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iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

DEMOCRATIZATION AND INSTABILITY IN 

UKRAINE, GEORGIA, AND BELARUS

Robert Nalbandov

June 2014

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

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public release; distribution is unlimited.

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copyrighted.
iv

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I would like to extend my sincere appreciate to the Strategic Studies Institute for supporting this project. My research on 
v

the role of political culture in institutional transformations in 

post-imperial and post-colonial societies will continue to grow. 

I would like to especially thank Dr. Korneli Kakachia, Associate Professor, Tbilisi State University; Roland Kovacs, Country 

Director in Ukraine, Pact, Inc.; Hanna Shelest, Senior Researcher 

at National Institute for Strategic Studies, Ukraine; Sergiy Shtukarin, Executive Director at Center for Political Studies, Ukraine; 

and numerous content experts from Belarus. I am greatly indebted to the organizers of the “6th Kyiv Security Forum ‘Security In 

An Unsecure World’” which I had the pleasure of attending. 

ISBN 1-58487-628-X

vii

FOREWORD

Nations democratize at a different pace: Some 

achieve high governance standards, lasting political 

stability, and robust economies; others are lingering 

in their desires to look and act like their democratic 

counterparts. While no country strictly follows similar 

patterns of democratic institutionalization, there is a 

variable that defines the rate of success of their efforts: 

their political culture. 

The empirical study by Dr. Robert Nalbandov unveils this “democratization puzzle” of incongruence 

between the levels of democracy, internal peace, and 

economic prosperity between the newly independent 

states of Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus. By investigating the political cultures of the three post-Soviet countries, Dr. Nalbandov concludes that it was the distinct 

political cultures of these states (flexible in Georgia, 

rigid in Belarus, and bifurcate in Ukraine) that produced diverse outcomes in each specific case. 

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer 

this monograph, which gives valuable insights into the 

matters of democratization in politically volatile new 

environments. The three patterns of political cultures 

identified in the monograph can be easily generalized 

and applied in most instances of new nation-building 

projects. The recommendations for the U.S. military 

and the government produced by the analysis provide 

the roadmap for short- and long-term partnerships in 

the countries of post-Soviet space.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ROBERT NALBANDOV is currently an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Utah State University 

where he teaches the courses on U.S. foreign policy 

and European and Russian politics and security. Since 

2008, he has taught at Macalester College, St. Paul, 

Minnesota; University of St. Andrews, Scotland; University of Birmingham, England; Smolny College of 

Liberal Arts, St. Petersburg University, Russia; and 

Center for Security Studies, Angelo State University, 

Texas. Dr. Nalbandov is the author of Foreign Interventions in Ethnic Conflicts (Ashgate Publishing, 2009) 

and numerous articles on international and regional 

security, counterterrorism and U.S. foreign policy. He 

is currently working on his new book entitled Russia’s New Foreign Policy (University of Nebraska Press, 

forthcoming). Dr. Nalbandov holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Central European University, 

Budapest, Hungary.

xi

SUMMARY

This manuscript analyzes the interconnections between the democratic institutionalization of the newly 

independent states using the examples of Ukraine, 

Georgia, and Belarus, their political (in)stability, and 

economic development and prosperity. By introducing the concept of regime mimicry into the field of 

public administration, the author expands the epistemological frameworks of the democratization school 

to the phenomenon of political culture. Successes and 

failures of the democratic institutionalization processes in these countries largely depend on the ways 

their institutional actors reacted to internal and external disturbances of their domestic political, economic, 

and cultural environments. While Georgia’s political 

culture revealed the highest degree of flexibility in 

accepting the externally proposed institutional frameworks and practices, the bifurcate political culture in 

Ukraine impeded its democratic institutionalization, 

while the rigid political culture in Belarus completely 

stalled the process of institutional transformations.

1

DEMOCRATIZATION AND INSTABILITY IN 

UKRAINE, GEORGIA, AND BELARUS

INTRODUCTION

In 1991, the process of liberalization of political, 

economic, and cultural settings in the post-Soviet 

countries came somewhat unexpectedly to many. After 70 years of existence under communist rule, and 

notwithstanding the wide cultural diversity of the former Soviet republics, all of them decided to take a path 

toward democratization, at least nominally. Out of the 

political systems previously tested elsewhere, all the 

former Soviet republics settled on democracy, which 

was considered the best choice possible. With the assistance of the Western democratic world, the newly 

established, but historically well-placed, nations were 

rapidly exposed to the democratic realities of politics, 

economy, and culture existing elsewhere in the form 

of democratic institutions. The choice for a democratic 

way seemed obvious: What was working “out there” 

should work here, too. Democratization enjoyed the 

overwhelming consensus among the newly independent states, not only as the evolutionary hallmark 

among the existing and empirically tested governance 

regimes, but also as the preferred choice for the newly 

created nation-states across the geographic regions. 

While the ex-Soviet republics had the same starting 

point in their newly independent existence (the end of 

Soviet rule), three countries—Georgia, Ukraine, and 

Belarus—in particular stand out with regard to the 

diverse outcomes of their democratization processes. 

Moving away from the Soviet Union was difficult, and 

the choice of democratic governance was, in a way, 

the hardest transformation the three countries had 
2

ever faced in their histories. The results in each of the 

three cases show a remarkable diversity. Georgia became the champion of public administration and economic reforms, turning it from the hotbed of Soviet 

corruption into the “beacon of democracy.” Belarus 

has been suffering for 2 decades from the authoritarian governance of its lifelong president, Alexander 

Lukashenka. Finally, Ukraine occupies somewhat of a 

middle ground with its half-stagnant democratization 

after the disillusionment from the Orange Revolution 

of 2005. 

Democracy—with the institutions of rule of law, 

free market relations, the spirit of equality, and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms—

is popularly considered the most conducive regime 

for building political stability and economic and social development. From an institutional standpoint, 

democracy, as the process of creation and interaction 

of the “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that 

are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially” by the domestic policy (the citizenry) as well 

as “through channels that are widely accepted as official,”1

 involves the synergy of formal institutions 

(free courts, transparent elections, three branches of 

power, ombudsmen’s office, etc.) as well as informal 

ones (rule of law, human rights). 

From the point of political stability and economic 

and social development, democracy, according to 

Yi Feng: 

tends to have a positive effect on economic growth 

by inhibiting extra-constitutional political change and 

favouring constitutional political change. Democracy 

provides a stable political environment, which reduces unconstitutional government change at the macro 

level; yet along with regime stability, democracy of-
3

fers flexibility and the opportunity for substantial political change within the political system.2

The reality in Georgia, Belarus, and Ukraine, however, proves different. The impact of democracy on 

these variables is quite diverse in the three countries 

in focus. Georgia, the most democratically advanced 

state, has had the worst performance concerning its 

domestic political stability. The authoritarian rule in 

Belarus is the clear case of a nondemocratic society, 

which is, surprisingly, better developed economically 

and quite stable politically than the other two countries. The situation in Ukraine displays a weak correlation between the democratization level, on the one 

hand, and political stability and economic prosperity 

on the other. 

The issue of political stability under the rapidly 

democratizing and volatile domestic environments 

is of utmost importance. Diverse outcomes of postcommunist liberalization efforts under similar starting points represent the governance puzzle for the 

democratization literature. The puzzle raises a number of questions on the reasons for and durability of 

the democratization process. What makes democracy 

such an appealing regime for post-authoritarian and 

post-colonial societies to follow? How stable is the 

process of democratic nation-building after the initial 

installation of the institutions of democratic governance? Finally, can the future of political stability in 

the target countries be predicted given their current 

level of democratization and economic development?

The governance puzzle rests upon a number of 

premises. First, it assumes the existence of causal linkages between the level of democracy and overall political stability. It is popularly viewed that the more 
4

advanced the democracy, the lower the level of internal and external political disturbances. In general, 

democracy is positively related to overall stability. 

According to Feng:

democracy will increase the probability of major regular government change, lessen the chances of irregular 

government change, and, in the long run, decrease the 

propensity for minor regular government change.3

Democracies, therefore, are more conducive to 

peaceful and systematic political change than violent sporadic transformations in their autocratic 

counterparts. 

The second part of the governance puzzle is hidden 

in the variables that influence the level of democratization and, in turn, are influenced by the latter. The 

first such variable is economic development. There 

is a commonly accepted view that more prosperous countries tend to be more democratic than their 

poorer counterparts. According to K. Lundell: 

when countries become more affluent, the prospects 

of democracy increase. Countries with a high level of 

socio-economic development tend to be democratic, 

whereas poor countries most often lack democratic 

institutions and procedures.4

Susanna Lundström believes: 

the effect of democracy on economic freedom is positive and robust, supporting the so-called compatibility view . . . [A] higher level of democracy leads to 

an increased reliance on the market as the allocation 

mechanism, and to decreased restraints on international trade.5
5

Internally, democracy is considered to offer a larger 

degree and variety of freedoms than any other governance regime, including the protection of the economic and political rights. It creates incentives via reasonable taxes and free and fair economic legislation for 

the increased turnover of goods, services, and money, 

thus cutting the costs of economic transactions. It also 

protects businesses from unbridled tyranny of bureaucrats, corrupt officials, and life-threatening environments, allowing for them to operate and flourish. 

The second variable is the third party participation, which can be critical domestic political landscapes of the target countries. This influence can be 

both aggravating and mitigating the forces existing 

on the domestic levels. External players may directly 

contribute to the economies and finances of their protégés and act as “external homelands”6

 for the ethnic 

groups residing within the borders of states in question, their “surrogate lobby-states”7

 without ethnic 

linkages, or intervene out of personal reasons in the 

existing rivalry between the political groups by skewing the local power balance towards the parties they 

support.8 Third parties thus can have a very important 

role in redirecting the course of the democratization 

events depending on their own views with regards to 

the target countries and the domestic situation per se. 

Finally, diverse political cultures of the nations 

are the very meta-variable influencing the outcomes 

of the democratization processes from the point of 

their acceptance, endurance, or rejection by the target 

societies. Political cultures bring the identity components into the democratic institutionalization equation. On a domestic level, they define the modes of 

interactions within various actors of the domestic 

institutional actors and their reactions on the internal 
6

political processes. On a broader scale, political cultures presuppose responses of the local polity to the 

external challenges and disturbances. Overall, political cultures are the necessary ingredients for defining 

the longevity of the governance regimes, in general, 

and individual rulers, in particular.

The empirical evidence from Georgia, Ukraine, 

and Belarus reveals a very interesting deviation of the 

commonly accepted patterns. Diversity between the 

levels of democratization, political stability, and economic development in Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus 

can be explained by two factors. The first explanation 

of political stability in the countries with low democracy indicators is their “authoritarian resilience.”9

 Autocratic regimes are usually more successful in stifling 

their opposition forces than democracies. On the one 

hand, it is the low degree of freedom and disregard 

for general human rights that the “autocracies” enjoy. 

The other reason for the political longevity and domestic stability of the autocracies is their strict control 

over their own public administration apparatus. The 

vertical hierarchy of governance allows authoritarian 

leaders to suppress public processes and keeps all the 

reins of power in their hands. The other side of the 

“governance puzzle” is the fact that countries with 

high levels of democratization, such as Georgia, have 

low levels of political stability. This phenomenon can 

be explained by the highly volatile domestic environment and presence of interest groups, which do not 

abide by the common rules of political engagement.

The connection between the levels of democracy 

and economic and social development in the three 

countries also seems to refute the ascribed power of 

democratic governance. The example of Georgia as 

having the lowest economic and social development 
7

indicators, as opposed to Belarus, which is on the 

other end of the developmental spectrum, shows that 

seemingly causal links between these two variables 

mostly belong to the theoretical field. Even in autocracies, there can be well-established and affluent middle 

and upper-middle classes that are more interested in 

keeping their wealth than in political freedoms. Likewise, hectic political domains prevent proper economic development and hinder social progress between 

the institutional actors: citizens, their organized societal groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 

mass media, and the institutions of governance. 

In order to test the governance puzzle and see 

whether democracy plays the assumed important role 

in the matter of political stability and socio-economic 

development, two working hypotheses will be tested. 

The first one, the null hypothesis, postulates a reverse 

relation between democracy as the independent variable and political stability as the dependent variable. 

According to such a pessimistic vision, in newly democratizing societies, democracy is unable to prevent 

internal disturbances and external pressure or foster 

economic development. The second hypothesis engages in deeper exploration of the “democracy-stability-development” nexus by bringing in two intervening variables—economic development and political 

culture—and viewing them as being influenced by the 

factors of “authoritarian resilience” and “third-party 

interest”—to examine political stability from internal 

and external perspectives. 

The authoritarian resilience of the ruling elite, 

which manages to coerce successfully the domestic 

institutional actors and to dissuade them from seeking political freedoms, presents the internal side of 

political stability. The assumption behind this factor 
postulates that, in the absence of authoritarian resilience, countries with unstable political cultures tend 

to display higher levels of political volatility and unrelenting rivalry between domestic institutional actors. 

The second variable investigates the external side of 

political stability by bringing in third-party factors. 

The assumption of this variable is that external actors 

can support/hinder the domestic political stability of 

the target countries by contributing to or decreasing 

the durability of the existing governance regimes, and 

providing for or lessening the financial well-being of 

their populations. The ultimate and much broader issue here is whether it is possible to credibly predict 

the internal political developments in newly established nations based on the examples of these three 

post-Soviet countries.

DEMOCRATIZATION/POLITICAL STABILITY/

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 

Among all the governance regimes, democracies 

enjoy the closest synergy of efficiency and legitimacy 

because they offer the widest possible mechanisms for 

public participation in the evaluation of these qualities. Political stability, one of the main tasks of any 

governance regime, is widely viewed as: 

the capacity of a country to withstand internal and external shocks or crises.10 Internally, stability is created 

by “members of society restrict[ing] themselves to the 

behavior patterns that fall within the limits imposed 

by political role expectations. Any act that deviates 

from these limits is an instance of political instability.11

8
9

Internal political stability embraces the wide array of 

interactions between institutional actors. Internal political stability keeps countries’ integrity and prevents 

them from falling apart under the weight of domestic 

disturbances. External stability helps them resist economic, political, or military pressure from abroad. If 

chronic and unresolved, internal instability can lead to 

the failure of governments to satisfy the basic needs of 

their populations, which will eventually lead to their 

failure. Such failed states, or “cadaverous states,” as 

Ahmed Samatar calls them,12 with practically no civil 

life, no “central, regional, or local administrations 

. . . [no] public utility services, no electricity, no communications, no health services, [and] no schools,”13

have no visible prospects for peace. From this point 

of view, political stability means “the degree to which 

political institutions are sufficiently stable to support 

the needs of [their] citizens, businesses, and overseas 

investors,”14 as defined by the Global Peace Index. 

Ideally, internal stability should mean peaceful responses to institutionalized succession of powers via 

the planned long-term and peaceful change of political leadership through constitutional means without 

resorting to violence and adjustment policies. In its 

most developed form, it is the ability of a political 

system to ensure the functioning of its institutional 

structures of power (the interaction of the branches 

of government and their agencies), as defined in the 

constitution of the political model. In this ideal model, 

conflicts among the actors are resolved within the 

countries’ constitutions and are not accompanied by 

the revision of powers of political institutions on the 

basis of illegal factors, such as the dictate of a political leader, the use of direct force of pressure, or threat 

of illegitimate use of force. Externally, such a model 
10

would prevent any foreign control over domestic affairs, including direct management from abroad or 

indirect interventions. This essentially means the absence of any significant influence of extra-systemic political agents that can dramatically change the political 

landscape in the country.

Democracy and Political Stability.

For governance regimes to be successful and sustainable with regards to internal and external political 

stability and economic and social development, two 

qualities are necessary, according to Seymour Martin 

Lipset: effectiveness and legitimacy. By effectiveness, 

Lipset means: 

the actual performance of a political system, the extent 

to which it satisfies the basic function of government 

as defined by the expectations of most of members of 

a society, and the expectations of powerful groups 

within it which might threaten the system. . . . 15

Legitimacy in this context is the “capacity of a political 

system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or 

proper ones for the society.”16 Jack Goldstone capitalizes on Lipset’s model and argues: 

Effectiveness reflects how well the state carries out 

state functions such as providing security, promoting 

economic growth, making law and policy, and delivering social services. Legitimacy reflects whether state 

actions are perceived by elites and the population 

as ‘just’ or ‘reasonable’ in terms of prevailing social 

norms.17
11

The combined legitimacy and effectiveness of governance is a prerequisite for political stability in most 

societies, regardless of their governance regimes. The 

difference is in the sources of internal and external 

stability. In democratic societies, internal political stability is based on “the rule of law, strong institutions 

rather than powerful individuals, a responsive and 

efficient bureaucracy, low corruption, and a business 

climate that is conducive to investment.”18

These democratic institutions serve a dual purpose: They cut the transaction costs for its actors (citizens) and, at the same time, limit the options available 

for them. The first task is achieved by offering greater 

opportunities for self-expression and active participation in the decisions vital for their communities and 

countries. Citizens would have fewer reasons to revolt 

against their governments if they felt they received 

due protection concerning law and order. The effectiveness of democratic governance spreads over the 

majority of the institutional actors; legitimacy is created via the free and fair expression of their choice. Fulfillment of the second task is more complicated. Feng 

assumes that the more developed the democracy, the 

lower the level of internal political disturbances, thus: 

democracy will increase the probability of major regular government change, lessen the chances of irregular 

government change, and, in the long run, decrease the 

propensity for minor regular government change.19

This means that the institutional arrangements in 

place limit the changes for sporadic political activity 

while increasing the steady flows of political processes based on effective dialogues between governments 

and their citizens. 
12

External political stability is created through peaceful interactions between the governments in question 

and foreign actors. Unstable countries attract parochial interests of their immediate and distant neighboring states that are trying to capitalize on inefficient 

governance, internal violence, and low levels of law 

and order. Paul Collier holds that the lack of internal 

stability imposes significant costs on the regional stability because the “neighbourhood spill-overs give 

the foreign actors ‘reasonable claim to the right of 

intervention in order to reduce them’.”20 External political stability is also desirable “because it provides 

external players with the advantage of dealing with a 

government whose actions are predictable,”21 which 

contributes to the political, economic, and social developments of the nations in question.

Durability of internal and external political stability is closely related to the notion of a “social contract.” First appearing in the trial of Socrates,22 “social 

contract” is a mode of citizen/government interaction, essentially between the citizens themselves and 

the government, which acts as an external arbiter and 

guardian of domestic stability. In this line of reasoning, John Locke views the political power as: 

a right of making laws with penalties of death, and 

consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and 

preserving of property, and of employing the force of 

the community, in the execution of such laws, and in 

the defence of the common-wealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good.23

An interesting aspect of any social contract is that 

it can exist under both autocratic and democratic regimes. The difference between the democratic and 

authoritarian social contract is its durability and the 
13

fulfillment of the “public good” obligation of the 

governments. 

Longevity of the social contract ultimately defines 

the durability of the governance regime. This view on 

stability fulfills Lipset’s requirement for the legitimacy of state, where “groups will regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way 

in which its values fit in with their primary values,”24

and Aaron Wildavski’s political socialization, where 

“shared values [are] legitimating social practices.”25

These views on political stability include both prerequisites: internal (the societal “fit” and legitimacy) and 

external (the recognition of the international community). Problems in providing these prerequisites by the 

governments are referred to, by Charles Call, as the 

“internal” and “external” legitimacy gaps “where a 

significant portion of its political elites and society reject the rules regulating the exercise of power and the 

accumulation and distribution of wealth” and “when 

other states fail to recognize or accept its borders or its 

internal regime,”26 respectively. 

Historically, political stability depended on the 

will of the ruling autocrat. Under the monarchic autocratic rule of medieval Europe, people were deprived 

of security, rendering their everyday lives extremely 

unstable. In the jungle of human interactions populated by “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish” men, the Law 

of Nature dictated the “warre of every men against 

every men.”27 Internal political stability in monarchies 

rested upon the fear of their subjects for their lives in 

the omnipresent anarchy and uncertainty of the realities and their trust of the benevolence of the rulers 

who governed upon their sole discretion without any 

notion of public accountability. Similar to as it was 

in medieval Europe, social contract is also present in 
14

modern autocracies around the globe, but there, according to Vital Silitski, it: 

is asymmetrical in its nature. . . . [T]he state proposes 

the social contract in order to nip public discontent 

in the bud, without resorting to excessive punitive 

actions. . . . The asymmetrical nature of the social 

contract is caused by the inability of social groups 

to self-organize and elaborate horizontal contractual 

agreements.28

The key variable that differentiates democratic social 

contract from the autocratic one is the source of power. 

Whereas in democracies the power vested upon governments comes from their subjects, in autocracies: 

it is the state, and not civil society, that sets the framework of the consensus by offering material and nonmaterial benefits in exchange for citizens’ loyalty.29

Autocracies have different paths to political stability through the social contracts. The durability of 

those contracts is achieved by their “authoritarian 

resilience,”30 i.e., the tenaciousness of leaders to stay 

in power by providing for the basic needs of most of 

their subjects and effective mechanisms of coercion. 

In most cases, the authoritarian resilience is based on 

two pillars: coercion of the population and providing 

them with limited benefits. The fruits of the effectiveness of governance are offered to limited groups of 

elite individuals (usually power actors and oligarchs) 

closely affiliated with the ruling autocrats, creating the 

unique rational choice-based societal “fit”: the more 

benefits these groups receive from the governance, the 

“fitter” and more legitimate would be the regime. 
15

Similar to democracies, autocracies provide benefits to the rest of the population; however, while in 

democracy:

citizens both decide the size of government and have 

a right to the fiscal residuum, [in] autocracy . . . the 

state apparatus both decides the size of government 

and can appropriate the fiscal residuum.31

Due to the limits established by autocracies on civil 

participation in the political and economic lives of 

their countries, the benefits are provided to a much 

narrower extent. Autocracies aim at satisfying the 

basic needs of larger populations while keeping the 

better and, ultimately, lavish lifestyles of the “close 

circles,” allowing them to enjoy disproportionally 

larger benefits. That is why the middle-class layers 

in these societies are extremely thin. The individuals 

from the privileged groups, on the other hand, enjoy 

free and flexible interpretation of both the letter and 

the spirit of the law, including economic legislation, 

and receive preferential treatment by the institutions 

of governance—all of which falls under the umbrella 

of “corruption.”

The societal “fit” within the groups deprived of 

the benefits depends entirely on the effectiveness of 

coercion. The stronger the punitive mechanism of 

governance, in other words, the more “resilient” the 

regime is, the “fitter” it feels within the society. Autocracies use the government apparatus, commonly 

referred to in post-Soviet societies as “the administrative resources,” to limit the freedoms of their citizens 

and to disregard general human rights. Use of law 

and order as punitive mechanisms coerces subjects to 

the point where any expression of free will is punitive 
16

by definition. In comparison, durability of the social 

contracts for democracies depends on the constant 

dialogue between the government and the electorate, 

which is accomplished through wide civil participation in the institutional frameworks offered by democracies. Kant considered republican governance, i.e., 

government elected by people, as the most viable basis for building long-lasting peaceful relations within 

and between nations. He believed that what makes 

democracy unique is that: 

First, it accords with the principles of freedom of the 

members of a society (as men), second, it accords with 

the principles of dependence of everyone on a single 

common [source of legislation] (as subjects), and, 

third, it accords with the law of the equality of them 

all (as citizens) [emphasis provided].32

Effective fulfillment of the Kantian trinity leads to the 

“republican government,” or democracy, which decreases structural conflicts within societies and among 

them based on people’s conscious decisions to prosper rather than conflict. 

In modern times, Kantian ideas were further 

elaborated by John R. Oneal. and Bruce Russett to 

fill the requirements of modern political realities. 

The “Democratic Peace Theory,”33 heavily based on 

Kantian views of republican constitutions, economic 

freedoms, and world governance, used a three-prong 

approach to political stability: democratically elected 

governments; increased role of intergovernmental 

organizations (IGOs), such as institutions offering 

nonconflictual means of communications between the 

states; and the complex economic interdependence 

that ties the countries together in the mutually beneficial knots of trade and fiscal exchange. The result of 
17

the interplay of these factors is that democracies are 

positively correlated with political stability since the 

two democracies would rather cooperate than fight. 

Democracy is an evolutionary better suitable form 

for achieving domestic and international political stability on the basis of Kantian arrangements developed 

by citizens and vested upon their governments. In democracies, social contracts are concluded between the 

people and safeguarded by their elected governments, 

who are held constantly accountable to their electorate for proper fulfillment of the terms of the contract, 

i.e., their election promises. Politics in democracies 

also depend on the “resilience” of the regime, but in 

this case, the resilience is “democratic,” based on the 

willingness and ability of its citizens to participate 

in the political processes and, similar to autocracies, 

the benefits offered to them by their democratically 

elected government. Coercion is, by definition, absent 

in democratic resilience and the effectiveness of the 

regime is nondiscriminatory. 

Democracy and Economic Development. 

A very significant aspect of the democratic governance is its link with economic development and 

prosperity and, ultimately, peace. This link has been 

enshrined in Preliminary Article 4 of the Kantian Perpetual Peace as one of the preconditions for peaceful relations among the nations on the international 

arena: “National debts shall not be contracted with 

a view to the external friction of states.”34 However, 

what might be obvious, at first—that democracy is 

good for economic development—would appear to 

be a much more complicated interaction, if closely 

examined. Democracy may, indeed, be considered 
18

to have a positive effect on economic development, a 

significant part of which is the respect for individual 

property rights and free market relations. The major 

assumption in political economic literature is that democracies, with their strong power actors in the form 

of businesses free from state control and independent 

trade units, are closely related to Smithsonian “laissez 

faire”35 approaches, whereas autocracies, with their 

strict control over monetary flows and investments 

via referential elitist politics, are more restrictive in 

market relations.

The connection between democracy and economic 

development is double-sided. On the one hand, it is 

commonly assumed that: 

the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances 

that it will sustain democracy . . . [O]nly in a wealthy 

society in which relatively few citizens lived in real 

poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of 

the population could intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary 

to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible 

demagogies.36

Krister Lundell also supports the idea of democracy 

being conducive to economic development: 

When countries become more affluent, the prospects 

of democracy increase. Countries with a high level of 

socio-economic development tend to be democratic, 

whereas poor countries most often lack democratic 

institutions and procedures.37

The middle classes represent the sources for support for democracies because the latter provide the 

benefits for the considerably wider circles of stakeholders than the autocracies. Societies that can af-
19

ford wealthy middle classes are, thus, more inclined 

to uphold the social contracts with their democratically elected governments than autocracies since they 

have more assets to lose than the oppressed lowerincome societies, e.g., free market relations and selfexpression.

The opposite interpretation of the nature of the 

link between democracy and economic development 

is that the former promotes the latter. Milton Friedman argues that the more democratic the societies are, 

the more political and economic rights they offer to 

their populations.38 According to Feng, democracies, 

together with: 

the existence and exercise of fundamental civil liberties and political rights, generate the social conditions most conducive to economic development. Political and economic freedom enhances property rights 

and market competition, thus promoting economic 

growth.39

Democratically elected governments are more accountable to their citizenry than autocracies, which 

are based on unchecked, unrestrained, and uncontrolled powers of the absolutist regimes. Citizens can 

use impartial and transparent democratic institutions, 

such as courts and law and order agencies, to obtain 

support for their economic activities and to seek remedies in case of violation of their rights, including economic rights. Under the autocracies, these institutions 

resembling their democratic counterparts may exist as 

well, but they would have only nominal roles. The real 

interaction between governments and citizens in autocracies happens via other institutional mechanisms, 

for example, institutionalized corruption. The citizens 

enjoy selective rights and receive preferential treat-
20

ment depending on the distance to the ruling elites: 

the closer they are with those in power, the more they 

benefit from freedoms, including economic freedoms.

Yet the third, somewhat counterintuitive, view is 

that democracy is detrimental for economic development. Here, again, market arrangements and property rights come into play. As Adam Przeworski and 

Fernando Limongi note: 

The main mechanisms by which democracy is thought 

to hinder growth are pressures for immediate consumption, which reduce investment. Only states that 

are institutionally insulated from such pressures can 

resist them, and democratic states are not.40

Democracy facilitates consumerist society, which 

craves for exceedingly more wealth than is available 

at the expense of capital investments. The same authors conclude:

[D]emocracy generates an explosion of demands for 

current consumption. These demands, in turn, threaten profits; hence, they reduce investment and retard 

growth. Democracy is thus inimical to economic 

development.41

In laissez faire societies where the governments 

have little, if any, control over market relations, fiscal 

bubbles are frequent. Crises of financial overextension 

and fiscal overexpansion lead to unchecked and uncontrolled information provided to the market actors. 

The statistic analysis of Edward Mansfield et al. 

explains this phenomenon of the separation of the 

branches of government and the checks and balances 

existing between them. According to their research: 
21

Having a legislature that ratifies the chief executive’s 

trade proposals may create a credible threat that allows executives in democracies to arrive at freer trade 

outcomes than would otherwise occur. The possible 

veto of a trade deal by one or both legislatures in the 

dyad may lead the executives to search for lower mutually acceptable levels of trade barriers. This, in turn, 

may explain why pairs of democracies are better able 

to lower their trade barriers than mixed pairs.42

In this view, too much openness of democracies to 

the globalization processes and their overdependence 

on each other lead to the negative domino effects. 

Autocracies, on the other hand, tend to trade with 

a limited number of like-minded states, hence the low 

potential of global financial disturbances caused by 

them. Together with the limited trade and economic 

privileges of minority societal groups, autocracies, 

paradoxically, can bring economic growth. According to Przeworski and Limongi, “‘[S]tate autonomy’ 

favors growth, and ‘state autonomy’ is possible only 

under authoritarianism.”43 The main idea here is that 

the notion of state autonomy positively correlates 

with performance of domestic economies. This is the 

opposite side of laissez-faire, a sort of Keynesian vision 

on economy44 as influenced by governance regimes. 

The more the government is involved in regulating 

market relations, the more it is able to prevent situations similar to fiscal bubbles from happening by its 

regulatory actions. A typical institutional example of 

the “command-and-control” economy was the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics (USSR), the only body representing Soviet 

industries in external interactions. Such governing 

from above is, obviously, negative from the point of 
22

view of limiting the freedoms of the market actors but, 

at the same time, a command-and-control economy 

provides protection to the businesses in case of negative external influences. 

