alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 48.1 Applicability. ( a ) This part provides registration and identification requirements for small unmanned aircraft that are part of a small unmanned aircraft system as defined in § 1.1 of this chapter.
( b ) Small unmanned aircraft eligible for registration in the United States must be registered and identified in accordance with either: ( 1 ) The registration and identification requirements in this part; or
( 2 ) The registration requirements in part 47 and the identification and registration marking requirements in subparts A and C of part 45.
( c ) Small unmanned aircraft intended to be operated outside of the territorial airspace of the United States, or registered through a trust or voting trust, must be registered in accordance with subparts A and B of part 47 and satisfy the identification and registration marking requirements of subparts A and C of part 45.
###### Editorial Note on Part 302

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 302 appear at 84 FR 15935, Apr. 16, 2019.

#### § 302.305 Posting of applications.

A copy of every docketed application for exemption shall be posted in Department of Transportation Dockets and listed in the Department's Weekly List of Applications Filed. A copy of every undocketed application shall be posted in the Licensing Division's lobby of the Office of International Aviation.
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed January 31, 2024.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

No. 3D22-1385

Lower Tribunal No. 19-106-P

Monte Kennedy,

Appellant, 

vs.

Homeowners Choice Property & Casualty Insurance 

Company, Inc.,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Timothy J. 

Koenig, Judge.

Boyle, Leonard & Anderson, P.A., Alexander Brockmeyer, and 

Stephen M. Smith (Fort Myers), for appellant.

Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP and Mihaela Cabulea (Tampa); 

Kubicki Draper and Nicole L. Wulwick, for appellee.

Before EMAS, FERNANDEZ and SCALES, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Perez v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 343 So. 3d 140, 142 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“The question of whether an insured’s untimely 

reporting of loss is sufficient too result in the denial of recovery under the 

policy implicates a two-step analysis. If the insured breaches the notice 

provision, prejudice to the insurer will be presumed, but may be rebutted by 

ashowing that the insurer has not been prejudiced by the lack of notice.” 

(internal citations omitted)); LoBello v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 152 So. 3d 

595, 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (“[I]f the undisputed evidence will not support a 

finding that the insured gave notice to the insurer as soon as practicable, 

then a finding that notice was timely given is unsupportable.”); Hope v.

Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 114 So. 3d 457, 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (finding

the record did not set forth evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of 

prejudice to the insurer resulting from the homeowners delayed 

notice of loss; the evidence was “merely conclusory and fails to rebut the

presumption of prejudice to [the insurer] where the passage of time has 

rendered [the insurer] unable to determine exactly what current damage is 

directly attributable to Hurricane Wilma, and thus a covered loss.”).

2
§ 435.35 Acceptable reusable launch vehicle risk. To obtain safety approval for reentry, an applicant must demonstrate the following for public risk: ( a ) The risk to the collective members of the public from the proposed launch meets the public risk criteria of § 417.107(b)(1) of this chapter;
( b ) The risk level to the collective members of the public, excluding persons in water-borne vessels and aircraft, from each proposed reentry does not exceed an expected number of 1 × 10−4 casualties from impacting inert and explosive debris and toxic release associated with the reentry; and
( c ) The risk level to an individual does not exceed 1 × 10−6 probability of casualty per mission.
[Docket No. FAA-2014-0418, Amdt. No. 435-3, 81 FR 47027, July 20, 2016]
##### 



Exhibit 21.0
  UCBH
    Holdings, Inc. Subsidiaries
  December 31,
    2007
  Subsidiary

State of Incorporation/FormationSummit Bank Corporation Capital Trust I

DelawareUCBH Capital Trust I

DelawareUCBH Capital Trust II

DelawareUCBH Capital Trust III

DelawareUCBH Capital Trust IV

DelawareUCBH Capital Trust V

DelawareUCBH Capital Trust VI

DelawareUCBH Capital Trust VII

DelawareUCBH Capital Trust VIII

DelawareUCBH Holdings Statutory Trust I

ConnecticutUCBH Holdings Statutory Trust II

ConnecticutUnited Commercial Bank

California   United
    Commercial Bank Subsidiaries December 31,
    2007
  Subsidiary

State of Incorporation/FormationCalifornia Canton International Bank (Cayman) Ltd.

Cayman IslandsNewston Investments, Inc.

TexasSBGA California Investments, Inc.

CaliforniaUCB Community Development Enterprise, Inc.

CaliforniaUCB Investment Services, Inc.

CaliforniaUCB Asset Management, Inc.

DelawareUCB Insurance Services, Inc.

CaliforniaUCB Securities Corporation

WashingtonU.F. Service Corporation

CaliforniaUnited Commercial Bank Building Corporation (formerly known as
    Bank of Canton of CaliforniaBuilding Corporation)

CaliforniaUnited Commercial Bank (China) Limited (formerly known as
    Business Development Bank Ltd.)

California   SBGA
    California Investments, Inc. December 31,
    2007
 Subsidiary

State of Incorporation/FormationSBGA Investments, Inc.

Georgia
###### Editorial Note on Part 380

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 380 appear at 84 FR 15940, Apr. 16, 2019.

