AD-A282 112

U.S. Army Research Institute

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Research Report 1661

The Combat Vehicle Command

and Control System:

Combat Performance of Armor Battalions

Using Interactive Simulation

Glen A. Meade, Ryszard Lozicki, Bruce C. Leibrecht,

Paul G. Smith, and William E. Myers

BDM Federal, Inc. „— « f*

ELECTE

JUL181994

F

94-22374 DTie QUALITY INSPECTED 5

May 1994

Approved for public release; distribution Is unlimited.

94 7 15 0 15
U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency Under the Jurisdiction

of the Deputy Chief of Stafffor Personnel

EDGAR M. JOHNSON

Director

Research accomplished under contract

for the Department of the Army

BDM Federal, Inc.

Technical review by

Major James B. Henderson

Donald M. Kristiansen

NOTICES

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3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

Final Sep 91 - Sep 93

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

The Combat Vehicle Command and Control System: Combat

Performance of Armor Battalions Using Interactive

Simulation

ft. AUTHOR(S)

Meade, Glen A»; Lozickl, Ryszard; Leibrecht, Bruce C;

Smith, Paul G.; and Myers, William E.

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

N61339-91-D-0001/0025

62785A

791

2221

R01

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND AOORESS(ES)

BDM Federal, Inc.

P.0„ Box 967

Fort Knox, KY 40121-0967

PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

UcS. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and

Social Sciences

ATTN: PERI-IZA

5001 Eisenhower Avenue

Alexandria, VA 22333-5600

10. SPONSORING MONITORING

AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

ARI Research Report

1661

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Contracting Officer's Representative, Kathleen A. Quinkert.

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13. ABSTRACT {Mt»mumi00 words)

This research evaluated the operational effectiveness, training, and soldiermachine interface (SMI) Implications of a Combat Vehicle Command and Control (CVCC)

experimental configuration that included the Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer

and a Command and Control display. Using Ml tank simulators in the Mounted Warfare

Test Bed at Fort Knox, Kentucky, the researchers evaluated tank battalion operations.

Each of twelve groups of soldiers completed a 1-week training and testing schedule

that ended with a simulated combat scenario. One of a series, this report documents

tactical unit performance and techniques and procedures employed to take advantage of

the CVCC system's capabilities. Companion reports address operational effectiveness

data and training and SMI-related findings. The collective findings provide input

for the design and development of training programs for future automated command,

control, and communications systems in ground combat vehicles.

14. SUBJECT TERMS

CVCC Command and

CITV Operational

Ml tank Distributed

control

effectiveness

interactive simulation

UJ training

requirements

Soldier-in-theloop assessment

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OF REPORT

Unclassified

NSN 7S40-01-280-5500

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OF THIS PAGE

Unclassified

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

OF ABSTRACT

Unclassified

IS. NUMBER OF PAGES

200

16. PRICE CODE

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

Unlimited

Standard Form 298 (Rev

Pretcriocd by ANSI Sid m-U

2M.102

2-89)
Research Report 1661

The Combat Vehicle Command and Control System:

Combat Performance of Armor Battalions

Using Interactive Simulation

Glen A. Meade, Ryszard Lozicki, Bruce C. Leibrecht,

Paul G. Smith, and William E. Myers

BDM Federal, Inc.

Field Unit at Fort Knox, Kentucky

Barbara A. Black, Chief

Training Systems Research Division

Jack H. Hiller, Director

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600

May 1994

Army Project Number Manpower, Pereonnel

2Q162785A791 and Training

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
FOREWORP

The Fort Knox Field Unit of the U.S. Army Research Institute

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) conducts soldier-inthe-loop simulation-based research that addresses training

requirements for the future integrated battlefield. Efforts

under this program are supported by Memoranda of Understanding

with (a) the U.S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, Subject:

Research in Future Battlefield Conditions, 12 April 1989, and (b)

the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) , Subject: Combat

Vehicle Command and Control (CVCC) Program, 22 March 1989.

The CVCC research program combines advanced digital and

thermal technologies that enhance mounted warfighting capabilities for command, control, and communications (C3) . The CVCC

system includes digital maps, report and overlay features,

positioning and navigation functions, digital transmission

capabilities, and independent thermal viewing for unit and

vehicle commanders. This configuration provides a powerful

medium for investigating combat development and training requirements of future automated technology for armored vehicles. The

research reported here used distributed interactive simulation to

evaluate the CVCC capabilities at the battalion level. The preliminary findings presented in this report support Army developers in determining user requirements, specifying training

requirements, and assessing operational effectiveness of automated C

3 systems for ground combat vehicles. In addition, the

training and simulation techniques developed for this effort are

of use to other Army training and testing agencies.

Information resulting from this research has been briefed to

the following personnel: Commanding General, U.S. Army Training

and Doctrine Command; Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center

and School; Deputy Commanding General for Combat Developments,

U.S. Army Combined Arms Command; Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; Chief of Staff,

U.S. Army Armor School; Director, Directorate of Combat Developments, U.S. Army Armor Center; and Director, Mounted Warf ighting

Battlespace Lab.

EDGAR M. JOHNSON

Director
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The following members of the U.S. Army Research Institute

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Fort Knox Field Unit

provided invaluable input to this evaluation: Barbara Black,

Field Unit Chief; Kathleen Quinkert, Leader of the Future

Battlefield Conditions (FBC) team; Carl Lickteig and Gary

Elliott, FBC team members; and Major Jimmy Whitehead, the Field

Unit's research and development coordinator. In addition to

these individuals, Donald M. Kristiansen, principal scientist

with the ARI Fort Knox Field Unit and Major James Henderson,

assigned to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, also

made important contributions during prepublication review.

In addition to the authors. The BDN Federal, Inc., research

staff included William Doherty, Nancy Atwood, Major General

(Ret.) Charles Heiden, Alicia Sawyer, and Owen Pitney. Laura

Ford, Beverly Winsch, Jeffery Schmidt, Timothy Voss, Robert

Sever, and Jack Burkett provided invaluable assistance in

developing and editing the report. Research assistants

supporting the project included Silver Campbell, Ann Cash,

Kenneth Fergus, Brian Gary, Lewis Graff, Gary Gulbranson, Michael

Gustafson, John Jawor, David Johnson, Ronald Jones, Khristina

Orbock, Robert Pollock, Ronald Reyna, Charles Sawyer, Daniel

Schultz, Margaret Shay, Harold Wager, and Charles West.

Personnel of the on-site support contractor, Loral Training

and Technical Services, supported simulation equipment and data

collection/analysis. These personnel included Jimmy Adams, Fred

Brady, David Clippinger, Michael Krages, Paul Monday, Rob Smith,

and Diane York.

To present the large, multifaceted set of data resulting

from the evaluation, three reports have been organized. Each

report focuses on a different aspect of the data—operational

effectiveness, tactical performance, and training and user

interface issues. To avoid unnecessary redundancy in these

reports, the detailed descriptions of specific materials and

procedures generally have been allocated to one or another of the

reports. Thus, by design, the reports are mutually supporting.

The reader will be referred frequently to companion reports for

methodological detail.

vi
THE COMBAT VEHICLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM: COMBAT

PERFORMANCE OF ARMOR BATTALIONS USING INTERACTIVE SIMULATION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Requirement:

Meeting the command, control, and communications (C3)

challenges of the high speed, high intensity, widely dispersed

future battlefield requires a knowledge of the use and capabilities of current and future automated C

3 systems. Systematic

research and development efforts, including careful assessment of

operational implications and training requirements, are necessary

to field and deploy these systems. The U.S. Army's Combat Vehicle Command and Control (CVCC) research and development program

uses soldier-in-the-loop, simulation-based methodology to evaluate future C

3 technology. Previous CVCC research focused on tank

crews, platoons, companies, and the battalion Tactical Operations

Center (TOC). A focus on performance of unit commanders and

executive officers led to the battalion-level evaluation.

Procedure:

The research compared battalion operations under two

conditions: (a) Baseline, modeling conventional Ml tank and TOC

C

3 tools (mainly voice radio and paper maps), and (b) CVCC,

supplementing Baseline capabilities with a digital Position/

Navigation (POSNAV) system, a digital Command and Control Display

(CCD), the Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV) , and

digital TOC workstations. Using autoloading tank simulators in

the Mounted Warfare Test Bed (MWTB) at Fort Knox, Kentucky, eight

MOS-qualified armor crews (battalion commander, battalion operations officer, three company commanders, and three company

executive officers) were Integrated with semlautomated elements

under their control to form a complete tank battalion. Each

battalion-group operated in either the Baseline or the CVCC

condition, with six groups assigned to each. Each of the twelve

battalions completed 4 days of training and testing, culminating

in a simulated combat test scenario.

Findings:

The digital communications capabilities of the CVCC system

resulted in significant Improvements in both the accuracy and the

amount of tactical information transmitted (e.g., FRAGOs, enemy

vii
and friendly information), while significantly reducing the

amount of voice radio traffic. The POSNAV system allowed

commanders and staff to maintain a more accurate and up-to-date

appreciation of the unit's status and to coordinate maneuver more

effectively. The CITV enabled crews to acquire targets sooner

and at a greater range than in the Baseline condition and to

identify opposing force vehicles more accurately. CVCC units

also achieved better target effects against OPFOR vehicles as

demonstrated by a greater number of kills per hit—an effect

tentatively related to improved identification. Overall, CVCC

battalions demonstrated greater agility, depth, and

synchronization in the conduct of tactical operations and

protected their force more effectively than Baseline units.

Utilization of Findings:

The results of this research provide insights to the

operational effectiveness of tactical units using future

automated C

3 systems in ground combat vehicles. The findings

will be of use to combat and materiel developers, as well as

modelers, other researchers, and unit commanders, as wider

applications of tactical digital communications are demonstrated

and evaluated at the individual vehicle through brigade level.

viii
THE COMBAT VEHICLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM: COMBAT

PERFORMANCE OF ARMOR BATTALIONS USING INTERACTIVE SIMULATION

CONTENTS ,

Page

INTRODUCTION 1

Background 3

Purpose of the Battalion Evaluation 11

Hypotheses 13

METHOD 18

Approach 18

Description of the Test System 24

Procedures 33

Support Staff 50

Limitations 52

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 54

Comparability of Test Groups 55

Overview 56

Command and Control 56

Maneuver 75

Fire Support 100

Intelligence 109

Battlefield Integration 116

CONCLUSIONS 120

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 120

REFERENCES 125

APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY A-l

B. SELECTED PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHICAL

DATA B-l

C. OPERATIONS ORDERS AND FRAGMENTARY

ORDERS C-l

D. ITEMIZED LIST OF MEASURES D-l

ix
CONTENTS rcontinuecn

Page

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Blueprint of the Battlefield: Tactical

Level of War 4

2. CVCC Capabilities 8

3. Summary of Previous CVCC-Related Research ... 9

4. Summary of Prior CVCC Evaluations 10

5. Brigade Task Organization 19

6. Participant Staffing Model 22

7. Ml Simulator Configuration 25

8. CVCC Simulator Capabilities 26

9. CCD Capabilities 28

10. CITV Capabilities 29

11. Battalion TOG Operational Requirement 30

12. Training Program Characteristics 34

13. Collective Training Program Highlights .... 38

14. Test Scenario Sequence 41

15. Selected BOS Functions 48

16. Performance Data for Receive and Transmit

Friendly Information Hypothesis 65

17. Average Time on Net, in Minutes 70

18. Summary of Command and Control BOS Findings . . 75

19. Critical Times During Counterattack (in

Minutes, from STARTEX) 80

20. Mean Performance Data for Navigate

Hypothesis 84

21. Mean Performance Data for Engage Direct

Fire Targets Hypothesis 92

x
CONTENTS fContlnuech

Page

Table 22. Mean Enemy Kills in Primary Engagement

Areas 98

23. Summary of Findings for Maneuver BOS Issue . . 101

24. Fire Support Performance Data by Stage and

Condition 105

25. Summary of Findings Related to Fire Support . . 108

26. Mean Performance Data for Threat Information

Collection Measures, by Stage and Condition . . Ill

27. Summary of Findings Related to Intelligence . . 116

28. Summary of Conclusions from the CVCC Battalion

Evaluation 121

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Test unit structure 20

2. Participant distribution, by rank 23

3. Participant distribution by current

duty position 23

4. CVCC commander's station 27

5. CVCC battalion TOC workstation 31

6. Individual training program 35

7. Test scenario situation: Stage 1 42

8. Test scenario situation: Stage 2 43

9. Test scenario situation: Stage 3 44

10. Exercise control staff organization

during test scenario execution 51

11. Mean elapsed time to transmit FRAGO 59

12. Mean number and duration of requests to

clarify FRAGOs 60

xi
CONTENTS (Continued^

Page

Figure 13. Mean consistency of information content

in FRAGOs received on the company command

network 61

14. Mean consistency of information in

INTEL reports, and mean number of

INTELs received at the company echelon

per scenario 62

15. Mean number of requests to clarify INTEL

reports, per vehicle 64

16. Average number of voice transmissions between

the battalion commander/S3 and the TOC,

excluding named reports 67

17. Average volume of voice radio transmissions

on battalion nets 69

18. Average volume of voice radio transmissions

on company nets 69

19. Average number of named reports (all types)

sent per vehicle per stage 72

20. Mean performance for composite situational

assessment index 73

21. Mean distance between OPFOR and BLUFOR

center of mass at end-stage 79

22. Mean time to complete stage 85

23. Mean maximum läse range 87

24. Mean time to acquire targets 88

25. Mean time from first läse to first fire ... 89

26. Total number of fratricide events,

by condition 90

27. Mean target hit range, in meters 94

28. Mean target kill range, in meters 95

29. Mean hits per round fired, manned

vehicles 96

xii
CONTENTS rContinued^

Page

Figure 30. Mean kills per round fired, manned

vehicles 96

31. Mean kills per hit scored by manned

vehicles 97

32. Mean reported location accuracy for CFFs,

CONTACT reports, and SPOT reports 106

33. Mean descriptional accuracy of CFFs,

CONTACT reports, and SPOT reports 107

xiii
THE COMBAT VEHICLE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

COMBAT PERFORMANCE OF ARMOR BATTALIONS

USING INTERACTIVE SIMULATION

Introduction

Modern technology has led to significant developments in

weapons design since World War II. Tanks, infantry carriers, and

self-propelled weapons are more accurate, lethal, agile, and

survivable than their predecessors. New intelligence gathering

systems provide a wealth of raw information to the battlefield

commander. Yet, despite significant developments in fire control

systems, automotive design, armor protection, and target detection and acquisition, tactical communications and associated

command and control (C2) techniques have not changed much in the

last 50 years. Throughout the battlefield, tactical commanders

still rely on line-of-sight voice radio transmissions, augmented

by what they can personally observe to control their forces. As

a result, modern combat systems—both friendly and enemy—can

easily outpace traditional decision cycles.

The Army's current keystone operations doctrine (U.S.

Department of the Army, 1993) portrays a contemporary and future

combat environment characterized by speed, intensity, dispersion,

and fluidity. Commanders and their staffs must rapidly analyze

and act on available information to identify and mass fires at a

decisive point in time, space, and purpose. Highly mobile

operations both enable and complicate the process, as commanders

strive to synchronize various units and maintain both security

and surprise. Imperatives of force sustainment also present

unique challenges as units must be resupplied and refitted.

Finally, units that approach a known enemy position from

different directions and at various ranges must be able to

rapidly distinguish between enemy and friendly elements in order

to direct fires effectively against proper targets. The lessons

learned from Desert Storm (U.S. Department of Defense, 1992)

graphically illustrate many of the command, control and

communications (C3) problems of a rapid maneuver battle, such as

navigation difficulties, delays and interruptions to information

flow, confusion about friendly and enemy locations, and instances

of fratricide.

Digital technology offers the potential to pass large volumes

of data in burst transmissions. This information can be translated in graphic and/or textual formats. Furthermore, certain

types of data can be fully automated and thus reduce manual

reporting requirements. These capabilities can potentially

enable the future leader to keep pace with the command and

control challenges on the future battlefield. A comprehensive

research and development effort is required to field and deploy

combat-effective digital systems. The Army's C

3 modernization

thrust aims to capitalize on an extensive network of digital

nodes that will rapidly and reliably exchange combat-critical
Information. Under this thrust, the U.S. Army Tank Automotive

Command (TACOM) sponsored a U.S.-German bilateral research and

development effort. Known as the Combat Vehicle Command and

Control (CVCC) program, this effort addresses automated C

3

requirements for ground combat vehicles. The program is managed

by four teams, each with a German counterpart team: the Data

Elements, Operational, and Organizational Concepts Team, chaired

by the Directorate of Combat Developments, U.S. Army Armor

School; the Communications Team, chaired by the U.S. Army

Communications-Electronics Command; the Vehicle Integration Team,

chaired by TACOM; and the Soldier-Machine-Interface and

Simulation Team, chaired by the U.S. Army Research Institute for

the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI). The efforts of the

four teams are interdependent and mutually supportive.

As with any new technology, the potential of the CVCC system

can only be fully realized through practical exploration.

Although digital communications offer many possible applications,

the concepts themselves must be refined through user tests.

Furthermore, the new capabilities must be deployed with effective

tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). The current effort is

therefore concerned with identifying ways that the CVCC system

might best benefit the battlefield commander, and potential

modifications to mounted warfare TTPs. Another area of interest

is the implication for digital integration among and between

different elements of the pombined arms team.

Prior CVCC evaluations have investigated the system's utility

at company level and below. The scope and findings of that prior

work are outlined later in this report.

This report is one of three from the CVCC battalion-level

evaluation. It describes the evaluation's results for the

military reader, emphasizing performance differences that are

operationally meaningful. The first of the two companion reports

(Leibrecht, Meade, Schmidt, Doherty, & Lickteig, in preparation)

also focuses on operational issues, but is more technically

oriented. The second companion report (Atwood, Winsch, Sawyer,

Ford, & Quinkert, in preparation) addresses training and soldiermachine interface (SMI) issues. The former companion report

covers basically the same issues and measures reported in this

work, but provides the detailed statistical analyses that are

omitted here, whereas the latter report describes desired system

refinements and training approaches identified by the users

during the course of testing.

This report is organized into five sections, as follows:

1. Introduction - presents a statement of the problem

(preceding); command and control background, digital

communications and the CVCC project; purpose of the battalion

evaluation; and hypotheses.
2. Method - examines the experimental approach; describes

the CVCC system; explains procedures used during the «valuation;

and describes the support staff.

3. Results and Discussion - presents data and findings

relevant to command and control systems, maneuver, fire support,

and intelligence gathering and dissemination.

4. Conclusions - recaps and analyzes key findings, and

their implication for future applications.

5. Recommendations for further research - presents

implications for future efforts.

Background

This subsection establishes the background of the battalion

evaluation. It presents an overview of the Blueprint of the

Battlefield and a short narrative on command and control,

followed by a description of prior CVCC and related research.

Blueprint of the Battlefield

With the continuing evolution of the highly sophisticated

modern battlefield, the Army created a blueprint to serve as a

common framework for addressing battlefield operating systems

(BOSs). The current Blueprint of the Battlefield (U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC], 1991) is a comprehensive,

hierarchical listing of Army battlefield functions divided into

three levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. Each

level of war focuses on a specific area so that staff and field

organizations can relate Army needs to Army missions. The

tactical level of war is the level at which battles and

engagements are planned and executed, and involves formations at

corps level and below. It is at this level that tactical units

or task forces accomplish assigned military objectives. The

tactical level is further organized into seven battlefield

operating systems (BOSs) as shown in Table 1.

The BOSs also offer a suitable format for the evaluation of

the CVCC system's operational effectiveness. To that end,

specific research issues were developed to investigate CVCC's

contribution within the tactical framework as described in the

Blueprint of the Battlefield. Throughout the battalion-level

evaluation, command and control issues were the foremost concern.

Command and Control

Command and control (C2), in its basic form, refers to the

commander's ability to exercise authority and direction over

assigned forces to accomplish the mission. It consists of

various systems and procedures enabling the commander to

visualize the battlefield, assess the situation, and direct

forces toward successful accomplishment of the assigned mission
Table 1

Blueprint of the Battlefield: Tactical Level of War

Battlefield Operating Systems

Maneuver

Fire Support

Air Defense

Command and Control

Intelligence

Mobility and

Survivability

Combat Service Support

while maintaining sufficient combat power for continued combat

operations in accordance with the higher commander's intent

(U.S. Department of the Army, 1993).

Information on C

2

can be found in a variety of sources such

as Army Field Manuals (e.g., U.S. Department of the Army, 1988a,

and d), Army TTP publications (e.g., U.S. Department of the Army,

1990 and 1991), and in a variety of articles and papers published

in Army periodicals. The TTPs provide the "how to" rather than

the "what" that other doctrinal manuals provide. One of the main

objectives of the c

2

system is to provide the commander

information in order to make timely decisions during the conduct

of the operation. Observations and conclusions from the

U.S. Army's National Training Center (NTC) identify the critical

relationship between effective C

2

and battlefield success. They

emphasize that the commander must be able to "SEE" the

battlefield through fast and accurate reports provided by

subordinates and with the support of the tactical operations

center (TOC) for information processing, planning, and

coordination (R.S. Sever, personal communication, March 24,

1993).

Conventional C

2

techniques at the battalion and task force

level are based on voice radios, and the use of written materials

such as operations orders (OPORDs) and hand drawn overlays which

are posted to mapboards or mapcases. These tools, though

effective, require considerable time and effort to prepare,

coordinate, publish, and disseminate. Updating and maintaining

each of these also requires considerable effort and attention to

detail which, during the heat of battle, could be overlooked,

causing the loss of important information or the misunderstanding

of instructions.

Using doctrine and training manuals, the commander

determines what tasks are expected of the unit. TTPs offer

proven methods that can be tailored to the situation to

accomplish those tasks. The TTPs provide a common set of ideas
on how to accomplish critical tasks. These ideas can be selected

and adapted to a unit's mission, organization, expected area of

operations, and personnel to form the basis for the unit's

standing operating procedures (SOP). Extensive use of unit SOPs,

along with brevity codes, battlebooks, and other tools that

enable the unit to respond quickly to fragmentary orders (FRAGOs)

or changes to the original order can often spell the difference

between success and failure. The ability to pass information

quickly and accurately through other than voice media may enhance

the commander's ability to see the battlefield and help direct

the battalion or task force toward mission accomplishment.

Digital Communication and Horizontal Intearation

Many of the shortcomings related to the conventional c

3

process have potential resolution through automated systems. For

example: a system that would automatically post unit locations

and reported enemy activity to map displays would help the

commander maintain an accurate, up-to-date picture of the

tactical situation within his battle space. Likewise, the

ability to transmit text messages in lieu of voice transmissions

would help reduce the likelihood that key words or phrases would

be misunderstood or not received.

Digital technology offers a medium by which large amounts of

data can be assembled and broadcast in a fraction of the time

needed to transmit the same information verbally. Moreover,

these data can be displayed automatically in varied formats, such

as military graphics posted to a tactical map. This capability

offers a reduction in the time a commander might otherwise spend

posting that information to a paper map. Furthermore, the

probability that automated data would be displayed inaccurately

is much smaller than the margin for error associated with

manually posted information. .inally, certain types of

information (e.g., fuel levels and ammunition status) could be

shared through entirely automated routines. When combined with a

global positioning system that provides an accurate location for

a combat vehicle, the system could post and periodically update

the location of adjacent and subordinate vehicles or forces.

Digital means could therefore allow a commander to monitor

developments throughout his battle space from anywhere on the

battlefield. In other words, the commander could obtain a more

comprehensive and accurate perspective than he might using only

conventional means.

Digital communication is not new to the battlefield. Within

combat forces, the tactical fire direction system (TACFIRE)

represents perhaps the most familiar application of digital

communication. TACFIRE enables the fire support community to

transfer reports, messages, and some graphics by digital means,

to request, control and coordinate indirect fires. TACFIRE links

forward observers (FOs), maneuver fire support teams (FISTs), and

firing units with C

3

nodes throughout the fire support

organization (U.S. Department of the Army, 1991).
The Maneuver Control System (MCS) is another digital

communication application that has been fielded to facilitate

command, control and reporting at the tactical level of war. MCS

is one of five battlefield functional systems of the Army

Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS). MCS nodes at

maneuver battalion level feed tactical information to a network

that extends through brigade to corps level (Association of the

U.S. Army, 1992).

The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS),

a planned replacement for TACFIRE, will integrate fire support C

2

among mortars, field artillery, close air support, naval gunfire,

attack helicopters and offensive electronic warfare systems.

AFATDS will not only be multi-service (Army and Marine Corps), it

will also be interoperable with German and British fire support

systems (Association of the U.S. Army, 1992). AFATDS is a second

functional system of ATCCS.

The Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System

(SINCGARS) uses digital technology to encrypt, carry, and decrypt

both voice and data transmissions. In its basic form, SINCGARS

offers secure voice capabilities beyond those available with ANVRC 12 series radio systems. Furthermore, SINCGARS is designed

to support data transfer between and within tactical units (U.S.

Communications-Electronics Command, 1987). This capability

facilitates advanced C

3

applications at tactical echelons.

The M1A2 represents the first application of digital

communications technology to tanks. Other improvements in

sighting and navigation systems further enhance the M1A2 over its

predecessor, but the digital communications capability contained

in the M1A2 version of the intervehicular information system

(IVIS) enables the commander to receive, process, and distribute

combat data between tactical echelons from the individual tank up

to the battalion command group (U.S. Army Armor Center, 1993).

IVIS provides both automated and user-generated data

transfer capabilities among combat vehicles. This digital link

enables networked systems to augment conventional voice traffic

with automated tactical information (U.S. Army Armor Center,

1992). A commander with a mix of both IVIS-equipped and

conventional units must make a conscious effort to maintain

effective communications between the two (U.S. Army Armor Center,

1993). Also, tactical information from IVIS must be manually

transferred to the TACFIRE system in order to integrate indirect

fires. Likewise, no automated link exists between IVIS and MCS.

Furthermore, until IVIS (or a similar system) is expanded to

other members of the combined arms team, voice radio

communications and face-to-face contact will continue to provide

the primary information-sharing media for tactical forces.

The Airborne Target Handover System (ATMS) provides a

digital link between Army aviation systems, and includes call-
for-fire protocols, compatible with TACFIRE, to facilitate

indirect fire targeting from airborne forward observers

(U.S. Department of the Army, 1990). As such, ATHS integrates

aviation and indirect fire systems. Still, this system is not

integrated with either MCS or IVIS, and therefore relies on voice

means for integration with other battlefield systems. In effect,

ATHS acts as an interim accommodation pending the fielding of

AFATDS.

The CVCC system represents a further development of

automated C

3

systems. CVCC has an enhanced IVIS-like capability

that features a mass memory unit, full-color tactical map with a

complete array of terrain features, and a touch sensitive screen

in the Command and Control Display (CCD) at the commander's

station. Also, CVCC includes additional message formats and

capabilities over those provided by the MlA2,s IVIS. The system

also incorporates an enhanced CITV. Prior CVCC studies are

summarized later in this report. System capabilities are

outlined in Table 2. The CVCC system combines textual and

graphic information, using common formats between combat vehicles

and staff workstations/ sent and relayed via digital burst

transmission. The collective capabilities of the CVCC system

provide near real-time acquisition, processing, and dissemination

of combat critical information.

Prior CVCC Research

The current CVCC effort is the culmination of a series of

studies, sponsored by ARI, using Simulation Networking (SIMNET)

technology as a vehicle to explore new combat systems and

modifications to existing systems with individual vehicle

simulators and actual crews. The majority of this work has been

conducted in the Mounted Warfare Test Bed (MWTB2) at Fort Knox,

KY. The MWTB is described in more detail in a subsequent section

of this report. The narrative that follows summarizes the CVCC

program and related research. A more detailed description is

contained in Atwood et al. (in preparation). Table 3 provides a

summary of related research efforts that led up to the CVCC

system. Table 4 provides a summary of prior CVCC system

evaluations.

POSNAV. in one of the ear iest evaluations in the MWTB,

Du Bois and Smith (1989) compeu'cd the performance of crews using

two different automated positIon/navigation (POSNAV) displays

(grid and terrain map) and conventional navigation techniques on

the SIMNET database. POSNAV provided each tank with a display of

that tank's own position and heading. The study found that

^Staff or TOC workstations are used by the commander and

staff in the TOC (as opposed to equipment in the simulator).

* The MWTB was originally known as SIMNET-D (Developmental),

and later, the Close Combat Test Bed (CCTB).
Table 2

CVCC Capabilities

o Digital map with overlays

o Automated navigation

0 Route development and transmission

0 Driver's steer-to display

0 Friendly vehicle/unit locations

o Preparation, transmission, storage and retrieval of

digital reports, routes3, orders" and graphic overlays13

o Precise location inputs to digital reports

o Graphic display of key report information

o Automated status reporting: own vehicle and subordinates

o Enhanced commander's independent thermal viewer (CITV)

with IFF function

o Battalion/task force staff workstations

o Secure digital burst transmission

Note.

a

Route functions are not available on TOC workstations.

"Orders (freetext messages) and overlays can only be created or

edited on TOC workstations.

POSNAV enabled crews to navigate more accurately and efficiently.

Moreover, POSNAV crews were better able to perform map terrain

association, bypass obstacles, and react to enemy fire.

IVIS. Another important step in the development of

automated C

3

occurred with an evaluation of IVIS. IVIS

functionally combined POSNAV features from the previous effort

with digital report capabilities. Du Bois and Smith (1991)

reported that IVlS-equipped crews executed missions more rapidly

and effectively, reported more accurately and quickly, avoided or

bypassed previously reported obstacles, executed FRAGOs, and

occupied battle positions more effectively than Baseline crews.

Most of the findings from the IVIS evaluation favored the

navigation functions as opposed to the automated reporting

capabilities, possibly due to the fact that the IVIS effort was

limited to platoon operations. A follow on effort, focused at

the company level, was recommended to further develop the

reporting functions.

It is important to note that the IVIS version that Du Bois

and Smith (1991) studied differed from the version applied to the

M1A2 tank. Both IVIS versions shared many common functions, such

as navigation features and digital information sharing. As such,

many of the findings from the IVIS study can be generalized to

the potential performance of M1A2 units. The differences between

the M1A2 and the IVIS study configurations relate primarily to

8
Table 3

Summary of Previous CVCC-Related Research

POSNAV Evaluation (Du Bois & Smith, 1989). Individual tank

level.

Findings — Improved:

o navigation accuracy and efficiency

o map-terrain association

o ability to bypass obstacles

o reaction to enemy fires

IVIS Evaluation (Du Bois & Smith, 1991). Platoon level, POSNAV

plus digital reporting.

Findings —

o faster/more effective mission accomplishment

o ability to locate friendly elements

o more accurate and timely reporting

o more effective obstacle avoidance

o more effective FRA60 execution

o more effective BP occupation

CITV Evaluation (Quinkert, 1990). Individual tank level.

Findings —

o improved detection and engagement of multiple threats

the hardware (e.g., commanders, gunners, and drivers displays)

and message formats.

CITV. The CITV was evaluated separately using the Conduct

of Fire Trainer (COFT). Quinkert (1990) reported that the CITV

enabled crews to detect and engage multiple threats more rapidly

than conventionally equipped crews. Recommendations from this

study included the redesign of the commander's control handle,

modifications to the CITV display, and implications for crew

training.

CVCC company evaluation. In another study, CITV and an

improved digital C

3

system were integrated along with the other

enhancements mentioned in a preceding section, to form the

initial CVCC configuration, and evaluated within the context of

tank company operations. Leibrecht et al. (1992) found that

CVCC-equipped companies completed both offensive and defensive

missions more rapidly than Baseline units. The navigation
Table 4

Summary of Prior CVCC Evaluations

CVCC Company Evaluation (Leibrecht et al., 1992).

Findings —

o faster mission execution

o less travel/fuel consumption to accomplish mission

o enhanced target engagement

o more accurate and timely FRAGOs and CONTACT reports

o improved FRAGO and INTEL clarity

o more timely displacement in delays

CVCC Battalion TOC Evaluation (O'Brien et al., 1992).

Battalion-level operations, CVCC-compatible TOC workstations.

Findings —

o reduced commanders' workload re: monitoring and

directing subordinates

o established foundation for battalion-level evaluation

CVCC Battalion Preliminarv Evaluation (Leibrecht et al., 1993).

Battalion level operations. Company XOs.

Findings —

o validated battalion evaluation model

o refined measures for battalion evaluation

function enabled units to shorten travel distances and reduce

fuel use in both the offense and defense. The inclusion of the

CITV resulted in enhanced target engagement performance among

CVCC units. Digital reporting capabilities enabled CVCC-eguipped

units to generate more accurate and timely FRAGOs and CONTACT

reports. FRAGO and intelligence (INTEL) report clarity was also

improved by the digital capability. Furthermore, more timely

displacements in delay situations were observed among CVCC units

than among Baseline units. The company level evaluation

demonstrated several needs, specifically: a means to reduce

redundant reporting, a feedback mechanism to confirm message

reception, and a free text capability. Also, the company level

evaluation demonstrated the need to integrate digital

communications between the maneuver elements and a TOC-based

battle staff, in order to provide better information management

and enhance tactical coordination to assist the commander's

decision making process.

10
CVCC battalion TOC evaluation. The battalion TOC evaluation

(O'Brien et al., 1992) built on previous CVCC efforts by

extending the research to the battalion level. Automated TOC

workstations enabled the battalion staff to communicate digitally

with simulator-mounted unit commanders. The TOC workstations

used CVCC-compatible report formats, with some enhanced

capabilities. Specifically, the TOC staff could create tactical

overlays and free text messages that could be transmitted to and

relayed by the CVCC-equipped simulators. Unit leaders indicated

that the CVCC system reduced their workload with respect to

monitoring and directing subordinate units, but that the volume

of digital reports was a distraction. This work established the

foundation for the current, battalion-level effort.

Purpose of the Battalion Evaluation

Earlier research evaluating CVCC technology began with

individual components at lower echelons and progressed to the

integrated CVCC system at the company and battalion TOC levels.

The findings from the CVCC battalion TOC evaluation recommended

numerous modifications and system interface adjustments for a

more comprehensive battalion-level evaluation. A significant

change to the participant structure from the TOC evaluation was

the integration of company executive officers (XOs) to reduce the

report processing workload on company commanders. A preliminary

battalion evaluation was undertaken to verify this and other

changes from the prior effort. Leibrecht et al. (1993) found the

battalion evaluation model to be basically sound. The only

recommended changes involved data analysis and presentation. In

effect, the preliminary evaluation represents part of the current

effort. Therefore, other facets of the test design (i.e.,

training program, unit structure and scenarios) were held

constant from the preliminary evaluation to the current effort.

This allowed the inclusion of the four test units from the

preliminary evaluation in the database for the battalion

evaluation (reported here), thus increasing the effective

participant population for the battalion-level database.

At the battalion level, several questions are of direct

interest: How does the CVCC experimental configuration impact

the combat performance of battalions, especially in the context

of operational effectiveness? What improvements are necessary to

optimize utilization by the battalion's command group and staff

and company command groups? Will new TTPs be needed to optimize

system performance? How will the CVCC system affect requirements

for training armor unit leaders and crews?

These questions set the stage for the battalion evaluation,

designed to establish a database to help guide doctrine,

training, and design decisions and concepts for utilizing the

CVCC system in a mounted warfare environment. Based on the

questions of interest, the planning and execution of this

evaluation incorporated three overall objectives:

11
(a) Evaluate the operational effectiveness of armor

battalions using the CVCC experimental configuration,

compared to conventionally-equipped battalions.

(b) Investigate operational training issues and

concerns associated with the CVCC system.

(c) Identify critical SMI concerns and make

recommendations regarding CVCC design and utilization.

Each of these objectives formed the basis for specific

research issues. In generating the research issues linked to the

operational effectiveness objective, the Blueprint of the

Battlefield (U.S. Army TRADOC, 1991) provided an established

doctrinal basis. As explained in a preceding section, the seven

BOSs provide a framework for organizing tactical activities.

The CVCC system, as modelled in the current effort, has

eventual implications for all seven BOSs. However, this

evaluation did not focus on air defense, mobility and

survivability, or combat service support (CSS) issues. The

decision to exclude those systems in the battalion level

evaluation was primarily made due to the limitations of the

current simulation system and the CVCC software. The number of

opposing force (OPFOR) aviation and friendly force (BLUFOR) air

defense assets (i.e., SAPOR) necessary to adequately evaluate the

air defense system would have over stressed the simulation

capability available to support the battalion evaluation. With

recpect to the Mobility and Survivability BOS and the Combat

Service Support BOS, the way that combat engineer and service

support assets were simulated was not compatible with the rest of

the test unit organization. Furthermore, scenario modifications

needed to effectively integrate engineer and CSS operations would

have extended the length of the scenario beyond the time

available. In effect, the inclusion of air defense, mobility and

survivability and CSS systems was not practical within the

battalion evaluation. Therefore, only CVCC's potential

contributions to the remaining four BOSs were considered for this

evaluation.

Although the air defense, mobility and survivability, and

combat support systems were not evaluated in this effort,

operations within each of these systems were integrated within

the scenarios. The scenarios assumed BLUFOR air superiority

within the battalion's battle space, yet air defense assets were

notionally operating in direct support (OS) of the battalion.

Although no engineer assets or obstacles were active in the

simulation, engineers were also notionally operating DS to the

parent brigade, and a notional obstacle system existed.

Likewise, although CSS operations were not included in the

scenarios, the units' operational status (i.e., equipment and

ammunition levels) was a constant factor during combat

operations, and units were resupplied and refitted at

predetermined points in the scenario. Furthermore, information

12
pertinent to these BOSs was Integrated at various points to

Influence the scenario's progress.

Within the command and control, maneuver, fire support and

intelligence BOSs, the battalion level CVCC research w- s

undertaken to identify key areas where the CVCC system was

expected to improve performance relative to the Baseline system.

The issues were stated as follows:

1. Does the CVCC system enhance the command and control

BOS?

2. Does the CVCC system enhance the maneuver BOS?

3. Does the CVCC system enhance the fire support BOS?

4. Does the CVCC system enhance the intelligence BOS?

These issues formed the primary focus of this report. Other

research issues were associated with the training and SMI

objectives. The following issues addressed information needed to

further understand performance effects related to the operational

effectiveness issues and to evaluate the training and SMI

requirements. These issues are evaluated by Atwood et al., (in

preparation):

5. What training considerations and implications are

important in training unit commanders and crews to operate and

utilize the CVCC?

6. What SMI factors critically affect utilization of the

CVCC configuration, and how do they impact future CVCC design?

In summary, the battalion evaluation sought to address a

variety of issues relevant to CVCC equipment design and

employment. This report will address BOS-based issues further

described in the following section.

Hypotheses

The issues previously identified serve as a basis for these

hypotheses, which state the expected performance of CVCC-equipped

units as compared to conventionally-equipped units, hereafter

referred to as Baseline units. Functions and/or subfunctions of

each BOS, as identified in the Blueprint of the Battlefield

(U.S. Army TRADOC, 1991), are used to organize supporting

hypotheses. The functions and subfunctions that identify the

detailed hypotheses will, throughout the remainder of this

report, be generically referred to as "functions" or, if greater

clarity is required, "BOS-based functions." Discussions in this

section explain how the hypotheses relate to the tactical

blueprint (U.S. Army TRADOC, 1991), and describe how the CVCC

system could enhance the battalion's operational effectiveness.

13
Global hypothesis. The operational effectiveness of CVCCequipped battalions will be greater than that of units using

conventional C

2

methods. That is, CVCC systems were expected to

provide leaders and crews with a more accurate picture of both

the friendly and the reported enemy situation throughout the

unit's area. Digital communications were expected to improve

both the synchronization and the protection of the friendly

force, and to speed decision cycles as the unit reacted to

changing missions. Improved sensors (i.e., the CITV) are

expected to improve target processing and engagement performance.

Command and Control BOS

Hypothesis. CVCC-equipped battalions will command and

control subordinate units more effectively than Baseline

battalions. The Blueprint of the Battlefield describes five C

2

functions: (a) acquire and communicate information and maintain

status; (b) assess situation; (c) determine actions; (d) direct

and lead subordinate forces; and (e) employ tactical command,

control, and communications countermeasures (C3CM).

Because of simulation, measurement, and design limitations,

two of those functions (determine actions and employ tactical

C

3

CM) are not appropriate for investigation in this effort.

Hypotheses relevant to two of the remaining functions (assess

situation, and direct and lead subordinate forces) were

established, and four separate hypotheses were developed from the

remaining function, in order to investigate discrete elements of

information communication requirements. Together, the results

within each of these functions may show whether CVCC equipped

battalions exercised more effective command and control than

Baseline units.