DEMOCRATIZATION IN NUMBERS

Interplay between the variables of democratization, political stability, and economic and social development in Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus is reflected 

in the data collected on these countries by a number 

of international organizations, research institutions, 

and think tanks. The figures in this section include the 

meta-indicators studied for the three countries: level 

of democratization, political stability, and economic/

social development. Each of these meta-indicators includes multiple parameters that are jointly required 

for presentation of the holistic explanation of the two 

working hypotheses. The results of numerous statistical indicators mostly support the null hypothesis on 

the inability of democracy to prevent internal disturbances and foster economic and social development in 

Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The data also confirms 

the positive hypothesis on the favorable influence of 

authoritarian resilience and third-party support in 

keeping internal and external political stability and 

contributing to the financial and social well-being of 

their populations. 

Democratization.

The indicators put together in the “Democratization” category comprise general human rights and 

fundamental freedoms, as well as quality of governmental performance, including the degrees of effi-
23

ciency and corruption. The annual report of Freedom 

House, Freedom in the World 2013, named Georgia and 

Ukraine as both “partially free” while Belarus as a 

“not free” country. By comparison, a “free country” 

is one with “open political competition, a climate of 

respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic 

life, and independent media.”45 The Polity IV dataset 

gave similar rankings: Georgia and Ukraine received 

polity scores (combined scores of institutionalized democracy and institutionalized autocracy) of 6 while 

Belarus was given a polity score of -7.46

By the majority of other parameters, Georgia is on 

top of the democracy scale. According to the Press Freedom Index, Georgia offers the best conditions for journalists to express their opinions (rank 100), followed 

by Ukraine (126) and Belarus (157).47 The Worldwide 

Governance Indicators48 presented by D. Kaufmann 

and M. Mastruzzi offer additional valuable insights 

into the understanding of the level of democratization 

of the three countries. The survey includes the following six indicators: Voice and Accountability, Political 

Stability/Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, 

and Control of Corruption. One of the most important 

indicators is “voice and accountability,” which is the 

ability of citizens “to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom 

of association, and a free media.”49 In this category, 

Ukraine has the highest ranking (44.1—a rounded percentile rank among all countries; ranges from 0 [lowest] to 100 [highest] very closely followed by Georgia 

[42.7]). On the contrary, Belarus offers the fewest opportunities for its citizens to express their views (7.1). 

However, by their performance in the “Political Stability” category, Belarus and Ukraine are practically 

close, with ranks of 41 and 42, respectively. 
24

The least politically stable country, according to 

this survey, is Georgia, with the rank of 24.5. Paradoxically, the most effective governance is in Georgia (64.1)—in fact, it is five times more effective than 

in Belarus (12), and almost three times more than in 

Ukraine (24.9). Also, Georgia has the highest “Rule of 

Law” environment (48.8), while Belarus has the lowest capacity (14.7), with Ukraine being in between 

(25.1). The “Regulatory Quality” of the government is 

also the best in Georgia (70.8), which is almost twice as 

high as in Ukraine (32.5), and more than seven times 

higher than in Belarus (9.6). 

Finally, the “Corruption” variable is of immense 

importance in understanding the dynamics of democratization. By the Worldwide Governance Indicators, 

Georgia is a champion of the “Control of Corruption” 

with a rank of 54.1, while Ukraine is the most corrupt 

country (17.2), and Belarus is in the middle (23). It 

is notable that the poll conducted by the Razumkov 

Center on corruption perception named the political 

sphere, the state, and the judiciary as the most corrupt out of all sectors of governance in Ukraine.50 The 

Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 

2012 named Georgia as the least corrupt country of 

the three with a rating of 51, followed by Belarus (123), 

and Ukraine as the most corrupt country (144). 

Another dataset, the World Development Indicators 2010, holds Georgia as the least corrupt of the 

three studied (by the percentage of firms offering informal payments to the public officials), with only 14.7 

percent of companies paying bribes, and Ukraine as 

the most corrupt country with one third of the bribegivers, with Belarus somewhat in between (26.1 percent). Finally, public perceptions on corruption also 

matter in the democratization processes. The Global 
25

Corruption Barometer 2010/201151 holds three indicators in the study of public opinion in this particular 

aspect: perception of change, perception of most corrupt institutions, and perceptions of governments’ anti-corruption efficiency. According to the Barometer, 

78 percent of the respondents from Georgia believe 

that corruption decreased over the past 3 years, while 

most of respondents from Ukraine (63 percent) consider that corruption has not changed, and one-third 

feel that it has even increased. Lastly, 49 percent of 

the respondents in Belarus feel no change in the level 

of corruption. 

Economic and Social Development.

Due to the significant differences in the countries’ 

sizes and economic potentials, the data given in this 

section will focus on the per capita economic and social developmental parameters instead of giving crosscountry comparisons in the levels of gross domestic 

products (GDPs) and the comparative aggregate economic growth. Overall, Belarus has the highest indicators of economic and social development, while Georgia, by many datasets, is the least developed, of the 

three countries, economically and socially. According 

to the World Development Indicators 2010,52 gross national income (GNI) per capita in Belarus in 2010 was 

$5,950, with an overall GNI rank of 104. Belarus also 

has the lowest child mortality rates (17 per 1,000 live 

births in 1990 and only 6 in 2010), and the lowest maternal mortality ratio modeled estimate (15 per 100,000 

live births in 2008). In addition, only 5.4 percent of the 

population of Belarus live below the national poverty 

line (national level in 2009), and the country has the 

best income or consumption distribution, i.e., the low-
26

est 20 percent of the population possesses 9.2 percent 

of income distribution, while the highest 20 percent 

has 36.4 percent of income. 

Notwithstanding the highest indicators of democracy, Georgia has had remarkably low economic and 

social performance over the years since its independence. The GNI per capita of the Georgian population 

in 2010 was only $2,690, with an overall GNI rank of 

145. It is notable that Georgia has the highest child mortality rates among the three countries: 47 per 1,000 live 

births during the last year of the Soviet Union and 22 

in 2010, with the worst maternal mortality ratio modeled estimate: 48 per 100,000 live births in 2008. Out of 

the three countries studied, Georgia has skyrocketing 

numbers of citizens living below the national poverty 

line at 24.7 percent (national level in 2009), and the 

worst income or consumption distribution: the lowest 

20 percent of the population possesses 5.3 percent of 

income distribution, while the highest 20 percent has 

47.2 percent of income distribution. The last figures 

are the indicators of the growing disproportionality 

between the wealthiest and the poorest layers of the 

population. This is, in itself, a barometer for worsening internal political stability, since large social disparities can lead to mass protests and political unrest. 

Ukraine occupies a somewhat middle ground 

among the three countries with regards to its economic and social performance. The Ukrainian GNI 

per capita in 2010 was $3,000—in between Belarus and 

Georgia—with an overall GNI rank of 136. The child 

mortality rates in Ukraine are also at midpoint: 21 per 

1,000 live births in 1990 and 13 in 2010. The same situation can be found with the maternal mortality ratio 

modeled estimate: 26 per 100,000 live births in 2008. 

At the same time, Ukraine has the lowest percentage 
27

of citizens living below the national poverty line at 2.9 

percent (national level in 2008), and the best income 

or consumption distribution: the lowest 20 percent of 

the population possesses 9.7 percent of income distribution, while the highest 20 percent has 36.3 percent 

of the income. The indicators are slightly higher than 

those for Belarus. 

The three countries also differ significantly with 

regard to their investment climates, the facilitation 

of conducting businesses for the domestic and foreign entrepreneurs, as well as the overall dependency 

of foreign aid. The Heritage Foundation has ranked 

Ukraine the lowest among the three countries (161) 

and Georgia the highest (21), with Belarus being 

quite close to Ukraine (154)53 in its Index of Economic 

Freedoms. According to the World Development Indicators, Georgia also has the least amount of foreign 

direct investments (FDIs)—$1.1 billion, surpassed by 

Belarus with its $4 billion and Ukraine with the highest FDIs at $7.2 billion. 

Additional valuable inputs in understanding the 

domestic economic settings are contained in the data 

of the International Financial Corporation (IFC). The 

gap between the three countries with respect to doing 

business, protecting foreign investments and the dependence on foreign aid is quite striking. According 

to the IFC, the easiest country to do business with is 

Georgia (rank 9) while the most difficult is Ukraine 

(rank 137). Of the three countries, Georgia (rank 4) 

protects its investors the best. Ukraine, again, offers 

the least protection for foreign financial interests (rank 

21).54 Here, Belarus also occupies the middle grounds 

by these indicators. The IFC has given Georgia the 

highest indicators in the region of Eastern Europe and 

Central Asia, while Ukraine is the third from the bot-
28

tom. Finally, Georgia depends the most upon foreign 

aid: it has 5.5 percent of the GINI Index of the foreign 

aid dependency ratio, whereas Ukraine and Belarus 

depend the least, with 0.3 percent and 0.5 percent, 

respectively. The high numbers of the population 

living off the support of the donor organizations in 

Georgia can be explained, among other factors, by two 

civil conflicts with the Abkhazian and South Ossetian 

secessionist regions starting from 1992, which led to 

about 280,000 internally displaced persons by 2012.55

Finally, participation of the countries in the globalization processes brings valuable insights about 

their economic and social development. The increased 

involvement in globalization may be a positive indicator for their overall market liberalization and favorable investment climate. From this point of view, 

the KOF Index of Globalization 2012,

56 produced by the 

Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, focuses on the 

economic, social, and political openness of the countries. The Index considers “economic globalization” as 

the combined indicator of actual monetary flows and 

restrictions. According to these parameters, the country most open to economic globalization is Georgia 

(rank 29) and the least open one is Belarus (rank 117), 

with Ukraine occupying the middle position (rank 61). 

“Social globalization” is considered as the sum of personal contacts (between the citizens of the countries in 

question and the rest of the world), information flows, 

and cultural proximity. According to this indicator, the 

most socially globalized country is Belarus (rank 60), 

followed by Ukraine (rank 69) and Georgia (rank 88). 

One of the reasons for such high social globalization 

of Belarus, notwithstanding its relative isolation from 

most of the outside world, is its considerably high integration into Russian economic and social networks. 
29

Strong personal and family links between Belarusian 

and Russian populations, together with the Union 

State of Russia and Belarus, an entity with common 

political, economic, military, custom, currency, legal, 

humanitarian, and cultural space, trampolined Belarus to the most socially globalized country out of the 

three. Another explanation lies in the fact of frequent 

shopping trips of the Belarusians to the neighboring 

countries of the European Union (EU). As Alexander Lukashenka himself complained, Belarusians are 

spending $3 billion each year in their lucrative shopping in the EU. In the first half of 2013, there were over 

3.8 million foreign trips registered to the EU, with the 

total population of Belarus of 9.5 million.57

Political Stability.

Most of the datasets prepared by the research institutions and public opinion polls named Georgia as the 

least stable internally (durability of state institutions 

to withstand internal disturbances) and externally 

(durability of state institutions to withstand external 

pressure). Belarus and Ukraine are significantly more 

stable by various parameters. The Failed States Index 

2013 developed annually by the Fund For Peace views 

the political stability through the prisms of three categories of variables: cultural (demographic pressure, 

refugees, group grievance, and human flight), economic (uneven development, poverty, and economic 

decline), and political (legitimacy of the state, political services, human rights, security apparatus, factorized elites, and external intervention).58 In these combined categories, Georgia is ranked 51 of most failed 

states in the world, with the worst performance being 

in “group grievances,” “state legitimacy,” and “fac-
30

tionalized elites.” From the point of view of external 

stability, the war with Russia pushed Georgia down 

to the rank of the 33rd most failed state in 2008. The 

least failed state is Ukraine, ranked 177, followed by 

Belarus (rank 81). A similar dataset, the State Fragility 

Index, developed in 2011 by Monty Marshall and Benjamin Cole, focuses on the combination of governance 

effectiveness and legitimacy parameters. The Index 

named Belarus as the most politically stable out of the 

three countries (rank 4) and Georgia as the least stable 

(rank 8).59

The civil wars Georgia suffered from represent the 

significant factor in decreasing the internal political 

stability of the country. According to Eurostat 2012, in 

2010, Georgia was ranked 10 out of non-EU countries 

by the number of asylum seekers in the EU memberstates.60 Furthermore, in 2011, the World Prison Population List noted Georgia as having one of the highest 

prison populations per capita in the world (547 per 

100,000). The same list noted Ukraine as having the 

lowest numbers of prisoners (338 per 100,000), with 

Belarus occupying the middle position out of the 

countries (381 prisoners per 100,000).61

Much along the same lines, the 2013 Global Peace 

Index of the Institute of Economics and Peace, which 

includes multiple indicators for internal and external 

political stability, identified Georgia as the least peaceful country among the three studied here, ranking it 

139. This is largely due to the war with Russia in 2008 

and the continuous domestic rivalry between its multiple political forces. The best peace score (rank 96) 

was given to Belarus, while Ukraine was ranked 111. 

The Index explains the high stability score of Belarus by the phenomenon of “authoritarian resilience”: 

strong centralized authority limiting any political and 
31

economic freedoms while suppressing the level of 

criminality, which is a visibly positive development. 

According to the Index, Belarus managed to suppress 

“[a]n independent class of wealthy businessmen able 

to exert a strong political influence. . . keeping corruption at lower levels than in neighbouring Russia and 

Ukraine.”62 Belarus also keeps a considerably high ratio of “internal security forces to population,” which 

augments the authoritative resilience of its president 

by making the expression of free will a punishable 

venture. In Ukraine: 

[t]he main factors behind the decline in peacefulness 

. . . were a rise in perception of criminality under the 

presidency of Viktor Yanukovych . . . alongside a 

worsening of relations with an important neighbour, 

Russia.63

These two aspects negatively affected the ability of 

Ukraine to move up the peace ladder, which still put it 

high above Georgia with its unresolved conflicts. 

The Political Stability Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit offers another look into the matter of internal durability of the governance regimes. The Index 

views political stability as “the level of threat posed 

to governments by social protest.” The Index includes 

multiple variables that can be grouped, similarly to 

the Failed States Index, into political (history of post-independence and political instability, corruption, institutional trust, external political environment, regime 

types, and functionalism), economic (inequality, labor 

unrest, income growth, unemployment, and GDP per 

capita), and cultural (ethnic fragmentation, situation 

with minorities, and social provision). In 2009-10, according to the Index, the most politically stable country that thwarted public protests successfully was 
32

Belarus (rank 124), while the most politically unstable 

one was Ukraine (rank 16) followed by Georgia (rank 

73).64 This is somewhat a deviation from the common 

pattern, which kept Georgia at the bottom of political 

stability. The Worldwide Governance Indicators produced by Kaufmann et al.

65 also name Belarus as the 

most politically stable (rank 41) country, and Georgia as having the lowest political stability (rank 24.5). 

At the same time, Georgia has the highest indicator 

for the regulatory quality (rank 70.8), government 

effectiveness (rank 64.1), and control of corruption 

(rank 54.1). 

The level of participation of the countries in globalization can also be a measure of their external 

political stability. If a country is included in the processes of globalized economies, has wider political 

participation, and enjoys a higher level of social and 

cultural interactions, the more liberal and politically 

stable it will become. In addition to the economic and 

social globalization discussed previously, the KOF’s 

Index of Globalization includes a third category, “political globalization.” Political globalization is defined as 

the availability of foreign embassies and globalization 

inputs of the countries in question, such as memberships in international organizations, participation in 

the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s missions, 

and membership in international treaties.66 In this category, the most politically globalized country of the 

trio is Ukraine (rank 43), with Georgia and Belarus 

having somewhat closer standings: rank 139 and rank 

145, respectively. 

The high rank of Ukraine can be explained by its 

economic globalization via participating in the gas 

transit from Russia to Europe and family links with 

the large Ukrainian diaspora, mostly in Russia, but 
33

also slowly growing in the European countries and 

North America. The low ranking of Georgia and Belarus in the political globalization category can be explained by different reasons. Georgia’s global political 

participation was somewhat stalled by its long-term 

domestic political turbulence, including the civil wars 

of 1992, 1992–94, and the recent war with Russia in 

2008. The low standings of Belarus in political globalization, notwithstanding its strong economic and cultural performance in the form of economic remittances 

from and family links with Russia as well as frequent 

travels abroad, are due to the general closeness of its 

political environment, a vivid indicator of which is the 

ongoing disputes with Europe and the United States 

over human rights and political discrimination issues 

in Belarus, including the expulsion of ambassadors by 

Lukashenka.67

Does Public Opinion Matter? 

With the purpose of further exploring the democracy/stability/development nexus in Ukraine, 

Georgia, and Belarus, a questionnaire was distributed 

among the social networks (country-specific groups in 

Facebook and LinkedIn as well as various University 

alumni networks) to study the opinion and views of 

citizens of these countries concerning the three variables of the current study. The poll included 27 questions split into three sections: Citizenship, Law, and 

Rights; Representative and Accountable Government; 

and Civil Society and Popular Participation. The questions were borrowed from and based on the Democracy Assessment Guide of the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance68 and the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID) Guide to Rule 
34

of Law.

69 The response levels to the questionnaire in 

these three countries are characteristic of the high levels of political activity of domestic policy in some and 

the chronic apathy in others: 157 people participated 

in the questionnaire in Georgia, 64 in Ukraine, and 

only 13 in Belarus. 

Citizenship, Law and Rights.

Almost half of the Ukrainian respondents think 

that the rule of law is not provided throughout the 

country, whereas 44 percent are neutral on this question. The responses among the Belarusian pool are 

practically the same: 54 percent believe that the rule of 

law is not effective, and only 18 percent consider that 

the level of the rule of law is acceptable. Of Georgian 

respondents, 28 percent gave positive answers to this 

question, while 57 percent are on the middle ground. 

An overwhelming majority of the respondents in 

Ukraine (78 percent) and Belarus (64 percent) do not 

consider their country to have an effective separation 

of the branches of government, including independence of the courts from judiciary and executive powers. The answers among Georgian participants were 

split between those who are of a neutral opinion on 

this matter (43 percent) and those who do not consider the branches to be independent from each other 

(41 percent). 

Only 1.6 percent of the respondents in Ukraine 

have confidence in the legal system of their country to 

deliver fair and effective justice, while most of them 

(73 percent) think that the legal system is not effective. 

In Belarus, the situation is different: 27 percent of participants trust their legal system, whereas 27 percent 

and 18 percent have low and the lowest trust, with an 
35

additional 27 percent occupying the middle position 

on this question. The numbers of those who trust and 

mistrust the legal system in Georgia are almost equal: 

24 percent and 27 percent, respectively, with 48 percent having the middle opinion. 

About half of the Ukrainian respondents think that 

the situation with democracy and human rights is bad 

or very bad (25 percent, respectively), and only 20 

percent believe that the democracy level is high, and 

that human rights are provided by the government, 

with one third neutral on this question. More people 

in Belarus (63 percent combined) are of a negative 

opinion of their government’s ability to protect their 

rights, while only 9 percent consider that their rights 

are protected, with 27 percent having a neutral opinion on this question. A remarkable 53 percent of Georgian respondents think that human rights are better 

protected now than 10 years ago, and only 12 percent 

believe that the situation has changed for the worse. 

When human rights are translated into specifics of 

freedoms of movement, expression, association, and 

assembly, the highest number of the Ukrainian respondents (over 41 percent) think that they are more 

or less provided; over 21 percent believe that the situation with these rights is good, and only 33 percent 

of them think that these rights are not safeguarded. 

The Belarusian respondents are mostly of an opposite 

opinion: a combined 54 percent do not consider that 

these rights are provided or are not fulfilled by the 

state; a little more than 33 percent of them are of a 

neutral opinion on this question; and only 9 percent 

are satisfied with the situation. Of the Georgian respondents, 46 percent positively evaluate the condition with these rights in Georgia, 40 percent more are 

content with the situation, while 12 percent think that 
36

these rights are provided for effectively and for all 

residents. The rate of negative and positive responses in Ukraine is balanced on the issue of freedom of 

speech: 29.6 percent of them are satisfied with it, 22.2 

percent are not, while 46 percent consider the level as 

acceptable. Of the Belarusian respondents, 63 percent 

believe that freedom of speech is not provided in the 

country, and another 27 percent are of a neutral opinion on this subject. The situation is drastically different in Georgia: a combined total of 46 percent consider 

the situation with freedom of speech as good and very 

good, and 35 percent are of a neutral opinion. 

The responses to the questions on another set of 

human rights—freedom of religion, language, and 

cultural rights—were not positive in Ukraine: 75 percent believe that the situation with these rights ranges 

from bad to very bad. On the contrary, 45 percent of 

the Belarusian respondents consider the situation with 

these rights as good, and 36 percent think it is acceptable. The same occurs in Georgia: 61 percent of those 

questioned think that the situation is good, 28 percent 

are of the middle opinion on this question, and only 10 

percent think it is bad. 

The views of the Ukrainian respondents were almost equally split (20 percent each) between those 

who think that individuals and organizations working to improve human rights are free from harassment and intimidation and those who believe they are 

harassed, while the rest occupies the middle ground 

on this question. In Belarus, however, most of the respondents (72 percent combined) believe that human 

rights activists are harassed. The situation was, again, 

different in Georgia, where, according to 45 percent 

of the respondents, human rights activists are mostly 

free from intimidation in fulfilling their duties; an-
37

other 43 percent think that the situation is acceptable. 

The situation with economic freedoms in Ukraine is 

considered bad by 40 percent of respondents, very 

bad by 13.3 percent, and good only by 11.6 percent. 

In Belarus, however, most of those questioned (54 

percent) take the middle ground on this matter, and 

the remaining are equally spread between opposing 

opinion spectrums. A similar situation is in Georgia: 

44 percent of the respondents have a middle opinion on the matter of economic freedoms, 31 percent 

believe that condition with these freedoms is good, 

and 24 percent are not satisfied with the condition of 

economic freedoms. 

Finally, most of the Ukrainian respondents are either somewhat unhappy (40 percent) or not satisfied 

at all (44 percent) with the level of economic development of Ukraine. The situation is different in Belarus: 

45 percent of the respondents think that the economic 

development of their country is on an average level, 

and there is a balance between those who are satisfied and dissatisfied with the performance of the Belarusian economy. Most of the Georgian respondents 

occupy the middle ground on this matter; another 24 

percent are satisfied with the economic development, 

while 32 percent are not happy with the situation. 

Representative and Accountable Government.

The majority of Ukrainian (up to 60 percent) and 

Belarusian (89 percent) respondents believe that the 

elections in their respective countries have not become 

more transparent over the last decade. The situation is 

drastically different in Georgia: 90 percent of respondents consider the elections procedure to have significantly improved over the past 10 years. In Ukraine, 
38

40 percent of participants think that the opposition 

parties and NGOs are moderately free in organizing 

themselves, whereas the numbers of those on the opposing spectrum of the opinion (fully free/not fully 

free) are almost equal: 25.5 percent and 29 percent, 

correspondingly. Most of the Belarusian respondents 

consider their opposition parties and NGOs to be either oppressed (22 percent) or highly oppressed (44 

percent). In Georgia, the situation is different: a combined 55 percent believe that their opposition parties 

and NGOs are free from prosecutions, and 30 percent 

think their freedom is on an average level. 

Most of the respondents from Ukraine are either 

somewhat not satisfied (46 percent) or mostly unsatisfied (18 percent) with their last elections, whereas 28.5 

percent of them occupy the middle ground on this issue, and only 8 percent of them combined are either 

fully or partially satisfied with the elections. The respondents from Belarus are most dissatisfied with the 

elections (64 percent combined). On the contrary, most 

of the Georgian respondents are either satisfied (40 

percent) or very satisfied (31 percent) with the recent 

elections, and another 20 percent occupy the middle 

position on this question. The overwhelming majority 

of Ukrainian respondents do not trust their government to some degree (62.5 percent fully and 26.8 percent partially), with only 1.8 percent having full trust 

in it. The numbers of those trusting their government 

are higher in Belarus (11 percent fully trust, 33 percent 

partially trust, and 33 percent do not trust). The Georgian respondents were almost equally split between 

those who do not trust their government (27 percent) 

and those who do (33 percent), with the remaining 40 

percent having a middle opinion on this matter. 
39

On the question of access by the citizens to government information, the majority of the Ukrainian 

respondents think that the situation is on a moderate level (49 percent), whereas 33 percent think that 

citizens cannot get access to information. Most of the 

Belarusian respondents (44 percent) occupy the middle ground on this question; 33 percent of them share 

their Ukrainian counterparts’ views on partial access 

to the information, and 11 percent think that they are 

deprived of such information. Half of the Georgian 

respondents are of a middle opinion on this question, 

and another 33 percent are satisfied with the access to 

governmental information. Most of those questioned 

in Ukraine (79 percent combined) think that police 

and security services are not accountable to the public, 

and so do 55 percent of their Belarusian counterparts. 

At the same time, 22 percent of them think that police and security services are somewhat accountable. 

In Georgia, 33 percent of respondents consider police 

somewhat accountable, and 12 percent think they are 

fully accountable to the public, whereas 37 percent 

keep accountability at the average level. 

Of the Ukrainian respondents, 43 percent believe 

the crime level in their country to be on a moderate 

level; 29 percent and 13 percent think that it is somewhat high and very high, correspondingly. Among 

the Belarusian respondents, 44 percent think that the 

crime level is moderate, 33 percent think it is low, and 

22 percent believe that is it high. In Georgia, most of 

those questioned (54 percent) think the crime level 

is low, 31 percent consider it acceptable, and only 13 

percent think it is high. Most of the respondents in 

Ukraine (87 percent) think that businesses influence 

public policy, and so do their Georgian counterparts 

(60 percent), whereas in Belarus the majority (67 per-
40

cent) believes that politics is free from the influences 

of large corporations.

Finally, on the question on corruption in the government, 20 percent and 35.7 percent in Ukraine consider public officials and public services as somewhat 

corrupt or very corrupt. In Belarus, the majority (44 

percent) think that corruption is on a moderate level. 

Most of the Georgian respondents (41 percent) take 

a middle ground on this question; 36 percent believe 

their civil servants are free from corruption. 

Civil Society and Popular Participation.

Of the Ukrainian respondents, 42 percent believe 

that the independence of mass media from the government is on an average level, and another 40.7 percent 

of them think that it is not independent. In Belarus, 

these numbers are skewed towards the negative spectrum: 55.5 percent and 11 percent, respectively, consider mass media somewhat dependent and very dependent on the government. In Georgia, the situation 

is similar: 43 percent of the respondents view mass 

media as dependent on the government and only 21% 

think it is independent. 

The question on efficiency of media in investigating government and private corporations divided the 

pool of Ukrainian respondents in half: 20 percent are 

on opposite sides of the spectrum, while 52.7 percent 

are neutral on this issue. The same response rate in 

Ukraine can be found on the question of freedom of 

journalists from restrictive laws, harassment, and intimidation. The respondents from Belarus are more 

pessimistic in their estimates of media efficiency: 

overall, 77 percent of them think that mass media is 

not efficient. In Georgia, the majority of respondents 
41

was either pessimistic (34 percent) or took the middle 

ground (43 percent) on the investigative ability of 

journalists. The situation with journalists’ freedom 

in Belarus is radically different: an overwhelming 88 

percent of respondents believe that their journalists 

work under constant harassment by the government. 

The political polarization in Georgia is also evident in 

this question: while 40 percent are of a neutral opinion on media liberty, 32 percent think that journalists 

are harassed and another 28 percent think they are 

not harassed. 

Of Ukrainians, 49 percent are of a neutral opinion 

on independence of voluntary associations, citizen 

groups, and social movements from the government, 

whereas 38 percent and 5 percent of them think that 

they are somewhat independent and fully independent from government pressure. Their Georgian counterparts are of a different standing: 43 percent have a 

middle view on this issue, while 43 percent think that 

they are very independent from the government. The 

Belarusian respondents are of a completely different 

opinion on this question: 66 percent view the third 

sector as not independent from their government. 

From the point of view of external political stability, most of the Ukrainian respondents think that their 

country is somewhat independent (49 percent) or fully 

independent (14.5 percent) from the influence of other 

countries on its domestic political affairs. The Belarusian response rate is almost the same: 55.5 percent 

think that their country is somewhat independent, and 

11 percent consider it fully independent from outside 

influences. In Georgia, too, most respondents (54 percent) believe their country is free from outside influences, and another 34 percent are of a middle opinion. 
42

The future internal political stability for each country was evaluated quite differently within the three 

countries. Of the Ukrainian respondents, 58 percent 

feel that significant political changes will happen to 

Ukraine in the next five years, whereas the rest believe 

in political stability without any major transformations. Georgians are of a more radical view: 78 percent anticipate significant changes in the political life 

of their country. Their Belarusian counterparts are of 

exactly the opposite opinion: 67 percent do not expect 

any notable political change to happen in Belarus in 

the next 5 years. Such an outlook in Ukraine is due 

to, perhaps, the fact that most of those questioned 

prefer political freedoms (69 percent) to economic 

stability, which argues for an increase in the level of 

political activity of the masses over the coming years. 

In Georgia, too, 63 percent prefer politically free rather than economically stable. In Belarus, the situation 

is opposite: 56 percent prefer economic freedoms to 

political liberties.

POLITICAL CULTURE AS AN IDENTITY 

CONSTRUCT 

The responses to the questionnaire reflect the interplay between the levels of democratization, political stability, and economic development in the target 

countries. Political culture is the meta-variable that 

glues together the other variables and affects the behavior of the institutional actors and their opinions regarding specific aspects of their respective governance 

regime. It permeates the very core of the societal fabric 

and profoundly impacts the ways the actors respond 

to internal and external disturbances of their political 

environment. Political culture is a very complex phe-
43

nomenon. It does not appear overnight. It is a complex 

product of convoluted interactions of the actors at the 

political, economic, and cultural layers intertwining 

the social fabric. In order to understand the current 

political settings in Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus, 

which influenced the course of democratization of 

their societies after independence, it is necessary to go 

back in their histories. The circumstances that led to 

the creation of the complex phenomenon of political 

culture are pivotal in understanding the responses of 

the three nations to the changing domestic and international environs. 