#### § 380.60 Purpose.

This subpart establishes registration procedures for foreign charter operators intending to engage in the formation of groups for transportation on Public Charters that originate in the United States.
Exhibit 32.2



Certification Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as added by

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Pulaski Financial Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ended September 30, 2005 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), the undersigned certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as added by § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirement of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Pulaski Financial as of and for the period
covered by the Report.
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date:
December 13, 2005



/s/    RAMSEY K.
HAMADIName:

Ramsey K. HamadiTitle:

Chief Financial Officer
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 92 (Thursday, May 11, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 30449]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-11854]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL FOUNDATION ON THE ARTS AND HUMANITIES


Cooperative Agreement for: Documentation of Successful ArtsREACH 
and Creative Links Grant Projects

AGENCY: National Endowment for the Arts, NFAH.

ACTION: Notification of Availability.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The National Endowment for the Arts is requesting proposals 
leading to one (1) award of a Cooperative Agreement for an effort to 
document successful ArtsREACH and Creative Links grant projects for use 
as case studies by other community-based coalitions, and for public 
information. Approximately 30 successful ArtsREACH projects and 15 
Creative Links projects will be documentation and two publications will 
be prepared for printing and web site posting. In addition, materials 
such as photographs, audio, and/or video tapes may be assembled and 
prepared for posting on the Agency Web site. Those interested in 
receiving the solicitation package should reference Program 
Solicitation PS 00-05 in their written request and include two (2) 
self-addressed labels. Verbal requests for the Solicitation will not be 
honored. It is anticipated that the Program Solicitation will also be 
posted on the Endowment's Web site at http://www.arts.gov.

DATES: Program Solicitation PS 00-05 is scheduled for release 
approximately May 26, 2000 with proposals due on June 28, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Requests for the Solicitation should be addressed to the 
National Endowment for the Arts, Grants & Contracts Office, Room 618, 
1100 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20506.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Hummel, Grants & Contracts 
Office, National Endowment for the Arts, Room 618, 1100 Pennsylvania 
Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20506 (202/682-5482).

William I. Hummel,
Coordinator, Cooperative Agreements.
[FR Doc. 00-11854 Filed 5-10-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7537-01-M
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk November 23, 2009

p1116 

# Order

November 23, 2009

139162 & (99)

DAVID SCHIED, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 139162 COA: 282804 Ingham CC: 07-001256-AW STATE OF MICHIGAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS, MICHIGAN STATE POLICE, WASHTENAW COUNTY PROSECUTORS, LINCOLN CONSOLIDATED SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, SANDRA HARRIS, NORTHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, SCOTT SNYDER, KATY PARKER, DAVID BL ITHO, LEONARD REZMIERSKI, KELLER THOMA LAW FIRM, WAYNE COUNTY REGIONAL EDUCATION SERVICES AGENCY, MARLENE DAVIS, KEVIN MAGIN, DAVID SOEBBING, and NORTHVILLE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants-Appellees.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 19, 2009 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion for
miscellaneous relief is DENIED.
129 STAT. 2202 PUBLIC LAW 114–100—DEC. 16, 2015 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.J. Res. 78: 

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 161 (2015): 

Dec. 16, considered and passed House and Senate. 

Æ 

Public Law 114–100 

114th Congress 

Joint Resolution 

Making further continuing appropriations for fiscal year 2016, and for other purposes. 

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016 (Public Law 114–53) is further 

amended by striking the date specified in section 106(3) and 

inserting ‘‘December 22, 2015’’. 

Approved December 16, 2015. 

Ante, p. 2193. 

Dec. 16, 2015 

[H.J. Res. 78] 


dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with PUBLAWS
Motion Granted; Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 21, 

2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-12-00433-CR

ROBERT HERNANDEZ RAMOS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 212th District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 10CR3693

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury convicted appellant of capital murder. On April 2, 2012, the trial 

court sentenced appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole. See 

Tex. Penal Code § 12.31(a)(2). Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

Appellant’s appointed counsel filed a brief in which he concludes the appeal 

is wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders 
2

v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967), by presenting a professional 

evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to 

be advanced. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).

A copy of counsel’s brief was delivered to appellant. Appellant was advised 

of the right to examine the appellate record and file a pro se response. See Stafford 

v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). As of this date, more than 

sixty days have passed and no pro se response has been filed.

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief and agree the 

appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. Further, we find no reversible error in 

the record. We are not to address the merits of each claim raised in an Anders brief 

or a pro se response when we have determined there are no arguable grounds for 

review. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Boyce and Donovan.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

I,Gary D. Gall, President, Chief Executive Officer, certify that:

 

1.I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Western Sierra Bancorp(the “Registrant”);

 

2.Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to makethe statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterlyreport;

 

3.Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

 

4.The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

 

a)designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

 

b)evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectivenessof the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period coveredby this report based on such evaluation; and

 

c)Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscalquarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,  to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of registrant’s board of directors:

 

a)all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

 

b)any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.

 

 
| Date:  November 10, 2003 |                                  |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
|                          |                                  |
|                          | /s/ Gary D. Gall                      |   |
|                          | President and Chief Executive Officer |   |
|                          |                                  |

 

----
#### In the Matter of Calvin G. Kenyon et al., Respondents, v Katrina M. Kenyon, Appellant.

