### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 14

- 2579

U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee
,

v.

A NTHONY A DAMS , Defendant

- Appellant

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 11 CR 779

- 5

— Sharon Johnson Coleman
, Judge

.

____________________

A RGUED J UNE 5, 2015

— D ECIDED J UNE 12, 2015

____________________

Before W OOD , Chief Judge , and F LAUM and E ASTERBROOK , Circuit Judges

. E ASTERBROOK , Circuit Judge

. As part of a plea bargain, A n thony Adams pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit armed robbery affecting interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. §1951(a), and to possessing a firearm during and in relation

to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C

. §924( c)(1)(A). Sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment, he asks us to set aside his plea and remand for a trial. His argument rests on Rosemond v.2 No. 14

- 2579

United States , 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014), which was decided after he entered the plea (t hough before he was sente nced).

Rosemond holds that a person cannot be convicted of ai ding and abetting a violation of §924(c) unless he has enough time to drop out of joint criminal activity after learning that a confe derate is armed. We stated in United States v. Newman
, 755 F.3 d 543, 547 (7th Cir. 2014), that the rules of accountabi lity for aiding and abetting track those of conspiracy law u nder Pinkerton v. United States , 328 U.S. 640 (1946). Adams puts Newman together with Rosemond and concludes that there are new, and more st ringent, rules for co

- conspirator liability. But that’s not what either Rosemond or Newman held; instead Rosemond adapted the rules of aiding

- and

abetting liability to make them more like the Pinkerton a pproach to conspiracy. The indictment charged Adams w ith conspiring to rob a drug stash house. T hieves think them good targets because they may hold large supplies of drugs and cash, and victims cannot rep ort the offense to the police. B ut Adams was caught in a sting, proposed by an informant working with fe deral agents. Adams was eager to participate and did not raise an entrapment defense. Cf. United States v. Mayfield , 771 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). N ow , however, he rues the guilty plea and contends that he cannot be held accountable for three firearms that were in a van when he was arrested.

The plea agreement sets out the factual basis for the co nvictions. Adams signed this agreement and adopted its co ntents in open court. According to the nar ration, a conspir ator (not the informant) took a tool box from one van and moved it to another as part of the group ’ s preparation for the theft. The t ool box was opened after the arrest and found to co n-No. 14

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tain three firearms. Adams maintains that he was no t the person who moved the tool box and did not know what it contained. But h e did acknowledge , as part of the factual b asis for the §1951(a) conviction, that he and the other co nspirators “agreed to rob a purported stash house of at least 50 kilograms of coc aine, using firearms.” Being armed thus was part of the agreement. With respect to the §924(c) co nviction, Adams acknowledged that he “knowingly possessed a firearm” and that he had agreed with five other persons “to rob a purported stash house of at least 50 kilograms of cocaine, and to use firearms in furtherance of the robbery.” Finally, Adams acknowledged that “in furtherance of and as a foreseeable consequence of that agreement, a toolbox co ntaining” firearms was placed in the van. These acknowledgment s suffice to hold Adams accoun table for the firearms, no matter who put the tool box in the van and whether o r not Adams knew what was in it

. He

con ceded that the presence of firearms was a “foreseeable consequence” of his agreement to rob a stash house “us ing firearms.” Using weapons was part of the plan. Pinkerton makes one conspirator liable for the foreseeable acts of ot hers within the scope of the agreement . The provision of weapons was part of the plan, and thus within the conspir acy’s scope, and what’ s part of a plan is foreseeable to the planners

. Adams never attempted to withdraw from the conspiracy, so he is accountable for his confederates’ for eseeable acts. Nothing in Rosemond alters this assessment. The Court dealt with a situation in which one c riminal participant u ne xpectedly produced a gun, and Rosemond was arrested b efore he had an opportunity either to assist or to walk away

.4 No. 14

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The Court held that “ a defendant may be convicted of abe tting a §924(c) violation only if his intent reaches beyond a simple drug sale, to an armed one .” 134 S. Ct. at 1248. And whether the defendant had the necessary intent, the Court concluded, depended in part on whether he anticipated his colleague’s possession of a gun. If he did, then he was cu lpable; if he did not, then it mattered whether he had a chance to stop assisting the criminal venture ( i.e., to walk away) after learning that someone else was packing. Adams admitted planning that one or more of the co nspirators would be armed. His intent thus “reache[d] beyond a simple drug [theft] , to an armed one .” If this had been a prosecution for aiding and abetting, there would not have been a problem under Rosemond . No more is there a problem when the charge is conspiracy. It does not matter under Rosemond
, Pinkerton , or Newman , whether Adams knew how
many guns would be used, who would supply them, and whethe r they would come in a toolbox , a holster, a car’s s ecret compartment , or a picnic basket ; it is enough if the cri minal agreement entailed use of a firearm. Adams is not ent itled to withdraw his plea.

A FFIRMED