U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD

INVESTIGATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 2011-06-I-HI

JANUARY 2013

 DONALDSON ENTERPRISES, INC.

FIREWORKS DISPOSAL EXPLOSION AND FIRE

(5 Fatalities, 1 Injury)

WAIKELE SELF STORAGE

WAIPAHU, HAWAII

APRIL 8, 2011

KEY ISSUES:

• HAZARDS OF FIREWORKS DISPOSAL AND THE ACCUMULATION OF

EXPLOSIVE FIREWORKS COMPONENTS

• LACK OF REGULATIONS AND INDUSTRY STANDARDS ADDRESSING

FIREWORKS DISPOSAL

• INSUFFICIENT CONTRACTOR SELECTION AND OVERSIGHT

REQUIREMENTS FOR HAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES
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Table of Contents

Table of Contents..........................................................................................................................................2

Acronyms and Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................6

Executive Summary......................................................................................................................................8

Technical Findings......................................................................................................................................10

Contractor Selection and Oversight Findings.............................................................................................10

Regulatory and Industry Safety Standard Findings ....................................................................................11

1.0 The Incident ....................................................................................................................................13

2.0 Fireworks ........................................................................................................................................15

2.1 Explosive Classification of Fireworks............................................................................................15

2.2 Importing Fireworks .......................................................................................................................17

2.3 Seized Fireworks Disposal..............................................................................................................18

2.3.1 History.....................................................................................................................................18

2.3.2 Present Fireworks Disposal Framework .................................................................................19

2.4 Federal Government Seizure Programs ..........................................................................................19

3.0 Pre-Incident.....................................................................................................................................21

3.1 Federal Seized Property Management Contract..............................................................................21

3.2 Federal Fireworks Disposal Subcontract ........................................................................................21

3.3 Donaldson Enterprises, Inc. ............................................................................................................23

3.4 Waikele Self Storage.......................................................................................................................24

3.5 DEI Initial Fireworks Disposal Activities.......................................................................................25

3.6 Modifications to the Fireworks Disposal Process...........................................................................26

3.6.1 Initial Modification .................................................................................................................26

3.6.2 Second Modification...............................................................................................................30

3.7 Morning of the Incident ..................................................................................................................30
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4.0 Technical Analysis..........................................................................................................................34

4.1 Site Inspection and Evaluation........................................................................................................34

4.2 Disassembly Activities....................................................................................................................39

4.3 Testing.............................................................................................................................................40

4.3.1 ATF Testing of Firework Samples..........................................................................................40

4.3.2 CSB Testing of Firework Samples..........................................................................................40

4.3.3 HIOSH Testing of Tools.........................................................................................................40

4.4 Conclusions on Ignition ..................................................................................................................41

5.0 Incident Analysis ............................................................................................................................43

5.1 Process Safety Management Standard ............................................................................................43

5.1.1 Process Hazard Analysis.........................................................................................................44

5.1.1.1 Process Safety Information .................................................................................................44

5.1.1.2 Identifying, Evaluating, and Controlling Hazards..............................................................45

5.1.2 Management of Change (MOC) Review ................................................................................46

5.2 Principles of Inherent Safety...........................................................................................................46

5.3 Relevant Training and Experience..................................................................................................47

5.3.1 DEI Management ....................................................................................................................47

5.3.2 Experience...............................................................................................................................47

5.3.3 Training...................................................................................................................................47

5.4 Relevant Incidents...........................................................................................................................48

5.4.1 Enschede Fireworks Incident..................................................................................................48

5.4.2 Lansing, Kansas Incident ........................................................................................................49

6.0 Contractor Selection and Oversight ................................................................................................51

6.1 Federal Acquisition Regulation ......................................................................................................51

6.1.1 Determining Responsibility ....................................................................................................51

6.2 Supplements to the FAR.................................................................................................................52
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6.2.1 Department of the Treasury ....................................................................................................53

6.2.2 Department of Defense ...........................................................................................................53

6.3 Subcontractor Selection ..................................................................................................................55

6.3.1 VSE Procurement Selection Methodology for Subcontractors...............................................55

6.3.1.1 Initial Solicitation................................................................................................................55

6.3.1.2 Subcontractor Selection – Determining Responsibility ......................................................56

6.4 Fireworks Disposal Subcontract Provisions....................................................................................57

6.5 Subcontractor Oversight .................................................................................................................57

6.5.1 Initial DEI Fireworks Disposal Plan .......................................................................................57

6.5.2 Property Destruction Plan Review and Approval ...................................................................58

6.5.3 VSE Regional Office ..............................................................................................................59

6.5.4 BAI..........................................................................................................................................59

6.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................59

7.0 Regulatory and Industry Standards Analysis..................................................................................61

7.1 Hawaii Occupational Safety and Health Division ..........................................................................61

7.1.1 Jurisdiction..............................................................................................................................61

7.1.2 HIOSH Investigation of the Incident ......................................................................................62

7.2 ATF.................................................................................................................................................62

7.3 Regulation of Hazardous Waste......................................................................................................63

7.3.1 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act..............................................................................63

7.3.2 State of Hawaii Department of Health (DOH)........................................................................65

7.4 Industry Standards ..........................................................................................................................67

7.4.1 National Fire Protection Association ......................................................................................67

7.4.1.1 NFPA 495 ...........................................................................................................................67

7.4.1.2 NFPA 1123 .........................................................................................................................67

7.4.1.3 NFPA 1124 .........................................................................................................................68
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7.4.2 Review of Current Fireworks Disposal Practices ...................................................................68

7.4.2.1 Fireworks Operators............................................................................................................68

7.4.2.2 Local Law Enforcement Agencies......................................................................................69

7.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................69

8.0 Causal Analysis...............................................................................................................................70

8.1 Physical Events, Conditions, and Outcomes...................................................................................70

8.2 DEI..................................................................................................................................................70

8.3 VSE.................................................................................................................................................71

8.4 Industry Codes and Standards.........................................................................................................71

8.5 Government.....................................................................................................................................71

9.0 Recommendations...........................................................................................................................73

Federal Acquisition Regulatory (FAR) Council .........................................................................................73

Department of the Treasury Office of the Procurement Executive (OPE) .................................................73

Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture (TEOAF) .........................................................................74

VSE Corporation.........................................................................................................................................74

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) ............................................................................................75

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)...........................................................................................75

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) .................................................................76

References...................................................................................................................................................78

Appendix A: Hawaii Firework Seizures....................................................................................................80

Appendix B. Department of Defense Contractor’s Safety Manual ...........................................................85
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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AE Ammunition and Explosives

AIHA American Industrial Hygiene Association

ANSI American National Standards Institute

APA American Pyrotechnics Association

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

BAI Thomas E. Blanchard & Associates, Inc.

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

CCR Central Contractor Registration

CLIN Contract Line Item Number

CO Contracting Officer

CSB U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

CURT Construction Users Roundtable

DAR Daily Activity Report

DDESB Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board

DEI Donaldson Enterprises, Inc.

DFARS Department of Defense Acquisition Regulation Supplement

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DLIR Department of Labor and Industry Relations

DoD Department of Defense

DOH State of Hawaii Department of Health

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation

DTAP Department of Treasury Acquisition Procedures

DTAR Department of Treasury Acquisition Regulation System

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

ESD Electrostatic Discharge

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

HAR Hawaii Administrative Rules

HAZWOPER Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response

HFD Honolulu Fire Department

HIOSH Hawaii Occupational Safety and Health Division
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HPD Honolulu Police Department

HSPM Health and Safety Program Manager

ICC International Code Council

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

ICE/HSI U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland 

Security Investigations

MOC Management of Change

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

OPE Department of the Treasury Office of the Procurement 

Executive

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PHA Process Hazard Analysis

PPE Personal Protective Equipment

PSM Process Safety Management

RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

QCM Quality Control Manager

SBA Small Business Association

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SPE Senior Procurement Executive

SSHO Site Safety and Health Officer

SOW Statement of Work

TEOAF Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture

TEP Temporary Emergency Permit

TFU Thermal Flash Unit

TFF Treasury Forfeiture Fund

TSDF Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facility

VSE VSE Corporation

UXO Unexploded Ordnance
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Executive Summary

On April 8, 2011, at approximately 8:50 am, an explosion and fire occurred at a magazine1

DEI is an unexploded ordnance

located at 

Waikele Self Storage in Waipahu, Hawaii, that was leased and used by Donaldson Enterprises, Inc. (DEI) 

for seized fireworks storage and disposal-related activities. Five DEI personnel in the magazine at the 

time of the incident were fatally injured. 

2 (UXO) remediation company based on Oahu that employs fewer than 20

full-time workers. Pursuant to a federal seized property management contract with the Treasury 

Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture (TEOAF), federal government contractor VSE Corporation (VSE) 

awarded DEI a subcontract in early 2010 to dispose of imported fireworks seized in Honolulu, Hawaii, by 

federal law enforcement personnel. Three fireworks shipments were seized as contraband3 because they 

were labeled as consumer grade fireworks but, upon inspection, appeared physically consistent with more 

hazardous commercial display grade fireworks. 

Federal contractor selection regulations did not require VSE procurement personnel to conduct a safetyrelated review of DEI prior to awarding the company the subcontract, nor did VSE procurement personnel 

involved in awarding this subcontract have training and experience related to fireworks disposal. VSE’s 

procurement office selected DEI as the fireworks disposal subcontractor because DEI was already storing 

the seized fireworks at the time under a separate subcontract with VSE, and because DEI submitted the 

lowest-cost and most time-efficient bid, which VSE determined to be the best overall value for the 

government. VSE procurement personnel were unaware that DEI had no prior fireworks disposal 

experience when it awarded the subcontract.

Because seized fireworks requiring disposal are considered hazardous waste in the United States, DEI 

was required to obtain an environmental permit from the State of Hawaii Department of Health (DOH). 

In June 2010, DOH issued DEI a 90-day emergency hazardous waste permit authorizing “thermal 

treatment”4 of the fireworks at a local shooting range, and DEI began its disposal work soon after. The 

permit did not evaluate or address fireworks disassembly or diesel soaking. To dispose of the first seizure

of fireworks, DEI personnel separated individual firework tubes from their original configuration and 

soaked the firework tubes whole in 55-gallon diesel-filled steel drums inside the magazine. DEI then 

transported the soaked fireworks to a local shooting range to burn them in either drums or a portable 

incinerator. 

The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) learned that because DEI was experiencing minor explosions 

with some types of fireworks while burning the initial shipment of seized fireworks, the company altered 

 1 A “magazine” is “any building or structure, other than an explosives manufacturing building, used for storage of 

explosive materials.” Commerce in Explosives, 27 CFR §555.11 (2003). 2 “Unexploded ordnance” is an explosive weapon such as a grenade, bomb, or land mine that has not exploded and 

poses a risk of detonation. It can be located on the ground, partially buried in the ground, under bushes or other 

vegetation, and in water. 

3 Goods that have been imported illegally.

4 Burning. 
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its fireworks disposal methodology in summer 2010. As a result of the altered methodology, DEI 

personnel began cutting open, or disassembling, individual firework tubes by hand on a loading dock just 

outside the magazine entrance and separating out the individual explosive fireworks components, the 

black powder5 and aerial shells,

6 which are both susceptible to ignition from sparks, friction, and static

electricity. The accumulated explosive powder from the fireworks, referred to as “black powder,” was 

stored in a plastic container lined with a plastic garbage bag. To improve diesel permeation of the shells 

and minimize explosions, DEI personnel cut one-inch slits in the aerial shells. They then soaked the 

shells in diesel and burned them at the shooting range. VSE personnel were aware of this procedure 

change, but did not question or express concern about it. DEI completed disposal of the initial seizure in

late fall 2010 without incident. 

DEI began work on the next fireworks seizure in December 2010. In early 2011, DEI again altered the

fireworks disposal process to increase the fireworks destruction rate by maximizing the amount of aerial 

shells that could be burned at once. Expanding upon the modification DEI developed when disposing of 

the initial seizure, DEI personnel disassembled the firework tubes outside the magazine by hand and 

separated the individual explosive components, the black powder and aerial shells, into cardboard boxes. 

The cardboard boxes containing the black powder were lined with plastic garbage bags to minimize 

leakage. DEI personnel stacked and stored boxes containing aerial shells and black powder within the 

magazine and simultaneously soaked aerial shells in diesel. DEI notified VSE of this change in 

methodology via email in March 2011, but VSE again did not question the change.

Although DEI wrote a brief document presenting a hazard review of its fireworks disposal activities when 

it was awarded the subcontract, this analysis did not consider the safety implications of cutting into the 

fireworks and accumulating their explosive components. Because the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) standard does not apply to activities 

conducted under the umbrella of fireworks disposal,

7 DEI was not required to conduct a formal Process 

Hazard Analysis (PHA) of its fireworks disposal activities or a formal Management of Change (MOC) 

analysis when it modified its disposal process.

At the time of the incident, DEI personnel had abruptly halted their disassembly work due to rain and had 

taken the materials involved in the process to just inside the magazine entrance. Boxes containing aerial 

shells, black powder, and partially disassembled firework tubes were stacked inside the magazine near the

entrance along with tools, a metal hand truck, and chairs. Once the materials were moved into the 

 5 Black powder is a mixture of charcoal, sulfur, and potassium nitrate. The standard composition typically contains 

75% potassium nitrate, 10% sulfur, and 15% charcoal. Turcotte, R., Turcotte, A.M., Fouchard, R., and Jones, 

D.E.G. Thermal Analysis of Black Powder. Journal of Thermal Analysis and Calorimetry. Canadian Explosives 

Research Laboratory, Natural Resources Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. 2003; Vol. 73, p 105. 6 An “aerial shell” is “a cartridge containing pyrotechnic composition, a burst charge, and an internal time fuse or 

module, that is propelled into the air from a mortar and that is intended to burst at or near apogee [highest point].” 

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1124. Code for the Manufacture, Transportation, Storage, and Retail 

Sales of Fireworks and Pyrotechnic Articles, Section 3.3.1, 2006. 7 PSM only applies to activities associated with fireworks manufacturing; it does not apply to fireworks disposal. 

http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=22524 (accessed 

December 29, 2012)
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magazine, the DEI project supervisor stepped outside to make a phone call. While he was on the phone, a 

large explosion occurred inside the magazine near its entrance.

The CSB determined that changes in DEI’s fireworks disposal process resulted in the accumulation of a 

large quantity of explosive components just inside the magazine entrance, creating the essential elements 

for a mass explosion.8

 Insufficient federal contractor selection and safety oversight requirements for 

hazardous activities, a significant gap in regulatory and industry standards pertaining to fireworks

disposal, and a lack of hazard management by DEI personnel, enabled DEI to introduce significant 

hazards to its fireworks disposal process without those hazards being adequately identified or effectively 

controlled. 

The CSB investigation into this incident identified the following key findings:

Technical Findings

1. DEI’s hazard analysis of its fireworks disposal process was insufficient. The company

failed to identify key hazards of handling, disassembling, and storing contraband 

commercial display fireworks, and did not adequately control the identified and evaluated 

hazards.

2. DEI personnel disposing of the fireworks lacked the training, experience, and knowledge 

of procedural safeguards for the safe conduct of the fireworks disposal.

3. DEI’s modifications to the fireworks disposal process accumulated substantially large

quantities of explosive material in boxes, greatly increasing the potential explosion 

hazard. This change to the disposal process was not adequately reviewed for safety 

implications.

4. The CSB, along with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) 

and the Hawaii Occupational Safety and Health Division (HIOSH), identified a number 

of possible ignition sources in the magazine at the time of the incident, including 

sparking tools, a metal hand truck, a rolling office chair, and plastic bags capable of 

producing static discharge.

Contractor Selection and Oversight Findings

5. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which governs federal agencies’ acquisition 

of goods and services, does not specifically require a federal contracting officer to 

consider safety performance measures and qualifications when determining the 

“responsibility” of a potential government contractor or subcontractor to handle, store, 

and dispose of hazardous materials such as fireworks.

 8 A mass explosion is “one which affects almost the entire load instantaneously.” 49 CFR §173.50 (b)(1) (2003). 
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6. The Department of the Treasury Acquisition Regulation (DTAR), the Department of the 

Treasury’s supplement to the FAR, does not impose sufficient requirements for safe 

practices and subcontractor selection and oversight with respect to the unique hazards 

associated with handling, storing, and disposing of hazardous materials.

7. VSE’s procurement office conducted a non-technical review of DEI and the competing 

offeror for the fireworks disposal subcontract that did not address health and safety. 

8. VSE did not use personnel with the technical background or expertise to properly select 

and oversee subcontractors performing work with hazardous materials such as fireworks, 

nor did it consult with or hire anyone with that expertise. 

Regulatory and Industry Safety Standard Findings

9. The CSB found a lack of regulations or industry standards that adequately address safe

fireworks disposal. Federal or local codes, regulations, or industry standards do not 

establish safety requirements, provide guidance on proper ways to dispose of fireworks, 

or address the hazards associated with the disassembly of fireworks and the accumulation 

of explosive fireworks components. 

10. While OSHA’s PSM standard applies to fireworks manufacturing, OSHA has determined

that the regulation does not apply to work activities related to fireworks disposal. 

Therefore, DEI was not required to implement a more robust PSM system for its 

fireworks disposal process. For example, DEI’s change to its disposal process led to the 

accumulation of material that created a mass explosion hazard. PSM elements such as 

Management of Change (MOC) would have required a safety review of this change. 

11. Emergency hazardous waste disposal permits are granted in Hawaii and throughout the 

country to entities seeking to dispose of seized contraband fireworks because they are 

considered an imminent threat to human health and the environment. However, the 

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) does not incorporate PSM-type 

elements in its hazardous waste permitting process, despite the extremely hazardous 

nature of the materials covered by these permits. 
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As a result of this investigation, the CSB makes recommendations to 

• The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council 

• The Department of the Treasury Office of the Procurement Executive (OPE)

• Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture (TEOAF)

• VSE Corporation

• The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

• The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

• The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

Section 9.0 of this report details the recommendations.
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1.0 The Incident

On April 8, 2011, at approximately 8:50 am, an explosion and fire occurred at a magazine known as “A21” located at Waikele Self Storage in Waipahu, Hawaii. Five Donaldson Enterprises, Inc. (DEI)

employees were fatally injured and a sixth sustained minor injuries. 

DEI, a small unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance company based on the island of Oahu, was using the

magazine to store seized contraband fireworks and prepare them for disposal. On the morning of the

incident, five DEI personnel were disassembling one-inch contraband firework tubes on a cement loading 

dock located directly in front of the magazine entrance, while a sixth remained inside the magazine 

cleaning and organizing (Figure 1). To accomplish the disassembly work, DEI personnel cut into the 

individual firework tubes by hand using a PVC pipe cutter or knife and separated the individual explosive 

components contained within each tube, the aerial shells and the black powder (which functions as a lift 

charge9

) into cardboard boxes.

According to witness statements, around 8:30 am it began to rain heavily, and the DEI workers quickly 

moved materials involved in the disassembly process – including tools, chairs, and boxes containing 

aerial shells, black powder, and partially disassembled firework tubes – to just inside the magazine 

entrance. While five of the workers remained inside, the project supervisor went outside to the front left

corner of the loading dock to make a phone call. While he was on the phone, an explosion occurred

inside the magazine, and a fire ensued. 

The five individuals located inside the magazine at the time of the incident did not survive. Three DEI 

employees sustained fatal burn injuries while two succumbed to carbon monoxide poisoning. The project 

supervisor sustained minor injuries.

 9 A lift charge is a “pyrotechnic composition used to propel a component of a mine or shell device into the air. Lift 

charge is limited to black powder (potassium nitrate, sulfur, and charcoal) or similar pyrotechnic composition 

without metallic fuel.” APA Standard 87-1. Standard for Construction and Approval for Transportation of 

Fireworks, Novelties, and Theatrical Pyrotechnics, Section 2.10, 2001.
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Figure 1. DEI work area outside of the A-21 magazine at Waikele Self Storage
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2.0 Fireworks

2.1 Explosive Classification of Fireworks

The American Pyrotechnics Association10 (APA) defines fireworks as “[a]ny device, other than a novelty 

or theatrical pyrotechnic article, intended to produce visible and/or audible effects by combustion, 

deflagration,11 or detonation.”12,13 Fireworks require a source of combustible material for energy such as 

black powder, which acts as a lift charge to propel the device into the air. A chemical substance known as 

a burst charge14 contained within the aerial shell emits brightly colored light once the firework is 

propelled into the air. According to industry literature, black powder is extremely sensitive to ignition 

from small sparks, which can be emitted from static electricity, friction, and electrical contacts, and may 

explode violently when ignited.

15 

The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) hazard classification system regulations classify fireworks 

as Class 1 explosives due to the hazardous nature of the chemical compositions they contain.

16 Under 

DOT regulations, all explosives must be formally approved for transportation and assigned an EX 

Number before they can be transported within the U.S.17

The DOT system classifies explosives into divisions 1.1 through 1.6, of which fireworks typically fall 

into two: 1.3 and 1.4.18 Division 1.1 has the largest potential hazard, with each subsequent division 

representing a lower hazard category. Division 1.3 (1.3G19

 10 The American Pyrotechnics Association (APA), founded in 1948, is a fireworks industry trade association whose 

goal is to promote safe design and use of all types of fireworks and responsible regulation of the fireworks industry. 