Political Culture. 

In the present context, the notion of political culture 

goes beyond Douglas North’s definition of culture, 

which is a “language-based conceptual framework 

for encoding and interpreting the information that the 

lenses are presenting to the brain.”70 Dittmer defines 

political culture as “a system of political symbols . . 

. nest[ing] in a more inclusive system that we might 

term ‘political communication’,”71 which is deeply 

embedded in the identities of the actors reflected in 

their political behavior. Political behavior, according 

to Claude Ake, is: 

ubiquitous. Members of society behave politically 

insofar as, in obeying or disobeying the laws of the 

society, they support or undermine the power stratification system.72

David Laitin and Aaron Wildavski view political culture as a three-prong phenomenon: it instills 

“points of concern to be debated”; it guides people 
44

“by the symbols of their culture and is instrumental in 

using culture to gain wealth and power”; and it contains the symbols, which “must be interpreted in full 

ethno-graphic context.”73

For the purposes of the present research, political 

culture is defined as “modes of responses of institutional actors to challenges emanating from internal 

and external environments.” Based on that definition, 

political culture becomes, essentially, the symbolic 

media of political behavior—what Stephen Chilton 

calls “all publicly common ways of relating within 

the collectivity”74—in other words, the ways in which 

the institutional actors interact with their governance 

regimes and react to the presented political agendas, 

both domestic and international. Symbolic communications between the institutional actors within the 

specific governance regimes make political culture the 

product of their identities. 

On the domestic level, political culture includes 

the sets of behavioral responses of the actors towards 

the changes of their governance regimes. The same applies to the level of international system, only in this 

case, the changes in the governance are substituted by 

the fluctuations of the regional and/or global environment, depending on the roles the countries in question 

play in it. On either of these levels, changes occur on 

the institutional level and follow the pace of normative “lifecycles.” These lifecycles involve three stages 

defined by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink 

as “norm emergence,” “norm cascading,” and “norm 

internalization.”75

The normative change cycle starts with appearance of a norm either from inside, for example, the 

inception of human rights in England’s Magna Carta

in the 13th century and the French Revolution of 1789, 
45

or from outside, such as the post-colonial and postimperial governance transformations following the 

imperial collapses and based on externally proposed 

governance models. Gradually, the change of a norm 

in one sphere (for instance, in law enforcement) leads 

to normative spillovers in other areas (healthcare, education, urban planning, social security, etc.) starting 

to involve increased numbers of institutional actors. 

The final stage of the democratic normative lifecycle—

when a norm becomes a part of the political culture of 

a nation, an inherent component of its “moral fit,” and 

the core of its national identity—is the lengthiest process of all since it affects not only specific institutions, 

but also the whole complexity.

For the process of institutional change of political regimes to be successful and (more importantly) 

durable, it should transcend through the institutional 

actors with relatively insignificant interruptions. The 

outcomes of all the three stages of the normative 

lifecycle of institutional change depend directly on 

the political cultures of the target societies and how 

receptive they are to change. Political culture can be 

lenient and well receptive to political change, or it 

can be rigid and somewhat immune to institutional 

transformations. In the first case, the institutional 

change happens somewhat smoothly because of its 

acceptance by relatively high numbers of institutional 

actors. The rigid cultures, where the actors who prefer 

institutional statism to change, slow lifecycles. 

THREE HISTORICAL NARRATIVES 

Political cultures of different nations are not homogenous inasmuch as their identities are different. 

Political cultures are not created overnight; they are 
46

born out of centuries of human development and interactions with the neighboring societies and polity. 

Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus had similar historical 

conditions existing prior to their independence and 

even before Communist rule, which draw parallels 

between their overall socio-political and economic developmental levels. Nevertheless, there is a significant 

diversity among their political cultures influencing 

the current levels of democratization, political stability, and economic development. 

Historical Ukraine. 

Historically molded, Ukrainian identity is comprised, according to Sergei Shtukarin, of triple constructs: “national,” where its bearer reacts positively 

to the maxima “Ukraine for Ukrainians”; “civil,” 

which implies loyalty to Ukraine’s statehood regardless of ethnic background; and “alien” identity, which 

regards both Ukrainian ethnicity and statehood as foreign.76 Similarly, as Serhy Yekelchuk notes, the Ukrainian national identity engulfed three components, 

being “a direct descendant of medieval Kyivan Rus, 

the 17th-century Cossack polity, and the 1918–1920 

Ukrainian People’s Republic.”77 Current geographic 

divide in the Ukrainian society into the pro-European 

west and pro-Russian east was born of the centuries 

of interactions with both sides of the bipolar identity 

equation. Ukraine, with its historical core of the Kyivan Rus’ which gave birth to the medieval Slavic fiefdoms, represents the basis for common Eastern Slavic 

identity78 and was the center which the future Russian 

Empire would build around, but just at the outskirts 

of it.79 The name “Ukraine” in Eastern Slavic dialects 

means “at the edge,” the “borderland.” Ukraine had its 
47

short period of independence during medieval times 

in the form of the Galicia-Volhynia political entity in 

the 13th and 14th centuries, which Ukrainian historian 

Stefan Tomashivsky named as “the first undeniably 

Ukrainian state.”80

In the 15th and 16th centuries, a part of presentday Ukraine was included into the powerful PolishLithuanian Commonwealth,81 after which some of its 

western territories became semi-independent under 

the rule of the Cossacks, who were “Orthodox men 

roaming the steppes, and . . . famously independent 

minded.”82 Cossacks were the military regiments gathered in Zaporojskaya Sech’ who pledged no allegiance 

to their neighbors, be it the Polish-Lithuanian union, 

the Ottoman Empire, the Crimean Khanate, or Moscowia, the modern Russia. The governance regime 

in Sech’ could be named as an embryonic democracy 

with some sort of separation of responsibilities between the elected Hetman (the leader) and the Rada 

(the equivalent of the modern Parliament), which was 

a consultative body, as well as the equal voice given 

to every Cossack. A century later, in 1710, Sech’ produced one of the first prototypes of a modern-day 

democratic constitution under Hetman Orlyk,83 with 

real attributes of democracy, including the separation 

of powers and an elective governance style. 

However, it was they, the Cossacks, who, after 

the bloody defeat by the Polish army in 1651, asked 

Alexei I, Tsar of Moscovia, to accept them under his 

protection.84 They were seeking a temporary military 

alliance, fearing the ultimate subjugation by the Polish reign. The initial arrangements provided for mutual loyalty of Cossacks and Alexei I, wide autonomy, 

and keeping of internal composition of Ukraine. Later 

on, however, these accords were broken, and Mosco-
48

via totally subordinated the land it initially promised 

to defend (temporarily) from outside enemies. This 

marked the period of Ukrainian history under Russian rule, which transitioned to Soviet governance after the October Revolution of 1917. Ukraine did have 

its independence, though, in the form of the Ukrainian 

People’s Republic in 1918 and the West Ukrainian 

People’s Republic, which joined the former in 1919 

with the loss of its territory to Poland, Romania, and 

Czechoslovakia in the Polish-Ukrainian war of June 

1919. Ukrainian independence, however, turned out 

to be short-lived, and Ukraine was ultimately vanquished by the Soviet Army in mid-summer 1920, 

creating the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 

Historical Georgia. 

Situated “at a major commercial crossroads and 

among several power neighbors”85—not all of them 

friendly—right in the middle of the Great Silk Road, 

a halfway point between the East and the West, Georgian identity and culture has been historically exposed 

to the influences of diverse cultures, religions, languages, and mostly authoritarian governance regimes 

of the regional powers. The history of Georgia precipitates with foreign conquerors with direct and indirect 

reigns—Byzantine, Seljuk, Ottoman Turkey, Sassanid 

Persia, Arabs, and Mongols86—up until 1783, when 

eastern Georgia, followed by the western part of the 

country, were incorporated into the Russian Empire.87

Notwithstanding the heavy external political pressure 

and centuries of political subordination, Georgia remained a country with unchanged Christian beliefs, 

unique language (with its own written alphabet), and 

a very specific set of cultural traits. 
49

The end of the Russian Empire as a result of the 

October Revolution of 1917 gave a glimpse of hope to 

the Georgian polity, which soon established the first 

true modern independent country. However, what 

appeared to be the start of its independent existence 

on a par with the regional actors in reality was only 

a short intermission between the two empires—the 

Russian one and the Soviet Union one in the making. 

In 1921, Georgia, along with its immediate Caucasian 

neighbors, Armenia and Azerbaijan, was conquered 

by the Russian military88 and forcefully made a member of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federated Republic. Fifteen years later, this entity dissolved, with its 

members becoming separate, but not sovereign, republics within the Soviet Union. 

Historical Belarus. 

Creation of the Belarus nation dates back to the migration of the Eastern Slavic tribes in the 6th through 

8th centuries further eastwards to the borders of contemporary Belarus. The name “Belarus,” or “White 

Russia,” as noted by Jan Zaprudnik: 

originated in the 12th century and initially designated 

various parts of northwestern Russia or Ukraine. Since 

the 14th century, it has also been applied to eastern 

territories of present-day Belarus.89

Similar to Ukraine, Belarus had its first independent 

states of Polatsk, Turai, and Navahradak between the 

9th and 13th centuries.90 In later centuries, largely owing to the Mongol conquest of the Kyivan Rus’ in 1240, 

the lands populated by the Belarusian tribes were 

taken over by, first, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 
50

and later in the 16th century by the Polish-Lithuanian 

Commonwealth. The Commonwealth lasted until the 

late-18th century when, as a result of the three partitions of Poland, according to Andrew Wilson, “Belarus was swallowed almost whole by the Romanov 

Empire. . . .”91—the growing strength of Tsarist Russia. 

With the long history of Belarus, scholars stumble 

upon multiple roadblocks of defining Belarusian identity: is it Russian, similar to Russian, or something 

else? Historically, its origins, as Serhii Plokhy notes, 

“the Belarusian [identity] was based on the Ruthenian 

identity that had previously developed in the Grand 

Duchy of Lithuania but failed to produce distinct identity in modern times.”92 Among the possible reasons for 

the Belarus identity limbo was the systematic policy of 

Russification of the Tsarist rule, which was a part of the 

grand objective to de-Polonize the eastern Slavic lands 

within the Russian Empire and, thus, to pave the road 

for the gradual spread of Eastern Orthodoxy replacing 

Western Catholicism. In the push to eradicate the national consciousness of the Belarusians, Russian Tsar 

Nicolai I prohibited the usage of the term “Belarusia” 

and renamed the land the “North-Western Territory,” 

simultaneously banning the use of Belarusian as a 

distinct language in the 1840s.93 At the same time, the 

spread of socialist ideology in the Russian Empire and 

the industrial revolution had together emancipated 

the national self-consciousness of some of its nations, 

including the Belarusians. Following the defeat of 

Germany in World War I, the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic was created in 1918, marking an era of 

new communist governance, which, after the end of 

1922 (the official inception of the USSR), received the 

name “Sovietization.” 
51

Under the Soviet Union.

During the Soviet period, and even for quite some 

time after the USSR dissolution, the political cultures 

of its former republics were viewed from outside as 

somewhat uniform, as either all “Soviet” or all “Russian.” They were considered as parts of the gigantic 

ex-communist monolithic society with homogenous 

norms, rules, and practices. There was, indeed, a fair 

amount of truth in having such an approach to the 

nations willingly or forcefully brought under Soviet 

rule. The process of conversion of the identities of 

the multiethnic population speaking different languages and having quite diverse (and somewhat alien 

to each other) cultural traits and customs into a uniform one had the purpose of creating a single Soviet 

political culture. 

The primary aim of the Soviet Union can be presented as the process of cultural homogenization of 

the Soviet nations. The manual on Cultural policy in 

the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, as quoted by 

David Marples, identified three stages of the Sovietization process. The purpose of the first one was “to 

introduce a ‘social attitude’ among the population and 

to develop the ideological base of the working class.”94

The pinnacle of this endeavor, as rendered by its 

mastermind, Joseph Stalin, was:

[t]he flourishing of the cultures, which are national in 

form and socialist in content, under the dictatorship 

of the proletariat in one country with the purpose of 

merging them into a single socialist (both in form and 

content) culture with a common language.95

This was, however, illogical in its core; while the aim 

of Sovietization was eradication of the ethnic/nation-
al characteristics of its member-nations and creation 

of the one-size-fits-all Soviet identity, the process itself 

encouraged existence and, even more so, fermentation 

of national consciousness. 

The politics of Russification had an important part 

in the overall Sovietization process (conversion of citizens into Homo sovieticus), but it was conducted quite 

subtly and mostly had to deal with the promotion of 

the Russian language as the medium of inter-republican communication while keeping the national identities alive. In Belarus, for example, the policy of korenizaciya (“indigenization”) gave the Russian language 

the status of the “second” language after Belarusian, 

while Belarusian retained its official language status.96

In Georgia, according to J. Parsons, the:

Soviet policy has given active encouragement to the

rastsvet or flourishing of Georgian culture (as of that of 

the other nationalities) in the belief that by providing 

for both the socio-economic development of the republics and for political and cultural equality, attachment 

to national differences would, by itself, subside.97

As a result, neither the Georgian language nor 

the Georgian orthodoxy was stifled by early Soviet 

authorities. After Stalin, an ethnic Georgian was deposed post-mortem from his “personality cult,” and 

the anti-Stalin campaign started, which was viewed 

by many Georgians as anti-Georgian. In 1978, the Russian language was elevated to the level of official language along with Georgian, which was vehemently 

rejected by the Georgian establishment.

In Ukraine, this process, according to Anna Reid, 

was stricter than in either of the two communist republics in question. Reid identified a number of reasons for the more rigorous Russification of Ukraine: 

52
53

comparatively early existence under the Soviet geopolitical umbrella and the denial of the unique Ukrainian 

identity by Russian nationalists. According to Reid: 

Russians deny their [Ukrainians’] existence. Ukrainians are a ‘non-historical nation,’ the Ukrainian 

language is a joke dialect. . . . The very closeness of 

Ukrainian and Russian culture, the very subtlety of 

the differences between them, is an irritation.98

The denial of the ethnic uniqueness of Ukrainians, 

which Chaim Kaufman considers as the “strongest” 

identity of all,99 became an integral part of the systematic nationalism policy towards Ukraine in the Soviet 

Union. This process, however, was not uniquely Soviet. Similar to the Belarusian language ban, it started 

when Ukraine was a part of the Russian Empire. The 

so-called Valuevskiy Cirkulyar (Circular Letter of Valuev) by the Minister of Interior, and Ems Ukaz (in 1863 

and 1876, respectively) banned the use of the Ukrainian language and dialects in the western provinces. 

A somewhat lackadaisical approach to Soviet Russification in Belarus and Georgia, as opposed to the 

relentless take on Ukraine, can be explained by the 

differences in the views of Moscow on these nations. 

In Belarus, the lax Russification could be explained, 

among other reasons, by the fact that the ruling Russian elite of the Soviet Union felt little urge to change 

the Belarusian identity, since they largely viewed it as 

Russian by definition. In Georgia, the situation was 

on the opposite side of the spectrum of Russification 

policies. The Georgian language and culture were so 

alien to the Slavic language and culture that complete 

Russification efforts were not rationally justifiable. 

Besides, similar to the Belarusians, the Georgian elite 

and intelligentsia already had been integrated tightly 
54

within the Russian environment for several centuries 

after joining the Russian Empire, which made the process of socialization between these nations easy. Last, 

but not least, is the personality of Joseph Stalin, quis 

fabricates of the Soviet policy on nationalities, who, being an ethnic Georgian, was strict with the Georgian 

establishment in political matters100 but was somewhat lenient toward the expression of national selfconsciousness. 

Ukraine occupies the middle ground in the Russification policies in the three countries. Ukraine in 

its current territory appeared only in 1947 (excluding 

Crimea); the two parts of the country were growing 

in different political cultures—those of Russian and 

Austro-Hungarian Empires, respectively. On the one 

hand, although the Ukrainians were always tightly 

associated with the Russians themselves, the former 

felt strong nationalistic impulses coming from the 

Ukrainian elites, especially from its western parts. 

De-Ukrainization, including eradication of the Ukrainian language and culture, also embraced the identity 

factor. These policies extended far beyond mere linguistic subordination; since Ukraine historically was 

considered a core of the Russian identity, having this 

history belong to another nation or being narrated 

in another language would mean deprecation of the 

Russian identity. As Zbigniew Brzezinski rightly observed, “[W]ithout Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an 

empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes as empire.”101

There was, thus, a political reasoning behind the 

identity denial: The stronger the Russian/Soviet cultural linkages were with the Ukrainians, the stronger 

the cultural cleavage between Ukrainians and the 

Western world, especially with its immediate neigh-
55

bors—Poland and Lithuania. The systematic identity 

denial by the Russian imperial and then Soviet authorities created long-lasting stigmatization in Ukraine 

and had its part in the regional divide in Ukraine. The 

process of Sovietization in Ukraine had another significantly more tragic side. As a result of the policies 

of dekulakization (resettlement of the wealthy peasants 

to the northern territories) and collectivization (expropriation of the land and its transfer into the collective ownership, basically, abolition of private property),102 nearly 5 million people103 vanished in what 

became known as the Ukrainian holocaust, or the 

“Holodomor.”104

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the common political identity of the three nations as “Soviets” slowly began to vanish. In early-1990s, Georgia, 

Ukraine, and Belarus were suddenly exposed to the 

completely new international and domestic political 

realities and challenges of the independent statehood 

demanding some sort of reaction on the parts of their 

newly established national elites. Their responses to 

the new international environment were, however, 

quite predictable. Without the proper institutional 

knowledge of democratic practices and procedures, 

the newly created states used past experiences of communist bureaucracies merged with existing democratic institutional designs to build the bridges into their 

future. Lundell noted the phenomenon in the following passage: “Autocratic continuance [there] is largely 

due to the Soviet legacy. One-party communism has 

in many former Soviet republics been replaced by 

absolute presidential power.”105 By 1992, Georgia, 

Ukraine, and Belarus slid into the quagmire of stagnant ex-communist leadership with varying degrees 

of post-Soviet autocratic governance, but with signs 
56

of democracy embodied in such formative practices as 

elections and institutions of governance. Such a governing anomaly led to a volatile state in the domestic 

polity, and in some extreme cases, in grave turmoil. 

Independent Ukraine. 

Ukraine had its share of domestic problems during 

the early years of its independence. The anti-communist national self-determination group People’s Movement of Ukraine, or the Rukh, according to Anders, 

Aslund, and Michael McFaul, “served as an umbrella 

group for hundreds of local and national civic, cultural, political, and human rights organizations”106 in the 

late-1980s. The Rukh organized mass rallies calling for 

the removal of the communist party bosses and for the 

ultimate democratization of the country. It culminated in setting up a human chain from Kyiv to Lviv in 

1990 in commemoration of the short-lived Ukrainian 

independence in 1919 and to show the unity of the 

Ukrainian lands from the west to the east. Right after 

independence, however, the Rukh lost its momentum 

and popular influence among particularly radical institutional actors, giving way to the old communist 

apparatchiks. 

The first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, 

a former communist bureaucrat and member of the 

Ukrainian Politburo, was at the time of independence 

the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament). 

Kravchuk managed to transform “himself within less 

than 2 years from communist ideological policeman 

to national communist leader and . . . Ukraine’s first 

president and national leader.”107 Although Ukraine 

received large economic and industrial resources from 

the Soviet Union as a part of its independence inheri-
57

tance, this potential appeared to be obsolete and ill fit 

under the burden of independent existence. Skyrocketing inflation, coupled with the completely severed 

tentacles of the command-and-controlled economy 

centrally providing both the demand and supply line 

for the Soviet economy and thoughtless economic 

reforms, led to rapid economic downfall, including hyperinflation, severe GNP crush, corruption in 

the privatization policies, and the chronic budgetary 

deficit.108

In 1994, Leonid Kuchma replaced Kravchuk as a 

result of the fierce presidential pre-election battle and 

immediately started the painful process of economic 

stabilization of Ukraine. The results of the market 

liberalization reforms were the decrease of the country’s budgetary deficit, inflation, shrinking of public 

spending, increase of the GDP (although still lower 

than pre-1990 levels), and price stabilization.109 With 

this, Kuchma’s activities were aimed at attracting 

foreign loans, coping with balance of payments, and 

dispersion of credits, in other words, postponing the 

resolution of problems of real market reforms for an 

undefined future.110Also, Kuchma was not free from 

preferential political and economic regionalism and 

nepotism. He was accused by some in Ukraine of allegedly ordering the kidnapping and assassination of 

local journalist Georgiy Gongadze (coincidentally an 

ethnic Georgian), who was famous for his anti-corruption articles.111 The “competitive authoritarianism” 

type of governance developed under Kuchma where: 

democratic institutions exist and are regarded as 

principal means of obtaining and exercising political 

authority, but powerholders violate those rules so often that the regime fails to meet minimum democratic 

standards.112
58

The regime was, thus, not fully authoritarian but not 

democratic enough to allow for the free and fair expressions of the institutional actors of their political 

preferences. 

The eventual failure of Kuchma’s regime, notorious for corruption, is largely considered as the main 

precondition for the Orange Revolution in 2005. The 

public protests staged as a response to mass election fraud allegedly committed by the forces acting 

against the presidential pro-western runner-up Viktor 

Yushchenko enjoyed wide popular support. The regional split was also present here; while Yushchenko 

was mostly considered a pro-Western politician and 

enjoyed the support of western and central Ukraine, 

Viktor Yanukovych, then Prime Minister of Ukraine 

and the principal contender in the presidential elections in November 2004, had his electorate largely 

based in eastern pro-Russian Ukraine. The democratic 

part of the Ukrainian society predominantly viewed 

Yanukovych as a “Kuchma reincarnate” with the 

same Soviet-style bureaucracy and Kuchma’s backing. 

Yushchenko, who, by independent exit polls won by 

a margin of 10 percent in the second round, was put 

behind Yanukovych by the Central Election Committee. This sparked mass protest rallies by Yushchenko’s 

supporters in Kyiv and elsewhere in Ukraine113 except 

for its eastern regions. The third round of elections 

held in December confirmed Yushchenko’s victory. 

The promises of political change and economic 

revival made by incoming President Yushchenko appeared to be short-lived and the democratic path too 

difficult to continue. Because of internal struggle between powerful political and economic forces, Yushchenko appointed Yanukovych as Prime Minister in 
59

2006. As a result of subsequent presidential elections, 

4 years later Yanukovych became the President of 

the country,114 marking an almost 180-degree reversal from the volatile democracy to possible stable 

but stagnant rule. The result of the elections further 

widened the regional political divide in Ukraine on 

the pro-democratic West and the pro-Russian East. A 

clear sign of the fluctuations of the bifurcate political 

course of Ukraine is the May 2013 conclusion of the 

memorandum on obtaining the observer status in the 

Customs Union of the Eurasian Economic Community and the forthcoming agreement with the EU about 

the free trade zone in November 2013. The latter, to 

his credit, was initiated by Yanukovych, who is struggling to keep balance between the two gravity centers. 

The first direction is towards Vladimir Putin’s pet 

project of in vitro testing for the possible reanimation 

of the Soviet Union. The second direction is toward 

closer integration with the democratic communities. 

Ukraine does not want to “upset” both sides of the 

equation; according to Suzdalcev, Ukraine: 

wants to have all the benefits of the Customs Union 

but is not going to join it; instead, it wants to enter the 

European Union.115

These are, essentially, mutually exclusive steps, 

which would define the foreign political alignment of 

Ukraine for generations to come. 

Notwithstanding these oscillations, Ukraine continues to receive foreign support. According to the 

USAID “Greenbook” website, Ukraine received approximately U.S.$1.7 billion in economic assistance116

with an additional U.S.$103.593 million in 2012, a 

planned U.S.$104.407 million for 2013, with another 
60

U.S.$95.271 million planned for 2014.117 Ukraine is also 

a recipient of European aid; in 2011, the EU provided 

€30 million (euros) as an: 

assistance package to support the Ukrainian government in their institutional reform efforts in several key 

areas, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free 

Trade area, sanitation, state aid, and migration.118

Independent Georgia.

Early years of independence for Georgia were 

marked by the civil war against its first president, 

Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who came to power on the 

nationalistic and chauvinistic wave. Gamsakhurdia, 

whom Per Gahrton described as a “tactical fanatic,” 

“was an attractive and even efficient leader and a symbol of national liberation movement . . . [but] a catastrophe as executive administrator and president.”119

Gamsakhurdia’s reign proved to be short-lived when 

a significant part of his own close entourage and some 

military regiments revolted in early-1992. The resulting coup d’état paved the road to Georgian leadership 

for Eduard Shevardnadze, a mastodon of Soviet politics. By that time, Shevardnadze, probably the most 

well-known Georgian to the world outside of the 

former Soviet space, already ruled the republic from 

1972 to 1985 as the first secretary of the Georgian 

Communist Party. 

Shevardnadze re-entered Georgian politics first 

as the Chairman of the State Council, then Chairmen 

of Parliament from 1992–95, and finally its president 

from 1995 until the Rose Revolution of 2003. His early 

years in power were notable for the rollercoaster of 

internal Georgian political preferences and the disas-
61

trous economic condition. Most of Georgian economic 

potential in Soviet times was centered on the summer Black Sea resorts, tea production, citruses, and 

wine making, most of which were located in western 

Georgia, namely, in the breakaway Abkhazia. During 

Soviet times, Georgia had no strong and independent 

industrial production, and even the few factories that 

managed to survive the painful first years of independence, such as the metallurgical, chemical, cement, 

and fertilizer plants, could not survive without the 

centralized economy and steady and uninterrupted 

supplies of raw materials. Even more so, much of its 

agricultural potential was devastated because of the 

conflict sparked in 1992 in Abkhazia.

To his credit, Shevardnadze was a very shrewd 

politician. Called by some ill-wishers, “fox with a 

split tail,” Shevardnadze was an exemplary diplomat 

when it came to turning the most uncomfortable and 

failing situations to his benefit. In 1983, at the 200th 

anniversary of the unification with Russia, he made 

the following public comment for which he was reprimanded repeatedly by political rivals: “Georgia is 

called the country of the sun. But for us the true sun 

rose not in the east but in the north, in Russia—the 

sun of Lenin’s ideas.”120 His pro-Russian attitude radically changed because of the conflicts in Abkhazia and 

South Ossetia, who were backed up politically and economically by Russia. The reversal of Georgia’s political course culminated at the 2000 election campaign, 

when Shevardnadze promised to bring Georgia to 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by 

the end of his presidential term.121 To Shevardnadze’s 

credit, Georgia started showing a slow but sure drift 

towards the West politically, with its membership in 

NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994, and eco-
62

nomically, by joining, as a transit land, the energy carriers’ transportation projects from the Caspian Sea to 

the European markets. Nevertheless, his legacy is tarnished by unresolved conflicts, thousands of refugees, 

and absolute economic downfall, but, paradoxically, 

quite stable although stagnant domestic political environment fostered through overwhelming and chronic 

corruption. 

The corruption in Georgia deserves separate mentioning here. This phenomenon had deeply reaching 

roots. It was imposed by the Russian tsarist apparatus 

starting from the 18th century and further perfected 

by the Soviet bureaucratic machine. Independence 

brought to Georgia another type of corruption, called 

“state capture” by Wheatley, when “the political elite 

uses the apparatus of the state to further its own private interests.”122 This highly institutionalized form of 

corrupt behavior was accepted by the larger masses of 

society with very little resentment. 

It was only after 2000 that the new democratic forces started to appear in the Georgian establishment, 

which by 2003 consolidated around the triumvirate of 

the young Georgian politicians Mikheil Saakashvili, 

Zurab Zhvania, and Nino Burjanadze. Saakashvili, a 

U.S.-sponsored and educated lawyer who was practicing commercial law at Patterson, Belknap, Webb, 

and Tyler, joined the Parliament of Georgia in 1995. 

Soon after entry into the Georgian political scene, Saakashvili ignited the democratization processes modeled after the United States. These moves included the 

merit-based election of judges to the local courts, initiation of the prison reforms, and the anti-corruption 

campaign in the early-2000s. In November 2003, as 

a result of the Parliamentary elections called by the 

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
63

(OSCE) a “spectacular fraud”123 orchestrated by Shevardnadze’s political circles, the progressive forces led 

by young triumvirate flooded the streets of Tbilisi and 

other major Georgian cities in what became known 

as the bloodless “Rose Revolution.”124 Saakashvili 

accused Shevardnadze of a massive manipulation 

of votes; his followers stormed Parliament, bringing 

democracy to Georgia with a single red rose. 

Democratic transformations, however, were not 

endemic to Georgia, although it was born in the minds 

of the Georgian people tired of the inept and corrupt 

government unable to solve even the simplest problems of its population, such as ensuring 24/7 electricity 

and gas. The change was fostered and supported from 

outside. The United States has been the primary lobby 

state of Georgia ever since its independence, supporting it mostly financially. Linkoln Mitchell notes “that 

by 2003, the United States wanted Shevardnadze to 

move Georgia in a more democratic direction, with a 

special focus on parliamentary elections. . .”125 According to a Congressional Research Service note, Georgia regularly led the list of world states in terms of 

per capita U.S. economic aid. Between 1992 and 2010, 

Georgia has received U.S.$3.3 billion. In 2001, the economic support was U.S.$87.1 million; another U.S.$87 

million was earmarked for 2012, with a subsequent 

budgetary appropriation request for U.S.$68.7 million 

in 2013.126 These means were directed in support of the 

Georgian democratic institutions, cultural heritage 

retention, economic development, and military aid. 

As a result of titanic efforts to change the mentality and the culture of corruption and nepotism, the 

new government after the Rose Revolution undertook 

a number of significant steps to eradicate the culture of bribery and preferential treatments. This led 
64

to the dismissal of significant numbers of officials, a 

decade later many of whom joined in opposition to 

Saakashvili. Currently, Georgia is viewed by many 

as an exemplary young democracy with an effective 

rule of law and liberalized society, notwithstanding 

the unsuccessful war with Russia in 2008127 and continuous domestic political havoc of the power diarchy 

between President Mikheil Saakashvili and the incumbent Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, an ethnic 

Georgian tycoon from Russia. 

