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NASA INFRASTRUCTURE: 

ENABLING DISCOVERY AND 

ENSURING CAPABILITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 20, 2013 

Serial No. 113–50 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

RANDY WEBER, Texas 

CHRIS STEWART, Utah 

VACANCY 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

DAN MAFFEI, New York 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

SCOTT PETERS, California 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC VEASEY, Texas 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

MARK TAKANO, California 

ROBIN KELLY, Illinois 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

HON. STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi, Chair 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

CHRIS STEWART, Utah 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

DAN MAFFEI, New York 

JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

AMI BERA, California 

MARC VEASEY, Texas 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

September 20, 2013 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Steven Palazzo, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 26 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 27 

Statement by Representative Julie Brownley, Acting Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 28 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 29 

Witnesses: 

The Honorable Paul K. Martin, Inspector General, National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 30 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 32 

Mr. Richard Keegan, Associate Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 40 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 42 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 49 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

The Honorable Paul K. Martin, Inspector General, National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration .......................................................................................... 68 

Mr. Richard Keegan, Associate Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration ................................................................................... 84 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Submitted statement of Representative Donna F. Edwards, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology ....... 114 

Submitted statement of Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology .................................. 116 

Agency/MPCV Risk: Inability to Certify TPS Performance presentation, submitted by Representative Steve Stockman, Committee on Science, Space, 

and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................... 117 

Safety and Mission Assurance concerns related to the closure of the JSC 

Arc Jet Facility letter, submitted by Representative Steve Stockman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .... 158 

Update on Closure of the JSC Arc Jet Facility and National Security Concerns letter, submitted by Representative Steve Stockman, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 161 
Page

IV 

NASA, Ames Research Center’s Justification for Other than Full and Open 

Competition document, submitted by Representative Steve Stockman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .... 165 

Letter submitted by Representative Bill Posey, Committee on Science, Space, 

and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................... 170 

Letter submitted by Representative Bill Posey, Committee on Science, Space, 

and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................... 173 
(1) 

NASA INFRASTRUCTURE: 

ENABLING DISCOVERY AND 

ENSURING CAPABILITY 

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2013 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:35 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steven Palazzo 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 
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Chairman PALAZZO. The Subcommittee on Space will come to 

order. Good morning. Welcome to today’s hearing titled ‘‘NASA Infrastructure: Enabling Discovery and Ensuring Capability.’’ In 

front of you are packets containing the written testimony, biographies, and required Truth-in-Testimony disclosures for today’s 

witnesses. 

I recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to address NASA’s complex infrastructure issues. This is a tall order for an agency that is the 

ninth largest Federal Government real property holder. That includes an inventory of more than 124,000 acres, and more than 44 

million square feet within approximately 4,900 buildings and other 

structures. However, nearly 80 percent of the agency’s facilities 

date back to the Apollo era and are 40 or more years old. A 2012 

study by NASA estimated that NASA may have as many as 865 

unneeded facilities, with maintenance costs of over $24 million a 

year. Also, NASA has a backlog of over $2.19 billion in deferred 

maintenance. 

In order to better manage its infrastructure and facilities, NASA 

has established an Agency Master Plan to align its infrastructure 

with its mission and set up a Technical Capabilities Assessment 

Study to identify and evaluate Center capabilities against Agency 

needs. Also, various Centers are implementing innovative ways to 

address these infrastructure challenges such as the Langley 20- 

Year Revitalization Plan to right-size the Center’s facilities and 

bring about greater efficiencies. Despite these efforts, NASA will 

continue to face challenges with right-sizing its infrastructure as 

long as it does not have a coherent and consistent roadmap for exploration. 

Since 2005, Congress has provided consistent guidance on how 

NASA should develop such a roadmap as well as the necessary 

funding on a go-as-you-can-pay basis. Despite our efforts, OMB and 

the recent Administration have chosen to divert resources from exploration to other efforts. 

The President’s 2009 cut of $1 billion from the exploration budget, and the roughly 45 percent increase in the Earth Science budget 

since 2007 are just a few examples. 

Until the Administration allows NASA to develop a coherent exploration strategy, rather than pushing NASA toward costly, complex and controversial distractions such as the Administration’s asteroid proposals, NASA will never know what infrastructure and 

facilities it actually needs. 

Setting aside this issue, I believe there are things that the Administration and Congress can do to allow NASA to better manage 

its facilities. NASA already has authorities to enter into Enhanced 

Use Lease agreements to maintain underutilized infrastructure, 

Space Act Agreements, traditional leases, and various other incentives. 

I hope the witnesses will be able to discuss how NASA is using 

these existing authorities. Are they being fully utilized, and does 

NASA have robust policies to determine which authority should be 

used for each facility, and whether Agency oversight is sufficient to 

ensure fairness and protect taxpayer equities. 
28 

In addition to existing authorities, NASA and stakeholders have 

recommended various additional authorities such as conveyance 

authority, expanded Enhanced Use Lease, the establishment of a 

capital fund, and enhanced authority to cooperate with the commercial launch sector. While these proposals are promising, I believe that they must be accompanied by strong oversight provisions 

to ensure that taxpayer investments are protected. 

While the NASA Authorization Act of 2013 funds key NASA missions, maintains infrastructure and even increases funding for Center Management and Operations, it does not attempt to solve all 

of the agency’s complex infrastructure issues. Instead, we have allowed time for opportunities such as this hearing to gain better understanding of NASA’s challenges and options. I hope that the insights we gain today will be useful as we move forward with the 

NASA Authorization Act. 

I would be remiss if I did not mention the intense amount of interest that Members and stakeholders have in NASA’s infrastructure. This is exhibited by the recent debates surrounding the Kennedy Space Center’s Launch Complex 39A, the Shuttle landing facility, and the Shiloh site, as well as the Johnson Space Center’s 

arc jet, cleanup of the Santa Susanna Site, test stand use at Stennis Space Center, as well as Hangar One and Moffett field at Ames 

Research Center, to mention just a few. I know many Members 

have opinions on these topics that directly impact their districts. I 

look forward to working with my colleagues, as well as NASA and 

the Administration to tackle these challenges. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Palazzo follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE CHAIRMAN STEVEN PALAZZO

The purpose of today’s hearing is to address NASA’s complex infrastructure 

issues. This is a tall order for an agency that is the ninth largest Federal Government real property holder. That includes an inventory of more than 124,000 acres, 

and more than 44 million square feet within approximately 4,900 buildings and 

other structures. However, nearly 80 percent of the agency’s facilities date back to 

the Apollo era and are 40 or more years old. A 2012 study by NASA estimated that 

NASA may have as many as 865 unneeded facilities, with maintenance costs of over 

$24 million a year. Also, NASA has a backlog of over $2.19 billion in deferred maintenance. 

In order to better manage its infrastructure and facilities, NASA has established 

an Agency Master Plan to align its infrastructure with its mission and set up a 

Technical Capabilities Assessment Study to identify and evaluate Center capabilities against Agency needs. Also, various Centers are implementing innovative ways 

to address these infrastructure challenges such as the Langley 20 Year Revitalization Plan to right-size the Center’s facilities and bring about greater efficiencies. Despite these efforts, NASA will continue to face challenges with right-sizing its infrastructure as long as it does not have a coherent and consistent roadmap for exploration. 

Since 2005, Congress has provided consistent guidance on how NASA should develop such a roadmap as well as the necessary funding on a go-as-you-can-pay basis. 

Despite our efforts, OMB and the recent Administration have chosen to divert resources from exploration to other efforts.The President’s 2009 cut of $1 billion from 

the exploration budget, and the roughly 45 percent increase in the Earth Science 

budget since 2007 are just a few examples. 

Until the Administration allows NASA to develop a coherent exploration strategy, 

rather than pushing NASA toward costly, complex and controversial distractions 

such as the Administration’s asteroid proposals, NASA will never know what infrastructure and facilities it actually needs. 

Setting aside this issue, I believe there are things that the Administration and 

Congress can do to allow NASA to better manage its facilities. NASA already has 
29 

authorities to enter into Enhanced Use Lease agreements to maintain underutilized 

infrastructure, Space Act Agreements, traditional leases, and various other incentives. 

I hope the witnesses will be able to discuss how NASA is using these existing authorities—are they being fully utilized, does NASA have robust policies to determine 

which authority should be used for each facility, and whether Agency oversight is 

sufficient to ensure fairness and protect taxpayer equities.In addition to existing authorities, NASA and stakeholders have recommended various additional authorities 

such as conveyance authority, expanded Enhanced Use Lease, the establishment of 

a capital fund, and enhanced authority to cooperate with the commercial launch sector. While these proposals are promising, I believe that they must be accompanied 

by strong oversight provisions to ensure that taxpayer investments are protected. 

While the NASA Authorization Act of 2013 funds key NASA missions, maintains 

infrastructure and even increases funding for Center Management and Operations, 

it does not attempt to solve all of the agency’s complex infrastructure issues. Instead, we have allowed time for opportunities such as this hearing to gain better 

understanding of NASA’s challenges and options. I hope the insights we gain today 

will be useful as we move forward with the NASA Authorization Act. 