Display Fireworks – UN0335) “consists of 

explosives that have a fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both, but 

www.americanpyro.com (accessed July 14, 2012). 11 Deflagration is a reaction in which the speed of the reaction front propagates through the unreacted mass at a 

speed less than the speed of sound in the unreacted medium. Crowl, Daniel A. Understanding Explosions, A CCPS 

Concept Book, 2003; p. 204. 12 A detonation is a reaction in which the speed of the reaction front propagates through the unreacted mass at a 

speed greater than the speed of sound in the unreacted medium. Ibid. 13 APA Standard 87-1, Section 2.7, 2001. 14 According to APA Standard 87-1 Section 2.5, a burst charge is a “chemical composition used to break open a 

fireworks device after it has been propelled into the air, producing a secondary effect such as a shower of stars. 

Burst charge is also sometimes referred to as expelling charge or break charge...[b]urst charge for use in 1.3G 

fireworks is limited to black powder (potassium nitrate, sulfur, and charcoal) or similar pyrotechnic composition 

without metallic fuel for approval under provisions of this standard.” 15 Malitz, I. “Black Powder Manufacturing, Testing & Optimizing.” American Fireworks News (AFN), Dingmans 

Ferry, PA, 2003; p. 16. 

16 49 CFR §173.50(a) (2003). 17 49 CFR §173.56 (2003). 18 49 CFR §172.101 provides a Hazardous Materials Table that includes Identification Numbers for fireworks under 

each appropriate hazard classification/Division. 1.3 fireworks have the Identification Number of UN0335, and 1.4 

fireworks have the identification number UN0336. Identification Numbers that start with the prefix “UN” are 

appropriate for both domestic and international transportation. 

19 The “G” following the explosive classification number pertains to the compatibility group of the substance. 49 

CFR §173.52(a) (2011). Compatibility group “G” indicates pyrotechnic substances. 49 CFR §173.52(b) (2011). 
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not a mass explosion hazard.”20,21 The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives22 (ATF)

regulates 1.3G fireworks under 27 CFR Part 555, Commerce in Explosives, which subjects the fireworks 

to significant controls regarding storage, permitting, and marking requirements.

To be considered a 1.3G UN0335 device, an aerial shell contained within the firework cannot exceed 10 

inches in diameter.23 Otherwise, the firework would be considered a division 1.1 explosive with the 

ability to mass explode.24 In addition, black powder, an explosive mixture of charcoal, sulfur, and 

potassium nitrate that is often a component of aerial shells and the primary explosive for the lift charge 

inside each firework tube, is considered to be a 1.1 explosive on its own under the DOT classification 

system. 25

Division 1.4 (1.4G Consumer Fireworks – UN0336) “consists of explosives that present a minor 

explosion hazard.”26 The DOT rates the transportation hazard of these materials as “minimum.” Because 

of the limited amount of pyrotechnic composition permitted in each individual piece, their explosive 

effects are expected to be largely confined to the package, and they are consequently exempt from

regulations under 27 CFR Part 555.

27 Consumer fireworks intended for use by the general public are 

typically Division 1.4G UN0336 explosives.28

APA Standard 87-1, Standard for Construction and Approval for Transportation of Fireworks, Novelties,

and Theatrical Pyrotechnics, provides manufacturers, importers, and distributors of fireworks and 

novelties with relevant information to manufacture, test, ship, and label their products in accordance with 

federal law and good manufacturing practices. This standard requires that aerial mine and shell devices 

that are classified as Division 1.4 (i.e., consist of a single heavy cardboard or paper tube attached to a base 

and filled with pyrotechnic composition) should not contain more than 60 grams of total chemical 

composition, including the lift charge, burst charge, and the visible/audible composition, and the 

components that create a noise should be limited to 130 mg.29 When a device comprises multiple tubes, 

the total weight of all explosive or pyrotechnic components within the device cannot exceed 200 grams. 

Fireworks containing greater amounts of explosives are classified as either Division 1.3G UN0335 or 

Division 1.1G UN0333.

30

 20 49 CFR §173.50(b)(3) (2003). 21 A mass explosion is “one which affects almost the entire load instantaneously.” 49 CFR §173.50 (b)(1) (2003). 22 ATF works to protect communities from violent criminals and criminal organizations by investigating and 

preventing the illegal use and trafficking of firearms, the illegal use and improper storage of explosives, acts of 

arson and bombings, and the illegal diversion of alcohol and tobacco products. www.atf.gov (accessed November 

26, 2012). ATF regulates the importation, manufacturing, dealing in, receiving, and storage of display fireworks 

under 27 CFR Part 555. 

23 APA Standard 87-1, Section 4.1.1, 2001 24 Ibid. 25 49 CFR §172.101 Table (1990). 26 49 CFR §173.50(b)(4) (2003). 27 27 CFR §555.141(a)(7) (2006). 28 Division 1.4 can be further broken down into 1.4G and 1.4S subcategories.

29 APA Standard 87-1, Section 3.1.2.5, 2001. 30 49 CFR §172.101 Table (1990). 
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2.2 Importing Fireworks

Since the 1970s, the U.S. has greatly increased its importation of fireworks, due in part to lower labor 

costs overseas and increased federal regulation of fireworks manufacturing.

31 Fiscal year 2011 U.S. 

International Trade Commission statistics obtained and published by the APA show that 98 percent of all 

consumer fireworks and 75 to 80 percent of commercial display fireworks used in the U.S. are 

manufactured in and imported from China. Of the 440 million pounds of consumer and display fireworks 

consumed in the U.S. in 2010 and 2011, only approximately 1.5 percent (6.7 million pounds) was

produced domestically.32 

The importation of illegal fireworks33 has also been rising throughout the country.34 This increase has 

resulted in efforts by a network of government agencies, not-for profit organizations, and other entities to 

improve the quality and safety of imported fireworks through screening, inspecting, testing, seizing, and 

when necessary, disposal. Federal law enforcement agencies, including ATF, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection35 (CBP), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement36 (ICE), work to prevent the illegal 

importation of fireworks by inspecting, seizing, and testing firework shipments at major cities and ports 

of entry throughout the country. To illustrate the extent of the illegal fireworks importation issue in the 

U.S., between October 1, 2008, and November 30, 2012, the CBP Office of Field Operations37 conducted 

a total of 69 firework seizures at cities considered to be major ports of entry including Boston, Chicago, 

Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and San Francisco. The largest individual commercial seizure

conducted by CBP during the first half of 2012 contained nearly 18 tons of fireworks.38

 31 Yang, Xiyun. China’s Fireworks: A Trusted Import. Washington Post, [Online] 2007, 

In Honolulu,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/03/AR2007070302188.html (accessed July 12, 

2012).

32 American Pyrotechnics Association (APA). APA U.S. Fireworks Consumption Figures 2000-2011. 

http://www.americanpyro.com/pdf/Fireworks-Consump-Figures-2000-11.pdf (accessed July 14, 2012). 33 Imported fireworks may be deemed “illegal” or “contraband” under federal law if they have been imported 

without the requisite license or permit; if they have been mislabeled; if they have been smuggled or attempted to be 

smuggled into the U.S.; or if they exceed the maximum allowable explosive filler weight or charge weight, or 

maximum grams of explosives permitted.

34 Yang, Xiyun. China’s Fireworks: A Trusted Import. Washington Post, [Online] 2007, 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/03/AR2007070302188.html (accessed July 12, 

2012).

35 CBP exists within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and works to secure U.S. borders and facilitate 

trade to and from the U.S. www.cbp.gov (accessed November 27, 2012). 36 ICE is the principal investigative arm of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Its primary mission is to 

“promote homeland security and public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing 

border control, customs, trade, and immigration.” www.ice.gov (accessed November 27, 2012). 37 The CBP Office of Field Operations is “the largest component of CBP and is responsible for securing the U.S. 

border at ports of entry while expediting lawful trade and travel.” 

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/organization/assist_comm_off/field_operations.xml (accessed December 7, 

2012). 

38 “Watch Out for Illegally Imported Fireworks: CBP seizes dozens of illegal fireworks shipments on behalf of 

partner agencies.” July 3, 2012. http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/national/07032012.xml 

(accessed December 4, 2012).
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

18

Hawaii, CBP and ICE Homeland Security Investigations39 (ICE/HSI) together have conducted nine 

separate fireworks seizures between 2006 and 2012, including the seizure involved in the incident. 

These quantities are significant, as these fireworks pose substantial safety challenges once they are seized. 

Due to the unknown composition of seized fireworks and the hazards that may be involved, illegally 

imported and seized fireworks are typically destroyed; a major issue for all entities involved becomes 

how to properly and safely destroy them. 

2.3 Seized Fireworks Disposal

2.3.1 History

Through the early 1980s, the standard practice in the U.S. was to use U.S. Military Explosive Ordnance 

Disposal40 (EOD) technicians to dispose of fireworks confiscated by local and federal law enforcement, 

reflecting the military’s mission to support those agencies and their work. However, the CSB learned that

a July 29, 1980, explosion and fire at Fort Rosecrans in San Diego, California, that killed three EOD 

technicians and injured another caused the military to eliminate seized firework disposal activities. 

The incident involved disposing of homemade firework “poppers” illegally imported from Mexico. EOD 

technicians were loading fireworks, which federal law enforcement personnel had seized and stored in 

plastic bags, from a holding unit onto a military truck for destruction at Fort Irwin, California, when one 

of the bags on the truck began to pop and fizz. As an EOD technician grabbed the bag to throw it off the 

truck, it exploded. Three EOD technicians moved to the back of the storage unit and shut the door to 

isolate themselves from the explosion and resulting fire. However, they became trapped in the unit as the 

rest of the fireworks within the unit were set off, and all three were killed. 

The military’s decision not to handle seized fireworks highlights the risk involved in storing, transporting,

and disposing of contraband fireworks, because they are unpredictable and hazardous. Typically, no 

quality assurance controls are used in contraband fireworks manufacture. Mislabeled fireworks are by 

definition uncharacterized. Their unknown composition makes them dangerous to an EOD technician 

tasked with their disposal. Ultimately, this change shifted seized firework, storage, transportation and 

disposal responsibilities from EOD technicians within the military to permitted commercial entities and

federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

 39 ICE/HSI exists within ICE and is responsible for investigating immigration crime, human rights’ violations and 

smuggling of humans, narcotics, weapons, and other types of contraband. 

http://www.ice.gov/about/offices/homeland-security-investigations/ (accessed December 4, 2012). 40 Explosive Ordnance Disposal involves the rendering safe and disposal of all hazardous items containing 

explosives, including bombs, grenades, and mines.
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

19

2.3.2 Present Fireworks Disposal Framework

A small number of commercial41 treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDFs) across the country 

have the requisite environmental permitting to accept and dispose of explosives, including commercial 

and consumer fireworks. These facilities utilize various methods of disposal, including incineration,42

open burning,

43 and microbiological destruction.44

While these commercial facilities are available for disposal work, the CSB learned from local law 

enforcement agencies throughout the country that many local agencies have undertaken the task of 

disposing of seized fireworks themselves because contracting the work out to these facilities is too timeconsuming and costly. And some state and local law enforcement agencies have had difficulty disposing 

of seized fireworks due in part to stringent state environmental regulations and policies that prevent them 

from burning the fireworks. The CSB has learned the extensive time and cost necessary to ship the 

fireworks elsewhere has, unfortunately, resulted in the growing accumulation of illegal consumer and 

display fireworks in magazines in states across the country. 

2.4 Federal Government Seizure Programs

The approach federal agencies use for storing, transporting, and disposing of illegally imported and seized 

fireworks involves subcontracting to commercial vendors under an overarching, multi-million dollar 

federal seized property management contract. The U.S. has two separate and distinct federal forfeiture 

programs, one within the U.S. Department of Justice and one within the U.S. Department of the Treasury

(Treasury).

 41 Permitted to receive third party waste. 42 For example, General Dynamics operates a facility located in Joplin, Missouri, that contains two Resource 

Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permitted incinerators specifically designed to incinerate explosive 

materials and devices. www.ebveec.com (accessed November 26, 2012). Heritage-WTI, Inc, located in East 

Liverpool, Ohio, is another incineration system capable of receiving 60,000 tons per year of hazardous waste. 

www.heritage-wti.com (accessed November 28, 2012). 43 For example, Clean Harbors operates a RCRA permitted facility that accepts and treats over 300 kinds of 

explosive and reactive wastes, including consumer and commercial display fireworks. Clean Harbors practices the 

method of open burning, usually soaking the fireworks in diesel and burning them on concrete slabs in a large open 

space the size of a football field. www.cleanharbors.com (accessed November 27, 2012). 44 Heritage Disposal and Storage (HDS) operates a 24,000 square foot recycling facility for energetic materials, 

including fireworks. The HDS energetic materials recycling process is a proprietary process utilizing 

microbiological technology to recycle propellants, energetic materials, and ammunition into agricultural use 

products. HDS has treated approximately 2 million pounds of explosives for U.S. Government agencies. HDS 

documents indicate that in 2004, the Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality (NDEQ) evaluated the HDS 

processes and studied the final products and determined that the HDS process meets the definition of true recycling 

as outlined in NDEQ Title 128, Nebraska Hazardous Waste Regulations. HDS possesses an ATF Explosive 

Manufacturing License and is able to modify explosive materials for either safe disposal or resale. HDS considers 

the energetic materials it recycles to be “Highly Hazardous Materials” and has implemented management systems 

for all technical operations involving ammunition and explosives in accordance with PSM goals identified in 29 

CFR §1910.119 Appendix C, Compliance Guidelines and Recommendations for Process Safety Management 

(Nonmandatory). HDS documents indicate that no separating or disassembling of explosive components is done at 

this facility. www.heritagedisposalandstorage.com (accessed November 26, 2012). 
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

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The program relevant to this investigation is the Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture (TEOAF)

seizure and forfeiture program. TEOAF administers the Treasury Forfeiture Fund45 (TFF), which is the 

receipt account for the deposit of non-tax forfeitures made pursuant to laws enforced or administered by 

participating law enforcement agencies. Under this federal program, TEOAF procures general seized 

property management services, including storage and disposal, to support the seizure, forfeiture, and 

blocking programs of the Treasury and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) participating 

agencies.

46 Participating agencies seize a broad range of items, such as cars, horses and other livestock, 

handbags and jeans, perfume, and explosives (including fireworks), as well as other hazardous materials.

 45 The Treasury Forfeiture Fund was established in 1992 as the successor to the Customs Forfeiture Fund. The 

mission of the Treasury Forfeiture Fund is to “affirmatively influence the consistent and strategic use of asset 

forfeiture by participating agencies to disrupt and dismantle criminal enterprises.” 

http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/The-Executive-Office-for-AssetForfeiture.aspx (accessed June 6, 2012). 46 TFF participating agencies include the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI); ICE; CBP; 

U.S. Secret Service (USSS); and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizationalstructure/offices/Pages/The-Executive-Office-for-Asset-Forfeiture.aspx (accessed June 6, 2012). 
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

21

3.0 Pre-Incident 

3.1 Federal Seized Property Management Contract

On August 1, 2006, TEOAF awarded a ten-year contract (federal prime contract) to VSE Corporation 

(VSE) to support its Seized and Forfeited Property Program. VSE employs roughly 2,500 individuals and

provides diverse services to the government and military, including reverse engineering, supply chain 

management, management consulting, and process improvement.

47 VSE’s responsibility under the 

federal prime contract was to secure services for the receipt, storage, handling, transportation, 

consignment, or disposal of all seized, blocked, or forfeited general property48 through the subcontracting 

of vendors. Among other things, the federal prime contract required VSE, as the contractor, to ensure the 

safety of the public, workers, and property of others. 

The ten-year federal prime contract was protested49 and terminated by an agreement between Treasury 

and VSE. On September 28, 2010, TEOAF awarded VSE a seven-month interim contract50 for the 

continuation of services being provided under the earlier awarded federal prime contract. This interim 

contract was in place at the time of the incident. 

According to VSE officials, it was instrumental to the company in obtaining the federal prime and interim 

contracts that it had a separate subcontract with the management company Thomas E. Blanchard & 

Associates, Inc. (BAI). BAI utilizes a team of retired federal law enforcement personnel located 

throughout the U.S. who provide VSE with field services such as acceptance, transportation, and 

inspection of seized property, on an as-needed basis.51

3.2 Federal Fireworks Disposal Subcontract

 According to VSE, subcontracting with BAI 

enabled VSE to submit a lower-cost proposal to TEOAF that provided for national coverage without VSE 

incurring day-to-day expenses such as travel and per diem. Review of the subcontract shows there was no 

requirement that BAI make available field representatives with relevant safety experience, as their 

primary responsibility was tracking of inventory. 

Between 2007 and 2010, federal law enforcement agents conducted three separate firework seizures in 

Honolulu, Hawaii, intercepting the fireworks during importation from China.52

 47

 These shipments were 

www.vsecorp.com (accessed June 20, 2012). 48 The federal prime contract defined seized, blocked, or forfeited property as “seized, blocked, or forfeited tangible 

property that is not real property, money or investments, including aircraft; vehicles; vessels; machinery and 

equipment; antiques and collectables; and livestock.” 49 Pursuant to 4 CFR Part 21 (1996). 50 The contract was later extended to one year. 51 BAI provides field services solutions to companies and government agencies throughout the United States. 

http://blanchardai.com (accessed June 21, 2012). 52 CBP seized one fireworks shipment on December 10, 2007. ICE/HSI seized one fireworks shipment on February 

4, 2009, and one on January 13, 2010. 
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

22

labeled as 1.4G UN0336 consumer fireworks, but the fireworks contained within the shipments had

physical characteristics of more hazardous 1.3G UN0335 display fireworks (See Appendix A). The 

fireworks involved in the incident53 (referred to as “primary seizure”) were seized in 2010 and consisted 

of multi-tube devices known as cake fireworks, which are made up of individual firework tubes linked by 

pyrotechnic fuse. Each firework tube contains a lift charge and aerial shell (Figure 2). 

Figure 2. Cake firework tube, lift charge, and aerial shell configuration (photo courtesy of ATF)

Because CBP and ICE/HSI both participate in the Treasury Forfeiture Fund, VSE was responsible, as the 

prime federal contractor, for locating vendors to transport, store, and ultimately destroy the shipments 

when instructed to do so by the seizing agency. In March 2010 VSE awarded a subcontract to Donaldson 

Enterprises, Inc. (DEI) to dispose of the seized fireworks. Figure 3 shows the chain of contractual 

relationships relevant to this incident (Section 6.0 discusses VSE’s selection and oversight of DEI).

 53 The third fireworks seizure (number 2010-3205-000-012-01) was seized on January 13, 2010. This seizure is 

referred to as the “primary seizure” as it contained the fireworks that resulted in the explosion on the day of the 

incident.
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

23

TREASURY EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 

ASSET FORFEITURE

(TEOAF)

VSE CORPORATION

Federal Prime Contractor for Seized 

Property Management

DONALDSON 

ENTERPRISES, INC.

(DEI)

Awarded Federal 

Subcontract for Seized 

Fireworks Disposal

THOMAS E. 

BLANCHARD & 

ASSOCIATES, INC.

(BAI)

Had field representative 

on Oahu

Figure 3. Contractual Relationships

3.3 Donaldson Enterprises, Inc.

DEI is a small company that was founded in 1988 and provides environmental and UXO mitigation 

services throughout the Pacific basin. DEI employs a staff with experience in both military and civilian 

UXO clearance operations. During World War II and the Vietnam War, the military used areas 

throughout Hawaii for live munitions training. Many of these areas have been returned to civilian use, 

but may still have UXO present. Individuals and companies hire DEI to determine the presence and 

extent of UXO in an area or at a site and provide UXO escort services.

54

 54 “The UXO Escort is responsible for the safe escort of non-UXO qualified personnel who are not directly involved 

in specific UXO clearance site work, but have activities to perform within restricted/exclusion areas...the escort 

function involves hazard recognition and avoidance only, not the execution of UXO search or clearance actions...”

 When UXO is located, DEI 

personnel typically clear the UXO by installing explosives and remotely initiating an explosion to safely 

destroy the UXO. DEI also assists in the development of UXO clearance plans and provides training to 

http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/wage/p29494.htm#.UN-QFm_BGSo (accessed December 29, 2012).
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

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others in UXO identification and avoidance. Prior to being awarded the subcontract by VSE, DEI’s work 

did not include the disposal of fireworks. 

3.4 Waikele Self Storage

DEI leased magazine A-21 at Waikele Self Storage, Ltd. in Waipahu, Hawaii, to store unexploded 

ordnance.

55 Waikele Self Storage consists of 120 storage units cut into a solid rock hillside that were 

built during World War II and used by the Navy as ammunition storage bunkers. These magazines are 

tunnel-like structures, each approximately 250 feet long, with concrete floors, walls, and domed ceilings. 

Each magazine has a loading dock and ramp leading to one entrance with steel doors. 

The A-21 magazine is 250 feet long, 16 feet wide, and 12 to 14 feet high. Its entrance is secured with a 

steel door that is 6.1 feet wide by 9.4 feet high, and split into two segments (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Magazine A-21 (and loading dock), Waipahu, Hawaii

DEI told the CSB that its personnel stored the three fireworks shipments, which consisted of boxes 

wrapped in plastic stacked on wood pallets, towards the rear of the magazine. DEI personnel pulled out 

boxes individually when they were ready to prepare the fireworks for disposal. 

