Department of Homeland Security
 

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Transportation Security Administration 


Office of Inspection’s Efforts To Enhance 


Transportation Security 


OIG-13-123 September 2013
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
 

Department of Homeland Security
 

Transportation Security Administration 

Anne L. Richards 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits 

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

SEP 24 2013 

MEMORANDUM FOR: John W. Halinski 

Deputy Administrator 

Transportation Security Administration 

Roderick Allison 

Assistant Administrator 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: Transportation Security !dministration Office of Inspection’s 

Efforts To Enhance Transportation Security 

Attached for your action is our final report, Transportation Security Administration Office of 

Inspection’s Efforts To Enhance Transportation Security. We incorporated the formal 

comments from the Transportation Security Administration in the final report. 

The report contains 11 recommendations aimed at improving the operations of the 

Transportation Security Administration’s Office of Inspection. Your office concurred with all 

of the recommendations. As prescribed by the Department of Homeland Security Directive 

077-01, Follow-Up and Resolution for Office of Inspector General Report Recommendations, 

within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, please provide our office with a written 

response that includes your (1) agreement or disagreement, (2) corrective action plan, and 

(3) target completion date for each recommendation. Also, please include responsible 

parties and any other supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the current 

status of the recommendation. 

The OIG considers recommendation #2 resolved and closed. Recommendations #5, 7, 9, 10 

and 11 are resolved and open. The other recommendations will remain unresolved and 

open. Once your office has fully implemented the recommendations, please submit a 

formal closeout request to us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendations. 

The request should be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed‐upon corrective 

actions. 

Please email a signed PDF copy of all responses and closeout requests to 

OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
 

Department of Homeland Security
 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will provide copies of 

our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and appropriation 

responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post the report on our 

website for public dissemination. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact John E. McCoy II, Deputy 

Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 254-4100. 

Attachment 

www.oig.dhs.gov 2 OIG-13-123
 

 

 

   

     

      

      

         

         

           

   

             

             

                  

                         

               

           

           

            

       

         

            

           

         

         

       

       

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 1
 

Background ........................................................................................................................ 2
 

Results of Audit................................................................................................................... 6
 

Use of Criminal Investigators.................................................................................. 6
 

Planning, Performance, and Quality Control........................................................ 12
 

Recommendations................................................................................................ 15
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis.......................................................... 18
 

Appendixes

Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ........................................... 35
 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report .............................. 38
 

Appendix C: Organizational Structure of OOI as of June 2012 ......................... 45
 

Appendix D: Major Contributors to This Report ............................................... 46
 

Appendix E: Report Distribution ....................................................................... 47
 

Abbreviations

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

DHS Department of Homeland Security

FY fiscal year

LEAP Law Enforcement Availability Pay

OHC Office of Human Capital

OIG Office of Inspector General

OOI Office of Inspection

OPM Office of Personnel Management

TSA Transportation Security Administration

USC United States Code

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Executive Summary

The Office of Inspection in the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) conducts

inspections, internal reviews, and covert testing to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency

of TSA's operations and administrative activities, and to identify vulnerabilities in TSA

security systems. Additionally, the office carries out internal investigations of the TSA

workforce to ensure its integrity. We conducted an audit of this office to determine

whether it is efficient and effective in its efforts to enhance transportation security.

The Office of Inspection did not operate efficiently. Specifically, the office did not use its

staff and resources efficiently to conduct cost‐effective inspections, internal reviews,

and covert testing. The office employed personnel classified as “criminal investigators,”

even though their primary duties may not have been criminal investigations as required

by Federal law and regulations. These employees received premium pay and other

costly benefits, although other employees were able to perform the same work at a

lower cost. Additionally, the office did not properly plan its work and resource needs,

track project costs, or measure performance effectively. Quality controls were not

sufficient to ensure that inspections, internal reviews, and covert testing complied with

accepted standards; staff members were properly trained; and work was adequately

reviewed. Finally, the office could not always ensure other TSA components took action

on its recommendations to improve TSA’s operations.

As a result of these issues with the office’s cost‐effectiveness and quality controls over

its work products, TSA was not as effective as it could have been, and management may

not be able to rely on the office’s work. Additionally, the Office of Inspection may not

have fully accomplished its mission to identify and address transportation security

vulnerabilities. With the appropriate classification and training of staff and better use of

resources, the office could improve the quality of its work. The appropriate number of

reclassifications and more precise cost savings cannot be determined without an

objective and comprehensive review of position classifications. If TSA does not make

any changes to the number of criminal investigator positions, we estimate that it will

cost as much as $17.5 million over 5 years for premium Law Enforcement Availability

Pay. The office could realize further savings in training, travel, supplies, and other

special employment benefits, including statutory early retirement, if its personnel

classified as criminal investigators were reclassified to noncriminal investigator

positions.

We made 11 recommendations to TSA that, when implemented, should lead to more

efficient and effective operations, improve transparency and accountability, and

enhance its efforts to protect the Nation’s transportation systems.

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Department of Homeland Security 

Background

TSA is responsible for protecting the Nation’s transportation systems. The agency

provides airline and other transportation security through passenger, baggage, and

container screening, as well as other security programs. The mission of the TSA Office

of Inspection (OOI) is to (1) ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of TSA's operations

and administrative activities through inspections and internal reviews, (2) identify

vulnerabilities in security systems through operational testing, and (3) ensure the

integrity of TSA's workforce through comprehensive special investigations. At the time

of our audit, OOI was composed of the following four divisions:

	 Inspections and Investigations Division – inspects TSA program components,

including Federal Air Marshal Service, Federal Security Directors’ offices, and TSA

Headquarters’ offices to ensure that TSA’s policies and procedures are being

followed. Additionally, the division identifies vulnerabilities in passenger,

baggage, and cargo operations. The division also investigates alleged criminal

and administrative misconduct of TSA employees.

	 Internal Reviews Division – assesses TSA programs and operations for efficiency,

effectiveness, and compliance with laws, regulations, and TSA policies. In

addition, the division conducts audits of air carriers in accordance with

Government Auditing Standards, to determine their compliance with 9/11

security fee requirements. From 2008 through 2011, the division audited

approximately $4.8 billion in 9/11 security fees and identified approximately

$12.6 million in fees that were owed to the Federal Government.

	 Special Operations Division – plans, conducts, and reports results of covert

testing to identify vulnerabilities in transportation security systems. Covert

testing is designed to identify security vulnerabilities and address deficiencies by

recommending corrective actions.

	 Business Management Office – supports the three operational divisions by

managing OOI’s communications and information systems and coordinating

resources.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

As shown in table 1, OOI reported the following accomplishments from fiscal year (FY)

2010 through the first quarter of FY 2012:

Table 1. Investigations Opened and Reports Completed From

FY 2010 through First Quarter FY 2012

Investigations Opened 930

Reports of Inspections 93

Reports of Internal Reviews 56

Reports of Special Operations (Covert Testing) 16

Source: Totals based on data provided by OOI.

In FY 2011, the TSA Office of Human Capital (OHC) conducted a position management

review in OOI and reported that the office could gain efficiencies by restructuring its

organization, realigning its workload, reclassifying positions, and refocusing on core

functions and purpose.1 In FY 2012, at the direction of the TSA Administrator, OHC

began an Organizational Transformation Initiative. The initiative is designed to support

the agency's ongoing evolution into a high‐performance counterterrorism organization

and ensure that each TSA office executes its assigned responsibilities efficiently,

effectively, and economically. As a result, OOI changed its organizational structure and,

in an effort to reduce the number of supervisory layers, eliminated several positions.

(Appendix C contains more information on OOI’s current organizational structure.)

OOI staff is composed primarily of personnel employed in positions classified by TSA as

criminal investigators, transportation security specialists, and program analysts who

operate in a matrix environment in which individuals assist divisions other than the one

to which they are assigned. For example, in addition to conducting investigations,

criminal investigators may conduct inspections or covert testing. According to data

provided by OOI’s Business Management Office, in FY 2011, TSA allocated

approximately $43.5 million to OOI, of which $27.2 million was spent on salaries for 205

employees, including 35 transportation security specialists and 124 criminal

investigators. Transportation security specialists supervise, lead, or perform

inspections, investigations, enforcement, or compliance work. TSA defines a criminal

investigator as an individual who plans and conducts investigations of alleged or

suspected violations of Federal criminal laws.

According to TSA Management Directive No. 1100.88‐1, Law Enforcement Position

Standards and Hiring Requirements, criminal investigators are considered law

enforcement officers. By law, however, to qualify for statutory enhanced retirement

1 TSA OHC Position Management Review, Office of Inspection, August 2011.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

benefits, only those Federal employees whose duties include "primarily the

investigation, apprehension, or detention of individuals suspected or convicted of

offenses against the criminal laws of the United States" qualify as law enforcement

officers.2 Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations require law enforcement

officers to spend in general an average of at least 50 percent of their time investigating,

apprehending, or detaining individuals suspected or convicted of violating criminal laws

of the United States.3

Law enforcement officers are entitled to special statutory employment benefits. For

example, they are entitled to retire at age 50 with full benefits after only 20 years of

service.4 They receive a faster accruing pension. They also are eligible to receive extra

pay known as Law Enforcement Availability Pay (LEAP).5 Although TSA is exempt from

certain personnel management provisions of Title V of the United States Code (USC),

including the LEAP statute, TSA Management Directive No. 1100.88‐1, Law Enforcement

Positions Standards and Hiring Requirements, incorporates LEAP.6 To receive LEAP,

which is an additional 25 percent premium above base pay, criminal investigators must

certify annually that they have worked and are expected to be available to work a

minimum annual average of 2 or more unscheduled duty hours beyond each normal

workday.7

Because of their position classifications, OOI criminal investigators are eligible for LEAP

and entitled to early retirement. These benefits are more costly to the government

than regular benefits.8 Approximately 97 percent of OOI’s criminal investigators

2 5 United States Code (USC) § 8331(20), § 8401(17), 5 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). § 831.902; see

also 5 CFR. § 842.802. 3 5 CFR §§ 831.902, 842.802. These regulations define and establish requirements for law enforcement

officers. This workload requirement does not apply to individuals who qualify to be in a secondary

position, such as first‐level supervisors to criminal investigators or those in administrative positions. 4 5 USC §§ 8336(c), 8412(d)(2). 5 Congress enacted the Law Enforcement Availability Pay Act of 1994 "to provide premium pay to criminal

investigators to ensure the availability of criminal investigators for unscheduled duty in excess of a 40

hour work week based on the needs of the employing agency." 5 USC § 5545a(b). 6 TSA’s Management Directive No. 1100.88‐1 also incorporates the statutory and regulatory definitions of

“law enforcement officer” referred to throughout this report. TSA is not exempt from Title V provisions

concerning law enforcement retirement. 7 See 5 CFR §§ 550.181‐186, particularly § 550.184, Annual certification. Each newly hired criminal

investigator and the appropriate supervisory officer must certify the investigator is expected to meet the

substantial hours requirement in § 550.183 during the upcoming 1‐year period. 5 CFR § 550.184(a). 8 Eligibility for law enforcement retirement coverage must be “strictly construed” because the benefits

are “more costly to the government than more traditional retirement plans and often results in the

retirement of important people at a time when they would otherwise have continued to work for a

number of years.” Bingaman v. Department of the Treasury, 127 F.3d 1431, 1435 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing

Morgan v. Office of Personnel Management, 773 F.2d 282, 286‐87 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

received LEAP during the period of our audit. The salary for criminal investigators is

capped and varies based on the differing locality pay of each duty station. For example,

criminal investigators based in OOI headquarters in the Washington, DC, area have a

salary cap of approximately $164,000, which includes LEAP and locality pay. From

financial information we obtained from TSA, we determined that in FY 2011, the median

pay for an OOI criminal investigator was $161,794 and the median pay for a

transportation security specialist was $117,775. TSA’s records showed that in FY 2011,

salaries for criminal investigators, who comprised about 60 percent of OOI staff,

accounted for $18.5 million, or 68 percent, of the $27.2 million in total salaries paid.