The potential advantages afforded by digital communications

were expected to simplify the unit's ability to communicate

information, and to manage means of communication, both C

2

subfunctions. Three forms of information (mission, enemy

information, and friendly troop information) accommodated the

further categorization of supporting hypotheses, as indicated

below.

Receive and transmit mission. CVCC-equipped battalions were

expected to relay FRAGOs more quickly and more consistently

across echelons than Baseline battalions. Voice FRAGOs typically

take longer to transmit than digital messages, while

transcription errors and other factors may modify the content of

a voice FRAGO that a company commander relays to his

subordinates. By contrast, a digital FRAGO can be relayed

exactly as it was received. As a result, CVCC was expected to

enhance FRAGO dissemination and interpretation during fast-paced

operations.

14
Receive and transmit enemv information. CVCC-equipped units

were expected to relay enemy information more rapidly and more

accurately than Baseline units. Within the context of the

battalion evaluation, this task focused primarily on the receipt

and relay of enemy information from higher to lower echelons. As

with FRAGOs, perfect consistency was expected for relayed digital

messages. As such, commanders were expected to maintain better

awareness of the enemy situation throughout their battle space in

the CVCC condition.

Receive and transmit friendly troop information. Status

reports from CVCC-equipped units were expected to be more

accurate and timely than those from Baseline units. Given

automated, real-time position and status reporting (i.e.,

location, ammunition, equipment, fuel and personnel), more

accurate and timely performance was anticipated in the CVCC

condition. As a result, commanders in the CVCC condition were

expected to have a better understanding of their own units'

situation.

Manage means of communicating information. CVCC-equipped

units were expected to manage communications more effectively

than Baseline units by significantly reducing their voice radio

signature. Also, units were expected to strike an effective

balance between voice and digital traffic in the CVCC condition,

and to maintain an effective division of labor for relaying

reports. Digital messages were expected to reduce the likelihood

that a commander would require verbal repetition or clarification

of previously transmitted reports or orders.

Assess situation. The combination of automated position and

status reporting, and user-generated reports provided the

commander an up-to-date, graphic display of the tactical

situation throughout his battle space. These displays, augmented

with voice communications, were expected to improve the

commander's awareness of the battalion's overall situation.

Direct and lead subordinate forces. CVCC-equipped units

were expected to provide more effective direction to subordinate

forces than Baseline units. The system's integrated tactical

display was expected to provide a more comprehensive and timely

picture of the tactical situation (both enemy and friendly) as

compared to the Baseline. This improved situational awareness

would enable the commander to better determine what refinements

or changes might be necessary to the current plan in order to

achieve success. Digital message capabilities were expected to

enhance the commandci's ability to communicate changes, and to

monitor the course of the battle throughout his area of

3

The impact of digital communications on FM transmissions

was not evaluated in the current effort. See the description of

the test system, and limitations subsections of the method

section.

15
operations. These factors were expected to provide the commander

more positive control over his subordinates.

Maneuver BOS

Hypothesis. CVCC-equipped units will maneuver more

effectively than Baseline units. The three Maneuver functions

are: (a) move; (b) engage the enemy; and (c) control terrain.

The real-time displays of friendly unit positions and the

automated reporting features inherent to the CVCC condition were

expected to improve a unit's ability to accomplish each of these

functions. Furthermore, the CITV was expected to allow improved

target processing within each crew. The supporting hypotheses

within this BOS are taken from all three maneuver functions.

The first two supporting hypotheses are gleaned from the

Move function. This function is concerned with the positioning

or repositioning of forces relative to the enemy to secure or

retain positional advantage over the enemy (U.S. Army TRADOC,

1991). The reader is cautioned that the move function

corresponds to the definition of maneuver stated in FM 100-5,

Operations (U.S. Department of the Army, 1993), which

distinguishes between maneuver and firepower as dynamics of

combat power.

Move on surface. CVCC-equipped units were expected to move

more effectively as a unit, and to control their exposure to

enemy fires more effectively than were Baseline units. The

POSNAV features allowed commanders to maintain an accurate

understanding of their subordinates' locations, without frequent

verbal reports, and without having to rely on direct observation.

Furthermore, as units moved, CVCC units were better able to key

on each other to maintain formation, even when out of line-ofslght contact. The tactical map display was expected to make it

easier for commanders to shield their unit's movement from

reported enemy locations.

Navigate. CVCC-equipped crews were expected to navigate

more effectively than Baseline crews. At the individual crew

level, the navigation component of the CVCC system simplified

navigational tasks. As a result, crews were expected to move

more rapidly and efficiently throughout the battlefield.

Two hypotheses are formulated from the function, "engage the

enemy" (i.e., subfunction, "employ direct fire").

Process direct fire targets. Due to the CITV, CVCC-equipped

crews were expected to process direct fire targets more

effectively and efficiently than Baseline crews. This hypothesis

is consistent with the results reported by Quinkert (1990) and

Leibrecht et al. (1992). However, this effect was expected to be

tempered within the context of the battalion evaluation. All

vehicle (tank) commanders (TCs) in the current evaluation were

cast in leadership roles (i.e., commanders, operations officer

16
(S3), and company XOs). Therefore, C2 requirements were expected

to claim most of a TC's attention in both the Baseline and CVCC

conditions. It is also possible that commanders would use the

CITV for alternate purposes, such as monitoring the movement and

formation of subordinate platoons. As a result, TCs were not

expected to spend as much time searching for targets as TCs at

platoon level or below. Instead, it was expected that gunners

would independently acquire and identify targets. Since the CVCC

and Baseline gunners' positions are essentially the same, the

potential advantages from the CITV were not expected to be

realized among command tanks. By contrast, this and the

following hypothesis also offer a means to determine whether the

CVCC system might claim too much of the crews' collective

attention as compared to conventional C

2

techniques, and

therefore hamper crew level performance.

Engage direct fire targets. CVCC-equipped units were

expected to more effectively engage opposing forces with direct

fires than were Baseline units. The CVCC system allowed units to

rapidly share accurate enemy and friendly information in graphic

form. This capability could be exploited to coordinate and mass

direct fires on the enemy.

Control terrain. CVCC-equipped units were expected to

control terrain more effectively than Baseline units. The

improved situational awareness attributed to the CVCC system was

expected to enhance the unit's control over key terrain within

the area of operations. That is, by enabling the unit to more

effectively coordinate combat operations, commanders at each

level (i.e., battalion and company) would be better able to

assess the degree of control their unit exerted over the terrain

in their battle space, and direct subordinates accordingly.

Fire Support BOS

Hypothesis. CVCC-equipped units will employ indirect fires

more effectively than Baseline units. The tactical blueprint

describes three fire support functions: (a) process ground

targets; (b) engage ground targets; and (c) integrate fire

support (U.S. Army TRADOC, 1991). The first of the functions

directly involved participants on a frequent basis. The decision

to engage enemy formations with indirect fire means, reflected by

a participant-generated call for fire (CFF), provided measurable

data inherent to the "process ground targets" function, and

therefore forms the basis for the analysis of CVCC's contribution

to the fire support BOS within the current effort. No hypotheses

were developed to support the other two functions within the fire

support BOS, in view of the influence of higher and supporting

headquarters (i.e., maneuver brigade and direct support artillery

battalion) on those functions in most operations.

The ability of a CVCC-equipped crew to determine precise

enemy locations using the laser range finder led to the

17
expectation that CFFs would be more accurate in the CVCC

condition. However, given that targets were viewed through the

same sights in both conditions, target description accuracy was

not expected to differ between conditions, except as influenced

by better resolution through the CITV.

Intelligence BOS

Hypothesis. CVCC-eguipped units will more accurately report

combat-critical enemy information than will Baseline units. The

tactical blueprint identifies three intelligence functions: (a)

collect information; (b) process information; and (c) prepare

intelligence reports. The current effort was not directly

concerned with the "process" and "prepare report" functions, in

that those functions were more appropriate to activities within

the contractor-operated TOC (see Method). The critical factor

that participants were concerned with was the collection of

information, evidenced by critical tactical reports (i.e., SPOT,

CONTACT, and SHELL reports). As with CFFs, positional accuracy

was expected to be greater in reports rendered by CVCC units as

compared to Baseline units, as was the accuracy of target

descriptions.

Method

The following narrative explains the design of the battalion

evaluation. The Approach section addresses the research design,

the test unit configuration, and the soldiers that participated

in the evaluation. The CVCC system description explains the

equipment that was used to support the evaluation in general, and

the Baseline and CVCC configurations of the Ml simulators, the

battalion TOC, the SAFOR, and other forces included in the

simulation. The Procedures section explains the training program

that prepared participants for the test scenario, the tactical

scenario used during the data collection itself, exercise control

procedures, and data collection procea res. The Support Staff

section describes the organization and responsibilities of the

research staff during test weeks. The final subsection describes

the operationally meaningful limitations of this simulation-based

research.

Approach

Qygrvigw

The battalion evaluation compared performance between units

using condition as the primary independent variable. The fourday schedule, unit structure, and tactical scenarios were

generally held constant between conditions. There were some

differences in the individual and crew training programs, which

were tailored to the condition. A total of twelve groups

participated in the evaluation. Each battalion group was

assigned either to the Baseline or the CVCC condition. Six

groups served in each condition.

18
Besides the primary independent variable (condition) a

secondary independent variable and an incidental variable were

also included in the test design. Participants served as

battalion and company command groups to form the secondary

independent variable: echelon (i.e., battalion commander and S3

at the battalion echelon and company commanders and XOs at the

company echelon). The test scenario was divided into three

distinct tactical stages: two delay stages (defensive

framework), and one counterattack (offensive framework). The

incidental variable, stage, was used in order to group data

separately for each tactical situation. The data for the stages

were analyzed separately, but no statistical comparisons were

intended between stages. A more thorough explanation of the test

scenario may be found in the Procedures section of this report.

Leibrecht et al. (in preparation) offer a more detailed

explanation of the research design.

Unit Configuration

Although the CVCC system is adaptable to a variety of combat

vehicles, the developmental process has been limited to a single

platform (i.e.. Ml series tank). The current effort is therefore

focused on a tank battalion as opposed to a battalion task force.

The test unit was identified as the 1st Battalion 10th Armor, an

element of 1st Brigade, 23rd Armor Division. The brigade also

contained two infantry (IN) battalions (1-91 and 1-92) , and a

typical brigade slice of combat support (CS) and combat service

support (CSS) assets. The brigade's task organization for the

test scenario is shown in Table 5.

Table 5

Brigade Task Organization

1-91 IN (H) Bde Control

1-50 FA (155mm, SP) (DS)

A/1-440 ADA (-) (V/S) (DS)

A/23 ENGR Bn (OPCON)

1-92 IN (M) l/A/23 MI Bn (C&J) (DS)

2/A/1-440 ADA (DS) l/l/B/23 MI Bn (GSR)

2/1/B/23 MI Bn (GSR)

1/23 MP Co

45 CHEM Co (SMK/DECON) (-) (DS)

1-10 AR 2/48 CHEM Co (SMK) (-) OPCON

l/A/1-440 ADA (DS)

Bde Trains

1 FSB (DS)

Test unit task organization. As a J-Series tank battalion,

the test unit was assumed to have four line companies of fourteen

19
Ml series tanks each, a scout platoon of six N3 Bradleys, and a

heavy mortar platoon with six 107 nun mortars mounted in M106

mortar carriers (U.S. Department of the Army, 1988d) . The normal

complement of command and control, utility, cargo, and special

purpose vehicles was assumed, as well as liaison and direct

support assets allocated from Brigade.

Because the test unit was operating as a tank-pure

battalion, the four line companies were deployed without crossattachments. The scout platoon, mortars, and direct support air

defense element were all controlled at the battalion level. The

battalion's CSS assets and the supporting Mobile Support Team

(MST) were handled notionally. Figure 1 graphically represents

the test unit structure.

1-10

XL o

COR

S3

i

|5Ha5Kgfa

11111

SCT h4VM0RT Wggi

Figure 1. Test unit structure.

Superior, adjacent, and supporting units. With two

exceptions, all friendly elements outside of the test unit were

represented notionally. The exercise control staff assumed the

roles of the brigade commander, brigade staff, adjacent unit

commanders, and liaison officers. The first exception was the

three firing batteries (eight guns each) of the direct support

(DS) field artillery (FA) battalion. These were represented

20
through the Management Command and Control (MCC) system (see

Description of the Test System) , were moved by the Battle Master,

and were assigned fire missions by the FSO. The second exception

was a tank company (represented by SAFOR) from an adjacent unit

that was passing through the battalion's area of operations at

the outset of the test scenario.

Organic units. Within the battalion, only the line

companies, the scouts, the mortar platoon, the command group, and

the TOC appeared within the simulation. All other CS and CSS

elements were notional. The eight manned simulators were

allocated to the battalion commander, the S3, and the commanders

and executive officers (XOs) of A, B and C Companies. The three

line platoons of A, B and C Companies, all of D Company, and the

scout platoon were represented with semiautomated forces (SAFOR) .

The SAFOR were operated by two SAFOR operators who responded to

commanders' orders and directions. The battalion staff were

represented by four civilian personnel (battalion XO, S2,

assistant S3, and FSO) that operated out of an M577 extension in

the simulator bay. The TOC was graphically represented within

the simulation by three M577s and an M2 that were generated by

the MCC. The mortar platoon's vehicles were also generated by

the MCC. Company executive officers assumed the additional duty

of Fire Support Team (FIST) chief.

Participants

General. A total of 282 U.S. Army personnel and one

Marine4participated in the battalion evaluation. These

personnel included 95 officers and 188 non-commissioned officers

(NCOS) and enlisted men stationed at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Participants ranged in age from 19 to 43. All participants held

an armor Area of Concentration (AOC) cr were currently qualified

in armor Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs). The staffing

model is shown in Table 6. With the exceptions noted below,

eight officers and sixteen NCOs and enlisted men supported each

of the twelve test weeks (six Baseline and six CVCC conditions).

For a variety of reasons, test groups did not always include

a complete set of participants. Contingency rules from the test

support package (Sawyer, Meade, Ainslie, and Leibrecht, in

preparation) dictated the priority for duty assignments given

missing personnel. The data included in the results and

discussion section are modified to accommodate missing

participants.

It would have been preferable to draw each participant group

from line tank battalions, and to organize crews based on

established battle rosters. However, this was not possible. In

4

An armor-qualified Marine major assigned to the USAARMS

faculty served as the battalion commander for a Baseline

rotation.

21
Table 6

Participant Staffing Model

Number Position Qualifications

1 Bn Cdr

1 Bn S3

3 Co Cdrs

3 Co XOs

8 Gunners

8 Drivers

(LTC or MAJ, AR)

(MAJ or CPT, AR)

(CPT or 1LT, AR)

(1LT or 2LT, AR)

(SGT or CPL, 19K)

(CPL or PFC, 19K)

almost all cases, the entire test group had to be organized ad

hoc using available personnel that were tasked from training,

school, and combat units at Fort Knox. The following figures

provide selected data regarding participants' qualifications.

Additional data are tabulated in Appendix B.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of participants by rank.

All battalion commanders were majors, and all but one battalion

S3 were captains. Only during one test week (CVCC condition)

were there two field grade officers available for the battalion

command group. Most of the company commanders were captains. As

shown in Figure 2, the Baseline population included a higher

number of NCOs in the ranks of sergeant first class (SEC) and

staff sergeant (SS6).

Service experience. Total service experience and experience

in Armor units serves as a general indicator of group

comparability. Overall, experience levels among officers were

comparable, whereas the average experience level among NCOs in

Baseline groups was greater than among CVCC groups (see App. B.,

Table B-l).

Experience in selected duty positions. Figure 3 shows the

distribution of participants by current duty position. The

number of officers currently assigned as company commanders and

XOs and to instructor duties slightly favors the Baseline

condition. Likewise, the number of NCOs currently serving as TCs

and instructors favors the Baseline condition. By contrast, the

number of NCOs and enlisted personnel currently assigned as

gunners and drivers favors the CVCC condition. It should be

noted, however, that this distribution does not reflect prior

experience levels.

Besides current assignment, experience levels in selected

positions are important in characterizing the participant group's

background (see App. B., Table B-2). The data show roughly

comparable levels of experience at the battalion level (battalion

commander, XO and staff) and company level (company commander,

22
cvcc Baseline

ttltlll (7) MAJ (6) HUM

Mm mil (

18

)

CPT (2

') um um i

Hill Hill IHM (15) 1LT (15) HHI Hill Hill

II Hill (7) 2LT (6) Hill I

SFC (3) HI

I Hill (

6

)

SSG (15

) Hill Hill Hill

I HHI Hill ,oo\ an (oo\ Hill Hill I HHI Hill (ZZ) SCaT (22) |||(||||tl

till HHI HHI HHI /QQv nDI /CDr ,„. Hill Hill HHI II

HHI HHI Hill HHI (") CPLySPC (37) mti HHMHII Hill

mum!!!!!!! (26) PFC/PVT OD mmt

Figure 2. Participant distribution, by rank.

CVCC officers Baseline

* (1) BnXO (1) I

» (1) Bn S3 (1) I

tNMi (6) CoCdr (10) INN MM

INNNI (8) CoXO (ll)INNNNII

tNNW (8) PKLdr (A MNI

* (1) instructor (4) NN

NNN* (7) Student (1) i

INNNNINIH (15) OtnOT (14) INN NNI NN

NCO/Enllsted

m (3)TankCdr(ii)iNNNNM

ii mnnm wmmil mn IIWI yS£) uiUniiOr \£&) ww» P^W IWW WWI ^W

W^w^w^W ^w^^wWfW WwWW»^»^^W¥ ^^WW I •^»/ ^^IIVwI \"**/ ^^"' WWW WWw w^w »w

m (3) Instructor (18) NM MN INN IN

Student (3) IN

NNNNI (8) Other (14)NINNNINN

Figure 3. Participant distribution by current duty position.

23
XO, and platoon leader) among officers, although the number and

cumulative experience of officers that have served as a battalion

S3 are roughly twice as great in the CVCC condition. The number

of NCOs with experience as platoon sergeants was three times as

great in the Baseline condition, and the cumulative experience

was better than four times as great in the Baseline condition.

At the tank commander level, the number of participants was

roughly double, and the cumulative experience better than three

times as great among the Baseline group. The number of NCOs and

enlisted participants experienced as gunners was only about 20%

greater in the Baseline condition, but the cumulative experience

was nearly 50% greater.

Military schooling. (App. B., Table B-3). The Baseline group

had a greater percentage of graduates at all military school

levels among NCOs and enlisted personnel, and all but Command and

General Staff Officer's Course (CGSOC) among officers. The

Baseline group had better than twice as many Combined Arms and

Services Staff School (CAS3) and Basic Non-Commissioned Officers

Course (BNCOC) graduates, better than three times the number of

Advanced Non-Commissioned Officers Course (ANCOC) graduates, and

nearly 50% more Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC)

graduates than the CVCC group.

Description of the Test System

This section summarizes the test equipment used by

participants and the control staff to execute and control

training and testing. It also lists additional equipment used to

collect and analyze the data from the evaluation. More detailed

descriptions can be found in Leibrecht et al. (in preparation)

and Atwood et al. (in preparation).

MWTB Test Equipment

MWTB equipment used in this evaluation included Ml

simulators, battalion TOC workstations, SAFOR workstations,

simulation control consoles, displays for monitoring the

battlefield, simulation utilities consoles, an automated data

collection system, and a data reduction and analysis subsystem.

Each of these components transmitted and received information

over a coaxial cable Ethernet computer network. More complete

facility descriptions appear in previous CVCC publications,

especially O'Brien et al. (1992).

Ml Simulators

For this evaluation, MWTB Ml tank simulators were used in

both the Baseline and CVCC conditions. The SIMNET Ml simulators

were modified to accommodate changes in the crewstations for

commander, gunner and loader to simulate CVCC capabilities. MWTB

simulators did not include all functions and controls found in an

actual Ml, but only those necessary to fight the tank. This was

consistent with the "selective fidelity" concept used to develop

24
cost effective simulators (U.S. Army Armor School, 1989). Table

7 summarizes the Baseline and CVCC simulator configurations.

Table 7

Ml Simulator Configuration

Baseline CVCC

Standard SIMNET Ml Baseline Ml

simulator, plus: simulator, plus:

0 Thermal Imaging System (TIS) e CCD

0 Autoloader (40 round basic load) e CITV

0 SINCGARS radio

Baseline Simulator. The Baseline simulators contained

selected controls, indicators and sights available on an Ml tank.

Some features of the tank were not represented in the simulation,

and therefore the controls corresponding to those capabilities

were represented by decals on the simulator wall. For example:

smoke was not available in the simulation, therefore the smoke

grenade launcher controls on the TC's control panel were merely

decals.

Several design limitations of the standard simulator are

noteworthy to the extent that they effect crew performance as

compared to an actual. Ml series tank. These are mentioned here

in only a general sense. Related SIMNET publications (e.g., the

SIMNET User's Guide. U.S. Army Armor School, 1989, and the Ml

SIMNET Operator's Guide. U.S. Army Armor School, 1987) will

provide the reader greater detail on these limitations.

Specifically, the simulator emulates a closed-hatch mode, and

offers only a limited view from the commanders hatch. This

limitation affects conventional navigation and formation-keeping

performance. The former problem is offset, to some extent, by

the addition of simulator-unique navigation tools. Also, the

simulator only emulates the main gun and its primary direct fire

system. That is, the gunner only has the gunner's primary sight

(GPS) available. Unlike the standard SIMNET Ml simulator, the

simulators used for this evaluation also emulated the TIS channel

in both the GPS and gunner's primary sight extension (GPSE) .

Ammunition handling was simulated by an automatic loader

(autoloader) and ammunition transfer controls at the TC's

position. The autoloader was incorporated to vacate the loader's

position for a research assistant (trainer/monitor). The

autoloader took approximately eight seconds to reload after a

round was fired. If a round was already chambered and the gunner

changed the ammo selection, the autoloader took approximately

25
eleven seconds to clear the breach and load the new round. The

TC could transfer ammunition from the semi-ready rack to the

ready rack by using a switch on the turret wall. Simulators

began each scenario stage with a basic load of 27 sabot and 13

HEAT rounds, to simulate a 120inm gun configuration.

A simulated tactical radio network provided communication

capabilities. Each simulator was equipped with two SINCGARS

radio simulators. The radios converted voice transmissions into

digital signals, which were broadcast over the simulation

Ethernet. This capability also made it possible to capture voice

transmissions along with simulation data broadcast over the

Ethernet. An intercom system provided for communication between

crewmembers. Maximum effective radio communication distance was

unlimited.

CVCC Ml simulators. In addition to the basic Ml simulator

hardware and software described previously, CVCC simulators

included several other major capabilities. The CCD and CITV

distinguished the CVCC Ml from the Baseline Ml. Table 8

summarizes the CVCC simulator's capabilities. Figure 4

illustrates the commander's station in the CVCC simulator, with

the CCD to the vehicle commander's right, and the CITV to his

front (between the GPSE and CCD).

Table 8

CVCC Simulator Capabilities

CCD with:

O Digital map

O Digital messages

O Location of own forces

O Status of own tank and

subordinate units

Target acquisition and engagement

CITV with:

O laser range finder (LRF)

O 3 scan modes

O 3X and 10X magnification

O white hot/black hot polarity

O target onsignate

O

O

Navigation

Digital terrain map and

tactical overlays

Digital navigation routes

Communications

Digital burst transmissions of:

O combat reports

O tactical overlays

Driver's steer-to display O navigation routes

Note. Capabilities listed are unique to the CVCC configuration.

The CCD was the primary interface used to receive, transmit,

and display digital messages. The CCD's capabilities are listed

26
Figure 4. CVCC Commander's Station.

in Table 9. The display was dominated by a nap screen and

variable menu area. Other parts of the screen were dedicated to

function keys and permanent information displays. The screen was

manipulated using a touch screen and/or a thumb cursor on the

commander's control handle. When preparing reports, locations

could be entered using the touch screen, thumb cursor, or the

vehicle's laser range finders (LRF). CCD reports that included

locations automatically posted a position icon to the map screen

when the report was in the receive queue, open, or posted to the

map by the commander. A more detailed description of the CCD and

its capabilities may be found in O'Brien et al. (1992).

The CCD is designed to receive and transmit digital data

through the radio interface unit (RIU) of the SINCGARS radio.

However, the RIU was not implemented for the current evaluation.

Instead, digital messages were routed directly between the CCD's

host computer and the simulation Ethernet.

The navigation component allowed the commander to monitor

the position of his own vehicle, as well as adjacent and

subordinate units. It was also used to create navigational

27
Table 9

CCD Capabilities

Input Options

O Thumb (cursor) control

O Touch screen Input

O Laser range finder location Input to combat reports

Navigation

O Digital tactical map with selectable grid lines, scales, and terrain

features

O Digital tactical overlays

O Own-vehicle location (grid and Icon)

O Own-vehicle orientation (azimuth heading and directional icon)

O Friendly vehicle location icons

O Report-based icons

O Graphic navigation routes with waypolnts and storage/retrieval

O Navigation waypoint auto advance

O Driver's display (with steer-to-indicator)

Dlfltal Communication

O Combat report preparation

O Send/receive/relay combat reports (including report icons)

O Receive/relay tactical overlays

O Send/receive/relay navigation routes

O Friendly vehicle locations (mutual POSNAV)

O Automated logistics reports, with auto routing

routes. The navigation nodule included a steer-to display at the

driver's position that displayed the direction and distance to

the waypoint designated on the CCD. The driver could then

navigate the tank to that location using minimal verbal

communication with the TC. The TC could designate a sequence of

waypoints (i.e., a route), and set the navigation module in an

auto-advance mode, so that the display would advance to the next

waypoint when the tank came within 100 meters of the current

destination. Routes could be saved to a file and transmitted

like other CCD messages.

All CCD reports except the logistics report could be sent on

demand. The logistics report represented a special report

category. When accessed, the logistics report showed the current

status of one's own vehicle and any subordinate units. The user

could obtain the equipment, personnel, ammunition, or fuel status

of his unit, or the summary status (all four areas) of his own

vehicle. This report was current when accessed. If the report

remained open, the CVCC system would update it automatically

based on both time and status criteria.

The CITV provided the commander with an independent

battlefield viewing capability and an independent LRF. The

28
reader should note that the CITV modelled in the battalion

evaluation differed from the CITV that is employed in the M1A2

system. Table 10 summarizes the CITV capabilities within the

CVCC system.

Table 10

CITV Capabilities

o Independent viewer with LRF

o 3X and 10X magnification

o White-hot and black-hot polarity

o Target designate (main gun slew to CITV line of

sight)

o Manual search mode

o Autoscan mode

o Gun line of sight (GLOS) mode (CITV slew to main gun

line of sight)

o Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)

o Own vehicle icon (directional, all parts moving)

The CITV display was mounted directly in front of the

vehicle commander, and the sensor operated independently of the

turret. CITV controls were located on the CITV display panel and

the commander's control handle. The CITV tank icon, located at

the bottom center of the CITV display, contained separate

components showing the orientation of the CITV, the main gun, and

the tank hull, with the 12 O'clock position always representing

grid north. The CITV tank icon also displayed left and right

sector limits that were used with an autoscan mode. The CITV had

three operating modes:

(a) In the manual search mode, the commander manipulated

the sight using the commander's control handle.

(b) In the autoscan mode, the sight automatically

oscillated between pre-set sector limits. The TC could

adjust both the sector limits and the scan rate.

(c) In the gun line of sight (GLOS) mode, the CITV was

slaved to the gunner's primary sight in both azimuth and

elevation.

In the autoscan and GLOS modes, the TC could override the

CITV and revert to manual control by depressing the palm switch

on the commander's control handle. The TC could also designate

targets (bringing the gun tube on line with the CITV) whenever he

was operating in manual mode.

The CITV included an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)

system that was activated with the CITV LRF. When the commander

lased at any vehicle using the CITV, an IFF symbol appeared in

29
the upper left corner of the CITV display. IFF system accuracy

varied from 40-90 percent, based on the range to the target.

Gunners were still required to visually confirm targets prior to

engaging.

Tactical Operations Center

In addition to the vehicle simulators, a battalion TOC

supported tactical operations in both the Baseline and CVCC

conditions. Both the Baseline and CVCC T")Cs contained standalone SINCGARS radio simulators compatible with those in the

simulators. In the CVCC condition, automated TOC workstations

extended the capabilities available in the CVCC Ml simulators.

Table 11 compares the Baseline and CVCC battalion TOCs.

Table 11

Battalion TOC Operational Requirement

Baseline TOC CVCg TQC

o Conventional mapboards and o Four Bn TOC workstations

status displays o Large screen SitDisplay

o Acetate overlays o FSE terminal

o Paper message transcripts o SINCGARS radio simulators

and journals

o Fire support element (FSE)

terminal

o SINCGARS radio simulators

Baseline battalion TOC. The Baseline TOC was located in a

single M577 extension. Battle reports, unit locations and

status, and other pertinent information were maintained on wall

charts and maps. The TOC staff maintained staff journals

manually. Radios were configured for voice communication over

the brigade command net, brigade operations and intelligence

(O&I) net5, the battalion command n^t and the battalion O&I

net6. See Leibrecht et al. (1993) for a more detailed

description of the Baseline TOC.

CVCC battalion TOC. The automated (CVCC) TOC contained four

automated workstations and a large-screen Situation and Planning

5The Bde O&I network was allocated to a citizens band

channel due to a shortage of stand alone SINCGARS radio

simulators.

"The battalion O&I net was established to handle routine

information without cluttering or interfering with the battalion

command net (U.S. Department of the Army, 1988d) , and for fire

support and admin/log traffic, since neither net was represented.

30
Display (SitDisplay), located in an M577 extension. The four

workstations were configured for the battalion commander/XO, the

assistant S3, the S2, and the FSO. An additional workstation

(CSS) was located in the exercise control room (ECR) for scenario

control purposes. The workstations exchanged data on a TOC local

area network (LAN), connected to the CVCC network.

Each TOC workstation consisted of two color monitors, a

keyboard, a mouse, and a central processing unit (see Figure 5).

The left-hand monitor was configured as a map display that

portrayed a digital topographical map. Pull-down menus on the

map display enabled the operator to create, edit, and transmit

overlays on the battalion digital net. Other menus allowed the

operator to copy overlays from other workstations on the LAN.

The right-hand monitor, called the Communication and Planning

Display, presented textual information received from other

sources. It enabled the user to create, edit, store, and

transmit reports generated from his workstation, and to access

reports from other workstations on the LAN. See Leibrecht et al.

(in preparation) for a more detailed description of TOC

workstation capabilities.

Figure 5. CVCC battalion TOC workstation.

The CSS workstation included all the capabilities of the

other workstations, and allowed control personnel to monitor

message traffic and unit locations in the same format as the

participants and the TOC staff. The CSS workstation also

contained specialized utilities for exercise control that are

detailed in Leibrecht et al. (in preparation).

31
SAFOR and MCC controlled forces

As previously explained, the majority of the battalion

consisted of SAFOR. The friendly SAFOR were controlled through

two workstations located in the ECR. A third workstation served

as the OPFOR terminal. The battalion's organic heavy mortar

platoon and direct support artillery were generated through the

MCC system. The following paragraphs outline how these forces

were controlled.

SAFOR. SAFOR units could be controlled "on-line" to

accomplish specific tasks, or programmed to execute more

comprehensive combat missions. Maximum engagement ranges,

gunnery proficiency levels, initial positions, and routes to be

followed in offensive operations were programmed and stored. The

OPFOR operated entirely from exercise files for each training and

test stage, in order to expose each test unit to the same threat.

Friendly SAFOR exercise files placed SAFOR vehicles in their

initial positions for each stage, and included a copy of the

standard overlay for that stage. The actual movement between

positions was left to the operator based on the unit commander's

direction.

In the Baseline condition, friendly SAFOR operators

communicated with the simulator-mounted unit commanders and TOC

staff using voice radio only. Strict exercise control procedures

limited the type and timing of information that the SAFOR

operator and the radio operator passed to the participants (see

"Exercise Control Procedures," later in this report).

Operational messages (CONTACT, SPOT, situation report or SITREP

and other reports) appeared on the SAFOR workstation screen to

represent reports from units controlled through that workstation.

These text messages were then relayed by voice to the commander

in the simulator. If the pace of the operation did not permit

the SAFOR or radio operator to send all the reports, the operator

sent the most critical reports (SPOT, CONTACT, current status)

according to established contingency rules.7SAFOR operators

also received orders and FRAGOs verbally, and then implemented

those orders using the SAFOR workstation.

In the CVCC condition, friendly SAFOR vehicle locations and

status were automatically reported to the CVCC digital network,

to provide position icons and logistics status on the CCDs and

TOC workstations. Furthermore, digital CVCC messages were

automatically generated by the SAFOR8and transmitted on the

digital network at the same time that the corresponding text

7

'A copy of SAFOR operator guidelines and contingency rules

are included in Leibrecht et al., 1993.

8

SAFOR could create CONTACT, SPOT, SHELL, and SITREP, but

not INTEL, OFF, ADJUST, or NBC reports. SAFOR-generated SITREPs

were incomplete, lacking a front-line trace and commander's

intent.

32
message was displayed on the SAFOR operator's workstation. Voice

radio augmented the digital communications, and allowed the SAFOR

or radio operator to Interact with the commanders In simulators.

However, there was no capability for SAFOR operators to receive

digital messages from their unit commanders.

MCC forces. The MCC-generated mortar and artillery assets

were Initialized by the Battle Master at the start of the

exercise. The FSO executed Indirect fires and mo"«id the mortar

platoon using the FSE terminal In the TOC. The ■■ wltzer

batteries were moved by the Battle Master, at predetermined times

during the scenario. Fire support units would not accept fire

missions during movement, but a unit could be halted In position

at any time during the move. Once halted, each unit took several

minutes to set up before It could resume firing.

The only difference In fire support operations between

conditions lay In the tools that the FSO had to monitor the

battle and receive CFFs. The Baseline FSO received only voice

radio calls, while the CVCC FSO received mainly digital calls on

the FSO workstation. However, there was no automated link

between the CVCC TOC workstation and FSE terminal. All voice and

digital Indirect fire requests had to be manually entered In the

FSE terminal. Likewise, no capability existed to provide POSNAV

Icons for MCC-generated forces. Therefore, neither the mortars

nor the howitzers were automatically posted on TOC workstations

or CCDs.

Procedures

This subsection outlines the procedures used to prepare

participants for the test scenario, provides an overview of the

scenario, explains exercise control procedures, and outlines data

collection procedures. A copy of the weekly training and test

schedule may be found In Leibrecht et al. (In preparation).

Training Program

The training program was executed during the first three

days of each test week. Table 12 summarizes the program.

Program objectives were to provide participants training on the

basic simulator (In both CVCC and Baseline conditions), the CVCC

system (CVCC condition only), and on company and battalion

operations. With respect to unit operations, the general

training objectives were to: (a) provide practice moving and

fighting as a unit In the SIMNET environment, (b) exercise the

battalion SOP, (c) provide "team-bulldlng" opportunities between

the participants, TOC staff, and SAFOR operators, and (d)

rehearse tactical tasks required within the test scenario.

Training was progressive, beginning with Individual tasks on

Monday and Tuesday morning. Collective training began at the

crew level during the latter half of Tuesday morning. Company

level training occurred on Tuesday afternoon, followed by

battalion level training on Wednesday. Selected training

materials from the Individual training program may be found In

33
the support package for the battalion evaluation (Sawyer et al.,

In preparation).

Table 12

Training Program Characteristics

Progressive (crawl, walk, run) ~

0 Individual to crew to company to battalion level

0 Basic simulator to CVCC

Tailored —

0 By crew position — emphasis on TC tasks

0 By condition

0 Emphasis on navigation In Baseline

0 Emphasis on CCD, CITV In CVCC

Individual training. The Individual training program began

with the General Introduction on Monday morning, then proceeded

to a program that was tailored by condition and crew position.

For CVCC crews, the tailored program focused on operating the

CVCC equipment. For Baseline crews, the tailored program

reinforced SIMNET navigation. In order to reduce the Impact of

the SIMNET environment on any data related to navigation

performance. Figure 6 Is a graphic representation of the

Individual training program.

The General Introduction Included an overview of the

battalion evaluation, and general rules of conduct within the

MWTB and the evaluation. Participants completed Privacy Act

statements and biographical questionnaires (copies of which may

be found in Leibrecht et al., 1993) at the end of the

Introduction.

Given that the primary focus of the battalion evaluation was

on C

2

issues, and that all officers filled leadership positions

at either the company or battalion echelon, the bulk of the

Individual training program was dedicated to their training at

the vehicle commander's position. The two thrusts within

vehicle commanders' training were: (a) to ensure a common

knowledge level on basic tank simulator functions, and (b) to

cover equipment-specific requirements of that week's test

condition.

9

The term, vehicle commander, is used throughout this report

to refer to the crew position in the simulator as well as the

entire sample of officers.

34
Period

CVCC

Offlowt | GuniMra A Drivara

Baseline

i

Officers j Gunners A Drivers

1 Mon-AM Qtnaral Introduction General Introduction

Tank v. Sim J Excused Tank v. Sim Excused 1

CCD Demonstration | SIMNET Navigation \

Briefing \

Seat-specific training | Seat-specific training | j

CCD Hands-on Training | TC's Navigation |

Exercise * |

1 Mon-PM

CCO Skills Test '

Excused *

i |

1 |

i

1

CITV Briefing |

CITV Handeln Training j

TUM-AM CITV Skills Test '

SAFOR Briefing i Seat-specific training

Bn SOP Briefing

i

SAFOR Briefing i Seat-specific training

Bn SOP Briefing I |

Figure 6. Individual training program.

Vehicle commanders' training began, in both conditions, with

a classroom presentation that addressed the differences between

the Ml simulators used in the evaluation and an actual Ml or M1A1

tank. This period had several objectives: (a) to highlight

features unique to the simulator, (b) to explain implications of

the simulation environment relevant to combat operations, and (c)

to alert participants to common problems that crews experience

within the simulation.

For Baseline units only, the tank versus simulator briefing

was immediately followed with a SIMNET navigation briefing. The

first objective of the navigation training was to point out the

special navigation tools built into the simulator. The second

objective was to reinforce basic land navigation techniques, with

emphasis on how those techniques were to be employed in SIMNET.

In the CVCC condition, the tank versus simulator briefing

was followed by a "CCD demonstration." The briefer demonstrated

CCD operation using a large screen display.

The next training event for both CVCC and Baseline groups

was the vehicle commander's seat-specific training. This was the

first hands-on training phase, and trained officers on basic

Ml simulator operations. Participants operated all primary

commander's controls, with specific emphasis on those that are

unique to the simulator. They also became familiar with gunner's

and driver's controls.

35
For Baseline units only, the first day of training concluded

with a hands-on, SIMNET navigation exercise. Officers were

paired together as vehicle commander and driver and were required

to navigate their vehicles through a series of checkpoints on the

SIMNET terrain. Each officer was given the six-digit grid

location of his start point, a mapboard with overlay, and a

protractor. After the first vehicle commander successfully

navigated to three checkpoints, the officers traded positions,

and the second vehicle commander navigated to three checkpoints.

Control personnel monitored progress using a plan view display

(PVD), and communicated with the crews by voice radio. The

controller ensured that each officer navigated to within

approximately two hundred meters of each checkpoint. The

navigation training exercise concluded at the lunch hour on

Monday.

In CVCC units, the training continued with CCD hands-on

training. Officers learned how to accomplish all CCD functions,

and practiced CCD tasks repeatedly in order to gain proficiency.

Trainers explained each function, talked participants through the

function, then observed while the participant practiced the task.

The CCD training concluded with a skills test that verified the

TC's ability to use the equipment. CCD training began before

lunch on Monday, and concluded about halfway through the

afternoon.

In the CVCC condition, the remainder of Monday afternoon was

dedicated to CITY training. This period began with a classroom

presentation on the CITV. TCs then proceeded to the simulators

for hands-on training. The same training approach was used for

the CITV as was used for CCD training. Trainers administered a

CITV skills test on Tuesday morning to verify learning.

The common training program on Tuesday began in the

classroom with a briefing on SAFOR operations. This briefing,

conducted normally by the senior SAFOR operator, explained the

capabilities and limitations of the forces that participants

would command and control during the evaluation. The briefer

explained how unit commanders would communicate with SAFOR

operators, how and under what conditions the SAFOR would report,

as well as what the SAFOR could and could not do.