 55 According to the lease for the A-21 magazine, it appeared that the storage of fireworks was also permitted. While 

the lease contained boilerplate language prohibiting the storage of explosives and fireworks, this language had been 

struck through on the executed contract. 
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

25

3.5 DEI Initial Fireworks Disposal Activities

DEI began its fireworks disposal work on the initial seized fireworks shipment56 (initial seizure) in 

summer 2010. According to DEI’s Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), its disposal process involved 

soaking individual whole firework tubes that had been separated from the cake in diesel-filled 55-gallon 

steel drums located within the magazine for a minimum of 24 to 48 hours, removing the fireworks from 

the diesel soaking drum, and transporting the diesel soaked fireworks to the Koko Head firing range 

(Koko Head) to burn the fireworks in a drum or in DEI’s portable incinerator (a Thermal Flash Unit 

(TFU)). Diesel is sometimes used to soak and burn fireworks because it desensitizes the material to 

spark, friction, impact, and temperature and should result in a slow burn rather than an explosion. 

As Section 7.0 discusses, seized fireworks are considered hazardous waste under the Resource 

Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and, as such, require a RCRA permit for treatment and disposal. 

DEI notified the State of Hawaii Department of Health (DOH), Hawaii’s state environmental agency 

responsible for implementing and enforcing federal environmental regulations, of its intended burn 

operations at Koko Head via letter in May 2010. On June 8, 2010, DOH issued DEI a 90-day Emergency 

Hazardous Waste Permit57 authorizing DEI personnel to “conduct specific hazardous waste management 

activities at a designated site at Koko Head Range and proper storage of the waste fireworks.” 

According to DOH, the actions authorized in the permit were based on information DEI provided when it 

requested the permit, and DEI’s activities were limited to those the permit authorized. The permit stated 

that DEI would dispose of approximately 5,000 pounds of confiscated class “C” type58 illegal fireworks 

by thermal treatment, using empty 55-gallon containers or a mobile incinerator, at Koko Head. The 

permit expired 90 days after it was issued. Upon conclusion of the permitted activities, DEI was required 

to provide a closure report to the DOH Solid and Hazardous Waste Branch and the RCRA Facilities 

Management Office at EPA Region IX in San Francisco, California. The permit did not discuss diesel 

soaking or fireworks disassembly. 

 56 The initial seizure (number 2008-3201-000-013-01) was seized on December 10, 2007, and consisted of 11 pallets 

of fireworks and included “Maylar Tubes,” “Assortment Shells,” and “Singing Oriole/Dancing Swallows.” 

57 DOH has the authority under 40 CFR §270.61 and Hawaii Administrative Rules (HAR) §11-270-61 to issue 

temporary emergency permits to non-RCRA permitted, and RCRA permitted, persons or facilities seeking to engage 

in hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal activities where there is an “imminent and substantial 

endangerment to human health or the environment.” The burden is on the applicant to prove that such an imminent 

threat exists. 

58 1.4G fireworks were classified as “Type C” fireworks prior to 1991. 1.3G fireworks were previously classified as 

“Type B.” 49 CFR §173.53 (2001). 
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

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3.6 Modifications to the Fireworks Disposal Process

3.6.1 Initial Modification

DEI management later told the CSB that during the disposal of the initial seizure, some of the fireworks 

were exploding during burning operations, even after the diesel soaking time had been increased to one 

week. DEI believed this was due to inadequate diesel permeation of the aerial shells contained in these 

fireworks. To resolve this issue, DEI personnel used blades to disassemble the fireworks by cutting open 

the individual firework tubes by hand and taking apart their explosive components (the aerial shells and 

black powder lift charge) (Figures 5 and 6). They then cut a one-inch slit into each aerial shell (Figure 7),

soaked the aerial shells in diesel-filled drums (Figures 8 and 9), and burned them at Koko Head (Figures 

10 and 11). The black powder lift charge from the tubes was collected in plastic containers lined with 

plastic garbage bags. 

DEI completed its disposal of the initial seizure in December 2010. However, it did not dispose of the 

black powder lift charge collected from the disassembly work. The powder was being stored in 

containers in the back of the magazine at the time of the incident.59

Figure 5. Photo of DEI personnel disassembling initial fireworks seizure in 2010

 59 DEI completed its disposal work on the initial seizure in December 2010. The DOH 90-day Emergency 

Hazardous Waste Permit expired on September 5, 2010, and was not renewed. As discussed in Section 7.3.2, the 

CSB determined that DEI’s failure to renew the Emergency Hazardous Waste Permit for its fireworks disposal 

activities was not causal to the incident.
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

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Figure 6. Fireworks cake being disassembled

Figure 7. Slit aerial shell from DEI's first destruction
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

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Figure 8. 55 gallon steel drum and inner liner used for diesel soaking

Figure 9. Aerial shells removed from the firework tubes and placed in an inner liner for diesel soaking
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

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Figure 10. Fireworks burning in incinerator (TFU) 

Figure 11. Fireworks burning in drums 
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

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3.6.2 Second Modification

DEI began work on its second disposal job under the subcontract in December 2010 and in early 2011

again altered its fireworks disposal process. According to an email from DEI management to VSE, this 

modification was designed to increase the destruction rate of the third shipment of seized fireworks (later 

referred to as the “primary seizure,” as this was the seizure involved in the incident). To maximize the 

quantity of explosives that could be burned at one time, DEI personnel again disassembled the fireworks 

by cutting open individual firework tubes by hand and separating the individual explosive firework 

components, black powder lift charge and aerial shells, into cardboard boxes. The boxes containing black 

powder were lined with plastic garbage bags to minimize leakage. 

More precisely, DEI took three boxes of fireworks at a time out of the magazine and broke them down 

into three boxes of firework components: one box, lined with a plastic garbage bag, contained the black 

powder lift charge; one box contained the accumulated aerial shells; and one box contained the cardboard 

tubes and packaging material. Periodically, the plastic bags containing black powder were relocated from 

the cardboard boxes into plastic containers and were stored towards the middle of the magazine. 

DEI’s plan was to soak the aerial shells in diesel in the steel drums and burn them; however, the company 

had no plan to dispose of the accumulated black powder. 

3.7 Morning of the Incident

On April 8, 2011, at approximately 7:15 am, a team of six DEI personnel (a project supervisor, four UXO

Level I Technicians,

60 and one general laborer) arrived at the magazine to begin their disassembly work 

for the day. They prepared their outside work area by setting up a pop-up tent, table, and chairs on the

magazine loading dock located directly in front of the magazine entrance. 

According to witness testimony, DEI personnel previously stacked fifteen remaining boxes of whole oneinch firework tubes from the primary seizure in the front left corner of the magazine (Figure 14). Each

box contained 152 one-inch Sky Festival tubes that had been separated from a cake (Figure 12).

61

 60 A UXO Level I Technician (UXO Tech I) has successfully completed 200 hours of training on Munitions and 

Explosives of Concern (MEC) and Material Potentially Presenting an Explosive Hazard (MPPEH), and 40 hours of 

Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER). A UXO Technician is qualified for and 

fills a Department of Labor, Service Contract Act, Directory of Occupations contractor position of UXO Technician 

I, II, and III. See the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB). Minimum Qualifications for 

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Technicians and Personnel; Technical Paper (TP) 18, Section 3.1.1, 2004; this paper 

provides the minimum qualification standards for personnel conducting UXO-related operations in support of the 

Department of Defense. According to the DDESB, a UXO Tech I may not handle or transport UXO or discarded 

military munitions, including military pyrotechnic items, without the direction and supervision of UXO-qualified 

personnel, which include UXO Tech IIs, UXO Tech IIIs, UXO Safety Officers, UXO Quality Control Specialists,

and Senior UXO Supervisors. Ibid at Section C2.1.2, 2004. 

 DEI 

61 ATF evaluated the Sky Festival fireworks as part of the seizure enforcement process. Each of the 96 seized boxes 

of contraband Sky Festival fireworks contained 4 individual cakes containing 156 firework tubes, or shots. An 

individual cake contained 150 small tubes, and 6 large tubes. ATF kept one box to sample and test for evidence 

purposes, leaving 95 boxes. DEI removed all of the tubes from the cakes and boxed the 2,280 large tubes and
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

31

personnel initially transferred three boxes of whole firework tubes to the outside working area. They then 

began their normal disassembly process: two UXO technicians cut the tubes using a PVC cutter or knife,

while the project supervisor and the two additional technicians broke the tubes apart and separated the 

internal explosive components into one of the three cardboard boxes. 

The general laborer remained inside the magazine during this work, performing cleaning and organizing

tasks. When the DEI personnel were finished disassembling and separating this first round of firework 

tubes, they then pulled out three more boxes of whole firework tubes and took them to the outside work 

area to disassemble.

Figure 12. Sky Festival cake firework (from the primary seizure) contains 150 small tubes and 6 large tubes; large 

tubes located on the right side of the box were being disassembled on the day of the incident.

The team was able to disassemble six to seven boxes of fireworks before 8:30 am when according to the 

project supervisor, it began to rain heavily. The team stopped work and used a metal hand truck to move

the boxes containing black powder, aerial shells, and partially disassembled tubes, and stack them just 

 

57,000 small tubes separately. DEI determined that individual disassembly of the small tubes to remove the 

explosive components did not offer a sufficient advantage during the diesel soaking and burning process, so these 

tubes were not disassembled, and remained intact. According to witness statements, this resulted in 15 boxes of 

large tubes. According to CSB calculations, each box contained 152 large Sky Festival tubes. 
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

32

inside the magazine entrance. They also brought in the table, camp chairs, and a rolling office chair, 

leaving the pop-up tent outside on the dock. Figures 13 and 14 show the approximate location of 

materials within the magazine just prior to the incident. This information is based on witness statements

to the CSB. 

While the team of personnel remained inside the magazine, the project supervisor left and got his phone 

from his truck, which was parked in front of the magazine dock. He then walked to the front left corner 

of the magazine dock to make a phone call. While he was on the phone, a large explosion occurred inside 

the magazine and a fire ensued, fatally injuring all five DEI personnel who were located inside the 

magazine at the time of the incident. Only one of those five was able to escape the magazine during the 

event, and he succumbed to his burn injuries later that day.
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

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Figure 13. Magazine layout at the time of the incident

Figure 14. Side aerial view of magazine at the time of the incident
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

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4.0 Technical Analysis

The CSB investigation team arrived at the incident scene the morning of April 11, 2011. The team 

interviewed DEI personnel, examined the incident scene and physical evidence, and collected and 

reviewed relevant documentation. 

Investigation activity was coordinated with a number of other organizations:

• ATF

• Hawaii Occupational Safety and Health Division (HIOSH)

• U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

• Honolulu Police Department (HPD)

• Honolulu Fire Department (HFD)

4.1 Site Inspection and Evaluation

Following an examination of the incident scene, the CSB determined the explosion was a deflagration that

originated inside the magazine near the entrance. Damage indicators included chipping and scorching of 

the magazine walls, burned 55-gallon drums, and scorching on the lower portions of the ventilation duct 

within the magazine near the entrance. The other side of the concrete partition located in the middle 

portion of the magazine sustained little to no damage and the ventilation duct toward the rear had minimal 

marking. The very rear of the magazine still contained fully intact fireworks, with slight melting of the 

plastic wrapping (Figures 15 through 18).
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

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Figure 15. Damage to the magazine wall

Figure 16. Interior of the magazine post-incident

Ventilation Duct 

Damage to wall 
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

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Figure 17. Rear interior of magazine, behind concrete partition, post-incident

Figure 18. 2009 Seizure (second seizure) at rear of magazine, relatively undamaged with some melting of the 

plastic wrapping following the explosion and fire near the front of the magazine.
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

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The steel hand truck (Figure 19) used to move the boxes in and out of the magazine was propelled more 

than 100 feet from the magazine door into vegetation located across a road in front of the magazine. The

rolling office chair was found in the same area near a stream (Figure 20). The GMC Sierra truck, parked 

approximately 30 feet in front of the magazine entryway, was forced away from the magazine, its rear cab 

rotated approximately 10 feet away from its original position (Figure 21). The CSB was told that the 

truck was not running at the time of the incident. 

Figure 19. Steel hand truck found in vegetation (courtesy of Honolulu Fire Department)
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

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Figure 20. Rolling office chair found blown out of the magazine

Figure 21. Prior to incident, this GMC truck was parked just in front of the silver car. The force of the explosion

moved the rear of the truck to the right as indicated by the arrow.
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

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4.2 Disassembly Activities

CSB analysis of DEI’s activities on the day of the incident indicates that the act of disassembling the Sky 

Festival firework tubes from the primary seizure and separating out the explosive components into boxes 

increased the mass of explosive materials within a single container by a factor of 456.62 

Type of 

Firework

Mass of lift 

charge per 

individual 

firework 

tube 

(grams)

Mass of 

aerial shell 

explosives 

per

individual 

firework 

tube 

(grams)

Mass of lift 

charge DEI 

accumulated 

in a single 

container

(grams) 

Mass of aerial 

shell 

explosives DEI 

accumulated 

in a single 

container

(grams)

Scale-Up 

Factor

Sky Festival 

Fireworks 

disassembled 

by DEI on the 

Day of the 

Incident

3.3 4.7 1,505 2,143 456

Table 1. DEI disassembly process on the day of the incident increased the mass of explosives within a 

container by a factor of 456. 

DEI decided to disassemble these larger tubes in order to remove the black powder lift charges and aerial 

shells. As Table 1 shows, DEI’s disassembly activities, which accumulated large quantities of black 

powder (a 1.1 explosive on its own)63

 62 Factor/Scale-up Factor calculation is based on starting with the amount of explosives in a single large tube from 

the Sky Festival cake fireworks after DEI workers separated the large tubes from the original cake. ATF determined 

that each large tube contained approximately 3.3 grams of black powder lift charge and 4.7 grams of a perchlorate 

explosive pyrotechnic mixture in the aerial shell. The disassembly process had evolved over time, and on the day of 

the incident was such that 3 boxes of fireworks were removed from the magazine and taken out to the loading dock. 

The three boxes contained a calculated total of 456 large firework tubes. When DEI personnel disassembled these 

fireworks, they accumulated all of the black powder lift charge in one box; all of the aerial shells in a second box; 

and the remaining non-explosive materials in a third box. The CSB calculated that the box of accumulated black 

powder lift charges contained 1,505 grams of black powder and the box of accumulated aerial shells contained 2,143 

grams of explosive pyrotechnics, which was 456 times more than a single large tube from the 1.3(G) contraband Sky 

Festival fireworks contained. 

and aerial shells into boxes, greatly increased the risk to DEI 

personnel working that day by creating the potential for a mass explosion. 

63 The table located in 49 CFR §172.101 states that 1.1 explosives have the ability to mass explode.
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4.3 Testing

4.3.1 ATF Testing of Firework Samples

On January 16, 2010, ATF officials conducted a detailed examination of four samples64

4.3.2 CSB Testing of Firework Samples

collected from 

the primary seizure (Appendix A). ATF concluded from its analysis that the amount of pyrotechnic 

material contained within all four samples exceeded the allowable quantities for a 1.4G UN0336

consumer firework. Laboratory analysis of the explosive components from the larger Sky Festival tubes 

being disassembled on the day of the incident identified the lift charge as black powder and the burst 

charge (contained within the aerial shells) as a perchlorate explosive mixture. 

Physical testing of samples from the four types of fireworks contained in the primary seizure, including 

the Sky Festivals, is being performed to identify the likely means of accidental ignition of the fireworks.

The results of this testing were not completed at the time this report was issued; the results will be 

published on www.csb.gov when available. 

Composition testing, conducted to determine which chemical components most likely contributed to the 

energetic properties of the fireworks and whether any chemicals were added to the fireworks to make 

them particularly energetic, had not yet been performed at the time of this report’s release. The results 

will be published on www.csb.gov when available.

4.3.3 HIOSH Testing of Tools

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) good practice industry standards and ATF explosive 

regulations recognize the importance of minimizing ignition sources near explosives. For example, 

NFPA 1124, Code for the Manufacture, Transportation, Storage, and Retail Sales of Fireworks and 

Pyrotechnics Articles states that “[m]etal tools other than nonferrous conveyors shall not be stored in 

magazines.”65

Post-incident, HIOSH collected 12 separate tools found inside the magazine near the entrance: three 

cutting tools, pruning shears, a shovel/dust pan, loppers,

66 a push broom, a pair of miter saws, scissors, tin 

snips, and a battery-powered diesel pump. Metallurgical testing was conducted to determine if the tools 

were sparking and thus likely capable of initiating an explosion within the magazine.

 64 The four sampled fireworks were taken from the following: a. O Triple C 8/1; b. HALAWA 8/1; c. Sky Festival 

4/1; and d. Krazy Kids 8/1. 65 National Fire Protection (NFPA) 1124. Code for the Manufacture, Transportation, Storage, and Retail Sales of 

Fireworks and Pyrotechnic Articles, Section 5.4.8.1, 2006. 66 A “lopper” is a pruning shear with long handles. 
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

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Two tests were performed on each of the 12 tools. The first test identified what metal components were 

made of steel and the type of steel in each component. The second test demonstrated whether the tools’ 

steel components were “spark resistant.” A spark-resistant wrench was used as the control. Each tool

was applied to a grinding wheel to produce particles of the material being tested; these particles were then 

directed towards a flammable material to determine if they could be an ignition source. In every case 

except one (the non-ferrous dust pan), when the metal tested on these tools emitted visible sparks, the 

flammable material caught fire. The conclusion was that each of the tools, other than the non-ferrous 

dustpan, was capable of producing a spark, and therefore being an ignition source within the magazine.67

4.4 Conclusions on Ignition

ATF concluded in its investigative report on the incident that the explosion was likely triggered when 

loose explosive pyrotechnic powder, initially generated as the fireworks were disassembled outside, 

spilled or leaked from the boxes onto the storage magazine floor and was ignited due to friction or a 

metal-to-metal spark as DEI employees moved materials around inside the magazine. ATF concluded 

that the ignition likely propagated to one or more of the boxes of the accumulated explosives located near 

the magazine entrance, resulting in a large explosion. 

CSB explosion analysis concurred with ATF’s conclusion. The CSB adds that the ignition of the 

explosive powder could have resulted from any of the following uncontrolled ignition sources: sparks 

generated by the movement of the metal hand truck (either by knocking it over or dragging the metal lip 

on the floor); dropping or knocking over a removable steel drum lid onto the floor; or friction from the 

office chair rolling over explosive pyrotechnic powder. 

While less likely, static electricity from the plastic garbage bags used as liners for the cardboard boxes 

could have also caused the ignition. Ordinary plastic garbage bags are sometimes charged with static 

electricity as part of the manufacturing process in order for the bags to be tightly folded; as such, they are 

not appropriate for storing explosives.68 At the site, ATF investigators used special anti-static plastic bags 

to contain explosive components they collected as evidence (Figure 22). 

 67 OSHA. Report on Donaldson Enterprises, Inc.; April 9, 2012. 68 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Safety Standard for Explosives, Propellants, and 

Pyrotechnics; NSS 1740.12, Section 525(b)(2)(b), 1993. 
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Figure 22. Left photo (courtesy of ATF) shows anti-static bag used by ATF post-incident; right photo shows a roll 

of plastic garbage bags found following the incident.

While the CSB cannot definitively identify the source of ignition that led to the explosion, the physical 

evidence shows that the explosion initiated a rapid reaction, consuming significant quantities of explosive 

firework components, cardboard tubes, and boxes that had been accumulated within the magazine near its 

only entrance and exit, and prevented escape by a majority of the DEI workers who were inside the 

magazine at the time of the incident. 
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5.0 Incident Analysis

The CSB analyzed DEI’s firework disposal activities and its Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), an 

“evergreen”69 document which contained an “Activity Hazard Analysis” created by DEI management,

and determined that DEI would have greatly benefitted from Process Safety Management (PSM) 

principles and concepts of inherent safety.

70

5.1 Process Safety Management Standard

 For instance, rather than minimizing and controlling the 

amount of hazardous materials present, the DEI fireworks disassembly process increased and 

concentrated the hazard by removing explosive components from within individual firework cardboard 

containers and accumulating large quantities of these explosives in boxes. This process greatly 

compounded the total amount of explosive energy within each box, creating the conditions that allowed 

for the mass explosion. 

OSHA provides at 29 CFR §1910.109(k)(3) that the manufacture of pyrotechnics must meet the 

requirements of 29 CFR §1910.119, also known as OSHA’s PSM standard. The preamble states that 

“OSHA remains convinced that the hazards associated with the manufacture of explosives and 

pyrotechnics have the potential of resulting in a catastrophic incident, and pose a significant risk to 

employees and that the manufacture of explosives and pyrotechnics should be covered by the provisions 

of the final process safety management rule.”71

Despite the recognized hazardous nature of fireworks and explosives, a February 4, 1998, OSHA “Letter 

of Interpretation” narrows OSHA’s jurisdiction over those materials and defines the manufacture of 

explosives to mean the “mixing, blending, extruding, synthesizing, assembling, disassembling and other 

activities involved in the making of a chemical compound, mixture or device which is intended to 

explode,”

 Appendix A of the PSM standard lists toxic and reactive 

highly hazardous chemicals that present a potential for a catastrophic event at or above the threshold 

quantity. However, OSHA considers explosives and blasting agents to be so hazardous that they have no 

minimum threshold quantity to trigger the requirements of the PSM standard.