Furthermore, OOI paid criminal investigators approximately $6.1 million in LEAP over

FYs 2010 and 2011. For purposes of this audit, we did not review the cost to TSA of

other statutory law enforcement benefits such as early retirement. Chart 1 shows the

total salaries paid by position in OOI for FY 2011.

Source: OIG generated based on data provided by OOI’s Business Management Office.

$2.1

$4.3

$18.5

$2.3

Chart 1: OOI Total FY 2011 Salaries by Position

(in Millions)

Program Analysts (11% of OOI

employees, 8% of total salaries)

Transportation Security

Specialist (17% of OOI

employees, 16% of total salaries)

Criminal Investigators (60% of

OOI employees, 68% of total

salaries)

Other (12% of OOI employees,

8% of total salaries)

In April 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General

(OIG) Office of Investigations issued a Report of Inspection for TSA’s Office of Inspection,

Inspections and Investigations Division on OOI’s process of conducting investigations

into TSA employee misconduct. As a result of its inspection, the Office of Investigations

determined that the Inspections and Investigations Division’s investigative process

complied with applicable policies, directives, and law enforcement standards. Because

the Office of Investigations recently reviewed this process, we focused our audit on

OOI’s other products, services, and operations, and on personnel matters.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Results of Audit

OOI did not operate efficiently. Specifically, it did not use its staff and resources

efficiently to conduct cost‐effective inspections, internal reviews, and covert testing.

The office employed personnel classified as “criminal investigators,” even though TSA

did not ensure their primary duties were criminal investigations as required by Federal

law and regulations. These employees received premium pay and other benefits,

although other employees could have performed the same work at a lower cost.

Additionally, the office did not properly plan its work and resource needs, track project

costs, or measure performance effectively. Quality controls were not sufficient to

ensure that inspections, internal reviews, and covert testing complied with accepted

standards; staff members were properly trained; and work was adequately reviewed.

Finally, the office could not always ensure that other TSA components took action on its

recommendations to improve TSA’s operations.

As a result of the issues that we identified with OOI’s cost‐effectiveness and quality

controls over its work products, TSA was not as effective as it could have been, and

management may not be able to rely on OOI’s work. Additionally, OOI may not have

fully accomplished its mission to identify and address all transportation security

vulnerabilities. With the appropriate classification and training of staff and better use of

resources, OOI could improve the quality of its work. The appropriate number of

reclassifications and more precise cost savings cannot be determined without an

objective and comprehensive review of position classifications. If TSA does not make

any changes to the number of criminal investigator positions, we estimate that it will

cost as much as $17.5 million over 5 years on premium LEAP.9 OOI could also realize

further savings in training, travel, supplies, and other special employment benefits,

including statutory early retirement, if its personnel classified as criminal investigators

were reclassified to noncriminal investigator positions. With significant changes to

OOI’s operations, TSA can become more efficient and effective, improve transparency

and accountability, and enhance its efforts to protect the Nation’s transportation

systems.

Use of Criminal Investigators

OOI did not use its staff and resources efficiently in carrying out its work. The

office did not have a process to ensure that its criminal investigators met their

positions’ criminal investigative workload requirement or were properly

classified as criminal investigators. Rather than investigating criminal cases, the

9 We did not estimate the cost savings for other law enforcement special employment benefits.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

majority of the criminal investigators’ workload consisted of noncriminal cases;

monitoring and reporting on criminal cases; and carrying out inspections, covert

testing, and internal reviews. Such work could have been performed by other

OOI employees who do not receive LEAP, and who are not eligible for statutory

early retirement and other costly law enforcement benefits.

OOI did not ensure that its criminal investigators met the Federal workload

requirement for law enforcement officers, which makes them eligible for LEAP

(provided they meet the substantial hours requirement) and entitles them to

early retirement. Specifically, the office could not ensure that its criminal

investigators spent an average of at least 50 percent of their time investigating,

apprehending, or detaining individuals suspected or convicted of criminal

offenses. Additionally, some supervisory criminal investigators may not have

been properly classified. Their classification depends on correctly classifying the

individuals they supervise, and OOI had no assurance that subordinates were

properly classified, based on the Federal workload requirement for criminal

investigators. Although not able to demonstrate that criminal investigators met

the Federal workload requirement for law enforcement officers, (a prerequisite

for receiving LEAP), OOI personnel in these positions and their supervisors

received LEAP during the period of our audit.

DHS Management Directive 0810.1, The Office of Inspector General, requires OOI

to refer allegations of potentially criminal employee misconduct to the DHS OIG

Office of Investigations for review. Any case not retained by OIG is referred back

to OOI. According to the April 2012 Office of Investigations report, OOI closed

1,125 cases in FYs 2010 and 2011, of which 253, or approximately 22.5 percent,

were criminal in nature.

OOI criminal investigators primarily monitored and reported to TSA management

the results of collateral criminal investigations conducted by other Federal, State,

or local agencies, or they investigated administrative cases of alleged employee

violations of TSA policy. Table 2 shows the Office of Investigations’

categorization of 1,125 investigative cases closed by OOI in FYs 2010 and 2011.

The statistics in table 2 are based on the number of cases managed, not the time

spent working on cases. Thus, these statistics do not address the Federal

workload requirement for criminal investigators, which is based on time spent

working on criminal investigations.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table 2. FY 2010 and FY 2011 Closed Case Categorization

Type of Case Category Description Number Percent of

Total

Collateral

Criminal investigations conducted by other Federal,

State, or local agencies, which OOI monitored and

reported the results or investigated administratively.

577 51.3%

Administrative

Investigations of TSA employee misconduct that

violated TSA policy. 295 26.2%

Criminal (other

than collateral)

Criminal investigations submitted for acceptance or

declination to a U.S. attorney or State or local

prosecutor when appropriate.

253 22.5%

Total Cases 1,125 100%

Source: DHS OIG Office of Investigations Report #Q12‐TSA‐HQ‐120003, Report of Inspection for

TSA’s Office of Inspection, Inspections and Investigations Division, April 19, 2012.

In its 2011 position management review of OOI, OHC concluded that OOI’s

investigative workload did not support the number of criminal investigators in

the office. According to an FY 2011 OOI workload assessment, criminal

investigators spent, in 1 year, an estimated 25 to 30 percent of their time on all

investigations‐related activities, whether monitoring collateral cases or

conducting administrative and criminal investigations. Based on the OOI

workload assessment, OHC raised concerns in its review about the number of

criminal investigators in the Inspections and Investigations Division. In its report,

OHC also noted that TSA is focused on transportation security and has a limited

law enforcement function; therefore, modeling OOI after a law enforcement

agency might not be appropriate.

As a result of its review, OHC concluded that OOI could improve its efficiency,

and recommended that the office eliminate criminal investigator positions not

supported by the criminal investigative workload, either through attrition or

reassignment to an appropriate position. Following its position review, OHC

contracted with a company to conduct comprehensive position classification

audits of some OOI positions. These audits, the findings of which were

presented to OHC in February 2012, confirmed OHC’s findings that positions

were misclassified.

Subsequently, OHC reversed its position, and no longer concurred with the

contractor’s findings regarding reclassifications. In its Summary of Classification

Determinations dated June 2012, OHC maintained that these position

classifications were secondary law enforcement positions, and as such there was

“no required percentage of time or workload level required to sustain their

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

classification as law enforcement. As of August 2012, OHC had not taken action

to reevaluate and reclassify criminal investigator positions. Although OHC

concluded in 2011 that OOI’s investigative workload did not support the number

of criminal investigators and recommended eliminating positions, in December

2012, OOI posted multiple vacancy announcements to hire more criminal

investigators nationwide.

In June 2012, in response to OHC’s position management review findings, the

OOI Assistant Administrator at the time agreed to consult with OHC to assess the

office’s needs and determine the appropriate positions to perform OOI’s work.

The former Assistant Administrator also agreed to begin tracking criminal

investigators’ workload statistics to ensure that they met the minimum

50 percent criminal investigative activity legal requirement. OOI Letter No.

0007.2, dated August 2012, requires its employees to track work hours, including

LEAP hours, in its data management system.

OOI criminal investigators were also assigned to inspections, covert tests, and

internal reviews, all of which could be accomplished by other personnel who do

not receive LEAP or other statutory law enforcement benefits. Our review of 29

reports that were issued between FY 2010 and the first quarter of FY 2012 by

various OOI divisions showed that criminal investigators composed:

 61 percent of OOI personnel who conducted the 5 inspections;

 50 percent of OOI personnel who conducted the 10 covert testing

modules; and

 51 percent of OOI personnel who conducted the 14 internal reviews.

These results show that criminal investigators performed work not related to

criminal investigations. Using criminal investigators to conduct noncriminal

investigations is not an efficient use of resources. Paying LEAP to employees

who are not required to document the hours that they spend conducting

criminal investigations does not comply with TSA Management Directive

1100.88‐1, which incorporates the LEAP statute. It also cost TSA more in salary

and benefits because the noncriminal investigators could have been performed

the work. Additionally, TSA has no assurance that the LEAP availability hours

were properly certified because the component is unable to determine whether

the criminal investigators met the Federal workload requirement for that

position.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

OOI did not ensure its criminal investigators met the Federal workload

requirement for law enforcement officers, which qualifies them for LEAP and

other statutory law enforcement benefits. OOI did not require all staff to enter

time spent working on projects into its database, which would support the hours

charged to its criminal investigations. Without evidence to support the

classification and workload of the 124 criminal investigators in OOI, there is no

assurance that these positions are properly classified. Using noncriminal

investigators who do not receive LEAP to perform inspections, covert tests, and

internal reviews could result in future cost savings. Specifically, we estimate that

over a 5‐year period, OOI could save as much as $17.5 million in LEAP if its 124

criminal investigators were reclassified to noncriminal investigator positions.

However, the appropriate number of reclassifications and more precise cost

savings cannot be determined without an objective and comprehensive review

of position classifications.