Independent Belarus. 

The last years of the Soviet Union gave rise to 

nationalist feelings in Belarus. Suddenly the people 

started to realize that they are different from Russians, 

notwithstanding their strong linkages with Russia, 

including linguistic and cultural similarities, and the 

centuries-long acceptance of the fact that they are an 

inseparable part of the overall Russian ethnos.128 The 

Belarus Popular Front was created in 1988, and, from 

the onset, started to prepare the country for the forthcoming independence. Already by the early-1990s, the 

Belarusian political establishment and the public felt 

strong winds of change. In 1990, while still within the 

USSR, Belarusian Supreme Soviet declared its state 

sovereignty without having de facto independence. 

Independence came a year later when, in December 

1991, the heads of the three Slavic Soviet republics—

Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia—concluded a historical 

agreement to dissolve the Soviet Union.

Similar to Georgia and Ukraine, in the first years 

of independence, Belarus was ruled by former communist party leaders: Stanislav Shushkevich as the 

chair of the Supreme Committee and Vyachaslav Ke-
65

bich as the prime minister. However, neither of them 

lasted long; Shushkevich resigned under the burden 

of corruption accusations by Lukashenka, and Kebich 

lost the presidential elections to Lukashenka, who 

was rapidly gaining popular support. Lukashenka’s 

ascent to power started from his membership in the 

Supreme Soviet in 1990, where he served as the chair 

of the Anti-Corruption Commission. Right from this 

time, Lukashenka revealed a craving for power via 

highly populist means. As the commission chair, Lukashenka did his best to show the people that he was 

a true leader. According to Savchenko: 

He exhibited all the conspicuous stringency of a common man visibly outraged by the machinations of nefarious elites, promptly accusing top officials, including . . . Kebich and . . . Shushkevich of embezzlement, 

abuse of office, and general corruption.129

By the majority of indicators, Belarus is the most 

autocratic out of the three countries in this analysis. 

Its current president, Lukashenka, has been ruling 

the country with an iron fist ever since 1994. Immediately after the elections, Lukashenka applied heavyhanded authoritarian tactics aimed at staying vser’ez i 

nadolgo—”for real and for long.”130 After the elections, 

Lukashenka undertook a number of steps directed towards limiting the fundamental freedoms of its own 

citizens, including the freedom of speech. He “censored state media, closed Belarus’ only independent 

radio station and several independent newspapers 

. . .”; ignored the decisions of the Supreme Court proclaiming his decrees as unconstitutional; blocked the 

impeachment claims by the opposition by organizing 

the popular referendum in 1996, granting the power 

to rule over the parliament, eventually disbanding 
66

it with the Russian support; and establishing a fully 

puppet legislator.131 According to Juri Cavusau, between 2003 and 2005, Lukashenka’s government shut 

down 347 NGOs,132 while most of the remaining ones 

were forced to go underground or to immigrate to the 

Baltic States, such as the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, the leader in independent policy analysis. 

The limitations of civil society activities were institutionalized in the form of Article 193 of the Belarusian 

Criminal Code, which envisages 2 years in prison for 

cooperation with unregistered NGOs, while Article 

293 holds punishments for those who train people involved in public protests. 

Systematic gross human rights violations, suppression of political freedoms and rights of its citizens, and 

persecutions of the political opposition became the 

distinctive feature of Lukashenka’s autocratic regime. 

The recent establishment of an ideological expertise 

office within the Ministry of Defense over the public 

administration’s decisions133 further strengthens the 

positions of the “last dictator in Europe.” The following description of Lukashenka’s character by Brian 

Bennett tells a lot about this long-lasting leader with 

personality cult: 

Lukashenka was a loner. He saw no need to belong 

to a political party. . . . He was uniquely fitted to 

rolling up his sleeves and making decisions without 

sharing the burden or delegating. He liked the idea 

of the presidential system: it offered the prospect of 

power without having to cooperate much with others or make promises. Sharing power did not suit his 

temperament.134
67

Petr Kravchenko, former Minister of Foreign Affairs 

of Belarus, gave another very vivid account of Lukashenka’s character: 

like a 16-year-old youth wants intimacy with a woman, so Lukashenka with any fiber of his spirit, every 

cell of his organism, desired power as such. Because 

power for him was the real pleasure, in a way, as an 

end in itself and as a pleasure in wealth.135

The thirst for power of a typical Soviet-style apparatchik personality of Lukashenka at the dawn of his career became the trademark of the future autocrat. 

Economically, Belarus did not “get out” of the Soviet Union in complete shambles, unlike Georgia. The 

country kept most of its industrial potential intact and 

working, including oil refineries processing Russian 

oil and transiting it further to Europe; valuable natural resources processing, such as the potash mines, 

metallurgical, and chemical plants; and heavy industrial equipment factories, such as the Soviet giant 

MAZ truck factory and MZKT which manufactures 

heavy military machinery. These industrial capabilities, together with most of the economic potential of 

the country, are currently controlled by Lukashenka 

and his loyal oligarchs. 

Belarus is no stranger to foreign aid, although not 

on the scale of Ukraine and Georgia. The assistance 

was provided mostly in the form of developmental 

grants to the Belarusian civil society from Western 

democracies. The United States has been supporting 

democratic institutionalization for a number of years, 

although not encouraging the American companies to 

invest in Belarus due to overwhelming corruption and 

massive human rights violations. From 1992 through 

2007, total U.S. assistance to Belarus amounted to 
68

U.S.$340.96 million, with an additional U.S.$141.36 

million in the form of the Freedom Support Act with 

the assistance apex in 1993 reaching U.S.$129.87 million (little less than half of all assistance) and dropping dramatically with Lukashenka’s ascent to power, 

with the lowest point in 2007 of U.S.$0.15 million.136

Economic aid is closely followed by sanctions, including visa restrictions for Lukashenka, his closest entourage, and corrupt businesses and firms.137 The EU 

also tried to help Belarus; in 2011-13, the EU assistance 

programs of the European Commission amounted to 

€17.3 million.138 Finally, individual European governments, including Belarus’ immediate neighbor, 

Poland, extended their support, which, according to 

Gordon Fairclough, amounted to U.S.$120 million in 

aid to opposition groups.139

CAN DEMOCRACY LEAD TO 

POLITICAL STABILITY?

The data on the levels of democracy, political stability, and economic development, as well as the public perceptions of these variables in Ukraine, Georgia, 

and Belarus presented earlier, differ significantly with 

respect to their post-independence performance. All 

three countries jumpstarted their histories anew after 

1991 and, at first glance, should have taken similar 

paths considering vast similarities in their pre-independence state and general social cultural resemblance. However, as the countries progressed further 

into an independent existence, they evolved in completely different directions. 

A significantly high corruption level and unsatisfactory human rights conditions in Ukraine fit within 

its comparatively low political stability. Georgia is 
69

characterized by vibrant democracy, coupled with a 

low level of political stability alongside its poor economic performance. It is ahead of Ukraine and Belarus with its low corruption measures and relatively 

better situation with the human rights. The lowest 

democratic indicators in Belarus are intertwined with 

the highest level of political stability among all three 

countries, as well as good economic and social conditions created by the authoritarian governance for its 

people. The causes of the governance puzzle are deeply rooted in the diversity of the political cultures of 

Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus and how they respond 

to globalized democratization.

Ukraine. 

Ukraine is politically, economically, and culturally 

fragmented with several powerful centers of gravity. 

The rivalry between these poles creates an uneasy domestic environment that negatively affects political 

stability and economic development. Relationship between these variables has been unstable ever since its 

own Orange Revolution. Post-revolutionary disillusionment is quite frequent in politically volatile countries. Desperate electorates usually put too much hope 

in their leaders, who tend to over-promise their supporters, hoping for favorable votes. In Ukraine, on top 

of its political fickleness, the society rushed from one 

extreme to the other. A historically preexisting geographic divide was exacerbated by political diversity 

of the regional actors, with Yushchenko representing 

mostly the west and central Ukraine and Yanukovych 

harnessing his support from the pro-Russian East. 

The process that led to the Orange Revolution 

started as a response to the political stalemate of 
70

Kuchma’s government. The most important choice 

for the country, which, according to Krushnelnycky, 

was “wedged between the European Union and an 

increasingly autocratic Russia”140 was born out of the 

quest for the modern Ukrainian identity, on the one 

hand; and the popular repulsion of omnipresent corruption, chronic electoral fraud at all levels, the old 

Soviet style of governance, and overwhelming power 

centralization, on the other. After the fiasco with the 

fulfillment of the Orange Revolution pledges, political regionalization exacerbated. The pro-Western and 

pro-Russian forces did not lose their political orientations, but, under the changing realities, this was no 

longer a matter of concern. The south part of Ukraine 

is quite a special case, which is somewhat centrist and 

balanced. According to the Razumkov Center’s poll, 

only 1.3 percent of the sample of respondents believed 

that Yushchenko’s government had fulfilled its election promises.141 The post-revolutionary apathy and 

overall disappointment with the incompetence of 

Yushchenko’s government to solve the vital problems 

of economic and social development of the country 

led to a comeback of the Orange Revolution underdog, Yanukovych, first as prime minister in 2006 and 

later, in 2010, as president. 

Under the current circumstances, political stability is understood in Ukraine as the peaceful dialogue 

and political consensus between the opposition and 

the government. Ideally, the process of political communication between various political factions can be 

safeguarded by strong democratic institutions, such 

as parliament, making viable decisions and supervising their fulfillment. Due to the highly volatile domestic content before and immediately after the Orange 

Revolution, the Ukrainian political establishment is 
71

looking for a high predictability of governance. One 

possible explanation for this is that the political environment in Ukraine, especially after the failure of 

the results of the revolution to live through the next 

elections, had become more insensitive, more thickskinned to withstand the influences of the political 

processes. There is, however, an important difference 

between political predictability and political stability. While in both cases the political environment is 

shielded from internal and external disturbances, 

political stability offers the continuity of political 

processes, whereas political predictability offers the 

ability to predict political processes via institutional 

mechanisms of power retention; all other instances 

of hypothetical political change connote political 

unpredictability. 

From the point of view of internal political stability, the current situation in Ukraine is mostly immune 

from large-scale and unexpected transformation. This 

is achieved by high quasi-authoritarian resilience 

of the government, which, nevertheless, allows for 

some expressions of political deviance, unlike in Belarus. There is no catastrophic political or economic 

crisis, but the disillusionment of society is total after 

the disastrous outcomes of the revolution and their 

apathy for any repeated tries to change reality. The 

logic “we tried; it did not work; why bother again?” 

is overwhelming among the domestic polity. This is 

notwithstanding (or, perhaps, due to) the fact that the 

political sphere, the state apparatus, the judiciary, and 

the political parties are considered the most corrupt 

institutions in Ukraine.142 There are many in Ukrainian society willing to give up some of their freedoms 

to keep the country away from political instability, 

which negatively affects their economic well-being. 
72

At the same time, due to high political regionalization, the prospects for peaceful transition of power 

are quite vague. A domestic elitist environment is 

highly polarized, but paradoxically, interrelated and 

presents multiple forces of power each with its own 

agendas and lobbies. 

The human rights situation remains within the focus of many external actors, including human rights 

watchdogs and international organizations. The most 

conspicuous case is the ongoing imprisonment of 

Yulia Tymoshenko, former prime minister and current opposition leader. Her “alleged ill-treatment in 

prison where she is serving a 7-year sentence, and 

two of her former political allies,”143 raises the concerns of the EU and the United States. According to 

Freedom House: 

Ukraine suffered a decline for a second year due to 

the politically motivated imprisonment of opposition leaders, flawed legislative elections, and a new 

law favoring the Russian-speaking portion of the 

population.144

Tymoshenko still has her supporters who are not numerous but, nevertheless, represent a political power 

that cannot be neglected—over 18 percent of the voters support her party, Bat’kivshina (Fatherland).145

In Ukraine, internal political stability is not connected with the effectiveness of democratic institutions; it 

depends more or less on a strong economic base and 

absence of any significant political disturbances. Due 

to the overwhelming political and economic control 

of the current leadership, the chances for a forceful 

change of the ruling regime in the Orange Revolution 

style are quite limited, at least in the short run. Notwithstanding quite serious clashes between different 
73

clans and power interest groups, there is a high level 

of political predictability of Yanukovych’s “Party of 

Regions” not to yield its power to the opposition in 

any perceivable future. The government is highly resilient and monolithic with strong elites increasing 

family- and clan-based political fragmentation with 

the rest of the Ukrainian population. 

The absence of real and tangible change after 

the Orange Revolution had somewhat discredited 

the forces presently in the opposition. Failure of the 

revolution stiffled a previously active Ukrainian civil 

society, putting it into a lethargic sleep. Advocates 

for political transformations attribute this tenacity of 

the government to the overall passivity of the public. 

On the other side of the political spectrum, there is 

also no common vision and consensus on how political change would happen among opposition forces, 

which are separated by their internal quarrels. The 

most recent development in the Ukrainian political 

arena is the decision of Vitaliy Klichko, the world boxing champion and chairman of the pro-Western party, 

Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR), 

to run for the forthcoming March 2015 presidential 

elections, while calling for the rest of opposition leaders to unite.146 This, however, does not mean that the 

two remaining opposition candidates— Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Oleh Tyagnibok—will withdraw from the 

presidential race. The real opponent of Yanukovych, 

according to Victor Sumar, is neither of these candidates, but the dire “economic situation, social discontent, and numerous ‘discriminated’ businesses that 

can manage to support the opposition.”147

The process of democratic institutionalization in 

Ukraine is still undergoing growing pains. Here, individual trust prevails over organizational trust. This 
74

trust is, however, not stable, which reflects the changing loyalties to individual institutions. A part of the 

fluctuating preferences is that actors have chameleon 

loyalties to different institutions and may very easily switch their preferences, leading to high political 

unpredictability. This makes the domestic political 

environment extremely volatile. A peculiar nature of 

Ukrainian political culture is extremely low popular 

understanding of democratic institutions and their 

purposes. To a certain extent, this is due to the organizational behavior of incumbent government: political 

revenge. Not only does each incoming power get rid 

of most of the representatives of the former ones, it 

also engages in political persecutions. The most notorious cases are the imprisonment of Tymoshenko in 

2011 and Yuri Lutsenko, also the inspirer of the revolution and former Minister of Interior, in 2010 (pardoned in 2013); both were charged with corruption 

and embezzlement of public funds. 

Absence of a clear correlation between democracy 

and economic development can be explained by skyrocketing corruption and elitist economies. From the 

point of view of economic development, there is little 

economic stability due to the elitist nature of the business transactions. Since the economy does not benefit 

everyone, the biggest problem here is that there is no 

well-developed and established middle class, which 

is the backbone of any democratic society. According 

to the Razumkov Center, there is the phenomenon of: 

Ukrainian middle class [which] is emerging as a ‘new 

middle class’ in the Western perception of the term—

i.e., as the middle class whose social basis is made up 

by specialists (rather than owners).148
75

This means that the middle class is not self-sustainable in the long run and is very much project and 

program dependent. Among the factors impeding the 

flourishing of the middle class, the following can be 

mentioned: underestimated cost of labor, very high 

level of shadow social relations, and crisis of the state 

legal system. As a result, the authors of the article 

concluded: 

the middle class as the social backbone of civil society, 

not established yet, and the authorities of a state not 

ruled by law can be neither partners nor opponents, 

as they are estranged from each other and never meet, 

existing ‘in parallel worlds’.149

In addition to the uncertainty within the opposition ranks and the popular apathy, the government 

is also at a political limbo with regards to its foreign 

political course. External political stability of Ukraine 

depends on the balance between the two factors: the 

historical cultural, political, and economic influence 

of Russia, and the craving of Ukraine to join (return) 

to the family of European nations. The Russian factor has been both the positive and negative force in 

domestic Ukrainian politics, pressing on it politically 

and economically whenever it showed signs of drifting away from its geopolitical space. Russia traditionally has been one of the largest foreign investors in the 

economy of Ukraine, both by the amount of FDIs150 as 

well as other, less transparent investments. According 

to Boris Heifetz: 

Russian business owns in Ukraine four out of six oil 

refineries, almost all non-ferrous metallurgy plants; 

has its interests in the energy sector, steel industry and 

began expansion in engineering, chemical industry, 

and the financial sector.151
76

However, the money is invested not to contribute 

to economic development, but the contrary—to hinder it. A vivid example includes the shipyard Zarya in 

the Crimea, which was bought by the Russian United 

Shipyard Company, and its production is steadily 

decreasing not to present competition to Russian 

shipyards.152

The other foreign policy direction is towards the 

West and, more specifically, Europe. This part of 

Ukrainian identity is, however, quite weak. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Razumkov Center, Ukraine is considered a European country 

only historically and geographically—by other parameters, including economically, socially, politically, 

and culturally, the sample respondents considered 

Ukraine as a non-European country.153 Moreover, only 

12.3 percent of the respondents consider themselves 

Europeans.154 Ukraine is a part of the European Neighborhood Initiative (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership 

(EaP). It has a separate Partnership and Cooperation 

Agreement (PCA) with the EU to foster further integration. Ukraine is about to sign the next important 

milestone, the Associated Agreement with the EU, 

which will harmonize its economic, political, and cultural basis with the latter.

The Ukrainian government is trying to keep the 

visibility of balanced policy, showing clear aspirations 

towards ultimate membership in the EU but, at the 

same time, signing the Memorandum on the Observer 

Status in the Customs Union with Russia.155 On the one 

hand, this is a nonexistent status in a nonexistent entity, which brings no tangible benefits to Ukraine, even 

in the long run. On the other, however, with this step, 

Ukraine pledged not to undertake the steps that could 
77

harm the Customs Union, which is directly against the 

Euro-integration process, which, on its own account, 

is quite sluggish. For its part, Russia does not refrain 

from using the economic tools of its soft-power pressure on Ukraine to keep it within its own spheres of 

influence. An example of such economic blackmail is 

the recent ban imposed on all Ukrainian imports to 

Russia.156

Another part of the external political stability is 

covered by the NATO factor. Mykola Sungurovskiy 

noted several obstacles to the successful Euro-Atlantic 

integration of Ukraine: 

[a]bsence of national consensus and consolidation of 

political forces and society; lack of political will and 

strategic management at the level of state administration [and] the influence of the ‘Russian factor’.157

Even after the Soviet Union, NATO remains the 

major security threat for many in the eastern parts of 

the country. According to one of the public opinion 

polls, most Ukrainians (61.9 percent) do not support 

NATO enlargement,158 and this number is traditionally higher in the Eastern regions under the predominant Russian political, cultural, and economic influence. Another 44.5 percent of respondents think that 

Ukraine should abandon its plans to join NATO,159 and 

numbers of those who would not support Ukraine’s 

accession to NATO has always been very high.160

Inability of current Ukrainian government to 

choose a foreign policy course and strictly adhere to it 

(due to multiple reasons) shows the political dualism 

inherent to the Ukrainian political culture. According 

to Pavel Haydutski, in Ukraine: 
78

[s]ome give priority to the European vector, others—

Eurasian. However, all [are] trying to appeal to the 

public’s opinion and manipulate them. Today, in addition to studying public opinion on this matter, the 

legal mechanisms—the referendum—can be enacted. 

As a result, Ukraine, in fact, moved even closer to the 

danger of the split society.161

The “identity split and confusion of values”162 is also 

mentioned by Mikola Riabchuk in his analysis of the 

Ukrainian political future. 

Under the current political realities of weak and 

segmented opposition, a strong grip on power of 

the current leadership and political lethargy of the 

masses, the domestic political climate is notable for 

its high predictability, at least for the short run. Notwithstanding some internal friction between various 

interest groups and oligarchs within the ruling regime, domestic political landscape has some degree of 

stability. Under the contemporary Ukrainian realities, 

political stability is achieved by means of an intractable government not conducive to political change, 

which is very close to the definition of political stability used here. At the same time, there are some signs 

of the “Party of Regions” losing control over Kyiv 

and other central areas. The future of the retention of 

power within the close cycles of the “Party of the Regions” is through keeping Yanukovych in power for 

another term or coming up with his approved successor for the subsequent elections round. With all the 

growing popular discontent among the politically 

active population, the propensity for the Ukrainian 

political establishment to witness its own version of 

Lukashenka is quite low. 
79

Georgia.

The real test for democracy happened in Georgia in 

October 2012. The United National Movement (UNM) 

party under President Saakashvili lost the parliamentary elections to its main contender, the “Georgian 

Dream,” headed by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, 

who made most of his fortune in Russia. By publicly 

acknowledging the defeat during the parliamentary 

elections, Saakashvili’s government showed high 

“democratic resilience.” According to a Human Rights 

Watch report, the elections “marked Georgia’s first 

peaceful transition of power since independence,”163

which is a significant achievement in this turbulent 

country, especially after the painful defeat in the war 

against Russia in August 2008. 

Freedom in the World 2013 mentioned Georgia as 

the “most notable positive political development in 

Eurasia” but also pointed out the post-election political persecutions of the opposition: 

Georgia, which experienced its first orderly transfer of 

power to the opposition through democratic elections, 

finished the year on a less than satisfying note after the 

new government quickly arrested some 30 officials of 

the previous government, raising concerns about politically motivated prosecutions.164

The Georgian opposition throughout the years has 

been known for having maximalist agendas. Since the 

early days of independence, the opposition has been 

trying not only to mend the shortcomings of the former governments, but also to destroy completely its 

achievements. Saakashvili’s reign was remarkable for 

epic anti-corruption trials and prosecution of former 

government officials, with eventual dismantling of 
80

Shevardnadze’s “Citizens’ Union” party. Ivanishvili’s 

current government continues this line of politically 

motivated revenge by imprisoning former government figures, the most notable including the ex-Minister of Interior Kakha Targamadze, who was considered for a while as the front-runner for Saakashvili’s 

party in the October 2013 presidential elections. 

The notion of political stability is understood in 

Georgia as the predictability of future political development and the political continuity of powers. This 

means both the stability of a single political power 

within the constitutionally allowed framework and 

the anticipatory nature of governance, as well as the 

general sustainability of political environment as a 

whole. Georgia is on the path towards democratic 

institutionalization, which is more conducive to longterm political change, at least allowing for short-term 

political disturbances. Institutions as “systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure 

social interactions”165 set the “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social 

interactions”166 for their actors. In terms of democratic 

institutionalization, these tasks are achieved by the 

fully functioning, transparent, and fully accountable 

government apparatus, decreasing the propensity for 

the unstructured and/or forceful changes of governments and governances, and allowing for long-term 

political, cultural, and economic projects under the 

politically stable domestic climate. 

In Georgian realities, the mere existence of democratic institutions stipulated the presence of democracy. Having been a victim of multiple internal and 

external disturbances, there is an overwhelming 

consensus among Georgian society to avoid political 

extremes by prognosis of forecasting future political 
81

changes. In a February 2012 survey conducted jointly 

by the National Democratic Institute and the Caucasian Research Resource Center, the views on whether 

Georgia was a democracy or not were equally split 

between the respondents.167 From the point of internal political stability, considerable political maturity 

and political tolerance is required in order to provide 

for the fulfillment of democratic institutions. Instead, 

Georgia has been suffering for decades from political 

ambivalence. In a country where the political preferences of the electorate change with oscillating pendulum frequency, a political environment is stable only 

when it is based on a number of parameters. These 

parameters include a sustainable legal system protecting individuals and businesses from organized crime; 

a continuity of economic development through diversified business models; and protection of fundamental 

human rights and freedoms, including the freedom 

of opposition from political persecutions, is upheld. 

All these mean a developing political culture, i.e., the 

behavior of the actors within the legal institutional 

frameworks, which presupposes no frivolous interpretation of the institutional constraints.

Political stability in Georgia requires the presence of multiple political powers, which would create a healthy political competition with respect to the 

rules of engagement. Absence of these forces is, perhaps, one of the most important reasons for the low 

level of long-term political stability. There is no visible 

middle class to support democratic institutions. This 

point is very much in line with Lundell’s argument 

on economic development being the precondition for 

democratization.168 A well-established and vibrant 

middle class would further lead to sustainable and 

planned long-term political change since it would be 
82

more cautious to keep stability rather than biannual 

dramatic transformations. Long-term change will occur when democratic institutions are trusted and their 

decisions respected on a countrywide scale. 

Another peculiarity in Georgian politics is high 

individual versus low institutional trust. Because the 

new government has just started, at this point in time, 

it enjoys high trust from the electorate willing to allow 

it some time for political try-outs. According to the 

National Democratic Institute (NDI) public opinion 

poll conducted in March 2013, Bidzina Ivanishvili enjoys the highest trust of the people, alongside the head 

of the Georgian Church (75 percent and 92 percent, 

respectively), while the trust in Saakashvili is three 

times less (25 percent). Ivanishvili’s party also has 

more than 65 percent of trust of the Georgian population to solve vital issues, such as relations with Russia, 

economic development, healthcare, and law and order.169 This can be temporary, however, depending on 

the actual performance of the new institutional actors.

On the other hand, institutional trust in Georgia, 

while being low, is quite selective. The domestic polity believes in its institutions on the basis of their individual performance. According to the Freedom House 

issue of Nations in Transit 2012:

Confidence in the court system is slowly improving 

with 53 percent of respondents trusting the system in 

2011 compared to 22 percent in 2007. Courts are better 

equipped and funded and generally perceived as less 

corrupt.170

The existing political diarchy between Saakashvili 

and Ivanishvili, however, tears the political blanket 

in the country in futile attempts to draw and retain 

the choices of the electorate. The October 2013 presi-
83

dential elections mark an important milestone in the 

Georgian political history; they will show whether the 

country is ready for true democratic transformations. 

External political stability in Georgia is intimately 

linked with the restoration of its territorial integrity. 

There is common consensus that, until the areas of 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia are back under Georgian jurisdiction, the country will continue to experience phantom threats to its political stability from 

Russia. External stability, in the view of many Georgians, consists of three hypothetical parts: return of 

the secessionist territories; membership of the country in NATO; and a balanced foreign policy, which 

places Georgia firmly among the interests of the major 

regional players, Russia and the EU included. 

The first two parts of external stability are interchangeable and equally unattainable, at least in the 

perceivable future. If Georgia joins NATO, this would 

mean automatic inaction of the “one-for-all-and-allfor-one” Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This 

would inevitably draw the Alliance into political 

and possible military confrontation with Russia. The 

Greece-Turkey scenario over Cyprus would not be applicable here since Russia’s membership in NATO is 

far more unrealistic than that of Georgia. NATO tries 

to avoid this political and military gambit with Russia but simultaneously sends promising but misleading messages to Georgia. NATO’s General Secretary 

Anders Rasmussen recently said: 

[L]et me be clear. Meeting the requirements for NATO 

membership [for Georgia] must not be viewed only 

through a military prism. . . . As I look up the path 

ahead, I can see our shared destination of a stable and 

democratic Georgia at the heart of the Euro-Atlantic 

community. Georgia will become a member of NATO. 
84

But further work is needed to meet the requirements 

of membership.171

This is one among many encouraging verbiages 

NATO has been sending for years to Georgian 

leadership. 

In addition to its military nature, NATO has the 

mandate to support the democratization processes 

happening in the associated countries. Georgia is a 

member of the PfP program; it is involved in the Planning and Review Process (PARP) and has the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) for NATO membership. Georgia has repeatedly “declared NATO 

membership aspirations”; it has fully participated in 

NATO-led International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) in Afghanistan and the Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR in the Mediterranean. Finally, there is a special NATO-Georgia Commission to oversee the possible accession process. On the other hand, NATO has 

to understand that Georgian membership will bring it 

back in confrontation with Russia, who views Georgia 

and, largely Caucasus, as its arrière-cour, and NATO as 

its chronic nemesis. 

The last part of the external stability—a balanced 

foreign policy—is also quite difficult to achieve. Georgian partnership with the EU is framed by a number 

of legal instruments, such as the Partnership and 

Cooperation Agreement (1999) and the European 

Neighborhood Policy Action Plan. It is involved in the 

negotiations over the association with the EU, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement,172 although much will depend on the will of 

the Georgian leadership. Being less under the direct 

pressure from the EU’s main competitor than Ukraine 

and Russia, Georgia can freely advance on the path 
85

towards fuller integration with the EU, provided there 

is high commitment of the current government. 

Finally, the discrepancy between a high level of 

democracy and low levels of political stability and 

economic development, which goes contrary to the 

“democratization hypothesis,” can be explained by incongruence between form and contents of democratic 

institutions. Immediately after independence, Georgia took the path towards building democratic governance with its standard attributes, such as separation 

of the branches of power, free and transparent judiciary, law and order organizations, including the Ombudsman’s office, and their relevant agencies. These 

institutions proposed by Western organizations, including the U.S. Government and the EU, as a means 

of democratic revival of the post-Soviet nations from 

communism, found a very receptive environment in 

Georgia. However, their contextual side—the essence 

of democratic institutions—has been lagging behind 

its formative part. 

Belarus.

Belarus is a communism incarnate, with most of 

its spirit and letter, including the notorious abbreviation “KGB,” a watchdog of state security. The Soviet 

Union has not lost its relevance for the contemporary 

Belarusian political environment. According to Balazs 

Jarabik and Alastair Rabagliati: 

Lukashenka exploited the nostalgia many Belarusians 

felt for the Soviet Union over a long period of time, 

although in reality he was busy building a new system 

of power, one which is different, both institutionally 

and functionally, from the Soviet model.173
86

Once in power, Lukashenka cut down all possible 

forms of a free country while leaving the domestic political landscape deprived of its early aspirations for 

a democratic state. The human rights violations became an inherent part of the system of governance in 

Belarus. World Report 2013 informs: 

The government severely restricts freedom of expression. Most media is state-controlled, and television, 

radio, and internet censorship is widespread. Authorities continue to harass independent journalists for 

their work, including through arbitrary arrests, warnings, and criminal convictions. Journalists face great 

difficulties obtaining accreditation.174

As a matter of political control over the opposition, Wilson mentions the existence of secret “death 

squads” operating in Belarus since the late-1990s.175

Notwithstanding mostly repressive tactics, the 

domestic political environment was not always cloudless for Lukashenka. Time and again, protesters appear united in the common aspiration to ignite regime change. These opposition actors were, however, 

quickly suppressed, with subsequent harassment of 

the general population to prevent the expressions 

of disagreement. The failed “Jeans Revolution” in 

2006,176 an analogy with the revolutions in Georgia 

and Ukraine, was a response to the rigged presidential 

elections leading to suppression of the opposition and 

imprisonment of its leader, Alexander Kozulin, with 

charges of “hooliganism and incitement to mass disorder.”177 The public rallies were repeated during the 

2010 presidential elections, when about 700 protesters, 

among them seven presidential candidates, were sentenced with similar charges. Some of them, including 

presidential candidate Andrei Sannikov, sustained 
87

serious bodily injuries.178 The websites of opposition 

parties and groups were hacked and taken down, and 

their leaders thrown in jail.179 According to the Independent's report, Lukashenka’s “security forces have 

gone after his opponents with a ferocity that would not 

have looked out of place in Soviet times.”180 Another 

cycle of protests hit Belarus in 2011, with thousands 

of people demanding Lukashenka’s resignation.181 As 

a result, the regime outlawed further assemblies and 

public gatherings.

