MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2021	ME	 49

Docket: Cum-20-319

Argued:	 July	13,	2021

Decided: October	7,	2021

Panel: GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	HORTON,	and	CONNORS,	JJ.*

CECELIA	BOLES

v.

KAREN	M.	WHITE	et	al.

HUMPHREY,	J.

[¶1]		Cecelia	Boles	was	a	guest	of	tenants	who	rented	a	two-story	house	

owned	by	Karen	and	Ronald	White.	 Boles	appeals	from	a	summary	judgment	

entered	by	the	Superior	Court	(Cumberland	County,	Stewart,	J.)	in	favor	of	the	

Whites	on	Boles’s	complaint	alleging	premises	liability.		Boles	argues	that	the	

court	erred	when	it	concluded	that	the	tenants	were	in	exclusive	control	of	the	

premises,	that	the	Whites	did	not	expressly	agree	to	maintain	the	premises	in	

good	repair,	and	that	there	was	no	alternative	basis	for	finding	the	Whites	liable	

for	Boles’s	injury.		We	affirm	the	judgment	in	all	respects.		

*		Justice	Mead	sat	at	oral	argument	but	did	not	participate	in	the	development	of	the	opinion.
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I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]	 	 The	 following	 facts	 are	 drawn	 from	 the	 parties’	 supported	

statements	 of	 material	 facts,	 viewed	 in	 the	 light	 most	 favorable	 to	 Boles.		

See MSR	Recycling,	LLC	v.	Weeks	&	Hutchins,	LLC,	2019	ME	125,	¶	6,	214	A.3d	1.

[¶3]	 	 Cecelia	 Boles	 was	 injured	 on	 September	 18,	 2016,	 at	 the	 house

rented	by	her	daughter	and	son-in-law	 (the	Lytles)	when	she	descended	 the	

staircase	 between	 the	 first	 and	 second	 floor	 and	 fell	 off	 the	 landing	 at	 the	

bottom	of	the	staircase.1		The	height	of	the	landing	step	measured	eleven	inches,	

which	was	greater than	the	heights	of	the	rest	of	the	stairs	of the	staircase2 and	

did	 not	 comply	 with	the	 applicable building	 codes.	 	 The	 Lytles	 had	 recently	

entered	into	a	written	agreement	to	rent	the	house from	the	Whites.		The	lease	

included the	following	paragraphs that	are	relevant	to	this	appeal:	

10. Access:	 	 Renters	 shall	 allow	 homeowner	 to	 access	 the	

property	for	purposes	of	repair	and	inspection.		Renters	shall	keep	

the	 owners	 informed	 of	 any	 issues	 that	 arise	 with	 the	 property	

and/or	appliances.

12. The	renter	is	responsible	for	mowing	the	lawn	and	watering	

the	plants.		The	renter	is	responsible	for	all	snow removal,	either	

snow	 blowing	with	 the	machine	available;	 or	arranging	 plowing.		

1		Boles	had	arrived	at	 the	premises	 the	prior	afternoon	 to	babysit	her	grandchildren	and	had	

never	visited	 the	premises	before.		Boles	awoke	 the	next	morning	at	approximately	5:00	a.m.	and	

ascended	the	staircase	for	the	first	time	to	look	for	her	son-in-law.		Thereafter,	while	descending	the	

stairs,	Boles	fell	as	she	stepped	off	the	landing	onto	the	first	floor.		

2		The	record	does	not	reflect	how	much higher	the	landing	step	was	than the	other	steps.
3

The	 renter	 is	 responsible	 for	 salting	 or	 sanding	 walkways	 if	

necessary	to	prevent	personal	injuries	from	slipping	on	ice.

[¶4]	 	 On	 June	 24,	 2019,	 Boles	 brought	 suit	 against	the	 Whites	 on	 the	

theory	of	premises	liability	for	injuries	she	sustained	as	a	result	of	the	fall.		On	

June	26,	2020,	the	Whites	moved	 for	summary	judgment	on	all	counts	of	the	

complaint,	 contending	 that	 Boles	 could	 not	 establish	 that	 the	 Whites	 owed	

Boles a	duty	 of	care.	 	The	court	granted	 the	Whites’	motion,	concluding	 that	

there	was	no	genuine	dispute	that	the	Lytles	were	in	exclusive	control of	the	

premises,	 that	 the	lease	 did	 not	 contain	an	express	agreement	 requiring	 the	

Whites	 to	maintain	 the	premises	in	good	repair,	and	 that	 the	Whites	did	not	

otherwise	have	a	duty	to	maintain	the	premises.		