Our cost savings estimate does not take into account a potential increase in

overtime pay, which could result from criminal investigators being converted to

transportation security specialists or program analysts. Criminal investigators

who receive LEAP are not generally eligible to receive overtime pay, but

transportation security specialists and program analysts are eligible.10 During

FYs 2010 and 2011, OOI paid approximately $109,000 in overtime pay to 66

individuals in these two job positions. If all 124 criminal investigators

(approximately twice the number of OOI’s transportation security specialists and

program analysts who received overtime pay during this 2‐year period) were

converted, we estimate the increase in overtime pay would be approximately

$218,000 based on pay data from FYs 2010 and 2011. This potential increase in

overtime pay is significantly less than the $6.1 million paid in LEAP for the same

2‐year period.

In addition to the LEAP savings, OOI could realize savings if its criminal

investigators were reclassified as transportation security specialists or other

noncriminal investigator positions. These savings would come from cost

categories such as training, travel, supplies, and other benefits, including

statutory early retirement and a faster accruing pension. OHC reached this same

conclusion in its position management review.

When OOI was established in September 2003, TSA management may have

believed that the number of criminal investigators on staff was appropriate to

10 Criminal investigators who receive LEAP pursuant to 5 USC § 5545(a) are exempt from the overtime

provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, but may still receive Title V overtime pay.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

meet the office’s mission. However, in the 10 years since its establishment,

neither OOI nor TSA has conducted a comprehensive workforce analysis, which

would help determine the correct set of skills and the appropriate number of

personnel to accomplish the office’s mission cost‐effectively. In addition, OOI

has not demonstrated the need to retain the current number of criminal

investigators.

According to OPM’s Introduction to the Position Classification Standards, OPM

and Federal agencies are responsible for carrying out the classification system in

accordance with the principles set forth in law. This guide states that Federal

managers are responsible for organizing work to accomplish the agency's

mission in the most efficient and economical manner. The policy of the Federal

Government is to assign work in a way that will make optimum use of available

11 resources.

Although OPM has overall responsibility for establishing the basic policies and

guidance governing position classification and management for most Federal

agencies, TSA is exempt from OPM classifications.12 TSA has established its own

position classifications and classification management procedures. However,

with respect to law enforcement, TSA’s policy is to adhere to OPM requirements

so that TSA criminal investigators will be entitled to enhanced retirement

benefits. Without OPM’s approval, TSA criminal investigators would not qualify

for enhanced retirement benefits covered in 5 USC Chapters 83‐85 because TSA

is not exempt from these provisions.13 These benefits are only provided to those

law enforcement personnel who are covered under the statutory and regulatory

definitions of “law enforcement officer.”

TSA is required to submit to OPM a list of law enforcement positions, separating

the primary and secondary positions.14 TSA also is required to establish and

maintain a file regarding the position classification, the officer’s actual duties,

and all background material used to make the determination, to ensure

compliance with OPM regulations regarding law enforcement retirement

benefits. OPM has the authority to audit these files.15 Additionally, OPM can

respond to requests for interpretations of classification issues and advisory

opinions. Although OPM does not have the authority to require TSA to reclassify

11 OPM, Introduction to the Position Classification Standards, August 2009.
 12 49 USC § 40122(g).
 13 49 USC § 40122(g)(2)(G).
 14 5 CFR § 842.808(a).
 15 5 CFR § 842.808(c).
 

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positions, OPM may determine that positions have been misclassified and

therefore do not qualify for law enforcement retirement benefits.

In our opinion, as a subject matter expert, OPM can help TSA ensure that OOI

law enforcement positions are properly classified according to statutes and

regulations. This could help establish an efficient and cost‐conscious

organizational structure for OOI. Noting that OOI took no action to reclassify

position misclassifications it had previously identified, we believe that OPM

would conduct this work independently and objectively. Without an objective

and comprehensive workforce analysis of law enforcement position

designations, OOI cannot ensure that it is using its staff and funding as efficiently

as possible.

Planning, Performance, and Quality Control

OOI did not effectively plan its work, did not adequately measure its

performance, and did not have quality control procedures to ensure that all

divisions complied with standards that the office had committed to using in its

work. OOI also could not require other TSA offices to respond to its

recommendations. In addition, TSA did not hold OOI accountable for developing

and implementing effective quality controls over its resources, staffing, and

operations. As a result of the issues that we identified with OOI’s quality

controls over its work products, TSA management may not be able to rely on this

work, and the office may not have accomplished its mission to identify and

address transportation security vulnerabilities.

OOI did not create an annual work plan to identify projects for each division to

complete and the resources needed for each project. OOI divisions were not

required to submit annual work plans for approval to ensure that OOI’s planned

work was consistent with TSA’s priorities. Without an approved plan, OOI may

not have been held accountable for accomplishing planned projects and could

not effectively measure its annual performance.

OOI did not establish adequate performance measures or set standards to

demonstrate its improvement over time. The office also did not create

outcome‐based performance measures, which would compare the results of its

activities with the intended purpose, to assess its operations. Although OOI

collected data to measure each division’s output, such as the number of

recommendations made, the number of offices inspected, and new

investigations opened, these measures did not tie output to goals. During our

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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audit, OOI indicated that it would begin to include more outcome‐based metrics

in its performance measures.

Without an annual work plan and without adequate outcome‐based

performance measures, OOI could not prepare an annual budget plan based on

proposed work. Although OOI submitted a spending plan to TSA based on

historical data, including its salary obligations, travel, contracts, and training, it

did not track actual spending against the plan. Without a work plan as a basis for

an annual budget plan, OOI was unable to demonstrate that it was effectively

managing and distributing its resources.

OOI did not have accurate information on project costs. Not all OOI personnel

were required to record hours spent on projects or report other resource‐related

information in the existing data management system, and use of the system

varied by division. Recording project hours provides the basis for estimating and

tracking project costs. Without consistent use of the data management system,

OOI could not accurately measure project costs and could not ensure efficient

use of resources.

OOI did not establish quality control procedures to ensure that all its divisions

complied with applicable professional standards, such as Government Auditing

Standards and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency

Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation. Although OOI is not required to

follow these standards, the office committed to using them in conducting its

work. For instance, although during our audit it took steps to comply, the

Internal Review Division had not been externally peer reviewed as required by

Government Auditing Standards.

To determine air carriers’ compliance with 9/11 security fee requirements, OOI

conducts audits in accordance with Government Auditing Standards. For audits

that meet all applicable requirements in Government Auditing Standards, OOI

should include a compliance statement in the report. For audits that do not

meet all applicable requirements, OOI should include a modified compliance

statement in the report identifying the requirement or requirements that were

not met. Consequently, until a peer review is completed, all OOI reports

claiming to meet Government Auditing Standards should have modified

statements.

OOI also did not have policies and procedures to ensure that its staff members

met these standards’ training requirements to maintain technical proficiency.

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Following these standards would help OOI operate more efficiently and

effectively and would enhance its credibility.

OOI supervisors in the office’s three operational divisions did not adequately

review the supporting work papers for reports of inspections, covert testing, and

internal reviews. Of the 29 reports issued between FY 2010 and the first quarter

of FY 2012 that we reviewed, only 6 had evidence of supervisory review.

Supervisory review ensures that the work performed has met its objectives and

that the findings, conclusions, and recommendations are adequately supported.

Without consistent supervisory review, OOI could not ensure the quality of its

reports or that it had adequately identified and addressed security

vulnerabilities.

OOI did not have effective quality controls on data entry and review in its

management information system; therefore, it could not be certain of the

accuracy and reliability of its trend analyses and updates on the status of its

operations. For example, misspelling words in the system could result in

employees not identifying all of the investigations in a query when totaling the

number of investigations. In October 2011, after receiving conflicting

information on the number of investigations OOI had completed, the TSA Deputy

Administrator at the time identified data accuracy as an issue.

Our review of 29 OOI reports showed that the office did not ensure that its

employees documented their independence in conducting work. According to

Government Auditing Standards and Council of the Inspectors General on

Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, audit

and inspection organizations and individual auditors, program analysts, and

inspectors must be free from personal, external, and organizational impairments

to independence. None of the files associated with the 29 reports we reviewed

contained documented evidence of staff member independence. Without such

verification prior to conducting reviews, OOI could not ensure that its work was

free from potential or actual employee bias or impairment, which could have

jeopardized the integrity of the work. As a best practice, OOI should consider

having each employee assigned to OOI audits, evaluations, and inspections

complete an independence statement for each project to which they are

assigned. This will ensure that staff are free from personal impairments to

independence, and maintain documentation of the steps taken to identify

potential personal independence impairments.

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Department of Homeland Security 

OOI’s recommendations resulting from its inspections, covert testing, and

internal reviews were not always implemented. According to an OOI official, TSA

offices were not required to respond to or implement OOI’s recommendations

because OOI did not have the authority to require compliance with its

recommendations. OOI also did not have a formalized process to monitor

responses and implementation of recommendations or a resolution process to

resolve instances of nonconcurrence. As a result, TSA may have missed

opportunities to address transportation security vulnerabilities.

Conclusion

OOI did not use its staff and resources efficiently to conduct cost‐effective

inspections, internal reviews, and covert testing. The office employed personnel

classified as “criminal investigators” even though TSA did not ensure their

primary duties were criminal investigations as required by Federal law and

regulations. These employees received premium pay and other benefits

although other employees could have performed the same work at a lower cost.

Also, paying LEAP to employees who are not required to document the hours

they spend conducting criminal investigations does not comply with TSA

Management Directive 1100.88‐1, which incorporates the LEAP statute. In

addition, OOI’s work had several quality control issues, and TSA may not have

implemented the office’s recommendations. By analyzing and realigning the OOI

workforce to better suit its mission, TSA could realize cost savings, improve

transparency and accountability, and enhance its efforts to protect the Nation’s

transportation systems.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Inspection:

Recommendation #1:

Ensure that the Office of Inspection’s criminal investigators in primary positions

meet the minimum legal requirement of spending at least 50 percent of their time

on criminal investigative activity and meet all Law Enforcement Availability Pay

requirements as a condition of receiving this premium pay.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Recommendation #2:

Finalize and implement the Office of Inspection’s management directive on

policies and procedures concerning Law Enforcement Availability Pay to require

all employees receiving Law Enforcement Availability Pay to document their

work hours in the Office of Inspection’s database.

We recommend that the Transportation Security Administration’s Deputy

Administrator:

Recommendation #3:

Conduct an objective workforce analysis of the Office of Inspection, including a

needs assessment, to determine the appropriate staffing levels to accomplish

the office’s mission cost effectively. In conjunction with this analysis, perform a

position classification review of the Office of Inspection to ensure that all staff

positions are properly classified and ensure that those conducting the review,

such as the TSA Office of Human Capital or the Office of Personnel Management,

are independent of the process.

Recommendation #4:

Upon completion of the workforce analysis and position classification review,

reclassify criminal investigator primary positions that do not or are not expected

to meet the Federal 50 percent minimum legal workload requirement

appropriately. In addition, ensure that secondary law enforcement positions are

properly classified in accordance with Federal regulations. So long as they are

supervisors, their proper classification depends on the correct classification of

the individuals they supervise.

We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Inspection:

Recommendation #5:

Require the Office of Inspection to develop a detailed annual work plan to be

approved by its Assistant Administrator. This plan should contain project‐

specific information, including purpose, duration, realistic cost estimates, and

required staffing.

www.oig.dhs.gov 16 OIG‐13‐123
 

 

 

   

             

                     

   

                 

                       

        

   

                       

                     

               

  

   

                       

                 

                     

                    

   

                     

  

             

             

                   

  

   

                           

                           

                            

                   

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Recommendation #6:

Ensure that the Office of Inspection develops outcome‐based performance

measures for its programs, projects, and operations to evaluate efficiency and

effectiveness.