Political stability has its peculiarities in Belarus. 

The authoritarian resilience keeps all the political processes under its strict control, which diminishes the 

propensity for popular upheaval. The current high 

level of stability in Belarus is explained by growing 

internal contradictions in the economic and political 

structures. Vertical authoritarian model copes well 

with standard situations of domestic shocks and is 

largely immune to external challenges, too, but is not 

very capable of evolving and solving crises. Economic 

shocks extrinsic to the political system (global crisis of 

2009 and the domestic crisis of 2011) require responses in the form of modernization and reform, but they 

can undermine the foundation of the most authoritarian systems. In other words, a systemic change is 

required, but the system is not used to such changes. 

In essence, the notion of “political stability” can be applied to the vitality of Lukashenka’s regime per se and 

not the ability of the country to survive the external 

and internal shocks. Belarus is among those consolidated authoritarian regimes, especially with a high 

degree of legitimacy (but not legality), which quite 

naturally would show “better” results from political 

and economic standpoints than the number of liberal 

democracies. 
88

Political stability in Belarus, thus, depends on two 

factors: the autocratic leadership of Lukashenka (internally) and Russian economic subsidies (externally). 

The internal stability is explained by the iron-fist politics of Lukashenka, who created one “of the world’s 

most repressive states,”182 and with its systematic human rights violations and stifling of the freedoms of 

the Belarusians, which dissuaded them from any expressions of free will. The Belarusian paradox is in legitimizing the governance regime—”fitting” it within 

the polity—by the high level of authoritarian leadership of a single autocrat, by suppressing the civil and 

political freedoms and liberties, and by allowing for 

the development of socio-economic parameters of the 

country. This paradox, at first glance, refutes the thesis on the middle class being the backbone for democracy. Unlike most of the countries where the middle 

class prefers to keep democratic governance because 

it would allow it to have a better future via protecting 

their freedoms and economic interests, in Belarus the 

middle class is credibly harassed by Lukashenka to a 

point where it prefers to keep the situation as it is in 

fear that it could get worse. 

An overview of the study, “Social Situation in Belarus in 2009,” conducted by the Belarus Institute of 

Strategic Studies,183 gives a good picture of the total 

political and economic stagnation in the country. Most 

of its respondents (39.5 percent) do not anticipate any 

changes in their economic well-being and 54 percent 

do not worry about losing their jobs in coming years. 

Of the respondents, 58.9 percent believe that nothing 

has changed in the state’s support in times of economic crisis; 46 percent are satisfied with what the government does with varying degrees of problems. Out of 

those who are not happy with the government, 37.9 
89

percent do not think that anything can be changed, 

and 48.8 percent do not think that public uprising is 

possible due to the worsening of the economic situation, whereas 52.4 percent absolutely deny their participation in the riots and demonstrations. A total of 

54.8 percent do not want to go on strike; 44.5 percent 

will not sign any petition or appeal to the government; 

47.5 percent will not help the families of the protesters; 

and 67.0 percent will not participate in any forceful 

actions against their government. At the same time, 

48.4 percent do not plan to immigrate, of which 26.9 

percent do not want to leave because they are happy 

with what they have. 

Given a relatively high degree of forced legitimacy of the political regime and despite the repeatedly 

rigged elections at all levels, the weakness of the political opposition and dissent in society, and the apparent 

cohesion of the ruling elite, the stability of the current 

political regime appears to be high. By a systematic 

policy of repressions, Lukashenka dissuaded any political activity that deviates from his approved course. 

The Human Rights Watch states that currently “[a]t 

least 12 political prisoners remain jailed. Allegations 

of torture and mistreatment in custody persist.”184 According to the study conducted by the Independent 

Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Research, the 

predominant number of respondents (60.7 percent) 

believe that everybody is afraid to express their political views. With that, most of the respondents (51.1 

percent) consider that human rights are provided; 68.1 

percent claimed that the government did not abuse 

their rights; and only 26 percent think that their rights 

were violated.185 The resulting stagnation in political thought is overwhelming and omnipresent in the 

daily lives of people and in the country’s economy, 
90

where the government-based racket stifles small and 

medium businesses. 

Among the positive traits of the current regime 

is the coverage of the primary needs of the population, which, on the one hand, discourages ordinary 

citizens from taking political actions in protection of 

their rights. This is the clear case where economic benefits significantly overweigh political ones. According 

to another study of the same think tank, most people 

(42 percent) view an ideal country as the one in which 

they can be successful and make good money. Similarly, on the question, “What would you do if you 

were the president in a country with hardships and 

unhappy people?” 41.6 percent answered that they 

would create the conditions where citizens could be 

successful and make good money,186 while 72 percent 

of the respondents consider themselves supportive of 

the current government.187

Belarusian developmental authoritarianism is 

based on a comparatively better economic and social 

situation and on the control over larger industries and 

businesses by the close circle of elites. The Index of 

Democracy 2011 notes: 

rampant corruption, small elites control the bulk of 

their nations’ assets, institutions have been corroded 

by the effects of minerals-based development (the Belarusian regime depends on Russian subsidies), and 

governance and social provision are poor.188

All these became possible by the: 

state control over the economy [which] allowed 

President Lukashenka to starve opponents of resources and black-knight support from Russia [which] limited the regime’s vulnerability to Western democratizing pressure.189
91

Belarusian elites are under Lukashenka’s absolute 

control and enjoy his somewhat patrimonial approach 

and the divide-and-rule policy which prevents them 

from being too independent. As Alexander Feduta 

claims, Lukashenka, being the sole ruler of Belarus, 

did not consider it wise to steal from himself. He 

viewed “the whole country as his household, and a 

good boss of the household, which Lukashenka considers himself to be, does not steal his own stuff.”190

Due to the close nature of the Belarusian businesses to external oversight, the full extent of corruption 

is unknown. Some information on the shadow deals 

and the political persecutions in Belarus, nevertheless, sporadically appears mostly in the Russian press, 

when its Russian patrons are upset with Lukashenka’s 

performance. This was the case with the information 

about the corruption and political pressure, as well as 

on Lukashenka’s lavish lifestyle and the shadow gains 

of his pocket oligarchs.191 The same was true with the 

movie that was supposedly a political blockbuster in 

Russia, Godfather, in which the pro-governmental Russian TV station NTV talked about mysterious disappearances and assassinations of political opponents to 

the regime and also quoting Lukashenka’s statements 

on Hitler’s regime being a model for his own governance.192 Interestingly enough, the movie was made 

in 2010, and the events it covers go back to 1999; this 

shows the level of political manipulations and control 

between the two “brotherly” nations. In return, the 

Belarusian state channel ONT had a special program, 

which criticized Putin’s propaganda drive in a Russian car and openly calling him “a fool on the road”193

in reference to his test-driving a new Lada. 
92

Despite these occasional mutual stings, Russia, for 

the most part, has been the biggest actor contributing to political stability of Lukashenka’s regime and 

accounting for its highest level of economic development among the three countries. In 2011, Russia had 

more than 75 percent of the FDIs in the economy of Belarus.194 In 2012, the FDIs decreased by almost a quarter,195 but, nevertheless, the share of Russia was the 

highest: 46.7 percent.196 For example, in 2009, Russia 

invested U.S.$4 billion in the Belarusian economy.197

In 2011, Belarus became the sixth-most attractive foreign investment location for the Russian capital.198

The politics and economy in Russian-Belarusian relations are entangled to a point when Lukashenka’s 

domestic political support closely correlates with the 

fluctuation of Russian’s financial backing. According 

to Margarita Balmaceda, the Russian oil giant “Lukoil supported Lukashenka’s 2001 reelection campaign in exchange for promises that Naftan [the major 

Belarusian state-owned oil company] would be privatized. . . .”199 So-called “rent relations” with Russia are 

used to support the government at a level sufficient to 

ensure the loyalty of the majority of the population. 

The Belarusian government can, thus, provide for a 

higher growth of welfare of its population (and, hence, 

a greater degree of forced legitimacy) than more democratic governments in other post-Soviet countries 

(including Ukraine and Belarus), which do not have 

such lavish and immediate external rents and try to 

foster economic development primarily through the 

implementation of structural long-term reforms. 

Because of the systematic policy of eliminating 

political rivals, Lukashenka’s governance faces no 

internal threats due to virtually absent systemic opposition and no external threats by too weak and un-
93

willing external actors. The EU has lost active interest 

in Belarusian politics since freezing of the EU-Belarus 

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1997. 

Currently, the EU pursues what it calls a “policy of 

critical engagement”200 in Belarus through supporting 

the civil society development and imposing economic 

and travel sanctions on the country and its leadership. 

These two factors—coercive legitimacy and external political “calm” achieved through autocratic 

resilience and support/inaction of the third parties, 

respectively—made the current system developed by 

Lukashenka quite stable. In the short-term, stability 

increased with deliberate restrictions imposed on the 

development of democracy based on a noncompetitive model of the public interest (corporatism). In the 

longer-term, various elites would inevitably grasp 

their interests, which under the conditions of the crisis 

of the personal model of stability (inevitable death of 

the leader whom the stability of the system is clinging 

on) can become destabilizing. In such a crisis situation, 

the main factor in the stability of the system can be 

the interference of external forces (mostly from Russia 

and less so the EU and the United States). The main 

question is whether the national institutions and, in 

particular, the ruling political elites will have enough 

time during the personal dictatorship to develop and 

fully perceive their interests via proposing acceptable 

successors. 

POLITICAL CULTURE MATTERS

Three separate types of political behavior different from the communalistic ideology-infused political cultures started to develop in Ukraine, Georgia, 

and Belarus soon after their independence. While in 
94

all three cases, the process of defining their political 

egos happened through revival of historical roots, 

for the future identity constructs, the three nations 

had developed distinct political cultures. These political cultures—flexible (open and allowing change in 

Georgia), bifurcate (undetermined and ambiguous in 

Ukraine), and latent (dormant and suppressed in Belarus)—developed sets of preconditions affecting the 

democratic institutionalization and political stability 

in different ways. 

The study of the three democratization projects 

received a dual correlation between their political cultures and the governance regimes. Not only does the 

political culture define the “fit” of the regime within 

the domestic polity (the citizens), but it also envisages the variations in the degrees of their durability. 

If the political culture is conducive to fluctuations, it 

will negatively affect the political stability, as it will 

be more open to the shifts within domestic polity and 

foreign influences than the political culture, which rejects change. In this latter case, political stability will 

be guaranteed by the regime type that predisposes 

specific behavioral patterns of its citizens. 

Economic development also affects political stability. The more visible and affluent the middle class is, 

the more it would prefer internal and external stability. 

From the point of view of internal stability, accumulated wealth and property can be decreased as a result 

of sporadic and uncontrolled processes of unexpected 

political instability, such as revolutions, riots, civil unrest, and coup d’états. This can also happen during the 

short-term change of government within democratically accepted frameworks, such as impeachments of 

presidents or stepping down of the incumbent governments. Politically less active but better-off masses 
95

would prefer political alterations, hoping for the 

positive changes in their lives. Generally, a well-to-do 

electorate would prefer peace to war since it would 

have more to lose then to win from the participation of 

its country in military actions (given their uncertainty) 

and would also come up with increased unity in the 

face of negative political externalities. 

Ukraine.

The evolution of Ukrainian political culture reflects 

the regional split between the West and the East. The 

roots for this conflicting bipolarity go back to the Brest 

Church Union in 1596, which divided the country into 

the Greek-Catholic (western) and Orthodox (eastern) 

regions. The signing of the Union and the subsequent 

religious schism led to a long and bloody struggle between the followers of the two Christian denominations in Ukraine and had far-reaching cultural consequences for the country as a whole. In modern times, 

almost all leaders of the country had the election slogans of closeness with Russia, giving the Russian language a status of second official state language, and 

with Russia’s political, economic, and moral support. 

At the same time, they continue to seek integration 

with the western political structures in hopes of receiving economic support.

This was the case of Yushchenko and later Yanukovych, as well as all other political leaders of smaller 

scale. Political flirtation with the West by expressing the desire for integration with Western political 

structures, including the EU and NATO, resulted in 

simultaneous rejection of such moves by “removing 

Ukraine’s aspirations to [NATO] membership from 

the list of the state policy priorities in the sphere of 
96

national security.”201 Such political oscillations turn to 

the detriment of the “other side” of the political orientation since Russia, too, demands political loyalty. 

As analyst Vadim Karasev, notes, “current UkrainianRussian relations are suffering from serious uncertainty, probably the biggest uncertainty for the entire 

period.”202 This was due to the fact that Ukraine has to 

make decisive steps in the nearest future in the direction of further integration with the EU, whereas Russia 

is pressing for Ukraine’s membership in the Customs 

Union, the two conflicting prospects for its political, 

cultural, and economic future. 

The Ukrainian political personality split suggests 

the general conceptualization of this phenomenon as 

the Ukrainian predicament, the core of its bifurcate 

political culture developed since the times of existence 

under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: to seek 

patrons abroad, instead of relying on the loyalty of local constituency. As it seems, for the purpose of attaining the domestic legitimacy, it is paradoxically transferred abroad to receive the legitimacy externally to 

prove it to the local constituencies. After having successfully risen to power, the leadership cannot abandon the modus operandi of playing on the two different 

boards and, eventually, both the external lobby-states 

and the domestic constituency become disillusioned 

in their political performance. 

Another significant part of the political culture 

in Ukraine is popular apathy born as the result of 

the omnipresent electoral fraud and the inability to 

achieve high political impacts on the popular level. 

The orchestrated mass “protests,” such as concerts 

or marches with paid participants holding banners 

of political parties they do not support, contribute to 

the public disillusionment of the potentially politi-
97

cally active citizenry and disbelief in their own ability to change things in the country. These facts stress 

the low levels of domestic legitimacy and efficiency 

of the governance and the self-destructive nature of 

current political culture, the political behavior, which 

is rather petty rent-seeking instead of being directed 

at attainment of long-lasting political capital and 

popular support. 

Georgia.

The centuries of foreign dominance forced upon 

Georgia a political culture that is highly adaptive to 

fluctuations of the geo-political environments. A possible explanation of this phenomenon could be its 

geographic location, which put Georgia at the junctions and overlaps of the traditions and interests of 

the Western and Eastern hemispheres. Nevertheless, 

it is not easy to pinpoint what accounts for frequent 

modifications in Georgian political culture and what 

made the Georgian political establishments so conducive to new political realities. A possible explanation 

is in external environment: the Georgian nation, having been under constant threats of annihilation from 

numerous invaders, had to adapt its political behavior 

constantly to the influence of external factors in order 

to survive physically. 

The existence of Georgia under Russian rule for 

more than 3 centuries is particularly notable from the 

point of view of the flexible identity of the Georgian 

political culture under the external influences. Ronald 

Suni very rightly pointed out the cultural change: 

In the half-century of Russian annexation of Eastern 

Georgia . . . Transcaucasian society was irreversibly 
98

transformed. The effects of the Georgian metamorphosis were fundamental and profound. . . . [W]ith the 

Russian occupation, a historical progress began that 

rent the fabric of traditional Georgian society, producing new opportunities and loyalties. . . . By the end of 

the first 50 years of Russian rule, the once rebellious, 

semi-independent dynasties of Georgia had been 

transformed into the service gentry loyal to their new 

monarch.203

This change turned to be quite durable: even after 

a short period of its independence, Georgia, having 

been annexed by the Soviet Union, forcefully or willfully, continued to follow its northern neighbor in the 

political, cultural, and economic choices. 

Another explanation for the pliable political culture is that Georgian society has been particularly 

known for its cultural openness and the ability to easily accept, test, and live through the newly proposed 

norms, be they cultural, economic, or political. The 

process of norm socialization, “of inducting actors 

into the norms and rules of a given community,”204 has 

always been easy for the Georgian establishment. A 

good example of this is the changing orientation of the 

Georgian elite after they had left the Turkish/Persian 

sphere of influence and fell onto the Russian one. This 

was revealed in the language selection, cultural assimilation, and incorporation of external traits in their 

everyday lives. 

The current Georgian establishment follows the 

path-dependence and the traditions of political versatility of its former leadership, including Shevardnadze’s political curtsy to Moscow on the sun rising 

from the north for the Georgians; Zurab Zhvania’s 

statement at the Council of Europe meeting in 1999, 

“I am Georgian and therefore I am European”; Saa-
99

kashvili’s craving for the NATO membership for 

Georgia; and more recently, the carefully pro-Russian 

stance of the new Georgian leadership. These last developments in the political orientation in Georgia can 

be seen in purely cultural and economic acts, such 

as sending the Georgian athletes to take part in the 

Universiade Games in Russia in the summer of 2013, 

participation of Georgia in the 2014 Winter Olympic 

Games in Sochi, as well as talks on possible resumption of imports of the Georgian to Russia banned well 

before the war of 2008. At the same time, Ivanishvili’s 

government made recently a serious political statement showing aspirations to join the Eurasian Union, 

a proposed political entity of selected former Soviet 

republics, including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—together with its breakaway 

regions.205 If taken, this step with all its grave consequences for the Georgian political orientation could 

possibly become the most significant departure from 

the 2 decade-old Georgian pro-Western political and 

cultural orientation. 

Belarus.

Unlike Georgia and, to a certain degree, Ukraine, 

the political culture in Belarus is limited-elitist, coercive, patrimonial, and mostly geographically homogenous. There is no regional political divide in Belarus, 

nor is the identity split as in Ukraine. The Belarusian 

political identity is not flexible to easily respond to 

change, as it is Georgia. It is quittist,

206 as Wilson describes, which signifies the highest possible level of 

apathy among the three countries. Whereas the Ukrainians had a limited chance to try and test the vox populi

in action, and the Georgians experienced its lasting ef-
100

fects after their respective revolution, Belarusians were 

never given such opportunity to enjoy the democratic 

freedoms due to the highly oppressive ruling regime 

almost immediately after their independence. The 

dormant and suppressed Belarusian political culture 

is clearly seen in such defeatist popular statements of 

the critics of democratization as “Belarus is not ready 

for democracy,” which, as Alexei Pikulik contends, 

“are not just a way to secure ideological legitimization, but also a sincere belief of a significant part of the 

country’s political class.”207 Here, too, unlike in Georgia and Ukraine, the polity prefers stagnant political 

stability to uncertain but vibrant change. 

Another side of the political culture in Belarus is 

“limited-elitist” due to a lack of historically established interest groups and diverse elites who would 

engage in political interplay that would include potentially wider cycles of players. The benefits of the 

regime are provided to the small groups of individuals in or closely affiliated with the ruling circle. As a 

result of the highly paternalistic and feudal political 

culture developed under Lukashenka, the elites do not 

possess the real power to influence the domestic political environment. There are no significantly strong 

personalities or charismatic figures, let alone opposition leaders (not jailed), who would possess enough 

political gravitas to instigate cultural change among 

the electorate. The regime simply “buys the loyalty” 

of those groups who may be affected by economic liberalization, which is identified with democratization. 

This is evident on the level of external political stability, where large industrial enterprises and agricultural 

business are subsidized via lavish Russian donations. 

Russia supports the existing Belarusian politicaleconomic model via direct grants and loans, “energy 
101

rebates,” including in exchange for mostly symbolic 

military and political alliance with the former. 

The political culture in Belarus is also “minimalist” 

in a sense that the domestic institutional actors prefer 

the token satisfaction of the primary needs in fear that 

“it could get worse.” In comparison to the post-independence economic, social, and political chaos of most 

of the ex-Soviet republics, including the civil wars in 

Georgia and economic hardships in Ukraine, the people in Belarus choose to have minimal but guaranteed 

benefits offered by their government rather than try 

to change the situation in pursuit of vague benefits. 

These include the average quality but free medical 

services; local enterprises making mediocre profits 

but not “owned” by foreigners, which signifies the 

perceived pride in independence; state-owned enterprises offering more stability than private ones; and 

predominant popular preferences for lower wages, 

but with guaranteed jobs.208 The minimalist political 

culture, according to Silitski, is: 

[a] replica of the old Soviet one, but at a lower level 

of incomes with the following common expression 

regarding democracy, ‘We don’t need this democracy 

with hullabaloo. We need a democracy when a person works, earns some wages to buy bread, milk, sour 

cream, sometimes a piece of meat to feed his baby’.209

Such a stance is well aligned with the preferences 

of the majority of the local polity for economic benefits 

as opposed to political freedoms. 
102

DEMOCRATIZATION THROUGH “REGIME 

MIMICRY” 

Most of the modern societies that had sprung up as 

a result of the imperial collapses, including the postSoviet nations, do not try to reinvent the wheel. They 

all tend to adopt already existing and tested governance frameworks, which are mostly democratic. Their 

choice for the governance regimes is mainly based on 

two considerations. On the one hand, the new nations 

reveal purely rational anticipation of political and economic benefits concomitant upon joining the newly 

acquired hosts of like-minded but developmentally 

advanced nations. This is what James March and Johan Olsen call the “logic of expected consequences” 

when institutional actors make their choices in pursuit of increased anticipated utility. The other reason 

is contained in the wish to “look alike” with the rest 

of the democratic community of states by copying/

pasting their democratic structures and institutions 

that had proved effective there and, thus, should, in 

principle, achieve the same success in the local political, economic, and cultural environments. Such a behavior is based on the “logic of appropriateness”: the 

countries consider it suitable to adopt the norms, rule, 

and practices of the democratically advanced societies 

because this is how they start viewing themselves.210

There can be, of course, the combination of both choices, and the variable of political culture is fundamental 

in understanding the rationales behind them since it 

defines the modes of responses of democratizing nations to external and internal institutional challenges. 

The choice goes for democratic institutions as opposed to those of other regimes because, through its 

institutional mechanisms, it provides most of the po-
103

litical stability in the long run and creates more durable conditions for the economic development of the 

policy. The regimes created in Georgia and Ukraine 

fall under the category of “hybrid,” which are not 

yet fully democratic but already not completely authoritarian (and the qualitative and quantitative data 

gathered here confirms that). In the year preceding 

the Rose Revolution, Lucan Way and Steven Levitsky 

placed Ukraine (Georgia was absent from the analysis) within the “competitive authoritarianism” subsection of the “hybrid regimes” since their: 

formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as 

the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so 

often and to such an extent, however, that the regime 

fails to meet conventional minimum standards for 

democracy.211

In the same issue, Larry Diamond placed Georgia 

and Ukraine into the category “ambiguous regimes” 

because they had “the form of electoral democracy 

but fail to meet the substantive test, or do so only 

ambiguously.”212

The essential peculiarity of “hybrid regimes” is 

that they would allow for a limited degree of democratic expression of political choices of their constituencies without proper democratic internalization. The regimes, such as in Kuchma’s Ukraine and 

Shevardnadze’s Georgia, allowed for comparatively 

higher degree of political freedom.213 Fully authoritarian regimes, such as in Belarus, rule with an iron fist 

and prevent any possible expression of political will, 

thus are more politically stable. However, they, too, 

choose the democratic facades. There, the political stability depends directly on the physical well-being of 
104

an autocrat and the degree of effectiveness of public 

coercion. As soon as the authoritarian regimes allow 

for some signs of political competition, skillful “norm 

entrepreneurs,” such as Yushchenko and Saakashvili 

and later Ivanishvili, start to appear on the political 

scene and attempt to change the situation. 

Implementation of the three democratization scenarios in Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus is based on 

the externally provided blueprints. The democratic 

institutional frameworks are transplanted into their 

domestic realities by means of regime mimicry—a 

comprehensive process of political, economic, cultural 

identity change. This process is similar to isomorphic 

mimicry in biology, where “one organism mimics 

another to gain an evolutionary advantage.”214 An 

example of isomorphic mimicry is a frog, Lithodytes 

lineatus (commonly known as Sapito listado), living in 

Pan-Amazonia. Lithodytes is a harmless creature that is 

often confused with a highly poisonous Allobates femoralis. During the process of physical evolution, Lithodytes had adopted the form of its poisonous look-alike 

without its poisonous content to avoid being eaten by 

other creatures. In biology, this phenomenon is given 

the following explanation, “individuals of a more palatable species (mimic) gain advantage by resembling 

members of another, less palatable species (the model)”215 in order to evolve into a seemingly dangerous 

form (usually a predator) to attain increased protection from other predators, while retaining the nonmalevolent content. 

The scholarship on organizational management 

and economic development extends the notion of 

mimicry to such actors as “key suppliers, resource and 

product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other 

organizations that produce similar services or prod-
105

ucts”216 from more developed countries. Here, the “[o]

rganisations can mimic other organisations without 

having evidence that mimicry would actually increase functional performance.”217 According to Lant 

Pritchett et al.:

[O]rganizations adopt—‘modern’ or—‘best practice’ 

forms or notional policies even when these are not 

followed up by, or are even consistent with, actual 

functional performance in the context of a given organization’s actual capability for policy implementation. 

Moreover, these carbon-copy organizations are then 

asked to perform tasks that are too complex and/or 

too burdensome, too soon.218

Furthermore, Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell 

talk about several types of organizational isomorphism: coercive isomorphism (formal and informal 

pressure on domestic organizations by their external 

counterparts and by cultural expectations of own society); mimetic isomorphism (when domestic organizations vaguely see their functions, they adopt the forms 

of other organizations hoping that what works there 

would work at home); and normative isomorphism

(when organizational actors blur the distinction between organizational commitment and professional 

allegiances).219 The difference between isomorphic 

and organizational mimicry is that while the former 

renders a life-saving service to its actor, the latter, on 

the contrary, fails the actor: isomorphism helps the 

species to survive and the organizational mimicry 

offers an ineffective remedy to the organizations by 

focusing on the formative and not contextual sides of 

the matters. 

In matters of public governance, both “hybrid” and 

“authoritarian regimes” opt for the democracy to sur-
106

vive in new and vastly unfamiliar settings of the institutional jungle into which they were plunged. The regime mimicry develops where the whole governance 

regime mimics the advanced democratic institutions 

and notionally reflects the externally implanted and 

not organically developed rules, norms, and practices. 

In the field of democratic institutionalization, the regime mimicry would mean adoption of comprehensive forms of institutions of democratic governance 

(courts and the legal system, in general; offices of 

Ombudsmen; systems of human rights protection; 

elections; local self-governance agencies, etc.) without the full “lifecycle” of their socialization. This usually happens when newly independent nations, after 

the painful process of gaining sovereignty, suddenly 

side with the institutions of other countries that have 

been developed in the process of cognitive evolution. 

These nations are faced with the painful normative 

conundrums of defining their developmental paths 

and, while making the choice towards democracy, 

adopt the institutions of more democratically developed countries without proper grasp of their purpose 

and content. 

Countries engage in regime mimicry for a variety 

of reasons. They may adopt practices of the institutions foreign to their popular “fit” because they would 

expect to receive purely tangible benefits from “joining 

the club” of democratic countries. These benefits may 

include developmental milestones through increased 

socialization with the countries whose institutions are 

adopted, such as memberships in international organizations (for instance, in the World Trade Organization 

[WTO] or NATO) through implementing institutional 

reforms. In this case, the mimicking countries will follow the “logic of expected consequences.” They may 
107

also mimic the existing structures and undertake the 

reforms because they started associating themselves 

with the advanced democratic countries they want to 

look like. Here the benefits may also be available, but 

they are not the primary rationale for the regime mimicry; it is the identity construct that matters in building associations with other regimes. Such a behavior 

follows the “logic of appropriateness.” 

For a case comparison, consider the EU’s external 

conditionality as an example of the externally provided institutional frameworks. Frank Schimmelfennig 

and Ulrich Sedelmeier identify three models of acceptance of institutional learning: the external incentives 

model, which “follows the logic of consequences and 

is driven by the external rewards and sanctions”; the 

social learning model, which follows the logic of appropriateness and emphasizes identification with the 

institutional model and “the legitimacy of its rules as 

key conditions for rule adoption, rather than the provision of material incentives”; and the lesson-drawing model, in which states adopt the “rules because 

they judge them as effective remedies to inherently 

domestic needs and policy changes rather than out of 

consideration about the incentives.”220 In this process 

of institutional socialization, the EU conditionality 

policies, or the acquis communautaire, create rational 

choice or identity-based frameworks for the countries 

to adopt the relevant institutions. 

There is a fundamental difference between organizational and regime mimicries. Because of the sectorspecific nature of the former, duplication of the externally imposed designs without essential touch with 

the domestic political, economic, and cultural grounds 

leads to their ultimate failure due to the low level of 

their holistic socialization. The functional spillovers 
108

within and across organizational and functional areas 

are possible, of course, and they may succeed up to 

a certain point, as the neofunctionalist logic goes.221

But unless they include “specific socialization mechanisms (strategic calculation, role playing, normative 

suasion),”222 their area of application will be limited to 

the precise organizations and, even narrowly, to units 

within them.

The process of regime mimicry is a dangerous 

path: a developing country could be dragged into the 

vortex of mimicked settings and, furthermore, into 

state failure. According to Philipp Krause, a: 

[p]art of the reason fragile states are hopelessly stuck 

is precisely because they try to mimic the formal institutions of success, rather than figuring out the functions of statehood on their own.223

In order for the mimicry to be successful, it should 

fully and completely transcend the societal fibers and 

become an inherent part of the political cultures of 

the mimicking nations. Regime mimicry can, indeed, 

turn into full-scale cognitive socialization, and this is 

where its greatest paradox lies: the fuller the mimicry, 

the higher the chances for it to turn into full normative 

socialization that would eventually end the mimicry. 