[¶5]		Boles	 timely	 filed	 this	appeal.		See	14	M.R.S.	 §	1851	 (2021);	M.R.	

App. P.	2A,	2B(c)(1).		

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶6]		“We	review	a	grant	of	summary	judgment	de	novo,	considering	the	

evidence	in	 the	light	most	 favorable	 to	 the	nonprevailing	party	 to	determine	

whether	 the	parties’	statements	 of	material	 facts	and	 the	 record	evidence	 to	

which	 the	 statements	 refer	 demonstrate	 that	 there	 is	 no	 genuine	 issue	 of	

material	fact	and	the	moving	party	is	entitled	to	judgment	as	a	matter	of	law.”		

Kurtz	&	Perry,	P.A.	v.	Emerson,	2010	ME	107,	¶	15,	8	A.3d	677 (quotation	marks	
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omitted);	see	also M.R.	Civ.	P.	56(c).		“A	material	fact	is	one	that	can	affect	the	

outcome	 of	 the	 case,	 and	 there	 is	 a	 ‘genuine	 issue’	 when	 there	 is	 sufficient	

evidence	 for	a	 fact-finder	 to	choose	between	competing	versions	of	 the	 fact.”		

Stewart-Dore	v.	Webber	Hosp.	Ass’n,	2011	ME	26,	¶	8,	13	A.3d	773.		

[¶7]		A	landlord	is	not	liable	for	injuries	caused	by	a	dangerous	condition	

on	property	that	is	under	a	tenant’s exclusive	control	except	when	the	landlord	

“(a)	fails	to	disclose	the	existence	of	a	latent	defect	which	he	knows	or	should	

have	known	existed	but	which	is	not	known	to	the	tenant	nor	discoverable	by	

him	in	 the	 exercise	 of	 reasonable	 care;	(b)	 gratuitously	 undertakes	 to	make

repairs	 and	 does	 so	 negligently;	 or	 (c)	 expressly	 agrees	 to	 maintain	 the	

premises	in	good	repair.”		Nichols	v.	Marsden,	483	A.2d	341,	343	 (Me.	1984)

(citations	omitted).		This	rule	and	its	exceptions	apply	to	injuries	sustained	by	

a	 tenant’s	 guest	 or	 others	 on	 the	 premises	 with	 the	 tenant’s	 consent.		

See Stewart	 v.	 Aldrich,	 2002	 ME	 16,	 ¶¶	 2,	 6,	 10-14,	 788	 A.2d	 603	 (applying	

Nichols and	 its	 exceptions	 where	 the injured	 plaintiff	 was	 a	 guest	 of	 the	

landlord’s	 tenant).	 	 Finally,	 unambiguous	 contract	 language	 must	 be	

interpreted	according	to	its	plain	meaning,	and	that	interpretation is	a	question	

of	law.		T-M	Oil	Co.	v.	Pasquale,	388	A.2d	82,	85	(Me.	1978).
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A. Exclusive	Control

[¶8]		Boles	argues	that	the	court	erred	in	concluding	that	the	premises	

was	under	the	exclusive	control	of	the	Lytles	because	the	Whites	reserved	the	

right	 to	 access	 the	 premises	 “for	 purposes	 of	 repair	 and	 inspection”	 in	

paragraph	ten	of	the	lease.		Under Nichols,	a	landlord	must	 first	establish	the	

landlord’s	 “absence	 of	 control	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 liability	 for	 a	 dangerous	

condition	 on	 the	 premises.”	 	 Stewart,	 2002	 ME	 16,	 ¶ 12,	 788	 A.2d	 603

(quotation	marks	omitted).		“Although	we	have	not	explicitly	defined	the	term	

‘control,’	the	cases applying	Nichols illustrate	that [it]	means	a	power	over	the	

premises	that	the	landlord	reserves	pursuant	to	the	terms	of	the	lease	or	the	

tenancy,	 whether	 express	 or	 implied,	 and	 does	 not	 include	 the	 incidental	

control	that	comes	from	being	able	to	threaten	tenants	with	nonrenewal	of	a	

lease	or	with	eviction.”		Id.	¶	13.		More	specifically,	“landlords	may	retain	control	

over	non-common	areas	when	 they	 reserve	certain	 rights	 or	 responsibilities	

over	the	premises	by	the	terms	of	the	lease	or	tenancy.”		Id.

