COURT OF CHANCERY

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

BONNIE W. DAVID

MAGISTRATE IN CHANCERY

COURT OF CHANCERY COURTHOUSE

34 THE CIRCLE

GEORGETOWN, DE 19947

Final Report: December 28, 2023

Date Submitted: December 20, 2023 

Julia Bettina Klein, Esquire 

Klein LLC 

225 West 14th Street, Suite 100

Wilmington, Delaware 19801 

Sean A. Meluney, Esquire 

William M. Alleman, Esquire

Meluney Alleman & Spence LLC 

1143 Savannah Road 

Lewes, Delaware 19958 

RE: Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,

C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD

Dear Counsel:

This final report addresses respondent Insight Building Co., LLC’s motion to 

dismiss petitioner Jane Clevenger’s Amended Verified Petition (the “Petition”)

under Court of Chancery Rules 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the 

reasons explained below, I recommend that the Court grant the motion and dismiss 

the Petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, with leave to transfer to the 

Superior Court pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 1902.
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,

C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD

December 28, 2023

Page 2 of 13

I. BACKGROUND1

On August 3, 2021, petitioner Jane Clevenger (“Petitioner”) and respondent 

Insight Building Co., LLC (“Respondent” or “Insight”) entered into an agreement 

pursuant to which Petitioner agreed to purchase, and Insight agreed to sell, a new 

construction home in Milton, Delaware (the “Construction Contract”). Am. Verified 

Pet. [hereinafter, “Pet.”], Ex. A, Dkt. 11. Paragraph 18 of the Construction Contract, 

entitled “Dispute Resolution,” provides that:

Any dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or relating to any of 

the terms or provisions in this Agreement shall be submitted to 

mandatory final and binding arbitration, subject to the terms of this 

Paragraph. No party may have recourse to the jurisdiction of any court 

unless any disagreement or contest has first been submitted to 

arbitration in the manner described below . . . .

Pet., Ex. A § 18 (the “Dispute Resolution Provision”). In addition to setting forth 

procedures governing arbitration, Paragraph 18 requires that:

The Parties shall maintain the confidentiality of all aspects of this 

Agreement (including information respecting any arbitration entered 

into between the Parties). As such, each party acknowledges and agrees 

that it shall not, without the other party’s prior written permission in 

each instance, disclose the Confidential Information of such other party 

1 The following facts are taken from the Petition and the documents incorporated by 

reference therein, including the Construction Contract (defined below) attached as Exhibit 

A to the Petition. See Freedman v. Adams, 2012 WL 1345638, at *5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 

2012) (“When a plaintiff expressly refers to and heavily relies upon documents in her 

complaint, these documents are considered to be incorporated by reference into the 

complaint[.]” (citation omitted)).
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,

C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD

December 28, 2023

Page 3 of 13

to any third party (other than as required to fulfill its obligations 

hereunder and/or as may be required by any applicable law, rule or 

regulation (such as a subpoena or other valid discovery request). The 

term “Confidential Information” shall not include information that is 

either: (i) in the public domain; or (ii) independently discoverable 

without violating any confidentiality or other obligation of any kind to 

any individual or entity. To the extent that Confidential Information is 

required to be provided to an affiliate or other third party to effectuate 

the terms hereof, such third party must first agree to be bound by the 

same confidentiality provisions as set forth herein.

Id. § 18(i) (the “NDA”).

According to the Petition, in the weeks before the Construction Contract was 

signed, “Insight refused to let [Petitioner] engage her own real estate agent; tried to 

pressure her into buying too big of a house; discouraged her from retaining counsel 

. . . ; [and] manufactured a persistent sense of impending doom and urgency . . . .” 

Pet. at 3; see also id. ¶ 52 (alleging Insight “took advantage of [Petitioner]’s known 

vulnerabilities” and “discouraged her from seeking professional advice”). During 

that period, “Insight Homes never mentioned or discussed with [Petitioner] that she 

would be required to sign an NDA and a [Dispute Resolution Provision] in 

connection with the Contract to build her Home”; rather, “[t]he only terms 

[Petitioner] ever discussed with Insight Homes were terms concerning the 

construction of her Home: purchase price, model, lot number, timing, upgrades, and 
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,

C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD

December 28, 2023

Page 4 of 13

the like . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 26, 46.