I would be remiss if I did not mention the intense amount of interest that Members and stakeholders have in NASA’s infrastructure. This is exhibited by the recent 

debates surrounding the Kennedy Space Center’s Launch Complex 39A, the Shuttle 

landing facility, and the Shiloh site, as well as the Johnson Space Center’s arc jet, 

cleanup of the Santa Susanna Site, test stand use at Stennis Space Center, as well 

as Hanger One and Moffett field at Ames Research Center, to mention just a few. 

I know many Members have opinions on these topics that directly impact their districts. I look forward to working with my colleagues, as well as NASA and the Administration to tackle these challenges. 

Chairman PALAZZO. With that, I yield to the Ranking Member, 

the gentlewoman Ms. Brownley. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today’s 

hearing to review NASA’s infrastructure and facilities, and welcome to our witnesses. Ranking Member Edwards had another 

commitment this morning, and has asked me to sit in her chair, 

and I request that her prepared statement be entered into the 

record. 

Ranking Member Edwards and I share the same passion for ensuring that NASA has a productive and inspiring future. However, 

a strong and vibrant space program requires that we provide 

NASA with adequate resources, including the R&D tools and facilities it needs to accomplish its challenging missions and cutting 

edge research. 

I am concerned about the state of the agency’s facilities and infrastructure. The fact that NASA’s facilities are aging should come 

as no surprise. Many were built during and before the Apollo era. 

Today, challenged by both declining funding and an uncertain 

budgetary environment, NASA is trying to make due with what it 

is given. In that regard, I am especially concerned about adequately funding NASA’s Environmental Compliance and Restoration Program, which is responsible for cleaning up hazardous materials and waste that have been released to the surface or groundwater at NASA installations, NASA-owned industrial plants supporting NASA activities, current or former sites where NASA operations have contributed to environmental problems, and other sites 

where the Agency is legally obligated to address hazardous pollutants. 

According to NASA’s Fiscal Year 2014 budget requests, one of 

the projects planned includes investigation and clean up of contaminated groundwater, soils, and demolition at Santa Susana 

Field Laboratory in accordance with a consent order with the State 
30 

of California. This and other planned environmental compliance 

restoration activities have been the result of painstaking negotiations between NASA and several States. 

That is why I hope to learn more about the status of NASA’s actions at Santa Susanna, and about what is needed to address 

NASA’s other longstanding facilities and infrastructure challenges. 

NASA’s successes are a shining light of inspiration and accomplishment for our youth and our Nation, and I want to ensure that 

we enable NASA to continue to fill that role in the coming years. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Brownley follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE ACTING RANKING MINORITY

MEMBER JULIE BROWNLEY

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today’s hearing to review NASA’s infrastructure and facilities, and welcome to our witnesses. 

Ranking Member Edwards has another commitment and has asked me to sit in 

the chair. I request that her prepared statement be entered into the record. 

Ranking Member Edwards and I share the same passion for ensuring that NASA 

has a productive and inspiring future. However, a strong and vibrant space program 

requires that we provide NASA with adequate resources, including the R&D tools 

and facilities it needs to accomplish its challenging missions and cutting-edge research. 

I am concerned about the state of the agency’s facilities and infrastructure. The 

fact that NASA’s facilities are aging should come as no surprise. Many were built 

during and before the Apollo era. Today, challenged by both declining funding and 

an uncertain budgetary environment, NASA is trying to make do with what it is 

given. 

In that regard, I am especially concerned about adequately funding NASA’s Environmental Compliance and Restoration program, which is responsible for cleaning 

up hazardous materials and waste that have been released to the surface or groundwater at NASA installations, NASA-owned industrial plants supporting NASA activities, current or former sites where NASA operations have contributed to environmental problems, and other sites where the Agency is legally obligated to address 

hazardous pollutants. 

According to NASA’s FY 2014 budget request, one of the projects planned includes 

investigation and cleanup of contaminated groundwater, soils, and demolition at 

Santa Susana Field Laboratory in accordance with the consent order with the State 

of California. 

This and other planned environmental compliance and restoration activities have 

been the result of painstaking negotiations between NASA and several states. 

That is why I hope to learn more about the status of NASA’s actions at Santa 

Susana and about what is needed to address NASA’s other long-standing facilities 

and infrastructure challenges. 

NASA’s successes are a shining light of inspiration and accomplishment for our 

youth and our nation, and I want to ensure that we enable NASA to continue to 

fill that role in the coming years. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Brownley. If 

there are Members who wish to submit additional opening statements, your statements will be added to the record at this point. 

Chairman PALAZZO. If there are Members who wish to submit 

additional—actually, at this time I would like to introduce our 

panel of witnesses. Our first witness is the Honorable Paul Martin, 

the Inspector General of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Our second witness is Mr. Richard Keegan, NASA’s 

Associate Deputy Administrator. As our witnesses should know, 

spoken testimony is limited to five minutes each, after which Members of the Committee have five minutes each to ask questions. 

Your written testimony will be included in the record of the hearing. 
31 

I now recognize our first witness, Mr. Martin, for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE PAUL K. MARTIN, 

INSPECTOR GENERAL, 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS 

AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. MARTIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Palazzo, Congresswoman Brownley, and Members of the Subcommittee, the Office of Inspector General welcomes this opportunity to discuss the 

challenges facing NASA with respect to its aging infrastructure 

and antiquated facilities. 

Over the past three years, we have issued 10 audits examining 

many of NASA’s most pressing infrastructure-related issues. In my 

remarks this morning, I will focus primarily on our February audit 

that assessed NASA’s efforts to reduce its unneeded infrastructure. 

As mentioned, NASA is the ninth largest Federal Government 

property holder, controlling approximately 4,900 buildings and 

structures, more than 80 percent of which are over 40 years old 

and beyond their design life. However, NASA has not been able to 

properly fund required maintenance for its facilities, and estimates 

its deferred maintenance costs at $2.3 billion. 

In our February audit, we identified 33 facilities, wind tunnels, 

test stands, thermal vacuum chambers, air fields, and launch infrastructure, that NASA was not fully utilizing or for which managers 

could not identify a future mission use. These facilities cost more 

than $43 million to maintain in 2011 alone. The need for these facilities has declined as a result of their poor condition, changes in 

NASA’s mission, and the advent of alternative testing methods. We 

found that NASA’s attempts over the years to address its infrastructure problems have met with limited success. Our audit identified four reasons why. 

First, Fluctuating and Uncertain Requirements. Changes to national space policy initiated by the President and Congress have increased the difficulty of determining which facilities NASA needs. 

For example, NASA’s human exploration mission has transitioned 

from the Space Shuttle Program to the Constellation Program to 

the Space Launch System in just six years. Because decisions about 

whether to retain specific facilities depends heavily upon the missions that NASA undertakes, frequent changes to these missions 

complicate the Agency’s efforts to manage its infrastructure. 

A recent example is the A–3 test stand at Stennis, which was 

constructed to accommodate special testing requirements for the 

J2-X engine. When Constellation was cancelled in 2010, the test 

stand was approximately 65 percent complete. Because neither the 

Space Launch System nor any other existing or planned NASA program requires the A–3’s capabilities, NASA plans to mothball the 

$350 million test stand later this month once it is completed. Even 

so, maintenance costs for the mothballed stand may reach $1.5 million annually. 

Second, Agency Culture and Business Practices. Historically, 

NASA has practiced a decentralized approach to managing its infrastructure, leading Centers to compete for work from the Agency’s major programs. A ‘‘keep it in case you might need it’’ culture 

has led Centers to either build or preserve facilities that duplicate 
32 

capabilities elsewhere in the Agency. For example, NASA currently 

has 36 wind tunnels at 5 Centers, 35 rocket test stands at 6 sites, 

and 40 large thermal vacuum chambers at seven locations. 

Third, Political Pressure. The political context in which NASA 

operates often impedes its efforts to reduce infrastructure. During 

our review, we noted several examples where political leaders intervened in NASA’s plans to close or consolidate Agency facilities. 

For example, Members of Congress opposed NASA’s decision to 

consolidate arc jet operations at Ames, and in another matter, argued against NASA’s efforts to relinquish control of Hangar One at 

Moffett Field. While input from federal, state, and local officials is 

not unique to NASA, such pressure creates additional difficulties as 

the Agency seeks to manage its aging infrastructure. 

Finally, Inadequate Funding. Disposing of facilities that NASA 

no longer needs is not without cost, and in many instances, requires environmental remediation. For example, under the terms of 

its current agreement with California, NASA estimates that the environmental cleanup at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory will 

cost more than $200 million. Consequently, NASA’s ability to reduce its infrastructure depends on funding for cleanup and other 

costs associated with demolition and disposal. 

NASA officials readily acknowledge that the Agency has more infrastructure than it needs to carry out current and planned missions, and to its credit NASA has a series of initiatives underway 

that we believe are positive steps toward right sizing its real property footprint. However, many of these efforts are in the early 

stages and their ultimate success remains unclear. 

In the end, NASA’s best efforts to reduce its excess facilities may 

be insufficient to overcome the cultural and political obstacles that 

have impeded past efforts. Accordingly, an outside process similar 

to the DoD’s Base Realignment and Closure Commission may be 

needed to help make the difficult but necessary—infrastructure decisions. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Martin follows:] 
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Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Martin. 

