IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

JULIE MICHAELSON, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM GARR, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 13-0302

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FN2012-003403

The Honorable Lisa M. Roberts, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

William Garr, Scottsdale

Defendant/Appellant in Propria Persona

OPINION

Judge Maurice Portley delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Donn Kessler and Judge Patricia K. Norris joined.
MICHAELSON v. GARR

Opinion of the Court

2

P O R T L E Y, Judge:

¶1 William Garr appeals the order of protection issued and 

affirmed by the superior court in favor of his ex-fiancée, Julie Michaelson. 

For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Michaelson ended her engagement to Garr in late September 

2012. She sought and was granted an ex parte order of protection on 

October 16, 2012. The order of protection prohibited Garr from having 

any contact with Michaelson; from committing crimes against her; and

from possessing, receiving, or purchasing any firearms or ammunition. 

The order was served on Garr the following day. 

¶3 Five months later, Garr requested a hearing and one was 

scheduled. Both parties testified at the hearing, and the superior court 

continued the order of protection. Garr then filed this appeal.2 

DISCUSSION

¶4 Garr contends that the superior court erred by continuing 

the order of protection. In particular, he argues that there was no specific 

allegation of domestic abuse and the court did not state a basis for 

continuing the order. He also claims that the portion of the order 

preventing him from possessing or using weapons violates federal law.3

 1 On appeal, we view the facts “in the light most favorable to upholding 

the trial court’s ruling.” Mahar v. Acuna, 230 Ariz. 530, 532, ¶ 2, 287 P.3d 

824, 826 (App. 2012).

2 Although the order of protection against Garr expired on October 13, 

2013, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 13-3602(K)

(West 2014), we do not consider his appeal to be moot because “expired 

orders of protection have ongoing collateral legal consequences.” See 

Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, 617-18, ¶¶ 9-10, 227 P.3d 811, 814-15 (App. 

2012) (explaining that the collateral consequences exception allows this 

court to review an otherwise expired order of protection). 

3 Michaelson did not file an answering brief. In the exercise of our 

discretion, we decline to treat her failure to file an answering brief as a 

confession of error. See Gonzales v. Gonzales, 134 Ariz. 437, 437, 657 P.2d 

425, 425 (App. 1982) (“Although we may regard [the] failure to respond as 

a confession of reversible error, we are not required to do so.”).
MICHAELSON v. GARR

Opinion of the Court

3

¶5 We review the decision of the superior court to continue an 

order of protection for an abuse of discretion. Cardoso, 230 Ariz. at 619, 

¶ 16, 277 P.3d at 816. The court abuses its discretion when it makes an 

error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion or “when the record, 

viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s decision, 

is devoid of competent evidence to support the decision.” Mahar, 230 

Ariz. at 534, ¶ 14, 287 P.3d at 828 (citation omitted) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). We review any questions of law de novo. In re Marriage 

of Pownall, 197 Ariz. 577, 580, ¶ 7, 5 P.3d 911, 914 (App. 2000). 

¶6 An order of protection shall be continued by the court if the 

plaintiff demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that “there is

reasonable cause to believe . . . [that] [t]he defendant may commit an act of 

domestic violence.” A.R.S. § 13-3602(E)(1);4 Ariz. R. Prot. Order P. 8(F). In 

the context of a past or current romantic relationship, the term “domestic 

violence” is broadly defined in § 13-3601(A) and includes a wide array of 

criminal acts as well as harassment by “verbal, electronic, mechanical, 

telegraphic, telephonic or written” communication. A.R.S. §§ 13-3601(A), 

(A)(6), -2921(A)(1). 

¶7 At the hearing, Michaelson never claimed that Garr 

committed any acts of physical domestic violence. Instead, she testified 

that Garr was harassing her. Specifically, she testified that on September 

26, 2012, Garr sent her between 60-110 unwanted text messages, and on

October 4, 2012, he called her employer, identified himself as an attorney 

and gained access to her work schedule, and then sent her a text stating 

that he “had all the information he needed” and knew when she was at 

work or at home. Michaelson also testified that on October 15, 2012, after 

she declined to accept the flowers he attempted to send to her at work, 

Garr sent her a text indicating that their relationship was brought together 

by God and only God could separate them. After considering the 

testimony of both parties and the other evidence, the court stated that “the 

Plaintiff has established by a preponderance of the evidence that an act of 

domestic violence has occurred. The order of protection is affirmed.” 