2

 Petitioner alleges she “signed the [Construction] 

Contract under duress when it was emailed to her for her electronic signature, not 

realizing that certain inconspicuous provisions of the contract deprived her of her 

day in court and of the opportunity to present any breach of the [Construction] 

Contract on the merits after discovery and with the assistance of counsel.” Id. ¶ 47; 

see also id. ¶ 26 (alleging Petitioner “had no idea of what an arbitration was and the 

limited avenues for a review of arbitration decisions by the court,” and “had no 

reason to expect, nor did she understand, that this was, in effect, what she was doing 

by signing the [Construction] Contract”). 

After closing, Petitioner raised with Insight concerns about poor air quality,3

standing water, an infestation of frogs, and holes in the foundation of her new home, 

among other issues. Id. ¶ 32.

2 Petitioner alleges those terms were memorialized in a Customer Priceout Worksheet, 

attached as Exhibit B to the Petition. See Pet. ¶ 49; id., Ex. B.

3 The Petition emphasizes that the air quality in Petitioner’s home is particularly 

troublesome given Petitioner’s respiratory ailments. See Pet. at 2 (“[C]limate is irreverent, 

especially when provoked, and when the weather ravaged parts of Colorado with an 

extraordinary wildfire in 2021 it also ravaged Ms. Clevenger’s lungs. Her respiratory 

system, already debilitated by asthma, imploded, and Plaintiff resolved to retire in 

friendlier and calmer climes by the Delaware beaches.”); id. ¶ 36 (“Ms. Clevenger, who 

several times had to seek medical care and receive treatment for bronchitis and sinus 

infections and had become increasingly anxious and depressed about the ongoing 

nightmare of dealing with the issues at her home and Insight Homes representatives, has 

lost any confidence in Defendant’s ability to do anything right.”).
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,

C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD

December 28, 2023

Page 5 of 13

On March 24, 2023, Petitioner initiated this action through the filing of a 

Verified Petition. Dkt. 1. On August 1, 2023, Petitioner filed the operative Petition, 

which alleges five counts. Count I seeks reformation of the Construction Contract 

to remove the Dispute Resolution Provision, including the NDA therein. Pet. ¶ 45. 

Count II seeks a declaratory judgment that “(a) the NDA is void for lack of 

consideration; (b) void and unenforceable because it was obtained through 

inequitable conduct; (c) unenforceable as a matter of public policy . . . ; [and] 

(d) unenforceable as unconscionable . . . .” Id. ¶ 59. Count III seeks a declaratory 

judgment that the Dispute Resolution Provision “is unenforceable (a) as 

unconscionable . . . and (b) because arbitration is strictly a matter of consent and 

[Petitioner], even though she signed the [Construction] Contract and initialed each 

page electronically, did not knowingly consent to the [Dispute Resolution Provision] 

. . . .” Id. ¶ 65. Count IV alleges a claim for breach of contract premised on Insight 

“supplying defective product and unworkmanship like services,” and Count V 

alleges a claim for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. 

¶ 72. 
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,

C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD

December 28, 2023

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II. ANALYSIS

Respondent has moved to dismiss the Petition pursuant to Court of Chancery 

Rules 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted.

4

“The Court of Chancery will grant a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss ‘if it 

appears from the record that the Court does not have jurisdiction over the claim.’” 

Yu v. GSM Nation, LLC, 2017 WL 2889515, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 7, 2017) (citation 

omitted). “The Court of Chancery is a court of limited jurisdiction.” Id. Title 10, 

Section 342 of the Delaware Code states that “[t]he Court of Chancery shall not have 

jurisdiction to determine any matter wherein sufficient remedy may be had by 

common law, or statute, before any other court or jurisdiction of this State.” 10 Del. 