[699 NYS2d 317]

—Crew III, J.

Appeal, by permission, from an order of the Family Court of Albany County (Duggan, J.), entered June 3, 1998, which, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, granted temporary custody of respondent’s child to petitioners.

Petitioners are respondent’s parents and the maternal *747grandparents of respondent’s son (born in 1982). Beginning in November 1997, petitioners were awarded temporary custody of respondent’s son through a series of temporary orders issued by Family Court, including an order entered June 3, 1998 which extended such temporary custody until further order of said court. Respondent thereafter sought permission to, *inter*alia, appeal Family Court’s June 3, 1998 order. This Court denied respondent’s request without prejudice to renew in the event that a hearing was not held within 90 days. Upon renewal, granted respondent permission to appeal and denied her motion in all other respects. In the interim, respondent moved in Family Court for summary judgment. By order dated November 30, 1998, Family Court granted respondent’s motion, dismissed the petition and, in so doing, expressly vacated all temporary orders of custody and support.

Respondent, as so limited by her brief, contends only that Family Court erred in issuing the series of orders awarding temporary custody of her son to petitioners, including the June 3, 1998 order from which this appeal is taken. The issuance of Family Court’s November 30,1998 order, which, as noted previously, granted respondent summary judgment and vacated all temporary orders of custody, renders the instant appeal moot. As we perceive no exception to the mootness doctrine (see, *Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne,*50 NY2d 707, 714-715), the appeal is dismissed (see, *Matter of Jamie EE.,*232 AD2d 761, 762).

Mercure, J. P., Peters, Carpinello and Graffeo, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, as moot, without costs.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-4157

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

REGGIE WALDO CANADY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior

District Judge. (7:02-cr-00127-F-3)

Submitted: August 23, 2006 Decided: September 18, 2006

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mitchell G. Styers, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC, Warrenton,

North Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, Acting United

States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Christine Witcover Dean, Assistant

United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Reggie Waldo Canady appeals his 248-month prison sentence

resulting from his conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine

base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000), possession with the

intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1) (2000), and for using and carrying a firearm during the

drug conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000). Finding

no error, we affirm.

Canady contends that the district court imposed his

sentence in violation of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220

(2005). After Booker, a sentencing court is no longer bound by the

range prescribed by the sentencing guidelines. United States v.

Green, 436 F.3d 449, 455-56 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v.

Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005). In determining the

sentence, however, courts are still required to calculate and

consider the guidelines range, as well as the factors set forth in

18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005). Id. In sentencing

defendants after Booker, district courts should apply a

preponderance of the evidence standard, taking into account that

the resulting guideline range is advisory only. United States v.

Morris, 429 F.3d 65, 72 (4th Cir. 2005). We will affirm a

post-Booker sentence if it is within the statutorily prescribed

range and is reasonable. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546-47.
- 3 -

Here, the district court correctly calculated Canady’s

range under the now-advisory sentencing guidelines using a

preponderance of the evidence standard. After giving due

consideration to the § 3553(a) factors, the district court then

sentenced him within the statutorily prescribed range for his

offenses and below the range provided for by the sentencing

guidelines. Canady has not rebutted the presumption that the

district court imposed a reasonable sentence.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
§ 27.619 Special factors. ( a ) The special factors prescribed in §§ 27.621 through 27.625 apply to each part of the structure whose strength is— ( 1 ) Uncertain;
( 2 ) Likely to deteriorate in service before normal replacement; or
( 3 ) Subject to appreciable variability due to— ( i ) Uncertainties in manufacturing processes; or
( ii ) Uncertainties in inspection methods.
( b ) For each part to which §§ 27.621 through 27.625 apply, the factor of safety prescribed in § 27.303 must be multiplied by a special factor equal to— ( 1 ) The applicable special factors prescribed in §§ 27.621 through 27.625; or
( 2 ) Any other factor great enough to ensure that the probability of the part being understrength because of the uncertainties specified in paragraph (a) of this section is extremely remote.
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-22-00271-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF K.J. AND K.J.,

CHILDREN

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from the 231st District 

Court

of Tarrant County (231-707263-21)

December 22, 2022

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that the 

appeal should be dismissed. It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed for want of 

jurisdiction.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

PER CURIAM
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

March 23, 2022

No. 04-21-00569-CV

Richard GIBSON and All Other Occupants,

Appellant

v.

Shawn C. BROWN,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2021CV04375

Honorable J Frank Davis, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellant’s brief was due on March 11, 2022. Neither the brief nor a motion for 

extension of time has been filed. Appellant is therefore ORDERED to file, no later than April 

4, 2022, his brief and a written response reasonably explaining: (1) his failure to timely file a 

brief, and (2) why appellee is not significantly injured by appellant’s failure to timely file a brief. 

If appellant fails to timely file a brief and the written response by April 4, 2022, we will dismiss 

the appeal for want of prosecution. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c) 

(allowing involuntary dismissal if appellant fails to comply with court order).

_________________________________

Irene Rios, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 23rd day of March, 2022.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court