Recommendation #7:

Periodically assess the results of the Office of Inspection’s performance

measures to assess the office’s progress toward meeting the intended goals and

revise programs as necessary.

Recommendation #8:

Ensure that the Office of Inspection requires staff members to document hours

spent on projects in its management information system, and ensure that

criminal investigators document hours to support Law Enforcement Availability

Pay.

Recommendation #9:

Establish a quality assurance program to ensure that the Office of Inspection

complies with applicable professional standards such as Government Auditing

Standards and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency

Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation. This program should include

the following:

 Tests of the quality and reliability of data in the office’s management

information system.

 Evidence that staff meet continuing professional education requirements.

 Documentation of staff’s independence for each project.

 Quality control reviews to ensure that the work products meet

professional standards.

Recommendation #10:

Ensure that the Office of Inspection completes its action to have an external peer

review of its efforts to audit air carriers expeditiously and continues to have an

external peer review of this work at least once every 3 years. Those reports

previously issued that were not in compliance with Government Auditing

www.oig.dhs.gov 17 OIG‐13‐123
 

 

 

                       

                     

             

   

                   

                         

                         

     

         

                         

                        

                       

                       

                    

                       

                        

                     

                         

                    

                    

                     

                       

       

                         

                   

                       

                            

                       

                    

                         

   

                       

                 

                    

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Standards need to be modified and reissued with language identifying that the

Office of Inspection was not in full compliance with Government Auditing

Standards at the time the audits were conducted.

Recommendation #11:

Develop and implement a policy for recommendation follow‐up and resolution

to ensure that other TSA offices respond to all recommendations issued by the

Office of Inspection and establish a resolution process when an office does not

concur with a recommendation.

Management Comments and OIG Analysis

In its response to our draft report, TSA acknowledged its responsibility to ensure

that OOI is managed effectively and concurred with all of our recommendations.

The component disagreed with some of our findings regarding OOI’s use of

criminal investigators and with our conclusion that OOI did not use its criminal

investigators in an efficient and cost‐effective manner. TSA also disagreed that

noncriminal investigators were able to perform the same work at a lower cost

and that OOI did not properly administer LEAP. Additionally, according to the

component, we limited our review to the inspections, audit, and special

operations functions of the office which employ only a small number of criminal

investigators. However, we reviewed all OOI divisions which employed 114

criminal investigators during our audit. Our work included analyzing staffing and

pay data for all 114 of OOI’s criminal investigators, including 93 (approximately

82 percent of OOI’s criminal investigators) in OOI’s investigations portion of the

Inspections and Investigations Division

We maintain our position that OOI did not ensure its criminal investigators met

the Federal legal workload requirement for law enforcement officers, which

entitles them to statutory benefits such as early retirement, and qualifies them

for LEAP. OOI did not require all staff to enter time spent working on projects

into its database, which would support the hours charged to its criminal

investigations. Without evidence to support the workload and classification of

the criminal investigators in OOI, there is no assurance that these positions are

properly classified.

OOI could not substantiate that all of its criminal investigators primarily were

engaged in the investigation, apprehension, or detention of criminals or

suspected criminals. To be eligible for LEAP, criminal investigators must first

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

qualify as law enforcement officers within the meaning of statutory provisions

that provide for early retirement, namely 5 USC § 8331(20) and § 8401(17). Both

of these provisions define law enforcement officers as employees whose duties

are primarily the investigation, apprehension, or detention of criminals or

suspected criminals.

OOI also could not substantiate that its criminal investigators spent an average

of at least 50 percent of their time on criminal investigations, as required by

OPM regulations. OPM regulations define a law enforcement officer (which TSA

considers a criminal investigator to be) as “an employee, the duties of whose

position are primarily the investigation, apprehension, or detention of

individuals suspected or convicted of offenses against the criminal laws of the

United States, including an employee engaged in this activity who is transferred

to a supervisory or administrative position.”16 These regulations require criminal

investigators in primary positions to spend an average of at least 50 percent of

their time performing such duties.

TSA does not dispute our assessment that the statutory law enforcement

retirement provisions and implementing regulations require that criminal

investigators in primary positions generally spend at least 50 percent of their

time performing criminal investigative work. Additionally, TSA acknowledges

that OOI’s criminal investigators performed noncriminal investigative work.

However, for several reasons, the component does not believe the work was

inappropriately performed by these criminal investigators or that criminal

investigators were improperly classified and/or were not entitled to LEAP.

According to OHC’s Analysis of Mainstream Operations – Office of Inspections,

criminal investigators work on non‐investigative activities such as inspections,

covert testing, and internal reviews. Criminal investigators assist various OOI

divisions and conduct work other than investigations. We also question OOI’s

use of criminal investigators, rather than noncriminal investigators, who could

have performed this work at a lower cost of salary and benefits.

16 5 CFR § 831.902 defines law enforcement officers for purposes of the Civil Service Retirement System.

The definition of law enforcement officer for purposes of the Federal Employees Retirement System is

basically the same except for the addition of a “rigorous position” requirement. 5 CFR § 842.802.

“Rigorous position” means the duties are so physically demanding that employment opportunities should

be limited to “young and physically vigorous individuals.”

www.oig.dhs.gov 19 OIG‐13‐123
 

 

 

                         

                        

                         

                      

                           

                    

                               

                     

                     

     

                           

                

                         

               

                 

                   

                        

                       

                          

                         

     

                             

                       

                    

                   

                   

                       

                        

                 

                     

                   

                       

                  

                     

                         

                   

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In its response, TSA disagreed with some of our conclusions related to work

performed by OOI criminal investigators. TSA noted that the number of cases

opened and closed does not reflect the amount of time dedicated to an

individual case. Additionally, the component does not believe that it can be

inferred that OOI’s referral of cases to DHS OIG for investigation means that all

resulting OOI investigations are administrative in nature. In addition, according

to TSA, the outcome of a case does not dictate the nature of the investigation or

reflect the necessary knowledge, skills, and experience needed to plan and

conduct the investigation in which there are allegations or suspected violations

of criminal law.

Prior to our audit of OOI, OIG’s Office of Investigations conducted a review to

determine whether OOI’s investigations complied with professional standards.

In its April 2012 report, the Office of Investigations determined that the caseload

for criminal investigators assigned to OOI’s Inspections and Investigations

Division consisted primarily of work on administrative investigations, which are

noncriminal cases; or collateral cases (that is, criminal investigations conducted

by other agencies) that OOI monitored and reported on. For these collateral

cases, the interviews or documents that OOI obtained were not necessary to

resolving the criminal case. According to the report, OOI closed 1,125 cases in

FYs 2010 and 2011, of which 872, or approximately 77.5 percent, were collateral

or administrative in nature.

In our analysis, we pointed out the number of criminal cases closed in FYs 2010

and 2011 to demonstrate that the majority of the investigative caseload was

collateral or administrative, not criminal. We maintain that monitoring and

reporting on criminal investigations conducted by other agencies does not

meet the legal requirement for law enforcement officers to investigate,

apprehend, or detain suspected or convicted criminals at least 50 percent of

the time. We also maintain that employing a pool of criminal investigators for

a “just‐in‐case scenario” is inefficient and defeats Congress’ intent regarding

special law enforcement statutory benefits such as early retirement and LEAP.

Congress intended to make eligibility for law enforcement and criminal

investigator status restrictive and specifically did not extend the benefits to all

persons who work in a law enforcement capacity. Consequently, employees

whose primary duties involve maintaining law and order, protecting life and

property, and guarding against or inspecting for violations of law do not qualify

as law enforcement officers, and do not receive early law enforcement

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

retirement or LEAP.17 When Congress extended law enforcement benefits to

employees in the Federal Employees Retirement System, it made clear that such

coverage under this system is even more restrictively defined than in the Civil

Service Retirement System, and that eligibility for law enforcement officer

benefits must be “strictly construed” because of the additional cost of early

retirement coverage.

18

Because the Office of Investigations had recently completed its review of OOI’s

Inspections and Investigations Division, we did not review OOI’s investigative

work papers or test the quality of OOI’s investigative work. As a result of its

inspection, the Office of Investigations determined that OOI’s Inspections and

Investigations Division’s investigative process complied with applicable policies,

directives, and law enforcement standards. In its response to our audit, TSA

noted the results of DHS OIG Office of Investigations’ report. However, as noted

in our report, the focus of our audit was not to assess OOI’s compliance with

investigative standards, but rather to focus on OOI’s other products, services,

and operations, as well as the overall effectiveness and efficiency of OOI.

At the time of our review, OOI did not require all staff to enter time spent

working on projects into its database, and OOI could not provide data on the

number of hours criminal investigators spent on criminal investigations. For

purposes of determining law enforcement eligibility, it is critical to determine

the amount of time an employee spends performing qualifying law enforcement

duties. In its response, TSA acknowledged that OOI’s previous data management

system was “incomplete.” Therefore, the component contended we could not

conclude that OOI’s criminal investigators did not meet the statutory workload

requirements for law enforcement officers or that criminal investigators were

paid LEAP for work that could have been performed by noncriminal investigative

personnel.

However, as with any audit report, when an auditee cannot support a cost, that

cost is questioned. In this case, we question OOI’s use of its resources. The

Inspector General Act Amendments of 1978, as amended, defines a questioned

cost as, among others, “a finding that, at the time of the audit, such cost is not

supported by adequate documentation; or a finding that the expenditure of

funds for the intended purpose is unnecessary or unreasonable.” Further,

according to Office of Management and Budget Circular A‐123, Appendix C,

“when an agency’s review is unable to discern whether a payment was proper as

17 5 CFR §§ 831.902; 841.802.
 18Bingaman v. Department of the Treasury, 127 F.3d 1431, 1435 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

a result of insufficient or lack of documentation, this payment must also be

considered an error.” Consequently, we questioned costs for all of OOI’s

criminal investigators because OOI did not have support for the number of hours

they spent performing criminal investigations and could not ensure that it was

complying with Federal regulations for law enforcement officers.

TSA’s response also mentions that our report includes budget savings that

according to the component are based on an assumption that noncriminal

investigator personnel could replace all of OOI’s criminal investigators.

Additionally, TSA notes that this assumption was made without any

demonstration that transportation security specialists or program analysts are

qualified to “perform the work of criminal investigators.” The component also

questions our calculation of potential overtime savings using past performance

as a basis for estimation. However, OHC’s position classification review indicated

that the majority of OOI’s work does not support the criminal investigator

classification and acknowledged that efficiencies could be gained through

position reclassifications.

We disagree with TSA’s assessment of our budget savings calculations for several

reasons. We did not recommend that noncriminal investigators replace all of

OOI’s criminal investigators. Rather, we noted that noncriminal investigative

activity could be performed by staff in other job series, such as transportation

security specialists or program analysts, at a lower cost. Until a thorough

workforce analysis, needs assessment, and position classification review are

conducted, OOI will not be able to improve its cost‐effectiveness. Also, without

evidence to support the workload and classification of OOI’s criminal

investigators, there is no assurance that these positions are properly classified.