[¶9]		Applying	these	principles, we	vacated	a	summary	judgment	in	favor	

of	the	defendant	landlords	after	concluding	that	there	was	a	genuine	dispute	of	

fact	concerning	 the	degree	of	control	retained	by	 the	landlords	because	 they	

reserved	the	right	to	enter	the	premises	to	plow	snow	from	the	parking	lot and	
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did	in	fact	plow	snow	“whenever	necessary.”		Hankard	v.	Beal, 543 A.2d	1376,	

1377-78	(Me.	1988).		Similarly,	we	vacated	a	summary	judgment	in	favor	of	the	

defendant	landlord	after	concluding	 that	 there	was	a	genuine	dispute	of	 fact	

concerning	the	degree	of	control	retained	by	the	landlord	over	the	basement	

stairs	because,	although	the	stairs	could	be	accessed	only	through	the	plaintiff’s	

apartment,	there	was	evidence	that	the	lease	did	not	include	the	basement	or	

its	stairs,	that	the	plaintiffs	accessed	the	stairs	only	at	the	landlord’s	behest,	and	

that	 the	 landlord	 occasionally	 used	 the	 stairs	 to	 service	 the	 furnace	 in	 the	

basement.		Rodrigue	v.	Rodrigue,	1997	ME	99,	¶¶ 4,	12-13 n.2,	694	A.2d	924;	see	

also Chiu	v.	City	of	Portland,	2002	ME	8,	¶¶	12-15,	788	A.2d	183 (reasoning	that	

there	was	a	genuine	dispute	as	 to	whether	 the	 tenants	had	exclusive	control	

over	 an	 exterior	 window	 because	 the	 landlord	 had	 previously	 repaired	 an	

adjacent	exterior	window,	could	have	repaired	 the	window	without	entering	

the	residence,	had	been	asked	by	 the	 tenant	 to	 fix	 the	windows	at	issue, and	

“did	not	disavow	his	obligation	to	repair”	them).

[¶10]	 	 The	 question	 before	 us	 is	 whether,	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 law,	 the	

reservation	of	access	in	paragraph	ten	of	the	lease	for	purposes	of	“inspection	

and	repair,”	without	more,	creates	a	genuine	dispute	as	to	whether	the	Lytles	

had	exclusive	control	over the	premises,	including	the	interior	staircase.		We	
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conclude	that	it	does	not	create	such	a	dispute.		The	Whites’	general	reservation	

of	access	for	purposes	of	repair	and	inspection	is	distinct	from	the	landlords’	

degree	of	control	disputed	in	Hankard,	Rodrigue,	and	Chiu.		In	those	cases, there	

was	at	least	some	evidence	of	shared	control	in	each	case	between	the	landlord	

and	 tenants—those	 landlords	 had	 actually	 exercised	 some	 form	 of	 control,	

whether	reserved	or	not,	over	the	portion	of	the	premises	at	issue	during	the	

tenancy.		See	Hankard,	543	A.2d	at	1377-78	 (landlords	 reserved	 the	 right	 to	

plow	 and	 did	 plow	 snow	 on	 parking	 lot	 over	 which	 control	 was	 disputed);	

Rodrigue,	1997	ME	99,	¶	12	n.2,	694	A.2d	924	(landlord	did	not	clearly	include	

in	 the	lease	 the	stairs	over	which	control	was	disputed	and	used	 those	same	

stairs	 during	 the	 lessee’s	 tenancy);	 Chiu,	 2002	 ME	 8,	 ¶	 14,	 788	 A.2d	 183	

(landlord	previously	repaired	windows	over	which	control	was	disputed).3

[¶11]		Our conclusion	is	consistent	with	decisions	in	other	jurisdictions	

that	have	deemed	a	landlord’s	mere	reservation	of	the	right	to	enter	and	repair	

the	 premises	insufficient	 evidence	 of	 that	 landlord’s	 control	 for	 purposes	 of	

liability.		See	e.g.,	Lucier	v.	Impact	Rec.,	Ltd.,	864	A.2d	635,	640	(R.I.	2005)	(“The	