The last officers' training session on Tuesday was a

briefing on the unit SOP.10The Battle Master distributed

copies of the battalion SOP extract to all officers, and

explained some of its key points. The Battle Master emphasized

the voice network structure and the expected division of labor

between company commanders and XOs regarding message processing.

Individual training for gunners and drivers was also

tailored to their crew position. Gunners and drivers were

10A copy of the battalion SOP may be found in Sawyer et al.

(in preparation).

36
excused following the general introduction on Monday morning, and

told to return at a specified time on Tuesday morning for seat

specific training. They were familiarized with the other

positions in the simulator, and received detailed, hands-on

training in their assigned positions.

During CVCC test weeks, the time period following the

battalion situational training exercise (STX) on Wednesday

morning was dedicated to CCD reinforcement training for officers

only. Training began with a short lecture using the large-screen

display, then vehicle commanders returned to the simulators for a

hands-on message processing exercise. The exercise was designed

to reinforce CCD training between battalion level training

exercises.

The lunch hour on Wednesday was used to discuss selected

research issues with officers. A representative of the ARI-Fort

Knox Field Unit led the discussion. Participants were briefed on

the use of kill suppress and its implications for the results of

the evaluation.11The discussion also focused on the need for

participants to navigate for themselves rather than following

SAFOR elements between fighting positions.

Collective Training. Collective training began at midmorning on Tuesdays, and lasted through Wednesday afternoon of a

test week. Training progressed in crawl-walk-run fashion through

four distinct exercises: crew "sandbox" training, a company STX,

a battalion STX, and a battalion training exercise. During

Baseline training, navigation refresher training for all crews

occurred between the battalion STX and the battalion training

exercise. The remainder of this section describes the collective

training program in greater detail. Table 13 summarizes the

collective training program.

Each collective training event was preceded by an

inbriefing, and closed with a group debriefing. Battalion and

company OPORDs existed for each tactical scenario in order to

simplify participants' planning and to standardize execution.

The OPORDs were issued at the start of the exercise.

Participants were given time to review the orders, to coordinate

with the TOC staff and each other, and to refine their plans.

^Kill suppress rendered manned vehicles invulnerable within

the simulation, in order to keep unit commanders intact

throughout the data collection period. Leibrecht et al. (in

preparation) explains kill suppress and its implications in

greater detail.

37
Table 13

Collective Training Program Highlights

Crew sandbox training

O Individual crews

O Cross-country navigation

O Friendly and enemy SAFOR

O Location, enemy action, own status reporting requirements

Company sltuatlonal training exercise

O 4 tank companies: 3 manned, 1 SAFOR

O Battalion OPORDs and FRAGOs, Company OPORDs

O Companies delay on line

O Companies counterattack on line

O Battalion Commander and S3 observe and CPX the battle

O Company Commanders learn to employ SAFOR platoons

O Exercise Battalion SOP

O Limited Brigade and adjacent unit radio traffic

Battalion sltuatlonal training exercise

O Full Battalion structure

O Battalion and Company OPORDs

O Companies defend from mutually supporting BPs

O Battalion Command Group employs manned & SAFOR companies & SAFOR scout

platoon

O Limited Brigade and adjacent unit radio traffic

Navigation refresher training (Baseline only)

O Crew level refresher training

O Modified version of crew sandbox exercise

Battalion training scenario

O Full Battalion structure

O Brigade, Battalion and Company OPORDs, Brigade and Battalion FRAGOs

O Stealth-based terrain recon

O Companies delay from mutually supporting BPs

O Battalion counterattacks with 3 Companies on line

O Representative Brigade and adjacent unit traffic

Crews were allocated fifteen minutes to conduct simulators checks

prior to actual scenario execution.

In crew "sandbox" training, each crew was required to

negotiate a series of checkpoints positioned in a twenty-five

square-kilometer area (i.e., 5 Km X 5 Km). In addition to

navigating, crews sent tactical reports and engaged semiautomated

OPFOR vehicles. Each sandbox also contained BLUFOR vehicles to

38
reinforce vehicle Identification. In the CVCC condition, crews

were encouraged to use the CCD's navigation component and digital

reports to meet the training objectives.

The company STX, scheduled for Tuesday afternoon, exercised

C

3

and reporting requirements In a delay scenario. In this

exercise, the four line companies operated on line, each In a

separate lane. Each company delayed against and OPFOR motorized

rifle battalion, reinforced (MRB+) In Stage 1, then attacked an

OPFOR motorized rifle platoon (MRP), reinforced with one or two

tanks In Stage 2. During this exercise, the Battle Master

assumed the role of battalion commander. Communications with the

notional brigade headquarters and adjacent units were held to a

minimum In order to focus on communications between the battalion

TOG, the company command groups, and the SAPOR operators.

During the company STX, the battalion commander and S3

received concurrent training In the TOG, as a team building

activity. In the CVCC condition, this training also Included an

Introduction to the TOC's automated capabilities. As the

tactical situation developed, the battalion commander's and SB's

crews followed one of the companies, and reinforced that

company's fires. During the second stage, the battalion

commander and S3 mounted their simulators to observe the battle.

The TOG staff participated In the company STX to receive and

relay tactical reports, and to become familiar with the

participants' operational preferences. The TOG staff also

enforced reporting standards as outlined In the battalion SOP.

The participant battalion commander and S3 communicated with

the Battle Master and staff on the brigade command net. This

allowed the battalion command group to discuss the battle and

procedures without Interfering In communications between the

Battle Master, TOG, and companies.

The battalion STX was scheduled for Wednesday morning.

A, B, and G Companies established battle positions around an

engagement area, and D Company (all-SAFOR) established a position

In depth. In addition to the four line companies, the battalion

STX Incorporated the entire battalion command structure, a SAFOR

scout platoon, and more extensive communications with the brigade

and adjacent forces. The OPFOR represented a motorized rifle

regiment (MRR) attacking with two MRBs+ In the first echelon. A

MRP, acting as a combat reconnaissance patrol (GRP), preceded

each lead echelon MRB+. As the attack continued In depth, the

OPFOR became vulnerable to counterattack. The battalion

commander was expected to Identify the opportunity and execute an

appropriate counterattack plan.

The navigation refresher training was scheduled for the last

hour on Wednesday morning during Baseline weeks. This crew level

exercise was essentially a repeat of the crew sandbox training,

with Its primary emphasis on navigation tasks. Each crew was

assigned the same sandbox as they had operated In on Tuesday.

39
The requirement varied from Tuesday in that simulators were

placed at the last checkpoint in the sandbox, and crews were to

negotiate the checkpoints in reverse sequence.

The battalion training scenario, scheduled for Wednesday

afternoon, served as a "dress rehearsal" for the test scenario.

Unit commanders participated in a terrain reconnaissance along

the battalion's front line as part of the preparation for the

tactical scenario. A, B, and C Companies established initial

delay positions on line, with D Company in depth. In stage one,

ELUFOR companies delayed the two lead echelon MRBs+ of an

attacking MRR. As the situation developed, D Company was to

counterattack remnants of the lead echelon MRBs+, and complete

their destruction. During the conduct of the delay, the brigade

commander ordered a battalion level counterattack to intercept

the second echelon MRB+ in a designated engagement area. In

stage two, D Company anchored the counterattack while A, B, and C

Companies maneuvered to flank the OPFOR's second echelon MRB+.

An OPFOR chemical attack was simulated against the BLUFOR during

stage two to prompt an NBC-1 report.

Scenario Overview

The test scenario was scheduled for Thursday of each week.

The scenario was divided into three tactical stages, preceded by

a preparation period. The divisions of the test scenario are

referred to as stages in order to avoid confusion with the

tactical phases described in OPORDs 20 and 200 (see Appendix C) .

Stages and phases did not correspond with each other. The

scenario began with an inbriefing by the Battle Master. After

the inbriefing, the Battle Master published the Brigade OPORD,

then turned the participants over to the battalion XO for the

battalion OPORD. Preparation continued with a terrain

reconnaissance and internal coordination, and culminated with

simulator pre-operations checks. Table 14 summarizes the

sequence of events in the test scenario.

The tactical situation leading up to the test scenario

involved a defensive operation to the battalion's front. In that

operation, forward units stopped the lead divisions in an OPFOR

combined arms army, but were forced to withdraw when the OPFOR's

second echelon force was committed. The test unit's mission was

to assist the disengagement and rearward passage of the friendly

force, then conduct an aggressive delay in sector for four hours,

and destroy the lead echelon MRR of a motorized rifle division

(MRD).

After completing preparation. Stage 1 execution commenced.

1-10 Armor was set with A, B, & C Companies in battle positions

(BPs) along Phase Line (PL) KING, oriented to the South. D

Company was in reserve along PL CLUB. The battle handover had

been effected, and the last elements of TF 1-2, 1st BDE, 52nd ID

(M) had completed their passage of lines through 1-10 Armor's

FLOT, but were still in the 1-10 Armor sector. The battalion

scout platoon, after assisting the passage of lines, moved

40
Table 14

Test Scenario Sequence

Preparation

o Bde OPORD briefing

o Bn OPORD briefing

o Leaders' recon

o Planning and coordination

o Pre-exercise message traffic

o Simulator pre-ops checks

Stage 1 — Delay

o Test unit engages, damages 2 OPFOR MRBs

o Bde counterattack FRAGO received and processed

o Remnants of OPFOR lead echelon MRBs stop, establish hasty

defenses

o Test unit consolidates in subsequent BPs

Stage 2 — Counterattack

O TOC publishes FRAGO

o Test unit attacks through remnants of Stage 1 OPFOR (1

NRC)

o Bde FRAGO to resume delay received and processed,

o Test unit engages, destroys 2nd echelon MRS of OPFOR lead

echelon regiment, consolidates on OBJ.

Stage 3 »- Delav

O TOC publishes FRAGO

o Cos reposition to resume delay

o Test unit engages 2 OPFOR MRBs

o OPFOR employs chemicals

o BLUFOR submits NBC-1, withdraws to subsequent BPs and

consolidates

forward to establish initial contact with the advancing OPFOR.

The scouts reported OPFOR recon elements, and Division

intelligence reported OPFOR activity forward of PL KING. The

Scouts pulled back, completed their passage of lines, and moved

back to consolidate along PL JACK.

Stage 1; DELAY. Stage One was the initial delay. The

OPFOR first echelon MRR attacked with two MRBs+ abreast (see

Figure 7) . As the BLUFOR delayed in sector, the brigade located

the second echelon MRB+ of the lead echelon MRR, and ordered the

test unit to counterattack.

41
PL KING

Figure 7. Test scenario situation: Stage 1.

As this stage began, two OPFOR recon platoons advanced to

locate 1-10 Armor's initial defensive position. The scout

platoon consolidated and moved to screen the battalion's left

flank. The OPFOR executed a ten minute artillery barrage along

PL KING. The OPFOR recon platoons established contact with A and

C Companies. Subsequently, the OPFOR attacked with two MRBs+ in

the first echelon of the 144th MRR and one MRB+ in its second

echelon. Each MRB+ had two motorized rifle companies, reinforced

(MRCs+) in its first echelon and a third MRC+ in its second

echelon. Meanwhile, a friendly tank coirpany from TF 1-2

continued its rearward movement (North) past D Company.

As the battle progressed, A Company was forced to delay

because of the OPFOR pressure and because 1-92 MECH on the West

(right) of 1-10 Armor had begun to delay. The battalion CDR

ordered the battalion to delay to subsequent BPs. After the

movement to the subsequent BPs was initiated. Brigade issued

FRAGO 1 to OPORD 20. The FRAGO required 1-10 Armor to

counterattack South West to destroy the 144th MRR's second

echelon MRB+. The battalion commander sent a warning order and

the staff began preparing battalion FRAGO l.

As the situation developed. Brigade granted permission for

1-10 Armor to commit its reserve (D Company) in a limited

counterattack. As C Company (in the East) delayed, the

easternmost OPFOR MRB+ turned to the North West and broke contact

with C Company. Shortly thereafter, B Company reported that the

42
OPFOR had broken contact and turned toward A Company. Meanwhile,

A Company remained in contact as it delayed to PL Club.

D Company was committed to relieve the pressure on A Company.

Throughout the battle the OPFOR movement, reports from BDE, and

reports from 1-92 MECH built the situation that the main OPFOR

effort was to the North West. As the stage ended, the first

echelon MRBs of the 144th MRR had either been rendered combat

ineffective or passed through the 1-10 Armor sector to the North

West. All companies were set in BPs generally along PL Club in

the West, and PL Jack in the East, and were preparing to

counterattack. The battalion staff was ready to publish

battalion FRAGO 1.

Stage 2. COUNTERATTACK. The counterattack was executed in

the second stage of the scenario, against an OPFOR MRB+.

Starting positions for each unit corresponded with the scripted

end-stage positions from Stage One. Figure 8 shows the

disposition of the Battalion as it approached the LD,

approximately 12-15 minutes into Stage Two. With the

counterattack in progress, division intelligence assets located

the enemy's second echelon MRR. This led to a second Brigade

FRAGO requiring the battalion to resume the delay (i.e., in Stage

3).

Figure 8. Test scenario situation: Stage 2.

As this stage began, the TOC issued FRAGO 1 to OPORD 200

(via voice radio in baseline and via digital transmission in

CVCC). D Company remained in its defensive position along PL

Club. The remainder of the battalion attacked with three

43
companies abreast: A Company right (Vtest), B Company in the

center, and C Company on the left (East). The scout platoon

screened the battalion left flank between C Company and the

adjacent unit.

After the companies crossed the LD, Brigade issued FRAGO 2

to OPORD 20, to resume the delay upon completion of the

counterattack. The battalion commander sent a warning order and

the staff started preparing battalion FRAGO 2. As the

counterattack progressed, the battalion encountered remnants of

the OPFOR lead echelon in hasty defenses. These elements were

destroyed and overrun. As the battalion reached its objective,

it made contact with the 2nd echelon MRB+ of the 144th MRR (with

two MRCs+ in its first echelon and one MRC+ in its second

echelon), and engaged the OPFO.'.. As this stage ended, the OPFOR

was eliminated. A, B, C Companies were on their objectives, and D

Company remained in its supporting position in depth. The

battalion staff was prepared to publish battalion FRAGO 2.

Stage 3; DELAY. In Stage Three, the test unit resumed the

delay against the two lead echelon MRBs+ of the second echelon

regiment. The stage began with BLUFOR units on their Stage Two

objectives. Figure 9 represents their disposition after

repositioning for the delay, approximately 10-15 minutes into

Stage Three. In this stage, the OPFOR supported its attack with

non-persistent chemical munitions. The scenario ended as the

test unit relayed the NBC-1 reports and established its

subsequent battle positions.

PL QUEEN

PLACE

Figure 9. Test scenario situation: Stage 3

44
This stage began when the TOC issued FRAGO 2 to OPORD 200

(via voice radio in baseline and via digital transmission in

CVCC) . FRAGO 2 established new BPs along PL ACE (per Bde FRAGO

2) . A, B, & C Companies moved to establish defensive positions

from West to East, respectively. D Company moved to the center

of sector along PL Queen, as the battalion reserve. The OPFOR

represented the two lead MRBs+ of the 146th MRR, a second

echelon MRR of the 39th GMRD. Each of the MRBs+ attacked with

two MRCs+ in its first echelon and one MRC+ in its second

echelon. The OPFOR introduced non-persistent chemical munitions

to penetrate the BLUFOR lines. 1-10 Armor delayed to subsequent

BPs along PL Queen. As this stage ended, the companies were set

in position, had submitted SITREPs, and were prepared to continue

the delay mission.

Exercise Control Procedures

Each training and test scenario was executed according to

established control procedures (see Leibrecht et al., 1993) to

maintain consistency across conditions and test weeks. The

battalion TOC staff assisted the battalion commander by preparing

tactical overlays, synthesizing critical battlefield information,

and maintaining a broad picture of the entire battlefield.

Exercise participants were permitted to conduct pre-mission

planning and coordination in the TOC, but they were not allowed

in the TOC during the exercises. This prohibition was explained

within the scenario context by the pace of the battle and the

distance to the TOC. A "Scenario Situation and Events List"

outlined the procedure for each individual scenario. The events

list was used by the ECR staff to coordinate actions within the

simulation. Copies of the events list may be found in Sawyer et

al. (in preparation).

Two types of documents laid out SOPs for control personnel,

to ensure consistent implementation of training and test

exercises (see Leibrecht et al., 1993). The first type included

operating guidelines for the ECR and TOC staff. The second type

of exercise control document specified the decision process and

options for handling various contingencies. Both the guidelines

and contingency documents were generic to all scenarios, whereas

the events lists were specific to each scenario.

Operating guidelines. Within the ECR, "SAFOR Operator Radio

Protocols" established the rules for operator-generated reports

and responses on the voice radio network. SAFOR operators'

responsibilities to the battalion and company commanders had to

be carefully balanced with their responsibilities as control

staff members. SAFOR controllers executed the orders given them

by the unit commanders, but strict controls existed for certain

actions. A copy of the SAFOR operator radio protocols may be

found in Sawyer et al. (in preparation).

With respect to reporting, the radio protocols specified

when and what information could be reported. Because each SAFOR

45
operator controlled up to seven BLUFOR platoons, he had

immediate, direct access to more tactical information than any

individual platoon leader would have. For the CVCC condition,

digital CONTACT, SPOT, SHELL, and SITUATION reports were

generated automatically by the SAFOR elements, based on reporting

software subroutines. In the Baseline condition, the same

reports were displayed on the SAFOR message screen. In order to

ensure consistency between conditions, the SAFOR and radio

operators waited until the message appeared on the screen to

transmit the voice report in the Baseline condition. In both

conditions, certain events could be reported as soon as the SAFOR

operator observed them, but the information transmitted was very

brief and non-specific. For example, if the operator observed a

given platoon engaging an OPFOR element, he was to report

"ENGAGING TANKS AND B-M-Ps, REPORT TO FOLLOW." Also, because of

their familiarity with the scenarios, SAFOR operators knew when

and where the OPFOR would appear, and knew the content of FRAGOs.

However, they were forbidden from sharing that information with

the participants. Moreover, when the FRAGOs were issued in the

course of the scenario, the SAFOR operators had to avoid filling

in missing information from their experience.

With respect to SAFOR positioning and movement, operators

usually did as they were ordered by participants without

question. However, there were some circumstances that were not

permitted. For example, if a unit commander directed a SAFOR

platoon to move beyond the FLOT prior to enemy contact in a

defensive situation, the Battle Master intervened as the Brigade

Commander to disallow the maneuver. Any such intervention was

handled with a relevant tactical reason.

A "TOC SOP" was integrated in the Battalion SOP Extract, to

establish general TOC operating guidelines. A control staff only

addendum to the TOC SOP established specific guidelines regarding

TOC staff-participant interaction (Sawyer et al., in

preparation). The battalion XO supervised TOC staff activities.

He monitored and directed the staff to ensure consistent

application of the rules. Operating rules were practiced during

staff training sessions and carefully followed during all test

week training and testing activities.

As with the SAFOR operators, the TOC staff also had to

balance responsiveness to the battalion commander with exercise

control responsibilities. Standardization was accomplished

through the battalion OPORDs and FRAGOs, and through scripts used

during the orders briefing and the leaders' reconnaissance.

Also, as with the SAFOR operators, the TOC staff avoided

previewing tactical information based on prior knowledge of

training and test scenarios. Any information provided to the

command group from the TOC during the course of the scenario was

consistent only with the information that the TOC staff received

up to that point. When the brigade FRAGO was released during

stages 1 and 2, the TOC staff worked strictly within the current

tactical situation and the battalion commander's guidance. If

46
asked for recommendations, the TOC tailored any suggestions to

the progress of the fight up to that point in time. As a result,

the battalion FRAGOs that were developed "on line" typically

varied between test groups. At the start of the subsequent

stage, the TOC staff published the standardized FRAGO for the

stage (see Appendix C) in lieu of the one that was developed "on

line," in order to restore standardization between test groups.

Contingency rules. Contingency rules addressed cases

involving participant absences, research staff absences,

interaction between participants and research staff, equipment

breakdowns, and schedule delays. The contingency rules helped to

ensure that personnel and technical problems were handled in a

consistent manner across test weeks. Any significant departures

from established control procedures (as might be necessitated by

equipment problems) or contingency rules were noted in writing

and later reviewed by the research staff for impact on the data

collected. Where necessary, data reduction or analysis was

adjusted to account for departures from planned procedures.

Leibrecht et al. (in preparation) provide a more extensive

description of the contingency rules.

Data Collection Procedures

Data were collected through a variety of means. On-line

data collection was accomplished through automated and manual

means. Automated data collection was accomplished using the MWTB

DataLogger. On-line manual data collection included logs

maintained by various control personnel. The respondents were

also asked to provide feedback after the fact through the

exercise debriefing and questionnaires. Post-hoc data collection

included transcriptions of radio transmissions from the

DataLogger files of test scenarios. A more detailed description

of data collection instruments and procedures may be found in

Leibrechtetal. (1993).

The data were grouped into a series of measures that were

designed to support the issues identified earlier in this report.

Those issues were further defined from functions supporting four

of the seven tactical BOSs. Appendix D contains a complete list

of measures, categorized by BOS and functions. Table 15 recaps

those BOS functions. The remainder of this subsection will

outline the kinds of measures used to compare unit performance of

Baseline and CVCC battalions.

Command and Control BOS. Six functions served as the basis

for measures of performance in the Command and Control BOS, as

shown in Table 15. Measures used to support the first three

functions included the time necessary to transmit FRAGOs, enemy,

and friendly information, and the duration of clarifying

transmissions. In the Baseline condition, transmissions were

also scored for consistency of relayed information. In the CVCC

condition, perfect information consistency was assumed for all

digital messages. SITREPs were scored for accuracy of reported

47
locations. Linear control measure crossings and the arrival at

point or area control measures (I.e., checkpoints and battle

positions) were scored also for latency. One measure recorded

the time required to compile and relay fuel and ammunition status

on request from higher headquarters. These measures Involved a

combination of data collected on-line by both automated means and

control logs, and data that were reduced manually from scenario

playbacks.

Table 15

Selected BOS Functions

Command & Control BOS

o Receive & transmit

mission

o Receive & transmit

enemy Information

o Receive & transmit

friendly troop

information

o Manage means of

communicating

information

o Assess situation

o Direct & lead

subordinate forces

Maneuver BOS

o Move on surface

o Navigate

o Process direct fire targets

o Engage direct fire targets

o Control terrain

Fire Support BOS

o Process ground targets

Intelligence BOS

o Collect threat information

Data for the function, "manage means of communicating

information," measured the duration and number of radio

transmissions, to determine whether the availability of digital

communication would reduce a unit's voice radio signature. These

data were collected and analyzed by automated means.

Participants' assessments of the tactical situation were

measured through a questionnaire that was completed Immediately

following the last stage of the test scenario. The data provided

by the participants were compared to corresponding data from

DataLogger to analyze participants' responses for accuracy.

Data for the function, "direct and lead subordinate forces"

assessed whether the battalion prevented decisive engagement and

withdrew intact in delay situations, whether the battalion massed

fires effectively on the OPFOR in the counterattack, and whether

the battalion met the commander's Intent. These evaluations were

made by the Battle Master's on-line observation, based on

objective criteria extracted from the battalion task force

mission training plan (U.S. Department of the Army, 1988c).

48
Maneuver BOS. Measures of performance supporting the

maneuver BOS were based on the following functions: (a) move on

surface; (b) navigate; (c) process direct fire targets; (d)

engage direct fire targets; and (e) control terrain.

The first two functions were concerned with tactical

movement. The first, "move on surface," considered the

positioning and movement of platoons and companies. Specific

measures investigated the stand-off that the unit maintained from

the enemy force, and the BLUFOR's exposure to enemy observation.

In delay situations, the range to the opposing force when a unit

displaced was of interest. In the counterattack, times required

to reach the LD and objectives were recorded. These data were

extracted by the automated data processing equipment, based on

"flags12" recorded by control personnel when specific events

occurred.

Individual vehicle movement data were analyzed under the

second maneuver BOS function, "navigate." Measures for this

function quantified distance travelled, fuel usage, and the time

to complete each scenario stage. These data were extracted by

the automated data processing system. Control personnel also

flagged and noted when any participant's vehicle wandered out of

its assigned sector, or otherwise appeared misoriented. In

addition to the automated data generated on misoriented vehicles,

the Battle Master encouraged the participants to discuss lost

vehicle incidents in scenario debriefings.

Direct fire target acquisition among manned simulators was

analyzed under the function, "process direct fire targets."

Since DataLogger recorded lasing events, the first läse from a

manned vehicle to any target was used as an indication that the

crew had acquired that target. Data processing routines

determined times to acquire targets (i.e., the elapsed time from

target exposure to first läse), läse to fire times (i.e., the

elapsed time from the first läse on a target until the crew

engaged that target), elapsed times between first lases on

different targets, and maximum ranges. Control personnel noted

and flagged any observed fratricide incidents. These events were

discussed in debriefings, and captured in DataLogger files.

Direct fire effectiveness among both manned vehicles and

SAFOR was analyzed under the function, "engage direct fire

targets." Measures supporting this function included the percent

of OPFOR and BLUFOR killed in each stage, kill ratios, mean hit

and kill ranges, and the relative location of OPFOR losses in

delay stages (i.e., the number of enemy losses beyond designated

12 Event flagging is a utility on the PVD that allowed the

control staff to augment the DataLogger record with electronic

indices. In addition, the Asst S3 in the TOC flagged selected

reports using a personal computer that was connected to the

Ethernet. See Leibrecht et al. (1993).

49
phase lines). Additional measures that quantified only the

performance of manned vehicles reported the percent of OPFOR

vehicles killed by manned vehicles, the number of rounds fired,

hits per round fired, kills per hit, and kills per round fired.

The automated data processing system also reported the number of

hits scored against each manned vehicle that would have killed

that vehicle if kill suppress had not been used.

The degree to which the friendly force controlled terrain

was determined using measures that reported the number of OPFOR

vehicles that crossed designated phase lines in each tactical

stage, and the Battle Master's assessment whether the BLUFOR was

bypassed by the OPFOR in delay stages. Automated data processing

routines determined whether any OPFOR vehicles penetrated those

phase lines.

Fire Support BOS. Measures of performance supporting the

function, "process ground targets," quantified the positional and

descriptive accuracy of calls for fire (CFFs) . Automated data

processing routines determined the distance between a reported

grid and the actual grid for an OPFOR element at the time a CFF

was sent on the battalion net. Descriptive accuracy determined

whether the type of target reported was present. These data were

not adjusted for any expected processing time on the part of the

supporting indirect fire units. Since the delays associated with

processing CFFs were out of the participants' control,

participants were encouraged to report actual locations, and the

FSO was responsible for "leading" moving targets.

Intelligence BOS. Measures of performance supporting the

function, "collect threat information," quantified the positional

accuracy of SPOT, SHELL, and CONTACT reports, and the descriptive

accuracy of SPOT and CONTACT reports.

Support Staff

The test support staff was responsible for training exercise

participants, controlling all scenarios and exercises, operating

the ECR stations, and operating the surrogate battalion TOC.

Figure 10 shows the support staff structure during test scenario

execution. This staff also administered manual data collection

instruments.

Scenario Roles and Responsibilities

The Exercise Director retained overall decision-making

authority for all matters regarding the conduct of training and

testing, supervised the overall conduct of the scenarios, and

served as the Assistant Battle Master. The Event Coordinator,

Battle Master, Floor Monitor, and others assisted the Exercise

Director in ensuring proper execution of events. This permitted

decentralized execution consistent with the research plan. The

Event Coordinator worked out of the ECR to coordinate activities

50
Exercise Director

Event

Coordinator

Control Room

Staff

Battle Master

PVD Monitor

OPFOR Operator

BLUFOR Operators (2)

Radio Operators (2)

Simulator Staff

Roor Monitor

Research Assistants (4)

TOC Staff 1

Bn Executive Officer

inteliigence Officer

Fire Support Officer j

Asst Ops Officer |

Figure 10. Exercise control staff organization during test

scenario execution.

between the ECR, battalion TOC, and the vehicle simulators

throughout the training and test scenarios.

Exercise control room staff. The Exercise Director, the

Battle Master, two BLUFOR operators, two radio operators, an

OPFOR operator, and a PVD monitor staffed the ECR. The Battle

Master maintained primary responsibility for scenario execution.

The Battle Master, assisted by the ECR staff, role-played the

brigade commander and staff, adjacent and supporting unit

personnel, and other tactical elements. He also presented the

brigade OPORD (pre-mission briefing), and ensured that the ECR

was set up prior to the start of each exercise. In addition, he

supervised the ECR staff during execution to ensure strict

adherence to the operating procedures and to the scenario events

list. At the conclusion of each scenario, the Battle Master

conducted the debriefing.

Simulator staff. Eight Research Assistants (RAs) served as

vehicle trainers/monitors during individual and collective

training. Their responsibilities included training participant

crews on the operation of the simulators (Baseline and CVCC) and

the CVCC equipment (CVCC only). During the test scenario, four

vehicle monitors collected data on crew performance. The Floor

Monitor supervised the trainers/monitors. The Floor Monitor also

assisted the Event Coordinator by notifying site support staff of

equipment malfunctions, and tracking repair progress.

51
TOC staff. Four research staff members manned the TOC, and

assumed key roles in the battalion staff. TOC staff members were

selected for their extensive military background: all were

retired soldiers or members of the Army Reserve, with experience

in TOC operations.

The senior TOC staff member assumed the role of battalion

XO, and supervised staff operations. In addition, the XO

conducted the battalion OPORD briefings and the stealth-based

terrain reconnaissance for the test scenario. Other staff

positions within the TOC were the Intelligence Officer (S2),

Assistant Operations Officer (S3 Air), and FSO.

Limitations

There were several limitations to the simulation environment

that must be considered in conjunction with this evaluation.

Some of these are common to all simulations using the current

SIMNET technology. Other limitations were unique to the CVCC

simulation. This section summarizes the limitations, and their

implications to the battalion evaluation.

SIMNET gunnery performance only approximates the system

capabilities of an actual tank or the Ml COFT. The simulator's

visual fidelity makes target identification difficult at ranges

beyond 2000 meters, and the automatic lead does not accurately

model the actual tank. As a result, crews often perceived that

the simulators did not function properly in direct fire

engagements. However, it is important to remember that both

Baseline and CVCC crews used essentially the same simulator

elements in direct fire engagements. There were no differences

between conditions within the GPS/GPSE and gunner's controls.

Furthermore, the emphasis on C

2

performance in the battalion

evaluation minimized the impact of this limitation.

Another limitation of the basic simulator is that the system

did not provide the same degree of visibility that is available

in an actual tank, even when "buttoned up." This, along with

other factors limited the crew's ability to navigate and to

acquire targets through the vision blocks. The simulator

contained navigational aids (i.e., the grid azimuth indicator and

the hull-turret reference display) to help offset the navigation

problem. Furthermore, Navigation training was an important part

of the training program for Baseline units. Scenarios were

designed to present targets within the tank's frontal arc in

almost all circumstances, in order to offset the lack of 360°

visibility. These factors should have reduced the potential

impact of visibility on navigation in the Baseline condition, and

target acquisition in general.

Within the CVCC condition, the digital network structure did

not include an actual brigade network. Therefore, any relays

from the battalion to the brigade echelon were notional. Also,

there was no downward digital link from Company Commanders to the

52
SAFOR operators, and therefore no compelling reason for

commanders or XOs to relay digital traffic to their subordinates.

This latter limitation may have artificially reduced the number

of digital reports relayed to the platoon echelon, and therefore

resulted in the loss of data regarding information transfer

between echelons. Separate research focusing on multi-echelon

effects of digital communications was undertaken in conjunction

with the battalion evaluation (see Lickteig, Williams, and Smart,

1992) .

Given that the RIU was not used for this evaluation, digital

traffic did not compete with voice traffic on the FM radio

network. Therefore, no valid conclusions can be made regarding

the unit's overall (i.e., voice plus digital) radio signature.

Likewise, time-based comparisons between voice and digital

message traffic were based on the simplifying assumption that

digital transmissions would be nearly instantaneous, and are

presented primarily for descriptive purposes.

Another limitation was that the network structure was not

comparable between conditions. In the Baseline condition, the

TOC, battalion commander, S3 and company commanders operated on

the battalion command network. The TOC and company XOs operated

on the battalion O&I network. Company commanders and XOs also

operated on their internal company command networks. As a

result, traffic passed on either battalion network had to be

relayed at the company network if it was to be shared between the

company commander and XO. In the CVCC condition, the same voice

networks were in effect, but only one battalion level digital

network existed, and all simulators had access to that digital

network. Therefore, any digital reports that were transmitted at

the battalion echelon were immediately available to both the

company commander and the XO without having to be relayed.

All simulators operated with a feature known as "kill

suppress." This feature effectively rendered the simulators

invulnerable to enemy fires. Kill suppress was used to protect

participant crews so that the data collection on their command

and control performance would continue throughout the scenarios.

During the officer's call on Wednesday afternoon of each test

week, vehicle commanders were made aware of the kill suppress

feature and its implications, and encouraged to play their

assigned roles as if they were vulnerable. Nevertheless, crew

performance was, on occassion, most likely affected by the use of

kill suppress.

In both the Baseline and CVCC conditions, the short amount

of training time available did not allow test groups to master

all tasks. Since no test group came into the evaluation as an

existing, combat unit, the lack of unit cohesion most likely

limited their ability to operate as effectively as an existing

organization. However, since all groups operated under these

constraints regardless of condition, this limitation would not

have had any implication on performance between groups. However,

53
the short amount of training time also limited the opportunity

for CVCC condition participants to experiment with the equipment,

and therefore, limited their opportunity to discover or refine

techniques and procedures appropriate to digital communications.

This factor may have limited the performance of CVCC groups, and

masked potential performance differences between conditions.

Finally, because the TOC was operated by contract personnel,

TOC operations were standardized between iterations in order to

control for possible contamination of the test data. The degree

of standardization also inhibited experimentation that may have

uncovered additional advantages of the CVCC system, or led to the

development of additional C

2

techniques and procedures.

Results and Discussion

This section describes and discusses the results of the

battalion evaluation, with emphasis on those findings which are

meaningful in an operational context, based on the demonstrated

performance of battalion and company commanders, battalion S3s,

and company XOs. The presentation opens with a discussion of the

comparability between test groups, and an overview of the

results, followed by findings relevant to each of the four

research issues, and implications that transcend two or more

operating systems (i.e., battlefield integration). The section

closes with a recap and summary of findings. The organization of

data follows the evaluation's four operationally-based research

issues: (a) command and control, (b) battlefield maneuver,

including target engagement, (c) attack by indirect fire, and (d)

collection of intelligence information.

Focusing on tactical performance and potential TTP

applications, this report presents only part of the results from

the battalion evaluation. Atwood et al. (in preparation)

document the results pertaining to training and SMI issues, with

a focus on questionnaire-based data and equipment usage measures.

The findings reported here are based, in large part, on the same

set of operational effectiveness data analyzed by Leibrecht et

al. (in preparation). Because of that overlap, the discussion

within this report avoids a highly technical flavor in deference

to the latter companion report. To that end, the reader who is

concerned with tests of statistical significance will find that

information in Leibrecht et al. (in preparation).

The measures of performance supporting this evaluation have

been summarized in the earlier Data Collection subsection of this

report. Each performance measure is summarized within the data

presentation, but for the sake of brevity, the operational

definitions of those measures are omitted from this report.

Those definitions are contained in other CVCC literature,

specifically O'Brien et al. (1992) and Leibrecht et al. (in

preparation).

54
Circumstances in executing the evaluation occasionally led

to missing data. Two Baseline battalions and one CVCC battalion

completed only part of Stage 3 of the test scenario, making it

unfeasible to compute some of the Stage 3 measures for those

units. One CVCC battalion had no S3 or S3 crew. Therefore, that

unit generated data for only seven of the eight planned crews.

During one Baseline week, the S3 crew operated with no gunner.

Target acquisition and engagement measures for that crew were

excluded from the database. In addition, occasional equipment

difficulties led to dropping impacted measures from the database.

The presentation of performance measures which follows is

organized by the research issues outlined earlier in this report.

The sequence within each issue's subsection follows the

hypotheses supporting that research issue. Each subsection

concludes with a summary of key findings distilling the

noteworthy results. Data findings are clustered and shown

graphically to illustrate both demonstrated and potential

benefits and shortcomings of the CVCC system.

The TTP implications presented in this section are a

compilation of techniques observed during tests, suggested by

participants after-the-fact in debriefings and questionnaires,

and used by the TOC staff during the evaluation. TTP and

operational effectiveness findings from previous efforts are also

integrated where appropriate.

Comparability of Test Groups

The data regarding experience levels among the participants

that were presented earlier in the Method section and Appendix B

suggest that the Baseline groups were generally more experienced

—both practically and academically—than CVCC groups. The

differences in experience among officers are relatively minor,

and the groups can be considered comparable across conditions.

There are, however, significant differences between the Baseline

and CVCC groups in the experience levels among NCOs and enlisted

personnel.

Potential impact on data. The majority of performance data

are concerned with the battalion's overall performance, as a

result of C

2

processes, and are therefore influenced most

directly by the performance of the officers. Since the officer

population does not differ significantly, there should have been

no impact on the data among C

2

measures. By contrast, direct

fire engagement data among manned simulators could have been

affected by the higher gunnery experience levels among Baseline

NCOs and enlisted personnel. Since the primary focus of the

battalion evaluation is on C

2

processes, the potential impact on

direct fire performance was not a major concern.

55
Overview

Overall, C

2

processes were enhanced among CVCC units in

several ways. Most notably, CVCC units used significantly fewer

voice radio messages to accomplish all missions. At the same

time, they enjoyed wider, more complete, and more consistent

receipt and transmission of mission, enemy and own troop

information. CVCC commanders operated with more accurate, up-todate tactical information with regard to their own unit status

and the enemy situation. However, these advantages did not yield

measured differences between conditions in the units' ability to

assess the tactical situation or to direct and lead subordinate

forces.

CVCC units also maneuvered more effectively than did

Baseline units. CVCC units maintained greater stand-off from the

OPFOR, and achieved more advantageous loss-exchange ratios in two

of the three stages, overall. In offensive missions, CVCC units

met LD times more consistently, and reached their objectives

earlier than Baseline units. CVCC units acquired OPFOR units

earlier and at greater distances in all stages. By contrast,

CVCC units did not achieve any measurable advantage in their

ability to control terrain within the evaluation.

The CVCC equipment enabled participants to send more

accurate CFFs, CONTACT and SPOT reports, as compared to Baseline

unit participants. These findings highlighted the advantage of

the CVCC system with respect to fire support target processing

and intelligence collection.

The reduced acquisition time, improved tactical reporting,

and enhanced agility attributed to the CVCC system have important

implications for the employment of advanced C

2

systems. These

capabilities would enable the commander to reposition his force

with greater agility to gain and maintain positions of advantage

over the enemy, and to assume or retain the initiative in

tactical operations. Most important, CVCC would allow the

commander to be more proactive as he attempts to influence the

battle and operate within the enemy's decision cycle.

Command and Control

Issue: Does the CVCC system enhance the Command and Control

BOS?

The CVCC system enhanced the unit's ability to command and

control their activities. The real-time tactical displays in the

TOC and command vehicles provided the commander an accurate, upto-the-minute picture of his own unit situation. Digital message

capabilities enabled the entire unit to receive and relay FRAGOs

almost instantly. Graphic displays enhanced inter-unit

coordination, and voice radio nets were far more accessible to

commanders and staff, to further facilitate coordination and

information sharing. This subsection presents C

2

techniques and

56
procedures used during the evaluation, followed by the

presentation of performance data, and culminating in a summary of

Command and Control BOS findings. The performance-based results

within the Command and Control BOS are organized according to the

six C

2

functions: Receive and transmit mission, receive and

transmit enemy information, receive and transmit friendly troop

information, manage means of communication, assess situation, and

direct and lead subordinate forces.

Command and Control Techniques and Procedures

The automated position reporting features of the CVCC system

provided a significant advantage throughout the unit, with

respect to maneuver coordination and position monitoring.

Commanders and staff at every level could observe the performance

of subordinates and adjacent elements on the CCD and TOC

workstation map displays. When necessary, verbal communication

(e.g., directions or suggestions to adjust march speeds or

positions) enhanced that coordination.

In order to maintain an accurate unit status, operators in

the automated TOC posted the battalion operational effectiveness

summary charts in a conspicuous location on their workstations.

Also, a corner of the large screen SitDisplay was dedicated to

the operational effectiveness summary chart. As such, when unit

status changed, the TOC could quickly recognize that development.