TSA also has not demonstrated that the work performed by its criminal

investigators requires the use of criminal investigators especially because these

individuals performed non‐investigative work or investigations that were

collateral or administrative in nature. Therefore, we believe using past

performance as a basis for cost estimation is reasonable since there is no

evidence to suggest that future work will be significantly different than what has

been done in the past.

We understand that TSA may incur overtime costs if criminal investigators are

reclassified to noncriminal investigator positions. However, the additional

overtime costs would be significantly less than those paid for LEAP and other law

enforcement statutory benefits, such as early retirement. Approximately 97

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percent of the OOI criminal investigators received LEAP during the period of our

review.

We analyzed OOI’s overtime and LEAP data for all OOI divisions for FYs 2010 and

2011 and noted that the amounts paid for overtime are significantly less than

those paid for LEAP. During this 2‐year period, OOI paid approximately $109,000

in overtime pay to 66 individuals who were either transportation security

specialists or program analysts. If all 124 criminal investigators (approximately

twice the number of OOI’s transportation security specialists and program

analysts who received overtime pay during this 2‐year period) were converted,

we estimate the increase in overtime pay would be approximately $218,000

based on pay data from FYs 2010 and 2011. This potential increase in overtime

pay is significantly less than the $6.1 million paid in LEAP for the same 2‐year

period.

TSA concurs that OOI needs a comprehensive workforce analysis but does not

believe our report fully reflects the scope of the work conducted by OHC during

its reviews. Both TSA and OIG acknowledge that OOI’s criminal investigator

position descriptions have been classified and certified by OHC in accordance

with TSA established criteria. However, TSA characterizes the work completed

by OHC in FY 2011 as a limited position management review of General

Schedule‐15 equivalent secondary law enforcement positions assigned to OOI

Headquarters. Similarly, the component minimized the results of the 2012 desk

reviews by stating in its response that these reviews were conducted on seven

employees, (five of whom were supervisory criminal investigators and two who

were in noncriminal investigative positions) none of whom were in the

Inspections and Investigations Division. However, there is no mention in OHC’s

report that its position management review was limited to this division. Rather,

the key findings section of the report indicates that the review was conducted of

OOI.

As a result of the desk reviews, TSA maintains that OHC did not implement the

recommendations because they were not based on a correct set of job

responsibilities for the positions in question. An OHC official defended this

position by affirming that the contractor did not fully understand the unique

nature of OOI’s operations and concluding that a more thorough analysis was

needed to make an accurate assessment. In an effort to understand OHC’s

reversal of position, we requested additional information, but it was never

provided to us.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Following its position review, OHC contracted with a company to conduct desk

audits of some OOI supervisory positions to ensure that these positions were

properly classified. The desk audits confirmed OHC’s findings that positions’

series, pay bands, or both were misclassified. In addition, the contractor

concluded that positions outside of its audit scope were also misclassified.

Although the contractor was responsible for auditing only specified supervisory

positions, in the course of its audits and interviews, it was necessary to

determine the “exact nature of the work supervised to ascertain the proper

series for the manager positions.” In doing so, the contractor found many

positions’ occupational series and pay bands were misclassified. Specifically, the

contractor found that many positions were classified as criminal investigators

when “little or no work of this nature presently exists within the OOI

organizations we reviewed.”

OHC’s position regarding the findings of the contracted desk audits changed

over the course of several months. Initially, OHC’s notes indicated that it

concurred with the contractor’s findings and believed the recommendations

should be implemented. Later, OHC supported implementing the rebanding

but not the reclassification recommendations for two reasons: (1) the

reclassification would negatively affect its criminal investigators and (2) OOI's

Assistant Administrator at the time agreed to track the criminal investigator

workload and backfill positions with transportation security specialists as

positions became vacant.

Subsequently, OHC reversed its position, and no longer concurred with the

contractor’s findings regarding reclassifications. OHC maintained that these

position classifications were secondary law enforcement positions, and as such,

not subject to the percentage of time or workload level required to sustain their

classification as law enforcement officers. As we stated in our report, OPM

regulations do not require secondary criminal investigators to meet this

workload requirement. For example, this requirement does not apply to

individuals whose primary duties are to serve as first‐level supervisors to law

enforcement officers. However, according to regulations, a supervisory criminal

investigator's primary duty should be as a first‐level supervisor of law

enforcement officers. Specifically, the subordinates of a supervisory criminal

investigator should be spending on average at least 50 percent of their time

conducting criminal investigations. OOI could not support that its criminal

investigators spent 50 percent of their time conducting criminal investigations.

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In its response, TSA notes that OOI, in conjunction with OHC, is scheduling a

workforce analysis project, which will include a review of criminal investigator

positions in both the Audits and Inspections Division and the Security Operations

Division. However, we note in particular there is no mention of a similar type

review to be conducted of the criminal investigators in the Internal Affairs

Division (formerly the Investigations portion of the Inspections and

Investigations Division). At the time of our review, Investigations included the

majority (approximately 82 percent) of criminal investigators in OOI.

We maintain our position that OOI has not demonstrated the need to retain the

current number of criminal investigators. Using transportation security

specialists or program analysts to perform inspections, covert tests, and internal

reviews could result in future cost savings because they do not receive LEAP and

other law enforcement benefits. Further, a general investigator can supervise,

lead, or perform work involving planning, conducting, or managing investigations

that do not involve criminal violations of Federal laws, such as administrative

cases. According to OPM, when an investigation or inquiry leads to a criminal

violation, it is usually referred to a criminal investigator, which in TSA’s case

generally would be the DHS OIG Office of Investigations. A general investigator

is not considered a law enforcement officer like a criminal investigator is, and

does not qualify for LEAP.

Finally, TSA notes that OOI’s Business Management Office provided to OIG

planned work and proposed accomplishments that were used to prepare the

annual budget plan which is required for the congressional budget justification.

According to TSA, the annual budget plan is updated throughout the year based

on adjustments to work schedules. Furthermore, according to TSA, although the

spending plan considers historical data, it is primarily focused and constructed

around current and future leadership priorities, changes in existing programs,

and the cost of newly implemented programs.

As noted in our report, OOI did not create an annual work plan to identify

projects for each division to complete and the resources necessary for each

project. Additionally, the office did not establish adequate outcome‐based

performance measures or set standards to demonstrate its improvement over

time. Without an annual work plan or adequate outcome‐based performance

measures, OOI could not prepare an annual budget plan based on proposed

work. OOI also did not have accurate information on project costs as not all OOI

personnel were required to record hours spent on projects or report other

resource‐related information in the existing data management system.

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Therefore, OOI could not accurately measure project costs and ensure efficient

use of resources.

In conclusion, we emphasize that numerous changes are necessary to improve

OOI’s efficiency and effectiveness. Our recommendations will improve

transparency and accountability and should help TSA enhance its national

transportation security efforts.

Response to Recommendation #1

Recommendation 1: We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the

Office of Inspection ensure that the Office of Inspection’s criminal investigators

meet the minimum legal requirement of spending at least 50 percent of their

time on criminal investigative activity and meet all Law Enforcement Availability

Pay requirements.

TSA Concurred: According to TSA, OOI implemented a Resource Allocation

Management system to ensure that cases are classified and work hours are

documented. Supervisors will review these hours on a quarterly basis.

Additionally, OOI agreed to participate in an independent workforce review in

conjunction with OHC to evaluate the workloads and classifications for criminal

investigators in OOI. TSA stated an independent contractor will conduct this

review to determine how many criminal investigators are needed to meet TSA’s

demand and which positions are appropriately categorized as primary or

secondary law enforcement positions as outlined in 5 CFR § 842.802 and 5 CFR §

831.902. TSA also indicated that the Resource Allocation Management system

will ensure that OOI’s workload is correctly managed and recorded. Further, the

component will pay LEAP in accordance with applicable laws and policies. TSA

estimates this will be completed in June 2014.

OIG Analysis: TSA’s response to this recommendation did not address

specifically how OOI will ensure that primary criminal investigators meet the

legal requirements to spend at least 50 percent of their time on criminal

investigative activity. TSA’s response is related to recommendation 3, in which

we recommended that TSA perform another objective workforce analysis and

ensure that the recommendations are implemented.

This recommendation is unresolved and will remain open until OOI provides

documentation to indicate how it will ensure that its criminal investigators are

meeting the legal requirement to spend at least 50 percent of their time

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conducting criminal investigations, which is required to qualify them as law

enforcement officers and make them eligible for LEAP.

Response to Recommendation #2

Recommendation 2: We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the

Office of Inspection finalize and implement the Office of Inspection’s

management directive on policies and procedures concerning Law Enforcement

Availability Pay to require all employees receiving Law Enforcement Availability

Pay to document their work hours in the Office of Inspection’s database.

TSA Concurred: TSA stated that, pursuant to OOI Letter No. 0007.2, dated

August 2012, OOI supervisors will ensure that LEAP hours are documented in

OOI's Resource Allocation Module system and reviewed quarterly. TSA

requested that the recommendation be closed because the directive is already in

place and was provided to OIG.

OIG Analysis: We have received and reviewed the management directive and

determined that it satisfies this recommendation. Accordingly, this

recommendation is resolved and closed.

Response to Recommendation #3

Recommendation 3: We recommend that the TSA Deputy Administrator

conduct an objective workforce analysis of the Office of Inspection, including a

needs assessment, to determine the appropriate staffing levels to accomplish

the office’s mission cost effectively. In conjunction with this analysis, perform a

position classification review of the Office of Inspection to ensure that all staff

positions are properly classified and ensure that those conducting the review,

such as the TSA Office of Human Capital or the Office of Personnel Management,

are independent of the process.

TSA Concurred: According to TSA, OOI and OHC are in the process of scheduling

a workforce review. OHC has completed a detailed description of the

requirements to conduct the workforce analysis and position classification

review. The project plan for these reviews is scheduled to be completed by

October 1, 2013. TSA anticipates the reviews to begin during the first quarter of

FY 2014 and the estimated completion date is April 2014.

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OIG Analysis: As part of its response to recommendation 1, TSA stated that OOI

had agreed to participate in an independent workforce review in conjunction

with OHC to evaluate the workloads and classifications for criminal investigators

in OOI. According to TSA, an independent contractor will conduct this review to

determine how many criminal investigators are needed to meet the agency’s

demand and which positions are appropriately categorized as primary or

secondary law enforcement positions as outlined in 5 CFR § 842.801 and 5 CFR §

831.902. In its response, TSA indicated that this workforce review will be

conducted in both the Audits and Inspections Division and the Security

Operations Division. However, we note in particular that there is no mention of

a similar type review to be conducted of the criminal investigators in the Internal

Affairs Division (formerly the Investigations portion of the Inspections and

Investigations Division). At the time of our review, Investigations included the

majority (approximately 82 percent) of criminal investigators in OOI.

The complete results of the independent workforce analysis, needs assessment,

and position classifications should be provided to the TSA Deputy Administrator

and the Assistant Administrators of OHC and OOI. The recommendations from

these efforts should be implemented, and the TSA Deputy Administrator should

be notified of any nonconcurrence with conclusions and recommendations.