72

Had PSM been applicable to DEI’s fireworks disposal process, DEI would have been required to conduct 

a formal Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) on its disassembly procedure that explicitly identified a) the 

 an interpretation further promulgated by the Hawaii Occupational Safety and Health Division

(HIOSH), part of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DLIR). Following the DEI incident, 

HIOSH evaluated DEI’s disposal process and determined it would not fall under the standard because 

DEI’s disassembly work was done under the umbrella of fireworks disposal rather than manufacturing. 

 69 An evergreen document is a document that is updated on an ongoing basis to reflect changes to a system or 

procedure.

70 Inherent Safety is a “concept, an approach to safety that focuses on eliminating or reducing the hazards associated 

with a set of conditions.” Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life 

Cycle Approach; 2nd ed., 2009; p.11. 71 Preamble to 29 CFR Part 1910. Section 3 – III. Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule (1992). 72 OSHA Letter of Interpretation. Applicability of PSM Standard to Explosive and Pyrotechnic Manufacturing,

February 4, 1998.
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hazards of the disassembly process; b) any previous incidents involving DEI that had a likely potential for 

a catastrophic consequence in the workplace; c) engineering and administrative controls applicable to the 

hazards; d) consequences of the failure of these controls; e) justification and risk assessment associated 

with facility siting; and f) a human factors analysis of the proposed process.73 DEI would have also been 

required to conduct a formal management of change (MOC) analysis of its proposed disposal 

methodology before changes were made, to identify and control hazards introduced by the change.

74 

5.1.1 Process Hazard Analysis

According to the PSM standard, a PHA is conducted to “identify, evaluate, and control the hazards 

involved” in a process associated with highly hazardous chemicals.

75 DEI’s Corporate Health and Safety 

Plan required DEI’s Quality Control Manager (QCM) and Corporate Health and Safety Program Manager 

(HSPM) to analyze and control risks associated with DEI activities by identifying explicit risks associated 

with specific and implied tasks, determining the hazards causing these risks and the magnitude of risks, 

making risk acceptance decisions by balancing risk benefits against risk assessments, eliminating 

unnecessary risks, integrating specific controls into plans, and training and enforcing controls and 

standards. As such, upon developing its original fireworks disposal plan pursuant to the fireworks

disposal subcontract, DEI management personnel produced an SOP that contained a two-page “Activity 

Hazard Analysis” to evaluate its fireworks disposal activities. The Activity Hazard Analysis, however, 

did not robustly identify hazards associated with the disassembly process and was not evaluated by 

outside entities such as VSE, or DOH during the permitting process. Furthermore, safeguards DEI 

management listed to mitigate identified hazards, such as flame-retardant clothing and non-sparking tools, 

were not implemented, as evidenced by the HIOSH testing of the tools found within the magazine and 

physical evidence indicating workers were not wearing personal protective equipment (PPE) at the time 

of the incident. 

5.1.1.1 Process Safety Information

To conduct a thorough PHA, DEI personnel would have had to compile certain process safety information 

to help identify and understand the hazards of their disposal process. Safety information critical to the 

DEI process would include thermal and chemical stability as well as physical, toxicity, and reactivity 

data. None of these data were available to DEI workers, however, because these fireworks were brought 

into the country as contraband, and there were no company, contractual, or regulatory requirements to 

obtain the data prior to initiating disposal operations. Because contraband fireworks are generally 

uncharacterized, a better safety approach would have been to assume that they were extremely energetic 

and highly sensitive to potential ignition and to develop procedures and protocols to dispose of them as if

they were at the highest level of potential hazard. This is consistent with the approach OSHA requires for 

 73 29 CFR §1910.119(e) (2002). 74 29 CFR §1910.119(l) (2002). 75 29 CFR §1910.119(e) (2002). 
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Hazardous Waste and Emergency Response, where workers who may need to enter an insufficiently 

characterized environment must prepare as though it presented the highest level of potential hazard, such 

as wearing a very high level of personal protective equipment (PPE).

76

5.1.1.2 Identifying, Evaluating, and Controlling Hazards

The Activity Hazard Analysis in place at the time of the incident77 identified five operations being 

performed by DEI personnel while conducting fireworks disposal activities:

1. Separating and cutting fireworks

2. Establishing SOPs to desensitize fireworks to prepare for their destruction by burning

3. Destroying fireworks by burning 

4. Standing in front of the TFU, and

5. Standing near the TFU

The Activity Hazard Analysis identified heat, shock, and friction as possible hazards of separating and 

cutting fireworks that could lead to fire, severe burns, detonation, or death. The recommended controls 

for these activities were to use non-sparking tools, refrain from dragging boxes of fireworks across 

cement, and prepare fireworks outside the magazine; however, wearing the proper PPE such as flame 

resistant clothing was not listed. DEI personnel allowed sparking tools, steel drums, a steel hand truck, 

and a rolling office chair inside the magazine, hazards that could have been eliminated if tools and other 

items manufactured with non-spark-producing materials had been used.

The Activity Hazard Analysis also did not identify hazards of separating explosive firework components 

that are sensitive to shock, friction, and static, such as black powder, and accumulating them in large 

quantities, creating a mass explosion hazard. No safety analysis was done that focused on minimizing the 

amount of hazardous material that was being accumulated during the disposal process, nor did the 

analysis identify or evaluate hazards stemming from the use of regular plastic garbage bags to store black 

powder rather than utilizing anti-static bags. 

To prevent possible injury or exposure to fumes from the TFU during burn operations, the Activity 

Hazard Analysis instructed DEI personnel not to stand downwind of the TFU and to wear proper PPE, but 

specific PPE requirements were not given. DEI’s Corporate Health and Safety Plan states that PPE must 

be worn when work activities involve known or suspected atmospheric contamination; when vapors, 

gases, or airborne particulate matter may be generated; or when direct contact with skin-affecting 

substances may occur. Records show that DEI purchased rubber gloves, face shields, eye protection, and 

fire-retardant clothing for its personnel conducting the disposal work. But on the day of the incident,

 76 29 CFR §1910.120 (C)(5)(iii) (2012). 77 DEI developed an initial hazard analysis in 2010 prior to disposal of the initial seizure; it was updated on an 

unknown date prior to the incident to include separating and cutting the fireworks as operations being conducted, 

and heat, shock, and friction as hazards of this operation, that could result in death.
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workers wore only ordinary street clothes, including cotton shorts and t-shirts, which are not flame 

resistant. 

The magazine had only one means of ingress and egress. Yet DEI work practices allowed for explosive 

and combustible materials to effectively block this exit. The only life-saving provision afforded DEI 

workers who might be trapped inside the magazine were three small portable fire extinguishers attached 

to the magazine wall: one near the entrance, one towards the middle of the magazine, and one in the rear. 

No provision for emergency breathing air or fire protection clothing was provided. The only worker able 

to escape from the magazine after the explosion exited with his clothing in flames, and he sustained fatal 

burn injuries. Two workers succumbed to carbon monoxide poisoning inside the magazine. Had the 

proper PPE and emergency provisions such as breathing air been available and used, the severity of the 

injuries might have been reduced and lives could have been saved.

5.1.2 Management of Change (MOC) Review

Under PSM, proposed changes to a process must be analyzed to determine their technical basis, required 

authorizations, and impact on health and safety.

78 As DEI activities were not covered under PSM, DEI 

altered its original fireworks disposal process twice without conducting an MOC-type review. The CSB 

has found no evidence suggesting that DEI conducted a detailed analysis of the risks associated with 

disassembling the fireworks and creating the potential for a mass explosion by accumulating explosive 

fireworks components. 

5.2 Principles of Inherent Safety

Inherent safety focuses on eliminating or reducing hazards associated with a process. That is, a process 

can be made inherently safer by eliminating or reducing the hazards associated with materials and 

operations.

79 The four principles of inherent safety are to minimize, substitute, moderate, and simplify.80

To minimize is to reduce the quantity of material or energy contained in a process.81 However, rather 

than minimize hazards, DEI’s fireworks disposal process increased the quantity of hazardous energy and 

created the potential for a mass explosion when explosive components were removed from individual 

firework tubes, concentrated in a box, and allowed to accumulate. 

One approach to minimizing hazards that DEI could have used would have been to immediately soak the 

aerial shells in diesel as each firework tube was disassembled. If a process to effectively destroy the 

black powder lift charge as each tube was disassembled was not feasible, DEI should have developed an 

alternative disposal process that did not require the disassembly of the individual firework tubes.

 78 29 CFR §1910.119(l) (2012). 79 Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life Cycle Approach; 2nd 

ed., 2009; p.11. 

80 Ibid at 29. 81 Ibid at 30. 
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5.3 Relevant Training and Experience

DEI’s main practice as a company was to conduct UXO identification and clearance activities 

through remote ignition (Section 3.3). While the company did employ individuals with military 

explosives backgrounds, many of whom held management-type positions, this experience was 

not sufficient to safely handle or disassemble contraband commercial display fireworks. 

5.3.1 DEI Management

DEI’s firework disposal team included a project manager, a senior supervisor, a site safety and health 

officer (SSHO), and a project supervisor. This team collaborated to develop DEI’s fireworks disposal 

methodology and the SOP, which included the two-page Activity Hazard Analysis (Section 5.1.1.2). The 

DEI project manager was responsible for communicating with VSE, executing all instructions, managing 

all aspects of the project, overseeing the overall performance of those on the project team, coordinating all 

contract and subcontract work, and resolving any problems. The senior supervisor planned, coordinated,

and supervised all operations, and communicated on a regular basis with VSE personnel. The SSHO 

implemented the overall safety program during the project and was responsible for implementing all

Accident Prevention Plan and onsite training requirements, and changes to the level of PPE as site 

conditions warranted. The project supervisor oversaw the lower-level UXO technicians employed by 

DEI, performed on-site activities (such as fireworks disassembly), and maintained control of team and 

daily activities. DEI personnel involved in the fireworks disposal activities under the fireworks disposal 

subcontract lacked the requisite training and experience needed to safely identify and control the hazards 

of this type of hazardous work. 

5.3.2 Experience

DEI management told the CSB that DEI personnel had significant experience dealing with explosives

from their time served in the military as EOD technicians; however, there is no evidence that this 

experience pertained to disposing of commercial fireworks. As discussed in Section 2.0, military EOD 

policy does not support military EODs handling contraband commercial fireworks.

5.3.3 Training

The DEI Corporate Health and Safety Plan required that all DEI field personnel undergo the initial 40-

hour “Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response” (HAZWOPER) course prior to 

participating in field activities. This training covers medical surveillance requirements; safety, health, and 

other hazards present on the site; selection and use of appropriate PPE; work practices to minimize risks 
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

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from potential hazards; and the safe use of test equipment and engineering controls.82 In addition, all DEI 

managers and supervisors were required to have at least eight extra hours of specialized OSHA supervisor 

training prior to job assignment. 

Four of the six DEI personnel involved in the incident were certified UXO Level I Technicians and 

received their UXO training83 and credentials from commercial schools in Hawaii and Texas; however, 

this training does not provide information on commercial fireworks or disassembly activities. In 

addition, according to the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB), a UXO Level I 

Technician may not handle or transport UXO or discarded military munitions, including pyrotechnics, 

without the direction and supervision of UXO-qualified personnel.84 UXO-qualified personnel include 

UXO Level II Technicians, UXO Level III Technicians, UXO Safety Officers, UXO Quality Control 

Specialists or Senior UXO Supervisors.85 The four UXO Level I Technicians involved in the incident had 

not been adequately trained to handle and dispose of commercial contraband fireworks, and required 

direction and supervision at the magazine from the project supervisor to conduct the disposal work.

The CSB’s interviews with DEI management, and analysis of DEI’s disposal process and hazard analysis 

show that despite their military EOD experience, these individuals were not experienced or adequately 

trained to comprehend the hazards associated with this kind of work. In addition, the CSB could not 

identify the existence of training available to civilians covering fireworks disposal. 

5.4 Relevant Incidents

The following incidents provide valuable lessons regarding the hazards of handling and disposing of 

fireworks and the importance of identifying and properly managing those hazards. 

5.4.1 Enschede Fireworks Incident 

On May 13, 2000, a fireworks explosion and fire at the SE Fireworks86

 82 29 CFR §1910.120(e)(2) (2006). 

Depot in Enschede, Netherlands, 

killed 23 and injured 947. This incident involved stored fireworks labeled as 1.4G consumer fireworks. 

As with DEI, an investigation into the incident concluded that although the fireworks were labeled as 

1.4G consumer fireworks, these fireworks were consistent with 1.3G display fireworks and the mass 

explosion was consistent with 1.1G explosives. The report on this incident highlights that aerial shells, 

when taken from their packaging, must be treated as a 1.1G explosive with the potential to mass 

83 UXO Technician Level I training consists of a four-week course that provides students with training in the safe 

detection, location, identification, and disposal of unexploded ordnance. 

http://teex.org/teex.cfm?pageid=training&area=teex&templateid=14&Division=publicsafety&Course=UXO200&na

vdiv=publicsafety (accessed September 17, 2012). 84 DDESB. Technical Paper (TP)18, Minimum Qualifications for Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Technicians and 

Personnel, Section C2.1.2, 2004. 85 Ibid. 86 SE Fireworks was a major importer of fireworks from China and a supplier for concerts and events in the 

Netherlands. 
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explode.87 This conclusion is critical for anyone conducting firework disposal activities, as separating 

and accumulating explosive firework components can introduce the possibility of a mass explosion.

5.4.2 Lansing, Kansas Incident

On July 4, 2012, a volunteer was killed when he and other local volunteers, some of whom worked with 

the local fire department, were disposing of fireworks that had not discharged during a fireworks display 

show for the City of Lansing, Kansas. The state-licensed fireworks display operator had been conducting 

this show annually for more than ten years. He told the CSB that each year during his shows as many as 

ten percent of the fireworks do not properly discharge and must be disposed of. In this incident, 

volunteers were disposing of undischarged three-inch diameter aerial shells by digging a pit several feet 

deep, starting a fire to burn the cardboard containers from cake fireworks, and throwing the defective 

firework aerial shells into the pit one at a time (Figures 23 and 24). This had been the common disposal 

method for this display operator for the last several years and was specifically developed to avoid past 

incidents when unexploded fireworks discharged on the back of a pickup truck during transportation, as 

well as in a garbage dumpster hours after the show was completed. The display operator had developed 

this disposal technique based on experience working for a fireworks manufacturing company. 

Just prior to this incident, following a verbal instruction for everyone to take cover, a chain of three-inch 

spherical aerial shells was thrown into the fire pit. At least one of the shells was ejected from the pit and 

exploded, fatally injuring a volunteer who had taken cover 40 to 50 feet away behind sand troughs 

constructed to stabilize the mortar tubes during the show. 

As Section 7.0 discusses, a significant regulatory and industry standards gap exists surrounding fireworks 

disposal in the U.S. This incident is yet another reflection of that gap, and illustrates the lack of guidance 

for disposing of fireworks, both contraband and non-contraband. 

 87 National Fire Service of the Netherlands. Final Consideration. National Fire Service Documentation Center, p. 8.

http://www.nbdc.nl/cms/servlet/nl.gx.nibra.client.http.GetFile?id=498631&file=Final_consideration_(Slotbeschouw

ing_Engels).pdf (accessed Nov 16, 2012). 
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Figure 23. Burn pit used for fireworks disposal (courtesy of the Office of the Kansas State Fire Marshal)

Figure 24. Sand troughs built to stabilize mortar tubes for the display show, behind which volunteers took cover 

during disposal activities as aerial shells were thrown into the burn pit (yellow rectangle) (courtesy of the Office 

of the Kansas State Fire Marshal)
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6.0 Contractor Selection and Oversight

The procurement process TEOAF and VSE utilized, which is governed by the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR), the Department of the Treasury Acquisition Regulation System (DTAR), the 

Department of the Treasury Acquisition Procedures (DTAP), and bureau-level procurement policies and 

procedures, does not explicitly address safety, and lacks sufficient selection and oversight requirements 

for the prime contractor VSE and its subcontractors for the unique hazards associated with fireworks

disposal. 

6.1 Federal Acquisition Regulation

The FAR,

88 a broad set of regulations governing the federal agencies’ acquisition of goods and services, 

covers both the selection of contractors and in many cases the selection of subcontractors under federal 

contracts. These regulations deal with the types of contracts available to procure and the factors to 

consider when determining the qualifications of a prospective contractor or subcontractor. As such, the 

FAR governed the TEOAF federal prime seized property management contract and the process for 

awarding subcontracts under the prime contract. 

6.1.1 Determining Responsibility

FAR Subpart 9.104-489 requires prime contractors to determine the “responsibility” of their 

subcontractors before awarding a subcontract.90 To be deemed “responsible” under the FAR, a 

prospective contractor or subcontractor must “a) [h]ave adequate financial resources to perform the 

contract...[;] b) [b]e able to comply with the required or proposed delivery or performance schedule...[;]

c) [h]ave a satisfactory performance record91

 88 48 CFR Chap. 1 (2012). 

...[;] d) [h]ave a satisfactory record of integrity and business 

ethics...[;] e) [h]ave the necessary organization, experience, accounting and operational controls, and 

technical skills, or the ability to obtain them (including...quality assurance measures and safety 

programs...)[;] f) [h]ave the necessary production, construction, and technical equipment and 

89 48 CFR §9.104-4 (2005). 90 48 CFR §9.104-1 discusses requirements for determining the responsibility of a prospective contractor. 48 CFR 

§9.104-4 extends those requirements to determining the responsibility of prospective subcontractors. 

91 According to the FAR, “[a] prospective contractor that is or recently has been seriously deficient in contract 

performance shall be presumed to be nonresponsible...[p]ast failure to apply sufficient tenacity and perseverance to 

perform acceptably is strong evidence of nonresponsibility. Failure to meet the quality requirements of the contract 

is a significant factor to consider in determining satisfactory performance.” 48 CFR §9-104-3(b). (2005). See also 

48 CFR §42.15, Contractor Performance Information: “Past performance information is relevant information, for 

future source selection purposes, regarding a contractor’s actions under previously awarded contracts. It includes, 

for example, the contractor’s record of conforming to contract requirements and to standards of good workmanship; 

the contractor’s record of forecasting and controlling costs; the contractor’s adherence to contract schedules, 

including the administrative aspects of performance; the contractor’s history of reasonable and cooperative behavior 

and commitment to customer satisfaction; the contractor’s reporting into databases...the contractor’s record of 

integrity and business ethics, and generally, the contractor’s business-like concern for the interest of the customer 

(2002). 
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facilities...[;] and g) [b]e otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an award under applicable laws and 

regulations.”92 FAR Subpart 9.104-2 states that, when necessary, a contracting officer (CO) may develop 

special standards of responsibility, especially when unusual expertise is needed for adequate contract 

performance.93 Pursuant to these sections, VSE contract procurement personnel are required to determine 

a potential subcontractor’s “responsibility” before awarding any subcontract; as such, they would have to 

have the ability to assess any prospective subcontractor’s technical qualifications relevant to the work 

involved. 

FAR Subparts 9.104-1 and 9.104-4, however, do not specifically require prime contractors to include any 

safety performance metrics and qualifications criteria in their review of a prospective subcontractor’s 

responsibility, despite the fact that the work of federal agencies can be hazardous. As discussed in the 

CSB’s Xcel Investigation Report, issued in August 2010, several organizations and industry associations, 

including the Construction Users Roundtable94 (CURT), the American National Standards Institute95

(ANSI), and the American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA), have developed guidelines and 

recommended practices addressing the use of safety criteria for selecting and prequalifying contractors. 

CURT has stated that demonstrated safety performance is a “critical criterion used in the [contractor] 

prequalification process.”96 CURT guidance lists staff qualifications, accident history, a contractor’s

safety program, and an owner’s previous experience as potential criteria for safety prequalification of a 

contractor. ANSI Standard Z-10, “Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems,” also 

recommends that the contractor prequalification process include consideration of safety criteria for 

successful contractor safety performance management.97

6.2 Supplements to the FAR

Over the years, federal agencies have developed supplements to the FAR containing regulations and 

policies that are more specific to an agency’s activities and needs. The courts have ruled that agency 

supplements, like the FAR itself, have “the force and effect of law.”98

 92 48 CFR §9.104-1 (2005). 

 The U.S. Department of Defense 

93 48 CFR §9.104-2 (2005).

94 CURT is an industry organization that promotes advocacy by users of construction services on national issues that 

includes “developing industry standards and owner expectations with respect to safety, training and worker 

qualifications” http://www.curt.org/2_0_about_curt.html (accessed September 27, 2012). CURT is composed of 66 

member companies, organizations, and government entities that represent some of the largest industrial corporations 

and users of construction services in the U.S. including ExxonMobil, Dow Chemical, Intel, Duke Energy, Shell, the 

U.S. Army Corp. of Engineers, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons, and the U.S. General 

Services Administration.