I now recognize our next witness, Mr. Keegan, for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. RICHARD KEEGAN, 

ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS 

AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. KEEGAN. Chairman Palazzo and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 

today to discuss NASA’s continuing efforts to balance and align the 

Agency’s infrastructure goals with today’s evolving mission requirements. 

Every day, NASA scientists and engineers achieve tremendous 

advances in the areas of human space flight, Earth Science, space 

science, aeronautics research, and space technology, inspiring people worldwide. These achievements would not be possible without 

access to reliable and cost effective physical infrastructure capabilities located across the country at NASA’s 10 Centers and their associated facilities. NASA takes seriously its responsibility to be an 

effective steward of these capabilities, ensuring they are effective 

and available as needed for our current and future missions. 

Like other Federal agencies, NASA is challenged with managing 

the significant needs of an aging physical infrastructure portfolio 

within a budget environment that can be difficult to predict. 

NASA’s infrastructure was largely constructed during or before the 

Apollo era. While our facilities are generally well-designed and constructed, age and changing mission requirements have affected the 

resilience and usefulness of many of our facilities. Yet in spite of 

these challenges, NASA continues to make significant progress on 

achieving our overarching facility strategy. For example, each 

NASA Center has one or more major facility replacement projects 

underway at the planning, design, or construction stage. 

NASA is pursuing public and private sector utilization opportunities for assets that are excess to its needs. An example is the recent 

agreement between NASA and Space Florida for the use of Orbital 

Processing Facility 3 at Kennedy Space Center. Another such opportunity is the ongoing competition regarding Kennedy’s Launch 

Complex 39A. Given that this is an ongoing competition, it would 

be inappropriate for me to comment further on this particular matter today. 

Agency-deferred maintenance, an estimate of the essential but 

unfunded maintenance work necessary to bring all facilities up to 

standards, has decreased by 5.7 percent since 2011. The utility system replacement projects at our NASA Centers are underway, reducing the risk of major utility failures that could impact Agency 

operations, and the number of real property assets owned and 

maintained by NASA continues to decrease, thereby freeing up infrastructure dollars for other projects. NASA estimates that it will 

reduce administrative space by another 256,000 square feet by the 

year 2015 via demolition, transfer, or lease termination. 

Today, NASA’s infrastructure decisions are guided by an Agency 

facility strategy defined in 2009, along with a 20-year Agency master plan that informs implementation of this strategy. NASA has 

also established an Agency level mission support council to inte-
42 

grate senior management review of decisions within the mission 

support portfolio, ensuring that mission requirements and facility 

investment are better aligned. Additionally, we have established a 

collaborative partnering arrangement between center and headquarters officials in order to ensure facility strategic goals are realistic, based on budget availability. 

In July, 2012, NASA stood up a Technical Capability Assessment 

Team, or TCAT, under the leadership of the Associate Administrator that was charged with developing a process for identifying 

and assessing each Center’s technical capabilities against the current and future needs of the Agency. The team was also asked to 

identify areas for potential capability divestment or investment, 

due to changing mission needs and/or duplication of capabilities. 

Once complete, the team’s analysis will be used from a facilities 

perspective to inform future Agency master planning activities, and 

to support future strategic facility investment decisions. 

In summary, NASA believes that our strategic infrastructure approach, aligned with mission requirements and guided by a wellintegrated risk management practice provides the best framework 

for achieving the Agency’s infrastructure goals in the most cost effective manner over time. We therefore appreciate this Subcommittee’s continued support for NASA programs and priorities, and for 

the funding NASA needs to maintain, protect, and improve our Nation’s valuable Space and Aeronautics Program infrastructure. I 

will be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Keegan follows:] 
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Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Keegan. I thank the witnesses for being available for questioning today. Reminding Members that Committee rules limit questioning to five minutes, the 

Chair will at this point open the round of questions. The Chair recognizes himself for five minutes. 

My question is going to be for Mr. Martin or Mr. Keegan. Both 

of you can answer. How does NASA’s Enhance Use Leasing authority differ from the authorities granted to other Federal agencies? 

Mr. Keegan, you would like to start? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I am not certain the authorities other agencies 

have in the Enhanced Use Leasing area. I know that we use our 

Enhanced Use Leasing authority at five Centers currently, and I 

think there is more that NASA can do to take advantage of that 

authority. But I am not aware of a comparison with other agencies 

and the particular authorities they have under Enhanced Use 

Leasing. I know we are restricted, for example, from the nature of 

in-kind contributions we can accept and things like that. 

Chairman PALAZZO. That is a good question. Mr. Martin, do 

you—I will come back with the in-kind limitations. 

Mr. Martin, do you have—would you like to add anything? Because I know there have been reports and studies, you know, talking about NASA’s Enhanced Use Leasing authority compared to 

other agencies. I am assuming you all read these and can kind of 

glean best practices. 

Mr. MARTIN. Yes, I was going to comment on the same thing 

Rick mentioned that is the limitation on Enhanced Use Leasing. 

The in kind contributions need to be tied to some type of—— 

Mr. KEEGAN. Energy. 

Mr. MARTIN. —energy-dependent type thing, and I think as we 

talk about what are possible changes that Congress may consider, 

it may be removing that limitation. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Would you like to expand on that to maybe 

address possibly commercial space endeavors and others, because 

it is limited to just energy—environmental projects at this time. 

Mr. KEEGAN. I know that NASA requested authority this year to 

accept commercial revenue under tightly controlled circumstances 

where we share, for example, a launch complex. I know the Air 

Force has—or DoD has that authority where they can accept a 

commercial vendor’s funding to fund a support contract at that 

launch facility to provide services to all the launch vehicles, government and commercial, and giving NASA that authority would give 

us—it might provide some leveraging of resources, but also from a 

private industry point of view, create common business practices, 

whether it is a NASA launch site or DoD launch site. 

Chairman PALAZZO. If we expand these authorities, would you all 

like to—I mean, how would we go about A) making sure it is uniform and fair across all the Centers, and B) how are we going to 

protect the taxpayer investment and making sure that we are getting the right return on these agreements and authorities? Mr. 

Keegan? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I think, first of all, any degree of oversight, you 

know, the Committee would want to exercise would be important, 

but NASA would develop internal procedures for the use of those 

authorities that would make sure that we make decisions that are 
51 

optimum from an agency level that are equitable across the Centers, and that do protect the taxpayer interest to get the, you know, 

the most and maximum benefit out of the assets that they have 

funded, you know, at NASA. 

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add to that? 

Chairman PALAZZO. Yes, Mr. Martin. 

Mr. MARTIN. The broader issue on leasing is that leasing is a valuable mechanism that NASA can use to help pick up some of its 

operations and maintenance costs. We did a review looking at 

NASA’s leasing practices, and our bottom line conclusion there— 

quite frankly, there were several. One is that NASA—before you 

can enter into an Enhanced Use Lease or a traditional lease, NASA 

needs to make a decision that it needs to retain that facility or 

property for a future mission use. We found that NASA wasn’t 

making that decision as a threshold matter. You are not supposed 

to use leasing of in kind as a substitute for disposal, demolition, 

or giving over it to GSA. So that is a threshold issue. The threshold 

decision is does NASA have a future mission use for this facility 

or property? And if so, our audit found that NASA was not aggressively promoting these leasing opportunities at its Centers. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I mean, that comes back to we really need 

a roadmap for where NASA is going to explore next so we can actually determine what facilities and infrastructure that we truly 

need. Would you agree with that, Mr. Keegan? 

Mr. KEEGAN. Yes, I think a definitive roadmap obviously would 

allow us to focus our facility investments, sort of have more certainty about where we are going and the kind of investments we 

need to make. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Mr. Martin? 

Mr. MARTIN. I would agree as well. We pointed out in our written 

and oral remarks that changing the focus of these sort of big ticket, 

long-term missions, and focused primarily on human exploration, is 

costing the taxpayers a significant amount of money. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I have a tendency to agree, and I think that 

is one of the reasons why the NASA 2013 Authorization Act does 

direct NASA to come up with a roadmap so that we can know 

where we are going, and then we can all focus on getting there. 

So I appreciate your questions. My time is expired. I now recognize Ms. Brownley for five minutes. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and my question is directed to Mr. Martin. 

Your office’s February 2013 report on NASA’s environmental remediation efforts at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory appears to 

question NASA’s 2010 agreement with the State of California to 

clean up NASA’s portion of the site to background levels. It says, 

and I quote, ‘‘NASA has agreed to clean its portion of the Santa 

Susanna site to a level that exceeds the generally accepted standard necessary to protect human health in light of the expected future use of the site.’’ In your report, are you suggesting that NASA 

not comply with the agreement, and if so, could you clarify its findings and recommendations? 