This recommendation is unresolved and will remain open until TSA provides a

copy of the independent workforce analysis, needs assessment, and position

classification review for all criminal investigators in OOI, as well as

documentation of how it implemented the results. Once OOI provides

documentation to support the action taken on the outcomes, we will close this

recommendation.

Response to Recommendation #4

Recommendation 4: We recommend that the Deputy Administrator for the

Office of Inspection, upon completion of the workforce analysis and position

classification review, reclassify primary criminal investigators who do not meet

the Federal 50 percent minimum legal workload requirement appropriately. In

addition, ensure that secondary law enforcement positions are properly

classified in accordance with Federal regulations. Their proper classification

depends on the correct classification of the individuals they supervise.

TSA Concurred: As stated in its response to recommendation 1, OOI and OHC

are scheduling an independent workforce analysis, which will include a

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classification review of criminal investigator positions in OOI. According to TSA,

this workforce analysis will gather the necessary data to determine the number

and type of criminal investigators needed to efficiently carry out the agency’s

mission. TSA indicated that at the conclusion of this review, OHC, in conjunction

with OOI, will make appropriate classification decisions based on applicable

Federal law and regulations.

OIG Analysis: The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that OOI’s criminal

investigator positions, primary and secondary, are appropriately classified

according to Federal laws and regulations. Although OPM has overall

responsibility for establishing the basic policies and guidance governing position

classification and management for most Federal agencies, TSA is exempt from

OPM classifications.19 TSA has established its own position classifications and

classification management procedures. However, with respect to law

enforcement, TSA’s policy is to adhere to OPM requirements so that TSA’s

criminal investigators will be entitled to enhanced retirement benefits.20

Without OPM’s approval, TSA’s criminal investigators would not qualify for

enhanced retirement benefits covered in 5 USC Chapters 83‐85 because TSA is

not exempt from these provisions.

Agencies are required to classify positions and grade jobs based on the duties

and responsibilities assigned to the position and the qualifications required to

perform the work. TSA’s planned workforce analysis, which includes a position

classification review, does not meet the intent of our recommendation because

it does not include all criminal investigators in OOI.

This recommendation is unresolved and will remain open until TSA provides us

with results of the workforce analysis, needs assessment, and position

classification review of all criminal investigators in OOI as well as documentation

on implementation of the results.

Response to Recommendation #5

Recommendation 5: We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the

Office of Inspection require the Office of Inspection to develop a detailed annual

work plan to be approved by its Assistant Administrator. This plan should

19 49 USC § 40122(g).
 20 These benefits are only provided to those law enforcement personnel who are covered under the
 

statutory and regulatory definitions of “law enforcement officer.”
 

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contain project‐specific information, including purpose, duration, realistic cost

estimates, and required staffing.

TSA Concurred: TSA stated that OOI has developed a work plan for the Audits

and Inspections Division and Special Operations Division. These plans will be

combined into one plan for approval by OOI’s Assistant Administrator. TSA

indicated the OOI plan will be completed by September 30, 2013, and will be

updated upon completion of the workforce analysis to address the staffing

requirements. TSA anticipates all of this will be completed by December 2013,

with additional updates through June 2014.

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved and open until TSA provides a

copy of the work plan signed by the Assistant Administrator, which contains

project‐specific information, including purpose, duration, realistic cost estimates,

and required staffing. We will close this recommendation after determining that

the annual work plan meets the intent of this recommendation.

Response to Recommendation #6

Recommendation 6: We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the

Office of Inspection ensure that the Office of Inspection develops outcome‐

based performance measures for its programs, projects, and operations to

evaluate their efficiency and effectiveness.

TSA Concurred: According to TSA, OOI has developed overall performance

metrics for the office, as well as detailed metrics for each division, such as (1)

conduct 95 percent of scheduled risk‐based, intelligence‐driven covert test

missions; (2) close investigative cases within 90 days; and (3) complete 95

percent of scheduled inspections with a 90 percent concurrence rate on findings.

TSA stated that OOI tracks conformance to these metrics quarterly and annually.

The estimated completion date for developing these metrics is December 2013.

OIG Analysis: TSA’s response to this recommendation does not fully address the

intent of the recommendation. The examples given were goals and not

outcome‐based performance measures, which would compare the results of its

activities with the intended purpose to assess its operations. For example,

outcome‐based performance measures could include “percentage of OOI

findings corrected or recommendations implemented” and “percentage of

passenger and baggage screening recommendations adopted annually,” both of

www.oig.dhs.gov 30 OIG‐13‐123
 

 

 

                 

             

               

             

                   

                  

                 

       

                  

                       

                   

           

                    

                            

                       

                     

       

                        

           

                    

                   

             

                   

           

       

                  

                       

                     

                   

      

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Department of Homeland Security 

which were described in OOI’s strategic framework discussion document

provided to OIG during our fieldwork.

This recommendation is unresolved and open until TSA provides documentation

to support that OOI has developed and implemented outcome‐based

performance measures that evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the

office. Upon reviewing the documentation, we will close this recommendation

after determining that it meets the intent of this recommendation.

Response to Recommendation #7

Recommendation 7: We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the

Office of Inspection periodically assess the results of the Office of Inspection’s

performance measures to determine the office’s progress toward meeting the

intended goals and revise programs as necessary.

TSA Concurred: TSA stated that OOI tracks conformance to performance metrics

quarterly and annually and will continue to track the outcomes. As part of its

implementation plan for this recommendation, OOI will review the goals no later

than September 30, 2013, to determine their validity and whether they

accurately measure performance.

OIG Analysis: The intent of our recommendation was for OOI to evaluate its

performance periodically using outcome‐based performance measures to

demonstrate OOI’s progress toward meeting its intended goals and mission. This

recommendation is resolved and will remain open until OOI provides

documentation to support that it periodically assesses outcome‐based

performance measures, not only goals, for its programs, projects, and

operations, to evaluate their efficiency and effectiveness.

Response to Recommendation #8

Recommendation 8: We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the

Office of Inspection ensure that the Office of Inspection requires staff members

to document hours spent on projects in its management information system,

and ensure that criminal investigators document hours to support Law

Enforcement Availability Pay.

www.oig.dhs.gov 31 OIG‐13‐123
 

 

 

                        

                     

           

                      

                  

               

                          

                   

                            

                   

                       

                    

                       

   

       

                  

                       

                   

                     

                  

         

                     

  

             

             

                   

  

                      

                   

                

                     

                   

                     

                       

                     

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TSA Concurred: TSA stated that this is currently being done by OOI personnel

through the use of the Resource Allocation Management system and requests

that this recommendation be closed.

OIG Analysis: OOI’s Letter No. 007.2, dated August 2012, partially addresses this

recommendation and satisfies recommendation 2. We have reviewed the policy

and determined it satisfies our recommendation that criminal investigators

document LEAP hours. However, the scope of this policy is limited because it

applies to OOI’s Assistant Administrator, Deputy Administrator, and all criminal

investigators, but not to all OOI staff. In addition to LEAP hours, this policy

requires OOI’s criminal investigators to document project hours, but this

requirement does not apply to OOI’s other employees, based on the policy’s

scope. This recommendation is unresolved and open until OOI can provide

documentation to support that it requires all of its employees to document

project hours.

Response to Recommendation #9

Recommendation 9: We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the

Office of Inspection establish a quality assurance program to ensure that the

Office of Inspection complies with applicable professional standards such as

Government Auditing Standards and the Council of the Inspectors General on

Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation. The

program should include the following:

 Tests of the quality and reliability of data in the office’s management

information system.

 Evidence that staff meet continuing professional education requirements.

 Documentation of staff’s independence for each project.

 Quality control reviews to ensure that the work products meet

professional standards.

TSA Concurred: According to TSA, OOI has developed and implemented a quality

assurance program to address the specific activities cited in the

recommendation. TSA’s response identifies specific activities that were

undertaken, including: the completion of an OOI Handbook and updating of

handbooks for OOI divisions; development of standard operating procedures for

inspections and audits of 9/11 security fee requirements; revising of checklists,

which include both objectives and steps to ensure consistency; completion of an

external peer review of the audit program for 9/11 security fee requirements;

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development of a certificate of “no financial interest or conflict” statement; and

interview training scheduled for August and September 2013, as well as in‐house

training scheduled for December 2013.

OIG Analysis: TSA’s response meets the intent of our recommendation. This

recommendation is resolved but will remain open until OOI can provide us

documentation supporting the establishment and implementation of a quality

assurance program. We will close this recommendation once support is received

showing OOI ensures compliance with professional standards, including those

specified in this recommendation.

Response to Recommendation #10

Recommendation 10: We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the

Office of Inspection ensure that the Office of Inspection completes its action to

have an external peer review of its efforts to audit air carriers expeditiously and

continues to have an external peer review of this work at least once every 3

years. Those reports previously issued that were not in compliance with

Government Auditing Standards need to be modified and reissued with language

identifying that the Office of Inspection was not in full compliance with

Government Auditing Standards at the time the audits were conducted.

TSA Concurred: According to TSA, an independent certified public accounting

firm performed an external peer review. The scope of this review was for all

projects conducted from 2008 to 2011 by OOI for which Government Auditing

Standards require a peer review. OOI will modify, annotate, and reissue any

reports which are deficient according to the peer review findings. TSA estimates

that this will be completed in December 2013.

OIG Analysis: The actions taken to obtain an external peer review address our

recommendation. This recommendation is resolved and will remain open until

OOI provides us with the peer review report, documentation to support any

actions taken as a result of the peer review findings, and documentation that

shows prior reports were modified and reissued appropriately.

Response to Recommendation #11

Recommendation 11: We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the

Office of Inspection develop and implement a policy for recommendation follow‐

up and resolution to ensure that other TSA offices respond to all

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recommendations issued by the Office of Inspection and establish a resolution

process when an office does not concur with a recommendation.

TSA Concurred: According to TSA, OOI has established procedures to follow up

on recommendations to ensure concurrence and completion. The estimated

completion date is December 2013.

OIG Analysis: TSA’s response meets the intent of our recommendation. This

recommendation is resolved but will remain open until TSA provides sufficient

documentation of the policy and procedures it has in place to track

recommendations made by OOI, including follow‐up, concurrence, and

resolution for instances of nonconcurrence.

www.oig.dhs.gov 34 OIG‐13‐123
 

 

 

   

     

                       

                         

                                  

                       

             

                               

                      

                              

                   

                           

                        

                     

                   

                     

  

                           

               

                            

                                   

                              

                                  

                                       

                  

                     

   

                       

                    

                            

                     

                     

                        

                    

                       

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Appendix A

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107‐296) by amendment

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one in a series of audit, inspection, and

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy,

efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department.

We conducted an audit of TSA’s OOI to determine whether it is efficient and effective in

its efforts to enhance transportation security. Our audit covered OOI operations from

FY 2010 through the first quarter of FY 2012. To achieve our audit objective, we

analyzed data, reviewed documentation, and interviewed key TSA officials directly

involved in the management and administration of OOI, as well as OOI employees, to

determine their roles and responsibilities within OOI. We also interviewed officials from

various TSA offices, including the former and current Deputy Administrators; the

Assistant Administrators of OHC, Office of Security Operations, and Office of

Professional Responsibility; as well as officials from the Office of Budget and

Performance.