Given that vehicle commanders could not permanently post the

logistics module, the TOC was able to verbally alert the

battalion commander to changes in the unit status almost as soon

as they happened. In several cases, the TOC recognized the

change in a company's equipment status even before the company

commander was able to calculate his losses.

During the preparation period, the TOC staff used a concept

of operations overlay to demonstrate the anticipated scheme of

maneuver during the delay. This type of overlay would also be an

effective planning tool, in that it enables the staff to

visualize a course of action from one phase of the operation to

the next. As configured for the battalion evaluation, the

concept of operation overlay could only model the BLUFOR's

proposed course of action. OPFOR reactions and counteractions

could not be portrayed in the same, time-sequenced fashion. This

constituted a minor shortcoming, but the effectiveness of the

concept of operation overlay could be enhanced by expanding the

multi-phase capability to the intelligence estimate.

Throughout the operation, the S2 maintained a working

estimate of the enemy situation in overlay form. The S2

integrated data from subordinate and adjacent sources, and higher

headquarters. The overlay could be provided to the command net

on demand to provide a synthesized, "big picture" update of the

enemy situation.

57
The CVCC system proved particularly helpful in planning the

FRAGOs during the operation. In Stages 1 and 2, brigade FRAGOs

were received at points of the battle when it was either not

feasible or inadvisable for the commander or S3 to return to the

TOC. However, they were able to receive and post the digital

FRAGO overlay and text on their CCDs, and therefore participate

substantially in the planning process. As the commander

developed a concept for the FRAGO mission, he communicated that

in brief terms to the XO and S3 Air. The S3 Air drafted a

battalion operations overlay to support the commander's concept,

and then transmitted the overlay on the battalion net for

approval or refinement, all within a very short period of time.

Given the commander's approval, the S3 Air could then develop the

FREE TEXT message to accompany the overlay. This message would

contain critical mission information such as the mission

statement, critical subordinate unit tasks, and coordinating

information that could not be shown graphically (see the digital

texts to FRAGOs 1-200 and 2-200 in Appendix C) . Subordinate

commanders, if not engrossed in the current battle, could

eavesdrop on the entire process, and would therefore have

significantly more information than would otherwise be available

to them regarding the subsequent operation. Assuming digital

links with brigade and adjacent units, the final FRAGO plan could

also be transmitted for coordination, greatly improving the

liaison process.

When company commanders received the FRAGO, they could relay

the entire battalion FRAGO exactly as they received it to their

subordinates. The CCD had no drawing program that allowed

commanders to integrate sub-unit graphics (e.g., platoon BP«)•

However, many commanders generated routes using the navigation

function, and transmitted them to their subordinates in order to

specify either directions of attack in the offense, or critical

points such as objectives or BPs. These digital tools, along

with brief voice transmissions enabled CVCC units to tailor the

FRAGO effectively at company level.

Throughout CVCC operations, participants used verbal

transmissions to enhance digital communications and to alert each

other to critical events. In many cases, verbal information was

redundant, but it did help call participants' attention to

important tactical developments such as initial contact and

status changes.

Receive and Transmit Mission

Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to receive and transmit

information on the battlefield was expected to be significantly

better than the Baseline units'.

The performance measures that supported this hypothesis

captured the duration of FRAGO transmissions, the number and

duration of related, clarifying transmissions, and the

consistency of FRAGOs received on the company command nets. CVCC

58
units could transmit the complete FRAGO virtually

instantaneously. Baseline units took much longer to relay FRAGOs

to all subordinates, and the orders that were relayed excluded

much of the pertinent information in the original FRAGO.

Furthermore, Baseline units consistently required a series of

voice radio transmissions to clarify the FRAGOs, whereas CVCC

units rarely needed to discuss the digital FRAGO. In effect,

both the rapid burst transmission of digital FRAGOs and the

clarity of Information communicated therein contributed to speed

FRAGO dissemination.

Elapsed time from battalion transmission of FRAGO to receipt

by company commander/XO. This measure was defined as the total

elapsed time between the time the battalion TOC initiated

transmission of a FRAGO to the time the last company commander

finished transmitting the FRAGO, to include any transmissions

clarifying the order. The data are illustrated in Figure 11. In

CVCC battalions, the FRAGOs were received almost instantaneously

by all unit commanders and their XOs via digital burst

transmission. Two CVCC commanders requested clarification of the

FRAGO to resume the delay following the counterattack, resulting

in an average of 0.09 minutes elapsed time for CVCC units in

Stage 3. In the Baseline condition, average times ranged from

9.5 to 27.22 minutes (average 18.65 minutes) in Stage 2 of the

exercise and 6.18 to 26.05 minutes (average 15.65 minutes) in

Stage 3.

M

I

N

U

T

E

S

"1 18.7

18 _

16_ | 15.6

14.

12 j

10.

8.

6.

4.

2.

0. o 0.09

D CVCC

Q BASELINE

STAGE 2 STAGE 3

Figure 11. Mean elapsed time to transmit FRAGO.

Number of requests bv company commander/XO to clarify FRAGO/

overlay. This measure reported the average number of company

commander's and XO's unique requests for clarification of a FRAGO

and/or the accompanying overlay. A unique req lest was defined as

a single question, raised by a given participant, in a single

59
transmission. For example, if a company commander asked, "Where

is BP 45," received an answer, then asked, "Where is BP 35," that

constituted two unique requests. By contrast, if he had asked,

"Say again location of BPs 35 and 45" in the original

transmission, that was interpreted as a single, unique request.

Data for this measure were only collected for Stages 2 and 3.

In both stages, there was a notably higher number of

requests for clarification among Baseline units. In Stage 2,

there were no requests among CVCC units, as opposed to .33

requests per vehicle among Baseline units. In Stage 3, there

were .08 requests per vehicle among CVCC units, and .53 requests

per vehicle among Baseline units. These data are graphically

illustrated in Figure 12. The lower number of requests for

clarification in CVCC may be attributed to the clarity of the

digital FRAGO, as demonstrated by the consistency of received

FRAGOs discussed later in this subsection.

LJCVCC _. BASELINE

R

E

Q

U

E

S

T

S

.55 -I1

.53

.50 .

.45 .

.40 .

.35 - .33

.30 .

.25 -

.20 .

.15 .

.10 -

0

.08

.05 .

.00 .

E

C

0

N

D

S

35-

30.

25.

20.

15.

10.

5.

0

31.7

27.6

15.3

STAGE 2 STAGE 3 STAGE 2 STAGE 3

Figure 12. Mean number and duration of requests to clarify

FRAGOs.

Duration of requests bv company commander/XO to clarify

FRAGO/overlay. This measure reported the average length of

transmissions required to clarify the FRAGOs (Stages 2 and 3

only). Figure 12 illustrates the data for this measure. As

shown, requests for clarification took significantly longer, on

average, in Baseline units, on a per-request basis. Taken in

conjunction with the preceding measure, two important factors

emerge: (a) The digital FRAGOs were better understood, as

evidenced by both fewer requests for clarification and shorter

requests when clarification of the digital FRAGO was required;

and (b) requests for clarification in Baseline units required a

relatively large amount of radio air time, as suggested by both

the number and duration of requests.

60
Consistency of FRAGO received. FRAGO consistency among

Baseline units was measured by comparing the information

transmitted on the company command network to a scoring template

(see O'Brien et al., 1992) that contained key information from

the scripted FRAGO. The results are presented in Figure 13. In

the CVCC condition, all manned simulators received the

FRAGO/overlay simultaneously. As such, error-free content was

assumed for digital orders. For the Baseline condition, the

average percentage of information relayed correctly was 19% in

Stage 2 and 35% in Stage 3. In practical terms. Baseline units

sacrificed from 65 to 81% of the FRAGO content due to either

transcription error or lack of time.

P

E

R

C

E

N

T

100 _

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

100 100

18.94

35.27 Zl CVCC

Q BASEUNE

STAGE 2 STAGE 3

Figure 13. Mean consistency of information content in FRAGOs

received on the company command network.

Summary. These data demonstrate a substantial advantage of

the CVCC system over the Baseline: Baseline units used, on

average, 34 minutes of radio air time per scenario relaying and

clarifying mission information, and only correctly relayed an

average of 27% of the FRAGO information to their subordinates.

Digital communications sped FRAGO dissemination, and digital

FRAGOs were more easily interpreted and implemented. Digital

communications substantially reduced the time necessary to

transmit mission information, and enhanced both the quantity and

quality of information that was conveyed.

Receive and Transmit Enemv Information

Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to receive and transmit

enemy information on the battlefield was expected to be

significantly better than the Baseline units'.

61
The data used to evaluate this hypothesis quantified the

duration of INTEL report transmissions, the consistency of

information received on the company command network, and the

number of requests to clarify intelligence data. Also, the

number of INTEL reports transmitted on company command networks

was tallied as a part of the data processing routine. Throughout

the battalion evaluation, CVCC units were able to distribute

significantly more tactical intelligence than Baseline units,

both in terms of quality (consistency with the original report)

and quantity.

Consistency of INTEL received. INTEL report consistency was

defined as the percentage of scripted INTEL elements (i.e., size,

type, number and location of units) transmitted on the company

command network. The scoring was accomplished using a scoring

template similar to that used for FRAGOs (see O'Brien et al.,

1992) . As with FRAGOs, the consistency of information received

was assumed to be error-free in the CVCC condition. Figure 14

portrays the results from this measure.

D cvcc BASELINE

%

D

A

i on 100 16 _

16

90 _

80 J

70 _

60 J

50 J

40 J

30 J

20 J

10 J

0 J

# 14-

N

10

-

T

8H

E <H

L 4 J

S 2 J

0 J

I 60.87

R

E

L

A

Y

E

1.4

D

M(san consiBtency

Mean | of INTELS

Figure 14. Mean consistency of information in INTEL reports, and

mean number of iNTELs received at the company echelon per

scenario.

In Baseline, only a small number of INTEL reports (8) could

be scored. As shown in Figure 14, this correlates to only 1.4

INTELS per scenario, as compared to sixteen scripted messages.

Across all Baseline groups, only six INTEL reports were relayed

in Stage 1. The consistency score for those reports averaged

60%, and ranged from 0% to 100% consistent. Only one Baseline

INTEL report per stage was scorable in Stages 2 and 3.

Consistency scores for those reports were 100% and 25%,

respectively. Overall, less than 10% of the scripted INTEL

reports were relayed on the company network among Baseline units,

and only 61% of the scripted information was relayed in those

62
cases. By comparison, all CVCC participants received each INTEL,

in its entirety.

There are two possible explanations for the low number of

reports received in the Baseline condition. The first is a

matter of relevancy. Company commanders may not have relayed

INTEL reports that they did not consider relevant to their

subordinates. The second is a matter of priority. When the

company was in contact, INTELs that did not bear on the immediate

situation would not have been copied (let alone relayed), in

favor of more critical tactical information. Furthermore, if the

commander inadvertently "tuned out" some critical information,

there was only a slight chance of that information being

recovered at a later point, when it may have been more

convenient.

In CVCC, the commander or XO could ignore a received report

if current contact so dictated, and then retrieve it later. Once

the INTEL was opened, it was as easily relayed -s not, and

subordinates could likewise view the report immediately or let it

"time out" of the receive queue and retrieve it later. Also,

voice transmissions were often used to highlight or summarize

critical INTELs. Since the voice net was more accessible (see

"Manage means of communication," later in this subsection), it

was easier to pass information verbally, or to call attention to

digital reports in CVCC units.

Time to transmit INTEL reports full net; Battalion TOC to

lowest manned net. This measure is defined as the elapsed time

between the initiation of an INTEL transmission from the TOC

until the message was relayed to the last manned vehicle. Only

INTELs relayed by the company commander or XO were included in

the data. In Baseline condition, relay times averaged 1.58

minutes overall, and ranged from 0.57 to 3.63 minutes. In the

CVCC condition, all INTEL reports were received simultaneously on

the battalion's digital net.

Number of requests to clarifv INTEL reports. This measure

reports the average number of vehicle commander's unique requests

to clarify INTEL messages. A unique request was defined in the

same manner as a unique request for FRAGO clarification. The

data for this measure show an average of .02 requests per

scenario per vehicle among CVCC units, as opposed to .15 requests

per scenario per vehicle among Baseline units. Figure 15

illustrates the average number of requests per vehicle per stage.

The difference between conditions is too small to characterize as

any more than a trend, but is nevertheless descriptive of the

same kind of trend demonstrated previously in the FRAGO

clarification measure.

Summary. CVCC units were able to disseminate INTEL reports

more widely, rapidly, and with greater consistency than Baseline

units. Furthermore, the CCD allowed the vehicle commander to

easily recall or review information that he may have chosen to

63
.07

R .06

E

Q

.05

U .04

E .03

S

.02

T

S

.01

.00

.07 .07

.03

.02

cvcc

BASELINE

STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3

Figure 15. Mean number of requests to clarify INTEL reports, per

vehicle.

ignore when his unit was engaged in close combat. These findings

indicate that the CVCC system improves the unit's ability to

communicate enemy information. The ease with which enemy

information was disseminated in CVCC has important implications

for improved situational awareness. To the extent that graphic

displays enabled the unit to literally "paint" the enemy

situation, commanders were better informed.

Receive and Transmit Friendly Troop Information

Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to receive and transmit

friendly troop information on the battlefield was expected to be

significantly better than the Baseline units'.

The data for this function measured the average times to

transmit SITREPs, the average number and duration of voice

transmissions between the TOC and the battalion commander and S3,

and the timeliness of position reporting. The low number of

observations during Stage 3 was primarily attributed to the

absence of a Brigade-level FRAGO in the last stage of the

scenario. Therefore, only Stages 1 and 2 were analyzed for the

measures "average duration of voice transmissions between the

battalion commander/S3 and TOC," and "number of voice

transmissions between the battalion commander/S3 and TOC." Most

of the coordination between the battalion commander, S3 and the

TOC in Stages 1 and 2 dealt with processing the Brigade FRAGO.

Baseline battalion command groups spent significantly more

time on the radio coordinating and directing subordinate units

than CVCC command groups. The real-time tactical displays

available in both the CVCC TOC and vehicle simulators provided

CVCC units a more accurate picture of their own unit status, as

64
compared to Baseline units. Table 16 provides summary data from

the measures supporting this hypothesis.

Table 16

Performance Data for Receive and Transmit Friendly Information

Hypothesis

Measures

Stage

CVCC

1

Baseline

Stage 2

CVCC Baseline CVCC

Stages

Baseline

Mean time to transmit SITREP full

net (minutes).

MA 3.05

(2.84)

n-52

NA 2.61

(2.16)

n-32

NA 2.24

(1.72)

n-25

Mean duration of communications

between Bn oommander/S3 and

TOC (minutes).

0.56

(0.58)

n-42

0.51

(0.57)

11-142

0.52

(0.47)

n-20

0.45

(0.37)

n-88

NA NA

Number of voice transmissions

between the Bn commander/S3

and TOC

5.17

(5.56)

Q-6

13.5

(10.67)

D-6

1.83

(1.83)

Q-6

9.50

(7.89)

n-6

NA NA

Delay between observed event and

report to TOC (minutes).

PL/LD crossing.

BP arrival.

0.91

(159)

n-10

1.13

(145)

n-12

1.28

(1.04)

n-12

0.73

(0.72)

n-6

0.43

(0.30)

n-4 n-0

1.36

(1.58)

Q-11

3.29

(3.83)

n-12

1.79

(0.15)

£1-3

2.26

(3.93)

Ü-5

5.43

(3.90)

n-4

2.57

(3.53)

Q-3

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the means.

NA = not applicable.

Mean time to transmit SITREP full net; lowest net to

battalion TOC. This measure was defined as the elapsed time from

the transmission of a SITREP on a company net until the company

SITREJ? was received by the battalion TOC.

In the Baseline condition, average times were 3.05 minutes

in Stage 1, 2.61 minutes in Stage 2, and 2.75 minutes in Stage 3.

By contrast, the CVCC equipment allowed unit leaders to compile

SITREPs in a significantly different manner than in Baseline

units, such that no relay was necessary. In most cases, CVCC

company XOs did not have to consult subordinate platoon leaders

for SITREP data, because they could rely on CCD displays to

gather most of the pertinent information. Furthermore, given

automated position and unit status reporting at all levels,

almost all of the SITREP data were redundant in CVCC units.

Three pieces of tactical information in the SITREP format

were not constantly displayed via the position and status

65
reporting system: The enemy's action (type and level) and the

reporting commander's intent. Digital reports and voice messages

would easily fill in that information to allow a superior

commander in a combat vehicle, or staff member in the TOC to

ascertain the subordinate unit's situation. For example, the

most recent CONTACT, SPOT, and CFFs from a company would indicate

the enemy's current activity, while coordinating transmissions or

verbal updates from the friendly company commander would indicate

the friendly company commander's current intent. As a result,

unit-generated SITREPs could be dropped from routine reporting

requirements when using CVCC equipment.

Mean duration of voice radio transmissions between the

battalion commander/S3 and TOC. This item was designed to

capture the average length of voice transmissions of other than

named reports (e.g., named reports include SPOT, SITREP, INTEL).

These transmissions primarily included coordination, analysis,

and other general information-sharing activities between the

commander, S3, and TOC. The average durations (see Table 16) do

not yield any difference between conditions; however, when

considered in conjunction with the number of transmissions

(following), the difference in net time is notable.

Number of voice transmissions between the battalion

commander/S3 and TOC (Stages 1 and 2 only). This measure

quantified the total number of voice radio transmissions from the

battalion commander or S3 to the battalion TOC. Besides those

transmissions originated by the participants, this measure also

included requests for guidance, unscripted traffic and questions

from the TOC that required command decisions. The measure

excluded named reports and verification that FRAGOs or named

reports had been received. For example, coordination between the

Battalion Commander and XO regarding a Brigade FRAGO or the

emplacement of an artillery-delivered scatterable minefield would

be included whether initiated by the TOC or the commander.

Likewise, a recommendation from the TOC that a unit begins

movement to meet an LD time would be included. By contrast, TOCinltiated updates on either the friendly or the enemy situation

would not be included, unless requested by the commander of S3.

CVCC units sent substantially fewer voice radio messages

than Baseline units, as shown in Table 16 and as illustrated in

Figure 16. When the data from this and the preceding measure are

combined, the difference between conditions becomes even more

apparent. The more frequent occurrence of transmissions among

Baseline units led to notably more radio air time spent

coordinating tactical details in the Baseline condition.

Delay between observed PL/LD crossing and reported crossing.

This measure gauged the amount of time, in minutes, between the

observed crossing of a linear control measure and the company's

corresponding report to the TOC. In CVCC, this measure depended

on voice reports, not the graphic display. As seen in Table 16,

66
p 14-

12 J

10 J

8 ,

6 J

4 J

2 J

0 J

13.50

E

' ,-:l:.:.

;

,.V-,

R

9.50

V 1 |CVCC

I J BASELINE E

C !•» H J.X.I

1.83

I

C

L

E

STA<GE 1 STAGE 2

Figure 16. Average number of voice transmissions between the

battalion commander/S3 and the TOC, excluding named reports.

the data for this measure do not yield any significant

differences.

Delay between observed arrival and reporting set at BP.

This item assessed the elapsed time from a unit's observed

arrival in a battle position, and when that company reported

"set" in the BP on the battalion command net. In the

counterattack stage, the objectives were treated as BPs. No

meaningful trends emerged among these data (see Table 16).

When the CVCC system's capabilities are compared to the data

for both linear and area control measures, an important advantage

of the CVCC system becomes apparent. In the Baseline condition,

the battalion commander relied heavily on voice radio traffic to

monitor the flow of the battle. Overall, Baseline commanders

received periodic information that averaged over 2 minutes old,

and was up to nearly 13 minutes old on occasion. In CVCC, the

CCD provided the commander with constant, up-to-the-minute

position information on all his forces. Therefore, voice reports

were redundant.

It should be noted that voice transmissions in the CVCC

condition were still important. In the case of positioning, a

verbal report often served a valuable coordinating function,

particularly if other actions (e.g., lifting or shifting fires)

were tied to a unit crossing a phase line or arriving in a

position. Furthermore, arriving at a BP or objective is not the

same as being established in that position. In those cases, a

verbal progress report (e.g., "Seizing RAIN now, SET in five")

67
would provide important additional information. Therefore,

although they may have been redundant, verbal position reports

need not be eliminated.

Summary. The CVCC system enhances the communication of

friendly troop data. A recurring comment during CVCC debriefings

was the observation that unit commanders had an excellent picture

of the unit's situation throughout the battle. By contrast.

Baseline commanders often reflected that they had difficulty

keeping track of the friendly unit situation (Meade, Fergus,

Pollock, Cash, and Lozicki, in preparation). Given the automated

position and operational effectiveness data available through the

CCD, and the reduction of voice radio traffic between conditions,

the CVCC system clearly enhances the ability to access and

interpret friendly unit information. As with enemy information,

these capabilities have significant implications for improved

situational awareness in CVCC units.

Manage Means of Communicating Information

Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to manage means of

communicating information on the battlefield was expected to be

significantly better than the Baseline units'.

Data for this function were taken from four measures:

the average number of voice transmissions, the average length of

voice transmissions, the total time on radio nets, and the

average number of named voice reports. Overall, the duration of

individual transmissions were comparable across conditions, but

CVCC units sent significantly fewer voice transmissions than

Baseline units, and therefore significantly reduced the units'

voice radio signature.

Average number of transmissions. This measure tallied the

number of transmissions from simulators only, during each stage.

In other words, transmissions from the TOC, ECR, and SAFOR

operators (i.e., support staff) were excluded. A transmission

was defined as the keying of a microphone on a radio network.

Transmissions of less than one second and greater than 30 seconds

were excluded, to eliminate both "hot mike" events and "clicking"

events. Stage 3 data are excluded from this measure, due to the

differences between it and the preceding stages (e.g.: the lack

of a Brigade FRAGO).

Significant differences occurred between conditions on every

network when average number of transmissions were considered.

There were far fewer voice transmissions made in CVCC than in the

baseline condition. Figures 17 and 18 clearly show the extent to

which digital communications reduced voice radio traffic.

Differences were also found between scenario stages.

The differences between stages are explained by a variety of

factors, including varied stage lengths and the nature of the

68
N

U

M

B

E

R

400 3.89.75

350«

cvcc

H] BASELINE

STAGE 1 STAGE 2

Figure 17. Average volume of voice radio transmissions on

battalion nets.

N

U

M

B

E

R

250«

200.

150.

100«

50«

0

235.17

132.00

171.11

87.28

j I CVCC

Q] BASELINE

STAGE 1 STAGE 2

Figure 18. Average volume of voice radio transmissions on

company nets.

missions (explained previously). actual run times varied

between iterations (see Time to complete stage under the Maneuver

BOS).

On the battalion command network, the number of

transmissions across Stages 1 and 2 was 1.9 times greater in

Baseline than in CVCC. On the O&I net, the differences were even

greater, with Baseline units transmitting 3.2 times as often

across both Stages. On company networks, CVCC units averaged

109.6 transmissions per stage, as compared to 202.6 transmissions

per stage in Baseline.

69
Average length of voice radio transmissions. This measure

captured the average duration of voice radio transmissions, in

seconds, from simulators only. The same criteria applied to the

previous measure was used for this measure.

The lengths of voice transmissions did not differ

significantly between conditions or stages. Overall, voice

transmissions averaged from 3 to 4.5 seconds. This finding

suggests that the availability of digital communications does

not directly influence soldiers' behavior when communicating by

voice.

Total time on voice radio network. This measure represents

the cumulative time on the network for all simulators. The data

(see Table 17) were only computed for Stages 1 and 2, and are

segregated by tactical radio network. No data appear for the

Brigade O&I network because only the TOC and ECR operated on that

frequency. As expected, given the number of transmissions

reported earlier. Baseline units spent consistently more time on

the voice radio net than CVCC units.

Table 17

Average Time on Net, in Minutes

Stage 1 Stage 2

Radio network CVCC Baseline CVCC Baseline

Brigade Command 4.67 9.55 1.90 2.93

(1.60) (5.60) (0.48) (2.39)

Battalion Command 20.34 35.98 12.08 25.56

(5.55) (6.11) (4.62) (7.26)

Battalion O&I 5.25 17.52 2.86 10.12

(1.95) (4.18) (2.30) (3.38)

A Company Command 9.86 16.04 5.82 10.68

(4.30) (5.32) (3.57) (2.30)

B Company Command 9.10 14.51 5.81 11.01

(0.86) (1.31) (1.36) (1.69)

C Company Command 4.72 15.51 4.75 12.29

(1.15) (2.61) (0.91) (3.81)

Hotfi. n = 6 for all cells.

Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the means.

70
Number of named voice reports. This measure reported the

number of named voice reports sent in each condition.1*

5 In

Baseline condition, this measure indicated the average number of

named reports communicated per vehicle, per stage. In CVCC

condition, it portrays the average number of named reports sent

by voice per vehicle, per stage. This measure excludes reports

generated by subordinate SAFOR and merely relayed by

participants. The data presented here represent Stages 1 and 2

only, in order to maintain consistency with other measures

supporting the manage means of communication function. For the

sake of brevity, only composite data are presented in this

report. For greater detail, see Leibrecht et al. (in

preparation).

Overall, Baseline unit and vehicle commanders sent an

average of 9.67 named reports per vehicle per stage, as compared

to 2.09 named voice reports per manned CVCC vehicle per stage.

Company commanders and XOs sent most of the named reports in both

cases, with Baseline company commanders and XOs contributing an

average of 12.29 named reports each, per stage, and CVCC company

commanders and XOs submitting an average of 2.40 named voice

reports each, per stage. These data are illustrated in Figure

19.

For CVCC units only. Figure 19 illustrates the average

number of both voice and digital reports sent per vehicle in a

stacked bar format. Overall, CVCC units generated approximately

the same amount of information as Baseline units, but at a

significant reduction in voice traffic.

Summary. The number of transmissions and time on voice net

data demonstrate an important operational benefit of digital

communications technology: the profound reduction in voice

traffic. The enhanced accessibility of command networks was

remarkable. Participants' debriefing comments help illuminate

the difference: Baseline participants often expressed

frustration at being unable to enter the battalion command

network to report critical events. By contrast, CVCC unit

commanders often expressed wonder that the command net seemed so

quiet (Meade et al., in preparation).

The reader is reminded that the radio interface unit (RIU)

was not in operation for this evaluation. Therefore, voice and

digital transmissions did not compete for radio air time. It is

not appropriate to draw any conclusions regarding the unit's

overall radio signature from the data presented here. It would

be reasonable to assume that digital bur&t transmissions would

13Named voice reports were those corresponding to digital

report formats: CONTACT, SPOT, SHELL, INTEL, SITREP, CFF, ADJUST

fire, NBC, FUEL status, and AMMO status.

71
[ I CVCC VOICE CVCC DIGITAL BASELINE VOICE

N

U

M

B

E

R

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

- m

12.73.

Ll.45 2.67 1.82

0.6401(^12.

10.50

l Yum - . i

3.33

16.67

&*H% kd 7.92

'T'*yr'f*iy'

i

1.47

STAGE 1 STAGE 2

Battalion echelon

STAGE 1 STAGE 2

Company echelon

Figure 19. Average number of named reports (all types) sent per

vehicle per stage.

increase the amount of time that radio nets were active in the

CVCC condition, but the practical affect will have to be

determined through additional research.

Assess Situation

Hypothesis: The CVCC unit leaders' assessment of

battlefield events was expected to be significantly better than

the Baseline units'.

Situational assessment was measured using a questionnaire

that was administered to all vehicle commanders at the conclusion

of the final test stage. The questionnaire consisted of five

items relating to the friendly and enemy situation during the

final stage. Besides reporting factual data, the participants

were also asked to register the degree of confidence they had in

their response to each item. Each item therefore yielded two

measures. The factual responses were scored against automated

data, and in addition to being reported individually, were also

compiled into a composite situational assessment index. The data

reported for individual items did not reveal any substantial

differences between conditions. Those data are presented by

Leibrecht et al. (in preparation), and are excluded from this

report for the sake of brevity. The results of the composite

index are presented in Figure 20.

72
35 .

%

30 .

c

25 .

o 20 .

R

R

15 .

E 10 .

C 5 .

T

0 .

Figure

index.

20.

_ 33.18

30.65

24.41

21.65

G cvcc

BASELINE

BATTALION ECHELON COMPANY ECHELON

Mean performance for composite situational assessment

Composite situational assessment index. The composite

situational assessment index used an algorithm that combined each

score from the situational assessment questionnaire (see

Leibrecht et al.f in preparation). The composite score is

expressed in terms of percent correct, with possible values

ranging from 0 to 100. As shown in Figure 20, the data did not

differ notably or consistently between conditions. The

remarkably better scores at the battalion echelon may be

attributed to a better understanding of the overall situation

throughout the battalion.

In analyzing the methods used to assess situational

awareness, the approach appeared to be faulty. The assessment

itself was an indirect measurement using selected pieces of

information that might be considered a byproduct of the

participants' tactical awareness. The underlying assumption was

that an after-the-fact snapshot of certain kinds of information

would facilitate an appraisal of what participants heard, saw,

and thought throughout the battle.

The timing of the assessment may have affected the data

trend. In order to avoid interrupting the tactical situation,

the assessment occurred at the end of the final test stage. By

virtue of relatively recent SlTREPs and more comprehensive

intelligence reports, both Baseline and CVCC units should have

had a fairly accurate snapshot of the tactical situation

immediately preceding the end of the exercise. It is therefore

possible that awareness peaked at these points for all units,

without respect to condition. Therefore, if the CVCC system

assisted commanders to maintain a more accurate assessment

throughout the scenario, the "peaking" effect near the end of the

73
exercise may have reduced the likelihood that such an affect

would be captured.

By contrast, the previous findings and discussion regarding

the communication of mission, enemy, and friendly information

demonstrate how the CVCC system allowed the commander to see the

battle more effectively from initial contact to mission

completion. Hence, CVCC provided the commander and staff a

valuable tool that enabled them to constantly assess the tactical

situation. Nevertheless, those apparent advantages did not yield

a measurable difference among the measures of situational

assessment.

Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces

Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to direct and lead

subordinate forces on the battlefield was expected to be

significantly better than the Baseline units'.

The data collected for this function captured whether the

oattalion prevented decisive engagement in delay situations,

whether it withdrew intact from initial delay positions, whether

it massed fires on the OPFOR in the counterattack, and whether

the battalion met the commander's intent. Also, the individual

data points for each measure were compiled to form a battalion

command effectiveness composite index. As a whole, unit

Performance was comparable across all conditions and stages. As

such, the presentation and discussion of these data is omitted

from this report. See Leibrecht et al. (in preparation) for the

a comprehensive presentation of data and detailed analysis.

Summary of Command and Control BOS Findinas

Table 18 summarizes the results among command and control

BOS functions. Overall, the data revealed several meaningful

differences between conditions, and highlighted many of the

advantages offered by the CVCC system. Most importantly, the

CVCC system allowed commanders to see the battlefield more

accurately. By reducing the volume of voice traffic, the CVCC

system made command nets more accessible. Relative disadvantages

of the Baseline condition were demonstrated by the duration and

number of transmissions required to disseminate tactical

information (e.g., FRAGOs, INTELs, and SITREPs), and the

inefficiency related to voice traffic indicated by FRAGO and

INTEL consistency measures. Participant comments regarding their

overall ability to monitor the battle suggested that CVCC unit

commanders were more aware of their subordinate units' status

than Baseline unit commanders.

This subsection has focused on C

2

processes. Due to the

multi-stage structure of the scenario, the need to reconstitute

the force for the second and third stages, and the ensuing

breaks, it was not feasible to assess how units might have,

reacted in continuing operations. What's more, beyond the data

74
Table 18

Summary of Command and Control BOS Findings

Function Findings

Receive and transmit mission o

o

Receive and transmit enemy o

information o

Receive and transmit friendly o

troop information

Manage means of

communicating information

Assess situation

More rapid dissemination of FRAGOs using digital format.

Error-free information relayed to subordinates in CVCC, poor

consistency in Baseline.

Far less voice traffic and time required to clarify digital

FRAGOs.

Wider dissemination of digital INTEL information.

Digital INTEL reports retained 100% of information

Fewer voice transmissions between battalion commander, S3

and TOG to coordinate battle and analyze new missions in

CVCC.

Friendly unit positions constantly displayed; unit status

constantly displayed in TOG and immediately available in

command tanks in CVCC, as compared to periodic reports in

Baseline.

Significantly fewer voice radio transmissions, overall, in

CVCC.

Marked reduction in the amount of time that radio nets are

active with voice traffic.

Notable reduction in the number of named reports sent by

voice in CVCC.

No demonstrated differences.

Direct and lead subordinate

forces

No demonstrated differences.

presented regarding the dissemination of scripted FRAGOs, the

measures within the Command and Control BOS could not directly

quantify the speed with which commanders reacted to the

developing tactical situation. However, an underlying precept of

performance measures within both the Maneuver and Fire Support

BOSs is that the command group's mental agility did affect

engagement outcomes. The next subsection addresses the resultant

performance in the movement and fires of test battalions.

Marreuvgr

Issue: Dees the CVCC system enhance the Maneuver BOS?

Given the CVCC system's automated navigation and CITV

capabilities, the expected impacts on maneuvering and engaging

the enemy on the battlefield are substantial. The BOS-based

75
functions and hypotheses supporting the analysis of maneuver

performance were introduced earlier in this report. The Data

Collection subsection of this report summarized the measures used

to quantify performance under these functions. This subsection

presents the results of Maneuver-based performance measures. The

analysis leads off with techniques and procedures observed or

suggested during the evaluation. The performance data

presentation and discussion is organized around five maneuver

functions: (a) move on surface, (b) navigate, (c) process direct

fire targets, (d) engage direct fire targets, and (e) control

terrain. The subsection closes with a summary of Maneuver BOSrelated findings.

The results for two measures developed under the Maneuver

BOS are not presented, because the measures produced nearly all

zeros. These measures were "mean time out of sector/axis," and

"number of OPFOR vehicles penetrating designated line." Other

specific treatments of data were undertaken to explain unexpected

trends, as recounted in the results for each maneuver function.

The data from several crew-level measures are not recounted in

their entirety, in order to focus more on the battalion's overall

performance. Previous reports from the CVCC program (e.g.,

Leibrecht et al., 1992) and Leibrecht et al. (in preparation)

present and analyze data regarding crew performance in greater

detail.

Maneuver Techniques and Procedures

The . .lowing narrative describes techniques and procedures

used by c nnanders and crews in their simulators to navigate and

"fight" their individual vehicles, and to control and coordinate

the maneuver of their subordinates with that of adjacent

elements. For unit and individual vehicle movement, the

discussion focuses on how the CCD was used. For engagement, the

focus is on target acquisition, particularly how the CITV was

employed.

The CCD could be configured to deselect given map features,

such as contour lines and vegetation. The advantage of this was

to simplify the display and the processing load on the CVCC

computer. If the operator chose to display all map features, the

computer would take longer to update the display as the vehicle

moved or other data were introduced. Also, a cluttered display

was more difficult to interpret. As such, it was generally

preferable to disable selected terrain features.

The problem with this procedure was the tendency to ignore

the terrain under certain conditions. For example, when the

tactical situation changed and units were to move to new

locations, the vehicle commander who failed to display all

terrain features risked selecting routes and fighting positions

that potentially exposed the tank and unit to enemy observation

and fires. Thus, it was advisable to display those terrain

76
features when planning movements in close proximity to known or

suspected enemy locations, or when establishing battle positions.

Vehicle commanders used various tactical map scales as the

situation dictated throughout the scenario. Smaller scales

(i.e., 1:125,000, 1:250,000) were required to analyze tactical

information throughout the battalion area, and to interpret

FRAGOs. Larger scales (i.e., 1:25,000 and 1:50,000) were used to

control smaller units (companies and platoons), and to develop

tactical routes.

A technique that was used by some commanders to define

engagement areas and to facilitate their terrain appreciation was

to open a report format (e.g., CONTACT), and then läse to various

terrain features to the front. As the range return was

processed, the CCD would post a report icon in the corresponding

location on the tactical map. The vehicle commander could then

verify coverage of the engagement area and any target reference

points (TRPs) within his area of operations. Variations of this

technique could be used to develop tank range sketch cards, and

to coordinate direct fire plans throughout the unit.

The CITV was commonly used in the auto-scan mode. This

proved an effective technique under most circumstances, allowing

the vehicle commander to search for targets in a hands-off

manner. When potential targets appeared, the commander could

override the search mode and investigate the possible target, all

without interfering with the gunner's search. If the target was

hostile, the commander could use the target designate function to

slew the turret, then return to auto or manual scan as soon as

the gunner identified the target.

In some cases, commanders used the CITV to monitor

formations. The advantage of this technique was that the

commander did not have to physically turn around in the cupola to

see parts of the unit. The drawback was that a valuable target

acquisition tool was turned away from the direction of likely

enemy contact. Given that all scenarios were fought under

daylight, high visibility conditions, the cupola may have been a

better tool for this task. The CCD can also help monitor

formations, but it is often difficult to interpret vehicle

positions on the CCD, particularly if operating in a smaller

scale. When considering low visibility operations, it may be

desirable to use the CITV for formation monitoring and positionkeeping among selected tanks in a unit.

Many of the CVCC participants expressed concern over the

degree to which their attention was drawn inside the turret by

the CVCC system, particularly early in the training process.

Both the CITV and the CCD required the vehicle commander to look

away from the vision blocks. This frequently generated fear that

dangerous targets would appear and not be detected because the

commander did not have his head up. Note that these points refer

to closed-hatch operations, implying even greater concerns

77
regarding open-hatch operations. As they became more familiar

with the system, however, vehicle commanders developed a routine

to attend to the vision blocks, CITV and CCD periodically. As

confidence in the CCD and the CITV grew, and participants refined

their routine, they became more comfortable with the overall

system. A key lesson learned is that an effective scan routine

was an essential usage technique.

Move on Surface

Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to move on the surface

of the battlefield was expected to be significantly better than

the Baseline units'.

Generally, CVCC unit performance was better than Baseline

units' among four of the five measures supporting this function.

CVCC units maintained greater stand-off from OPFOR units over all

stages, as measured at the moment that the unit began to maneuver

in both delay stages, and at the end of all stages. CVCC units

crossed the LD closer to the scripted time, and reached the

objective more quickly than Baseline units during the

counterattack. Overall, these findings suggest that CVCC units

were more agile than Baseline units.

Distance between BLUFOR and OPFOR center of mass fCoM^

Originally designed for delay missions (Stages 1 and 3) , this

measure was defined to quantify the battalion's success in

preventing the enemy force from closing on them during the delay.

Subsequently the measure was extended to the offensive mission

(Stage 2), since that mission ended with a defense of the newly

occupied objectives. The distance between each BLUFOR nonreserve company's CoM and the CoM of its nearest OPFOR company

was computed at the point when the last OPFOR firing occurred.

The average of the three non-reserve companies' values was

computed to yield a battalion-level measure. Larger values

signified better unit performance.

Data for this measure are displayed in Figure 21. Overall,

the average end-of-engagement distance separating BLUFOR and

OPFOR companies was significantly greater in the CVCC condition

than in the Baseline condition. Differences between stages

resulted from the tactical differences built into the test

scenario. That is, in Stages 1 and 3, the intent was to

establish contact, engage with direct and indirect fires, and

maintain an effective stand-off range to retain freedom of

maneuver and not be decisively engaged during the delay. In the

counterattack, the intent was to close with and destroy the

OPFOR, and hence, shorter engagement ranges were expected.

The distances indicated in Stage 1 suggest that most

companies had broken contact by the time the last engagement

occurred. The difference can only be seen as an advantage for

CVCC when taken in the overall context of the scenario. Given

the degree of OPFOR destruction achieved by most units prior to

78
K 5.5

5.0

I

4.5

L 4.0

0 3.5

M 3.0

E

2.5

T

E

R

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

s 0.0

n 5.207

3.235 3.043

2.553

2.349

2.768

cvcc

BASELINE

STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3

Figure 21. Mean distance between OPFOR and BLUFOR center of mass

at end-stage.

the end of the stage (see Table 21) r and the need to rearm prior

to the counterattack, w.hese distances are reasonable. CVCC units

were able to disengage more of their force, and were prepared to

execute sustainment operations further away from the action—thus

better protecting the (notional) CSS assets as well as the units

being resupplied.

In the counterattack, the results must be cross-referenced

with OPFOR losses, and with the amount of time to accomplish that

function (i.e., time to complete Stage) to ensure that the

primary function—enemy destruction—is accomplished rapidly.

