

As I was preparing for this hearing and reading the history of 

this, sometimes you have problems described as once in a lifetime, 

once in a generation. 

The problem we are facing here with cleaning up the nuclear 

waste from our weapons programs is literally a once in the span 

of human history problem. It is not an easy issue at all. 

So I am certainly approaching this hearing with a very open 

mind, understanding the incredible complexity and the difficulty of 

what we are trying to deal with here. 

So, again, from my standpoint, I come to this hearing with no 

bias whatsoever, really looking to ask questions. 

Certainly, what can we do to potentially improve the process? 

What can we do to clean up these sites—because in the end that 

is what we are trying to do. We are trying to really take care of 

prior mismanagement back when the environment was not even 

considered, back in the 40s and 50s. Now, a generation later, we 

are having to grapple with this problem, and it is an incredibly difficult problem. 

So, again, I am looking forward to hearing all the witnesses and 

really with no bias at all but a very open mind. 

So thank you, witnesses, for appearing and thank you, Madam 

Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

We will have votes beginning at 11:30. 

So what our plan is, is we will go until about 10 minutes into 

the first vote. So I expect that we will be here until about 11:40. 

Then we will pause the hearing so that Senator Johnson and I can 

go vote and then come back and complete the hearing as soon as 

we have had those three votes. 

So I just wanted to give everybody that heads-up before we 

begin. 

Let me introduce our first panel. 

Gregory Friedman was named Inspector General (IG) of the U.S. 

Department of Energy in 1998. His Federal career has included 

serving as the Vice Chair of the President’s Council on Integrity 

and Efficiency and as a member of the Advisory Council on Government Auditing Standards. Mr. Friedman has received numerous 

public awards, including the Department of Energy’s Meritorious 

Service Award, the Meritorious Presidential Rank Award and the 

Presidential Rank Award for Distinguished Executive. 
4 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Friedman appears in the Appendix on page 39. 

Joseph Bader was appointed as a member of the Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) on November 29, 2004. Previously, Mr. Bader held several executive and senior management 

positions in the nuclear weapons and nuclear power sectors. Mr. 

Bader, through his work at Fluor Daniel, was also involved in the 

Department of Energy’s Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Program. Mr. Bader has a Bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering from Villanova University and a Master’s in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Virginia. 

J.E. ‘‘Jack’’ Surash—am I saying that correctly, Mr. Surash? 

Mr. SURASH. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Great—is currently the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Acquisition and Project Management (APM) at the 

U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Remediation. 

Mr. Surash joined the Department of Energy as a member of the 

Senior Executive Service (SES) in 2005 as Director of the Office of 

Infrastructure and Facilities Management at the National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA). Mr. Surash also has had a distinguished 27-year Navy career and retired at the rank of Captain 

from the United States Navy’s Civil Engineer Corps in 2003. 

It is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses 

that appear before us. So, if you do not mind, I would like to ask 

you to stand. 

Do you swear that the testimony that you will give before this 

Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 

the truth; so help you, God? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do. 

Mr. BADER. I do. 

Mr. SURASH. I do. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let the record reflect the witnesses have all 

answered in the affirmative. 

You will be using a timing system today. We would ask that your 

oral testimony be no more than 5 minutes. Of course, your written 

testimony will be printed completely in the record. 

And we will begin with you, Mr. Friedman. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. GREGORY H. FRIEDMAN,1

INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Johnson 

and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here at your 

request to testify on the Office of Inspector General’s (OIGs) perspective on contract management by the Department of Energy’s 

Office of Environmental Management. 

Frankly, my testimony, at least the opening part of the testimony, Chairman McCaskill and Ranking Member Johnson, parallels your opening statements in large part. 

As you pointed out, the Department is responsible for disposing 

of large volumes of radioactive, hazardous and mixed waste resulting from more than 50 years of nuclear defense and energy research work. Although largely centered at sites where essential 

components of the U.S. nuclear weapons program existed—such as 

Richland, Washington; Savannah River, South Carolina; and Oak 
5 

Ridge, Tennessee—the effort involves 2 million acres of land located in 13 States and employs more than 30,000 individuals, the 

vast majority of whom are contractors. 

According to the Department’s own statistics, EM activities are 

being coordinated through more than 40 prime contracts having a 

total value of over $90 billion. The current projected cost of completion is about $270 billion, as the Chairman referred to in her opening remarks. 

EM has been part of the Management Challenges List prepared 

by the Department of Energy’s Office of Inspector General for the 

last decade or more. Our reviews of the Department’s performance 

in this area have highlighted concerns in contract management, 

project management, cost estimating and project baseline control. 

My full statement includes several examples of our recent reports 

which reflect these findings. Today, I would like to focus on just 

one of the reports concerning the cleanup of the K–25 building in 

Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 

As a historical note, K–25, completed in 1945, contained about 2 

million square feet of space. It was one of, if not the, largest buildings under one roof ever constructed in the United States to that 

date. K–25, using the gaseous diffusion method, was a major uranium enrichment facility—a complex but critical part of the U.S. 

weapons program. 

In July 2011, we reported that due to contracting project management weaknesses the Department was not in a position to fully 

grasp the ultimate cost and time required to complete the environmental cleanup at K–25. Specifically, the Department had not recognized that the total project costs could increase to as much as 

$1.2 billion, almost double the original baseline. 

We found the Department had not first confirmed that the contractor reports on cost and schedule performance were accurate 

and reliable, conducted analysis necessary to fully understand the 

scope and severity of the outstanding technical issues, organized 

K–25 as a standalone project to give it the necessary management 

visibility, adjusted its approach to managing the K–25 cleanup effort despite numerous events that should have prompted such a reassessment and ensured that consistent Federal leadership to oversee the project existed throughout its entirety. 

There have been a number of successful remediation efforts at 

select Department sites and facilities. However, significant problems with contracting project management have adversely impacted the Department’s ability to achieve program goals. 

The Department’s EM program faces significant technological 

challenges. Its magnitude is unprecedented. And the maze of contracts, contract types, subcontracts and consulting agreements is 

extremely complex. 

Yet, there are several common threads which appear to be among 

the root causes of the problems facing the program. Specifically, 

improvements are needed to ensure that: 

Project scopes are realistic and manageable; 

Change control management is adequate and project baselines, a 

primary management tool, are updated on a real-time basis; 

Contract terms are kept current so they track with project 

events; 
6 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Bader appears in the Appendix on page 47. 

Contractor performance is measured against established metrics, 

including realistic and reliable cost estimates; 

Federal staffing is sufficient in terms of size and expertise to provide effective contracting project oversight and ensure the crucial 

safety requirements are adhered to; 

And, finally, the projects have focused, empowered and consistent 

Federal project manager leadership throughout their life cycle. 

When problems do arise, it has certainly been our observation— 

and I think most would agree with this—that early detection is 

key. Prompt and candid reporting by contractors and timely, responsive action by Federal officials allow for thoughtful consideration of alternative courses of actions, expedited implementation of 

corrective measures, and maintenance of an effective baseline for 

evaluating contractor performance and project progress. 

Recognizing the national importance of an effective and efficient 

EM program, the Department’s efforts continue to be a prime focus 

of the Office of Inspector General. Notably, we are completing, as 

we speak, a review of alleged design quality problems at the Department’s $12.2 billion waste treatment plant at the Hanford, 

Washingtonsite. 

Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I will be pleased to answer any questions you 

may have. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Friedman. 

Mr. Bader, thank you for being here. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. JOSEPH F. BADER,1 BOARD 

MEMBER, DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD 

Mr. BADER. Thank you, Chairman McCaskill and Ranking Member Johnson. 

I am Joseph Bader, Board Member of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. 

I submitted a written statement for the record that describes the 

Board’s mission and discusses our role in safety oversight of the 

Department of Energy’s design and construction projects, particularly the ones needed for cleanup activities. It provides a fair 

amount of detail on our initiative to ensure that DOE considers 

safety early in the design of its facilities, and it summarizes some 

of DOE’s successes and failures in this regard. 

I will provide a brief summary of my written testimony for your 

consideration today. 

The DNFSB was established by Congress in 1988 to provide safety oversight for DOE’s defense nuclear facilities. We are the only 

agency that provides independent safety oversight of the facilities. 

We are statutorily mandated to review the design of new DOE defense nuclear facilities before construction begins, to monitor construction and to make recommendations to the Secretary of Energy 

as needed, to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety. 

The Board constantly emphasizes the concept of safety in design 

to DOE. Failing to consider safety early in the design of a complex 
7 

facility will lead to surprises and costly changes later in the process. 

DOE’s directives and guidance for managing major projects now 

spell a sound strategy for integrating safety into the design for new 

facilities. A comprehensive approach to assessing safety risk and 

project risk throughout the life of the project is also central to 

DOE’s approach to new design and construction projects. 

The Board is committed to the early resolution of safety issues 

with DOE. To that end, we publicly document significant unresolved technical differences between the Board and DOE concerning design and construction projects in periodic reports to Congress. 

Right now, the most significant design and construction projects 

for DOE’s defense nuclear cleanup program are the waste treatment and immobilization plant at Hanford and the Salt Waste 

Processing Facility at the Savannah River site. Both of these 

projects are massive. SWPF has a project cost of about $1.7 billion, 

and WTP is likely to exceed $12.3 billion. 

They are also incredibly important to DOE’s cleanup mission. 

Millions of gallons of high-level waste liquids and solids have been 

stored for decades in tanks that are beyond their design life. This 

waste has no path to disposal or treatment unless these projects 

are successfully completed. 

Since its conception in 2000, the WTP has been a fast-track design-build project. This approach set the project up for technology 

problems, and the problems were compounded by safety issues that 

arose when DOE and its contractors began a significant technical 

redesign in 2009. 

That changed safety aspects of the design without sufficient 

basis. The redesign proceeded even though the project had not resolved key technical issues dealing with pulse jet mixing, hydrogen 

generation and erosion and corrosion. 

In 2012, former Secretary Chu undertook a comprehensive review of the plant’s design and formed expert teams to address outstanding technical issues. 

DOE’s path forward on this project is in a state of flux and is 

exacerbated by the discovery of new leaks in the tanks at Hanford. 

SWPF is a simpler facility, and it avoided the major technical 

uncertainties that have plagued WTP. However, both projects have 

struggled with quality assurance, particularly in control of work by 

their suppliers and subcontractors. Quality assurance problems led 

to significant rework and delays at SWPF, in particular. 

DOE’s quality assurance requirements for its defense nuclear facilities are fundamentally sound, but a lack of rigor in implementing the requirements has been problematic. 

Safety culture plays a critical role in the ability of designers and 

workers to raise and resolve technical issues and safety concerns 

on these major projects. The hazards posed by a failed safety culture are real and have led to costly disasters in industry. 

Because of the problems on the WTP project, DOE leaders understand that they need to constantly assess and reinforce the safety 

culture throughout the DOE defense nuclear complex. The in-depth 

assessments of safety culture that DOE is undertaking across the 
8 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Surash appears in the Appendix on page 66. 

complex are part of a long-term effort that will be needed to improve the culture that exists today. 

That ends my statement. I will be happy to answer any questions 

you may have. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much, Mr. Bader. 

Mr. Surash. 

TESTIMONY OF J.E. ‘‘JACK’’ SURASH,1 DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ACQUISITION AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT, 

OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. SURASH. Good morning, Madam Chairman and Ranking 

Member Johnson. 

My name is Jack Surash. I am the Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Acquisition and Project Management in the Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management. I am a registered professional engineer. I have been with the Department about 7 years. 

And thank you for pointing out that I served in the U.S. Navy 

Civil Engineer Corps for almost 28 years and achieved the rank of 

Captain before I retired. 

In my position, I am responsible for the effective and efficient operation of the acquisition functions within Environmental Management. My office ensures compliance with acquisition statutes, regulations and DOE policies, as necessary, to achieve the Department’s 

mission. My office also provides project management assistance, 

project oversight and performance evaluation by working closely 

with senior Department of Energy officials, external stakeholders 

and major contractors. 

As the largest environmental cleanup program in the world, 

EM’s mission is to complete the safe cleanup of 107 sites across the 

country brought about from 5 decades of nuclear weapons development and nuclear energy research. Since its creation in 1989, EM 

has made substantial progress. As of September 2012, we have 

completed cleanup at 90 of these sites, many of which supported 

nuclear weapons through the production of plutonium, uranium 

and tritium. 

EM accomplishes its mission through contracts, which account 

for 90 percent of our budget. As such, it is critical that EM carry 

out an effective and efficient process for acquiring services and 

managing contracts. 

EM transitioned from the historically large site management and 

operating contracts by unbundling them, and by that, I mean using 

smaller scope-specific contracts that use clear metrics and incentives to complete work within cost and schedule. 

EM has had some notable successes at Rocky Flats in Colorado, 

Fernald in Ohio and, most recently, in executing over 133 projects 

under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Cleanup at 

many of these sites was completed ahead of schedule and billions 

of dollars below initial estimates. 

We have made many improvements in project and contract management, and I believe we are on the right track. Acknowledging 

the progress we have made in managing smaller efforts, GAO, in 
9 

its February 2013 High Risk List update, stated it would further 

narrow the focus of its high risk designation to major contracts and 

projects with values of at least $750 million. 

But we know we have more work to do. Based on the lessons we 

have learned, the Department has put in place policies and guidance to improve our contract and project management, some of 

which are already showing success. 

First, we require proper up-front planning so that the project requirements have been clearly identified and the appropriate design 

maturity and technology readiness have been achieved. In particular, we require that 90 percent of the design for nuclear 

projects be completed prior to establishing the project baseline. 

Second, we engage our internal and external oversight organizations at every critical stage of project development to ensure their 

expertise is incorporated early in the process. 

Third, we consider the use of firm-fixed-price contracts to complete work requirements in order to cap the government’s cost liability. We have also put in place objective performance measures 

to incentivize contractor performance and reduce costs. 

And, finally, we have expanded the use of project peer reviews, 

following a process similar to the Department’s Office of Science. 

We have partnered with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE) to obtain cost estimating services as well as resources for 

project peer reviews. 

But, please, let me be clear. We have a responsibility to taxpayers to ensure that we apply lessons learned in the future and 

strive to achieve our mission as efficiently and effectively as possible. 

Two projects—the Waste Treatment Plant at Hanford, Washington and a Salt Waste Processing Facility at Savannah River in 

South Carolina—have proved especially challenging. Applying the 

lessons learned over the past decade, the Department would have 

taken a different approach on these complex, first-of-a-kind nuclear 

projects. 

While these projects have not lived up to our expectations, these 

projects, in addition to our entire portfolio, have benefited from 

new contract and project management policies and guidance. This 

is part of our conscious campaign to maintain discipline throughout 

our processes, to improve our ability to meet cost and schedule targets. 

As I have said in the past, I treat this as a journey and not a 

destination. We must work to continually improve our contract and 

project management. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and 

I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much. 

Let me start with Mr. Friedman. 

Mr. Friedman, the numbers of employees at the Department of 

Energy—15,671 Federal employees; 92,419 contractors, according 

to our estimate; one of the most lopsided agencies as it relates to 

employee-to-contractor ratios. 

Some of my colleagues have advocated doing away with the Department of Energy. 
10 

What would happen to those contractors’ employees if we did 

away with the Department of Energy as it relates to the function 

we are talking about today? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Chairman McCaskill, you could do—obviously, 

there have been a number of proposals over the years to do away 

with the Department of Energy. It was created after the 1973–1974 

embargo, putting—piecing together a lot of disparate parts. 

The reality, as least from my perspective and our perspective as 

the Office of Inspector General, is that the functions that are represented by the Department of Energy’s mission would have to continue. We have a moral obligation, for example, in the EM program 

to clean up the sites that are environmentally endangered as a result of the 50 years of nuclear work. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What percentage of those contractors—the 

some 100,000 contractors that are employed at the Department of 

Energy—what percentage of those would you estimate are working 

on environmental cleanup and environmental management? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. My understanding—it is 30,000. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thirty thousand. So those 30,000 would 

have to be reassigned to another department of government, or we 

would just—— 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. Perhaps I misunderstood your original question. 

The functions that they are carrying out—cleaning up the sites 

that have been talked about here today—from my point of view, 

certainly, we have a moral obligation to continue that, whether we 

do it with the same contractors, different contractors or Federalize 

it, if that is where we are heading. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. OK. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. There is that possibility. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. I know you mentioned, Mr. Surash, 

that there have been some contracts that have come in on top and 

at budget. But, historically, what percentage of the contracts would 

you say have come in at or near the cost estimate that was given 

at the beginning of the contract? 

Mr. SURASH. Ma’am, off the top of my head, I do not have that 

number, but I will be happy to provide that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, can we do a ballpark? 

I mean, I would assume that most of the contracts in this area 

have not come in at estimate based on our research we have done. 

Mr. SURASH. Well—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. The nuclear cleanup contracts. 

Mr. SURASH. If I go back, if I looked at the work—$6 billion 

worth of work—done during the Recovery Act time, 2009 to 

2011—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. I am looking at the $150 billion of work that 

has been done since 1990. How much of that? 

Let’s take the stimulus out of it. 

Mr. SURASH. OK. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And, good for you, that those contracts came 

in at estimate and on schedule. 

Let’s take that $6 billion out and do the other $140-some billion. 

What percentage if you had to—and I will not hold you to this. I 

am just curious. 
11 

Are you comfortable in saying that certainly more than 50 percent of them have not come in on estimate, or more than 70 percent? 

Mr. SURASH. I am just guessing. I will provide the number for 

the record, but I was going to say approximately 50 percent. It is 

not a number that I am happy with, and we are certainly on a path 

to improving that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. And what percentage of those that 

came in over estimate got performance bonuses for doing a great 

job? Isn’t it 100? 

Mr. SURASH. No, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Who has been denied a performance bonus? 

Mr. SURASH. The question would be the fee for performing cost 

reimbursable work? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes. 

Mr. SURASH. With the contractor—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. I am very familiar with this concept because 

I found it in the Department of Defense (DOD)—— 

Mr. SURASH. OK. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. In Iraq and when we did all 

our work on war contracting. We were monogramming hand towels 

with cost-plus contracts. We were doing all kinds of things to drive 

up the cost. 

And the performance bonus was a rite of passage. It was not 

being based on how well they had performed under the contract. 

This area is rife with examples of how badly these contracts have 

been scoped, how badly they have been estimated, and yet, it appears to me, in looking at the research we did for this hearing that 

there was never a question that everybody got their performance 

bonus, sometimes before they even performed. 

Mr. SURASH. But let me, if I may, give you one very large example—the Salt Waste Processing project down in South Carolina— 

the work completed to date is in excess of $1 billion. That is what 

we have spent on the project. The contractor has earned less than 

$20 million of fees. So, on that one, on that particular contract, 

that particular project, I think we have—and that—to be very 

clear, that was fee earned during the design portion of that contract. 

So, once construction started, essentially, we actually paid the 

contractor, I believe, about an additional $20 million. We then 

clawed that back. 

The contractor actually was obviously not happy with that and 

submitted a claim, but we denied that, and we clawed that back. 

So, $1 billion of work, less than $20 million of fees. 

So, in that particular case, for this very large, complex project, 

I am happy with the—with what we are doing, with holding this 

contractor accountable. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And I think that is a great example, and 

certainly I know that if I were sitting where you are sitting I would 

try to find an example that would kind of push back against the 

question I am asking. 

But don’t you think what I am saying is—if you look at the scope 

of work that has been done and the monies that have been paid, 

don’t you think the assertion I am making today—when I have 
12 

looked at all these contracts, there has been contract after contract 

where the estimates were low, where safety was not even taken 

into consideration before the contract began, when there was not 

even a timely notification of as much as a half a billion dollars 

overrun in cost until 18 months after it was due. 

I can go through contract after contract after contract, billions 

and billions and billions of dollars, and in every single one of those 

contracts, they got their performance bonus. 

Mr. SURASH. If I may, ma’am, I would point out a couple of 

items. First, a number of years ago, we moved away from qualitative award fee. So almost all of our fee is quantitative. So we pay 

a fee for preestablished milestones. 

Now I know that the IG did find a case out at the Waste Treatment Plant. I believe it dates back to 2003. It was several million 

dollars where the fee was paid, and the work was not done correctly. That was a mistake, and we have since put in a very rigorous process across the board, including the Waste Treatment 

Plant, to keep that from happening. 

But if I may give a second example, this is the K–25 project that 

Mr. Friedman’s office reviewed. And we agree; we definitely had 

problems. There were problems on the contractor side with performing at Oak Ridge on that very complex nuclear demolition and 

decontamination of a gaseous diffusion plant. 

It is huge. A couple of golf courses would fit within this building—the largest plant, the largest building built in the 1940s or 

50s when it was constructed. 

We also had some problems on the Federal side. I actually remember this fairly well. This is one of the first major issues that 

I uncovered after arriving at the Office of Environmental Management. 

So what we did is that contract had been restructured once already. We restructured the contract again from a cost-plus-awardfee to a cost-plus-fixed-fee—relatively low fixed fee—and we did 

that because we were just having management problems in managing the work there. 

And, if I may go one step further, to talk about that particular 

contract, if I may—this is the K–25—this is the contractor that had 

the K–25 project. 

In about 2009, when we did this contract restructuring, the intent here was to put in place a cost reimbursable contract with a 

relatively straightforward fee design. 

About 6 or 7 months after we did this, I can remember a meeting 

where the contractor came in and told our assistant secretary that 

they were going to have an additional overrun of several hundred 

million dollars. This was in about 2009. 

We were not happy about this. 

So the action we took is we accelerated the reprocurement action 

that we had ongoing. We ended this contract when they hit the target cost. This contract included this K–25 facility plus a lot of other 

work. 

And so within about a 9-month timeframe after the competitive 

proposals—were received, we awarded a new contract. 

And I would say of our large contracts, this is about a $2.1 billion 

project and includes K–25, a couple other facilities down there. 
13 

This is actually one of the best performing. We did a great job 

pre-award, getting a new contractor in there, and this is about the 

best performing large contractor. If you were to ask me, this is the 

example I would have provided you. 

The contractor is doing a bang-up job there. The Federal staff at 

Oak Ridge—I think they took to heart the IGs recommendations 

made several years ago, and they are managing and administering 

this contract in a tremendous fashion. 

This K–25 project is now going to come in several hundred million dollars lower than what it was rebaselined at. So it is still over 

cost from what we originally thought, but I think I am happy with 

what we were able to do when this happened. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

First of all, Mr. Surash, thanks for your military service. 

And I would like to ask all the witnesses; do you think the Federal Government has any capability of doing this themselves—in 

other words, not using contractors? Can we hire the people? 

And, Mr. Friedman, I will start with you. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Senator Johnson, my view is that all options 

ought to be on the table. 

I am not sure I can sit here today and say the Federal Government could do it without the contractor assistance. I am not sure 

that is the case. 

There is a lot of very specialized expertise that is necessary— 

technicians with unique skills. And I am not sure that we have 

them, and I am not sure that it would be easy for us to get them 

at the pay scale that we can pay for most Federal employees. 

But I would not rule out any option to try and cure this problem. 

So I think the possibility of Federalization ought to be considered. 

We have not studied it, per se, but it is certainly an option that 

ought to be thought through. 

Senator JOHNSON. But, if we were to totally Federalize it, we 

would have to hire tens of thousands of employees. Is that correct? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is absolutely correct. 

Senator JOHNSON. Twenty thousand plus? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is absolutely correct, and people with experience in these very unique skill sets that would be necessary to 

do this sort of work. 

Senator JOHNSON. So, from what you have seen as an Inspector 

General in the Federal Government, do you think the Federal Government—what is the likelihood that we would be able to hire 

those 20,000 very specialized employees and be able to pull this 

thing off? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I started my career as a careerist, Senator 

Johnson. So I have confidence that you could do it if you set your 

mind to do it, but I do not have a high confidence level. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. 

Mr. Bader, do you believe the Federal Government has the capability of hiring these specialized individuals and doing this themselves? 

Mr. BADER. I would think it would be difficult but not impossible. 

Senator JOHNSON. Sir? 
14 

Mr. SURASH. Sir, this is not something that I have actually, 

frankly, thought about before. I think it would be very challenging. 

I mean, some of the great successes that we have seen, like out at Rocky Flats—we had almost a $4 billion project brought in at 

a half a billion dollars and years ahead of time. 

I am not confident that a Federal workforce could do that. I 

think a properly managed and incentivized contract work force—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Let’s talk about the available contractor base. 

My guess is you are using the Federal employees to basically manage the general contractor who then potentially manages some subcontractors, correct? 

How many general contractors in the world exist that could actually handle this really once-in-a-span-of-human-history problem 

that we are trying to solve here? 

Mr. SURASH. Sir, this is very complex, specialized work. The nuclear safety background and requirements are a heavy lift. So I 

would say about a couple of handfuls at most today. 

This seems to be—— 

Senator JOHNSON. So you have maybe got about 10 general contractors? 

Mr. SURASH. Yes, sir, prime. Contractors that can function as a 

prime contractor to do this work, yes, sir. 

Senator JOHNSON. Do you feel it is essential to have those prime 

general contractors to also supervise the subcontractors, or do you 

think the Federal Government could hire enough people to act as 

the general to work with the subcontractors? 

Mr. SURASH. A lot of the work is actually performed by the prime 

contractors. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. 

Mr. SURASH. We have about 30,000 incumbent workers at our 

site that are highly trained and typically will remain there if it is 

a follow-on contract with the next contractor. And probably half of 

the work is done in that manner, and maybe the other half is subcontracted out. 

It is something I would be happy to look at. I think it is a great 

concept. It would be—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Well, I am not suggesting. I am just asking 

about the possibility. Mr. Friedman, if we spent $100 billion, or 150—whatever the figure is we have spent to date—has anybody done an analysis in 

terms of what the contractor base has made in profits over that 

time period? Mr. Surash was talking about $20 million made on a billion dollars worth of a contract, which is not from a business guy’s standpoint, I do not know why they do it. 

But do you have any feel for what has been contracted in the 

past, what the profit levels are for the contractors? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not know, but remember, Senator Johnson, 

you have to look at the investment and the capital that the contractors have put forward before you make that analysis. Twenty 

million on a relatively small investment may not be a bad return 

although I do not think it is a good return. But the returns have 

been considerable over time. 

Senator JOHNSON. Name considerable. 
15 

I mean, are you talking percent? Are these guys making 50 percent of sales? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. 

Senator JOHNSON. And, by the way, percent of return really is 

based on sales because you are putting in all kinds of time and effort. It is not just simply you are investing in equipment in terms 

of how you evaluate your return. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, there are multiple ways. I do not want to 

debate with you about them—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Sure. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN [continuing]. Because you are a business man, I 

know, but there are multiple ways of evaluating the efficacy of a 

particular project from a business point of view. Certainly, you 

have identified one. 

I do not have a number as to how profitable they have been over 

time, but I will tell you that the cadre of contractors that keep coming back for more work are not coming back because they are losing money. So it is pretty obvious that they find it reasonably attractive. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. I guess that was the question I was going 

to ask you. 

Mr. Surash, are you concerned about losing contractors? 

Mr. SURASH. Sir, I do not believe so. 

We are working to try to increase the contractor base. I mean, 

going from 12 prime contracts in the late 90s to almost 40 contracts today has resulted in some expansion of that base. 

We also have a strong focus on trying to set aside work for small businesses, and we are executing about $300 million a year on 

some very complex work with small businesses, and—knock on 

wood—they are doing very well on the work that they have. 

Senator JOHNSON. Just one more quick one? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Sure. 

Senator JOHNSON. You had mentioned in your testimony that at 

I believe it was the Savannah River site that you would have taken 

a different approach. Can you just briefly describe what approach 

was taken and how you would have done it differently? 

Mr. SURASH. Absolutely. And I think Mr. Friedman and Mr. 

Bader have also commented on that. 

One of the problems, and a lesson learned the very hard way, is 

that we have a lot of very dangerous waste out there left over from 

the Manhattan site, Manhattan Project days and legacy of the nuclear weapons program. So, on one hand, we want to get on with 

the work; on the other hand, there is doing it the right way in a 

step-by-step fashion. 

And so a lesson learned is that we have not matured technologies; we have not let design get sufficiently mature; we have 

not worked on the nuclear safety aspects of our projects before trying to start to begin construction of them, and we are not going to 

do that again. 

We have learned that lesson, and that is why in my statement 

and in the actions we are taking now, we want to do a better job 

with up-front planning. We want to mature the technologies that 

are going to be used. We want to work very closely with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and the other regulators. 
16 

We want to advance the design because what happened on both 

the Salt Waste Processing project and out at the Waste Treatment 

Plant is actually construction was underway and we found that we 

had to change the design. At the Waste Treatment Plant, we have 

technology problems. 

So we would have gone in a step-by-step fashion if we had to do 

it over again. Mature the technologies. Get the design done. Then 

build. 

Senator JOHNSON. Two problems that really exist are just a onetime design as well and some of these tanks are already leaking, 

and there is some imperative to get going on these things. Is that 

also correct? 

Mr. SURASH. You are absolutely correct, and that is the push-pull 

that we have. We want to get on with the work, but there is a 

proper way, if time was not taken into account, that we would 

want to proceed. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

Senator Begich, welcome. 

Senator MCCASKILL. We are glad you are here. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BEGICH 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, for 

this Committee hearing. 

Mr. Surash, let me ask you the question; you had said on the 

stimulus money you received—those were all on—I am not sure I 

heard you properly, but they came in as you anticipated, pricewise. 

Mr. SURASH. Ninety percent of all the work on just about six billion dollars worth of work were essentially on-cost. 

Senator BEGICH. And were those some of the contractors that we 

also have issues with on the other end? 

Mr. SURASH. On many of them, not exactly, but I would say the 

majority of them, yes, sir. 

Senator BEGICH. OK. 

Mr. SURASH. But I would also, if I may, say that with the Recovery Act, we needed work that was ready to go, and we actually implemented some of our lessons learned and new processes and procedures during the Recovery Act. 

Senator BEGICH. I guess I am leading to the question here that 

the Recovery Act money, which was probably the most recent kind 

of block that was significant—that had different procedures than 

some of the past? 

And let me ask you—it is a two-parter here—because we have 

a bad habit here in Congress of not telling agencies what their full 

amounts will be because we do continuing resolutions and we do 

lots of stuff here that really, to be frank with you, screw up the 

process. 

And so was getting the stimulus money in a known quantity 

helpful in getting those bids? 

Mr. SURASH. Thank you, sir. 

On your first question, we implemented some of the improvements from lessons learned during Recovery Act, and we saw good 

results from that. 
17 

But another very important thing which you bring up is the ability to have budget predictability. 

Frankly, in the past, on some of our large projects, we approved 

what is called a project baseline, which is our commitment to the 

Congress that we are going to deliver a certain project at a certain 

cost on a certain date without being able to properly carve out in 

our budget for the next 5, 10 or 15 years, that money and have it 

absolutely reserved. So that has been an issue. 

Recovery Act—we, essentially, got the money—— 

Senator BEGICH. You knew what you were getting. 

Mr. SURASH [continuing]. More or less up front and—yes, sir. 

Senator BEGICH. Let me hold you there. 

Mr. Friedman, you just heard this conversation here. Do you 

agree with that or disagree with that? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not know which aspect, Senator Begich. 

Senator BEGICH. Whichever one you want to respond to. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Whichever one. 

Senator BEGICH. Because then I will do the others that you do 

not. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. As Mr. Surash alluded to, I think the Department—the EM program received $6 billion under the Recovery Act, 

if I remember correctly. Its annual budget is $5.5 billion, which 

gives you some perspective. 

But what is interesting is that, as he alluded to, the Department 

as a strategy, chose projects that were sort of the low-hanging fruit, 

comparatively easy projects, less challenging projects. 

So that while—— 

Senator BEGICH. So the risk was less. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The risk was less. 

And we issued a number of reports on the EM’s expenditures 

under the Recovery Act. There were a number of positive attributes, and we reported those. There were some problems. 

But I think in part it was a function of the fact that these were 

by their own strategy, which I think we understand in terms of getting the money into the economy quickly—they were comparatively 

shovel-ready projects. 

Senator BEGICH. Understood. 

Let me ask, Mr. Surash, when these projects are scoped, how 

much of the Agency is part of that process at the front end? 

In other words, let me lead you to the next question so you know 

where I am going, and that is I know where Mr. Johnson was 

going. I agree; I would not want to see 20,000 Federal workers— 

I just did the math on how long it would take us to recruit them 

because our recruitment system is so efficient here in the Federal 

Government. It might be 10 years from now before we get the first 

200. But how we use, the contrary is, the people we have working 

for us. 

I guess the question is I know when I was mayor, and we would 

scope projects. And there was a constant situation where we had 

someone who was scoping the project, and the bids came in much 

higher than the estimates. That person did not work for us after 

a little period of time. 

So how is internally your operation doing this? 
18 

Mr. SURASH. Yes, sir, let me try to give you a sense of that. I 

will talk about—— 

Senator BEGICH. Let me pause you because I know one other 

issue Senator McCaskill and I had when I was on Armed Services 

was the F–35, which had questions of its scoping capacity. And it 

almost doubled, I think, per unit price, if I remember right. 

And they had to make some changes over there from the topdown, if I remember right—general-down. But that had never been 

done before. 

So I am curious; how is it working? 

Mr. SURASH. So let me try to answer it this way, if I may. I will 

talk about contracting authority and approval of a project. 

So, on the contracting side, our sites—and there are approximately 6 large sites—— 

Senator BEGICH. Correct. 

Mr. SURASH [continuing]. Have $25 million of change authority. 

So any contract action, whether it is a new contract or a change, up to $25 million, they can deal with. That is a lot. 

Senator BEGICH. Cumulative or individual change? 

Mr. SURASH. Each item. That is a lot of—— 

Senator BEGICH. Cumulative, it could be who knows what. 

Mr. SURASH. Item by item. 

Senator BEGICH. OK. That is still a lot of money. 

Mr. SURASH. Twenty-five million is a lot of money. Now, in the context of $5.5 billion, it is a relatively small 

amount. 

Senator BEGICH. Right, but if it is cumulative and so you start 

adding up items. 

Mr. SURASH. Absolutely. My authority is $50 million. 

Senator BEGICH. Mm-hmm. 

Mr. SURASH. Above me, it goes into a Department of Energy Office of Acquisition and Procurement Management. 

So, at that point, definitely, the rest of the Department and our 

General Counsel, et cetera, have this ability. 

Senator BEGICH. But how is the project originally scoped—be- cause I saw when you mentioned the K–25 it was $100 million 

below the rebaseline. 

Mr. SURASH. Right. 

Senator BEGICH. I am just curious; from the original to the rebaseline, how much difference in cost increase was that? 

Mr. SURASH. If I—— 

Senator BEGICH. Because you are basically saving off of an increase. 

Mr. SURASH. That is true, and that is why I wanted to be fair 

when I said that. 

Senator BEGICH. How much is that increase? 

Mr. SURASH. If I may, sir, can I tell you about the project approval and then answer that, if that would be OK? 

Our sites for a project, to approve the baseline—the baseline is 

what we are committing to the Congress that we are going to deliver on. 

Our site managers have $100 million of authority. My Assistant Secretary has $400 million. Anything above $400 million is above 

him. We have an Undersecretary. We have a Deputy Secretary. 
19 

And so they have—— 

Senator BEGICH. OK. 

Mr. SURASH. They are involved in that. 

If I may, I will give you very rough numbers, but I can, for the 

record, give you the exact numbers. 

Senator BEGICH. That would be great. 

Mr. SURASH. For that K–25 project, I believe it was about $500 

million original baseline cost, circa 2008. 

Senator BEGICH. Mm-hmm. 

Mr. SURASH. And the rebaseline was approximately $1.3 billion. 

So I mean, again, to be fair, I said that we are three or four. 

Senator BEGICH. Let me pause you there. 

Mr. SURASH. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEGICH. Who did the original baseline? 

That is what I am trying to get to because here is my question; 

we do not have a good habit in the Federal Government. 

I mean, I will not get on my Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 

rant, but they are always off 20 percent, which—I do not know— 

is a couple hundred billion a year on the deficit. 

But, it seems around here $200 billion seems to be small change 

according to some people, not to me, who does the original scoping 

to develop the baseline? Is that internal? 

Mr. SURASH. The way this would work is it starts with the contractor. That is who is doing the work. 

So the contractor—— 

Senator BEGICH. With your oversight? 

I mean, someone must look at these numbers—— 

Mr. SURASH. Sure. 

Senator BEGICH [continuing]. Within your organization and say 

these look good. 

Mr. SURASH. It is, essentially, maybe three steps. 

So, step one, a contractor number comes through competition or 

through negotiation. So you have a number of, let’s say, $400 million. 

Senator BEGICH. OK. 

Mr. SURASH. And in the case I am giving you, it is the Deputy 

Secretary that is approving this project, or not. 

So, on top of the contractor’s number, there would be a risk analysis done for the sorts of risks that the Department of Energy sees 

in the contractor’s ability to perform this. And there are certain 

work elements that the contractor would not be responsible for. 

So, in this case, let’s say that there is $100 million of Department of Energy risk. 

So what would be presented to the person called the Acquisition 

Executive, who in the example I am making up here is our Deputy 

Secretary, is: Here is the scope of the project. Here is when we are 

going to complete it. The price is $500 million. 

And lots of different components in the Department are aware of 

this. There are external reviews done. We have a separate office 

that, in this case, would go out and do an external, independent 

cost estimate to make sure that we have this project in our sight. 

So let me just, if I can, say as an example of our improvements— 

I mean, I do not like the numbers here. 
20 

But in 2008 we were kind of under the old system. In 2010, we 

were on the way to improving so we set a new baseline which is 

what we thought it was going to take to do the job. And all I can 

say now is partially through providing the right number up front 

and, No. 2, the contractor performing, we are going to come in 

below this higher amount. 

Senator BEGICH. OK. Thank you. 

I apologize, Madam Chairman. I went longer than I should there. 

But I am just trying to figure out—and I get now you have a new 

system, but how that baseline is developed is really the core. And 

if you are developing it and you are off—again, your old model— 

60 percent on the K–25, really what I am trying to figure out is 

how that happens. I think I got a sense. 

But also, I want to make sure—and we are part of the problem 

too because you are being asked to give us a number. We tell you 

it is too high because the budgets are so much. Then you have to 

fit it in. 

Is your system now to the point where you will be able to say, 

here is the amount; it is going to cost a hell of a lot of money, but 

that is what it is going to cost? 

Despite the pressures that may come from Congress and/or the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which is a great sanitizer, are you going to be able to do that in the future—because I 

just know the numbers are huge when you are off. 

So I will end on there. Maybe it is a rhetorical question. I do not 

know. 

Mr. SURASH. I can try to give an answer, if that is OK. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Sure. 

Mr. SURASH. And, again, this is from the acquisition and project 

management standpoint. There is a lot of other folks above me, including our Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and the Secretary, et 

cetera. 

I would just like to say that there are tremendous regulatory 

pressures. We have consent orders that if we do not get certain 

work done that we will be fined. So this is on the budget side, this 

is very difficult. 

And I would like to have, quite frankly, a better ability to project 

how much we are getting in the out years—not just, for instance, 

now what we are going to get appropriated in fiscal year (FY) 2014 

but from the project management and acquisition side, 5, 6, 10 

years out so that we can plan, so that today we can say, oh, that 

project fits our profile or it does not. And, if it does not, we really 

should not be trying to start it because that is part of how in the 

past we got in trouble. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Do not hold your breath on getting budget 

commitments 10 years down the line. We have a hard time getting 

budget commitments 10 minutes from now, much less 10 years 

down the line. 

I understand the Department of Energy has some serious vacancies in its leadership and that, in fact, where you work, Mr. 

Surash, you have been without a confirmed Assistant Secretary 

since 2011. Is that correct? 

Mr. SURASH. That is correct, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me also ask about chasing technology. 
21 

I want to talk about Hanford. The cost of this project has gone 

from $4.3 billion to $13.4 billion. That is how it has changed in 

terms of what the estimates were, and there is no guarantee that 

it is not going to cost even more than that. One of the problems 

has been the technology is not working. 

It concerns me in some of the information I read for this hearing 

that not only are we chasing technology; we have actually gone to 

a large-scale effort at technology when there has not even been a 

small-scale testing of the technology. And so we have spent—instead of spending $10 million or $20 million, we have spent multiples of that to learn that the technology simply does not work. 

How are you dealing with this issue? 

Mr. SURASH. OK. So I just would like to first say that we are 

dealing with very complex, first-of-a-kind plants. Nobody has ever 

built these before. Nobody has ever put the components together. 

So what we want to do better—what you stated is true, ma’am. 

Unfortunately, it is true. 

So, again, another lesson learned that I talked about before has 

to do with up-front planning. 

So what we need to do here is let the technology mature and 

work out the bugs, work with the regulators, work with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, make sure that we are meeting or addressing the requirements, make sure that our budget— 

and what I was talking about before is really planning authority— 

is in line and can support the project, and then let the design mature. 

So, if I may give an example of where this has worked relatively 

well—the Salt Waste Processing project. Yes, we have a large cost 

overrun going on there, but what we did there is we actually have 

a pilot-scale plant that has been in operation for several years that 

is using the exact technology that this much larger, billion-dollarplus plant is going to use. 

So that is an example of the sorts of things that we should do. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So you understand this is a problem, 

and you understand this is an issue, and you understand the investment in small-scale will pay for itself multi-times over rather 

than abandoning something that you go to large scale without the 

proper small-scale test. 

Mr. SURASH. Absolutely, and this is part of this tug on getting 

on with work versus doing it right. 

A pilot plant will actually cost a little bit more money up front. 

It will take more time. But we have learned the hard way for the 

first-of-a-kind nuclear, very complicated projects that we really 

need to do this or else we are asking for trouble and we are rolling 

the dice down the road. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Do you believe, Mr. Friedman, that they are 

doing better on this front? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think, frankly, there have been a number of actions which I think are admirable and which we certainly agree 

with in seeing from our history, but I think the jury is out. We are 

going to have to wait and see. At this point, I cannot give you confirmation of that. 
22 

Senator MCCASKILL. The number of prime contractors—I want to 

make sure I understood your testimony correctly. We are not seeing a shrinkage; we are actually seeing an increase? 

Mr. SURASH. We have seen a little bit of an increase, and I would 

say mainly on the smaller contractors. Off the top of my head, I 

cannot think of a very large new firm that has entered the picture. 

If I am mistaken, I will provide—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. And what about subs? 

Mr. SURASH. Ma’am, our privative contract, as you are aware, is 

with the prime contractors. There seems to be—I am not aware of 

issues with lack of subcontractors or lack of competition. So that 

seems to be going OK. 

In some cases, for instance, the Oak Ridge project I was talking 

about before, the way we structured that is we wanted 60 percent 

of the work to be done by subcontractors, and that seems to be 

working out relatively well. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You know what is interesting to me is, having spent so much time in the defense space, you have a wealth 

of competitors compared to some space at DOD. A wealth of competitors. 

But it appears to me that in many instances you have not been 

as robust as DOD in seeking new contracts, new bids, rather than 

just extending existing contracts. 

Would you say, is that an accurate statement, Mr. Friedman, 

from your perspective? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not have a specific report to support that, 

Senator McCaskill, but I do believe that is the case. I think they 

could be more aggressive in seeking out alternatives. 

Senator MCCASKILL. If you had to—and my time is coming to a 

close, and I want to make sure that we get a second round with 

my colleagues if possible before we go vote. 

But if you could crystallize where you think the most challenges 

remain—we are not even halfway yet. I do not think Americans 

have any idea the amount of money that has gone out the door 

with relatively little oversight. 

I mean, has there been a hearing like this that you are aware 

of, ever? 

Mr. SURASH. Not focusing on contract management, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes. I mean, we have been doing this for 23 years and spent $150 billion, and there has been very little overlooking the shoulder on this. And that never is good for the taxpayers. 

So, could you crystallize, Mr. Friedman, the two or three biggest 

challenges that have not yet fully been embraced by this area of 

contracting in our government? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, let me break it into two buckets if I can. 

One is the Federal side. We need the right people with the right 

expertise who feel empowered to handle the government’s perspective on contract oversight. That has been lacking in the past. 

The right numbers are important, but people with the right skill 

sets at the right place at the right time and, again, empowered. 

And, second, to get back to a point which I think all of you have 

raised, is the question of baselining and a change control system. 

This is the second bucket, if you will. The contractors’ side is mak-
23 

ing sure that we have the quality estimates that are validated by 

the government, by Federal folks, and that becomes the line— 

against which we evaluate contractor performance going forward 

and project performance going forward. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Surash, I was kind of gleaning from your testimony that one 

of the directions you are moving to in terms of contracting is breaking these contracts down into more manageable, bite-sized pieces. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. SURASH. Absolutely. If you went back to the late 1990s, you 

would have seen approximately 12 very large, very general scoped 

contracts that were management and operating type of contracts. 

A very different sort of contracting mechanism today—we have 

approximately 40 contracts, and all but 2 of these are what I would 

call traditional cost-plus types, a couple small fixed-price type of 

contracts. 

So, absolutely, we have done that. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. To me, that makes sense. 

In the Hanford site, it is also my understanding that $4.3 billion 

original cost estimate—that was for a phase I, and it was always 

contemplated there is going to be a phase II. And now, when we 

are talking about the $12.3 billion or $13 billion, that includes both 

phase I and phase II. Is that correct? 

Mr. SURASH. Absolutely. 

Senator JOHNSON. And, by the way, has that been broken down 

to smaller bite-sized pieces as well? 

Mr. SURASH. If I may first mention that the $4.2 billion number 

that keeps getting mentioned—that was for a contract awarded in 

2000. And what I want to point out there is that was for a plant 

that would operate for 40 years and treat about 40 percent, by volume, of the radioactive waste out there. 

The plant today will treat 100 percent of the high-level waste, 40 

percent of the low-level waste and operate for 50 years. So that is 

partially the reason for this cost growth. We actually are increasing 

the scope of what can be provided. 

To answer your question on the waste treatment plant, that is 

currently a single contract still today. It was originally awarded in 

2000. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. It is Hanford where we are actually getting leakage right now, too, isn’t it? 

Mr. SURASH. That is correct. Actually, there is a separate contractor that is managing the underground tanks where we have 

some suspected leaking tanks. 

Senator JOHNSON. That is definitely heightening the concern in 

trying to speed this process up to address that fact. 

Mr. SURASH. Yes, sir, absolutely. 

Senator JOHNSON. Let’s go to the Safety Board a little bit in 

terms of its impact on cost and scope and those types of things. 

Mr. Bader, in the Safety Board’s recommendations, is there any 

cost-benefit analysis done to your recommendations? 

Mr. BADER. There is not. 
24 

Senator JOHNSON. What guides your recommendations then? 

Strictly, public safety? 

Mr. BADER. First of all, we look at the public safety and try and 

be sure that there is adequate protection. In doing that, we consider the technical and economic feasibility but do not do a costbenefit analysis. 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Surash, has any recommendation from 

the Safety Board ever been turned down or pushed back, or let’s 

say first, turned down? 

Mr. SURASH. Sir, that is a little bit out of my area of expertise, 

but I can provide that for the record. There may have been. 

Mr. Bader may—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Friedman, are you aware of any recommendations from the Safety Board being turned down? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not know specifically, Senator. 

Senator JOHNSON. So—— 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not know one way or the other. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. It would be my concern if you have a 

Safety Board—again, I think we are all concerned about safety— 

but if they are operating outside any kind of cost-benefit analysis, 

one of my concerns—I know in Idaho one project was the Idaho National Laboratory. 

I know a Safety Board recommendation was to take into account 

a seismic event, and so that project was stopped dead for at least 

a year and a half to basically redesign a plant that was scheduled, 

I think, to operate for 18 months. 

Now I believe those were tanks that were there, that have been 

sitting there for decades, also certainly at risk in terms of seismic 

events, but now we are going to clean it up, hopefully, in the span 

of about 18 months. 

And then the Safety Board recommends, no, we have to include 

all this rebar, all these construction codes, construction techniques, 

to really prevent damage in a seismic event. 

Is that part of the problem there? 

Mr. SURASH. Sir, if I can answer, that actually happened at the 

integrated waste treatment plant in Idaho that you were mentioning. We came across that on the Salt Waste Processing project 

and also the waste treatment plant. 

The root of all this has to do with this proper up-front planning. 

We really need to mature the design, work with regulators and 

oversight organizations before we start building. But we did not, 

and what happened is accurate. 

Senator JOHNSON. Do you know what the cost of that was in 

terms of reinforcing that building for seismic events? 

Mr. SURASH. I will provide a very accurate number for the 

record, sir. It was—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Ballpark? 

Mr. SURASH. Just a wild guess, maybe $20 million or $30 million. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. Well, unfortunately, in the scheme of 

things, that is not that big a number in terms of what we are 

spending. 

Mr. Bader, do you want to comment on that? 

Mr. BADER. We did not make a recommendation. We had a letter, 

which we would call a project letter, which was issued. And, actu-
25 

ally, if you would like us to submit it for the record, I have a copy 

here. 

And we were actually largely in agreement with the project 

through DOE on the seismic requirements. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. I guess maybe I should ask you this question; are there any safety recommendations that you made that 

DOE has either pushed back on or simply declined to enact? 

Mr. BADER. There was one recommendation which was partially 

rejected by the Secretary but which he said he would actually respond in his implementation plan in a manner that would meet our 

concerns. 

Senator JOHNSON. Out of how many recommendations have you 

put forward since your establishment—a ballpark? 

Mr. BADER. I will have to get back to you, but it is 40 or 50 over 

the years. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. That is all I really have, Madam Chairman. Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I want to thank all of you for being here. 

I thank all of you for the efforts you are making to tackle a problem that—I agree with you, Mr. Friedman. We have a moral obligation to clean this stuff up, but this, I do not think, is ever going 

to be anybody’s poster child for the most efficient and effective use 

of taxpayer money in terms of how we have gone about this challenge. But all of you, I know, are serving the public, and we appreciate it very much. 

And we will take a recess now to have three votes. I believe we 

are at the end of the first vote. So, by my clock, we should be able 

to reconvene in approximately 30 minutes with the second panel. 

Thank you very much. [Recess.] 

I will get started. I know that my Ranking Member is right behind me because we walked over together. He just got waylaid in 

the hall for a minute. 

And we have to be out of here by 1. I know you all are heartbroken at that—that we cannot go on for hours, but—— [Pause.] 

If you all would do the best you can in terms of the length of 

your oral testimony today. 

I am sure that I speak for my colleague in that we have obviously had an opportunity to review a lot of the information that 

you have provided us already, but we do not want to minimize your 

opportunity to speak today. Since we are under a time constraint 

of about 30 minutes, we want to make sure we at least have an 

opportunity to ask some questions. 

Michael Graham is the Principal Vice President at Bechtel National, Inc. and is a Manager of Bechtel’s U.S. Environmental Operations. Previously, Mr. Graham was the Associate Director of Environmental Programs at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New 

Mexico. He has held key management positions at the Idaho National Laboratory, the Hanford site and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratories. 

Michael McKelvy is President of CH2M HILL’s Government, Environment and Infrastructure Division. Mr. McKelvy has served as 

President and Group Chief Executive for the Industrial Client 

Group and President for the Manufacturing and Life Sciences Business Group. Mr. McKelvy also serves as the Chairman of the Board 
26 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Graham appears in the Appendix on page 73. 

for CH2M HILL’s Environmental Remediation joint venture companies at the Hanford and Idaho sites. Previously, Mr. McKelvy 

worked as a project manager and project architect in Oklahoma. 

Frank Sheppard is Vice President and Deputy Project Manager 

of Parsons Governmental Services. Mr. Sheppard also serves as the 

Deputy Project Manager of the Salt Waste Processing Facility at 

Savannah River, where he is responsible for project costs and 

scheduled performance. Previously, Mr. Sheppard served as a Salt 

Waste Processing Facility contracts manager and business manager. Prior to his work at Parsons, Mr. Sheppard worked at the Departments of Defense and Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the United Nations. 

If you all would stand in order to take the oath that is customary 

in this Committee—do you swear that the testimony you will give 

before this Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing 

but the truth; so help you, God? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I do. 

Mr. MCKELVY. I do. 

Mr. SHEPPARD. I do. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much. 

We will begin with you, Mr. Graham. 

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL GRAHAM,1 PRINCIPAL VICE 

PRESIDENT, BECHTEL NATIONAL, INC. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Madam Chairman, Senator Johnson, Members of 

the Subcommittee, I am Michael Graham, Principal Vice President 

at Bechtel National—a contractor to the DOE for environmental 

management work and the lead contractor for the Hanford Waste 

Treatment and Immobilization Plant. 

Bechtel is a global engineering and construction company with 

more than 115 years in the business. Our company has a long history of working in the private sector, but we have also worked on 

some very large government projects, including the Hoover Dam, 

building Liberty Ships during World War II and now the Washington Metro Silver Line in our back yard. 

We have successfully designed, managed and constructed hundreds of large-scale projects around the world, including putting 

out the oil fires in Kuwait, constructing major motorways and highspeed rail lines in Asia and Europe, including the Chunnel, and designing and building nuclear power plants in the United States. 

Some of our largest endeavors have been design-build projects. 

Bechtel National began operations in 1977, and among its first 

contracts were response efforts at Three Mile Island in 1979. 

To be sure, DOE projects are often complex and challenging. 

They are often one-of-a-kind endeavors, but they also present an 

opportunity to solve some of our country’s greatest problems, many 

that owe their legacy to the Manhattan Project. 

We are proud of our accomplishments for DOE. I have personally 

worked at four of the major DOE sites—Hanford, Idaho, Savannah 

River and Los Alamos. For example, I led the Hanford Groundwater-Vadose Zone Integration Project to evaluate the impacts of 
27 

Hanford waste on the groundwater in the Columbia River, and that 

included tank waste. 

To date, DOE’s Environmental Management program reports 

that it has completed cleanup of 90 of their 107 waste sites—a testament to strong industry support that works together, in partnership with DOE, to solve challenging problems. 

Yes, we have successfully completed tough jobs, but the very 

toughest ones are now upon us. 

The largest and most complex DOE project is the waste treatment plant in Washington State. This one-of-a-kind project includes a complex of facilities being designed and built to immobilize 

a highly radioactive waste in 177 aging underground tanks. Some 

of these tanks date back to World War II. Sixty-seven are reported 

to have leaked. 

In December 2000, when we entered into the contract to design 

and build the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant, we knew this job, 

which is the size of at least 2 commercial nuclear power plants, 

would be a challenge. Working closely with DOE, we have managed 

the challenges of new technologies, uncertain waste streams from 

the tanks, evolving requirements and the need to sustain a complex 

supply chain during periods of funding uncertainties. 

The waste treatment project today is a very different project than 

when we signed up for it in 2000. Back then, DOE described it as 

a pilot project and one that was much smaller in scale and capability. DOE directed it be a fast-track design-build effort to address 

the real risk of high-level waste leaking into the groundwater from 

those aging tanks. Glass was scheduled to be produced by 2007, 

with 10 percent of the waste being treated by 2018. A multi-billiondollar phase II facility would be built later. 

Since then, the plant capacity has been significantly increased to 

enable DOE to eliminate that second phase. Pretreatment capacity 

was increased by 40 percent, and the high-level waste facility glass 

production was increased by a factor of 4. These and other increases in scope were substantial factors addressed in the revised 

project baseline in 2006. 

We are very proud of Bechtel’s performance on this design-build 

contract overall, but like any project, we have learned many lessons along the way. 

Our conservative design-build approach approved by DOE has 

significant built-in margin. For example, implementing the revised 

seismic criteria in 2006 did not require any major construction rework. 

Nevertheless, Bechtel, with DOE, has taken several steps to improve the design-build concept and execution. After the project was 

rebaselined in 2006, we deployed an earned value management system to track and manage our progress. This system has been certified and revalidated by DOE as recently as 2012. Utilizing this 

system, the WTP project performed to that baseline until 2011, 

when DOE requested that decisions regarding the waste treatment 

processing requirements be revisited. 

Last year, Secretary Chu put some parts of the project on pause 

while he assembled a team to take another look at a number of 

critical technical decisions. Many of these decisions are related to 

what would happen if WTP receives waste outside of its waste ac-
28 

1The prepared statement of Mr. McKelvy appears in the Appendix on page 78. 

ceptance criteria. Resolution of those decisions to everyone’s satisfaction could have impacts on cost and schedule. 

We are confident we can complete the job and put WTP into operation as we work our way through these decisions. We, and other 

contractors involved in this critical national mission, remain fully 

committed to complete the project. 

WTP is currently designed to safely treat most of the tank waste. 

We simply must get on with it. As you know, the situation with the 

tanks continues to deteriorate. That is the real risk. 

Thank you for the opportunity for me to make these remarks. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much, Mr. Graham. 

Mr. McKelvy. 

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL MCKELVY,1 PRESIDENT AND DIVISION CHIEF EXECUTIVE, GOVERNMENT, ENVIRONMENT AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE DIVISION, CH2M HILL 

Mr. MCKELVY. Good afternoon, Chairman McCaskill and Ranking Member Johnson. Thank you for the invitation to appear here 

today to discuss contract management by the Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management. 

I will quickly summarize my written statement and ask that it 

be included in the record. 

CH2M HILL is an employee-owned global engineering firm 

founded in 1946 and headquartered in Colorado. We have been recognized as an industry leader as judged by Engineering News 

Record. 

CH2M HILL was the first firm in the heavily male-dominated 

engineering and construction industry to receive the prestigious 

Catalyst Award for our commitment to recruit, develop and advance women in the workplace. 

And, most important to me, CH2M HILL was judged for the fifth 

year in a row as one of the world’s most ethical companies by the 

Ethisphere Institute—the only U.S. firm selected from the construction industry. 

Our success as a contractor can be attributed to our safety focus, 

our exceptional people and continually refined project delivery processes. Safety is always the first and foremost consideration for any 

CH2M HILL project or endeavor. 

In the invitation letter, you outlined several areas for today’s discussion. I will do my best to address those areas, the first being 

the management of environmental remediation contracts. 

CH2M HILL has a successful record of performance managing 

and operating nuclear facilities and providing innovative cleanup 

and environmental remediation for the DOE since 1994. We have 

been responsible for the successful delivery of two of DOE’s three 

largest closure projects—the Miamisburg Project and the Rocky 

Flats Project. 

Not unlike some of the work we do for other Federal agencies, 

we typically set up joint ventures or special purpose entities to help 

provide diversity in skill sets and allow greater corporate reachback for project support. 
29 

CH2M HILL’s work at the Hanford site dates back to the early 

70s. Over the last 2 decades, CH2M HILL has had several large 

contracts at the Hanford site, including the Tank Farms Contract 

from 1999 to 2008 and, currently, the Central Plateau Remediation 

Contract which we have had since 2008. 

DOE’s use of cost-plus-award-fee contracts on the Hanford Plateau Remediation Company (PRC) project has allowed the DOE to 

meet specific objectives and standards, and make adjustments for 

changes in funding the work priorities, which provided us the flexibility as to best accomplish the work. 

On the Idaho Cleanup Project, CH2M HILL is currently managing the safe cleanup of the Idaho National Laboratory. To 

achieve the cleanup goals as part the cost-plus-incentive-fee contract, our scope includes the treatment of 900,000 gallons of highly 

radioactive sodium-bearing waste currently stored in underground 

tanks. 

As part of the contract, we have designed and constructed a firstof-a-kind facility—the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU), to 

treat and prepare liquid radioactive waste for permanent disposal. 

Early on, several issues hindered progress during the designbuild phase that increased the complexity of the construction, resulting in push-back in startup of the facility. The most significant 

issue was the way in which seismic analysis has been conducted. 

This issue resulted in the DOE decision, at the urging of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, to upgrade the hazards classification of the facility after preliminary design had already been 

completed. 

Last, in 2008, a further 1-year delay in the project completion 

was the direct result of fiscal funding limitations. IWTU was originally estimated at $379 million. However, due to the directed design and operational changes, we provided the government with a 

revised estimate of $600 million to complete the project. 

The contract was adjusted in 2010, and subsequently, a cost cap 

of $533 million was established for IWTU, less than the validated 

estimate, and at which point we would pay for any of the additional costs over the 533. In addition, schedule incentives and penalties were established for the project completion date. 

Last April, construction was completed at a final cost of $621 

million, with the parent companies of our joint venture contributing more than $88 million to complete the construction. In addition, we earned no fee and incurred schedule penalties for not having the facility online by the contract period. 

Despite these setbacks, we are extremely proud of the Idaho 

Cleanup Project’s workforce and the great work accomplished over 

the years. And even with the issues at IWTU, the Idaho Cleanup 

Project contract was delivered in phase I over $500 million below 

cost and to the satisfaction of the State of Idaho and the Department of Energy. 

Our employees accepted great challenges and were empowered to 

come up with innovative solutions, resulting in this unprecedented 

success and a stellar record of safety. The safety of our workers, 

the public and the environment is our foremost value on the challenging and dangerous work across the EM complex. 
30 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Sheppard appears in the Appendix on page 83. 

Success has been possible because of the cooperative agreements 

between the three principal parties—Congress, the Department of 

Energy and the contractor community. 

I would like to thank the Subcommittee for their time today, and 

with that, Madam Chairman, I would be pleased to answer any 

questions. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much, Mr. McKelvy. 

Mr. Sheppard. 

TESTIMONY OF FRANK SHEPPARD, JR.,1 VICE PRESIDENT AND 

DEPUTY PROJECT MANAGER, PARSONS CORPORATION 

Mr. SHEPPARD. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman, Senator Johnson. Thank you for having me here today to discuss the subject of 

contract management by the Department of Energy. 

My name is Frank Sheppard. I represent Parsons and the Salt 

Waste Processing Facility currently being constructed at the Savannah River site near Aiken, South Carolina. I am the Deputy 

Project Manager for SWPF and have been with Parsons since September 2011. 

SWPF is a large, complex, first-of-a-kind radioactive waste treatment facility. The mission of SWPF is to safely and efficiently segregate radioactive salt waste into products suitable for processing 

at the Defense Waste Processing Facility and the Saltstone Processing Facility, both of which are currently in operation. The SWPF 

facility is the last component needed in the liquid waste system at 

the site and is on the critical path for completion of DOE’s cleanup 

mission at Savannah River. 

When operational, this facility will process 100 million gallons of 

radioactive waste. The construction of the facility is currently over 

72 percent complete, and we recently finished enclosing the facility 

with completion of the roof in February 2013, just 1 week past our 

contractual target milestone. 

In 2001, the DOE issued a Critical Decision–0 (CD–0), cost range 

of $673 million to $2.6 billion. Although there have been cost increases for a number of reasons, the current Parsons contract is 

valued at $1.7 billion, which is still just slightly above the median 

cost of the 2001 original CD–O cost estimate. 

Our focus throughout the project has been on safety, quality, 

schedule and cost. Parsons’s safety performance on SWPF is good 

and is improving. The construction recordable injury rates are 

roughly half the industry average. Parsons believes in investing to 

continually improve safety as a core value and a fundamental principle of our business. 

SWPF is unique for DOE or NNSA first-of-a-kind construction 

projects in that we have no major outstanding technical or regulatory issues in the design or construction of the facility. 

Our contract requires a through-put of approximately 6 million 

gallons per year, and we are confident we will be able to process 

9 million gallons a year. Parsons has tested a Next Generation Solvent that can increase the through-put capacity to more than 12 

million gallons per year. This could dramatically reduce the oper-
31 

ational life of the facility, save significant life cycle costs for the Department and accelerate major risk reduction at Savannah River. 

There are several factors that have led to the cost increases associated with the SWPF project: 

Changes in throughput capacity from 3 million gallons at the initial start of the contract to now 6 million gallons per year. 

At Critical Decision–1, the contract required a performance Category 2 facility design. 

In January 2006, DOE directed Parsons to begin preparation of 

an enhanced preliminary design to meet more stringent PC–3 seismic requirements. 

The initial quality standard for SWPF was the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9001. In June 2009, DOE directed compliance with the Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA–1) as 

the primary quality standard. The overhead associated with establishing and maintaining an NQA–1-compliant program carries significant cost implications. 

For example, the cost of a piece of equipment can be 5 to 10 

times higher than an identical piece of equipment manufactured to 

a less rigorous standard. The same cost burden is realized again 

on the constructionsite through extensive documentation, inspection, layers of oversight and testing. 

The diminished ability of most nuclear-qualified vendors and 

suppliers to effectively meet NQA–1 on a consistent basis has 

caused significant cost growth on SWPF as well as many other 

DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) construction projects. 

The most significant delay on the SWPF project was related to 

the manufacturing and delivery of our 10 large American Society 

of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) vessels. After initially awarding 

one subcontract, it became apparent the vendor could not provide 

the quality necessary for the large vessels. The contract was terminated, and a subsequent contract was awarded with the tanks delivered in June and July 2012, over 2 years later than originally 

planned. 

This is not an isolated issue affecting just nuclear vessel manufacturers and persists with items such as pipes, bulk materials and 

valves. 

Parsons has consistently worked to mitigate any scheduling and 

cost impacts while maintaining the high degree of safety and quality necessary on a DOE project. Given the extensive delay in delivery of the large vessels, Parsons effectively built the facility around 

the area of the vessels and then safely lifted and placed the vessels 

into the facility. 

We recently signed a contract modification with DOE that incorporates all of the additional costs associated with the challenges 

and the impacts I have spoken to earlier. This modification establishes a cost cap type of contract for completion of construction. 

Parsons has assumed significant liability with this type of contract 

where we are committed to deliver construction complete on or 

ahead of schedule and at or below the target cost. 

In conclusion, we have no outstanding technical or regulatory 

issues relative to resolve at SWPF. Parsons and DOE have agreed 
32 

on a path forward to complete construction no later than December 

2016. 

We are working with DOE to negotiate the path forward for the 

remainder of the contract. 

We will continue to propose new and innovative concepts to DOE 

that can potentially reduce overall life cycle costs. 

We are confident that we will deliver a facility that will successfully complete startup, will provide a safe operational environment 

for the workers, will significantly outperform the contractual capacity requirements and will provide significant risk reduction at the 

Savannah River site. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. I am 

happy to answer any questions you have. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you so much. 

We only have about 12 minutes, I am afraid. So I am going to 

try to just briefly get in the questions in about half that time and 

turn it over to my colleague. 

And, obviously, there will be more questions we will ask of you 

for the record since our time has been curtailed with the unfortunate timing of votes this morning. 

First, let me say I really appreciate that you are here. This Committee has run into trouble with some companies that do business 

with the government not wanting to come in front of this Committee. So I appreciate that you are here and willing to answer 

questions. 

And I also appreciate the fact that doing business with the government is no walk in the park. I understand that this is a complex 

area. If the government was not involved—and you layer in the involvement of not just the Department of Energy but all the regulatory layering you have both at the State level and at the national/Federal level, and I am appreciative of that. 

Let me see if I can get a yes or no answer from all three of you 

to this question. Do you believe that EM has the necessary internal 

expertise to oversee your contracts, yes or no, Mr. Graham? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, I do. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. McKelvy. 

Mr. MCKELVY. Yes, I do. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Sheppard. 

Mr. SHEPPARD. Yes, I do. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Briefly, on contractor whistleblowers, I 

have worked very hard to expand the protection of whistleblowers 

beyond government employees to employees of contractors who do 

primarily government work. We have successfully done this in the 

2013 Defense Authorization Act. 

This is kind of a yes or no question, too. Have you received any 

direct guidance from the Department of Energy in terms of how potential whistleblowers should be handled? 

Do you know, Mr. Graham? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I do not recall. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You do not know. 

Mr. MCKELVY. No specific direction. 

Mr. SHEPPARD. Not since I have been on a project, since 2011. 

Senator MCCASKILL. We will take care of that because we want 

to make sure that you are getting some specific guidance on that. 
33 

Earlier this year, CH2M HILL entered into a settlement with the 

Department of Justice (DOJ) for a timecard fraud at Hanford. For 

years, employees falsified timecards. Under the settlement, HILL 

admitted not only did certain members of management know this 

timecard fraud was ongoing, but some supervisors actively helped 

to conceal it. 