To estimate the potential cost savings that OOI could realize if OHC reclassified these

criminal investigators as transportation security specialists or other noncriminal

investigator positions, we first estimated the amount that the office could save in LEAP.

We used FY 2011 LEAP data provided by TSA as a basis because it is the most recent

period for which we have a full year of data. In FY 2011, OOI spent approximately

$3.5 million in LEAP. Using this cost figure, we estimate that OOI could save as much as

$17.5 million over the next 5 years if it did not have to pay LEAP and all of its 124

criminal investigators were reclassified to noncriminal investigator positions. We did

not review potential cost savings from early retirement and other law enforcement

statutory benefits.

To determine whether OOI was operating efficiently, we assessed OOI’s use of

personnel, specifically focusing on criminal investigators. We analyzed applicable laws

and regulations, as well as DHS and TSA guidance. We reviewed budget and pay

documentation from the OOI Business Management Office and analyzed other financial

information provided to determine how much TSA paid to OOI’s criminal investigators

for LEAP. We also reviewed and relied on OHC’s position management report, desk

audits contracted by OHC, and supporting documentation provided by OHC. However,

we did not validate the documentation supporting their findings or conclusions.

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Additionally, we relied on the April 2012 DHS OIG Office of Investigations’ Report of

Inspection for TSA’s Office of Inspection, Inspections and Investigations Division. This

report is part of OIG’s oversight of DHS’ internal affairs offices. OIG determined that

OOI’s Inspections and Investigations Division complied with applicable policies,

directives, and law enforcement standards in its investigative process but made

recommendations to update the division’s current policies and procedures. We did not

review OOI’s work papers, nor did we perform tests on this work. However, we did

analyze pay data and LEAP costs for all of OOI’s criminal investigators, including in the

Inspections and Investigations Division.

To determine whether OOI was operating effectively, we reviewed OOI’s policies and

procedures and work products from its Internal Reviews Division, Special Operations

Division, and Inspections and Investigations Division. For our review, we judgmentally

selected a sample of reports completed by each OOI division during the scope of our

review. We reviewed 29 reports issued between FY 2010 and the first quarter of

FY 2012: 14 internal reviews, 10 covert tests, and 5 inspections. Our sample was

selected based on data provided by OOI from its information system, which was not

tested for accuracy. To determine whether these reports complied with applicable

professional standards, we developed data collection instruments to assist in analyzing

the reports and supporting documentation using applicable professional standards.

Specifically, the following standards were used as a basis for our assessments:

	 Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for

Inspection and Evaluation;

	 Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Guide for Conducting

Peer Reviews of the Audit Organizations of Federal Offices of Inspector General;

	 Government Auditing Standards; and

	 OOI Handbooks.

This audit was performed by DHS OIG Office of Audit personnel at TSA headquarters in

Arlington, VA. In addition, the team consulted with the OIG Statistician for our

judgmental sampling methodology.

We conducted this performance audit between January 2012 and December 2012

pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to generally

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable

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basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe that

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions

based upon our audit objectives.

www.oig.dhs.gov 37 OIG‐13‐123
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix B

Management Comments to Draft Report

CS. Deportment ofHomdaod Security 601 South 12" Street 

Arlington, VA 20598 

AUG 2' 120f3 

• TranSJ?Ortation 

· .. ,;l Secunty Administration 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Anne L. Richards 

Assistant £nspector General for Audits 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

FROM: J.W. Halinski~ Deputy Administrator 

SUBJECT: Agency Response to OIG Recommendations re: Transporration Securiiy 

Administration Office of Inspection's Efforts to Enhance TransportaTion 

Security (OTG Project No. 12-046-A UD-TSA) 

This memorandum constitutes the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) formal response to 

the subject report. TSA recognizes its responsibility for effective management of the Office of 

Inspection (001) and the critical mission this office plays in TSA. We appreciate that the report 

acknowledged much of the good work and contributions 001 makes to ensure the integrity of TSA 's 

transportation security mission. 

Background 

The mission of TSA 's OOI is to ensure the security and integrity ofTSA's operations and 

administrative activities through proactive compliance, efficiency, and effective inspections; internal 

reviews; impartial and comprehensive special investigations; and a rigorous and robust covert testing 

program. 

001 is composed of three divisions: internal Affairs Division (lAD), Audits and Inspections Division 

(AID), and the Special Operations Division (SOD). lAD is responsible for conducting investigations 

of criminal and administrative misconduct ofTSA employees and contractors nationwide. lAD 

maintains six field offices which are geographically dispersed to carry-out this mission. AID is 

responsible for conducting inspections and comprehensive audits ofTSA program components and 

certain regulated parties, such as the auditing of air carriers to ensure compliance with the September 

11th Security Fee requirements mandated by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 49 U .S.C 

§ 44940(b). Lastly, SOD conducts covert testing ofTSA-implemented security procedures to identify 

vulnerabilities and to address deficiencies in those systems and recommend corrective actions. 

In April 2012, the Department of Homeland Security {DHS)-Office of the lnspector General (OLG) 

released its Report of Inspection for TSA 's Office of Inspection, inspections and investigations 

Division. As stated by OIG, this report was part of OIG's oversight of DHS' internal affairs offices. 

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OIG detennined that OOI's Inspections and Investigations Division (IID)1 complied with applicable 

policies, directives, and law enforcement standards in its investigative processes. 

As a result of the above April 2012 review, 010 limited its current review to only the inspections/audit 

(AID) and special operations (SOD) functions of the office. These two divisions (AID & SOD) jointly 

employ twelve of the one hundred and five 1811 criminal investigators in 001, four of whom are 

managers. 

Discussion 

TSA appreciates the ongoing efforts taken by OIG so that TSA and 010 could clarify and resolve 

outstanding issues raised by the audit. While TSA concurs with OIG's recommendations and is 

implementing these recommendations, TSA disagrees with OIG's conclusions that 001 did not use its 

1811 criminal investigator workforce in an efficient and cost-effective manner, that non-1811 

employees were able to perfonn the same work as 1811 criminal investigators at a lower cost, and that 

001 did not properly administer law enforcement premium pay . . TSA also notes that it has provided 

010 with additional infonnation demonstrating compliance with budgeting requirements and 

professional standards. As a result, TSA submits the following: 

As acmowledged by 010, TSA is authorized under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 

Public Law 107-71 (ATSA), to establish and classify positions and compensate its workforce. 

OOI's 1811 criminal investigators are subject to the special retirement provisions for law enforcement 

officers (LEO), including mandatory retirement, and employees' payment of an additional percentage 

of salary towards their retirement annuity. 5 U.S. C. §§ 8331(20) and 8401 (17). Under these special 

retirement provisions, 1811 criminal investigators occupying primary law enforcement positions are 

required to, in general, spend at least 50 percent of their time investigating, apprehending, or detaining 

individuals suspected or convicted of violating criminal laws of the United States. 5 C.F.R. § 831.902, 

5 C.F.R. § 842.802. 

Regardless of whether they occupy primary or secondary law enforcement positions pursuant to TSA's 

independent pay setting authority, TSA's 1811 criminal investigators receive premium pay for 

unscheduled overtime pursuant to TSA policy, TSA Management Directive (MD) 1100.88-l, Law 

Enforcement Position Standards and Hiring Requirements. This premium pay compensates 1811 

criminal investigators for unscheduled duty in excess of their basic 40-hour work week to ensure their 

availability to perfonn unscheduled duty that meets the needs of the Agency. Pursuant to TSA policy, 

1811 criminal investigators must work, or be available to work, a minimum annual average of 2-hours 

of unscheduled overtime per non-excludable regular workday. TSA policy provides that for the 

purposes of law enforcement premium pay administration, the Agency follows the provisions of 

5 U.S.C. § 5545aand 5 C.F.R. § 550.181 through§ 550.186.2 

1 IJD bas subsequently been divided between lAD and AID. AID is now responsible for dte inspection/audit functions and 

lAD is responsible fer the criminal and administrative investigations functions. 

~A MD 1100.&&-1 docs not incorpor11te Title 5 LEAP provisions: TSA LEAP is paid under the independent pay setting 

authority of the TSA and for dte purposes of administration fellows the Title S statutory and regulatory provisions 

refennced in the texl 

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Both TSA and OIG agree that the statutory law enforcement retirement provisions and implementing 

regulations provide that a criminal investigator in a primary position will generally spend at least 

50 percent ofhislher time performing criminal investigative work. While 001 acknowledges that its 

criminal investigators did perform worl<. that was not categorized as a criminal investigation, it does not 

necessarily follow that such work was inappropriately performed by an 1811 criminal investigator, nor 

does it mean that the 1811 criminal investigator is improperly classified and/or is not entitled to 

availability premium pay for several reasons. 

As recognized by OlG, the number of cases opened and closed does not reflect the amount of time 

dedicated to an individual case. Additionally, it cannot be inferred that OOI's referral of cases to DHS 

OIG for investigation means that al.l resulting 001 investigations are administrative in nature. 

Pursuant to an agreement with OIG, 001 investigates crimina.! allegations that typica.lly would have 

been previously referred, including time and attendance fraud, workers' compensation fraud, theft at 

checkpoints of less than $2000 and domestic assaults by non-LEOs. Additionally, OIG routinely 

returns criminal allegations to 001 for investigations, including assault, theft, and illegal drug use 

cases. Moreover, the outcome of a case (i.e. administrative action) does not dictate the nature of the 

investigation and does not reflect the necessary knowledge, skills, and experience needed to plan and 

conduct the investigation where there are a11egations or suspected violations of criminal law. 

TSA also notes that OIG's estimated budget savings is premised on an assumption that a transportation 

security specialist or program analyst could replace each ofOOls criminal investigators without any 

demonstration that a transportation security specialist or a program anaJyst are qualified to perform the 

worlc of criminal investigators. Nor does TSA believe that there is any basis for the caJculation of 

potential overtime savings, inasmuch as it is premised on an assumption that unidentified work 

performed by transportation security specialists and program ana.lysts in the past accurately reflects the 

amount and cost of overtime that would be needed to meet OOI's mission critical needs if alll811 s 

were converted to non-criminal investigators. 

TSA acknowledges thai OOI's previous data management system for performing particular functions 

was incomplete. Therefore, we believe that OIG cannot draw the conclusion that 001 agents did not 

meet statutory workload requirements, or that 181 I criminaJ investigators were paid availability pay 

for work that could have been performed by non-I 811 personnel. Moreover, we note that pursuant to 

TSA policy, an 1811 crimina.! investigator may only be decertified from receiving Law Enforcement 

Availability Pay (LEAP) for failure to perform unscheduled duty as assigned or reported or inability to 

perform unscheduled duty for an extended period of time due to physical or heaJth reasons. Cf Smith 

v. Dep'l of the Army, 2012 MSPB 24 (2012) (finding that 5 C.F.R. § 550.184(d) permits the 

involuntary termination of LEAP "only for inability or unwillingness to perform the unscheduled 

duty.") 