95 ANSI is as private, non-profit organization that “oversees the creation, promulgation and use of thousands of 

norms and guidelines that directly impact businesses in nearly every sector...[and] is also actively engaged in 

accrediting programs that assess conformance to standards...” 

http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/overview/overview.aspx?menuid=1 (accessed December 20, 2012). ANSI is 

comprised of nearly 1,000 businesses, professional societies and trade associations, standards developers, 

government agencies, and consumer and labor organizations. 96 CURT, Construction Safety: The Owner’s Role, UP-802, 2004, p.6. 97 ANSI/AIHA. ANSI/AIHA Z-10, American National Standard for Occupational Health and Safety Management 

Systems, 2012; p.18. 98 Davies Precision Machining, Inc. v. U.S., 35 Fed Cl. 651 (1995). 
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(DoD), for example, developed the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS),

99

6.2.1 Department of the Treasury

which, among other things, reflects the nature of the DoD’s hazardous work and its commitment to 

protecting the public and workers by requiring more rigorous contractor and subcontractor selection and 

oversight practices to ensure safety is effectively managed. However, the Treasury supplement (the 

DTAR) does not explicitly require the consideration of health or safety in its selection and oversight 

provisions, despite the fact that subcontractors are engaging in hazardous work pursuant to the TEOAF 

federal prime contract.

The DTAR establishes uniform policies for all acquisition activities throughout Treasury, including the 

TEOAF. 100 The Treasury Office of the Procurement Executive (OPE), which is responsible for 

evaluating, reviewing, and issuing all departmental acquisition regulations and guidance, directly oversees 

and controls the DTAR.101 The Senior Procurement Executive (SPE) is the director of OPE and may 

approve all individual and class contract FAR and DTAR deviations.102 The SPE has also published a 

companion policy guide to the DTAR, the DTAP, which must be used in conjunction with the DTAR and 

FAR to ensure adherence to all Treasury policy and federal procurement regulations.103 

Although the TEOAF is responsible for managing participating agencies’ seized and forfeited property, 

which may include explosive and hazardous materials, provisions contained within the DTAR do not 

reflect the importance of occupational health and safety when conducting hazardous activities. The 

DTAR and DTAP lack explicit safety provisions, and do not provide for additional contractor and 

subcontractor selection and oversight procedures when contracting for the handling, storage, or disposal 

of hazardous materials such as fireworks.

6.2.2 Department of Defense

The DoD’s DFARS Section 223, “Environment, Energy and Water Efficiency, Renewable Energy 

Technologies, Occupational Safety, and Drug-Free Workplace,”104 considers additional safety and 

contractor oversight for all DoD acquisitions involving the use of ammunition and explosives105 (AE),

including handling or loading, assembling, transportation, storage, and disposal.

106

 99 48 CFR Chapter 2 (Sections 200 to 299) (last updated May 29, 2012). 

 Section 223 requires

100 48 CFR Chapter 10 (Sections 1000 to 1052) (2011). 101 48 CFR §1001.304 (2011). 102 48 CFR §1001.403 and 1001.404 (August 2011). 103 See Department of the Treasury Acquisition Procedures (DTAP) (June 1, 2011) 

http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Mgt/Documents/DTAP%2006-01-2011.pdf

(accessed September 18, 2012). 104 48 CFR §223 (May 29, 2012) 105 “Ammunition and Explosives” is defined as “liquid and solid propellants and explosives, pyrotechnics, 

incendiaries and smokes in the following forms: (i) Bulk; (ii) Ammunition; (iii) Rockets; (iv) Missiles; (v) 

Warheads; (vi) Devices; and (vii) Components of (i) through (vi), except for wholly inert items.” 48 CFR §252.223-

7002, Safety Precautions for Ammunition and Explosives (May 1994). 

106 48 CFR §223.370-1(a) (May 29, 2012). 
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contracting officers to incorporate DoD Manual 4145.26M, DoD Contractor’s Safety Manual For

Ammunition and Explosives (DoD Safety Manual),107 into all contracts under which AE are handled (AE 

procurement actions).108

The DoD Safety Manual provides safety requirements, guidance, and information to minimize potential 

accidents that “could interrupt DoD operations, delay DoD contract production, damage DoD property, 

cause injury to DoD personnel, or endanger the public during DoD contract work or services involving 

AE.”109

For example, Section C1.5 requires that DoD safety personnel conduct pre-award safety surveys to 

evaluate each potential contractor’s ability to comply with contract safety requirements. A potential 

contractor must provide the CO with any site plans; its safety and fire prevention programs; descriptions 

of proposed facilities; its safety history; proposed operations and equipment (including a process flow 

narrative/diagram, proposed hazard analysis and proposed procedures for all phases of AE operations);

and information on any subcontractor the contractor plans to utilize to perform AE work.

 These requirements apply to DoD contractors and subcontractors handling AE and provide 

additional contractor selection and safety oversight information.

110

Under Section C1.6, DoD has the authority to conduct an additional “pre-operational survey” under 

certain circumstances, such as when a contract has been awarded to a contractor with “limited 

experience,” or following a “major modification,” both of which were significant factors in the DEI 

incident.

 The policy 

states that DoD safety personnel will then assess whether the prospective contractor has sufficient 

programs in place before awarding an AE contract.

111

Section C1.7 states that, post-award, a contractor must comply with all requirements of the DoD Safety 

Manual in addition to following all applicable local, state, and federal codes, standards, and regulations. 

The contractor also must implement a demonstrable safety program to prevent AE-related accidents, 

designate qualified individuals to administer the safety program, and prepare and keep available for 

review all hazard analyses.112

Chapter 3 provides general safety requirements for all AE operations addressed within the manual. They 

reflect the “cardinal principle of AE safety,” which is to “limit exposure to a minimum number of 

personnel, for a minimum amount of time, to the minimum amount of the hazardous material consistent 

with safe and efficient operations.”113 It includes minimum requirements for 1) SOPs; 2) training and 

housekeeping; 3) controlling and monitoring subcontractors, including the method the contractor uses to 

determine whether subcontractors are qualified to perform work safely; 114

 107 DoD Contractor’s Safety Manual for Ammunition and Explosives. DoD 4145.26-M. (March 13, 2008). 

and 4) handling and storing

108 48 CFR §223.370-3(b) (2012). 

109 DoD 4145.26-M Section C1.1. Purpose. (March 13, 2008). 110 DoD 4145.26-M Section C1.5. Pre-Award Safety Survey. (March 13, 2008). 111 DoD 4145.26-M Section C1.6. Pre-Operational Safety Survey. (March 13, 2008). 112 DoD 4145.26-M Section C1.7. Post-Award Contractor Responsibilities. (March 13, 2008). 113 DoD 4145.26-M Section C3.2.1. Personnel and Material Limits. (March 13, 2008). 114 DoD 4145.25-M Section C3.3.5. Control and Monitoring. (March 13, 2008). 
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explosives waste in operating areas (including a requirement that black powder must be stored in 

containers with water).

115

Chapter 11, which includes a sample matrix used for guidance, 116 requires that all contractors have a risk 

identification and management system and perform a hazard analysis that evaluates processes, materials, 

equipment, and personnel hazards.117 (Appendix B includes excerpts from the DoD Safety Manual). 

As discussed in Section 6.3, VSE’s selection and oversight of DEI as a subcontractor as well as DEI’s 

fireworks disposal process reflect a lack of safety focus throughout the entire contracting process. All 

parties involved would have greatly benefited from contract safety provisions similar to those found in the 

DoD Safety Manual, including those that required pre- and post-award safety surveys of subcontractors, 

the creation and review of risk assessments and hazard analyses, the implementation of a safety program, 

and provisions that emphasize the importance of minimizing hazards. 

6.3 Subcontractor Selection

6.3.1 VSE Procurement Selection Methodology for Subcontractors 

VSE procurement personnel assigned to work under the TEOAF prime and interim contracts have varied

training and technical backgrounds and are responsible for subcontracting to vendors to manage a wide 

array of projects. While explosives and hazardous materials are periodically seized and must be 

managed, VSE procurement personnel responsible for selecting and overseeing vendors to conduct these 

activities, including storage and disposal, lacked the requisite backgrounds or expertise necessary to 

understand the risks of managing this type of property – nor does VSE employ or consult with experts to 

assist in selecting vendors capable of properly managing hazardous and explosive materials. 

6.3.1.1 Initial Solicitation

In early 2010, VSE procurement personnel assigned to work under the TEOAF federal prime contract 

began the task of securing a vendor to dispose of the contraband fireworks that CBP and ICE/HSI had 

seized in Honolulu. Based on initial market research, on February 16, 2010, VSE sent a request for a 

firm-fixed-price118 quotation119

 115 DoD 4145.25-M Section 3.6. Explosives Waste in Operating Areas. (March 13, 2008). 

to five vendors, including DEI. VSE requested a quote from DEI for one 

116 DoD 4145.25-M Section C11.2.2.2 and Table C11.T1. (March 13, 2008). 117 DoD 4145.25-M Chapter 11. Risk Identification and Management. (March 13, 2008). 118 According to FAR Subpart 16.202-1, “[a] firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is not subject to any 

adjustment on the basis of the contractor’s cost experience in performing the contract. This contract type places 

upon the contractor maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss. It provides 

maximum incentive for the contractor to control costs and perform effectively and imposes a minimum 

administrative burden upon the contracting parties...” 

119 VSE required a firm-fixed-price bid to dispose of the contraband fireworks because VSE procurement personnel 

understood that the terms of the federal prime contract required a firm-fixed-price for all purchase orders. The CSB 

learned that VSE understood that firm fixed price contracts are best suited for situations where the subcontractors’ 
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

56

main reason: DEI was already storing the fireworks through a separate subcontract with VSE, and VSE 

had a stated preference for a “one-stop shopping” subcontractor. Two solicited suppliers, DEI and 

Liberty Disposal (Liberty), a fireworks disposal company in Michigan,

120 responded with firm fixed-price 

quotations. DEI’s quotation estimated a total of 400 hours of labor and projected a cost of $157,579.73 

for disposal of 40 pallets of fireworks. According to DEI management, the price was based on 

assumptions that certain facilities, such as Koko Head, could be used for burning and that the timelines 

they provided were accurate. The quotation did not detail how DEI would dispose of the fireworks or 

include possible permitting requirements. The CSB has found no evidence that VSE procurement 

personnel discussed these matters with DEI when analyzing the quotation.

Liberty, which provided a more detailed quotation to VSE that explained how the company would 

dispose of the fireworks (via incineration in Ohio) and what permitting would be necessary, estimated its 

total to be $268,372.56.

6.3.1.2 Subcontractor Selection – Determining Responsibility

Once VSE procurement specialists received the two price quotations from DEI and Liberty they began 

their analysis by researching both companies on the Central Contractor Registration121 (CCR) website to 

ensure that neither was on the excluded parties list, and then compared each company’s Small Business 

Administration122

VSE procurement analysis found DEI’s proposal to be the lowest-cost and most time-efficient, and 

therefore determined it to be the best overall value for the government. According to VSE, this, along 

with the fact that DEI was a local company already storing the fireworks, led VSE procurement to select 

DEI as the subcontractor. VSE procurement’s lack of health and safety focus during the procurement 

process resulted in a flawed responsibility determination and the award of the subcontract to DEI on 

March 17, 2010.

(SBA) profile. VSE procurement specialists also perused company websites to get an 

idea of the type of work each vendor did. No additional analysis was done to determine prior work 

history, proposed disposal methodology, or the vendor’s technical skills to safely and responsibly dispose 

of explosives. VSE procurement personnel also failed to discover if DEI had prior fireworks disposal 

experience; instead, VSE procurement personnel told the CSB that because they were not the subject 

matter experts, they deferred to DEI as the expert based on the company’s website and what DEI said its 

capabilities were. 

 

scope of work is fully understood. The protocols associated with seized property do not allow a subcontractor 

bidding on the seized fireworks disposal subcontract to open boxes containing the fireworks and verify their 

contents to help in their cost estimation process. 

120 http://libertydisposalinc.com (accessed July 6, 2012). 121 The Central Contractor Registration (CCR) is the primary vendor database for the U.S. Federal Government. It 

collects, validates, stores and disseminates data in support of agency acquisition mission. Government vendors are 

required to register in CCR in order to be awarded contracts by the government. 

http://www.osdbu.dot.gov/related/ccr.cfm (accessed September 27, 2012) 122 The Small Business Administration (SBA) provides financing, contracts, counseling sessions and other forms of 

assistance to small businesses, http://www.sba.gov/about (accessed September 27, 2012). Both DEI and Liberty are 

SBA certified. 
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6.4 Fireworks Disposal Subcontract Provisions

The lack of safety focus is also apparent when reviewing the context of the fireworks disposal subcontract 

itself. The subcontract awarded to DEI contained a Statement of Work (SOW) and a Subcontractor 

Property Management Handbook (Property Management Handbook); both were generic, related to the 

management of general property, and did not address hazards associated with handling or disposing of 

explosive hazardous materials, including fireworks. 

The SOW’s stated intent was to “facilitate the transportation, storage, and destruction of seized general 

property as well as hazardous waste materials in Hawaii.” Its objectives were “General Property 

Management Services in accordance with the Property Management Handbook” and “destruction of 

property via the use of a hazardous waste landfill or landfill.” Under “description of work” the SOW 

stated that the vendor must “have the capacity to transport, store, and destroy general property as well as 

hazardous waste materials...must locate a facility that is a fully-regulated hazardous waste land fill or a 

land fill...dispose of property in accordance with all federal, state, and local laws, codes, ordinances, and 

regulations...[and that] a waste-to-energy facility [was] preferable...” Nothing within this SOW provided

any technical detail of DEI’s proposed fireworks disposal methodology or the risks involved. When 

asked about the general language contained within the SOW, VSE procurement personnel told the CSB 

that this was a standard language SOW except for specifics that had been inserted such as the state where 

the work was being conducted. These individuals told the CSB this was because the person writing the 

SOW was unfamiliar in terms of what to include specific to fireworks disposal, as that person did not 

understand the process. 

The Property Management Handbook included guidance on a seizure’s life cycle, property collection,

chain of custody, property manipulation, property transportation, property storage, and property removal 

from storage. However, the language and instructions related to seized general property; explosives, 

fireworks, or other hazardous materials, or the risks of working with such items, were not discussed. 

6.5 Subcontractor Oversight

6.5.1 Initial DEI Fireworks Disposal Plan

After DEI was awarded the fireworks disposal subcontract, DEI submitted a fireworks disposal plan to 

VSE for review and approval. DEI management personnel developed the fireworks disposal plan and told 

the CSB that, as they could find no guidance regarding fireworks disposal, they relied solely on military 

manuals and on-the-job military EOD training and experience to develop the initial disposal 

methodology. The CSB has been unable to verify the use of those military manuals. 

Post-award, the VSE Regional Office in California (Regional Office) became the main VSE day-to-day 

contact for DEI. While this office received DEI’s daily activity reports (DARs) and maintained contact 

with DEI management, CBP, and the BAI representative in Hawaii, its personnel lacked necessary 

expertise or training to understand the risks associated with handling and disposing of explosives, 
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

58

including fireworks. Regional Office Personnel also indicated to the CSB that they did not understand the 

kind of permitting DEI required to conduct its disposal work and why such permitting was needed. 

The initial DEI fireworks disposal plan, “DEI Disposal of Commercial Grade Fireworks Plan,” (disposal 

plan) detailed DEI’s intended disposal methodology and was written for the “VSE Regional Office and 

those who will need to oversee the destruction of the commercial grade fireworks via services provide[d] 

by DEI.” The disposal plan provided for DEI to carry out a series of burn operations using a DEI portable

incinerator (TFU) that was capable of holding 40 to 50 pounds of fireworks. DEI noted the following 

steps in its plan: 

1. DEI would ask the VSE Regional Office to reserve the Koko Head range at least two weeks 

before the actual burn operation, 

2. DEI would pre-soak fireworks in diesel fuel for a minimum of 48 hours to ensure “complete 

desensitization,”

3. Desensitized fireworks would be loaded into 55-gallon steel drums and transported to Koko 

Head, 

4. The TFU would be ignited and preheated for 15 to 20 minutes, 

5. The pre-soaked fireworks would be fed down a chute one at a time, 

6. Photos would be taken and provided to the VSE Regional Office upon request, and 

7. DEI personnel would sign and date CBP Form 7605 block 8123 and submit to the VSE 

Regional Office.

The Regional Office used the information to create a VSE Property Destruction Plan for submission to 

VSE Risk Management for review and approval. The Property Destruction Plan mischaracterized DEI’s 

initial disposal plan by stating that the diesel fuel would “neutralize” rather than “desensitize” the 

fireworks.

124 As noted, diesel is used to desensitize explosives to spark, friction, impact, and temperature, 

and should result in a slow burn. The explosives are not “neutralized,” and no chemical changes occur

when diesel is added. The plan also indicated that a BAI field representative would be present to 

“oversee destruction.” However, the CSB later learned that the BAI field representative lacked the 

expertise to oversee DEI’s practices, and VSE had ultimately approved DEI’s conduct of the work 

without BAI’s daily oversight. In short, this plan overstated the safeguards in place to ensure that

disposal was being done safely. VSE Risk Management approved the Property Destruction Plan on April 

28, 2010.

6.5.2 Property Destruction Plan Review and Approval 

The VSE Risk Management analyst who reviewed the Property Destruction Plan lacked the expertise or 

relevant training to adequately assess a plan for fireworks disposal. After receiving the plan, this analyst 

told the CSB that he first reviewed the very brief disposal methodology consisting of a few lines, which 

 123 Certification of Destruction. 124 As noted, diesel is used to desensitize explosives to spark, friction, impact, and temperature and should result in a 

slow burn. 
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described soaking the fireworks in diesel fuel to “neutralize” them and then destroying them by 

incineration. The analyst told the CSB that he deferred to DEI’s expertise when reviewing this section 

because of his lack of knowledge about fireworks, and he conducted no further research on DEI’s 

proposed methodology. Section IV of the Property Destruction Plan required the analyst to check either 

“Yes” or “No” for whether DEI was qualified to destroy the fireworks. Because VSE’s Procurement 

Office had already assessed DEI’s qualifications and selected DEI as the subcontractor, the Risk 

Management analyst checked “Yes” without researching DEI’s qualifications, experience, or proposed 

methodology. The analyst did search for adverse events involving DEI in VSE’s adverse incidents 

database and, finding no such history, approved and returned the Plan to the Regional Office. 

6.5.3 VSE Regional Office

The approach taken by the VSE Regional Office echoed the stated position adopted throughout VSE: 

company personnel lacked expertise in handling fireworks or other explosives and hazardous materials 

and therefore deferred to DEI as the “expert” on fireworks disposal. The decisions on which VSE 

deferred to DEI included DEI’s two deviations from the original fireworks disposal plan to begin 

disassembling the fireworks by hand. Regional Office staff confirmed to the CSB that when DEI 

significantly altered its disposal methodology in March 2011, VSE was simply informed in a notification 

email. However, VSE Regional Office personnel would not have recognized the hazards associated with 

disassembling fireworks and accumulating boxes of explosive components. Because VSE trusted that 

DEI was an expert that would recognize and address any risks involved, VSE did not question any 

changes or express concern.

6.5.4 BAI 

As discussed, VSE relied on BAI field representatives to provide field services such as property 

inspections and storage on an as-needed basis. A BAI representative in Hawaii came to the magazine

occasionally and served as VSE’s observer during DEI’s disposal process. He also took photos of the 

disassembly process (Figures 5 and 6). The subcontract between VSE and BAI did not require the BAI 

representative to oversee safety, which the representative could not have done effectively because he had 

no experience with fireworks and explosives and therefore would be unable to offer any valuable insight. 

The CSB concurs with ATF’s conclusion that the BAI field representative did witness some disposal 

work where unsafe practices would have been apparent to observers with expertise in explosive disposal 

operations.

6.6 Conclusion

Neither VSE nor BAI used personnel with the necessary backgrounds and expertise to recognize the 

hazards associated with DEI’s fireworks disposal work. All deferred to DEI as the “expert” regarding 

fireworks disposal and were unaware of the hazards of disassembling the fireworks by hand, 

accumulating explosive materials in cardboard boxes, and storing them in a magazine along with potential 

spark- and static-producing items.
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To improve the subcontractor selection and oversight process under the TEOAF seized property 

management contract, government acquisition regulations must emphasize safety system management.

The FAR should be strengthened to require the analysis of safety performance measures and 

qualifications when determining the “responsibility” of prospective contractors and subcontractors 

handling explosive and hazardous materials. Federal agencies such as Treasury, that require contractors 

and subcontractors to deal with explosives and other hazardous materials, should adopt and implement 

stringent safety-related contractor and subcontractor selection and oversight provisions similar to those 

found within the DFARS. In addition, entities tasked with implementing safety-related contracting 

requirements must have the personnel or consultants in place with the necessary technical expertise to 

sufficiently evaluate and oversee contractors and subcontractors to ensure the work is being conducted 

safely.
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7.0 Regulatory and Industry Standards Analysis

Within Hawaii, ATF, HIOSH, and the State of Hawaii Department of Health (DOH) all have regulatory 

oversight over various aspects of fireworks manufacturing, storage, handling, and disposal. National Fire 

Protection Association (NFPA) industry standards also include good practices pertaining to fireworks 

manufacturing and storage. However, the CSB found a significant gap with regulatory and industry 

standards pertaining to the safe disposal of fireworks in the U.S.