Full mimicry exacerbates all three types of institutional learning models, as defined by Schimmelfennig 

and Sedelmeier, the types of spillovers and socialization patterns, and leads to the proper development 

of the normative “lifecycle” of democratization, including norm emergence, norm cascading, and norm 

internalization. The success of the regime mimicry is 

largely based on the ability of the countries to open 

up for the institutional change and not only to accept 
109

the proposed structured but, most importantly, to try 

to adjust them to their own realities. This is the crucial point in effective institutional change: increased 

mimicry accepted by the political elites would lead 

to the mutually interchanging process of adaptation 

of the mimicry to the societal “fits” and even deeper 

societal transformations of those “fits” for the nations 

in question. 

In the matter of democratic transformations following either of the two logics, the societies with the 

flexible political cultures adopt the proposed frameworks either because others do so and they want to resemble them, or they expect certain benefits from the 

process of change. The only difference is in durability 

of the change. In both cases, the adoption starts via 

mimicry since the host societies have no or limited prior experience of the proposed institutions—as was the 

case with Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus. At this stage, 

all three intervening variables will step in: the specific 

political culture, the force of external persuasion, and 

the economic condition of the target countries being 

under the influence of the specific logics guiding the 

agents of change.

The ideal condition for a full mimicry is the simultaneous existence of all three variables. For a country 

to start copying the institutional designs, there should 

be high enough external pressure on the parts of external and internal agents of change. In other words, the: 

[i]nternational organizations, local policy makers, and 

private consultants [should] combine to enforce the 

presumption that the most advanced countries have 

already discovered the one best institutional blueprint 

for development and that its applicability transcends 

national cultures and circumstances.224
110

The political cultures of the recipient societies should be highly conducive to change. Finally, 

countries must be economically more or less stabile 

to sustain the institutional change, which, as a transformation process, is always costly. These variables 

should be under the influence of both logics—appropriateness and consequentiality. This means that the 

societies should be both willing to identify themselves 

with the democratic institutions and be individually interested in receiving tangible benefits from the 

regime mimicry. 

Presence of these three factors will lead to full and 

successful regime mimicry. New norms would emerge 

that would further develop into stable behavioral patterns. Further along in the mimicry, the norms would 

start cascading—they would transcend through larger 

societal layers, allowing for the participation of the 

increased number of institutional actors. Finally, the 

essence of mimicry would gradually fade, and the 

democratic normative internationalization will take 

place. Here, the paradox of full mimicry means that 

acceptance of new external designs will eventually 

turn into the appearance of new contexts. 

The mimicry will be partial and less successful if 

either one, or all, of the three factors are absent. When 

the external pressure is low, i.e., when the agents of 

change approach the process negligently and halfheartedly, institutional design transfer will stumble 

upon the multiple external constraints, including the 

agents’ own budgets and their allocations for the institutional support, their organizational management 

constraints, and the election cycles, to name a few. If 

the domestic political cultures of the host societies 

are intractable, they will continue to reject the externally proposed institutional changes until this process 
111

stalls. When economies of the mimicking countries 

experience hardships, the regime mimicry might slow 

down at the norm socialization since the countries 

would not be able to support financially further reforms processes. Finally, when used separately by the 

host societies, the two logics would lead to skewed visions on the proposed change. The logic of expected 

consequences alone would signal the external actors 

that the host societies are not interested in a cognitive 

change and only have short-term mercantile expectations with the set-in-stone preferences. Similarly, the 

logic of appropriateness would alarm external actors 

who would assume that the “like identities” were too 

early to develop and are based on too shallow institutional grounds. It would indicate that without proper 

material constraints and interests, the host societies 

are internally too feeble and overly receptive to the 

proposed transformations and may easily change 

their preferences. 

In sum, unenthusiastically proposed institutions, 

coupled with the rigidity of the recipient countries’ 

political cultures without proper financial backing, 

together with the bifurcate approach to the behavioral 

logics, create only partial mimicry. This mimicry would 

allow for the first stage in the norm “lifecycle”—norm 

emergence—and would inhibit subsequent stages of 

institutional socialization through norm cascading 

and internationalization. The changes would remain 

a facade because they face the rigid political cultures 

and the unwillingness of the regime itself to permit 

institutional change. The normative lifecycle would 

stumble upon the roadblocks created by the ruling 

regime, which prevents it from full development. Partial regime mimicry would signify an even lesser degree of democratization since the created institutional 
112

change will be considerably less durable and will not 

even partially serve their purpose but will exist as a 

mere mockery. 

The way to overcome the problem of full or partial mimicry, i.e., to fill the form with the content, 

lies through a long-lasting and fundamental cultural 

change. Norm internalization will only happen under 

full-scale cultural transformations, which should transcend all the societal layers and sediment deep in the 

core of the individual identity of the nations. A good 

example of a successful internalization—and in quite 

a short period of time—is the transformation of Germany from supporting the Nazi regime into a democratic and egalitarian society shortly after World War 

II. For this process, two aspects are necessary. First, 

the external support in the form of knowledge transfers and economic assistance of the democratically developed nations to the newly democratizing societies 

will install and help sustain the institutional change 

through the norm emergence to the norm cascading. 

Second, the indomitable will of the nations and their 

governments, as the “norm entrepreneurs,” is needed 

not only to accept the institutional changes and live 

through them without altering their political direction, but also to make the change an inherent part of 

their future identity. If both of these variables are present, the process of regime mimicry will move beyond 

democratic norm cascading to their internalization by 

creating and sustaining the identity imprints. 

Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus are at various stages 

of democratization and engage in diverse types of regime mimicries. The early years of their independence 

were quite turbulent, institutionally speaking. The 

three countries were plunged into the unknown and, 

therefore, by default an unsafe regional and interna-
113

tional environment. No longer was the responsibility 

for decisionmaking and the behavior on the international arena being kept in Moscow: Ukraine, Georgia, 

and Belarus became individually in charge of their independent existence. The environment they appeared 

in at that time was highly unpredictable for them 

since they never fully existed as independent entities. 

In a habitat full of uncertainty and unpredictability, 

the three countries had chosen the institutional frameworks of democracy based on a number of reasons, 

which were different in each case. 

Regime Mimicry in Ukraine. 

In Ukraine, the process of democratic normative 

lifecycle was stalled at the stage of norm cascading. 

While local institutions have the designs and forms of 

democratic governance, they are not backed up by effectively conducted reforms, which will contribute to 

the normative spillovers in different areas. Some sectors are more advanced in their mimicry than others. 

The best example of this discrepancy, which is also 

within the separate components of the same sectors, 

is economic reforms. According to Marcin Święcicki: 

After 2 decades of transition, Ukraine is still far behind 

countries that joined the EU, including the three Baltic 

States, in economic reforms. . . . The most advanced 

areas in Ukraine’s transition to a market economy by 

2010 were small-scale privatization, price liberalization, and trade and the foreign exchange system. The 

least advanced were governance and enterprise restructuring, competition policy, and infrastructure.225
114

The same pessimistic tendency is noted in the case 

study, “Lessons from the Ukrainian Transition”: 

[P]ositive developments in reform were not accompanied by a level of structural reform sufficient to guarantee a return to real economic growth . . . or to eliminate widespread distortions, non-payment and barter 

transactions, and rent seeking, particularly in the energy sector and in energy-intensive industries. Moreover, the government tolerated, and even encouraged, 

non-monetary transactions and even, to some extent, 

non-payments.226

The start of the democratic institutionalization 

process in Ukraine was similar to most of the postSoviet republics: it, too, was expecting some benefits 

from joining the league of advanced European democracies. The external incentives model seemed to 

be working for Ukraine for quite some time. Out of the 

three models of isomorphism discussed previously, 

the first two—mimetic—was more applicable in the 

Ukrainian case. It has been receiving signals from the 

European community of having palpable advantages 

of behaving as democracies do, the most recent being the upcoming free trade agreement with the EU. 

Domestic actors also supported the democratic institutionalization to a point where more decisive steps 

should have been taken with regards to moving away 

from the external incentives toward the social learning and lesson-drawing model. There the process was 

interrupted by two factors: change of the government 

in Ukraine and the subsequent adjustments of the geopolitical orientation of the country after the failure of 

the Orange Revolution. 

The general political course of integration with 

the European structures was somewhat reversed after 
115

the government change in 2010 with the addition of a 

clearly pro-Russian direction. The democratic world 

continues to assist Ukraine with institutional support, 

but the effectiveness of the reforms is lowered by a 

number of factors. First of all, it is the considerably 

large size of the country when compared with Georgia and Belarus that makes it difficult to effectively 

affect the institutional settings. Next is the regional 

divide, which diversified the popular responses to the 

proposed change. Finally, it is the internal ambiguity 

within the institutional actors as to how the country 

should develop further and the fluctuation of the 

domestic political environment. 

This factor of geographic political preferences also 

affects the choice of the two logics. On the one hand, 

the government clearly sees the tangible economic and 

political benefits of democratic direction, including institutional socialization. On the other hand, however, 

the preferences are divided by the unique Ukrainian 

identity split between the West and the East, which 

prevents it from following both behavioral logics; it 

is impossible to credibly evaluate the pros and cons 

of either direction as well as to force the diverse parts 

of the country to follow a single course. The external 

incentives model that was working under the logic 

of consequentiality is further burdened by the fact 

of multiple rational preferences. The real question is 

whether Ukraine will eventually manage to mold a 

single political identity based on the mix of the two 

logics. This would also define the general political 

line: integration with the West/Europe or with the 

East/Russia. 

The regime mimicry here is partial, but it is still a 

preferred way of interaction between the institutional 

actors, on the one hand, and the international commu-
116

nity on the other. It is quite difficult to implement a 

change of political culture in such a large country as 

Ukraine. It would take much longer for the norm cascading and internalization due to the high diversity 

of the domestic political and cultural terrain. On the 

other hand, the relative rigidity of the Ukrainian political culture significantly contributes to the internal 

political stability of the country.

Regime Mimicry in Georgia. 

In the case of Georgia, the mimicry is complex and 

omnipresent since it transcends all societal layers and 

is present in most societal functions. Externally available institutional designs were proposed to Georgia 

by international organizations (such as the EU, NATO, 

World Bank, etc.) in the form of various institutional 

incentives and reforms (educational, military, healthcare, to name a few) via financial support and knowledge transfers. While these reforms started during 

Shevardnadze’s time, they accelerated with Saakashvili’s ascent to power and his rigorous implementation of them. 

From the point of view of the stimuli behind the 

regime mimicry, Georgia chose a combination of isomorphism—coercive, mimetic, and normative. It took 

the path towards democratization by combining the 

external incentives model (membership in international and regional organizations, grants, and credits) 

with the social learning (cultural change) and lessondrawing (internal development) models. In doing so, 

Georgia was guided by the symbiosis of the two logics. 

The logic of consequentiality brought in the rational 

choice reasoning of expected rewards associated with 

acceptance of the institutional designs (such as further 
117

integration into the European structures including its 

possible membership in NATO) and punishments following possible defection from the accepted normative behavioral patterns. The logic of appropriateness, 

on its part, fostered real cultural change via a mentality transformation from that of a corrupt post-Soviet 

republic into an advanced democratic nation.

Anti-corruption activity, judiciary reform, revision 

of taxation—these are a few examples of institutional 

norm emergence. The process of norm cascading started with the gradual transformation of Georgian society where the spillovers went beyond their functional 

areas and started affecting an increasing number of 

institutions. For instance, corruption, a typical Soviettype Georgian institution, was eradicated not only in 

law enforcement or judiciary but also in education, 

health, urban planning, etc. According to Alexander 

Kupatadze:

[C]orruption has been substantially reduced in sectors where citizens interact with the state more frequently, including registering property, acquiring 

passports and licenses, and the police and the tax 

administration,227

in other words, everywhere where socialization between the electorate and the regime was the highest. 

The process of full norm internalization, however, 

has not taken place yet. One reason is that the political 

culture requires a much longer period for cementing 

the change than the two election cycles after the Rose 

Revolution. The biggest change in the political culture 

of the Georgian elite was the nonacceptance of election fraud, which is widely spread in most post-Soviet 

societies. Jim Nichol called the 2012 parliamentary 

elections in Georgia “the first in the South Cauca-
118

sus resulting in competitive and peaceful transfer of 

power,”228 a totally different picture from all previous 

elections elsewhere in the Caucasus precipitated with 

various intricate forms of election fraud. For the norm 

internalization to have a long-lasting effect, the transformations should affect the deeper fibers of society to 

a point of no return to previously existing norms. 

Another factor decelerating norm internalization 

is emergence of the backward trends with Ivanishvili’s government, which engaged in political reversals, including the random amnesty of some 9,000 

prisoners sentenced during Saakashvili’s governance 

almost immediately after the elections229—politically 

motivated detentions and lawsuits against the former 

officials (such as former Minister of Interior Vano 

Merabishvili) and those associated with Saakashvili’s 

governance. These developments impede a full normative lifecycle from completion and prevent the regime mimicry from turning into the real democratic 

institutionalization. 

The norm diffusion became possible due to Georgia’s political culture, which is actively systaltic and 

constantly prone to change, both domestically generated or externally imposed. It is fluid and highly 

susceptible to adoption or “mimicking,” at various 

time junctions, the externally presented institutional 

arrangements of the governance regimes by the political elites. The pace of a normative “lifecycle” is quite 

high in Georgia. However, in order to bring the partial 

mimicry into full and transform it into complete norm 

internalization, two factors are necessary: unweathering external support and the iron will of the domestic 

institutional actors. Georgia does possess the first set 

of requirements for democratic norm internalization. 

The future of the domestic politics, more specifically, 
119

the October 2013 presidential elections and, especially, their aftermath, will show how committed those 

actors are to retain democratic designs. 

An unexpected but serious problem with regime 

mimicry can come from the side of external agents—

the institutions that are mimicked—which treat their 

mimicking counterparts the way a fully functioning 

institution should. They assume, in a way, that if the 

institutions are created or adopt democratic practices, 

they are democratic by definition. They put unbearable weight of democratic responsibility on the mimicking countries, which appear not to be ready for 

such a momentous burden. In doing so, they fail (or 

do not want) to assume that the recipient countries 

are simply mimicking them, and the change has only 

been a facade. The closing speech of NATO Secretary 

General Rasmussen following the meetings of NATO 

Defense Ministers on June 5, 2013, is notable with this 

regard. When asked about the recent politically motivated persecution of the political opponents in Georgia by a Georgian journalist, he replied: 

We are following these developments with great concern. . . . I made clear, and Ministers made clear, that 

we take it for granted that the Georgian authorities 

will fully respect the fundamental principles of rule of 

law and will guarantee due process.230

Such a conniving attitude, in a sense, assumes that 

mimicking countries have fully passed all the stages 

of democratic norm institutionalization and views 

them as properly functioning entities fully performing 

according to the standards of the copied institutions, 

which is not always the case.
120

Regime Mimicry in Belarus. 

In Belarus, regime mimicry is in its embryonic 

form—quite far from even norm emergence. The type 

of isomorphism that stands closest to the Belarusian 

model is mimetic. Under the conditions of inherent 

uncertainty on the international arena, which were exacerbated by the relatively “young” independent existence of Belarus, its governance has chosen democratic 

design as a formative model to follow without proper 

institutional socialization. The continuous autocratic 

reign of Lukashenka is cutting down any aspirations 

for coercive isomorphism: the regime is intractable to 

either internally initiated or rational stimuli or pressure imposed from outside. The external incentive 

model stopped working a long time ago when the advanced democracies were dissuaded in their attempts 

to bring Belarus into the host of Europe, where it belongs, normatively and geographically speaking. 

As early as in 1997, the EU froze its Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Belarus in 

response to: 

the political situation in the country—most recently 

the violations of electoral standards in Belarus’ presidential elections (2010) and the ensuing crackdown 

on civil society, political opposition, and independent 

media.231

This is because the autocratic governance coercively impedes the external incentives from being properly diffused among institutional actors who had never 

had a chance to enact the social learning, let alone the 

lesson-drawing models. None of the two logics were 

at work here: the benefits for acting democratically are 

not clearly visible or available for the domestic actors 
121

to start behaving appropriately. Belarusian autocracy manages to block successfully both the external 

support in the form of transfers of democratization 

designs and the institutional actors from expressing 

their free will for change. 

There are, of course, some signs of institutional designs of the democratic governance in Belarus, such 

as dispersed civil society and quite nominal human 

rights protection mechanisms. However, neither of 

them is fully efficient. Even worse so, they are sporadic, nonsystemic, and subject to strict internal oversight. Belarus has accepted democratic institutions 

mostly by their form, while utterly disregarding their 

contexts. For example, according to its constitutions, 

Belarus is “a unitary, democratic, social state based 

on the rule of law” where “[t]he individual, his rights, 

freedoms and guarantees to secure them are the supreme value and goal of the society and the State” and 

its people are “the sole source of state power and the 

bearer of sovereignty in the Republic of Belarus.”232 In 

reality, however, Lukashenka is the alpha and omega 

of domestic authority in the country, allowing for no 

contextual or substantial transfer of the institutional 

meaning. 

At the same time, Belarus, too, imitates the externally proposed institutional frameworks, but there 

is an important difference between the two types of 

mimicry. In Georgia and to a certain degree in Ukraine, 

this process is deliberate and rational. These countries 

experience the influence of external constraints and 

opportunities by accepting certain institutional frameworks. Here the difference is that the autocratic governance blurs Belarus’ vision of tangible benefits from 

full democratic institutionalization. The authoritarian 

political culture shows a significantly higher degree of 
122

rigidity than in Georgia and Ukraine. It has no strictly 

defined regional identity but fully depends on the will 

of Lukashenka, who tries to balance at the brink of different extremes for the personal benefits and those of 

his close cycle. 

With all the difficulty of dealing with Europe and 

the recent worsening of the relations with Russia over 

the possession of and control over “Belaruskali.” One 

of the Belarusian industrial giants producing significant amounts of world’s potassium.233 Belarus is turning for political and economic help elsewhere. The 

recent economic rapprochement with China (with the 

amount of U.S.$5.5 billion and another U.S.$30 billion 

in the future) marked another round in the political 

games of Lukashenka with the rest of the world. By 

calling China “the global empire,” “the leading power 

of the world,” and “the world’s center,”234 Lukashenka is sending clear political messages both to the West 

and Russia of keeping his options open and actively 

looking for a patron. This step signifies the political 

immaturity of Lukashenka’s regime, which negatively 

affects the process of international mimicry: the level 

of international involvement in Belarus in the form 

of institutional or fiscal support is extremely small 

and equally nonsystemic. Overall, the resistance to 

political evolution reflects the increased institutional 

path-dependency in Belarus in withstanding the environmental changes and preventing conscious institutional socialization. The pace of normative “lifecycles” there is lethargic and subject to the limitations 

of the Belarusian respective political culture, which 

makes its societies immune to multiple short-term 

regime changes. 
123

“INPUTS” VERSUS “OUTPUTS” 

In most of the advanced democracies, there is a 

dual connection between democratic governance and 

political stability. Democratic institutions with their 

norms, rules, and practices put in place centuries 

ago as a result of human evolution create the necessary conditions for both internal and external political 

stability. Democratic governance builds up the environment for equal political participation and fair 

treatment for all the citizens. A social contract existing 

in the democracies is based on the notion of positive 

trust existing between the government and its citizens. 

The citizens trust the government in its observance of 

the terms of the social contract by offering physical 

and property protection, as well as observing the human rights and fundamental principles. This is done 

by creating and respecting the checks-and-balances in 

the government, as well as keeping the government 

accountable via holding regular free and fair elections. 

The government, for its part, trusts the citizens in their 

fulfillment of the terms of the social contract by respecting its decisions and not revolting against them. 

Advanced democratic governance regimes also 

contribute to the external stability of their countries by 

decreasing the possibility and effectiveness of foreign 

interference in their domestic affairs. The positive 

trust presents itself by the increased public cohesion 

in face of the threat coming from outside as well as 

preventing their governments from starting arbitrary 

wars. Under the constraints established by democratic designs, the ruling government would have to 

go through lengthy procedures of authorizing use of 

force abroad. In addition, democratic governments 

must comply with the global and regional governance 
124

regimes, having established the world order that (at 

least nominally) respects the principles of state sovereignty, nonintervention into the domestic affairs of 

other states, and the supremacy of the human rights 

protection system. 

The situation is radically different in autocracies. 

There, the internal political stability is based on the 

negative trust instilled by the fear of the citizens that 

they would definitely be worse off if they show disagreement with the ruling regimes. The governments 

consider any public activity of its citizens as suspicious by definition, and the former fear that any actions will necessarily have punitive backlashes on the 

part of their governments. Thus, the stability of autocracies is measured by their ability to coerce effectively 

their own citizens into compliance with the existing 

institutional arrangements. This usually makes political culture apathetic and discourages political experiments. Internal durability of the autocratic regimes 

also depends on individual leadership, where the 

autocrats via their close cycles of family and affiliates 

represent the sole source of legitimacy and stability 

for the countries and their citizens. The change of autocratic leadership usually leads to at least short-term 

political disturbance, depending on the specific interplay of domestic power groups. 

From the point of view of external political stability, the autocratic governance is much less stable than 

its democratic counterpart. Autocratic leaders tend 

to show more contrariness in defining their foreign 

policy priorities by the virtue of having much fewer 

constraints due to the absence or ineffective checksand-balances systems. The reason is that the constituencies have far fewer possibilities to participate in the 

domestic and foreign lives of their countries under the 
125

pressure of their autocratic governance and to block 

the undesired actions of their governments. 

The process of governance is a two-way reciprocal 

dialogue between the ruling regime and institutional 

actors. In order to be effective, democratic governance 

should provide for the protection of the rights of their 

citizens and also ensure their free and uninterrupted 

participation in the political life of their country. The 

second part of the effective governance is contained 

in the efforts the citizenry makes to contribute to this 

process. Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell call these two 

components of democracy as “inputs” and “outputs.” 

According to them:

A state regulates relations to its citizens on two dimensions. One is the ‘input’ side, which relates to access to 

public authority. The other is the ‘output’ side and refers to the way in which that authority is exercised.235

On the more contextual level, the outputs and inputs are closely connected with the notion of the social contract where outputs are about the benefits the 

citizens will get from the government in case of their 

compliance as well as the punishments they would 

receive in case of defection from their governments’ 

rule, and inputs are enshrined in the process of participation of the citizenry in governance processes. 

Effective interplay between outputs and inputs 

has direct consequences for the overall sustainability 

of the governance regimes discussed by Lipset. In his 

equation, outputs are tantamount to regime effectiveness, and inputs are related to the notion of governments’ legitimacy. Democracies exercise political 

equality on the combined inputs and outputs sides of 

their social contracts. Equal democratic participation 
126

of the citizens in the form of the inputs provides for 

the basis of norms, rules, and practices of democratic 

institutionalization. Impartial outputs cement the 

equality between the citizens as exercised by the democratically elected authorities. The inputs, in a sense, 

are the bases of the fulfillment of the “social contracts” 

since they represent the media of participation of the 

institutional actors in the lives of their countries. 

In autocracies, the linkages between inputs and 

outputs are distorted by authoritarian resilience. On 

the one hand, autocracies do not allow for outputs to 

be available to all layers of society. Unlike democratic 

equality, autocracies provide higher outputs for close 

cycles of governance and discriminate against all the 

rest and much lower outputs for the rest of the population. Correspondingly, the effectiveness and legitimacy of authoritarian regimes are based on inputs 

from those cycles alone, which mostly have to do with 

the individual loyalty to the regimes and their leaders. Under autocratic governance, institutional actors 

do not produce or are restricted from full provision of 

the inputs, whereas outputs are skewed in favor of the 

ruling elites. 

Autocracies may remain stable for some time by 

providing lone outputs, which will satisfy the main 

human requirements for the institutional actors, as 

stated by Abraham Maslow.236 At the same time, they 

would have to compensate for the inputs by mimicking the democratic institutional forms without creating viable conditions for full and equal participation 

of the actors in the political processes. In situations 

with high outputs but low inputs, there is a risk of the 

governance to turn into some form of authoritarian 

regime. Not fearing popular discontent, governments 

may provide for the basic or even higher needs of 
127

their societies, while keeping their political participation to a minimum. On the contrary, low outputs combined with high inputs, which is a perfect precondition for state failure, would increase the proclivity of 

popular uprisings. Not satisfied with the current economic conditions, the public may consolidate against 

their governments. 

The future of the democratization/political stability/economic development nexus in Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus can be explored by relating it to the 

inputs versus outputs discourse on democratization 

from the point of view of the characteristics of their 

regime mimicries. Ideally, the levels of outputs should 

be equal to those of inputs. The reason why the regime mimicry is more advanced in Georgia, partial in 

Ukraine, and rudimentary in Belarus is because democracy is only possible where there are both inputs 

and outputs; without either of these components, it 

will only be partial and unviable. 

Ukraine.

The duality of its political culture had affected negatively the prospects for internal and external political stability. Internally, the current government is in 

charge of the political processes and due to the overwhelming popular apathy, faces a low threat from 

the increased political activity of the opposition. The 

Orange Revolution–type euphoria has long ago sunk 

into oblivion. Only serious internal economic and/or 

political shocks can pose any significant threats to the 

ruling regime. The partial regime mimicry allows the 

current government to provide for the basic needs of 

its population in the form of outputs: jobs available 

to most of the population with the unemployment 
128

level as low as 1.6 percent of the total population;237

and relatively decent healthcare, education, and communal services. These outputs are offered to the wider 

societal layers, although to a much more limited scale 

than in Belarus. There is still inflation that has to be 

dealt with, making it difficult for the government to 

sustain decent economic levels with current economic 

policies. Further reforms are necessary with regard 

to economic revival. This is very difficult to undertake without substantial external support. Ukraine 

has to make a serious decision quite soon about its 

foreign policy direction. 

The input side of democratic institutionalization is 

also present but is limited due to the political apathy 

of the institutional actors, which prevents them from 

inflicting large-scale internal political change. Current actions of the political opposition are sporadic 

and nonsystemic, which is further aggravated by the 

internal political rifts between the key opposition parties. Vitali Kilichko’s recent announcement to run for 

president may act as a significant wake-up call for the 

Ukraine’s anemic political life from the point of view 

of uniting the opposition and increasing the inputs 

side of democratization. This move will most definitely face the highly tenaciousness current governance. 

Yet, the chronic apathy would prevent another revolutionary scenario from happening. 

From the point of view of external political stability, popular political lethargy aggravates the limbo 

of the Ukrainian political establishment to choose a 

foreign policy course. As reflected in a Congressional 

Research Service memo, the: 

conflict between Ukraine’s political forces has led its 

foreign policy to appear incoherent, as the contend-
129

ing forces pulled it in pro-Western or pro-Russia 

directions. . . . Ukrainian leaders gave lip service to 

joining NATO and the European Union, but did little to meet the standards set by these organizations. 

Ukrainian leaders also promised closer ties with 

Russia in exchange for Russian energy at subsidized 

prices, but balked at implementing agreements with 

Russia that would seriously compromise Ukraine’s 

sovereignty. . . .238

In practical terms, it translates into Yanukovych’s 

dropping NATO’s membership action plan (MAP) 

aspirations of Yushchenko without any significantly 

important steps towards economic, political, and cultural integration with Russia or with the EU. 

Georgia. 

Internal political stability in Georgia may be shaken by possible future abrupt and largely unexpected 

governmental changes and the resulting “tilting” of 

the main political axis towards rapprochement with 

Russia. Many of the recent moves made by Ivanishvili’s new government, including statements blaming 

Saakashvili for starting the war with Russia,239 the declared participation in the 2014 Olympic Games, resumption of wine exports to Russia, and the release 

of prisoners, while not openly anti-Western, show the 

“gaps” in the volatile domestic political culture. 

The signs of “thawing” of relations with Russia are 

directed mostly at gaining popular support at home 

by reviving the economic and cultural nostalgia of 

older generations of Georgians with Russia. The new 

government is making some steps to reestablish the 

political, economic, and cultural relations with Russia,240 which is not well-received by a considerable 
130

part of the Georgian population. Quite recently, Ivanishvili promised to follow another geopolitical course: 

towards integration with NATO, while blaming Georgian society in a “low level of political culture.”241 This 

move seems quite out of touch with the real geopolitical situation. Ever since Putin’s second presidential 

term, anti-NATO rhetoric firmly entered the internal 

political discourse in Russia. NATO retains the highest threat level for Russian statehood, as viewed both 

by its military and politicians. Russia would, thus, 

do everything in its power not to border NATO with 

Georgia being its member. 

The deployment of NATO radar installations in 

Eastern Europe is one of the highest irritants for Russia. 

According to Commander of the Moscow Antimissile 

Defense Major General Vladimir Lyaporov, “the only 

guarantee for . . . [Russia] is the complete halt by the 

U.S. of deploying its missile defense systems in Europe.”242 One of the most outspoken critics of NATO, 

Dmitri Rogozin, former Russian representative to the 

Alliance, echoed the military’s view in saying: 

We will, of course, build the system that would overcome and suppress any anti-missile defense. If anyone 

thinks that we can be surrounded by a missile fence, 

let them recall: under Peter [the Great] we ‘cut through 

the window’ to Europe, and now we will crush the 

whole wall, if someone tries to isolate us or tries to 

bring us to our knees.243

From this perspective, not only the two currently 

proposed directions (Russia versus NATO) cannot be 

pursued simultaneously, but they are quite oxymoronic by definition. 

In addition, some of the most important preelection promises of the Georgian Dream—economic 
131

revival and improvement of the social climate in the 

country—have not yet been put into life. According 

to the recent NDI public opinion poll, most of the 

respondents do not see significant changes in the 

situation in Georgia after Ivanishvili’s election. The 

promised increase of the output side of governance, 

including low prices for gasoline, decreased unemployment (from the registered towering 15 percent in 

2012),244 consumer products, and communal services, 

has been thwarted, which explains the growing disillusionment of Georgian society with the performance 

of their current government. With the hectic and nonsystemic movements in domestic politics, the number 

of those becoming dissuaded with current government is slowly growing. All these make the October 

2013 presidential elections another test for the domestic political stability via the democratic inputs. The incongruence between the high inputs and low outputs 

may endanger an already volatile domestic political 

environment, especially in light of the elections. 