While TSA concurs that a comprehensive workforce anaJysis is appropriate for 001, the Report does 

not fully reflect the scope of the TSA 's Office of Human CapitaJ's (OHC) referenced reviews and 

recommendations. As recognized by 010, OOI's 1811 criminaJ investigator position descriptions have 

been classified and certified by OHC in accordance with TSA MD 1100.88-1. The fiscal year (FY) 

2011 review conducted by OHC; however, was a limited position management review ofK-Band (GS15 equivalents), secondary law enforcement positions assigned to OOI Headquarters. Similarly, the 

2012 desk audits were of only 7 employees, none of which were in the liD. Two employees were 

i80is and the remainder were supervisory K-band !81ls. OHC did not adopt the contractor's 

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4 

recommendations because the recommendations were not based on a correct set of job responsibilities 

tor the positions in question. 

001, in conjunction with OHC, is scheduling a workfi1nx analysis project, which will include a review 

audit of 1811 positions in both AID and SOD. The review will examine AID and SOD's workload and 

make a determination of the appropriate classification for each position, including primary and 

secondary law enforcement designation as appropriate. The review will also examine the current and 

projected demand for criminal investigator positions, and compare it against current staffing levels. 

Finally, TSA notes that the 001 Business Management Office provided to OJG planned work and 

proposed accomplishments used to prepare the annual budget plan. This is a required submission as 

part of the annual Congressional Budget justification. The 001 annual budget plan is presented to 

TSA's Budget Office and updated throughout the FY based on adjustments to work schedules. 

Moreover, while the spending plan takes into account historical spending and data, it is primarily 

focused and constructt:d around current and future leadership priorities, changes in existing programs, 

and the cost of newly implemented programs. 

Recommendation #1: 

Ensure that the Office of Inspection's criminal investigators in primary positions meet the minimum 

legal requirement of spending at least 50 percent of their time on criminal investigative activity and 

meet all Law Enforcement Availahility Pay requirements as a condition of receiving this premium pay. 

Agency Response: Concur. 

Implementation Plan: As noted in response to Re~.:ommendatinn #2, 001 implemented a Resource 

Allocation Management (RAM) system to ensure that cases are classified and work hours are 

documented. Supervisors will review work hours on a quarterly basis. 

Additionally, as noted in response to Recommendation #3, 001 previously agreed to participate in an 

independent workforce review in conjunction with OHC in order to evaluate the respective workloads 

and classifications for criminal investigators within OOI. This review will be conducted by an 

independent contractor to determine how many criminal investigators are needed to meet the Agency's 

demand and which positions are appropriately categorized as primary and/or secondary law 

enforcement positions as outlined in 5 C.F.R. § 842.801 and 5 C.F.R. § 831.902. The implementation 

of the RAM will ensure that OOI's workload is correctly managed and recorded. Funher, TSA will 

pay LEAP in accordance with applicable laws and policies. Estimated Completion Date (ECD): June 

2014. 

Recommendation #2: 

Finalize and implement the Office of Inspection's Management Directive on policies and procedures 

concerning law enforcement availability pay to require each employee receiving law enforcement 

availability pay to document their \VOrk hours in the Office of Inspection's database. 

Agency Response: Concur. 

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Implementation Plan: Pursuant to the Assistant Administrator for Inspection's August 2012 

Management Directive, 001 supervisors will ensure that LEAP will be documented in OOI's RAM 

system and reviewed quarterly. This directive is already in place and a copy has been provided to the 

DHS-OIG. TSA acknowledges in the Report that OJG considers this recommendation resolved and 

closed. 

Recommendation #3: 

Conduct an objective worktorce analysis of the Oflice of Inspection, including a needs assessment, to 

detennine the appropriate staffing levels to accomplish the office's mission cost effectively. In 

conjunction with this analysis, perform a position classification review of the Office ofTnspection to 

ensure that all staff positions are properly classified and ensure that those conducting the review, such 

as the TSA Office of Human Capital or the Office of Personnel Management, are independent of the 

process. 

Agency Response: Concur. 

Implementation Plan: OOI and OHC are in the process of scheduling such a review. OHC has 

completed a detailed description of the requirements to conduct the workforce analysis and position 

classification review. The project plan for the workforce analysis and classification review is 

scheduled to be completed by October I, 2013, with the projected start date of the review to begin 

during the first quarter of FY 2014. ECD: April 2014. 

Recommendation #4: 

Upon completion of the workforce analysis and position classification review, reclassify criminal 

investigator primary positions that do not or are not expected to meet the Federal 50 percent minimum 

legal workload requirement appropriately. In addition, ensure that secondary law enforcement 

positions are properly classified in accordance with Federal regulations. So long as they are 

supervisors, their proper classification depends on the correct classification of the individuals they 

supervise. 

Agency ResJmnse: Cuncur. As stated in Implementation Plan #I, 001 ami OHC are scheduling an 

independent workforce analysis, which will include a classification review ofOOI 1811 positions. 

This \VOrkforce analysis will gather the necessary data to detennine the number and type of criminal 

investigators needed to efficiently carry out our mission. At the conclusion of this review, OHC, in 

conjunction with 00!, will make appropriate classification decisions based upon applicable Federal 

law and regulations. ECD: June 2014. 

R«ommendation #5: 

Require the Office oflnspection to develop a detailed annual work plan to be approved by its Assistant 

Administrator. This plan should contain project specific infonnation, including purpose, duration, 

realistic cost estimates, and required staffing. 

Agency Response: Concur. 

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Implementation Plan: 001 has developed a work plan for AID and SOD. These plans will be 

combined into one plan for approval by the Assistant Administrator. The 001 plan will be completed 

no later than September 30, 2013, and will be updated upon completion of the workforce analysis to 

address the staffing requirements. ECD: December 2013, with additional updates through June 2014. 

Recommendation #6: 

Ensure that the Office oflnspection develops outcome based performance measures for its programs, 

projects, and operations to evaluate efficiency and effectiveness. 

Agency Response: Concur. 

Implementation Plan: 001 has developed overall performance metrics for the office, as well as 

detailed metrics for each division, such as I) conduct 95 percent of scheduled risk·based, intelligence 

driven covert test missions; 2) close investigative cases within 90 days; and 3) complete 95 percent of 

scheduled inspections with a 90 percent concurrence rate on findings. 001 tracks conformance to 

these metrics quarterly and annually. ECD: December 2013. 

Recommc:ndation #7: 

Periodically assess the results of these measures to determine the Office of Inspection's progress 

toward meeting the intended goals and revise programs as necessary. 

Agency Response: Conc:ur. 

Implementation Plan: As stated in Implementation Plan #6, 001 tracks conformance to performance 

metrics quarterly and annually. 001 will continue to track the outcomes. Additionally, the goals will 

be reviewed no later than September 30, 2013, to determine their validity and whether they accurately 

measure proscribed perfom1ance. ECD: September 2013. 

Rec:ommendation #8: 

Ensure that the Office of Inspection requires staff members to document hours spent on projects in its 

management information system, and ensure that criminal investigators document hours to support 

Law Enforcement Availability Pay. 

Agency Response: Conc:ur. 

Implementation Plan: This is currently being done by OOI personnel through the use of the RAM 

system, and it is therefore requested by TSA that this recommendation be closed. 

Recommendation #9; 

Eslahlish a quality assurance program to ensure that the Offi ce oflnspection complies with applicable 

professional standards such as Government Auditing Standards and the Council of the Inspectors 

General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation. This program 

should include the following: 

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• Conduct tests of the quality and reliability of data in the office's management information 

system. 

• Ensure staff meets continuing professional education requirements and maintain evidence of 

this. 

• Ensure staffs independence is documented for each project. 

• Conduct quality control reviews to ensure that the work products meet professional standards. 

Agency Response: Concur. As of the date of this response, 001 has developed and implemented a 

quality assurance program and the specific activities cited in the recommendation. Specific activities 

undertaken include: the completion of an 001 Handbook and the update of handbooks for 001 

divisions; development of standard operating procedures for inspections and September 11th Security 

Fee audits; revised checklists which include both objectives and steps to ensure consistency; 

completion of an external peer review for the September 11th Security Fee audit program; 

development of a certificate of no financial interest or conflict statement; and interview training 

scheduled for August 27-29 and September 24-26, 2013, as well as in-house training scheduled for 

December 3-5, 2013. ECD: December 2013. 

Recommendation 1#10: 

Ensure that the Office of Inspection completes its action to have an external peer review of its efforts 

to audit air carriers expeditiously and continues to have an external peer review of this work at least 

once every 3 years. Those reports previously issued that were not in compliance with Government 

Auditing Standards need to be modified and reissued with language identifying that the Office of 

Inspection was not in full compliance with Government Auditing Standards at the time the audits were 

conducted. 

Agency Response: Concur. An independent CPA firm performed the external peer review 

referenced in the above recommendation. The scope of this review was for all projects conducted from 

2008 to 2011 by 001 for which the Government Auditing Standards require a peer review. OOI will 

modifY, annotate, and reissue any reports which are deficient according to the peer review findings. 

ECD: December 2013. 

Recommendation #11: 

Develop and implement a policy for recommendation follow up and resolution to ensure that other 

TSA oflices respond to all recommendations issued by the Office of Inspection and establish a 

resolution process when an office does not concur with a recommendation. 

Agency Response: Concur. 

lmplemeotation Plan: 001 has established processes to follow up on recommendations to ensure 

concurrence and completion. ECD: December 2013. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C

Organizational Structure of OOI as of June 2012

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix D

Major Contributors to This Report

Paul Wood, Audit Director

Sharon Trodden, Audit Manager

Anthony Colache, Auditor‐in‐Charge

Gary Alvino, Program Analyst

Ashley Smith, Program Analyst

Keith Lutgen, Program Analyst

Melissa Woolson, Program Analyst

Ruth Gonzalez, Program Analyst

Corneliu Buzesan, Program Analyst

Mohammad Islam, Statistician

Kelly Herberger, Communications Analyst

Kevin Donahue, Independent Referencer

Maureen Duddy, Independent Referencer

Ralleisha Dean, Independent Referencer

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix E

Report Distribution

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary

Deputy Secretary

Chief of Staff

Deputy Chief of Staff

General Counsel

Executive Secretary

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs

Acting Chief Privacy Officer

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch

DHS OIG Budget Examiner

Congress

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate

www.oig.dhs.gov 47 OIG‐13‐123
 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this document, please call us at (202) 254-4100, fax your 

request to (202) 254-4305, or e-mail your request to our Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) Office of Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

For additional information, visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov, or follow us on Twitter 

at: @dhsoig. 

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To expedite the reporting of alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any 

other kinds of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to Department of Homeland 

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submit an automated DHS OIG Investigative Referral Submission Form. Submission 

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reviewed by DHS OIG. 

Should you be unable to access our website, you may submit your complaint in writing 

to: 

Department of Homeland Security 


Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305 


Attention: Office of Investigations Hotline 


245 Murray Drive, SW 


Washington, DC 20528-0305 


You may also call 1(800) 323-8603 or fax the complaint directly to us at 

(202) 254-4297. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.