7.1 Hawaii Occupational Safety and Health Division

7.1.1 Jurisdiction

Hawaii is one of 26 jurisdictions OSHA approved to operate its own state safety and health program 

under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) Section 18(b).125 HIOSH administers Hawaii’s 

OSHA State Plan Program and has adopted Federal OSHA standards in their entirety, contained within 

the Hawaii Administrative Rules (HAR). 

OSHA’s Explosives Standard, 29 CFR §1910.109,

126 and HAR Title 12, Subtitle 8, Part 2 (General 

Industry Standards) cover the storage and handling requirements of explosives and pyrotechnics. 

However, Section 4(b)(1) of the OSH Act precludes OSHA from any enforcement activity over a working 

condition if another federal agency exercises its statutory authority.

127 In this case, HIOSH’s authority to 

regulate most manufacturing, distribution, handling, and storage of fireworks in Hawaii, including DEI’s 

activities, would be preempted should ATF have chosen to exercise its statutory authority under ATF’s 

Federal Explosives Law and Regulations, found at 18 U.S.C. Chapter 40 and 27 CFR Part 555.128 

OSHA Directive Number CPL 02-01-053, Compliance Policy for Manufacture, Storage, Sale, Handling,

Use and Display of Pyrotechnics,

129 clarifies situations in which OSHA may issue citations for hazards 

related to fireworks and conditions during which the OSH Act General Duty Clause can be applied to 

address hazards not specifically covered by OSHA standards.130

 125 29 U.S.C. §667 (1970). 

 Because ATF’s regulations in 27 CFR 

Part 555 specifically address working conditions associated with storing explosives, including 

commercial 1.3G UN0335 display fireworks, they preempt OSHA’s storage requirements for explosives 

in §1910.109(c). However, storing 1.4G UN0336 consumer fireworks in their finished state falls under 

126 29 CFR §1910.109, Explosives and Blasting Agents (1998). 127 29 U.S.C. §653 (1970). 128 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Title XI, Chapter 40. Importation, Manufacture, Distribution and Storage 

of Explosive Materials. (October 22, 1986). 27 CFR Part 555, Commerce in Explosives (2007). 

129 CPL 02-01-053, Policy for Manufacture, Storage, Sale, Handling, Use and Display of Pyrotechnics (October 27, 

2011).

130 CPL 02-01-053, Executive Summary (Oct. 27, 2011). 
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OSHA’s and HIOSH’s authority.131 Hazards such as ignition sources, including static electricity hazards 

associated with storage and handling of explosive materials not covered by ATF, may also be cited under 

§1910.109(b)(1) and correlating HAR standards.132

7.1.2 HIOSH Investigation of the Incident

On September 30, 2011, HIOSH announced that it had completed its investigation of the DEI incident. 

HIOSH identified 11 potential causes for the explosion, each of which carries a separate penalty. HIOSH 

issued four serious, seven willful, and one other citation against DEI, alleging DEI’s serious violation of 

29 CFR §1910.36(b)(2)133 and HAR §12-71.1 by blocking the magazine’s only exit; willful violation of 

HAR §12-61-2(a)(3) that exposed employees to explosion hazards (the presence of sources of static 

electricity as potential ignition sources) while they worked with explosive materials; willful violation of 

29 CFR §1910.109(b)(1) and HAR §12-74.1 by separating pyrotechnic materials in close proximity to 

other explosives, storing ferrous134 tools inside the magazine, and permitting spark-producing devices 

near the magazine; and willful violation of 29 CFR §1910.132(d)(1)(i)135 and HAR §12-64.1 for the lack 

of appropriate PPE. 

As discussed in Section 5.1, because DEI’s disassembly activities were under the umbrella of disposal 

rather than manufacturing, HIOSH was unable to cite DEI for PSM-related violations. In addition, while 

HIOSH did cite DEI for various alleged health and safety violations, no OSHA or HIOSH guidance 

specifically relates to fireworks disposal.

7.2 ATF

As discussed above, 27 CFR Part 555, Commerce in Explosives, regulates the importation, 

manufacturing, distribution, and storage of explosive materials, including commercial display 1.3G 

UN0335 fireworks. Under Subpart D, anyone intending to import, manufacture, or deal in explosive 

materials must obtain an ATF license.136 However, a separate license is not required for storage facilities 

operated by the licensee as an integral part of one business premises.137

 131 CPL 02-01-053 Section B(2), Enforcement of 29 CFR §1910.109 (Oct. 27, 2011).

 Because DEI had a 

132 CPL 02-01-053 Section B(3), Enforcement of 29 CFR §1910.109 (Oct. 27, 2011). 13329 CFR §1910.36(b)(2) states “[m]ore than two exit routes must be available in a workplace if the number of 

employees, the size of the building, its occupancy, or the arrangement of the workplace is such that all employees 

would not be able to evacuate safely during an emergency.” 29 CFR §1910.36(b)(2). The number of exit routes 

must be adequate (Nov. 7, 2002). 

134 Of or containing iron. 135 29 CFR §1910.132(d)(1) states that an employer must “assess the workplace to determine if hazards are present, 

or are likely to be present, which necessitate the use of personal protective equipment (PPE). If such hazards are 

present, or likely to be present, the employer shall... (i) Select, and have each affected employee use, the types of 

PPE that will protect the affected employee from the hazards identified in the hazard assessment...” 29 CFR 

§1910.132(d)(1)(i) (June 8, 2011). 136 27 CFR §555.41(a)(1) (2005). 137 27 CFR §555.41(a)(2)(i) (2005). 
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manufacturing license from ATF as a result of its UXO activities, its personnel were approved to store the 

three fireworks seizures in the A-21 magazine without ATF inspection. At the time of the incident, no 

ATF staff had inspected the magazine although, according to DEI management, a day and time were 

being set up for this; the goal was to have it classified under ATF regulations as a Type 1 magazine,

138

which is authorized under ATF regulations to store high explosives.139

ATF storage regulations include requirements for storage within Types 1, 2, 3, and 4 magazines. These 

regulations state that explosive materials cannot be placed directly against interior walls and, except for 

fiberboard or other nonmetal containers, containers of explosive materials cannot be unpacked or 

repacked inside a magazine or within 50 feet of a magazine.140 Tools used to open containers of 

explosives must be of non-sparking materials, except that metal slitters can be used to open fiberboard 

containers.141 Magazines are required to be kept clean and dry; free of grit, paper, empty packages, trash,

and containers; and floors are to be regularly swept with brooms or other items with non-sparking parts. 

Volatile materials are required to be kept at least 50 feet from outdoor magazines.142 ATF regulations do 

not provide guidance on fireworks disposal or disassembly activities. 

7.3 Regulation of Hazardous Waste

7.3.1 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is a federal law that regulates non-hazardous and 

hazardous solid waste. RCRA Subtitle C implements the Hazardous Waste Permit Program, which 

regulates the generation, handling, transportation, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste from cradle to 

grave. RCRA requires a permit143 for the treatment,144 storage,145 and disposal146 of any hazardous waste 

as identified or listed in 40 CFR Part 261.147

 138 27 CFR §555.203(a). (1981). 

139 “High Explosives” are explosive materials which can be caused to detonate by means of a blasting cap when 

unconfined.” 27 CFR §555.2-2(a) (1998). 140 27 CFR §555.214 (a) and (c) (1981). 141 27 CFR §555.214 (d) (1981). 142 27 CFR §555. 215 (1981). 143 A permit includes a permit by rule (270.60), emergency permit (270.61), and standardized permit (subpart J of 

this part). 40 CFR §270.2 (2006).

144 Treatment means “any method, technique, or process, including neutralization, designed to change the physical, 

chemical, or biological character or composition of any hazardous waste so as to neutralize such wastes, or so as to 

recover energy or material resources from the waste, or so as to render such waste non-hazardous, or less hazardous; 

safer to transport, store, or dispose of; or amenable for recovery, amenable for storage, or reduced in volume.” 

40 CFR §270.2 (2006). 

145 Storage means “the holding of hazardous waste for a temporary period, at the end of which the hazardous waste 

is treated, disposed, or stored elsewhere.” 40 CFR §270.2 (2006). 146 Disposal means “the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any hazardous waste 

into or on any land or water so that such hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be 

emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground water.” 40 CFR §270.2 (2006). 147 40 CFR §270.1(c) (2006). 
DEI Final Investigation Report January 2013

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Under RCRA, no material is a hazardous waste unless it is first deemed a solid waste.148 RCRA places 

hazardous waste into two categories: 1) listed wastes, which appear on one of the four hazardous waste 

lists established by regulations;

149 or 2) characteristic wastes, which exhibit one or more of four features: 

ignitability;150 corrosivity;151 reactivity;152 and/or toxicity.153 Confiscated, seized, or forfeited fireworks 

(when a solid waste) are considered regulated hazardous waste under RCRA because they are ignitable,154

reactive,

155 and potentially toxic solid wastes.156 

Standard RCRA operating permit applications include two parts (A and B)157 and are comprehensive. 

Permit application requirements include a description of the facility and procedures, structures, or 

equipment used at the facility to prevent hazards in unloading operations, and to prevent undue exposure

to hazardous waste (for example, protective clothing);

158 a description of precautions to prevent accidental 

ignition or reaction of ignitable, reactive, or incompatible wastes as required to demonstrate compliance 

with 40 CFR §264.17;159 and an outline of training programs by owners or operators to prepare workers 

to operate in a safe manner.160 RCRA permit applicants must also comply with the facility standards in 

40 CFR Part 264, including personnel training requirements161

 148 “Solid waste” is defined under 40 CFR §261.2 as a “discarded material which is A) Abandoned...or; B) 

Recycled...; or C) Considered inherently waste-like...; or D) A military munition...” 40 CFR §261.2 (2010). 

“Hazardous waste” is defined under 40 CFR §261.3 as a solid waste that exhibits any of the characteristics of 

hazardous waste identified in subpart C or that is listed in subpart D of this part. 40 CFR §261.3 (2006). 

and requirements for handling ignitable, 

149 40 CFR §261.31-33 (2011). 150 40 CFR §261.21 (2011). 151 40 CFR §261.22 (2011). 152 40 CFR §261.23 (2011). 153 40 CFR §261.24 (2011). 154 Characteristic of ignitability: “(a) A solid waste exhibits the characteristic of ignitability if a representative 

sample of the waste has any of the following properties: (2) It is not a liquid and is capable, under standard 

temperature and pressure, of causing fire through friction, absorption of moisture or spontaneous chemical changes 

and, when ignited, burns so vigorously and persistently that it creates a hazard...” 40 CFR §261.21(a)(2) (2011). 

155 Characteristic of reactivity: “(a) A solid waste exhibits the characteristic of reactivity if a representative sample 

of the waste has any of the following properties: (1) It is normally unstable and readily undergoes violent change 

without detonating. (2) It reacts violently with water. (3) It forms potentially explosive mixtures with water. (6) It is 

capable of detonation or explosive reaction if it is subjected to a strong initiating source or if heated under 

confinement. (7) It is readily capable of detonation or explosive decomposition or reaction at standard temperature 

and pressure. (8) It is...a Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 explosive as defined in 49 CFR §§ 173.50 and 173.53.” 40 CFR 

§261.23(a) (2011). 

156 Toxicity characteristic: “(a) A solid waste...exhibits the characteristic of toxicity if, using the Toxicity 

Characteristic Leaching Procedure, test Method 1311 in ‘Test Methods for Evaluating Solid Waste, 

Physical/Chemical Methods’...the extract from a representative sample of the waste contains any of the 

contaminants listed in table 1 at the concentration equal to or greater than the respective value given in that table.” 

40 CFR §261.24(a) (2011). 157 RCRA application Part A and Part B requirements are contained within 40 CFR §§270.13 and 270.14, 

respectively.

158 40 CFR §270.14(b)(8)(v) (1983).

159 40 CFR 270.14(b)(9) (1983). 160 40 CFR §270.14(b)(12) (1983). 161 40 CFR §264.16 (2006).
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reactive, or incompatible wastes.162 RCRA permits are effective for a fixed term not to exceed 10

years.163 

Under 40 CFR §270.61,

164 persons or facilities seeking to engage in hazardous waste treatment, storage, 

or disposal activities may obtain an emergency hazardous waste permit if the waste is determined to be an 

“imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or the environment.”165 Emergency permits 

may be oral or written and are effective for 90 days once issued.166 They are significantly less detailed 

and robust than traditional RCRA permits and require substantially less work on the part of the applicant 

and the permit writer. Throughout the U.S., seized fireworks are sometimes disposed of pursuant to 

these emergency permits due to the hazardous characteristics of firework components.

Although not applicable to this incident, RCRA regulations also have a complete exemption from all

permits, including emergency permits, for all qualified responders to “an immediate threat to human 

health, public safety, property, or the environment, from the known or suspected presence of military 

munitions, other explosive material, or an explosive device, as determined by an explosive or munitions 

emergency response specialist as defined in 40 CFR §260.10.”167

7.3.2 State of Hawaii Department of Health (DOH)

DOH is Hawaii’s state environmental agency, and implements federal environmental regulations that 

have been adopted under the HAR, including RCRA regulations. As such, DOH has the authority under 

40 CFR §270.61 and HAR §11-270-61(a) to issue emergency hazardous waste permits to RCRA and nonRCRA permitted persons or facilities. According to DOH policy, DOH views “illegal fireworks as 

hazardous wastes that exhibit an unusual risk to the public and the environment”168 and therefore issues 

emergency permits to those who wish to treat or dispose of contraband fireworks.

As discussed in Section 3.4, DOH issued DEI an emergency hazardous waste disposal permit on June 8, 

2010, for fireworks disposal activities. 40 CFR §270.61(b)(3) requires that the emergency permit “clearly 

specify the hazardous wastes to be received, and the manner and location of their treatment, storage, or 

disposal.” According to DOH policy, the specific conditions authorized in an emergency permit depend 

on analysis of facts provided by the applicant. However, the policy also provides that DOH‘s “basic 

 162 40 CFR §264.17 states that an owner or operator must take precautions to prevent accidental ignition or reaction 

of ignitable or reactive waste. This waste must be separated and protected from sources of ignition or reaction, 

including but not limited to open flames, smoking, cutting and welding, hot surfaces, frictional heat, sparks (static, 

electrical, or mechanical), spontaneous ignition (e.g., from heat-producing chemical reactions), and radiant heat. 

(2006). 163 40 CFR §270.50 (1985). 164 40 CFR §270.61 (1996). 165 40 CFR §270.61 (1996). 166 40 CFR §270.61 (b)(1) and (2) (1996). 167 40 CFR §§264.1(g)(8)(i)(D) (2006) and 40 CFR 270.1(c)(3)(i)(D) (1997). 168 State of Hawaii Department of Health, Environmental Management Division, Solid and Hazardous Waste 

Branch. Temporary Emergency Permits to Treat, Store or Dispose of Hazardous Waste, November 29, 2010. 

http://hawaii.gov/health/environmental/waste/hw/pdf/tempemergpermit.pdf (accessed July 10, 2012).
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template for TEP [temporary emergency permit] conditions is designed with the temporary, emergency 

nature of the situation in mind and under no circumstances should it be overly burdensome on the 

permittee.”169 

The emergency hazardous waste disposal permit that DOH issued to DEI required that DEI complete the 

disposal within 90 days of the date issued. DOH instructed DEI via email that no extensions would be 

provided. This time limit proved to play a significant role in the incident, as DEI’s first disposal job 

exceeded the 90-day time limit, and emails written by DEI management in fall 2010 indicated that for all 

future fireworks disposal jobs, DEI would disassemble the firework tubes prior to obtaining a permit in 

order to maximize the available time for burning. These efficiency improvements resulted in the 

accumulation of large quantities of explosive firework components, which created a mass explosion 

hazard.

In its permit application letter, DEI stated it intended to destroy approximately 5,000 pounds of illegal 

“Class 1.3 and 1.4 fireworks” including “firecrackers, poppers, sparklers, and aerials,” through burning 

activities at Koko Head. Emails show that DOH requested DEI’s fireworks disposal plan, which detailed 

diesel soaking and burning activities, prior to awarding the permit. However, DOH wrote the permit to 

include only the burn activities. The CSB has found no evidence that DOH personnel conducted 

additional analysis to better understand DEI’s disposal plan. In fact, evidence suggests that safety was not 

a factor in DOH’s review process, and DOH personnel told the CSB that their focus was on 

environmental protection, not safety. In addition, DOH personnel lacked the requisite background to 

analyze DEI’s proposed disposal methodology, experience, and qualifications when issuing this permit.

Safety is an important aspect of hazardous waste disposal; the legislative history supports the argument 

that RCRA is intended to address environmental implications of hazardous waste treatment and disposal

and also those of health and safety. In fact, RCRA was created in part to provide “for the safe disposal of 

discarded materials...”170 (Emphasis added). Congress also noted in enacting RCRA that “disposal of 

solid waste and hazardous waste in or on the land without careful planning and management can present a

danger to human health and the environment...”171 

RCRA regulations also support the consideration of safety. For example, 40 CFR §264.17 requires that 

an owner or operator take precautions to prevent accidental ignition or reaction of ignitable or reactive 

waste. In addition, 40 CFR §264.16 requires that facility personnel complete classroom or on-the-job 

hazardous waste training that at a minimum ensures they are able to respond effectively to 

emergencies.172

 169 State of Hawaii Department of Health, Environmental Management Division, Solid and Hazardous Waste 

Branch. Temporary Emergency Permits to Treat, Store or Dispose of Hazardous Waste, November 29, 2010. 

 These regulations illustrate that RCRA and comparable state regulations, such as the 

HAR, can and should address environmental protection as well as the safety and health of workers and the 

public. This is especially important for the emergency permitting process, which requires a much less 

http://hawaii.gov/health/environmental/waste/hw/pdf/tempemergpermit.pdf (accessed July 10, 2012). 170 A Legislative History of the Solid Waste Disposal Act. Pub. L. no. 94-580, 90 Stat 2795 (1976). 171 A Legislative History of the Solid Waste Disposal Act. Pub. L. no. 94-580, 90 Stat 2797 (1976). 172 40 CFR §264.16 (2006). 
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substantial review of permit applicants even though the materials involved are extremely hazardous and 

pose an imminent safety, health, and environmental threat.

To reflect the importance of public and worker safety, an emergency permit applicant seeking to dispose 

of explosive hazardous materials such as fireworks should be reviewed extensively. RCRA should 

incorporate PSM-type elements such as PHA and MOC into its regulations to provide for a more robust 

safety program for entities conducting activities that are not covered by OSHA’s PSM standard, such as 

fireworks disposal. Increasing the focus on safety will help ensure that activities being performed 

pursuant to a RCRA emergency hazardous waste permit are done so safely and responsibly.

7.4 Industry Standards

7.4.1 National Fire Protection Association

The NFPA works to prevent fire-related hazards and advocates for public safety by developing, 

publishing, and disseminating good practice standards intended to minimize risks. This includes 

fireworks and explosives-related standards, which are developed by NFPA’s Pyrotechnics Committee. 

However, NFPA has no standard or guidance for the safe disposal of fireworks. NFPA standards are 

voluntary unless adopted by federal, state, or local agencies as part of regulations.

7.4.1.1 NFPA 495

NFPA 495, Explosive Materials Code, covers the manufacture, transportation, storage, sale, and use of 

explosive materials and emphasizes the importance of training for persons handling explosive materials 

and developing a hazards analysis for processes involving manufacturing, movement, storage, testing, or 

developing energetic materials.173 However, this standard does not apply to any type of fireworks.

174

7.4.1.2 NFPA 1123

NFPA 1123, Code for Fireworks Display, applies to constructing, handling, and using fireworks and 

equipment intended for outdoor fireworks display and operation of the display.175 This standard provides 

for the flooding of a fireworks mortar shell with water within 15 minutes if the firework fails to fire.176

 173 NFPA 495. Explosive Materials Code. 2010 ed.

 

The standard also states that any storage, handling, assembly, testing, or transportation of fireworks 

materials and devices intended for outdoor display – prior to their delivery to the display site – must 

comply with NFPA 1124, 18 U.S.C. Chapter 40; and 27 CFR Part 55. For fireworks disposal, Section 

8.2.10.2 states that suppliers will provide disposal instructions and those instructions will be followed. 

174 NFPA 495, Section 1.3.4. 175 NFPA 1123. Code for Fireworks Display. 2010 ed.; Section 1.1.1. 176 NFPA 1123, Section 8.2.10.1.1. 
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This would not be applicable to seized contraband fireworks, and it does not appear that NFPA 1123 

provides any other guidance on fireworks disposal.

7.4.1.3 NFPA 1124

NFPA 1124, Code for the Manufacture, Transportation, Storage, and Retail Sales of Fireworks and 

Pyrotechnic Articles, applies to manufacturing facilities and to the storage of display fireworks and black 

powder at facilities other than display sites – but the standard does not apply to disposal.

177 This standard 

requires that all tools used to open containers of explosive materials be non-sparking,178 and that 

magazines must be used exclusively for storage of explosive and pyrotechnic materials.179 As noted, DEI 

did not utilize the magazine exclusively for storage: DEI also soaked fireworks in diesel-filled steel 

drums, which the CSB would consider to be part of a process. In addition, a number of sparking items 

were found within the magazine or blown out of the magazine post-incident, including steel drums, a 

metal hand truck, metal chair, and metal tools.

