NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT KRISTEN BURNHAM, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Caroline Burnham and as Representative of Ethan J. Mayne, a m inor, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; RICHARD ALAN YOUNG, Defendants - Appellees. No. 11-17743 D.C. No. 2:07-cv-08017-DGC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona David G. Cam

pbell, District Judge, Presiding Subm itted October 15, 2013 * * San Francisco, California 

# FILED

OCT 18 2013 M OLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

* * The panel unanim ously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argum e nt. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).Before: THOMAS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT, District

Judge. * * * Plaintiff Kristen Burnham (“Burnham ”) appeals from the district court’s judgm e nt in favor of the United States. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm . Because the parties are fam iliar with the factual and procedural history of the case, we will not recount it here. I We review the district court’s decisions concerning discovery for an abuse of discretion. Preminger v. Peake , 552 F.3d 757, 768 n.10 (9th Cir. 2008). Rule 16(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a] schedule m ay be m odified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Good cause exists when a deadline “cannot reasonably be m e t despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 Advisory Com m .’s Notes (1983 Am .). The sam e standard applies for m odifying a scheduling order on rem and. See Mark H. v. Lemahieu , 513 F.3d 922, 940 n.16 (9th Cir. 2008). Because Burnham was not diligent in m eeting the expert disclosure and fact discovery deadlines, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that good cause did not

* * * The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, sitting by designation. 2exist for m odifying the scheduling order to allow for new disclosures and

additional discovery.

II The district court did not err in excluding Burnham ’s expert report, an issue that was contained in her prior appeal. Under the m andate rule of the doctrine of law of the case, “a m andate is controlling as to all m a tters within its com pass, while leaving any issue not expressly or im pliedly disposed of on appeal available for consideration by the trial court on rem and.” Firth v. United States , 554 F.2d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 1977). Further, “‘one panel of an appellate court will not as a general rule reconsider questions which another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the sam e case.’” Hegler v. Borg , 50 F.3d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Merritt v. Mackey , 932 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1991)). Because this Court im pliedly affirm ed the district court’s exclusion of Burnham ’s expert report in the first appeal in this case, we will not reconsider the issue on this appeal. See Burnham v. United States , 400 F. App’x 190, 191 (9th Cir. 2010). III Burnham ’s claim

that “the trial court’s finding that plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant’s agent was negligent is in error,” is waived because she did not

3present an argum e nt to support it. United States v. Williamson , 439 F.3d 1125,

1137–38 (9th Cir. 2006) (issues raised in brief but not supported by argum e nt are abandoned); United States v. Tisor , 96 F.3d 370, 376 (9th Cir. 1996) (issue waived by failing to present argum ent or pertinent authority to support contentions); see Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A). AFFIRMED.

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