C. § 342. This Court “maintains subject matter jurisdiction ‘only when (1) the 

4 On August 11, 2023, Insight filed its Opening Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss

the Amended Petition or to Strike Certain Allegations Contained In It. Resp’t.’s Op. Br. 

In Supp. Of Its Mot. To Dismiss The Am. Pet. Or To Strike Certain Allegations Contained 

In It [hereinafter, “OB”], Dkt.12. On October 3, 2023, Petitioner filed her Answering Brief 

in Support of Opposition to Respondent’s Opening Brief in Support of its Motion to 

Dismiss the Amended Petition or to Strike Certain Allegations Contained In It. Pet’r.’s 

Ans. Br. In Supp. Of Opp’n To Resp’t.’s Op. Br. In Supp. Of Its Mot. To Dismiss The Am.

Pet. Or To Strike Certain Allegations Contained In It [hereinafter, “AB”], Dkt. 15. On 

October 18, 2023, Insight filed its Reply Brief in Further Support of its Motion to Dismiss 

the Amended Petition or to Strike Certain Allegations Contained In It. Resp’t.’s Reply Br. 

In Further Supp. Of Its Mot. To Dismiss The Am. Pet. Or To Strike Certain Allegations 

Contained In It [hereinafter, “RB”], Dkt. 17. I heard oral argument on December 20, 2023. 

Dkt. 19.
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,

C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD

December 28, 2023

Page 7 of 13

complaint states a claim for relief that is equitable in character, (2) the complaint 

requests an equitable remedy when there is no adequate remedy at law or 

(3) Chancery is vested with jurisdiction by statute.’” Smith v. Scott, 2021 WL 

1592463, at *14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 23, 2021) (citation omitted). 

Petitioner’s sole jurisdictional hook5is a request for reformation, which is an 

equitable remedy.

6

 But “Chancery jurisdiction is not conferred by the incantation of 

magic words[,]” and simply asking for an equitable remedy is not an “open sesame” 

to equity jurisdiction. Yu, 2017 WL 2889515, at *3 (footnote omitted) (first quoting 

McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 603 (Del. Ch. 1987); then Int’l Bus. 

Machs. Corp. v. Comdisco, Inc., 602 A.2d 74, 78 (Del. Ch. 1991)). Rather, “‘[i]f a 

realistic evaluation [of the pleadings] leads to the conclusion that an adequate 

5 Petitioner concedes that Counts II and III of the Petition, which seek declaratory 

judgments, do not provide an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See 

Heathergreen Commons Condo. Ass’n v. Paul, 503 A.2d 636, 642 (Del. Ch. 1985) (“[T]he 

Court of Chancery has jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action only if there exists 

an underlying basis for equity jurisdiction measured by traditional standards . . . .”).

6 The parties agree that Count I seeking reformation is not subject to arbitration because it 

presents a threshold issue of enforceability. See OB at 15-20; AB at 11-12; RB at 1-2; see 

also, e.g., Chemours Co. v. DowDuPont Inc., 2020 WL 1527783, at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 

2020) (applying “state contract law to determine whether [the plaintiff] consented to 

arbitration”), aff’d, 243 A.3d 441 (Del.); Carder v. Carl M. Freeman Cmties., LLC, 2009 

WL 106510, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2009) (“[W]hether parties agree to arbitrate is generally 

one for the courts to decide and not arbitrators.” (citation and internal question marks 

omitted)).
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,

C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD

December 28, 2023

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remedy is available, this court, in conformity with the command of Section 342 of 

Title 10 of the Delaware Code, will not accept jurisdiction over the matter.’” Id. at 

*3 (quoting McMahon, 532 A.2d at 603).

The Petition here seeks to “reform” the Construction Contract to remove the 

Dispute Resolution Provision, and the NDA therein, based on “unilateral mistake 

and inequitable conduct.” Pet. ¶ 45. But, as Insight argues, the “reformation” 

Petitioner seeks—deleting the offending provision—would have the same effect as

a declaratory judgment determining that such provision is invalid or otherwise 

unenforceable.