While some sections within NFPA 1124 provide relevant safety guidance for fireworks storage activities, 

this standard does not provide any guidance on fireworks disposal. In addition, nowhere are the hazards 

of fireworks disassembly and the accumulation of explosive fireworks components discussed. 

7.4.2 Review of Current Fireworks Disposal Practices

The CSB had informal discussions with a number of fireworks manufacturers and state and local law 

enforcement agencies to better understand their firework disposal methodologies. The responses varied, 

illustrating that manufacturers have developed their own disposal procedures in the absence of industry 

guidance. 

7.4.2.1 Fireworks Operators

Disposal methods were inconsistent across these operators and ranged from procedures that incorporate 

stringent PSM guidelines to those that simply burn the fireworks in a pit, sometimes after soaking them in 

diesel. Several operators indicated that the best method to dispose of undamaged fireworks is to shoot 

them off as intended and strongly stated their opposition to disassembling or soaking fireworks in diesel 

prior to burning. Some operators said that they contract the disposal of 1.3G UN0335 fireworks to thirdparty companies (in Louisiana, Pennsylvania or Ohio) or turn them over to the local fire marshal or law

enforcement.

 177 NFPA 1124. Code for the Manufacture, Transportation, Storage, and Retail Sales of Fireworks and Pyrotechnic 

Articles, 2006 ed.; Section 1.1. 178 NFPA 1124, Section 5.4.7. 

179 NFPA 1124, Section 5.4.8.
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7.4.2.2 Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Fire departments and local law enforcement agencies are also inconsistent in their handling, storage, and 

disposal of fireworks. For example, the State of California Office of the State Fire Marshal seizes and 

takes possession of all contraband fireworks in the state. Its personnel told the CSB that they do not 

disassemble seized fireworks or soak them in diesel prior to burning them. The Office sometimes 

provides 1.3G UN0335 display fireworks to bomb technicians for training, and disposes of 1.4G UNO336 

consumer fireworks in approved burn pits or ships them to an authorized disposal contractor in Louisiana. 

However, its personnel concede that cost and budget constraints have resulted in a large inventory of 

hundreds of thousands of pounds of seized fireworks being stored in magazines within California.

The San Francisco Fire Department confiscates mostly type 1.4G UNO336 fireworks, wets them down, 

grinds them, and then discards them. They do not have a procedure for 1.3G UN0335 fireworks.

Finally, the Houston Fire Department confiscates primarily type 1.4 G UNO336 fireworks, stores them in

magazines, and then either sends them to the bomb squad for disposal, turns them over to the local police 

department for training, or burns them without first soaking them in diesel.

7.5 Conclusion

The wide array of disposal techniques across the country; incidents such as the one in Lansing, Kansas;

and the lack of existing regulations and standards that provide safety requirements and guidance to those 

disposing of fireworks, all support the conclusion that a regulatory gap exists in this country pertaining to 

fireworks disposal. Closing this gap to prevent fatal incidents requires a combined effort by ATF, EPA, 

NFPA, state and local agencies, and the fireworks industry to create standards and guidance that clearly 

indicate the dangers of handling and disposing of fireworks, and discuss how to properly and effectively 

manage the hazards and safely conduct this work. 
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8.0 Causal Analysis

For the DEI Investigation, the CSB team developed an accident map (AcciMap) (Figure 24), a multilayered causal diagram that allows for the evaluation of higher level causes at the governmental, 

regulatory, and societal levels. This diagram is especially useful for developing broadly applicable 

recommendations for accident prevention,

180 and includes five levels:

1. Physical Events, Conditions, and Outcomes: the immediate causes of the incident as displayed in a 

traditional logic tree;

2. DEI: company rules and policies; and conduct of fireworks disposal work;

3. VSE: primary government contractor responsible for subcontractor selection and oversight;

4. Industry Codes and Standards: good practice guidelines provide safety standards; and

5. Government: laws and legislation are developed to regulate federal contracting and the handling, 

storage, and disposal of explosive hazardous materials. 

8.1 Physical Events, Conditions, and Outcomes

Five workers were fatally injured due to a fire and explosion inside a magazine. The fire and explosion 

were a result of the accumulation of explosive black powder and aerial shells inside the magazine near its 

only entrance, and multiple ignition sources were present. The fire developed near the only entrance and 

exit, and prevented workers’ escape from the magazine. All of these physical outcomes and conditions 

were the result of DEI’s high-risk fireworks disposal activities. 

8.2 DEI

DEI developed a fireworks disposal methodology that evolved into disassembling seized fireworks and 

separating and accumulating their explosive components – black powder and aerial shells – into 

cardboard boxes. By accumulating these explosive components, the DEI process created a much larger 

explosive hazard than the original fireworks represented. In addition, DEI’s Activity Hazard Analysis

and procedures failed to identify and control the key explosive hazards involved in this process. DEI 

personnel also had a lack of fireworks training and experience. 

 180 The AcciMap tool was developed by Jens Rasmussen and popularized by Andrew Hopkins. Rasmussen, J., &.

A. Hopkins. “Risk Management in a Dynamic Society: A Modeling Problem.” Safety Science, 27 (2.3), 1997; pp 

183-213. 
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8.3 VSE

The main federal seized-property management contractor, VSE, did not use individuals with the requisite 

technical and explosives expertise in its subcontractor selection and oversight process. VSE procurement 

personnel lacked explosives and fireworks experience and were not qualified to assess the technical 

differences between the two proposals they received to dispose of the fireworks. Even though DEI had 

never conducted a firework disposal operation, VSE procurement staff selected DEI as the subcontractor 

to dispose of contraband fireworks because DEI was already storing the fireworks, and its proposal was 

determined to be the lowest-cost and most time-efficient bid for the government, resulting in attractive 

“one-stop shopping.” In addition, no VSE personnel or representatives aware of DEI’s disposal process

had the expertise to identify or evaluate any hazards associated with the activities being conducted. 

8.4 Industry Codes and Standards

No Industry Codes or Standards exist that provide safety guidance on fireworks disposal. 

8.5 Government

There is a regulatory gap that exists pertaining to fireworks disposal in the United States. 

RCRA emergency permits lack safety management provisions. The State of Hawaii DOH awarded DEI 

an emergency hazardous waste permit to dispose of the contraband fireworks without reviewing its 

qualifications or proposed disposal methodology. As the DEI firework disposal operation evolved and 

major hazards were introduced from disassembling and accumulating firework components, the 

emergency hazardous waste permit included no requirements to review the safety aspects of these critical 

changes.

Neither the FAR, the DTAR, nor the DTAP explicitly address safety, and lack sufficient selection and 

oversight requirements for the prime contractor and its subcontractors with respect to the unique hazards

associated with the disposal of hazardous materials, including fireworks.
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Industry 

Codes and 

Standards

VSE DEI Physical Events, Conditions, and Outcomes Government

Single Entrance/

Exit from 

Magazine

Fire Blocked 

Escape from 

Magazine

Multiple Ignition 

Sources Present

People Present

Explosion and Fire 

Inside Magazine

Accumulation of Explosive 

Components and 

Combustibles Inside 

Magazine Near Entry/Exit

High-Risk Fireworks 

Disposal Process

No VSE Personnel with 

Explosives or Firework 

Experience

Lack of VSE 

Subcontractor 

Oversight

VSE Procurement did not 

Evaluate Experience or 

Qualifications of Offerors

VSE Procurement Personnel were not Qualified 

to Award Firework Disposal Subcontract

DEI was Low-Priced 

Bidder

DEI Was Local 

Company, Already 

Storing Fireworks

VSE Preference 

for One-Stop 

Shopping

No Involved Government Personnel had 

Firework or Explosives Experience

Lack of Government 

Contractor Oversight

No Industry 

Standard on Safe 

Firework Disposal

Insufficient Safety 

Oversight Provisions in 

Seized Property Contract

VSE Awards Firework Disposal 

Subcontract to DEI, a UXO Company 

Lacking Firework Disposal Experience

Work 

Activities

Insufficient Contractor and 

Subcontractor Selection Criteria

No Regulatory Safety 

Oversight of 

Fireworks Disposal

Lack of Safety 

Management in RCRA 

Emergency Permitting

5 Worker Fatalities

Figure 24. DEI Investigation AcciMap
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9.0 Recommendations

The CSB makes recommendations based on the findings and conclusions of the investigation. 

Recommendations are made to parties that can affect change to prevent future incidents, which may 

include the company, contractors, industry organizations responsible for developing good practice 

guidelines, regulatory bodies, and/or organizations that have the ability to broadly communicate lessons 

learned from the incident, such as trade associations. 

Federal Acquisition Regulatory (FAR) Council

2011-06-I-HI-R1

Establish an additional contractor responsibility determination requirement under Subpart 9.104-1 of the 

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) addressing contractor safety performance. The analysis under this 

requirement should focus on incident prevention, and environmental and system safety. At a minimum, 

the language should specifically require the review of a prospective contractor’s:

• Environmental and safety programs;

• Safety record and incident history;

• Ability to use safe methods for any work involving hazardous materials (including explosives); 

and

• Suitable training and qualifications for the personnel involved in the work including prior 

relevant safety experience. 

Department of the Treasury Office of the Procurement Executive 

(OPE)

2011-06-I-HI-R2

Establish formal policy requiring that:

• Solicitations for contracts dealing with the storage, handling, and disposal of explosive hazardous 

materials, including fireworks, incorporate rigorous safety-related contractor selection provisions 

such as those provided in the DoD’s Contractor’s Safety Manual for Ammunition and 

Explosives, Section C1.5, “Pre-Award Safety Survey”; and

• Contracts dealing with the storage, handling, and disposal of explosive hazardous materials, 

including fireworks, include a provision requiring that any subcontract (regardless of tier) for the 

storage, handling, and disposal of explosives (including fireworks) be selected based on rigorous 
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safety-related contractor selection provisions such as those provided in the DoD’s Contractor’s 

Safety Manual for Ammunition and Explosives, Section C1.5, “Pre-Award Safety Survey.” 

2011-06-I-HI-R3

Establish a formal policy requiring that contracts and subcontracts dealing with the storage, handling, and 

disposal of explosive hazardous materials, including fireworks, incorporate rigorous safety-related 

contractor oversight provisions such as those provided in the DoD’s Contractor’s Safety Manual for 

Ammunition and Explosives, Section C1.6, “Pre-Operational Safety Survey” and C1.7, “Post-Award 

Contractor Responsibilities” to provide effective oversight of subcontractors handling and disposing of 

explosives and hazardous materials. 

2011-06-I-HI-R4

When the NFPA guidance developed by the National Fire Protection Association for the safe disposal of 

fireworks as recommended under recommendation 2011-06-I-HI-R7 is completed, incorporate this 

document by reference into the formal policies established by 2011-06-I-HI-R2 and 2011-06-IHI-R3.

Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture (TEOAF)

2011-06-I-HI-R5

Require additional provisions within the TEOAF seized property management contract, such as a contract 

line item number (CLIN), that provide for the prime contractor to use expert(s) to assist the prime 

contractor’s personnel in the selection and oversight of subcontractors who handle, store, or dispose of 

explosive hazardous materials, including fireworks, pursuant to the main contract. 

VSE Corporation

2011-06-I-HI-R6

Use experts to:

• Assist VSE procurement in selecting vendors to properly handle, store, and dispose of explosive 

hazardous materials, including fireworks, pursuant to prime contract requirements; and,

• Assist VSE personnel in overseeing the work to ensure it is being conducted safely.
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National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

2011-06-I-HI-R7

Develop a new standard, or incorporate within an existing standard, best practices for the safe disposal of 

waste fireworks that are consistent with environmental requirements. At a minimum this guidance or 

standard should:

• Discourage the disassembly of waste fireworks as a step in the disposal process;

• Minimize the accumulation of waste explosive materials, and encourage practices that reduce, 

recycle, reuse, or repurpose fireworks; and

• Incorporate input from ATF, EPA, and other agencies, experts, and available resources on 

fireworks disposal methodologies.

2011-06-I-HI-R8

Once fireworks disposal best practices under recommendation 2011-06-I-HI-R7 is completed, develop 

and implement an outreach plan to promptly communicate the new NFPA practices to relevant 

government agencies and private entities that dispose of waste fireworks. 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

2011-06-I-HI-R9

Revise the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle C regulations to require a 

permitting process with rigorous safety reviews to replace the use of emergency permits under 40 CFR 

§270.61 for the disposal of explosive hazardous materials, including fireworks. At a minimum, the new 

process should require the use of best available technology, safe disposal methodologies, as well as safety 

management practices, such as those required by OSHA’s Process Safety Management Standard (PSM), 

29 CFR §1910.119 (e.g., hazard analysis and control, management of change).

2011-06-I-HI-R10

Until recommendation 2011-06-I-HI-R9 can be implemented, develop and issue a policy guidance 

document to provide a regulatory process with rigorous safety reviews to replace the use of emergency 

permits under 40 CFR §270.61 for the disposal of explosive hazardous materials, including fireworks. At 

a minimum, the new process should require the use of best available technology, safe disposal 

methodologies, as well as safety management practices, such as those required by OSHA’s Process Safety 

Management Standard (PSM), 29 CFR §1910.119 (e.g., hazard analysis and control, management of 

change). Ensure its effective communication to all EPA regional administrators, state environmental 

agencies, and organizations within the fireworks industry.
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2011-06-I-HI-R11

Effectively participate in the National Fire Protection Association’s standard development process to 

develop guidance on the safe and environmentally sound disposal of fireworks, as recommended under 

recommendation 2011-06-I-HI-R7.

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF)

2011-06-I-HI-R12

Effectively participate in the National Fire Protection Association’s standard development process to 

develop guidance on the safe disposal of fireworks, as recommended under recommendation 2011-06-IHI-R7. 
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BY THE

U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

Rafael Moure-Eraso

Chair

Mark Griffon

Member

Beth Rosenberg

Member

Date of Approval January ___, 2013. 
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Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life Cycle 

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Crowl, Daniel A. Understanding Explosions, A CCPS Concept Book, 2003; p 204.

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Rasmussen, J., & Hopkins, A. “Risk Management in a Dynamic society: A Modeling Problem.” Safety 

Science, 27 (2.3), 1997; pp 183-213. 

Turcotte, R., Turcotte, A.M., Fouchard, R., and Jones, D.E.G. “Thermal Analysis of Black Powder.” 

Journal of Thermal Analysis and Calorimetry. Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory, Natural 

Resources, Canada, Ottawa, Canada. 2003; Vol 73.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). “Watch Out for Illegally Imported Fireworks: CBP Seizes 

Dozens of Illegal Fireworks Shipments on Behalf of Partner Agencies.”

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/national/07032012.xml (accessed Oct 14, 2012).

Yang, Xiyun. “China’s Fireworks: A Trusted Import.” Washington Post, [Online] 2007,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/03/AR2007070302188.html (accessed 

July 12, 2012). 
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Appendix A: Hawaii Firework Seizures

Between 2007 and 2010, CBP and ICE/HSI agents in Hawaii conducted three separate seizures of 

fireworks that were being imported from China into Honolulu, due to suspicion that they were illegally 

labeled for consumer use. 

Seizures

Initial Seizure

On December 10, 2007, CBP seized a shipment of fireworks (initial seizure) in Honolulu181 and declared 

these fireworks forfeited on February 12, 2008.182 This shipment consisted of 11 pallets of fireworks and 

included “Maylar Tubes,” “Assortment Shells,” and “Singing Oriole/Dancing Swallows.” 

Second Seizure

On February 4, 2009, ICE/HSI seized a second shipment of fireworks in Honolulu183 (second seizure) 

illegally imported from China. The property, consisting of 5,480 pieces contained in 1,370 cartons/39 

pallets, was forfeited on July 6, 2009, for knowingly smuggling goods into the United States.

184 This 

seizure was being stored in the rear of the magazine at the time of the incident.

Primary Seizure

On January 13, 2010, ICE/HSI seized a third shipment of fireworks in Honolulu185 (primary seizure) 

during its importation from China. The property was forfeited on March 22, 2010, for introducing 

merchandise contrary to law186 and knowingly smuggling goods into the U.S.187 DEI was in the process 

of disassembling the primary seizure on the day of the incident.

This shipment consisted of eight cardboard containers holding 296 boxes or 17 pallets of fireworks

marked “Fireworks 1.4G” with the Identification Number UN0336 and DOT approval number 

EX2008060273. The four different products contained within this shipment were 65 boxes/519 pieces of 

“O Triple C”; 65 boxes/519 pieces of “Halawa”; 96 boxes/383 pieces of “Sky Festival”; and 70 boxes/559 

pieces of “Krazy Kids.” The total value of this shipment was over $30,000.00. Table 2 below details 

specific fireworks in the seizure and samples requested by CBP.

 181 Seizure Number 2008-3201-000-013-01. 182 For introducing merchandise contrary to law under 19 U.S.C. §1595A(c) and knowingly receiving explosive 

materials without a license or permit under 18 U.S.C. §842(a)(3)(A).

183 Seizure Number 2009-3201-000-052-01. 184 Under 18 U.S.C. §545 (1996). 185 Seizure Number 2010-3205-000-012-01. 186 19 U.S.C. §1595a(c) (2008). 187 18 U.S.C. §545 (1996). 
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U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security (Disposition Order) VSE (Chain of Custody)

Line Item# Description Unit of Quantity Count was: Count Sample 

Measure now: pulled

_____________________________________________________________________________________

001-A001 CC Halawa CTNS 64 65 (519 pieces) 64 1

002-A001 KK Krazy Kids CTNS 69 70 (559 pieces) 69 1

003-A001 RR O Triple C CTNS 64 65 (519 pieces) 64 1

004-A001 SF Sky Festival CTNS 95 96 (383 pieces) 95 1

Table 2. Seizures and Samples188

All four of these fireworks are multi-shot devices, often referred to as “cakes” in the industry, 189 and are 

designed to produce a succession of effects. According to the APA, each tube in a multi-shot device is 

typically 0.6” – 1.38” in diameter. A single igniter is generally used to initiate the first effect; a timed 

fuse, the spacing of the tubes, and the total number of tubes determine subsequent ignition of the tubes 

and the overall duration of the device. The tubes typically incorporated in these devices can include 

comets, mines, small aerial devices, audible effects, and any combination thereof.190 In the instantaneous 

version of these devices, all tubes ignite simultaneously. 

ATF testing and analysis of Primary Seizure

ATF conducted a detailed analysis of the primary seizure and concluded that

1. The CC Halawa fireworks consisted of a multi-tube device (shot cake) comprising 25 tubes. The 

shot cakes were packaged eight per carton and the tubes within each device were spaced less than 0.5 

inches apart. Each shot cake contained two types of tubes, half of which contained shells with stars. For 

laboratory analysis, one of each type of tube was randomly selected, weighed, and disassembled. The lift 

charge for the tubes (with and without stars) consisted of 5.15 grams of black powder. The shells 

contained a 1-gram lift charge; 10.83 grams of pyrotechnic stars; and a burst charge, identified as 

perchlorate explosive mixture, of either 2.47 or 5.79 grams. The cake contained a total of 374.32 grams 

of explosives and pyrotechnics material. The ATF observed that, while the carton displayed a marking 

 188 CTNS = Cartons (boxes).

189 http://www.fireworks.us/Fireworks-Multi-Shots-Cakes-s/7.htm (accessed April 22, 2012). 

190 American Pyrotechnics Association (APA). Generic Close Proximity Product Types: Pyrotechnics Used Before 

a Proximate Audience, March 1, 2009; p 12. 

http://www.americanpyro.com/pdf/APACloseProxDescriptionsFinal.pdf (accessed November 1, 2012). 
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indicating that it contained 1.4G UN0336 fireworks, the individual shot cakes were unmarked; the ATF 

therefore concluded that the product violated APA 87-1, paragraph 3.5.2. The DOT hazard classification 

for multiple tube devices with less than 0.5-inch tube separation is limited to 200 grams. This product 

also exceeded the maximum allowable explosive filler weight of 130 milligrams permitted in consumer 

fireworks by 27 CFR §555.151 (a)(7) and the maximum permitted charge weight of 130 milligrams for 

devices that are intended for sale to the public and produce an audible charge effect (APA 87-1, paragraph 

3.373). The ATF therefore opined that the CC Halawa fireworks were classified as explosives (Class 1.3 

or higher) and subject to regulations under 27 CFR Part 555, Commerce in Explosives.

2. The KK Krazy Kids fireworks also consisted of a 25-tube shot cake packaged eight per carton, 

with the tubes spaced less than 0.5 inches apart. Each tube contained 3.75 grams of a black powder lift 

charge. The shell contained 1-gram black powder lift charge; 9.01 grams of pyrotechnic stars; and 2.28 

grams perchlorate explosive lift charge. The entire multi-tube assembly contained a total of 400.25 grams 

of explosives and pyrotechnics material. The ATF observed that, while the carton displayed a marking 

indicating that it contained 1.4G UN0336 fireworks, the individual shot cakes were unmarked and 

therefore concluded that the product violated APA 87-1, paragraph 3.5.2. The DOT hazard classification 

for multiple tube devices with less than 0.5-inch tube separation is limited to 200 grams. This product also 

exceeded the maximum allowable explosive filler weight of 130 milligrams permitted in consumer 

fireworks by 27 CFR §555.141(a)(7) and the maximum permitted charge weight of 130 milligrams for 

devices that are intended for sale to the public and produce an audible charge effect (APA 87-1, paragraph 

3.7.3). The ATF therefore opined that the KK Krazy Kids fireworks were classified as explosives (Class 

1.3 or higher) and subject to regulations under 27 CFR Part 555, Commerce in Explosives.