The greater range among CVCC units, which also destroyed a

greater portion of the enemy formation and completed the mission

more rapidly, does sustain the finding that CVCC units performed

better than their Baseline counterparts.

Time to reach line of departure rstacre 2 onlv^ . The

counterattack FRAGO established an LD time 15 minutes after the

start of the Stage. These data were computed as the time elapsed

from the start of the stage (STARTEX) to the point when the first

vehicle crossed the LD. Although not defined as a separate

measure, the amount of time for the battalion to report REDCON-l

was also recorded.

Within that 15 minute time frame, the battalion was expected

to disseminate the FRAGO and move to the LD. In all cases, A

Company had the furthest travel distance to the LD:

approximately 6.5 km. In Baseline units, this often meant that A

Company had to begin moving before the order was completely

79
Table 19

Critical Times During Counterattack (in Minutes, from STARTEX)

Measure CVCC Baseline

REDCON-1 time (Target: ASAP)

Earliest 3.083 13.533

Average

Latest

7.825

12.483

17.279

23.917

n-5 n=4

LD time (Target: 15.0)

Earliest 13.3 16.367

Average

Latest

19.433

24.0

24.844

31.6

n=6 n=6

Arrived on Objective (Target:

ASAP)

Earliest 23.872 29.817

Average

Latest

29.424

36.383

36.349

45.089

n=6 n=6

relayed to the platoon leaders. Units reported REDCON-1 when all

elements had received the order and were on the move or ready to

move. Because of differences in orders transmission media

between conditions, and variations in how units in both

conditions processed the FRAGO, REDCON-1 times varied among

units. Some units did not formally report REDCON-1.

Among those units that reported REDCON-1, CVCC units took

significantly less time to do so: an average of 7.83 minutes as

compared to an average of 17.28 minutes among Baseline units (see

Table 19) . This clearly demonstrates an advantage for orders

processing among CVCC units, as previously indicated under the

Command and Control BOS.

LD crossing times are also shown in Table 19. CVCC units

crossed the LD, on average, 19.43 minutes into the stage (range:

13.3 to 24.0 minutes), as opposed to 24.84 minutes, on average

(range: 16.37 to 31.6 minutes), for Baseline units. When

expressed as a deviation from the target time, CVCC units

averaged 4.43 minutes late and ranged from 1.7 minutes early to 9

minutes late. Using the same criterion. Baseline units ranged

from 1.37 minutes to 16.6 minutes late, and averaged 9.84 minutes

late. This trend also shows a clear advantage among CVCC units.

80
Time for companies to reach objectives fStage 2 only) . This

measure quantified the time to reach the objective during the

counterattack, for all non-reserve companies. The time was

measured from the start of the stage until each company (A, B,

and C) reached the objective. The times were averaged to arrive

at a single value per test unit. The data are presented in Table

19.

CVCC units arrived an average of seven minutes sooner than

Baseline units. This represents a significant difference between

CVCC and Baseline. When combined with the previous measure, CVCC

units took an average of ten minutes to move from the LD to the

objective, as compared to 11.5 minutes in Baseline units.

Range to OPFOR at displacement f Stages 1 and 3 onlv^ . The

displacement criterion for the delay mission was when a companysized OPFOR element approached within 2000 m of a BLUFOR

company's position (see Appendix C, OPORD 200). This measure was

designed to quantify how well the company commanders were able to

apply this criterion in requesting/executing their unit

displacement. The linear distance between each BLUFOR nonreserve company's CoM and its nearest OPFOR company's CoM was

computed at the time the battalion displacement began, then was

averaged across companies. For the conditions of this

evaluation, longer distances generally corresponded to better

performance.

In both delay stages, the average displacement ranges were

greater for CVCC-equipped companies. The average range among

CVCC units was 2836.5 m (standard deviation (SD) - 564.4) in

Stage 1 and 2369.8 m (SD 404.9) in Stage 3. The average range

in Stage 1 among Baseline units was 2607.2 m (SD - 392.6), and in

Stage 3 was 2251.0 m (SD - 451.9). However, these data do not

represent a significant difference between CVCC and Baseline.

Units in both conditions began the displacement at a greater

range in Stage 1 than in Stage 3, due to the availability of

better long range fields of fire in the first stage.

The reader will note that, in all cases, the average ranges

exceeded the 2000 meter disengagement criterion. This is

explained by the measures' definition, in that the data were

collected when the battalion began the delay, rather than taking

individual measurements for each company as it began to maneuver.

These data do not clearly indicate the range to the OPFOR from

the BLUFOR company that keyed the disengagement, so it is

difficult to determine whether the displacement criterion was

met. However, by referring to other measures, the reader can

make a judgement regarding the underlying precept: that of

avoiding decisive engagement.

Overall, CVCC units achieved a more advantageous loss/kill

ratio and retained more of their own combat power than did

Baseline units in Stage 1 (see Table 21) . More OPFOR losses were

inflicted by Baseline units, but at a higher proportionate cost

81
in terms of own losses. Units in both conditions effectively

stopped the OPFOR advance in Stage 1. In Stage 3, however, the

data trend leaned the opposite direction. Although CVCC units

began the delay in Stage 3 with the OPFOR at a greater range,

they sustained more losses and inflicted less damage on the

enemy. In summary, while an apparent trend is indicated by the

mean range to the OPFOR at the time of displacement, the data are

not conclusive.

Exposure index. The exposure index was developed to

quantify a vehicle's risk of enemy-initiated engagement.

Following initial intervisibility with an enemy vehicle, a count

of all intervisible enemy vehicles was obtained for each manned

vehicle every 30 seconds until the first main gun firing by that

company, or either the battalion commander or S3, in the case of

the command group. All counts from the sample period were

averaged to yield a single value per manned vehicle. For this

measure, smaller values were desirable. In effect, this measure

was designed to determine the degree to which command group

vehicle crews used cover and concealment up to the point that the

unit was engaged. Direct fire periods were excluded from the

data collection window to avoid contaminating the data with those

periods during which the vehicle crew risks being engaged

specifically for the purpose of returning fire on the enemy.

There were no consistent differences between the CVCC and

Baseline conditions. In Stage 1, Baseline units had higher

indices than CVCC units, but the trend was reversed in Stage 3.

In the counterattack, CVCC battalion command groups were more

exposed than Baseline battalion command group vehicles, whereas

CVCC company commanders and XOs were less exposed than their

counterparts. Units in both conditions were exposed more often

in the delay stages than in the counterattack, due to the

difference in force ratios throughout the stages.

An unexpected effect was that the exposure index for

battalion command group members in both conditions and all stages

was higher than for company echelon vehicles. This may be

attributed in part to the averaging affect across company echelon

vehicles, as opposed to the battalion command groups' desire to

move to the action. That is, if one company out of three was in

contact, then only two of the six company command tanks might

have been exposed, whereas the battalion commander and S3 might

move to that action and in so doing, expose themselves to enemy

observation. Alternatively, battalion commanders and S3s in CVCC

may have held their fire longer once in line-of-sight contact.

This would have had the effect of accumulating more exposure time

until either member of the command group opened fire.

Summary. Three of the five measures within this function

showed a substantial difference between CVCC and Baseline units:

the distance between OPFOR and BLUFOR company centers of mass at

end stage, the time to reach the LD, and the time to reach the

objective in the counterattack. Also, REDC0N-1 times in Stage 2

82
show a clear advantage for CVCC units. Otherwise, the data

trends among the remaining measures suggest an advantage for CVCC

units, but the differences shown between CVCC and Baseline are

too small to be considered reliable. The trends favoring CVCC

unit performance are consistent with findings in prior efforts,

and support the hypothesis that CVCC units moved more effectively

than Baseline units.

Navigate

Hypothesis: The CVCC unit's ability to navigate on the

battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the

Baseline units'.

Only one measure supporting this hypothesis (time to

complete stage) produced data that show a clear advantage among

CVCC units. The other two measures, distance travelled and fuel

used, yielded data that did not demonstrate discernable

differences between conditions.

Distance travelled and fuel used. These measures report the

actual distance travelled and fuel consumption among manned

vehicles during each stage. Because of the direct relationship

between distance travelled and fuel used, the findings are

grouped together for analysis and discussion. Because of the

CVCC's automated navigation capabilities, it was anticipated that

CVCC-equipped battalions would be able to navigate more

accurately and avoid being lost or misoriented. Accordingly,

crews in the CVCC condition were expected to travel less

distance, overall, in accomplishing the mission. As a result of

the expectation that the CVCC capabilities would reduce overall

distance travelled, it was anticipated that fuel consumption

would also decline.

As shown in Table 20, CVCC units did not perform as expected

in the delay stages. CVCC units travelled further and consumed

more fuel than Baseline units in delay stages. In the

counterattack, distance travelled and fuel used was slightly

lower in CVCC units.

The differences between conditions in both delay stages can

be attributed, in part, to the greater degree f agility

demonstrated by CVCC units. Overall, CVCC units maneuvered in

greater depth within the battalion's area of operations during

the delay. Thus, CVCC units took advantage of the CVCC system's

navigational aids to operate in a more fluid and tactically sound

fashion than Baseline units. Whereas Baseline crews generally

used direct routes to move to subsequent positions, CVCC units

could use the terrain more effectively to maintain cover and

concealment, without becoming misoriented. Another factor may

have been the degree to which participants in the battalion

evaluation operated in conjunction with their subordinate SAFOR

elements, and the degree of maneuver freedom afforded the

battalion commander in the scenarios. Command crews in CVCC were

83
FRAOO 2 to OPORD 200 FOR TRAINING ONLY

e. D Co: occupy BP 46. Prepare to reinforce, in priority, B

Co, A Co, and C Co. On order, displace to BP 41.

f. Mortars: locate to rear of B Co.

g. Scouts: screen eastern flank.

h. Companies report when "set" in BPs.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. No Change.

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Bn Cdr will locate to rear of B Co vie BP 45.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

OFFICIAL: PATTON

Cdr

HASZARD

S3

FRAGO 2 Overlay (Omitted)

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-45
FRAGO 2 to OPORD 200 (Oral Transcript for Baseline)

FOR TRAINING ONLY

"GUIDONS, THIS IS YANKEE THREE-THREE, ORDERS, OVER."

NOTE: All subordinate stations respond.

"FRAGO: SECOND ECHELON MRR IS APPROACHING BN SECTOR FROM SOUTH

EAST, ETA: 20 MINUTES."

"NOVEMBER RESUMES DELAY AT PL ACE. BDE DISPOSITION PER ORIGINAL

ORDER."

"YANKEE DEFENDS FROM AT (time specified by ECR) ALONG

PL ACE (83 E-W gridline), DELAYS ENEMY S OF PL TRUMP FOR ANOTHER

TWO HOURS."

"ALPHA: DEFEND FROM BP 25 (ES840840) ORIENT SOUTH. DELAY THRU

BPs 11 THEN 12."

"BRAVO: DEFEND FROM BP 45 (ES867840) ORIENT SOUTH. DELAY THRU BPs

46 THEN 21, THEN 22."

"CHARLIE: DEFEND FROM BP 35 (ES896840) ORIENT SOUTH. DELAY THRU

BP 36 THREE-SIX (ES902870) THEN BPs 31 AND 32."

"DELTA: OCCUPY BP 46 (ES873875). BE PREPARED TO REINFORCE BRAVO,

ALPHA OR CHARLIE IN THAT ORDER. BLITZ TO BP 41 ON ORDER."

"SIERRA ONE ONE: SCREEN LEFT FLANK."

"SIERRA TWO ONE: SUPPORT FROM CENTER OF SECTOR."

"BLITZ WHEN READY, REPORT WHEN SET. ACKNOWLEDGE, OVER."

NOTE: Ail subordinate stations acknowledge.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-46
FRAGO 2 to OPORD 200 (Text for CVCC digital overlay)

{ OVERLAY TEXT ]

FRAGO 2-200 1

SITUATION

Enemy -2d Ech MRR moving

NW into Bn sector, ETA: 20 min. 1

Friendly -1st Bde resumes delay,

1-92 on our R, 1-91 to rear @PL

TRUMP.

MISSION -1-10 defends at

R along- ACE, delays En S

of Trump for 2 hrs.

EXECUTION -see O/L.

D: b/prep reinf B,A,C. i

Coord: move when ready, report |

REDCON 1. !

END {

Close {

C-47
Mission and Commander's Intent Statements from Company Orders

Company A

MISSION

A/1-10 AR accepts BHO from and assists in the rearward

passage of lines of TF 1-2 NLT 0950R 9_ at PL KING, Then

A/1-10 AR defends from BP 10; on order delays through successive

BPs forward of PL TRUMP until 1350R 9_. 0/0 conducts

rearward passage of lines through 1-91 IN (M).

EXECUTION

After rearward passage of TF 1-2, 1 want to hit the enemy

hard in EA STING, disrupt his pursuit, and weaken his 1st echelon

battalions. The enemy should approach BP 10 with two companies

leading followed by one second echelon company. The enemy's main

effort will be directed at A Co due to the open terrain and

orientation of the main attack. We will then give ground to vie

PL CLUB to determine the enemy's main effort. I want to keep

constant contact with the enemy while avoiding decisive

engagement and hit him as heavily as possible throughout the

remainder of the sector. We need to be ready to hold the ground

just south of PL TRUMP and be alert for opportunities for limited

counterattacks. We will prevent the enemy from penetrating PL

TRUMP prior to 135OR 9_.

Company B

MISSION

B/l-10 AR accepts BHO from and assists in the rearward

passage of lines of TF 1-2 NLT 0950R 9_ at PL KING. Then

B/l-10 AR defends from BP 20; on order delays through successive

BPs until 1350R 9_. 0/0 conducts rearward passage of lines

through 1-91 IN (M).

EXECUTION

After rearward passage of TF 1-2, I want to hit the enemy

hard in EA WHIP, disrupt his pursuit, and weaken his 1st echelon

battalions. The enemy should approach BP 20 with two companies

leading followed by one second echelon company. The enemy's main

effort will be directed at A Co, on our right, due to the open

terrain and orientation of the main attack. We will then give

ground to vie PL CLUB to determine the enemy's main effort. I

want to keep constant contact with the enemy while avoiding

decisive engagement and hit him as heavily as possible throughout

the remainder of the sector. We need to be ready to hold the

ground just south of PL TRUMP and be alert for opportunities for

C-48
limited counterattacks. We will prevent the enemy from

penetrating PL TRUMP prior to 1350R 9_.

Company C

MISSION

C/l-10 AR accepts BHO from and assists in the rearward

passage of lines of TF 1-2 NLT 0950R 9_ at PL KING. Then

C/l-10 AR defends from BP 30; on order delays through successive

BPs until 0950R 9_. 0/0 conducts rearward passage of lines

through 1-91 IN (M).

EXECUTION

After rearward passage of TF 1-2, I want to hit the enemy

hard in EA CHAIN, disrupt his pursuit, and weaken his 1st echelon

battalions. The enemy should approach BP 30 with two companies

leading followed by one second echelon company. The enemy's main

effort will be directed at A Co, on the BN right flank, due to

the open terrain and orientation of the main attack. We will

then give ground to vie PL CLUB to determine the enemy's main

effort. I want to keep constant contact with the enemy while

avoiding decisive engagement and hit him as heavily as possible

throughout the remainder of the sector. We need to be ready to

hold the ground just south of PL TRUMP and be alert for

opportunities for limited counterattacks. We will prevent the

enemy from penetrating PL TRUMP prior to 1350R 9_.

C-49
Appendix D

Itemized List of Measures

Command and Control BOS

Receive and Transmit Mission

o Elapsed time from Bn transmission of FRAGO to receipt by Co

Cdr/XO

O Number of requests by Co Cdr/XO to clarify FRAGO/overlay

o Duration of Request by Co Cdr/XO to clarify FRAGO/overlay

o Consistency of relayed FRAGO

Receive and Transmit Enemy Information

o Consistency of INTEL received

O Time to transmit INTEL report full net: Bn TOC to lowest

manned net

o Munber of requests to clarify INTEL reports

Receive and Transmit Friendly Troop Information

o Mean time to transmit SITREP full net: lowest net to Bn TOC

O Mean duration of voice transmissions between Bn Cdr/S3 & Bn

TOC, except named reports

0 Number of voice transmissions between the Bn Cdr/S3 and the

TOC, excluding named reports

O Deviation of BLUFOR location reported in SITREP from actual

location

o Delay between observed PL/LD crossing and reported crossing

o Delay between observed BP arrival and reporting SET at BP

o Elapsed time from request for fuel and/or ammo report until

received by Bn TOC

Manage Means of Communicating Information

o Average length of voice radio transmissions, by radio network

o Average number of voice radio transmissions, by radio network

o Total time on voice radio network

o Number of named voice reports

Assess Situation

o Percentage of OPFOR tanks correctly identified

o Percentage of OPFOR BMPs correctly identified

O Percentage of own vehicles destroyed

o Destruction of OPFOR vehicles after the order to delay

o Deviation between true and reported distance

o Composite situational assessment index

D-l
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces

O Did Task Force prevent decisive engagement?

o Did the Bn withdraw intact?

o Number of counterattacking companies engaging OPFOR

o To what extent did the Bn meet the Bde Cdr's intent?

o Battalion command effectiveness composite index

Maneuver BOS

Move on Surface

o Distance between BLUFOR and OPFOR center of mass (CoM),

average per Bn

O Time to reach LD

o Time for companies to reach Objectives (Stage 2)

O Range to OPFOR at displacement

o Exposure index

Navigate

o Distance travelled

o Fuel used

o Time to complete stage

o Mean time out of sector/axis

o Mean time misoriented

Process Direct Fire Targets

o Maximum läse range

O Time to acquire targets

o Time between lases to different targets

o Time from first läse to first fire

o Number of fratricide hits by manned vehicles

o Number of fratricide kills by manned vehicles

Engage Direct Fire Targets

o Percent of OPFOR killed by end of stage

O Percent of BLUFOR killed by end of stage

o Losses/kill ratio

o Percent OPFOR vehicles killed by all manned vehicles

o Number of manned vehicles sustaining a killing hit

o Mean target hit range

o Mean target kill range

o Hits/round ratio, manned vehicles

o Kills/round ratio, manned vehicles

0 Kills/hit ratio, manned vehicles

o Number of rounds fired by manned vehicles, by echelon

o Number of OPFOR vehicles killed south of PL Jack (Stage 1)

o Number of OPFOR vehicles killed south of PL Club (Stage 1)

o Number of OPFOR vehicles killed south of PL Queen (Stage 3)

O Number of OPFOR vehicles killed south of PL Ace (Stage 3)

D-2
Control Terrain

o Was the Bn bypassed by the OPFOR?

o Number of OPFOR vehicles penetrating designated line (Stage 1)

o Number of OPFOR vehicles penetrating designated line (Stage 2)

O Number of OPFOR vehicles that crossed PL Queen (Stage 3)

Fire Support BOS

Process Ground Targets

o Mean accuracy of CFF locations

O Percent of CFFs with correct type

Intelligence BOS

Collect Threat Information

O Accuracy of CONTACT report locations

o Accuracy of SPOT report locations (observed and destroyed)

O Accuracy of SHELL report locations

o Percent CONTACT reports with correct type

o Correctness of SPOT report number and type (observed and

destroyed)

D-3
3000.

3095

,3019

2875

2579 2575

2500 - 2433

2000.

1500-

1000.

500-

0 -

\Z\ cvcc

i ] BASELINE

M

E

T

E

R

S

STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3

Figure 23. Mean maximum läse range.

time between initial visibility of an enemy vehicle and the first

läse to the same vehicle. For CVCC-equipped vehicles, lases by

the commander and the gunner were compared to select the shorter

interval. For each stage, the average per vehicle was computed.

Because of the CVCC's independent thermal viewing capabilities

for unit and vehicle commanders, crews were expected to acquire

targets more quickly in the CVCC condition.

Figure 24 shows times to acquire by condition and mission

(i.e., delay and counterattack). Across all Stages, CVCC units

acquired targets sooner than Baseline units. The difference

averaged 20 seconds in Stage 1 and 26 seconds in Stage 3 (24

seconds, on average, for delay situations). Since CVCC crews

generally acquired beyond effective main gun range (i.e., 2500

meters in NWTB), this allowed them more time to initiate the

engagement with indirect fires before opening with direct fires.

In the counterattack, the difference between conditions is much

more notable, averaging approximately 43 seconds.

Both this and the preceding measure suggest that the CVCC

unit commander is not so burdened with C

2

tasks (i.e., drawn to

the CCD) that he cannot contribute substantially to target

acquisition.

Time between lases to different targets. As an index of

speed in acquiring sequential targets, this measure quantified

the time interval separating successive lases to different enemy

vehicles. The computational procedure measured the elapsed time

from a manned vehicle's last läse at an OPFOR vehicle to its

first läse at the next OPFOR vehicle. The advantage of

sighting/lasing systems for both the commander and gunner (the

"hunter-killer" capability) led to the expectation of shorter

87
2.82

M

I

N

U

T

E

S

cvcc

BASEUNE

DELAY COUNTERATTACK

Figure 24. Mean tine to acquire targets.

"hunter-killer" capability) led to the expectation of shorter

values for this measure among CVCC-equipped vehicles.

The mean values for this measure did not vary greatly across

conditions. The reader should be aware that, given the

independent laser in the CITV and the ability to use the CXTV's

LRP to input enemy locations in tactical reports on the CCD, not

every läse event was directly related to a direct fire

engagement. It is possible that using the CITV's laser for

report input may have affected this measure in an unpredicted

manner.

Time from first läse to first fire. This measure was

designed to provide an index of a crew's speed in responding to

enemy targets with direct fire. Conceptually, the process

included application of IFF procedures. In practice, elapsed

time was computed from a manned vehicle's first läse at an enemy

vehicle to the firing of the first round directed at the same

vehicle. Given the enhanced situational awareness expected to

result from CVCC capabilities (e.g., greater awareness of

friendly and enemy positions), shorter lase-to-fire times were

anticipated for CVCC-equipped vehicles. Performance data from

this measure are presented graphically in Figure 25.

During the delay stages. Baseline units appear to enjoy an

eight second advantage over CVCC units, on average. By contrast,

during the counterattack, CVCC units' lase-fire times were an

average of six seconds shorter than Baseline units'. At first

glance, these data suggest slower reaction times in the delay

among CVCC units. However, when considering the data presented

earlier (i.e., earlier acquisition by CVCC units), the slower

läse to fire times become less alarming. That is, the initial

88
s

E

C

o

N

D

S

25 24.60

21.00

20 _

16.20

i^ in 15.

10.

r

5 .

0. . ,

[J cvcc

I I BASELINE

DELAY COUNTERATTACK

Figure 25. Mean time from first läse to first fire.

acquisition could result in longer average lase-to-fire times as

CVCC units waited until the OPFOR formation closed within

effective direct fire range. As with the previous measure, the

difference in the delay may be attributed, in part, to the

independent LRF on the CITV.

Number of fratricide hits and kills bv manned vehicles. IFF

was an important element of the process direct fire targets

hypothesis. The IFF system built into the CITV and the graphic

display of own unit locations on the CCD were expected to help

prevent fratricide events among CVCC units.

Fratricide events were infrequent over the course of the

scenarios, and the low number of events overall make it difficult

to attribute their occurrence to other than random factors.

Nevertheless, it is clear that those incidents occurred more

frequently in CVCC units, as shown in Figure 26.

Many of the fratricide events were observed by control

personnel and investigated in detail during scenario debriefings.

According to the crews, most of those that occurred in CVCC units

were attributed to faulty target identifications made by the

gunner when the vehicle commander was preoccupied with command

and control tasks. Vehicle commanders reported using the CITV to

obtain an IFF readout in only a few of the observed fratracide

cases, but the system provided either enemy or indeterminate

identifications. In those situations, vehicle commanders

attempted to visually confirm the target through the GPSE, but

were unable to recognize the vehicle as friendly (Meade et al.,

in preparation).

89
9 _

7

8.

T 0

7_

0 6.

F

T E

V

F

5.

A 4, 1 ] cvcc 3 3

L N

T

3 J

2 J

| J BASELINE

# S 1 J

0

0 J

HITS KILLS

Figure 26. T<)ta:L numb«sr of fratricide events, by condition.

In cases where the gunner was operating independently of the

vehicle commander, the CVCC system provided no direct advantage

over Baseline. Differences in the relative deployment of CVCC

units may have resulted in more opportunities to engage adjacent

friendly elements. Alternatively, the higher experience levels

among Baseline gunners, combined with the higher volume of voice

position reports associated with the Baseline condition may have

favorably influenced Baseline unit performance. Finally, the

availability of the IFF system may have provided a false sense of

security among CVCC crews, despite warnings of its expected error

rate.

Summary. The significantly faster acquisition times and

greater maximum range returns for CVCC units support the

hypothesis of better target processing performance using the CVCC

system. However, the degree of advantage attributable to the

CVCC system in this evaluation is not as great as the performance

differential documented in prior efforts. Otherwise, the lack of

notable differences among the remainder of the measures may be

attributed to the degree to which vehicle commanders are

distracted by command and control duties in both conditions. In

view of the better target processing performance among crews

during previous evaluations (Quinkert, 1990, Leibrecht et al.,

1992), the findings in the current effort show that the CCD does

not distract a unit commander any more than conventional C

2

methods at the company and battalion levels. The higher

incidence of fratricide among CVCC crews, although not a

statistically significant finding, bears further study.

90
Enaaae Direct Fire Targets

Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to engage direct fire

targets on the battlefield was expected to be significantly

better than the Baseline units'.

The measures supporting this hypothesis contain data taken

from the entire unit as well as manned vehicles only. Vehicle

kill data (both enemy and friendly) include both catastrophic and

firepower kills (as determined on-line by the vehicle's

computer), but not mobility kills. In order to demonstrate the

units' overall effectiveness, kills due to both direct and

indirect fire are counted among unit-level performance measures,

unless otherwise noted. Finally, friendly damages and casualties

include those resulting from friendly fire (i.e., fratricide).

Many of the measures supporting this hypothesis demonstrated

better performance among CVCC units, although the differences

between conditions were relatively small. CVCC crews did achieve

a notably higher kill per hit ratio than did Baseline units, and

a more advantageous loss to kill ratio in Stages 1 and 2. CVCC

units also retained a greater proportion of their own force

during the counterattack (Stage 2) . Two measures showed trends

favoring Baseline units, specifically: percent of OPFOR killed

per stage, and the number of hits per rounds fired by manned

vehicles. Negligible differences between conditions appeared for

the number of rounds fired by manned vehicles. Table 21 contains

summary data (means and standard deviations) for selected

measures supporting this hypothesis.

Percent of OPFOR killed bv end of staae. This primary

indicator of engagement outcome quantified the battalion's

success in destroying the enemy forces. As shown in Table 21,

the data for this measure differed sharply between the

counterattack and delay stages, due to the difference between the

missions. The difference between conditions in Stage 1 is

negligible (less than two OPFOR vehicles, on average) . In Stage

2, CVCC units turned in a slightly better performance than

Baseline units, but the difference was again relatively small

(less than five vehicles).

In Stage 3, the difference was more notable, representing an

average of 15 more kills per stage by Baseline units. This

difference is probably due to differences in the way that unit

commanders positioned their forces at the start of the stage. It

may also suggest that CVCC unit commanders were more constrained

by the graphic control measures that appeared on their CCDs with

the FRAGO that began Stage 3. Baseline commanders were given

only the center of mass of the assigned battle position, whereas

CVCC commanders received the digital overlay with the BPs. By

conforming to the BP as drawn on the overlay, CVCC commanders

established platoon fighting positions that were less suitable to

engaging the enemy at longer ranges than those selected by

Baseline commanders. CVCC company commanders were not routinely

91
Table 21

Mean Performance Data for Engage Direct Fire Targets Hypothesis

MMSur*

Stage

CVCC

1

Baseline

Stage 2

CVCC Baseline

Stage 3

CVCC Baseline

Ptroant OPFOR killed 87.1

(8.7)

n-6

88.2

(8.6)

n-6

98.1

(16)

D-6

91.1

(13.4)

n-6

71.9

(21.8)

Q-5

87.2

(17.9)

Q-4

Percent BLUFOR killed 22.1

(10.0)

Q-6

26.0

(10.7)

n-6

4.4

(2.3)

n-6

9.4

(6.0)

Q-6

26.6

(9.7)

Q-5

22.3

(10.7)

n-4

Lowes/kill ratio1

0.16

(0.08)

n-6

0.19

(0.10)

n-6

0.05

(0.02)

n-6

0.12

(0.09)

n-6

0.28

(0.13)

Q-5

0.18

(0.11)

n-4

Percent OPFOR vehicles killed by

manned vehicle«

10.1

(6.5)

n-6

10.4

(3.7)

n-6

6.6

(2.9)

n-6

3.8

(2.7)

Q-6

14.0

(6.5)

Q-5

12.6

(7.1)

n-4

Number of manned vehicles

auttaining a killing hit

2.17

(184)

Ü-6

2.33

(0.82)

Q-6

0.67

(0.82)

Q-6

0.83

(0.98)

Q-6

2.40

(1.52)

Q-5

3.25

(189)

n-4

Number of rounds fired by manned

vehicles

Bn Echelon 11.6

(10.3)

Q-ll

10.0

(6.5)

n-12

4.1

(5-9)

Q-11

5.2

(6.8)

n-12

6.5

(7.2)

Q-10

8.8

(10.5)

n-8

Co Echelon 15.4

(7-5)

n-36

15.1

(10.8)

n-36

8.0

(9.0)

n-36

8.1

(8.6)

n-36

10.5

(6.6)

n-30

12.1

(8.8)

Q-24

Note. Standard deviations appear in parenthesis below the means.

1

BLUFOR vehicles lost per OPFOR vehicle killed. Lower numbers

indicate better performance.

encouraged to reposition platoons and coordinate adjusted platoon

BPs with the battalion commander or TOC at the start of Stage 3.

The overlay was therefore more restrictive than the verbal FRAGO.

In retrospect, it would have been advisable to use less

restrictive graphics in the CVCC overlay, and to direct unit

leaders to find hasty defensive positions that would optimize

engagement ranges.

Percent of BLUFOR killed bv end of stage. This measure was

used to evaluate whether the battalion successfully "protected

its forces." The entire BLUFOR (manned and unmanned) was

included in these data. The data are shown in Table 21.

Overall, CVCC units were slightly more successful at

sustaining their combat power than Baseline units. In Stage 2,

92
the smaller mean value and the smaller standard deviation among

CVCC units are notable: Baseline unit losses were, on average,

nearly double those suffered by CVCC groups in the counterattack.

Losses in the delay stages averaged between 22 and 27 percent of

the BLUFOR, and were not consistent between units. The data for

Stages 1 and 3 essentially cancelled each other out, such that

only a negligible difference (i.e., less than 0.4%) remains,

overall, in delay situations.

Losses/kill ratio. The losses/kill ratio provides

information about a units' combat effectiveness, and was

calculated by dividing the total number of BLUFOR losses by the

total number of OPFOR losses. It is similar to a loss-exchange

ratio.

In both Stages 1 and 2, CVCC units achieved a more

advantageous ratio than did Baseline units. These data are more

easily interpreted using the reciprocal of the decimal fractions

shown in the table. In Stage 1, CVCC units averaged 6.25 kills

per BLUFOR vehicle lost, as compared to 5.26:1 in Baseline. In

Stage 3, the data favor the Baseline (5.56:1) over CVCC units

(3.57:1). The most notable difference occurred in the

counterattack. In Stage 2, CVCC units averaged 20 OPFOR vehicle

kills per loss, while Baseline units averaged 8.33:1. When the

Stage 2 data are analyzed in isolation, a clear advantage is

indicated for the CVCC system.

Percent of OPFOR vehicles killed by all manned vehicles.

This measure provides an indication of the degree to which

participant crews contributed to the OPFOR's destruction during

the scenario. It was calculated by determining the number of

OPFOR vehicles killed by manned vehicles, and dividing by the

total number of OPFOR vehicles killed.

Overall, CVCC units claimed a slightly larger proportion of

total kills than did Baseline units. The greatest differential

between conditions appeared in the counterattack. This affect

may be a result of both navigation and C

2

performance: In

Baseline units, company commanders and XOs were required to both

navigate and control the movement of their units in coordination

with adjacent units, as well as search for targets. In CVCC, the

automated navigation function simplified individual tank

movement, while the CCD simplified coordination tasks. This

allowed the vehicle commander more opportunities to search for

targets and to initiate the engagement more quickly once in

contact.

Number of manned vehicles sustaining a killing hit. Even

though manned simulators were programmed to override the damaging

effects of direct and indirect fire hits, the host computer

classified hits in terms of damages sustained. The number of

vehicles sustaining at least one killing hit was tallied during

each stage to include fratricide events. This measure provided a

rough indicator of exposure to lethal fires.

93
The data for this measure appear in Table 21. Although

consistently fewer manned tanks in the CVCC condition sustained

killing hits, the difference was negligible. The data for this

measure are consistent with the fact that Baseline units tended

to fight at closer ranges to the OPFOR, and were therefore more

susceptible to taking losses. In all but the last stage, these

data correspond to those regarding BLUFOR losses as a whole.

Mean target hit range. This measure was designed to capture

the average distance at which crews firing their main guns scored

hits against enemy targets. Applied to manned vehicles only, the

measure was computed as the distance (in meters) from a firing

vehicle to the OPFOR vehicle hit by the round fired (i.e.,

fratricide hits were excluded). The range values for all hits

scored by a given crew were averaged to produce a single value

per vehicle, per stage. Given the hunter-killer advantage of the

CITV, CVCC-equipped battalions were expected, on the average, to

hit targets at greater ranges. As shown in Figure 27, the data

show only slight, inconsistent differences between conditions.

M

E

T

E

R

S

2500 _

2000 .

1500 «

1000 _

500 m

2352

2199

180 1891 Ü£3l943

CVCC

|~1 BASELINE

STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3

Figure 27. Mean target hit range, in meters.

Mean target kill range. This measure was defined and

computed very similarly to the preceding measure (mean target hit

range), the only difference being whether the result was

classified as a kill. The data for this measure (see Figure 28)

show differences of between 100 and 150 meters, on average,

between conditions in all three stages.

Due to the small differences between conditions and

variability of the data, the values for mean target hit and kill

ranges must be considered comparable. This may be attributed to

the limitations of the equipment used for the evaluation. Given

that the gunner's fire control system did not differ between

94
2500 _

M 2000 -

E

T

E 1000 -

R

~ 500 J

1500 -

2324 2211

1819

1967

1715

1827

G cvcc

BASELINE

STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3

Figure 28. Mean target kill range, in meters.

conditions, any apparent advantage accorded CVCC crews by longer

acquisition ranges may have been negated by limitations in the

MWTB environment.

Hits/round ratio, for manned vehicles. As an index of basic

firing accuracy (marksmanship), the proportion of rounds hitting

an OPFOR vehicle was computed for each manned tank. Higher

ratios indicate better performance. The results (see Figure 29)

are expressed as a decimal fraction to indicate the number of

hits scored per round fired. Overall, only on* in four rounds

found their target, despite condition. This finding is a good

indicator of the level of gunnery performance that can be

expected using the MWTB simulators. The data show no appreciable

difference between conditions (average .26 hits/round in Baseline

as opposed to .24 hits/round in CVCC).

Kills/round ratio, for manned vehicles. Similar to the

hits/round ratio, this measure compared the number of enemy

vehicles killed to the number of rounds fired by each manned

tank. It serves as an indicator of the effectiveness of main gun

firings. Higher ratios represent better performance. The data

fcr this measure (see Figure 30) show no appreciable difference

between conditions.

Kills/hit ratio, for manned vehicles. This measure

calculated the proportion of hits resulting in target destruction

(mobility kills excluded) for each crew. Higher ratios indicate

better performance. Figure 31 shows the ratio of kills per hit

by condition and Stage. Overall, CVCC crews killed a

substantially higher proportion of the targets they hit (average

.38), as compared to Baseline crews (average .27).

95
H 0.30^

I

T 0.25.

S

0.20 J

P

D 0.15J

R 010-1

o

U 0.05 .

N

D 0.00

.28 .29 .29

18

.26

.22

cvcc

BASELINE

STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3

Figure 29. Mean hits per round fired, manned vehicles.

.11

09 09

.07

K

I

L

L

S

E

R

R

O

U

N

D

0.11 n

0.10.

0.09.

0.08.

0.07.

0.06.

0.05.

0.04.

0.03.

0.02.

0.01 .

0.00.

.02

.06

cvcc

BASEUNE

STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3

Figure 30. Mean kills per round fired, manned vehicles.

There is no readily apparent reason for the difference

between conditions, although some plausible explanations do

exist. The result might be due to better round selection among

CVCC crews, or to more deliberate gunnery performance on the part

of CVCC gunners, resulting in more lethal effects.

The data relevant to mean hit and kill ranges (presented

earlier) suggested greater engagement distances among CVCC units.

Generally, higher hit rates are associated with shorter range

engagements, a finding that is consistent with the hits/rounds

96
K

0.45

I 0.40.

L

L

S

0.35.

0.30.

P

E

0.25.

0.20.

R 0.15.

H

0.10.

I 0.05.

T 0.00.

.43

.39

.31 .30

.17

.32

D cvcc

L] BASELINE

STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3

Figure 31. Mean kills per hit scored by manned vehicles.

fired data. The facto:.s that go into scoring a kill (given a

hit) include the point of impact and angle of attack (i.e.,

whether the round struck a vulnerable point on the target), and

the type of munition (i.e., whether the chemical or kinetic

energy was sufficient to cause lethal effects). As will be shown

in data relevant to intelligence collection functions, CVCC units

more accurately reported OPFOR vehicles, by type. Assuming

improved target identification, possibly attributed to better

resolution provided by the CITV as compared to the TIS, CVCC

crews would have been better informed, and more likely to select

the optimal round for the target. Unfortunately, round selection

data were not collected, and the preceding argument is therefore

purely supposition.

The data within the "process direct fire targets" function

also show that CVCC crews generally had more time to acquire,

track, and engage targets at extended ranges. Those factors

would support the argument that CVCC crews were more deliberate

in their gunnery performance, and therefore might have taken

better aim, resulting in more lethal effects, although better

hits per round fired data would have also been expected if that

were the case.

Number of rounds fired bv manned vehicles. As a basic index

of firing activity by crews in manned simulators, this measure

captured the cumulative number of SABOT and HEAT rounds fired by

each crew during each stage. Similar to the number of OPFOR

vehicles killed by manned vehicles, this index provided a general

indicator of the extent to which manned tanks participated in the

actual fighting of the battle. It also provided the denominator

97
for the hits and kills per round measures. As shown in Table 21,

the mean number of rounds fired did not differ consistently

between the CVCC and Baseline conditions.

Number of OPFOR vehicles killed south of designated PL

fStages 1 and 3 only) . For each of the two delay stages,

lethality in the primary engagement areas was quantified by

determining the cumulative number of OPFOR vehicles killed by the

battalion south of two successive PLs during the course of the

stage. The data were cumulative, by stage. That is, in each

stage, the number of kills reported south of the second phase

line included those killed south of the first. In general, the

earlier the enemy was attrited the better, other factors (such as

friendly losses) being equal.

The summary data for these measures appear in Table 22.

Baseline battalions consistently killed more of the enemy in the

primary engagement areas in both delay stages. This pattern is

consistent with the results discussed for the Control Terrain

hypothesis in the following subsection, and probably related to

the greater stand-off distance which CVCC units tended to

maintain (see earlier Move on Surface subsection).

Table 22

Mean Enemy Kills in Primary Engagement Areas

Measure CVCC Baseline

Stage 1

Number OPFOR vehicles killed 64.7 81.7

south of PL Jack (22.7) (14.3)

n=6 n=6

Number OPFOR vehicles killed 84.8 89.8

south of PL Club (11.8) (9.1)

n=6 11=6

Stage 3

Number OPFOR vehicles killed 38.6 54.5

south of PL Ace (22.1) (33.3)

n=5 n=4

Number OPFOR vehicles killed 67.2 83.8

south of PL Queen (21.8) (17.2)

n=5 n=4

Note. Measures apply only to delay stages (Stages 1 and 3) .

Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the means.

98
In Stage 1, the cumulative OPFOR losses south of PL Club are

comparable between conditions (85 v. 90 vehicles), whereas

Baseline units consistently achieved more kills than CVCC units

earlier in the stage (i.e., 82 v. 65 vehicles south of PL JACK).

However, when compared to the planned scheme of maneuver (see App

C, OPORD 200), CVCC units did accomplish an intended task (i.e.,

destruction of the lead enemy companies—64 vehicles—in the

initial engagement areas). However, this trend was not repeated

in Stage 3.

Summary. Several of the measures for this function

supported the hypothesis that CVCC capabilities would benefit the

direct fire engagement of enemy targets. The better prevention

of BLUFOR losses and the losses/kill ratio favored CVCC units in

Stage 2, and CVCC battalions achieved higher kills per hit ratios

in all stages. The lack of significant findings among remaining

measures suggests that the engagement performance of command

crews using the CVCC system is not decremented as compared to

Baseline command vehicle crews. In other words, the CVCC system

allows the commander to attend to critical C

2

responsibilities

without reducing his tank crew's ability to fight for itself, as

compared to Baseline command tank crews.

Control Terrain

Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to control terrain on

the battlefield was expected to be significantly better than the

Baseline units'. The data indicate comparable performance

between Baseline and CVCC units.

Was the battalion bypassed bv the OPFOR? Virtually all of

the Baseline and CVCC battalions completed Stage 1 without being

bypassed by the enemy, and all battalions who completed Stage 3

did so without being bypassed. There was no apparent difference

between the two conditions.

Number of OPFOR vehicles penetrating designated line. For

each stage, a control line was defined to determine undesirable

enemy penetration by the end of the stage. These control lines

were based on mission training plans and represented defensive

boundaries which the battalion should have controlled to deny

enemy penetration during that portion of the delay. In Stage 1,

CVCC-equipped battalions allowed an average of 4.17 enemy

vehicles (standard deviation, 6.46) to penetrate the control

line. In Stage 2, one CVCC battalion permitted two enemy

vehicles to penetrate, and another CVCC battalion allowed one

enemy vehicle through. In Stage 3, one CVCC battalion completed

the mission with ten enemy vehicles penetrating the control line.

This contrasts with performance of the Baseline battalions, none

of whom permitted any enemy vehicles to penetrate the designated

control line in any of the three stages. It is important to note

that although enemy penetrations were more frequent among CVCC

units than Baseline units, most CVCC units did successfully

prevent enemy penetrations.

99
For the delay missions (Stages 1 and 3), CVCC battalion

performance is best attributed to their tendency to begin the

displacement earlier and end their missions with greater standoff distance than Baseline battalions. These trends were

discussed in the subsection addressing the Move on Surface

hypothesis. No explanation for the CVCC units' performance in

Stage 2 is readily evident, although it can be seen as an

isolated event.

Summary. Given no apparent differences in favor of the CVCC

condition, the hypothesis that CVCC units will control terrain

more effectively than Baseline units is not supported.

Summary of Maneuver BOS Findinas

The CVCC system offers some significant advantages over the

Baseline relevant to the Maneuver BOS. Those findings are

characterized in Table 23. The better movement performance data

are consistent with Du Bois and Smith (1989) and Leibrecht et al.

(1992), and demonstrate how CVCC can improve a unit's agility.

The engagement data, although not as notable as the findings

reported by Quinkert (1990) and Leibrecht et al. (1992), do show

that the CVCC system does not inhibit the performance of command

vehicle crews. In effect, the CVCC system offers the capability

to move forces more rapidly about the battlefield in order to

mass fires on known enemy formations. The CITV allows crews to

acquire targets more rapidly, and therefore speed the OPFOR's

destruction.

Whereas the movement of combat units and the employment of

direct fires are important aspects of tactical performance, the

ability to integrate other resources is equally critical. The

subsection that follows addresses the potential benefit offered

by digital communications between the front-line combat force and

supporting indirect fire assets.

Fire Support

Issue: Does the CVCC system enhance the Fire Support BOS?

This subsection presents data and findings regarding CVCC's

impact on the accuracy of designating enemy targets for

engagement with indirect fires. The data presentation follows a

narrative describing how the FSO in the TOC coordinated indirect

fires in support of both Baseline and CVCC unit operations. The

data presentation is organized around a single hypothesis, based

on the Process Ground Targets function of the Fire Support BOS.

The quantitative focus in addressing this issue is the accuracy

of CFF reports, reflecting the precision with which battalion

elements were able to determine and communicate the locations of

enemy targets selected for indirect fire attacks.

Due to the similarity between measures quantifying CFF

accuracy and measures supporting the intelligence collection

100
Table 23

Summary of Findings for Maneuver BOS Issue

Function Findings

Move on Surface

Navigate

Process Direct Fire Targets

Engage Direct Fire Targets

Control Terrain

Greater distance between OPFOR and BLUFOR company CoM

at end of engagement among CVCC units.

CVCC units reached counterattack objectives more quickly.

Slightly greater stand-off distance at start of delay among CVCC

units.

Better REDCON-1 and LD times In counterattack for CVCC units.

CVCC units completed missions more rapidly.

Greater apparent freedom of movement among CVCC units.

Distance travelled and fuel used performance inconclusive.

Greater maximum läse ranges among CVCC crews.

CVCC crews acquired targets earlier than Baseline crews.

Baseline crews achieved slightly faster first läse to first fire times.

Slightly higher Incidence of fratricide among CVCC units.

Higher kills per hit ratio among CVCC crews.

More advantageous loss/kill ratio among CVCC units during the

counterattack.

Fewer BLUFOR losses among CVCC units during the

counterattack.

Slightly higher proportion of OPFOR killed by CVCC crews.

Baseline units killed more OPFOR vehicles south of first PL in

Stage 1. south of both PLs in Stage 3.

No demonstrated differences.

hypothesis in the following subsection, a presentation of

intelligence data is integrated with graphics presenting OFF data

in this subsection. This approach is consistent with the

interacting concerns shared by the FSO and 32 (i.e., targeting

and damage assessment data) within a combat unit.

Fire Support Techniques and Procedures

The CVCC system offered several advantages over the Baseline

system with respect to fire support operations. Not all of that

potential was demonstrated in the battalion evaluation, due to a

variety of limiting factors. The fire support data that follow

focus entirely on vehicle commanders' performance. Except to the

extent that indirect fires affected the battalion's overall

performance, the remainder of the indirect fire procedure was not

directly evaluated. This narrative is offered to describe the

101
difference in fire support operations between conditions, and to

highlight additional potential developments of the CVCC system.

Fire support planning was standardized across all units and

conditions. The fire support overlays used by the TOC and

participants were as identical as practical. The master copy was

an onion-skin paper overlay, that was reproduced mechanically to

acetate overlays for participants and TOC staff in both

conditions. The digital overlay was developed by transcribing

the target locations from the paper map with overlay to the TOC

workstation using the overlay tools.

Each group had the option of requesting additional targets

during the preparatory phase of the test scenario. The FSO

maintained a working fire support overlay throughout the

scenario. The first difference between conditions that became

readily apparent was the manner in which the additional targets

were published. In Baseline, the new targets had to be manually

transcribed to participant's existing overlays. In the CVCC

condition, the updated overlay was transmitted on the battalion

net at the beginning of Stage 1. CVCC participants therefore

had, at their disposal, a more accurate and comprehensive fire

support overlay.

In all test runs, the FSO executed standardized counter

preparatory fires in delay stages, and preparatory fires on the

objective during the counterattack. Participants could change

the plan, but only by specifically requesting that a given target

be included in the schedule. Once again, the ability to update

the fire support overlay in CVCC battalions provided an important

advantage to units. The CVCC system's responsiveness also

supported changes to fire support coordination measures both

prior to and during operations.

During the training scenarios, the TOC cooperated with the

participants in developing SOPs regarding the use of indirect

fires in the absence of explicit CFFs. For example, if the

battalion commander directed that fires be executed on reported

enemy formations greater than company size, the FSO would

initiate fires based on qualifying SPOT reports if he had not yet

received any CFFs. CVCC also made it very easy for the S2 and

FSO to exchange information. As CFFs were received, the FSO

managed them according to the priorities of fire and target

engagement priorities established in the OPORD, as modified by

the commander during the course of the scenario. The FSO also

cleared fires based on the last known location of friendly

elements.

In Baseline, the FSO maintained current locations of fire

support elements as reported to him by the fire support element

terminal, which served as his interface to the simulation system.

The FSE terminal represented the normal voice and TACFIRE digital

interface between a maneuver battalion FSO and his supporting FA

headquarters, as well as communications with the maneuver

102
battalion's mortar platoon. The FSO used those data to post

mortar and howitzer unit locations on his map. He could estimate

each units' coverage using an acetate-based template. The FSO

posted friendly maneuver unit positions based on information from

the S3 Air, in order to clear fires. All CFFs were received from

participants via voice radio, and transcribed manually. Fire

missions were executed using the FSE terminal. Unless he

received assistance from other staff members, the FSO was limited

in the number of CFFs he could manage. The FSO also allocated

the fire mission to a specific asset (mortar platoon or section,

howitzer battery or platoon) when he entered the CFF to the FSE

terminal, thus performing a portion of the duties normally

associated with the supporting fire direction center (FDC).

In CVCC, the FSO maintained current fire support unit

locations using the FSE terminal, as in Baseline. He posted

those to his TOC workstation map display using overlay tools, and

could also integrate a range fan for each fire support unit.

Thus, when a fire mission was posted to the map, the FSO could

easily determine which fire support units could answer that

reguest. Friendly maneuver unit locations were automatically

posted to the FSO's TOC workstation, allowing him to clear fires

more effectively than in Baseline. Fire missions were received

digitally, augmented by voice transmissions for coordination and

special reguirements, such as Final Protective Fires (FPFs). The

digital system made it possible to receive multiple CFFs while

processing earlier reguests. The volume of CFFs that could be

received was much greater in CVCC. While that capability

increased the FSO's sorting reguirement, the TOC workstation's

In-Folder display provided a menu from which the operator could

easily select CFFs based on the priority of fires. Fire missions

were executed using the FSE terminal, as in the Baseline

condition.

One drawback that was noted during the current evaluation

was that the system posted locations (i.e., position icons) for

dead and immobilized BLUFOR vehicles. Thus, although the unit

had withdrawn from an initial position, the picture on the TOC

workstation suggested that friendly elements were still forward.

The unit status display in the operational effectiveness module

could indicate current friwodly losses, to help deconflict the

situation depicted on the map screen. Also, verbal confirmation

from the company commander or XO helped resolve the situation.

Until the status of those stay-behind vehicles was confirmed,

however, the FSO was reluctant to clear proximate fires.

Another drawback noted during the current evaluation was a

lack of automated feedback. The CVCC system provided no digital

response to the originator to signal that a mission was in

progress, or to clarify which mission was being fired. The FSO

could provide verbal feedback, but that process was relatively

involved. Furthermore, it could become confusing if one

participant generated multiple CFFs in a short period of time. A

direct, automated link between the originator and the FDC could

103
facilitate a digital feedback mechanism, but as explained

earlier, such a data transfer capability was not modelled in the

battalion evaluation.

Process Ground Targets

Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to process ground

targets for indirect fire on the battlefield was expected to be

significantly better than the Baseline units'.

The two measures that supported this hypothesis (CFF

accuracy, and percent of CFFs with correct type) were very

similar to those used to support the analysis of intelligence

performance, in the next subsection. The composite data for fire

support and intelligence functions are illustrated in Figures 32

and 33. The number of CFFs recorded in Stage 3, particularly

among Baseline units, was insufficient to support a meaningful

analysis of Stage 3 data, partially due to the number of Baseline

units that did not execute the final stage. Therefore, data are

presented for Stages 1 and 2, only.

Throughout the evaluation, CVCC units' CFFs were far more

accurate than those sent by Baseline units. As a result of more

accurate CFFs, the FSO was able to target OPFOR formations more

effectively. Also, by capitalizing on the automated position

display capability on his TOC workstation, the FSO could clear

fires more effectively in both offensive and defensive

operations. Furthermore, in the absence of explicit CFFs, the

FSO could fire on targets identified by CONTACT14and SPOT

reports, which were also more accurate among CVCC units as will

be shown in the presentation of intelligence collection data.

Table 24 provides summary data (means and standard deviations) on

CFF measures, by stage and condition. Figures 32 and 33

graphically demonstrate the difference in both linear accuracy

and target identification performance between conditions.

The reader is reminded that qualified, fire support team

(FIST) chiefs were not part of the company manning structure in

this evaluation. Company XOs assumed that responsibility.

Baseline participants were provided the format for CFFs, whereas

CVCC participants could bring up the CFF format in their CCDs.

XOs received no dedicated refresher training on indirect fire

rvocedures to reinforce the skills they brought into the

evaluation. Therefore, any potential disadvantage attributable

to the absence of a trained FIST chief was held constant across

all test groups.

Mean accuracv of CFF locations. CFF accuracy was quantified

by comparing the enemy location specified in each CFF to the

actual location of the nearest enemy unit at the time the CFF was

14The CONTACT report format used for the battalion

evaluation included a grid location for the contact.

104
Table 24

Fire Support Performance Data by Stage and Condition

MMSur* CVCC

Stag« 1

BaMlina CVCC

Stage 2

Baseline

CFF location accuracy, In matert

Percent of CFFa with correct type

526.75

(475.64)

Ü-25

90.57

(17.70)

n = 25

4087.15

(8022.25)

D-8

73.33

(25.50)

Q-9

679.17

(896.97)

n-15

87.50

(28.87)

n-16

2981.29

(1621.19)

n«7

66.67

(23.57)

n-7

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the means.

transmitted. Only CFFs with valid grid locations were analyzed.

In practice, the CoM of the three enemy vehicles (regardless of

type) nearest the reported location defined the location of the

nearest enemy unit. Only those unit and vehicle commanders

transmitting scorable CFFs contributed values for this measure.

An average was determined for each vehicle that transmitted one

or more scorable CFFs during a stage, such that the number of

observations (n) represents the number of vehicle commanders that

contributed useable data in that stage, rather than the number of

CFFs scored. This computational process yielded distance

measurements of the discrepancies between actual and reported

locations. The smaller the discrepancy, the better the accuracy.

Linear targets (i.e., final protective fires or FPFs) were not

scored.

Procedurally, with the exception of FPFs1^ and fires

targeted on suspected enemy positions (i.e., preparatory fires),

participants were directed to report actual current enemy

positions in their CFFs. The ESO adjusted the aim point

according to the reported or expected direction of enemy movement

(if applicable), based on the elapsed time from the original CFF.

Thus, in all cases, CFFs on targets of opportunity could be taken

at face value for data analysis purposes.

As seen in Figure 32, the CFFs submitted by CVCC

participants were substantially more accurate than those

submitted by Baseline participants. Table 24 shows that accuracy

differed significantly between stages as well. The standard

deviations for these data are smaller for the CVCC-equipped

^Throughout the evaluation, linear targets were planned

immediately in front of BPs to cover the withdrawal of BLUFOR

elements. Although their practical use differed from a true FPF,

they were referred to as FPFs for the sake of convenience.

105
battalions than for the Baseline battalions. This indicates more

consistent performance when using CVCC equipment, a distinct

benefit on a fast-paced, highly fluid battlefield.

M

4000 -

3500 -

E 3000 .

T

2500 -

2000 .

E 1500 .

R

1000 -

500 .

S 0 -

3603

584

948

510

,.-

401

708

vvi.mr:

1279

369

;: . '

CVCC

BASELINE

CPP CONTACT SPOT-OBS SPOT-DES

Figure 32. Mean reported location accuracy for CFFs, CONTACT

reports, and SPOT reports.

Of the CFF requests transmitted by Baseline participants,

many were not scorable because they lacked adequate location

information. Out of all CFFs generated by Baseline units, 66

percent were missing target locations. A virtually identical

proportion of voice CFFs from CVCC participants (65%) were also

unscorable, but CVCC units used voice CFF formats less than 3

times per scenario, on average.

These data show that the CVCC capabilities increased both

accuracy and consistency of performance in reporting enemy

locations in CFF reports.

Percent of CFFs with correct tvoe. This measure quantified

the accuracy of unit and vehicle commanders' enemy vehicle

identification in their requests for fire support. Scoring was

accomplished by comparing the reported vehicle type with the

actual types of enemy vehicles visible to the reporting vehicle

at the time the CFF was transmitted. Only reports containing a

valid grid location and valid type of enemy vehicle (e.g., tank

or personnel carrier) were scored. If one or more enemy vehicles

of the type reported were visible, the CFF was scored "correct."

For each commander sending scorable CFFs, the proportion scored

"correct" was calculated.

106
Figure 33 displays the data for this measure, showing a

consistently greater proportion of CFFs containing correct enemy

vehicle types in the CVCC condition. The performance advantage

of CVCC-eguipped units was significant across all stages.

%

D

A

T

A

C

O

R

R

E

C

T

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

** 85.7 86.0 ^

70.4

53.7

80.9

60.2

CVCC

IJ BASELINE

CFF CONTACT SPOT-OBS SPOT-DES

Figure 33. Mean descriptional accuracy of CFFs, CONTACT reports,

and SPOT reports.

Paralleling the preceding measure, the standard deviations

for this measure are smaller for the CVCC condition in both

stages. The consistency of this trend suggests less variability

of performance when using the CVCC equipment. This is also an

important indicator to the reliability of performance among CVCCequipped crews.

These data establish that the CVCC capabilities increase the

overall accuracy and consistency of reporting the type of enemy

vehicle in CFF reports.

In both of the measures for CFF performance, more CVCC

participants were able to send useful indirect fire requests, as

evidenced by the numbers of observations indicated in Table 24.

The numbers do not necessarily reflect the number of CFFs

generated, but they do indicate that, given the CCD,

approximately three times as many participants were able to

generate useful CFFs in Stage 1, and approximately twice as many

did so in Stage 2. An occassional comment in debriefings

attested to the ease with which an unpracticed observer could

format and send an accurate CFF, using the CCD (Meade et al., in

preparation). Although it was not possible to verify whether

this resulted in a greater number of actual calls for indirect

fire, a greater volume of requests is a reasonable expectation.

107
This finding is both an advantage and a disadvantage. Given

the accuracy of digital CFFs as described in the preceding

measures, a higher volume of CFFs would provide the FSO a more

up-to-date list of valid targets for available artillery tubes.

Furthermore, the ease with which the FSO can collect targeting

data from other reports (e.g., SPOT reports) further enhances his

ability to maintain a valid target list. In the test scenario,

the only operational constraints on the availability of fires

were (a) indirect fire asset movement times and (b) the FSO's

ability to manually enter CFFs in the FSE terminal. Other realworld constraints on fire support availability (e.g., competing

priorities, ammunition supply rates, firing unit target

signature, equipment and personnel status) were not replicated.

An important implication of these factors is that an increased

volume of CFFs would have a corresponding impact on the need to

manage indirect fires (e.g., enforce priorities and delivery

rates) at all levels. By contrast, the improved accuracy of

targeting data would enable the firing unit to deliver effective

fires with fewer resources.

Summary of Fire Support BOS Findinas

Table 25 summarizes findings pertaining to the processing of

ground targets under the Fire Support BOS. The data clearly

document that the CVCC capabilities enhance both location and

identification accuracy in the process of requesting fire

missions from mortar and artillery elements. In turn, this can

be expected to improve the accuracy of indirect fires delivered

on enemy targets, contributing to more effective massing of

friendly fires.

Table 25

Summary of Findings Related to Fire Support

Measures CVCC Advantages

Accuracy of CFF CFF report location accuracy greater

Locations for Stages 1 and 2.

% CFFs with Correct CFF report vehicle identification

Type accuracy greater for Stages 1 and 2.

# CFFs with complete Greater volume of usable information

information in Stages 1 and 2.

The superior location accuracy afforded by the CVCC system

is undoubtedly due largely to the ability to input precise

locations to CFFs by lasing. The CVCC's advantage in terms of

108
target Identification accuracy most likely results from the

CITV's surveillance capabilities as well as the digital exchange

of information about enemy elements, including the display of

report-based icons on the tactical map. The CFF formats in CVCC

also apparently prompted more complete information to the TOC, as

evidenced by the greater volume of scorable information. Both of

these factors are consistent with the likely improvement in

situational awareness on the part of CVCC unit and vehicle

commanders. In summary, the CVCC capabilities are especially

valuable in ensuring that complete and accurate locations were

submitted with CFF reports.

The results presented in this section indicate how CVCC

capabilities helped unit and vehicle commanders increase the

effectiveness of indirect fires. The following section on the

Intelligence BOS discusses the CVCC's impact on the accuracy of

information reported about enemy activities.

Intelligence

Issue: Does the CVCC system enhance the Intelligence BOS?

This subsection examines the effect of CVCC capabilities on

collecting intelligence information. One hypothesis, based on

the Collect Threat Information component of the Intelligence BOS,

organizes data presentation. The data presentation is preceded

by a description of intelligence analysis procedures employed in

the Baseline and CVCC conditions, and observations on potential

uses of the CVCC system to enhance tactical intelligence

operations.

Intelligence Techniques and Procedures

In both the Baseline and CVCC conditions, the battalion S2

provided standard information to participants during the

preparation stage. Intelligence overlays, to include a decision

support template with named and targeted areas of interest

(NAI/TAIs) were prepared in both acetate and digital formats,

using the same procedures as for the fire support overlays.

Once the simulation was under way, the S2 received the

tactical reports and external intelligence provided by the

brigade S2, and attempted to compile an analysis of the

developing enemy situation. Reports were received and posted to

the intelligence situation map. In Baseline, the 32 used a paper

map with an acetate drop. In CVCC, the map display on the TOC

workstation replaced the paper map. The S2 manually tallied

enemy vehicles observed and destroyed in both conditions, in

order to analyze the enemy's deployment.

The automated message handling v apabilities in CVCC enabled

the 32 to receive and process a larger volume of tactical

information. Report aggregation routines built into the software

facilitated the analysis by grouping like reports that showed

109
similar types and numbers of enemy vehicles in close proximity to

each other in both time and space. As the enemy situation

developed, the S2 was able to develop a working overlay of

reported enemy activities throughout the battalion's battle

space. That updated overlay could be transmitted on demand, to

provide the commander a graphic representation of the current

enemy situation. Although not implemented during the battalion

evaluation, the overlay could have included anticipated approach

routes and times for follow-on echelons, based on known locations

and assumed march rates.

By contrast, in Baseline the S2 was harder pressed to

receive, analyze, and post enemy information. On request, he

could describe the situation as he saw it via voice radio.

However, as shown in relevant portions of the command and control

analysis earlier in this section, the quality of information

sharing associated with voice-only media did not compare

favorably with CVCC's digital capability.

An aspect of the CVCC system that was not implemented during

the scenario was the employment of CVCC-equipped elements in

reconnaissance missions. CVCC capabilities could have

facilitated the rapid development and dissemination of a

reconnaissance and surveillance plan, and allowed the S2 to

monitor and adjust reconnaissance operations during execution.

Digital reporting from the recon elements also would facilitate

the post-hoc analysis and dissemination of the results.

Overall, the CVCC system provides the S2 a variety of useful

tools to collect and analyze intelligence data.

Collect Threat Information

Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to collect threat

information on the battlefield was expected to be significantly

better than the Baseline units'.

During the battalion evaluation, on-line intelligence

gathering within the test unit was limited to tactical reporting

from maneuver units. The battalion scouts were included in the

simulation, but they were given security missions (i.e., flank

screen) in areas not threatened by the OPFOR during the scenario.

Ground surveillance radar (GSR) units were notionally deployed in

the sector, under brigade control, but no scripted tactical

intelligence was attributed to those units. The measures

supporting this analysis quantified the accuracy of reported

locations for SPOT, SHELL, and CONTACT reports, and the

descriptive accuracy of SPOT and CONTACT reports. Figures 32 and

33 (presented in the previous subsection) illustrate the overall

performance trends for these measures. Table 26 shows

performance data by stage and condition.

Throughout the evaluation, CVCC units sent significantly

more accurate CONTACT and SPOT reports. Reported grids in both

110
Table 26

Mean Performance Data for Threat Information Collection Measures,

by Stage and Condition

MtuurM

Stage 1

CVCC Baseline

Stage 2

CVCC Baseline

Stage 3

CVCC Baseline

Rtport accurtcy avtrag« deviation, in

mttars

CONTACT reports 538.27

(681.31)

Q-30

881.13

(1022.42)

Q-16

600.37

(840.10)

Q-23

988.88

(1471.44)

Q-10

355.67

(497.26)

Q-19

1043.29

(1762.46)

n-7

SPOT reports (observed) 436.70

(470.39)

Q-34

1993.28

(2774.19)

Q-23

369.39

(433.76)

Q-25

1331.22

(1490.23)

Q-13

375.7

(588.2)

Q-18

884.5

(• •)

Q-2

SPOT reports (destroyed) 394.44

(423.19)

n-32

1430.09

(2381.98)

Q-22

362.96

(396.43)

Q-25

1040.97

(1392.92)

Q-11

328.6

(532.1)

Q-17

884.5

(•-)

n-2

SHELL reports 2034.27

(1033.36)

Q-22

1648.10

(595.52)

Q-15

1662.83

(577.95)

Q-15

1333.20

(429.22)

Q-5

1888.25

(645.23)

n-25

1783.67

(751.28)

Q-7

Percent of CONTACT reports with

correct type

84.72

(29.20)

Q-30

59.38

(31.01)

Q-16

88.70

(26.25)

Q-18

50.71

(32.14)

Q-14

84.47

(30.32)

Q-19

46.43

(30.37)

Ü-7

Correctness of SPOT reports

(percentage)

Observed 81.86

(27.29)

Q-34

83.82

(25.12)

Q-23

95.16

(11.88)

Q-2S

94.29

(17.90)

Q-14

81.47

(30.45)

Q-19

100.0

(-•-)

n-2

Destroyed 78.99

(27.44)

Q-33

54.55

(40.31)

Q-23

88.58

(17.13)

Q-2S

68.94

(32.53)

Q-12

73.52

(32.08)

Q-18

73.08

(•-) Ü-2

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the means.

types of reports were significantly more accurate among CVCC

units than among Baseline battalions. CVCC battalions also sent

a significantly higher proportion of reports with correct OPFOR

vehicle types and numbers. By contrast, SHELL reports sent by

Baseline units tended to be more accurate than those reported by

CVCC battalions, although the difference was not substantial.

Accuracv of CONTACT report locations. CONTACT report

location accuracy determined how close the reported enemy

location was to actual enemy locations. The measure was computed

as the distance, in meters, from the reported location to the

nearest OPFOR vehicle at the time the report was sent. Only

reports containing valid locations were scored. As with the CFF

measure in the preceding subsection, the number of observations

111
(n) is the number of vehicle crews that contributed one or more

scorable reports during the stage. The average distance for all

reports In the stage was computed for each crew, and the results

were then compiled to determine the means and standard deviations

shown in the table.

Throughout the battalion evaluation, the CONTACT report

format specified in the unit SOP required the type of contact

(e.g., tanks, PCs) and grid locations. This contrasted with the

more common format used by units in the field and contained in

the Armor Center SOP (U.S. Army Armor Center 1990), which

requires only the type of contact and cardinal direction (e.g.,

"CONTACT, TANKS, SOUTH, OUT").

The mean deviations for this measure can be found In Table

26 and are Illustrated In Figure 32. Location accuracy was

significantly better among CVCC units than among Baseline units.

The largest difference between conditions occurred in Stage 2,

with Baseline units' deviations averaging approximately three

times those of CVCC units. The differences between units were

consistent throughout Stages 1 and 2. In all three stages, the

standard deviations for CVCC battalions were substantially

smaller than those for Baseline battalions. Indicating more

consistent and reliable reports. As discussed earlier In this

report, the more consistent performance of the CVCC units is a

distinct advantage.

Although excluded in the analysis, one data point that

clearly demonstrates the benefit of LRF input to reports was a

Baseline CONTACT report (Stage 1) that was 41,778 meters off.

This most likely occurred due to the transposition of grid

numbers (e.g., reporting a grid of 456123 as opposed to 123456).

While such a mistake would eventually be discovered and corrected

as message information was processed, such an event typically

involves follow-up transmissions between the originator and other

stations on the network to confirm the actual location of the

enemy activity. Given the automated reporting features Inherent

to the CVCC system, analogous events are very unlikely.

In virtually all Baseline units, leaders continued to use

the more familiar CONTACT report format throughout training and

into the test scenario. Generally, the participants acknowledged

the advantage of providing grid locations, but they were also

concerned that the time necessary to determine and transmit the

grid was critical. A very common procedure was to alert the

battalion to the contact without the grid, then follow up with

the grid location in a second CONTACT report or a SPOT report.

Twenty-nine percent of all Baseline CONTACT reports (38.3 out of

133.7 per stage, on the average) could not be scored for accuracy

due to lack of valid locations.

In most CVCC units, leaders quickly concluded that the time

necessary to format and transmit the digital CONTACT report was

also a critical factor. Hence, almost all CVCC units also chose

112
to use the more familiar, type/direction CONTACT report format as

an immediate, audio alert, that was to be followed by detailed

information as soon as possible. Forty percent of the voice

CONTACT reports among CVCC units (80 out of 198) were not

scorable for that reason.

Considering that CONTACT reports serve primarily an alerting

function, this does not represent a critical loss of tactical

information. However, valuable intelligence information is lost

when the enemy location is not specified. Inspection of the cell

sample sizes for CONTACT report accuracy (Table 31) revealed that

more CVCC commanders sent CONTACT reports containing valid grid

locations. Also, although the proportion of non-scorable, voice

CONTACT reports was roughly equal between conditions (38% vs.

40%), the raw number of unscorable reports in Baseline is roughly

twice the number in CVCC. Thus, the CVCC capabilities enabled

participants to provide a larger quantity of fully usable enemy

information to the TOC staff.

Accuracv of SPOT report locations. The same procedures used

to compute accuracy of locations specified in CONTACT reports

were used for locations in SPOT reports. Both Baseline and CVCC

units were instructed to report OPFOR vehicles observed and

destroyed. The accuracy of reported locations was computed for

each type of information, yielding two submeasures (i.e.: "SPOTObs" for observed, and "SPOT-Des" for destroyed in Figures 32 and

33).

As with CFF and CONTACT reports, SPOT reports were

substantially more accurate in the CVCC units than in Baseline

units. Likewise, reports from CVCC units were more consistent,

as evidenced by smaller standard deviations in each category.

This finding was true for both stages (i.e., 1 and 2), and for

both observed and destroyed OPFOR vehicles. This finding can

most likely be attributed to the accuracy resulting from the u&e

of the LRF to input report data.

An average of 52.7 unique SPOT reports per scenario were

sent by Baseline unit and vehicle commanders. Of these, an

average of 13.8 reports (26.3 percent) did not contain valid

locations and were therefore excluded from the analysis for

accuracy. This indicates a substantial proportion of flawed SPOT

reports within the Baseline condition.

Accuracy of SHELL report locations. SHELL report location

accuracy was quantifier as the deviation, in meters, between the

reported and actual locations of OPFOR indirect fire attacks.

The means among Baseline units tend to be smaller than among CVCC

units, with the most notable difference occurring in Stage 1

(1648 meters in Baseline, 2034 meters in CVCC). Given the

variability of the data, the differences between conditions

cannot be considered reliable. Furthermore, given the area fire

nature of artillery, the difference is not meaningful from an

operational standpoint.

113
A possible explanation for the inaccuracy of the CVCC

condition in this case may be attributed to the use of the LRF to

input report locations. In most other cases the LRF will likely

obtain a reliable return from a solid target, and therefore

provide relatively accurate input to the CCD for tactical

reports. In the case of artillery, however, participants may

either have input the attack location by hand using the CCD

touchscreen, or lased to a point on the ground near the artillery

bursts. Either of these options would have returned relatively

inaccurate locations.

An average of 23.4 SHELL reports per scenario were

transmitted by Baseline unit and vehicle commanders. Of these,

an average of 6.75 per scenario (28.8 percent) were not scorable

due to missing locations.

The data for these three measures (i.e., CONTACT, SPOT, and

SHELL report location accuracy) show that, in those cases where

the system could capitalize on reliable range returns from the

LRF, accuracy was remarkably better among CVCC units than among

Baseline units. This finding is consistent with the CFF report

accuracy data from the Fire Support BOS (discussed earlier in

this section), where similar procedures were used to quantify

location accuracy.

Percent CONTACT reports with correct type. This measure was

concerned with the descriptive accuracy of CONTACT reports. For

each vehicle, an automated data reduction routine determined the

proportion of CONTACT reports sent from that vehicle during the

stage that contained correct OPFOR vehicle identifications. A

vehicle identification was considered correct if any of the

reported type vehicle shared intervisibility with the reporting

vehicle when the report was transmitted.

Throughout all three Stages among all CVCC groups, CONTACT

reports averaged better than 84% correct, while Baseline units'

CONTACT reports averaged less than 60% correct (see Figure 33).

This difference yielded a statistically significant betweenconditions advantage in favor of CVCC units.

Correctness of SPOT report number and type. This measure

was concerned with the number and type of vehicles observed and

destroyed. Given a SPOT report containing some number of a

certain type vehicle (e.g., 3 tanks observed), an automated data

reduction procedure determined the number of like OPFOR vehicles

with current intervisibility to the sender, regardless of actual

grid location. The result provided the numerator for the scoring

procedure, and the reported number became the denominator.

Values greater than 100% were reduced to 100%. In effect, the

data reduction procedure penalized over reporting, but excused

under reporting. All reports sent from a given vehicle in a

stage were averaged to provide a single data point for that

vehicle and that stage. The data reported in Table 26 are

averaged for all vehicles, by stage and condition.

114
While both over-reporting and under-reporting are

operationally meaningful errors, the decision to penalize one and

not the other was made due to simulation fidelity factors. Given

intervisibility with a number of OPFOR vehicles, a participant is

more likely to not see some of the vehicles than he is to see

more than are actually present. Therefore, by not penalizing for

under-reporting, the data reduction procedure gave the benefit of

the doubt to participants, commensurate with known simulation

limitations.

Figure 33 presents the data for this measure graphically,

collapsed across stages for observed and destroyed vehicles.

Table 26 provides more detailed data. Overall, the data show a

considerable advantage in favor of the CVCC condition.

Among the data for OPFOR vehicles observed, performance

between conditions is essentially comparable. When the data are

collapsed across both stages, CVCC units reported correctly 87.5

percent of the time, as opposed to 87.8 percent in Baseline

units.

By contrast, the data for OPFOR vehicles destroyed is

substantially more accurate among CVCC units. Overall, CVCC

units were 83.1 percent correct as opposed to 59.5 percent

correct for Baseline units.

Given the treatment of the data, these results indicated

that units in both conditions over-reported the number of OPFOR

vehicles observed about 12 percent of the time. With respect to

OPFOR vehicles destroyed, however, over-reporting was clearly

more common among Baseline units. The potential impact of this

effect is meaningful. When the S2 tallies SPOT report data, his

estimate of the OPFOR order of battle is not affected by

condition, but his estimate of OPFOR vehicles destroyed is more

likely to be overstated in the Baseline condition. Therefore, he

is more likely to underestimate current OPFOR combat power.

Summary of Intelligence BOS Findinas

Table 27 summarizes findings relevant to the Intelligence

BOS. CVCC units rendered SPOT and CONTACT reports that were

significantly more accurate than Baseline units' reports, in

terms of location accuracy. With respect to SHELL report

location accuracy, no meaningful differences were found between

conditions. CVCC units also rendered CONTACT reports with

consistently more accurate OPFOR vehicle identifications than

Baseline units, and CVCC units reported the number and type of

OPFOR vehicles destroyed more accurately in SPOT reports. The

accuracy of SPOT reports quantifying the number and type of OPFOR

vehicles observed was comparable across conditions. Given

generally better intelligence gathering among CVCC units overall,

however, it can be concluded that the CVCC system improves unit

performance within the Intelligence BOS.

115
Table 27

Summary of Findings Related to Intelligence

Measure Findings

Location accuracy in

reports

Vehicle identification

in reports

Number of OPFOR

vehicles reported

Volume of usable data

in reports

Greater among CVCC units for CONTACT

and SPOT reports.

Comparable between conditions for

SHELL reports.

Higher percentage of reports with

correct Identifications from CVCC

units.

Higher percentage of OPFOR vehicles

reported, by type, among CVCC units.

Greater among CVCC units.

The implication of enhanced intelligence reporting is a

marked improvement in the data available to the unit commander

and staff regarding the enemy situation. As stated in the

summary of Command and Control BOS findings, the CVCC system

gives the commander a better view of the overall tactical

situation, and therefore enhances his ability to dictate the

terms of battle to the opposition.

Battlefield Integration

This subsection addresses implications that transcend

individual battlefield operating systems. These findings are

organized around the tenets of Army operations and the dynamics

of combat power outlined in FM 100-5 (U.S. Department of the

Army, 1993). This discussion is based on Battle Master

observations during the conduct of tests, participant feedback

during debriefings (Meade et al., in preparation), and a

synthesis of findings presented in earlier subsections of this

report.

Tenets of Armv Operations

Initiative. The CVCC system cannot instill initiative, but

it does have the potential to facilitate operations within

offensively-minded units. This potential results from the

improved agility within CVCC units, the enhanced view of the

friendly situation provided through the CCD, and the greater

ability to disseminate battlefield intelligence. CVCC provides

the commander and staff with a tool that allows them to get

116
Inside the enemy's decision cycle early. This capability opens

opportunities to seize the initiative from the enemy.

Aaility. The findings from the "move on surface" and

"navigate" functions suggest that CVCC units can move more

quickly than their Baseline counterparts. For example, CVCC

units moved further, in less time than Baseline units in Stage 1

of the test scenario. Also, CVCC units reacted faster to changes

in mission, as evidenced by better REDCON-1 and LD times in Stage

2. The test scenarios offered participants few opportunities to

shift forces to meet unanticipated contingencies, or to take

advantage of an enemy vulnerability. However, situations were

observed during selected iterations in which commanders

recognized such a need. The common challenge in all those cases

was the need to communicate the shift to subordinates.

In Baseline units, the commander could verbally direct the

subordinate unit to a desired location, using an existing graphic

or grid location. Feedback from the subordinate unit consisted

of an acknowledgement and periodic progress reports, all subject

to transposition and navigational error. In CVCC, the TOC could

translate the commander's directive into a new graphic, and

transmit that on the net for everyone's benefit. As an

alternative, the battalion commander could personally generate a

route for the subordinate, and transmit that graphic directly to

the company commander. As the subordinate moved in CVCC, the

battalion commander had constant, real-time data on the unit's

progress. Furthermore, as enemy contacts developed, CVCC units

could use the digital reports to reorient and reposition more

efficiently than their baseline counterparts.

Even more important than the tangible effects described in

the preceding paragraphs, the CVCC system can significantly

improve leaders' "mental agility." As described under

initiative, the tactical display can help the commander recognize

opportunities to strike against the enemy.

Depth. To the degree that CVCC enhanced the ability to see

the battlefield (i.e., friendly positions, friendly operational

status, and intelligence data presented in almost real time and

overlaid on the tactical map), it also enhanced the unit's

ability to manage its resources over time. The operational

effectiveness module enables the unit to easily identify critical

resource concerns. The improved agility described earlier

enables the commander to more easily disengage a portion of his

force for rearming and resupply, and shortens that element's

turn-around time. Assuming the extension of selected CVCC

capabilities (i.e., position reporting) to organic CSS elements,

the staff can push support forward more effectively, particularly

in the offense, to extend the battalion's overall capability.

These advantages extend the battalion's operational depth in both

time and space.

117
Synchroni2ation. CVCC units, by virtue of the tactical

display provided in the CCD, enjoy 3d an enhanced capability to

synchronize movement and fires. By being able to monitor the

progress of subordinate and adjacent units, commanders relied

less on voice radio communications to coordinate maneuver.

Likewise, the fire support officer could visually monitor the

units' progress and control fires mote effectively.

The enhanced capability to synchronize combat operations was

demonstrated primarily in the conduct of the counterattack. CVCC

units came closer to meeting LD times than Baseline units, and

massed fires on the OPFOR more often than Baseline units.

Versatility. As with the tenet of initiative, versatility

is much more a state of mind than the result of technological

advantage. Yet, given a commander and staff with the ability to

anticipate and react quickly to developing tactical and strategic

factors, the enhanced communications capability provided in the

CVCC system enables the unit to respond to such changes more

efficiently. In effect, CVCC increases the options avalable to

the commander in many situations.

Dynamics of Combat Power

The dynamics of combat power involve maneuver, firepower,

protection and leadership. The first two dynamics correspond

with BOS that have been addressed in preceding discussions, and

will not be recounted here, except as they interact with the

dynamics of protection and leadership.

Protection. During Stage 1 of the delay, CVCC units

maintained greater stand-off from the OPFOR while still

inflicting damage, and retained a larger percentage of their own

combat power than did Baseline units. Furthermore, CVCC units

achieved a more advantageous loss-kill ratio. The same holds

true in the counterattack (Stage 2), but not in the subsequent

delay (Stage 3).

Fratricide prevention is also an important aspect of force

protection. The results of the current evaluation suggest that

the CVCC system does not offer any substantial advantage over the

Baseline system. CVCC units had more fratricide events than

Baseline units, despite the IFF capability built into the CITV.

This result is clearly a matter that must be carried forward for

further development. As suggested earlier in this report, the

problem may have been that the IFF utility was integral to the

CITV, where only the vehicle commander could use it. Had the IFF

been ported to the GPS/GPSE, the gunner would have had the

benefit of the automated system, without having to rely on the

commander for an independent reading.

Other aspects of the protection dynamic were not stressed in

the battalion evaluation. For example, mobility and

countermobility operations were represented in notional form

118
only. Operational security was oversimplified as well. Finally,

the OPFOR held tightly to its programmed routes, and was not

allowed to deviate in order to exploit a possible BLUFOR

weakness.

Leadership. The importance of effective leadership was

demonstrated throughout the CVCC effort. While there was no

intent to grade participants that assumed the role of battalion

commander, there were observable differences in performance that

transcended the presence or absence of CVCC equipment. Among

both type units, there were individuals that seemed to interpret

the tactical situation and employ their resources more

effectively than others to accomplish the mission. The CVCC

system provided the commander a set of tools that enabled him and

his unit to accomplish certain functions more quickly and more

effectively. To the extent that CVCC units enjoyed a more

accurate picture of their own situation, and could more rapidly

disseminate enemy information, commanders had more comprehensive

information with which to identify critical points on the

battlefield. As such, CVCC enhanced leadership.

Summary of Findinas

Within the command and control functional area, the CVCC

system provided participants the ability to transmit more

comprehensive intelligence reports on a wider basis, and to

maintain a more accurate picture of their own unit status.

Furthermore, CVCC units were able to receive, analyze, and

transmit FRAGOs more efficiently, enhancing the unit's agility

and synchronization. Additional CVCC capabilities that were not

measured within this evaluation provide promising aids to

tactical planning processes across the combined arms spectrum, to

include the integration of CS and CSS planning.

Within the maneuver functional area, CVCC units moved faster

and used a larger portion of the battlefield than did Baseline

units, acquired the enemy at greater ranges, and maintained

positions of advantage more effectively to achieve better lossexchange ratios in both Stages 1 and 2 (delay and counterattack).

CVCC crews engaged the OPFOR at consistently greater ranges on

average, and although they did not achieve the same hit rates as

Baseline crews, they did achieve a significantly higher kill rate

among hits scored. Advantages in target engagement performance

attributed to the CITV in prior research (e.g., Quinkert, 1990),

and more substantial advantages demonstrated for POSNAV and CVCC

by Du Bois and Smith (1989) and Leibrecht et al. (1992) and

reinforced in the current evaluation clearly highlight the

improved potential of a CVCC-equipped battalion or task force for

maneuver functions.

Within the fire support and intelligence systems, CVCC units

consistently reported enemy locations and actions more accurately

than Baseline units. Furthermore, CVCC enhanced the unit's

ability to identify targets of opportunity, as evidenced by the

119
six-fold increase in CFFs sent. As a result of improved

reporting, indirect fires could be targeted and synchronized more

effectively, and a more accurate enemy situation could be

developed, to enhance the unit's situational awareness.

In summary, the CVCC system provides the commander a better

view of the battlefield, and enables the unit to move faster,

strike harder, and finish the enemy sooner than a conventionally

equipped unit. It affords the staff more time to coordinate,

integrate, and synchronize the commander's orders and directives.

These findings demonstrate the benefits that can be achieved

using enhanced sensors (i.e., the CITV) and automated C

2

technology in one specific type combat vehicle (i.e., a CVCC

equipped tank unit), with a compatible automated system (i.e.,

the CVCC TOC workstation) in the combat unit's TOC. The findings

also suggest implications for expanding and integrating an

automated C

2

system to different combat and combat support units,

such as mechanized infantry, combat engineers, air defense,

intelligence, and artillery. The CVCC battalion evaluation,

therefore, provides the basis for the continued research and

development of automated C

3

systems throughout the combined arms

team.

Conclusions

Based on the performance of tank battalions in the simulated

combat environment of the MWTB, the findings of the evaluation

support the conclusions shown in Table 28.

The reader should bear in mind these conclusions are based

on the performance of tank battalions operating in an interactive

simulation environment. Inherent in the experimental design and

methodology were a number of limitations (discussed earlier in

this report) which form an important part of the context for the

evaluation's conclusions.

Recommendations for Future Research

The recommendations contained in this section include

primarily methodological suggestions and developmental

initiatives to further the application of digital command and

control systems similar to those employed in the CVCC program.

Selected equipment-based recommendations are also highlighted,

where appropriate. Where used in this section, the terms "CVCC,"

or "CVCC system" apply to the integrated array of improved

thermal technologies and digital reporting technologies.

The overall CVCC research program, from the individual tank

level tests of the CITV and prototype POSNAV system (Quinkert,

1990, Du Bois and Smith, 1989) through the current evaluation has

demonstrated several operational advantages attributable to

120
Table 28

Summary of Conclusions from the CVCC Battalion Evaluation

Con •.. and and Control

o CVCC unit« received more comprehensive FRAGO» in far leu time than required within Baseline units. Furthermore,

digital FRAGOs were more easily interpreted, resulting in notably fewer requests for clarification.

o Digital message formats enabled CVCC units to relay more comprehensive enemy information from external sources to

subordinate elements, in leu time than among Baseline units.

o The tactical display of POSNAV data (position and operational status) enabled CVCC units to maintain their own unit

status In a more accurate and timely fashion than Baseline units.

o CVCC units were able to accomplish all tactical missions with a significant reduction in their voice radio signature,

resulting in greater access to voice radio networks.

o As a result of enhanced friendly and enemy situation data, CVCC commanders and staff had the tools available to

maintain a more accurate assessment of the overall tactical situation.

Maneuver

o CVCC units moved further, in less time than Baseline units, to maintain more effective stand-off ranges during tactical

engagements. This permitted CVCC units to complete tactical missions in less time than Baseline units.

o The hunter-killer advantage of the CITV enabled CVCC units to acquire targets sooner and at greater ranges than Baseline

units. CVCC units also achieved better kill per hit ratios than Baseline units, suffered fewer losses, and achieved better

losses per kill ratios in the counterattack.

o Overall, CVCC units demonstrated greater agility and synchronization than Baseline units.

o CVCC command vehicle crews were able to engage the OPFOR as effectively as their Baseline counterparts, Indicating

that the C

2

requirements associated with the CVCC system do not inhibit the crew's ability to fight the tank.

o The IFF capability integrated Into the CITV in the CVCC system did not prevent fratricide events, and should be a subject

of further study. This effect may be attributed to the combined result of unrealistic expectations regarding the IFF's

reliability and its Implementation in other than the primary direct fire control system.

o CVCC units demonstrated greater apparent freedom of movement.

Fire Support

o CVCC units generated more accurate CFFs than Baseline units,

o CVCC calls for fire contained a greater volume of useful Information.

intelligence

o CVCC units generated more accurate CONTACT and SPOT reports than Baseline units,

o CVCC units generated a greater volume of useful information in CONTACT and SPOT reports.

enhanced battlefield sensors (i.e., the CITV) and automated

digital communications on the tank platform. In addition to CVCC

research findings, lessons learned from the Battlefield

Synchronization Demonstration in December, 1992 and March 1993

(see Courtright et al., 1993, and Goodman, 1993) provide a basis

for an investigation of applications across the entire combined

arms team. It is recommended that CVCC technology be integrated

121
among infantry, armor, aviation, engineer, air defense,

battlefield surveillance, and artillery systems, and that the

entire force be linked thru TOC workstations, to further develop

hardware and software specifications, as well as employment

techniques, at the brigade and division level.

Another important aspect of future research should be an

investigation of integrating conventional systems with advanced

capabilities, as well as the integration of non-compatible

technologies. For example, the impact of fielding an advanced,

automated C

2

capability in only selected combat vehicles should

be investigated. That is, assuming that the full sensor and C

2

suite could only be purchased for a portion of an existing combat

vehicle fleet, is it preferable to outfit only selected units

throughout the field army, or to establish priorities for key

command vehicles (e.g.: battalion commander and S3, TOC, company

commanders and XOs, platoon leaders)?

Additionally, assuming that cargo and utility vehicles

within a combat unit do not have digital position reporting

capabilities, the potential effect on unit sustainment of global

positioning system applications versus conventional navigation

tools should be determined.

Although only a small number of fratricide events occurred

in either condition during the battalion evaluation, and the data

are inconclusive, integrating an IFF capability into the CITV did

not appear to prevent fratricide. Within a CVCC-like system, a

possible solution might be to integrate an IFF capability with

the position-tracking of friendly vehicles: When a lased position

corresponds to the reported location of a friendly vehicle, a

warning would be sounded over the intercom, and/or displayed in

the primary sights. The gunner should, in any case, receive

direct feedback from any given IFF system.

The provision of the concept of operations module in the TOC

workstations was a useful planning tool. However, since the

module could only demonstrate BLUFOR actions, OPFOR reactions and

counteractions had to be visualized and demonstrated in other

ways. It is recommended that the concept of operations overlay

tool be modified to incorporate possible enemy actions.

Up to and through the battalion evaluation, the tactical

planning process was truncated in order to focus on tactical

operations. We recommend that future investigations extend the

planning responsibilities of participating units to increase

ownership over the tactical operation, and to evaluate TOC

operations to:

(a) Study parallel planning techniques using CVCC.

(b) Develop information management techniques within the

TOC.

122
(c) Identify critical staff functions and techniques or

procedures to accomplish those tasks.

(d) Determine the impact of commander's critical

information requirements (CCIR) on CVCC supported

operations.

(e) Develop command post and TOC standing operating

procedures (SOPs), e.g., staff synergy, vertical and

horizontal synchronization.

(f) Evaluate the integration of digital communications

between targeting systems and fire support elements.

The CVCC system demonstrated many potential advantages of

both automated C

2

systems and enhanced battlefield sensors.

However, the full impact of these technological enhancements can

only be fully demonstrated through additional applications and

tests in both computer-based, man-in-the-loop simulation, and

field trials.

123
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128
Appendix A

Glossary

AA

ACR

AD

ADA

AFATDS

ALO

AMMO

AOAC

AOBC

ATTCS

AR

ARI

Arty

ASP

Asst

ATCCS

ATHS

Atk

B/prep

BAI

BDEf Bde

Bdy

BHL

BHO

BLUFOR

Bn

BOS

BP

BSA

BSD

C2

C3

C3CM

C&J

CAA

CAS

CAS 3

CATK

CCD

CCIR

Cdr

CFF

Avenue of Approach

Armored Cavalry Regiment

Armor Division

Air Defense Artillery

Advanced field artillery tactical data system

Air liaison officer

Ammunition status (report)

Armor Officer Advanced Course

Armor Officer Basic Course

Army tactical command and control system

Armor

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences

Artillery

Ammunition supply point

Assistant

Army tactical command and control system

Airborne target handover system

Attack

Be prepared

Battlefield air interdiction

Brigade

Boundary

Battle handover line

Battle handover

Friendly (Blue) forces. NOTE: Includes all

friendly manned vehicles (simulators), SAFOR, MCCgenerated units, and notional units.

Battalion

Battlefield operating system

Battle position

Brigade support area

Battlefield Synchronization Demonstration

Command and control

Command, control and communications

Command, control and communications

countermeasures

Collection and jamming

Combined arms army

Close air support

Combined Arms and Services Staff School

Counterattack

Command and control display

Commaner's critical information requirements

Commander

Call for fire

A-l
CFL

CGSC

cGy

CITV

Cmd Grp

Co

COFT

CoM

CONTACT

CP

CPX

CRP

CS

CSR

CSS

CVCC

CWS

DAG

DCA

DECON

Def

Div

DS

DSA

Coordinated fire line

Command and General Staff College

Centigray

Commander's independent thermal viewer

Command Group

Company

Conduct of Fire Trainer

Center of mass

Contact (report)

Check point or command post

Command post exercise

Combat reconnaissance patrol

Combat support

Controlled supply rate

Combat service support

Combat vehicle command and control

Commander * s weapon station

Divisional Artillery Group

Data collection and analysis

Decontaminate or decontamination

Defend

Division

Direct support

Division support area

E

EA

Ech

ECR

Eff

En

ENGR

EPW

ETA

East

Engagement area

Echelon

Exercise control room

Effective

Enemy

Engineer

Enemy prisoner of war

Estimated time of arrival

FA

FASCAM

FBC

FDC

FEBA

FIST

FO

FLOT

FPF

FRAGO

FS

FSB

FSCL

FSE

FSO

FUEL

Field Artillery

Family of scatterable mines

Future Battlefield Conditions

Fire direction center

Forward edge of the battle area

Fire support team

Forward observer

Forward line of own troops

Final protective fires

Fragmentary order

Fire support

Forward support battalion

Fire support coordination line

Fire support element

Fire support officer

Fuel status (report)

A-2
GAS

GLOS

GMRD

GMRR

GPS

GPSE

GSR

GTD

GTR

HEAT

Hr

HV MORT

Hvy Mort

ID

IDM

IFF

IN

INTEL

IR

IVIS

L

LAN

LD

LOSAT

LRF

MCC

MGS

MECH

MI

MLRS

MOPP

MOS

MOU

MP

MRB

MRB+

MRC

MRC+

MRD

MRP

MRR

MRS

MSR

MST

MWTB

(M)

N

n

Gunner's auxiliary sight

Gun line of sight

Guards motorized rifle division

Guards motorized rifle regiment

Gunner's primary sight

Gunner's primary sight extension

Ground surveillance radar

Guards tank division

Guards tank regiment

High explosive, anti-tank

Hour

Heavy mortar

Infantry division

Improved data modem

Identification, friend or foe

Infantry

Intelligence (report)

Infrared

Intervehicular information system

Left

Local area network

Line of departure

Line of sight anti-tank

Laser range finder

Management command and control

Maneuver Control System

Mechanized Infantry

Military Intelligence

Multiple launch rocket system

Mission oriented protective posture

Military occupational specialty

Memorandum of understanding

Military Police

Motorized rifle battalion

Motorized rifle battalion, reinforced

Motorized rifle company

Motorized rifle company, reinforced

Motorized rifle division

Motorized rifle platoon

Motorized rifle regiment

Muzzle reference system

Main supply route

Maintenance support team

Mounted Warfare Test Bed

Mechanized

North

Number of observations (data points) used in

A-3
NAI

NBC

NLT

NTC

NW

O&I

O/L

O/O

OBJ

OEG

OPCON

OPFOR

Ops, Opns

OPORD

PIR

PL

PLD

PLDC

Pit

POF

POSNAV

PP

Prep

PVD

R

RA

RAG

Recon

REDCON

Regt

Reinf

Res

RSR

RSTA

S

SAFOR

Set

SE

SHELL

SIMNET

SINCGARS

SitDisplay

SITREP

SMI

SMK

SOI

SOP

SPOT

statistical analysis

Named area of interest

Nuclear, biological and chemical

No later than

National Training Center

Northwest

Operations and intelligence

Overlay

On order

Objective

Operational exposure guidance

Operational control

Opposing forces

Operations

Operations order

Priority intelligence reguirement

Phase line

Probable line of deployment

Primary Leadership Development Course

Platoon

Priority of fires

Position/Navigation

Passage point

Prepare

Plan view display

Right

Research assistant

Regimental Artillery Group

Reconnaissance

Readiness condition

Regiment

Reinforce

Reserve

Reguired supply rate

Reconnaissance, surveillance and target

acquisition

South

Semiautomated forces

Scout

Southeast

Shell (report)

Simulation networking

Single channel ground-air radio system

Situation and planning display

Situation report

Soldier-machine interface

Smoke

Signal operating instructions

Standard operating procedure

Spot (report)

A-4
Spt

SP

STX

SW

Support

Self-propelled

Situational training exercise

Southwest

TAG

TACFIRE

TACOM

TAF

TAI

TBD

TC

TCP

TF

TIS

Tns

TO&E

TOC

TR

TRADOC

TRP

TTP

USAARMS

V/S

Vic

Tactical command post

Tactical fire direction system

U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command

Tactical Air Force

Target area of interest

To be determined

Tank Commander

Traffic control point

Task force

Thermal imaging system

Trains

Table of organization and equipment

Tactical operations center

Tank regiment

Training and Docrine Command

Target reference point

Tactics, techniques and procedures

U.S. Army Armor School

Vulcan/Stinger

Vicinity

W

xo

West

Executive Officer

A-5
APPENDIX B

Selected Participant Biographical Data

Table B-l

Participants' Service Experience (in Years)

Officers NCO/Enlisted

CVCC Baselinei CVCC Baseline

Active Duty 6.16

(4.41)

n-47

6.63

(4.13)

n-48

4.73

(3.84)

n-92

7.06

(5.00)

n-96

In Armor units 3.93

(2.58)

n-47

4.49

(2.61)

n-48

4.36

(3.24)

n-92

6.06

(4.37)

n-95

In Ml units 1.8Ü

(1.15)

n-37

2.03

(1.27)

n-38

2.98

(1.86)

n-91

3.79

(3.07)

n-89

In M60 units 1.98

(2.66)

n-26

2.45

(1.99)

n-26

2.82

(3.23)

n-35

4.56

(3.90)

n-48

Note. Each data cell includes the mean, standard deviation (in

parentheses) and number of respondents (n).

Experience levels among Baseline NCOs are significantly higher

than among CVCC NCOs.

B-l
Table B-2

Participants' Experience in Selected Positions, in Total Manyears

Duty Position CVCC Baseline

Officers

Battalion commander

Battalion XO

Battalion S3

Battalion S2

Other battalion staff

Company commander

Company XO

Platoon leader

NCO/Enlisted

Platoon sergeant

Tank commander

Gunner

Driver

n-0 n-0

1.16 ~

n-2 n-0

9.8 4.52

n-10 n-4

— 0.50

n-0 n-1

18.45 19.95

n-15 n-21

20.02 20.96

n=14 n-16

27.60 36.16

n-24 n-32

64.24 51.25

n-44 n-41

7.02 30.42

n-6 11-18

53.97 173.8

n-2i n-44

119.28 182.0

n-56 n-65

152.25 141.96

n-87 n-78

Note. Table includes multiple responses from individual

respondents. E.g., an officer with experience as a platoon

leader, XO and company commander would have reported their tenure

in each duty position.

Cell entries include total man-years, and number of respondents

experienced in that duty position (n).

B-2
Table B-3

Participants' Military Schooling Leva] (Schools Completed)

CVCC Baseline

Military School f % f %

Officers

Command & General Staff

Officer Course (CGSOC)

3 6.4 3 6.3

Combined Arms and

Services Staff School

(CAS3)

6 12.8 14 29.2

Armor Officer Advance

Course (AOAC)

22 46.8 27 56.3

Armor Officer Basic

Course (AOBC)

46 97.9 48 100

NCO/Enlisted

Advanced NCO Course

(ANCOC)

3 3.3 17 17.7

Basic NCO Course

(BNCOC)

19 20.7 46 47.9

Primary Leadership

Development Course

(PLDC)

38 41.3 59 61.5

Note. Table includes mult:Lple respouses from individual

respondents. E.g., a CAS3 graduate will most likely have also

graduated from AOAC and AOBC.

f frequency.

NCOs among the Baseline group have completed a significantly

higher number of advanced military schools than NCOs among the

CVCC group.

B-3
APPENDIX C

Operations Orders and Fragmentary Orders

Delay Test Scenario

OPORDs to support the Delay Scenario were developed for the

Brigade, Battalion, and each subordinate Company. The Brigade

and Battalion level orders are reproduced in this appendix. The

company orders are omitted to conserve space, but the mission and

commander's intent statements from each are included. Brigade

and Battalion FRAGOs were also produced for both the Baseline and

CVCC condition.

CVCC FRAGOs were published as overlays with integrated text

messages. Only the text messages are included here. Within the

scenario, a hard copy of the Brigade FRAGO with overlay was

received at the Battalion TOC when the oral FRAGO was transmitted

over the Brigade command network. Therefore, both the hardcopy

and oral text are included. At the battalion level, however, the

executive officer could only publish an oral FRAGO, given the

distance between the TOC and units, and the time available in the

tactical situation.

OPORD 20, 1st Bde 23rd AD C- 2

FRAGO 1 to OPORD 20 C-17

FRAGO 1 Oral transcript for Baseline C-19

FRAGO 1 Text for CVCC digital overlay C-20

FRAGO 2 to OPORD 20 C-21

FRAGO 2 Oral transcript for Baseline C-23

FRAGO 2 Text for CVCC digital overlay C-24

OPORD 200, 1-10 AR, 1st Bde, 23rd AD C-25

FRAGO 1 to OPORD 200 C-39

FRAGO 1 Oral transcript for Baseline C-41

FRAGO 1 Text for CVCC digital overlay C-43

FRAGO 2 to OPORD 200 C-44

FRAGO 2 Oral transcript for Baseline C-46

FRAGO 2 Text for CVCC digital overlay C-47

Mission and Commander's Intent statements C-48

from Company orders.

C-l
OPORD 20 FOR TRAINING ONLY

Copy __ of ^ Copies

1ST 806,23 AD

ES872023

0400R 9

OPORD 20

Reference: Map Series V753, V751 Kentucky - Indiana, Sheets

M3753 I, II, III, IV; M3760 II, III Edition 1-AMS, 1:50,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout Order: ROMEO

Task Organization

1-10 AR

1/A/1-440 ADA (DS)

1-92 IN (M)

2/A/1-440 ADA (DS)

1-91 IN (M)

BDE CONTROL

1-50 FA (DS)

A/1-440 ADA (-) (V/S) (DS)

A/23 ENGR BN (OPCON)

1/A/23 MI BN (C&J) (DS)

l/l/B/23 MI BN (GSR)

2/1/B/23 MI BN (GSR)

1/23 MP CO

1ST FSB (DS)

BDE TNS

45TH CHEM CO (SMK/DECON)(-)

(DS)

2/48TH CHEM CO (SMK) (-)

OPCON

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence Overlay)

(1) Overview. The 8th CAA has been attacking for the

last 24 hours from SE to NW along the Elizabethtown-Brandenburg

axis. The 52 ID(M) has stopped the first echelon divisions, the

4th MRD on the west and the 17th MRD on the east, just south of

Elizabethtown. The commitment of the second echelon divisions of

the 8th CAA has forced the withdrawal of the 52 ID(M). These

second echelon divisions, the 39th GMRD on the east and the 1st

GTD on the west, are currently pursuing the 52d ID(M). Expect to

find elements of the 39th GMRD in the brigade's sector.

(2) Composition and Disposition. The 39th GMRD first

echelon consists of the 140th GMRR on our right and the 144th

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-2
OPORD20 FOR TRAINING ONLY

GMRR on our left. The second echelon is expected to be the 79th

GTR on our right and the 146th GMRR on our left. The 39th GMRD

is equipped with BMP-2s and T-80s. The 140th and 144th are

currently located vie ES850580 to FS020600 and are estimated at

90% strength. The 146th GMRR and 79th GTR are estimated at 95%

strength.

(3) Most Probable Course of Action. The 8th CAA will

continue to attack for the next 24-36 hours to secure crossings

sites over the Ohio River in order to pass the 18th CAA through

to continue the attack north. The 39th GMRD will continue to

attack along the Elizabethtown-Brandenburg axis for the next 24

hours and attempt to seize crossing sites vie ET730070. The

enemy main effort will most likely be the center portion of our

sector west of Otter Creek.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) (Higher) 23 AD defends in sector NLT 0950R 9_

to destroy the enemy second echelon divisions of the 8th CAA, the

39th GMRD (L) and 1st GTD (R). 0/0 counterattacks to destroy

enemy elements in sector. The Division Commander's intent for is

to cover the deployment of the Division's main defense vicinity

PL TRUMP with elements of two brigades, and draw the 8th CAA's

2nd echelon into a vulnerable position where the division can

counterattack to complete the destruction of the 39th GMRD and

1st GTD.

(2) (L) 210 ACR delays in sector on the Corps eastern

flank.

(3) (R) 3d Bde, 23 AD delays in sector from 0950R

9_ to 1350R 9_ to destroy the enemy's 1st echelon

regiments, forcing deployment of second echelon regiments.

(4) (Front) 1st Bde, 52 IN ^M) conducts a withdrawal

and battle handover at PL KING, and executes a rearward passage

of lines NLT 101400 OCT 04.

(5) (Rear) 2d Bde initially Div reserve. 0/0 becomes

Div main effort and counterattacks south to destroy enemy

elements in sector.

(6) 1-50 FA DS to 1st Bde.

c. Attachments and Detachments. See Task Organization.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-3
OPORD20 FOR TRAINING ONLY

2. MISSION

Ist Bde 23rd AD accepts battle handover from and assists with

the rearward passage of lines and 52 ID (M) NLT 0950R 9_.

1st Bde delays in sector from 0950R 9_ to 1350R [ 9_ to

destroy the first echelon regiments of the 39th GMRD.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of the Operation. Annex B (Operations Overlay).

1st Bde establishes contact points south of PL KING to assist

rearward passage of 1st Bde, 52d IN (M). Once the rearward

passage is complete, we will delay in sectorf destroy the 1st

echelon regiments, and force the deployment of the enemy second

echelon regiments prior to PL TRUMP, creating the preconditions

for a counterattack by the 2d Bde, 23 AD. The deep battle will

be fought with air interdiction and MLRS, to delay the second

echelon regiments until the lead echelons can be defeated.

(1) Maneuver. My intent is to hit the enemy hard at the

Battle Handover Line (PL KING), disrupt his pursuit, and destroy

the leading companies of his first echelon regiments. 1-10 AR

will defend in sector on the east, 1-92 IN (M) on the west, and

1-91 IN (M) in reserve. We will then delay to vie PL CLUB in

order to determine the enemy's main effort. The enemy's main

effort is expected to be in the 1-10 AR sector, parallel to Otter

Creek. As 1-10 AR delays, 1-92 IN (M) will withdraw to maintain

an orderly delay and preclude a deep penetration in the bde

sector. As our battalions displace throughout the Bde sector, I

plan to keep constant contact with the enemy while avoiding

decisive engagement. Since the division plans to launch a major

counter attack with the 2d Bde, I see few opportunities to shape

the battlefield for a bde counterattack. However, we should be

alert for opportunities to conduct limited counterattacks against

an exposed flank or isolated units. I plan to accomplish this by

conducting a delay in sector in three phases.

Phase I. Overwatch the BHL with two battalions, accept

the battle handover from 1st Bde, 52 ID, and assist as Ist Bde

conducts a rearward passage of lines through our sector. Hit the

enemy hard at PL KING, then continue to destroy his units as we

delay between PL KING and PL CLUB.

Phase II. Continue the orderly delay between PL CLUB and

PL SPADE. By PL SPADE, tne second echelon enemy battalions must

be committed and heavily damaged.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-4
opoRD 20 FOR TRAINING ONLY

Phase III. Continue to hit the enemy while delaying

between PL SPADE and PL TRUMP. We must force the commitment of

the second echelon regiments prior to PL TRUMP. 0/0 conduct BHO

and rearward passage of lines through 1-91 IN (M) and 3-4 AR at

PL TRUMP.

(2) Fires. Annex C (Fire Support).

(a) 1st Bde has priority of fires within division.

CAS and MLRS will be targeted against the 39th GMRD's follow-on

echelons as the Brigade's deep battle. Conventional artillery

will support the close battle.

(b) POF (FA) Phase '—1-10 AR, 1-92 IN (M), 1-91 IN

(M); Phase I—1-10 AR, 1-92 IN (M)f 1-91 IN (M); Phase III—1-91

IN (M).

(c) Bde has six FASCAMS available. Bde Cdr is

approving authority.

(3) Obstacles, Mines, and Fortifications. Annex D

(Barrier Overlay).

(a) Priority of Support. 1-10 AR, 1-92 IN (M), 1-

91 IN (M).

(b) Priority of Effort. Countermobility,

survivability, mobility.

(c) Upon commitment of Reserve, priority of support

shifts to 1-91 IN (M), and priority of effort to mobility.

(4) Counterair Operations. Annex E (Air Defense).

(Omitted). Priority of protection: 1-91 IN (M), Main CP, 1-10

AR, 1-92 IN (M).

(5) Intelligence. Annex A (Intelligence),

b. 1-10 AR

(1) Prepare to delay in sector from 0950R 9_ until

1350R 9_.

(2) Eastern boundary ES975800. Western boundary

ES860770.

(3) Man Bde contact points in sector.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-5
OPORD20 FOR TRAINING ONLY

(4) Support TF 1-2, 1st Bde, 52 ID rearward passage of

lines and battle handover at PL KING in sector.

(5) Coordinate with 1-91 IN (M) for rearward passage of

lines and battle handover thru PPs 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, and 18.

(6) Provide guides for all passage lanes in sector.

(7) 0/0 conduct rearward passage of lines and battle

handover with 1-91 IN (M).

(8) Maintain one company reserve and do not commit

without Bde approval.

c. 1-92 IN (M)

(1) Prepare to delay in sector from 0950R 9_ until

1350R 9_,

(2) Eastern boundary ES860770. Western boundary

ES703733.

(3) Man Bde contact points in sector.

(4) Support TF 1-77, 1st Bde, 52 ID rearward passage of

lines and battle handover at PL KING in sector.

(5) Provide guides for all passage lanes in sector.

(6) Coordinate with 3-4 AR, 3d Bde for rearward passage

of lines and battle handover thru PPs 21, 23, 26, and 28.

(7) 0/0 conduct rearward passage of lines and battle

handover thru 3-4 AR, 3d Bde.

d. MP.

(1) Process EPWS.

(2) Guard BSA.

(3) Provide TCPs along MSRs.

e. Reserve: 1-91 IN (M).

(1) Prepare defensive positions vie. PL TRUMP NLT

0950R 9_.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-6
opoRD 20 FOR TRAINING ONLY

(2) Eastern boundary ES790930. Western boundary

ES922994.

(3) Be prepared to counterattack south.

(4) Provide guides for all passage lanes.

(5) Be prepared to assist 2d Bde, 23 AD in forward

passage of lines.

f. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) PIR:

(a) Concentrations of ten or more tanks.

(b) Use of Chemical munitions.

(c) Use of airmobile opns.

(d) Report penetration of CO size or greater at all

PLs.

(e) Report changes in enemy equipmentf uniforms,

formations, etc. which would indicate commitment of second

echelons.

(2) MOPP: 1 in effect NLT 0945R 9_.

(3) OEG: 70 cGy Report 50 cGy„

(4) Air Defense Warning — Yellow.

(5) Weapons Control Status — Tight.

(6) Other Reporting Requirements:

(a) Report battle handover complete.

(b) Report initial enemy contact.

(c) Report crossing PLs.

(d) Report Passage of Lines complete.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-7
OPORD 20 FOR TRAINING ONLY

(7) Recognition symbol for rearward passage of lines is

orange panel marker front of vehicle during the day — red

flashlight at night.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Annex G (Service Support). (Omitted)

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Command.

(1) Succession of Command: SOP.

(2) Division Main CP located vie ET568140.

(3) Brigade Main CP located vie ET872023.

(4) Division TAC located vie ET624035.

(5) Brigade TAC located vie ES877947.

(6) Division rear CP located vie ET681207.

(7) Division alternate CP is DSA ET440280.

(8) Brigade alternate CP is Bde Tns ET785227.

b. Signal.

(1) SOI index ALPHA in effect.

(2) Radio listening silence in effect 0930R 9_

until first contact is reported or passage of lines is completed.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

OFFICIAL: KNOX

Cdr

TANK

S3

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-8
opoRD 20 FOR TRAINING ONLY

Annexes: A—Intelligence

B—Operations Overlay

C—Fire Support

D—Barrier Overlay

E—Air Defense (Omitted)

F—Engineer Barrier Overlay

G—Service Support (Omitted)

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-9
ANNEX A to opoRD 20 FOR TRAINING ONLY

ANNEX A (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 20

REFERENCE: Map Series V753, V751 Kentucky - Indiana, Sheets

M3753 1, 11, 111, IV; M3760 II, III Edition 1-AMS, 1:50,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout Order: ROMEO

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

a. Para la, OPORD 20.

b. See current INTSUM and Appendix 1 (Situation Overlay).

c. The enemy can conduct extended air/ground operations in

the 1st Bde sector with the following assets:

(1) Hip/Hoplite with IR sensors.

(2) Divisional Recon Bn.

(3) Four regimental recon companies.

d. The consolidation and subsequent movement of forces in

sector indicate continued attack on the Elizabetown-Brandenburg

axis.

e. Enemy in the division sector are the Ist GTD and the 39th

GMRD, second echelon divisions of the 8th CAA. These divisions

were recently committed after the 52d IN (M) stopped the two

leading divisions, the 4th GMRD and the 17th GMRD. Forward

elements and advance guard will probably attempt to hold critical

terrain and assist follow-on battalions to break through or

bypass our forces to secure crossing sites over the Ohio River.

1st Bde will face the 39th GMRD.

f. Elements of the 39th GMRD are moving to attack forward

elements of the 1st Bde, 23 AD. Time of attack is estimated at

0950R 9_. First echelon units are tentatively identified

as the 140th GMRR (on our right) and the 144th GMRR (to our

front), followed by the second echelon regiments, 79th GTR (R)

and the 146th GMRR (L).

g. The 39th is equipped with BMP-2s and T-80 tanks. There

are unconfirmed reports that the 79th GTR may have been upgraded

to T-80 U tanks. The MRRs are doctrinally organized and can be

expected to task organize their MRBs consistent with standard

threat doctrine. The Ist brigade can expect three MRRs to

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-10
ANNEX A to OPORD 20 FOR TRAINING ONLY

attack, each with two MRB( + ) in the first echelon and one in the

second echelon.

h. Within each of the MRBs, expect to see three NRCs,

augmented with four (4) tanks each from the tank company. The

MRBs will also approach two (2) up and one (1) back.

i. Air superiority (initially) to enemy forces.

j. Most likely chemical attack is H + 40/60.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. Where will the 39th GMRD attempt its main breakthrough?

b. What is the direction of attack and what are the

immediate objectives?

c. Will the enemy employ chemical or nuclear weapons? If

so, when and where?

d. Where are the RAGs and DAG located?

e. Where are locations of enemy battalion and larger CPs?

3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS

a. Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units.

(1) Priority Intelligence Requirements. Para 3h (1)

(Coordinating Instructions), OPORD 20.

(2) 1-10 AR, 1-92 IN (M), and 1-91 IN (M) report as

obtained:

(a) Size, location, direction of movement,

disposition, unit identification, composition, and type of

equipment of enemy units in contact.

(b) Enemy jamming activity.

(c) All enemy helicopters flying nap-of-the-earth

by DTG, direction, location, and type of aircraft.

(d) All locations of enemy artillery units acquired

through counterfire surveillance. Priority to self-propelled

artillery.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-ll
ANNEX A to opoRD 20 FOR TRAINING ONLY

(2) 1-50 FA. Direction of enemy artillery fire.

(3) A/1-440 ADA. Report type, location, and activity of

all enemy aircraft.

(4) 1/23 HP.

(a) Report attempted enemy subversion of local

population and officials.

(b) Interrogation priority: enemy unit location,

direction of attack, intentions, activities, identifications, and

strengths.

b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units.

(1) 23d AD is requested to provide as obtained:

(a) Location, size, type of unit in vie of 3d Bde

boundary.

(b) Type of unit, time, and direction of movement

of air or surface traffic toward the Ist Bde sector.

(c) Location and direction of fire of all enemy

artillery.

(2) 210 ACR is requested to provide as obtained:

(a) Location, size, type of unit in vie of Bde

boundary.

(b) Enemy activity and direction of movement of air

or surface traffic toward the Ist Bde sector.

5. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS AND MATERIEL

Omitted

6. DOCUMENTS AND/OR EQUIPMENT REQUIRED

Omitted

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

SOP except as modified in paragraph 4.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-12
ANNEX A to OPORD 20 FOR TRAINING ONLY

Acknowledge:

Appendix 1 — Approach Overlay/NAI (Omitted)

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-13
ANNEX c to opoRD 20 FOR TRAINING ONLT

ANNEX C (Fire Support) to OPORD 20

REFERENCE: Map Series V753, V751 Kentucky - Indiana, Sheets

M3753 I, II, III, IV; M3760 II, III Edition 1-AMS, 1:50,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout Order: ROMEO

1. SITUATION

a. Fnemy Forces. Para la, OPORD 20 and Annex A

(Intelligence) to OPORD 20.

b. Friendly Forces. Para lb, OPORD 20.

c. Attachments and Detachments. See Task Organization.

2. MISSION

Fire support units provide conventional, nuclear, and

chemical fires in support of 1st Bde's delay in sector from

0950 9_ to 1350 9_. Provide fires in support of the

rearward passage of lines and battle handoff from 52d ID(M) NLT

101400 OCT 04.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of the Operation. A 20 minute conventional

counterpreparation will be fired by Division Artillery, on order,

on completion of battle handoff and rearward passage of lines by

the 52d ID(M) . Groups and series of targets are planned in major

choke points to slow the enemy's advance and assist friendly

forces disengagement from delay positions.

b. Air Support. 9 TAF supports the brigade with 36 sorties

daily. Priority to interdiction of second echelon armor

concentrations of company size or greater, 03 facilities, and

engineer bridging assets. Plan 4 sorties per CAS mission.

Priority of employment to the Brigade deep battle and counterfire

targets, in that order.

c. Chemical/Nuclear Support. See Appendix 1. (Omitted)

d. FA Support.

(1) General.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-14
ANNEX c to opoRO 20 FOR TRAINING ONLY

(a) Priority of Fires: Phase I/II/III: 1-10 AR, 1-

92 Mech, and on order 1-91 Nech when committed to counterattack.

(b) Counterfire priorities. Enemy mortars and FA

firing at lead battalions, then nuclear-capable fire systems.

(c) Close Support: C2 vehicles, BMP/BTR/Tank

concentrations of platoon size or larger.

(d) Copperhead Priorities: C2 vehicles, ADA

vehicles, bridging assets, RSTA assets and recon elements.

(2) Organization for Combat. 1-50 FA (155 SP) DS 1st

Bde.

(3) Miscellaneous.

(a) Cdrs munitions effectiveness criteria is 10%

casualties.

(b) No targets of opportunity on less than platoon

size enemy armor formations.

h. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Division FSCL is PL DEUCE upon completion of

rearward passage of lines and battle handoff.

(2) Initial Bde CFL is PL DEUCE. 0/0 CFL is PLs KING,

JACK, CLUB, and SPADE (in order).

4. SERVICE SUPPORT.

a. General. 0P0RD 20, para 4.

b. ASP locations —See Annex G (Omitted).

c. CSR is RSR for the next two days.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL,

a. Command.

(1) See OPORD for Div/Bde TOC locations.

(2) 1-50 FA TOC initial ES860890.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-15
ANNEX c to opoRD 20 FOR TRAINING ONLY

b. Signal.

(1) SOI index ALPHA in effect.

(2) FS nets/Bn SOP.

Acknowledge:

Appendix 1—Fire Support Overlay (Omitted)

Appendix 2—Chemical/Nuclear Support (Omitted)

FOR TRAINING ONLT

C-16
FRAGo 1 to OPORD 20 FOR TRAINING ONL Y

Copy of Copies

1ST BDE, 23 AD

ES877947

1024R OCT 04

FRAGO 1 to OPORD 20

Reference: No Change

Task Organization; No Change

1. SITUATION

39TH GMRD shifting course from N to NW through the 1-92 IN

(M) sector. Enemy right flank is exposed and vulnerable to

counterattack.

2. MISSION

On order, 1st Bde counterattacks in sector to destroy the

144th GMRR and force the deployment of 2d echelon regiments of

the 39th GMRD.

3. EXECUTION

a. 1-10 AR (main effort).

(1) Counterattack on orderf from BPs vicinity PL SPADE,

along Axis Stingray to seize OBJ Ice (ES855826).

(2) Attack by fire into EA SHARK to destroy remnants of

144th and to prevent envelopment of 1-92 IN (M).

(3) Be prepared to withdraw to original sector if 2d echelon

regiments are committed.

b. 1-92 IN (M).

(1) Establish a hasty defense vie PL CLUB and PL QUEEN

to fix the enemy in support of 1-10 AR's counterattack.

(2) 0/0, lift and shift fires south.

c. 1-91 IN (M).

(1) Follow 1-10 AR as Bde Reserve.

FOR TRAINING ONUT

C-17
FRAO01 to OPORD 20 FOR TRAINING ONLY

(2) 0/0, counterattack thru 1-10 AR into EA SHARK (main

effort, 0/0).

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) PL QUEEN (PLD) effective on implementation. PLD may

be adjusted based on progress of 1-10 AR delay in sector.

(2) Boundary change between 1-92 and 1-10 effective on

implementation of this FRAG0. Bde (Div) eastern boundary change

effective when elements of 1-10 are clear of proposed 210 ACR

sector.

(3) Earliest time of implementation: (40 min

from issuance) .

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. No Change.

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Bde Cdr currently located with 1-10 AR vie ES851947.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

OFFICIAL: KNOX

Cdr

TANK

S3

ANNEX A: FRAGO 1 OVERLAY (Omitted)

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-18
FRAGO 1 to OPORD 20 (Oral transcript for Baseline)

FOR TRAINING ONLT

"GUIDONS, THIS IS NOVEMBER THREE-THREE, ORDERS, OVER."

MOTE: YANKEE 06, MIKE 06, and DELTA 06 respond on Bde Cmd

net.

"THIS IS NOVEMBER THREE-THREE: FRAGO."

"RED AXIS SHIFTED TO NORTH WEST; RIGHT FLANK EXPOSED TO

COUNTERATTACK.

"ON ORDER, 1ST BDE COUNTERATTACKS IN SECTOR TO DESTROY THE 144TH

GMRR AND FORCE DEPLOYMENT OF 2ND ECHELON REGIMENTS OF THE 39TH

GMRD.

"YANKEE: MAIN EFFORT: COUNTERATTACK ON ORDER FROM BRAVO-PAPAS

VICINITY PHASE LINE SPADE, ALONG AXIS STINGRAY (ES865900-858856)

TO SEIZE OBJ ICE (CENTER OF MASS ES855826) AND ATTACK BY FIRE

INTO ENGAGEMENT AREA SHARK (CENTER OF MASS ES845810).,,

"MIKE, SUPPORT YANKEE BY FIRE FROM PHASE LINES CLUB AND QUEEN."

"DELTA: BE PREPARED TO ASSUME YANKEE'S MISSION."

"NEW GRAPHICS EFFECTIVE ON ORDER, HARD COPY ENROUTE YOUR TOCS."

"YANKEE AND MIKE, YOUR BOUNDARY WILL RUN SOUTH GENERALLY

ALONG THE 83 GRID LINE. YANKEE, YOUR LEFT BOUNDARY WILL SHIFT TO

VICINITY THE 92 GRID WHEN YOU CLEAR THAT SECTOR."

"PROBABLE LIMA-DELTA IS PAPA-LIMA QUEEN, FROM VICINITY

ES830860 - 920880. LIMA-DELTA WILL BE ADJUSTED BASED ON YANKEE'S

POSITION WHEN THIS FRAGO IS IMPLEMENTED."

"BE PREPARED TO EXECUTE NO EARLIER THAN (T+74 MIN)."

"BDE COMMANDER CURRENTLY WITH 1-10 AR."

"ACKNOWLEDGE, OVER."

FOR TRAINING ONL Y

C-19
FRAGO 1 to OPORD 20 (Text for CVCC digital overlay)

| OVERLAY TEXT |

FRAGO 1-20

SITUATION -Enemy axis shifted

from N to NW into 1-92 IN sector

to expose a flank.

MISSION -O/O 1st Bde catks in

sector to destroy 2nd

echelon/144th MRR and force

depl of 2nd ech/39th GMRD. !

EXECUTION

1-10 AR (main effort) CATK

along STINGRAY to seize ICE;

atk by fire into SHARK.

1-92 IN spt by fire from vie PL

CLUB & QUEEN.

1-91 IN B/prep to assume main {

attack.

Coordination: New bdys and PL

eff o/o. PLD may be adjusted

when order is implemented.

COMMAND -N06 with 1-10 AR.

END j

1 Close |

C-20
FRAoo 2 to OPORD 20 FOR TRAINING ONLY

Copy of Copies

1ST Bde, 23 AD

ES877947

_1115R 9_

FRAGO 2 TO OPORD 20

Reference: No Change

Task Organization: No Change

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy: 2d echelon regiments of the 39 GMRD are moving NW

into the Bde sector. Air interdiction has delayed the enemy

arrival until (thirty minutes from time this FRAGO is

issued).

b. Friendly: 23 AD continues to defend in sector.

2. MISSION

On order, 1st Bde establishes defensive positions along PL

ACE (83 E-W gridline), to delay enemy forces S of PL TRUMP until

(two hrs, thirty-five minutes from time this FRAGO is

issued).

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept: Annex A, Operations Overlay. 1st Bde occupies

sector along PL ACE with 1-10 AR on the left, 1-92 IN (M) on the

right, and 1-91 IN(M) to the rear along PL TRUMP.

b. Subordinate Unit Tasks:

(1) 1-10 AR delays in sector from PL ACE (vie ES830830-

910830) to PL TRUMP until (time specified).

(2) 1-92 IN (M) delays in sector from PL ACE to PL

TRUMP, until (time specified).

(3) Reserve: 1-91 IN (M) re-occupies defensive positions

along PL TRUMP. On order, counterattacks south to destroy enemy

penetrations.

c. Coordinating Instructions: Defend on order, no later

than (thirty minutes from time order is issued).

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-21
FRAoo 2 to OPORD 20 FOR TRAINING ONLY

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. No Change.

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Bn Cdr will locate to rear of 1-10 AR.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

OFFICIAL: KNOX

Cdr

TANK

S3

ANNEX A: FRAGO 2 OVERLAY (omitted)

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-22
FRAGO 2 to OPORD 20 (Oral transcript for Baseline)

FOR TRAINING ONLY

"GUIDONS, THIS IS NOVEMBER THREE-THREE, ORDERS, OVER."

NOTE: YANKEE 06, MIKE 06, and DELTA 06 respond on Bde

Cmd net.

"THIS IS NOVEMBER THREE-THREE: FRAGO."

"SECOND ECHELON REGIMENTS OF 39th GMRL» ARE APPROACHING NOVEMBER'S

SECTOR. THE ENEMY ADVANCE IS DELAYED BY AIR INTERDICTION, ENEMY

EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN SECTOR NO SOONER THAN (30 min from

time this FRAGO is issued).

"YANKEE AND MIKE: RESUME DELAY IN SECTOR FROM ACE (83 E-W

GRIDLINE) ON ORDER, TO PREVENT ENEMY PENETRATION OF TRUMP UNTIL

(2 hrs 35 min from time this FRAGO is issued).

"DELTA: RESERVE, REOCCUPY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS ALONG PL TRUMP, O/O

COUNTERATTACK SOUTH TO DESTROY ENEMY PENETRATIONS."

"NEW GRAPHICS EFFECTIVE ON ORDER, HARD COPY ENROUTE YOUR TOCS."

"BE PREPARED TO EXECUTE AT (30 MIN FROM ISSUE

TIME)."

"ACKNOWLEDGE, OVER."

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-23
FRAGO 2 to OPORD 20 (Text for CVCC digital overlay)

OVERLAY TEXT

FRAGO 2-20

SITUATION -Enemy 39th GMRD

2d Ech Regts approaching Bde

sector, delayed by BAI ETA: 30

mins.

MISSION -O/O 1st Bde delays

from PL ACE to PL TRUMP until

(time).

EXECUTION

1st Bde delays with 1-10 AR on

L, 1-92 IN on R, 1-91 IN in Res

vie TRUMP.

1-91: O/O catk S to destroy en

penetrations.

Coordination: defend 0/0, NLT

(time).

END

Close

C-24
opoRD2oo FOR TRAINING ONLY

Copy __ of Copies

1-10 AR, 1ST Bde, 23 AD

ES866925

0530R 9

OPORD 200

Reference: Map Series V753, V751 Kentucky - Indiana, Sheets

M3753 1, II, 111, IV; M3760 II, III Edition 1-AMS, 1:50,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout Order: ROMEO

Task Organization;

A Co, 1-10 AR Bn Control

Scout Pit

B Co, 1-10 AR Hvy Mort Pit

l/A/1-440 ADA (V/S)(DS)

C Co, 1-10 AR

Bn Trains

D Co, 1-10 AR MST/B/1 FSB

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence Overlay)

(1) Overview. The 17th MRD has been attacking for the

last 24 hours from SE to NW along the Elizabethtown-Brandenburg

axis. The 1st Bde, 52 ID(M) has stopped the 17th MRD, just south

of Elizabethtown, and forced the commitment of the second echelon

division, the 39th 6MRD. The 39th 6MRD has forced the withdrawal

of the Ist Bde, 52 ID(M) . The 39th GMRD is currently pursuing

the Ist Bde, 52d ID(M). In our sector, we will most likely face

elements of the 144th GMRR, and possibly the 140th GMRR, of the

39th GMRD.

(2) Composition and Disposition. The 39th GMRD is

equipped with the BMP-2 and T-80. The 144th GMRR is to our

front, and the 140th GMRR is to our right. The 146th GMRR is the

second echelon regiment behind the 144th GMRR. The 79th GTR is

the second echelon regiment behind the 140th GMRR. The 144th

GMRR consists of three NRBs and one tank battalion. The MRBs

will fight as task organized reinforced MRBs, according to

standard threat doctrine. The 144th GMRR is currently located

vie ES950580-FS020600 and is estimated at 90% strength.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-25
OPORD 200 FOR TRAINING ONLY

(3) Most Probable Course of Action. The 144th GMRR will

continue to attack NW along the Elizabethtown-Brandenburg axis

and attempt to seize crossing sites over the Ohio River vie ET

730070. The enemy main effort will most likely be the right

portion of our sector, west of the Otter Creek corridor. The

most likely formation is two (2) MRUs ( + ) up and one (1) back.

Each MRB can be expected to approach with two (2) MRCs (+)

forward and one (1) back. All rivers in our sector are fordable

and the terrain offers good cross country mobility.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) (Higher) Ist Bde 23 AD accepts battle handover from

and assists with the rearward passage of lines of 1st Bde, 52 ID

(M) NLT 0950R 9_. 1st Bde delays in sector from 0950R to

1350R 9_ to destroy the first echelon regiments of the 39th

GMRD forward of PL TRUMP. The Brigade commander's intent is to

hit the enemy hard at PL KING, disrupt his pursuit, and destroy

the leading companies of the lead regiments. He intends to

continue the delay in depth, continuing to attrite the enemy, to

force the commitment of the second echelon regiments north of PL

TRUMP.

(2) (L) 210 ACR delays in sector on the Corps eastern

flank.

(3) (R) 1-92 IN (M) accepts battle handover from and

assists the rearward passage of lines of TF 1-77, then delays in

sector from 0950R 9_ to 1350R 9_ to destroy the 140th

GMRR south of PL TRUMP.

(4) (Front) TF 1-2, 1st Bde, 52 IN (M) conducts a

withdrawal and battle handover at PL King and executes a rearward

passage of lines through 1-10 AR NLT 0950R 9_.

(5) 1-91 IN (M) (Bde Reserve) prepares defensive

positions vie PL TRUMP NLT 0950R 9_. 0/0 conducts

counterattack south.

(6) 1-50 FA DS to 1st Bde.

(7) A/23d ENGR OPCON to 1st Bde, 23 AD.

(8) A/1-440 ADA DS to 1st Bde, 23 AD.

c. Attachments and Detachments. See Task Organization.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-26
opoRD 200 FOR TRAINING ONLY

2. MISSION

1-10 AR accepts battle handover from, and assists in rearward

passage of lines of TF 1-2 NLT 0950R 9_ at PL KING. 1-10

AR delays in sector from 0950R to 1350R 9_ to destroy the

144th GMRR south of PL TRUMP. 0/0 conducts rearward passage of

lines through 1-91 IN (M).

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. Annex B (Operations Overlay). My

intent is to accept the battle from TF 1-2 at PL KING and destroy

4 reinforced motorized rifle companies at PL KING. We will then

delay in sectorf defending from successive company BPsr

destroying the enemy without becoming decisively engaged, forcing

the deployment of the 146th GMRR, the second echelon regiment

following the 144th GMRR, prior to PL TRUMP.

(1) Maneuver. The battalion scouts will establish

Contact Points 7, 9, 10, and 2 forward of PL KING and assist TF

1-2, 1st Bde, 52d IN (M) in their rearward passage of lines. My

intent is to hit the enemy hard at PL KING, disrupt his pursti'

and destroy at least one company each in EAs STING, WHIP, ai.

CHAIN. The 144th GMRR's main effort is expected to be in the

right portion of our sector. A Co will probably be hit hardest

due to its location on our right and because of the open terrain

in its sector. We will fall back to BPs, vie PL JACK, in order

to confirm his main effort. As we delay throughout the Bn

sector, I plan to keep constant contact with the enemy unless we

are forced to pull back to prevent a major penetration. I see

few opportunities to shape the battlefield for a counterattack,

but ws must be ready to launch a limited counterattack if the

enemy exposes a flank or appears vulnerable. We will prevent the

39th GMKD from penetrating PL TRUMP until after 1350R 9_.

I plan to accomplish this delay in three phases:

(a) Phase I. Cover the BHL with three Cos in BPs

10, 20, and 30, and position at least two platoons forward in

each. Accept the battle handover from TF 1-2, and assist as they

conduct a rearward passage of lines through our sector on Passage

Lanes ELEPHANT, PONY, DOG, AND CAT. Scouts establish observation

of enemy forces and follow TF 1-2 through the passage points,

then consolidate and screen the left flank. Destroy the lead

enemy companies in EAs STING, WHIP, and CHAIN. Displace if an

enemy company closes to within 2000 m or when an enemy unit of

company size or larger attempts to bypass one of our companies.

A Co will probably delay to BP 13 first, overwatched by B Co. B

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-27
OPORD 200 FOR TRAINING ONLY

Co will then delay to BP 23, overwatched by A Co and C Co. C Co

will delay to BP 33 overwatched by B Co. Do not cross PL CLUB

without permission.

(b) Phase II. Cos continue to defend on successive

BPs in the battalion sector. Scouts establish Screen Line ONE

along eastern boundary. Bn will be alert for enemy exposed

flanks which would present opportunities for counterattack. I

anticipate that A Co will be hard pressed on the right flank. As

they delay to BP 11r D Co will stage in BP 42, then counterattack

into the enemy's flank forward of BP 11. B and C Co will protect

D Go's flank, then fall back to and defend from BPs 24 and 34,

respectively. A Co will support the counterattack by fire from

BP 11, then withdraw to BP 12, consolidate, and reconstitute the

Bn reserve. D Co will consolidate on BP 11 after its

counterattack. The timing on this limited counterattack is

critical. We must anticipate the opportunity and have the forces

in motion before it's too late.

(c) Phase III. Continue to attrite the enemy

between PL SPADE and PL TRUMP. Be prepared to launch limited

counterattacks if opportunities arise. We must force the

commitment of the second echelon regiment, 146th GMRR prior to PL

TRUMP. Scouts establish Screen Line TWO. Cos occupy BPs vie. PL

TRUMP and defend to retain. 0/0 establish contact with 1-91 Mech

scouts at designated Contact Points and conduct BHO and rearward

passage of lines through 1-91 Mech on designated Passage Lanes.

0/O move to assembly areas (TBD) to become the 1st Bde Reserve.

(2) Fires (Fire Support Overlay):

(a) 1-10 AR has priority of FA Fires within the Bde.

(b) Priority of Fires (FA): Phase I—Scouts, A Co, B

Co, C Co, D Co; Phase II, III—A Co, B Co, C Co, D Co, Scouts.

(c) Priority of Fires (Mtrs): Phase I—Scouts, A

Co, B Co, C Co, D Co; Phases II, III—A Co, B Co, C Co, D Co,

Scouts.

(d) 1-10 AR has two FASCAM minefields available.

FASCAM reguires Bde Cdr's approval for use.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-28
opoRD2oo FOR TRAINING ONLY

(3) Obstacles.

(a) Priority of Support; A Co, B Cof C Co, D Co.

(b) Priority of Effort: Countermobility,

survivability, mobility.

b. A Co.

(1) Phase I: Defend BP 10. Provide guides for Passage

Lane PONY. Engage enemy in EA STING.

(2) 0/0 delay thru BP 13 to BP 11. Be prepared to

defend from BP 13.

(3) Phase II: On order, defend BP 11.

(4) 0/0 support D Co counterattack by fire.

(5) Phase III: On order, defend BP 12.

(6) On order, conduct rearward passage of lines on

Passage Lanes BLUE and GREY.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-29
OPORD 200 FOR TRAINING ONLY

c. B Co.

(1) Phase I: Defend BP 20. Provide guides for Passage

Lane DOG. Engage enemy in EA WHIP.

(2) 0/0 delay though BP 23 to BP 24. Be prepared to

defend from BP 24.

(3) Phase II; On order, defend BP 42.

(4) 0/0 delay to BP 21.

(5) Phase III; On order, defend BP 41.

(6) On order, conduct rearward passage of lines on

Passage Lane YELLOW.

d. C Co.

(1) Phase I: Defend BP 30. Provide guides for Passage

Lanes CAT and ELEPHANT. Engage enemy in EA CHAIN.

(2) 0/0 delay through BP 33 to BP 34. Be prepared to

defend from BP 34.

(3) Phase II; On order, defend BP 31.

(4) Phase III; On order, defend BP 32.

(5) On order, conduct rearward passage of lines on

Passage Lanes PURPLE and BLACK.

e. D Co.

(1) Phase I-III; Be prepared to reinforce A, B, or C Co

sector once enemy's main effort is identified.

(2) Occupy BP 40 initially; be prepared to occupy BP 22.

(3) Be prepared to conduct counterattacks to maintain

integrity of the Bn sector or when opportunities arise, with

priority of planning for counterattack from BP 42 to relieve

pressure on A Co, vie BP 11.

(4) Be prepared to occupy BP 22 and to conduct rearward

passage of lines on Passage Lane ORANGE.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-30
opoRD 200 FOR TRAINING ONLY

f. Scouts.

(1) Phase I: Establish Contact Points 7, 9, 10 and 2

NLT 0800R 9_. Screen forvrard of PL KING, 0/0f conduct

rearward passage of lines on routes PONY, DOG, CAT, and ELEPHANT.

Consolidate at CP 10, then screen BN left flank from rear of C Co

to PL CLUB.

(2) Phase II: Establish Screen Line ONE.

(3) Phase III; Establish Screen Line TWO.

g. Mortars.

(1) Phase I: Occupy initial Firing Point vie ES895810.

Be prepared to operate split section to support Bn delay.

(2) Phase II-III: Move under control of Bn FSO. On

order, coordinate own rearward passage of lines.

h. 1/A/1-440 ADA. Priority of protection: reserve and TOC.

i. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) PIR:

(a) Concentrations of ten or more tanks.

(b) Use of Chemical munitions.

(c) Use of airmobile opns.

(d) Report penetration of CO size or greater at all

PLs.

(e) Report changes in enemy equipment, uniforms,

formations, etc. which would indicate commitment of second

echelon units.

(2) MOPP: Level 1 in effect NLT 0950R 9_.

(3) 0E6: 70 cGy Report 50 cGy.

(4) Air Defense Warning — Yellow.

(5) Weapons Control Status — Tight.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-31
OPORD 200 FOR TRAINING ONLY

(6) Disengagement criteria: MRC close within 2000 m or

when company size unit attempts to bypass your position.

(7) Other Reporting Requirements.

(a) Report BH complete.

(b) Report initial enemy contact.

(c) Report crossing PLs.

(d) Report Passage of Lines complete.

(8) Recognition symbol for rearward passage of lines is

orange panel marker front of vehicle during the day — red

flashlight at night.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Annex E (Service Support). (Omitted)

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL,

a • Command.

(1) Succession of Command: SOP.

(2) Cmd Group will be to rear of B Co.

(3) Bn TOC initial location ES866925, subsequent

location ES851947.

(4) Alternate Bn CP is Combat Trains CP.

(5) Brigade Main CP located vie ET872023.

(6) Brigade TAC located vie ES877947.

(7) Brigade alternate CP is Bde Tns ET785227.

b. Signal.

(1) SOI index ALPHA in effect.

(2) Radio listening silence in effect 0930R 9_

until first contact is reported or passage of lines completed.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-32
OPORD 200 FOR TRAINING ONLY

ACKNOWLEDGE:

OFFICIAL: PATTON

Cdr

HASZARD

S3

Annexes: A—Intelligence

B—Operations Overlay (Omitted)

E—Service Support (Omitted)

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-33
ANNEX A to opoRD 200 FOR TRAINING ONLY

Copy of Copies

1-10 AR, 1st Bde, 23 AD

ES866925

0530R 9

ANNEX A (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 200

REFERENCE: Map Series V753f V751 Kentucky - Indiana, Sheets

M3753 I, IIf III, IV; M3760 II, III Edition 1-AMS, 1:50,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout Order: ROMEO

1. GENERAL. (See Appendix 1, Enemy Situation Overlay)

a. Enemy Situation

(1) Location. The first echelon divisions of the 8th

CAA have been stopped by the 52d IN (M). The Ist GTD and the

39th GMRD, second echelon divisions of the 8th CAA, were

committed at 0200 hrs this morning to continue the attack

northwest along the Elizabethtown to Brandenburg axis. The 1st

Bde faces the 39th GMRD, which is currently moving north vie.

ES850580 to FS020600.

(2) Strength. The 1st echelon regiments of the 39th

GMRD consist of the 140th GMRR, on our right, and the 144th GMRR

to our front. These regiments are estimated at 90% strength.

The second echelon regiments, the 79th GTR following the 140th

GMRR, and the 146th GMRR following the 144th GMRR, are estimated

at 95% strength.

b. Enemy Capabilities. The enemy is expected to advance

into the 1st Bde sector NET 1000R 9_. They can attack in

the brigade sector with 2 MRRs followed by a second echelon,

consisting of 1 MRR and 1 TR. The MRRs are equipped with BMP-2s

and T-80s. There are unconfirmed reports that the 79th GTR has

been upgraded to T-80 Us. Use of chemical agents is anticipated.

c. Most Probable Course of Action. The 144th GMRR will

continue to attack NW along the Elizabethown-Brandenburg axis

with 2 MRBs (+) in the first echelon followed by 1 MRB (+) in the

second. The regimental tank battalion has been split up to

provide tanks to each MRB. Each MRB will consist of three (3)

MRCs with four (4) tanks each. These MRBs will also probably

attack two (2) up and one (1) back. The enemy main effort will

most likely be the right portion of our sector, west of Otter

Creek. The first echelon MRBs will attack along Avenues of

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-34
ANNEX A to opoRD 200 FOR TRAINING ONLY

approach Al and A2 to seize Bn immediate objectives vie ES860830

and ES930855. Expect the second echelon MRB to be committed at

this point along Al and continue north-northeast to seize the MRR

immediate objective vie ES810920 to ES875955. Expect the RAG to

support the initial attack from vie ES9174. Significant Bn-size

flank AA from the east are: Bl—ES9683; B2—ES9294. From the

west, two Bn size AA are significant: Cl—ES8579 and C3—ES8288,

respectively.

2. PRIORITY INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS (PIR)

a. Para 3,1,(1), OPORD 200.

b. Has the 2d echelon MRB been committed to AA Al (NAI 30,

31, 32, 33, and 34.)?

c. Where has the RAG been positioned (NAI 30)?

d. Is the enemy attempting to attack the Bn flanks (NAI 20,

21, 22, and 23)7

e. Will the enemy conduct airmobile operations (NAI 36 and

45)?

f. Is the enemy headed toward Brandenburg (NAI 33, 34, 35,

42, 43)?

g. Is the enemy in MOPP 3 or 4?

h. Is the enemy using new formations or equipment, such as

the T-80Ü7

3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS.

a. Subordinate and Attached Units.

(1) A Co. Size, composition, and direction of enemy.

(NAI 20, 21, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36).

(2) B Co. Size, composition, and direction of enemy.

(NAI 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 40, 41, 42, 43, and 45.)

(3) C Co. Size, composition, and direction of enemy.

(NAI 22, 23, 40, 41, 42, 44, and 45).

(4) Scouts. Size, composition, and direction of enemy.

(Initial—NAI 30, and 40; subsequent—NAI 22 and 23).

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-35
ANNEX A to opoRD 200 FOR TRAINING ONLY

(5) GSR. Initial—NAI 30, 31, 40, and 41.

b. Higher and Adjacent.

(1) Ist Bde. (1-92 IN (M)). Size, composition, and

direction of enemy. (NAI 20 and 21).

(2) Ist Bde, (210 ACR). Size, composition, and

direction of enemy. (NAI 22 and 23).

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL. SOP

5. DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT REQUIRED. Omitted.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Omitted.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION. SOP.

8. MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS. Omitted.

APPENDICES:

1 — Enemy Situation Overlay (Omitted)

2 — NAI/TAI

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-36
APPENDIX 2 to ANNEX A to OPORD 200 FOR TRAINING ONLY

Copy of Copies

1-10 AR, 1st Bde, 23 AD

ES933776

05 3 OR 9_

APPENDIX 2 (NAI/TAI) TO ANNEX A (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPORD 200

REFERENCE: Map Series V753f V751 Kentucky - Indiana, Sheets

M3753 I, IIf III, IV; M3760 II, III Edition 1-AMS, 1:50,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout Order: ROMEO

1. NAI/TAI Information tasks.

Information

Is enemy attacking flank? Size,

composition, direction?

Is enemy attacking flank? Size,

composition, direction?

Is enemy attacking flank? Size,

composition, direction?

Is enemy attacking flank? Size,

composition, direction?

Where is RAG? Has 2d echelon MRB

been committed? Size, composition,

direction?

Has 2d echelon MRB been committed?

Size, composition, direction?

Has 2d echelon MRB been committed?

Size, composition, direction?

Has 2d echelon MRB been committed?

Is enemy headed toward Brandenburg?

Size, composition, direction?

Has 2d echelon MRB been committed?

Is enemy headed toward Brandenburg?

Size, composition, direction?

NAI/TAI Unit

20 1-92 IN (M)

21 1-92 IN (M)

22 210th ACR,

Scouts

23 210th ACR

Scouts

30 Co A, B

Scouts

Div Arty

GSR

31 Co A, B

GSR

32 Co A, B

33 Co A

34 Co A, B

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-37
(FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY)

35 Co A, B Is enemy headed toward Brandenburg?

Size, composition, direction?

36 Co A Will enemy conduct airmobile opns?

Size, composition, direction?

40 Co B, C Size, composition, direction?

Scouts

GSR

41 Co B, C Size, composition, direction?

GSR

42 Co B, C Is enemy headed toward Brandenburg?

Size, composition, direction?

43 Co B Is enemy headed toward Brandenburg?

Size, composition, direction?

44 Co C Size, composition, direction?

45 Co B, C Will enemy conduct airmobile opns?

Size, composition, direction?

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-38
FRAGo 1 to OPORD 200 FOR TRAINING ONLY

Copy of Copies

1-10 ARf 1ST Bde, 23 AD

ES866925

_1049R 9_

FRAGO 1 TO OPORD 200

Reference: No Change

Task Organization: No Change

1. SITUATION

a. 144th GMRR shifting course from N to NW through the 1-92

IN (M) sector. Enemy right flank is exposed and vulnerable to a

counterattack.

b. 1ST BDE counterattacks in sector to destroy the 144th

GMRR and force the deployment of 2d echelon regiments of the 39th

GMRD.

c. 1-92 IN (M) establishes hasty defenses vie PL CLUB and

QUEEN to fix the enemy in sector.

d. 1-91 IN (M) follows 1-10 AR as Bde Reserve. 0/0

counterattacks through 1-10 AR.

2. MISSION

1-10 AR counterattacks at (execute time

specified by ECR) from current positions along Axis Stingray to

seize OBJ ICE (ES855826), attacks by fire into EA SHARK

(ES845810) to destroy the 144th GMRR.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept (see overlay): 1-10 AR counterattacks with three

Cos abreast, from left to right: C Co, B Co, and A Co.

Counterattack should engage the 144th's 2nd Ech MRB its right

flank. Be prepared to withdraw to original sector when 2d

echelon regiments are committed.

b. A Co: counterattack along AXIS BETTY to seize OBJ RAIN

(ES835835). Orient from TRP 01 to TRP 02.

c. B Co counterattack along AXIS PAM to seize OBJ SNOW

(ES854824). Orient from TRP 02 to 03.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-39
FRAO01 to opoRo 200 FOR TRAINING ONLY

d. C Co counterattack along AXIS LIZ to seize OBJ FOG

(ES871814). Orient from TRP 03 to 04.

e. D Co support by fire from BP 11. Prepare to reinforce, in

priority, B Co, A Co, and C Co.

f. Mortars: follow B Co.

g. Scouts screen Bn left flank from C Co left rear to Bn

Bdy. Maintain contact with 210 ACR.

h. Coordinating instructions.

Boundary change; Eastern lateral boundary effective when

scouts clear proposed boundary. Western lateral boundary

effective immediately.

Phase Line QUEEN and the LD are effective immediately.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. No Change.

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Bn Cdr currently located with B Co vie BP 21.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

OFFICIAL: PATTON

Cdr

HASZARD

S3

FRAGO 1 Overlay (Omitted)

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-40
FRAGO 1 TO OPORD 200 (Oral transcript for Baseline)

FOR TRAINING ONLY

"GUIDONS, THIS IS YANKEE THREE-THREE, ORDERS, OVER."

NOTE: All subordinate stations respond.

"FRAGO: ENEMY ATTACK SHIFTING TO NORTH WEST; VULNERABLE TO FLANK

ATTACK."

"NOVEMBER COUNTERATTACKS TO DESTROY THE 144TH AND FORCE

DEPLOYMENT OF 39TH 2ND ECHELON."

"MIKE DEFENDS TO OUR RIGHT."

"YANKEE COUNTERATTACKS AT (time specified by ECR)

ALONG AXIS STINGRAY TO SEIZE OBJ ICE, ES855826; ATTACKS BY FIRE

INTO SHARK FROM ES832823 THRU 855811 THRU 835788 THRU 812802; TO

DESTROY 144th AND TO FORCE DEPLOYMENT OF SECOND ECHELON

REGIMENTS."

"YANKEE ATTACKS WITH THREE COMPANIES ABREAST: FROM LEFT TO RIGHT:

CHARLIE, BRAVO ALPHA."

"ALPHA: ATTACK ALONG AXIS BETTY FROM BP 12 THRU ES860890 THRU

860870; TO SEIZE OBJECTIVE RAIN, ES835835. ORIENT SW."

"BRAVO: MAIN EFFORT—ATTACK ALONG AXIS PAM FROM BP 24 TO SEIZE

OBJECTIVE SNOW, ES854824. ORIENT SW."

"CHARLIE: ATTACK ALONG AXIS LIZ, FROM BP 34 TO SEIZE OBJECTIVE

FOG, ES871814. ORIENT SW. "

"DELTA: SUPPORT BY FIRE FROM ONE-ONE; STAND BY TO REINFORCE

BRAVO, ALPHA OR CHARLIE IN THAT ORDER."

"SIERRA: SCREEN LEFT FLANK; MAINTAIN FLANK CONTACT."

"SIERRA TWO-ONE: FOLLOW BRAVO."

"BRAVO BLITZ WHEN ALPHA CROSSES SPADE. ALPHA AND CHARLIE KEY ON

BRAVO; REMAIN ON LINE."

"WESTERN BOUNDARY CHANGE EFFECTIVE NOW: FROM ES745920 THRU 829840

THRU 799753. EASTERN BOUNDARY EFFECTIVE WHEN SCOUTS CLEAR 210^

NEW SECTOR: BOUNDARY IS FROM ES921982 THRU 925901 THRU 901779."

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-41
FOR TRAINING ONLY

"OTHER GRAPHICS EFFECTIVE NOW:

"PL QUEEN: FROM ES834864 THRU 850870 THRU 886876 THRU

924892."

"LINE OF DEPARTURE: NW-SE RUNNING ROAD FROM VICINITY ES850870

THRU 870860 THRU 910847 THRU 953825."

"REPORT REDCON ONE. ACKNOWLEDGE, OVER."

NOTE: AJJ subordinate units ac/cncwiedge. If necessary,

paraphrase/describe added graphics.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-42
FRAGO 1 to OPORD 200 (Text for CVCC digital overlay)

| OVERLAY TEXT |

FRAGO 1-200

SITUATION

Enemy attack shifting to NW,

flank exposed.

Friendly -1st Bde CATKs to

destroy 144th, force 39th GMRD

to commit 2d Ech.

1-92 def on bn R.

1-91 (Bde Res) O/O CATKs thru

1-10.

MISSION -1-10 CATKs at R

to seize ICE, fires into SHARK to

kill 144th. O/O delays 2d ech

MRR.

EXECUTION i

D spt/fire from BP11, prep reinf

BAC. !

Coordination -Atk on line, key on

B O/L eff now. 210 Bdy eff

when

1-10 clears sector.

END

i

close I

C-43
FRAGo 2 to OPORD 200 FOR TRAINING ONLY

Copy of Copies

1-10 AR, 1ST Bdef 23 AD

ES866925

1310R 9_

FRAGO 2 TO OPORD 200

Reference: No Change

Task Organization: No Change

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy. 2d echelon regiments of the 39 GMRD are moving NW

into the Bde sector. ETA: (20 minutes from time of FRAGO

publication).

b. 1ST BDE defends along PL ACE to delay the enemy in sector

S of PL TRUMP until (approx 2 hrs).

c. 1-92 IN (M) delays in sector on our right flank.

d. 1-91 IN (N) Bde Reserve, reoccupies positions at PL

TRUMP, to our rear.

2. MISSION

1-10 AR defends at (time specified by ECR) along

PL ACE (83 E-W grid line). On order, delays enemy S. of PL TRUMP

until (approx 2 hrs).

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept (see overlay). 1-10 AR defends from BPs along PL

ACE with three Cos abreast; from left to right, C Co, B Co, and A

Co. D Co occupies a BP to the rear as Bn reserve. On order, Bn

delays in sector.

b. A Co: defend from BP 25; orient towa TRP AQ30. On

order, displace to subsequent BPs 11 and 12.

c. B Co: defend from BP 45; orient toward TRP AR30. On

order, displace to subsequent BPs 46, 21, and 22.

d. C Co: defend from BP 35; orient toward TRP AT30. On

order, displace to subsequent BPs 26, 31, and 32.

FOR TRAINING ONLY

C-44
Table 20

Mean Performance Data for Navigate Hypothesis

Measure CVCC

Stage 1

Baseline CVCC

Stage 2

Baseline

Stage 3

CVCC Baseline

Distance travelled (meters)

Bn Echelon

Co Echelon

Fuel used (gallons)

Bn Echelon

Co Echelon

13517.8

(7352.1)

n-n

13512.3

(8171.9)

11-12

7455.6

(3341.9)

Q-ll

8509.5

(3114.2)

Q-12

8006.0

(2585.3)

Q-10

6550.5

(2394.8)

n-8

13378.9

(5083.2)

n-36

11270.2

(4062.7)

n-36

9597.2

(2521.8)

Q-35

10044.0

(2823.8)

n-36

9037.3

(3242.2)

n-30

7525.5

(2514.2)

[1-23

20.74

(8.23)

Ü-11

22.91

(10.90)

Q-12

12.63

(3.78)

n-n

16.29

(4.74)

Ü-12

14.87

(3.09)

n-10

12.64

(3.11)

n-B

20.22

(6.89)

ü«36

18.99

(5.77)

n-36

17.53

(8.92)

11-35

16.18

(4.84)

n-36

15.04

(5.09)

n-30

12.29

(3.68)

n-23

Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the means.

able to operate more confidently on their own, independent of

their subordinate (SAFOR) platoons, and as a result moved about

the battlefield more often to observe from different vantage

points. In the company level evaluation, test units were allowed

less flexibility to maneuver laterally and in depth. Leibrecht

et al. (1992) reported that CVCC units, given those tactical

constraints, travelled less distance and consumed less fuel while

accomplishing the same tasks as Baseline units (e.g., moving to

specified BPs, checkpoints, and objectives).

The distance travelled and fuel used measures were

originally intended to quantify any movement resulting from a

crew becoming lost or misoriented within the battalion's

boundaries. Another measure, "mean time out of sector/axis," was

also intended to capture such events. Although the measures

themselves did not successfully identify lost vehicle cases,

control personnel observed crews that became separated from their

subordinate elements in both conditions. Those observations

indicated that the performance of individual tanks differed

consistently between conditions. Among CVCC units, separated

crews moved rapidly to rejoin their units once they realized that

they had been " left behind." Once on the move, CVCC crews

typically kept rolling until they had rejoined the unit.

Baseline crews typically did not waste much time starting the

move, but their movements were more deliberate. They were more

likely to follow roads, trails, or other linear objects, and they

often stopped at various points to verify their location and

84
reorient for the next leg of their move. As a result, separated

or misoriented Baseline crews generally took longer than CVCC

crews to rejoin their parent unit. Finally, Disoriented Baseline

crews occasionally linked up with adjacent elements rather than

their own.

Time to complete stage. The time required to fully execute

each stage was defined as the elapsed time from the start of the

stage to the completion of the last scripted event (submission of

a SITREP). This measure is defined under navigation due to the

large degree to which maneuver contributed to meeting end-stage

criteria. In every stage, the battalion was expected to move to

or through a given set of terrain-based battle positions or

objectives, as well as fight a tactical engagement. Given the

CVCC's automated C

3

capabilities, CVCC-equipped battalions were

expected to perform each mission more quickly than Baseline

battalions.

The data for time to complete each stage are represented

graphically in Figure 22. Stage 3 data were excluded from the

analysis due to the fact that several battalions were not able to

complete the stage. Overall, battalions using the CVCC system

took significantly less time for mission completion. The

different times between stages correspond with scripted scenario

times as indicated in the preceding discussion on the Command and

Control BOS.

N

N

U

T

E

S

80 _

70 _

60 .

50 .

40 _

30.

20 _

10.

0

73.95

67.52

52.40

41.46

CVCC

D BASELINE

STAGE 1 STAGE 2

Figure 22. Mean time to complete stage.

The faster completion times for CVCC-equipped battalions

overall are congruent with the data for time to reach LD and time

to reach the objectives (discussed earlier under the Move on

Surface hypothesis). This trend replicates previous findings

reported by Leibrecht et al. (1992).

85
Suirnnary. The greater agility and faster completion times

demonstrated by CVCC crews illustrate an advantage of the CVCC

system. Although the differences among some measures were not

significant, and do not support their hypotheses as originally

stated or intended, the results do suggest better navigation

performance in general, particularly when considered in

conjunction with the findings of previous evaluations.

Process Direct Fire Targets

Hypothesis: The CVCC units' ability to process direct fire

targets on the battlefield was expected to be significantly

better than the Baseline units'.

This hypothesis entirely relied on the performance of manned

crews. Previous CVCC and CITV evaluations demonstrated

significant performance differentials in favor of CITV-equipped

crews (Leibrecht et al., 1992; Quinkert, 1990). However, in

those prior efforts, a higher percentage of the soldierparticipants were operating in crews at the platoon level and

below, where crew gunnery performance is a critical factor. In

the battalion evaluation, all crews manned command tanks at the

company level and higher. The immediate issue of concern was

whether C

2

duties at the company and battalion echelon reduced

the potential contribution provided through the combination of

the CITV (i.e., the hunter-killer capability) and the CCD (i.e.,

shared enemy information) at the crew level. Because these

measures are concerned with crew level performance, only a

summary of findings is provided for some of these measures. A

detailed presentation and analysis of data may be found in

Leibrecht et al. (in preparation).

Overall, CVCC units acquired targets significantly sooner

and at greater ranges than did Baseline units. The times between

lases to different targets showed no discernible difference.

Times from first läse to first fire seemed to show a slight

advantage in favor of the Baseline condition. Also, CVCC units

had a higher incidence of fratricide events.

Maximum läse range. This measure was designed to quantify

the outer edge of the range envelope for detecting potential

targets. It was defined as the maximum distance a manned vehicle

lased to a potential target, per stage, excluding lasing to nonvehicles. In the CVCC condition, both GPS and CITV läse events

were eligible. Given the CITV capabilities to enhance

battlefield surveillance and target acquisition, CVCC-equipped

vehicles were expected to generate greater maximum läse ranges.

Mean maximum läse ranges are illustrated in Figure 23. Overall,

the mean ranges for CVCC-equipped vehicles were significantly

greater than those for Baseline vehicles, although the difference

between conditions all but disappears in Stage 2.

Time to acquire targets. Target acquisition time was

quantified by measuring, for each manned vehicle, the elapsed

86