7

 Thus, “[w]hile the [Petition] includes the ‘magic words’ of certain 

equitable remedies in an attempt to invoke equity jurisdiction, the Superior Court 

can grant a full, fair, and complete remedy” through a declaratory judgment—the 

same relief sought in Counts II and III. Yu, 2017 WL 2889515, at *4-5 (concluding 

the Court of Chancery lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a complaint seeking 

reformation, among other equitable remedies, where the plaintiff’s “best remedy” 

was available at law).

7 See OB at 27 (first citing ISS Facility Servs., Inc. v. JanCo FS 2, LLC, 2023 WL 4096014, 

at *2 (Del. Ch. June 20, 2023) (finding the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a 

request for specific performance because a declaratory judgment, available at law, would 

provide a sufficient remedy); then Hillsboro Energy, LLC v. Secure Energy, Inc., 2008 WL 

4561227, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 3, 2008) (same)).
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,

C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD

December 28, 2023

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Even if a declaratory judgment would provide a less than “full, fair, and

complete remedy,” this Court lacks jurisdiction over this action for a separate 

reason—the Petition fails to adequately plead entitlement to reformation. 

“Reformation is an equitable remedy which emanates from the maxim that equity 

treats that as done which ought to have been done.” Greenberg v. BCV Social, LLC, 

2023 WL 8167825, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2023) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Obsidian Fin. Gp., LLC v. Identity Theft Guard Sols., Inc., 2021 

WL 1578201, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 2021)). “Reformation does not . . . provide 

the Court ‘equitable license . . . to write a new contract at the invitation of a party 

who is unsatisfied with his or her side of the bargain; rather, it permits the Court to 

reform a written contract that was intended to memorialize, but fails to comport with, 

the parties’ prior agreement.’” Id. (ellipses in original) (citation omitted). A party 

seeking reformation must plead the following: 

(i) that the parties reached a definite agreement before executing the 

final contract; (ii) that the final contract failed to incorporate the terms 

of the agreement; (iii) that the parties were similarly mistaken or that 

[one] knew of [another’s] mistake and remained silent; and (iv) the 

precise mistake the parties made. 

AECOM v. SCCI Nat’l Hldgs., Inc., 2023 WL 6294985, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 

2023) (alterations in original) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). The 

circumstances constituting the mistake must be pled with particularity in accordance 
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December 28, 2023

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with Court of Chancery Rule 9(b). See Joyce v. RCN Corp., 2003 WL 21517864, at 

*3 (Del. Ch. July 1, 2003) (“Rule 9(b) requires that ‘in all averments of . . . mistake, 

the circumstances constituting . . . [the] mistake shall be stated with particularity.’”

(alteration and ellipses in original)).

The Petition fails to adequately plead these elements. First, the Petition fails 

to allege facts supporting an inference that the parties reached a specific prior 

agreement that the Construction Contract would not include a dispute resolution 

procedure. The Petition alleges in conclusory fashion that “[t]here was a specific 

understanding that the construction contract would contain only the terms pursuant 

to which the Home would be constructed,” which “did not include the [Dispute 

Resolution Provision] or the NDA.” Pet. ¶ 50; see also id., Ex. B. Yet, the Petition 

also alleges that “Insight[] never mentioned or discussed” dispute resolution or 

confidentiality, such that Petitioner “had no reason to anticipate or believe” that the 

Construction Contract would address those issues. Id. ¶¶ 46-47 (emphasis added); 

see also id. ¶ 26 (“The only terms [Petitioner] ever discussed with Insight Homes 

were terms concerning the construction of her Home . . . .”). In other words, the 

Petition expressly alleges the absence of a prior agreement concerning dispute 

resolution or confidentiality. And without such an agreement, the Petition does not 

plead a conceivable basis for reformation. See In re TIBCO Software Inc. S’holders 
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,

C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD

December 28, 2023

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Litig., 2015 WL 6155894, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2015) (explaining that 