3. The RR O Triple C fireworks also consisted of a multi-tube device (shot cake) comprising 25 

tubes packaged eight per carton. The tubes were spaced less than 0.5-inch apart. A tube was selected 

randomly from a single multi-tube device, weighed, disassembled, and submitted to the laboratory for 

analysis. Each tube contained 5.15 grams of a black powder lift charge; 10.5 grams of pyrotechnic stars;

and 6.18 grams of a perchlorate explosive burst charge. Each shot cake contained a total of 570.25 grams 

of explosives and pyrotechnics material. The ATF observed that, while the carton displayed a marking 

indicating that it contained 1.4G UN0336 fireworks, the individual shot cakes were unmarked; thus, ATF

concluded that the product violated APA 87-1, paragraph 3.5.2. The DOT hazard classification for 

multiple tube devices with less than 0.5-inch tube separation is limited to 200 grams. This product also 

exceeded the maximum allowable explosive filler weight of 130 milligrams permitted in consumer 

fireworks by 27 CFR §555.141 (a)(7) and the maximum permitted charge weight of 130 milligrams for 

devices that are intended for sale to the public and produce an audible charge effect (APA 87-1, paragraph 

3.7.3). The ATF therefore opined that the RR O Triple C fireworks were classified as explosives (Class 

1.3 or higher) and subject to regulations under 27 CFR Part 555, Commerce in Explosives.

4. The SF Sky Festival fireworks consisted of a 156-tube shot cake packaged four per carton. The 

cake contained six large tubes, and 150 smaller tubes spaced less than 0.5 inches apart. One of each type 

of tube was randomly selected, weighed, disassembled, and submitted for analysis. The large tubes 

contained 3.3 grams of a black powder lift charge and 4.7 grams of a perchlorate explosive burst charge, 

while the small tubes contained 0.96 gram of black powder lift charge and 1.22 grams of pyrotechnic 
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stars. Each shot cake contained a total of 375 grams of explosives and pyrotechnic material. The ATF 

observed that, while the carton displayed a marking indicating that it contained 1.4G UN0336 fireworks, 

the individual shot cakes were unmarked; thus, ATF concluded that the product violated APA 87-1, 

paragraph 3.5.2. The DOT hazard classification for multiple tube devices with less than 0.5-inch tube 

separation is limited to 200 grams. This product also exceeded the maximum allowable explosive filler 

weight of 130 milligrams permitted in consumer fireworks by 27 CFR §555.141 (a)(7) and the maximum 

permitted charge weight of 130 milligrams for devices that are intended for sale to the public and produce 

an audible charge effect (APA 87-1, paragraph 3.7.3). The ATF therefore opined that the RR O Triple C 

fireworks were classified as explosives (Class 1.3 or higher) and subject to regulations under 27 CFR Part 

555, Commerce in Explosives.

ATF analysis of samples from the subject seizure, collected from undamaged cartons found near the rear 

of the magazine after the subject explosion, provides photographic documentation of individual tubes for 

each type of these fireworks. The analysis concluded that a) the aerial component within the Halawa 

cakes were consistent with star shells and contained approximately 13.4 grams of powder; b) the aerial 

shells within the Krazy Kids cakes contained between 5.7 and 12.1 grams of material that appeared to be 

consistent with a flash powder; c) the aerial component within the O Triple C cakes contained 

approximately 5.9 grams of material consistent with flash powder; and d) the aerial shells within the Sky 

Festival cakes contained comets and approximately 4.3 grams of material that appeared to be consistent

with flash powder.

Case Processing and Management

Post-seizure, a CBP Fines, Penalties and Forfeitures Officer (FP&F) at Port of Honolulu oversaw the 

seized property program and aspects of case processing. CBP issued disposition orders (CBP Form 7605) 

to VSE as TEOAF’s primary federal contractor to secure storage for the seizures, coordinate their 

destruction, monitor and control storage costs, and inspect the storage facilities.

Storage

Initial Seizure 

On December 11, 2007, CBP issued a disposition order to VSE to store the initial seizure. VSE 

subcontracted to Timberline Environmental Services191 (Timberline) to locally store the fireworks at 

Waikele Storage. At some point, Timberline entered into a separate agreement with DEI to store the 

seizures. For unknown reasons, VSE did not renew their storage contract with Timberline and instead, in 

late 2008, directly subcontracted with DEI to store the firework seizures. On December 12, 2008, CBP 

issued a new disposition order to VSE to transfer the initial seizure from Timberline to DEI as the “new 

vendor for storage.” DEI began storing the seizure at Waikele Storage on February 17, 2009. 

 191 Timberline provides unexploded ordinance (UXO) services, including vegetation clearance, target removal, scrap 

management and large scale soil sifting operation on live ranges http://www.uxoservices.com (accessed November 

29, 2012). 
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Second Seizure

On February 19, 2009, CBP issued a disposition order to VSE to store the second seizure. DEI had stored 

this seizure in the back of the magazine, where it was at the time of the incident.

Primary Seizure

On January 13, 2010, CBP issued a disposition order to VSE to store the primary seizure. On or around 

March 29, 2010, these fireworks were transferred to the A-21 magazine for storage. 

Destruction

Initial Seizure

On February 10, 2010, CBP issued a disposition order to VSE to destroy the initial seizure. CBP issued a 

second disposition order on April 16, 2010. DEI obtained the requisite permitting to begin the disposal 

process on June 8, 2010. 

CBP Form 7605 states that DEI completed its destruction of the initial seizure on December 1, 2010.

Second Seizure

Post-incident, on July 20, 2011, CBP issued a disposition order to VSE to destroy the second seizure. 

However, these 39 pallets of cake fireworks have not yet been destroyed and are being stored in the 

magazine where the incident occurred. 

Primary Seizure

On April 16, 2010, CBP issued a disposition order to VSE, set to expire June 16, 2010, for destruction of 

the primary seizure. 

The incident occurred while DEI was completing its disassembly of these fireworks; it had destroyed 

approximately 35 percent of this seizure at the time of the incident. 
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Appendix B. Department of Defense Contractor’s Safety Manual

Pertinent Sections.

DoD 4145.26-M, March 13, 2008

C1.1. PURPOSE

C1.1.1. This Manual provides safety requirements, guidance and information to minimize

potential accidents that could interrupt Department of Defense (DoD) operations, delay DoD

contract production, damage DoD property, cause injury to DoD personnel, or endanger the

public during DoD contract work or services involving ammunition and explosives (AE). The

Manual contains the minimum contractual safety requirements to support DoD objectives. These

requirements are not a complete safety program, and this Manual does not relieve a contractor

from complying with Federal, State, interstate, and local laws and regulations.

C1.2. APPLICABILITY. When included in or properly incorporated into their contracts,

subcontracts, purchase orders, or other procurement methods and made applicable to the

contractor (or to their subcontractors), these safety requirements apply to contractors and

subcontractors handling ammunition or explosives. Nothing in this Manual should be construed

as making the Department of Defense a controlling employer under Occupational Safety and

Health Administration (OSHA) regulations and standards.

C1.5. PRE-AWARD SAFETY SURVEY

 C1.5.1. The PCO will request a DoD pre-award safety survey to help determine contractor

capability. DoD safety personnel conduct pre-award surveys to evaluate each prospective

contractor's ability to comply with contract safety requirements. While the pre-award safety

survey is an opportunity for the contractor to request clarification of any safety requirement or

other AE issue that may affect the contractor's ability to comply, any such clarification must be

issued by the contracting officer. During pre-award surveys, the contractor shall provide:

C1.5.1.1. Site plans conforming to subparagraphs C1.8.5.1. through C1.8.5.5. for

proposed facilities to be used in contract performance.

C1.5.1.2. Evidence of implementation of a safety program containing at least the

mandatory requirements described in Chapter 3 of this Manual.

C1.5.1.3. General description of proposed contract facilities, including size, building

layouts, construction details, and fire resistive capabilities.

C1.5.1.4. Fire prevention program and available firefighting resources, including local

agreements or other documentation demonstrating coordination.

C1.5.1.5. Copies of required licenses and permits or demonstration of the ability to obtain 

approvals necessary to support the proposed contract.
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C1.5.1.6. A safety history including accident experience; safety survey or audit reports by 

insurance carriers or Federal, State, and local authorities; and any variances, exemptions, or

waivers of safety or fire protection requirements issued by Federal, State, or local authorities.

C1.5.1.7. Proposed operations and equipment to include process flow narrative/diagram,

proposed facility or equipment changes, proposed hazard analysis, and proposed procedures for

all phases of AE operations.

C1.5.1.8. Subcontractor information.

C1.5.8.1. Identification of all subcontractors proposed for the AE work.

C1.5.8.2. Proposed methods used to evaluate the capability of the subcontractor to

comply with the requirements of this Manual.

C1.5.8.3. Proposed methods used to ensure subcontractor compliance.

C1.6. PRE-OPERATIONAL SAFETY SURVEY

 C1.6.1. The Department of Defense reserves the right to conduct a pre-operational survey

after contract award in these situations:

C1.6.1.1. Contractor has limited experience with the item.

C1.6.1.2. After major new construction.

C1.6.1.3. After major modifications.

C1.6.1.4. After an AE accident.

 C1.6.2. When these situations occur, the contractor shall provide sufficient notification to the 

ACO and Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) contract safety personnel, to provide 

adequate time for the Department of Defense to schedule and perform a preoperational survey.

C1.7. POST-AWARD CONTRACTOR RESPONSIBILITIES. The contractor shall:

 C1.7.1. Comply with the requirements of this Manual and any other safety requirements

contained within the contract.

 C1.7.2. Develop and implement a demonstrable safety program, including operational

procedures, intended to prevent AE-related accidents.

 C1.7.3. Designate qualified individuals to administer and implement this safety program.
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 C1.7.4. Prepare and keep available for review all hazard analyses used to justify alternative

methods of hazards control implemented in order to comply with the mandatory requirements in

this Manual.

 C1.7.5. Provide access to facilities and safety program documentation to DoD safety 

representatives.

 C1.7.6. Report and investigate AE accidents in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Manual.

 C1.7.7. Provide identification and location of subcontractors to the ACO for notification or

approval in accordance with terms of the contract.

 C1.7.8. Establish and implement management controls to ensure AE subcontractors comply

with paragraphs C1.7.1. through C1.7.7. of this section.

C3.5. HOUSEKEEPING IN HAZARDOUS AREAS

 C3.5.1. Contractors shall keep structures containing AE clean and orderly.

 C3.5.2. Contractors shall establish a regular cleaning program to maintain safe conditions.

Personnel shall not perform general cleaning concurrently with hazardous operations.

 C3.5.3. Explosives and explosive dusts shall not be allowed to accumulate on structural

members, radiators, heating coils, steam, gas, air or water supply pipes, or electrical fixtures.

 C3.5.4. Contractors shall use proper design of equipment, training of employees, and catch or 

splash pans to prevent spillage of explosives and other hazardous materials. Operators shall

promptly remove spillage of explosives and hazardous materials following proper procedures

established per section C8.4.

 C3.5.5. Personnel shall use cleaning methods, such as hot water, steam, etc., that do not

create ignition hazards for cleaning floors in buildings containing explosives. When these

methods are impractical, personnel may use nonabrasive sweeping compounds that are

compatible with the explosives involved. Flammable compounds shall not be used. Combustible 

sweeping compounds (closed cup flash point less than 230oF) are acceptable for use. Personnel 

shall not use sweeping compounds containing wax on conductive floors if the wax can reduce 

conductivity. Personnel shall not use cleaning agents containing alkalis in areas with nitrated 

organic explosives, since these materials are incompatible and can form sensitive explosive 

compounds.

 C3.5.6. Cleaning methods may use nonferrous wire brushes to clean explosives-processing

equipment only when other methods of cleaning are ineffective. A thorough inspection should

follow such cleaning to ensure that no wire bristles remain in the equipment. This also applies to

cleaning magnesium ingot or other metal molds used in explosives processing. Cleaning methods 

should substitute fiber brushes for hairbrushes to reduce generation of static.
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 C3.5.7. Contractors shall dispose of all loose explosives swept up from floors of operating

buildings. Responsible personnel shall thoroughly inspect and determine disposition of

explosives recovered from sources other than ammunition breakdown operations and equipment.

C3.9. SAFETY HAND-TOOLS

 C3.9.1. Unless a hazard analysis indicates otherwise, only hand tools constructed of wood or

non-sparking metals such as bronze, lead, and “K” Monel shall be used for work in locations and

on equipment that contain exposed explosives or hazardous concentrations of flammable dusts,

gases, or vapors that are susceptible to mechanical spark. Hand tools shall be cleaned and

inspected prior to use. Be aware that nonferrous metals used in so-called non-sparking tools may

produce sparks. If the use of ferrous metal tools is required because of their strength and wear

characteristics, the contractor’s safety office shall approve their use.

 C3.9.2. If their strength makes the use of ferrous metal hand tools necessary during

maintenance and repair operations, exposed explosives and other highly flammable and

combustible materials shall be removed from the area. In addition, explosives operations in the

immediate vicinity shall be discontinued to guard against accidental ignition of materials by

flying sparks, and potential contact surfaces should be oiled or covered to reduce the likelihood

of sparks.

C3.11. PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

 C3.11.1. All AE operations require a hazard assessment to determine the need for protective

clothing and personal protective equipment. The assessment shall include an evaluation of all

hazards and factors contained in paragraph C3.11.2.

 C3.11.2. The contractor shall provide a changing area for employees who must remove their

street clothes to wear protective clothing, such as explosive plant clothing, anti-contamination

clothing, or impervious clothing. To minimize the risk of exposure to unrelated personnel, AE

operators shall not remove contaminated clothing from the AE areas. Employees shall not wear

any static-producing clothing in areas where electrostatic discharge (ESD) is a hazard.

 C3.11.3. Explosives plant clothing, generally referred to as powder uniforms, shall have

nonmetallic fasteners and be easily removable.

 C3.11.4. When sending explosives-contaminated clothing to an off-plant laundry facility, the

contractor is responsible for informing the laundry of the hazards associated with the

contaminants and any special laundering or disposal requirements.

C7.12. DISASSEMBLY

 C7.12.1. Equipment and tooling that require disassembly during the manufacturing process

should be designed to prevent metal-to-metal contact and trapping of explosive material.
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 C7.12.2. Non-routine disassembly of equipment and tooling, such as that necessary for

equipment repair, shall not be started until potential hazards from trapped material or process

residuals have been evaluated and controls or safeguards have been implemented to mitigate the

hazard.

SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR MANUFACTURING

AND PROCESSING PYROTECHNICS

C8.1. GENERAL. The safety precautions for manufacturing and processing pyrotechnics are

similar to those required for many types of explosives and other energetic materials. However,

pyrotechnics exhibit many different characteristics because they are formulated for different

purposes. Knowledge of the various pyrotechnic properties is critical to the establishment of

proper hazard controls. Pyrotechnics can be divided into several general categories including:

initiators (igniters), illuminants, smokes, gas generators, sound generators, heat producers, and

timing compositions. Each of these categories has its own characteristics and attendant

processing requirements. Knowledge of these characteristics is necessary to assure safety in

processing. The range of characteristics associated with pyrotechnics includes compositions that

are easily initiated, including compositions that burn in seconds at temperatures exceeding 5000

degrees Fahrenheit (°F) [2760 degrees Celsius (°C)] through compositions that require

substantial energy for initiation and have relatively low output temperatures. As examples, the

auto-ignition temperature for smoke compositions is typically about 356°F [180°C], while for

illuminants it is about 932°F [500°C]. Illuminants burn approximately 2.7 times faster than

smokes and the heat of reaction is 1.5 times as great. Infrared (IR) flare compositions are both

hotter and faster burning than illuminants. Many of the compositions in the igniter or initiator

class are as sensitive to ESD, friction, or impact as are initiating explosives such as lead azide

and lead styphnate. Initiation thresholds to stimuli such as impact, friction, and ESD and energy

output of initiator compositions shall be determined and understood to ensure adequate safety

controls are implemented to provide personnel safety in specific processes. In addition to the

safety precautions generally required for the handling of explosives and other energetic

materials, section C8.2. provides specific guidance pertinent to pyrotechnic operations.

C8.3. PROCESS REQUIREMENTS

 C8.3.1. Housekeeping and Cleanliness Guidelines. Pyrotechnic operations require stringent

housekeeping and cleanliness due to the sensitive nature of the ingredients and compositions; the

dangerous effects of contamination, including cross contamination of oxidizers and fuels; and the

amount of open or exposed ingredients and mixtures. Materials control and cleanliness are

mandatory not only to reduce the likelihood of accidental initiations, but also to minimize the

effects of an accident.

 C8.3.1.1. Do not allow ingredient or composition dusts to accumulate, whether on the

exterior work surfaces or the interior of process equipment and ventilation systems. Accident

investigations frequently identify dust buildups as the source of initiation when items are

dropped on or scraped across them. Dust accumulations also can provide a propagation path

from the initiation of a small quantity to a much larger quantity, thereby increasing the

magnitude of an accident.
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 C8.3.1.2. Vapor recovery methods or ventilation shall prevent the accumulation of volatile 

vapors, and ignition sources shall be eliminated or controlled to prevent the initiation of a solvent 

vapor cloud. Where volatile flammable solvents are part of the process, solvent vapors in 

ventilation systems, hallways, conduits, or pipes may also provide a propagation path from the

initiation of a small quantity to larger quantities.

 C8.3.2. Static Control Systems. As many pyrotechnic ingredients, mixtures, or the solvents

used in their production are highly susceptible to initiation by static electricity, static control

systems are mandatory where hazard analysis indicates a need. Static control systems include

conductive floors or mats, shoes, wrist straps, grounding of equipment, etc.

 C8.3.3. Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment. For all pyrotechnic operations, a documented 

hazard analysis and risk assessment is mandatory to validate the layout of operations, selection 

of materials and equipment, and process control parameters. (See Chapter 11 of this Manual.)

C9.4. UNPACKAGED AE ITEMS AND DAMAGED CONTAINERS

 C9.4.1. Unpackaged AE items shall not be stored in magazines containing AE in their

original shipping container, but may be stored in separate magazines.

 C9.4.2. Damaged containers of AE should not be stored in a magazine with serviceable

containers of AE. Such containers should be repaired or the contents transferred to new or

serviceable containers. All containers of AE in magazines shall be closed with covers securely

fastened. Containers that have been opened shall be properly closed before restoring them.

Stored containers should be free from loose dust and grit.

 C9.4.3. Do not permit loose powder, grains, powder dust, or particles of explosive substances 

from broken AE or explosive substance containers in magazines. In addition, clean up any 

spilled explosive substance as soon as possible following proper procedures established per 

section C8.4. and suspend all other work in the magazine until accomplished.

RISK IDENTIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT

C11.1. GENERAL. AE operations involve many hazards and risks. These include the type of

hazards associated with any industrial enterprise, e.g., AE reactivity, lifting, slipping, tool use,

toxic chemicals, potential exposures to environmental extremes.

 C11.1.1. The evaluation of hazards and risk of accidents addressed in this section relate to

processes, not end products. The safety of operations is a contractor responsibility.

 C11.1.2. A basic risk identification and management system is a necessary element of a

comprehensive AE safety program. The purpose of this chapter is to address risk identification

and management for all AE processes.
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C11.2. RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. Contractors shall have a risk identification and

management system and perform a hazard analysis resulting in the evaluation of processes,

materials, equipment, and personnel hazards. This analysis will aid in the development of a

written SOP for AE contract operations. The analysis may include such factors as: initiation

sensitivity; quantity of AE; heat output, burn rate, potential ignition and initiation sources;

protection capabilities of shields; personnel protective equipment and clothing; fire protection;

and personnel exposure with special considerations (such as toxic or corrosive chemicals). The

contractor shall document the analysis and keep it as long as the SOP is active. The risk analysis

should identify normal and abnormal (planned and unplanned) energy input into the AE,

documenting the comparison between energy input and the sensitivity of the AE.

 C11.2.1. The contractor shall perform risk analyses using personnel knowledgeable in the

process, materials, equipment, and relevant safety requirements.

 C11.2.2. A hazard is any condition, which, by itself or by interacting with other variables,

may result in death or injury to personnel or damage to property. Controls only reduce the

likelihood or severity of hazards. Controls do not eliminate hazards.

C11.2.2.1. After identifying a hazard, qualified contractor personnel shall determine the

associated risk. The risk analysis of a potential accident shall address both the severity and the

probability of occurrence of an accident.

C11.2.2.2. Evaluation of the hazard provides information useful for ranking the degree of 

risk associated with a hazard. The degree of risk indicates which hazardous conditions should

receive priority for corrective action when compared to other hazardous conditions. One

technique for ranking hazardous conditions is the assignment of a risk assessment code. The

evaluation of the hazard results in the assignment of a narrative or numerical risk assessment that

enables management to evaluate the seriousness of the risk before and after action is taken to

control it.