Mr. MARTIN. Sure. Our recommendation is just as you spelled it 

out. The Santa Susana Field Laboratory, we believe that NASA 

needs to investigate any and all alternatives for reaching a more, 
52 

we think, appropriate resolution of the environmental remediation 

based on the future use of the site. The agreement that NASA has 

entered into, as you indicated, would be to clean the Santa Susana 

Field Laboratory, NASA’s portion, to a background level, which will 

cost taxpayers over $200 million. Given that the expected future 

use is for recreational purposes, cleaning up to that level will cost 

the taxpayers $25 million. And so we were laying the facts out 

there that NASA should do everything in its power to clean—to follow, I think, what is the normal practice and clean this site for its 

expected future use. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. Okay. Well, I think the future use I think is 

still—I don’t think it is defined necessarily to strictly recreational 

areas, but I know that there is some interest in moving in that direction. But the agreement certainly was very carefully negotiated, 

certainly by the State of California and DTSC, and there was a 

reason I think the State felt and I certainly concurred that cleaning 

up to background levels was the appropriate clean up for it to be 

safe for potentially recreational use or other uses. But I appreciate 

your comment on that. 

I guess I would follow up with Mr. Keegan with regards, again, 

to the Santa Susana Field Lab and its clean up. So I understand, 

certainly my interpretation and I think the State of California’s interpretation on the AOC is that the agreement is it will get cleaned 

up to these background levels. I know that there was recently a 

completed EIS report, and the purpose of that EIS report was to 

determine the best ways in which this clean up could occur. I think 

we are in the process of a public comment period as we speak, 

which ends, I think, on October the 1st. 

So I was just wondering with the EIS report and that process 

that is going on if you could just comment from your vantage point 

what is the status of NASA’s actions with respect to the clean up 

of your portion of that site? 

Mr. KEEGAN. Yes, Congresswoman. All the information you just 

related is my understanding as well of where we are. The draft EIS 

is open for comment until October 1, and we expect a final EIS in 

November, and NASA is committed to fulfilling our obligations 

under the AOC. There is sufficient funding in our FY14 request to 

accomplish all the activities that are planned for FY14, leading to 

fulfilling our commitments under the AOC. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. So regardless then of what the IG may be recommending, your commitment is still to the agreement with the AOC? 

Mr. KEEGAN. We are committed to the agreement under the 

AOC. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. Okay, thank you. 

Thank you very much, and I will yield back my time. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you. I know recognize Mr. Brooks for 

five minutes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Which one of you two would be best to share information about 

launch pad 39A? Do you both have insight on it? 

Mr. MARTIN. The Inspector General’s office has not done any audits or reviews of the current—certainly the current RFP that is on 

the street for leasing. We have looked more broadly at launch infrastructure, but we have not looked specifically at pad 39A or 39B. 
53 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Keegan? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I can talk in general terms about pad 39A as an 

asset, but not about the ongoing competition, because it is a matter 

that is under competition and we want to preserve the integrity of 

that competition. 

Mr. BROOKS. Are you familiar with the accumulated taxpayer 

costs for the construction and maintenance of launch pad 39A? 

Mr. KEEGAN. The current replacement value if we were to build a new one just like that is over half a billion dollars. It is $535 million. 

Mr. BROOKS. Five hundred thirty-five million dollars. Are you familiar with the annual maintenance costs for launch pad 39A? 

Mr. KEEGAN. When it was in operations, it was about $12 million 

a year. Now in the mothball status when we are doing only a minimal amount of maintenance, it is $1.2 million. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, I do want to address as best as possible the 

announcement for proposals or request for proposals concerning 

39A. It has come to my attention that it is possible that under the 

current proposal situation that 39A could be taken over by one private company. Is that an accurate perception that I have? 

Mr. KEEGAN. The AFP, which is a public document, is open to 

proposals for either single user use or multi-user use of pad 39A. 

We don’t express a preference for the operational concept. 

Mr. BROOKS. Are you familiar with SpaceX’s proposal? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I probably should not comment on that. 

Mr. BROOKS. Are you familiar with it? That is my first question, 

not whether you should comment on it. 

Mr. KEEGAN. Yes. 

Mr. BROOKS. And is it public? 

Mr. KEEGAN. No. 

Mr. BROOKS. The information I have from the Committee staff 

and also from letters by my colleagues in the House and then also 

individuals in the Senate to NASA, they express concern that the 

way things are going, NASA may turn over launch pad 39A to a 

single user, SpaceX, which would be to thee exclusion of other commercial space providers and also potentially to the exclusion of 

launch pad 39A being a backup for the Space Launch System. Is 

there any merit to those concerns expressed by my colleagues in 

the House and their letters to NASA, and then also by Members 

of the United States Senate? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I would—as I said earlier, the AFP that NASA 

issued indicated that we were open to either a single user concept 

or a multi-user concept. With respect to SLS, I think our analysis 

indicated that pad 39B is more than sufficient under any reasonable scenario to fully subscribe—to fully meet the requirements of 

SLS. As a matter of fact, it won’t fully subscribe 39B. 39B has the 

potential to do a lot more, and so to achieve that maximum potential, we are looking to make 39B a multi-user launch pad. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, I have serious concerns and reservations with 

NASA’s potential plans to lease Kennedy Space Flight Center’s 

launch complex 39A exclusively to one company. If you would, 

please explain to me and the panel what benefit it is to taxpayers 

for one commercial provider to have sole use of pad 39A, regardless 

of which commercial provider that may be. 
54 

Mr. KEEGAN. I am not sure how much I should say about this. 

I would just say that the AFP provides the criteria under which 

NASA will make a selection in best interest of the public to get the 

maximum benefit for the public out of that asset that taxpayers 

have invested in. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well that being the case, as much as I can, I would 

encourage NASA to make launch pad 39A a multi-user facility. I 

have reservations about the potential adverse impact on our space 

program of one of our primary launch pads being taken over by one 

user, which in my judgment, would tend to both stifle competition, 

which I think is a good thing, on the one hand, and on the other 

hand, reduce the ability of 39A to be used as a backup, should it 

be necessary for either other private users or by NASA itself. 

I see my time has expired, but I hope that you will take my concerns and the concerns of other Members of Congress and of the 

United States Senate into account as NASA wrestles with this matter. Thank you. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Kilmer. 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow up on 

the previous gentleman’s line of questioning. 

A handful of questions. If launch complex 39A is run as a multiuse facility, I understand the commercial companies involved want 

to make it multi-user. Has NASA completed fully converting 

launch complex 39B into a multi-user facility, and if not, what is 

the remaining cost of doing so? And if so, can we assume that no 

more taxpayer funds are needed to modify 39B for multiple users? 

Mr. KEEGAN. The work to convert pad 39B is not fully complete, 

but I don’t have the cost figures. We are in that scheduled process. 

If you like, I could provide that for the record. 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you. In addition, can you talk about how 

those costs compare to the $1.2 million of maintenance costs that 

you just spoke about related to pad 39A? 

Mr. KEEGAN. The cost for conversion of 39B or ultimately for the 

cost of maintenance? 

Mr. KILMER. Both. 

Mr. KEEGAN. I don’t have the specifics on that, but again, I can 

provide that for the record. I am certain that an active launch pad 

would cost more to operate and maintain than the $1.2 million to 

maintain a mothball launch pad. 

Mr. KILMER. Okay. Thank you. The rest of my questions were 

covered. Thank you. 

Chairman PALAZZO. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize 

Mr. Stockman for five minutes. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Thank you. I remember when the Columbia had 

its unfortunate accident, and the one thing that they mentioned in 

the after report was the inability for NASA to focus on safety, and 

the culture—as you recall, the culture of safety was not there. And 

yet, I have this report in front of me, an internal review, which 

talks about safety. Some of the concerns I have are in regards to 

arc jet. Mr. Martin, are you familiar with the closing of arc jet? 

Mr. MARTIN. I am familiar with the consolidation of the arc jet. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Are you familiar also with the report that I hold 

in my hand? It is called ‘‘The Inability to Certify TPS Performance.’’ It was issued March 8, 2012. 
55 

Mr. MARTIN. I have not personally read it. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this report be 

submitted for the record, and that one of the things—— 

Chairman PALAZZO. Without objection. 

[The information appears in Appendix II] 

Mr. STOCKMAN. One of the things it states, actually, your report 

is that this closing of arc jet could raise—and this is all quote from 

your own report—from NASA’s own report. ‘‘We believe the loss 

will impact our ability to certify TPS or in tests next year.’’ And 

I am wondering if you could take an opportunity to look at this. 

I mean, you and I or both of you could look at this and understand, 

I think, the mistake that is going forward on consolidating the arc 

jets, because quite frankly, it is going to impact safety. That is not 

me, that is—also, we have two letters from other individuals which 

I would like to also submit for the record—— 

Chairman PALAZZO. Without objection. 

[The information appears in Appendix II] 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am wondering, if 

you haven’t heard of this, why not and would you consider looking 

at this if we turned it over to you? 

Mr. MARTIN. If I could, as a point of clarification, I am with the 

Inspector General’s office. That is not our report. That is probably 

Mr. Keegan’s report or big NASA’s report or an advisory group. So 

I am not familiar with it because the Office of Inspector General 

has not issued that report. I would be happy to read any piece of 

paper that anyone puts in front of me—— 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Okay. 