“[r]eformation requires an antecedent agreement” (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted)); see also AECOM, 2023 WL 6294985, at *7 (dismissing 

reformation count where plaintiff’s theory was not premised on “any actual 

agreement between the parties” (emphasis added)); Obsidian Fin. Gp., 2021 WL 

1578201, at *10 (concluding a “reformation claim fail[ed] as a matter of law” where 

the petition was “bereft of particularized facts detailing a ‘specific prior 

understanding’ as to the terms it s[ought] to reform”); Richard B. Gamberg 2007 

Fam. Tr. v. United Rest. Gp., L.P., 2018 WL 566417, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2018) 

(concluding plaintiff failed to adequately plead entitlement to reformation where it 

did not “offer any facts or arguments to explain what ‘specific prior contractual 

understanding’ should govern” (alterations in original) (citations and footnotes 

omitted)). 

Second, the Petition fails to allege facts supporting an inference that Insight

knew Petitioner was “mistaken” about the inclusion of the Dispute Resolution 

Provision in the Construction Contract, or that Insight remained silent in the face of 

such “mistake.” Aside from conclusory allegations that Insight discouraged 
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,

C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD

December 28, 2023

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Petitioner from retaining counsel8and “took advantage of [her] known 

vulnerabilities,”9the Petition provides no factual basis to infer that Insight knew 

Petitioner did not agree to the Dispute Resolution Provision and yet remained silent. 

To the contrary, the facts alleged in the Petition—that Petitioner electronically 

signed the Construction Contract and initialed every page, including the page on 

which the Dispute Resolution Provision appears—compel the opposite inference.10

8 But see Pet., Ex. A § 11(c) (“The Purchaser has the right . . . to retain an attorney of the 

Purchaser’s choice to represent the Purchaser at settlement.”).

9 Pet. ¶¶ 52-54; see also id. ¶ 24 (claiming Insight tried to “upsell” and “intimidate” 

Petitioner into executing the Construction Contract); id. ¶ 53 (“At no time relevant hereto 

did Insight Homes point out to [Petitioner] that the [C]onstruction Contract contained a 

waiver of her right to seek redress in the judicial system or that she agreed to an NDA for 

no consideration.”); AB at 9 (claiming Insight “actively discouraged [Petitioner] from 

seeking counsel”).

At oral argument, Petitioner’s counsel suggested that Insight and Petitioner stood in a trust

relationship, but the Petition does not allege that Insight, Petitioner’s contractual 

counterparty, owed fiduciary duties to Petitioner.

10 Under Delaware law, “[w]here [a] putative contract is in the form of a signed writing, 

that document generally offers the most powerful and persuasive evidence of the parties’

intent to be bound.” Eagle Force Hldgs., LLC v. Campbell, 187 A.3d 1209, 1230 (Del. 

2018) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Chemours, 2020 WL 1527783, at *10 (“Delaware 

law views . . . a signature as ‘the most powerful and persuasive evidence’ of [a party’s]

intent to be bound by the [agreement], and, consequently, its consent to arbitration.” 

(emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)). The Petition alleges no facts from which the Court 

could reasonably infer that, despite Petitioner signing, and initialing every page of, the 

Construction Contract, Insight knew she did not mean to agree to certain terms therein.
Jane Clevenger v. Insight Building Co., LLC,

C.A. No. 2023-0359-BWD

December 28, 2023

Page 13 of 13

Because the Petition fails to adequately allege Petitioner’s entitlement to the 

equitable remedy of reformation, I recommend that the Petition be dismissed for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction.

11

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, I recommend that the Petition be dismissed 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, with leave to transfer to the Superior Court 

pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 1902. This is a final report pursuant to Court of Chancery 

Rule 144(d)(1).12

Sincerely,

/s/ Bonnie W. David

Bonnie W. David

Magistrate in Chancery

cc: All counsel of record (by File & ServeXpress)

11 In light of the recommendations herein, Insight’s motion to strike certain allegations in

the Petition is moot.

12 See Ct. Ch. R. 144(d)(1) (“In actions that are not summary in nature or in which the 

Court has not ordered expedited proceedings, any party taking exception shall file a notice 

of exceptions within eleven days of the date of the report.”).