CONTROLS OVER AMMUNITION WITHIN THE OFFICE OF 

SECURE TRANSPORTATION 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Office of Inspector General 

Office of Inspections and Special Inquiries 

Inspection Report 

Controls Over Ammunition Within the 

Office of Secure Transportation 

INS-O-07-02 July 2007 


CONTROLS OVER AMMUNITION WITHIN THE OFFICE OF 

SECURE TRANSPORTATION 

TABLE OF 

CONTENTS 

OVERVIEW

Introduction and Objective 1 

Observations and Conclusions 1 

DETAILS OF FINDINGS

Background 3 

Sensitive Property 3 

Ammunition Requests 4 

Ammunition Issue and Receipt 4 

Transportation of Ammunition 5 

Control of Ammunition 6 

Armor Piercing Ammunition 7 

RECOMMENDATIONS 8 

MANAGEMENT AND INSPECTOR COMMENTS 8 

APPENDICES

A. Scope and Methodology 9 

B. Management Comments 10 
Overview 

Page 1 Controls Over Ammunition Within the 

 Office of Secure Transportation 

INTRODUCTION The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Office 

AND OBJECTIVE of Secure Transportation (OST) conducts transportation missions 

supporting national security, including the safe and secure 

transportation of nuclear weapons, weapon components, and 

special nuclear material. OST is headquartered in Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, and has three commands, which are located in: Oak 

Ridge, Tennessee; Amarillo, Texas; and Albuquerque. OST 

performs its mission through the use of a paramilitary force of 

approximately 350 Federal Agents. These Agents are trained, 

equipped, and armed to prevent the theft, sabotage, or takeover of 

protected materials by unauthorized persons. In addition, NNSA 

has a fleet of aircraft housed on Kirtland Air Force Base in 

Albuquerque that supports the OST mission. 

OST provides weapons training for its Federal Agents at firing 

ranges throughout the United States. In December 2005, OST 

provided training on the new SR-25 .308 caliber sniper rifle at a 

private firing range in Kingsville, Texas. The Office of Inspector 

General received allegations regarding internal control weaknesses 

concerning the accountability and transportation of ammunition 

associated with this training exercise. We were told that an officer 

from OST’s Agent Operations Eastern Command (AOEC) in Oak 

Ridge had taken 3,400 rounds of ammunition from the exercise 

without proper authorization and that this ammunition had been 

transported on board NNSA aircraft without being declared. 

We initiated an inspection to review the facts and circumstances of 

the allegations and to examine related internal controls over 

ammunition within OST. We note that an OST Inquiry Team also 

initiated a review into the incident and subsequently expanded its 

review to examine controls over ammunition OST-wide. 

OBSERVATIONS AND Our inspection substantiated the allegations, and we concluded that 

CONCLUSIONS OST did not have adequate internal controls over its ammunition. 

Specifically, we found that OST did not: 

• Categorize and control ammunition as sensitive property, as 

required by Department policy; 

• Follow requirements for requesting ammunition for 

activities other than organized, approved training; 

• Execute required documentation for the issuance and 

receipt of ammunition; 
Page 2 Observations and Conclusions 

• Ensure that ammunition transported on board NNSA 

aircraft by OST personnel was declared, which DOE policy 

identifies as a serious safety violation; 

• Ensure that ammunition in the possession of Federal 

Agents was properly controlled; and, 

• Ensure the accountability of armor piercing ammunition. 

In September 2006, OST issued a report on its review of 

ammunition accountability, which incorporated an April 2006 

report on AOEC’s handling of the 3,400 rounds of ammunition. 

The OST report concluded that there were systemic ammunition 

accountability problems throughout OST. The report found that 

OST was missing significant quantities of ammunition, that there 

was gross negligence in the accounting and inventory of the issued 

ammunition, and that some personnel who were responsible for 

safeguarding their assigned ammunition failed to do so. The OST 

report contained several recommendations and corrective actions, 

to include changes to policy and operational procedures. Some of 

the specific findings in OST’s report related to and were consistent 

with certain of the findings reported herein. 
Details of Findings 

Page 3 Details of Findings 

BACKGROUND Department of Energy (DOE) Order 580.1, “Department of Energy 

Personal Property Management Program,” identifies the standards, 

practices, and performance expectations for the management of 

personal property owned by DOE. The Order applies to all DOE 

elements with personal property management responsibilities, 

including NNSA, and states that “a list of those items of personal 

property that are considered sensitive must be developed and 

maintained by each DOE element.” The Order goes on to state: 

The list must consist of – items, regardless of value, that 

require special control and accountability because of 

susceptibility to unusual rates of loss, theft, or misuse or 

due to national security and export control considerations. 