Mr. MARTIN. —to inform our independent review of NASA. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. But I am just saying is the person that is—and 

we all remember the tragedy, and I just think that wisdom dictates 

that we take a look at what they are recommending and what is 

going on. And what is going on now is that we are transferring arc 

jet, and in the meantime, diminishing NASA’s ability to create a 

culture of safety. I would think that you would be interested as Inspector General—that this would be something that would be critical to your office. 

Mr. MARTIN. The culture of safety is critical to my office. Absolutely. Consolidating NASA’s infrastructure is also critical. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. But you wouldn’t want to do it at the expense 

of safety, would you? 

Mr. MARTIN. Not if there is a tradeoff. Safety would come first. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Okay. Well, I want to point to you that this is 

what is happening. In order to cut literally $5 million out of a very 

large budget, it is questioning the rationale behind that and I am 

just really concerned that we are going to repeat our mistakes. 

I guess, Mr. Keegan, you have something to say or do you want 

to comment on it? Are you more familiar with it? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I am not familiar with any official NASA report 

that comes to that conclusion. I know our chief engineer and a 

whole team of engineers across the Agency looked at this closely 

and determined that we could safely make this transition. So—— 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Well, that is not what your own report says, or 

the experts. I am just letting you know. I will give it to you. I will 

give you the letters, I will give you your own report which I highly 
56 

recommend you read. I think that if this comes out down the road 

that we have problems then it is going to be looked back that we 

didn’t do our jobs, that we on the Committee turned a blind eye 

to NASA documents and said we are going to go forward with a 

policy that is going to be detrimental to safety. And I just have to 

tell you, for me, that raises real concerns and I am glad you are 

open to reading this. I will forward you the documents and I hope 

you take into consideration. 

My time is also run out, but if you guys could come by my office 

sometime and you want to speak with me, I would be happy to do 

so, but this is a fear that we are going to repeat the same mistakes 

we did before by making safety secondary to $5 million. It just 

doesn’t make sense. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you. 

Chairman PALAZZO. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize 

Mr. Bera. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just register support 

for the comments that Mr. Brooks and Mr. Kilmer made with regard to some concern about the launch complex 39A decision-making process, and I would register that I actually think it would be 

in our interest to have that as a multi-user facility. 

My line of questioning is actually going to be a little bit different. 

Based off of Mr. Martin’s opening testimony and based off of my 

vast congressional experience of 9 months on this committee, it 

seems as though we have gone through several missions just in 

that nine months. You know, when I first got here, it seemed like 

the mission was we were going to look for manned space travel to 

Mars, and we talked about asteroid retrieval. Then there was a 

shift to a mission to the Moon. I think you were very clear in your 

testimony that the first step we have to do is actually come up with 

a strategic plan, that we actually have to have a mission and a 

roadmap, and I think this committee has made that recommendation. Because if you don’t have that long-term plan, if you don’t 

have that roadmap, how are we going to make the decisions on 

what facilities to keep, what facilities not to keep, what to decommission, what the best process is? I would love to hear your 

thoughts on that, either one of you. But again, I think that is the 

critical issue here, how you get NASA, the Administration, and 

Congress on the same page to come up with a single mission in a 

single timeframe, and then we can make decisions. You know, if we 

want to go to Mars, is the best step to go to the Moon? Is the best 

step to do asteroid retrieval? So we need that clarity of mission, 

would you guys agree? 

Mr. KEEGAN. Yes, Congressman, I would certainly agree that the 

more definitive your technical roadmap for your mission requirements, the more you can tailor and optimize the limited resources 

you have to invest, especially in these large cost items that Mr. 

Martin mentioned. So that would help. 

I would say also that NASA agrees that we can also do better 

just in the situation we are in as pointed out in the Inspector General’s report to do a better job within our existing authorities and 

our existing situation to dispose of our excess infrastructure as 

well. 

Mr. BERA. Mr. Martin, would you agree with that? 
57 

Mr. MARTIN. Well, as the Office of Inspector General, we are not 

permitted to have any original thoughts or opinions. We are not 

management, we just come behind management after they have 

made a decision and criticize that decision. 

Mr. BERA. So let me change the question. Would you agree lack 

of mission clarity makes it much harder to make some of these decisions on what assets to keep and what assets not to keep? 

Mr. MARTIN. Absolutely. 

Mr. BERA. Okay. 

Mr. MARTIN. Absolutely, and then if I could, beyond the human 

exploration, you know, the scientific mission, which is obviously a 

massive component of what NASA does, the thermal vacuum chambers and a lot of the big ticket—the wind tunnels, the very expensive infrastructure that NASA has, you need to have a map. 

Mr. BERA. Right. So my challenge to this body, my challenge to 

the Administration, my challenge to NASA’s leadership is that we 

need to lock ourselves in a room, we need to agree on a mission, 

and we need to agree on a timeframe by which we hope to accomplish that mission, similar to President Kennedy giving us a challenge in the 1960s, to get this clarity, because how can you make 

decisions, how can you look at assets without knowing where we 

want to head? So that is not a question, that is just a rhetorical 

comment. 

The other thing, Mr. Martin, in your testimony was the decisionmaking process. NASA as a large organization has to make central 

decisions. Each facility can’t make their own decision—because 

they are based on the interest of that particular facility. Again, we 

are in times of tight budgets and we have to have a better decisionmaking process. So again, that is not a question, it is just a comment. The decision-making process is going to get more complicated 

as well because, you know, we are seeing this shift from a largely 

public government agency to one that is becoming a public-private 

partnership, and that adds just another dimension of complexity. 

So again, not a question but just an observation. 

I will make one final comment. Again, I hope this body, this committee, the Administration, and NASA’s leadership can come to an 

agreement on what our mission is, what our timeframe is, and then 

just agree and let’s start moving forward and let’s go forth and accomplish that mission. 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Chairman PALAZZO. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize 

Mr. Hall for five minutes. 

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here, 

and I am pleased at a guy named Olin ‘‘Tiger’’ Teague, whose portrait is right over here, he is watching and I hope he is listening 

to all of this, because I am a very pro-NASA guy, always have been 

since I have been here. I asked, through him, to get on the NASA 

Committee and Energy and Commerce, and received both of them 

back in 1981. I have been with this Committee ever since. I have 

seen some things I have disagreed with, but I think they always 

try to be fair, and I guess that is what we are asking for here. 

I presume that NASA has a statutory mission obligating it to 

‘‘seek and encourage to the maximum extent possible the fullest 
58 

commercial use of space.’’ That is a very good statement. You can 

comment on that, can’t you, sir? 

Mr. KEEGAN. Yes, that is a very good statement. 

Mr. HALL. You subscribe to that, don’t you, when you comment—— 

Mr. KEEGAN. I subscribe to that. 

Mr. HALL. And with that mission in mind, I have some questions 

about the process NASA is using to determine the disposition of 

launch complex 39A and 39B at Kennedy Space Center. These are 

national assets that cost millions of dollars as has been testified to 

here to construct that are historic sites of numerous space 

launches. And I don’t have a Texas angle here. Johnson Space Center and Mr. Tiger are not involved here directly, but these launch 

pads certainly have an interest to all Americans in how they are 

going to be utilized to the greatest extent possible in the future, 

and how they will be maintained in the Florida environment. So 

it is my understanding that NASA is considering launch pad 39B 

for its own use in the future and is considering awarding the use 

of pad 39A for commercial industry use. Do you understand that 

and agree to that? You both agree to it? You think that is a good 

way to do it? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I would put it somewhat differently. With the end 

of the Shuttle Program, NASA and Kennedy in particular identified 

assets that we would no longer require to implement our program, 

and in January, 2011 put out an announcement of availability to 

provide broad information about those assets. Pad 39A was one of 

those assets, the Shuttle launch facility was another one, Orbiter 

Processing Facility 3 was yet another, so—— 

Mr. HALL. Okay, I thank you for that, and I will get to that. 

In regards to launch pad 39A, is NASA doing all it can to, as I 

have quoted up here, ‘‘encourage to the maximum extent possible 

the fullest commercial use of space.’’ 

Mr. KEEGAN. Yes, that is a criteria in the AFP and we will evaluate the proposals according to criteria in the AFP. 

Mr. HALL. Some have argued that NASA should operate 39A as 

a multi-user facility, given the significant investment by the taxpayers, roughly $500 million. Please explain the rationale if 39A 

were not to be operated as a multi-user facility. 

Mr. KEEGAN. The rationale would be that the proposed use in 

that scenario would best meet the criteria that we laid out in the 

RPF and provide the best benefit for the Nation of the investment 

in that facility. 

Mr. HALL. What steps can NASA take to ensure that out-leases 

are awarded through an open, competitive, and fair process? Mr. 

Martin, will you respond to that? 

Mr. MARTIN. Well, I think they have. They have the RFP, the request for proposals right now, and you have a decision-making 

process at NASA Headquarters which NASA currently is involved 

in. Again, as an Office of Inspector General, if there are any complaints or allegations that the process was somehow circumvented—— 

Mr. HALL. I understand your—— 

Mr. MARTIN. —we will jump in. 
59 

Mr. HALL. —thrust there. Who will make the decision for 39A, 

personnel at Kennedy Space Center or NASA Headquarters? 