The reality is: Saakashvili’s two presidential terms 

are over; his nominee, Vano Merabishvili, ex-Prime 

Minister and ex-Minister of Interior, is detained by 

the new government with charges of corruption and 

abuse of power. This, however, does not mean that 

Saakashvili’s party is beheaded. David Bakradze, a 

young pro-Western politician and the former Chair 

of Parliament, has been nominated as a presidential 

candidate from the United National Movement. The 

candidate of the Georgian Dream, Giorgi Margvelashvili, is relatively well known to the Georgian political 

establishments as a person involved in the democratic 

processes while working at the NDI and the Georgian 

Institute of Public Affairs (GIPA’96), the first American-type higher educational institution in Georgia.245
132

Had the presidential elections been held immediately 

after the successful parliamentary début of the Georgian Dream, their results might have depended largely 

on public euphoria. Now the situation has somewhat 

changed: the inability of the new government to bring 

quick and visible economic outputs for their population has shaken the political scale towards increased 

political uncertainty and, as a result, the high propensity for the intensification of negative inputs in different forms of popular protests. 

External threats to political stability, on the other 

hand, ceased after the war with Russia in 2008. With 

the acknowledgement of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia, their de facto territorial loss for Georgia turned into the de jure separation 

of these territories. This also means a paradoxically 

stabilizing development from the point of view of the 

absence of the external threat. For more than 2 decades, Georgia has been living under constant fear of a 

Russian invasion, which was reaffirmed by numerous 

sporadic bombings of its northern districts bordering 

Chechnya. This factor significantly affected internal 

political processes and economic development. Now 

that the frozen conflicts in the secessionist regions have 

been somewhat resolved, the threat of resumption of 

hostilities is quite low. This stance is corroborated by a 

recent survey by NDI, in which only 26 percent of respondents consider Russia a threat, while another 42 

percent believe that this threat is exaggerated, and 23 

percent more thinks that Russia is no longer a threat 

to Georgia.246
133

Belarus.

The outputs-inputs imbalance of democratic governance is important in analyzing the longevity of the 

current governance regime in Belarus. By covering 

mostly the outputs satisfying limited and elementary 

demands of its population, Lukashenka’s authoritarian social contract managed to survive throughout the 

first decades of post-Soviet existence. These outputs 

in the form of relatively high economic benefits, very 

low unemployment (0.6 percent of the total population),247 decent education, healthcare, communal services, etc., are on an acceptable level for the public, 

which increases the legitimacy of the authoritarian 

regime among the majority of institutional actors. 

One such visible output mentioned by the Global Peace 

Index 2013 of the Institute of Economics and Peace is 

the low level of criminality, which satisfies the basic 

safety/security strata of the Maslow pyramid. The inputs side of the state-citizenry interaction is restricted 

to sporadic expressions of popular unrest, which are 

quickly put down by the punitive state apparatus. The 

regime is highly effective in precluding any form and 

content of the public participation not agreed upon 

with Lukashenka’s close circles. 

Widely acceptable outputs and almost absolute absence of political inputs on the part of the institutional 

actors created a special type of social contract in Belarus based on the policy of intimidation and popular 

content. This, in turn, breeds apathy and indifference 

to the political situation inside the country. In Silitski’s 

words, Belarus “secures civil peace and political stability, which justifies limitations on some civil freedoms.”248 The social contract in Belarus is thus based 
134

on fear and en masse intimidations, coupled with 

high autocratic resilience, which jointly represent the 

very mechanisms preventing the democratic norms 

from full emergence, let alone their cascading and 

socialization. The regime mimicry is embryonic in 

Belarus, which is evident in the forms and names of 

governance tools (president, parliament, the system of 

courts, constitution, etc.) that do not fully fulfill their 

designated purpose. 

From the point of view of internal and external political stability, Belarus is also the most politically consolidated and homogenous if compared with Georgia 

and Ukraine. It is not divided either by ethnic, ideological, or geographic lines: the country is unvaried 

concerning its ethnic composition and rock solid with 

its geopolitical preferences. Years of balancing between Europe and Russia created a very pragmatic 

foreign policy directed to serve the sole task of prolongation of the durability of Lukashenka’s regime. 

Unlike Ukraine, there is no internal right between the 

geographic political orientation of the country. Unlike 

Georgia, there are not threats to the territorial integrity of Belarus internally or from outside. This fact 

also contributes to the political stability of Belarus by 

limiting the external threats to Lukashenka’s regime. 

POLICY IMPLICATIONS 

FOR THE UNITED STATES

Ultimately, it is the political cultures of Ukraine, 

Georgia, and Belarus that define the durability of their 

political regimes and variations in their democratic institutionalization. The U.S. policy towards these countries should be based on the acknowledgment of the 

phenomenon of diverse political cultures as having 
135

decisive influence over the political processes in these 

countries. Out of the three countries, Georgia is the 

closest ally of the United States, politically and militarily speaking. It has been a recipient of significant 

economic and military aid from the United States, including the training and equipment of its elite military 

units. Ukraine, too, has been cooperating militarily 

with the United States, but mostly via the international channels of NATO. Together, Georgia and Ukraine 

have been active participants of joint international 

military peacekeeping efforts, such as the U.S.-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Belarus, on the other 

hand, follows the general “outlier” trajectory by being 

the least cooperating state with the U.S. military structures. Its involvement with the “former adversaries” is 

limited to its participation in the NATO PfP exercise. 

Ukraine. 

The situation in Ukraine deserves close attention 

from the United States. Ukraine as a stable country, 

both politically and economically, is in direct U.S. interests, with its considerable stakes in general European political stability and global peace. Ukraine is an 

important hub on the way between the East and West 

in terms of cultural, economic, and political interactions. According to Mark Kramer, having Ukraine as a 

democracy would be: 

a firm barrier against any attempt to restore the Soviet Union. . . . On the other hand, the United States 

has sought to diminish and forestall tensions between 

Ukraine and Russia and to ensure that the two large, 

neighboring states live peacefully together.249
136

Traditionally, the United States has been keenly interested in keeping the stability in Ukraine from several perspectives: ensuring the regional nuclear nonproliferation, safeguarding human rights and civil 

society development, and supporting its economic 

independence. 

Early U.S. concerns in Ukraine were framed 

by post–Cold War nuclear nonproliferation initiatives. Ukraine was one of the few Soviet republics 

left with a nuclear arsenal after its dissolution. As 

Dubovyk states: 

If there was one absolute priority for the United States 

during the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was to stabilize the situation of the former Soviet Union’s nuclear 

weapons.250

Soon after Ukraine’s independence, the U.S. administration focused on improving cooperation 

in such fields as nuclear nonproliferation and safe 

nuclear energy. So far, the United States contributed 

the cumulative sum of more than U.S.$360 million 

to decontamination of the Chornobyl nuclear disaster.251 Within the framework of the 1993 “NunnLugar” Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the 

United States: 

provide[s] equipment, services and technical advice to 

assist Ukraine in preventing proliferation and in securing and dismantling weapons of mass destruction, 

related materials, and production facilities inherited 

from the former Soviet Union.252

More recently, while congratulating Yanukovych 

with his presidency, President Barack Obama reiterated the 2008 United States-Ukraine Charter on Strate-
137

gic Partnership, while noting the main themes of U.S. 

policy toward Ukraine: 

[e]xpanding democracy and prosperity, protecting security and territorial integrity, strengthening the rule 

of law, promoting non-proliferation, and supporting 

reform in Ukraine’s economic and energy sectors.253

The United States is particularly vigilant and 

“deeply disappointed” with the human rights situation in Ukraine, in particularly, the “politically motivated prosecution” of the prominent opposition figures, such as Tymoshenko.254 U.S. Congress H. Res. 

730 (2012) calls for tougher reaction on the part of the 

U.S. Government, including denial to issue visas to 

Ukrainian officials: 

involved in serious human rights abuses, anti-democratic actions, or corruption that undermines or injures democratic institutions in Ukraine, including officials responsible for and participating in the selective 

prosecution and persecution of political opponents.255

The United States is also concerned with the general condition of civil society, including its inputs in 

the democratic process, among others, via their election participation. In the Department of State statement after the October 2012 elections, the U.S. Government called the election a “step backward” from 

the previous progress and regretfully noted “the use 

of government resources to favor ruling party candidates, interference with media access, and harassment 

of opposition candidates.”256

Economic well-being of Ukraine, including its energy independence from Russia, is also on the U.S. 

agenda. Ukraine is a member of the Partnership and 
138

Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU and the 

Ukraine-EU Action Plan within the European Neighborhood policy. It is the major area connecting Russian 

gas with European markets, and its internal and external political stability depends largely on the energy 

security of Europe. According to Gunther Oettinger, 

the EU Commissioner for Energy, Ukraine has the potential to become “the Eastern European gas hub” with 

its “significant gas resources, both conventional and 

unconventional, together with the vast networks of 

gas pipelines already in place and important gas storage capacities.”257 Economically, too, a strong Ukraine 

is a guarantee for the retention of democratic values. 

The current trade blackmail by Russia as a response to 

the mere fact that “the most pro-Russian of all possible 

Ukrainian leaderships no longer wants to be friends 

with Moscow by the Russian rules and wants to sneak 

away to Europe”258 shows the possible worsening of 

the domestic economic climate. This may add up to 

the economic hardships of the population and, as a 

result, bring it closer to the brink of political protests. 

Any dependence of Ukraine on Russia concerning the 

gas supplies as well as economic development will 

negatively affect the domestic economic settings in 

Europe and, ultimately, its energy security.

The U.S. Government should continue its efforts 

to support civil society, economic development, and 

the ongoing rule of law initiatives, such as the democratization grants, various sector-specific economic assistance programs, and the media development fund 

grants. All these programs will further contribute to 

the strengthening of the input sides of democratic institutionalization. Existence of relative internal and 

external political stability allows for long-term programs currently being supported. The United States 
139

should also closely work with the Ukrainian government in the matter of deepening the integration of the 

country in the international structures, such as the EU 

and NATO.

The Ukrainian-U.S. military relations, according to 

Leonid Polyakov, are directed at: 

help[ing] in building a stable, prosperous democracy 

that can become a viable economic and security partner to the West . . . within the bilateral military-tomilitary contacts programs, within NATO partnership 

events, and through the practical accomplishment of 

peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.259

Ukraine is involved in military cooperation with the 

American, in particular, and Western, in general, military structures primarily through the channels of international organizations (mostly NATO). 

Ukraine is an active participant in international 

military exercises and international peacekeeping efforts. Ukrainian contribution to the “Coalition of the 

Willing” in Iraq included the cumulative 7,000 soldiers, with the peak deployment of 1,630.260 Its membership in the ISAF in Afghanistan is limited to 22 

soldiers. Overall, according to the Ministry of Defense 

of Ukraine, the country is involved in 11 peacekeeping 

missions and other international operations with the 

current total of 476 servicemen.261 Ukraine also is quite 

active in joint military exercises with regional and international partners, such as “Peace Shield,” “Rapid 

Trident,” “Sea Breeze” (with NATO and Partners for 

Peace countries), “Cossack Steppe” (Ukraine-United 

Kingdom [UK]-Poland), “Maple Arch” (Ukraine-Canada-Poland-Lithuania), “Blackseafor,” “Light Avalon” (Ukraine-Hungary-Romania-Slovak), “Rescuer/

Medcuer,” and “Jackal Stone 2011,”262 to name a few. 
140

Contributing involvement of Ukraine in international peacekeeping efforts is based on its cooperation framework with NATO, regulated by the NATOUkraine Special Partnership Charter (1997), the engine 

of which is the NATO-Ukraine Commission. The Commission is tasked with fostering military cooperation 

and consultations between the Alliance countries and 

Ukraine within international military peacekeeping 

engagement. Its main purpose is to promote technical 

cooperation with Ukraine in the field of armaments; 

foster civil emergency planning; and encourage public 

information sharing and scientific cooperation. Subsequently, the Commission established sector-specific 

instruments as the Joint Working Group on Defense 

Reform (JWGDR) responsible for military-to-military 

cooperation (1998), NATO-Ukraine Working Group 

on Civil and Democratic Control of the Intelligence 

Sector and Partnership Network for Civil Society 

Expertise Development (2006).

Ukraine was the first among the former Soviet 

republics to join the PfP endeavor in 1994. In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine started 

expressing increasing desire for close integration with 

the Alliance, which manifested in the Intensified Dialogue with NATO (2005) and the general agreement of 

the Alliance members expressed at the NATO Bucharest Summit (2008) to accept Ukraine as its member in 

the future. The direction towards NATO membership 

was abandoned with the change of the government 

in 2010: according to Steven Woehrel, “Yanukovych 

has made clear that his country is not seeking NATO 

membership, but is continuing to cooperate with 

NATO, including the holding of joint military exercises”263—two steps back and one step forward. 
141

The military side of the bilateral U.S. cooperation 

with Ukraine, according to Polyakov, is based on the 

following set of its core interests:

U.S. willingness to support the preservation of 

Ukraine’s independence as a key to regional security 

and Ukrainian willingness to cooperate with the United States in fighting terrorism and preserving international peace.264

These interests are further formulated in a number 

of bilateral documents defining their cooperation 

frameworks, among which the most important were 

concluded on international assistance programs 

and projects in military sphere (1999); on exchange 

of research and development information in the 

sphere of military technical cooperation (2000); and 

on transfer of military equipment and rendering of 

services (2004). 

The framework cooperation principles are presented by the U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership. Section II focuses on bilateral military cooperation aimed, first and foremost, at bringing Ukraine 

closer to NATO through enacting a: 

structured plan to increase interoperability and coordination of capabilities between NATO and Ukraine, 

including via enhanced training and equipment for 

Ukrainian armed forces.265

The U.S. European Command (EUCOM), through 

the Office of Defense Cooperation, provides “military 

equipment and training to support the modernization 

of Ukraine’s military.”266 These activities include, but 

are not limited to, Joint Contact Team Program-Ukraine 

(JCTP) (deployment of the U.S. troops to share their
142

experience with their Ukrainian colleagues); International Military Education and Training (IMET) (training of the Ukrainian military and affiliated civilian 

personnel in the U.S. to foster closer partnership with 

NATO), and Foreign Military Sales and Financing 

(economic assistance to defense reforms).

The prospects of the military cooperation between 

the United States and Ukraine will be, without a doubt, 

influenced by the third party, Russia. Seeing itself as 

“one of the most influential and competitive centers of 

the world” and having conceptually “negative opinion on the NATO enlargement and approach of NATO 

military infrastructure to the Russian borders,”267 Russia is vitally interested in diminishing military cooperation of the former Soviet republics—especially 

bordering it—with NATO, in general, and the United 

States, in particular. Ukraine is the last outpost of Russia in the Western direction, the last “buffer” between 

NATO and Russia, and is, therefore, treated by the 

latter with particular attention. Recently, for example, 

Russia accused Ukraine of supplying arms to Georgia 

prior to war in 2008.268 The deal, which was viewed 

by the Russian political and military establishment as 

having been fostered by the United States and which, 

therefore, was received with extreme discontent. Although some renowned experts on Soviet Union, including Brzezinski, consider that “[t]oday’s Russia is 

in no position to assert a violent restoration of its old 

empire. It is too weak, too backward and too poor,”269

it would still try to do its best to influence foreign policy courses of those former Soviet republics who are 

weaker, poorer, and more backward that itself. 

If Russia manages successfully to coerce Ukraine 

to move away from its association with the EU and 

closer to its Customs Union, this would mark a turn-
143

ing point in the future political orientation of Ukraine, 

as the largest Eastern European country. This would 

inevitably affect its military cooperation with the Alliance and its member-states, including the United 

States. Therefore, the United States should intensify 

its military cooperation and partnership with Ukraine 

to keep it true to its choice of democratization and from 

reverting the course towards the military reforms and 

overall military progress. 

Georgia. 

The future of the political stability in Georgia depends on the sustainability of the initial institutional 

transformations: the will of the domestic polity and 

the durability of the political culture to internal and 

external shocks. Currently, in Jack Goldstone’s terms, 

in Georgia the: 

popularly elected government . . . is seen to be pursuing just policies [that] can survive for some years even 

if it has difficulty delivering on its programs, while it 

struggles to strengthen its capacities to govern.270

The regime mimicry has not yet gone through the 

final stage of the normative process and is now threatened by the fluid political identity that may adversely 

affect the previously made democratic progress. Reversal of the political courses in Georgia is fraught 

with irreversible consequences. 

The United States is vitally interested in keeping 

Georgia politically stable. During Saakashvili’s governance, to a certain degree, the United States acted as 

a role model for Georgia and the major financial and 

moral supporter for its institutional reforms. It has 
144

been a consistent lobby of the Georgian political course 

towards democratization for the past 2 decades. It has 

been supporting its democratization efforts by providing economic, educational, political, and cultural 

assistance. Some programs, such as the USAID-funded “Georgia Community Mobilization Initiative” in 

2000-05, were multi-million dollar efforts to transform 

Georgian society by increasing its inputs in its daily 

lives and keeping its elected leaders accountable for 

their actions. Largely to its credit, Georgia was able to 

keep the beacon of democracy turned on through its 

October 2012 parliamentary elections. 

Continuous U.S. support via active dialogue with 

all domestic political forces is required to sustain the 

democratic institutionalization process in Georgia. 

The United States should further encourage democratization efforts of Georgia by holding constant dialogue with all the participants of the political process 

to avoid possible short- and long-term destabilization. 

The United States should continue fostering the reform processes, primarily in the field of institutional 

and economic development and human rights protection. The current programs, such as the ongoing 

democratization grants and other sector-specific programs (Democracy Commission grants, democracy 

outreach, media partnership, economic developmental aid via USAID; the activities of the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation directed to the poverty reduction and economic growth; education exchange programs; mass media support programs, etc.) should be 

reinforced. Tackling different areas of the democratic 

development process will strengthen regime mimicry 

and move it towards norm internalization. In addition, this would contribute significantly to the increased participation of the institutional actors in the 
145

“input” part of the democratization design. The U.S. 

involvement will also positively influence internal political stability of Georgia by extending consultations 

and advice on democracy and economic development. 

Otherwise, the norm internalization will be stalled, 

and the mimicry process will revert to partial with 

unpredictable consequences. Under the worst-case 

scenario, the resulting situation may lead to a reversal 

of democratic gains. 

Another priority direction for the U.S. interests 

in Georgia is its continuous integration within the 

Western political structures, including NATO. The 

democratization part of the NATO basket will ensure 

the steady implementation of reforms and preservation of the overall political orientation of the country. 

The April 2008 Bucharest Summit for the first time 

named Georgia (together with Ukraine) as an aspirant 

country and noted that it “will become a member of 

NATO,” although it did not specify when exactly this 

would happen. The activities of the NATO-Georgia 

Commission (NGC) include political consultations 

and cooperation on assisting Georgia in its Euro-Atlantic integration processes. Georgia is a participant 

in the NATO Planning and Review Process (PARP) to 

further assist its democratic transition and has the Annual National Program (ANP) to provide frameworks 

for Georgia-NATO cooperation.

The U.S. actions in the matter of further integration of Georgia in NATO should continue with the 

cautious understanding of the sensitive relations of 

Georgia with Russia. The possible development closer 

to Russia would endanger this carefully created and 

nurtured cooperation with the North Alliance. The recent statement of Ivanishvili on his intent to obtain a 

NATO MAP for Georgia in 2014,271 which many view 
146

as another stepping-stone on the path to the NATO 

membership, seems to reinforce the general foreign 

policy course of the country towards further democratization. However, in light of the moves of Georgia 

toward the other Russian direction, this statement 

seems less credible. Advocates for NATO membership 

for Georgia should not forget the outspokenly negative stance of Russian leadership on this issue. Russia 

has been a consistent antagonist to NATO, in general, 

and to its enlargement, in particular. These feelings 

exacerbated after Putin came to power in 2000. Prime 

Minister Dmitri Medvedev recently stated that possible membership in NATO “will not bring anything to 

Georgia as a sovereign and well-developing state but 

will create a long-term and constant source of tension 

between our countries.”272 Nevertheless, the United 

States should continue to support the aspirations of 

Georgia to join the progressive community of states 

under the aegis of NATO. 

Georgia has been an active participant of the international military peacekeeping efforts. The Georgian 

contingent in the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq included the cumulative 10,000 soldiers with the peak 

deployment of 1,850.273 With its 1,561 troops, Georgia 

is the largest per capita contributor to the ISAF in 

Afghanistan and has suffered the highest casualties 

among the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) 

nations.274 In addition, Georgia is deeply integrated 

into the international military organizations: it is participating in joint PfP endeavor within the frameworks 

of NATO and is involved in other multilateral military 

exercises in the region. 

All this became possible as a result of the military 

cooperation with the United States, which started 

over a decade ago with the inception of the “Georgia 
147

Train and Equip Program” (GTEP) in 2002-04. With 

the total cost of U.S.$64 million and the participation 

of 150 U.S. military experts,275 the GTEP was placed 

to address the growing need of Georgia in securing 

its borders from the repeated Russian provocations, 

such as the numerous bombings of the Pankisi Gorge, 

a mountainous part of Georgia bordering Chechnya. 

The task of the GTEP was to train the Georgian soldiers in such areas as border security, anti-terrorism, 

and crisis response, as well as to foster the reform in 

the Georgian military sector. In addition to the training program, GTEP provided the country’s military 

units with the most up-to-date military equipment, including “uniform items, small arms and ammunition, 

communications gear, training gear, medical gear, 

fuel, and construction materiel.”276 Altogether, 2,000 

Georgian soldiers from four light infantry battalions 

and a mechanized company team were trained within 

the frameworks of the GTEP mission. 

After the GTEP, another significant military assistance program is the Georgian Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (GSSOP) with an additional 

$159 million from 2005–08 to train three brigades of 

2,000 soldiers and to provide the necessary military 

equipment, such as anti-improvised explosive devices 

(IEDs) and radios.277 Also, the U.S. military assisted in 

reorganization and rehabilitation of the naval capabilities of the Georgian defense. The Georgia Border 

Security and Law Enforcement (GBLSE) and Export 

Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) programs 

(with U.S.$850,000 combined) provided assistance in 

repairing the Georgian fleet and maritime radar stations.278 Finally, Georgia is included in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, 

which provides training and education to the military 
148

students. Overall, from 2006-11, U.S. $846,000 was 

spent on increasing the skills and knowledge of the 

Georgian military.279

Not surprisingly, such military cooperation between the United States and Georgia caused a harsh 

negative reaction in the Russian political establishment.280 Tony Karon described the Russian reaction 

on the GTEP as “hopping mad.”281 The Russian fears 

were that Georgia would use the U.S.-trained military 

in operations in its breakaway regions of Abkhazia 

and South Ossetia. Also, as a part of the common antiNATO paranoia in the Russian defense and policy 

circles, the GTEP program was considered as another 

step to a closer alignment of Georgia with the NATO. 

The Russian factor has to be taken very seriously into 

account in case of any future military assistance programs in Georgia. As the Russian government traditionally is highly suspicious of any American involvement in the region, which it considers its “own lot” 

and is not going to leave,282 it is highly imperative that: 

the United States must move forward in a highly 

transparent manner, in coordination with our European and NATO allies, in order to dispel misinformation 

and to lessen any risk of miscalculation.”283

With this negative Russian stance to the deepening 

partnership with the United States, in particular, and 

NATO, in general, the U.S. military should intensify 

its cooperation with Georgia. To put it bluntly, Georgia has run out of the territories that Russia can lay 

its claims on. There are no other parts of Georgia, except for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which have been 

tightly integrated with Russia legally (through common Russian citizenship) and morally (through their 
149

external homelands), which can entice future Russian 

military involvements. This fact, together with the 

new seemingly more favorable Georgian government 

creates the conditions conducive to political stability 

in the mid- and possibly long-term. At the same time, 

the United States should reiterate its support to the 

territorial integrity in Georgia by mediating the nonaggression pact between Georgia and Russia on the 

international arena and during bilateral negotiations 

with both parties concerned. 

The U.S. military should continue cooperation with 

Georgia within the frameworks of the U.S.-Georgia 

Charter on Strategic Partnership, which stresses the 

U.S. support to “the efforts of Georgia to provide for 

its legitimate security and defense needs, including 

development of appropriate and NATO-interoperable 

military forces.”284 Whereas the pre-2008 war NATO 

was hesitant to conduct real talks on the Georgian accession, the post-war NATO, with the U.S. impetus, 

should reinstate the return to the integration processes for Georgia. While NATO will remain as an 

ongoing irritant for the general Russian polity, it is 

highly unlikely that Russia will find another intervention pretext in Georgia in case of the further NATO 

enlargement efforts. This will also give a boost to 

the external democratic institutionalization efforts in 

Georgia and keep it true to the democratization reforms. At the same time, the United States and NATO 

should make it very clear to the Georgian leadership 

that they would not be willing to support the military 

actions of Georgia directed towards the return of the 

lost land: this would mean direct confrontation with 

Russia should be avoided. 
150

Belarus. 

Belarus has been also within the focus of the international community, but not because of its threat 

to regional stability or due to the high level of internal violence. Belarus is the most politically stable, 

internally and externally speaking, and economically 

developed (per capita) out of the three countries in 

the present analysis. Internally, Belarus represents 

Goldstone’s case of the duality between effectiveness 

and legitimacy: 

States that have high levels of either effectiveness or legitimacy, however, can survive for a number of years. 

A harsh dictatorship can survive for some years on effectiveness alone, or even for decades if it maintains 

high effectiveness and some degree of legitimacy.285

Belarus remains a political anomaly and a régime 

démodé in the heart of Europe. It is the only country in 

the geographic borders of Europe that is not a member of the Council of Europe and, as a non-EU country, does not have the Partnership and Cooperation 

Agreement with the EU. 

The current situation with human rights and civil 

society liberalization in Belarus is alarming. Lukashenka’s regime is characterized by high autocratic resilience, which makes any politically deviant behavior 

punishable. Grzegorz Gromadzki et al. present quite 

gloomy prospects: 

In the future, we can expect to witness new repressions 

by Europe’s last dictator and further deterioration of 

the situation. . . . Lukashenka will do everything in his 

power to oppress the political opposition, NGOs and 

the media in order to ensure the extension of his rule. 
151

. . . [C]o-operation with Lukashenka’s regime is and 

will be, for the foreseeable future, impossible.286

Under the present circumstances, the U.S. Government should continue working with Belarusian civil 

society both domestically and abroad287 to increase its 

inputs in Belarusian political life. 

The United States has had a very cautious but consistent policy with regards to Belarus. It has been a 

constant critic of the human rights violations and the 

impeding of the civil society development in Belarus. 

In 2004, the U.S. Congress adopted so-called “Belarus 

Democracy Act” committing: 

[t]o assist the people of the Republic of Belarus in regaining their freedom and to enable them to join the 

European community of democracies; to encourage 

free and fair presidential, parliamentary, and local 

elections in Belarus, conducted in a manner consistent 

with internationally accepted standards and under the 

supervision of internationally recognized observers; 

To assist in restoring and strengthening institutions of 

democratic governance in Belarus.288

The biggest achievement of the Act, according to 

Stewart Parker, “was that the U.S. anti-Lukashenka 

rhetoric was given the ‘legal base’ that legitimized 

turning words into action.”289 Notwithstanding the 

baseline for support to the Belarusian civil society, 

U.S. assistance has been constantly decreasing, due to 

the strong and repressive grip on the domestic political life of the current regime.

Belarus is also the only country among the three 

discussed here that has experienced foreign political and economic punitive actions against it. In addition to supporting civil society development, the 
152

U.S. Government, together with the EU, has been on 

and off imposing sanctions on Belarus demanding 

for the improvement of the domestic political situation, including the release of political prisoners and 

lifting the repressions against Belarusian civil society. The sanctions were applied in 2008 with a short 

relief in 2009–10 and then reinstated in 2011 as a response to the fraudulent elections. These sanctions 

embraced economic and political pressure on Belarusian leadership and several state-owned companies, including visa restrictions for Lukashenka and 

his close entourage.290 The 2004 Act was reinforced 

by the 2012 Belarus Democracy and Human Rights 

Act, which envisaged further political containment of 

Lukashenka’s regime. 

With their comprehensive nature, the effectiveness 

of the sanctions imposed on Belarus is dubious. On 

the one hand, they show the U.S. attitude towards the 

regime. As the country vitally interested in promotion 

of democratic governance as the governing principle 

in the world, the United States cannot stay dormant 

to the systematic human rights violations and oppressions of the Belarusian citizens. On the other, these 

sanctions have little, if no, real influence on the domestic political or climate in Belarus, being back-up 

in both these spheres by its patron, Russia. The movement towards China is rather an attempt to gain shortterm economic benefits than a real long-term project. 

Toughening of the sanctions would not bring the 

desired effect here: Belarus is highly Russia-oriented 

in its exports. Besides, the Belarusian companies, if 

needed, can trade with the rest of the world through 

the third-party subsidiaries in Russia, thus, bypassing 

trade restrictions. 
153

There is also another fear “about Russian efforts 

to strengthen its sphere of influence in the region.” 

By “isolating Belarus, the EU and United States are 

playing into Moscow’s hands, without achieving real 

gains on democratization.”291 In such a specific political climate, a strategy that can bring the desired 

results should be somewhat similar to the “congagement”292 policies—a mix of containment and engagement—as proposed by Zalmay Khalilzad in relation 

to Pakistan. The positive trait—if such a word can be 

applied to the current regime in Belarus—of Lukashenka, in comparison with the former communist rule, 

is absence of ideology-laden rivalry with the West, 

in general, and the United States, in particular. The 

congagement strategy applied toward the Belarusian 

government can lead to the desired policy outcome 

since not tinted by ideological burden Lukashenka’s 

regime can become more pliable if offered more 

carrots than sticks. 