Items include, but are not limited to, weapons, 

ammunition [emphasis added], explosives . . . . 

Each facility must have written procedures for the management of 

sensitive items. The procedures are to include the use of 

memorandum receipts or custody documents at the time an item is 

assigned or when there is a change in custody. These procedures 

must also establish custodial responsibilities describing the 

requirements for appropriate physical and administrative controls, 

especially for items assigned for general use within an 

organization, and reporting changes in custody. A physical 

inventory of sensitive items is required to be conducted annually. 

SENSITIVE PROPERTY We found that OST did not categorize and control ammunition as 

sensitive property, as required by DOE Order 580.1. OST’s 

“Standard Operating Procedures (T7) for Property Management” 

defines a sensitive item as “Personal property, regardless of value, 

which is susceptible to theft, appropriation for personal use, or is 

readily convertible to cash, and is specified in the sensitive items 

list (Tab 3, Annex J).” However, the sensitive items list at Tab 3 

only includes “Firearms, Laptop/palmtop (pda) computers, Tape 

recorders, Cameras (still, digital, video), Night vision devices 

(NVDs), and TV/VCR combination units.” 

While OST centrally controls those items it has designated as 

sensitive property, OST’s “Standard Operating Procedures (T5) for 

Munitions Management System,” which addresses the 

accountability of ammunition, does not require centralized control 

of ammunition. For example, OST sensitive items are required to 

be recorded and tracked in OST’s centralized property records 

system, and discrepancies during an annual inventory require an 

inventory reconciliation report that is reviewed, approved, and 
Page 4 Details of Findings 

certified by the OST Property Management Officer. However, 

OST’s standard operating procedures for ammunition management 

allow ammunition to be listed in separate databases maintained at 

each OST section, and annual inventory discrepancies are only 

reported to Section Chiefs or support contractor property managers. 

As stated previously, OST’s September 2006 report on ammunition 

found significant and systemic weaknesses in the control of OST 

ammunition. In addition, during a recent Office of Inspector General 

investigation, it was noted that an OST site that had established an 

“amnesty box” to promote the return of equipment had thousands of 

rounds of ammunition returned. We believe that, if OST controlled 

ammunition as a sensitive item, a number of OST’s problems with 

ammunition controls could have been prevented or mitigated. 

AMMUNITION We found that OST did not follow requirements for requesting 

REQUESTS ammunition for activities other than organized, approved training. 

OST’s “Standard Operating Procedures (T5) for Munitions 

Management System” states that ammunition requested for use 

during other than organized, approved training requires prior written 

approval on SB Form 100, “TSD Ammunition/Pyrotechnic Issue 

Request,” at least 24 hours prior to the required issue time. 

Authorizing signatures are required by the Chief, Training/Exercise 

Operations Section; an OST Support Branch logistic specialist; the 

Chief of the OST Support Branch; or an OST Section Chief. 

Upon completion of the December 2005 training at the Kingsville, 

Texas, firing range, 3,400 of the 15,000 rounds of .308 caliber 

ammunition issued for the training were not expended. On 

December 9, 2005, an AOEC officer from Oak Ridge was allowed 

to take possession of the 3,400 rounds after only signing a 

“Munitions Bulk Issue and Return Form” that indicated the 

ammunition was for “Road Use.” Contrary to OST policy, the SB 

Form 100 was not used and there was no evidence of approval of 

the transaction by the Chief, Training/Exercise Operations Section; 

an OST Support Branch logistic specialist; the Chief of the OST 

Support Branch; or an OST Section Chief. 

AMMUNITION We found that OST did not execute required documentation for the 

ISSUE AND RECEIPT issuance and receipt of ammunition. As stated previously, DOE 

Order 580.1 requires the use of memorandum receipts or custody 

documents at the time an item is assigned or when there is a 

change in custody. The AOEC officer who took possession of the 

3,400 rounds of .308 caliber ammunition on December 9, 2005, 

told us that he issued 200 rounds to each of 16 AOEC Federal 
Page 5 Details of Findings 

Agents who participated in the training and retained the remaining 

200 rounds. However, the Agents did not sign receipts for the 

ammunition, nor was there a record of change in custody. In 

addition, AOEC’s local “Ammunition Accounting Standard 

Operating Procedures” states that each Federal Agent will sign a 

consolidated “AOEC OSB-69 form” to record all assigned 

ammunition, but this also was not done. This finding and the 

previous finding were consistent with a general finding in the OST 

report that the ammunition was drawn and issued for road use 

contrary to applicable procedures and policies. 

TRANSPORTATION We found that OST did not ensure that ammunition transported 

OF AMMUNITION on board NNSA aircraft by OST personnel was declared, which 

DOE policy identifies as a serious safety violation. NNSA’s 

“OST-AVN-140.0, TRANSPORT OF HAZARDOUS 

MATERIALS MANUAL,” requires the declaration of ammunition 

carried on board NNSA aircraft. Appendix C contains the NNSA, 

Office of Transportation Safeguards, Shippers Declaration for 

Dangerous Goods (Example), which states that: 

This form declares that certain hazardous materials 

will accompany NNSA Nuclear Couriers, in the form 

of ammunition, smoke grenades, flares and explosive 

rounds in the performance of their mission. 

The Shippers Declaration also states that: 

Failure to comply in all respects with the applicable 

Regulations, DOE and Sandia National Laboratories 

Packaging Procedures and NNSA Aviation Safety rules 

is a serious safety violation. 

The Shippers Declaration concludes with a statement, which 

is to be signed by the NNSA Office of Secure Transportation 

senior onsite official, that: 

I hereby declare that the contents of this consignment are 

fully and accurately described above by the proper 

shipping name, and are properly packaged for shipment 

aboard a U.S. Government aircraft in compliance with 

NNSA Office of Secure Transportation policy. 

On December 10, 2005, an NNSA DC-9 was used to transport the 

AOEC officer and 16 other AOEC Federal Agents from Corpus 

Christi, Texas, to Knoxville, Tennessee. We were told that they 
Page 6 Details of Findings 

carried back the 3,400 rounds of .308 caliber ammunition with their 

personal gear and weapons. We determined, though, that the 3,400 

rounds were not declared. The AOEC officer acknowledged to us that 

he had made a mistake by not declaring the ammunition. This finding 

was consistent with an OST Inquiry Team finding, although the OST 

report did not identify that this was a serious safety violation. 

CONTROL OF We found that OST did not ensure that ammunition in the 

AMMUNITION possession of Federal Agents was properly controlled. OST’s 

“Standard Operating Procedures (T7) for Property Management” 

requires that ammunition be accounted for and controlled by the 

“holding entity.” However, after the AOEC officer and the 16 

other Federal Agents took possession of the .308 caliber 

ammunition, they failed to report the acquisition of this 

ammunition or turn the ammunition in to the designated official 

within the holding entity in a timely manner. This ammunition, 

which had not been approved by OST management for road use, 

was outside the control and accountability of OST for 45 days, 

until most of it was turned in by January 23, 2006. 

In addition, the Federal Agents failed to store the ammunition in the 

manner required by “Standard Operating Procedures (T5) for 

Munitions Management System.” It states that “ . . . with the 

exception of munitions issued to support training scenarios which can 

be temporarily stored in ‘ready use’ lockers, all munitions assigned to 

OST will be stored in OST munitions storage areas.” We were told 

that during the period from December 9, 2005, to January 23, 2006, 

some of this ammunition was stored at Agents’ private residences and 

some was kept in their lockers at the Oak Ridge command. 

Further, although a Munitions Issue Form executed on January 23, 

2006, reflected that 3,400 rounds of ammunition were turned in to 

the OST armory, a subsequent inventory by the OST Inquiry Team 

determined that some of the 3,400 rounds were missing. We were 

told that some of the ammunition was not returned in its original 

packaging. For example, some rounds were loose in plastic bags. In 

addition, we were told that some of the ammunition turned in was 

not the same as issued—it was a different manufacturer or type or 

was corroded (indicating aged ammunition). We were told that, as 

of March 2007, a total of 119 rounds were still missing. 

We noted that OST’s report of inquiry had similar findings, although 

the extended period of time over which these conditions existed (45 

days) was not specifically identified, nor was it specifically identified 

that some of the ammunition was stored at Agents’ residences. 
Page 7 Details of Findings 

ARMOR PIERCING We found that OST did not ensure the control and accountability 

AMMUNITION of armor piercing ammunition, with some OST Federal Agents 

apparently attempting to conceal the fact that armor piercing 

rounds were lost, missing, or stolen. 

On at least two occasions, OST has had inventory shortages of armor 

piercing ammunition. It appears that Agents attempted to cover this up 

by substituting ammunition altered to look like armor piercing rounds. 

In April 2006, during a 100 percent inventory of ammunition at the 

AOEC, OST identified two rounds of ammunition that had the tips 

colored black to make them appear to be armor piercing rounds. 

These rounds had been turned in by an unknown Federal Agent as part 

of the armor piercing ammunition he had been issued for mission 

purposes. This incident was not addressed in OST’s September 2006 

report, but the report did identify a similar situation at the Agent 

Operations Central Command, where 27 rounds of 5.56 mm ball were 

found colored black on their tips to give the appearance of armor 

piercing rounds. The perpetrator was not identified. 

DOE policy considers armor piercing ammunition to be “specialty 

rounds,” which require special reporting when they are determined 

to be lost, missing, or stolen. DOE M 470.4-3, “Protective Force,” 

which applies to NNSA, states that: 

After conducting a preliminary inquiry involving an 

indication of an unaccounted for, missing, or stolen 

firearm, a significant quantity of ammunition (in excess of 

100 rounds), or any amount of pyrotechnics, explosives; 40 

mm, .50 caliber AP [armor piercing], or any other 

specialty rounds [emphasis added]; PF [protective force] 

management must immediately report such a shortage to 

the DOE cognizant security authority, who must report to 

the Office of Security within 24 hours. The DOE cognizant 

security authority must then prepare and transmit an 

Incident of Security Concern (see DOE M 470.4-1). 

We determined that the 27 rounds of 5.56 mm ball were reported 

in a September 2006 OST “Report of Security Incident/Infraction.” 

However, we did not find any evidence that the two missing 

rounds from April 2006 were reported in accordance with DOE M 

470.4-3. In neither case was there any indication that action was 

taken against any Agent for attempting to conceal the missing 

specialty rounds. We noted that OST’s procedures did not include 

examining ammunition as Agents turned it in to ensure it was what 

it was supposed to be. 
 

Page 8 Recommendations 

 Management and Inspector Comments 

RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Secure 

Transportation ensures that: 

1. OST policies and procedures identify ammunition as sensitive 

property, as required by DOE Order 580.1. 

2. Requirements for requesting ammunition for activities other 

than organized, approved training are followed. 

3. Documentation for the issuance and receipt of ammunition is 

prepared and maintained as required by DOE and OST policy. 

4. Ammunition transported on board NNSA aircraft is declared, 

as required, to avoid future serious safety violations. 

5. Ammunition in possession of Federal Agents is properly 

controlled and stored. 

6. All armor piercing ammunition is properly controlled and 

accounted for, that all missing armor piercing rounds are 

appropriately reported, and that appropriate action is taken 

against any Federal Agent who attempts to conceal that armor 

piercing rounds are missing. 

MANAGEMENT In comments on a draft of this report, NNSA agreed with the report 

AND INSPECTOR and the corresponding recommendations. NNSA identified 

COMMENTS corrective actions that have been taken. We will review the 

specific actions taken by management to ensure they adequately 

address all of our recommendations. NNSA’s comments are 

included in their entirety at Appendix B. 
Appendix A 

Page 9 Scope and Methodology 

SCOPE AND The majority of the fieldwork for this inspection was conducted 

METHODOLOGY from March through December 2006. The inspection included 

reviewing the process used by OST to control, account for, and 

transport ammunition. The inspection also included: 

• Review of ammunition issue and receipt documentation; 

• Review of ammunition accountability records; 

• Review of OST ammunition transportation criteria; 

• Review of DOE directives on ammunition; and, 

• Interviews of OST officials and Federal Agents. 

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the “Quality 

Standards for Inspections” issued by the President’s Council on 

Integrity and Efficiency. 
Appendix B 

Page 10 Management Comments 
 IG Report No. INS-O-07-02 

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