Mr. KEEGAN. That decision will be made at NASA Headquarters 

and I will be the source selection. 

Mr. HALL. One more question about the closure of Johnson Space 

Center, and it is not—we don’t—Johnson is not in this battle. But 

the NASA authorization of 2010, Sections 1102 and 1103 required 

NASA to conduct an institutional requirement study which has 

driven NASA’s action to consolidate, retire, outsource, and revitalize various facilities. However, the language in Section 1105 

states ‘‘Prior to receipt by the Congress of the study, recommendations, and implementations strategy developed pursuant to Section 

1103, none of the funds authorized under this Act may be used to 

transfer the functions, missions, or activities and associates civil 

service and contractor positions from any NASA facility without 

authorization by the Congress to implement the proposed strategy.’’ 

To your knowledge, has NASA complied with the law, Mr. Inspector General? 

Mr. MARTIN. I am actually unfamiliar with that particular portion. I have not heard that they haven’t complied with the law. 

Mr. HALL. Congressional Members have asked multiple times 

through letters, and I understand that the delegation from Florida 

has stated their position and I respect that. I would do the same 

thing if I was on their—operated out of Florida instead of Texas. 

I just think that fairness is fairness, and ask this last question. Is 

Ames arc jet facility able to fulfill all of NASA’s needs, Mr. NASA? 

Mr. KEEGAN. It will be when we complete the transition. 

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the witnesses and I thank you. 

I yield back. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now—the Chair now recognizes Ms. 

Bonamici for five minutes. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

to the witnesses. 

One of the things that we have talked about a lot in this subcommittee is the importance of and need to maintain United States 

leadership in space and aeronautics going forward, so I wanted to 

talk a little bit about the National Academy’s assessment of the 

NASA laboratories. 

In that assessment, the panel, after assessing the NASA laboratories use for basic research, recommended that NASA increase resources to its aeronautics laboratories and facilities to attract and 

retain the best and brightest researchers, and to at least remain 

on par with international aeronautical research organizations in 

Europe and Asia. So it is worth noting, too, that the panel found 

that the equipment and facilities at NASA’s basic laboratories are 

inferior to those at comparable Department of Energy laboratories, 

top tier U.S. universities, and corporate research laboratories. You 

know, it goes without saying that without the modern and capable 

facilities, it is hard to remain competitive with the rest of the 

world. 

So Mr. Keegan, in your prepared statement, the following reference to the National Research Council about the NASA laboratories, you state that ‘‘NASA is evaluating the replacement of several laboratories that will support the Agency’s future research 
60 

needs.’’ So can you please talk a little bit about that effort and how 

you are weighing the importance of remaining competitive in the 

research field? How are you bringing in stakeholders on that task 

and how are you making research a priority? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I would say that NASA is very concerned about the 

issue of having state-of-the-art research facilities and being able to 

attract the best and the brightest to work at NASA. In the NRC 

report, they cited the Exploration Sciences Building at Goddard as 

an example of a renewal facility or repair by replacement facility 

that included state-of-the-art laboratory facilities, and we have several similar facilities in planning or in design right now where we 

would replace old, antiquated facilities with a new, energy efficient, 

smaller footprint building but at the same time, including state-ofthe-art laboratory facilities. 

Ms. BONAMICI. And what is the basis of the definition? I understand it is future research needs. Where is that decision coming 

from, and who has input into that? 

Mr. KEEGAN. The broader research community has input to it 

through the various standing mechanisms, but the—basically it is 

a decision that is made at the strategic level at NASA Headquarters in terms of where to put our priorities in terms of the research we should emphasize. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Well, I want to align myself with Mr. Bera’s comments, too, about the need to have a clear mission, and again, that 

is critical to the work that you are doing but all of NASA as well. Can you talk a little bit about the—what is apparently a $2 billion deferred maintenance backlog. Is that getting worse, better, or 

staying about the same and what do you need to significantly reduce that deferred maintenance backlog? 

Mr. KEEGAN. The deferred maintenance backlog is a measure of 

all the maintenance that it would take to bring all of our facilities 

up to current standards. It has accumulated and grown over the 

years, historically because NASA has not been able to carve out 

sufficient funding to maintain facilities up to standard from limited 

resources. Since 2011, it has come down and the way we were able 

to make progress against that was through the use of demolition— 

if you demolish a facility with a lot of accumulated deferred maintenance that comes off the books—and by our repair by replacement approach, where we replace old, antiquated facilities with 

newer, more efficient, flexible facilities, and again, we get rid of 

that accumulated backlog of deferred maintenance. So we have had 

a little success in the last couple years through using those strategies. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you, and can you follow up a little bit on 

the similar capabilities, smaller footprint strategy, and talk about 

why NASA settled on this strategy versus other options, and how 

is it going? And I want to ask Mr. Martin, too, based on your work, 

to what extent is NASA positioned to make progress on carrying 

out the similar capabilities, smaller footprints, and what might be 

the barriers? 

Mr. KEEGAN. We chose that because we thought we didn’t want 

to reduce the capability that NASA had, but we thought it had to 

exist in a smaller footprint because the resources weren’t available 

to maintain sort of the capability suite that we have. 
61 

Mr. MARTIN. I think the jury is still out about how successful. 

We are seeing some of the dynamics during this hearing here, some 

of the cultural and historic influences within NASA about shedding 

itself from a Center and program-specific area. We are seeing some 

of the, as GAO calls it, stakeholder influences, the political influences that individual Members of Congress don’t want to diminish 

the capabilities of NASA Centers within their jurisdictions. It is 

very complex and dynamic. I think it is too early to tell specifically 

though how this is going to play out. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you, and my time is expired. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Mr.—the Chair now recognizes Mr. Posey for 

five minutes. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am sure we 

have all been witness to the fact it often seems that everyone in 

the rooms knows how to make a baby stop crying, except the person who is holding it. In the interest or balance, I would like to 

enter into the record and briefly quote a couple of the letters referred to a few minutes ago by the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 

Hall. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Mr. Posey, I am going to reserve the right 

to object to the inclusion of this material into the record until my 

staff and I have the time and opportunity to review it. 

Mr. POSEY. Mr. Chairman, with all due respect I will yield to 

that. I haven’t ever heard of that rule before. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Neither have I, until the last minute so why 

don’t we do this? Since I have already done it twice, we will do it 

a third time. Without objection. 

[The information appears in Appendix II] 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you. I would just like to read a couple of lines 

of it. We won’t enter it into the record until you have had a chance 

to prove it. 

But it says ‘‘We write to voice our continued support of NASA’s 

ongoing effort to quickly and efficiently lease their costly, excessive 

space launch infrastructure and other assets for commercial use 

consistent with—’’ and it gives all the Federal regulations. ‘‘Two 

decades ago, the United States was a world leader in commercial 

launches. Today, that has virtually disappeared. However, there 

are American launch companies that are committed to changing 

that.’’ And we basically talk in this letter, then, about the rest of 

the world, China, Russia, et al, are launching commercial satellites 

left and right while our best launch pads sit there and rot. We commend NASA for moving forward, essentially, and I think you will 

be pleased to include the letter when you have the opportunity to 

read it, or your staff does. 

You know, Kennedy Space Center and NASA is asking for proposals for both single and multi-user pad use. People here are trying to weigh in, actually, before that process is completed. Our position is we need to complete the process. We are not taking sides 

on the formal configuration of the launch pad, whether single or 

multi-use, although they are looking at both. We just want our 

space program to move forward. We want to alleviate the Monday 

morning quarterbacking and second guessing. We have Inspector 

Generals that do that for us. You know, we have used charts and 
62 

we have seen charts in this Committee that are a matter of record 

that show over two dozen of our space programs—we call them 

missions to nowhere—over the last two decades, and billions and 

billions and billions of dollars wasted because we have the parochial interest of different members trying to micromanage what 

NASA does. It is like a city councilman trying to tell police chief 

who to arrest and who not to arrest. I think that is a big problem 

and that is the essence for this letter. 

A question I have for the Inspectors—and I have several. I hope 

we have time for a second round today. Earlier this summer, the 

Kennedy Space Center selected Space Florida to operate their 

former Shuttle landing facility. It is well-known that the Federal 

Government can prove difficult for private industry to partner 

with, obviously, because the government has many bureaucratic 

policies and procedures. Can you tell me what steps NASA is taking to ensure Space Florida’s success in attracting commercial business to the KSC former Shuttle landing facility? 

Mr. KEEGAN. My knowledge of that process is that we are anticipating negotiations with Space Florida beginning soon and anticipate a lease award in December. I am unaware of any issues in 

that regard. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay, thank you. 

NASA has determined that much of its former Shuttle infrastructure at Kennedy Space Center, including 39A, is no longer needed 

by the space agency. If NASA is unable to attract private companies to utilize these facilities, what will happen to them, just for 

the record? 

Mr. KEEGAN. They will be excessed and demolished or abandoned. 

Mr. POSEY. At a loss of a significant investment. 

Mr. KEEGAN. That capability will no longer be there. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you. Do you believe that NASA has the legal 

authority it needs to expeditiously deal with their excess or underutilized property? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I think yes, we have the authority to effectively 

deal with that, yes. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay, my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I 

yield back. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Mr. Posey, are you done? Okay. I just want 

to remind you also that your letter has been entered into the record 

without objection. I do just want to remind all the Members it is 

normal practice to allow staff to review your letters for the record 

or reports for the record, so if we could, we will try to do that in 

the future. 

Mr. POSEY. One question, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Yes. 

Mr. POSEY. There were two letters. There was a bipartisan letter 

signed by every Democrat and every Republican member of the delegation in the House, and there was one signed bipartisan, both 

our Democratic and our Republican Senator signed a similar letter. 

Are both of those bipartisan unanimous letters admitted for the 

record? 

Chairman PALAZZO. They will be without objection. 
63 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you, and I apologize if you had not had the 

chance to see these letters before. I thought we had supplied you 

copies of them. Mr. Hall had copies of them and some of the other 

Members did, and I do apologize if you did not get them. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Mr. 

Veasey. Okay, he is good. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 

now recognizes Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. I wasn’t expecting 

that. 

Just one note, I have been here 25 years and people ask me, 

what is the thing that you are the proudest of that you have accomplished in Congress? Now with Ralph, he has been here a lot 

longer and had a lot more accomplishments than I have, so it 

doesn’t take me a long time to figure out what it is that I am the 

most proud of. And one of the things I am most proud is that I am 

the author of this Commercial Space Act of 2004. I think that bill, 

that piece of legislation has done more to change America for the 

better than anything that I have done in 25 years. Now my Democratic colleagues wouldn’t be surprised that that is the only thing 

that I am lauding right now, but the fact is is that we all worked 

together and this is the great thing about this Committee is that 

we do work together as Democrats and Republicans and try to get 

things done because we believe in space, but we also believe in 

science and technology as an energy source for our country to improve its condition and the condition of our people. 

If America is to remain the leading Nation or at least a leading 

Nation in space, we must ensure that the energy and the creativity 

of the American commercial space industry is brought into the play 

in a big way. To the degree that we have not laid the foundation 

so that the creative genius and investment by people in the private 

sector can take place, well, we will be limiting America’s role and 

America’s leadership in space. So that is one of the things that we 

are talking about, facilities. It is really important that we use our 

facilities in a way that is maximized, that are going to maximize 

bringing in private sector involvement and investment, especially 

if we are talking about assets that are now not being used and are 

not likely to be used by NASA. We have some—let me just note, 

I know that there is a controversy about this space pad 39A, and 

I will just say this. We need—right now, we need to make sure that 

whatever decision is made, it is going to make sure that that asset 

is put to use for—as soon as possible for as long as possible in producing a service or producing an activity that will benefit our people. We have got people in the private sector who want to use that. 

If it is determined that one decision will mean that that pad is not 

being used, well, we shouldn’t make that decision. There is a decision that says well, it is going to be used right away and it is going 

to be put to use as soon as possible, well that is a decision that 

we should be doing. We shouldn’t be—and that is just my advice. 

That was the spirit behind that bill, the Commercial Space Act. 

Let’s get as many people involved and invested in space and space 

activities as we can and as soon as we can. So that is my bit of 

advice on how to solve that problem. I am not being specific because I don’t have the wisdom to go through all of the, you know, 

paperwork to make that determination. But I would say it should 
64 

be based on that concept and also it should be based not on the 

philosophy, but on what practically will have that impact. 

I think I am going to leave it at that. I would yield my friend, 

Mr. Stockman, 60 seconds. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, as a follow up to my 

questions to Mr. Richard Keegan on the safety concerns of the internal NASA report, I cited I would ask that part of my questions 

for the record for the NASA Chief of Safety and Missions Assurance address the concerns and response to the Committee. I understand that safety is not necessarily Mr. Keegan’s job, but is in 

NASA’s witness before us today, so I ask that that follow up occur, 

Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. KEEGAN. And I would say that our Administrator has told 

us safety is every one of our jobs, so—— 

Mr. STOCKMAN. So you can go on the record that you will show 

this to the head of the safety? 

Mr. KEEGAN. Yes. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Well thank you. At this time, we will—we do 

have a little time before votes are going to be called. They estimate 

it is going to be at 10:50. There are—I believe some members have 

said they would like to ask a few more questions, so if you don’t 

mind, we will go into a second round. 

At this time, we will go into a second round of questions. Just 

real quick, Mr. Keegan. How does NASA decide if a facility is underutilized? In some of the follow up aspects of your answer, include the standard criteria that would be used. What is the process 

for making such a determination, and of course, what type of oversight provisions exist to ensure that this process is not manipulated or taken advantage of? 

Mr. KEEGAN. It is, first of all, an open agency discussion with all 

of the relevant stakeholders taking place. But utilization is measured based on a facility’s capacity versus the actual activity that 

takes place in that facility during a period of time. So if a test 

stand is available but is only used, you know, 50 percent of the 

time that it is available for testing, you would just say that is underutilized. That doesn’t necessarily mean that it is excess. If that 

facility has a unique capability that is critical to NASA, we need 

to keep it and we would strive to increase the level of utilization 

to spread to fix costs, but it doesn’t mean we can somehow excess 

it. So I think in general, that is responsive to your question. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Mr. Martin, do you have anything to add? 

Mr. MARTIN. Not too much to add, no, not to that. The criteria 

that the Agency uses to identify what is excess—I mean, there are 

test stands, as Mr. Keegan indicated, that may be used once a 

year, just given the current human exploration or rocket development program, and that is underutilized, but if you only need to 

use it once a year, you have to have that capacity when you need 

it. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Good response. How about from an oversight 

controls standpoint? 
65 

Mr. MARTIN. Well I mean, what we have is—and we discussed 

it in our testimony—is you have redundancies, I think unnecessary 

redundancies among many of the Centers, because historically they 

have competed for work. I mean, there used to be a philosophy just 

a handful of years ago about sustaining ten healthy Centers, that 

is, partitioning the work at that time in the Constellation Program 

among all the Centers to keep them busy. Well, Constellation is no 

more and clearly from an infrastructure perspective NASA does not 

have, unfortunately, ten healthy Centers. I am not sure from an infrastructure standpoint NASA has a single healthy Center. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Well, I appreciate that comment but I think 

it comes back to the stark reality is that we need a roadmap to exploration so these Centers can actually judge their infrastructure, 

judge their facilities and so going forward, they can actually know 

are they going to be utilizing those assets in the future, because 

you know, it was mentioned that people like to hold on to their facilities and hold on to their assets, because they don’t know what 

is going to be there tomorrow because of the massive amount of uncertainty. And I think this Committee will agree with that because 

it has been mentioned several times. 

So at this time, I will recognize Ms. Brownley. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I wanted to—Mr. Keegan, wanted to follow up with Ms. 

Bonamici’s line of questioning around the deferred maintenance 

backlog and clearly, that is a backlog that this significant is going 

to impede construction and maintenance and operations budgets. 

So I wanted to follow up with the question that if budgets remain 

at the current level, how much progress do you think in the next 

five to ten years could NASA expect to make on its goal that was 

stated in the Agency Master Plan of having 62 percent of NASA’s 

assets be under 40 years old by 2055? 

Mr. KEEGAN. Clearly our ability to make progress against that 

strategic goal is limited by the resources that are available to accomplish it, so we would still be shooting at the same goal but it 

would take us that much longer to get there. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. So I mean, if you had to kind of reconcile things 

based on the current level of budgeting, you couldn’t predict what 

it might look like five to ten years out? 

Mr. KEEGAN. Not certainly in the moment, and it would be very 

difficult anyway because we would have to, I think, go back and 

revisit the assumptions then about the amount of infrastructure we 

would have and can we do anything to affect that, and so forth. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. Okay. And then following up on that, if current 

trends continue, I fear that NASA will reach a point of mediocrity 

and due to the condition, age, and capabilities of the facilities. In 

your opinion, how far away from that point do you think we are? 

Mr. KEEGAN. In my opinion, I believe and I hope that we are a 

long way away and we have a dedicated group of employees and 

leaders trying to figure out innovative ways to address sort of these 

difficult issues and complex issues that would allow us to make 

better progress even in a resource-constrained environment. 

Ms. BROWNLEY. Well, thank you. I mean, I think I certainly believe and I know the Ranking Member also believes the importance 

of investing in NASA and enabling the Agency to carry out a 21st 
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century space program. And on the other hand, I think that given 

where the budget is and so forth, it may be worthwhile for us to 

be looking or at least to know what a plan B might look like with 

budgets as they are and what it might look like so that we can, 

I think, better evaluate a future direction. 

Mr. KEEGAN. Thank you. 

Chairman PALAZZO. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Posey. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In your written testimony, you said that the Agency will continue 

to conduct and operate only those assets required to conduct its 

program, maintain core capabilities, and meet national responsibilities. And yet, NASA’s own IG report earlier this year noted that 

the Agency has historically maintained unused facilities for a decade or more, and that it is an institutional problem. How do you 

see this culture being changed and NASA said their 10 research 

Centers will manage their infrastructure in a coordinated fashion? 

Mr. KEEGAN. As the Inspector General also pointed out, it is a 

complex problem to address, and sometimes there are differences 

of opinion about whether a capability may be needed at some time 

in the future or not. As an example, some of the facilities mentioned in the Inspector General’s report, some have been demolished, some have been abandoned or mothballed, but others are 

currently active again because requirements have emerged to use 

the capabilities in those facilities. And so there is some difficulty, 

and a lot of this is based on judgment and prediction of what might 

be required. I would say that with the—we created the Mission 

Support Council at the Agency level in order to provide some kind 

of Agency-wide strategy and optimization of these types of decisions. It is not just managed at the local level. And we have active 

teamwork with all the Center directors and relevant Agency managers to make sure we make decisions in the best interest of the 

Agency. But it is a problem that we have to wrestle with and make 

better progress against. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you. Buried deep in the appendices of the IG’s 

report was a reference to a recent change we made which allowed 

DoD to work with contractors on property that they don’t have a 

use for and which would be to the mutual benefit of the taxpayer. 

I was delighted to see that there and I would just like to encourage 

you to share with our staff the benefits of allowing NASA to do 

that. I think it would be much more effective and I think our taxpayers would be much better served, and it would probably make 

a whole lot of people a lot more comfortable, reduce a lot of bureaucracy, and every American would benefit. 

What is—same question for each of you—the single best action 

that you believe that Congress could take to improve our space program? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I think I would defer that to my Administrator. 

Mr. MARTIN. I think my answer would be to come together on the 

broad overall mission for NASA, not just human exploration, but 

science, aeronautics, if it is even possible to come together, and 

then to fully fund that mission. Because for far too long, NASA has 

been asked to do too many things with not enough funds, and then 

we have hearings—important hearings like this, but discussions 

like this. So identify the missions, plural, fully fund those missions 
67 

over the long term, and I think that is the best thing that could 

happen. 

Mr. POSEY. Well, I think that is the heartfelt wish of everybody 

on this Committee on both sides of the aisle. The only time it ever 

gets a little bit difficult, I think, is when we try and all agree on 

what exactly those missions are and we try and convince the other 

430 Members that aren’t in here of the necessity of fully funding 

it. The residual benefits that every American receives from our 

space program—but I appreciate your comments and if you get 

more developed through the flow chart, and I would appreciate you 

sharing those with us as well. 

Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PALAZZO. The gentleman yields back. 

I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and 

the Members for their questions. The Members of the Committee 

may have additional questions for you, and we will ask you to respond to those in writing. The record will remain open for two 

weeks for additional comments and written questions from Members. The witnesses are excused, and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:55 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by The Honorable Paul K. Martin 
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Responses by Mr. Richard Keegan 
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Appendix II 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
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SUBMITTED STATEMENT OF DONNA F. EDWARDS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE

ON SPACE, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today’s hearing to review NASA’s infrastructure and facilities, and I would like to welcome our witnesses. 

Before I start, allow me to congratulate NASA, the Ames Research Center, the 

Wallops Launch Facility, agency employees, contractors, the Mid-Atlantic Regional 

Spaceport, and Orbital Sciences in particular, for two outstanding space launches 

in the past two weeks. I am hopeful that LADEE will give us further insight into 

the Moon’s environment and that Orbital’s docking of its Cygnus spacecraft to the 

International Space Station signals the start of routine cargo resupply to that orbital laboratory. 

NASA, like other government agencies, built a range of facilities during its early 

years to meet national objectives. In NASA’s case, those objectives included sending 

probes to investigate the Earth-space environment and study near and distant planets, advancing aeronautics, and sending humans to the surface of the Moon and returning them home safely. The Space Shuttle, during its thirty years of operations, 

required its own considerable infrastructure. 

These facilities, and many others at NASA, have enabled the United States to 

achieve the remarkable discoveries and advances over the last 50 years that have 

inspired generations of Americans. 

The problem, as we know, is that the assets that enabled the past, are now, to 

an extent, a burden on the future. Nearly 80 percent of NASA’s facilities are more 

than 40 years old. In addition, NASA is carrying a deferred maintenance backlog 

assessed at more than $2 billion. 

It is hard to expect NASA to perform as a 21st century space agency with 20th 

century facilities. In fact, a 2010 National Academies report, Capabilities for the Future: An Assessment of NASA Laboratories for Basic Research, found that: 

‘‘Over the past five years or more there has been a steady and significant decrease in NASA’s laboratory capabilities, including equipment, maintenance, and 

facility upgrades..The fundamental research community at NASA has been severely impacted by the budget reductions that are responsible for this decrease 

in laboratory capabilities, and as a result NASA’s ability to support even NASA’s 

future goals is in serious jeopardy.’’ 

And yet, research laboratories are just one facet of the problem. There are test 

stands, wind tunnels, arc jets, thermal vacuum chambers, launch complexes, and 

Shuttle processing facilities that are underutilized or that may no longer have a defined NASA need. 

NASA Authorization Acts of 2005, 2008, and 2010 have provided direction to 

NASA to address its infrastructure challenges, and multiple reports of the NASA 

Inspector General, among other advisory bodies, have highlighted NASA’s infrastructure challenges. 

To its credit, NASA has, and is, taking positive steps to facilitate prudent, strategic decisions on maintenance, consolidation, demolition, and renewal of facilities, 

including the development of an Agency Facilities Strategy and an integrated agency-wide Real Property Master Plan. 

But let’s face it, NASA’s facility and infrastructure challenges are a bit of a Catch22. NASA needs clear direction on its future, especially in human spaceflight and 

exploration, to help the agency leverage and optimize its infrastructure decisions 

and investments. 

And the underutilization of assets, along with the poor state of NASA’s research 

labs, is in part a result of not giving NASA the resources it needs to implement the 

missions the nation is asking it to carry out. 

So, we have a choice: ignore the problem and let NASA’s facilities run themselves 

into the ground to the point at which NASA is limping into mediocrity. 

Or invest in NASA and enable its future as a 21st century space agency that will 

continue its remarkable successes while fostering our national innovation agenda, 

the passions and dreams of our people, and new discoveries and advances in science, 

aeronautics, human spaceflight and exploration. 

I submit that this is not the time to back away from NASA. Rather, this is the 

time to provide NASA with the tools it needs to become a productive 21st century 

space agency. 

That’s why I included in my alternative NASA Authorization Act of 2013 bill, H.R. 

2616, provisions to both focus NASA on an exploration goal and to help address 

NASA’s aging facilities. 

I know there are a lot of issues to discuss and I look forward to hearing from our 

witnesses on today’s topic, for which I believe the hearing title couldn’t be more 
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apt—‘‘NASA INFRASTRUCTURE: ENABLING DISCOVERY AND ENSURING CAPABILITY.’’ 

Thank you, and I yield back. 
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SUBMITTED STATEMENT OF EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE

ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

Good morning. I would like to join my colleagues in welcoming our witnesses to 

today’s hearing. 

When we think of NASA, we think of astronauts at work on the International 

Space Station, the Apollo program and today’s Orion and Space Launch System exploration vehicles. We think of cutting edge aeronautics research; robotic spacecraft 

landing on Mars, heading to the far reaches of the solar system and beyond, and 

imaging distant galaxies; as well as of spacecraft circling the Earth to provide us 

with unforgettably imagery and critical data needed to better understand our home 

planet and its climate. When we think of NASA, we don’t often think of wind tunnels, environmental test chambers, research labs, and office buildings. However, 

NASA’s impressive accomplishments would not be possible without NASA’s infrastructure and NASA’s dedicated workforce. 

That is why today’s hearing is so important. We must ensure that NASA has the 

facilities and equipment that it needs to remain preeminent in space exploration, 

science, and aeronautics in the coming decades, and this hearing will help provide 

Members with the information we will need as we make decisions on NASA’s funding and priorities. In that regard, I hope that today’s hearing will be followed in 

the future by a hearing to look at what can be done to ensure that NASA’s employees will remain productive and at the forefront of their fields too, especially at a 

time when the federal workforce is facing severe challenges on a number of fronts. 

Mr. Chairman, as we debate the fiscal challenges we face as a nation, it is important that we not let our examination of NASA’s infrastructure turn into simply an 

accounting exercise, one focused on cost savings and budgets cuts. By that I don’t 

mean to minimize the importance of seeking efficiencies and appropriate cost savings in NASA’s infrastructure investments whenever possible. Rather, what I am 

saying is that we need to focus first on what we are trying to accomplish with the 

nation’s investments in NASA-what are the outcomes we are seeking. Only then, 

can we intelligently assess what NASA will need in the way of infrastructure now 

and in the future. I believe that the NASA Authorization bill that Rep. Edwards 

and I introduced earlier this year provides clear direction and compelling goals for 

the agency, and I want to continue to work with colleagues on both sides of the aisle 

to come to a bipartisan consensus on NASA this year. However, I think it should 

be clear to all of us that NASA will be unable to achieve those goals if we fail to 

invest in safe, efficient, and productive infrastructure for the agency. 
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PRESENTATION SUBMITTED BY STEPHEN STOCKMAN
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LETTER SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE BILL POSEY
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LETTER SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE BILL POSEY
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