¶8 Garr, however, contends that the court considered improper 

evidence to reach its decision. First, he claims that the court considered 

text messages he sent to Michaelson’s eighteen-year-old daughter. The 

record belies the argument because the court stated the evidence was “not 

 4 We cite to the current version of the applicable statute absent any 

changes material to this Opinion. 
MICHAELSON v. GARR

Opinion of the Court

4

relevant for purposes of today’s hearing. The only thing that’s relevant is 

what Mr. Garr did to [Michaelson] directly that constitutes an act of 

domestic violence.” As a result, we reject the argument.5 

¶9 Garr next challenges the admission of an illegible email he 

sent to Michaelson that she submitted to show the court that he contacted 

her after being served with the order of protection. At the hearing, Garr 

stated that the email “was not accurate” and that he did not “agree to that 

at all.” Although the contents of the email were illegible, the email clearly 

displayed his name, email address, and the date on which it was sent. As 

a result, his argument goes to the weight and not the admissibility of the 

evidence. See, e.g., State v. Lacy, 187 Ariz. 340, 349, 929 P.2d 1288, 1297 

(1996) (“Lack of positive identification goes to the weight of evidence, not

to its admissibility.”); State v. Hatton, 116 Ariz. 142, 149, 568 P.2d 1040, 

1047 (1977) (noting that evidence that was “not a conclusive link in the 

case goes only to the weight and not the admissibility”). Because the 

superior court was the trier of fact and had to determine whether an act of 

domestic violence occurred, the court properly considered the email as 

proof that Garr violated the order of protection. See Ariz. R. Prot. Order 

5(A). 

¶10 Garr also argues that the superior court erred by (1) 

admitting evidence of text messages that had not been printed out and (2) 

excluding testimony about Garr’s engagement and upcoming marriage. 

Because Garr did not object to the admission of the unprinted text 

messages6 or to the preclusion of his then-current romantic situation,7 he 

waived any error and we will not review those rulings for the first time on 

appeal. See State v. Lopez, 217 Ariz. 433, 435, ¶¶ 5-6, 175 P.3d 682, 684 

(App. 2008) (noting that defendant’s failure to object to the introduction of 

testimony on the grounds of hearsay waived the issue on appeal).

 5 Similarly, we reject Garr’s claim that the order of protection was not 

filed under the name of the party requesting protection. Because 

Michaelson named herself as the plaintiff on the petition, the argument is 

specious.

6 Before Michaelson submitted the evidence to the court, Garr had an 

opportunity to review the text messages on Michaelson’s cell phone and 

made no objection. 7 The court properly found that Garr’s anticipated marriage was not 

relevant to determine whether the order, which had been issued five 

months earlier, should be continued. See Ariz. R. Prot. Order 5(A). 
MICHAELSON v. GARR

Opinion of the Court

5

¶11 Finally, Garr argues that the superior court erred by 

continuing the portion of the order preventing him from possessing or 

purchasing firearms or ammunition for the duration of the order of 

protection. 8 We disagree. 

¶12 A court issuing an order of protection can “prohibit the 

defendant from possessing or purchasing a firearm for the duration of the 

order” after determining that “the defendant is a credible threat to the 

physical safety of the plaintiff.” A.R.S. § 13-3602(G)(4). Here, the superior 

court reviewed the text messages on Michaelson’s cell phone, along with 

the testimony, and determined that Garr was a credible threat to 

Michaelson’s physical safety.

¶13 The superior court scrolled through the multiple text 

messages between Garr and Michaelson contained on Michaelson’s phone 

and read one message into the record.9 The remaining text messages 

reviewed by the court were not read into the record or otherwise 

preserved in any form in the record and so are unavailable for our review. 

See State v. Villegas-Rojas, 231 Ariz. 445, 446 & n.1, ¶ 4, 296 P.3d 981, 982 & 

n.1 (App. 2012) (noting that where an officer’s probable cause statement 

was before the superior court but not in the record on appeal, it was 

unavailable for appellate review). As a result, “[i]n the absence of the 

record, an appellate court will presume that the evidence at a trial was 

sufficient to sustain a finding, the verdict, or a charge to the jury.” Bryant 

v. Thunderbird Acad., 103 Ariz. 247, 249, 439 P.2d 818, 820 (1968); accord 

Duckstein v. Wolf, 230 Ariz. 227, 233, ¶ 15, 282 P.3d 428, 434 (App. 2012). 

Moreover, because Garr is challenging the ruling, it was his responsibility 

to preserve the record and ensure that it contained the materials relevant 

to his appeal. See Villegas-Rojas, 231 Ariz. at 446 n.1, ¶ 4, 296 P.3d at 982

n.1 (“It is [Appellant’s] responsibility to ensure the record ‘contains the 

material to which he takes exception.’” (quoting State v. Wilson, 179 Ariz. 

17, 19 n.1, 875 P.2d 1322, 1324 n.1 (App. 1993))). Accordingly, because we 

presume the evidence supports the judgment, the superior court did not 

 8 Garr now challenges the firearm prohibition solely on federal grounds. 

Specifically, he contends that because he did not meet the definition of an 

“intimate partner” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), the firearm 

prohibition could not apply to him as a matter of law. Because we can 

resolve the issue under state law, we do not address his argument. 

9 The message read aloud was, “Bill, you are too much. I CAN’T TAKE IT 

ANYMORE. It is time to stop now.” 
MICHAELSON v. GARR

Opinion of the Court

6

err by continuing the firearm prohibition against Garr for the remainder of 

the order of protection. 

CONCLUSION

¶14 Based on the foregoing, we affirm.