Are any of the employees, supervisors or management who participated in, or who were aware of, this fraud still working at Hanford? 

Excuse me. I looked at the wrong one. Sorry. 

Mr. MCKELVY. Yes, that is for me. Thank you. 

To my knowledge, the employees who were directly affected with 

that issue have terminated or are no longer with CH2M HILL or 

under disciplinary action. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And does that include the supervisors who 

were aware of this and did nothing to stop it or just the ones who 

were doing it? 

Mr. MCKELVY. I believe it is both. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK, if you would followup with that—— 

Mr. MCKELVY. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. And make sure. I think this is 

something that obviously people who were responsible for that—I 

certainly understand that you can have wrongdoers in a business 

operation and have the head of operation not know about it. But, 

when they are discovered, we want to make sure that the head of 

the organization, the head of the company, takes care of it—— 

Mr. MCKELVY. Absolutely. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. Particularly in working with 

the government. 

Mr. MCKELVY. It is how you respond that makes the difference. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is exactly right. 

And, finally, for me—and then I will turn it over to Senator 

Johnson and I will have a number of questions for you for the 

record—would it be worthwhile for DOE to obtain more independent cost estimates of its projects? [Pause.] 

Anybody can jump in here. 

Mr. SHEPPARD. Well, I think, if I could, since we just concluded 

contract negotiations, DOE does have not only internally, but they 

contract out to firms like Project Time and Cost that do independent government cost estimates on the government side. 

I think for unique, first-of-a-kind projects, the challenge is trying 

to get the right factors and the right historical costs on one-of-akind type projects to do an adequate job of predicting costs in the 

future. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, you know, I am glad you jumped in, 

Mr. Sheppard, because the example that piqued my interest in this 

area was, in fact, the facility where you are working. The current 

estimated cost was $1.2 billion, and GAO said an independent estimate by DOE’s cost analysis said that it was $2.7 billion. But, yet, 

it is still currently estimated at something much closer to $1.2 billion. 

So it is almost as if they are doing some of this but paying no 

attention to it. 
34 

Mr. SHEPPARD. They do that. There are certain elements of a cost 

estimate, mainly the contingency piece, that takes into account the 

unknown risks that are frequently experienced on first-of-a-kind 

projects—some of the things that are directed changes through design and seismic requirements. The others are things associated 

with the NQA–1 atrophy of the supply chain that are just unknown, unanticipated and very hard to bound. 

So I think you will see a broad range. Even when you look at the CD–0 estimate, the initial estimate by DOE was between $673 million to $2.6 billion back in 2001. That includes a large part of contingency, some of which we have experienced on SWPF. Currently, our recent mod to the contract—Parsons is at $1.7 billion. So we are right about the mid-range of the original 2001 estimate, but a large part becomes how much of the contingency is realized during the execution of the project. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Wouldn’t we be better off to go with the 

higher estimates, though, than the lowest? 

It seems like to me that what we have done on a consistent 

basis, if you look at the history of these contracts, is we have lowballed all of them. 

Mr. SHEPPARD. I think it would—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. And then come back and——. 

Frankly, it makes contract oversight look shoddy. It makes it 

look like that somehow you all are not doing your best work when 

I am sure that you are trying to estimate costs accurately. 

Shouldn’t we be trying to influence this process in terms of an 

oversight function, to say, hey, quit low-balling these estimates and 

let’s be honest up front what this stuff is going to cost? 

Mr. SHEPPARD. I think you would be in a much better position 

to take a more conservative estimate up front, particularly on firstof-a-kind nuclear construction projects. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Just call you, right? 

Senator JOHNSON. Right. I appreciate your holding this hearing. 

This was very informational, and I think important. 

And I certainly want to thank the witnesses for coming forward 

as well. 

I will quickly give you an opportunity—I believe you were sitting 

through the first panel. Anybody want to comment on anything 

said that was just burning at you, just listening to it, or not? 

[Pause.] 

That is fine. 

Is there one thing in dealing with the EM in this regard—the 

Department of Energy—that you think would dramatically improve 

project management? 

Mr. Graham, I will start with you. 

Mr. GRAHAM. I think we talked about it earlier, in terms of meeting these regulatory milestones and establishing regulatory milestones that are years in front of us, somehow being able to work 

a regulatory framework and a funding certainty framework that 

will allow us to better work with the regulators to deliver their requirements. 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. McKelvy. 
35 

Mr. MCKELVY. As was said by Mr. Surash in the panel, it would 

be wonderful if there was a 5-year funding stream identified because often the projects are directed to clean up one area; then all 

of a sudden the funding is attained for another area, and then everyone has to change and move to a different area. And it is not 

quite systemic or under some kind of order. 

You couple that with other regulatory agencies—the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), et cetera—that seem to sometimes have a different strategy and a different goal from the DOE 

EM has. 

And there could be better partnership with all the regulatories, 

the other agencies as well, in terms of what the end goal is. 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Sheppard. 

Mr. SHEPPARD. I think we touched upon some of that, mainly 

with finding the true scope of what the project is and what you 

want—in this case, capital—large construction projects to achieve 

in the end and then having a bounding cost estimate that is realistic and accounts for all of the contingencies that may happen on 

these types of projects. 

The thing that was not discussed this morning that you have to 

consider is the overall life cycle costs. Although we are focused on 

the cost of these projects, as with SWPF, it is a critical element to 

significant reduce overall life cycle costs—so not only consider the 

costs associated with the initial project but how it fits into the 

overall mission at Savannah River and the overall life cycle costs, 

which are substantial on an annual basis. 

Senator JOHNSON. With these one-of-a-kind projects, is it possible 

to properly define the scope of the project, Mr. Graham? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I think it is quite the challenge. And I think, again, 

we have gone into these with phases where you fund a phase of the 

work, get that locked down and then move ahead. 

But my point I made earlier—in terms of trying to meet the regulatory framework, I think DOE often gets themselves ratcheted 

into—as Jack Surash put it, you are trying to deliver; you are trying to make commitments. 

And, again, we are dealing with, I think, our toughest problems 

right now in DOE. 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. McKelvy. 

Mr. MCKELVY. I think that there could be a better job done of 

scoping and costing the facilities with all of the factors that could 

be encountered up front. 

The IWTU facility, for example, at the time that the baseline cost 

was determined, there was not the input from the Defense Board 

that increased the seismic requirements, and then there were other 

inputs from previous DOE management that wanted the facility to 

have structural integrity for future calcine processing. If those 

things had been known at the very beginning, before the construction had started and before the design was done, then the baseline 

would have been much more accurate. 

Senator JOHNSON. Was it possible to know that ahead of time? 

In defense of the government, I mean. 

Mr. MCKELVY. There could have been earlier involvement from 

the Defense Board, certainly, and perhaps the longer-scale plan for 

the calcine process could have been factored in. 
36 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. Mr. Sheppard, do you want to comment? 

Mr. SHEPPARD. I think it is basically the same thing. It is just 

the timing of the changes, whether they are DOE directed changes 

or throughput changes. 

And, if you look at the larger, complex facilities—the Parsons 

contract was awarded in 2002, and construction started in 2008. 

So, when you have a span of 6 years, things are going to change. 

People are going to want to have facilities designed and built safer. 

But, whenever you have major changes in the middle of design, it 

causes significant impacts that usually are not felt and realized 

until much later down the road. 

Senator JOHNSON. Who primarily drives those changes? 

Is that from the Safety Board? 

Is that the government? 

Is that, as you are going through the design phase, you are raising red flags? 

Or, all of the above? 

Mr. Graham. 

Mr. GRAHAM. I think it is all of the above. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK 

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, I think. Again, if you look at the waste treatment plant, for example, there was a change in the seismic requirements after we got started. 

And so, again, as we talked about, anytime you are adding new 

requirements when you are in the middle of the job, whether you 

are building one of these complex factories or whether you are 

building a house, if you have to change the insulation and go back 

rework things, it is an expensive trip. 

Senator JOHNSON. From the first panel, it seemed like the direction we were moving was trying to bring these contracts into smaller bite-sized pieces. Would that be helpful or harmful, Mr. 

Graham? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I think that it—you have to weigh whether cutting 

it into smaller pieces makes it more manageable for the pieces. But 

then how do you integrate the pieces that have to come together? 

And so I think that—— 

Senator JOHNSON. That kind of speaks to really defining the 

scope of the project. We really need something pretty large on the 

front end, and then maybe—so define the scope, take a little more 

time on the scope of the project and then break it down into bitesized pieces? 

Mr. GRAHAM. You could break down into some pieces. But again, 

at the end of the day, if you look at a facility like the waste treatment plant, where there is major, large facilities that have to interact together, it does not lend itself, I think, to splitting it into small 

parts. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. Mr. McKelvy, it looked like you wanted 

to weigh in. 

Mr. MCKELVY. Yes, sir. On the projects that are design-build 

projects, construction projects, that is one—usually one contractor, 

one piece, one budget. 

When you look at the overall cleanup of a 500-square-mile site, 

there are various, discrete pieces of the work that are all budgeted 

and costed in. Whether they were contracted separately or not, 
37 

they are still identified and funded by the DOE on a per-project 

basis. 

So, the other aspect of this is that, sure, the scope can change 

on a building—a first-of-a-kind building. But often we will get into 

some remediation, and we will have thought from the information 

from the 40s and 50s that there are 1,000 drums of waste buried 

40 feet underground, and when you dig it up you find that there 

is 2,000 or 3,000. 

And so it is the dynamic scope change of the circumstance, of the 

complexity of the work. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. Again, thanks for your testimony. 

And thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. We really appreciate your being here. We 

will get some questions to you for the record since our time was 

curtailed today. 

And I am glad that we had this hearing. I think it was very helpful. 

I hope you found it helpful and not, you know, as somebody accused us of always trying to shoot fish in a barrel. I hope you did 

not feel like you were fish, and I hope you did not feel like you 

were in a barrel. 

Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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