3 Even	viewing the	landlords’	reservation	of	access	in	Hankard in	isolation,	paragraph	ten	remains

distinguishable	because	the	reservation	in	Hankard was	not	a	general	reservation	of	the	right	to	enter	

for	inspection	and	repair;	rather,	it	was	a	reservation	of	the	right	to	enter	for	the	specific	purpose	of	

plowing	snow.		Hankard,	543	A.2d	at	1377-78.			
8

lease	 provisions,”	 including	 the	 landlord’s	 right	 to	 enter	 the	 premises	 to	

determine	whether	it	was	in	good	condition,	“did	not	give	[the	landlord]	control	

over	 the	 property,	 but	 rather	 were	 merely	 to	 protect	 [the	 landlord’s]	

investment	and	reversionary	interest	in	the	property.”);	Settles	v.	Redstone	Dev.	

Corp.,	797	A.2d	692,	696	(D.C.	2002)	(“A	landlord	has	retained	sufficient	control	

to	 create	 a	 duty	 to	 repair	 if	 he	 has	 the	 power	 or	 authority	 to	 manage,	

superintend,	direct	or	oversee,”	but “the	landlord’s	explicit	reservation	of	the	

authority	to	enter	the	premises	and	to	make	repairs	is	insufficient	to	constitute	

retention	of	control.”)	(quotation	marks	omitted);		Dubay	v.	Cambridge	Hous.	

Auth.,	225	N.E.2d	374,	375 (Mass.	1967)	(“The	reservation	of	the	right	to	enter	

the	tenant’s	premises	to	make	repairs	.	.	.	did	not	put	the	lessor	in	control	of	the	

premises.”)	(quotation	marks	omitted);	Webb	v.	Danforth, 505	S.E.2d	860,	861	

(Ga.	Ct.	App.	1998)	 (“A	landlord’s	retention	of	 the	right	 to	enter,	inspect	and	

repair	is	not	inconsistent	with	a	full	surrender	of	possession	to	the	tenant.”).

[¶12]	 	 Given	 the	 “bedrock	 principle”	 that	 a	 lease	 “is	 equivalent	 to	 a	

conveyance	for	almost	all	purposes,” Stewart,	2002	ME	16,	¶	14,	788	A.2d	603,	

and	in	the	absence	of	evidence	showing	that	the	Whites	had,	in	fact,	retained	or	

exercised	any	degree	of	control	over	any	portion	of	the	premises	after	renting	
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it	 to	 the	 Lytles,	we	 conclude	 that	 the	 Lytles	were	in	 exclusive	 control	 of	 the	

premises.

B. Express	Agreement	to	Maintain	Premises

[¶13]		Boles	argues	that	paragraphs	ten	and	twelve,	the	latter	of	which	

enumerates	the	maintenance	responsibilities	of	the	Lytles	as	tenants,	create	a	

genuine	 dispute	 as	 to	 whether	 the	Whites	 expressly	 agreed	 to	 maintain	 the	

premises	in	good	repair.		Even	if	a	tenant	is	in	exclusive	control of	the	premises,	

the	third	exception	under	Nichols provides	that	the	landlord	may	still	be	liable	

for	injuries	 sustained	 on	 the	 premises	if	 the	landlord	 “expressly	 agree[d]	 to	

maintain	the	premises	in	good	repair.”		Nichols,	483	A.2d	at	343.		

[¶14]	 	Boles	 contends	 that	 paragraph	 ten	 triggers	 this	 third	 exception	

because	 it	 constitutes	 “a	 written	 assurance”	 by	 the	 Whites	 to	 repair	 the	

property.		In	Nichols,	we	vacated	a	summary	judgment	in	favor	of	the	defendant	

landlords	 because	 there	 was	 a	 genuine	 dispute	 of	 fact	 as	 to	 whether	 the	

landlords	 expressly	 promised	 to	 maintain	 the	 premises	 after	 one	 of	 the	

landlords	 testified	 that,	 prior	 to	 signing	 the	 lease,	 she	 orally	 informed	 the	

tenants	 that	minor	 repairs	 would	 be	 the	 tenants’	 responsibility	 while	major	

repairs	would	be	handled	by	the	landlords	themselves.	 Id. at	344.
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[¶15]	 	 Conversely,	 in	 Saunders	 v.	 Picard,	 we	 affirmed	 a	 summary	

judgment	in	 favor	of	the	defendant	landlord,	holding	that	“evidence	that	[the	

landlord]	fixed	the	furnace,	the	water	system,	and	the	chimney,	without	more,	

will	 not	 support	 an	 inference	 that	 [the	 landlord]	 had expressly	 agreed	 to	

maintain	 the	 premises	 in	 good	 repair.”	 	 683	 A.2d	 501,	 502	 (Me.	 1996)

(emphasis	added).		Further,	with	particular	reference	to	the	case	before	us,	the	

rule	 imposing landlord	 liability	 when	 the	 landlord	 contracts	 to	 keep	 the	

premises	in	repair	“has	no	application	where	the	landlord	.	.	.	merely	reserves	

the	privilege	 to	enter	and	make	 repairs	if	he	sees	 fit	 to	do	so.”		Restatement	

(Second)	of	Prop.: Landlord	&	Tenant	§	17.5	cmt.	b(1)	(Am.	Law	 Inst.	1977);	

see also	Givens	v.	Union	Inv.	Corp.,	359	A.2d	40,	42	(R.I.	1976)	(“The	general	rule	

.	 .	 .	is	 that	 the	inclusion	in	 a	lease	 of	 a	 provision	 reserving	 to	 the	lessor	 the	

privilege	 to	 enter	 and	 to	make	 repairs	is	 commonly	 held	 not	 to	 obligate	 the	

lessor	to	make repairs.”)	(quotation	marks	and	alteration	omitted).				

[¶16]		Thus,	although	 the	plain	language	 of	paragraph	 ten	 of	 the	lease	

reserves	a	right	of	access	to	the	Whites,	as	landlords,	in	the	event that	repairs	

are	needed,	it	does	not	expressly	require	 them	 to	undertake	any	repairs	nor	

does	 it,	 unlike	 the	 landlord’s	 disputed	 oral	 commitment	 to	 make	 repairs	 in	

Nichols,	provide	any	assurance	that	they	will.
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[¶17]		Boles	also	argues,	based	on	the	maxim	expressio	unius	est	exclusio	

alterius,	that	all	repair	obligations	not	enumerated	in	paragraph	twelve	of	the	

lease	fell	to	the	Whites.	This	maxim	reflects	a	“well-settled”	rule	of	construction	

useful	 for	 the	 interpretation	 of	 ambiguous	 language	 in	 statutes	 and	 other	

documents	“that	[the]	express	mention	of	one	concept	implies	the	exclusion	of	

others	not	listed.”		Musk v. Nelson, 647 A.2d 1198, 1201-02 (Me. 1994)(applying	

the	maxim	 to	interpret	a	statute);	see	also Stone	v.	U.S. Envelope	Co.,	119	Me.	

394,	 396-97,	 111	 A.	 536	 (1920) (applying	 the	maxim	 to	interpret	 corporate	

bylaws that	lacked	express	provisions	on	the	disputed	issue).

[¶18]	 	 However,	 the	 maxim	 has	 no	 application	 to	 language	 that	 is	

unambiguous,	see,	e.g.,	Young	v.	Greater	Portland	Transit	Dist.,	535	A.2d	417,	

418	 n.2	 (Me.	 1987) (declining	 to	 apply	 the	 expressio	 unius maxim	 to	 an	

unambiguous	statute),	and	paragraph	twelve	of	the	lease	is	not	ambiguous	in	

any	respect	material	to	the	Whites’	obligations.		Indeed,	any	application	of	the	

maxim	to	interpret	paragraph	twelve,	assuming	its	applicability,	would	mean

only that	 any	 repairs	 not	 listed	 in	 paragraph	 twelve	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	

tenants’	 responsibilities—not	 that	 the	Whites	would	 be	 required	 to	 perform	

them.		
12

[¶19]		We	conclude	that	neither	paragraph	ten	nor paragraph twelve	of	

the	 lease	 contains an	 express	 agreement	 that	 the	 Whites	 will	 maintain	 the	

premises	in	good	repair.4		

C. Alternative	Basis	for	Liability

[¶20]		In	her	opposition	to	the	motion	for	summary	judgment	and	now	

on	appeal,	Boles	cites	Patten	v.	Bartlett,	111	Me.	409,	89	A.	375	(1914),	to	argue	

that	a	landlord	may	be	liable	if	he	“rents	a	premises	containing	an	unreasonably	

dangerous	 condition	 therein,”	 and	 “fail[s]	 to	 remedy	 the	 danger	 before	

accepting	 tenants.”	 	 The	 Superior	 Court	 did	 not	 address	 this	 argument,	 and	

although	Patten	remains	good	law,	we	find	that	it	has	no	application	to	the	facts	

of	this	case	and	is	easily	distinguished.		

[¶21]	 	 In	 Patten,	 the	 plaintiff’s	 horse	 was	 killed	 after	 it	 fell	 into	 an	

unmarked	pit,	which	was	concealed	by	ice	and	snow	and	which	the	defendant	

landlord	had	promised	to	repair	before	the	tenant	took	occupancy.		111	Me.	at	

410-14,	89	A.	375.		Here,	unlike	in	Patten,	the	Whites	did	not	promise	to	repair	

the	step,	nor	is	the	step	the	type	of	concealed	“nuisance”	that	was	contemplated	

4		Although	Boles	characterizes Karen	White’s	deposition	testimony about	the	Whites’	interest	in	

conditions	identified	in	their	house inspection	as	evidence	that	the	Whites	had	agreed	to	maintain	

the	premises	in	good	repair	upon	renting	it	to	the	Lytles,	the	Whites’	prior repairs	and	intentions	to	

improve	the	house	do	not	establish	the	existence	of	an	agreement with	the	Lytles.		
13

in	Patten.		See	id.	at	415,	89	A. 375.		This	latter	distinction	is	consistent	with	the	

legal	 principle that	 a	landlord	is	liable	 for	injuries	 caused	 by	 a	latent	 defect	

when	 that	 defect	 is	 “hidden	 from	 knowledge	 as	 well	 as	 from	 sight	 and	 one	

which	could	not	be	discovered	by	ordinary	and	reasonable	care.”		Cole	v.	Lord,	

160	Me.	 223,	 228,	 202	A.2d	 560	 (1964) (quotation	marks	 omitted);	see	 also	

Nichols,	483	A.2d	at	343.5		

[¶22]	 	 Moreover,	 “no	 duty	 is	 owed	 to	 tenants	 to	 make	 the	 structural	

design	or	plan any	more	safe	than	it	was	at	the	time	of	letting.”		Thompson	v.	

Frankus,	 151	Me.	 54,	 56,	 115	A.2d	 718	 (1955)	 (citing	Rosenberg	v.	 Chapman	

Nat’l	 Bank,	 126	 Me.	 403,	 405,	 139	 A.	 82	 (1927));	see	 also	 Miller	 v.	 Hooper,	

119 Me.	527,	529,	112	A.	256 (1921)	(“An	owner	may	build	a	tenement	house	

with	 stairways	 which	 because	 of	 steepness	 or	 for	 other	 obvious	 structural	

reasons	are	inconvenient	or	even	unsafe.		The	tenant	cannot	exact	any	change.		

If	such	stairways	need	to	be	repaired	or	rebuilt,	the	owner	is	not	required	to	

make	them	safer	or	more	convenient.”).

5		The	first	Nichols exception	imposes	liability	upon a	landlord	when	the	landlord	“fails	to	disclose	

the	existence	of	a	latent	defect	which	he	knows	or	should	have	known	existed	but	which	is	not	known	

to	the	tenant	nor	discoverable	by	him	in	the	exercise	of	reasonable	care.”		Nichols	v.	Marsden,	483	

A.2d	341,	343	(Me.	1984).		Although	Boles’s	argument	alleges	liability	under	Patten,	the	concealed	

nature	of	the	defect	in	Patten mirrors	the	latent	defect	exception,	which,	in	addition	to	requiring	that	

the	latent	defect	be	one	that	the	landlord	should	have	known	of,	also	requires	that	the	defect	be	one	

that	is	undiscoverable	by the	tenant.		Id.		We	also	note	that	the	parties’	statements	of	material	facts	

do	not	contain	an	assertion	that	the	Whites	failed	to	warn	the	Lytles	of	any	alleged	defect.	
14

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.

Christian	 J.	 Lewis,	 Esq.,	 and	 Sean	 V.	 Walton,	 Esq. (Orally),	 Hardy	 Wolf	 &	

Downing,	P.A.,	Lewiston,	for	appellant	Cecelia	Boles

John	B.	Schulte,	Esq. (Orally), and	L.	John	Topchik,	Esq.,	Law	Offices	of	John	B.	

Schulte,	Portland,	for	Karen	M.	White	and	Ronald	C.	White	Jr.

Cumberland	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	CV-2019-238

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