Out of the three countries, Belarus is the least exposed to international military cooperation and partnership. As an economy, politics and culture, its main 

partner in the military field is Russia. As a Union State 

composed of Russia and Belarus, it has to protect its 

joint borders, which, in case of the latter, are directly 

facing the NATO. The Group of Belarus and Russian 

Forces is located in two strategic radars: the “Volga” 

radar in Hantsavichy operating on the basis of the 

Russian-Belarusian Military Agreement of 1995 and 

Baranovichi radar with 1,200 soldiers built in 2003 to 

substitute for the old Soviet radar in Skrunda (Latvia). 

Both radars are capable of detecting ballistic missiles in space at a distance of several thousand miles, 

identifying and evaluating those targets with their 

coordinates, and providing control over the western 
154

direction in azimuth range of 120 degrees.293 Interesting enough, Russia is exempt from compensating the 

Belarus government for using those radars. 

Currently, there are talks of Russia building the 

third military base—an air force regiment—by 2015 

to protect the joint borders of the common state. This 

move, however, is received with low enthusiasm in 

the Belarusian opposition political establishment. According to Natalia Makushina: 

The Kremlin has long been using Lukashenka’s desire to retain power at any cost with the purpose of 

promoting its projects in the former Soviet Union. The 

result of tactics ‘after me, the deluge’ of the Belarusian leader . . . has already led to serious problems in 

relations with the West. Chronic dependence on Russian preferences . . . is dangerous because it deprives 

Belarus of the opportunity to make its own political 

decisions, including in the military sphere.294

Indeed, the closer Belarus is to Russia, the farther 

away it moves from the bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the military sphere with the West.

Partnership with the NATO structures is limited 

to participation of Belarus in the PfP exercise starting 

from 1995. For this endeavor, Belarus has reserved a 

peacekeeping battalion, a military police platoon, 15 

officers in the multinational headquarters, military 

transport aircraft Il-76MD, seven doctors, a mobile 

hospital, and a multifunctional nuclear, biological, 

and chemical (NBC) platoon.295 Belarus is absent in 

any other participation in multidimensional and multilateral peacekeeping operation led by the Western 

countries. The minimalist approach is based on the 

nature of the political climate in the country where the 

Euro-Atlantic structures is still viewed largely within 
155

the confrontational context. There is no current cooperation between the United States and Belarusian 

military institutions. The point to keep in mind is that 

any future interaction will be contingent upon Lukashenka’s will. It will serve his personal preference 

and will be presented domestically with the sole purpose of increasing his own political stakes. 

The Eastern direction of Belarusian military cooperation, on the other hand, has recently been rigorously explored. In particular, Belarus is involved in 

close military partnership with China in the sphere of 

joint production of high-precision weapons; electronic 

warfare; air defense systems, and multiwheeled chassis and tractors for special installation. An example of 

the partnership is the Belarusian-Chinese joint venture “Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant (MWTP)” with the 

Belarusian share of 30 percent and the Chinese “Aerospace Corporation “Sanjiang” holding the remaining 70 percent.296 According to some experts, China, 

under the NATO military embargo imposed after the 

Tiananmen events of 1989, is keen to obtain the latest military technologies, and Belarus turned to be a 

ready supplier. 

CONCLUSIONS

The findings of the research expand on the null hypothesis of the negative influence of democracy over 

the political stability and economic development of 

Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus. They also largely substantiate the thesis on the role autocratic resilience, 

economic development, and third-party interest play 

in mitigating or aggravating threats to internal and external stability. The results of the public opinion polls 

and face-to-face interviews with the key stakeholders 
156

show that in the countries with developing political 

cultures, political stability and economic development 

depend on the authoritarian resilience and economic 

support from abroad (Belarus). In absence of these 

conditions under increasing globalization, the countries had to mimic the existing democratic practices, 

which under the influence of unsettled political cultures reveal the breach between the outputs and inputs of the political process. They adopt democratic 

practices without proper institutional socialization 

(Georgia and Ukraine), which leads to high political 

instability and low social and economic development.

In countries at the early stages of their independence, the choice for democracy, paradoxically, 

brought more political instability than for authoritarian governance. The character of political interactions 

in any country is determined by the procedure of 

transfer of power (which is a form of public inputs in 

the governance process). The wider population circles 

are involved in the governance processes, the more 

dynamic the power transience becomes. In democracies, it is achieved by means of established effective 

norms, rules, and standards, which jointly allow for 

peaceful domestic political processes. To keep political 

stability in these societies, democracies require highly 

developed political cultures, which would permit the 

expressions of free will within the democratically accepted frameworks of policymaking. At the same 

time, democracy is one of the least punitive regimes—

generally speaking and with reference to the core of 

democratic governance as extended to the large circles 

of citizens. Popular discontent with policies is accommodated through mechanisms of political participation, rule of law, and democratic governance rather 

than direct suppression of political deviance. 
157

In stark contrast to it is the autocratic rule, which 

stifles most of the signs of deviation with its punitive 

policies. The political process here is static, and with 

the high costs of entry into the political lives of new 

actors, even more so for those disassociated with the 

ruling regimes. The process of power transfer happens either within the close circles of supporters of 

the regime or only after the removal of the autocrat 

from governance. As a result, all the autocracies need 

to keep their domestic stability is the constant iron fist 

of effective punishment for political deviation and the 

good health of an autocrat. Appearance of any dictator, like Lukashenka, inevitably leads to the test of political durability of the regime. 

From the point of view of power transience and 

the domestic political process, Georgia is the most 

democratic and vibrant, followed by Ukraine. Political stability in Georgia depends on the ability of 

the institutional actors to act within the democratic 

frameworks. Power transience, by definition, is not a 

negative process; it is a sign of a healthy domestic polity. It starts negatively affecting the political stability 

if undertaken outside of the democratic frameworks 

and disregards the rules of democratic institutional 

design. Belarus, on its part, is the most politically 

static but, nevertheless, is a very stable country. By 

restricting public participation, the government keeps 

the monopoly over political processes and forcefully prevents the expressions of dissatisfaction with 

its actions. 

 In more advanced democracies, democratic governance, on the contrary, contributes to the internal and 

external political stability by operating democratic institutions effectively. Via open and free participation 

of all layers of the society in the political processes, 
158

democracies limit the chances for unexpected and, 

mostly, forceful governmental changes and provide 

for the political longevity of democratic institutions. 

Construction of a democratic political system is a necessary condition for the development of national institutions outside the political culture. When they are absent or weak, the system is stable, but there is no basis 

for democracy. When they are present, they become 

destabilizing factors, but they ensure the preservation 

of a competitive political system. 

In trying to accelerate the process of building 

democratic institutions, a newly created country has 

the only option available for it: to accept, or “mimic,” 

the existing structures and agencies of the advanced 

democracies and to try to adapt them to their own 

political environs. In Georgia, due to its open and 

widely tolerant political culture, the regime mimicry 

is almost full; what is lacking is the final stage of the 

democratic institutionalization: norm internalization. 

The undetermined and ambiguous political culture in 

Ukraine makes mimicry partial—well developed in 

some spheres, while lacking in others. The dormant 

and suppressed political culture of Belarus had halted 

the mimicry in the embryonic stage, where there are 

some institutions that resemble those in advanced democracies, but they utterly lack socialization among 

the institutional actors. 

In order to be successful and contribute to longlasting political stability, democracy should be “lived 

through”; it should be the paramount of the political 

evolutionary process. If offered from outside, the success of the democratization process would depend 

on the rigidity of political culture, internally, and the 

interest of third parties, externally. The United States 

has been assisting Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus on 
159

their different paths to democratic governance. This 

support, however diverse and multifaceted, is directed towards keeping these countries politically stable, 

economically developed and socially self-sustainable. 

While Georgia and, to a certain degree, Ukraine are 

firmly committed to democratic development, Belarus 

remains a clear outlier with its autocratic leadership. 

However, there is hope that the society will eventually 

wake up from the 2 decades of lethargy and take back 

the powers that belong to them. Ultimately, it is up to 

the people themselves to decide which governance regime “fits” them better. All they have to do is to prove 

to the generations to come that their initial decisions 

to follow the democratic designs were not accidental, 

but the carefully planned and experienced results of 

historical choices they made. 

ENDNOTES

1. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitski, Informal Institutions 

and Democracy. Lessons from Latin America, Baltimore, MD: The 

Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, p. 6.

2. Yi Feng, “Democracy, Political Stability and Economic Growth,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 27, No. 3, 

1997, p. 441.

3. Ibid., p. 398.

4.Krister Lundell, “Autocratic Stability and Democratization: 

The Impact of Political Economy and Governance,” Paper prepared 

for the panel, “Bad Guys, Good Governance? Varieties of Capitalism in Autocracies,” at the International Political Science Association - European Consortium of Political Research (IPSA-ECPR) 

Joint Conference, 2012.

5. Susanna Lundström, “Decomposed Effects of Democracy 

on Economic Freedom,” Working Paper in Economics, Vol. 74, 

2002, Göteborg University, Sweden, p. 16.
160

6. Rogers Brubaker, “Nationhood and National Question in 

the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutional Account,” Theory and Society, Vol. 23, 1994, pp. 55-76.

7. Erin K. Jenne, “A Bargaining Theory of Minority Demands: 

Explaining the Dog that Didn’t Bite in 1990 Yugoslavia,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, 2004, pp. 729-754. 

8. Robert Nalbandov, Foreign Interventions in Ethnic Conflicts, 

Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2009.

9. A. J. Nathan, “China’s Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, 2003, pp. 6–17.

10. Eurasia Group, Global Political Risk Index, New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2010. 

11. Claude Ake, “A Definition of Political Stability,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2, January 1975, p. 273.

12. Ahmed Samatar, “Somalia: Statelessness as Homelessness,” Ahmed Samatar and Abdi Samatar, eds., The African State. 

Reconsiderations, Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002, p. 12.

13. Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia. The Missed Opportunities, 

Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1994, p. 28.

14. Global Peace Index 2011, New York: Institute for Economics 

and Peace, 2011, p. 40.

15. Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” The 

American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1, March 1959, p. 86.

16. Ibid.

17. Jack A. Goldstone, “Pathways to State Failure,” Conflict 

Management and Peace Science, Vol. 25, 2008, p. 285.

18. Ben Shepherd, “Political Stability: Crucial for Growth?” 

IDEAS Report, SU004—Resurgent Continent? Africa and the World, 

2010, p. 9.
161

19. Yi Feng, “Democracy, Political Stability, and Economic 

Growth,” p. 398.

20. Lisa Chauvet, Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffler, “The Cost 

of Failing States and the Limits to Sovereignty,” paper prepared 

for WIDER, February 2007, p. 3.

21. Cecilia Emma Sottilotta, “Political Stability in Authoritarian Regimes: Lessons from the Arab Uprisings,” working paper 

prepared for Instituto Affari Internazionali, Vol. 1301, 2013, p. 2.

22. Plato, Crito, London, UK: Book Jungle, 2008.

23. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Charleston, SC: 

CreateSpace, 2013, p. 3. 

24. Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 

Development and Political Legitimacy,” pp. 86–87.

25. Aaron Wildavsky, “Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation,” 

American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, 1987, p. 6.

26. Charles T. Call, “Beyond the ‘Failed State’: Toward Conceptual Alternatives,” European Journal of International Relations, 

Vol. 17, No. 1, 2010, p. 308. 

27. Both this quote and the one preceding it can be found 

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108. Ibid., pp. 43–56.

109. Ibid., p. 75.

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142. Ibid.

143. Human Rights Watch Report 2013, p. 500.

144. Freedom in the World 2013, Washington, DC: Freedom 

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145. Sociology Poll, “If next elections to the Verkhovna Rada of 

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149. Ibid., p. 4.

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154. Sociological Poll, “Do you consider yourself to be European, to belong to the culture and the history of European community?” (regional distribution, age distribution) Kyiv, Ukraine: 

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156. Rustem Falyakhov, Jana Milyukova, and Constantine 

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159. Sociological Poll, “How should Ukraine act towards 

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160. Sociological Poll “How would you vote if the referendum 

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166. Douglass C. North, “Institutions,” The Journal of Economic 

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167. Luis Navarro and Ian T. Woodward, Public Attitudes 

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169. Navarro and Woodward. 

170. Nations in Transit 2012, Georgia Report, Washington, DC: 

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172. “EU, Georgia Making ‘Good Progress’ in Association 

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173. Balazs Jarabik and Alastair Rabagliati, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Belarus,” FRIDE, May 2010, p. 2

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188. Intelligence Unit, Index of Democracy 2011, 

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177

200. European Union—EEAS (European External Action 

Service), Minsk, Belarus, available from eeas.europa.eu/belarus/. 

201. “Yanukovich Podpisal Otkaz Ot NATO” (“Yanukovich Signed Refusal To Join NATO”), 24UA July 15, 2013, available from ru.tsn.ua/ukrayina/yanukovich-podpisal-otkaz-ukrainy-otnato.html.

202. “Karasev: Ukrainsko-Rossiiskie Otnosheniya Zavisli v 

Neopredelennosti” (Karaves: The Ukrainian-Russian Relations 

Are At A Limbo), Ukrinfo News Agency, July 18, 2013, available 

from www.ukrinform.ua/rus/news/ukrainsko_rossiyskie_otnosheniya_

zavisli_v_neopredelennosti___karasev_1538605. 

203. Ronald Grigor Suni, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 

Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994.

204. Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” International 

Organization, Vol. 59, No. 4, International Institutions and Socialization in Europe, 2005, p. 805.

205. “Грузия Может Вступить В Евразийский Союз” 

(“Georgia May Join the Eurasian Union”), PolitRUS, June 13, 2013, 

available from www.politrus.com/2013/06/13/georgia-russia-9/. 

206. The term borrowed from Andrew Wilson at the Kyiv Security Forum, Kyiv, Ukraine, April 2013.

207. Alexei Pikulik, “Prerequisites for Democracy, or Did Belarus Ever Have a Chance?” Belarusian Institute of Strategic Studies, 

October 22, 2012, available from www.belinstitute.eu/en/node/409. 

208. The analysis is based on the public opinion poll, BISS 

2010, “Social Situation in Belarus in 2009,” conducted by Minsk, 

Balarus: The Research Center of the Institute for Privatization and 

Management.

209. Vital Silitski, “From Social Contract to Social Dialogue: 

Some Observations on the Nature and Dynamics of Social Contracting in Modern Belarus,” Kiryl Haiduk, Elena Rakova, Vital 

Silitski, eds., Social Contracts in Contemporary Belarus, Minsk, Belarus: Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 158.
178

210. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional 

Dynamics of International Political Orders,” International Organization, Vol. 52, 1998, pp. 943–969.

211. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2, April 

2002, p. 52.

212.Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13, No. 2, April 2002, p. 22.

213. A great example of this allowing a somewhat lackadaisical attitude to the signs of democratization in Georgia was the 

cartoon series, “Dardubala” (translated as a “disaster”), produced 

by an opposition channel and openly broadcast via public TV. In 

this show, then President Shevardnadze was depicted in a satirically negative way, together with the known (and mostly corrupt) 

local Georgian officials. 

214. Philipp Krause, “Of Institutions and Butterflies: Is 

Isomorphism in Developing Countries Necessarily a Bad Thing?” 

Background Note, The Overseas Development Institute, April 

2013, p. 1.

215. Thomas N. Sherratt, “The Evolution of Imperfect 

Mimicry,” Behavioral Ecology, Vol. 13, No. 6, 2002, p. 821.

216. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “The Iron Cage 

Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality 

in Organizational Fields,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 28, 

No. 2, 1983, p. 148.

217. Krause, p. 1.

218. Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock, and Matt Andrews, 

“Capability Traps? The Mechanisms of Persistent Implementation Failure,” Working paper 234, Washington, DC: Center for 

Global Development, December 2010, p. 2.

219. DiMaggio and Powell, p. 150.
179

220. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds., The 

Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Ithaca, NY, and London, UK: Cornell University Press, 2005, p. 10.

221. Ben Rosamond, “Neofunctionalism,” Theories of European 

Integration, Houndsmills, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 

2000, pp. 50-73.

222. Checkel, p. 815.

223. Krause, p. 2.

224. Peter Evans, “Development as Institutional Change: The 

Pitfalls of Monocropping and the Potentials of Deliberation,” 

Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 38, No. 4, 

Winter 2004, p. 33.

225. Marcin Święcicki, “Ukrainian Economy and Economic 

Reforms,” Taras Kuzio and Daniel Hamiton, Open Ukraine: Changing Course Towards a European Future, Washington, DC: Johns 

Hopkins University Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2011, p. 65.

226. Lessons from the Ukrainian Transition: Reform Driving Forces in a Captured State, Warsaw, Poland: Center for Social and Economic Research, 2005, p. 1.

227. Alexander Kupatadze, “Ending Georgian Corruption 

Needs Institutional Reform,” Oxford Analytica, January 2013. 

228. Jim Nichol, “Georgia’s October 2012 Legislative Election: 

Outcome and Implications,” Library of Congress, Washington, DC: 

Congressional Research Service, October 15, 2012, p. 4. 

229. “Georgian Parliament Adopts Sweeping Amnesty,” Radio Free Europe—Radio Liberty, December 22, 2012.

230. Closing Press Conference by NATO Secretary General 

Anders Fogh Rasmussen following the meetings of NATO Defense Ministers, Brussels, Belgium, 2013, available from www.nato.

int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_101215.htm. 

231. European Union—EEAS. 
180

232. Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Constitution of Belarus, Minsk, 

Belarus, 1996.

233. “Лукашенко: “Российские Негодяи” Обвалили Калийный Рынок” (“Lukashenka: ‘Russian Scoundrels’ Crushed 

the Potassium Market”), Regnum, September 10, 2013, available 

from www.regnum.ru/news/1705815.html. 

234. “Минск Меняет Москву на Пекин” (“Minsk Dumps 

Moscow For Beijing”), GazetaRU, July 17, 2013, available from 

www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/07/17_a_5433737.shtml. 

235. Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell, “What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 21, No. 2, April 2008, p. 169.

236. Abraham H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” 

Psychological Review, Vol. 50, 1943, pp. 370–396.

237. “Уровень Безработицы в Украине Снизился до 1.6%” 

(“Unemployment Level in Ukraine Down to 1.6%”), UNIAN, August 16, 2013, available from economics.unian.net/rus/news/174639-

uroven-bezrabotitsyi-v-ukraine-snizilsya-do-16.html. 

238. Steven Woehrel, “Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. 

Policy,” May 24, 2013, Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, 

RL33460, p. 6.

239. “Иванишвили Заявил о Неадекватных Действиях 

Властей Грузии в Августе 2008 Года” (“Ivanishvili Declared 

About Inadequate Actions of the Georgian Leadership in August 

2008”), Russia-Georgia: Information Parity project, News Georgia, April 10, 2013, available from georusparitet.com/official_statement/20130410/151555105.html. 

240. “The Hopes of Ivanishvili Regarding Russia,” The Messenger Online, October 11, 2012, available from www.messenger.

com.ge/issues/2712_october_11_2012/2712_edit.html. 
181

241. “Иванишвили Еще Раз Подтвердил Намерение Уйти 

из Политики до Нового Года”(“Ivanishvili Once More Confirmed His Desire To Leave Politics Before the New Year”), Georgia Online News Agency, August 23, 2013, available from www.

apsny.ge/2013/pol/1377319338.php. 

242. “Единственная Гарантия—Полный Отказ От ПРО” 

(“Complete Halt to the Antimissile Defense: The Only Guarantee”), GazetaRU, May 2, 2012, available from www.gazeta.ru/

politics/2012/05/02_a_4569905.shtml. 

243. “Рогозин про Системы ПРО: Выломает Всю Стену 

Если Нас Кто-то Попытается Изолировать” (“Rogozin’s Take 

on Antimissile Defense: We will Crush the Whole Wall if Isolated”), GazetaRU, June 29, 2012, available from www.gazeta.ru/

politics/news/2012/06/29/n_2414157.shtml. 

244. National Statistics Office of Georgia, “Employment 

and Unemployment,” GeoStat, available from www.geostat.

ge/?action=page&p_id=146&lang=eng. 

245. By an anecdotal coincidence, Bakradze is an alumnus of 

the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs (GIPA’96), whose rector 

was Margvelashvili in 2000–06 and in 2010–12.

246. “Участники Опроса Считают, Что Опасность Со Стороны России Преувеличена” (“The Respondents Think That 

the Threat from Russia Is Overestimated”), News Georgia, RussiaGeorgia: Information Parity project, April 15, 2013. 

247. “Зарегистрированная безработица в Беларуси 

сохраняется на уровне 0.6%” (“Registered Unemployment Level in Belarus Stays at a Level of 0.6%”), BeltaNews, 

April 9, 2013, available from www.belta.by/ru/all_news/society/

Zaregistrirovannaja-bezrabotitsa-v-Belarusi-soxranjaetsja-na-urovne06_i_630389.html. 

248. Vital Silitski, “From Social Contract to Social Dialogue: 

Some Observations on the Nature and Dynamics of Social Contracting in Modern Belarus,” Kiryl Haiduk, Elena Rakova, Vital 

Silitski, eds., Social Contracts in Contemporary Belarus, Minsk, Belarus: Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 160.
182

249. Mark Kramer, “Ukraine, Russia, and U.S. Policy,” 

PONARS Policy Memo 191, April 2001.

250. Volodymyr Dubovyk, “U.S.-Ukraine Relations: The Long 

Road to Strategic Partnership,” PONARS Policy Memo No. 424, 

December 2006, p. 2.

251. U.S. Participation in the Kyiv Summit and the Chornobyl Pledging Conference: Fact Sheet, April 19, 2011, available from the State Department website, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/

ps/2011/04/161228.htm.

252. “Fact Sheet on Ukraine’s Non-Proliferation Efforts,” Foreign Policy, March 4, 2010.

253. Press release from the White House website, February 11, 

2010, available from www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/readoutpresidents-call-with-president-elect-yanukovych-ukraine.

254. Steven Woehrel, “Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy,” May 24, 2013, Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, RL33460, 

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, p. 6. 

255. “Urging the Government of Ukraine to ensure free and 

fair parliamentary elections on October 28, 2012, by adhering to 

democratic standards, establishing a transparent electoral process 

and releasing opposition leaders sentenced on politically motivated grounds,” Washington, DC: U.S. Congress Resolution H. 

RES. 730, July 13, 2012.

256. U.S Department of State Statement on Parliamentary 

Elections in Ukraine, October 29, 2012, Washington, DC, available 

from ukraine.usembassy.gov/statements/elections-ukraine-2012.html. 

257. Interview with Gunther Oettinger, the EU Commissioner for Energy, Kyiv, Ukraine, June 13-14, 2013, available 

from ec.europa.eu/energy/international/bilateral_cooperation/ukraine_

en.htm. 

258. Arkadiy Moshes, “Последний Довод” (“Last Reason”) Daily Journal, August 22, 2013, available from www.

ej.ru/?a=note&id=13213. 
183

259. Leonid I. Polyakov, U.S.-Ukraine Military Relations and the 

Value of Interoperability, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College, 2004, p. 65.

260. Steven A. Carney, “Allied Participation in Operation 

‘Iraqi Freedom’,” Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 2011, p. 116.

261. Website of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, available 

from www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?part=peacekeeping&lang=en. 

262. “Armed Forces of Ukraine,” White Book 2011, Kyiv, 

Ukraine: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 2012, p. 34. 

263. Steven Woehrel, “Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 24, 2013, “Summary” section.

264. Polyakov, p. 65.

265. “United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of 

European and Eurasian Affairs, available from www.state.gov/p/

eur/rls/or/142231.htm.

266. U.S. Embassy in Ukraine ukraine.usembassy.gov/odc.html. 

267. Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept, adopted on 

February 12, 2013. 

268. Andrey Mikhailov, “Is Ukraine ashamed of its infamous 

military cooperation with Georgia?” Pravda.RU, October 2, 2012, 

available from english.pravda.ru/world/ussr/02-10-2012/122326-

ukraine_georgia_military-0/. 

269. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Russia, like Ukraine, will become 

a real democracy,” Financial Times, December 10, 2013.

270. Goldstone, p. 286.

271. “Ivanishvili: We Will Get NATO MAP in 2014,” Eurasianet, May 2, 2013, available from www.eurasianet.org/node/66914.
184

272. “Медведев: Вступление в НАТО Ничего Не Добавит 

Грузии” (“Medvedev: Membership of Georgia In NATO Will 

Bring No Benefits To Georgia”), GazetaRU, June 8, 2013, available 

from www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2013/08/06/n_3093897.shtml .

273. “Allied Participation in Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’,” 

p. 62.

274. “International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, Key Facts 

and Figures,” October 1, 2013. 

275. John Diedrich, “US faces tough training mission in the 

Caucasus,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 30, 2002. 

276. Jim Garamone, “U.S. Troops in Georgia to Begin Counterterrorism Training,” American Forces Press Service, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 30, 2002, available 

from www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=44111. 

277. “Striking the Balance: U.S. Policy and Stability in Georgia,” A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC: United States Senate, December 22, 2009, p. 5.

278. Ibid., p. 6.

279. “International Military Education and Training Account 

Summary,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, June 23, 

2010, available from www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14562.htm.

280. Irakli G. Areshidze, “Helping Georgia?” Perspective, Vol. 

12, No. 4, March-April 2002, p. 3. 

281. Tony Karon, “Why U.S. Arrival in Georgia Has Moscow 

Hopping Mad,” The Time, February 27, 2002.

282. “Putin: Rossiya Nikogda Ne Sobiralas’ Uxodit’ 

Iz Zakavkaz’ya”(“Putin: Russia Is Never Going To Leave Transcaucasus”), GazetaRU, December 2, 2013, available from www.

gazeta.ru/politics/news/2013/12/02/n_5787465.shtml. 
185

283. “Striking the Balance: U.S. Policy and Stability in Georgia,” A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC: United States Senate, December 22, 2009, p. 5.

284. “United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, January 9, 2009. 

285. Jack A. Goldstone, “Pathways to State Failure,” Conflict 

Management and Peace Science, Vol. 25, 2008, p. 286.

286. Grzegorz Gromadzki, Vitali Silitski, and Luboš Veselý, 

“Effective Policy towards Belarus. A Challenge for the Enlarged 

EU,” European Choice for Belarus, Warsaw, Poland: Stefan Batory 

Foundation/Association for International Affairs, April 2005. 

287. Many of the nonprofit civil society organizations have 

moved to the neighboring countries, as the Belarusian Institute 

for Strategic Studies.

288. U.S. Government Act, “To provide for the promotion 

of democracy, human rights, and rule of law in the Republic of 

Belarus and for the consolidation and strengthening of Belarus 

sovereignty and independence,” Public Law 108-347, 108th 

Cong., Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, October 

20, 2004, available from https://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/laws/108/

publ347.108.txt. 

289. Stewart Parker, The Last Soviet Republic, 2nd Ed., ebook, 

Great Britain,Commissar Books, 2011, p. 169. 

290. Steven Woehrel, Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy Concerns, Congressional Research Service 7-5700, RL32534,Washington, 

DC: Congressional Research Service, February 12, 2013.

291. Ibid, p. 9.

292. Zalmay Khalilzad, “A Strategy of ‘Congagement’ toward Pakistan,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2012, 

pp. 107-119.
186

293. “Voennie Bazi Rossii Na Nashei Zemle” (“Russian Military Bases On Our Soil”), Svobodnie Novisti, available from old.snplus.com/!_old-site_!/arhive/jan07/2/str/1-05.htm. 

294. Natalia Makushina, “Comment: Why Belarus Needs 

Third Russian Military Base,” Deutsche Welle, September 6, 2013, 

available from www.dw.de/комментарий-зачем-беларуси-третьявоенная-база-россии/a-16868264. 

295. Website of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of 

Belarus, www.mil.by/ru/military_policy/rb_nato/. 

296. “Military and Technical Cooperation between Belarus 

and China,” Belarus Security Blog, October 18, 2013, available from 

www.bsblog.info/military-and-technical-cooperation-between-belarusand-china/.
187

ANNEX 1

QUESTIONNAIRE

Democratization and Instability in Ukraine, 

Georgia, and Belarus

5 = very high/very good

4 = high/good

3 = middling or ambiguous 

2 =low/bad

1 = very low/very bad

1. What is the country of your origin?

___ Georgia ___ Ukraine ___ Belarus

All the remaining questions are regarding your 

country of origin, regardless of your current country 

of residence and will use the following answer scale:

5 = very high/very good

4 = high/good

3 = middling or ambiguous 

2 =low/bad

1 = very low/very bad
188

Please pick one answer to each question:

Citizenship, Law, and Rights

1. To what extent is the rule of law operative 

throughout the country?

2. How independent are the courts and the judiciary from the executive?

3. How much confidence do you have in the legal 

system to deliver fair and effective justice?

4. How has the situation regarding democracy

and human rights improved in the last decade?

5. How effective and equal is the protection of the

freedoms of movement, expression, association and 

assembly?

6. How would you evaluate the situation with the

freedom of speech? 

7. How secure is the freedom for all to practice

their own religion, language or culture?

8. How free from harassment and intimidation are 

individuals and groups working to improve human 

rights?

9. How would you assess the situation with economic freedom? 

10. How satisfied are you with the economic development of your country? 
189

Representative and Accountable Government

Did the elections become more transparent in the 

last decade? 

___ Yes ___ No

11. How free are opposition or non-governing parties to organize?

12. How much are you satisfied with the last elections held? 

13. How much do you trust your government?

14. How comprehensive and effective is legislation giving citizens the right of access to government 

information?

15. How publicly accountable are the police and

security services for their activities?

16. What is, in your opinion, the crime level in your

country?

17. Do businesses influence public policy?

___ Yes ___ No

18. How much confidence do you have that public 

officials and public services are free from corruption?
190

Civil Society and Popular Participation

19. How independent are the media from government?

20. How effective are the media and other independent bodies in investigating government and powerful corporations?

21. How free are journalists from restrictive laws,

harassment and intimidation?

22. How independent are voluntary associations,

citizen groups, social movements etc., from the government?

23. How much, in your opinion, is the influence 

of other countries on the domestic political affairs of 

your country? 

24. Would you anticipate any significant political 

change in your country within the next 5 years?

___ Yes ___ No

25. If you were to choose between economic

 stability and political freedom, which one would you 

prefer? 

___ Economic stability ___ Political freedom
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp 

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. Robert Nalbandov

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil